Friday, 22 January 2010, 13:29
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 006439
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/22/2035
TAGS PINR, UK
SUBJECT: (C/NF) KUDOS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS FOR
BIOGRAPHIC AND PERSONALITY REPORTING ON UK SHADOW MINISTER FOR PRISONS ALAN DUNCAN (C-RE9-02552)
REF: LONDON 002656
Classified By: ELISSA G. PITTERLE, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS
1. (C/NF) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS GREATLY APPRECIATED POST'S BACKGROUND AND BIOGRAPHIC REFTEL ON SHADOW MINISTER FOR PRISONS ALAN DUNCAN. ANALYSTS FOUND THE INFORMATION REGARDING DUNCAN'S MIDDLE EAST EXPERTISE, AS WELL AS COMMENTS ON HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH SHADOW FOREIGN SECRETARY WILLIAM HAGUE PARTICULARLY INSIGHTFUL AND EXCEPTIONALLY WELL-TIMED AS ANALYSTS ARE PREPARING FINISHED PRODUCTS ON THE CONSERVATIVE LEADERSHIP FOR SENIOR POLICYMAKERS. ANALYSTS WOULD APPRECIATE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ALAN DUNCAN AS TIME AND RESOURCES PERMIT.
A. (C/NF) WHAT IS DUNCAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADER DAVID CAMERON AND WILLIAM HAGUE?
B. (C/NF) WHAT ROLE WOULD DUNCAN PLAY IF THE CONSERVATIVES FORM A GOVERNMENT?
C. (C/NF) WHAT ARE DUNCAN'S POLITICAL AMBITIONS?
2. (U) PLEASE CITE C-RE9-02552 IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS. CLINTON
Thursday, 25 February 2010, 08:15
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000134
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/24/2020
TAGS PREL, PHUM, MARR, ETRD, AJ, AM, RS, IR, TU
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJANI PRESIDENT TO U/S BURNS: "YOU CAN'T
BOIL TWO HEADS IN ONE POT"
Classified By: Charge Donald Lu, for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) Summary: President Aliyev used this coarse street slang to describe the relationship between Russian President Medvedev and PM Putin, but he might well have used the same idiom to describe his concerns about Turkey-Armenia reconciliation and the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) Peace Process. He told U/S Burns that the "Sword of Damocles" of the April 24 Armenian Remembrance Day is hanging over the NK Process, as well as the Turkey-Armenia normalization process. He suggested that it would be easier if the Turkey-Armenia normalization could be considered after April in order to allow more time for progress on NK. He also took the opportunity to press the USG to apply maximum pressure on Yerevan to make concessions on NK. He stressed, "Now we are trying to be even more flexible."
2. (C) Summary Continued: On Iran, President Aliyev said he supported economic isolation and believed it could be effective if enforced by a broad coalition. He complained about Iranian security provocations. On a proposed battalion-sized Afghanistan contribution, Aliyev said that he would support sending a team to Georgia to observe the training being provided by EUCOM to Georgian troops headed for Afghanistan. On energy cooperation, President Aliyev said that if the Turks demonstrate "constructive behavior" this year that a gas transit deal can happen. Finally, on the jailed youth activists, though he made no firm commitments regarding their release, he said, "I think (a pardon or amnesty) can be done. I had no intention to hurt anyone." End Summary.
Seeks Pressure on Yerevan to Resolve NK
---------------------------------------
3. (C) Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Bill Burns began his hour-long meeting with President Ilham Aliyev by stressing that he was sent with the simple message that Washington wants to build our bilateral relations and create a stronger partnership. He then offered his condolences for the three Azeri soldiers killed on the Line of Contact on February 18. Aliyev responded that such events show that there is no peace, no peace treaty and no peacekeepers enforcing the cease-fire. He worried more such incidents could happen. Burns commented that such incidents underscored the urgency of finding a political solution on Nagorno-Karabakh.
4. (C) The balance of Aliyev,s comments sought to convey that he was ready to move forward in the Minsk Group Process, but that international pressure would be needed if Armenia was to move forward. He said that it is now time to find a final resolution, but Armenian President Sargsian wants to walk away from the process. "I told the co-chairs that Armenia wants to delay as long as possible and escape at the end."" He said that Azerbaijan was prepared to do its part to propel the talks forward. "Now we will try to be even more flexible."
5. (C) Aliyev outlined several steps to persuade Armenia to agree to the Minsk Group Basic Principles:
-- the three co-chair countries should consolidate their efforts at a senior-level,
-- (C) the three co-chair countries should send a strong message that the independence of NK is not under review, and
-- (C) if these new proposals are not accepted, there should be consequences in terms of international isolation, especially in the form of Russia,s curtailing some of its economic support for Armenia.
6. (C) Aliyev noted that at Sochi, President Sargsian had inserted a proposal for specifying a definite date for a referendum or plebiscite on NK final status. This, Aliyev argued, undermined the entire framework of the agreement, which is premised on an eventual referendum ) with no definite timeframe ) in exchange for legalizing "the illegally established regime in NK."" He also noted that Armenia is vulnerable to isolation because it is dependent upon remittances from its diaspora, as well as imports of gas and electricity. "After 18 years of negotiation, we have tested all options. If this phase (of Minsk Group talks) ends, what is next?" the President asked aloud.
The Russian Role in NK and Russian Succession
BAKU 00000134 002 OF 004
---------------------------------------------
7. (C) In response to U/S Burns' question about the Russian role in the NK talks, Aliyev responded that he was convinced that Medvedev's efforts have been sincere. He said that Medvedev has personally met with the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents five times. Thus any failure to make progress on this issue will damage Medvedev's credibility. He said that at Sochi, Medvedev tried to persuade Sargsian to achieve a breakthrough. He added, however, that it was strange that with so much pressure from Moscow and Lavrov's visit to Yeveran, the Armenians not only resisted progress, but actually backtracked on previously-agreed items. In response to a question, Aliyev said that he believes that PM Putin has his own separate opinion about the desirability of an NK resolution. "I have no evidence, but I can feel this," Aliyev remarked.
8. (C) Aliyev said that he considers Medvedev "a modern, new-generation intellectual," surrounded by people whom he does not control. He said that he has personally witnessed Medvedev taking decisions that then required further approval before they were implemented, referring specifically to a border demarcation agreement that he had agreed with Medvedev only to have it stymied by ""others,"" presumably in the prime ministerial office. He added, "Many high-ranking officials don't recognize (Medvedev) as a leader." He said that there are signs of a strong confrontation between the teams of the two men, although not yet between Putin and Medvedev personally. "We have a saying in Azeri, 'Two heads cannot be boiled in one pot'" (crude street slang suggesting that two leaders are spoiling for a fight).
Strong Pushback on the Turkey-Armenia Normalization
--------------------------------------------- -------
9. (C) U/S Burns stressed that the U.S. believes that progress on the Turkey-Armenia protocols could create political space for Sargsian to be more flexible on NK. He continued that the reverse was also true, that a failure of the Turkey-Armenia process would almost certainly result in serious negative consequences for the NK process. Aliyev said that NK progress would require a minimum of five or six months. He suggested that the entire Turkey-Armenia protocol ratification process be delayed until after April 24. He said that the "Sword of Damocles" of Armenian Remembrance Day is hanging unhelpfully not only over the Turkey-Armenia process, but also now the NK progress. "If there were no deadline, maybe we could see how to combine our efforts (to resolve NK)."
10. (C) Aliyev pushed back with his usual warnings about the negative effects of Turkey-Armenia protocol ratification without being proceeded by NK progress. He darkly predicted postponement of any NK settlement; no comprehensive regional security improvement; damage to Turkey-Azerbaijani relations; no real partnership between Turkey and Armenia; further isolation of Central Asia; the undermining of energy projects; and damage to Georgia, both in lost transit income, but also in its role as the sole land corridor between Russia and Armenia.
Relations with Iran Described as Tense and Unstable
--------------------------------------------- ------
11. (C) U/S Burns explained in detail the steps the U.S. had taken to initiate dialogue with Tehran and support the Tehran Research Reactor initiative. He ended by noting that, given the rejection of these overtures, the U.S. would move forward with another UNSC resolution that included new sanctions targeting the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Aliyev responded that although the visible side of Azerbaijan's relations with Iran appears normal, the substance was very different. "I do not exclude that relations will be become more difficult," the President added.
12. (C) "(German Chancellor) Merkel was very firm with me on Iran, trying to persuade me. I told her, 'No need,'" the President recalled. He said that he was supportive of Iran's economic isolation and believed it could work if the international community worked together. He said that earlier sanctions observance had been spotty with many European energy companies working in Iran. "Statoil supports Iran more than it supports us!" he complained. He noted that Russian President Medvedev once told him that Russia did not want the Americans to squeeze Iran, but also did not want a nuclear Iran.
BAKU 00000134 003 OF 004
13. (C) Aliyev said that Iranian provocations in Azerbaijan were on the rise. He specifically cited not only the financing of radical Islamic groups and Hezbollah terrorists, but also:
-- the Iranian financing of violent Ashura ceremonies in Nakhchivan,
-- the organization of demonstrations in front of the Azeri consulates in Tabriz and Istanbul,
-- a violent religious procession recently in Baku,
-- the use of the President's photo alongside the Star of David on the Azeri-language Seher TV broadcast into Azerbaijan, and
-- conflict in the Caspian.
14. (C) The President added that Azerbaijan will not reciprocate on the liberalization of the visa regime with Iran. He also noted that Azerbaijan is planning to create a TV channel in Persian that will broadcast into Iran. He said that he did not understand why the Supreme Religious Leader chose Ahmadinejad over former President Moussavi. He joked that perhaps it was too dangerous to have two ethnic Azeris at the head of the Iranian state. He said that the election fraud was outrageous, with Ahmadinejad winning in Azeri-dominated Tabriz and Moussavi winning in Tehran, where it was harder to falsify the vote. He viewed the situation as very tense within Iran and believed it could erupt at any time.
Supports Afghanistan Troop Contribution, with Conditions
--------------------------------------------- -----------
15. (C) U/S Burns asked for the President's support to continue our discussions about a battalion-sized contribution of troops to Afghanistan that would include a U.S. train and equip program. The President said that he is aware of this initiative and his foreign and defense ministries are working on it. He said that the fundamental problem is one of ""optics,"" claiming it was difficult for him politically if it looks like the Americans are only training Azeri troops to send them off to Afghanistan. He said that it would be easier if half of those trained would be sent to Afghanistan, while the second half would remain in Azerbaijan or be used for other purposes. U/S Burns noted that the President's suggestion would create problems involving the U.S. funding of the training. The Charge proposed that as an initial step, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministry staff observe the training of Georgian troops headed to Afghanistan by U.S. Marines. The President thought this was a good idea and instructed his aide to look at this suggestion.
Pardon or Amnesty of the Youth Activists "Can be Done"
--------------------------------------------- ---------
16. (C) U/S Burns said that one of the ways Azerbaijan could show leadership as a tolerant and secular country was in advancing democracy and human rights. He specifically asked that, following the appeal process of the two youth activists, the President find a way on humanitarian grounds to release the two men. Aliyev made no firm commitment, but responded, "I think this can be done. I had no intention to hurt anyone." When U/S Burns expressed the hope that the government could quietly take this step, the President said, "Okay."
Russians are a Factor in Turkish Gas Transit
--------------------------------------------
17. (C) On energy cooperation, President Aliyev said that if the Turks demonstrate "constructive behavior" this year that a gas transit deal can happen. He was clear, however, that nothing would be signed before April 24. He also professed to be worried that active Turkish-Russian cooperation could be one of the impediments to progress. He confided that Turkish Energy Minister Yildiz recently told the head the Azerbaijani State Oil Company, "Why do you want to ruin our relations with Russia? Do you really need Nabucco?"
18. (C) The President continued that it is imperative for Azerbaijan that formalities for the commencement of Shah Deniz Phase II gas development begin this year. This project will bring $20 billion in much-needed investment to Azerbaijan and potentially develop Azerbaijan into a major source of new gas, as much as 50 billion cubic meters.
BAKU 00000134 004 OF 004
19. (C) Unprompted by U/S Burns, Aliyev spelled out the reasons Azerbaijan decided to sell gas to Russia last year, noting that ""Moscow had asked" and offered a good price for gas that was surplus anyway. But the real reason, Aliyev confided, was that the sale illustrated to "our Turkish friends" that they will not be allowed to create a gas distribution hub. "Aliyev made clear his distaste for the Erdogan government in Turkey, underscoring the "naivete" of their foreign policy and the failure of their initiatives, including the loss of support for Turkey among traditional international friends because of Ankara,s hostility to Israel. He noted that in his view, there had never been any merit to the notion of a "moderate Islamist" government in Turkey, and that Erdogan,s insistence on promoting Hamas and Gaza ) when other Arab countries were notably silent on these issues ) had brought Turkey no benefits.
20. (U) Lastly, U/S Burns asked for the President's assistance in resolving the long-standing difficulties in finalizing the lease for the new Embassy compound. The President responded positively that he thought this could be done.
21. (U) U/S Burns was accompanied by EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Amb. Tina Kaidanow, NSC Director Bridget Brink, and Charge. President Aliyev was joined by his Foreign Policy Advisor Novruz Mammadov.
22. (U) This message has been cleared by U/S Burns. LU
Monday, 10 April 2006, 14:23
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 001401
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, INR/NESA, AND S/CT - H. CRUMPTON
NSC FOR FRAN TOWNSEND, JUAN ZARATE, MIKE TAYLOR, NICOLE
SHAMPAINE, NIK RAMCHAND, ELLIOTT ABRAMS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/09/2016
TAGS PTER, PINS, ASEC, EPET, MCAP, KPAL, AE, IZ, IR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND
COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISOR TOWNSEND'S VISIT TO THE UAE
REF: A. 05 ABU DHABI 3243 B. 05 ABU DHABI 3565 C. ABU DHABI 409 D. ABU DHABI 779 E. ABU DHABI 1228 F. ABU DHABI 248 (NOTAL) G. ABU DHABI 176 H. ABU DHABI 605 I. USDEL 00007 J. ABU DHABI 1123 K. ABU DHABI 909 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary. Embassy Abu Dhabi looks forward to welcoming you to the UAE on April 23. In the aftermath of the controversy of the Dubai Ports World acquisition of P&O, your assurances to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ), your host for the visit, that the USG values the UAE as an ally and friend will be well received. While you should commend the UAE for its assistance and cooperation, you should take advantage of your luncheon with MbZ and his brother, State Security Director Sheikh Hazza, to push the UAE on several areas of interest to the USG: counterterrorism, counter terror finance, Iran, Hamas, Iraq, and ideological extremism (each is covered in the scenesetter). The UAE remains a committed partner in the global war on terror, but it continues to take an ad hoc approach to countering terrorism that "solves" the problem for the UAE locally, but fails to contribute on a transnational basis. In January, the U.S. and the UAE held the first meeting of the Joint Terrorist Finance Coordinating Committee (JTFCC), but the discussions were not as detailed or as robust as the U.S. delegation anticipated. Treasury U/S Levey will return to the UAE to hold a second meeting April 30 that will focus on cash couriers and charities.
2. (S) Although the UAE regards Iran as one of its most serious threats to national security, UAE officials are reluctant to take actions that could anger their neighbor and compromise their extensive trading relationship. At the same time, we are seeing more of a willingness on the part of the UAE to support USG initiatives without the full approval of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As tensions escalate between Iran and the international community, the UAE is growing increasingly nervous. The UAE leadership--which has told us they consider Hamas a terrorist organization--plans to uphold its previous commitments of humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people. The UAE has taken an active role in encouraging Sunni participation in the Iraqi political process and it continues to condemn the sectarian violence that is preventing stabilization of the country. In the face of growing ideological extremism in the Gulf, the UAE leadership is politically determined not to allow Islamist extremists to gain a foothold on UAE soil. End Summary.
Counterterrorism Efforts
------------------------
3. (S) The UAE is concerned about the terrorist threat to the UAE, but lacks a comprehensive implementation strategy for reducing its vulnerability (ref A). The UAE considers homeland security one of its top priorities, but rather than prioritizing national security projects, its efforts have focused on contracting risk assessments, forming committees, and procuring equipment. The UAE has also aggressively tried to prevent the radicalization of UAE nationals and Arab/South Asian expatriates. UAE officials publicly and strongly condemn extremism and terrorist attacks, anti-extremism has been the focus of government-approved Friday sermons in the mosques, and the UAE ministry of Education has modernized the Islamic studies curriculum in its schools.
4. (S) The UAEG government reacts quickly when presented with evidence of a terrorist presence inside the UAE, but does not approach the problem from a transnational manner. The UAE's immediate response when terrorists pose a risk is to deport them. UAE agencies do not investigate fully to see how far the problem goes or whether there is an international network involved. Although the U.S./UAE counterterrorism cooperation is strong (with the UAE working closely with the USG on specific cases), Emiratis do not consistently share lead information found in the possession of individuals in their custody with each other or with the U.S. Government. These tactics limit law enforcement and intelligence services' ability to use intelligence to disrupt extremist cells and planned attacks. The UAE's insistence on deportation as a solution does not protect the country long-term or truly address the nature and scope of the problem. The UAEG must be willing to take action against Emirati nationals, it must investigate fully, and it must share information with other Gulf countries and with the USG.
5. (S) The only way to generate significant change in the UAE on the issue of counterterrorism is to convince the senior leadership that it needs to continue to display political will and commitment in tackling the terror challenge with a transnational approach. MbZ is the person most able to elicit this type of change. Embassy recommends you have a frank and forthright discussion during your meeting with MbZ and his younger brother, Hazza, to encourage this type of change. Although you should commend them for the UAE's CT efforts and cooperation, you should also encourage them to be personally involved in developing a more effective and fully cooperative counterterrorism posture.
Counterterrorism Finance
------------------------
6. (S) The UAE has made significant strides in regulating the financial sector against money laundering and terrorist financing (ref B). Although the UAE now has a strong legal framework in place, it must turn its efforts to enforcement. It is imperative that UAE authorities investigate and prosecute violators of terror finance/anti-money laundering, cash courier, and charity laws and regulations. To date, investigation and prosecution has been weak. In an effort to increase U.S. and UAE cooperation on terrorist financing, the first meeting of the U.S/UAE Joint Terrorist Finance Coordinating Committee (JTFCC) was held in Abu Dhabi on January 24, 2005 (ref C). The UAE team had representatives from the Central Bank, State Security, Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice. However, no one participated from Dubai. In order for the JTFCC to be an effective committee, Dubai's Police, State Security, Customs, and the Department of Islamic Affairs and Charities must participate. Embassy is coordinating a second meeting April 30 that will focus on cash couriers and charity regulations.
Iran
----
7. (S/NF) UAE leaders are very concerned about escalating tensions between Iran and the international community. The UAE feels vulnerable--as evidenced by the fact that its leaders frequently note that Iran is "very near" the UAE. Commercial ties between Dubai and Iran are significant (Dubai is Iran's largest non-oil trading partner), and as a result the UAEG walks a fine line between maintaining and encouraging this trade and working to prevent suspected Iranian proliferation activities. Although the UAEG is worried about Iran's nuclear ambitions, its short-term policy decisions regarding Iran center on not provoking its neighbor. The USG has approached the UAEG four times since January, asking it to interdict and inspect cargo suspected of going to Iran's nuclear and/or missile programs. None of those instances have resulted in a successful interdiction. In the first two instances UAE officials simply refused to take action (refs F and G). The Director of Dubai's State Security Organization explained during the 11 February U.S./UAE Counterproliferation Task Force meeting that the decision to not inspect the containers had been a political decision based on the UAE's concern that Iran might retaliate (ref H). In the two later instances (ref K), ships that had been scheduled to arrive in Dubai went directly to Bandar Abbas.
8. (S) In recent meetings with senior USG officials, MbZ has expressed clear support for U.S. initiatives against Iran. MbZ and UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid agreed with Secretary Rice February 23 about the need to counter Iran's growing influence in the region and its nuclear ambitions, although they specified that any sanctions should target the key Iranian leadership, not the Iranian people (ref I). MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that he did not think it was necessary to wait for all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to agree before proceeding with any plans against Iran (ref E). "Whoever is interested in getting on board ship should be encouraged," he said. "I don't think it's logical or smart to wait for everyone to get involved so we can sail. ... If another GCC member believes it's not right, that's his choice." In the Arab region, MbZ specifically identified Bahrain and Jordan as two countries that also view Iran as a threat and that are "capable to work with us." He told A/S Welch that the UAE would prepare a paper responding to USG concerns about Iran and mechanisms for addressing the challenge posed by Iran. In a March 27 meeting with CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid, MbZ spoke about the Iranian threat with a greater sense of urgency. He was strongly in favor of taking action against Iran and its president sooner rather than later.
9. (S/NF) SSD Director Hazza told A/S Welch March 29 that the Ayatollah Ali Khameini had once issued a fatwa prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons by Iran, but noted that this should not be considered a guarantee. Hazza assessed that Iran is also a threat due to its ties to international terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida, as well as their financial support to Hamas. He added that the relationship between Iran and Syria, and their links to Hizballah, was also of concern, as was Iran's attempts to expand its influence in Iraq and elsewhere in the world. MbZ also expressed to A/S Welch March 28 the concern that Hizballah was supporting Hamas. During your meeting, you should explain the graduated approach to addressing Iran in the United Nations Security Council and encourage the UAE to isolate Iran--regardless of potential economic backlash. You should also explain the importance of the UAE working closely with the USG on interdiction requests. This meeting will be a good follow-on to the discussion U/S Joseph had with Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan (AbZ) on April 8, where Joseph outlined the USG's policy priorities for Iran (septel). (Note: While AbZ, like MbZ, expressed support for U.S. initiatives against Iran, he stated that the USG should come to the UAE as a "very last resort. ... If you can solve something without involving the UAE, please do so." End Note.)
Palestinian Territories/Hamas
-----------------------------
10. (S) UAE leaders have told us that they consider Hamas a terrorist organization and that they would not fund Hamas unless they denounce violence (refs D and E). However, after Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal visited Abu Dhabi on March 22 and met with UAE Minister of Presidential Affairs Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Mohammed al-Sha'ali, Meshaal publicly claimed that the UAEG had pledged to continue to provide financial assistance to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (ref J). MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that the UAEG allowed Meshaal to come, but that "officially, we don't recognize Khaled Meshaal." MbZ said that once a new Palestinian Prime Minister is selected, UAEG officials will travel to the Palestinian territories to ascertain that UAEG assistance is "going to the right people." UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid sounded a note of optimism when he told Secretary Rice February 23 that Hamas, "with some pressure," would understand the need to respect the will of the international community.
11. (S) The UAE has historically provided significant financial assistance to the Palestinian people. Typically, the UAE sends aid to the Palestinian territories through charity organizations, or by projectized assistance; but the UAEG has also provided financial assistance directly to the Palestinian Authority, most recently $20 million in March 2006 to Mahmoud Abbas for salaries. In the wake of the Hamas electoral victory, UAE leaders told us they intend to honor their previous commitments of humanitarian assistance (including the $100 million Sheikh Khalifa housing complex that was announced last year).
12. (S/NF) In his meeting with A/S Welch March 29, SSD Director Hazza assessed that there was both a positive and a negative side to the Hamas election win. On the negative side, he cited Hamas' position with regard to Israel, and their violent agenda. On the positive side, Hazza noted the fact that Hamas was now in power and was accountable to the international community. He spoke to A/S Welch of the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Hazza also asked A/S Welch how the USG would react to those countries that did support the Hamas government, and whether they would run afoul of U.S. laws restricting support to terrorist organizations. A/S Welch replied that that would be a problem, emphasizing that no money should go to the government unless Hamas renounced violence and accepted Israel. A/S Welch also told Hazza that it was not the responsibility of the U.S. or other Arab countries to pay the salaries of the new Hamas government, underscoring the need for Hamas to show accountability. MbZ told A/S Welch that Hamas benefited from "official and private contributions" from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar. MbZ said it was "easy to take $1 million in a suitcase" to Lebanon, alluding to cash couriers.
Iraq
----
13. (S/NF) A partner in the war on terror, the UAE continues to provide U.S. forces access, overflight clearances, and other critical logistical assistance to Operation Iraqi Freedom (and Operation Enduring Freedom). The UAE has also been a helpful supporter of Iraq's burgeoning political process. It has worked with Iraqi political and religious figures to encourage greater Sunni integration, and it has consulted with Ambassador Khalilzad on a number of occasions about the need to stem sectarianism in Iraq. The UAE has publicly condemned acts of sectarian and terrorist violence in Iraq, most recently, the February 22 bombing of the al-Askariya Shrine. MbZ and Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid expressed their concerns about Iran's interference in Iraq's internal affairs to Secretary Rice during her visit to Abu Dhabi February 23. MbZ further told General Abizaid that discontent with Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja'afari was creating volunteers for al-Qaida. He pledged the UAE's support to the fight against al-Qaida. In his meeting with A/S Welch, MbZ advocated using the Arabic language media to tell Iraqis the truth about how many of their own people are dying at the hands of the insurgents. If Iraqis were to see the figures, he opined, they would conclude that support of the insurgency is "not worth it."
Ideological Extremism
---------------------
14. (S) MbZ and his brothers continue to be outspoken on the issue of Muslim extremists and the threat they pose to the region. MbZ underscored for A/S Welch the UAE's preferred approach of denying extremists a foothold rather than allowing them to play a role in the political process. Although he warns of the dangers of free elections in countries with a well-organized Muslim Brotherhood presence, he tells USG guests that the UAE will go ahead with elections. The Emirati leadership has told us that they will not allow Islamists to participate in elections. (Note: The UAE has announced that half of the members of the Federal National Council would be elected while half would continue to be appointed by the rulers of the various emirates. Despite this announcement, the UAE still lags behind other Gulf states in terms of democratization. End Note.) MbZ also sees extremist ideology threatening the educational system, where he and his brothers are spending considerable resources to modernize the curriculum and the teaching corps. SISON
Thursday, 03 May 1990, 10:04
C O N F I D E N T I A L PRETORIA 07087
CAPE TOWN ALSO FOR EMBASSY
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS PGOV, SF
SUBJECT: MANDELA REPORTED "FURIOUS" AT TOP ADVISER FOR
THWARTING THATCHER MEETING
1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT
2. NELSON MANDELA IS "FURIOUS" WITH TOP ADVISER ZWELAKHE SISULU FOR PERSUADING THE ANC LEADERSHIP TO VETO HIS PLANS TO MEET MARGARET THATCHER IN LONDON IN MID-APRIL, ACCORDING TO A CLOSE SISULU ASSOCIATE. GABU TUGWANA (PROTECT), SISULU'S DEPUTY AT THE "NEW NATION" NEWSPAPER, TOLD USIS OFFICER APRIL 27 THAT SISULU HAD BEEN THE MOST PERSUASIVE SPEAKER AT THE ANC EXECUTIVE MEETING WHICH DECIDED THE ISSUE OF WHETHER TO MEET THATCHER. WE UNDERSTAND MANDELA WAS KEEN FOR A THATCHER MEETING, BUT THAT SISULU ARGUED SUCCESSFULLY AGAINST IT.
3. SISULU, WHO HAS BEEN SECONDED FROM THE "NATION" TO WORK AS MANDELA'S APPOINTMENTS SECRETARY, HAS ALSO DRAWN FIRE FROM ANC RANK AND FILE FOR HIS HANDLING OF MANDELA'S SCHEDULE. WE ARE REGULARLY SURPRISED AT HOW OPENLY ACTIVISTS DISPARAGE SISULU'S MANAGEMENT OF MANDELA'S SCHEDULE TO US. TRANSKEI LEADER BANTU HOLOMISA BECAME SO FRUSTRATED BY DEALING WITH SISULU FOR MANDELA'S VISIT THERE APRIL 21-27, HE TOLD US HE INSISTED ON COMPLETE CONTROL OF MANDELA'S SCHEDULE AS THE PRICE FOR THE TRANSKEI GOVERNMENT'S COOPERATION WITH THE VISIT. SISULU RELENTED. FOR OUR PART, SISULU HAS BEEN NOTORIOUSLY UNRELIABLE IN ARRANGING MEETINGS BETWEEN MANDELA AND US OFFICIALS -- IT TOOK SEVEN WEEKS OF STEADY HOUNDING TO OBTAIN AN APPOINTMENT FOR AMBASSADOR SWING WITH MANDELA. IN AN IRONIC TWIST, THE FORMERLY UNDEPENDABLE WINNIE HAS NOW BECOME ONE OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE CHANNELS TO MANDELA.
3. COMMENT: TUGWANA'S STORY ABOUT THE ARGUMENTS OVER THE THATCHER VISIT RINGS TRUE. MANDELA HAS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS EXPRESSED HIS EAGERNESS FOR AN EARLY MEETING WITH THATCHER TO EXPRESS THE ANC'S OBJECTIONS TO HER POLICY. WE WERE CONSEQUENTLY SURPRISED WHEN THE MEETING DIDN'T MATERIALIZE ON HIS MID-APRIL VISIT TO LONDON, AND SUSPECTED THAT ANC HARDLINERS HAD NIXED MANDELA'S PLANS.
4. SISULU IS A MAN OF MANY TALENTS, AND WE DON'T DOUBT HE HAS THE INTELLECTUAL FORTITUDE TO CONVINCE HIS SENIORS IN THE ANC OF ALMOST ANYTHING. BUT THE OVERWHELMING JOB OF KEEPING MANDELA'S APPOINTMENT BOOK IS TAKING ITS TOLL. "MANDELA NEEDS A GOVERNMENT AROUND HIM, NOT JUST ME, TO HANDLE HIS SCHEDULE," HE RECENTLY LAMENTED TO US. WITH THE STILL TIGHT COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE IN THE MANDELA ENTOURAGE, SISULU'S LACK OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACUMEN COULD PROVE A DISTINCT LIABILITY.
SWING.
Wednesday, 28 January 2009, 15:50
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000181
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/27/2019
TAGS PARM, PREL, MARR, MNUC, IR, SA, RU
SUBJECT: SAUDI EXCHANGE WITH RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR ON IRAN'S
NUCLEAR PLANS
Classified By: P/M COUNSELOR SCOTT MCGEHEE REASONS 1.4 (b) (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY & COMMENT: Netherlands Ambassador Ron Strikker, Russian Ambassador Victor Gibinvish, and Embassy Riyadh Pol/Mil Counselor Scott McGehee met on January 25 with Dr. Prince Turki Al-Kabeer, Undersecretary for Multilateral Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to deliver a joint demarche on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The meeting evolved into a pointed exchange between the Russian Ambassador and Dr. Prince Turki on Iran's nuclear ambitions. Prince Turki warned that if Iran tried to produce nuclear weapons, other countries in the Gulf region would be compelled to do the same, or to permit the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Gulf to serve as a deterrent to the Iranians. Turki then pointedly demanded that the US keep Saudi officials informed about US plans for Iran.
2. (C) Dr. Prince Turki is not a decision-maker, but he is a reliable transmitter of official Saudi thinking. Most of what he said is not new, although this is the most explicit mention we have heard of Saudi willingness to see nuclear weapons deployed in the GCC as a deterrent to Iran. His concern that the United States will negotiate a "grand bargain" with Iran without consulting Saudi Arabia is a concern we have heard often in recent weeks. End summary & comment.
3. (C) After hearing a brief verbal demarche from Ambassador Strikker on the upcoming June Plenary of the GICNT, Dr. Turki turned to Ambassador Gibinvish, saying, "On this issue, what concerns us most is how to get our neighbor to change its policy on enrichment." Iran needs to be convinced to enter a dialogue on this matter, he continued, noting that Saudi Arabia is also concerned about the Russian-built reactor at Bushehr. A leakage from a plant at that location could bring an environmental catastrophe to Saudi Arabia, pointing out that it is located less than 300 kilometers away from Saudi shores, across open water.
4. (C) Ambassador Gibinvish was able to say only "Sure, I agree!" before Prince continued, "The location is so dangerous! Not just to us, but to the world economy!" He urged that Russia use its influence to have the reactor moved north, suggesting that a location on the shore of the Caspian Sea would be much better, where there is water available for reactor cooling, and where mountains rise behind to contain any possible leakage from moving south. Perhaps more troubling, he said, is Iran's pursuit of nuclear enrichment. He explained that if Iran tries to produce nuclear weapons, other countries in the Gulf region would be compelled to do the same, or to permit the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Gulf to serve as a deterrent to the Iranians.
5. (C) Amb. Gibinvish responded that Iran's desire to enrich uranium reflected its fears that it will someday be attacked by Israel or the United States and also a sign of Iran's desire to establish its "supremacy" in the region. Prince Turki interjected: "And we cannot accept Iranian supremacy in the region. We are okay with nuclear electrical power and desalination, but not with enrichment." He said that the prospect of Iranian enrichment raises troubling questions about their motivations for doing so: "they do not need it!"
6. (S) Amb. Gibinvish noted that "some experts in Russia believe that Iran will have a bomb in 10 to 15 years." Russia, he said, is concerned about this matter as well, and has "put forward initiatives" with Iran. Russia hopes to discuss this further with Saudi Arabia in the near future, and he said that an "important delegation" would be coming to Riyadh in about two months to discuss this with the Saudi leadership. Prince Turki said that the Russian delegation would be welcomed, stressing that "we must work together to get them to abandon their effort to acquire nuclear weapons. Israel too, he said, must be convinced to surrender its nuclear arsenal. But you deal with them, you have influence, that is why I raise this with you." Amb. Gibinvish pledged that "we will do what we can. But the Iranians are difficult partners." At this point, Prince Turki turned to Pol/Mil Counselor who had momentarily stopped taking notes. Prince Turki said "Please write this down. Whatever is discussed with the Iranians, we must be kept informed! Any
RIYADH 00000181 002 OF 002
negotiations with the Iranians must take into account the interests of Saudi Arabia, otherwise, we will not accept it! We should be told -- in advance! -- of what you plan to say."
RUNDELL
Tuesday, 22 July 2008, 05:00
S E C R E T RIYADH 001134
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT PASS TO ISN/RA RMANGIELLO AND RNEPHEW, AND
NEA/ARP BMCGRATH
EO 12958 DECL: 07/20/2018
TAGS MNUC, PGOV, PREL, SA, TRGY, KNNP, IR
SUBJECT: SAUDIS ON IRAN REF UPCOMING NAM FM MEETING
REF: A. SECSTATE 74879 B. RIYADH 43 Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires Michael Gfoeller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) On July 21, Pol Counselor delivered demarche on the upcoming Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Foreign Ministers meeting scheduled for Tehran from July 27-30 (Reftel A) to Saudi MFA Deputy Director for Western Affairs Department Mojahid Ali Alwahbi.
2. (S) Alwahbi informed us that Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (MFA Deputy Secretary equivalent) Dr. Nizar bin Obaid Madani would lead the Saudi delegation. He assured us Saudi Arabia did not want the NAM meeting to become an Iranian propaganda event, adding he had seen the proposed agenda and did not expect it to develop in such a manner. Alwahbi agreed Iran's continued nuclear enrichment was a grave SAG concern with regional security implications (Reftel B).
3. (S) Alwahbi strongly advised against taking military action to neutralize Iran's program. Rather, establishing a US-Iranian dialogue was the best course of action, asserting that the USG opening an Interest Section or re-opening our Embassy in Tehran would be positive step. Alwahbi was heartened by the USG's initiative for Under Secretary Burns to meet with the Iranians last week in Geneva. He added that, in his view, Iran's position was "shifting" and wanted to avoid escalation of tensions. He noted his belief that the Russians had recently been effectively pressuring Iran to be less provocative. Alwahbi concluded that he expected Iran to keep tensions relatively low at least until after the US presidential election.
4. (S) COMMENT. These comments are typical of Saudi MFA bureaucrats who take a pacific stance towards Iran, but diverge significantly from the more bellicose advice we have gotten from senior Saudi royals. END COMMENT. GFOELLER
Friday, 12 February 2010, 13:18
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000173
NOFORN
SIPDIS
SECDEF FOR USDP, ISA, ISA/EURNATO
EO 12958 DECL: 02/11/2020
TAGS PREL, MARR, MOPS, NATO, IT, AF, IR
SUBJECT: SECDEF MEETING WITH ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
FRANCO FRATTINI, FEBRUARY 8, 2010
ROME 00000173 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Alexander Vershbow for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D )
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (SecDef) met with Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Franco Frattini during an official visit to Rome on February 8. On Afghanistan, Frattini was eager to move beyond the London Conference and work to produce practical results for the Afghan people. He proposed better civil-military coordination at senior levels in NATO, and raised the prospect of coordination on local projects across the Afghanistan-Iran border. SecDef thanked Frattini for Italy's pledge of more troops for operations in Afghanistan and explained where gaps in civil-military cooperation existed. Frattini believed the international community was lining up against Iran, and encouraged better coordination with countries outside the P5-plus-1. SecDef warned that a nuclear Iran would lead to greater proliferation in the Middle East, war, or both. SecDef agreed with Frattini that a United Nations conference highlighting security challenges in the Horn of Africa was a good idea. END SUMMARY.
------------
Afghanistan
------------
2. (S/NF) Frattini opened by telling SecDef that the U.S. can count on Italy's full support on Afghanistan, Iran and fighting terror. He had recently talked with General Jones and Secretary Clinton and relayed the same message. He expressed a desire to focus on the comprehensive approach in such a way to improve the daily lives of Afghans. He asserted a need to press President Karzai on delivering improved governance or risk losing support for the mission in coalition Parliaments. Frattini wanted to get beyond "just talking" -- referencing the London conference -- and noted concrete Italian projects to convert poppy cultivation to olive oil production and to create a national high school for public administration.
3. (S/NF) SecDef commended Rome's efforts to increase Italian contributions, asking whether even more Carabinieri might be available for training the Afghan security forces. He observed that General McChrystal's emphasis on protecting Afghan civilians has changed attitudes among Allied publics. SecDef said he is pushing the comprehensive approach, noting a need for all stakeholders in Afghanistan to share information effectively. He said he hoped that NATO's new Senior Civilian Representative, Ambassador Mark Sedwill, could facilitate this. SecDef recommended a focus on better governance below the level of the national government -- which would take decades to turn into a modern government ) taking advantage of traditional institutions and competent governors at the regional and sub-regional levels and leveraging them into local success stories. At the national level, however, our priority should be to develop those ministries most critical to our success, such as Defense, Interior, Finance, Agriculture, and Health. Noting Gen. McChrystal's recent statement that the situation in Afghanistan is no longer deteriorating, SecDef said that much of the challenge is psychological -- convincing Afghans that we can win and that we will not abandon them.
4. (S/NF) Frattini agreed that civilian-military integration is the weakest part of the Afghan strategy. He expressed frustration that NATO foreign ministers only discuss issues like agriculture and education while defense ministers only discuss security. The problem, Frattini suggested, is that they don't talk to each other. He proposed a joint meeting of foreign and defense ministers, beginning with talks at the expert level. SecDef responded that Gen. McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry do civilian-military collaboration at the national level on the basis of a Joint Campaign Plan, as do local ground commanders with leaders of PRTs. What is missing is the level in between -- the regional commands -- and SecDef expressed a desire for Sedwill to appoint subordinates to address this in each RC, building on the
ROME 00000173 002.2 OF 003
example of the civ-mil cell in RC-South. The effect would be cascading civil-military coordination at the national, regional, and local levels. SecDef noted that similar efforts by UNSRSG Kai Eide had been hamstrung by resourcing and the UN's aversion to working with the military. As a NATO representative, Sedwill should not have these problems.
5. (S/NF) Frattini also asked about practical cooperation across the Afghan-Iranian border. Local incentives for cooperation might undermine weapons and drug trafficking and help co-opt reconcilable Taliban. SecDef noted that Iran is playing both sides of the street -- trying to be friendly with the Afghanistan government while trying to undermine ISAF efforts. He noted that intelligence indicated there was little lethal material crossing the Afghanistan-Iran border. SecDef suggested that trade route protection from Afghanistan into Eastern Iran, which is important for local economies on both sides of the border, might be a place to start. SecDef noted that any effort will need to be coordinated with Kabul. Frattini agreed this would be a good starting point.
----
Iran
----
6. (S/NF) Frattini supported recent public statements by SecDef raising the pressure on Iran. He declared that Ahmadinejad cannot be trusted, especially after contradicting recent constructive statements by his own government. Frattini, citing a recent conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, said he believed Russia would support the sanctions track. The challenge was to bring China on board; China and India, in Frattini's view, were critical to the adoption of measures that would affect the government without hurting Iranian civil society. He also specifically proposed including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Brazil, Venezuela and Egypt in the conversation. He expressed particular frustration with Ankara's "double game" of outreach to both Europe and Iran. Frattini proposed an informal meeting of Middle East countries, who were keen to be consulted on Iran, and noted that Secretary Clinton was in agreement.
7. (S/NF) SecDef emphasized that a UNSC resolution was important because it would give the European Union and nations a legal platform on which to impose even harsher sanctions against Iran. SecDef pointedly warned that urgent action is required. Without progress in the next few months, we risk nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, war prompted by an Israeli strike, or both. SecDef predicted "a different world" in 4-5 years if Iran developed nuclear weapons. SecDef stated that he recently delivered the same warning to PM Erdogan, and he agreed with Frattini's assessment on Saudi Arabia and China, noting that Saudi Arabia is more important to both Beijing and Moscow than Iran.
8. (S/NF) SecDef urged Frattini to reconsider a planned visit to Italy by a prominent Iranian Parliamentarian in the wake of recent executions of students in opposition to the government. At the same time, we needed to ensure we did not discredit the opposition by creating the impression that they are the tools of foreign partners.
--------------
Horn of Africa
--------------
9. (C) Frattini expressed concern about deteriorating conditions in Somalia and Yemen. He noted a recent conversation with President Sharif of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG), in which Sharif said that he would be unable to pay his security forces by the end of February. Frattini said that Italy was encouraging the EU Presidency to focus on Somalia and Yemen, and had proposed a United Nations conference addressing Horn of Africa security issues. Italy was providing funding to the TFG's national budget. SecDef concurred that the region deserved more focus.
ROME 00000173 003.2 OF 003
10. (U) SecDef has cleared this cable. Drafted by OSD staff. DIBBLE
Monday, 16 May 2005, 09:12
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 002178
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/16/2015
TAGS PREL, MASS, PHUM, ELAB, IR, IZ, XF, SA, PK, FR, TC
SUBJECT: MBZ ON IRAQ, IRAN, PAKISTAN
REF: ABU DHABI 1008
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison. For reasons 1.4 (a), (b), and (d).
1. (U) Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed,s weekly Sunday "VIP Majlis" provided an excellent opportunity for a visiting National Defense University delegation to observe first-hand the UAEG,s informal consultative process. MbZ, brothers MinState Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan and Interior Minister Sheikh Saif, and Labor Minister al Ka'abi were joined by several dozen prominent Abu Dhabi officials and businessmen for the weekly gathering at Bateen Palace.
NDU
---
2. (U) NDU President Lt. Gen. Dunn and National War College Deputy Commandant Ambassador Wahba briefed MbZ on several new NDU initiatives, including opportunities for UAE students in the Information Resources Management College program, which emphasizes threats, vulnerabilities, and risks in a net-centric environment. Ambassador Sison praised the UAE's selection of NDU candidates, noting that several were serving in key positions today: GHQ Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff MG Mohammed Hilal al-Kaabi, GHQ Director of General Procurement Obaid Al Ketbi, Deputy Commander UAE Air Force Brigadier Ali, and MbZ's aide Yousef al Otaiba had all benefited from NDU programs.
Iraq
------
3. (C) Ambassador Sison noted that day's visit to Iraq by Secretary Rice, highlighting the Secretary's encouragement
SIPDIS for continued momentum in the political process and her meetings with PM al-Jaafari and KDP leader Barzani. MbZ voiced disdain for al-Jaafari, citing (again) his concerns over the Prime Minister's ties to Iran. These concerns were aimed at Jaafari's Dawaa Party colleagues, as well. While agreeing that it was important for Iraq's Sunni Arabs to be more involved in the political process and in drafting the constitution, MbZ complained that "there wasn't one worthwhile Sunni" on the scene. He criticized new Sunni Defense Minister Dulaimi as being "in it for himself." Nor did MbZ have anything good to say about former Iraqi Finance Minister Mahdi's nomination as one of two Vice Presidents, complaining that Mahdi "did not work for the people of Iraq." Nonetheless, MbZ said he agreed with the USG's efforts to encourage the various Iraqi factions to work together. The UAE would continue to help train Iraqi police forces at the UAE's police academy in Al Ain and provide reconstruction assistance. It was important for the region as a whole that the U.S. and its allies "got it right" in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, he underscored. (Note: MbZ aide Yousef al Otaiba had a few days earlier shared with Ambassador concerns passed by former PM Allawi that Dulaimi was "devious," "bad news," "very close" to Iranian intelligence, and had been introduced to the Iranians by Chalabi. Yousef had also noted the UAEG,s impression Mahdi had not always been a "team player" in the government of former PM Allawi. End note.)
Iran
----
4. (S) Turning to Iran, MbZ voiced certainty that the EU-3 efforts with Iran would break down and that Iran would resume its nuclear activities ) if it had not already done so. Repeating concerns first voiced to us in February (reftel), MbZ appeared convinced that it was only a matter of time before Israel or the U.S. would strike Iranian nuclear facility targets. U.S. installations in the Gulf could be targeted by Iran in the aftermath of such an action, he warned. MbZ agreed with the USG,s tough line with Tehran and the Europeans. A nuclear-armed Iran would destabilize the Gulf region and possibly allow terrorist access to WMD. MbZ asked Lt. Gen. Dunn whether it would be possible for &anyone8 to "take out" all locations of concern in Iran via air power; Lt. Gen. Dunn voiced doubt that this would be possible given the dispersed locations. "Then it will take ground forces!" MbZ exclaimed. Ambassador noted that the UAE's Director of Military Intelligence, BG Essa al Mazrouei, would pay counterpart visits this week to CENTCOM, J-2, DIA, and CIA for discussions on Iran and Iraq-related matters. MbZ said he looked forward to sharing "contingency planning" scenarios in future conversations.
Pakistan
--------
5. (C) Ambassador asked about MbZ's visit the week before to Lahore to meet with Pakistani President Musharraf. MbZ chuckled and asked why the USG "always" convinced the Pakistanis to delay news of the capture of senior Al Qaeda operatives such as Abu Faraj al Libbi. MbZ went on to congratulate Washington for its decision to allow U.S. firms to bid for contracts to provide F-16s and other defense technology to Pakistan. It was important to support Musharraf as he battled the terrorists, he emphasized. While the Indians had and would continue to balk at the decision, the region needed Musharraf to stay strong. There was no alternative leader in sight, MbZ opined. Besides, he continued, the F-16 decision would not tip the military balance between India and Pakistan. Even if it had, India's strength as a stable democracy would ensure that it would not ever be in as "risky" a situation as its neighbor. MbZ then slapped his knee and said "you,ll never guess what Musharraf asked me...he asked me whether the UAE had received approval for the Predator!" (Note: the USG's inability to meet the UAE's request for an armed Predator remains a sore point for MbZ, although he has not directly raised the issue with us for some time.)
Gyrocopter, GAWC
----------------
6. (SBU) MbZ also referred to his interest in exploring selling the UAE's "gyrocopter" (a helicopter-supported UAV co-developed with Austrian company Schiebel) to the U.S. Air Force, an idea he first floated during Gen. Moseley,s visit for the May 3 F-16 ceremony. MbZ noted that his aide would pass detailed gyrocopter specifications to the Embassy this week. (Note: We will be exploring this initiative with CENTAF and CENTCOM in relation to force protection aerial surveillance system needs at Al Dhafra airbase for the 380 th Air Expeditionary Wing. End note.)
7. (C) Lt. Gen. Dunn complimented MbZ on the Gulf Air Warfare Center (GAWC), which he and the NDU group had toured that morning. MbZ expressed satisfaction over the relationship between the UAE and U.S. Air Forces, but expressed disappointment that more GCC countries had not joined recent GAWC classes. Ambassador noted the recent robust participation by Saudi Arabia in the GAWC's fourth class, which had included six Saudi F-15s and two young pilots who were also members of the Saudi royal family. MbZ asked whether the two high-ranking Saudis had actually completed all requirements for graduation or had been "passed through." Ambassador confirmed that they had completed all course requirements. MbZ commented that "the real reason" the Saudis had turned out for the GAWC class had been "to see what the UAE was up to" with the F-16 Block 60 and other procurement successes. Although Egypt and Jordan wished to join in the next GAWC class, MbZ added, they also wanted the UAE Air Force to pay fuel costs. MbZ said he had asked both countries "to go talk to ADNOC," the state-owned Abu Dhabi National Oil Company.
France
------
8. (U) MbZ noted that he would travel to Paris June 18-20 to meet with President Chirac, recalling that he had canceled his trip to France at the last minute in mid-January.
Camel Jockeys
-------------
9. (SBU) On the margins of the MbZ conversation, Ambassador thanked Interior Minister Sheikh Saif for his assistance the week before in allowing G/TIP visitor Feleke Assefa access to camel jockey rehabilitation and social support centers. Ambassador noted that a Tier 3 ranking remained a possibility despite the UAEG,s vigorous efforts since mid-March with UNICEF, IOM, and others. A trafficking in persons reassessment would take place in August, she noted, and it was important for the UAE to continue the good work it was doing in solving the problem. MbZ aide Yousef al Otaiba promised to forward a copy of the UAE-UNICEF TIP implementing agreement and budget. (Note: he has done so; we have forwarded the document electronically to G/TIP and NEA/ARPI. End note.)
Labor and the FTA
-----------------
10. (SBU) Labor Minister al Ka'abi noted he had received reports that the U.S. and UAE sides had moved closer on the text of the labor chapter of the FTA during the last day of negotiations. He reiterated the UAEG,s concern that it receive some recognition of its unique demographic situation, as only 15 percent of the population held Emirati citizenship. SISON
Thursday, 21 January 2010, 12:17
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 000131
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/19/2020
TAGS PINR, PTER, PINS, UK, IR
SUBJECT: [SOURCE REMOVED] TARGETED BY IRANIAN REGIME
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Greg Berry, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: [DETAIL REMOVED] and prominent VOA commentator Ali Reza Nourizadeh recently told [NAME REMOVED] he had been targeted by Iranian intelligence, an allegation confirmed by London LEGATT. Nourizadeh was approached some months ago by Mohammad Reza Sadeqinia, an Iranian national who introduced himself as a "big fan" of Nourizadeh's. Nourizadeh met Sadeqinia on several occasions in London and Washington, DC, but became suspicious when Sadeqinia took large numbers of photos, including of Nourizadeh's vehicle. Sadeqinia was arrested in California on charges of soliciting murder after he attempted to hire a hitman to kill Iranian-American broadcaster Jamshid Sharmahd. Because his pattern of behavior towards Nourizadeh was similar to his interactions with Sharmahd, FBI shared the threat information with UK authorities, who subsequently warned Nourizadeh. END SUMMARY.
2. (C/NF) Ali Reza Nourizadeh [DETAILS REMOVED] had been visited by British anti-terrorism police who informed him he had been targeted by the Iranian regime. The UK authorities (who,[NAME REMOVED] later learned had received the threat information from the FBI) told Nourizadeh that Reza Sadeqinia, a man who had visited Nourizadeh several times in London and Washington, DC, was working for the Iranian intelligence services and gathering information on Nourizadeh's habits. They advised Nourizadeh that Sadeqinia had been arrested in California for soliciting the murder of Iranian-American broadcaster Jamshid Sharmahd.
3. (C/NF) Nourizadeh, obviously shaken by this news, told [NAME REMOVED] Sadeqinia had contacted him several months before, claiming to be a "big fan" of Nourizadeh's. Nourizadeh became suspicious after Sadeqinia insisted on taking large numbers of photos, including shots of Nourizadeh's car and garage. His suspicions were confirmed after he received a message from a well-placed friend who told Nourizadeh he had seen dozens of photos of him on the desk of Iranian Deputy Intelligence Minister Alavi. At that point, Nourizadeh stopped taking Sadeqinia's calls and heard nothing more about the matter until he was visited by UK anti-terror police January 14.
4. (C/NF) London LEGATT confirmed the arrest of Sadeqinia in the U.S. after he attempted to hire a man to kill Iranian-American broadcaster Jamshid Sharmahd of Tondar Radio. Prior to the solicitation of the hitman, videos of Sharmahd had begun to appear on YouTube with commentary that he was acting against Iran and an enemy of the state. Sadeqinia apparently admitted his surveillance of both Sharmahd and Nourizadeh and claimed he was working on behalf of Iranian intelligence. After similar videos of Nourizadeh were discovered, the FBI authorized UK authorities to share the threat information with Nourizadeh. UK authorities are working with Nourizadeh to improve his personal security, and Nourizadeh is cooperating by providing information about his interactions with Sadeqinia.
5. (C/NF) COMMENT: Nourizadeh is a well-known figure both inside and outside Iran, and is an outspoken critic of the Iranian regime, so it is unsurprising that the regime would want to keep a close eye on him. If, however, the regime has targeted Nourizadeh for assassination, as it appears to have done with Sharmahd, it marks a clear escalation in the regime's attempts to intimidate critics outside its borders, and could have a chilling effect on journalists, academics and others in the West who until recently felt little physical threat from the regime. Nourizadeh, while clearly taking the threat seriously, will not be cowed -- he's faced this type of threat before (many years ago when he first left Iran), and he has confidence in the British authorities' ability to protect him. In fact, he has encouraged other prominent opposition leaders like Shirin Ebadi and Mohsen Makhmalbaf to relocate to London for their own safety. END COMMENT.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN
Sunday, 20 April 2008, 08:47
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000649
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP, DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP AND S/I
SATTERFIELD
EO 12958 DECL: 04/19/2018
TAGS EAID, ECON, EFIN, IZ, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, SA, IR
SUBJECT: SAUDI KING ABDULLAH AND SENIOR PRINCES ON SAUDI
POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
Classified By: CDA Michael Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (S) Summary: US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus met with Saudi King Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, General Presidency of Intelligence Chief Prince Muqrin bin Abd al-Aziz, and Interior Minister Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz during their April 14-15 visit to Riyadh. The Saudi King and senior Princes reviewed Saudi policy toward Iraq in detail, all making essentially the same points. They said that the Kingdom will not send an ambassador to Baghdad or open an embassy until the King and senior Saudi officials are satisfied that the security situation has improved and the Iraqi government has implemented policies that benefit all Iraqis, reinforce Iraq's Arab identity, and resist Iranian influence. The Saudis evinced somewhat greater flexibility regarding the issues of economic and humanitarian assistance for Iraq and debt forgiveness. In a conversation with the Charge' on April 17, Saudi Ambassador to the US Adel al-Jubeir indicated that the King had been very impressed by the visit of Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, and al-Jubeir hinted that the Saudi government might announce changes to its Iraq policy before the President's visit to Riyadh in mid-May. End Summary.
Positive Signs in Iraq
2. (S) In all their meetings with the Saudi royals, both Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus conveyed the progress in Iraq and confirmed the negative role Iran is playing in Iraq. They characterized the recent ISF-led operations in Basra and Baghdad as having a striking effect against the Shia militias, most importantly turning Iraqi public opinion away from the militias. While Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's decision to take action against the militias was described as hasty and not well-planned, Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus emphasized that any tactical shortfalls were overshadowed by the greater positive effect of unifying Iraq and demonstrating the GOI's, and most specifically al-Maliki's, determined resolve to take on the Shia militias, especially Jaysh al-Madhi. Concurrently, these operations unequivocally demonstrated Iran's subversive activities in Iraq and its broader regional ambitions. Throughout all their discussions, Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus stressed the importance and urgent need for the Saudis to join us in supporting Iraq.
The Saudi Embassy Issue
3. (S) King Abdullah, the Foreign Minister, and Prince Muqrin all stated that the Saudi government would not send an ambassador to Baghdad or open an embassy there in the near future, citing both security and political grounds in support of this position. The Foreign Minister stated that he had considered dispatching an ambassador and had sent Saudi diplomats to Baghdad to identify a site for the Saudi embassy. However, he said. "the King simply forbade us to go any farther." King Abdullah confirmed this account in a separate meeting with Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus. The King asserted that the security situation in Baghdad was too dangerous for him to risk sending a Saudi ambassador there. "He would immediately become a target for the terrorists and the militias," he said.
4. (S) The King also rejected the suggestion that by sending a Saudi ambassador to Baghdad he could give essential political support to the Iraqi government as it struggles to resist Iranian influence and subversion. He expressed lingering doubt on the Iraqi government's willingness to resist Iran. He also repeated his frequently voiced doubts about Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki himself by alluding to his "Iranian connections." The Saudi monarch stated that he does not trust al-Maliki because the Iraqi Prime Minister had "lied" to him in the past by promising to take certain actions and then failing to do so. The King did not say precisely what these allegedly broken promises might have been. He repeated his oft heard view that al-Maliki rules Iraq on behalf of his Shiite sect instead of all Iraqis.
5. (S) However, in a potentially significant move, the King did not reject the idea of dispatching a Saudi ambassador to Baghdad completely. Instead, he said that he would consider
RIYADH 00000649 002 OF 003
doing so after the Iraqi provincial elections are held in the autumn. The conduct of these elections would indicate whether or not the Iraqi government is truly interested in ruling on behalf of all Iraqis or merely in support of the Shia, King Abdullah asserted.
Grudging Acknowledgment of Change in Iraq
6. (S) The Foreign Minister signaled another potential softening in Saudi policy by saying that the Kingdom's problem was not with al-Maliki as a person but rather with the conduct of the Iraqi government. The King himself admitted that the Iraqi government's performance has improved in recent months and grudgingly accepted the point that al-Maliki and his security forces have indeed been fighting extremists, specifically Shia extremists in both Basra and Baghdad and Sunni extremists and Al Qaeda in Mosul. However, the King and the senior Princes argued that more time would be required to judge whether the recent change in Iraqi behavior was lasting and sincere. The King suggested that much of the Iraqi government's improved performance is attributable to US prodding rather than change in Iraqi attitudes.
7. (S) The Foreign Minister also suggested that the USG should prod Ayatollah Sistani to speak out in favor of a unified Iraq and national reconciliation among different Iraqi sects and groups. "You have paid a heavy price in blood and treasure, and Sistani and his people have benefited directly. You have every right to ask this of him," Prince Saud al-Faisal said.
Possible Saudi Economic Assistance
8. (S) The King, Prince Muqrin, and the Foreign Minister all suggested that the Saudi government might be willing to consider the provision of economic and humanitarian assistance to Iraq. Prince Muqrin asked Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus to send him a list of the kinds of assistance that the US government would like to see the Kingdom provide Iraq. Al-Jubeir later told the Charge' that this assistance would be separate from the USD 1 billion in aid that the Saudi government had promised at the Madrid Conference but still not delivered due to security worries. He said that the Madrid commitment consisted of $500 million in trade credits and $500 million in project assistance with strict conditionally, along the lines of what the World Bank would require. Al-Jubeir added that the assistance the Saudi government might provide via Prince Muqrin would initially be in the range of $75-$300 million.
Possible Debt Relief
9. (S) The King noted that Saudi debt relief for Iraq "will come at some point," although he did not say when. Al-Jubeir told the Charge' that debt relief is a real possibility. He also noted that the Saudi government might make changes to its Iraq policy, perhaps including both assistance and debt relief, prior to the President's visit to Riyadh.
The Need to Resist Iran
10. (S) The King, Foreign Minister, Prince Muqrin, and Prince Nayif all agreed that the Kingdom needs to cooperate with the US on resisting and rolling back Iranian influence and subversion in Iraq. The King was particularly adamant on this point, and it was echoed by the senior princes as well. Al-Jubeir recalled the King's frequent exhortations to the US to attack Iran and so put an end to its nuclear weapons program. "He told you to cut off the head of the snake," he recalled to the Charge', adding that working with the US to roll back Iranian influence in Iraq is a strategic priority for the King and his government.
11. (S) The Foreign Minister, on the other hand, called instead for much more severe US and international sanctions on Iran, including a travel ban and further restrictions on bank lending. Prince Muqrin echoed these views, emphasizing that some sanctions could be implemented without UN approval. The Foreign Minister also stated that the use of military pressure against Iran should not be ruled out.
RIYADH 00000649 003 OF 003
12. (S) Comment: Saudi attitudes toward Iraq, from the King on down, remain marked by skepticism and suspicion. That said, the Saudis have noticed recent events in Iraq and are eager to work with the US to resist and reverse Iranian encroachment in Iraq. The King was impressed by Ambassador Crocker's and General Petraeus' visit, as were the Foreign Minister, GPI Chief, and Interior Minister. Cautious as ever, the Saudis may nevertheless be willing to consider new measures in the areas of assistance and debt relief, although further discussions will be required to make these ideas a reality. End Comment. 13. (U) This cable was reviewed and cleared by Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus. GFOELLER
Tuesday, 02 June 2009, 06:19
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001177
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/01/2019
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, MOPS, IR, KWBG, IS
SUBJECT: CODELS CASEY AND ACKERMAN MEET WITH DEFENSE
MINISTER BARAK
Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Summary: Post hosted two CODELS during the week of May 25: one from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee led by Senator Casey, the other from the House Committee on Foreign Affairs led by Congressman Ackerman. Both delegations met with Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who conveyed similar points on the Peace Process and Israel's concerns about Iran. End summary.
Peace Process
-------------
2. (C) Barak began his meeting with the Casey delegation by apologizing for being late due to what he described as an "internal debate" at the Prime Minister's office regarding the development of a response to President Obama's upcoming speech in Cairo. He noted there are "perceived gaps" between the USG and the GOI regarding the Peace Process, and explained the GOI's internal debate is focused primarily on how to ensure that the U.S. and Israel "trust each other." Barak expressed confidence that PM Netanyahu is sincere in wanting to "seize this opportunity and move forward" with the Palestinians, but alluded to members of the coalition who do not agree with this course of action.
3. (C) From his perspective, Barak told the Casey delegation that the GOI was in no position to dictate policy to the Palestinians or the USG regarding the Peace Process -- "it takes two to tango, and three to negotiate," he said. Barak noted that it is the GOI's responsibility to ensure that "no stone is left unturned" regarding the Peace Process; if efforts to achieve peace ultimately fail, then the GOI must be able to state that every effort was pursued. He said he personally had no objection to "two states for two nations," and panned Arab arguments for a bi-national state in Israel. Barak said Israel envisions "two peoples living side by side in peace and good neighborliness" as the final goal.
4. (C) With the Ackerman delegation, Barak focused on the need for a regional approach to the peace process. He supports a regional initiative for peace and cooperation for the entire Middle East region to be launched by Israel. He stressed as well the need to build trust and convince the U.S. administration that the new Israeli government is "serious in its efforts toward peace."
5. (C) Barak commented on political developments in the West Bank and Gaza in both meetings. He said the GOI continues to review its policy, and then added that the Palestinian Authority has much to accomplish in terms of law enforcement, a functioning judiciary, and regaining control of Gaza before a "balanced" Palestinian state can be created. He has been extremely impressed with the work of U.S. Security Coordinator Gen. Dayton training PA security forces, and commended Salam Fayyad's concrete, practical approach.
6. (C) Barak made clear in these meetings that he feels the Palestinian Authority is weak and lacks self-confidence, and that Gen. Dayton's training helps bolster confidence. He explained that the GOI had consulted with Egypt and Fatah prior to Operation Cast Lead, asking if they were willing to assume control of Gaza once Israel defeated Hamas. Not surprisingly, Barak said, the GOI received negative answers from both. He stressed the importance of continued consultations with both Egypt and Fatah -- as well as the NGO community -- regarding Gaza reconstruction, and to avoid publicly linking any resolution in Gaza to the release of kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.
Iran/North Korea
----------------
7. (C) In his meeting with CODEL Casey, Barak said the GOI believes its "keystone" relations with the USG remain strong. He described the integral role the USG plays in preserving Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME), especially when faced with threats posed by Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas. He noted that the GOI's positions on Iran are well known, and described North Korea's recent nuclear test as a "second wake-up call" (the first being the AQ Khan network). Barak asked rhetorically how a lack of firm response to North Korea would be interpreted by Iran's leadership, speculating the USG would be viewed as a "paper tiger."
8. (C) In both meetings, Barak said "no option should be removed from the table" when confronting Iran and North Korea; engagement will only work in conjunction with a credible military option, he said. Barak said he was
TEL AVIV 00001177 002 OF 002
personally skeptical that engagement would lead to an acceptable resolution, and argued in favor of a paradigm shift to confront the triple threat posed by nuclear proliferation, Islamic extremist terrorism, and rogue/failing states. He said a strategic partnership with China, Russia, India, and the EU is essential in facing these threats. Barak argued that failure to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran would result in a nuclear arms race in the region as Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia look to acquire nuclear weapons.
9. (C) When asked if the USG and GOI have fundamental differences of opinion when assessing Iran's nuclear program, Barak said we share the same intelligence, but acknowledged differences in analysis. He suggested that the USG view is similar to presenting evidence in a criminal court case in which a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty. As such, USG standards are tougher -- especially following the failure to find WMD in Iraq -- while end-products such as the 2007 NIE unintentionally take on a softer tone as a result. Barak said the fate of the region and the world rests on our ability to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons -- as such, the standards for determining guilt should be lower as the costs are higher.
10. (C) In both meetings, Barak described Iranians as "chess, not backgammon players." As such, Iran will attempt to avoid any hook to hang accusations on, and look to Pakistan and North Korea as models to emulate in terms of acquiring nuclear weapons while defying the international community. He doubted Tehran would opt for an open, relatively low-threshold test like the recent one in North Korea. Rather, Iran will seek ways to bypass the NPT while ensuring its program is redundant and well-protected to prevent an irreparable military strike. Barak estimated a window between 6 and 18 months from now in which stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons might still be viable. After that, he said, any military solution would result in unacceptable collateral damage. He also expressed concern that should Iran develop nuclear capabilities, other rogue states and/or terrorist groups would not be far behind.
Pakistan
--------
11. (C) Barak reinforced his message regarding Pakistan in both meetings. He described Pakistan as his "private nightmare," suggesting the world might wake up one morning "with everything changed" following a potential Islamic extremist takeover. When asked if the use of force on Iran might backfire with moderate Muslims in Pakistan, thereby exacerbating the situation, Barak acknowledged Iran and Pakistan are interconnected, but disagreed with a causal chain. To the contrary, he argued that if the United States had directly confronted North Korea in recent years, others would be less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons programs. By avoiding confrontation with Iran, Barak argued, the U.S. faces a perception of weakness in the region.
12. (U) CODELS Casey and Ackerman did not have the opportunity to clear this message.
********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv ********************************************* ******************** CUNNINGHAM
Saturday, 03 November 2007, 05:03
S E C R E T STATE 152317
EO 12958 DECL: 10/31/2027
TAGS PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: POST REQUESTED TO FOLLOW UP ON ONGOING MATTERS OF
PROLIFERATION CONCERN RAISED AT APEC BY PRESIDENT BUSH
REF: (A)STATE 071143, (B)STATE 073601, (C)STATE 72896, (D)BEIJING 5361, (E) STATE 148514
CLASSIFIED BY EAP DAS THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN: 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (S) URGENT ACTION REQUEST: IN SEPTEMBER DURING THEIR MEETING AT THE APEC SUMMIT IN SYDNEY AUSTRALIA, PRESIDENT BUSH DISCUSSED WITH CHINESE PRESIDENT HU STRONG CONCERNS RELATING TO THE ONGOING TRANSSHIPMENT VIA BEIJING OF KEY BALLISTIC MISSILE PARTS FROM NORTH KOREA TO IRAN'S MISSILE PROGRAM. PRESIDENT BUSH PLEDGED TO RESPOND TO PRESIDENT HU'S REQUESTS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. EMBASSY SHOULD ON NOVEMBER 3 AT THE MOST EFFECTIVE LEVEL POSSIBLE, DELIVER THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 8 WHICH RELATES TO SPECIFIC, TIME- SENSITIVE INFORMATION ABOUT AN IMMINENT TRANSSHIPMENT. IN ADDITION, AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY POST SHOULD DELIVER THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 9 TO MFA AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY BY THE AMBASSADOR SINCE THIS IS IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS.
----------
OBJECTIVES
----------
2. (S/REL CHINA) Post should:
--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Request China to stop an imminent shipment to Iran's ballistic missile program. This is the same cargo that the Ambassador shared about on October 25 (ref E). It is now scheduled to leave Beijing airport on November 4.
--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Note the importance of this demarche since it relates to a topic discussed by Presidents Bush and Hu in Sydney. Embassy should further note that the Embassy will be seeking an appointment at the highest level possible to convey a more extensive presentation on this topic of ballistic missile parts from North Korea to Iran.
--Remind Chinese officials that President Bush has been personally engaged on the issue of the transshipment of ballistic missile parts between North Korea and Iran via Beijing and that he raised this issue with President Hu at the APEC Summit.
-- Seek information on the steps China has taken since the APEC discussion to address this issue and impress on them the necessity for China to take immediate strong action.
-- Stress that the credibility of UN Security Council actions must be maintained by vigorous implementation by UN Member States of UNSC resolutions calling for Chapter VII sanctions, particularly 1718, 1737, and 1747.
--Indicate that the U.S. believes that the proliferation of missile technology between North Korea and Iran will increase and that these two countries will attempt to conduct these transfers through Chinese territory.
--Emphasize the need to inspect cargo and personal goods on regularly scheduled flights transiting Beijing from North Korea to Iran in order to detect and deter these shipments.
--Explain to Chinese officials that the U.S. carefully reviews the intelligence material that we have on shipments before we share it, and we ask that Chinese authorities respect this and act on our information accordingly and appropriately.
--Indicate that the United States believes that we can work together cooperatively and effectively on these issues.
--Express our willingness to continue to share as much information as possible to assist China's efforts to uphold these UN Security Council resolutions.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
Background: Ballistic Missile Parts Shipped via Beijing Between North Korea and Iran.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
3. (S/Rel China) Iran and North Korea have continued their longstanding cooperation on ballistic missile technology, via air- shipments of ballistic-missile related items. We assess that some of these shipments consist of ballistic missile jet vanes that frequently transit Beijing on regularly scheduled flights on Air Koryo and Iran Air. We believe that the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) is the probable end user for these parts. SBIG is listed in the annex to UNSCR 1737 and these jet vanes are controlled under Item 10.A.2 of the Missile Technology Control Regime and Item 6 of China's missile- related export control regulations. Moreover, UNSCRs 1718 and 1737 prohibit the transfer to or from North Korea or Iran, respectively, of jet vanes and any other item listed in UNSC document S/2006/815. These shipments therefore represent violations of UNSCRs 1718 and 1737.
4. (S/Rel China) The U.S. has raised this issue with China at the highest levels several times in the last few months. In May 2007, the United States informed China of imminent shipments on three separate occasions (Refs A,B and C). Though Chinese officials informed Embassy Beijing that China's investigations have found no evidence of these transfers, it appears that these shipments did occur and are continuing to transit via Beijing. In addition this issue was raised by ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney during bilateral nonproliferation talks in August 2007 (Ref D). The Deputy Secretary also raised this issue with Executive Vice Foreign Minister (EVFM) Dai Bingguo via during a telephone conversation in August. Finally, in September 2007, President Bush discussed this issue with Chinese President Hu at the APEC summit in Sydney. The two leaders agreed that the USG would provide the PRC with further information on these transfers.
5. (S/Rel China) On October 25 the U.S. provided PRC officials with detailed information, including the airway bill and flight number, of another imminent shipment of military related goods from North Korea to Iran via Beijing. This shipment was also assessed as destined for Iran's solid propellant missile development organization, the Shahid Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG). We now have information that the goods will be shipped on November 4 and insist on a substantive response from China to this information.
6. (S/Rel China) Our information indicates that at least 10 air shipments of jet vanes have transited Beijing thus far and that these shipments will not only continue but will also grow in volume. We have encouraged the Chinese to undertake frequent inspections of cargo on Air Koryo or Iran Air flights transiting Beijing from North Korea to both deter and detect these shipments.
7. (S/Rel China) The Department is seeking both immediate action on this new information and a strategic approach with regards to this critical issue. We assess that the best way to prevent these shipments in the future is for Chinese authorities to take action, such as those identified in para 9, that will make the Beijing airport a less hospitable transfer point.
--------------------------------------------- --------
NON-PAPER ON URGENT MATTER TO BE DELIVERED NOVEMBER 3
--------------------------------------------- --------
8. (S/Rel China) Begin points:
-- Last week we raised with you information regarding North Korean plans to send a shipment, probably for Iran's ballistic missile program, to Iran. We believe the cargo is intended for Iran's Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), which is responsible for Iran's solid-propellant ballistic missile program. You had requested additional information.
-- We now have reason to believe that the items above will be shipped to Iran via scheduled Iran Air flight on November 4.
--If these goods are missile-related, North Korea is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile-related items and UN Member States are prohibited from importing those items. In addition, North Korea would potentially be precluded under UNSCR 1737 from transferring these items to Iran if they are among the missile-related components included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or China determines that they would contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such, is subject to the mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution. With these concerns in mind we are asking that Chinese authorities investigate this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to Iran.
------------------------------------------
BEGIN NON-PAPER FOR DELIVERY BY AMBASSADOR
------------------------------------------
9. (S/REL CHINA) Begin Points:
--Over the past several months we have raised with Chinese officials the problem of ballistic missile-related transfers between Iran and North Korea being transshipped through China. President Bush raised U.S. concerns on this matter with President Hu during the APEC summit in Sydney, demonstrating the importance of the issue to the United States. In response to President Hu's request for additional details, we are providing you further information regarding these activities. Specifically, we are urgently providing information regarding an imminent shipment of serious concern.
-- North Korea is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile- related items and UN Member States are prohibited from importing those items. In addition, North Korea would potentially be precluded under UNSCR 1737 from transferring these items to Iran if they are among the missile-related components included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or China determines that they would contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such, is subject to the mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution. With these concerns in mind we are insisting that Chinese authorities urgently investigate this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to Iran.
--We are very concerned that North Korean shipments of jet vanes occur on regularly scheduled commercial air flights transiting through Beijing. We believe this has been the case on about 10 flights.
--These items are likely intended for Iran's solid propellant missile development organization, the Shahid Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG).
--These cargo shipments probably include front companies.
--We have identified a large number of shipments beginning late last year of what are probably ballistic missile-related items that have transited Beijing, and we would like to share further information on these shipments.
--[DETAILS REMOVED] December 2006: A delegation from SBIG returned from Pyongyang probably via Beijing and transported what we assess to be jet vanes for a solid propellant medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) under development in Iran.
--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] January 2007: North Korea delivered what were probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.
--On or around [DETAILS REMOVED] January 2007: North Korea delivered what were probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.
--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] May 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.
--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] May 2007: An air shipment composed of five what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.
--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] June 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.
-- On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] June 2007: An air shipment composed of five what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.
--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] June 2007: An air shipment composed of three what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.
--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] July 2007: An air shipment composed of ten what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.
--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] July 2007: An air shipment possibly composed of an unknown number of jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.
--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] August: An air shipment possibly composed of one jet vane from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.
--We believe that the number of jet vanes sent to Iran will increase dramatically in the future.
--To date we believe that about 40 probable jet vanes have been sent from North Korea to Iran.
--The contract for these components called for a total number of 500 and we assess that shipments of these may increase to a rate of 100- 160 per month.
--In addition, our information indicates that a second order of 1,500 components - possibly additional jet vanes - was agreed to in December of last year.
-- We believe that this trade will continue to utilize regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.
--As we have discussed on several occasions, Iran also has been seeking probable tungsten-copper alloy plates from China's Dalian Sunny Industries, also known as LIMMT. Dalian Sunny Industries shipped part of an order for this material in September. These plates are suitable for Iranian domestic production of jet vanes or as an insulator for ballistic missile components. Iran could be seeking these plates in case North Korea is unable to provide the quantity or quality of jet vanes required.
--We urge you to prevent such shipments via whatever action you deem appropriate, including frequent inspection of [NAMES REMOVED] flights. The use of regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights indicates that frequent regular inspections of [NAMESREMOVED] flights are in order and would help deter these shipments in the future.
--We will continue to provide you with relevant information to help end this proliferation.
------------------------------
Reporting Requirement and POC
------------------------------
10. (U) Please report delivery of cable and any immediate response by November 8, 2007.
11. (U) Washington point-of-contact for follow-up information is Matthew Zartman (202) 647-7588, zartmanml@state.sgov.gov. Please slug all responses for ISN, T, and EAP. Washington appreciates Post's assistance.
RICE
Wednesday, 18 November 2009, 17:29
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 11 STATE 119085
SECRET//NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 11/17/2034
TAGS ASEC, CVIS, PINR, PREF
SUBJECT: WALK-IN GUIDANCE FOR 2009: HANDLING
FOREIGN NATIONAL WALK-INS, DEFECTORS, AND ASYLUM SEEKERS
REF: (A) 08 STATE 061194 (B) 7 FAM 180 (C) 09 STATE 030541 (D) 04 STATE 061816 (E) 2 FAM 227 (F) 08 STATE 110175 (G) 09 STATE 110904 (H) 9 FAM 42.1 N4, PN2-5, and PN7
(U) Classified by: David Appleton, Director, INR/CCS, Reason: 1.4 (c, d).
SUMMARY AND TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. (S/NF) This telegram replaces Ref A as the Department's comprehensive guidance on handling foreign national walk-ins, defectors, and asylum seekers - all of whom are generally referred to in this telegram as "walk-ins." This telegram was coordinated with interagency partners, including CIA, DHS, DIA, and the FBI. It explains the procedures for receiving walk-ins; determining whether they are of intelligence value and whether defector, temporary refuge, protection, resettlement, parole, or other status is appropriate; and coordinating an appropriate response. A link to this telegram will be included in the Chief of Mission (COM) Guide on ClassNet (http://diplomaps.state.sgov.gov/com). (For guidance on handling U.S. citizens requesting emergency protection ("temporary refuge") at posts, see Ref B.)
2. (S/NF) COMs should ensure that all post personnel are properly prepared to handle walk-ins. Post management, RSO, and GRPO have the most responsibility for ensuring proper handling of walk-ins, but other officers may play critical roles.
3. (S/NF) Correct handling of walk-ins is important for three principal reasons. Walk-ins (1) may be sources of invaluable intelligence; (2) pose numerous security challenges; and (3) may need protection. Improper handling of walk-ins can put them and post personnel at risk and result in the loss of important intelligence. Thus, post's procedures must be clear, well-understood, and workable at any hour, day or night.
4. (U) Questions or comments regarding the guidance in this telegram should normally be directed by telegram to INR/CCS, which will coordinate a Department response. If additional guidance is required in an emergency walk-in situation, however, post should contact the Department's Operations Center (202-647-1512), which will alert the appropriate Department personnel.
5. (U) This telegram contains the following sections:
A. - Storage and dissemination of this telegram (paragraph 6) B. - Post preparation for handling walk-ins (paragraphs 7-23) C. - Procedures for handling walk-in arrivals (paragraphs 24-33) D. - Requirements for reporting on walk-ins (paragraphs 34-39) E. - Temporary refuge guidance and cautions (paragraphs 40-52) F. - Long-term options for walk-ins(paragraphs 53- 63) G. - Travel assistance for walk-ins(paragraphs 64- 65)
END SUMMARY.
Section A. STORAGE AND DISSEMINATION OF THIS TELEGRAM
6. (U) Posts should retain this telegram in the RSO's files and in a location accessible to duty officers, replacing and destroying Ref A and any other prior versions. RSOs should ensure that all officers have read this telegram and know where it is retained.
Section B. POST PREPARATION FOR HANDLING WALK-INS
7. (S/NF) Each post's Counterintelligence Working Group (CIWG) should meet upon receipt of this telegram to review post's procedures for dealing with walk-ins. The CIWG should ensure that post's procedures are consistent with the guidance in this telegram and local security concerns, include appropriate defensive security measures, and allow screened walk-ins to meet securely with appropriate post officials.
8. (S/NF) Post's walk-ins procedures should include (1) special procedures for the reception of embassy (including consular section) walk-ins of possible intelligence value; (2) procedures for constituent posts, if any; and (3) procedures for approaches at residences, in vehicles, on the street, via telephone, and through both electronic and hand-delivered mail. Heightened security at USG installations increases the possibility of approaches to USG officials outside USG facilities. Because of the inherent risks, however, post procedures should permit arranging substantive meetings outside post only in exceptional circumstances and only after approval of the COM based on the recommendations of the RSO and GRPO.
9. (S/NF) Post's procedures must allow for appropriately balancing the following considerations which may come into play in walk-in cases:
(a) post security; (b) the safety of the individual; (c) the intelligence value and bona fides of the individual; (d) whether the individual requires protection and, if so, whether appropriate protection is available from international organizations or host-country sources; (e) whether the individual should be resettled outside the host-country and, if so, whether resettlement in another country or the United States is possible; (f) the time available for resolution of the case; and (g) the need to safeguard the confidentiality of any information that may have a bearing on a future consular-related activity or possible resettlement request.
10. (S/NF) Post's procedures must be cleared by the RSO and coordinated with the GRPO and, at posts with an FBI Legal Attache (LEGATT), with the LEGATT. (All three should be on post's CIWG.) Post's RSO should update post's walk-in plan with the GRPO and LEGATT, if any, on a semi-annual basis or as needed.
11. (S/NF) RSOs should ensure that all relevant potential participants in handling walk-ins are appropriately briefed and trained. Non-cleared personnel can be told that a USG official will interview walk-ins, because that fact is not classified. The fact that a walk-in may be referred to other post officials for a decision on further actions is classified and may not be shared with non-cleared personnel. All briefings should emphasize the importance of ensuring that the walk- in is fully screened, but should also convey that legitimate walk-ins may exhibit nervous or anxious behavior, particularly because access controls and host nation security forces around many of our diplomatic posts make it difficult for walk-ins to approach our facilities discreetly. All briefings should also stress the importance of not drawing attention to the walk-in or alerting host nation security personnel.
12. (S/NF) RSO briefings should include (1) briefing those who may have first contact with a walk-in - including non-USG local guards and receptionists - on the procedures to follow at first contact; (2) providing additional briefings to MSGs, other USG security personnel, and USG duty officers on a semi-annual basis or as needed on more sensitive aspects of the program; (3) briefing consular officers on handling walk-ins who approach through a consular service window; and (4) briefing all arriving cleared USG personnel on the procedures for approaches that occur off post premises (as part of the arrival briefing).
13. (S/NF) To ensure that walk-ins can communicate their wishes clearly, post may wish to prepare language cards that can be shown at first contact to a walk-in who does not speak English, giving options from which the walk-in can select. One option should be "I wish to speak with an American official." Other options should be plausible alternatives, such as "I wish to obtain information about travel requirements." In addition to the local language, post should consider having such cards available in priority interest languages such as Russian, Spanish, Arabic, Farsi, Mandarin, and Korean, as appropriate in light of the local environment.
14. (S/NF) The RSO should incorporate post's procedures into the MSG and local guard orders as necessary.
15. (S/NF) Posts should designate a room, preferably outside the Public Access Control (PAC) hard-line, for conducting the initial interview of a walk-in.
16. (S/NF) Post should have an interview guide that can be used during the initial interview, and should maintain a current roster of cleared USG personnel who can provide interpretation services to assist the RSO and others in interviewing walk- ins as required.
17. (S/NF) Post procedures should clearly identify the officer who will do the initial interview of a walk-in, and a backup for when that officer is absent. (These are normally the RSO and Assistant RSO.) These officials should have a prearranged signal and appropriate contact numbers for notifying GRPO of a walk-in of possible intelligence value.
18. (S/NF) MSGs, local guards, and receptionists should have a codeword or pre-arranged signal to alert the RSO (or other designated officer) of a person requesting to speak with a U.S. officer.
19. (U) Post should verify that current phone numbers, addresses, and directions for host government offices that handle refugee claims and the local offices of the UNHCR and UNDP are included in post's walk-in procedures and the duty officer handbook. This information should also be readily available as a handout for walk-ins.
20. (U) Post procedures should contain current information on the host government's legal obligations towards persons claiming to be refugees or to be in danger of being tortured. These obligations may arise from the host country's domestic law and/or treaty obligations. States party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 African Union Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa have agreed not to expel or return refugees, as defined in those instruments, from their territory under certain circumstances. States party to the 1987 Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment have agreed not to expel or return an individual from their territory to another country where there are substantial grounds for believing that he/she would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
21. (S/NF) RSO and GRPO should coordinate any operational tests of walk-in procedures.
22. (S/NF) RSOs should review walk-in procedures with constituent posts and ensure that they are properly prepared to handle walk-ins. This should include ensuring that constituent post's procedures are also incorporated into local guard orders as necessary.
23. (S/NF) Posts without an RSO, GRPO, or UNHCR/UNDP presence in-country should promptly develop additional post-specific guidance to ensure that the guidance in this telegram is adjusted to fit their situation.
Section C. PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING WALK-IN ARRIVALS
24. (S/NF) The MSG, local guard, receptionist, or other employee or official who first makes contact with the walk-in should ascertain whether the walk- in wishes to talk with the USG official, using the language cards as necessary. If so, they should use the pre-arranged signal to inform the USG official designated to deal with walk-ins (normally the RSO or Assistant RSO) as soon as possible. Posts with MSGs may wish to instruct non-USG local guards, receptionists, and others likely to be a walk-in's first point of contact to refer a walk-in who wishes to speak with a USG official to the MSG, and then have the MSG involve the RSO.
25. (C) Post's first priority must be to determine whether the individual is carrying a weapon, device, or hazardous material that endangers post personnel. Walk-ins must be screened and searched before being permitted within the security perimeter. If a walk-in possesses any object or item that appears suspicious or potentially hazardous, security personnel should deny access even if the walk-in presents the item as evidence of some intelligence he offers, e.g., red mercury presented as proof of plutonium enrichment. Security personnel are not required to prove that an object, item, or material is hazardous to refuse entry to the walk-in. Only DS-supplied and/or DS- approved instruments should be used to examine suspect material. Posts should follow established DS and Department procedures for screening and reporting suspect materials, e.g., white powder incidents. In the event post encounters material or information relating to alleged radioactive materials, please refer to Ref C for comprehensive interagency approved guidance.
26. (C) The walk-in's identification and/or travel documents should be copied as soon as the walk-in is screened in, if at all possible. Otherwise, the papers should be copied before the end of the walk- in's initial interview. Identifying and keeping records of walk-ins is important for security and intelligence reasons; copying their identity documents early is advisable because walk-ins may get cold feet and leave if kept waiting for an interview.
27. (S/NF) After the walk-in has been searched, the RSO or designated alternate must interview the walk-in, using post's interview guide. The RSO should attempt to establish the individual's bona fides. (Walk-ins may in fact be mentally disturbed persons, intelligence vendors, fabricators, provocateurs from hostile intelligence services, or persons gathering information on behalf of terrorist organizations.) Once the subject's bona fides are established to the RSO's satisfaction, the RSO should establish what the walk-in wants, whether the walk-in appears to be of possible intelligence or counterintelligence interest, how much time the walk-in has, and methods for future contact, among other information. The RSO must also attempt to determine whether the individual is in imminent danger, including (1) immediate physical danger, (2) danger of involuntary repatriation to a country where the individual's life or freedom would be threatened for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, or (3) danger of involuntary repatriation to a country where it is more likely than not that the individual will be subjected to torture. Finally, the RSO may have reason to interview the individual for information regarding potential threats to USG personnel and facilities. (If such information is obtained, the RSO generally should advise the LEGATT and should consider flagging the individual for the Rewards for Justice Program.)
28. (S/NF) Monitoring of foreign nationals in walk-in rooms overseas is permitted only in accordance with guidelines set forth in Ref D. All other recording or monitoring conducted by post employees, including those in cover positions, must be consistent with the Department Notice of January 24, 1977 ("the Vance Memorandum"), which states that "No officer or employee of the State Department . . . shall direct, arrange for, permit, or undertake the monitoring or mechanical or electronic recording of any conversation, including any telephone conversation, without the express consent of all persons involved in the conversation," unless advance approval is granted by the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of State. (Reproduced at Tab U, Special Agent's Legal Authorities, available at http://intranet.state.gov.)
29. (C) Post personnel should never leave a walk- in unattended. If possible, two or more post officials should work together during the interview phase.
30. (S/NF) If the RSO finds the walk-in credible and to be of possible foreign intelligence or counterintelligence interest, the RSO should follow post procedures to ensure transfer of the walk-in to the GRPO as quickly as possible with minimal exposure to other post personnel. The GRPO will determine further actions (interview, contact again at a later date, etc.).
31. (C) Post must strictly limit disclosure of the fact of any request for temporary refuge, departure from the host country, asylum in the United States, third-country visa assistance, issuance or refusal of visas or permits to enter the United States, and requests to resettle elsewhere. Only USG personnel with a need-to-know should be made aware of such requests.
32. (C) Post should provide no comment in response to press inquiries, unless otherwise instructed by the Department.
33. (C) Post must consult with the Department prior to responding to congressional inquiries on specific walk-in cases.
Section D. REQUIREMENTS FOR REPORTING ON WALK-INS
34. (S/NF) If a walk-in is of intelligence interest, the case will be handled by the Intelligence Community (IC) once that interest is established, and reporting on the case will occur in IC channels. Post must notify the Department of all/all cases not handled within the IC and involving the following, using the reporting channels described in paragraphs 37-39 below except where otherwise indicated:
(a) A person who may have information on immediate threats to USG personnel or facilities. See paragraph 35 below for reporting channel instructions. (b) A person who possesses information regarding plans and intentions of governments and/or organizations hostile to the United States. (c) A person who may have information on weapons proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, or any significant new intelligence or military-related subjects. (d) A foreign diplomat, foreign consular officer, other foreign government official (including members of the national police and the military), or political party official, regardless of his/her country of nationality. (e) A person who appears threatened by involuntary repatriation to a country where the person's life or freedom would be threatened for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, or where it is more likely than not that the person would be tortured. See paragraph 36 below for reporting channel instructions. (f) Persons seeking resettlement (including "asylum") in the United States. See Section E (paragraphs 40-52) below and Ref E for additional guidance on such cases. (g) Persons granted temporary refuge. See paragraphs 50-52 for instructions on reporting such cases.
35. (S/NF) Security threat information reportable per paragraph 34(a) above should be reported via TERREP or TERREP exclusive channel telegram (as appropriate) as soon as possible. Threat information of an extremely urgent nature should be provided to the RSO and other appropriate post officials immediately and relayed to the DS Command Center (DSCC) at (571) 345-3146 or via DSCC secure line at (571) 345-7793.
36. (S/NF) Cases involving threats of involuntary return as described in paragraph 34(e) above should be brought to the Department's attention immediately, by phone, email or cable slugged for PRM/A, with U.S. Mission Geneva, attention Refugee and Migration Affairs (RMA), as an info addressee.
37. (S/NF) Except as specified above for threat and involuntary return cases, telegrams should be sent through normal channels, be slugged for INR/CCS, P, DS/CI, and the appropriate regional bureau, and describe the time-sensitivity of the case. INR/CCS is the action office and will distribute to other bureaus as appropriate. In extremely sensitive cases, post should send a Roger Channel telegram to INR/CCS, which will ensure appropriate, limited distribution.
38. (S/NF) If the case may require consideration of U.S. resettlement options, posts may also wish to slug PRM/A, DRL/MLGA, L/HRR, and CA/VO, and to add DHS/USCIS WASHDC as an info addressee.
39. (S/NF) All telegrams should use the PINR and ASEC tags. CVIS and PREF tags also should be used in potential resettlement cases. All telegrams referring to UNHCR should add U.S. Mission Geneva, attention Refugee and Migration Affairs (RMA), as an info addressee.
Section E. TEMPORARY REFUGE - CAUTIONS AND GUIDANCE
40. (S/NF) Walk-ins sometimes request that they be permitted to remain in an embassy or other USG facility beyond closing hours. The Department considers this a request for temporary refuge, not a request for asylum, and post officials should be particularly careful not to equate the two. In U.S. immigration law, asylum is a status granted to qualified refugees, and an application for "asylum" can only be made in the United States. A walk-in may request "asylum" in an embassy based on the erroneous belief that safe passage out of the host country will be assured if the request is granted. While a few mostly Latin American countries recognize such a right of "diplomatic asylum," the United States and most other countries do not recognize that concept or accept that the granting of refuge in an embassy is an authorized use of diplomatic facilities. A walk-in who requests "asylum" may also in substance be requesting an opportunity to resettle in the United States; guidance on such requests is below under long-term options.
41. (S/NF) Granting a walk-in temporary refuge in an embassy or other USG facility may actually increase the danger to an individual, particularly in hostile countries and if the individual is a host-country national. The longer the person remains, the more likely the host government will become aware of the request for temporary refuge and possibly take retaliatory action. In hostile countries, the United States generally is unable either to assure a walk-in's safe conduct out of the country or continued safety in the country once they leave post premises. Thus granting temporary refuge may lead to a protracted stalemate, with the walk-in effectively residing in post premises. "Residence within a post" of persons hostile to the host government could be a continuing source of controversy and lead to serious adverse effects on U.S. interests and unexpected financial implications for the post.
42. (U) In light of these factors, all foreign national walk-ins seeking refuge in a USG facility should be informed that post cannot ensure (a) their safe conduct out of the host country; (b) their future safety within the host country; or (c) their entry into the United States. They should also be informed that they may actually endanger their own welfare or interests by remaining at post.
43. (S/NF) Temporary refuge may never be granted to foreign nationals who simply wish to immigrate to the United States or evade local criminal law; if granting refuge would put post security in jeopardy; or if the Department instructs post not to do so.
44. (S/NF) Post should use appropriate measures to remove a person seeking refuge from the premises when temporary refuge is not warranted.
45. (S/NF) Only the COM or Principal Officer, or a person designated to act on their behalf in their absence, may grant a request for temporary refuge.
46. (S/NF) Temporary refuge may be granted only if there is compelling evidence that the walk-in is in imminent physical danger for any reason, or in imminent danger of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
47. (S/NF) Within the kinds of cases described in paragraph 46, post should grant temporary refuge in those rare situations in which an individual faces not just imminent physical danger, but immediate and exceptionally grave physical danger, i.e., possible death or serious bodily injury, either in the host country or in another country to which the individual will be summarily returned by host- country authorities.
48. (S/NF) Also within the kinds of cases described in paragraph 46, post may at its discretion grant temporary refuge if the physical danger or the danger of involuntary repatriation as defined above is less serious but appears imminent. In determining if granting temporary refuge is appropriate in such instances, post should consider the following questions:
(a) How serious and immediate is the threat to the walk-in? (b) Will the threat to the individual increase or decrease if the walk-in is allowed to remain at post? (c) Can the individual leave or be required to leave post without being noticed? (d) If detection by host government authorities is inevitable and the alleged threat is from the host government, can the walk-in's presence and subsequent departure be explained in a manner that will not further endanger the individual? (e) What are the likely consequences of allowing the individual to temporarily remain at the post with regards to the individual, other persons in the host country, the security of the post, and the safety of U.S. Government personnel? (f) Is the individual of intelligence value to the United States? (g) Is the person facing immediate and exceptionally grave physical danger on account of peaceful political, religious, or humanitarian activities consistent with U.S. values and policies?
49. (C/NF) Temporary refuge generally should not be granted at residential diplomatic or consular premises. The inviolability of diplomatic residences (except the COM's) is linked to the diplomat's residency and may be lost if the host government declares persona non grata (PNG) the diplomat whose residence is involved. Consular residences do not enjoy inviolability (unless it is provided by special agreement). As a practical matter all residences, whether diplomatic or consular, are generally less secure than the embassy or consulate.
50. (C) If temporary refuge is granted, post should notify the Department in an appropriately classified "NIACT Immediate" precedence telegram and should notify other relevant overseas posts by immediate precedence telegram. Telegrams to the Department should be slugged for INR/CCS, P, PRM/A, L/HRR, L/DL, DSCC, DRL/MLGA, CA/VO, and the appropriate regional bureau. DHS/USCIS WASHDC should be a direct telegraphic info addressee. Post also should notify the Department by telegram if temporary refuge is requested but denied, unless the case is clearly without merit, e.g., appeals by a drunken or deranged person.
51. (S/NF) If the host government (or the government of the alien's nationality, if the individual is a third-country national) requests an interview with a walk-in who is granted temporary refuge, post should notify the Department and await guidance. Post should not/not comply with such interview requests unless explicitly authorized to do so by the Department.
52. (SBU) If granted, temporary refuge should be terminated as soon as circumstances permit (e.g., when the period of active danger ends), but only with Department authorization. Post management should inform the Department (to the same addressees listed in paragraph 50) when temporary refuge is terminated. A person who has been granted temporary refuge may, of course, leave voluntarily whenever he/she wishes. Post management should reasonably ensure that the decision to leave is voluntary.
Section F. LONG-TERM OPTIONS
53. (U) Walk-ins often wish to resettle in the United States, but this may not be appropriate or possible. The United States encourages local or regional resettlement of refugees and international resettlement burden-sharing among many governments.
54. (C/NF) In routine cases involving walk-ins from third countries who may be refugees, the walk- in should be referred to the host government for adjudication of his or her status as long as the host country has satisfactory asylum or refugee- processing procedures. In most cases, potential refugees should also be referred to the local office of the UNHCR, especially if local refugee/asylum procedures are not available. UNHCR is mandated to provide protection for refugees and has primary international responsibility for seeking durable solutions for refugees, including possible opportunities for third-country resettlement. This mandate extends to UNHCR even in countries that are not party to any of the treaties just mentioned. Where there is no UNHCR office, UNHCR's responsibilities are normally handled by the local UNDP office. Beware, however, that in some countries UNHCR (or UNDP) may be placed in an awkward position if it is notified of a case and there is a need to conceal the case from the host government. If this possibility exists, post should approach UNHCR or UNDP discreetly.
55. (C/NF) If it appears that entry into the United States is the appropriate long-term solution to a walk-in's situation, the walk-in should not be issued a non-immigrant visa except in unusual circumstances after consultation with the Department. Non-immigrant admission will generally not be appropriate because the circumstances that lead an individual to become a walk-in normally lead also to ineligibility under section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as an intending immigrant. Admission to the United States therefore normally should be as a refugee or parolee. In some circumstances an immigrant visa may also be available.
REFUGEE ADMISSION
56. (U) A person outside the United States may be granted refugee admission if he or she qualifies as a "refugee" as defined in U.S. law and meets other applicable requirements. DHS has sole responsibility for adjudicating applications for refugee admission outside the United States. DHS/USCIS officers determine whether or not an individual is a refugee on a case-by-case basis after a personal interview. To qualify, a person must normally be outside his country. Given adequate justification, however, DHS may adjudicate an "in country" refugee application when requested by a U.S. Ambassador with the concurrence of PRM/A and DHS/USCIS in Washington. See Ref F, entitled "How a post can refer cases to the U.S. refugee admissions program", and Ref G, entitled "Worldwide processing priority system for FY 2010", for more information.
57. (U) The U.S. definition of "refugee" encompasses a person who, under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, is outside his or her country of nationality (or, if he or she has no nationality, the country of last habitual residence) and has experienced past persecution or has a well-founded fear of persecution in that country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. U.S. law deems the following persons to have been persecuted on account of political opinion: a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure, or for other resistance to a coercive population control program; a person who has a well-founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or be persecuted for such failure, refusal, or resistance.
58. (U) Persons admitted to the United States as refugees are eligible for initial reception and placement assistance from non-government organizations (NGOs) funded under cooperative agreements with PRM and for other publicly funded benefits.
59. (U) If the host government cannot or will not protect the individual from involuntary repatriation and UNHCR is unable to intervene, and post believes that the person may qualify as a refugee, post should contact PRM/A for guidance on how to proceed.
PAROLE
60. (S/NF) Foreign nationals may also travel to the United States pursuant to the Secretary of Homeland Security's parole authority under Section 212(d)(5) of the INA. Parole may be granted based on humanitarian or significant public benefit grounds. Authority over humanitarian parole requests rests with DHS/USCIS/RAIO/HAB. Authority over Significant Public Benefit Parole (SPBP) rests with DHS/ICE. DHS/ICE/OIA-LEPB has developed guidelines in consultation with the Department for the processing of SPBP cases. Guidelines for both types of parole are contained in Ref H.
61. (S/NF) Use of parole for a walk-in may be warranted in extraordinary cases, such as when no other resolution appears feasible and a walk-in is of special interest to the United States, when a walk-in is in immediate danger, or when the case is politically sensitive. If post wishes to pursue parole for a walk-in, it must submit a request by telegram, slugged for INR/CCS, CA/VO/F/P, DRL/MLGA, P, and the appropriate regional bureau. An info copy should go to the appropriate DHS bureau. The telegram must provide justification for the request; include a certification by the COM or the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) that the information provided is complete and accurate; and identify all interested agencies at post that were involved in reviewing and endorsing the request. A "CLASS" name check must be completed, and all required Security Advisory Opinion requests (SAOs) must be submitted. The results of the "CLASS" name check should be indicated in the cable.
62. (U) All financial arrangements for parolees must be made in advance. Post should not make any guarantees of such assistance, but should maintain a list of possible local sponsors that might be willing to assist (e.g., church groups or social service agencies in the United States), to contact in urgent situations if the parolee first agrees and signs a statement authorizing disclosure of his/her identity and situation to persons outside the U.S. Government. In some cases the Department may also be able to help by contacting private organizations in the United States to assist parolees upon arrival.
DEFECTORS
63. (S/NF) For the purpose of this telegram, the term "defector" refers to a person of any nationality (usually from a country whose interests are hostile or inimical to those of the United States) who has escaped from the control of their home country and is of special interest to the U.S. Government. Defector cases generally are handled under parole procedures. The GRPO will work out these arrangements with DHS/ICE and/or post's consular section once Washington's approval is obtained. The LEGATT should be notified of defector status as soon as practicable.
Section G. TRAVEL ASSISTANCE
64. (S/NF) If the appropriate agencies decide that a walk-in should be allowed to travel to the United States (in any of the capacities described above), transportation out of the host country and to the United States must be arranged. Transportation out of friendly countries should not pose a problem. Post should take appropriate steps, in coordination with the host government, to ensure that the individual is permitted to travel and protected from possible adverse actions (e.g., by their country of nationality). If the individual lacks means to pay for transportation, post should consult with the Department regarding options. Approved refugees are eligible for a transportation loan administered by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (the recipient will be responsible for eventual repayment). In exceptional circumstances, USG-funded transportation assistance for parolees may also be possible through IOM. Requests for such assistance should be sent to the Department (specifically PRM/A) for consideration.
65. (S/NF) In unfriendly countries, transportation out of the country may prove impossible or impractical. In such cases, the individual should be informed that if he/she makes their way to a more friendly country, the United States will consider them for admission. To the extent possible without compromising the confidentiality of the individual's request, post should monitor the situation and ensure that, if the individual leaves the country, he/she is met by USG or UNHCR officials at the first possible transit point.
66. (U) Minimize considered. CLINTON
Friday, 31 July 2009, 20:24
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 24 STATE 080163
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/31/2034
TAGS PINR, KSPR, ECON, KPKO, KUNR
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: THE UNITED
NATIONS
REF: STATE 048489
Classified By: MICHAEL OWENS, ACTING DIR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on the United Nations (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued DOS reporting of biographic information relating to the United Nations (paragraph 2).
A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the 2004 NHCD and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs focused on the United Nations. The review produced a comprehensive list of strategic priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs (paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on the United Nations. The priorities should also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).
B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.
C. (S/NF) Important information often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review of this National HUMINT Collection Directive. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels.
2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting:
A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community's collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination to the IC.
B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible when they have information relating to persons linked to : office and
STATE 00080163 002 OF 024
organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.
3. (S/NF) Priority issues and issues outline:
A. Key Near-Term Issues 1) Darfur/Sudan (FPOL-1) 2) Afghanistan/Pakistan (FPOL-1) 3) Somalia (FPOL-1) 4) Iran (FPOL-1) 5) North Korea (FPOL-1)
B. Key Continuing Issues 1) UN Security Council Reform (FPOL-1) 2) Iraq (FPOL-1) 3) Middle East Peace Process (FPOL-1) 4) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC-3) 5) UN Humanitarian and Complex Emergency Response (HREL-3) 6) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDN-5H) 7) Terrorist Threat to UN Operations (TERR-5H) 8) Burma (FPOL-1)
C. UN Peace and Peacebuilding Operations 1) Africa (FPOL-1) 2) Outside Africa (FPOL-1) 3) Policy Issues (FPOL-1)
D. UN Security Council 1) Procedures and Dynamics (FPOL-1) 2) Sanctions (FPOL-1)
E. UN Management 1) UN Leadership Dynamics (FPOL-1) 2) Budget and Management Reform (FPOL-1)
F. UN General Assembly Tactics and Voting Blocs (FPOL-1)
G. Other Substantive Issues 1) Food Security (FOOD-3) 2) Climate Change, Energy, and Environment (ENVR-4) 3) Transnational Economic Issues (ECFS-4H) 4) Arms Control and Treaty Monitoring (ACTM-4) 5) Health Issues (HLTH-4) 6) Terrorism (TERR-5H) 7) Trafficking, Social, and Women's Issues (DEPS-5H)
STATE 00080163 003 OF 024
H. Intelligence and Security Topics 1) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 2) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 3) Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations (FPOL-1) 4) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H)
15. Collection requirements and tasking
(Agriculture is the Department of Agriculture; Commerce is the Department of Commerce; DHS is the Department of Homeland Security; DIA/DH is Defense Intelligence Agency/Defense HUMINT; Energy is the Department of Energy; DNI/OSC is the Open Source Center of the Director of National Intelligence; FBI is the Federal Bureau of Investigation; HHS is the Department of Health and Human Services; Navy is the Navy HUMINT element; NCS/CS is the CIA's Clandestine Service; OSC/MSC is the Map Services Center of OSC; State is the Department of State; TAREX (Target Exploitation) collects information using HUMINT Methods in support of NSA's requirements; Treasury is the Department of Treasury; USAID is the U.S. Agency for International Development; USSS is the U.S. Secret Service; USTR is the U.S. Trade Representative; WINPAC is the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center.)
A. Key Near-Term Issues
1) Darfur/Sudan (FPOL-1). -- Views of United Nations (UN) member states on contributing troops and air transportation equipment, such as helicopters, to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the African Union (AU)-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). -- Details of deployments of troop contributor countries to UNMIS/UNAMID. -- Details on actions and views of UN personnel deployed in UNMIS/UNAMID. -- Views of UNSC members on the success or failure of UNMIS/UNAMID. -- Operational plans of UNMIS/UNAMID from both the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York, and UNMIS/UNAMID in Sudan. -- Details of diplomatic engagement between UNMIS/UNAMID Special Envoys for the Darfur Peace Process in Sudan, and the Sudanese government or Darfur rebel groups. -- Views of member states on UN activities in Sudan (including Darfur). -- Divisions between UN member and UN Secretariat assessments of the situation on the ground as it affects UN action.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Rwanda, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda,
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Vietnam International Organizations: AU, European Union (EU), UN
2) Afghanistan/Pakistan (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of key UN leaders and member states regarding the ongoing operations of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), including force protection in Afghanistan. -- Information on plans and intentions of UN leadership or member states affecting elections in Afghanistan. -- Reactions to and assessments of security threats directed at the UN or aid personnel attempting to render humanitarian assistance. -- Plans and intentions of key member states and Secretariat leadership concerning Afghan political and economic reconstruction, including efforts to combat warlords and drug trafficking. -- Afghan, Pakistani and Iranian intentions or reluctance to secure and safeguard UN and nongovernmental organization (NGO) personnel (international as well as locally-hired staff).
Countries: Afghanistan, Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Iran, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam Terrorist Groups: Taliban International Organizations: EU, UN, World Bank
3) Somalia (FPOL-1). -- UN plans and potential to expand, reinforce, or replace the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). -- Plans and intentions of UN leadership, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and member states to deploy a UN-led maritime force to monitor piracy off the coast of Somalia. -- Willingness of member states to pledge troops or air transport to a possible UN or multinational force in Somalia. -- Views of Somali population on the deployment of a UN or multinational peacekeeping force in Somalia. -- Details of diplomatic engagement between UN envoys and Somali government or Somali opposition officials. -- Information on World Food Program activities in Somalia. -- Details of UN Development Program (UNDP)-Somalia training Transitional Federal Government police officers and Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia officials in the Joint Security Force.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Somalia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, NATO, UN
4) Iran (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of the UN Secretary General (SYG),
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Secretariat staff, or member states to address efforts by Iran to develop, test, or proliferate nuclear weapons. -- Positions and responses of member states to future International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) Director General reports on Iran,s Implementation of Safeguards and relevant provisions of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. -- Specific plans and activities of the UK, France, Germany (EU-3), and Russia with respect to IAEA policy toward Iran. -- Plans and intentions of key UN leaders and member states, especially Russia and China, regarding human rights in Iran, sanctions on Iran, Iran,s arming of HAMAS and Hizballah, and Iran,s candidacy for UN leadership positions. -- Plans and intentions of Perm 5, other key member states, coalition partners, and key Secretariat officials concerning sanctions against Iran. -- Member support/opposition/subversion of US positions regarding Iranian sanctions. -- Iranian diplomatic efforts with the IAEA and UN member states to avoid passage of additional sanctions and effective implementation of existing sanctions, as well as its efforts to end UNSC involvement in Iran's nuclear program by returning Iran's nuclear file to the IAEA. -- Information on Iran,s activities as chair of the UNDP and within the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). -- Development and democratization activities of the UNDP in Iran; details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s relationship with Iranian officials.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam Terrorist Groups: HAMAS, Hizballah (Lebanese) International Organizations: EU, IAEA, UN Non-State Entities: West Bank and Gaza Strip
5) North Korea (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of UNSC members, especially the P-5, to consider additional resolutions against North Korea and/or sanctions under existing resolutions. -- Information on the plans and actions of UNSC members to address efforts by North Korea to develop, test, or proliferate nuclear weapons. -- UN views on food aid to North Korea, designating it as a nation in famine, and misuse of aid. -- North Korean delegation views and activities; instructions/plans of delegation officials on North Korean WMD-related issues. -- Development and democratization activities of the UNDP in North Korea. -- Details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s relationship with North Korean officials. -- Biographic and biometric information on ranking North Korean diplomats.
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Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, IAEA, UN
B. Key Continuing Issues
1) UN Security Council Reform (FPOL-1). -- Positions, attitudes, and divisions among member states on UN Security Council (UNSC) reform. -- Views, plans and intentions of Perm 5 and other member states on the issue of UNSC enlargement, revision of UNSC procedures or limitation of Perm 5 privileges. -- International deliberations regarding UNSC expansion among key groups of countries: self-appointed frontrunners for permanent UNSC membership Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan (the Group of Four or G-4); the Uniting for Consensus group (especially Mexico, Italy, and Pakistan) that opposes additional permanent UNSC seats; the African Group; and the EU, as well as key UN officials within the Secretariat and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Presidency. -- Willingness of member states to implement proposed reforms. -- Reactions of UN senior leadership towards member recommendations for UNSC reform.
Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, UN
2) Iraq (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of the Perm 5, other key member states, coalition partners, and key Secretariat officials concerning Iraqi political and economic reconstruction, the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), and internal Iraqi boundaries. -- Plans and intentions of the International Organization for Migration to assist with the reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees. -- Extent to which member states will support or subvert US positions regarding Iraqi objectives, including reconstruction efforts. -- Information on plans and intentions of the SYG, Secretariat staff, or member states affecting elections in Iraq. -- Iraqi actions to convert UNAMI to a Chapter 6 mission. -- Iraqi attitudes toward the UN. -- Reactions to and assessments of security threats directed at the UN or aid personnel attempting to render humanitarian assistance.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Iraq, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam
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Terrorist Groups: Insurgents in Iraq, Iraqi Shia Militants International Organizations: EU, UN, World Bank
3) Middle East Peace Process (FPOL-1). -- Details on views, plans and intentions of key Secretariat decision-makers, member states and influential blocs and coalitions on UN engagement and role in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), including implementation of the roadmap. -- Indications that a UNGA special session on the Middle East might be reconvened. -- Developments within the UN system that would further the Arab-Israeli peace process. -- Details about Quartet (EU, UN, US, and Russia) MEPP plans and efforts, including private objectives behind proposals and envoy negotiating strategies. -- Strategy and plans of SYG special envoy regarding US positions, Quartet plans, and other (EU, Russia, UK) special envoys. -- Indications member states or donor countries might scale back UN peacekeeping presence in or aid donations to the Middle East. -- Plans of the SYG or member states to pressure the US on the MEPP. -- Views, plans and tactics of the Palestinian Authority, including its representative to the UN, to gain support in the UNSC, UNGA, or UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) for its strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli issues, including from Russia and EU countries, especially France, Germany, and UK. -- Views of Secretary General,s Special Envoy and UNSC on possible settlement of the Shab'a Farms dispute to include Syria/Lebanon border demarcation. -- Secretariat views regarding water management as part of the Middle East Peace Process, including domestic and regional competition for allocation. -- Quartet views on Syria's policies and approach toward Israel and Palestinians and on Syrian motives behind and efforts to subvert or support Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. -- UN efforts to influence negotiating positions on territorial boundaries, water resources and management, and right of return. -- Views, plans and tactics of HAMAS to gain support in the UNSC or UNGA for its strategies and positions on HAMAS-Israeli issues, and on HAMAS-Palestinian Authority issues, including from Russia, China, Iran, and EU countries, especially France, Germany, and the UK. -- Information on UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) activities in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank, and its relations with HAMAS/Hizballah. -- Plans and intentions of member states to support/oppose US priority to reduce the number of Middle East resolutions.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica,
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Croatia, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Spain, Syria, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam Terrorist Groups: HAMAS, Hizballah (Lebanese) International Organizations: EU, UN Non-State Entities: Palestinian Authority, West Bank and Gaza Strip
4) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC-3). -- Plans and policies of UN leaders, member states, and foreign NGOs to promote human rights. -- Plans and intentions of member states toward the International Criminal Court (ICC), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and other UN-related courts and tribunals dealing with human rights issues. -- Plans and intentions of UNHRC members to support or oppose US policies in the UNHRC. -- Views of UNSC and other member states on Zimbabwe,s government policies on human rights, humanitarian assistance, democracy, and candidacy for any UN leadership positions. -- Views and intentions of UNSC, UN human rights entities, and members regarding Sri Lankan government policies on human rights and humanitarian assistance; UN views about appointing a Special Envoy for Sri Lanka. -- Plans and perceptions of member states toward establishment of new measures to prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other systematic human rights abuses. -- Plans and intentions of member states toward proposals and resolutions supported by the US or like-minded states, including those advancing democracy; women's rights, particularly implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1325 and 1820; those pertaining to children in armed conflict; or those condemning human rights abuses in individual countries. -- Information on reactions of member states to resolutions designed to promote democracy, human rights and reforms in the Muslim world. -- Perceived success or failure of abilities and priorities of the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), and efforts by member states to undermine OHCHR independence. -- Views, intentions and tactics of UNHRC members regarding reform and the role of the US. -- Member state support for/opposition to objectives of human rights, refugee, development, and emergency relief agencies. -- Plans and intentions of member states or UN Special Rapporteurs to press for resolutions or investigations into US counterterrorism strategies and treatment of detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan or Guantanamo. -- Degree of coordination by and among human rights agencies, especially between the UN Human Rights Council, the OHCHR,
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the UNGA Third Committee, the UN Economic and Social Council, and the International Labor Organization. -- Plans and agenda for upcoming UNGA Third Committee and UNHRC sessions and world human rights conferences, particularly plans by developing countries to stymie criticism of their human rights records through procedural motions or influencing votes. -- Plans of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to sponsor resolutions or conventions in the UN restricting freedom of speech under the rubric of criminalizing "defamation of religion." -- Details of UNHRC and OHCHR budget shortfalls.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Chad, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, France, Georgia, Iraq, Japan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Russia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe International Organizations: AU, EU, Human Rights Entities and War Crimes Courts, ICC, OIC, UN
5) UN Humanitarian and Complex Emergency Response (HREL-3). -- Information on the planning and execution of responses to humanitarian emergencies by UN member states and Secretariat; indications US assistance may be requested. -- Efforts of UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), World Food Program (WFP), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), and other UN entities to respond to and to coordinate activities in humanitarian or refugee crises, including environmental disasters. -- Views of UN Secretariat, UNSC members, and key member states on UNRWA. -- Details on effectiveness of UNHCR and OCHA leadership. -- Information on ability of UN to gain/not gain humanitarian access to troubled areas, especially in light of security concerns. -- Location of humanitarian facilities, including GPS coordinates, and number of personnel. -- Details of friction between UNHCR, OCHA and UN Security Coordinator Headquarters and field offices. -- Level of cooperation and coordination or lack thereof between UN aid agencies and non-UN aid programs. -- Interoperability and willingness to work with US coalitions in humanitarian assistance operations; willingness to provide support despite security threats. -- Indications of donor fatigue. -- Status of and member support for/opposition to efforts by UNHCR to refocus organization's work and to redistribute programs to other agencies. -- Details on UNHCR funding shortfalls. -- Perceived ability of the UNDP to coordinate an effective UN presence in each country and to promote democratic
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governance. -- Plans and ability to care for and protect internally displaced persons. -- Communications and logistics problems.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: Economic-Societal Entities, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN, World Health Organization
6) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDN-5H). -- Plans and intentions of member states to address threats to international security from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. -- Views of member states on tactical and substantive aspects of resolutions pertaining to missile proliferation, missile defense, nuclear disarmament, the IAEA, and Israel's nuclear program. -- Information from key Secretariat decision-makers, key IAEA Secretariat staff, member states, or influential blocs or groups, such as the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), the OIC, or the Group of 77 (G-77), on the role of the UN on nuclear proliferation or addressing the expansion of capabilities to produce or use weapons of mass destruction.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, IAEA, International Arms Control Organizations, OIC, UN
7) Terrorist Threat to UN Operations (TERR-5H). -- Plans and intentions of Secretariat and member states to respond to individuals affiliated with terrorist groups or state sponsors of terrorism threatening the safety or security of domestic and overseas UN personnel, facilities, protectees, or installations. -- Evidence of relationship or funding between UN personnel and/or missions and terrorist organizations. -- Debate in Secretariat, UNSC counterterrorism bodies (subcommittees), UN agencies and among member states about measures for funding of security for UN domestic and overseas facilities, operations, and personnel. -- Host-country intentions to secure and safeguard UN and NGO personnel. -- Reactions to and assessments of terrorist acts directed at the UN, UN personnel, UN protectees, or domestic and overseas UN installations, including foreign UN missions in New York. -- Details of UN efforts to acquire, collect, assess and disseminate threat information within the US and overseas. -- Plans of UN security offices to upgrade security at UN
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domestic and overseas UN facilities.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN
8) Burma (FPOL-1). -- Views of UNSC and member states on Burma,s policies and actions on human rights, humanitarian assistance, democracy, and attempts to play a larger UN role. -- Plans and intentions of the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General on Burma regarding future interaction with Burma and engagement with UN member states. -- Plans and intentions of the SYG on Burma; level of trust in his Special Adviser. -- Views of Burmese officials on the SYG, on his Special Adviser on Burma, and on key countries in the UN. -- Role of the UN in Burmese elections. -- Development and democratization activities of UNDP in Burma; details about the UNDP Resident Coordinator,s relationship with Burmese officials.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, Burma, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, UN
C. UN Peace and Peacebuilding Operations.
1) Africa (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of UN leaders and member states regarding peace operations, especially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Chad/Central African Republic, Burundi, Cote d,Ivoire, and Liberia. -- UN peacekeeping plans and intentions regarding military operations against rebels based in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. -- Early warning information available to the Secretariat on potential threats to peace and security. -- UN views on the role of AFRICOM in African conflict resolution and post-conflict capacity building. -- UN expectations of US military involvement in African peacekeeping missions and how this may influence UN willingness to establish, curb, or end missions. -- Extent to which UN peace operations in Africa are straining the resources of the UN and member states; impact of current operations on future operations and readiness. -- UN views on peacekeeping mission creep and pressures to expand the UN role in African conflict zones, either in the form of more comprehensive "peacemaking" mission mandates or in areas where security threats demand more aggressive and timely UN-led multilateral intervention. -- Details on views of the UN Department of Peacekeeping
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Operations on operational plans, including the ability of the UN and its member states to build capacity in Africa, including by working with the AU or other regional organizations and NGOs. -- Efforts by China, France, Iran, and others to gain influence in Africa via UN peace operations. -- Information on extent of support and capabilities for peace operations by the AU and the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS). -- Official stance on deploying HIV positive troops and actual practice. -- Degree to which official peacekeeping reporting matches unofficial communications of events; views on those discrepancies. -- Views of African states that host peacekeepers regarding UN peacekeeping troops and troop contributing countries. -- Attitudes and intentions of Ghana and Rwanda concerning UN peace operations in Africa and perception of their relative ability to contribute to such efforts. -- Attitudes of other African States to Ghana/Rwanda participation and leadership.
Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Congo, Cote d,Ivoire, Democratic Republic, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, India, Japan, Jordan, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zimbabwe International Organizations: AU, EU, ICC, NATO, UN Non-State Entities: Lord,s Resistance Army
2) Outside Africa (FPOL-1). -- Plans and intentions of UN leaders and member states regarding ongoing peace operations outside Africa. -- Willingness of UN leaders and member states to support UN peacekeeping efforts and utilize preventive diplomacy in areas of potential conflict. -- Views of member states on and plans to respond to the US-backed G-8 plan to expand global peace operations capabilities. -- Views and positions of key member states and Secretariat toward proposed resolutions, mandates, peacekeeping issues, and US-sponsored initiatives. -- Information on whether member states will utilize references to the ICC to condition support for peace operations. -- Information on deployment benchmarks, pre-deployment screening, and supply and logistic shortfalls in peace operations. -- Ability to obtain pledges and deploy capable military forces, including surge capabilities. -- Views of UNSC members, the Secretariat, and key member states on Haiti,s government policies and actions on human rights, humanitarian assistance, and democracy.
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-- Views and positions of UNSC members, the Secretariat, and key member states regarding the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and peacekeeping in Lebanon.
Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Georgia, Haiti, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, ICC, NATO, UN
3) Policy Issues (FPOL-1). -- UN member views, plans, and intentions concerning the capability of the UN to organize, lead, and carry out new, complex military operations and civilian police operations. -- Information on Secretariat or member views on or initiatives for peace operations reform. -- Information on the appointment of SYG special representatives for new peace or political operations. -- Scope, objectives, command structures, rules of engagement, and threat environment for proposed peacekeeping activities, including transportation and communications infrastructures and any available maps. -- Types, number, and capabilities of troops, equipment, and materiel that countries are willing to contribute. -- Information on interoperability of equipment and material available for logistic support. -- Information on turf battles between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, and Department of Political Affairs over control of peace operations. -- Information on turf battles between logistic and military sides of peace operations. -- UN member views on reform of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. -- Information on troop contributing countries' tendency to follow orders given by troop contributing country commanders vice UN field commanders. -- Influence of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) on including human rights and refugee concerns within peace operations mandates. -- Host government views and concerns about UN policies toward that country. -- Influence of UN security coordinator on operational planning; field personnel reaction to UN security directives. -- Capability/plans for Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) deployments. -- Details on peacekeeper abuse of women and children; national and UN responses. -- Changes in ability of member states, especially member states of EU, AU and ECOWAS, to contribute troops to peace operations, including for economic, social, and operational reasons. -- Details on contributions of member states (in kind,
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personnel, or financial).
Countries: Austria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, India, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, UN
D. UN Security Council
1) Procedures and Dynamics (FPOL-1). -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC members and Secretariat on issues that come before the UNSC, especially voting intentions of UNSC members and priorities or frictions among the Perm 5. -- Plans and intentions of UNSC members to support or oppose US policies in the UNSC. -- Specific views and positions of key member states on US-sponsored initiatives, initiatives with implications for the US, and other proposed resolutions and mandates. -- Plans, intentions, views, positions, lobbying, and tactics of regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the UNSC, especially those that do not include the US (particularly the Africa Group, AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group, Arab League, the OIC, and the Group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC). -- Differences in the positions of member states, differences between UN missions and their capitals, internal procedures for determining voting instructions, and voting instructions to delegations. -- Priorities, plans, and intentions of new member states joining the UNSC, and influences on them by regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the UNSC, especially those that do not include the US (particularly AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group, Arab League, and the OIC). -- Plans and intentions of member states of regional groups regarding UNSC candidacy. -- Biographic and biometric information on UNSC Permanent Representatives, information on their relationships with their capitals.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, OIC, UN
2) Sanctions (FPOL-1). -- UNSC member plans, intentions, and views toward sanctions issues, especially during negotiations of sanctions resolutions. -- Willingness of and efforts by UN member states to violate sanctions. -- Perceived and actual impact of sanctions on target
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governments, individuals, entities, as well as on civil population. -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC sanctions committee members. -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UNSC sanctions committee expert groups and their ability to support sanctions monitoring. -- Pressure to limit scope and length of new sanctions, especially from coalitions and regional groups. -- Views and actions of the Secretariat or member states with regard to sanctions, including to bolster UN ability to support sanctions implementation and to address violations. -- Views of target government on sanctions imposed on it.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Sierra Leone, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, UN
E. UN Management
1) UN Leadership Dynamics (FPOL-1). -- SYG's management and decision-making style, and his influence on the Secretariat. -- Plans, measures and efforts undertaken by the SYG and subordinates on US political and bureaucratic objectives for UN management. -- Role and influence of Secretariat and other key officials with SYG and other UN system agencies. -- Views of and brokering by key officials on major issues. -- Changes in and appointment and selection process for key officials of Secretariat, specialized agency, committee, commission, and program officials in New York, Geneva, Vienna, and other UN system cities, to include special assistants and chiefs of staff. -- Personalities, biographic and biometric information, roles, effectiveness, management styles, and influence of key UN officials, to include under secretaries, heads of specialized agencies and their chief advisers, top SYG aides, heads of peace operations and political field missions, including force commanders. -- Relations between key UN officials and member states. -- Views of member states on the next SYG race, to include preferred candidates and candidates lacking UN member support. -- Views of UNSC members and other member states on Cuban, Iranian, or Syrian candidacy for any UN leadership positions.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN
2) Budget and Management Reform (FPOL-1). -- Plans, measures and efforts undertaken by the SYG and
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subordinates on US political and bureaucratic objectives for UN management. -- Perceptions of member states of the effectiveness of the Office for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) to combat waste, fraud, mismanagement, and corruption. -- Effectiveness of the OIOS, in light of the review of the OIOS mandate. -- Plans and moves to implement OIOS recommendations. -- SYG's view of the role of the OIOS. -- Secretariat attitudes toward and evidence of corruption in UN agencies and programs, and willingness to implement measures to reduce corruption. -- Plans and intentions of UN member states or the Secretariat to address corruption issues at the UN and UN agencies. -- Plans and intentions of UNDP Executive Board members to push for or block management reform proposals. -- Plans and intentions of UNDP Executive Board members or senior UNDP managers to address potential or actual cases of corruption or mismanagement by field missions, including efforts to cover up waste, fraud, or abuse. -- Internal complaints by UNDP staff about waste, fraud, or abuse and efforts by UNDP management to respond to them. -- Plans and intentions of Board members, such as Iran, to push for increased UNDP funding for programs in their own countries or those of their friends. -- Degree of independence from UN headquarters of UNDP Resident Coordinators in the field and perceptions of field staff on UN aid consolidation reforms under the "One UN" Program. -- Efforts by the G-77 Board members to develop common group platforms, especially on budget and management reform issues. -- Developments in the implementation of the performance based personnel system and contractor reform. -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of UN specialized agency executive committees. -- Impact and effectiveness of whistle-blowing provisions on the UN reform process. -- Attitudes of UN staff and member states towards extending a common whistle-blower protection program to all UN funds and programs. -- Indications of pressure by member states or groups to increase or control growth in the budget. -- Secretariat and member attitudes towards changes in the scale of assessments. -- Options under consideration to resolve financial problems. -- SYG views on and plans for responding to Government Accountability Office reports calling on the UN to more effectively implement results-based budgeting, and make further progress on management reform. -- Secretariat and member attitudes and plans to improve the UN budget process. -- Status and use of advanced information systems to
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streamline UN processes.
Countries: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN
F. UN General Assembly Tactics and Voting Blocs (FPOL-1). -- Plans, intentions, views, positions, lobbying, and tactics of regional groups, blocs, or coalitions on issues before the General Assembly, especially those that do not include the US, i.e., the Africa Group, AU, EU, NAM, G-77, Rio Group, Arab League, the OIC, and the GRULAC. -- Details of bargaining on votes or candidacies and attempts to marginalize or undermine proposed or planned US positions or policy initiatives. -- Information on the EU agenda in the UNGA, especially as it relates to US priorities in the First, Third, and Fifth Committees. -- Information on efforts by the EU or other member states to secure additional voting rights in the UN and its specialized agencies. -- Lobbying by member states for committee membership assignments or vice presidencies. -- Information on current and likely future leadership of regional groups, blocs, and coalitions. -- Differences over positions between UN missions and their respective capitals. -- Voting instructions to delegations on key resolutions. -- Plans, intentions, and agendas of key committee chairs; member views of issues that come before these committees. -- Efforts of Third World countries to moderate, via NAM and G-77, Third World positions on development, defamation of religion, or human rights issues. -- Intentions of UN members to use non-UN bodies and working groups to bypass perceived UN bureaucracy. -- Perceptions of member states of the viability and potential impact of the US-backed Democracy Caucus. -- Biographical and biometric information on key NAM/G-77/OIC Permanent Representatives, particularly China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Senegal, and Syria; information on their relationships with their capitals.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: AU, EU, OIC, UN
G. Other Substantive Issues
1) Food Security (FOOD-3). -- Status and proposals related to the UN Comprehensive
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Framework for Action to address the global food crisis. -- WFP activities and proposals related to reforming donor food aid policies and establishing a new standing global fund to address regularly occurring food crises. -- WFP and FAO plans and proposals regarding the impact on food prices and food security of the growing use of ethanol and biofuels. -- Internal UN responses to international calls for reform of FAO and WFP.
Countries: Afghanistan, Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ethiopia, France, Haiti, Iraq, Japan, Libya, Mexico, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe International Organizations: FAO, UN, World Animal Health Organization Non-State Entities: Palestinian Authority, West Bank and Gaza Strip
2) Climate Change, Energy, and Environment (ENVR-4). -- Country preparations for the December 2009 Copenhagen UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Meeting. -- Developments related to other UNFCCC meetings and discussions on a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. -- Perceptions of key negotiators on US positions in environmental negotiations. -- Developments on the Montreal Protocol, including reactions to US efforts to limit hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). -- Indications that member states working through the UN and its specialized agencies are/are not fostering environmental cooperation, partnerships and capacity building between and among member states and regional and sub-regional organizations. -- Monitoring of and compliance with UN-sponsored environmental treaties; evidence of treaty circumvention. -- Information on adherence to member states' own national environmental programs, including protection, monitoring, and cleanup efforts. -- Efforts by treaty secretariats to influence treaty negotiations or compliance. -- Information on the Convention on Biological Diversity, particularly on access, benefit sharing and bio-safety. -- Information on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including potential efforts to modify or amend its provisions. -- Information on excessive maritime claims, including those relating to ridges. -- Information on efforts to develop a mechanism to add chemicals to the list of persistent organic pollutants. -- Information and perceptions on the strategic approach to international chemicals management, especially efforts of the EU's management program. -- Information on participation in and compliance with the UN Basel Convention. -- Status of efforts to set standards to promote
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environmental protection, including protection of forests, desertification, and invasive or endangered species. -- Efforts within the UN to protect water resources, and to promote development of alternative sources of energy.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, UN
3) Transnational Economic Issues (ECFS-4H). -- Information on efforts by UN member states or organizations to promote or obstruct regulatory reform, including banking and financial reforms, transparency, international law, trade, development, and foreign direct investment to reflect the Monterrey anti-poverty consensus and the Millennium Development Goals. -- Plans, intentions, and tactics of the UNGA President regarding international financial problems; views of member states regarding these plans. -- Plans and intentions of member states to support US priorities related to economic freedom and promotion of democracy. -- Secretariat or member plans to develop multilateral economic, trade, or development agreements impinging on US interests. -- Efforts by member states and the Secretariat to reconcile international differences over globalization, especially the perceived impact of globalization on human rights, labor, and environmental issues. -- Member positions on UN decisions, plans, and activities concerning environmentally sustainable economic growth through market economies, free trade, private investment, and efficient multilateral development assistance. -- Efforts to expand the global compact involving corporations committed to observing human rights, environmental, and labor standards. -- SYG's views and statements on trade issues and efforts to influence future World Trade Organization rounds. -- Plans and intentions of UN member states that may impact freedom of navigation. -- Information on international taxation initiatives.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, FAO, International Financial Institutions and Infrastructures, UN, World Bank, World Trade Organization
4) Arms Control and Treaty Monitoring (ACTM-4). -- Plans, tactics, timetables, and draft proposals for the Eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and especially
STATE 00080163 020 OF 024
information related to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone initiative, from interested individual member states (especially China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, and South Africa) and like-minded groups such as the NAM and the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden). -- Member state views of the major problems facing the NPT; whether or under what conditions states would consider withdrawing from the NPT. -- Member views on and responses to US plans and policies on missile defense and positions on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, particularly those of Russia, China, and Pakistan. -- Information on IAEA plans for safeguards, international fuel banks, or other nuclear fuel supply arrangements, and meetings of the Board of Governors at the IAEA. -- Member views on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); prospects for country ratifications and entry into force. -- Member plans for plenary meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group; views of the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. -- Readiness of member states to reform the agenda of the UN General Assembly's First Committee; proposals prepared by member states for the First Committee. -- Views of key delegations on US proposals on land mines. -- Tactical and substantive information regarding periodic arms control meetings in New York, Geneva, Vienna and elsewhere, including the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review process, UN experts group on missiles, and meetings on conventional arms. -- Plans and intentions of member states to introduce new arms control or proliferation prevention measures or make significant changes to existing agreements. - Member or Secretariat plans to address WMD proliferation, safeguards, arms control and disarmament, or other threat reduction efforts. -- Foreign attitudes on UN-sanctioned arms control negotiations. -- Biographic and biometric data on, and positions of key UN arms control interlocutors, especially candidates for the position of Director General of the IAEA, and the heads of other international institutions.
Countries: Austria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, IAEA, International Arms Control Organizations, NATO, OSCE, UN
5) Health Issues (HLTH-4). -- UN, WHO, and other international organizations,
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forecasts, expected impacts, plans, proposals, key studies, and reactions to major health crises and other health-related issues, including efforts on disease eradication, improving health standards and access to care and medicine, and programs to monitor and respond to emerging infectious disease outbreaks and other disasters or emergencies. -- Information on deliberations in the UN and other international health organizations on health issues and the policy positions and objectives of member states and key figures, including compromises, insertions, and items omitted in published declarations and studies. -- Information on international health organizations, relationships and interactions with countries and other organizations, including relationships with regional offices or subsidiaries. -- Details on limits and restrictions placed on international organizations to investigate reports of diseases that pose an international threat, including restrictions placed on the nationality of members of investigation teams. -- Details on disease transparency, particularly indications about inconsistent reporting of outbreaks to appropriate international organizations and delivery of specimens to WHO- and FAO-affiliated laboratories, and including discussions or agreements impacting the publicly disclosed occurrence of diseases. -- Details of discussions related to the accessibility of HIV/AIDS drugs (antiretroviral drugs or ARVs). -- Details related to the availability, accessibility, and regulation of health care, particularly medications, vaccines, and counterfeits. -- Member state attitudes toward maintenance of smallpox stocks. -- Information on global counterfeit medications to include surveillance, countermeasures, and research and development issues. -- Details on efforts to implement health-related Millennium Development Goals. -- Details on corruption in international health organizations or the corrupt use of goods and services provided for health issues by bilateral and multilateral donors and international health organizations, including WHO, UNAIDS, FAO, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. -- Details on irregularities in Global Fund fundraising, spending, and treatment of whistle blowers. -- Personalities, biographic and biometric information, roles, effectiveness, management styles, and influence of key health officials, to include the Director General of the WHO, head of UNAIDS, the Pan American Health Organization, under Secretaries, heads of specialized agencies and their chief advisers, and top aides.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey,
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Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, FAO, UN, World Animal Health Organization, WHO
6) Terrorism (TERR-5H). -- Information on plans and intentions of UN bodies and member states to respond to or address within UN fora the worldwide terrorist threat. -- Structure, plans and key figures of UN counterterrorism strategy. -- Information on plans and activities of UNSC,s four counterterrorism sub-bodies. -- Plans and intentions of member states to address terrorism by implementing anti-terrorism legislation as called for under resolutions, particularly as they relate to tracking financial transactions. -- Views of member states on US policy toward terrorism. -- Efforts of member states to support or oppose activities undertaken by UN specialized agencies such as the International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization to improve maritime and airline security. -- Information on UN support for technical assistance to member states to combat terrorism, particularly in Africa. -- Views of member states about inclusion or exclusion of terrorism against Israel in counterterrorism efforts and definition of terrorism. -- (For further requirements, see the NHCD on Terrorism Threats to US Interests at Home and Abroad, July 13, 2005.)
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN
7) Trafficking, Social, and Women's Issues (DEPS-5H). -- Plans and intentions of member states to support or oppose US priority to combat trafficking and exploitation of men, women, and children. -- Member state perceptions of ability of UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to follow through on strategies to support women and children through UN specialized bodies. -- Information on member efforts to combat organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and trafficking in persons. -- Plans and intentions of member states to address reproductive issues, including the aims of the EU vis-a-vis the US, GRULAC, Arab, and OIC nations. -- Member state perceptions or plans regarding efforts to reconcile religious differences worldwide. -- Information on reforms undertaken within the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and future plans of the organization. -- Member views on education initiatives.
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Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, OIC, UN
H. Intelligence and Security Topics
1) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.
2) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.
3) Foreign Nongovernmental Organizations (FPOL-1). -- Influence of key UN-affiliated foreign NGOs on UN decision-making. -- Efforts of foreign NGOs to undermine US policy initiatives. -- Foreign NGO role in, views toward, and influence on UN policies and activities on globalization, justice, human rights, the environment, and family/women/children/reproductive issues. -- Ability and capacity of foreign NGOs to assist refugees, displaced persons, and victims of disasters through the UNHCR and WFP. -- Ability and capacity of foreign NGOs to support the UN Environmental Program or national efforts with environmental protection, pollution monitoring, and cleanup efforts. -- Contacts between foreign NGOs and Secretariat staff that could involve sharing of confidential data. -- Foreign efforts to strip US or foreign NGOs of UN affiliation and to block US or foreign NGOs seeking UN affiliation. -- Efforts by member states-*particularly China, Cuba, Israel, Russia, and Islamic countries*-to obtain NGO affiliation for organizations supporting their policies. -- Efforts by organizations affiliated with terrorist organizations or foreign intelligence organizations to obtain NGO affiliation with the UN. -- Efforts by the EU through the Arhus convention to place NGOs on UN bureaus; reactions of member states to those efforts. -- Role of NGOs at the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (OHCR), OHCHR, and UNHRC in the Third Committee of the UNGA.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: EU, OIC, UN
4) Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H). -- Current technical specifications, physical layout, and planned upgrades to telecommunications infrastructure and
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information systems, networks, and technologies used by top officials and their support staffs. -- Details on commercial and private VIP networks used for official communications, to include upgrades, security measures, passwords, personal encryption keys, and types of V P N versions used. -- Telephone numbers and e-mail addresses of key officials, as well as limited distribution telephone numbers/directories and public switched networks (PSTN) telephone directories; dialing numbers for voice, datalink, video teleconferencing, wireless communications systems, cellular systems, personal communications systems, and wireless facsimiles. -- Information on hacking or other security incidents involving UN networks. -- Key personnel and functions of UN entity that maintains UN communications and computer networks. -- Indications of IO/IW operations directed against the UN. -- Information about current and future use of communications systems and technologies by officials or organizations, including cellular phone networks, mobile satellite phones, very small aperture terminals (VSAT), trunked and mobile radios, pagers, prepaid calling cards, firewalls, encryption, international connectivity, use of electronic data interchange, Voice-over-Internet protocol (VoIP), Worldwide interoperability for microwave access (Wi-Max), and cable and fiber networks.
Countries: Austria, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam International Organizations: UN CLINTON
Tuesday, 16 June 2009, 21:39
S E C R E T STATE 062392
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 06/16/2034
TAGS PINR, KSPR, ECON, BU
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: BULGARIA
REF: STATE 18756
Classified By: SUZANNE MCCORMICK, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on Bulgaria (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued DOS reporting of biographic information relating to Bulgaria (paragraph 2).
A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the NHCD contained in Ref C and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs focused on Bulgaria. The NHCD sets forth a list of priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs (paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on Bulgaria. The priorities may also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).
B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.
C. (S/NF) Important information responsive to the NHCD often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review leading the the NHCD,s issuance. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels.
2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting ) including on Bulgarians:
A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community's collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination to the IC. State reporting officers are encouraged to report on noteworthy Palestinians as information becomes available.
B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible when they have information relating to persons linked to Bulgaria: office and organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.
3. (S/NF) Bulgarian NHCD outline -- priority issues:
A. National Leadership and Governance 1) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4) 2) National Leadership (LEAD-3H) 3) Political Evolution and Democratic Reform (DEPS-4H) B. Energy Security and Foreign Relations 1) Energy Security (ESEC-3H) 2) Russia (FPOL-4H) 3) European Union (FPOL-4H) 4) Black Sea, Balkans, and Other Regional Neighbors (FPOL-4H) 5) The United States (FPOL-4H) 6) International Organizations and Other Foreign Relations (FPOL-4H) C. Financial Stability, Economic Development, and Societal Challenges 1) Financial Stability and Economic Development (ECFS-5) 2) Money Laundering (MONY-4) 3) Demographics, Minorities, and Human Rights (DEMG-5H) D. National Security 1) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 2) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H) 3) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness (FMCC-4H) 4) Proliferation and Counterproliferation (ACWP-3) 5) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H) 6) Information to Support US Military Operational Planning (INFR-5H) E. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H)
4. (S/NF) Reporting and collection needs:
A. National Leadership and Governance
1) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4). Policies, plans, and efforts to develop, protect, and strengthen independent and effective judiciary, including advocates, opponents, obstacles, and progress. Government, non-public and public views about, and indications of, impact of corruption and crime on governance, internal development, financial stability, intelligence and security services, weapons security, military readiness, and foreign investment. Details about organized crime groups, including leadership, links to government and foreign entities, drug and human trafficking, credit card fraud, and computer-related crimes, including child pornography. Details about cyber crime. Government plans and efforts to combat cyber crime. Details about drug trafficking, including trends, types of drugs, production, identification of trafficking groups and individuals, money laundering, and smuggling methods and routes. Government counter-drug control and enforcement plans, organizations, capabilities, and activities. Government efforts to cooperate with international partners to control illicit drug trade. Illegal acquisition of government documents, such as passports and driver licenses. Links between terrorists, organized crime groups, and cyber criminals. Details about law enforcement organizations and capabilities, including procedures, capabilities, challenges, and plans to remedy obstacles to swift and equal justice. Plans and efforts of law enforcement organizations to use biometric systems.
2) National Leadership (LEAD-3H). Objectives, strategies, efforts, authorities, and responsibilities of national leaders. Philosophies and motives behind leadership objectives, strategies, and efforts. Identities, motives, influence, and relations among principal advisors, supporters, and opponents. Decisionmaking procedures, including differences under varying circumstances. Relations among national government entities, including president, premier, ministers, national security and defense council, intelligence and security services, legislature, prosecutor general, and judiciary. Corruption among senior officials, including off-budget financial flows in support of senior leaders. Sources of funding for political candidates, and government plans and efforts to ensure funding transparency. Public support for or opposition to administration, as well as government strategies and tactics to increase, maintain, and exercise authority. Assessment, vulnerability, personality, financial, health, and biometric information about current and emerging leaders and advisors.
3) Political Evolution and Democratic Reform (DEPS-4H). Government and public commitment to, and plans and efforts to protect and strengthen, representative government, rule of law, freedom of press, religious freedom, private ownership, and individual liberties. Policies and efforts regarding political, judicial, economic, social, and educational reform. Plans and programs to manage perceptions, including through media manipulation. Popular attitudes about Bulgaria,s evolving political, philosophical, and regional identity. Identification, roles, goals, and composition of significant societal groups, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Developments within political parties and blocs. Details about internal workings of major political parties. Strength and vitality of political parties. Information about opposition and extremist groups, including domestic and foreign support.
B. Energy Security and Foreign Relations
1) Energy Security (ESEC-3H). Policies, plans, and efforts to diversify energy sources and develop, rehabilitate, or expand energy infrastructure, including investment in capacity, efficiency, storage, nuclear power, flex-fuel, or other sources of alternative energy. Details about financing strategies, and openness to foreign investment. Willingness, plans, and efforts to develop and implement unified Europe energy security strategy. Declared and secret energy agreements with Russia, Iran, other Caspian basin countries, and others. Details about national energy policymakers, key commercial figures in the sector, and their relations with other national leaders. Views about and responses to Russian plans and efforts regarding Bulgarian dependence on Russian energy. Factors, including corruption and foreign influence, affecting government decisionmaking on key energy issues. Energy imports, including sufficiency, impact on economy, and influence on bilateral relations. Organized crime involvement in energy sector.
2) Russia (FPOL-4H). Policies, plans, and efforts regarding relations with Russia, especially on strategic issues, such as energy, security, transportation, and trade. Details about personal relations between Bulgarian leaders and Russian officials or businessmen. Senior leadership, intelligence officials, and ministerial-level vulnerabilities to Russian influence. Efforts to cooperate with or oppose Russia in support of, or opposition to, US policies. Leadership and public views about relations with Russia. Government and public attitudes about Russia,s strategic objectives in the region, and Bulgaria,s vulnerability to Russian coercion and influence. Views about Russian attempts to exploit historic and current ties in order to influence internal developments and advance Russia's interests in Bulgaria and throughout the region.
3) European Union (FPOL-4H). Philosophies and motives behind leadership objectives, strategies, and efforts regarding the European Union (EU). Leadership and public views about levels of influence among European states, including relations between states and EU institutions as well as emergence of a preeminent state or a core alliance in Europe. Evidence of Bulgarian mismanagement of EU funding, and government efforts to ensure transparent management of financial aid. Details about formal and informal alliances between Bulgaria and other EU states, including plans and efforts to cooperate on issues of mutual concern. Plans and efforts to cooperate with regional neighbors, EU members, and non-state actors to influence EU policies. Response to Russian efforts to influence EU policies through Bulgaria. Plans and efforts, including investment strategies, regarding European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Plans and efforts regarding EU expansion. Plans and efforts regarding specific EU policies and decisions.
4) Black Sea, Balkans, and Other Regional Neighbors (FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts regarding relations with Black Sea and other regional neighbors. Plans and efforts to jointly respond to challenges regarding counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and illegal migration. Plans and efforts regarding cooperative agreements, especially Black Sea FOR, Harmony, Enhanced Black Sea Security Proposal, and Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone. Bulgarian participation in US-sponsored programs designed to promote regional security cooperation, healthy civil-military relations, and effective management of military resources. Plans and efforts regarding Russian influence in the region, especially on politics, energy, and other domestic issues. Plans and efforts to cooperate with regional neighbors on energy security. Details about disputes with neighbors. Relations with, and military deployments in, the Balkans. Plans and efforts to promote democracy in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Plans and efforts regarding Macedonia and Kosovo. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding Ballistic Missile Defense.
5) The United States (FPOL-4H). Policies, strategies, and efforts concerning relations with the US. Expectations regarding diplomatic, security, and economic relations with the US. Leadership and public perceptions about US regional policies, presence, and activities. Plans and efforts to support or oppose US positions in international fora.
6) International Organizations and Other Foreign Relations (FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts to pursue national objectives in international fora, such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Plans and efforts regarding leadership opportunities in international organizations. Details about relations with China and nations that are hostile to US interests.
C. Financial Stability, Economic Development, and Societal Challenges
1) Financial Stability and Economic Development (ECFS-5). Plans and efforts to respond to global financial crisis. Public response to financial challenges. Plans and efforts regarding economic cooperation with the US, EU, Group of Eight, and international financial institutions, including World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Paris Club. Opposition, extremist, and fringe group plans and efforts to exploit financial crisis to achieve objectives. Plans and efforts to pursue economic reform, including among monetary and fiscal policies. Plans and efforts to develop national infrastructure, and private sector and market institutions, including financial system. Plans and efforts to adopt international investment norms, protect intellectual property, and support entrepreneurs, especially in small and medium businesses. Plans and efforts to attract foreign investment. Plans and efforts to protect foreign investors from government corruption and inefficiencies. National and regional economic conditions, including real output, domestic and foreign investment, foreign trade, capital flight, monetization, and gray economy. Role and attitudes of Currency Board regarding fiscal and monetary policy. Plans and efforts to limit capital flight and barter. Economic policy decisionmaker identities, philosophies, roles, interrelations, and decisionmaking processes. Role of private businessmen in economic planning. Published and non-published national budget, including oversight and associated banks and financial institutions. Details about major financial institutions. Plans and efforts to comply with IMF agreements.
2) Money Laundering (MONY-4). Government plans and efforts to implement anti-money laundering legislation, enforcement, and prosecution. Money laundering, including methods, techniques, transactions, locations, and associated individuals, organizations, and institutions. Use of shell corporations and non-financial intermediaries, such as lawyers, accountants, and casinos, as well as related bank accounts to launder criminal proceeds. Links between money laundering groups and terrorists. Drug traffic involvement in money laundering. Use of money laundering as an influence-gaining measure.
3) Demographics, Minorities, and Human Rights (DEMG-5H). Information about, and government policies and efforts regarding, religious and ethnic minorities, especially Roma and Turks. Public attitudes toward minorities. Indications of human rights abuses. Details about demography, including birth rate, fertility rate, mortality rate, incidence of infectious diseases, and migration. Plans and efforts to respond to declining birth rates, including through promotion of immigration.
D. National Security
1) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.
2) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H). Plans, efforts, and ability to maintain defense spending for force modernization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interoperability, meeting NATO-required spending levels and force goals, and defense capability initiative implementation. Strategy and efforts to win public support for such spending. Plans and efforts to fulfill commitments to NATO, including manpower and equipment for out-of-area operations. Actions to accommodate NATO procedures and methods. Government and public confidence in NATO Article 5 security guarantees. Attitudes toward stationing or long-term deployment of NATO or US forces on Bulgarian soil, NATO commands in Bulgaria, and out-of-country deployments of Bulgarian forces. Plans and efforts regarding NATO enlargement, including strategic concepts and future roles of the alliance. Government, including military, intelligence, and security service willingness, ability, and efforts to protect US and NATO classified information. Awareness of and concern about foreign penetration. Implementation and strengthening of personnel-vetting procedures. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding EU defense and security cooperation, including ESDP; views and intentions regarding any conflict between ESDP and NATO obligations.
3) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness (FMCC-4H). Details about threat assessment, including agreement and disagreement among civilian and military leaders. Perceptions about, and response to, cyber warfare threat. Plans and efforts to support or oppose US objectives in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Willingness and capability to participate in NATO, EU, and other multilateral relationships, including out-of-area operations, multinational peacekeeping force in Southeast Europe, and humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Policies and efforts regarding access, overflight, and transit of US military forces and equipment. Disposition, readiness, and mission of military forces. Plans and efforts regarding force structure, military reform, and modernization, including future roles, strengths, and compositions of military services. Details about military cooperation with other nations. Details about defense industry, including plans and efforts to cooperate with foreign nations and actors. Weapon system development programs, firms, and facilities. Types, production rates, and factory markings of major weapon systems. Decisionmaking regarding acquisition of US or other nation weapon systems. Military and paramilitary manpower, structure, budget and expenditure by service and function, mission, doctrine, tactics, order of battle, command and control, equipment, maintenance, training, exercise participation, support for international peacekeeping operations, professionalism, non-commissioned officer development, health care, pay, housing, loyalty, and morale. Civil-military relations. Offensive and defensive cyber warfare policies, plans, efforts, and capabilities. Indications of national-level denial and deception program, including doctrine, targets, goals, organizations, and activities. Location, mission, organization, associated personnel, funding, development, and use of underground facilities and other hardened structures, including for protection of command and control networks, civil and military leaders, and critical resources. Details about, and transfer of, advanced engineering techniques to harden key facilities, including by use of specialty concretes. Details about dual use of underground civil infrastructure. Plans and efforts to help other states develop underground facilities and other hardened structures.
4) Proliferation and Counterproliferation (ACWP-3). Commitment, plans, efforts, and ability to manage a secure military export regime, including details about monitoring end user activities and imposing penalties for violations. Organizational readiness and capability of border police and customs officials to control borders. Plans and efforts to adhere to international control regimes. Plans and efforts to implement legislation and enforce effective export licensing regimes. Willingness and efforts to cooperate with the US to prevent proliferation. Foreign use of Bulgaria as weapons transshipment point. Details about weapons transportation, including associated firms, agents, modes, methods, routes, nodes, schedules, and communications. Details about organizations, groups, and individuals engaged in sales of weapons or technologies, especially to states that are hostile to US interests or non-state entities. Plans and efforts to circumvent antiproliferation treaties and arrangements.
5) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H). Government counterterrorism policies, plans, capabilities, and efforts. Government and public support for or opposition to US efforts, including military operations, in the war on international terrorism. Government willingness, capability, and effort to establish and protect legislative framework to combat terrorists; control borders; detain terrorists; seize terrorist-associated bank accounts; share intelligence; and protect weapons, associated facilities, and energy and other critical infrastructure against terrorist attack and intrusion. Terrorist plans to attack US and other persons, facilities, or interests. Terrorist plans and efforts to acquire or transship chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Terrorist identities, motives, objectives, strategies, locations, facilities, command structures, links to other groups or states, associations with humanitarian or medical groups, use of forged and/or modified travel documents, telecommunication methods and modes, transportation, funding, finance and business operations, money laundering, security, recruitment, and training. Indications of foreign entity, public, or local support for terrorists. Details about terrorist involvement in illicit drug and other criminal trade.
6) Information to Support US Military Operational Planning (INFR-5H). Information to support US contingency planning, including for noncombatant evacuation, and humanitarian and medical relief operations. Current status, vulnerability of, and plans to modify, critical infrastructures, especially transportation, energy, and communications. Civilian and military medical and life science capabilities and infrastructures. Military medical research and development, including new vaccines, therapeutics, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear medical defense. Information, including statistics, about infectious diseases, such as avian influenza, tuberculosis, human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome, hepatitis A, and tickborne encephalitis. Locations and levels of chemical and radiological contamination of food, water, air, and soil. Locations and types of industrial facilities with chemicals stored onsite. Descriptions and locations of potential evacuation sites, police and fire stations, hospitals, hotels, and diplomatic facilities. Plans and capabilities of government and NGOs to support, including provision of security for, relief operations. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding detained, captured, and arrested US persons, including prisoners of war and missing in action.
E. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H). Current specifications, vulnerabilities, and capabilities of, and planned upgrades to, national telecommunications infrastructure and information systems, networks, and technologies used by civilian and military government authorities, including intelligence and security services. Details about command and control systems and facilities. National leadership use of, and dependencies on, dedicated telecommunications infrastructures and information systems. Details about national and regional telecommunications policies, programs, regulations, and training. Information about current, and planned upgrades to, public sector communications systems and technologies, including cellular phone networks, mobile satellite phones, very small aperture terminals, trunked and mobile radios, pagers, prepaid calling cards, firewalls, encryption, international connectivity, use of electronic data interchange, and cable and fiber networks. Information about wireless infrastructure, cellular communications capabilities and makes and models of cellular phones and their operating systems, to include second generation and third generation systems. Details about the use of satellites for telecommunication purposes, including planned system upgrades. Details about Internet and Intranet use and infrastructure, including government oversight. Details about foreign and domestic telecommunications service providers and vendors. Plans and efforts to acquire US export-controlled telecommunications equipment and technology. Plans and efforts to export or transfer state-of-the art telecommunications equipment and technology. Details about information repositories associated with radio frequency identification enabled systems used for passports, government badges, and transportation systems. Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and e-mail addresses of principal civilian and military leaders.
CLINTON
Thursday, 16 April 2009, 14:17
S E C R E T STATE 037566
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 04/16/2034
TAGS PINR, KSPR, ECON, CD, CV, GA, ML, MR, NG, SG, UV
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: WEST AFRICA
SAHEL REGION
REF: A. 08 STATE 124337 B. 04 STATE 179667
Classified By: CATHERINE BROWN, DAS IPC. REASON: 1.4(C).
1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on the West Africa Sahel region (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued DOS reporting of biographic information relating to the West Africa Sahel region (paragraph 2).
A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the NHCD contained in Ref B and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs focused on the West Africa Sahel region (Ref A). The review produced a comprehensive list of strategic priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs (paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on the West Africa Sahel region. The priorities should also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).
B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.
C. (S/NF) Important information often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review of this National HUMINT Collection Directive. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels.
2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting:
A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community's collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination to the IC.
B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible when they have information relating to persons linked to the West Africa Sahel region: office and organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.
3. (S/NF) Priority issues and issues outline:
This directive covers eight countries of Sahelian West Africa: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. The coastal countries to the south (Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Benin) are covered separately in the West Africa Littoral directive.
I. Regional Issues
A. Security 1) International Terrorism (TERR) 2) Response To Terrorism (TERR) 3) Military (FMCC) 4) Support for U.S. Military Contingency Planning (HREL) 5) Insurgent and Separatist Groups (SRCC) 6) Relations With The United States (FPOL) 7) Drug Trafficking (DRUG) 8) Peacekeeping (SRCC) 9) GRPO can provide text of this issue.
B. Governance 1) Leadership (LEAD) 2) Government Stability and Support For Democracy (DEPS) 3) Human Rights (HRWC) 4) Political Opposition (DEPS)
C. Socio-Economic Issues 1) Agriculture and Food Security (FOOD) 2) Foreign Aid and Relations (FPOL) 3) Criminal Activities (CRIM) 4) Health and Infectious Diseases (HLTH) 5) Population and Refugee Issues (DEMG) 6) Economic Institutions and Initiatives (ECFS) 7) Environmental Issues (ENVR)
D. Information Systems and Telecommunications Infrastructure (INFR)
II. Country-Specific Issues
A. Chad: Sudan/Darfur Issues (SRCC-2)
4. (S/NF) Reporting and collection needs:
I. Regional Issues
A. Security
1) International Terrorism (TERR). -- Details, presence, and activities related to al-Qa'ida in the land of the Islamic Maghreb and other terrorist-related individuals and organizations. -- Plans and intentions for operations against U.S. or allied personnel or interests. -- Links to weapons of mass destruction or related materials. -- Presence and activities of fighters returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. -- Information on organizations, leadership, personnel, tradecraft, intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities, financing, front companies, recruitment, and training. -- Weapons and methodologies, particularly for improvised explosive devices. -- Details about local support networks, particularly for transshipments. -- Details about couriers operating in, or originating outside of, the region. -- Presence and activities of non-North African fighters in the region. -- Indications that international terrorist groups are seeking to take advantage of political, ethnic, tribal, or religious conflict. -- Health, biographic, biometric, and assessment information on leaders.
NIPF Priority for TERR Chad: 1, Mali: 1, Mauritania: 1, Niger: 1
NIPF Priority for Non-State Actors for TERR Al-Qa'ida and Sunni Affiliates: 1, Hizballah (Lebanese): 1, Jama'at Tablighi: 3
HUMINT Priority for TERR Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H, Senegal: 5H
2) Response To Terrorism (TERR). -- Capability, willingness and intent of countries to cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism (CT) efforts and policies, and to conduct counterterrorist operations. -- Details about CT legislation, organizations, capabilities, equipment, operations, tactics, and limitations. -- Data regarding the impact of U.S. and multilateral economic sanctions -- Policies, attitudes, and actions regarding U.S. and other western CT training. -- Military and security forces' attitudes towards CT training and operations. -- Interaction and interoperability of security and military forces with foreign CT forces. -- Public attitudes towards CT policies and activities. -- Plans to deploy biometric systems to enhance domestic counterterrorism efforts.
NIPF Priority for TERR Chad: 1, Mali: 1, Mauritania: 1, Niger: 1
NIPF Priority for Non-State Actors for TERR Al-Qa'ida and Sunni Affiliates: 1, Hizballah (Lebanese): 1, Jama'at Tablighi: 3
HUMINT Priority for TERR Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H, Senegal: 5H
3) Military (FMCC) -- Plans, intentions, status and details of the national defense policy and strategy. -- Military relations with other countries, including training exercises. -- Capabilities, disposition, vulnerabilities, and readiness of forces. -- Details about military personnel, units, equipment, and tactics. -- Plans and efforts regarding military reform, procurement, and modernization. -- Government cooperation regarding U.S. POW/MIAs and detained U.S. citizens. -- Evidence of coup plotting in military ranks. -- Evidence of criminal activity in military ranks and impact. -- Extent and effects of ethnic, religious, and political factions within the military. -- Public attitudes towards the military and other security forces. -- Details of covert arms acquisitions and arms sales.
NIPF Priority for FMCC Chad: 3, Mali: 4, Mauritania: 4, Niger: 4, Senegal: 4
HUMINT Priority for FMCC Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H
4) Support for U.S. Military Contingency Planning (HREL). -- Plans, intentions, and capability of host governments to support evacuation or humanitarian assistance by U.S. forces, including host nations' ability and willingness to protect U.S. citizens and/or facilities. -- Internal developments that could prompt U.S. contingency planning for Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) or humanitarian assistance. -- Host government's emergency management capabilities and points-of-contact. -- Details about infrastructure, medical facilities, and communication networks. -- Geocoordinates and description of third-country diplomatic, humanitarian aid, and non-governmental organization (NGO) facilities. -- Evacuation routes, including official/unofficial checkpoints, chokepoints, and potential impediments.
NIPF Priority for HREL Chad: 3, Niger: 5
HUMINT Priority for HREL Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H, Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 5H, Senegal: 5H
5) Insurgent and Separatist Groups (SRCC). -- Plans, intentions, and capabilities of separatist, insurgent or radical opposition groups or organizations to influence or destabilize host country government. -- Clandestine efforts to subvert peace accords and reconciliation efforts. -- Plans and intentions relating to U.S. citizens and military personnel in the region. -- Leadership, organization, recruitment and training, tactics, sources of financing, and Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence capabilities. -- Goals and attitudes toward peace accords and reconciliation efforts. -- Links to foreign governments and non-state actors in foreign countries. -- Public support for groups. -- Links to international terrorist groups. -- Health, biographic, biometric, and assessment information on leaders.
NIPF Priority for SRCC Chad: 2
HUMINT Priority for SRCC Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H, Mali: 4H, Mauritania: 5H, Niger: 4H, Senegal: 5H
6) Relations with the United States (FPOL). -- Plans and intentions of government and government leaders concerning relations with the United States, including plans and efforts to support or oppose U.S. policies and efforts in international fora. -- Decision-making, policies, plans, negotiating strategies, and efforts, particularly regarding Burkina Faso. -- Impact of relations with China on relations with the United States. -- Public opinion about U.S. actions in Africa, particularly regarding the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation foreign aid program. -- Response to U.S. policies regarding the Sahel region, the Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and the global war on terror. -- Impact of trade relations with India and Brazil on relations with the United States.
HUMINT Priority for FPOL Burkina Faso: 3H, Cape Verde: 5H, Chad: 4H, The Gambia: 5H, Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 3H, Niger: 5H, Senegal: 4H
7) Drug Trafficking (DRUG). -- Government plans and intentions regarding drug production and trafficking. -- Use of transportation networks for drug production, trafficking, or storage. -- Details about types of drugs trafficked and associated transportation networks and seizures. -- Details about front companies, financial institutions, and money flow. -- Links to international terrorist groups. -- Links to drug producers outside of region, particularly Latin American cocaine cartels. -- Links to regional or international drug distribution networks. -- Law enforcement and judiciary capabilities to combat drug trafficking and production. -- Drug traffickers' efforts to corrupt or undermine law enforcement and government. -- Presence, use, or transshipment of precursor chemicals and associated equipment for drug production. -- Information about terrorist or insurgent groups' income derived from the drug trade, including drug types and quantities. -- Information on impact of drug trafficking and use, particularly on public health and crime, and supporting internal statistics.
NIPF Priority for DRUG Senegal: 5
HUMINT Priority for DRUG Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 4H, Chad: 5H, The Gambia: 5H, Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 3H, Niger: 5H
8) Peacekeeping (SRCC). -- Governments' plans and intentions to participate in or support peacekeeping operations and funding allocated/spent. -- Military and security forces' willingness and capability to train with other nations and participate in peacekeeping operations, and details of peacekeeping experience. -- Military and security forces' capabilities and willingness to accept international military assistance and joint training. -- Perception of troops' performance during peacekeeping operations.
NIPF Priority for SRCC Chad: 2
HUMINT Priority for SRCC Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H, Mali: 4H, Mauritania: 5H, Niger: 5H, Senegal: 5H
9) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.
B. Governance
1) Leadership (LEAD). -- Key issues of concern to national and opposition leadership, particularly dynamics and decision-making processes of key civilian and military officials and of ruling political parties, including coup plotting. -- Attitude toward political opposition. -- Personal financial resources, financial institutions used, and personal relationships. -- Biographic data, including opinions about the United States.
HUMINT Priority for LEAD Burkina Faso: 3H, Cape Verde: 5H, Chad: 3H, The Gambia: 5H, Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 3H, Niger: 5H, Senegal: 4H
2) Government Stability and Support For Democracy (DEPS). -- Internal or external threats to government stability, democracy, or rule of law, including government efforts to address these threats. -- Government control over national territory and borders, including areas where government authority is weak or absent. -- Commitment to representative government and democratic reforms, particularly during election cycle. -- Laws, policies, and prospects for political succession and elections. -- Details on corruption and anti-corruption measures. -- Drivers of, and responses to, political instability or economic deterioration. -- Details on administrative, judicial, and legislative organs and related decision-making. -- Signs of ethnic, religious, or generational polarization and impact on decision-making. -- Political and social infrastructure development in remote regions.
NIPF Priority for DEPS Chad: 4, Mauritania: 5, Senegal: 5
HUMINT Priority for DEPS Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H, Mali: 5H, Niger: 5H
3) Human Rights (HRWC). -- Details of human rights abuses by intelligence and security services, military, paramilitary, police, or other officials, or by insurgent, separatist, or other groups. -- Details of government efforts and capability to prevent or respond to abuses. -- Government reaction to foreign and domestic criticism of alleged human rights abuses. -- Details of alleged disenfranchisement or enslavement of individuals or groups, including government complicity or inaction. -- Government relationship with international peacekeeping and aid organizations.
NIPF Priority for HRWC Chad: 2, Mauritania: 5, Niger: 5
HUMINT Priority for HRWC Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 4H, Mali: 5H, Senegal: 5H
4) Political Opposition (DEPS). -- Plans, intentions, and role of opposition parties in political system, including intention to use extra-legal means to depose government. -- Activities, plans, intentions, and sources of funding and support. -- Leadership, organization, agendas, membership, and level of influence. -- Plans and intentions related to the election cycle. -- Alliances, factions, and evidence of links to foreign governments or insurgent/separatist groups. -- Opinions of ethnic, religious, and other population groups towards the government and political opposition.
NIPF Priority for DEPS Chad: 4, Mauritania: 5, Senegal: 5
HUMINT Priority for DEPS Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H, Mali: 5H, Niger: 5H
C. Socio-Economic Issues
1) Agriculture and Food Security (FOOD). -- Government plans and actions regarding agricultural output, food security, and food safety. -- Willingness to cooperate with U.N. and other donor agencies on food-related issues. -- Details about food prices and food trade and public reaction to increasing food prices. -- Indications of environmental factors affecting agricultural output. -- Government policies and initiatives to increase agricultural producer income. -- Status of, and prospects for, cash and subsistence crops. -- Indications of invasive species affecting food security or development. -- Details about manipulation of food aid by government or warlords to enhance power.
NIPF Priority for FOOD Chad: 5
HUMINT Priority for FOOD Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H, Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 5H, Niger: 5H, Senegal: 5H
2) Foreign Aid and Relations (FPOL). -- Governments' and leaders' views on foreign nations and international organizations, particularly China, Iran, and India. -- Foreign alliances, aid, and activities, including those withheld from public view. -- Details on international trade issues and economic assistance needs and requests. -- Governments' actions and intentions regarding existing U.S. Status of Forces Agreements and the Rome Convention's International Criminal Court (Article 98).
HUMINT Priority for FPOL Burkina Faso: 3H, Cape Verde: 5H, Chad: 4H, The Gambia: 5H, Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 5H, Niger: 5H, Senegal: 4H
3) Criminal Activities (CRIM). -- Details of corruption and cross-border criminal activity, including weapons trafficking, human trafficking, alien smuggling, illicit finance, and cigarette smuggling. -- Government and law enforcement plans and intentions to combat criminal activity. -- Organizations, activities, methodologies, alliances, and vulnerabilities. -- Cooperation with terrorist or insurgent groups. -- Key investors, facilitators, beneficiaries, and corrupt officials.
HUMINT Priority for CRIM Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 4H, Chad: 5H, The Gambia: 5H, Mali: 4H, Mauritania: 3H, Niger: 4H, Senegal: 5H
4) Health and Infectious Diseases (HLTH). -- Details of infectious diseases and general health conditions, including number of cases, percentage of population affected, fatalities, dates, areas of occurrence, and impact. -- Government policies, plans, and efforts for disease prevention and identification. -- Nutrition-related health of population, including refugees. -- Vaccination practices, capabilities, and response related to drug-resistant and Emerging and Re-Emerging Diseases, particularly polio and tuberculosis. -- Effect of HIV/AIDS or other diseases on military, government, or economic performance. -- Public attitudes towards disease prevention and treatment programs. -- Indications of infectious plant, animal, or zoonotic diseases (animal to human transmission) with potential economic or public health consequences. -- Details about contaminated food, water, air, and soil. -- Information on medical facilities, including capabilities and training.
NIPF Priority for HLTH Chad: 4
HUMINT Priority for HLTH Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H, Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 5H, Niger: 5H, Senegal: 5H
5) Population and Refugee Issues (DEMG). -- Population movements in the region, and governments' involvement and response. -- Indications of actual or potential refugee movements within or into the region. -- Locations and conditions of refugee camps and informal refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) gathering sites and transit routes. -- Government capability and willingness to assist refugees and IDPs. -- Health and demographic statistics of refugees and IDPs. -- Dynamics and impact of migration and demographic shifts. -- Efforts to repatriate refugees.
NIPF Priority for DEMG Chad: 3, Mali: 4, Mauritania: 4, Niger: 4
HUMINT Priority for DEMG Burkina Faso: 4H, Cape Verde: 4H, The Gambia: 4H, Senegal: 4H
6) Economic Institutions and Initiatives (ECFS). -- Policies, strategies, and efforts to improve economic growth. -- Leadership views on economic, trade, and fiscal policies and regulatory enforcement. -- Identities and roles of governments' economic policy-making and regulatory bodies/officials. -- Macroeconomic statistics regarding trade, budget, balance of payments, and national economies, including reliability or manipulation of data. -- Public perception of economic conditions, including youth employment prospects. -- Nature and extent of underground banking systems. -- Details on economic assistance needs and partnerships, and effectiveness of aid. -- Financial data transmission systems and accounting methods. -- Details of natural resource development activities, including financing.
HUMINT Priority for ECFS Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, Chad: 5H, The Gambia: 5H, Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 4H, Niger: 5H, Senegal: 5H
7) Environmental Issues (ENVR). -- Details of plans and efforts by governments, NGOs, and others to combat deforestation and desertification, including the Great Green Wall project. -- Governments' willingness and ability to manage exploitation of natural resources and respond to natural and man-made environmental disasters. -- Capability and willingness to protect nearby sea lanes, and fishing grounds and other Exclusive Economic Zone claims. -- Negotiating positions at international environmental meetings. -- Government and public perceptions regarding environmental issues.
NIPF Priority for ENVR Niger: 5
HUMINT Priority for ENVR Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, Chad: 4H, The Gambia: 5H, Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 5H, Senegal: 5H
D. Information Systems and Telecommunications Infrastructure (INFR).
-- Current specifications, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and planned upgrades to, national telecommunications infrastructure and information systems, command and control systems, networks, and technologies used by government, military, and private sector. -- National leadership use of, and dependencies on, dedicated telecommunications infrastructures and information systems. -- Details about national and regional telecommunications policies, programs, regulations, service providers, vendors, and training. -- Details about internet and intranet use, infrastructure, and government oversight. -- Plans and efforts to acquire U.S. export-controlled telecommunications technology. -- Details about information repositories for Radio Frequency Identification-enabled systems used for passports, government badges, and transportation systems. -- Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and e-mail addresses of principal civilian and military leaders.
NIPF Priority for INFR Chad: 4
HUMINT Priority for INFR Burkina Faso: 5H, Cape Verde: 5H, The Gambia: 5H, Mali: 5H, Mauritania: 5H, Niger: 5H, Senegal: 5H
II. Country-Specific Issues
A. Chad: Sudan/Darfur Issues (SRCC-2).
-- Details about Sudanese-backed insurgency in Chad and Chadian-backed insurgency in Sudan and related population movements. -- Indications of actual or potential refugee or IDP movements, especially Sudanese and Central African Republic refugees. -- Human rights abuses against refugees currently located in Chad. -- Government's political will and intention to engage Sudanese-backed separatists. -- Military capability to combat Sudanese-backed separatists. -- Role of international institutions in stabilizing domestic uprising. -- Details about Chadian insurgents' relationship with the Government of Sudan. -- Details about the government's relationship with Sudanese insurgents in Darfur. -- Presence or activities of international terrorist groups in insurgencies.
CLINTON
Thursday, 16 April 2009, 14:11
S E C R E T STATE 037561
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 04/16/2034
TAGS PINR, KSPR, ECON, KDEM, KHIV, ZF, XA, CF, RW, BY
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: AFRICAN GREAT
LAKES (DROC, BURUNDI, RWANDA)
REF: A. 08 KIGALI 00830--05/DEC/2008 B. 08 STATE 122706--19/NOV/2008 C. 04 STATE 101403--06/MAY/2004
Classified By: SUZANNE MCCORMICK, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS, REASON: 1.4(C).
1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on African Great Lakes (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued DOS reporting of biographic information relating to DROC, Burundi, and Rwanda (paragraph 2).
A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supersedes the NHCD contained in Ref C and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs announced in Ref B focused on African Great Lakes. The review produced a comprehensive list of strategic priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs (paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on African Great Lakes. We thank Kigali for its Ref A input. The priorities should also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).
B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.
C. (S/NF) Important information often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review of this National HUMINT Collection Directive. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels. We appreciate Ref A response from Kigali.
2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting:
A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community's collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination to the IC.
B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible when they have information relating to persons linked to African Great Lakes: office and organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.
3. (S/NF) Priority issues and issues outline:
I. Regional Issues
A. Democratization and Political Stability 1) Leadership Dynamics (DEPS) 2) Rebel and Militia Groups (SRCC) 3) Democracy and Governance (DEPS) 4) Political Opposition (DEPS) B. Military and Security 1) Military Developments (FMCC) 2) Weapons Procurement (FMCC) 3) Police and Paramilitary Forces (CINT) 4) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 5) Support to US Military Contingency Planning (HREL) 6) Terrorism (TERR) C. Societal Challenges 1) Refugees (DEMG) 2) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC) 3) Infectious Disease and Health (HLTH) 4) Food Security and Agriculture (FOOD) 5) Economic Stability (ECFS) D. External Relations 1) Regional Relations (SRCC) 2) International Relations (FPOL) E. Overarching Issues 1) Media Structure and Availability (INFR) 2) Information Systems and Telecommunications Infrastructure (INFR)
II. Country-Specific Issues
A. Mineral Resources (ENVR) B. Genocidal Legacy Issues (HRWC)
4. (S/NF) Reporting and collection needs:
I. Regional Issues
A. Democratization and Political Stability
1) Leadership Dynamics (DEPS)
-- Leadership dynamics and decision-making processes of key civilian and military officials; influence of corruption and patronage in decision-making. -- Status of relations among top leaders of African Great Lakes countries, especially Kigali and Kinshasa, and Kampala and Kinshasa. -- Plans and intentions regarding political succession, including post-election transitions; indications of coup plotting. -- Leader influence on popular opinion and popular sentiments. -- Influence on government leadership of religious organizations, interest groups, ethnic groups, and military. -- The role of military, intelligence, and security services in national policy decision-making and their control of government institutions and parastatals. -- Leadership policies and actions that cause or respond to political instability or economic deterioration. -- Leadership financial resources and personal relationships. -- Government and public views about and evidence of impact of corruption and crime on internal stability and development. -- Information on political stability, sources of instability, and nature of challenges to effective governance. -- Government plans and efforts to respond to threats to political stability; strategies for addressing underlying discontent. -- Changes inside key ministries and security forces, including personal dynamics, tribal politics and factions. -- Details on identities, motives, influence, and relations among principal advisors. -- Biographic and biometric data, including health, opinions toward the US, training history, ethnicity (tribal and/or clan), and language skills of key and emerging political, military, intelligence, opposition, ethnic, religious, and business leaders. Data should include email addresses, telephone and fax numbers, fingerprints, facial images, DNA, and iris scans.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 4; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H
2) Rebel and Militia Groups (SRCC)
-- Efforts by rebel or militia groups or non-state actors--especially entities such as the FDLR that contain Rwandans who participated in the 1994 genocide--to obtain control of or greater participation in national or local government; to obtain control of natural or financial resources; to integrate into the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) or to cooperate with the FARDC in the exploitation of economic resources. -- Extent of political influence of rebel or militia groups. -- Attitudes toward implementation of regional peace accords. -- Organization, leadership, order of battle, training, strategies and tactics of armed groups and factions, including those integrated into government. -- Efforts by rebel or militia groups to recruit government forces or demobilized troops/fighters. -- Indications of shifting alliances and factions. -- Indications of political and social infrastructure development by rebel and militia groups, including fundraising, recruitments, weapons and repair parts procurement, and propaganda. -- Public sympathy or antipathy toward rebel and militia groups. -- Evidence of influence or pressure on, or support for, rebel or militia groups from foreign governments, non-state actors, and Congolese diaspora. -- Infiltration and resupply routes used by rebel and militia groups. -- Evidence that drug trafficking, evasion of the Kimberly Process, or other criminal activities, including cyber crime, are used to finance the activities of rebel and militia groups. -- Evidence and impact of the presence of troops from neighboring countries and their proxy forces in Congo, particularly the Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF).
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI- PRIORITY 5; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 4; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5 REGIONAL REBEL GROUPS AND NON-STATE ACTORS WHO CARRY OUT ATROCITIES AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES: ALLIED DEMOCRATIC FORCES (ADF), DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF RWANDA (FDLR), LORD,S RESISTANCE ARMY (LRA)-PRIORITY- 4
3) Democracy and Governance (DEPS)
-- Leadership views, intentions, and actions on democratic reforms, to include free press, treatment of opposition political or ethnic groups, respect for human rights, respect for rule of law and independent judiciary, and fair elections. -- Extent/effectiveness of government control over national territory and over cross-border flows of people and goods. -- Progress of or obstacles to disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, and reintegration (DDRR) of ex-combatants into a civilian society. -- Structure, interaction, and role of administrative, judicial, and legislative organs, including indications that they are overshadowed by personal politics. -- Information on effectiveness or abuse of the electoral system or judiciary, including government procedures to maintain the integrity and secrecy of the ballot during each phase of balloting and vote reconciliation. -- Details on all aspects of the electoral process, to include election laws, electoral procedures, election monitoring, balloting, and election equipment. -- Details on corruption in government institutions and efforts to reduce it. -- Signs of ethnic, religious, or generational polarization and role of ethnic, regional or class distinctions in access to decision-making and natural or financial resources. -- Information on government improvements in infrastructure, including in remote regions. -- Ability and efforts to adhere to/evade the Kimberly Process, and to combat illicit finance.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 4; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H
4) Political Opposition (DEPS)
-- Activities, plans, and intentions of political opposition parties and individuals; sources of funding and support. -- Government attempts to stifle political opposition. -- Alliances or factions, and evidence of links to foreign governments or armed groups. -- Political opposition party leadership, organization, agendas, membership, and level of influence on civil society and military; leadership biographic data. -- Opposition party regional and ethnic support areas, family and financial networks, key patrons and clients, and internal alliances and rivalries -- Opinions of ethnic, religious, and other groups on the government and political opposition.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 4; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H
B. Military and Security
1) Military Developments (FMCC)
-- Military capabilities, intentions, and actions in support of or against existing political leadership or government activities. -- Progress of or obstacles to the integration of former government, rebel, and militia fighters into a new armed force; loyalty of units integrated from former armed opponents. -- Impact of ethnic, political, regional, or tribal divisions within the military and other security forces on morale, readiness, placement of leaders, and support for the government. -- Indications of military involvement in human rights abuses, recruiting of children, criminal or corrupt activity, or anti-government insurgency. -- Loyalties, cohesion, discord, rivalries, competing agendas or ambitions, and signs of dissension within military leadership, officer corps, and ranks; evidence of corruption/criminal activity in the military or security forces and effects on preparedness. -- Extent and effects of ethnic and political divisions within the military and between the military and political leadership. -- Attitudes toward AFRICOM; willingness to cooperate with AFRICOM. -- Ability and willingness to cooperate with forces from neighboring countries and deployed peacekeeping forces to manage threats. -- Personnel strength levels, force structure, doctrine, modernization plans, training, discipline, professionalism, morale, order of battle, logistics, combat effectiveness, and capabilities of military services. -- Details on military facilities, such as airfields and army camps, and on military equipment, including numbers, operational status, and procurement/refurbishment activity. -- Details about military relations with other countries, especially China, Libya, Sudan, North Korea, Iran, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and other former Soviet bloc countries. -- Details about foreign military assistance and training. -- Attitudes toward and impact of US military training. -- Details on defense budget by function and service. -- Development and implementation of mechanisms for civil control of the military. -- Public attitudes towards the military and other security forces.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 5H; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H
2) Weapons Procurement (FMCC)
-- Details of arms acquisitions and arms sales by government or insurgents, including negotiations, contracts, deliveries, terms of sale, quantity and quality of equipment, and price and payment terms. -- Transfer of strategic materials such as uranium. -- Information on insurgent groups' weapons and material entry and transshipment points, routes, and destinations. -- Indications of smuggling and weapons and weapons repair parts trafficking. -- Factory markings and paint/color schemes on all arms/weapon systems and their munitions acquired or produced locally.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 5H; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H
3) Police and Paramilitary Forces (CINT)
-- Non-military security force loyalties, leadership, capabilities, organization, size, locations, and ethnic composition. -- Roles and missions of various units. -- Evidence of splits within police and paramilitary forces. -- Evidence of contact and cooperation with rebel groups. -- Ability to maintain local security without intervention or assistance of military forces. -- Reports of misconduct, human rights violations, or involvement in illegal/illicit activities, or the misuse of foreign training funds or equipment. -- Evidence of conflict between security forces and the military.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 5H; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H
4) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.
5) Support to US Military Contingency Planning (HREL)
-- Details on developments that could prompt US contingency planning for non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) or humanitarian assistance. -- Host nation support for evacuation or humanitarian assistance by US forces (AFRICOM), including host nation ability and willingness to protect US citizens and/or facilities. -- Government plans and capabilities to cope with emergencies, including civilian and military response, or to request or accept assistance from the US, UN, or others. -- Government or other organizations' plans to work with UN and international donor and NGO groups in relief and reconstruction efforts, resettlement programs, and development assistance. -- Details on obstacles to aid distribution and implementation of humanitarian aid programs. -- Details of emergency infrastructure, including locations, descriptions, and capabilities of military, police, and fire response resources. -- Location and description of third-country diplomatic and aid/NGO facilities, and of leaders' residences and alternate locations. -- Information on the character and severity of existing or potential future humanitarian crises resulting from natural disasters or from internal or regional violence. -- Description and locations of potential evacuation sites, hospitals, hotels, government installations, religious sites and shrines, civilian institutions including schools and stadiums, diplomatic facilities, educational and medical facilities, and culturally significant sites. -- Evacuation routes, including chokepoints and potential impediments. -- Volcanic activity on the Congo (Kinshasa)/Rwanda border.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 4; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H
6) Terrorism (TERR)
-- Individuals and organizations supporting international terrorism, including legitimate businesses and financial transactions, money laundering, drug trafficking, logistical support, cyber crime, and document forgeries. -- Extent to which ethnic, tribal, religious and regional fragmentation could serve to attract international terrorist groups. -- Evidence of transit and safe haven by transnational and regional terrorist groups. -- Vulnerability of populace to Islamic extremism. -- Evidence of domestic terrorist groups. -- Indications of funding from Gulf-based financiers or NGOs.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 5H; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS: HIZBALLAH (LEBANESE)-PRIORITY 1 REGIONAL REBEL GROUPS AND NON-STATE ACTORS WHO CARRY OUT ATROCITIES AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES: ALLIED DEMOCRATIC FORCES (ADF), DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF RWANDA (FDLR), LORD,S RESISTANCE ARMY (LRA)-PRIORITY- 4
C. Societal Challenges
1) Refugees (DEMG)
-- Government plans, policies, and efforts regarding refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). -- Government capability and willingness to absorb, register, assist, and protect refugees and IDPs. -- Government capability and willingness to protect and assist NGO and aid agency personnel. -- Plans and intentions of rebel forces to cooperate, hinder, or manipulate aid for refugees and IDPs. -- Indications of rebel or militia forces infiltrating refugee camps or groups, or using such camps/groups to mask their activities. -- Public attitudes for or against repatriation of IDPs or refugees. -- Information on neighboring country efforts regarding refugees and IDPs. -- Number, location, and size of refugee and IDP areas (to include hospitals, churches, and other de facto IDP areas as well as traditional camps); transit routes used by refugees and IDPs. -- Numbers, age, gender, ethnicity, general health and security conditions, nature and extent of critical needs of refugees and IDPs. -- Factors driving refugee movements; links between refugee movements and political and economic stability. -- Indications that the inability of returning refugees to reclaim their land is contributing to instability. -- Details of cross-border criminal activity, including travel routes and nodes, transshipment sites, communications, and financial facilitators, especially for human smuggling and trafficking. -- Attitudes toward women; women,s legal rights, especially rights to education, work, land ownership, and inheritance. -- Process and effects of migration and demographic shifts within and among regional nations, including movement from rural to urban areas and youth bulge. -- Details about geographic distribution of population and internal migration. -- Information on population density, population growth, age breakdowns, economic and housing characteristics, ethnic and religious affiliations, occupations, literacy, educational attainment, access to electricity, water, and sanitation.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 3; RWANDA- PRIORITY 3
2) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC)
-- Plans, intentions, and actions of rebel and militia groups, federal and state government officials, military, intelligence and other security services, to commit human rights violations, including mass killings, extra judicial killing, forced disappearance, torture, sexually based violence, arbitrary arrest, police brutality, and persecution of minorities and ethnic factions. -- Indications that policies targeting civilians could be perceived as strategically advantageous to a government, rebel, or militia group. -- Indications of leaders, failure to instill discipline within armies, rebel groups, or militias that could lead to human rights violations and abuses. -- Ethnic/regional tensions that might fuel genocidal activity, including scapegoating or calls for violence against noncombatants of a particular ethnic, regional, or political group by government, rebel, or militia groups. -- Indications of mobilization or force posturing directed against civilians. -- Threats against or denial of access to media, foreigners, or NGOs to areas of concern. -- Support for or response to activities of international criminal tribunals, including the International Criminal Court. -- Ability and willingness of all levels of government to promote human rights. -- Details on government policies, procedures, and efforts regarding prevention of human rights abuses, including efforts to marginalize specific groups of people. -- Efforts of the police and military to uphold or violate human rights. -- Government intentions to follow through on investigations and prosecution of human rights abuses. -- Indications that ambiguity between civilians and combatants could lead to violence against civilians. -- Plans and activities of the government to use food, or other government-controlled commodities, as a political tool. -- Evidence of attacks or planned attacks on peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers; limitations on the activities of NGOs. -- Evidence that humanitarian aid agencies are preparing for an increase in the number of civilian casualties or refugees. -- Evidence that truth and reconciliation activities or war crimes trials are increasing or decreasing tension or fostering or alleviating instability. -- Landmine or explosive remnant of war (ERW) casualties and evidence of mine stockpiling; government intentions to clear landmine/ERW areas.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI- PRIORITY 4; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 3; RWANDA- PRIORITY 4
3) Infectious Disease and Health (HLTH)
-- Government plans, policies, and capabilities to prevent, control, and treat existing and emerging disease outbreaks, particularly HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, polio, and avian influenza. -- Details of infectious diseases and general health conditions including number of cases, percentage, fatalities, dates, and areas of occurrence. Also if possible, provide historical data in order to compare recent data collection. -- HIV statistics, including percentage of military, police force, and orphans that are HIV positive. --Information concerning the influence of traditional healers on infectious diseases as well as endemic health issues. -- Details on drug resistant strains, including malaria, HIV/AIDS, avian influenza, and tuberculosis. --Information concerning maternal and child health, in terms of access to prenatal care, statistics on the types of pregnancy-related poor outcomes related to infant and/or maternal morbidity/mortality, and access to well-baby clinics. -- Access to care information, including regions and populations with access to advanced levels of care and those without basic prevention and treatment needs. -- Information on medical professionals, including number of personnel by type (nurse, physician, midwife, etc.), medical specialty, and location (urban or rural). -- Education and training requirements for medical professionals; locations of institutions where training is available. -- Information on medical facilities/hospitals, including capabilities, personnel, training, equipment, etc. Disaster response capability/plan. -- Details about contaminated food, water, air, and soil and the effect on health. Toxic industrial chemical contamination, including types of industrial facilities, chemicals on site, and products being generated. -- Details on water, food, and vector-borne diseases, including location, prevalence, and virulence. -- Government efforts to protect the population from zoonotic (animal to human transmission capable) diseases; details on the stockpile and storage of vaccines. -- Information on drug addiction treatment facilities. -- Information on mental health issues, including the government,s willingness to report, the types and severity of mental health problems, and access to care. -- Chronic disease information, including types and access to treatment, such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 4; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H
4) Food Security and Agriculture (FOOD)
-- Government policies, plans, intentions, and actions regarding food security and food safety, and willingness to cooperate with UN and other donor agencies. -- Nutritional status of population, including refugees. -- Indications that rising food prices are adversely affecting nutritional status and/or contributing to instability; use of subsidies or export/import bans. -- Yields and prospects for cash and subsistence crops; changes in agricultural practices, such as cropping patterns and crop selection; use/availability of seeds and fertilizers. -- Government acceptance of genetically modified food and propagation of genetically modified crops. -- Status of structural adjustments and infrastructure improvements to increase agricultural producer income and reduce migration to urban areas. -- Information on surface and groundwater resources, to include sources, treatment, distribution and storage. -- Indications that deforestation, desertification, erosion and degradation of soils are affecting agricultural output. -- Food contamination affecting population health. -- Indications of invasive species, especially those affecting food security or development. -- Indications of water table degradation, decreases in lake levels below historic norms, or evidence of territorial disputes associated with declining water resources or quality.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI- PRIORITY 5; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 5; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H
5) Economic Stability (ECFS)
-- Overall economic status, including government plans and will to implement free-market reform, to ensure consistent regulations, and to uphold the rule of law on economic issues. -- Government plans and intentions to address economic effects of war and conflict, such as shortages of fuel, electric power, and food; unemployment; and wage arrears, particularly the inability to pay troops. -- Fiscal policies and investment strategies, financial and commercial links within and outside the region, status of foreign currency reserves, and positions on bilateral and multilateral economic issues and negotiations. -- Details of Chinese trade, aid, and investment activities. -- Public and expert perceptions of the effect on economic performance of corruption among government and business elites and of the competence of economic administrators. -- Policies and actions to attract foreign investment; plans and intentions of foreign nationals or companies to invest or start up new business ventures. -- Government strategy and objectives for engagement with international financial institutions--World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank--for loans, grants, debt management, and restructuring. -- Details on economic assistance needs and requests, including donors, projects, and effectiveness of current or proposed aid. -- Status of raw materials industries, including plans to develop/exploit resource deposits. -- Government plans and objectives regarding land reallocation; effects of land reallocation on indigenous population, commercial farmers, militant interest groups, and its impact on foreign investment. -- Indications of ethnic/regional tensions over resources, such as land and water. -- Details on and public perception of economic growth, including youth employment prospects. -- Statistics on economic indicators, including remittances. -- Details, capabilities, and potentially required repairs and upgrades of infrastructure and lines of communication, such as airfields, landing zones, river ports, rail lines, roads, bridges, medical facilities, and electric power, petroleum, and water facilities.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 5H; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H
D. External Relations
1) Regional Relations (SRCC)
-- Policy toward and relations with regional states, particularly with regard to ongoing conflicts, support for foreign dissidents, border incursions, peace negotiations, refugee assistance and repatriation, trade, aid, and security agreements. -- Government views and perceptions about activities and intentions of regional organizations, such as the African Union (AU), the East African Community (EAC), and other regional organizations. -- Activities of mercenaries or private security firms in assisting military forces or insurgencies; mercenary or private security firm involvement in trafficking activities.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 4; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5
2) International Relations (FPOL)
-- Government leader views and policies toward the US, AFRICOM, and international organizations; plans and intentions to support or oppose US positions in international fora. -- Public and private attitudes toward the US, AFRICOM, and US policies. -- Foreign alliances and activities, especially those involving China and Iran. -- Agreements and concessions negotiated with foreign states and non-state actors for military, paramilitary, or economic assistance. -- Government views and perceptions about activities and intentions of non-regional nations and organizations, particularly China, Iran, France, UN, and the European Union (EU). -- Perceptions by the civilian population towards the UN, particularly improvements or failures of UN efforts to address human rights abuses by peacekeeping forces. -- Plans and efforts of countries or organizations to arbitrate or influence conflict resolution. -- Efforts to enforce or circumvent sanctions against Iran, North Korea, and terrorist groups. -- Political will and intentions of governments to participate in or support peacekeeping operations sponsored by regional organizations, such as ECOWAS, or by the UN, US, France, or other. -- Willingness to contribute forces to African Union (AU) Standby Brigade Forces (e.g. EASBRIG) and/or the will to provide meaningful participation in CEEAC - Economic Community of Central African States) -- Government plans, intentions, and capabilities to provide, train, equip, transport, maintain, supply, and fund international peacekeeping forces, including providing command, control, communications, and intelligence. -- Military willingness and capability to train with other nations in programs such as the US Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) and Joint Combined Exercise for Training (JCET) programs, and to participate in peacekeeping operations. -- Local population relationship with foreign peacekeeping forces. -- Capabilities, attitudes, and behavior of peacekeepers from or stationed in regional nations, including understanding of and adherence to human rights standards. -- Government cooperation regarding rescue/recovery of US/allied POW/MIAs and detained/kidnapped US/allied citizens.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 5H; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H
E. Overarching Issues
1) Media Structure and Availability (INFR)
-- Government, public, and private perceptions of status of press freedom. -- Evidence of media control or manipulation, in particular to incite unrest, by government, opposition groups, non-state actors, and other groups. -- Details on print and broadcast media, including name, content, ownership, target audience, staff, broadcast frequency and power. -- Internet availability and use. -- Extent of, access to, and identity of, foreign television and radio broadcasts, and news publications. -- Changes to the UN commitment to provide media services in the eastern Congolese provinces.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 5; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H
2) Information Systems and Telecommunications Infrastructure (INFR)
-- Current specifications, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and planned upgrades to, national telecommunications infrastructure and information systems, command and control systems, networks, and technologies used by government, military, and private sector. -- Details about foreign assistance (especially Chinese) for improvements to the national telecommunications grid. -- National leadership use of, and dependencies on, dedicated telecommunications infrastructures and information systems. -- Details about national and regional telecommunications policies, programs, regulations, service providers, vendors, and training. -- Details about internet and intranet use, infrastructure, and government oversight. -- Plans and efforts to acquire U.S. export-controlled telecommunications technology. -- Details about information repositories for Radio Frequency Identification-enabled systems used for passports, government badges, and transportation systems. -- Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and e-mail addresses of principal civilian and military leaders.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 5H; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H
II. Country Specific Issues
A. Mineral Resources (ENVR)
-- Details on mining of diamonds, copper, cobalt, uranium, other minerals, and oil extraction: number and location of mines, production statistics and revenue generated, and extent of control given to China and other foreign governments, companies or consortiums; export statistics. -- Details on mineral, oil and other resource exploitation by rebel groups and foreign elements to include type and location of resources exploited, and revenue generated through sales, customs duties, taxation, and access control. -- Government ability/willingness to deal with environmental abuses.
COUNTRIES: CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC-PRIORITY 5H
B. Genocidal Legacy Issues (HRWC)
-- Government attitudes and intentions toward Tutsi survivors, Tutsis operating outside the power elite, Hutus, returning Hutu fighters/refugees, and Twa. -- Indications of increased ethnic tensions that could spark renewed violence. -- Government plans and intentions to counter ethnic violence or genocide; identification of government officials encouraging violence. -- Information on policies concerning human rights, democratization, political inclusion, reconciliation, land ownership and tenancy, and political prisoners. -- Public attitudes toward traditional judicial courts (gacaca) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. -- Information on participation in human rights abuses, including extra judicial killings by Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF); paramilitary, including local defense forces; police, security forces; or Tutsi civilians against Hutus. -- Divisions within President Kagame's inner circle and his party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). -- Public attitudes toward the FDLR and subgroups; links between those groups and supporters outside the Great Lakes Region. -- Information about identification, location and arrest of such leaders.
COUNTRIES: RWANDA- PRIORITY 4
CLINTON
Friday, 31 October 2008, 15:25
S E C R E T STATE 116392
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 09/18/2033
TAGS PINR, KSPR, ECON, KPAL, PREL, PTER, XF
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: PALESTINIAN
ISSUES
REF: A. 08 STATE 001379 B. 08 STATE 64936
Classified By: CATHERINE BROWN, DAS, INR/IPC. REASON: 1.4(C).
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on Palestinian Issues (paragraph 3-end) and encourages Department personnel at post to assist in compiling Palestinian biographic information (paragraph 2).
A. (S/NF) The NHCD results from a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs for Palestinian Issues and sets forth a list of priorities intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on Palestinian Issues. The priorities may also help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).
B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.
C. (S/NF) Important information responsive to the NHCD often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review leading to the NHCD's issuance. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels.
2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting - including on Palestinians:
A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community's collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination to the IC. State reporting officers are encouraged to report on noteworthy Palestinians as information becomes available.
B. (S/NF) When it is available, reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible: office and organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.
3. (S/NF) Palestinian NHCD outline - priority issues:
A. Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process 1) Conflict Resolution and Palestinian Relations with Israel (SRCC-1) 2) Final Status Issues (SRCC-1) 3) Perceptions of US Role in the Peace Process (SRCC-1) 4) Role of Regional Neighbors (SRCC-1) 5) Role of International Community in the Peace Process (SRCC-1)
B. Palestinian Leadership and Governance 1) Governance Issues (DEPS-1) 2) Security Forces' Capabilities (DEPS-1) 3) Palestinian Leadership (LEAD-1) 4) Fatah-HAMAS Relationship (LEAD-1) 5) Economic and Financial Stability (ECFS-2) 6) Civil Society and the Rule of Law (DEPS-1) 7) US, Regional, and International Foreign Policy (FPOL-4)
C. Palestinian Internal Security and Control 1) Palestinian Counterterrorism Capabilities and Response (TERR-2) 2) Role of Palestinian Authority Security Organs/Individuals in Terrorism (TERR-2) 3) Intelligence Services and Security Forces (CINT-5) 4) Illegal Activities (MONY-4)
D. Terrorism and Islamic Activism 1) International and Indigenous Terrorist Activities (TERR-2) 2) Internal and External Support for Palestinian Terrorists (TERR-2) 3) Islamic Activism (DEPS-1) 4) Threats Against American Citizens (TERR-2)
E. Palestinian Social Development and Infrastructure 1) Human Rights (HRWC-3) 2) Demographics (DEMG-3) 3) Water Management (ENVR-4) 4) Infectious Disease and Health (HLTH-5) 5) Civilian Infrastructure (INFR-3)
F. Government of Israel Plans, Policies, and Actions 1) Israeli Leadership Plans and Intentions on the Peace Process (LEAD-1) 2) Conflict Resolution (SRCC-1) 3) Government of Israel Security Issues (SRCC-1) 4) Military Response to Palestinians and Terrorism (FMCC-2) 5) Settlements (SRCC-1) 6) US and International Community (FPOL-3)
G. Information Infrastructure and Telecommunications Systems (INFR-3)
4. (S/NF) Palestinian NHCD - Full text -- reporting and collection needs under priority areas listed in paragraph 3 above:
A. Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process
1) Conflict Resolution and Palestinian Relations with Israel (SRCC-1). --Key positions, negotiating strategies, red lines, and points of flexibility of Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority elements, HAMAS, and other Palestinian parties concerned with the peace process, conflict resolution, and future dealings with Israel. --Negotiating positions for Palestinian talks with Israel on bilateral issues, particularly the extent of Palestinian Authority control in Jerusalem, right of return of Palestinian refugees to Israel, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, exchanges of territory, borders and security, and "end of claims". --Attitudes of the general public toward Palestinian-Israeli talks. --Attitudes of Palestinian security forces toward peace negotiations with and attacks on Israel inside Israel and the Palestinian territories. --Details of all formal and informal channels, used by the Palestinian leaders to discuss peace steps with Israel. --Palestinian perceptions of and relations with Israeli leaders and negotiating counterparts. --Palestinian positions on negotiations with Israel regarding water, transportation and energy infrastructure issues, access to the Israeli economy, and safe passage between areas of Israeli and Palestinian control.
2) Final Status Issues (SRCC-1). --Details regarding final-status arrangements on issues of security, borders and border crossings, and refugees. --Information regarding final-status agreements on water, economics, legal matters and prisoners, infrastructure and environment, and Jerusalem (including sovereignty, governance, and access to/control of the "Holy Basin").
3) Perceptions of US Role in the Peace Process (SRCC-1). --Palestinian leadership and citizen perceptions regarding the US role and efforts to influence the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. --Palestinian plans, intentions and efforts to influence US positions on the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. Palestinian efforts to galvanize regional and international support to influence US positions on the Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations. --Palestinian plans, intentions, objectives and activities related to US policies and programs on the peace process including extent of support for US and other counterterrorism efforts.
4) Role of Regional Neighbors (SRCC-1). --Palestinian perceptions of the policies of regional neighbors (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Libya and other Arab states and Iran) regarding a Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement. --Views and perceptions of regional neighbors on the impact a Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement would have on neighboring Palestinian populations. --Palestinian views of other countries' plans and efforts to support or oppose the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. --Palestinian perceptions of plans and efforts by individual regional neighbors to facilitate or hinder the development of institutions needed for a free and democratic Palestinian state. --Palestinian views about plans and efforts of Syria or Lebanon to resolve border disputes with Israel.
5) Role of International Community in the Peace Process (SRCC-1). --Palestinian perceptions about policies, plans, efforts and support for strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli issues from European Union members, especially France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Russia and multilateral bodies, including the Quartet (United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia), the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Arab League, and the United Nations. --Palestinian views on amounts and uses of international assistance provided to the Palestinian Authority as part of bilateral or multilateral negotiations.
B. Palestinian Leadership and Governance
1) Governance Issues (DEPS-1). --Status and relative strength of factions within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and internal decision-making processes of these factions. --Relations between the Palestinian Authority and the PLO and its factions. --PLO and HAMAS finances and sources of funding. --Evidence regarding the effectiveness of the Palestinian Authority in governing areas under Palestinian Authority control; status of political reform and influence of President. --Indications of challenges to Palestinian Authority rule. Extent of popular loyalty to Palestinian Authority leadership. --Information on municipal government structures, independent local power bases, and relationships between the Palestinian leadership and local leaders. --Plans and intentions of the Palestinian Authority to consider or reject the formation of a new Palestinian National Unity Government. --Details on efforts of HAMAS to exert influence over Palestinians to consolidate their support. --Attitudes, plans, and tactics of Islamist and secular groups to determine or affect the choice of a successor to the current Palestinian Authority President. --Level of Palestinian support for HAMAS elected officials. --Palestinian perceptions of the Palestinian legislative council and its ability to exercise power.
2) Security Forces' Capabilities (DEPS-1). --Plans, intentions, and willingness to sustain efforts to reform the security forces. --Relations between the security forces and foreign security services, especially for cooperation, training, information sharing, and funding including efforts to target terrorist or extremist threats to the peace process. --Changes in the senior leadership of the Palestinian Authority security forces, including the general intelligence organization (Mukhabarat) and the Preventive Security Organization (PSO). --Leadership dynamics and power relationships among the Palestinian Authority security forces; relations between civilian leaders and security forces commanders. --Level of responsiveness of security forces to civilian control. --Decision-making processes and rules of engagement of the security forces in specific security situations. --Organizational structure of the Palestinian Authority security forces. --Command, control, communications, and intelligence infrastructure of Palestinian Authority security forces. --Information on personnel strength, budget, weapons, training, force readiness, targeting, tactics, transportation, and logistics of the Palestinian Authority security forces.
3) Palestinian Leadership (LEAD-1). --Goals and strategies of Palestinian officials in the West Bank and Gaza to insure/undermine the viability of a democratic Palestinian state. --Plans and intentions of Palestinian President to call elections. --Role of the Prime Minister. --Identification of key advisers to the Palestinian Authority President and Prime Minister and their respective areas of influence. --Decision making processes within the Palestinian Authority leadership, including the roles of key ministries and the views of their leaders on priority issues for the government.
--Palestinian leadership attitudes toward and perceptions of the US. --Status of the current Palestinian Authority president's and prime minister's health. --Identification of possible successors to the current Palestinian Authority president, views of these possible successors, and those of other Palestinian leaders outside the government, on Palestinian-Israeli issues and information on the relationships of these possible successors with key Palestinian groups and Israel.
4) Fatah-HAMAS Relationship (LEAD-1). --Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority leadership and HAMAS efforts to resolve issues related to reconciliation or to continue competition. --HAMAS reaction to peace negotiation efforts. Relationship between the Palestinian leadership, to include the Presidency, and HAMAS officials in Gaza and rejectionist elements. --Leadership plans and efforts in Gaza and the West Bank to unify or maintain the division between the two territories. --Efforts by the Palestinian Authority leadership to involve HAMAS elected officials in negotiating strategies for the peace process. --Details of travel plans such as routes and vehicles used by Palestinian Authority leaders and HAMAS members. --Biographical, financial and biometric information on key PA and HAMAS leaders and representatives, to include the young guard inside Gaza, the West Bank and outside.
5) Economic and Financial Stability (ECFS-2). --Economic decision-making processes within the Palestinian Authority government and plans and actions to implement economic reform, liberalization, and development. --Palestinian Authority budget allocations and funding streams. --Details about employment data and government plans and efforts to increase employment. --Plans by Palestinian officials and Palestinian businessmen in the West Bank and Gaza for coping with economic downturns caused by political problems. --Data on Palestinian trade with Israel and Jordan. --Data on the impact of border closures and Palestinian-Israeli violence on economic development, including on the livelihoods of Palestinians with jobs in Israel or Jordan. --Information on levels of financial savings by Palestinians and their ability to withstand prolonged economic hardship. --Palestinian efforts to develop trading relationships with non-Israeli buyers and attract foreign investment. --Plans and efforts to seek funding from international relief organizations. --Palestinian plans and efforts to develop and exploit natural gas reserves off the coast of Gaza. --Plans to develop or expand energy infrastructure, including petroleum and natural gas storage/distribution facilities and electric utilities. --Financial flows from Diaspora Palestinians and the motivations for such investment. --Information on close ties between business families and politicians. --Corrupt practices by businessmen and politicians. --Trends in the business practices of local Palestinian businessmen, such as changes in enterprise ownership and control mechanisms and shifts in contract bidding methods. --Plans and efforts to counteract Israeli closure policies. --Palestinian perceptions regarding fulfillment of aid pledges from Donors' Conference.
6) Civil Society and the Rule of Law (DEPS-1). --Plans and intentions of leaders of the Palestinian Authority to encourage political openness, protect civil liberties, and promote fiscal transparency. --Plans and actions of Palestinian Authority to implement judicial and financial reforms. --Details about the Palestinian justice system and Palestinian attitudes towards the Palestinian Basic Law and Sharia/Islamic law. --Capability and commitment of Palestinian officials and organizations to maintain order and confront threats posed by extremist and terrorist groups, clans, and criminal organizations. --Details of plans and programs intended to promote and maintain public order. --Attitudes and influence of key Palestinian interest groups on Palestinian plans, policies and actions aimed at promoting the rule of law and public order. --HAMAS and other Palestinian efforts to apply Sharia and promote Islamic alternatives in civil society. --Details on HAMAS' social welfare network to include hospitals, education systems, textbooks, libraries and social services in the Palestinian territories and their funding sources in the region and worldwide; efforts by PIJ and other Palestinian organizations to provide similar services and details of their sources of funding. --Financial systems used by HAMAS charities in Europe to move funds to the Middle East. --Popular attitudes towards HAMAS and other organizations that provide social services. --Views and attitudes of the younger generation on HAMAS and their control of municipalities as well as their social service programs. --Evidence of control of the media by Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority or HAMAS to influence the Palestinian population. --Details on development of political parties, labor unions, and/or worker groups.
7) US, Regional, and International Foreign Policy (FPOL-4). --Efforts by the Palestinian Authority to gain support for its strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli issues from the US. --Palestinian Authority's objectives and strategies on key issues in US-Palestinian relationship and views on future of US relations. --Information on Palestinian Authority negotiating positions before discussions with the US and views of Palestinian officials after discussions with the US. --Popular attitudes toward and perceptions of the US.
C. Palestinian Internal Security and Control
1) Palestinian Counterterrorism Capabilities and Response (TERR-2). --Palestinian counterterrorism and internal security policies, plans, attitudes, commitment and actions in dealing with extremists and terrorist groups, and clans. --Actions, ability and willingness of the Palestinian security services in the West Bank and Gaza to thwart terrorist attacks and maintain public order. --Palestinian plans, intentions, objectives and activities regarding support to and cooperation with US counterterrorism efforts. --Cooperation between Palestinian security and intelligence services and Israeli counterparts on terrorism, including targeting efforts, technical operations, surveillance, interrogation, capture and prosecution of known terrorists. --Attitudes and influence of key Palestinian interest groups on Palestinian counterterrorism plans, policies and actions. --Views of Palestinian Authority President, his advisers, Palestinian Authority security chiefs and senior Palestinian officials toward the US and its counterterrorism policies; perceptions of US expectations for Palestinian cooperation in counterterrorism campaign.
2) Role of Palestinian Authority Security Organs/Individuals in Terrorism (TERR-2). --Ties between the security forces and Palestinian Authority leaders and other groups, including Palestinian political parties, militias, and rejectionist and terrorist groups. --Participation by Palestinian Authority security forces personnel in attacks against Israeli targets outside Israel and the Palestinian Territories. --Links between intelligence services and terrorist groups. --Locations of neighborhoods controlled by rejectionist and terrorist groups. --Indications of cooperation between Palestinian intelligence services and terrorist groups.
3) Intelligence Services and Security Forces (CINT-5). --Plans, intentions, key focus and rivalries of senior PA security force officials, including the General Intelligence Organization (Mukhabarat), the Preventive Security Organization (PSO), Military Intelligence (Istikhbarat), the National Security Force (NSF), and the Civil Police, as well as HAMAS's Security Support Force in the Gaza strip. --Command, control, communications, and intelligence infrastructure of Palestinian Authority security forces. --Indications of counterintelligence operations conducted by the security forces against foreign intelligence services operating in or through Palestinian Authority areas. --Information on signals intercept capabilities and targets, decryption capabilities, intercept sites and collection hardware, and intercept operation successes. --Plans and efforts to illicitly collect classified, sensitive, commercial proprietary, or protected technology information from US companies or government agencies. --Counterintelligence organization plans, efforts, and abilities, and warning of their use against US personnel. Details on security forces' penetrations of Palestinian rejectionist groups including electronic penetrations. --Technological capabilities, targets, and activities of Palestinian security forces. --Unit deployments and locations, infrastructure and facilities of Palestinian Authority security forces. --Details on processes used by Palestinian Authority security forces to acquire weapons and equipment, either legally or illegally. --Intentions by Palestinian security force leaders or rogue elements to use new capabilities against Israel or the US.
4) Illegal Activities (MONY-4). --Indications of levels of corruption among Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority and/or HAMAS leaders. --Individuals, governments, organizations, routes, and methods involved in arms smuggling, human trafficking/smuggling, money laundering and corruption in financial transactions in support of illegal activities. --Information on illegal weapons transactions with Israelis. --Activities of Palestinian gangs and irregular militia forces' involvement in crime and terrorism.
D. Terrorism and Islamic Activism
1) International and Indigenous Terrorist Activities (TERR-2). --Structure and internal dynamics of HAMAS militant wing (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Battalions), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and Popular Resistance Committees, Army of Islam, and other terrorist groups with a presence in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank, including leadership, membership, decision making processes, command and control, and factions. --Popular support for rejectionist groups. --Tactics, techniques, and operating methods of Palestinian terrorist groups, including tradecraft, counterintelligence measures, recruitment activities, underground facilities, operational tasking, and travel, infiltrations into Israel, disinformation, denial and deception techniques, and training. --Plans and intentions for, and extent and details of Lebanese Hizballah activities in Palestinian areas or within Israel, including retaliation for the deaths of Hizballah senior military leaders. --Relationship between Palestinian terrorist groups and al-Qa'ida, and indications of interest by Palestinian terrorist groups to work with global jihadists. --Indications of interest by Palestinian terrorist groups in the acquisition or use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, longer range missiles, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). --Communications systems used by senior leaders of Palestinian terrorist groups to direct and control subordinates and field operatives. --Use of Inmarsat, fax machines, cellular telephones, and computer communications, including the Internet, to conduct terrorist activities.
2) Internal and External Support for Palestinian Terrorists (TERR-2). --Evidence of Palestinian popular support for Palestinian and other terrorist groups; Palestinian public perceptions of rocket attacks against Israel. --Contacts and relations between Palestinian terrorist groups and other terrorist or rejectionist groups, especially Lebanese Hizballah, al-Qa'ida, and elements of the Arab population in Israel; influence of Islamic militants. --Extent and nature of control, sponsorship, and financial support of Palestinian terrorist groups by Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, or other countries. --Plans and intentions, capabilities and motivations of Palestinian terrorist groups and/or their state sponsors to conduct attacks against US, Israeli, Jordanian, Palestinian, or other western or allied targets. --Encouragement from state sponsors to conduct attacks against US, Israeli, Jordanian, Palestinian, or other western or allied targets. --Support mechanisms for Palestinian terrorist or rejectionist groups, including identities of key individuals and mechanisms for procuring and moving funds and weapons. --Smuggling between Gaza and the outside world, including routes and methodologies; information on weapons shipments into territories via tunnels, and maritime means for terrorist use. --Contacts and relations between HAMAS militants, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Resistance Committees, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), Lebanese Hizballah, Fatah al-Islam (FAI), and other known or emergent terrorist or rejectionist groups in the region, and elements of the Palestinian Authority. --Attitudes and motivations of the Palestinian Authority leadership regarding the activities of HAMAS, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and other terrorist or rejectionist groups. --Evidence of Palestinian Authority's, or PA senior officials' prior knowledge of, funding of, authorization of, or participation in popular unrest, violent outbreaks, or terrorist acts. --Financial support to NGO's from foreign governments, to include Venezuela and Turkey. --Contacts and cooperation between NGOs and terrorist groups, especially HAMAS charities and any political/humanitarian entities suspected of passing funds to militants.
3) Islamic Activism (DEPS-1). --Details about Islamic reformer, oppositionist and militant (activist) leaders, organizations, adherents, and supporters, including objectives, plans and strategies, tactics, and efforts to achieve goals. --Plans and efforts of internal or external Islamic activists to affect governance in Palestinian areas. --Islamic activist plans and efforts to develop political parties or organize opposition to the governing authorities. --Relations and cooperation among internal and external Islamic activists. --Cohesion and divisions within and among Islamic activist groups. --Influence of religious leaders on Islamic activist leaders, adherents, and supporters. --Islamic activist influence on national leadership, military and security services, educational institutions, government agencies, and NGOs. --Islamic activist use of public media, including the use of internet web forums, to achieve strategic, tactical and/or operational objectives. --HAMAS ownership of broadcasting stations. Government plans and efforts to support or defeat Islamic activist efforts. --HAMAS contacts or connections with Muslim Brotherhood in other countries. --Details of HAMAS connections to HAMAS external leadership in Damascus; HAMAS financial ties to external funding offices such as Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
4) Threats Against American Citizens (TERR-2). --Indications of Americans (officials, tourists, or residents) becoming targets of any terrorist groups operating in or near Israel, West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. --Palestinian terrorist groups' perceptions of US vulnerabilities and their perceptions of how the United States would respond to attacks against the homeland or US interests overseas. --Palestinian authorities' response to terrorist threats and attacks against the US interests, persons or facilities. --Policies, plans, and efforts regarding cooperation by Palestinian or Israeli officials with the US and regional neighbors concerning US POW/MIA accounting and recovery efforts and capabilities to assist or cooperate in recovery efforts.
E. Palestinian Social Development and Infrastructure
1) Human Rights (HRWC-3). --Palestinian data and perception of the humanitarian impact of Israel's closure of Gaza and lack of freedom of movement in the West Bank due to security checkpoints, the barrier, and other obstacles to free movement. --Details about HAMAS and the Palestinian Authority's facilitation of humanitarian operations in the West Bank and Gaza. --Information on treatment of prisoners or detainees from opposition groups. --Palestinian intelligence and security forces' attitudes toward and participation in torture, and other human rights violations.
2) Demographics (DEMG-3). --Population data for Palestinian areas and Palestinian Diaspora. --Details about, and changes to, key demographic indicators, such as birth rate, fertility rate, mortality rate, and internal migration. --Palestinian leadership's view of demographic trends; use of data in consideration of two-state solution. --Palestinian officials' efforts to deal with the 'youth bulge' and resultant educational, training, and employment challenges. --Efforts by Palestinian Authority or HAMAS officials or institutions to co-opt the youth.
3) Water Management (ENVR-4). --Plans and intentions of Palestinian officials in West Bank and Gaza to confront environmental issues, particularly problems with water and waste management. --Palestinian perceptions of efforts to mitigate the impact of power shortages on sewer treatment and other civil services. --Palestinian strategies and efforts regarding water management and protection of infrastructure against attack. --Details about annual water use, and renewable surface and groundwater reserves. --Cooperation and disputes with other states regarding regional water resources to include the aquifers. --Details about plans and efforts to augment supplies from non-conventional sources, such as desalination plants.
4) Infectious Disease and Health (HLTH-5). --Information on the effects of Palestinian-Israeli violence on public health conditions in Palestinian-controlled areas. --Details about prevalence, and outbreaks of infectious disease to include HIV and avian flu H5N1. --Palestinian Authority plans and efforts to prevent and manage outbreaks. --Statistical information on the incidence of chronic and infectious disease among various population groups (Gaza, West Bank, Bedouin, urban, agricultural areas, and so forth).
--Details about location and level of contaminants in air, water, food, and soil, including threat to health from accidental or intentional release of toxic industrial chemicals. --Military and civilian medical capabilities and infrastructure. --Details about HAMAS and other Palestinian groups' medical assistance to Palestinians.
5) Civilian Infrastructure (INFR-3). --Information on location and condition of power plants, roads, hospitals, waste treatment facilities and financial institutions in the Palestinian areas. --Information on Palestinian access to fuel for power plants.
--Palestinian perceptions of efforts to deal with impact of power shortages and efforts to mitigate power shortages on sewer treatment and other civil services.
F. Government of Israel Plans, Policies, and Actions
1) Israeli Leadership Plans and Intentions on the Peace Process (LEAD-1). --Government of Israel (GOI) leadership's negotiating positions, strategies, and goals in interactions with the Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority officials, with supporters or elements affiliated with HAMAS, and with other Palestinian parties concerned with the peace process. --Israeli leaders' perceptions of and relations with Palestinian leaders and negotiating counterparts. Evidence of informal channels, either sanctioned or unsanctioned by the Israeli leadership, to discuss peace steps with Palestinian leaders. --Israeli leadership views and intentions regarding the impact of their negotiations with Syria on their negotiations with the Palestinians. --Israel's decision-making process for launching military operations and determining retaliation for terrorist attacks.
--Israeli leaders' involvement in decisions on response to terrorist attacks. --Israeli leadership intentions and strategy toward managing the US relationship; views of prime minister and advisors toward the US and its counterterrorism policies. Israeli thoughts and views on impact of Israeli domestic politics, including changes in GOI leadership, on GOI approach to and conduct of the peace process and negotiations.
2) Conflict Resolution (SRCC-1). --Negotiating positions for Israeli talks with Palestinians on bilateral issues, particularly the extent of Israeli control of Jerusalem, right of return of Palestinian refugees to Israel, Israeli settlements in the West Bank and east Jerusalem, exchanges of territory, and "end of claims". --GOI views and positions on final-status issues; water rights, transportation and energy infrastructure issues, access to the Israeli economy, security, and safe passage between areas of Israeli and Palestinian control, legal matters and prisoners, and Jerusalem (including sovereignty, governance, and access to/control of the "Holy Basin"). --Attitudes of the Israeli public, including Israeli Arabs, toward Israeli-Palestinian talks. Efforts by opposition parties or members of the ruling coalition to influence government positions on the peace process. --Attitudes of Israeli security forces toward peace negotiations with Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Current plans and intentions regarding Palestinian access and movement, in particular, access and movement with economic consequences, e.g. movement of produce, access to fields, and movement of commercial goods between Palestinian villages.
3) Government of Israel Security Issues (SRCC-1). --Government of Israel (GOI) views and assessments of military strengths and vulnerabilities. --Perceptions of threats posed by Palestinian rejectionists, including the potential for conflict with their state sponsors, Syria and Iran, and Lebanon. --GOI negotiating positions, strategies, and goals in interactions with Syria, and Lebanon, especially on final status issues. --Israeli views of an Egyptian or Jordanian role in the context of final status issues. --Israeli views on a future regional security pact. --GOI plans, intentions and reactions to Palestinian intentions to develop Gaza off-shore natural gas reserves. GOI plans and actions to continue construction of security fence including views on boundaries, funding constraints, and external influences on decision-making. --GOI plans and actions to implement agreements with Palestinians on bilateral security measures and to implement unilateral security measures over Israeli- and Palestinian-controlled areas. --Views and actions on prisoner swaps/releases; information on Israel's treatment of Palestinian prisoners or detainees, including interrogation methods. --Information on and motivations for any increased Israeli population emigration from Israel.
4) Military Response to Palestinians and Terrorism (FMCC-2). --Details on Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations underway or planned against the HAMAS-controlled Palestinian militants in Gaza, terrorists, or terrorist infrastructure, including targeted assassinations and tactics/techniques used by ground and air units. --Israeli efforts to counter short-range rockets and mortars.
--IDF preparations to conduct increased operations against Palestinian targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Lebanon. --Impact of Israeli efforts against rocket attacks on Israeli views of security. --IDF preparations to conduct combat operations against Hizballah or Syrian targets along Israel's northern border or inside Lebanon or Syria. --IDF units, equipment, maintenance levels, training, morale, and operational readiness. --IDF tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting conventional and unconventional counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations. --Israeli assessment of the impact of reserve duty in the territories on IDF readiness.
5) Settlements (SRCC-1). --Evidence of Government of Israel support for or opposition to actions to limit and/or reduce settlement and outpost growth and construction. --Information on leaders of the Israeli settlement establishment, including Golan settlers, their ideology, motivations and who they claim to represent. --Divisions among the various settlement groups. --Details on settlement-related budgets and subsidies. Settlers' relationship with the Israeli political and military establishment including their lobbying and settlement methods. --Golan settlers' views of any potential peace agreement with Syria. --Support for settlers within Israeli society. --Indications of Israeli extremist groups becoming more active. --Perceptions of US demands or requirements of Israeli government regarding, security fences and settlements.
6) US and International Community (FPOL-3). --Israeli perceptions of US peace process approach; indications of critical or hostile reaction to US policies and views of Israeli leadership after discussions with the US. --Attitudes of key political and military officials concerning the state of the relationship with the US. --Plans to influence views and positions of academics, journalists, and business, religious and professional organizations towards the US and the US-Israeli relationship.
--Views of and responses to role of the Quartet. --Israeli plans and intentions to support US positions in the UN and other international fora. --Israeli support for US Iraq/Iran policies and US policies and attitudes toward other Middle Eastern countries, and European Union countries; relations with Russia, China, Turkey, Pakistan and India.
G. Information Infrastructure and Telecommunications Systems (INFR-3). --Current specifications, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and planned upgrades to national telecommunications infrastructure, networks, and technologies used by government and military authorities, intelligence and security services, and the public sector. --Details about command, control, and communications systems and facilities. --National leadership use of and dependencies on a dedicated telecommunications infrastructure. --Details about national and regional telecommunications policies, programs, regulations, and training. --Information about current and planned upgrades to public sector communications systems and technologies used by government, military personnel, and the civil sector, including cellular phone networks, mobile satellite phones, very small aperture terminals (VSAT), trunked and mobile radios, pagers, prepaid calling cards, firewalls, encryption, international connectivity, use of electronic data interchange, and cable and fiber networks. --Information about wireless infrastructure, cellular communications capabilities and makes and models of cellular phones and their operating systems, to include second generation and third generation systems. --Details about the use of satellites for telecommunication purposes, including planned system upgrades. --Details about internet and intranet use and infrastructure, including government oversight. --Details about foreign and domestic telecommunications service providers and vendors. --Plans and efforts to acquire US export-controlled telecommunications equipment and technology. --Plans and efforts to export or transfer state-of-the art telecommunications equipment and technology. --Details about information repositories associated with radio frequency identification (RFID)-enabled systems used for passports, government badges, and transportation systems.
--Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and e-mail addresses of principal civilian and military leaders.
RICE
Monday, 24 March 2008, 18:30
S E C R E T STATE 030340
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 02/27/2033
TAGS PINR, KPRP, ECON, PREL, PGOV, ETRD, PA
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: PARAGUAY
REF: 07 STATE 161706
Classified By: PAULA CAUSEY, DAS, INR. REASON: 1.4(C).
1. (S/NF) This cable reports the results of a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs for Paraguay. The review produced a list of priorities (paragraph 5) intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on Paraguay. The priorities also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).
2. (S/NF) Important information often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review of this National HUMINT Collection Directive. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels. 3. (S/NF) Please note that the community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting by email and other means is vital to this effort. When it is available, reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible: office and organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.
4. (S/NF) This National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.
5. (S/NF) Priority issues and issues outline:
A. Terrorism and Crime 1) Terrorist Threats and Activities (TERR-2) 2) Government Counterterrorist Response (TERR-2) 3) Impact of Corruption and Government Response (CRIM-3) 4) Narcotics Trafficking and Government Response (DRUG-3) 5) Money Laundering (MONY-3)
B. Political Dynamics and Democratization 1) Political Stability (DEPS-3) 2) Democratic Practice and the Rule of Law (DEPS-3) 3) Foreign Relations (FPOL-4) 4) Human Rights (HRWC-5)
C. Economy, Trade, and Investment 1) Economic Policies and Performance (ECFS-3) 2) Trade (TRAD-4) 3) Foreign Investment (TRAD-4)
D. Military and Security Issues 1) Critical Infrastructure Protection (INFR-4) 2) Military Structure and Capabilities (FMCC-4) 3) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 4) Health and Medical Developments (HLTH-4)
E. Information Infrastructure and Telecommunications (INFR-4)
6. (S/NF) Reporting and collection needs:
A. Terrorism and Crime
1) Terrorist Threats and Activities (TERR-2) - Information on the presence, intentions, plans and activities of terrorist groups, facilitators, and support networks - including, but not limited to, Hizballah, Hamas, al-Gama'at al-Islamiya, al-Qa'ida, jihadist media organizations, Iranian state agents or surrogates - in Paraguay, in particular in the Tri-Border Area (TBA). - Indications or evidence of terrorists' or terrorist support networks' involvement with narcotrafficking, money laundering, human smuggling, and/or other criminal activities as a means of obtaining funding or other logistical support; details on companies or organizations linked to terrorists or terrorist activity, to include financial transactions, shipping records, addresses, and associated companies/organizations. - Terrorist or terrorist support network plans and activities in the areas of recruitment, training, support, communications networks, local and regional command and control. - The arrival or expansion of Islamic NGOs or leaders with known or suspected radical affiliations. - Ties between and among terrorist organizations; evidence of terrorist links to government-including local/regional-officials, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (such as Jama'at al-Tabligh, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, and the Muslim World League), front organizations (including companies providing logistical or financial support), and organized criminal groups. - Identities information of terrorist members to include fingerprints, arrest photos, DNA, and iris scans. - Modus Operandi of individuals and terrorist groups, their use and/or modification of passports, seals/caches, and travel documents. - Plans, intentions, and activities of domestic terrorist groups and regional terrorist groups that operate in Paraguay.
2) Government Counterterrorist Response (TERR-2) - Information on the government's policy, plans and intentions for addressing the terrorist threat, including support for or opposition to the United States in the war against terrorism; Paraguay's position in regional and international fora, including support for or objection to U.S. counterterrorism policies. - Security services' capabilities, at the national and local levels, to counter terrorist groups and their activities; government plans or intentions to further develop or expand those capabilities. - Details of police and security services' efforts and programs to identify, monitor, and disrupt terrorist activities throughout Paraguay, and particularly in the TBA. - Government plans and efforts to deploy biometric systems. - Willingness to cooperate with the U.S. Government and other governments on counterterrorism issues, including the sharing of terrorist data; challenges (political, economic, financial, or personal) the government or government officials face which may influence their cooperation. - The status of, and prospects for, counterterrorism-related legislation.
3) Impact of Corruption and Government Response (CRIM-3) - Details about organized crime groups, including leadership, links to government or foreign entities, drug and human trafficking and smuggling, kidnapping, counterfeiting, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, connections to other international organized crime or terrorist groups, movement of organized crime into legitimate business structures, their locations, support structures and means of coordinating operations, with particular emphasis on their efforts to influence, suborn or corrupt government, law enforcement or security officials. - Information on the involvement of government, military, or security services personnel in corrupt practices, including officials involved in narcotrafficking and arms smuggling, trafficking in persons, funds diversion, influence peddling, bribe solicitation, blackmail, fraud--especially of travel documents--and nepotism; the impact of government corruption on efforts to pursue, capture, and prosecute terrorists and the effect on popular confidence in the government. - Details of corruption in government offices, particularly in the attorney general's office, the judiciary, and the customs service; status of any government efforts to combat corruption. - National, regional, or international criminal activity, including economic distortions caused by criminal activity; the government's efforts to devise and implement plans and policies to combat criminal activity; the level of cooperation with foreign security services on detecting, monitoring, and intercepting illicit arms and other smuggled goods.
4) Narcotics Trafficking and Government Response (DRUG-3) - Details of narcotics trafficking and associated criminal activities, particularly in the TBA and other border regions; illicit drug shipments and trafficking nodes, modalities, and routes. - Details on drug trafficking organizations, including leadership (biographic information and biometric data), communications (types and sources of technologies used), and methods of operation, to include processing and storage sites, methods of laundering money, and activities of front companies (financial activities, shipping records, addresses, and associated companies). - Traffickers' subversion or coercion of political, economic and judicial officials and systems, including attempts to gain influence through campaign contributions; impact of corruption from drug traffickers on executive offices, legislatures, military and security organizations. - Connections between narcotics traffickers and international organized criminal or terrorist groups. - Government control and enforcement plans, organizations, capabilities, and activities; military and police roles in combating drug trafficking or contributing to the trafficking. - Government plans and efforts to interdict the movement of narcotics through the TBA and elsewhere. - Details of legislative initiatives to improve counternarcotics enforcement and prosecutions.
5) Money Laundering (MONY-3) - Evidence of international organized crime, terrorist networks, drug producers, people smugglers, arms traffickers, government officials, military, and security services involvement in money laundering. - Details on the methods used to conduct illicit financial transactions. - Identification of financial organizations and businesses (names of personnel and physical location/address of entities), including exchange houses and informal mechanisms such as hawalas, involved in money laundering, the means employed, and the amounts and frequency of activity. - Government willingness and ability to enforce current law, investigate, and prosecute money laundering and illegal financial activities, to include plans to tighten financial controls and strengthen its financial intelligence unit. - Information about the underground market for treasury notes, bearer bonds, and other financial instruments.
B. Political Dynamics and Democratization
1) Political Stability (DEPS-3) - Plans and intentions of the government and ruling party to prepare for, or influence the outcome of, the April 2008 election. - Leading candidates and emerging leaders -- to include their views of, and plans for relations with, the United States, Venezuela, Cuba, and other Latin American nations - especially for the 2008 election. - Political parties' and candidates' preparations for the 2008 election; electoral politics, party platforms, tactics, and strategies employed in the run-up to the election and plans for the post-election period. - Information-before and after the election-on governing and opposition parties' alliances, rifts, internal factions, and constituencies, including key people, tactics, and strengths. - Details of post-election internal politics and political maneuvering during the transition from one administration to another. - Information on financial or material support to candidates, parties, or interest groups from foreign governments, especially from Cuba or Venezuela; post-electoral aid commitments from foreign governments. - Details of corrupt, illegal, or unethical activities aimed at subverting the electoral process. - Biographic and financial information on all leading contenders, and especially on Minister of Education Blanca Ovelar, former Vice President Castiglioni, Lino Oviedo, and Fernando Lugo; and biometric data, to include fingerprints, facial images, iris scans, and DNA, on these individuals.
2) Democratic Practice and the Rule of Law (DEPS-3) - Evidence of commitment, or lack of commitment, on the part of the government, political parties, or special interest groups to democratic principles, rule of law, transparent, corruption-free governance practices, and free and fair elections. - Details of political deal making and bargains and the resulting impact on popular confidence in the elections and the political process; indications of government or political party bargaining over the candidacy of Lino Oviedo and his campaign.
3) Foreign Relations (FPOL-4) - Information on the government's foreign policy plans and intentions toward neighboring states, regional powers (including the United States), and key international actors. - Status of the government's relations with and views of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his domestic and foreign policies and actions; the Paraguayan government perspective on Venezuelan efforts to influence Paraguay's political process or leadership. - Information on Paraguay's relationship with Cuba and the Paraguayan government perspective on Cuban activities and influence in Paraguay; Paraguay's policy on Cuba in international and regional fora and the Paraguayan leadership's views of the United States' Cuba policy. - Student exchange programs and philanthropic activities in Paraguay sponsored by Cuba or Venezuela. - Paraguay's relations with the MERCOSUR organization and its member countries in that multilateral environment. - Details of Paraguay's position on U.S. policies and actions in the region and internationally, including Paraguay's views on, and participation in, multilateral sanctions endorsed by the United States and/or the United Nations. - Information on key bilateral regional relationships, especially for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Bolivia. - Relations with Iran and information on Islamic facilities, including mosques, cultural centers, etc., supported by Iran. - Information on other key bilateral international relationships, especially for China, Taiwan, and Russia.
4) Human Rights (HRWC-5) - Government plans and intentions with regard to human rights issues, in particular willingness to crack down on - or disregard - violations by police, military or security services. - Performance of the police, military, and security services in upholding or violating human rights. - Government programs and efforts to prevent violence, trafficking in persons, prostitution, forced labor, slave labor, or vigilante activity.
C. Economy, Trade, and Investment
1) Economic Policies and Performance (ECFS-3) - Information on the state of the economy, the national budget, and internal and external debt; information on economic indicators, particularly for growth and inflation, including views of the government, political leaders, academics and other experts on Paraguay's economy and its future prospects. - Details on government efforts to improve economic performance by developing and implementing policies on taxes, investment, labor, or other resources. - Details of the effects on the general population of economic developments and programs. - Impact on the economy of the discovery of potentially large gas and oil deposits in the Chaco region. - Government willingness and capability to fairly and equitably enforce the law on economic, financial, and banking issues and uncover/prevent illegal activities. - Paraguay's interest and participation in the MCA Threshold Program.
2) Trade (TRAD-4) - Status of trade with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and other countries in the region, including government positions on future opportunities, areas for expansion, and potential areas of conflict; the impact of MERCOSUR on Paraguay's trade and the Paraguayan government's assessment of its benefits, potential drawbacks, and future prospects. - Paraguay's intentions with regard to ratifying Venezuela's membership in MERCOSUR. - The Paraguayan government's policies and positions related to trade with the United States; indications of genuine Paraguayan interest in negotiating a trade agreement with the United States; developments in Paraguay's position on intellectual property rights legislation and enforcement. - Paraguayan plans and intentions to expand their requests for market access to the United States beyond their traditional commodities - beef, textiles, and sugar.
3) Foreign Investment (TRAD-4) - Government plans and intentions to attract additional foreign investment to Paraguay, including details of incentives and disincentives for foreign investment in Paraguay. - Government and business views on the impact of rising crime and concerns about the independence of the judiciary on foreign investment, and government plans to deal with these concerns. - Paraguay's plans, policies, motives, and intended actions on intellectual property rights issues. - The Paraguayan government position on or participation in the Venezuelan initiative to create a regional development bank, the Bank of the South.
D. Military and Security Issues
1) Critical Infrastructure Protection (INFR-4) - Paraguay's approach to critical infrastructure protection strategies and technologies; efforts to reduce the vulnerability of key systems, including energy (e.g., hydroelectric), telecommunications, and transportation. - Overtures to the United States and others for assistance in planning and implementing protective measures. - Legislation or executive actions undertaken to improve infrastructure security, especially the physical security of power generation and distribution systems.
2) Military Structure and Capabilities (FMCC-4) - Capabilities of the military, current and future, in light of recent decisions to downsize and re-organize; objectives and expectations for the budget and missions of this future force. - Evidence of denial and deception (D&D) programs, including: personnel, organizations, strategies, tactics, technologies, activity scheduling, or support by foreign countries; evidence of satellite tracking or a satellite warning program, especially any foreign involvement. - Capabilities, plans, and intentions for participation in international peacekeeping operations. - Intentions with respect to cooperation with U.S. military forces, including the potential for reinstatement of a Status of Forces Agreement. - Information on military cooperation, assistance received or provided, or interaction with others in the region, for example, the training provided by Argentina; status of international military cooperation or assistance programs, such as the kinds of military support that might be offered by China, Iran, Venezuela, Taiwan, or other countries. - Plans and intentions for weapons and equipment acquisitions, including details on suppliers. - Reactions to major arms acquisitions by countries in the region. - Paraguayan views on Venezuelan and Bolivian military actions and activities, in particular, Bolivian deployments near the border of Paraguay. - Indigenous R&D, production, repair, maintenance or upgrade of military material. - Details on joint cooperation or co-production arrangements. - Details on military command, control, communications, computer and intelligence (C4I) systems. - Biographic and financial information and biometric data on military leaders.
3) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.
4) Health and Medical Developments (HLTH-4) - Infectious disease outbreaks; national strategies for dealing with infectious disease, including detection and control. - Capabilities and quality of medical care in private, public, and military medical facilities. - Disaster planning and response capability. - Sources, locations and levels of environmental and chemical contamination of air, water, food, and soil that might affect health; content and location of toxic industrial chemical production and storage facilities.
E. Information Infrastructure and Telecommunications (INFR-4) - Details of telecommunications and information systems, networks, and technologies supporting Paraguayan national leadership, military, foreign intelligence and security services (FISS), and civil sector communications. - Define Paraguayan wireless infrastructure, cellular provider information, and makes/models of cellular phones and their operating systems. - Define Paraguayan satellite communications infrastructure, to include VSAT networks and use of point to point systems. - Information on communications practices of Paraguayan government and military leaders, key foreign officials in country (e.g., Cuban, Venezuelan, Bolivian, Iranian, or Chinese diplomats), and criminal entities or their surrogates, to include telephone and fax numbers and e-mail addresses, call activity (date, time, caller numbers, recipient numbers), phone books, cell phone numbers, telephone and fax user listings, internet protocol (IP) addresses, user accounts, and passwords. - Identify national and supranational telecommunications regulatory, administrative, and maintenance organizations. - Identify scope of Paraguayan telecommunications encryption efforts, details on the use of and efforts to acquire modern telecom technologies, regional and national telecommunications policies, programs and regulations. - Details on information repositories associated with RFID enabled systems increasingly used for passports, government badges, and transportation system. RICE
Thursday, 17 March 2005, 14:58
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001593
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/14/2015
TAGS PARM, PREL, MNUC, KNNP, EU, IR, IS, GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: C-NE4-01083: ISRAELI INTENTIONS REGARDING THE
IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
REF: STATE 26053
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer; Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (S) SUMMARY: Israel sees Iran as the primary threat to its security and sees the enrichment cycle as the "point of no return" for Tehran's nuclear weapons program. The GOI believes that diplomatic pressure with teeth, such as sanctions, can affect Iranian behavior, and is lobbying the EU-3 and IAEA on details of a permanent suspension agreement. The Israelis support a unified international front but are concerned that the USG may move toward the EU position. Despite the GOI's focus on the diplomatic track, public and private speculation about possible Israeli air strikes continues. In weighing the military options, the GOI is aware of significant differences from its successful strike against Iraq's nuclear program in 1981, including an uncertain and dispersed target set, the presence of coalition forces in Iraq and the Gulf, Iranian capabilities to retaliate through Hizballah and terrorism, and the changed strategic environment. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- ----------
The Iranian Threat, "Point of No Return," and Timelines
--------------------------------------------- ----------
2. (S) PM Sharon calls Iran "the main threat to Israel" and has recently expressed concern that some states are "getting used to" the idea of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. Other senior Israeli officials echo this, cautioning that Tehran's nuclear weapons program poses what Mossad Chief Meir Dagan calls an "existential threat" that alters the strategic balance in the region.
3. (C) In a meeting with congressional visitors in December, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz described operation of the enrichment cycle as the "point of no return" for the Iranian program, a view shared by many senior GOI officials. Mossad Chief Dagan went a step further, saying that the Iranian program will be unstoppable once it no longer requires outside assistance to complete the enrichment process. At the technical level, the director for external affairs at the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) told poloff that the critical step would be Iran's operation of a centrifuge enrichment cascade.
4. (S) GOI officials have given different timelines for when they believe Iran will have full enrichment capability. In February, PM Sharon told the Secretary that he believes there is still time remaining to pressure Iran, but that the window of opportunity is closing quickly. DefMin Mofaz cautioned that Iran is "less than one year away," while the head of research in military intelligence estimated that Iran would reach this point by early 2007. Technical experts at the IAEC predicted that Iran would have enrichment capability within six months of the end of the suspension agreement. A few GOI officials admitted informally that these estimates need to be taken with caution. The head of the MFA's strategic affairs division recalled that GOI assessments from 1993 predicted that Iran would possess an atomic bomb by 1998 at the latest.
--------------------------------------------
Focus on Diplomacy and Concern with the EU-3
--------------------------------------------
5. (S) In the near term, Israel is focused on maintaining diplomatic pressure on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and EU-3. Sharon defines diplomatic pressure to include UNSC sanctions, e.g. on Iran's airlines and trade, as noted below. President Katsav has said that Tehran is "very conscious of international opinion." Other MFA and NSC officials point to the current suspension and to Iranian reaction to the Mykonos case as proof that diplomatic pressure can affect decision-making in Tehran.
6. (S) The Israelis often express disappointment with EU-3 efforts, but see no real alternative at this time. PM Sharon told reporters on March 10 that Iran uses the negotiations to "play for time." In private, Sharon, his Cabinet, and military leaders have all complained that the Europeans are "too soft." Similarly, President Katsav has cautioned that Iran will "cheat" on any commitments it makes. MFA staff told poloff that they do not believe that the EU-3 effort will be successful in obtaining a permanent suspension or that the Europeans will support effective sanctions against Iran.
7. (C) GOI technical experts said they have been lobbying the Europeans and IAEA on several issues. First, the GOI would like a clearer and more detailed listing of all activities covered by the suspension, along with timelines for each step. Second, they want more robust verification measures and greater focus on Iran's denial of access to IAEA inspectors. Third, the Israelis insist that any final agreement must be endorsed by the UNSC to ensure that noncompliance will be dealt with at an appropriate level. Fourth, Israel is pushing the EU-3 to define benchmarks that would signal a failure of the process, and to identify the concrete consequences of such failure.
8. (C) According to the IAEC, the GOI has urged the Europeans to examine bilateral or EU sanctions with small, but noticeable, economic impacts. After telling the press on March 10 that "it would probably not be advisable to impose an oil embargo on Iran," PM Sharon advocated trade and flight restrictions. Lower-level GOI officials said these steps could include restrictions on Iranians studying in Europe, limitations on travel by Iranian scientific personnel, and suspension of landing privileges for Iranian airlines within the EU. The goal, according to the deputy NSA for foreign affairs, is unified pressure from the EU, Russia, and U.S. for a "complete, full, verifiable cessation of the fuel cycle program." In the short term, this means a full suspension of all enrichment, reprocessing, heavy-water-reactor construction, and related R&D activities.
--------------------------------------------- --
Israeli Preference for USG and UNSC Involvement
--------------------------------------------- --
9. (C) In light of their uneasiness with EU-3 efforts, the Israelis are hoping for robust U.S. involvement and action by the UNSC. PM Sharon has urged the EU-3 to continue its efforts, but also stressed the importance of preparing to take Iran to the UNSC. In a meeting with a CoDel on December 12, DefMin Mofaz pushed for the U.S. to take the lead with the Europeans and pursue all diplomatic solutions, including sanctions. President Katsav asked the Secretary not to "wait for the Europeans."
10. (C) This desire for U.S. activity is amplified by the extremely limited options open to Israel on the diplomatic front. The IAEC's director for non-proliferation admitted that the GOI sees "little we can do" to increase pressure on Iran as long as Tehran abides by the suspension agreement. The MFA's office director for the Gulf states said that Israel would maintain its low-profile diplomatic activities, such as supplying IAEA members with intelligence material related to the Iranian program. She said the MFA believes that any overt Israeli pressure would backfire, leading to a surge of Arab support for Iran and focusing attention on Israel's own nuclear activities.
11. (C) Following the recent announcements on Iran by the President and the Secretary, several Israeli officials asked if the USG is shifting its policy on Iran. The deputy NSA for foreign affairs acknowledged that the U.S. move is probably necessary to build international consensus for taking Iran to the UNSC. At the same time, he expressed concern that the USG would be influenced by what he called the EU's habit of granting concessions to Iran prior to full compliance. Mid-level staffers at the NSC and IAEC were also disquieted by U.S. press reports claiming that the USG is re-examining its position on Hizballah.
------------------------------------------
The Military Option: Bushehr is not Osirak
------------------------------------------
12. (S) Despite frustrations with diplomatic efforts, Israeli officials are understandably reluctant to discuss possible military options. In public, PM Sharon has stressed the importance of the "political and economic" track. During a recent discussion with a visiting USG official, IDF Deputy Chief of Staff (and CoS-designate) Major General Dani Haloutz similarly said "we don't want to go there." In February, President Katsav told the Secretary that "the military option is not necessary -- bring the issue to the Security Council."
13. (S) Public speculation about possible military strikes usually focuses on the differences from the Israeli Air Force's attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981. In private, GOI officials have acknowledged that several factors would make any attack against Iran a much more difficult mission. A senior military intelligence official told the Embassy that the GOI does not know where all of the targets are located and said that any attack would only delay, not end, the Iranian program. The MFA's office director for the Gulf states noted that potential target sites are well dispersed throughout the country, with several located in built-up civilian areas. The IAEC stressed the importance of Russian assistance in restraining Iran's nuclear ambitions and said that any attack on Bushehr would likely result in Russian casualties and endanger Moscow's cooperation.
14. (C) MFA contacts said that the distance to the targets and the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and the Gulf raise additional complications. An Israeli assault would necessitate prior coordination with coalition forces in Iraq, they maintained, leaving the USG open to retaliation throughout the Islamic world, especially in Iraq. MFA and NSC officials acknowledged that any attack would also elicit a strong response from Arab states and the Palestinians, effectively freezing the peace process.
15. (C) The Israelis realize that Iran would use any military strike as an excuse to cease cooperation with the EU-3 and the IAEA. In addition, the GOI is acutely aware of Iran's ability to retaliate, both militarily and through attacks by its regional surrogates. PM Sharon has claimed that Hizballah has 11,000 rockets (and possibly UAVs) capable of reaching Israel from launching sites in Lebanon. The MFA's office director for the Gulf states said that she believed that Iran would retaliate by inciting terrorist groups in Israel and the Occupied Territories.
16. (C) Current USG, EU-3, and IAEA focus on Iran also creates a situation that differs from 1981, when the Israelis felt that the international community was ignoring the Iraqi threat. Israelis hope that the others will solve the Iranian problem for them, or as Vice PM Shimon Peres has said, "I do not think that the matter of Iran needs to be turned into an Israeli problem -- it is a matter of concern for the whole world."
--------------------------------------------- --
Comment: Diplomatic Solution Preferred, but ...
--------------------------------------------- --
17. (S) COMMENT: The Israelis are focusing on diplomatic channels in the IAEA and EU-3, and appear to have very real concerns about the feasibility of military strikes against the Iranian nuclear program. Nevertheless, the GOI has shown time and again that it will act militarily if it believes that its security is threatened, and the IDF is most certainly keeping contingency plans up to date. The Israeli press reported that in February PM Sharon's Security Cabinet had given "initial authorization" for an attack on Iran. The press reports cited an unnamed "Israeli security source," who claimed that the USG would "authorize" an Israeli attack. Post notes that it may not be possible to detect preparations for any military strike. Air defense operations would pose nearly perfect cover for civil defense and Air Force activities preceding any attack. Due to both the extreme sensitivity of the issue and the GOI's near inability to prevent leaks, any attack order would be closely held, probably even from many members of PM Sharon's Cabinet.
18. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The GOI knows that we share its interest in preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, we should expect continued Israeli lobbying at the highest levels urging the USG to ensure that the EU-3 effort is on track and backed by a solid international front. We will also hear Israeli concerns that the U.S. position may move toward the EU stance. At the same time, we should recognize that Israeli intelligence briefings will understandably focus on worst-case scenarios and may not match current USG assessments.
********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** KURTZER
Thursday, 17 March 2005, 10:32
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001580
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/15/2010
TAGS PGOV, PREL, KWBG, IR, IS, COUNTERTERRORISM, GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: MOSSAD CHIEF TO CODEL CORZINE: SOME FOREIGN
FIGHTERS BEGINNING TO LEAVE IRAQ
Classified By: Pol/C Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4(b) an d (d).
1. (S) Summary: Mossad Chief Meir Dagan told CODEL Corzine March 13 that Israeli and U.S. thinking on Iran largely tracks, adding that he believes the EU dialogue with Iran will ultimately fail. Dagan said that Israel has evidence that some foreign fighters have returned home from Iraq, perhaps indicating that the tide may be starting to turn in the U.S. battle against the insurgency there. He worried however, that these militants' countries of origin -- in particular Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria and Sudan -- are ill-equipped to control the returning jihadis, who might then pose a threat to stability in the region and, ultimately, to Israel. End Summary.
----
Iran
----
2. (C) Senator Jon Corzine, accompanied by Senate staff member Evan Gottesman, the Ambassador, Pol/Res and Poloff (notetaker), met with Mossad Chief Meir Dagan March 13. Acknowledging that there are at times differences in analysis of the facts, Dagan stressed that it is similarities rather than differences that are at the heart of the GOI-U.S. intelligence relationship, particularly on Iran. The facts themselves are not in dispute, Dagan continued, adding that the U.S. and Israeli assessments of Iran's intentions and plans are largely in accord. Iran has decided to go nuclear, Dagan said, and nothing will stop it. Dagan predicted that the EU dialogue with Iran will not succeed and that the issue of Iran's nuclear ambitions would eventually go to the UN Security Council.
-------------------------------------
Iraq - Foreign Fighters Heading Home?
-------------------------------------
3. (S) In response to the Senator's question, Dagan said that the tide may be starting to turn in Iraq with regard to foreign militant activity. Dagan said Israel has evidence that foreign fighters originating from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Syria and Yemen have arrived back in their home countries, and he assumes that some had returned to Saudi Arabia as well. Dagan predicted that, as with men who fought in Afghanistan during the 80's and 90's, these returning militants would stay in touch with each other, forming a network based on their common experiences in Iraq.
4. (S) Stressing that Israel has no assets in Iraq other than a friendly relationship with the Kurds, Dagan said that Israel's interest is more in the impact the jihadis from, for example, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, will have once they return to their countries of origin. Although he predicts Egypt and Jordan will "do all right," Dagan said he is less confident that governments in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, and Sudan are sufficiently well-equipped to face down the domestic challenge these returning militants will pose. The combination of their military training and the absence of strong governments willing and able to confront these men could have a devastating impact on Israel by causing chaos in their home countries, he added. Dagan predicted that these jihadis will have less of a direct impact on Palestinians, because Palestinians are already well aware of militant views and opinions via Internet chat rooms. Furthermore, Dagan said he feels that most Palestinians are not searching for "foreign flags," such as al-Qaeda, under which to rally, because those inclined to do so are already being well-mobilized under existing groups in the West Bank and Gaza.
-------
Lebanon
-------
5. (C) Dagan opined that Hizballah will never make the transition to a purely political party in Lebanon, since the organization remains very dependent on its jihadi orientation. Noting that even the recent Hizaballah-sponsored march in Beirut has not deterred the Lebanese from pressing for a full Syrian withdrawal, Dagan advised the U.S. to remain firm in its demand for a complete pullout, and attributed the willingness of the Lebanese people to rise up to U.S. action in Iraq.
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Essential to Use All Assets in the Fight Against Terrorism
--------------------------------------------- -------------
6. (C) Dagan said it is essential to combine all types of intelligence assets, rather than relying exclusively on human intelligence or signal intercepts, to counter terrorist threats. Terrorist organizations have been seeking to obtain WMD as a matter of course and, unlike countries that wish to acquire these weapons as a deterrent, non-state actors would be more inclined to actually use them, in Dagan's opinion. Asked about the relationship between illicit activities such as narcotic or arms trafficking and terrorism, Dagan confirmed that terrorist organizations try to fund their activities by criminal means, adding that credit card fraud and counterfeiting are also methods favored by these groups. Weapons originating from Yemen and Sudan are smuggled into the territories through Egypt for sale, as well as for use by militants, Dagan said.
7. (U) CODEL Corzine did not have an opportunity to clear this message.
********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** KURTZER
Thursday, 25 February 2010, 11:05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 000302
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE
EO 12958 DECL: 02/21/2020
TAGS PREL, PARM, MNUC, MASS, IR, TU
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' FEBRUARY 18 MEETINGS WITH U/S
SINIRLIOGLU
REF: ANKARA 263
Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Summary: During February 18 "Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue" meetings in Ankara, Turkish MFA Undersecretary Sinirlioglu:
-- Appealed for "simultaneity" between Armenian Protocols ratification and the Minsk Process; -- Registered increasing GoT dissatisfaction with Iraqi PM Malaki; -- Expressed hope USF-I CG Odierno's engagement would elicit substantive cooperation from the KRG against the terrorist PKK; -- Urged higher profile USG involvment in the Cyprus reunification talks, and; -- Confirmed GoT interest in further dialogue on missile defense.
End Summary.
IRAN
----
2. (C) Burns strongly urged Sinirlioglu to support action to convince the Iranian government it is on the wrong course. Sinirliolgu reaffirmed the GoT's opposition to a nuclear Iran; however, he registered fear about the collateral impact military action might have on Turkey and contended sanctions would unite Iranians behind the regime and harm the opposition. Burns acknowledged Turkey's exposure to the economic effects of sanctions as a neighbor to Iran, but reminded Sinirlioglu Turkish interests would suffer if Israel were to act militarily to forestall Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons or if Egypt and Saudi Arabia were to seek nuclear arsenals of their own. He said the international community's patience with Iran had been met with the Iranian refusal, since October, to work with the P5-plus-1, the clandestine enrichment facility near Qom and Tehran's recent decison to enrich its low-enriched uranium to 20%. The IAEA's creative proposal to fabricate new fuel assemblies for the Tehran Research Reactor had stumbled on a technically unfeasible Iranian counter-offer for a simultaneous exchange in Iran of Iranian fuel for fuel assemblies. Carefully constructed sanctions, Burns argued, targeting the increasingly pervasive economic power of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, would convey the international community's unity and determination. "We'll keep the door open to engagement," he stressed. A visibly disheartened Sinirlioglu conceded a unified message is important. He acknowledged the countries of the region perceive Iran as a growing threat: "Alarm bells are ringing even in Damascus."
ARMENIA
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3. (C) Sinirlioglu appealed for "simultaneity" between Armenian Protocols ratification and the Minsk Process. He emphasized "a strong reaction" against the protocols among ruling party MPs had to be overcome before the government would hazard a ratification effort. He warned Congressional passage of an Armenian genocide resolution would "complicate" his government's domestic political calculations regarding ratification. He said if something acceptable to Azerbaijani President Aliyev can found, then "we can move" the protocols forward. Sinirlioglu suggested Azerbaijan and Armenia's announcement of an agreed framework for Minsk Group progress would provide the GoT with the necessary political cover. Burns inquired about the prospect for progress on a natural gas deal between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Sinirlioglu implied
ANKARA 00000302 002 OF 005
Aliyev is holding an agreement hostage to Turkey's handling of the protocols: "He doesn't trust us."
IRAQ
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4. (C) Sinirlioglu registered the GoT's increasing dissatisfaction with PM Malaki and fear that he is tending "to get out of control." "He is preoccupied with his political survival;" nevertheless, Sinirlioglu continued, the GoT is in frequent contact with him. The MFA hosted Maliki advisors Sadiq al Rikabi and Tariq al Najmi to meetings 10 days prior. Sinirlioglu lamented Iran's efforts to influence the election. He noted Saudi Arabia is also "throwing around money" among the political parties in Iraq because it is unwilling to accept the inevitability of Shia dominance there. "We want a free, transparent and fair election," he said, "we need to forestall a deepening of the sectarian divide."
5. (C) After the March 7 elections, Sinirlioglu said, Turkey would initiate an effort to connect Iraqi gas fields to the Turkish grid via a 300 kilometer pipeline, costing USD 500 million. He asserted the pipeline could begin pumping within two years. He alleged Iranian opposition to the pipeline because most of Iraq's gas fields are in Kurdish and Sunni areas. Sinirlioglu advocated a second pipeline that would give Iraqi oil an alternative to the Gulf as a route to Europe once the country is able to meet its OPEC quota. He asserted the piplines' construction would pull the several Iraqi communities together into a common project. The creation of new "common assets," he said, could be more important for its politically unifying effect than its economic impact.
6. (C) Sinirlioglu registered his appreciation for USF-I Commanding General Odierno's recent visit. He hoped for the early drafting of an action plan that would elicit more cooperation from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leadership harboring in northern Iraq: "We want the KRG to understand that working with us is important."
ISRAEL
------
7. (C) Burns focused on Turkey's strained relationship with Israel. Sinirlioglu argued "the problem is not bilateral, but general." He attributed increasing regional country frustration with Israel to the stalled Peace Process, especially on the Palestinian track. He blamed the lack of progress on Israeli intransigence, which caused regional stake-holders to question Netanyahu's goals. He contended the "humanitarian situation in Gaza," which is not a punishment of Hamas, but of the Gazan people, fed Turkish popular anger against Israel. Even so, bilateral cooperation with Israel is continuing. Turkey is acquiring Israeli military equipment, notably Heron UAVs. Direct flights between the two countries are routine. Two-way trade is healthy, he said, tourism has dropped recently, but "will recover." Sinirlioglu described Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak's mid-January visit as "very good." He noted the MFA is exploring the possibility of arranging a meeting between the two prime ministers on the margins of an international gathering. Returning to a GoT obsession, he recalled the Turkey-brokered Syria-Israel proximity talks, "which were shattered by Cast Lead," Israel's December 2008 military operation in Gaza. Burns noted Syria places high value on Turkey's role as a mediator and repeated Senator Mitchell's statement that Turkey-brokered proximity talks can make an important contribution to the Peace Process.
ANKARA 00000302 003 OF 005
SYRIA
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8. (C) Sinirlioglu contended Turkey's diplomatic efforts are beginning to pull Syria out of Iran's orbit. He said a shared hatred for Saddam had been the original impetus for their unlikely alliance. "Now, their interests are diverging." Once again pitching Israel-Syria proximity talks, Sinirlioglu contended Israel's acceptance of Turkey as a mediator could break Syria free of Tehran's influence and further isolate Iran.
EU, CYPRUS and GREECE
---------------------
9. (C) Sinirlioglu said Turkey's EU accession is being obstructed by the politically motivated objections of several member states, notably France, Austria and Cyprus. He reserved special criticism for President Sarkozy. He accused France of changing the rules mid-game. He contended French opposition to Turkey's membership is "deepening the cultural divide" between Christian Europe and the Muslim world: "A wider audience is watching this."
10. (C) He regretted perceived Greek Cypriot complacency regarding the island's reunification talks: EU "membership makes them invulnerable." Greek Cypriots, he said, want the world to forget the progress achieved by the Annan Plan in 2004. They pretend relations between the island's two communities are an internal affair, even though, by treaty, it's been an international issue for 50 years. Talat's cross-voting proposal, Sinirlioglu continued, should have been a breakthrough, but the Greek Cypriots failed to react. Downer is frustrated, Sinirlioglu alleged, and so are the Turkish Cypriots. He implied the island's Turkish community would register its frustration by voting out Talat as TRNC "president" in April. He renewed Turkey's appeal for higher profile direct USG involvement in the negotiations.
11. (C) Sinirlioglu welcomed Greek PM Papandeou's belated response to Erdogan's October 30 letter seeking a frank new discussion of the two neighbors' several long-running disputes. He conceded Papandreou's delay is understandable in light of his likely preoccupation with Greece's acute financial crisis. Based on Papandreou's response, Sinirlioglu said, Turkey expects to begin new talks with Greece soon.
AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN and INDIA
-------------------------------
12. (C) Burns opened the discussion on Afghanistan with praise for Turkey's military, training and development contributions there. Sinirlioglu said Turkey had chosen to focus on three Afghan challenges: "the marriage of Wahhabism and Pashtun nationalism"; the chronic antagonism between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and; the country's security forces deficit. He said Turkey plans to address the first by ramping up its education programs in Afghanistan; the second by pursuing its trilateral Ankara Process, which sponsors meetings of senior Afghan and Pakistani ministerial and intelligence counterparts, and; the third by establishing a police training center in Kabul that aims for a throughput of 5160 trainees per year. Keying off the last point, AMB Tacan Ildem, who recently concluded an assignment as Turkey's NATO PERMREP, declared the EUPOL police training effort in Afghanistan a failure. He said the EU's criticism of Turkey's unwillingness to work directly with EUPOL is unjustified. He argued, since Turkey does not have a security agreement with the EU and is excluded from the
ANKARA 00000302 004 OF 005
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the GoT lacks a legal basis on which to cooperate with EUPOL. "We would like the EU to involve us not as a third country, but, in view of our accumulated rights," as a candidate for membership. He urged the USG not to coordinate bilateral agreements to support EU operations but, instead, to route all cooperation with the EU on security issues through NATO.
13. (C) Deputy Undersecretary for South Asian Affairs Engin Soysal led the discussion on Pakistan. He described the Ankara Process and the recent Turkey-sponsored Afghanistan Neighbors Summit as Turkish efforts to assert regional responsibility for South Asia's inter-linked problems. He said Turkey had not invited India to the neighbors summit in deference to Pakistani sensitivities; however, he claimed, Pakistan understands attempting to exclude India from the nascent South Asian regional structures would be a mistake. He reported Indian Prime Minister Singh had requested President Gul's assistance with Pakistan during the latter's visit to New Delhi the previous week. Acting on that request, Gul had phoned Pakistani President Zardari, who was skeptical of Indian intentions. Gul is planning to visit Pakistan later this year. Soysal said Iran is proposing a quadrilateal summit, which would include Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan, but that proposal had yet to generate enthusiasm.
14. (C) Soysal, Turkey's former ambassador to Pakistan, said the Pakistani military, though displeased with Zardari, remains unwilling to intervene; nevertheless, senior officers' patience may not be infinite. Zardari needs to increase the democratic legitimacy of parliament. Soysal offered. Nawaz Sharif has become a much more constructive player.
15. (C) Soysal urged a NATO training role in Pakistan. Picking up from Soysal, Tacan Ildem suggested NATO invite Pakistani military officers to courses at Oberammergau.
BOSNIA
------
16. (C) Sinirlioglu registered the GoT's determination to resist perceived EU efforts to exclude Turkey from the Balkans, particularly Bosnia. He identified effecting rapprochement between Bosnia and Serbia as Turkey's immediate diplomatic goal for the region. Towards that end, Sinirlioglu said, we convinced Haris Siladjdzic, who had been in Ankara the day before, to cease references to Serbian "genocide." The United States and Turkey have "agreed to disagree" on the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Bosnia; nevertheless, "we value your involvement in the Balkans."
BILATERAL EUROPEAN RELATIONS, NATO
----------------------------------
17. (C) Burns inquired about Turkey's bilateral relations with Europe. Sinirlioglu briefly recapped Turkey's unhappiness with Sarkozy. He described his country's relationship with Austria as infected by the latter's ethnic prejudice. He complained Belgium and Denmark are reluctant to suppress terrorist PKK-affiliated organizations active in their countries. Tacan Ildem added that, as part of the 2009 POTUS-brokered deal that had overcome Turkish objections to the appointment of Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO Secretary General, Denmark had promised to clarify its legal requirements prerequiste to acceding to Turkey's request for the closure of Roj TV, a PKK mouthpiece. This still needed to be done, Ildem said.
18. (C) Picking up from Ildem, Sinirlioglu recalled the
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POTUS-brokered deal had included an understanding that a qualified Turk would be considered for Assistant Secretary General. Instead, he said, a German of uncompelling merit was selected. "We suspect a deal between Rasmussen and Merkel." Ildem complained high-level positions should be part of NATO reform: "We missed an opportunity with the selection of the Assistant Secretary General." Sinirlioglu added: "We let Rasmussen have Secretary General, because we trusted you."
MISSILE DEFENSE
---------------
19. (C) Sinirlioglu inquired about Russia's reaction on missile defense. Burns said the Russians are much more relaxed towards the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) and we hope to have more conversations on missile defense bilaterally and, eventually, within the NATO-Russia Council. Sinirlioglu recalled PM Erdogan's request in his recent meeting with SECDEF Gates that the Iranian threat not be highlighted to justify PAA.
20. (U) Participants:
Turkey
Undersecretary Feridun Sinirliolgu Deputy Undersecretary Engin Soysal Ambassador Reha Keskintepe, Director General for the Americas Ambassador Tacan Ildem, Director General for International Security Affairs Ambassador Aydin Sezgin, Director General for Intelligence and Security Affairs Ebru Barat Gokdenizler, Deputy Director General for the Americas Serhat Aksen, Department Head, Americas
United States
Undersecretary William Burns Ambassador James Jeffrey Deputy Assistant Secretary Tina Kaidanow Bridget Brink, NSC Daniel O'Grady, Political Counselor Tamir Waser, P Staff Jeremiah Howard, Deputy Political Counselor - Notetaker
21. (U) Undersecretary Burns has cleared this cable.
Jeffrey
"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"
Tuesday, 23 February 2010, 10:47
C O N F I D E N T I A L DOHA 000070
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/13/2020
TAGS PREL, KWBG, KPAL, IR, QA
SUBJECT: SENATOR KERRY'S MEETING WITH QATAR'S AMIR
Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).
--------------
(C) KEY POINTS
--------------
-- The Amir of Qatar urged the U.S. in his February 14 meeting with Senator John Kerry (D-MA) to do everything in its power to find a lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Amir said the best way to begin is by moving first on the Syrian track.
-- In Qatar's view, now is the time to reach out to Damascus. The Syrian Government can help Arab extremists make tough choices, but only if the U.S., whose involvement is essential, demonstrates to Syria early on a willingness to address the return of the Golan Heights and supports Turkey's mediation efforts between Israel and Syria.
-- According to the Amir, Hamas will accept the 1967 border with Israel, but will not say it publicly so as to lose popular Palestinian support.
-- The Egyptians' goal, according to the Amir, is to stay in the game and maintain their relationship with the U.S., which is built around brokering regional peace, for as long as possible.
-- The Amir recommended that the U.S. and Qatar establish a small bilateral committee to discuss how to advance regional peace. Qatar can help move Hamas, because Qatar does not "play in their internal politics." That does not mean Qatar shares Hamas' ideology, stressed the Amir.
-- On Iran, the Amir said President Ahmadinejad is strong because he is uncorrupted. The Amir also advised the U.S. to continue ts efforts to open a dialogue with the Iranian ladership.
End Key Points.
1. (C) Senator Joh Kerry (D-MA), the Chairman of the Senate Foreig Relations Committee(SFRC), joined by Ambassador,P/E Chief, and SFRC staff member Dr. Jonah Blank met February 14 with the Amir of Qatar, Hamad bn Khalifa Al Thani. The meeting took place at Waba Palace, the residence of the Amir, and the Amir began the meeting by pointing out that the comfortable chairs on which the U.S. party was seated were made in Syria.
------------------------------
IMPORTANCE OF THE SYRIAN TRACK
------------------------------
2. (C) This opening led Senator Kerry to remark that he had held great discussions with Syria's President, Bashar Al-Asad, when he met him in Damascus some months ago. The Amir said President Asad is committed to "big change," but Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri's death and complications resulting from Syria's alleged involvement in it had brought about "complications" for Asad. The Amir added that "Bashar is still young and can grow."
3. (C) Senator Kerry said he took away from his visit to Damascus that Asad wants change. The Amir added that the Syrian President also wants peace with Israel and that the arrival of a U.S. Ambassador in Damascus would help in this regard. Senator Kerry said he had wanted a U.S. Ambassador in Syria a year ago, but agreed that the naming of an Ambassador is a positive development.
4. (C) The Amir cautioned that the Syrians will not accept everything the U.S. proposes, stressing that the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights continues and that the return of this land to Syria is paramount for Damascus. The Amir observed that the "Syrians have lost confidence in the U.S. and that the Israelis now have the upper hand in the region because of the support of the United States." The Israeli leaders need to represent the people of Israel, who themselves do not trust Arabs. The Amir said this is understandable and "we can't blame them" because the Israelis have been "under threat" for a long time.
5. (C) What has changed, continued the Amir, is that Arabs "for sure" now want two states -- Israel and Palestine. When you consider that many in the region perceive that Hizballah drove Israel out of Lebanon and Hamas kicked them (at least initially) out "of the small piece of land called Gaza," it is actually surprising that the Israelis still want peace. The region, however, is still "far away" from peace, concluded the Amir.
6. (C) Senator Kerry responded that in his long experience with the region, it was not unusual for people to take positions adverse to their own interests. Yasser Arafat went from living as a terrorist in Tunisia to signing an agreement with Israel on the White House lawn. The transformation of Arafat is an example of how actors in the region need to take risks if we are to move forward in advancing regional peace. Turning the conversation back to Syria, Chairman Kerry pointed out that Syria's facilitation of arms to Hizballah and its turning a blind eye to missile upgrades in Lebanon do not represent risk-taking in the promotion of peace.
7. (C) The Amir pointed out that any progress toward regional peace had come about due to American involvement. He implied that it would take U.S. intervention on the Syrian-Israeli track to address these issues and asked Senator Kerry what he would have Damascus do.
8. (C) The Chairman responded that President Asad needs to make a bolder move and take risks. He observed that if the Syrian President wants peace and economic development for his country, he needs to be more statesman-like, which would in turn help Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu engage him.
9. (C) The Amir agreed with Senator Kerry's assessment of Asad's aims and said he is ready for peace, but asked if the Israelis are ready. Would Israel accept to resume Turkey's mediation between Syria and Israel? Would the U.S. play a role in advancing the Syria track?
10. (C) If we can get Abu Mazen back to the negotiating table, we can engage on border issues -- including Israel's borders with Syria, advised Senator Kerry. Abu Mazen right now is not strong enough, though, to make necessary compromises with Israel because the Palestinian people have wanted him to stick to his guns on a settlement freeze and the Goldstone Report. The Chairman added that Netanyahu also needs to compromise and work the return of the Golan Heights into a formula for peace.
11. (C) The Amir encouraged the U.S. to work the Golan Heights issue first. He stressed that Syrians are very different from Iranians in "mentality," and said the Syrians turned to Iran for support only because they had nowhere else to go. Now is the time, the Amir told Senator Kerry, to reach out to Damascus.
-------------------------
PARAMETERS FOR DISCUSSION
-------------------------
12. (C) Senator Kerry responded that the U.S. is prepared to play a strong role in bringing about peace in the region. President Obama, said the Chairman, understands that he personally must engage and do so strongly. The Senator told the Amir that in his speech to the U.S.-Islamic Forum the previous evening, the Senator had focused on former President Clinton's parameters for peace and the 2002 Arab League peace initiative. Now, said the Senator, is the time to put those back on the table and resume talking, with the U.S. acting as a legitimate agent of peace. Chairman Kerry told the Amir he is convinced that we can see great progress in the coming year by moving swiftly from proximity talks, to direct talks between the parties and ending with final status discussions.
13. (C) To be successful, continued Senator Kerry, we must begin by agreeing at the outset the amount of land each side (Israelis and Palestinians) will obtain in the end and use that understanding to draw the borders. If both sides make good compromises, we can address the settlement issues in the context of giving something up so that the borders, when drawn, contain the agreed-upon amounts of land for both sides. The Amir agreed with the Senator's assessment and complimented President Obama for being the first U.S. President to take on the Middle East conflict in the first year of his term.
14. (C) Continuing the presentation of his ideas on the parameters of peace between Israel and the Palestinians, Senator Kerry noted that one of the biggest problems for Israel is the potential return of 5-6 million Palestinian refugees. The parties broached the return issue in discussions at Taba and agreed that the right of Palestinian return would be subject to later negotiation, pointed out the Chairman. If we can proceed from that point on the right of return, the Senator believes there is an "artful way" to frame the negotiations on borders, land swaps, and Jerusalem as a shared capital. 15. (C) Any negotiation has its limits, added Senator Kerry, and we know for the Palestinians that control of Al-Aqsa mosque and the establishment of some kind of capital for the Palestinians in East Jerusalem are not negotiable. For the Israelis, the Senator continued, Israel's character as a Jewish state is not open for negotiation. The non-militarization of an eventual Palestinian state and its borders can nonetheless be resolved through negotiation.
16. (C) The Amir underscored that Abu Mazen needs Arab support to make the above happen. Hamas "for sure," he said, will accept the 1967 border but will not say it publicly so as to lose popular Palestinian support.
---------------------------
DEALING WITH THE EXTREMISTS
---------------------------
17. (C) Senator Kerry told the Amir he knew Qatar could help the U.S. but asked how we deal with those who advocate violence. The Amir said the short answer is to work the Syrian track, which means pushing for Israel's return of the Golan Heights to Syria. The Amir said return of the Golan is important not just to Syria but also to Hizballah and Iran. The U.S. must bear in mind that Misha'al, a leader of Hamas based in Damascus, has drawn the conclusion that the Oslo accords were bad for Arafat. He lost the support of his own people and died living under Israeli siege. The Syrians can help Misha'al and others make tough choices, but only if the U.S. demonstrates to Syria early on a willingness to address the Golan. Senator Kerry responded that the U.S. would accept a legitimate discussion of the Golan Heights.
18. (C) What is more, said the Amir, the U.S. needs to support Turkey's mediation between Israel and Syria. It is important that the U.S. encourage Israel to understand that that resolving the status of the Golan Heights is very important to the United States.
19. (C) Senator Kerry asked the Amir if Hamas is under pressure given the circumstances in Gaza. The Amir answered by saying that Hamas needs Iranian support. He added that the biggest misconception in the region is that the Syrians, who host Hamas leaders in Damascus, go to Iran because they like the Iranians. This is wrong. Syria goes to those who will not shun them.
-------------
ROLE OF EGYPT
-------------
20. (C) Returning to the pressure Hamas is facing, Senator Kerry observed that economic development in the West Bank is taking place, but not in Gaza. The Palestinian reconciliation that would make possible developmental assistance in Gaza has not happened. The Egyptians have not delivered, said Senator Kerry.
21. (C) The Amir said the Egyptians' goal is to stay in the game and maintain their relationship with the U.S., which is built around brokering Middle East peace, for as long as possible. According to the Amir, Fatah and Hamas agreed on a memorandum of understanding, but the Egyptians wanted it changed. The Amir remarked that he has a feeling he knows which capital (Cairo) is the source of reports that Gaza is under pressure. He said the economic pressure in Gaza on families is not what it was. He offered as an example that Qatar Charity recently offered a family in Gaza 500 USD, but the family declined the gift saying its members had enough to get by and suggested another family that was in more dire need of assistance. The Amir said the notion that a family would turn down money is new.
22. (C) The Amir told Senator Kerry that everyone knows "Egypt has a problem with the Muslim Brotherhood. Okay, we understand. But Egypt should not expect the world to take external actions that would help it internally."
23. (C) Asked his advice for President Obama, the Amir recommended the establishment of a small U.S.-Qatar committee to discuss how to proceed. Qatar is close to Hamas, emphasized the Amir, because "we don't play in their internal politics." That does not mean we share their ideology or do not disagree with them. "I can remember many arguments with them (Hamas) on the 1967 border with Israel." The Amir noted that he had mediated with Hamas previously at the U.S. request, namely when he urged Hamas at the previous Administration's request to participate in Palestinian elections.
24. (C) Returning to the leadership of Hamas, Senator Kerry asked the Amir for his insights into how the leadership, with leaders sitting in both Gaza and Syria, makes decisions. The Amir said the impression that Misha'al sits in Damascus and others take orders from him is wrong. Several key players within Hamas are involved in decisions. They have differences over policy, but "the bottom line is that they all want the Palestinians to take their rights from Israel."
----
IRAN
----
25. (C) Senator Kerry observed that the international community is moving toward imposing additional economic sanctions on Iran. Understanding and respecting that Qatar needs to balance its relationships with regional powers, including Iran, the Chairman asked the Amir for his perspective on where we are going on Iran.
26. (C) The Amir answered by affirming that his first obligation is to defend the interests of Qatar. Due to the natural gas field Iran shares with Qatar, Qatar will not "provoke a fight" with Iran. He added that in the history of the two countries, "Iran has not bothered us." That said, the Amir noted that Iran is an important country in the Middle East. He faulted the U.S. for "making the mistake of speaking up for protesters" after the disputed Iranian presidential elections.
27. (C) The Iranian regime is strong, continued the Amir, because President Ahmadinejad is uncorrupted. "That is the secret to his success." Khatami is also not corrupted, but as a reformer he is in a weak position. Rafsanjani, on the other hand, is corrupt.
28. (C) Senator Kerry lamented that every communication the current Administration has attempted to the Government of Iran has gone back channel and been met with no response. There have been non-U.S. initiatives, too. Again, no success. The Chairman observed that the Iranians are scared to talk. The Supreme Ayatollah had met with Russian President Putin, but seems not inclined to meet with other political leaders. Our instinct is that we need to find a way to talk to him.
29. (C) Your instinct is right, replied the Amir. The U.S. needs to talk directly with senior Iranian officials. The Amir then asked, "What if I talk to the Iranian President. What would you have me say?"
30. (C) Senator Kerry responded, "The U.S. seeks serious discussion and sought to create a new foundation for a relationship based on Iran's non-confrontational compliance with IAEA requirements and other mutual interests." Those interests include dealing with drug-running, the Taliban, and illicit trade. The Chairman told the Amir he feared that Iran still thinks it is dealing with the 1953 America that tried to overthrow the Iranian government.
31. (C) The Amir responded that you cannot blame them for having that attitude, and Senator Kerry agreed, adding that the U.S. has a very different posture in the post-Cold War world of today. Iran has ambitions; I know this from other regional leaders, said the Senator. These are the first words that come out of their mouths.
32. (C) Iran wants to be a "big power," agreed the Amir, but what sort? He reminded Senator Kerry the U.S. should not forget that Iranians are Persian and the U.S. needs to approach them in that framework.
33. (C) Senator Kerry stressed that the U.S. "would love to have that dialogue." The U.S. respects Iranian civilization -- talent, art, culture, etc. It is crazy to continue on this collision course. The region needs schools and jobs, emphasized the Chairman, not another war. The Amir agreed that "demographics are a big worry." Not just for the countries in the region but for the U.S. too.
34. (C) Many scientific and technological transformations are underway, noted the Senator, "but Iran misinterprets the road to being a great power and the degree to which the international community is concerned about Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons." We are at a "fork in the road," and Iran must choose between confrontation or building partnerships. If the latter, we can open up new opportunities for cooperation in the sciences, technology, education, robotics, energy and other ongoing transformations.
35. (C) Going back to the speech he had delivered in Doha the previous evening, Senator Kerry told the Amir that 17 former U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense had come out in favor of eliminating nuclear weapons. Every stop closer to realizing that goal is a sign of progress, but "no one believes Iranian nukes get us closer to that goal."
36. (C) Senator Kerry reported that leaders of regional Arab countries tell me they want nuclear weapons if the Iranians have them. The Amir responded that he did not believe they were serious, but are saying this to put additional pressure on Iran.
37. (C) The Chairman noted that the disputed Iranian presidential elections may have derailed U.S. efforts to have serious dialogue with Tehran. The Amir agreed, offering that the Israelis are also using Iran's quest for nuclear weapons as a diversion from settling matters with the Palestinians. The historical backdrop of Arab-Persian relations does not help, the Amir added.
--------------
FINAL THOUGHTS
--------------
38. (C) The Amir advised the U.S. to continue trying to open a dialogue with the Iranian leadership. He also told Senator Kerry the U.S. needs to tell the Israelis they are causing the U.S. to lose the hearts and minds of Muslims. There was a time, such as during the Suez Canal crisis, when the Arabs loved the Americans and disliked the British and French, he said.
39. (C) Senator Kerry asked the Amir how the U.S. goes about changing its reputation. The Amir said first and foremost the U.S. must do everything in its power to find a lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the best way to begin is by moving first on the Syrian track.
40. (C) The Chairman of the SFRC said he expects a genuine effort by the President this year on an agreement and expressed his hope that Iranian issues would not complicate matters. The Amir agreed, adding that China likes the distraction for the U.S. as its forces fight in Iraq and Afghanistan.
41. (C) Senator Kerry concurred, noting that China is lending the U.S. money and expanding its influence at U.S. expense. He added that he ran against President George W. Bush saying the war with Iraq was the wrong war in the wrong place and time.
42. (C) The Amir closed the meeting by offering that based on 30 years of experience with the Iranians, they will give you 100 words. Trust only one of the 100.
43. (U) CODEL Kerry has cleared this message.
Lebaron
Monday, 22 February 2010, 12:46
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000097
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR NEA/ARP AND NEA/IR
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/02/22
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ETTC, UNSC, IR, AE
SUBJECT: CODEL LOWEY WITH UAE FOREIGN MINISTER ON IRAN
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Olson, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (S/NF) Summary. In a February 17 meeting, UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (AbZ) discussed Iran with a four-member Congressional delegation led by Chairwoman Nita Lowey of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. AbZ told the Codel the nuclear issue is only one aspect of the Iran problem, and that Iran's regional meddling was a serious concern. He pledged the UAE's backing as the US rallies support for new sanctions but questioned whether they would achieve the desired effect. AbZ noted the UAE's growing concern that Gulf allies were being shut out of Iran sanctions planning. End Summary.
IRAN'S REACTORS AND REACH
-------------------------
2. (S/NF) AbZ began by expressing pride in the US-UAE 123 agreement and the bilateral relationship generally. According to AbZ, the 123 is a powerful example for the region and provides a transparent alternative to Iran's nuclear model. The UAE views Iran as a huge problem that goes far beyond nuclear capabilities. Iranian support for terrorism is broader than just Hamas and Hizballah. Iran has influence in Afghanistan, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, the Eastern Province of KSA, and Africa (AbZ mentioned Nigeria specifically). Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez have close, cooperative ties. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, the expeditionary aspect of its foreign policy will become ever more challenging for neighboring states.
POSSIBILITY AND FUTILITY OF SANCTIONS
-------------------------------------
3. (S/NF) Lowey asked what AbZ thought about tougher sanctions against Iran and how the UAE can help with China. AbZ said the US and its allies "have to decide how to stop Iran" and that the UAE was surprised at the Chinese attitude. AbZ noted the Emiratis and the Saudis have spoken to the Chinese, and the UAE expressed a willingness to expand its energy ties (Note: AbZ seemed to be indicating that this was intended as a carrot, but he acknowledged the difficulty of supplanting an Iran-China trade relationship that reached $50 billion last year. End Note.)
4. (S/NF) AbZ urged quick action on tough new sanctions. The UAE is conscientious in its efforts to enforce existing UNSC sanctions but the Iranians have been able to find other routes, bypassing UAE ports, to import what they need. AbZ predicted that smart and swift implementation of new sanctions could still be ineffective but said that we must try.
GULF NEIGHBORS FEELING LEFT OUT
-------------------------------
5. (S/NF) AbZ highlighted a growing belief the UAE and the GCC are being left out of our Iran sanctions consultations. AbZ told Chairwoman Lowey that the P5+1 negotiations with Iran should be expanded to included the GCC. AbZ said there is a "trust barrier" to full GCC support for US policy, as there is a deep suspicion that the US is proceeding without consulting Gulf allies.
6. (S/NF) AbZ raised (as he likes to do regularly) the 2005 EU package offer to Iran that was briefed to the UAE by the Iranians, not the US or another ally. Things have improved since then, but "we still need some serious trust building between the US, the EU, and the GCC" on this issue. The DCM reminded AbZ (and the Codel) that there are extensive and privileged communications between the UAE and the USG on policy towards Iran and on sanctions planning. AbZ acknowledged there was trust from the UAE, but the rest of the GCC had continuing concerns. "Your problem today is to fix your relations with the GCC, quickly. A few countries in the region are already dealing with Iran as if they had the bomb."
7. (S/NF) AbZ said GCC states are left wondering what will happen to them in any deal the US and Iran reach through back channel conversations. He compared the current multilateral conversations over Iran's nuclear program with negotiations over North Korea's nuclear program, asking why North Korea's neighbors are part of the Six Party negotiations, but the GCC is not equally involved in similar conversations about and with Iran.
"WHAT IF?" SCENARIOS
--------------------
8. (S/NF) In response to questions from members of Congress, AbZ said that if Iran goes nuclear others in the region will move forward on the same track and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty will completely break down. He said a crisis or confrontation in the region would create oil supply problems worldwide. 14 million barrels a day pass through the Strait of Hormuz. That said, he noted that the US and UAE militaries have plans to keep Hormuz clear.
9. (S) AbZ concluded the meeting with a soliloquy on the importance of a successful peace process between Israel and its neighbors as perhaps the most effective way of reducing Iran's regional influence.
10. (SBU) Members of Congress in attendance: Congresswoman Nita Lowey, Congressman Tom Cole, Congresswoman Barbara Lee, Congresswoman Donna Edwards. OLSON
Tuesday, 09 February 2010, 11:35
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000069
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FROM AMBASSADOR
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/02/09
TAGS PREL, MARR, MOPS, AE
SUBJECT: UAE - SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF CJCS
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Olson, Ambasador; REASON: 1.4(A), (B), (C), (D)
1. (SBU) Admiral Mullen: we warmly welcome your visit to Abu Dhabi, and have requested an appointment with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ), whom you last met on 9 September 2009 in Washington. We have also requested a meeting with your counterpart, Lieutenant General Hamad al-Thani al-Romaithi, Chief of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces, whom you last met on 8 October 2009 in Washington.
--------------------------------------------- -----
The Relationship
--------------------------------------------- -----
2. (S/NF) The UAE is one of our closest partners in the Middle East and one of our most useful friends worldwide.
-- Al-Dhafra Air Force Base is the high altitude ISR hub for the AOR, and supports 50 percent of aerial refueling in the AOR.
-- Ports in Dubai and Fujairah are the logistics backbone for the U.S. Fifth. Jebel Ali (Dubai) is the most frequented USN liberty port after Norfolk.
-- Minhad Air Base is a critical hub for Coalition/ISAF partners in Afghanistan, including the Australians, Dutch, Canadians, Brits and Kiwis.
-- The UAE is a cash customer with FMS sales in excess of $11 billion. Commercial sales have an equivalent value. An additional $12 billion of FMS cases are in development with approximately the same volume of commercial sales in the works.
-- The UAE recently purchased nine Patriot batteries, and expects to move forward on the purchase of THAAD as the first non US customer.
-- The UAE currently commands CJTF-152 (Arabian Gulf) and maintains an active exercise schedule with U.S. (Red Flag) and other multi-lateral partners.
-- The UAE recently hosted an AFCENT survey team to consider U.S. access to Liwa (Safran) Air Base in support of contingency operations.
-- Additionally, the UAE is considering hosting the Regional Integrated Air and Missile Defense Center of Excellence.
--------------------------------------------- -----
Iran - the Primordial Concern
--------------------------------------------- -----
3. (S) The UAE leadership sees Iran as its primary external threat, and one that is existential in nature. Like much of the international community, the UAE finds the idea of an Iran with nuclear weapons unacceptable and thinks this eventuality would lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. At least as worrying to MbZ are Iran's aspirations for regional hegemony by support for terrorist proxies (Hizballah, HAMAS, possibly underground organizations in the Arab Gulf countries). MbZ is skeptical that Iran can be convinced to end its nuclear weapons program, and is not convinced that the international community will adopt tough sanctions. In other words, he sees the logic of war dominating the region, and this thinking explains his near obsessive efforts to build up the UAE's armed forces.
4. (S/NF) MbZ's main message to us during his September visit was that we needed to be better coordinated for Iran contingencies. High level engagement by CENTCOM planners have helped to address this concern, but he believes we have made less progress in addressing what he sees as the slow pace of deliveries of US
security assistance and he is still worried that he does not have enough equipment in place to defend his people when war with Iran breaks out. (And for MbZ it is a matter of when, not if.) We have repeatedly presented to his staff the various explanations for what he perceives as delays, but he remains unconvinced that we are addressing his concerns as a matter of priority.
--------------------------------------------- -----
Afghanistan - Pakistan: A Solid Partner
--------------------------------------------- -----
5. (S) Afghanistan: UAE SOF has been quietly deployed as part of OEF since 2003, and the UAE surged its contribution in 2009 adding a combined arms task force. The UAE's UAV capability has been a much appreciated force multiplier. On the economic development side, the UAE has pledged about $300 M in assistance, and quietly supported the Afghan Reintegration Fund at the recent London Conference. You should thank MbZ for his leadership in being the first Arab country to send troops to Afghanistan.
6. (C) Pakistan: the UAE has taken a leading role in the Friends of Pakistan initiative and has provided about $800 M in assistance in recent years. The Al Nahyan family had a long-standing relationship with former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and this has transitioned to support for her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, but the UAE stays in touch with all elements on the Pakistani scene, including Musharraf. MbZ will be very interested in your dialogue with General Kayani.
7. (S/NF) Threat finance: we have a cooperative relationship with the UAE at the Federal level on addressing Taliban financing. As our information has begun to flow, we have seen increasing activity and interest on the part of UAE authorities. That said, the subject is delicate and operational aspects are best handled through our well established Treasury/Intelligence channel.
--------------------------------------------- -----
Yemen: Increasing Concern
--------------------------------------------- -----
8. (S/NF) MbZ shares our concern about Yemen, and if anything, is more alarmed about the possibility for destabilization of Saudi Arabia. He is convinced that the Iranians are involved in Yemen, and supporting the Houthi rebels. When we tell him that we have no evidence of Iranian support, he is somewhat incredulous, suggesting that our focus on Al Qaeda has caused us to lose sight of the bigger picture of Iranian adventurism. You should encourage him to provide any specific information on Iranian activities to us through intelligence channels.
--------------------------------------------- -----
Iraq: the Bellwether for Iran
--------------------------------------------- -----
9. (S) Iraq: the UAE was the first GCC Country to cancel Saddam era debt and re-establish an embassy, and has generally followed a policy of constructive engagement with the Maliki Government. But MbZ runs hot and cold on Iraq. Sometimes he chooses to emphasize his supportive position; at other times he suggests that Iran has been the big winner in Iraq, and that Southern Iraq will be one of the major flashpoints in the upcoming confrontation with Iran. Anything you can say to reassure him about the US commitment to
Iraqi stability will be helpful. OLSON
Sunday, 20 December 2009, 12:14
S E C R E T DOHA 000728
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/14/2019
TAGS ENRG, PREL, TRGY, EPET, QA
SUBJECT: QATAR,S PRIME MINISTER ON IRAN: "THEY LIE TO US;
WE LIE TO THEM."
Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).
-- Deputy Secretary of Energy Poneman and Ambassador met December 10 with Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani (HBJ) to discuss energy research and development, critical infrastructure protection, and Iran.
-- HBJ indicated Qatar,s interest in a bilateral critical infrastructure protection partnership.
-- The PM was skeptical about the plausibility of Iranian acceptance of a nuclear compromise, saying he would be shocked if Iran abided by a deal to ship Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) out of Iran.
-- The best way to deal with the Iranians, he said, is to get them to dictate the terms of any such deal. The U.S. and its partners should strive to get the Iranians to put the details in writing, including timetables for implementation.
-- HBJ characterized Qatar,s relationship with Iran as one in which "they lie to us, and we lie to them."
-- According to HBJ, the GOQ tells Iran that it should "listen to the West,s proposal or there will be military action. If not by the U.S., then by the Israelis by the middle of next year."
End Key Points.
1. (C) Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman and Ambassador met December 10 with Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani. Also present on the American side was State Department Coordinator for International Energy Affairs, David Goldwyn. DepSec Poneman thanked the Prime Minister for the meeting and expressed his hope that the U.S. and Qatar could strengthen their bilateral and investment ties.
--------------------------------------
(C) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
--------------------------------------
2. (C) The Deputy Secretary extended USG appreciation to the Prime Minister for Qatar,s support for the victims of Hurricane Katrina. The PM observed in response that "We might have our own Katrina," an apparent reference to security concerns arising from Qatar,s relationship with Iran. Deputy Secretary offered U.S. help to Qatar in protecting its critical infrastructure and in addressing its broader security concerns. Expressing interest in critical infrastructure protection, HBJ said he would talk to the Ministries of Energy and Interior on how best to take advantage of U.S. assistance.
---------------------------------
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT
---------------------------------
3. (C) The Deputy Secretary raised science and technology investment, noting DoE interest in partnering with the GOQ on energy-related research and development projects. As an example of possible cooperation, DepSec Poneman cited computer simulation, emphasizing that the DOE national laboratories are international leaders in the field.
4. (C) The Deputy Secretary reported that DoE had recently invested in a nanotechnology program and cited this as another possible area of cooperation, telling the PM there are additional opportunities for GOQ partnerships with private labs. Shaykh Hamad immediately expressed strong interest in nanotechnology, and asked the DepSec to provide him with a paper on that subject. The DepSec agreed, and added that he would be pleased to host Shaykh Hamad at the Sandia nanotechnology facility or another national lab.
5. (C) Turning to genomics and solar technology as they relate to food production and Qatar,s National Food Security Program, Shaykh Hamad told the Deputy Secretary that he supported research in those fields, but expressed his opinion that Qatar,s investment in food and solar technology must be done on a commercial basis.
--------------------------
(S) IRAN,S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
---------------------------
6. (S) DepSec Poneman asked HBJ for his views on Iran,s nuclear program. The Deputy Secretary noted that the USG had entered into recent discussions with Iran not out of naivet, but as an effort to address a humanitarian concern (the need for medical isotopes) while also attempting to remove a
meaningful amount of special nuclear material. Even though the effort had not to date resulted in Iranian agreement, it had borne fruit in the form of Russian and Chinese support for the most recent resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna. The PM expressed his skepticism that the West would be able to reach a deal with Iran,s leaders, saying "I,d be surprised and shocked if the Iranians do a deal. You always think you have a deal with them and then you don,t." He continued, "The EU, Chirac, and Solana...they all thought they had a deal... Solana said two weeks; I advised him it would take two years."
7. (S) Asked for his advice on how best to approach the Iranians, HBJ said it is imperative that the Iranians commit to draft any deal, including a timetable. He reiterated that it is important to "make them tell you (what they will do). Otherwise they will say 'yes, but...' and the 'but' will be worse than a 'no.'" The Deputy Secretary countered that, "They don,t want to make a proposal." To which HBJ responded, "You don,t understand. Even Mousavi can,t make a deal!" Poneman pressed the issue, saying the U.S. would not be offering a better deal than what is currently on the table. The Prime Minster said, "I know, but this is the way they are."
8. (S) Referring to the current proposal on the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), Deputy Secretary Poneman stressed: "This is a fleeting opportunity. If they don,t take this deal, what comes next is worse." The PM noted that the Iranians frequently press the Qataris to have dialogue on their shared natural gas field and attempt to expand the dialogue to include other subjects. HBJ said that the Qataris "are always throwing cold water on their ideas."
9. (S) On Qatar,s close ties with Iran, the PM added that he knows the U.S. becomes upset at times by what it hears about the Qatar/Iran relationship. However he characterized the relationship as one in which "They lie to us, and we lie to them." Poneman replied by underscoring that "It would be helpful if everywhere they went, they (the Iranians) heard the same thing." The PM said for Qatar,s part, he had told Iran that it should "listen to the West, s proposal or there will be military action. If not by the U.S., then by the Israelis by the middle of next year." Poneman observed that the Russians had pressed the Iranians hard during the Vienna negotiations, reinforcing the view that Iranian failure to accept the Tehran Research Reactor deal would lead back to the UN Security Council. The PM asked if the U.S. believes the Russians were in agreement with the U.S. on the possibility of harsher measures. Poneman replied that, for now, the Russians appear to be holding a similar line to the USG on the TRR deal and we remain in close contact with Moscow.
10. (U) This cable has been cleared by DepSec Poneman at Department of Energy. LeBaron
Thursday, 17 December 2009, 13:07
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 001151
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ARP
ENERGY FOR S1, S2, O???CONNOR AND SANDOLOW
EO 12958 DECL: 2019/12/17
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PARM, ENRG, IR, YM, AE
SUBJECT: ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE WARNS DOE DEPSEC PONEMAN ABOUT IRAN
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard G. Olson, Ambassador, State, US Embassy Abu Dhabi, UAE; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (S/NF) Summary: During a December 9 meeting in Abu Dhabi (other meetings reported septel), Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman told Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) that the USG shared many energy policy priorities with the UAE, including renewable energy development and the importance of critical energy infrastructure protection. Poneman briefed MbZ on the Teheran Research Reactor (TRR) proposal and Vienna talks. MbZ said he would be surprised if Iran accepted the P5+1/IAEA proposal and warned that Iran was already acting like a nuclear power. Further, and more dangerously, Iran is establishing "emirates" across the Muslim world, including South Lebanon and Gaza, sleeper "emirates" in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, the mother of all "emirates" in Southern Iraq, and now Saada in Yemen. MbZ suggested that the U.S. is misreading the situation in Yemen and failing to recognize strong evidence of Iranian support. End Summary.
POTENTIAL COOPERATION:
RENEWABLES, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
-------------------------------------
2. (SBU) The Crown Prince asked DepSec Poneman several questions about U.S. energy development plans, including the outlook for the next 25 years. Poneman explained President Obama and Secretary Chu have a strategic vision of a new energy economy with a low carbon profile. In the short term, Poneman said DOE is investing Recovery Act funds to improve efficiency and support new technologies, but that the USG seeks to facilitate energy development through a portfolio approach, not dictate what the market should pursue. On nuclear, MbZ specifically asked what progress could be expected within the next three years. Poneman said there are a number of active deals under development, and strong public support for nuclear power, but that capital costs continue to be a challenge. (Comment: MbZ pressed hard on US plans for a nuclear renaissance, suggesting to us that he is worried we may compete with his program in the hunt for nuclear engineering and technical talent. End Comment.) Turning to renewable energy and efficiency, the DepSec noted that USG goals are very much in line with Abu Dhabi's own Masdar (Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company) and that he looked forward to greater DOE-Masdar cooperation (septel).
3. (SBU) Poneman also told MbZ that the USG is interested in supporting Abu Dhabi's critical energy infrastructure protection (CEIP) plans and said a DOE team was discussing cooperation potential with the Critical National Infrastructure Authority (CNIA, reported septel). Learning from Hurricane Katrina, DOE was focused on survivability of assets, resiliency and recovery. MbZ said he was personally very interested in greater cooperation with the U.S. on CEIP, through DOE, other USG entities and/or the private sector. He stressed that citizens' confidence in their government was very important, noting "We're doing our best to make them feel secure." MbZ added that while UAE is a small country, it has the resources to protect itself, and is willing to invest in top-quality infrastructure protection.
IRAN
----
4. (S/NF) DepSec Poneman briefed MbZ on the international proposal for Iran to ship 1,200 kg of Low Enriched Uranium produced at Natanz to a location outside Iran and where it would be enriched to 20 percent for use to produce medical radioisotopes at the Tehran Research Reactor. Poneman stressed that the IAEA, the Russians, and the U.S. had all taken every possible step to address stated Iranian concerns, including a first-ever official USG statement of support for the proposal. He stressed that the offer would not remain open indefinitely; as DG El Baradei had said, this is a "fleeting" opportunity. He also explained that the extra effort had strengthened international cooperation, with Russia and China supportive of the recent IAEA Board of Governors resolution.
Poneman stressed that the deal was not offered out of naivete, but rather out of the view that if Iran agreed it would remove a significant amount of LEU from Natanz and if Iran refused it would help build international support - beginning with Russia and China - for tougher sanctions.
5. (S/NF) The Crown Prince said he would be "very surprised" if a deal was possible, as Iran's nuclear program is not an issue of internal conflict but rather one of national pride for the vast majority of Iranians. He stressed that Iran is not North Korea, because 1) it is looking to reestablish a Persian empire in the 21st century, 2) Iran has resources and lacks neighbors, including the UAE, who can pressure it, 3) the leadership has not changed (it is the same people who seized Embassy Tehran in 1979) , and 4) Iran believes itself to be a superpower. Poneman said the USG does not disagree with MbZ's analysis, but believes pride makes the Iranian leadership more susceptible to the pressure of the world community uniting against them, whereas North Korea revels in its own isolation. MbZ agreed, and emphasized the strategic importance of creating a Palestinian State (i.e., resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) as the way to create genuine Middle Eastern unity on the question of Iran's nuclear program and regional ambitions.
YEMEN
-----
6. (S/NF) MbZ said Iran already acts like a superpower and explained that, while the UAE is a federation of emirates, Iran's "emirates" have a larger army and budget that the UAE. In addition to Iran's established emirates in South Lebanon and Gaza, sleeper emirates in Kuwait, Bahrain, the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, and the mother of all emirates in Southern Iraq. Now Iran has an emirate in Saada. MbZ told Poneman, "We believe you don't want us to believe" the mounting evidence of Iranian involvement in Yemen. He stressed that he doesn't believe Ali Abdullah Saleh either, but this is "not like cracking the enigma code" (in World War II), there are Iranian ships unloading weapons for the Houthis, and "you have the capability to track this." He warned, "We know your priority is Al-Qaeda, but don't forget Iran. Al-Qaeda is not going to get a nuclear bomb; Iran is a matter of time."
7. (SBU) DepSec Poneman has cleared this cable. OLSON
Monday, 14 December 2009, 09:57
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003195
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IR, NEA/I, AND NEA/FO LIMBERT, CORBIN.
EO 12958 DECL: 12/06/2019
TAGS PGOV, PECON, PREL, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ: THE VIEW FROM NAJAF
Classified By: Political M/C Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Local interlocutors from Najaf's social, economic, political and military circles discussed with Post's Senior Iran Watcher (IW) and PRToffs the scope of Iranian influence in the province, the role of the Shia clerical establishment (Marja'iyyah), notably Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, and the challenges confronting the province's farmers who are unable to compete with Iranian-subsidized produce. Interlocutors generally cautioned against a premature U.S. departure and agreed that Iran remains an influential force in Najaf, leveraging its ties with Iraqi political groups to extend its influence. Iran remains wary of Sistani's social and political clout among Shias, notably in Iran, given the Grand Ayatollah's rejection of the Iranian regime's adherence to clerical rule (vilayat-e-faqih). END SUMMARY
2. (C) During a recent visit to Najaf XXXXXXXXXXXX shared their views on the state of political and economic development in the province and Iran's role.
Provincial Council Chairman
---------------------------
3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that Iraqis throughout the country were growing increasingly frustrated with foreign interference, notably from Iraq's neighbors. He singled out Saudi Arabia and Iran as the biggest culprits, but noted that a "mental revolution" was underway among Iraqi youth against foreign agendas seeking to undermine the country's stability, pointing to such trends in Anbar against the Saudis, Najaf against the Iranians, and Mosul against the Turks.
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX echoed other interlocutors' concerns about a premature U.S. departure from Iraq and risks of a political and security vacuum. He noted that Iran had formed the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) political coalition comprised of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the Sadrists, among others, in an effort to bolster ISCI's image as the pan-Shia party of choice in the elections.
5. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed concerns about rumors circulating in Najaf that the USG was sponsoring a Baathist conference in the U.S. IW dismissed the news as baseless rumors intended to undermine the USG-GOI relationship. (NOTE: A recent press report in an ISCI-owned media also mentioned a proposed Baathist conference scheduled to be held in Washington in February. END NOTE).
Keeping the U.S. Bogged Down
----------------------------
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX described Iran as a threat to Iraqi stability, commenting that the Iranian government's (IRIG) goal is to keep the U.S. bogged down in Iraq in order to discourage U.S. military reprisals against the IRIG for its nuclear program. He commented that Iran fears Iraq's potential influence in the region, and will continue to support local proxies to exert its influence and undermine Iraq. "Iran does not offer its support for free," XXXXXXXXXXXX noted, there will be a price to pay for each proxy in exchange for Iranian support.
7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX is supportive of Maliki's decision to forego (at least for now) a political alliance with the INA that is dominated by the pro-Iranian Sadrist Trend and ISCI. Joining the INA will only undermine the integrity of Iraqi security institutions as ISCI/Badr and the Sadrists will try to fill key security positions with their own supporters, many of whom are unprofessional and sectarian, XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned. The Badr Organization, heavily influenced by Iran, continued to maintain a very effective intelligence arm, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX . Many former Iraqi fighter pilots who flew sorties against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war were now on Iran's hit list (NOTE: According to XXXXXXXXXXXX , Iran had already assassinated 180 Iraqi pilots. END NOTE).
8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) elements often resort to bribes (USD 10-20K) to secure the release of supporters in GOI detention and that the Najaf anti-terrorism unit regularly receives cash offers to release detainees. He asserted that XXXXXXXXXXXX also alleged that the Iraqi police were responsible for placing an IED close to the PRT base in November. "He (police chief) is a bad guy. After all, he is still part of the militia (Badr)," XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted.
Sistani: "What Do the Americans Want?" ----QDI>RpQd%'MkQQto pulse the cleric on his views about matters of political consequence.XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that Sistani's son, Muhammad Ridha, serves as the main conduit of information between his father whenever a religious/political message needs to be conveyed to Shia imams in the country.
12. (C) Sistani does not allow Iranian students to enroll in the howzeh (religious seminary) in order to prevent IRIG infiltration, XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted. XXXXXXXXXXXX himself is suspicious of Iranian intentions and asserted that the imams were "in the pocket of the Iranians", despite their proclaimed loyalties to Sistani.
The Sadrists
------------
13. (C) Regarding the Sadrists, XXXXXXXXXXXX recalled XXXXXXXXXXXX the late Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr (Moqtada Al-Sadr's father), commenting that, unlike his radical son, the late cleric was admired and respected by many Iraqis. He Qthe late cleric was admired and respected by many Iraqis. He criticized Moqtada for failing to capitalize and build on his father's legacy. XXXXXXXXXXXX also praised the efforts of Sadr's father and sought to distinguish between "good" and "bad" Sadrists; the former being adherents of Sadr's father. [Name removed] believes the Sadrists are politically weak and continue to splinter as former JAM elements form their own groups. (NOTE: XXXXXXXXXXXX believes XXXXXXXXXXXX is a closet Sadrist despite his public alliance with Maliki's coalition. XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that the Iranians had told the wayward Moqtada to stay-put in Iran for the time being. END NOTE).
Farmers: Iran and Syria Waging Economic Warfare
--------------------------------------------- --
14. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that most farmers support PM Maliki for his increasingly non-sectarian political message and success in improving security. However, he complained that Iran and Syria were waging economic warfare on Iraqi farmers by flooding provincial markets with low cost/quality produce that are heavily subsidized by their respective governments.
15. (C) Iraq's neighbors were pursuing such measures in order to prevent economic development, thereby forestalling the continued success of Iraq's new democracy, XXXXXXXXXXXX alleged. These problems were further aggravated by water shortages due to the ongoing drought, the high cost of fuels, outdated farming techniques, and power shortages, he noted. XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed that the Najaf Provincial Council had recently voted to ban the import of foreign tomatoes into Najaf in an effort to bolster local producers. (NOTE: 60 percent of Najaf's labor force works in agriculture. The sector is the province's most important revenue generating industry, followed by religious tourism. END NOTE).
16. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX railed against Iran's pervasive commercial influence in Najaf, noting that many Iranian-owned companies secure favorable contracts in the province by capitalizing on ties with local politicians. [ also criticized Iraqi politicians "for being ignorant and overly-reliant on clerics" for their political welfare.
COMMENT
-------
17. (C) Najaf, as the epicenter of Shia Islam, carries significant importance for Iran and its overall campaign to expand its sphere of influence in Iraq and the region. The city is home to many Iranian pilgrims and traders eager to profit spiritually and financially from the city's religious and commercial offerings. There is general awareness and acknowledgment among many Iraqis that Iran's influence, albeit a historic reality, does not always translate into mutual benefit for Najafis. Many also acknowledge that Iran will continue to capitalize on its ties to the city in order to foster greater socio-economic dependencies. The extent of its ability to influence the ways of the Marja'iyyah are more limited, particularly during Sistani's tenure, given the clerical establishment's unrivaled theocratic and geographic prominence when compared to its "sister city" Qom. HILL
Wednesday, 02 December 2009, 17:17
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 UNVIE VIENNA 000540
SIPDIS
FOR P, T, H, ISN, S/SANAC, IO, NEA, SCA, EAP
H PLS PASS STAFFDEL AS APPROPRIATE
DOE FOR S2 AND NA-20
NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, RYU, TALWAR
EO 12958 DECL: 12/01/2019
TAGS PREL, KNNP, AORC, IR, SY, KN, IN
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL KESSLER EXAMINES IRAN, SYRIA, AND
MULTILATERAL VIENNA'S FRUSTRATING NAM DYNAMIC
REF: EMBASSY VIENNA 1450
Classified By: Mark Scheland, Counselor for Nuclear Policy; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary: HFAC staffers Richard Kessler and David Fite received from IAEA Secretariat November 10 information on the Iran case that tracked with the tone of the subsequent Director General's reporting on Iran to the Board of Governors. The STAFFDEL heard that contact with Iran over "possible military dimensions" of the nuclear program was at an "absolute stalemate." According to Safeguards regional division director Herman Nackaerts, IAEA inspectors' first visit to the enrichment facility under construction near Qom had run predictably but without extraordinary responsiveness on Iran's part; the Secretariat was still trying to understand the motivation to build the plant as now designed. Nackaerts described the frustrating limitations of Iran's cooperation with the Agency, and the STAFFDEL deduced that Iranian officials held back because they were uncertain about what lines of inquiry the IAEA was best equipped to exploit. Questioning then-DG ElBaradei's remark to media that the Agency had found "nothing to worry about" in Qom, STAFFDEL asked if the Secretariat would report on how it judged the plant did or did not fit into Iran's publicly explained nuclear program. Nackaerts expressed appreciation for the precision and usefulness of U.S.-supplied information in the Qom case and generally.
2. (C) Summary contd.: On Syria, Nackaerts said the Secretariat had told Damascus its first explanation for the presence of anthropogenic uranium at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor was not credible. Further, the Secretariat still could not yet present the case for how what was being built at Dair Alzour fit in as "part of a Syrian program or part of someone else's program." On DPRK, IAEA/EXPO's Tariq Rauf said the IAEA, when it could, would ultimately have to "go back to the early 1990s" to reconstruct accountancy of plutonium and could not accept a "political" compromise setting material "off to the side." To get to a finding of "no diversion" would take several years and extensive resources and forensics.
3. (SBU) Contd.: Treating Technical Cooperation, the STAFFDEL received the same briefing on the Safeguards Department's project review process and internal database that was provided to a GAO review team in 2008. IAEA External Relations Director Rauf asserted, "We are not a denial organization." STAFFDEL related how segments of the GAO report had reduced Congressional confidence in the efficiency of TC. U.S. national labs were afforded too little time to review projects for our national decision-making on their merit and proliferation risk. Secretariat also described hindrances it faces in having UN and national development officials recognize and integrate nuclear applications.
4. (SBU) Contd.: The STAFFDEL also engaged P5-plus-1 heads of mission over lunch on the means to draw or impel Iran to open up on its nuclear program and on dynamics in Vienna between blocs of Member States. End Summary.
Fordow/Qom and Iran PMD: Frustration, but Good Support from the U.S.
-------------------------------------
5. (U) House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Majority Staff Director Richard Kessler and Professional Staff Member David Fite (STAFFDEL) spent ninety minutes with IAEA staff on November 10. Principal issues were safeguards verification in Iran and Syria, the screening of IAEA Technical Cooperation (TC) projects for proliferation risk, and TC Department efforts to improve project design and integration into national and UN development activities. STAFFDEL affirmed to Secretariat officials that the HFAC under Chairman Berman: was strongly supportive of the IAEA; put emphasis on counter-proliferation issues in countries of concern (indeed, was weighing legislation to impose further U.S. sanctions on Iran); had advocated an increase in NADR funding for extrabudgetary contributions to the IAEA, including for the Safeguards Analytical laboratory; and, supported "getting the U.S. up to date" on payment of its assessments to the IAEA's regular budget. Following the meeting at the IAEA, STAFFDEL consulted Ambassador and Mission staff and had a working lunch with P5-plus-1 heads of mission focused on Iran and the dynamics of multilateral
UNVIE VIEN 00000540 002 OF 005
diplomacy in Vienna. STAFFDEL's UNVIE program followed a day of consultations with Austrian officials (reftel).
6. (SBU) IAEA Safeguards Department Operations B (AOR Mideast, South Asia, parts of Europe, the Americas, and all nuclear weapons states) Director Herman Nackaerts briefed STAFFDEL on the inspection he had led a few weeks before to the recently disclosed Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom in Iran. Nackaerts said Iranian officials had been open to allowing inspectors access. The Secretariat was still trying to understand, he said, why Iran would build this facility, scaled as it was for 3000 centrifuges in contrast to the much large Natanz facility. It was positive, Nackaerts pointed out, that Fordow was now under safeguards. He noted that the IAEA had "at least two" safeguards inspectors at work in Iran "every day of the year" and would henceforth plan to visit Fordow regularly. Asked how "complete" the plant was or when it would be operational, Nackaerts said, "The information we got from Member States proved to be very precise" on this point. Asked about permission to take samples at Fordow, Nackaerts replied that Iranian officials had permitted the inspectors to perform the same safeguards procedures they typically undertook at Natanz.
7. (S) STAFFDEL asked if the Agency enjoyed full access to the Arak IR-40 plant. Nackaerts related there had been no access for a 12-month period but normal access in August and October 2009. However, the Iranians "claim they cannot go back on the decision of their parliament, and hence grant the IAEA a "visit" but do not call it Design Information Verification. On possible military dimensions (PMD), Nackaerts said the Secretariat's approach was to follow lines of inquiry that could involve use of nuclear material, for example, the documents treating uranium metal or green salt. The Iranians, he said in a tone conveying his skepticism, asserted the uranium metal document was "mistakenly" included in a packet of information they received from the AQ Khan network but was nothing Iran had asked for or used. The "green salt" documentation Iran dismissed as a forgery. Indeed, Nackaerts went on, Iran replied basically on the form of documents, not on their substance. The Secretariat had not been "impressed" by the 117-page rejoinder Iran had provided to the initial presentation of PMD documentation. It had told Iran the information hung together too much for it all to have bee fabricated and asked that, if some of the documentation were "doctored," Iranian officials should show the Secretariat "where the truth ends." Since August 2008, (when Ahmadinejad personally shut off Nackaerts's previously approved visit to workshops indicated in the documentation), Nackaerts concluded, there remained a high-level decision not to cooperate. STAFFDEL member Fite took from this that the Iranians were holding back "because they don't know where any opening will lead." Nackaerts agreed, saying they knew that every question they answered would bring another question.
8. (S) Fite alluded to then-DG ElBaradei's remarks of a few days before in U.S. media to the effect that the inspectors had found "nothing to worry about" in Fordow. Acknowledging the practical meaning of this remark -- that there were no centrifuges or nuclear material present -- Fite nevertheless regretted the headline and asked if the DG's formal report to Board members (Note: subsequently released as GOV/2009/74, deresticted by the Board November 27, and available to the public at www.iaea.org) would deal with how Qom fits or does not fit into Iran's explained nuclear program. Nackaerts replied, "We will identify the issues we're working." He went on that understanding the timeline of Fordow's development was hindered by Iran's practice never to involve people who really know the facts or the government's intentions in discussion with the Agency. The officials with whom inspectors meet clearly are "steered" by unseen observers, who send notes to the Iranian interlocutors during meetings. Iran recorded the meetings, he added, but did not permit the IAEA to do so. Further, the Secretariat never received original design documents, but ones produced for the Secretariat that were technically true to the facilities they found upon inspection. Against this Iranian practice, Nackaerts added, the Secretariat received very precise information from Member States that helped inspectors decide what to ask about. The organization of this information was good and, while the Agency was satisfied, it had inquired if more information could be shared with the Agency, "not necessarily for release to Iran," he said.
Syria Stalemate
UNVIE VIEN 00000540 003 OF 005
---------------
9. (SBU) The Syria case, Nackaerts said, was starting to look like Iran in that the government provided "good cooperation" on some areas but presented a "stalemate" on others. The Secretariat challenged Syria's proposed explanation for the presence of uranium at Dair Alzour/Al Kibar (i.e., that Israeli depleted uranium munitions could be the source), but the inquiry was at a roadblock. Syrian officials had been told their first explanation for anthropogenic uranium at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) was not credible, and the Agency had inquired what nuclear material Syria could have had that was not previously declared. Overall, the IAEA still "did not understand" (meaning, it could not yet present the solid case for) how Dair Alzour fit in as part of a Syrian nuclear program "or part of someone else's program."
Return to DPRK? Safeguards in India?
--------------------
10. (SBU) Asked how quickly IAEA inspectors could resume work in North Korea if re-admitted by the government, Tariq Rauf of IAEA External Relations and Policy Coordination (EXPO) observed that the last resumption had taken a week (for technical set-up, re-activation of cameras, etc.). Safeguards Operations A division had a program set out for what steps to undertake "under circumstances the DPRK may let us back in." Rauf continued that the Agency would to go back to the early 1990s' plutonium revelation to reconstruct material accountancy. When most recently in the DPRK, the IAEA had been monitoring facility shutdown processes but not implementing NPT safeguards on DPRK material. The Agency could "not accept" political compromises that would set some nuclear material "off to the side". Then-DG ElBaradei had called for implementation of the Additional Protocol in DPRK, but even if Pyongyang cooperated fully it would take several years and much in the way of resources and forensics to be able to get to a finding of "no diversion."
11. (SBU) Asked about progress toward safeguards implementation in India, Rauf confirmed the GOI had submitted a "formal list" of facilities that was not a document the Agency would characterize as a formal declaration under its safeguards agreement. India was under no mandatory timeline to make its declaration as it was not an NPT signatory. (Comment: Rauf's characterization was flat wrong. Mission had learned from the Safeguards Department three weeks before this meeting that India had officially "notified" two new facilities (Raps 5 and 6) under its 2008 safeguards agreement, that surveillance systems had been installed, and the facilities were under safeguards. End Comment.)
Scrutinizing and Promoting IAEA Technical Cooperation
--------------------------
12. (U) Renaud Chatelus of the Safeguards Division of Information Management (SGIM) acquainted STAFFDEL with IAEA screening of Technical Cooperation (TC) projects for their potential to afford access to sensitive technologies. Grounded in a 1979 Agency Information Circular, INFCIRC/267, the practice is to focus on projects related to enrichment, heavy water production, reprocessing of spent fuel, and plutonium or mixed oxide fuel. Chatelus said SGIM reviewed projects submitted, project approved, individual procurement actions, and overall implementation of projects. Reviews are conducted completely in-house, he said in reply to a question. Using the same PowerPoint slides that were presented to a GAO review team in 2008, Chatelus illustrated with screen shots from the Agency's staff access-only database the system of flagging projects for: compliance with INFCIRC 267, compliance with INFCIRC 540 (Additional Protocol), transfer of "sensitive items" on the Nuclear Suppliers Group or dual-use lists, general interest, or possible relation to a safeguarded facility. In subsequent discussion of the impact of screening and Member States' sense of entitlement to TC, EXPO's Tariq Rauf affirmed, "We are not a denial organization."
13. (U) STAFFDEL member Fite observed that segments of the GAO report treating transfers to state sponsors of terrorism as well as on program management had reduced Congressional confidence about TC. Fite said he had approached Appropriations staff about using a supplemental funding bill
UNVIE VIEN 00000540 004 OF 005
to resolve slow U.S. payment of assessments and do more for the Agency, but was rebuffed because the GAO report on TC had "poisoned the waters." Apart from political objections to certain TC recipients benefitting from U.S. funding, he added, a persisting "Achilles heel" was that U.S. national labs were afforded too little time to review projects for our national decision-making on their merit and proliferation risk. TC Department representative Johannes Seybold replied that the Agency aimed to provide Member States six weeks time for review, but was also at the mercy of requesting states providing the relevant project information. Just the compendium of project titles and short descriptions became a very thick document in each biennial cycle, Seybold went on, and the Agency was "struggling" with some Member States' national policies to be able to go beyond this level of transparency.
14. (U) STAFFDEL's meeting with Secretariat officials concluded in an exchange with Seybold, TC's section head for strategy and partnerships, about the IAEA's awkward position in development efforts coordinated by the UN or by developing countries' national institutions. Seybold laid out the following. The IAEA's cooperation with TC recipient states occurs through National Liaison Officers, generally in the atomic energy commission or government ministry responsible for nuclear power or radiological sources. Generally, neither the IAEA nor the corresponding national entity is a participant in UN development team or host government deliberations about development in the recipient country. Two-thirds of TC projects address development issues for which the IAEA is not the responsible lead agency in the UN system, e.g., water quality and availability, food security, climate. In many cases, national authorities and the UN team responsible for these areas in a given country lack awareness of IAEA capabilities, and/or they maintain a distance from things "nuclear." Seybold related Agency efforts to integrate with these authorities through the UNDAF (UN Development Assistance Framework) process and other partnering efforts. STAFFDEL expressed encouragement for bringing nuclear applications to greater impact in the development field.
P5-plus-1 Ambassadors Regret Iranian Paralysis on TRR; Depict Grim Dynamic with G-77/NAM
--------------------------------------------- -
15. (C) STAFFDEL was the guests of honor at lunch hosted by the Ambassador with his counterparts from China, Germany, Russia, and the UK and the French Charge d'Affaires. Kessler and Fite laid out HFAC's interest and Chairman Berman's supportive posture toward the Agency, as they had for Secretariat staff. Opening discussion of Iran, UK Ambassador Simon Smith said the Iranian answer on the ElBaradei-brokered deal on refueling the Tehran research reactor (TRR) "had to be 'yes' or 'no,' not waffling" as it had been. German Ambassador Ruediger Luedeking posited that the U.S. Administration had confounded Iranian internal processes and the latest EU3 proposal had "cornered" Iran. Agreeing that Iran faced an imperative between "yes" and "no," Luedeking observed, "they can't answer." HFAC Staff Director Kessler noted the committee had tried to follow up a Larijani approach conveyed one year before for a meeting with Chairman Berman, but found that the Iranians backed off.
16. (C) Russian Ambassador Alexander Zmeyevskiy asserted that confidentiality was a major concern for Iran. He noted its TRR counter-proposals, either to keep its LEU on its territory under IAEA safeguards until released in exchange for fuel rods, or to swap outgoing LEU piecemeal for incoming fuel assemblies. Moving beyond the TRR issue, UK Ambassador said he was severely disappointed that Member States had been unable to "apply consequences for the breaking of rules" of the organization. We needed to convince some other Member States, he continued, that tolerating rule breaking as on Qom and Code 3.1 (of the Subsidiary Arrangement of Iran's Safeguards Agreement) risked bringing the organization into discredit. STAFFDEL member Fite asked if Iran's Arab neighbors were among the problem interlocutors in Vienna; he asserted that officials of Arabian Peninsula countries told the Congress they see Iran as an "existential threat." While they may seek the cover of international signals or sanctions imposed by others, they say they do want action against Iran.
17. (C) Segueing from Iran to DPRK, Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi said the main difference between the cases was that progress with DPRK had been achieved when the North Koreans
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wanted something specific, whereas he (Hu) had never heard Iranian officials say that they wanted a settlement, or that they wanted anything specific. Although we did not at present know "how" to reach a deal with Iran, Hu concluded, we were not in the worst situation, in which Iran explicitly does want something -- nuclear weapons. Asked if he genuinely thought the DPRK would give up its weapons program for aid, Hu said "hope" (as opposed to "think.") Ambassador Davies seriously questioned that Pyongyang would give up a weapons capability in exchange for a significant material improvement in our relations, as the government would likely calculate it had been its possession of weapons that won the concessions.
18. (SBU) Ambassador turned the discussion to the dynamic between groups of Member States, as illustrated in the ongoing discussion of a Technical Cooperation project to advance IAEA use of "results based management." The German Ambassador observed that NAM positions on many issues were characterized by "myths" and they were clearly being dictated by Iran and Egypt. Ambassador Davies asked if the dynamic was further charged by states beginning to suspect that the U.S. seriously intends to strengthen the Agency in all its functions -- with the uncertain shifts in practice and distribution of resources and clout that could mean. STAFFDEL lead Kessler said the Congressional perception was one of a "lightning change" from the last Administration to the present one in U.S. approaches to the IAEA, to development assistance globally, and to multilateralism. German Ambassador agreed and said this was a complication for NAM states that know they are the immobile ones now. Yet, TC was a "sacred cow" and the NAM's impulse was to reject "illegitimate intrusion" into its distribution.
19. (SBU) French Charge Philippe Merlin discouraged STAFFDEL from expecting diplomatic gains, say in the NPT review, through greater generosity on IAEA peaceful use programs. "TC is the price we pay," he said, for developing countries' acquiescence toward the safeguards regime, the thing we really want. Fite asked if a reasoned discussion with development officials in capitals about making TC deliver more impact could translate into different instructions to the obstreperous missions in Vienna. German Ambassador took the view that any effort to change TC would be seen in capitals as "per se bad." It was more advisable to advocate to NAM states what their own interests in the safeguards regime were. UK Ambassador agreed there were no points to be scored by asking NAM capitals about TC effectiveness; he added that the UK Government "doesn't give two hoots" about TC, given the small funding level (from the UK Energy Ministry) in comparison to Britain's official development assistance. TC was, also in the UK view, the price we pay for the IAEA we want.
20. (U) STAFFDEL did not review this report.
DAVIES
Wednesday, 18 November 2009, 14:34
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 002502
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PTER, KWBG, EG, IR, SA, LE, IS
SUBJECT: 40TH JPMG: NEA REGIONAL DISCUSSION (PART 3 OF 4)
Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (S) Summary: As part of the 40th Joint Political Military Group (JPMG), U.S. and GOI counterparts discussed security issues in the Near East region. GOI officials expressed support for the P5 plus 1 engagement process with Iran, but doubted the process would lead to any change in Iranian behavior -- Iran will use the engagement process as an opportunity to continue its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro stressed that engagement with Tehran was not "open ended"; the United States is preparing sanctions in the event engagement does not prove successful. GOI interlocutors continued to express concerns regarding U.S. support of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF); U.S. participants reiterated U.S. support of the LAF as a counterweight to Hizballah. A/S Shapiro noted NEA, with PM participation and support, plans to brief the GOI on the U.S. policy regarding Lebanon in the near future. In a continuation from the JPMG Executive Session, GOI interlocutors made the argument that U.S. arms transfers in the region could potentially arm future enemies of Israel. GOI officials expressed frustration over the Goldstone Report; U.S. officials advocated sharing lessons learned regarding confronting terrorists in civilian-populated areas. GOI officials noted improved counter-smuggling efforts from Egypt regarding arms transfers to Gaza via the Sinai. However, they argued that Egypt can and should do more to prevent the flow of arms. U.S. delegation members also briefed on U.S. policy in Iraq, and expressed concerns about the current situation in Yemen. This is the third of four cables (septels) reporting on the JPMG. End summary.
2. (SBU) Main Israeli Participants:
-- Brigadier General (res) Pinchas Buchris, MOD Director General -- Major General (ret) Amos Gilad, MOD Political-Military Chief -- Brigadier General Ronen Dan, acting Israeli Defense Attache to the United States -- Gad Dovev, Director, MOD Mission, New York -- Alon Bar, MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs -- COL Shimon Arad, IDF J5 -- Rami Yungman, MOD Political-Military Bureau -- Schmuel Royter, Assistant to the MOD Director General
Main U.S. Participants:
-- Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs -- James Hursch, Director, DTSA -- Dr. Colin Kahl, International Security Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense -- Brigadier General Jefforey Smith, Joint Staff -- Beth McCormick, Deputy Director, DSCA -- Prem Kumar, Director for Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian and Jordanian Affairs, NSC -- Tom Goldberger, Director for Israel and Palestinian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs -- COL Richard Burgess, Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv -- Robert Maggi, PM Coordinator for Counter Piracy -- Kevin Maloney, Licensing Director, PM/DTCL
Plenary
-------
3. (S) MOD Director General Pinchas Buchris began the plenary, stating this was "perhaps the most important JPMG to date." He pointed to the threat of a nuclear Iran, and expressed hope that U.S. leadership will find a way to stop Iran. Otherwise, a nuclear-armed Iran will "impact the stability of the world," Buchris said. A/S Shapiro described this 40th JPMG as a key forum and the primary mechanism in the political-military dialogue between the United States and Israel. He said the United States wants to "re-energize" the JPMG, with the goal to "bring back strategic elements" into the discussion. A/S Shapiro highlighted the importance of mutual understanding and transparent dialogue.
Iran
----
4. (S) MOD Political-Military Director Amos Gilad presented a strategic overview. He began with Iran, reciting President Obama's statement made during a visit to Israel prior to becoming president that the United States would not tolerate a nuclear Iran. Gilad said Israel concurs, and described current dialogue with Iran as the "most sensitive stage" and Iran's "last chance." He said Iran remains determined to
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reach the "nuclear option," which he described as "intolerable." He quoted former President and Ahmadinejad opponent Rafsanjani as saying Iran "only needs one bomb for Israel," implying that Iran will continue to threaten Israel regardless of its leadership.
5. (S) A/S Shapiro noted that the United States shares Israel's concerns that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. He said that the United States is beginning with engagement, but at the same time is preparing tougher measures should engagement fail. A/S Shapiro stressed that engagement was not "open ended" -- the United States needs to see concrete steps and tangible results from the P5 1 talks. He noted concerns over the Qom facility; if Iran does not respond to engagement, then the United States will move toward stronger steps such as sanctions. DASD Kahl reiterated that it is not our intention to allow Iran to "run out the clock," and noted that engagement also serves to build international consensus on sanctions. MFA Deputy Director for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar argued that the United States must present a clearer message to the Europeans on what is expected of them regarding sanctions.
6. (S) A representative from Mossad said Tehran understands that by reacting positively to engagement, Iran can continue to "play for time" and avoid sanctions while pursuing its strategic objective to obtain a military nuclear capability. From Mossad's perspective, there is no reason to believe Iran will do anything but use negotiations to stall for time so that by 2010-2011, Iran will have the technological capability to build a nuclear weapon -- essentially reducing the question of weaponizing to a political decision. Mossad said Iran's main crisis is in the political sphere -- the current regime is weaker than prior to the elections, but does not face significant risk as its security apparatus remains loyal, while the opposition lacks a charismatic leader. The goal of the regime, therefore, is to calm down the domestic political environment -- Khamenei realizes the frustration demonstrated following the elections has not disappeared. BG Smith asked if Khamenei's death might change the political landscape; Mossad noted no information to suggest a change in Khamenei's health, while those surrounding him appear more loyal than ever.
7. (S) Mossad believes Iran wants to become a regional hegemon, and is dictating its agenda by using Hamas and Hizballah as force multipliers. In that respect, Iran is very creative in finding ways to transfer weapons systems to its proxies. Mossad said Tehran also understands the effort to split Syria from Iran's influence, and is working hard to deepen its relationship with Syria as a result. DASD Kahl argued that Iran is weaker regionally today than in recent years. He noted progress in Iraq, the results of the recent Lebanese elections, and outreach to Syria as signs of a weaker Iran. DASD Kahl also noted increased U.S. credibility in the Muslim world, while the crackdown following the Iranian elections exposed the current regime as brutal to the region and in Europe.
Hizballah/Lebanon/Syria
-----------------------
8. (S) Gilad addressed threats posed by "Hizballahstan" and "Hamastan," noting that Hizballah/Hamas-Syria-Iran cooperation has strengthened. He noted that rockets from Lebanon can now cover the entire territory of Israel, while ballistic missiles -- although not new -- remain Israel's most serious threat with adversaries having the capability to target Israeli citizens and major cities. IDF J5 Col Shimon Arad noted four main trends in Lebanon: 1) internal political deadlock since the elections; 2) Hizballah's growing military capabilities; 3) Lebanon as a volatile military arena; and 4) Lebanon's susceptibility to outside influences, including Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. He recommended improved US.-Israel coordination, and called for an exchange of views. Arad also recommended creating Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deconfliction measures, demanding improved LAF performance, and exerting greater pressure on Syria and smuggling. Finally, he called for sanctions on the Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC), trilateral meetings with the Lebanese and UNIFIL to deter Hizballah, and bolstering UNIFIL by extending Gen. Graziano's tour for an additional six months.
9. (S) A/S Shapiro acknowledged the GOI's desire for specifics regarding U.S. policy on Lebanon, and hoped to invite GOI representatives to Washington in the near future for a full brief led by NEA, with PM participation and support. He cited the need to provide an alternative to Hizballah, which explains U.S. goals to strengthen the LAF as a counterweight. DASD Kahl argued that any LAF cooperation
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with Hizballah is pragmatic given the LAF's current weakness. He noted that U.S. assistance has been temporarily put on hold since there is still no Lebanese government. Kahl also argued that prospects for better relations with Damascus depend on Syrian desires for better relations with the United States and the return of the Golan Heights. Arad argued that more must be done to weaken radicals and cease smuggling. Gilad said the GOI cannot envision a government in Lebanon without Hizballah, and said the LAF will come to the defense of Hizballah if attacked by Israel -- thus, a strengthened LAF hurts Israel.
QME
---
10. (S) Turning to U.S. regional arms transfers, Gilad suggested Qualitative Military Edge (QME) as a "codename" for potential threats against Israel. Israel currently enjoys peace with regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates -- but the future is uncertain, and each of these regimes faces the potential for change, he argued. U.S. weapons -- "the best in the world" -- level the playing field by reducing the need for training -- and could ultimately aid a future enemy of Israel, Gilad said. A/S Shapiro stressed the importance of transparency -- while there may be differences between Israel and the United States in terms of a regional assessment, the key is to ensure that there are no surprises, he said.
Peace Process
-------------
11. (S) Gilad described the Middle East peace process as a "pillar" of Israeli security. He quoted PM Netanyahu and President Peres that Israel remains sincerely committed to peace. Gilad noted however, that the re-launching of negotiations is complicated by the split in Palestinian leadership. He said a weak and corrupt PA had lost Gaza despite Israeli warnings. Gilad said 2010 will prove pivotal with Palestinian elections looming and Egyptian mediation efforts to broker reconciliation between Hamas and the PA having failed. That said, he noted that Israeli-PA security and economic cooperation in the West Bank continues to improve as Jenin and Nablus flourish, and described Palestinian security forces as the "good guys." NEA/IPA Director Tom Goldberger said Special Envoy Sen. Mitchell continues his mission, and noted that Egyptian reconciliation efforts were meant to strengthen the PA, not weaken it.
Goldstone Report
----------------
12. (S) Gilad addressed Israel's immediate neighbors within the context of the Goldstone Report. He said Israel has checked "all the details" of the report, and have concluded that the report's accusations are "baseless." Buchris said the report sets a bad precedent for countries trying to protect its citizens from terrorists; he noted 300,000 phone calls from the IDF to houses in Gaza ahead of strikes in the effort to prevent civilian casualties -- "no other country has taken such steps," Buchris argued. A/S Shapiro highlighted strong U.S. opposition to the report's referral to the UN Security Council, noting the report's biased mandate.
13. (S) Gilad said Israel only entered Gaza after Hamas violated the ceasefire or "tahdiya," which many Israelis felt was "humiliating" and left Defense Minister Barak open to criticism. Gilad characterized Operation Cast Lead as a success that accounted for humanitarian issues; the IDF showed restraint in the operation because Israel did not want to re-occupy Gaza. DASD Kahl advocated sharing perspectives and lessons learned on strategic communication to more effectively confront terrorists in civilian-populated areas. NSC Director for Israel and Palestinian Affairs Prem Kumar noted continued UNSC interest in the Goldstone Report, and asked Israel to inform the United States on any additional efforts or investigations the GOI was taking to help deflect any further damage from the report.
Egypt/Counter-Smuggling
-----------------------
14. (S) Gilad said Israel was frustrated by its Arab neighbors -- including specifically Egypt -- for supporting the Goldstone Report, which complicates the peace process. Israel continues to benefit from good security cooperation with Jordan, he said. Gilad argued that Egypt could stop smuggling into Gaza "completely," and questioned whether Egypt should be judged by its efforts or results. Gilad
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stressed the latter, and argued Egypt can do more on counter-smuggling. Finally, he noted Israeli concerns that Egypt continues to prepare for a potential future military confrontation with Israel, while no Egyptian military officers visit Israel.
15. (S) A/S Shapiro outlined U.S. military assistance to strengthen Egyptian border security, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping and civil defense efforts. He said the United States is working with Egypt to improve regional security efforts, such as counter-smuggling. Regarding the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, A/S Shapiro stressed efforts to improve energy security and counter-terrorism, while bolstering the capabilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the face of the Iranian threat. Finally, he noted U.S. withdrawal from the Anatolian Eagle exercise following the Turkish decision to suspend the IDF's participation. A/S Shapiro said the United States has been delivering the message that Turkey must improve its relationship with Israel.
16. (S) PM Counter-Piracy Coordinator Maggi briefed on the counter smuggling technical discussion meeting (septel). He cited the importance of working with Israel's neighbors -- including especially Egypt and Turkey -- to prevent Iranian weapons from entering Gaza. Maggi said more pressure should be applied in the EU and UN to gain more latitude -- and possibly further action from the EU. He said tracking cash flows, and increasing prosecutions and incarcerations were important, with the ultimate goal of increasing cooperation and momentum. Goldberger said Egypt sees Hamas as a national security threat, and added that Egypt had closed 200 tunnels since the beginning of 2009.
17. (S) Goldberger noted Egyptian domestic political sensitivities, and questioned whether more commercial and humanitarian goods could be allowed through the Gaza border crossings. Gilad strongly stated that there were no limits on commercial goods through the border crossings. Goldberger asked about construction materiel like cement; Gilad said the GOI would not allow Hamas to build bunkers -- goods such as cement or iron would not be allowed because of their military applications. He also argued that smuggling is a lucrative business for all involved, including the Egyptian government, and said the best way to stop the smuggling was to increase arrests and incarcerations. Goldberger mentioned U.S. economic and development assistance efforts in Sinai. He noted that most requests to third countries to deny arms transfer overflights are based on Israeli intelligence; additional information/intelligence from the GOI would ensure greater cooperation. Bar raised prosecuting shipping companies complicit in arms transfers to Gaza; A/S Shapiro said he would take that back to Washington for further consideration.
Iraq/Yemen
----------
18. (S) On Iraq, DASD Kahl noted there are currently 125,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq, which will be reduced to 50,000 soldiers by September 1, 2010 with complete U.S. troop withdrawal by the end of 2011. He noted the U.S. goal of establishing a long-term strategic relationship with a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq. A/S Shapiro and DASD Kahl briefed the GOI on U.S. efforts to assist the Iraqi military to complete its counterinsurgency force, transition the military to a force that can defend its borders, and align the Iraqi military more closely to the United States.
19. (S) DASD Kahl pointed to the growing threat (al Qaida, al Houthi insurgency, and southern secessionists) in Yemen. He said the United States is attempting to prevent Yemen from heading toward an "Afghanistan-type scenario" with general lawlessness and increased ungoverned spaces. BG Smith noted that al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to fester in North and sub-Saharan Africa. He said Egypt is actively involved in countering AQIM with 3,800 soldiers in Sudan -- this should be encouraged and expanded.
20. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared on this cable.
CUNNINGHAM
Tuesday, 17 November 2009, 17:08
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001654
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE
EO 12958 DECL: 11/17/2019
TAGS KNNP, PREL, TU, IR
SUBJECT: TURKEY: A/S GORDON PRESSES FM DAVUTOGLU ON IRAN
REF: ANKARA 1626
Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4(b,d)
1. (S) Iran dominated A/S Gordon's 40-minute meeting November 12 with Foreign Minister Davutoglu. The FM had just gotten off the phone with El-Baradei and had discussed in detail the IAEA proposal to send Iran's low enriched uranium to Turkey. El-Baradei had said he would "call Washington" that same morning. This had followed two long "harsh" sessions with the Iranians in Istanbul on Sunday evening. The Iranians have said they are willing to meet with Solana, but have told the Turks that they have serious problems with Cooper and the British. They have "more trust" in the U.S. The Iranians would also prefer to get fuel from the U.S. rather than the Russians.
2. (S) Davutoglu said the Iranians: a) are ready to send a delegation to Vienna to work out the specifics on this proposal; b) have given their "full trust" to Turkey; c) continue to face serious domestic problems inside Iran. He said the Turks actually see Ahmadinejad as "more flexible" than others who are inside the Iranian Government. Ahmadinejad is facing "huge pressure" after statements from some P5 members to the effect that a nuclear deal would succeed in weakening Iran,s nuclear capability -- which is interpreted by some circles in Iran as a virtual defeat.
3. (S) Given this context, the Turks had asked Ahmadinejad if the core of the issue is psychological rather than substance. Ahmadinejad had said "yes," that the Iranians agree to the proposal but need to manage the public perception. Accordingly, the Iranians are proposing that the first 400 kilos be transferred to Kish Island -- thereby keeping it on Iranian soil -- and would receive right away an equivalent amount (30-50 kilos) of enriched fuel. The second stage would focus on the management of Iranian public opinion, after which Tehran would proceed with the Turkey option for the remaining 800 kilos, probably in two tranches. Davutoglu said Baradei agreed to consider this.
4. (S) Davutoglu noted that he had spoken to NSA General Jones Wednesday, who had said that we should perhaps suggest to the Iranians that they transfer 600 kilos to Kish Island and 600 kilos to Turkey simultaneously. A/S Gordon said he could not give an official response to the proposal as this is the first time we heard it, but that he anticipates much skepticism about providing fuel to Iran before all the LEU has been taken out. It would be better to get all 1200 kilos out right away.
5. (C) Davutoglu noted that these are two different proposals. The first is Iran's request for fuel for its nuclear reactor. Even if this takes place, he said, we still need to work on limiting Iran's nuclear enrichment capability. If we succeed with this proposal, he said, it will create "confidence" and a "new momentum" and would allow room for negotiation.
6. (C) Noting that Davutoglu had only addressed the negative consequences of sanctions or the use of military force, Gordon pressed Davutoglu on Ankara's assessment of the consequences if Iran gets a nuclear weapon. Davutoglu gave a spirited reply, that "of course" Turkey was aware of this risk. This is precisely why Turkey is working so hard with the Iranians. President Gul himself had spent two hours Sunday with Ahmadinejad in Istanbul.
7. (C) Gordon noted that while we acknowledge that Turkey can be helpful as a mediator, some of the Prime Minister's recent public comments raise questions about how Turkey sees this issue. Davutoglu said he is aware of these concerns, but contended that the Guardian newspaper had not accurately presented its recent interview with the Prime Minister. The PM's comments had been taken out of context. Erdogan had been asked if he views Iran as a friend. If he had said "no," it would not have been possible to convince Tehran to cooperate on this latest proposal. Only Turkey can speak bluntly and critically to the Iranians, Davutoglu contended, but only because Ankara is showing public messages of friendship.
8. (C) Gordon pushed back that Ankara should give a stern public message about the consequences if UN resolutions are ignored. Davutoglu countered that Erdogan had given just such a statement in Tehran when he visited. He emphasized that Turkey's foreign policy is giving a "sense of justice" and a "sense of vision" to the region. Turkey has provided a "third option" in addition to Iran and the Saudis (who he contended are viewed as "puppets" of the US). The result, he said, is that we "limit Iranian influence in the region." We
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need a "pro-Western approach AND a sense of justice."
9. (C) A/S Gordon has cleared this cable.
JEFFREY
"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"
Wednesday, 16 September 2009, 07:34
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001254
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/16/2018
TAGS PREL, PARM, KNNP, BH, SM, MK, GR, FR
SUBJECT: A/S GORDON'S MEETINGS WITH POLICY-MAKERS IN PARIS:
A TOUR D'HORIZON OF EUROPE AND AFGHANISTAN
Classified By: Ambassador Charles Rivkin, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary. During Assistant Secretary Gordon's visit to Paris on September 11, he met with a number of French policy-makers including: Elysee Diplomatic Advisors Jean-David Levitte, Damien Loras, and Francois Richier, Assistant Secretary equivalent for Continental Europe Roland Galharague, and Acting Director of MFA Strategic Affairs bureau Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel. Discussions focused on Russia, upcoming developments in the Balkans (Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Kosovo), elections in Germany and Afghanistan, Turkey's EU Accession, NATO Enlargement and Strategic Concept, and Georgia and Ukraine. End Summary.
-------------------------------------
AFGHANISTAN: A MAJOR PRIORITY
-------------------------------------
2. (C) Jean-David Levitte noted that while public opinion in France is opposed to the war in Afghanistan, the situation here is much calmer than in the UK, Germany, or Italy. Angela Merkel's domestic political situation after the incident in Kunduz was particularly fragile, so that was part of the rationale behind the recent German-French-UK letter to UN SYG Ban Ki Moon to propose an international conference on Afghanistan by the end of the year. Levitte said that the goal of the conference would be to accelerate and improve the training of Afghan troops and police and to strengthen Afghan state institutions, which will help reinforce the importance of the international effort to skeptical publics. They are now waiting for Ban Ki Moon's response. Levitte emphasized that France remains "totally engaged" in Afghanistan with no limits or caveats on its troops. This autumn, France will complete a transfer of troops from Kabul to Kapisa and Surobi provinces (a presence that will be reinforced on the ground as France reassigns some sailors to other regional activities and replaces them with ground troops). A/S Gordon assured Levitte that the U.S. would soon be able to share the elements of the McChrystal military review with Allies. Levitte responded by praising General McChrystal and saying that French forces have an excellent dialogue with him on the ground. He added that Germany and the UK are determined to stay in Afghanistan as needed, but we may need to convince the Netherlands to remain, and that President Sarkozy had recently reinforced this message in a meeting with Dutch PM Balkenende.
-------------------------------------------
BOSNIA: FRENCH URGE TRANFER TO EU AUTHORITY
-------------------------------------------
3. (C) Levitte noted that of the five major conditions required to transfer authority in Bosnia from the UN High Representative to an EU High Representative, four have been fulfilled, and only the question of division of state property remains. This final condition should not alone "block all progress," especially as the current UN team in Bosnia is no longer effective. France wants to see the transfer of authority to a new EU team in November, as the rapprochement to Europe is an effective "carrot" to encourage the Bosniaks to continue progress in necessary reforms. A/S Gordon agreed that the current system is not working well, but noted that the international community will lose credibility if we move forward before all the necessary pre-conditions have been fulfilled. He added that the U.S. agrees that some form of carrot is necessary to urge Bosnian compliance. Levitte noted that they still have two months to urge Bosnian progress before a final decision is made. In a separate meeting, Assistant Secretary equivalent for Continental Europe Roland Galharague said that "transition is the number one objective," suggested the division of state property will take much time to resolve, and urged the U.S. to support early transfer of authority that would open the door to Bosnian aspirations for greater integration into EU institutions. He noted that the growing perception of divisions between the US and Bosniaks on one side who favored retaining the UN role and the EU and Serbs on the other created unhelpful opportunities for manipulation. A/S Gordon said this perception was inaccurate, but noted the U.S. is sensitive to the political need for Bosniak leaders to sell this decision to their publics. The USG needs to see a clear path ahead for transition in order to support it.
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KOSOVO AND SERBIA
-----------------------------------------
4. (C) Levitte noted that the EULEX mission is having diplomatic problems with the Kosovar government and public
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after signing two technical protocols with Serbia. They are hoping to ensure continued calm as Kosovo heads into municipal elections. A/S Gordon stated that the Kosovars will have to accept the protocols but that it should be clearly explained that these are technical agreements that have no impact on Kosovo's independent status. Levitte also criticized Serbian FM Jeremic, saying that he is doing nothing to encourage Serb return or participation in Kosovo's government. Levitte noted that Jeremic "makes big promises" every time he comes to France, but doesn't follow through. Levitte no longer meets with him and does not consider him to be the "modern face of Belgrade" that he purports to be.
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MACEDONIA AND CROATIA
-----------------------------------------
5. (C) Levitte expressed optimism that a new Greek government would be "more solid" and allow greater flexibility for progress in the Greek-Macedonian name dispute. A/S Gordon agreed that either a more solid Conservative government or a Socialist government would be a stronger, more flexible partner in the negotiations. He expressed hope that if the international community could convince Macedonia to abandon the idea of a referendum and get Greece to abandon the necessity of changing passports, then progress could be made. On Croatia, Levitte observed that the border issue with Slovenia is making progress. He hoped that the upcoming September elections in Germany would also allow the new German government to be more open to EU enlargement to include the Balkan countries. Paris wants the door to enlargement to remain open, even if the accession process takes time.
----------------------------------------
CONCERNS ABOUT TURKEY
----------------------------------------
6. (C) Levitte informed A/S Gordon that there had been no change in the French position advocating a "privileged partnership" between the European Union and Turkey, in lieu of EU membership. However, he emphasized that France was not preventing accession negotiations from progressing on all the EU chapters that do not pre-suppose membership. There remain plenty of chapters of the acquis to open, so if progress is not being made, the fault lies with Turkish intransigence on Cyprus. Unfortunately, Ankara is not completing the required necessary reforms and progress has stalled. Levitte anticipated a negative report this fall on Turkey's failure to fulfill the Ankara Protocol. A/S Gordon said that Turkey was caught in a vicious cycle and it is not completing necessary reforms because the Turks do not believe that their EU candidacy will be allowed to progress, and at the same time, their negotiations are not progressing because they aren't completing the required reforms. He noted that in the latest German Marshall Fund polls in Turkey, fewer that 30% of the Turkish public believes they will succeed in getting EU membership.
7. (C) Levitte agreed, but noted that Paris hopes that it will be the Turks themselves who realize that their role is best played as a bridge between the two worlds of Europe and Asia, rather than anchored in Europe itself. He stated that Turkey is in a difficult position as it wants to enter the EU but has refused to accept one of the other EU member states. Levitte predicted that a worse case scenario would be if Turkey finally manages to complete the acquis and end negotiations and a public referendum is held in France which is finally opposed to their membership. Despite all of these problems, Levitte claimed that President Sarkozy is a friend of Turkey and has visited the country at least 10 times in his life.
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RUSSIA AND GEORGIA
-----------------------------------------
8. (C) A/S Gordon described the challenges and frustrations of the U.S.- Russia relationship, which is based on finding areas where we can work together on our common interest. He noted progress at the July summit meeting on such issues as START talks and transfer of lethal material through Russia to Afghanistan. Galharague described Russia as a state with the trappings of democracy but without any mechanisms for the public to influence government decision-making. "The root of the problem is the regime," he said. Presidential advisor Loras added Russian leaders lacked sufficient, long-range vision for their country and instead, focused on a six-month time horizon and their business interests. Galharague
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described the French strategy as finding a balance between treating Russia as if it is too important or treating it like an enemy. The French observed that some in Russia have concluded their interests are served by keeping the west "tied down in an Afghanistan quagmire" and by sustaining the status quo in Iran. He elaborated that a solution that thwarts Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions and restores Iran as a normal member of the international community could undermine Russian regional and energy interests. Loras noted of late the Russians have been unhelpful on Iran. Moreover, they appear to have concluded they can pocket a projected U.S. decision to scale back or abandon the Bush administration's Missile Defense initiative without paying any cost.
9. (C) Looking ahead on the energy front, Loras predicted that substantial Russian under-investment in energy extraction infrastructure was such that Russia would not be able to meet European demand in four or five years. He observed this created an opportunity for Russia to have even more leverage over a Europe that has not prepared to diversify its energy supplies. In response to a question on Russia's decision to suspend negotiations on World Trade Organization membership in favor of a customs union with Kazakhstan and Belarus, A/S Gordon replied the U.S. would continue a policy review on Missile Defense to take the right decision based on the merits. On Russian actions regarding the WTO, he said that Moscow's decision was likely supported by Russians whose interests were not advanced by opening markets. Galharague observed that failure to advance WTO membership for Russia had negative implications for EU-Russian trade relations as progress in this EU effort pre-supposed progress on Russian accession to the WTO. Loras reported the coming year will involve substantial Franco-Russian interactions. This engagement would include a visit by French Prime Minister Fillon to Russia in September, a visit to France by Putin in November, a state visit to France by Medvedev in March, and a Sarkozy visit to Russia in 2010 on the margins of the St. Petersburg forum. These visits would occur under the auspices of reciprocal "Year of France" events in Russia and "Year of Russia" events in France.
10. (C) Levitte and A/S Gordon discussed the "dangerous" precedent of ships being intercepted in Georgian waters. Sarkozy Advisor Damien Loras noted that President Saakashvili has a French advisor who has informed Paris that Georgian ships have orders to respond if fired upon. This can escalate and the French message has been to emphasize that Georgia must not respond to provocation, as that would only play into Russia's hands. Levitte stressed the importance of maintaining the Geneva process, while noting that it may take a generation before the Russian public will be able to accept their loss of influence, from Poland and the Baltics to Ukraine and Georgia. Unfortunately, the Russian tendency is to view "good neighbors" as totally submissive subordinates. On the other hand, Paris is closely watching Medvedev, who is more frequently taking public stances in opposition to Putin. Medvedev is more open to the occidental powers and more open to modernization and rule of law issues that Russia must face. A/S Gordon observed that President Obama had spent a good deal of time with Medvedev on his trip to Russia, and had specifically targeted Russian youth in his public outreach event. In his meeting with Galharague and others, A/S Gordon noted that the U.S. pursues a policy to support Georgia in the face of Russian pressure without encouraging President Saakashvili to act in ways that are unhelpful.
-----------------------------------------
IRAN: NEXT STEPS
-----------------------------------------
11. (S/NF) Levitte noted that the Iranian response to the overture of President Obama and the West was "a farce," although Russia had received it as a real initiative. The current Iranian regime is effectively a fascist state and the time has come to decide on next steps. Levitte stated that this is why Paris is advocating a meeting of the EU3 PLUS 3 on the margins of the Pittsburgh G20 meeting. The French hope to approve a two-paragraph statement laying out next steps on negotiations or sanctions. He noted that German Chancellor Angela Merkel shares the view of the French President and is willing to be firm on sanctions, but that FM Steinmeier was more cautious. The Iranian regime must understand that it will be more threatened by economic harm and the attendant social unrest than it would be by negotiating with the West. Unfortunately, the P-3 cannot remain passive until Russia and China finally lose patience;
PARIS 00001254 004 OF 004
this is why a high-level political meeting is important to advance this discussion (and Levitte cited President Sarkozy's frank and direct style, saying that he would pinpoint Medvedev to explain his position). Levitte said that he informed the Chinese FM that if they delay until a possible Israeli raid, then the world will have to deal with a catastrophic energy crisis as well. At the same time, the debate over stopping the flow of gasoline into Iran will be very sensitive and would have to take into account which countries would be only too willing to step in and replace European companies. Levitte informed us that they would like President Sarkozy to talk to President Obama by telephone in the coming days to discuss the G20 and Iran. The French are proposing two possible windows to schedule the call.
----------------------------------------
NATO'S ENLARGEMENT AND STRATEGIC CONCEPT
----------------------------------------
12. (C) Levitte said that France was very pleased with the selection of Madeleine Albright to chair the "Group of 12," which will launch the process of reviewing NATO's Strategic Concept. Bruno Racine will be the French participant on the panel, and Levitte stressed that there is already strong agreement between France and the United States on the basis of exchanges that he has had with NSA General Jim Jones. Levitte noted that Paris agreed with Jones on suppressing the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which had become an obstacle rather than an incentive. A/S Gordon responded that we must not change the process in a way that would be interpreted as suggesting an end to NATO enlargement and eliminating MAP might do that. Levitte agreed and added that French President Sarkozy was "convinced" that Ukraine would one day be a member of NATO, but that there was no point in rushing the process and antagonizing Russia, particularly if the Ukrainian public was largely against membership. The Bucharest summit declaration was very clear that NATO has an open door and Ukraine and Georgia have a vocation in NATO (even if Georgia remains very unstable at the moment). Levitte added that Paris was very pleased with the ceremony on September 9 transferring the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) to French General Stephane Abrial.
--------------------------------
VENEZUELA
--------------------------------
13. (C) Levitte observed that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is "crazy" and said that even Brazil wasn't able to support him anymore. Unfortunately, Chavez is taking one of the richest countries in Latin America and turning it into another Zimbabwe.
14. (U) Assistant Secretary Gordon has cleared this message. RIVKIN
Sunday, 02 August 2009, 06:56
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000760
SIPDIS
NEA/ARP, NEA/RA
EO 12958 DECL: 07/22/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, KU, IZ
SUBJECT: GEN PETRAEUS AND KUWAITI DCOS ON IRAN, IRAQ, CT,
YEMEN AND JOINT MILITARY EXERCISES
REF: KUWAIT 724
Classified By: DCM Tom Williams for reasons 1.4 b and d
1. (S) CENTCOM Commander GEN David Petraeus, accompanied by Ambassador, engaged in a wide-ranging exchange on the evening of July 22 with Kuwaiti Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) LTG Ahmed Khalid Al Sabah. Key Points:
-- (C) On Iraq, General Petraeus said the USG appreciates Kuwait's robust aid for our Iraq efforts; Kuwait's security remains a top U.S. priority, and we will coordinate closely on force outflows from Iraq. The U.S. forces relied on support from Kuwait for our efforts in Afghanistan as well. Kuwait should remain open to engagement with Iraq as a means to help resolve disputes between the two countries and help Iraq achieve greater stability. DCOS Al Sabah responded that Kuwait seeks to rebuild relations with Iraq and prefers that negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait on international disputes be under the UN aegis.
-- (S) On Iran, Kuwait's head of Military Intelligence said the fate of Iran is in Supreme Leader Khamene'i's hands. He must either compromise with Ayatollah Rafsanjani or continue to support President Ahmadinejad. He assessed that the public had crossed the "fear line," and continued protests against the government were a possibility. He thought it would be important to see the Supreme Leader's response to protests. Continued unrest and government repression may be the catalyst that provokes Iranian security forces to crack down, align with the masses, or fracture.
-- (C) On CT, General Petraeus noted USG appreciation for recent CT actions by Kuwait's Interior Ministry forces, and said passage of comprehensive anti-terror legislation would greatly facilitate further efforts.
-- (C) General Petraeus characterized the bilateral security relationship as strong, and welcomed the upcoming Joint Military Commission (JMC) in October, as well as Kuwait's continued participation in joint military exercises.
Iraq
----
2. (C) GEN Petraeus thanked the GOK for its support for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and its facilitation of U.S. forces deploying and redeploying through Kuwait. He provided his congratulations on the results of the recent Parliamentary elections, noting in particular the election of four U.S.-educated women, and said that it was encouraging to see Kuwait's recent counter-terrorism progress. Petraeus also thanked the GOK for its financial, reconstruction, and moral support for Iraq during OIF. He urged that the GOK continue to remain open to negotiate disputes between Iraq and Kuwait, and hoped that such negotiations would be concluded successfully. He assessed that with assistance from its Arab neighbors Iraq would "muddle through" towards stability. Though establishing Iraqi stability absorbs a great amount of USG focus, he reassured the DCOS that Kuwaiti security would remain a priority for the U.S., and also promised that the U.S. would closely coordinate with the GOK on working through the logistics of support for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq through Kuwait. GEN Petraeus said Iraqi PM Maliki's visit to Washington would provide an opportunity for discussion on issues of concern to Kuwait, such as compensation, borders, and recovering the remains of Kuwaiti prisoners still missing from the 1990 invasion and Iraqi occupation. General Petraeus briefed the DCOS on levels of violence in Iraq, noting that the surge of US forces, fighting side-by-side with Iraqi forces that now number nearly 650,000, has contributed greatly to growing stability. U.S. combat forces have completed their withdrawal from Iraqi cities, although advisors and liaison elements remain along with joint coordination centers in Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul that provide the Iraqis with access to U.S. enablers and expertise. 3. (C) In response, the DCOS -- who was personally held as a POW during the Iraqi invasion -- expressed a desire to rebuild relations with Iraq, but, echoing the policy of the GOK, said that all Kuwaiti-concerned negotiations with Iraq should be conducted under the auspices of the UN. GEN Petraeus informed him, that in a recent conversation with Vice President Biden, he recommended that former Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Staffan de Mistura adjudicate the Iraq/Kuwait dispute.
KUWAIT 00000760 002 OF 002
Iran
----
4. (S) BG Abdulrahman al-Hadhood, Chief of Kuwaiti Military Intelligence, in a frank discussion on Iran, asserted that the future of Iran, and its relations with its regional neighbors, is in the hands of Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Khamene'i. The direction in which Khamene'i will lead Iran in this post-presidential election era will largely depend on whether he forges a compromise with Ayatollah Ali Akbar Rafsanjani or continues to pull the "puppet strings" of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Al-Hadhoud said the Iranian public, in staging mass protests in the wake of the elections, had "crossed the fear line." The next test for Iran will be to face the future reactions of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and to what extent the IRGC, the Basij militia, and the regular army are ordered to maintain security. He questioned whether the IRGC would hold ranks with Khamene'i or begin to sympathize with the Iranian masses should further crackdowns be instigated, as happened with the Iranian Army when it fractured and many joined the mass student protests in the 1979 Islamic revolution. Al-Hadhoud predicted that such a tripwire to tip the balance would be the arrest of Presidential challenger Mir Housein Mousavi. The DCOS also mentioned Kuwaiti understanding that Iran was supporting Shi'a in the Gulf and extremists in Yemen. GEN Petraeus asked for assistance in determining if Iran was, in particular, supporting the al-Houthi in Yemen.
5. (S) GEN Petraeus assured the DCOS that the US military is "very capable" and is fully prepared for various contingencies should unrest escalate or Iran become more unpredictable. He added that the US military is assisting Gulf states in shoring up ballistic missile and counter air defenses, as well as early warning systems in the eventuality of an Iranian missile launch. He encouraged the GOK to consider establishing a regional "Center for Excellence for Air and Missile Defense," -- complementing the UAE's Gulf Air Warfare Center -- which would focus on air and missile defense and on the interoperability of systems such as the PAC-III Kuwait now has deployed.
Counterterrorism
----------------
6. (S) GEN Petraeus congratulated the DCOS on the success of GOK security forces in counterterrorism (CT) operations in recent months, citing Kuwaiti crackdowns on individuals of "mutual concern." He conveyed to the DCOS that passage of comprehensive CT legislation would greatly facilitate further cooperation in this critical area. General Petraeus observed that Kuwait, based on its experience with extremists, should recognize that such elements will ultimately turn to targeting Kuwait.
Mil-Mil: Joint training and JMC
--------------------------------
7. (C) GEN Petraeus told the DCOS that the bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement (signed in 1991, renewed in 2001) had proved mutually beneficial and that the USG is inclined to renew it in 2011. He also said that he was looking forward to the October JMC to discuss with Kuwaiti COS LTG Fahad al-Amir Kuwaiti concerns over the FMS program and the possibility of creating a regional air and missile defense center of excellence in Kuwait. He also noted the receipt and approval of a Kuwaiti request for an avionics and weapon systems upgrade, and encouraged Kuwaiti participation in joint military exercises like Eager Mace and Bright Star. He also offered to help in the coordination of an Eagle Resolve exercise, should the GOK desire to host it. In addition, he encouraged Kuwait to send its special operations forces to Jordan's King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center and its fighter-attack aircraft to the UAE's Gulf Air Warfare Training Center.
8. (U) GEN Petraeus has cleared this cable.
********************************************* ********* For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: visit Kuwait's Classified Website at:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it ********************************************* ********* WILLIAMS
Friday, 31 July 2009, 15:51
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001046
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 07/31/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, FR
SUBJECT: IRAN: EU DIPLOMATS TO ATTEND AHMADINEJAD
INAUGURATION
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen H. Allegrone, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C/NF) European Union members will send low-ranking diplomats to the first of two inauguration ceremonies for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but they will not inform the Iranians of their plans, according to French MFA Acting Middle East Director (Assistant-Secretary equivalent) Jean-Christophe Paucelle. If the Iranians find out beforehand that the EU will not send Ambassador-level representation, Paucelle told poloff early July 31, then they may rescind the invitations to the August 3 event, as they did in similar circumstances prior to former President Khatami's inauguration in 1997. "It's hard to keep a secret when 27 nations are involved," Paucelle noted, "but we are trying." Only the Swedish EU Presidency will be represented by an Ambassador, Paucelle said.
2. (C/NF) All EU members will, however, send their Ambassadors to the August 5 inauguration ceremony in the Iranian Parliament. Paucelle adopted a defensive tone when explaining this decision, which he said was finalized in Brussels the morning of July 31. He admitted this issue had generated tense and fractious debate among European foreign ministers. "We are caught between two conflicting objectives," Paucelle explained. "On the one hand, we want to communicate that we do not approve of this illegitimate election. On the other hand, we need to be realistic: the power is in the hands of Khameini and Ahmadinejad, including the nuclear file, and we must negotiate with those in power. You are in the same position." Paucelle insisted that the EU will continue to respect what he described as "the Durban red lines." "We will walk right out if Ahmadinejad denies the Holocaust or declares that his regime will destroy Israel." (NOTE: Paucelle admitted that since non-Muslims had never before received an invitation to the inauguration ceremony presided over by the Supreme Leader, EU diplomats in Tehran have never entered the building where the event will take place, and so they are not sure how they will stage their walk-out, logistically, should they need to do so. They are worried that the doors may be locked. END NOTE.) Paucelle also reported that the German Ambassador will return from his vacation on August 4 to ensure that he will miss the first ceremony and attend the second one along with his EU counterparts. The British Ambassador will attend as well, even without credentials. "The Iranians are desperate for recognition and so they have disregarded their usual devotion to protocol -- and their anti-British vitriol -- on this occasion."
3. (C/NF) Paucelle said that the case of detained French citizen Clothilde Reiss has also influenced the EU decision to attend the inauguration ceremonies. "We think she may be released soon, and we don't want to create another irritant," Paucelle said. "There are enough already." He reported that the French have reason to believe Reiss may form part of a group of detainees likely to be released on the August 7 anniversary of Imam Mahdi. Paucelle noted that a letter released July 29 by Ahmadinejad supported the idea of granting clemency to post-election protesters during Mahdi celebrations. "The Iranians will need to take face-saving measures, and so she will likely transfer to house arrest or some other status," Paucelle said. He added that, of course, she may not be released at all next week, but the French remain optimistic that she will soon be out of prison. PEKALA
Thursday, 30 July 2009, 10:23
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001688
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/30/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PTER, EG, CH, IR, SA, LE, IS
SUBJECT: PM A/S SHAPIRO'S JULY 22-23 VISIT TO ISRAEL
REF: GRUBB-MILLER 07/22/09 E-MAIL
Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (S) Summary: Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro met with a number of GOI officials on July 22-23 to stress the importance of the U.S.-Israeli political-military relationship, and to discuss among other issues Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME). GOI interlocutors continued to press for the opportunity to review the QME report prior to its submission to Congress, and presented an official response to a U.S. non-paper on potential arms transfers to Arab countries. In that respect, the MOD proposed technical discussions in Washington on August 3 to further discuss GOI concerns over the potential F-15SA transfer to Saudi Arabia. GOI officials continued to express reservations regarding U.S. arms transfers to Lebanon, and requested the opportunity to further discuss U.S. strategy and intentions with respect to the Lebanese Armed Forces. GOI interlocutors raised continued concerns over the Iranian nuclear weapons program, noting that any policy of engagement be done in conjunction with tougher sanctions and for a finite period of time before turning to other "options on the table." Other issues raised by GOI officials included the Peace Process, Israel's export control system, and potential Israeli exports to China. Both sides agreed in principle to the next session of the Joint Political Military Group (JPMG) in October or early November in Israel. End summary.
2. (SBU) On July 22, A/S Shapiro met with MOD Director General Pinchas Buchris, MOD Political-Military Director Amos Gilad, Defense Export Control Directorate Chief Eli Pincu, and participated in a roundtable discussion led by J5 Strategic Division Chief Brigadier General Yossi Heymann. At the MFA on July 23, A/S Shapiro met with Director General Yossi Gal and participated in a roundtable discussion led by Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar and Export Control Director Roey Gilad. A/S Shapiro also participated in a strategic tour of Israel, and visited Israeli defense company Plasan-Sasa.
U.S.-Israeli Relationship
-------------------------
3. (SBU) A/S Shapiro stressed the importance of the U.S-Israeli political-military relationship, noting the significance of visiting Israel on his first overseas trip in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for the Political-Military Affairs Bureau. GOI interlocutors appreciated the opportunity to resume dialogue on this important aspect of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. MOD DG Buchris noted the two still relatively new administrations in the United States and Israel, and the importance of limiting the number of misunderstandings in the future.
Qualitative Military Edge
-------------------------
4. (S) GOI officials reiterated the importance of maintaining Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME). They said that Israel understands U.S. policy intentions to arm moderate Arab states in the region to counter the Iranian threat, and prefers such sales originate from the United States instead of other countries like Russia or China. However, Israel continues to stress the importance of identifying potential risks that may become future threats or adversaries, and for this reason maintains several objections as indicated in the official GOI response to the QME non-paper on potential U.S. arms sales to the region (ref e-mail to PM/RSAT separately).
5. (S) GOI officials also expressed continued interest in reviewing the QME report prior to its submission to Congress. A/S Shapiro reiterated that the report was based on an assessment from the intelligence community, and therefore not releasable to the GOI. He referenced previous points made to the Israeli embassy in Washington regarding the report, and welcomed any comments the GOI might have -- although such comments should be delivered as soon as possible as the report is already overdue. Israeli interlocutors appreciated the classified nature of the report, but also made clear it was difficult to comment on the report's results without reviewing its content or intelligence assessment. In that respect, Buchris and other GOI officials requested that the QME process be reviewed in light of future QME reports.
6. (S) GOI interlocutors attempted to make the argument that moderate Arab countries could in the future become adversaries -- and that this should be taken into account in the QME process. During a roundtable discussion led by the MFA's Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar, the MFA's Center for Policy Research gave intelligence briefs on Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Lebanon to further support the argument that these countries could become future foes. Policy Research Center interlocutors reviewed succession concerns in both Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Bar argued that a perceived closure in the capability gap between Israel and Arab states, coupled with a nuclear-armed Iran, could compel moderate Arab states to reassess the notion that Israel was a fixture in the region.
7. (S) Typically frank, MOD Political-Military Chief Amos Gilad was not certain how much longer Egyptian President Mubarak would live, and questioned whether his son Gamal was ready to assume command. Gilad said the Egyptian military led by Defense Minister Tantawi continues to train and exercise as if "Israel was its only enemy." He added that there were disturbing signs on the Egyptian streets, as women are dressed more conservatively, and that peace with Israel "is too thin, too superficial." On Saudi Arabia, Gilad said that King Abdullah does not hate Israel, but his chief priority is the survival of the regime.
8. (S) The GOI official response to the arms transfer non-paper includes several objections, such as the potential transfer of systems for the F-15SA to Saudi Arabia, including the Enhanced Paveway II, Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, and AESA radar. Buchris said the GOI is ready to establish a working group to discuss the F-15SA transfer, and proposed an Israeli technical team accompany BG Heymann to Washington (in town for a missile defense meeting) on August 3 to discuss the issue further. Buchris said the sale of the F-15SA was not the problem, but rather the weapons systems included on the planes and the location of the planes in Saudi Arabia.
Lebanon
-------
9. (S) The GOI remains concerned about U.S. arms transfers to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and has requested the opportunity to discuss further U.S. intentions regarding the LAF. A/S Shapiro said the results of the Lebanese elections represented a turning point, and rejection of Hizballah and its Iranian sponsors. The need to build up Lebanese institutions, including the army, was now more important than ever, he argued. A/S Shapiro said the LAF has thus far demonstrated a solid record of accounting for U.S. systems transferred to Lebanon.
10. (S) Buchris acknowledged that the elections in Lebanon were positive, but countered that Hizballah's influence remains strong. He argued that items such as the Cessna Caravan and the Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) lack sufficient mitigation measures, which creates the potential for an incident along the Israel-Lebanese border. Amos Gilad said the GOI does not believe the LAF will attack Israel. However, given the ties between Hizballah and the LAF, he was certain the IDF would eventually face the LAF in any conflict with Hizballah.
11. (S) Analysts from the MFA's Center for Policy Research argued there has been no dramatic change in the political arena despite the March 14 coalition's significant victory in the elections. They said the fragile political situation in Lebanon is currently stable, but Hizballah still possesses an unofficial veto over policy. Long term prospects will be tested by the Hariri Tribunal and Hizballah's desire for a reprisal to the 2008 Mughniyeh assassination. MFA Policy Research analysts further argued that the LAF faces tremendous pressure following the recent explosion of a Hizballah arms cache near the Lebanese-Israeli border. MFA DG Yossi Gal noted that UNIFIL had been prevented from investigating the explosion, and raised the recent crossing by Lebanese citizens into Israeli territory to plant Lebanese and Hizballah flags. He said French and Italian delegations had praised the GOI's restraint in these cases.
12. (S) A/S Shapiro asked if the election results might be the result in part of a backlash in the Christian community against Hizballah; the Policy Research analysts countered that the results were indicative of several factors, including the influx of Saudi money and an unstable opposition camp. They agreed that Hizballah leader Nasrallah might be a bit chastened following the elections, as suggested by A/S Shapiro, but that Hizballah continues to try and undermine the March 14 coalition.
13. (S) During the MOD roundtable discussion, BG Heymann also acknowledged the positive results of the elections. However, he feared the outcome did not represent the real power of the Shi'ites in Lebanon. He agreed that moderates and the LAF must be strengthened, but expressed deep concerns about ongoing cooperation between Hizballah and the LAF. He also said that such aid to Lebanon be paired with efforts to halt smuggling and directly weaken Hizballah.
14. (S) BG Heymann also cited concerns regarding mitigation measures for the Caravan and Raven in order to prevent an "accidental engagement" by the IAF. Overall, he was skeptical that these systems would benefit the LAF, and said the GOI would appreciate a more in-depth conversation regarding U.S. intentions and overarching strategy with respect to the LAF. Heymann suggested further talks to coincide with the August 3rd F-15 technical discussion in Washington; MFA DDG Bar echoed this request. A/S Shapiro offered to take that back to Washington for review. If it proved too difficult on short notice to bring together interagency experts to discuss US intentions with the LAF, A/S Shapiro suggested it be included in the Joint Political Military Group talks later in the fall.
Iran
----
15. (S) Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons remains the GOI's primary focus. Buchris stated bluntly that it was not clear to him where U.S. policy was heading with regard to Iran. In separate meetings, Buchris and Amos Gilad said that Israel's preeminent priority is to prevent Iran's nuclear weapons program, which if realized would cause a nuclear arms race across the Middle East as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt pursue similar programs in response. Gilad was skeptical
that engagement would work, noting Iranian desires to "establish a new empire" and pointing to Iranian support for Hizballah and "Hamastan." Buchris added that the United States' desire to engage with Iran should be accompanied by tough sanctions, and only pursued for a finite period of time; MFA DG Gal concurred. Alluding to a potential military strike, Buchris said "all options must remain on the table," and acknowledged that part of his job was insuring Israel was ready to employ such an option, no matter how undesirable it may be.
16. (S) A/S Shapiro made clear that a nuclear armed Iran was unacceptable to the United States. He referenced Secretary Clinton's July 15 foreign policy address at the Council on Foreign Relations, noting the offer of engagement with Iran -- but reinforcing that such an offer is not indefinite. A/S Shapiro argued that an Iranian rejection of our offer to engage will only help bolster international support for increased sanctions. He also pointed to the uncertain situation following the Iranian elections -- it was unclear at this point how the regime in Tehran will react to our offer of engagement. That said, he repeated that the engagement offer was not unlimited, noting that the United States will reassess its engagement strategy with Iran later this fall.
17. (S) A/S Shapiro cited a commonality of interests with the Gulf States, which also view Iran as the preeminent threat -- we should take advantage of this commonality, he said. During the J5 roundtable discussion, IDF interlocutors expressed skepticism that proposed military assistance to the Gulf would help against Iran, as some of the systems slated for delivery are not designed to counter the threats, nuclear and asymmetrical, posed by Iran. A/S Shapiro agreed that assistance to Gulf states should not diminish Israel's QME, but argued that it sends a signal to those countries (as well as Iran) that they have strong allies in the West. It also helps convince these regimes that their best interests lie with the moderate camp rather than with Iran.
18. (S) Buchris said the lack of an appointed U.S. special envoy focusing on Iran suggested the United States did not believe Iran was a priority. A/S Shapiro reassured Buchris that Iran was a top priority as President Obama and Secretary Clinton are intensely focused on Iran. The fact that Tehran has not responded to our offer of engagement makes a special envoy responsible for negotiations not as important, A/S Shapiro said -- in any case, much of the discussion will be behind the scenes.
19. (S) Buchris referenced a press report from Secretary Clinton's trip to Jakarta in which she said the United States would consider providing a defense umbrella for moderate Arab countries in the Middle East should Iran acquire a nuclear weapon. Buchris argued that such a statement already conceded the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran. MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar also raised the Secretary's Jakarta statement; A/S Shapiro stated that the Secretary's comments did not indicate a new policy approach, but were meant as a deterrent factor toward Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions -- not as a concession -- and that journalists covering the trip attempted to make more out of the statement than was intended.
20. (S) Amos Gilad referenced Russia's potential sale of the S-300 missile system to Iran, noting that Russian interlocutors initially denied the S-300 contract with Iran, and then later admitted it had been signed but added that the system would not be delivered for political reasons. However, Gilad said the Russians would reassess this political calculation should the United States continue to pursue missile defense plans in Poland and the Czech Republic. He speculated that the Iranians would continue to put pressure on Russia to sell the system rather than pursue alternative Chinese systems. He said the Russians appear committed to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, but he personally had doubts about their intelligence capabilities following their lack of knowledge regarding the Syrian nuclear project.
Peace Process
-------------
21. (S) Buchris acknowledged that the Palestinian Authority was doing a "good job" in the West Bank, noting respect for Palestinian Security Forces (PASF) as they take more control of security -- giving them the chance to succeed was important, Buchris said. He also commended the work of United States Security Coordinator Gen. Dayton in training the PASF. That said, Buchris argued the way ahead would be difficult, given the divide between Hamas and Fatah. Reconciliation talks between the two have stalled -- Amos Gilad said both sides are "more interested in swallowing one another" than negotiating. Behind the scenes discussions with Hamas by European countries and even U.S. visitors have not helped the situation, Buchris said. A/S Shapiro deferred to Special Envoy Sen. George Mitchell's efforts, but noted Secretary Clinton's point that a stronger PA will offer an alternative to Hamas. He also stressed Secretary Clinton's remarks during her July 15 speech that the United States will not engage with Hamas unless it has accepted the Quartet principles.
Export Control
--------------
22. (C) MOD Defense Export Control Directorate (DECD) Chief Eli Pincu reviewed the export control system, emphasizing an improved process, but also acknowledging the potential for improvement. He gave a brief presentation regarding Israeli export controls, including enhanced legislation, cross-ministry coordination, enhanced enforcement, and increased industry outreach and training. He noted 780 registered exporters in Israel; for 2009, 31,373 marketing licenses had thus far been issued, with 1,198 denials and 219 returned without action. MFA Export Control Director Roey Gilad stressed the partnership between the MOD and MFA on export licenses, and explained the system's dispute resolution mechanism in the event the MFA and MOD disagree on a particular case.
23. (C) Both Pincu and Roey Gilad noted that the GOI continues to seek assistance in closing export control loopholes, including brokering. Pincu noted that brokering had been included in the Defense Export Control Act, but that accompanying implementation legislation had not yet entered in to force. Pincu said the GOI had consulted with Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan on its brokering laws, and planned to raise it during the annual defense export control working group to be held in Washington in October. Roey Gilad and other DECD officials also hope to travel to Washington in the near future to further discuss brokering issues.
China
-----
24. (C) MFA Export Control Director Roey Gilad reiterated that the GOI in no way desires to compromise U.S. national interests with respect to exports to China. He noted, however, that the U.S. Department of Commerce created in 2007 a list of exemptions for certain items if sent to validated end users in China. Gilad questioned whether the same exemptions might be possible for Israel. As it currently stands, the GOI must pursue any export to China through the bilateral statement of understanding with the United States. While the statement calls for expeditious resolution of any requests to export to China, it often takes up to 80 days to obtain approval. By that time, Gilad said, China has often found the item through another supplier. Moreover, the Israeli export control system requires a 20-working day turn-around on all export license requests -- which is not possible, given the length of time required to obtain an answer from the United States. A/S Shapiro offered to raise the issue in Washington.
JPMG
----
25. (SBU) A/S Shapiro suggested the next session of the Joint Political Military Group (JPMG) convene shortly after the Jewish holidays, most likely in October or early November. GOI officials agreed in principle, and will look at the calendar and propose dates.
26. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared this cable.
********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv ********************************************* ******************** CUNNINGHAM
Monday, 15 June 2009, 13:08
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASHGABAT 000757
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/IR AND SCA/CEN
EO 12958 DECL: 06/15/2019
TAGS IR, TX, PGOV, PREL, PHUM
SUBJECT: IRAN POST-ELECTION: [Source removed] CALLS
RESULTS A "COUP D'ETAT;" SAYS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD DEMAND A RECOUNT
ASHGABAT 00000757 001.2 OF 002
Classfied By: Charge Richard Miles, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) In a conversation today with Iran Watcher, a [Source removed] in Ashgabat labeled the announcement of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's victory in Friday's presidential election a "coup d'etat," and called Iran's incumbent President "another Pinochet." [Name removed] said that based on calculations from Mousavi's campaign observers who were present at polling stations around the country and who witnessed the vote counts, Mousavi received approximately 26 million (or 61%) of the 42 million votes cast in Friday's election, followed by Mehdi Karroubi (10-12 million). According to his sources, Ahmadinejad received "a maximum of 4-5 million votes," with the remainder going to Mohsen Rezai. He said that more than anything else, the huge turnout of voters on Friday was a reflection of the Iranian electorate's overwhelming "anti-Ahmadinejad" sentiments.
PRECINCT RESULTS OBSCURED
2. (C) [Name removed] said that in a clear departure from established electoral rules and practice in Iran, including the procedures followed in the 2005 presidential election and last year's legislative elections, the authorities embargoed the results from individual precincts and announced instead that they must be conveyed directly to the central election authorities, who would announce the overall results after all the votes were counted. The Iranian authorities knew, he said, that attempts to falsify individual precinct counts could be countered by observers from the Mousavi and the other campaigns, so in order to engineer a "lopsided" Ahmadinejad victory, they had no choice but to conceal the precinct results. In his words, "People know who they voted for and the observers know who won in each precinct."
ARAB REACTION: A HUGE DISAPPOINTMENT
3. (C) [Name removed] said that Iranians are puzzled by the muted reaction thus far of the U.S. and EU governments, as well as "very disappointed" by the number of Arab rulers who have sent messages to Ahmadinejad congratulating him on his "victory." He said that the international community should acknowledge the illegitimacy of the election and demand that the Iranian authorities release and account for the results from each precinct. He said the IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) was behind the "coup." Even Supreme Leader Khamenei, he said, to whom the IRGC owes allegiance, is "not totally in control" of the IRGC. Citing the IRGC's warnings against a "velvet revolution" in the days leading up to the election, it would appear that the IRGC has taken on "a life of its own."
IRANIAN DIPLOMATS GET 4TH OF JULY INVITATION INSTRUCTIONS
4. (C) During a visit to the Iranian Embassy in Ashgabat last Friday to vote, [Name removed] said that, without exception, "everyone he spoke to" who was there to cast their ballot said they were voting for Mousavi. [Detail removed]
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: "OUR ONLY OPTION"
5. (C) [Name removed] said that the Iranian authorities, particularly the IRGC, are "merciless" and, "unlike the government in 1979," will use any level of force necessary to put down Iranians who attempt
ASHGABAT 00000757 002.2 OF 002
to demonstrate or force an annulment of the election. Instead, he said, the most effective means to counter the results will be in the form of peaceful, civil disobedience. "The people need to act in concert and 'shut down the country.'" "If no one goes to work and the government cannot function," he said, "this will cause them to think again."
6 (C) COMMENT: During our conversation our interlocutor recalled the words of his father [detail removed] during the lead-up to the 1979 revolution. He said that his father warned him against joining the revolution and to "watch out for the Islamists." "Once they get power," he had said, "they'll never relinquish it. People are going to be sorry." END COMMENT. MILES
Friday, 24 April 2009, 16:18
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001103
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I AND NEA/IR
NSC STAFF FOR OLLIVANT AND MAGSAMEN
EO 12958 DECL: 04/23/2029
TAGS PREL, PTER, PINR, MOPS, ECON, ETRD, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAN IN IRAQ: STRATEGY FOR PRESSURING IRGC-QF
REF: A. 07 BAGHDAD 150 B. 07 BAGHDAD 488 C. BAGHDAD 289
Classified By: Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) Summary: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - Quds Force (IRGC-QF) officers are active in Iraq, conducting traditional espionage and supporting violent extremists as well as supporting both legitimate and malign Iranian economic and cultural outreach. Iraqis and their government have demonstrated increasing willingness to push back against malign Iranian influence in the last year. Working with the Iraqis, we have succeeded in stopping some IRGC-QF activity through military operations and diplomatic engagement, while we prevented some IRGC-QF officers from entering Iraq through explicit warnings that we would target them unilaterally. However, under the Security Agreement effective January 1, all operations in Iraq must be conducted in conjunction with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and our previous unilateral warnings carry less weight. As Coalition Forces continue the period of responsible drawdown, we will rely increasingly on the GOI to keep the pressure on the IRGC-QF. We intend to support the GOI in these efforts through continued diplomatic engagement, intelligence sharing, and our security partnership of Coalition Forces working by, with, and through the ISF. End summary.
-----------
Background:
-----------
2. (S/NF) IRGC-QF leadership took advantage of the vacuum which surrounded the fall of Saddam Hussein and the entry of Coalition Forces into Iraq in 2003, using the opportunity to send operatives to Iraq when little attention was focused on Iran. In January 2007, Coalition Forces raided an unofficial Iranian consulate in Erbil, detaining five Iranians who claimed to be diplomats but in reality held no diplomatic status. They were suspected of operations aimed at killing Coalition and Iraqi security forces (refs A and B). The original targets of the raid, IRGC-QF officers Abbas Hoseyni (of the Erbil office) and Hormat Faruqi (of the Sulaimaniyah office), escaped and fled to Iran. The Iranian government immediately pulled back most IRGC-QF officers from Iraq and shuttered its "consulates" in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah until mid-2007; consulates in Basrah and Karbala remained open. Since 2007, Iran has submitted diplomatic visa applications for Hoseini and Faruqi to return to Iraq. In 2008 the Embassy and MNF-I convinced the GOI not to approve these applications, making it clear if they returned to Iraq, they would be targeted by Coalition Forces.
3. (S/NF) Since 2008, the MFA has passed names of Iranians applying for diplomatic visas to the US Embassy for vetting. Background checks have revealed that about 20 percent have possible ties to the IRGC or Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) (ref C). The MFA has informed us that it denies visas to all new suspected intelligence officers, but we have not been able to verify such claims. In January 2009, the MFA passed a list of 35 names to the USG of Iranian diplomats already in country before the vetting process began. Of those, eight had ties to IRGC or MOIS.
--------
Strategy
--------
4. (S/NF) As U.S. forces continue a period of responsible draw down, we will seek to ensure that the GOI understands that IRGC-QF activity harms Iraq -- which should be self-evident if the IRGC-QF continues to conduct malign activity that targets Iraqi citizens and infrastructure. Qactivity that targets Iraqi citizens and infrastructure. Engagements with political and security leadership at the national and provincial level, intelligence sharing, and security cooperation will be key to explaining the dangers of IRGC-QF activity and providing Iraqis the information they need to defend their own interests. The following are diplomatic, political, military, intelligence, and public information options which either the GOI can pursue unilaterally, or in concert with the USG, to target IRGC-QF activity in Iraq.
---------
Diplomacy
---------
BAGHDAD 00001103 002 OF 003
5. (S/NF) We intend to continue working closely with the MFA to deny visas to Iranian intelligence officers. We may also consider suggesting that the MFA use another diplomatic tool, albeit one with more consequences -- the "persona non grata" designation. The MFA may be reluctant to take this step because Iraqi diplomats in Iran would face retaliation and the dispute would inevitably become public. Since the fall of Saddam, the GOI has avoided most public disagreements with Iran.
--------------------
Security Partnership
--------------------
6. (S/NF) The role of the ISF in countering IRGC-QF in Iraq is critical, yet complex. We can encourage the Iraqi Army to take the lead on kinetic action against IRGC-QF agents, with Iraqi police monitoring and reacting to suspicious activity at the local level. We intend to continue to strengthen our partnership with the ISF to counter pro-Iranian elements who have infiltrated the security forces such as Kata'ib Hizbollah and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq. While the US combat mission will end by August 31, 2009, we will continue to assist the Ministry of Defense (MOD) with training, equipment, mentoring and other bilateral military-to-military programs and engagements. Military sales, such as the recent Iraqi interest in purchasing F-16s and plans to transition from AK-47 to M-4 rifles, will increase US influence through training and support in Iraq for years to come, although the MOD will continue to consider weapons purchases from other sources as well.
---------------
Border Controls
---------------
7. (S) The Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) can help limit IRGC-QF activity by combating smuggling and scrutinizing people and cargo crossing legitimate routes from Iran into Iraq. XXXXXXXXXXXX corruption at the ports of entry (POEs), unwillingness of inspectors to do their jobs, and poor leadership and professionalism at the supervisory level keep the DBE from being fully effective. The USG can assist, however. Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES), which checks travelers' biographic data, is already in use at many land and air POEs around Iraq. Additional training at sea ports, airports, and land borders could help Iraqi officials detect smugglers of cash, weapons, weapons components and other contraband. An Iranian IRGC-QF officer was briefly detained at Baghdad International Airport in November 2008 when his name was flagged in PISCES. In January 2009, KRG's Minister of the Interior Karim Sinjari praised PISCES and asked for the system at two more land border entry points the KRG shares with Iran, Khalil Ibrahim and Hadjer Meran.
8. (S) As of April 2009, there were 200 PISCES units in operation at 15 different POEs in Iraq. Current guidance states that every traveler entering or exiting Iraq is processed through PISCES. On occasion however, travelers will pay a small "fee" to enter or exit without going through PISCES. If a potential match is found to someone on the "stop list," the screen freezes, and only INIS can unlock the screen and conduct a secondary inspection. INIS notifies the GOI or USG when the identity of a wanted person is confirmed. PISCES is operated by Immigration officers assigned to the Department of Travel and Nationality, and the GOI will continue to use PISCES after the military drawdown. Collection and storage of biometric data is another tool the QCollection and storage of biometric data is another tool the GOI is already using at POEs, although Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) system is run by U.S. forces and will not stay in Iraq after their departure.
9. (S/NF) A timely example of cooperation with DBE in countering Iranian lethal aid smuggling occurred April 14. A DBE brigade in Maysan Province, partnered with Multi-National Division-South (MND-S) forces, captured an unmanned boat carrying explosive devices floating in the Huwayza Marsh. The patrol found three explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) and other military equipment. MND-S said it was the first time the DBE had reported success against this type of smuggling.
--------------------
Intelligence Sharing
--------------------
BAGHDAD 00001103 003 OF 003
10. (S/NF) Coordinating with GOI intelligence agencies to stop IRGC-QF activity is complicated by the fact that the Iraqi intelligence establishment is extremely fragmented. Intelligence offices affiliated with the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), DBE, and the Ministry of State for National Security Affairs (MSNSA) do not trust each other and often work in opposition. The USG could further assist Iraqi intelligence by negotiating and approving a bilateral US-Iraqi intelligence sharing agreements and further providing the GOI with intelligence that demonstrates the involvement of IRGC-QF officers in lethal assistance to extremists. US Forces in Iraq have established positive relationships with their ISF counterparts and are developing appropriate intelligence-sharing mechanisms. The USG can also assist the GOI to further develop its intelligence infrastructure to monitor malign Iranian influence and counter the IRGC-QF. INIS currently interacts closely with the Office of Regional Affairs (ORA). The establishment of a Defense Attach's Office at the Embassy will also help facilitate intelligence sharing and is under consideration by Chief of Mission.
-------------------
Public Information
-------------------
11. (S/NF) Highlighting nefarious Iranian activity to GOI leadership and the Iraqi public has had a significant impact on increasing GOI willingness to confront Iran, as well as public rejection of Iranian attempts to dominate Iraq's political and economic sectors. Provincial elections demonstrated that perceived fealty to Iran is a political liability for Iraqi politicians, and they are increasingly sensitive to it. Continued USG assistance in uncovering and publicizing Iranian attempts to influence events in Iraq will make the country a much more inhospitable environment for IRGC-QF operatives.
-------
Comment
-------
12. (S/NF) The Iranian government may sense that the drawdown of U.S. military forces in Iraq presents an opportunity to expand IRGC-QF activity, although the broader regional dynamic will undoubtedly also influence Iranian decision making. Without the ability to conduct unilateral military action against IRGC-QF operatives in Iraq, we will leverage our evolving diplomatic, intelligence, security, and military partnerships with Iraq to maintain pressure. Many USG agencies will be involved in assisting the Iraqis in this critical area, and must actively engage in order to counter IRGC-QF officers and their lethal aid. BUTENIS
Thursday, 02 April 2009, 05:49
S E C R E T AMMAN 000813
SIPDIS
NEA/ELA AND INR/TCA
EO 12958 DECL: 04/02/2029
TAGS PREL, PINR, IR, JO
SUBJECT: WARY OF U.S.-IRAN ENGAGEMENT, JORDAN OFFERS WORDS
OF CAUTION
REF: A. STATE 25892 B. 08 AMMAN 3329 C. AMMAN 668 D. 08 AMMAN 3189 E. 08 AMMAN 2660 F. 08 AMMAN 3372
Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary: This cable responds to Ref A request for evaluations of third-country reactions to possible U.S. engagement with Iran. Jordan's leaders believe such engagement would reward regional hardliners while undermining Arab moderates - without convincing Iran to cease its support for terrorism, end its nuclear program or drop its hegemonic aspirations. Jordanian officials argue that the best way to counter Iran's ambitions is to weaken the salience of its radicalism on the Arab street by fulfilling the promise of a "two-state solution," resolving other Arab-Israeli disputes, and making sure that Iraq's political and security institutions are not overwhelmed by Iranian influence when the U.S. drawdown is complete. If U.S.-Iran engagement does proceed in earnest, Jordan hopes to be closely consulted in advance and for its interests to be taken into account. End Summary.
Beware the Iranian Tentacles ... and Cut Them Off
--------------------------------------------- ----
2. (S) The metaphor most commonly deployed by Jordanian officials when discussing Iran is of an octopus whose tentacles reach out insidiously to manipulate, foment, and undermine the best laid plans of the West and regional moderates. Iran's tentacles include its allies Qatar and Syria, Hizballah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian territories, an Iraqi government sometimes seen as supplicant to Tehran, and Shia communities throughout the region. While Jordanian officials doubt dialogue with the U.S. will convince Iran to withdraw its "tentacles," they believe they can be severed if Iran is deprived of hot-button issues that make it a hero to many on the Arab street, such as its championing of the Palestinian cause.
3. (C) According to the GOJ analysis, Iran's influence derives from the perception that Tehran is able to "deliver" while moderates are not. The main failure of moderates as cited by radicals is ongoing Palestinian suffering and dispossession despite an international consensus favoring a viable, independent Palestinian state living peacefully next to Israel. The MFA's Deputy Director of the Arab and Middle East Affairs Department, Muwaffaq Ajlouni, put it this way: "Iran is not welcomed in the Arab world, but it is taking advantage of helpless people." From Jordan's perspective, the U.S. would benefit from pressing Israel to proceed to final status negotiations, which would garner Arab support to deal with shared security concerns about Iran.
4. (S) In Lebanon, the GOJ fears Iran's Hizballah proxy has been given too much rope and could be poised to increase its political influence during upcoming parliamentary elections. The King sees the Lebanon-Israel War of 2006 as having benefited Iran and Hizballah, by allowing a Sunni Arab street enamored of "resistance" to see past its suspicions of the Shia. And then-Foreign Minister Salah Al-Bashir in late 2008 described the spring 2009 vote as "when we will know who won last May," referring to the outcome of the Doha Accords that put an end to Lebanese infighting. Much like with the Palestinian issue, Jordanian leaders have argued that the only way to pull the rug out from under Hizballah - and by extension their Iranian patrons - would be for Israel to hand over the disputed Sheba'a Farms to Lebanon. With Hizballah lacking the "resistance to occupation" rationale for continued confrontation with Israel, it would lose its raison d'etre and probably domestic support.
5. (S) In Iraq, signs of growing security and political stability over the past year in particular have served somewhat to calm Jordanian nerves about Iran's interference. The King and others have cited indications that Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki is showing himself to be a national rather than a parochial or Iranian-controlled leader. During the U.S.-Jordan Political Dialogue in November 2008, FM Bashir noted that the Iraqi government had a "tendency to appease Iran," but he saw increased Jordanian (and Sunni Arab) diplomatic engagement with Baghdad as a potential bulwark against Iran (Ref B). Positive trends notwithstanding, many of our Jordanian interlocutors stress that the U.S. should leave Iraq only when it "makes sense," and thereby avoid a political and security vacuum that could be easily filled by Iran (Ref C).
Prepare for Iran to Disappoint
------------------------------
6. (S) Jordan's leaders are careful not to be seen as dictating toward the U.S., but their comments betray a powerful undercurrent of doubt that the United States knows how to deal effectively with Iran. Foreign Minister Nasser Joudeh has suggested the Iranians would be happy to let talks with the U.S. continue for ten years without moving them forward, believing that they can benefit from perceived acceptance after years of isolation without paying a price.
7. (S) Upper House President Zeid Rifai has predicted that dialogue with Iran will lead nowhere, arguing that if the U.S., the EU, and the Arab states agree that under no circumstances should Iran be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon, military force becomes the only option. "Bomb Iran, or live with an Iranian bomb. Sanctions, carrots, incentives won't matter," was how he put it to visiting NEA DAS David Hale in November. While Rifai judged a military strike would have "catastrophic impact on the region," he nonetheless thought preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would pay enough dividends to make it worth the risks (Ref D).
8. (C) Speaking to PolOffs in early February 2009, Director of the Prime Minister's Political Office Khaled Al-Qadi noted that the Gaza crisis had allowed Iranian interference in inter-Arab relations to reach unprecedented levels. He urged the U.S. to "understand the history," explaining that "after the Israelis, the Iranians are the smartest. They know where they are going and what they are doing." He doubted there would be any diplomatic breakthrough before Iran's June elections, partly because Iranian pragmatists cannot be practical due to religious and ideological considerations. He hoped any dialogue would be aimed at weakening hardliners, many of whom believe their "Great Satan" rhetoric.
Talk If You Must, But Don't Sell Us Out
---------------------------------------
9. (S) If direct U.S.-Iran talks must happen, the Jordanian leadership insists it not be at the expense of Arab interests, particularly those of moderates like Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority. Furthermore, they worry that engagement will set off a stampede of Arab states looking to get ahead of the curve and reach their own separate peace with Tehran. King Abdullah counseled Special Envoy George Mitchell in February that direct U.S. engagement with Iran at this time would just deepen intra-Arab schisms and that more "countries without a backbone" would defect to the Iranian camp. The Prime Ministry's Qadi has assessed that Iran sought to "transform the Israeli-Arab conflict into an Islamic-Israeli conflict" and that this strategy was already working with Syria and Qatar. Even more conspiratorially, then-FM Bashir in September 2008 highlighed Arab fears to a visiting CODEL that the United States and the West would allow Iran to play a hegemonic role in Iraq and throughout the region in exchange for giving up its nuclear program (Ref E).
10. (S) Asked late last year whether he advocated engaging Iran or working against its interests without engagement, the King told visiting U.S. Senators that U.S. should undertake both approaches concurrently but that engagement needs to be done "smartly" by setting benchmarks for behavior (Ref F). International Affairs Director at the Royal Court Jafar Hassan on April 1 operationalized Jordan's position as follows: the U.S. must not only consult its friends in the region, but declare that it is doing so publicly as a signal to Iran that the Arabs are full parties to the U.S. policy review. He called for the U.S. and the Arabs to work together to determine what deliverables are required from Iran, what subjects are appropriate for discussion, and also to set clear redlines. (Note: Hassan said Jordan was trying to work with its friends in the region to develop a joint-Arab strategy, but that this has yet to materialize. End Note.)
11. (S) Comment: Believing the U.S. is predisposed toward engagement with Iran, Jordanian officials have avoided forthrightly rejecting such overtures, but they remain anxious that Iran will be the only one to benefit - at their expense. Given Jordanian skepticism that Iran's regional ambitions can be reined in, they probably see establishing benchmarks as a way to keep U.S.-Iranian engagement limited and short-lived. Re-engagement could trigger a review of Jordan's relationship with Iran and with Islamic groups like Hamas, with which Jordan held limited security talks last year. When asked periodically whether by engaging with Hamas, Jordan was undermining PA President Mahmoud Abbas,
official interlocutors simply pointed out that Israel meets with Hamas through Egypt, that Syria and Iran are actively engaged with Hamas, and that Jordan cannot be disengaged. End Comment.
Visit Amman's Classified Website at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman Beecroft
xSunday, 22 March 2009, 10:14
S E C R E T RIYADH 000447
NSC FOR JBRENNAN AND JDUNCAN; STATE FOR S/WCI
EO 12958 DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS PREL, PTER, KWBG, SA, AF, IN, PK, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISER BRENNAN'S MEETING WITH
SAUDI KING ABDULLAH
REF: RIYADH 427
Classified By: Pol Counselor Lisa Carle, 1.4(b),(d)
1. KEY POINTS
-- (S) Saudi King Abdullah welcomed White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan, S/WCI Ambassador Williamson, and Ambassador Fraker to his private palace March 15 for a 90-minute discussion focused on U.S. Saudi-relations, counterterrorism cooperation, the Yemeni Guantanamo Bay detainees, Iran, and Iraq.
-- (S) Brennan presented the King with a letter from President Obama expressing a personal message of friendship, appreciation for our close and collaborative relationship and concern over the disposition of Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo.
-- (S) The King said he had told Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki only minutes before that Iran should stop interfering in Arab affairs, and had given Iran a one-year deadline to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia.
-- (S) The King expressed a complete lack of trust in Iraqi PM al-Maliki and held out little hope for improved Saudi/Iraqi relations as long as al-Maliki remains in office.
-- (S) When asked what advice he had for President Obama, the King said he had "one request": that it was "critically important to restore America's credibility" in the world.
U.S. SAUDI RELATIONS
2. (S) PLEDGES OF FRIENDSHIP: Brennan asserted that the U.S./Saudi alliance must remain strong, and assured the King of President Obama's wishes for a long and healthy U.S./Saudi relationship, and the President's personal commitment that Saudi Arabia had a friend in the White House. The King replied that he appreciated the sentiments and that he had great respect for President Obama. "We (the U.S. and Saudi Arabia) spilled blood together" in Kuwait and Iraq, the King continued, and Saudi Arabia valued this tremendously. Friendship can be a difficult issue that requires work, Abdullah said, but the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have done it for 70 years over three generations. "Our disagreements don,t cut to the bone," he stated.
3. (S) U.S. CREDIBILITY IS CRITICAL: The Bush Administration is now in the past, the King said. Both President Bushes were his friends, but the recent President Bush didn,t take his advice on dealing with issues in the region, and they found their problems "compounded." The King said, "we are ready to consult, provide guidance and to do whatever is necessary. We are people of the region and we know it well." Brennan responded that President Obama wants to listen, and asked what advice the King would offer to President Obama. Abdullah said his one piece of advice was that restoring U.S. credibility in the world was critically important. Brennan responded that this was an important issue for President Obama as well. Brennan said that under President Obama we will restore our credibility. He said the U.S. is a great country and we know what we have to do.
4. (S) THE WORLD NEEDS OBAMA: Brennan said President Obama looked forward to seeing the King at the G-20 summit in London. "Thank God for bringing Obama to the presidency," the King answered, which has created "great hope" in the Muslim world. "May God grant him strength and patience, Abdullah continued, "May God protect him. I'm concerned about his personal safety. America and the world need such a president."
5. (C) THAT WITHOUT WHICH NO SAUDI MEETING IS COMPLETE: Abdullah said "as a friend" that "it was a mistake" to limit access of Saudi citizens to the U.S., since "this damages bilateral relations and the image of the U.S. in Saudi Arabia." The King noted there were 60,000 Saudi students abroad, about one third of whom were in the U.S., and "others would have gone" but for the difficulties in gaining access to the U.S. The King noted that for many years very senior Saudi officials, including Prince Saud al-Faisal, had studied in the U.S. He then noted that Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., Adel al Jubeir (who was interpreting for the King) had studied in the U.S. and was "half American" as a result. He also said he was aware of, and appreciated, Ambassador Fraker's efforts to improve the visa situation "even though there were people in Washington who fought him." Finally, he observed that anyone from Saudi Arabia who studies in the U.S. inevitably becomes a friend and advocate of the United States and that we only hurt ourselves by cutting off this flow of students.
DETAINEES
6. (S) GUANTANAMO WILL BE CLOSED: Brennan explained that President Obama had made a commitment to close Guantanamo to eliminate the potential propaganda benefits its existence provided to Al-Qaeda, but also because it was the right thing to do. Brennan reassured the King, however, that President Obama would remain strong on counterterrorism. Brennan presented the King with a letter from President Obama addressing the issue of Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo. Brennan noted that he had met with Prince Mohammed bin Nayef (MbN) the day before to discuss at length The issue of the Yemeni detainees. Brennan further stated that he would be traveling to Sanaa the next day to meet with President Saleh, as the issue of the remaining 99 Yemeni detainees still needed to be resolved. Brennan praised MbN as an outstanding counterterrorism partner, and that the MOI was doing a wonderful, courageous job in countering the terrorist threat to the Kingdom. Returning to the subject later in the conversation, Brennan warned that the U.S. feared Yemen could become another Waziristan, and urged that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia needed to work together to keep Al-Qaeda in Yemen from growing even more dangerous. The King replied that having Somalia next door to Yemen only adds to the danger. Brennan said that the capabilities of the Ministry of the Interior security forces had grown impressively over the past 10 years. Brennan added that counterterrorism and intelligence sharing cooperation between our countries had never been better and that MbN deserved the credit. In an unusual concession, made at the conclusion of their conversation, the King said, "be assured I am fully briefed on the work you are doing with Prince Mohammed bin Nayef."
7. (S) HOW TO TRACK DETAINEES: "I've just thought of something," the King added, and proposed implanting detainees with an electronic chip containing information about them and allowing their movements to be tracked with Bluetooth. This was done with horses and falcons, the King said. Brennan replied, "horses don,t have good lawyers," and that such a proposal would face legal hurdles in the U.S., but agreed that keeping track of detainees was an extremely important issue that he would review with appropriate officials when he returned to the United States.
IRAN
8. (S) A "HEATED EXCHANGE": The King noted that Iranian FM Mottaki had been "sitting in that same seat (as Brennan) a few moments ago." The King described his conversation with FM Mottaki as "a heated exchange, frankly discussing Iran's interference in Arab affairs." When challenged by the King on Iranian meddling in Hamas affairs, Mottaki apparently protested that "these are Muslims." "No, Arabs" countered the King, "You as Persians have no business meddling in Arab matters." The King said the Iranians wanted to improve relations and that he responded by giving Mottaki an ultimatum. "I will give you one year" (to improve ties), "after that, it will be the end."
9. (S) "SPARE US YOUR EVIL": The King expressed hope the U.S. would review its Iran policy and "come to the right conclusion." Brennan responded that President Obama was personally reviewing U.S. Iran policy and wanted to hear the King's thoughts. Abdullah asserted that Iran is trying to set up Hizballah-like organizations in African countries, observing that the Iranians don't think they are doing anything wrong and don't recognize their mistakes. "I said (to Mottaki) that's your problem," recounted the King. Abdullah said he would favor Rafsanjani in an Iranian election, were he to run. He described Iran not as "a neighbor one wants to see," but as "a neighbor one wants to avoid." He said the Iranians "launch missiles with the hope of putting fear in people and the world." A solution to the Arab/Israeli conflict would be a great achievement, the King said, but Iran would find other ways to cause trouble. "Iran's goal is to cause problems," he continued, "There is no doubt something unstable about them." He described Iran as "adventurous in the negative sense," and declared "May God prevent us from falling victim to their evil." Mottaki had tendered an invitation to visit Iran, but Abdullah said he replied "All I want is for you to spare us your evil." Summarizing his history with Iran, Abdullah concluded: "We have had correct relations over the years, but the bottom line is that they cannot be trusted."
10. (S) AN EMPTY CHANNEL: The King said "three years ago" Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei had sent his adviser Ali Akbar Velayati with a letter asking for Abdullah's agreement to establish a formal back channel for communication between the two leaders. Abdullah said he had agreed, and the channel was established with Velayati and Saudi FM Saud al-Faisal as the points of contact. In the years since, the King noted, the channel had never been used.
11. (S) A DANGEROUS NEIGHBORHOOD: Brennan responded that the Saudis lived in a dangerous neighborhood with Iran across the Gulf, with Saudi Arabia sharing a long border with Yemen, and with a number of other troublesome countries nearby. Brennan noted that we have a lot of work to do in the Middle East together. The King responded that the world,s attention was focused on the region. He further stated that he believed that the U.S. could help in this sensitive region, but that we should not take matters lightly. Brennan noted that President Obama is fully aware of the dangers in the region, that the U.S. knew that it had to remain involved in constructing a solution, and that we would seek the King,s counsel in dealing with the many issues in the Middle East. The King asked if that included Iran. Brennan responded that it did. Brennan said that we had our eyes wide open to Iranian ambitions, that we were not nave to the dangers Iran posed to Saudi Arabia, and that Iran could not be allowed to succeed in its destabilizing activites. Brennan observed that the President had ordered a complete review of U.S. Iran policy and made reference to a passage in the President,s letter that we needed to test Iran,s intentions to cease its destabilizing behavior and live up to its international obligations. Brennan further observed that the U.S.-Saudi partnership had to remain strong and that together, and with others, we needed to thwart Iran,s nuclear ambitions. "That is important," responded the King. Finally, Brennan said the President wanted the King to know he had a good friend in the White House who would be willing to assist in any way that he could. The King thanked Mr. Brennan, said he appreciated the sentiments, said that he had great respect for President Obama, and reflected that we had been great friends for many years and would remain friends as our disagreements were minor.
12. (U) SEE REFTEL: Ref A provided a separate readout on the Iran discussion and the King's meeting with Mottaki.
IRAQ
13. (S) IN THE HANDS OF GOD AND IRAN: Brennan expressed the importance the U.S. attaches to achieving peace and stability in Iraq. The King replied that this was "in the hands of God," though he agreed that Iraq was vitally important to both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The King also pointed out that "some say the U.S. invasion handed Iraq to Iran on a silver platter; this after we fought Saddam Hussein."
14. (S) NO HOPE FOR MALIKI: The King said he had "no confidence whatsoever in (Iraqi PM) Maliki, and the Ambassador (Fraker) is well aware of my views." The King affirmed that he had refused former President Bush's entreaties that he meet with Maliki. The King said he had met Maliki early in Maliki's term of office, and the Iraqi had given him a written list of commitments for reconciliation in Iraq, but had failed to follow through on any of them. For this reason, the King said, Maliki had no credibility. "I don,t trust this man," the King stated, "He's an Iranian agent." The King said he had told both Bush and former Vice president Cheney "how can I meet with someone I don,t trust?" Maliki has "opened the door for Iranian influence in Iraq" since taking power, the King said, and he was "not hopeful at all" for Maliki, "or I would have met with him."
AN ALERT AND ENGAGING HOST
15. (S) I MISS MY HORSES: The King appeared alert and at times animated, entertaining his guests with anecdotes about his encounters with Iranian leaders (septel), and throwing up his hands in complaint when asked if he spent time with his horses: "I see them on television when they race," he said. "I love horses," he exclaimed, "every couple of weeks I get to see them, and then I have a very calm and restful sleep."
16. (S) DIALOGUE AND REFORM AS DUTY: In response to Brennan,s praise for the King,s interfaith dialogue initiative, his commitment to advancing rights as reflected by his recent appointment of the first female (deputy education) minister, the King said "Thanks for the sentiment but I did nothing special, only what I thought was my duty. I believe we do our duty as determined by God."
17. (S) PARTICIPANTS:
Saudi Arabia -- Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud -- HRH Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, Assistant Minister of the Interior -- Ambassador to the U.S. Adel al-Jubeir (interpreter)
U.S. -- John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism -- Ambassador Ford Fraker -- Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes Issues Clint Williamson -- John Duncan, NSC Director for Counterterrorism -- Shaun Coughlin, Special Assistant, S/WCI -- Embassy control officer/notetaker
18. (U) Assistant to the President Brennan cleared this cable.
FRAKER
Wednesday, 11 February 2009, 13:03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000226
SIPDIS
Note - PII information removed from original message.
SENSITIVE
LONDON FOR GAYLE
BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD
ASHGABAT FOR INGBORN
BAKU FOR MCCRENSKY
BAGHDAD FOR BUZBEE
DUBAI FOR IRPO
EO 12958 DECL: 06/02/2019
TAGS CASC, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PREL, SCUL, SNAR, SOCI, IR,
TU, IQ
SUBJECT: ELDERLY AMERICAN SMUGGLED OUT OF IRAN
Classified By: DCM;DOUG SILLIMAN FOR REASONS 1.4(B,D)
1. (C) Summary: American citizen Hossein Ghanbarzadeh Vahedi appeared in the Ankara Consular section around noon on January 9, 2009. Mr. Vahedi, age 75, told Conoff he had paid smugglers $7500 to take him across the Iranian/Turkish border after having been held against his will in Iran for seven months. Although suffering some aches and pains, he appeared to be in good health after a harrowing three-day journey from Tehran to Ankara that included a 14-hour mountain climb on horseback in freezing temperatures. Embassy staff provided immediate consular assistance and worked with Turkish authorities to prevent his deportation back to Iran. Consular officers escorted Vahedi to the Ankara airport where he departed on January 13. End summary.
----------
Background
----------
2. (SBU) On January, 7, Embassy Bern alerted posts in the region that American citizen Hossein Ghanbarzadeh Vahedi, DPOB xx/xx/1933 was trying to escape from Iran and could possibly surface in Iraq. Vahedi, a dentist from Los Angeles, instead appeared at the Ankara Consular Section around noon on January 9, 2009. Although visibly shaken,Vahedi said he had no major physical problems, but he did break down a few times when explaining his ordeal. He told Conoff that he had enough medication and declined local medical attention preferring to wait until he was back in the United States.
3. (SBU) Vahedi has been a resident, then citizen of the United States since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Aside from this trip, he has only returned to Iran once about ten years ago and did not encounter any problems on that visit. At his wife's urging to visit his parents' gravesite in Iran, he traveled to Tehran in early May 2008 where he spent four weeks with family and friends without incident. However, after clearing customs at Tehran airport on June 6, he heard his name called on the public address system with instructions to report to a separate office. At this office, GOI authorities confiscated his passport and told him he would not be leaving Iran. When Vahedi pressed as to the reason, he was dismissed with instructions to follow-up at the Islamic Revolution Court.
------------------------
Seven-Month House Arrest
------------------------
4. (SBU) Thus began a seven-month ordeal in which Vahedi appeared almost daily at the court to request that his passport be returned. During this de facto house arrest, Vahedi did contact Elizabeth Bucher, the Deputy Head of the Foreign Interest Section at the Embassy of Switzerland in Tehran. He reported that Ms. Bucher was very kind and helped him get his heart medications, but was unable to help him depart the country. He lived with friends and relatives staying only a few days with each to avoid them being implicated in his problems.
5. (SBU) Vahedi believed his passport was confiscated for two reasons, the first being simple extortion. It was made clear to him informally by the authorities at the court that if he paid a $150,000 fine the process would move more quickly. Secondly, he was told by GOI officials that he should use his influence to pressure his American citizen sons to terminate one of their business ventures. Vahedi's sons are the owners of Concertino Productions, a Los Angeles-based entertainment company that promotes, among other things, the popular Persian pop singers Kamran and Hooman. In addition to American performances, the duet has performed in Dubai and other middle-eastern venues. According to Vahedi, while the singers are simply Persian pop singers, they have gotten crowds riled up with occasional anti-regime rhetoric. Also included in these performances are female dancers whose costumes would not raise an eyebrow in most countries, but are perceived as immoral by the conservative elements inside Iran.
6. (SBU) Vahedi did not trust that paying the fine would expedite the return of his passport unless he also convinced his sons to cancel the next Dubai performance of Kamran and Hooman. Vahedi spoke of a third party who was pulling the strings within the Iranian government, particularly in regard to his son' business. He repeatedly told the officials of the Islamic Revolution Court that his children had lived in America all of their lives and as such he exerted no control over their strong, typically American independent behavior.
---------------
No Empty Spoons
---------------
7. (C) Vahedi spoke bitterly about his former country, especially its lack of a fair judicial system and widespread corruption. He told Conoff that all government employees receive free sugar, rice, and cooking oil to ensure their loyalty to the regime. He also said anyone with any authority lives by the "why should I put an empty spoon into my mouth" philosophy. Vahedi reported that regime spies were omnipresent including taxi drivers, hotel clerks, and restaurant workers. He also said it was common knowledge that all new Iranian-made cars had a "Khamenei tax" in the amount of $3100 that was earmarked for a fund for South Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria. At his daily appearances at the court, he came to know the intimate details of the lives of many of the other visitors, some of whom told Vahedi they had no idea where their loved ones were, or if they were even alive. Vahedi also helped one woman whose drug-addicted husband was incarcerated by paying her rent for the months he was there. Vahedi reported seeing Iranian citizens watch helplessly as their family members were hauled off in shackles without any official charges levied against them.
-----------------------
Picking the Best Option
-----------------------
8. (C) Vahedi realized that this situation was not going to change and alluded to people who knew of his situation from his daily appearances at the court approaching him with departure options. Vahedi said he studied the four most common illegally used routes out of Iran. The first was crossing as a stowaway on a merchant ship across the Persian Gulf into the UAE. Vahedi dismissed this plan because he thought the heavy shipping traffic was too dangerous and they risked being boarded by the Iranian Navy who were patrolling the area. The second option was overland through Baluchistan but Vahedi could not obtain enough facts about the execution of that plan to seriously consider that route. The third choice was to enter Iraq heading to Karbala and try to make contact with a member of the American military stationed there. Vahedi seriously considered this option, but feared being discovered by the Iraqis before he could make contact with an American soldier. XXXXXXXXXXXX
9. (SBU) In spite of temperatures hovering around zero degrees Fahrenheit, Vahedi chose the early part of January because it coincided with the Shia commemoration of Ashura and he thought it likely the police would be more preoccupied. In the weeks prior to his departure, this 75-year old man trained for strength and altitude by climbing in the hills north of Tehran. To protect his family and friends from retribution by the GOI after his absence was noted, he spoke to none of them of his escape plans. On January 7 Vahedi boarded a bus XXXXXXXXXXXX
-----------------
Over the Mountain
-----------------
10. (C) The two escorts were paid $5000 at the beginning of the journey and the three set out as soon as it was dark. For all his planning, Vahedi did not have clothing appropriate for the weather and had a very difficult time with the cold. At one point XXXXXXXXXXXX, the escorts had to physically hug him to keep him warm. As an inexperienced rider hours into the climb Vahedi lost his concentration and fell off the horse tumbling into the woods. He told Conoff that at this point, he really believed he was going to die by freezing to death on a mountainside. However, his only partially-paid escorts came to his aid and put him back on the horse. Although he had thought he would be able to walk part way, the altitude proved too much for him and his only choice was to remain on the horse. Vahedi said that he believes they were following known dug smuggling routes, evidenced by the way the horse knew exactly which way to turn. Vahedi said the horse often led the escorts, even going off the normal path in what seemed to be the wrong direction. Knowing that he escorts could also be trying to smuggle drugs on this trip, he covertly went through the one pack they had thrown on the horse and said he found nothing.
11. (SBU) Once over the Turkish border they were met on schedule by a man Vahedi described as about 25 years old. During the handover, Vahedi paid out another $2500 but was unsure how the three escorts split that payment. The Turkish escort then brought Vahedi into a home where he was fed and given time to rest and warm up. In the early evening he was driven to and waited there at the bus station for the 0200 bus to Ankara. Vahedi said he maintained a very low profile and did not talk to anyone during the 10-hour bus trip. He arrived at the Consular section around noon on Friday, January 9.
--------------------
Deportation Conflict
--------------------
12. (C) As Vahedi had entered Turkey illegally, Conoff worked with GOT officials to ensure his deportation back to America. Initially the Chief of the Foreigner's police within the Ministry of Interior in Ankara told Conoff that because "we knew Vahedi was coming" he intended to deport him back to Iran. Post is aware that Iranian and Iraqi citizens have been deported back to those countries in a fairly brutal manner. According to UNHCR some have been taken by bus in the middle of the night to the southern Turkish border and released. Police have then allegedly shot into the air forcing the deportees to run across the border into Iraq or Iran with no food or water to sustain them.
(13) (C) Post contacted Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, who subsequently exerted pressure on the Ministry of Interior to allow this 75-year old American citizen to be deported back to the United States. Consular staff assured his security during the four days it took to work through the departure arrangements and accompanied him through the police and court proceedings and finally onward to the airport. Vahedi told Conoff he had never done anything illegal in his life and that he was ashamed to be seen in policy custody. Vahedi departed Turkey at 4:00 p.m. on January 13.
-------
Comment
-------
14. (C) The problems Vahedi faced as a result of entering Turkey illegally highlights the tough stand this government takes on illegal entry. This is particularly true with Iranian and Iraqi nationals, even those who may also carry American citizenship. Ensuring Vahedi's return to the United States, vice deportation to Iran required the intervention of the embassy's front office.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
Jeffrey
Monday, 09 February 2009, 16:10
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 000231
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
EO 12958 DECL: 02/09/2019
TAGS PREL, KPAL, EG, IS, QA, IR, SY
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR REQUESTED EGYPTIAN FM ABOUL GHEIT
MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
-------
Summary
-------
1. (S/NF) Madame Secretary, Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit has been looking forward to meeting you since your nomination was first announced. The Egyptian leadership, including President Mubarak, are encouraged by the Administration's immediate attention to the Middle East and your and the President's early outreach to them. Overall, the Egyptians believe they did not receive fair treatment from the previous Administration and hope to see improvements. Aboul Gheit likely will explain Egypt's "soft power"--its ability to influence regional events without benefit of deep pockets. He likely will focus more on the strategic challenges of the region--the peace process and Iran--but may also address some pending bilateral matters. He may ask for your support for Egypt to be part of an expanded G8 or G20 and press the candidacy of Egyptian Culture Minister Farouq Hosny for Director General of UNESCO. He may not raise human rights (specifically Ayman Nour), political reform, or democratization; but you should. Aboul Gheit will want to discuss Gaza, including smuggling and counter-tunneling; Iran; and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. On Iraq and counter-terrorism, we and the Egyptians see largely eye-to-eye; intelligence cooperation is close and effective; and our military-to-military relationship is durable but stuck in a force-on-force mindset.
2. (S/NF) Summary continued: Aboul Gheit is smart, urbane, with a tendency to lecture and to avoid discussing Egyptian failings with all-purpose recourse to Egyptian sovereign pride. However, because this is his first meeting with you and it is in Washington, he may be more inclined to listen. You should thank him for Egypt's continuing regional leadership, in particular regarding their efforts to bring about a ceasefire in Gaza, and press him for Egypt to continue to use their influence and good offices to achieve a permanent solution to intra-Palestinian infighting and conflict. You should also stress the need for Egypt to more effectively insure that Hamas cannot rearm via smuggling across -- or tunneling under -- the border with Gaza. Aboul Gheit will press for your attendance at the March 2 Gaza Donors Conference in Cairo, and may complain about unhelpful Qatari and Syrian behavior. He will also want to explore US intentions towards Iran; President Mubarak told Senator Mitchell during his recent visit here that he did not oppose our talking with the Iranians, as long as "you don't believe a word they say." End summary.
------------------------
Respect and Appreciation
------------------------
3. (S/NF) In terms of regional affairs, Special Middle East Envoy Senator George Mitchell struck the right chord during his recent visit to Cairo when he told President Mubarak that he was here to "listen and hear your advice." The Egyptians have long felt that, at best, we take them for granted; and at worst, we deliberately ignore their advice while trying to force our point of view on them. You may wish to thank Aboul Gheit for the vital role Egypt played in bringing about a ceasefire in Gaza, and its efforts at making it last. You should ask him what the current state of play is between Hamas and Fatah and have him describe Egypt's vision of the future for the Palestinians, both among their factions, and vis a vis Israel. Note: Although the Egyptians will react well to overtures of respect and appreciation, Egypt is very often a stubborn and recalcitrant ally. In addition, Egypt's self-perception as the "indispensable Arab state" is contingent on Egyptian effectiveness on regional issues, including Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq.
-----------------------------------------
Egypt and the Israel-Palestinian Conflict
-----------------------------------------
4. (S/NF) Although Aboul Gheit was never enthusiastic about the Annapolis Peace process, resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the primary strategic political goal for the Egyptians. They are proud of their role as intermediary, well aware that they are perhaps the only player that can talk with us, the Israelis, and all Palestinian factions. Mubarak hates Hamas, and considers them the same as Egypt's own Muslim Brotherhood, which he sees as his own most dangerous political threat. Since the
CAIRO 00000231 002 OF 004
June 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza, the Egyptians, under the leadership of intelligence chief Omar Soliman (the de facto national security advisor with direct responsibility for the Israeli-Palestinian account) have shifted their focus to intra-Palestinian reconciliation and establishment of the Hamas-Israel ceasefire. Soliman brokered a half-year-long truce last year, which Hamas broke in December, leading to the Israeli invasion of Gaza. He has recently re-started those efforts, with the goal of getting Hamas to agree to a year-long ceasefire, which should give the Egyptians space to bring about their political goal of Palestinian reconciliation under a technocratic, non-partisan government headed by President Mahmoud Abbas.
----------------
Gaza and Tunnels
----------------
5. (S/NF) Smuggling through the Sinai Peninsula and into Gaza is an old and complicated problem for Egypt. Egypt views a well-armed and powerful Hamas as a national security threat, a point driven home in dramatic fashion by the January 2008 border breach when Hamas bulldozed the old border fence and more than half a million Palestinians poured into Egypt, unchecked and hungry. Since the closure of the Egypt-Gaza border following the June 2007 Gaza takeover by Hamas, most smuggling of consumer goods and weapons has gone underground. The narrow corridor between Egypt and Gaza is as honey-combed with subterranean passageways as a gigantic ant colony.
6. (S/NF) Although it is not directly in Aboul Gheit's bailiwick, belonging more to the security and intelligence forces, nonetheless the issue of tunnels and rearming Hamas is the subject of intense scrutiny (by Israel and the Congress), and sensitivity (by the Egyptians). Long criticized by Israel for "not doing enough" to halt arms smuggling via tunnels, the Egyptians have stopped complaining and started acting. Egypt has increased efforts to counter arms smuggling by accelerating its $23 million FMF-funded tunnel detection program along the Egypt-Gaza border and requesting U.S. support to purchase four backscatter X-Ray machines to scan vehicles entering the Sinai for weapons and explosives (note Aboul Ghait may not be of this EGIS-originated request). Egypt also continues to cooperate with Israel, especially via intelligence sharing, to prevent militants from Hamas and other extremist organizations from crossing the Gaza border, and on thwarting militant activity in Egypt. Egyptian efforts are all justified under President Mubarak's pledge that Egypt with "protect its borders."
7. (S/NF) Egypt will not take any action that could be perceived as collaboration in Israel's siege of Gaza, and they have been hyper-sensitive to any suggestion that foreigners are assisting them or overseeing their efforts to counter smuggling. Aboul Gheit publicly distanced Egypt from our January MOU with Israel to combat arms smuggling into Gaza, although he knew about it in advance and consulted with Secretary Rice and me about its contents. The Egyptians do not want to be stuck holding the Gaza bag, and must be able to point the finger of blame at Israel for the plight of the Palestinians. At the same time, Egypt has withstood scathing and widespread criticism in the Arab world for refusing to open the Rafah border crossing to supply Gaza. Even during the height of the December fighting, the Egyptians only sent medicine and medical supplies through the Rafah border; all other humanitarian goods went through the Israeli crossing at Kerem Shalom. They likewise insist that Rafah will only reopen to handle Gazan travellers when the Gazan side is under PA control with EU observers according to the 2005 AMA.
8. (S/NF) Ultimately, Egypt believes that the only realistic and viable solution to erode Hamas' power and stop arms smuggling is the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza and the opening of Gaza's border to legitimate trade. While in the short term we can best assist the Egyptians with technical know-how and training, long term counter smuggling success will depend on reducing the financial incentives to smuggling by providing the Sinai Bedouin with legitimate economic opportunities and by regularly opening the Gaza borders to trade, thereby reducing economic incentives to smuggle.
----------------------------------
The March 2 Gaza Donors Conference
----------------------------------
9. (S/NF) President Mubarak told Senator Mitchell that he
CAIRO 00000231 003 OF 004
wanted to personally invite you to the March 2 Gaza Donors Conference in Cairo. Aboul Gheit will press hard for you to accept this invitation. He is keen to keep up the momentum on Gaza reconstruction and for Egypt to be seen as taking the lead in helping the Palestinians. It is very important to him that this conference be at the ministerial level, and he will be disappointed if you are unable to accept.
-------------
Iraq and Iran
-------------
10. (S/NF) President Mubarak enjoys recounting for visiting members of Congress how he warned former President Bush against invading Iraq, ending with, "I told you so!" and a wag of his finger. In addition, there are Egyptian misgivings about Nuri Al-Maliki and Shia majority rule in Iraq. Egypt therefore will need additional prodding to continue to take steps to help rehabilitate Iraq into the greater Arab world. You should ask Aboul Gheit when he plans to fully open the Egyptian embassy in Baghdad and exchange accredited ambassadors with Iraq (the first Egyptian ambassador to post-Saddam Iraq was assassinated). As for Iran, Mubarak has a visceral hatred for the Islamic Republic, referring repeatedly to Iranians as "liars," and denouncing them for seeking to destabilize Egypt and the region. He sees the Syrians and Qataris as sycophants to Tehran and liars themselves. There is no doubt that Egypt sees Iran and its greatest long-term threat, both as it develops a nuclear capability and as it seeks to export its "Shia revolution." Nonetheless, Mubarak told Mitchell pointedly that he did not oppose the U.S. speaking to the Iranians, as long as we did not "believe a single word they say." Aboul Gheit will be keen to hear your description of U.S. intentions towards Iran. In his conversation with Senator Mitchell, Aboul Gheit carefully noting he was speaking personally, expressed more interest into bringing the Syrians into negotiations again; President Mubarak was not enthusiastic about dealing with the Syrians at this time.
------------------------
U.S. Assistance to Egypt
------------------------
11. (S/NF) The greatest Egyptian outrage a year ago -- Congressional conditioning of $100 million of U.S. assistance to Egypt -- may now be moot, according to our latest understanding of the state of play with the FY2009 appropriations language. Beyond the issue of conditioning, the Egyptians resent the U.S. unilateral decision to cut ESF in half, from $415 million in FY-08 to $200 million in FY-09, a level which the Egyptians find embarrassing, not because they need the money (they say), but because it shows our diminished view of the value of our relationship. In my view, it is important to the U.S. to continue an ESF program aimed at health, education, and poverty eradication to demonstrate concern for the Egyptian people as opposed to a strictly military assistance program. Egypt has also been unhappy with the use of these funds to support democracy in Egypt. It would be useful if you could urge that Egypt accept the FY 2009 levels so that we can proceed to program funds to benefit Egypt, while promising to engage in a serious review of the conflicts that exist and a desire to resolve them as soon as possible.
12. (S/NF) Concerning military assistance, the Egyptian political and military leadership feel that they have been "short changed" by our holding to an FMF level of $1.3 billion, (the same level for 30 years despite inflation), and which they contrast with increases to our military assistance to Israel. Finally, Egypt seeks a higher profile in international financial circles (Finance Minister Youssef Boutros Ghali was recently named Chairman of the IMF's policy-setting committee, the IMFC, the first from a developing country), and Aboul Gheit is likely to ask for your support to include Egypt in expanded G8 and G20 fora.
---------------------------------
Ayman Nour and Saad Eddin Ibrahim
---------------------------------
13. (S/NF) Egypt's political leadership considers our public chastisement of their treatment of jailed former opposition Al Ghad party leader Ayman Nour as interfering with internal affairs and infringement on national sovereignty. Mubarak takes this issue personally, and it makes him seethe when we raise it, particularly in public. Aboul Gheit's view is that we have made Ayman Nour a freedom martyr, and a damaging (and
CAIRO 00000231 004 OF 004
distorting) prism through which we view our relationship with Egypt. Much the same can be said about Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the outspoken political science professor and democracy activist who is in self-imposed exile in the U.S. because of spurious law suits brought against him for allegedly defaming Egypt. In a negative development in late January, Egypt,s Attorney General-equivalent took action to advance the only criminal case pending against Ibrahim. You should press Aboul Gheit hard on Nour and Ibrahim, and also urge the GOE to stop arresting other less prominent political activists. Nour's health is bad and he has served more than half his sentence; he deserves a humanitarian pardon. You may wish to lay down a marker for a future discussion on democratization and human rights concerns. You might note that although you and the President want to improve the relationship, Egypt could take some steps to remove these very volatile issues from the agenda.
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Farouq Hosny
------------
13. (S/NF) Egypt has mounted a full-scale international campaign to support the candidacy of Culture Minister Farouq Hosny for Director General of UNESCO. The Arab League and the African Union have already publicly stated their commitment to Hosny, and the Egyptians believe they also have the support of several Europeans, notably the French. Aboul Gheit will also seek US support -- or, at least, not to actively oppose -- the candidacy of Farouq Hosny as the next Director General of UNESCO. The U.S. informed him last year that we could not support the candidacy and urged Egypt to put forward another name. Abould Gheit will argue Hosny's merits for facing down the Islamic extremists who want to narrow the space in Egypt for artistic expression. U.S. objections have been to statements Hosny has made that "Israel had no culture. . .it stole cultural ideas from others and claimed them as its own" and other objectionable remarks. If we plan to derail the Hosny candidacy, we must provide a credible alternate, preferably an Arab and/or Muslim. SCOBEY
Wednesday, 24 December 2008, 21:58
S E C R E T STATE 134490
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/23/2018
TAGS ETTC, MASS, OPDC, PARM, PREL, AM,
SUBJECT: (S) LETTER FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE
REGARDING 2003 ARMENIAN ARMS PROCUREMENT FOR IRAN
REFS: A. YEREVAN 657, B. State 97802
Classified By: EUR/FO DAS Garber, Reasons 1.4 (b), (c), and (d).
1. (U) Please deliver the following letter from Deputy Secretary Negroponte. There will be no signed original. Embassy should also propose discussions with the Government of Armenia in coming weeks. Suggested dates and team composition will be provided septel. Embassy Yerevan is requested to report response.
2. (Secret/Rel Armenia) Begin Letter:
Dear Mr. President:
We value our positive relationship with your government, as we explore a range of shared interests, especially an agreement on Nagorno Karabakh and normalization of Armenia's relations with Turkey. At the same time, we are dismayed by a serious and, indeed, deadly - arms re-export case.
Secretary Rice, Assistant Secretary Fried, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza, and Ambassador Yovanovitch have raised with you our deep concerns about Armenia's transfer of arms to Iran which resulted in the death and injury of U.S. soldiers in Iraq. Notwithstanding the close relationship between our countries, neither the Administration nor the U.S. Congress can overlook this case. By law, the transfer of these weapons requires us to consider whether there is a basis for the imposition of U.S. sanctions. If sanctions are imposed, penalties could include the cutoff of U.S. assistance and certain export restrictions.
To avoid such sanctions, it is essential that you present compelling evidence that your government is now in partnership with us to ensure such transfers do not occur in the future.
To convince the United States that this will not happen again, we seek a written agreement from Armenia, memorializing its intent to implement measures that will prevent Armenia from becoming a source of weapons for Iran or other states or groups involved with terrorism and/or weapons proliferation. Such measures include:
-- Reform the Armenian Export Control Commission so its members are full time employees who exclusively work on export controls;
-- Establish, at each point of entry into Armenia, Armenian teams dedicated to detecting and interdicting dual-use commodities and other contraband;
-- Periodically accept unannounced visits by U.S. experts to assess the work of the teams;
-- Harmonize Armenia's export control legislation with that of the EU;
-- Update and make public Armenian export control lists, incorporating the control lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime, and other international control regimes;
-- Ensure that Armenian-based brokers do not facilitate arms related transfers; and
-- Consult with the United States on transfers to countries that are not member states of NATO or the EU, or participating states of the Wassenaar Arrangement.
We are prepared to send a team as early as possible in the New Year to discuss this proposal further. It is my hope that we can work together to forge a positive outcome which provides your government the opportunity to strengthen Armenia's export controls and for my government to assist you in this effort.
Sincerely, John D. Negroponte
End text of letter.
3. (S) Background: In 2003, Armenia facilitated Iran's purchase of rockets and machine guns. In 2007, some of these weapons were recovered from two Shia militant attacks in which a United States soldier was killed and six others were injured in Iraq. The Secretary discussed our concerns with President Sargsian on the margins of the UN General Assembly, but he denied any transfer occurred. The direct role of high-level Armenian officials and the link of the weapons to an attack on U.S. forces make this case unique and highly troubling. These transfers may provide a basis for sanctions pursuant to U.S. legal authorities. We propose a series of steps that Armenia will need to take to prevent future transfers, which will be weighed in the consideration of sanctions. We hope to use the threat of sanctions as a tool to generate Armenian responsiveness so that we will not be forced to impose sanctions measures.
4. (S) The Deputy Secretary is writing to President Sargsian and indicating that a team will be sent to Armenia to seek written agreement that Armenia will take steps to ensure that it does not become a source of weapons for Iran or other states or groups of concern. The team will also present additional information that will make clear why the United States is convinced that the transfers happened and make it unreasonable for Sargsian to continue his denials. We anticipate that the team will travel to Yerevan in the coming weeks, to provide sufficient time for the incoming Administration to be briefed on the situation.
5. (S) Objective: Our objective is to prevent Armenia from becoming a source of weapons for Iran or other states or groups of concern, without derailing a possible Nagorno-Karabakh settlement. Embassy Yerevan should seek to convey the seriousness with which the United States views this issue and emphasize that the transfer of arms to Iran and subsequently to terrorists in Iraq, in particular transfers that resulted in the death of an American serviceman, cannot be overlooked by the United States.
6. (U) Please contact EUR/PRA Matt Hardiman and ISN/CATR Margaret Mitchell with any questions or follow-up issues related to this case and slug any reporting on this issue for ISN and EUR. RICE
Wednesday, 10 December 2008, 08:10
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 002760
SIPDIS
TREASURY FOR LEVEY, S.
ATHENS FOR PURCELL, A.
EO 12958 DECL: 12/10/2018
TAGS KTFN, EFIN, ECON, KWBG, IR, IS
SUBJECT: U/S LEVEY REASSURES GOI THAT NO MOMENTUM WILL BE
LOST IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERROR FINANCE
Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
1.(S) In a visit to Israel on 16-17 November, Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Stuart A. Levey, reassured GOI officials that no momentum would be lost in USG efforts to combat terrorist financing or to pressure Iran during the transition to a new US administration in January. In meetings with Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, Mossad Director Meir Dagan, National Security Council Chairman Dani Arditi, and others, U/S Levey emphasized recent U.S. designations against the Union of Good, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), and the recent revocation of Iran's "U-Turn" license. In response to GOI officials' pressure to have the U.S. designate the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), Levey underscored the importance of international, multilateral concurrence for such an effort to be a success.
2.(S) Israeli officials were keen to outline an "escalation" in CBI programs that they believed pose a danger to the international financial system. Several key Israeli officials identified Reza Raei, Vice Governor of the CBI, as a key figure in masterminding new ways to help the Iranian commercial and banking sectors circumvent sanctions. Levey promised to continue pushing the Gulf states on adopting stronger regulation until the last day of his appointment.
3.(S) Mossad Chief Meir Dagan informed Levey that sanctions were beginning to have a negative effect on Iran's regime. NSC Chairman Arditi also told him that the PA was performing well in its renewed fight against terror finance in the West Bank. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- -----
GOI CONCERNED ABOUT COUNTER TERROR FINANCE POLICY CONTINUITY
--------------------------------------------- -----
4.(S) National Security Council (NCS) Chairman, Dani Arditi, in a November 16 meeting with U/S Stuart Levey, asked whether Levey thought his efforts would continue into the next U.S. administration. Even though he said he planned to resign as required in January, Levey told Arditi that he believed the Obama team would be committed to continuing the ambitious program against terrorism finance that he has shepherded over the last several years. Saying counter- terrorism finance was not a partisan issue in the U.S., Levey subsequently confirmed these sentiments to Foreign Minister (FM) Tzipi Livni and Mossad Director Meir Dagan in separate meetings that occurred on the following day, November 17.
----------------------
IRAN/NON-PROLIFERATION
----------------------
5.(S) On November 16, Levey outlined for Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar, and Senior Deputy Director General Yossi Gal positive developments in the Iran effort. He told them that Treasury had been very successful in curtailing business with Iran by most "major players". Levey said that expanding the non-proliferation strategy into insurance, and putting pressure on Iran's oil refining capacity and Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) industry were next steps being pursued. He also reported that the recent IRISL designation has been unusually effective.
CBI's Reza Raei Masterminds New Methods
---------------------------------------
6.(S) During their November 16 meeting, Arditi told Levey that the Israeli intelligence community has continued to see an escalation in CBI efforts to help designated Iranian commercial banks circumvent international and U.S. sanctions. The NSC Chairman presented several recent examples of CBI behavior that he characterized as unusual for a central bank. Arditi identified Reza Raei, Vice Governor of the CBI for Foreign Exchange Affairs, as the mastermind of these new
TEL AVIV 00002760 002 OF 004
efforts.
7.(S) Meir Dagan subsequently told Levey that the CBI had engineered a way for the UN-designated Iranian bank Sepah to conduct foreign business transactions through use of the Iranian Postal Bank. Bank Melli, a USG-designated bank, had also purchased shares in investment funds as a way to escape the effects of the sanctions, according to Dagan. Using these methods, Melli and Sepah have been able to fabricate a method of providing correspondent-like banking services to designated Iranian banks that find it increasingly difficult to deal in foreign currency. Arditi named the "Persia Equity Fund" as one such financial instrument being used by Melli. Levey commented that any such investment fund or financial instrument could be listed as a derivative designation of Melli if enough evidence could be shown linking the two organizations. Levey told Meir Dagan that he was in favor of pursuing a designation of Raei if GOI allegations were accurate.
No International Support for Designation of the CBI
--------------------------------------------- ------
8.(S) Arditi and subsequently, Dagan, asked Levey whether the USG was considering a designation of the CBI. Although Treasury had looked into the possibility, said Levey, a designation of the CBI would be ineffective without a multilateral effort. International support for such an effort simply did not yet exist, Levey explained. He told Dagan that we need to build support by sharing info about the CBI's illicit conduct, similar to the support we built for cutting off the U-turn license. Levey said that it would be better to focus on limiting other central and commercial banks' business with the CBI. Noting that the banking industry relies heavily on reputation, Levey told Arditi that the right strategy is to continue exposing the illicit activities of Iranian banks and banking officials.
European Banks' Business with Iran
----------------------------------
9.(S) MFA interlocutors revisited the progress of European banks in non-proliferation efforts. In a November 16 meeting with Yossi Gal, Senior Deputy Director General, and Alon Bar, Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs, Gal raised concerns that Italy and Germany were falling short in their commitment to enforce sanctions within their banking sectors. Gal told Levey that the MFA was planning a visit to Italy in December, but was unsure whether its attempt to persuade the politicians would filter down to action within the bureaucracy. Gal expressed the same concern about the banking sector in Germany, saying that resistance from the bureaucracy and the private sector often undermined attempts by political figures to improve German regulation. Bar and Gal encouraged Levey to join the GOI in pressing the governments and banking sectors of Germany and Italy to do more.
Cautious Optimism on Gulf States
--------------------------------
10.(S) On the status of UAE efforts to stem Iranian finance, Levey told Gal and Bar that he was optimistic about the country's efforts. Among other examples, he mentioned that the UAE had decreased the number of visas it was issuing to Iranian nationals and that Emirati ministers were receptive to his requests for increased banking regulation.
11.(S) FM Livni told Levey that Israel continues to encourage the Gulf states to more publicly outline their actions against Iranian finance within their banking sectors despite the countries' reasons for keeping such actions secretive. She asked Levey to join in this effort. Levey affirmed that the USG was encouraging sanctions in all sectors and posited that the Iranians were beginning to feel the pressure. Livni asked if the declining price of oil was becoming leverage in the efforts to thwart Iranian financial efforts. Levey said that it was and that the Iranian private sector was becoming more vocal in its criticisms of the government.
12.(S) Levey outlined for his GOI interlocutors recent
TEL AVIV 00002760 003 OF 004
efforts by Treasury to broaden its sanctioning of Iran to the shipping, insurance, and reinsurance industries. He cited the designation of IRISL as a positive first step and mentioned that Treasury had found willing partners in Europe and the UK to further efforts in this area.
Effect of Sanctions on Iran
---------------------------
13.(S) Dagan told Levey that the economic problems Iran is experiencing as a result of sanctions are encouraging debate within the regime. He said that in order to preserve the revolution, some key figures have begun to consider the need for change. The pressure is on, Dagan said, but he could not estimate when Iran would hit the brink. He noted that the lower cost of oil at the moment would likely prompt Iran to increase its production, thereby encouraging more business through the CBI. With oil prices low everywhere, however, Dagan and Levey agreed that Iran was a less attractive place for investment. Levey told Dagan that the present low oil prices provide a critical opportunity to convince other members of the international community to apply more pressure.
14.(S) Livni asked Levey if there was a risk of Iran regaining a foothold in certain markets as a result of the world financial crisis. Levey said that the market turmoil has worked to the USG's advantage: the crisis has made financial institutions even more risk-averse, thereby lessening Iran's attractiveness even further. Additionally, while Iran's banks are isolated, its economy is not.
U.S. Engagement with Iran
-------------------------
15.(S) FM Livni asked Levey during their November 17 meeting why the USG was considering a rapprochement with Iran through a U.S. Interests section in Tehran. She questioned whether the tactic would have a net positive outcome when measured against the negative perceptions such a move would be bound to create. Levey told Livni that this was a question better posed to the State Department, but that her concern was the central issue being debated by policy makers in Washington. In Levey's previous meeting with MFA officials Bar and Gal, he said that engagement with Iran would not work without leverage, indicating that sanctions would need to be in place no matter what the USG decides to do.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
STEMMING PALESTINIAN TERROR FINANCE: GOI PLEASED WITH PA'S PROGRESS
--------------------------------------------- -------------
16.(S) Levey told Arditi that Treasury's recent designation of the "Union of Good" was proof of the USG's commitment to continue to work against Hamas and Palestinian terrorists. Levey said, however, that while the USG supported efforts at thwarting terrorism in the territories, the USG wished to keep humanitarian goods flowing to the needy within the population.
17.(S) Arditi told Levey that Palestinian Authority (PA) efforts at stemming terrorism within the territories were going quite well. He said the PA's positive efforts "surprised" his staff and that he "never thought" the PA would do so well. Levey said that Treasury coordinated with Prime Minister Fayyad on the Union of Good designation and was pleased to hear that PA efforts were held in high regard by the GOI.
18.(S) When Levey inquired about efforts to prevent correspondent banking relations in Gaza from being severed, Arditi said that the Postal Bank "was on the agenda". Arditi lamented that the services provided by the Postal Bank would not be as good because of its small size and limited capacity. He expressed his hope that the central bank governor would be able to delay the commercial banks' decision to end their relationship with the Palestinians until a permanent solution was ensured.
19.(S) This cable has been cleared by Under Secretary Stuart
TEL AVIV 00002760 004 OF 004
Levey.
********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** CUNNINGHAM
Thursday, 23 October 2008, 09:20
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000049
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/23/2018
TAGS PINR, PINS, PGOV, PREL, IR, IZ, ZP
SUBJECT: [SOURCE REMOVED] OUTLINES IRC'S
AUXILIARY ROLE [DETAILS REMOVED] IRGC, MOIS
DUBAI 00000049 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, DOS. REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (c), (d)
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 18.
2. (S) Summary and Background: IRPO officer met with [SOURCE REMOVED] on October 15 and 20, 2008 to discuss [DETAILS REMOVED] his knowledge [DETAILS REMOVED] Iran's Ministy of Information and Security (MOIS) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). [NAME REMOVED] stated that, in addition to its standard relief role, the IRC has [DETAILS REMOVED]President Ahmadi-Nejad's election in 2005 ultimately infused the IRC with a more hardline leadership. [DETAILS REMOVED]
---------------------------------
4. (C) During the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, [NAME REMOVED] stated Iran's military used ICR cover to enter Iraq and inspect Iranian prisoners of war held in Iraq. Subsequently, in the Balkan war, the IRC provided cover to intelligence agents, [DETAILS REMOVED]
-----------------------------------------
5. (S) [DETAILS REMOVED] With the war underway, [NAME REMOVED] says the number of Qods officers seeking IRC cover increased and was between ten and 30. [DETAILS REMOVED] The only actual IRC officers in Iraq were the [DETAILS REMOVED].
6. (S) [DETAILS REMOVED] knew none of the purported IRC members, and concluded that they were not legitimate IRC relief workers and alleged that someone else must have been signing their professional certificates. [NAME REMOVED] recalled being told that IRC identification cards had become more important after US forces had detained Iranian officers carrying IRGC identification cards.
7. [DETAILS REMOVED]
Ahmadi-Nejad's Election and the IRC
-----------------------------------
8. (S) Per the IRC's regulations, following his election in 2005, President Ahmadi-Nejad was able to appoint four members (out of 16) of the IRC management group. These four [NAMES REMOVED] were opposed to the IRC's leadership and eventually requested its president, Dr. Ahmad Ali Noorbala, to resign. [DETAILS REMOVED] He did so in January 2006 [DETAILS REMOVED] Most of the incoming managers were members of the IRGC or the MOIS. [NAME REMOVED] said that pre-existing members now considered the IRC an agent of the IRGC.
9. (S) [NAME REMOVED] further elaborated on the presence of MOIS officials in the IRC and other government agencies. All government agencies include an MOIS representative [DETAILS REMOVED] [NAME REMOVED] Prior to Ahmadi-Nejad, the IRC official in this position was the sole MOIS representative; afterwards, [NAME REMOVED] said 40 officers at headquarters and 100 officers at the provincial officers came from the MOIS.
10. (S) [DETAILS REMOVED] in line with Ahmadinejad's government-wide directive, that all employees pass a counterintelligence course. [NAME REMOVED] indicated that such a course violated the principles of the IRC because Red Cross/Red Crescent organizations are supposed to be independent from the state.
11. (S) In addition to the personnel moves, [DETAILS REMOVED] The IRC under Dr. Noorbala had resisted the IRGC's request to take responsibility for relief and rescue operations. [DETAILS REMOVED] the IRGC's Basij forces to assume responsibility for relief and rescue. [DETAILS REMOVED]
12.(S) In 2007, the IRC's budget was granted an additional $200 million to acquire helicopters. The IRC, [DETAILS REMOVED] ordered 20 Russian MI-17 helicopters. Five of these were delivered to the IRC, the remaining 15 went to the IRGC. A similar helicopter order was planned for 2008. (Note: [NAME REMOVED] indicated that [NAME REMOVED] is the only Iranian entity allowed to import helicopters and that it is owned by the IRGC and MOIS.)
13.(S) [NAME REMOVED] has invested in three Iranian companies backed by the IRGC and Defense Ministry. The first, owned by the Defense Ministry, produces chemical weapons protective equipment; it had been defunct prior to the infusion of IRC funds. The second, owned by the IRGC, produces pre-fabricated military commands and mobile hospitals. The third, owned by the Defense Ministry, produces armored personnel carriers.
14.(C) Finally, the IRC [DETAILS REMOVED] began building health clinics in Karbala, Najaf, Hilla, Kazemayn, and Basra and awarded the construction contracts to IRGC companies, despite the IRC's own staff of qualified engineers. [NAME REMOVED] said the clinics would be used for treatment but also as warehouses for military equipment or military bases if needed. He noted that the Iraqi Red Crescent and Iraqi Ministry of Health were not happy with this activity.
Facilitating IRGC Support to Hezbollah
--------------------------------------
15. (S) The IRC again facilitated the entry of Qods force officers to Lebanon during the Israel-Hezbollah war in summer 2006. Although [NAME REMOVED] did not travel to Lebanon during the conflict, he reiterated that the only true IRC officers dispatched to Lebanon were [DETAILS REMOVED] all others were IRGC and MOIS officials. [NAME REMOVED] further said that the IRC shipments of medical supplies served also to facilitate weapons shipments. He said that IRC [DETAILS REMOVED] had seen missiles in the planes destined for Lebanon when delivering medical supplies to the plane. The plane was allegedly "half full" prior to the arrival of any medical supplies.
16. (S) [NAME REMOVED] also allowed the transfer of an IRC hospital in southern Lebanon to Hezbollah. [NAME REMOVED] said that Hassan Nasrallah had asked Supreme Leader Khamenei to allow Hezbollah to run the hospital during Dr. Noorbala's tenure as IRC president. Although Khamenei acquiesced, Dr. Noorbala prevented the transfer until his own departure. The hospitaL [DETAILS REMOVED] is under Hezbollah control. [NAME REMOVED] is allegedly close to Nasrallah and is also trying to create a network of medical clinics in Lebanon.
17. (S) Comment: [NAMES REMOVED] are examples of figures nominally within the Iranian government establishment who have taken courageous stands against IRGC and MOIS incursions into Iranian governance. Such figures are key to our ability to understanding and countering the malign activities of these organizations regionally
Comment: [DETAILS REMOVED]
Thursday, 07 August 2008, 07:43
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 000565
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/07/2018
TAGS PREL, PARM, IR, MU
SUBJECT: OMAN REMAINS WARY OF IRANIAN EXPANSIONISM
Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo per 1.4 (B and D).
Summary
-------
1. (S/NF) Minister of the Royal Office and head of the Office of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Ali bin Majid al-Ma'amari, reviewed Oman's view on Iran from a security perspective, highlighting Omani awareness of Iran's deceptive tactics and expansionist ideological desires in the region. During an introductory meeting with NAVCENT commander VADM William Gortney, accompanied by the Ambassador, General Ali addressed the Iranian nuclear file, security in the Strait of Hormuz, and Iranian interference in the region. Ali Majid's suspicious view of Iran stands in stark contrast to conciliatory if not obsequious public comments of Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin 'Alawi regarding Iran and its role in the region. End summary.
Won't Oppose Further Sanctions on Iran
--------------------------------------
2. (S/NF) Characterizing Oman's preference for "frankness and clarity," General Ali began his comments on Iran by noting the reality of Iran as a nearby neighbor, which influenced Oman's relations with Iran. Toward the end of the discussion, he compared Oman's normal relations with Iran to the relations of other GCC members with Iran. Throughout the meeting, he frequently touched on the theme of how different Oman was from other GCC member states, whose real intentions and positions often eluded Omani comprehension.
3. (S/NF) The Iranian nuclear issue stood at the forefront of the General's mind. He described the nuclear file as an international issue, noting that resolution of this issue should be dealt with through international bodies such as the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Oman would respect decisions of these groups and play its role in the international community. Oman would not oppose imposition of further measures against Iran by the international bodies; however, Oman did not want to play an active role in advocating for such measures itself.
Iranian Intentions Clear: Stall for Time
-----------------------------------------
4. (S/NF) Ali Majid stated that Oman was aware of Iranian stall tactics in the talks over the nuclear issue. Instead of responding by the August 5 deadline, the Iranian side offered a new initiative for talks, confirming reports from the U.S. and others that Iran indeed is trying merely to buy time. Letting the 5 August deadline pass in responding positively to the P5 1 proposal made the Iranian intention to stall "very clear to Oman." The Ambassador noted that the U.S. has been working with allies around the world, and especially within the EU, to further restrict Iranian economic activity in an effort to influence Iran's position on the nuclear file. General Ali agreed that sanctions to date were having an impact on the Iranian economy, despite Iran's public denials. Moreover, he said, Iran believed the U.S. would never attack Iran, a belief that encouraged Iran to persist in its stall tactics. Nevertheless, he advocated a non-military solution as the best option for the U.S., and suggested that over the long term, establishment of U.S. relations at some level with the Iranian government might enable the U.S. to better influence the Iranian government and people.
Empty Threats Against the Strait
--------------------------------
5. (S/NF) Responding to the Ambassador's question about recent Iranian statements threatening the Strait of Hormuz, Ali Majid dismissed the threats as "empty words" and perhaps a feeble attempt to up its bargaining leverage vis a vis the P5 1. VADM Gortney echoed the Ambassador's comments that such rhetoric negatively impacted the world's view of Iran and ultimately would undermine Iran's standing in the international community. On this same issue, the General expressed his pleasure with the White House press statement on August 5 responding to the IRGC commander's comments regarding closure of the Strait, agreeing that Iranian closure of the strait would be suicide (i.e., more harmful to Iran's own economic interests). He also commended the U.S. for not escalating the rhetoric but instead putting Iran's comments into proper perspective.
Iraq and Iranian Expansionism
MUSCAT 00000565 002 OF 003
-----------------------------
6. (S/NF) Prior to delving into the nuclear issues, Ali Majid acknowledged that Iranian interference in Iraq prevented achievement of a stable security environment there. He allowed that, at a minimum, Iran indirectly supported Shi'a militia in Iraq. Elaborating on his theme of "Iranian expansionist" ideology, he noted that the Iranian national radio broadcast commenced with the prelude "the voice of the Islamic Republic from Tehran." Focusing on "from Tehran," he astutely raised Omani concerns that such language revealed Iran's true intentions: a "greater Islamic Republic" with Tehran at its center. He further speculated that Iran wanted to give the impression that the Islamic Republic might already encompass "Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and even the Gulf."
7. (S/NF) Ali Majid linked the nuclear issue and the interference in Iraq by speculating that a resolution might entice Iran into ceasing its interference in Iraq. He offered a rhetorical question on whether Iran was serious about challenging the major powers or is it posturing in the media for domestic consumption. He conceded that he truly did not know the answer, but that with Iran's continued attitude on the nuclear issue, the security situation in Iraq would remain unresolved. Citing Oman's preference for a non-military solution, he nevertheless acknowledged that a nuclear-armed Iran as opposed to war with Iran posed "an extremely difficult dilemma for all of us."
Playing to Their Domestic Audience
----------------------------------
8. (S/NF) Acknowledging Iran's revolutionary zeal, the General attempted to put Iranian public statements in perspective when he described as exaggerations those comments by Iranian President Mahmud Ahmed-I Nejad or other Iranian figures, particularly regarding military capabilities. "Countries that believe they have some specific military weapons advantages usually keep them secret," he averred. He asserted that in the end, all power resided with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
9. (S/NF) Ali Majid portrayed Shi'a ideology as another factor complicating possible military conflict with Iran. Iranian leaders would not balk at sacrificing a quarter of their 60 million citizens in a military conflict. The Shi'a tradition of martyrdom spanned 14 centuries. The annual self-flagellation of Shi'a over 1,400 years served as an example of this martyr psychology. Beyond its Shi'a ideology, pride in its Persian national identity compelled Iran to demand international recognition and respect.
10. (S/NF) Returning back to comments about GCC countries, General Ali singled out Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar as three Gulf countries that probably would want the U.S. to strike Iran. However, he urged the U.S. to determine whether such voices were speaking on the basis of logic or emotion. He likened private entreaties of these countries to the U.S. for military action on Iran to the Iraqi opposition in exile providing the U.S. false information on Iraq that led to the invasion of Iraq. At the beginning of the meeting, Ali Majid had noted that, in contrast to Oman, other GCC members did not always speak with candor or clarity, leaving Oman to question the real motivations or intentions of its GCC brethren.
11. (S/NF) Punctuating his comments about Iran's irrationality, Ali Majid pointed to Libyan leader Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's recent comment that "Iran is crazy" not to pay attention to the history of Yugoslavia and Iraq, whose ignoring of U.S. pressure resulted in their collapse. Interestingly, he referred to Qadhafi's transformation from pariah to emerging member of the international community by noting that Qadhafi had once been "our enemy."
Oman in a "Strategic Relationship" with the U.S.
--------------------------------------------- ---
12. (S) Shifting from Iran, Ali Majid underscored Oman's "strategic relationship" with the U.S. and highlighted Oman's cooperation with the U.S. on counterterrorism issues. He described Oman's zero tolerance for extremism and refusal to negotiate with terrorists as a policy established at least since 1970 (the year of the Sultan's assumed power). Oman has been and continues to prepare itself to confront terrorism, he said, as it is not exempt from the plotting of terrorists. While Oman is "encircled by problems" -- specifically mentioning Yemen, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan --
MUSCAT 00000565 003 OF 003
Oman remains vigilant in preventing such problems from reaching the Sultanate. On the topic of Oman's partnership with the U.S., he harkened back to when the Soviets had sought a warm water port during the time of their invasion of Afghanistan and were rebuffed by Muscat as an example of how "Oman has stood at the side of the U.S." He also highlighted the irony that now the world faced "not the Soviets but the Taliban." He quickly followed this by noting that the U.S. would be wise to support talks with moderate members of the Taliban, which Oman encouraged as a way toward achieving security in Afghanistan.
13. (S/NF) Participants in the meeting included VADM Gortney, the Ambassador, the admiral's executive officer, Embassy Muscat's OMC Chief, and GRPO (notetaker). Sayyid Munthir bin Majid al-Sa'id, head of the Royal Office Liaison and Coordination Service participated as notetaker and translator for General Ali.
Comment
-------
14. (S/NF) In light of recent, more conciliatory statements by Minister Responsible for foreign Affairs Yusuf bin 'Alawi, Ali Majid's blunt assessment of Iranian intentions comes as refreshing reassurance of the official Omani position on Iran. While careful to flag Oman's longstanding preference for a non-military solution to the Iran question and, less directly, Oman's inability to actively confront Iranian obstinacy, the Sultanate nevertheless maintains a clear-eyed view of Iran, its increasingly threatening behavior and the potential repercussions for the region. His comments regarding attitudes and perceptions of fellow GCC members were startling as they would appear to confirm oft stated views of GCC counterparts of Oman as the sometimes "odd man out" in the GCC. Ali Majid's comments suggest that while not entirely comfortable with this, the Omanis acknowledge it. Ali Majid, as the Sultan's top security official and advisor, is known for taking a more hard-line view of matters relating to regional security. However, given his closeness to the Sultan and his status as a member of the inner-most circle of the Sultan's confidants, such views to a senior U.S. officer can be assumed to accord with those of Qaboos. GRAPPO
Saturday, 01 March 2008, 05:49
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 000174
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/01/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, ENRG, KWMN, IR, IZ, MU
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON'S MEETING WITH SULTAN
QABOOS
Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)
-------
SUMMARY
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1. (C) Sultan Qaboos discussed both domestic and regional issues during his February 19 meeting with Admiral William J. Fallon, CENTCOM Commander. On the domestic front, the Sultan described his desire to empower the government to be more responsive to citizen concerns. Seeking to strengthen the role of Omani women, the Sultan plans to convene a conference in 2009 designed to increase the participation and leadership of women in all aspects of Omani society. Sultan Qaboos also shared plans for continued infrastructure development in Oman and described efforts underway to obtain more natural gas. On Iraq, the Sultan advised against a premature withdrawal of U.S. forces and stated that more regional assistance would be forthcoming if Iraqis would "come together" to take charge of, and invest in, their own country. Sultan Qaboos shared U.S. concerns about Iranian meddling in Iraq and elsewhere, but contended that Tehran knew confrontation with the U.S. was not in its interest. Iran's "charm offensive" in the GCC had succeeded in lessening suspicions of some officials about the true intentions of Iranian policies. End Summary.
2. (C) CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon, accompanied by the Ambassador, met February 19 with Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id for approximately 2 hours at one of the Sultan's castles -- Husn al Shumugh -- in the interior of Oman. (Note: The Sultan was outside of Muscat on his annual 4-6 week "meet the people tour" during which he visits selected sites outside the capital. End Note.) The Sultan appeared in good health and was cheerful, although he commented that his role as ruler of Oman was demanding and did not allow him time to do all the things he wanted to do, such as reading more books. "My office is wherever I am," he stated, noting that he constantly had to attend to paperwork and urgent requests from his staff, among other tasks. The Sultan added that despite his busy schedule, he always made time to "watch the news," though he did not elaborate on his preferred media outlet.
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CONCERNS ABOUT IRAQ
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3. (C) The Sultan expressed concern over a premature withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. Recognizing recent improvements in the security situation, he counseled that American troops should only leave "when the time is right." He stressed that Iraqis had to "take charge" of the fate of their country, but questioned whether the different factions would be able to "come together" to accomplish this. He pointedly asked the Admiral, "Do you really think Prime Minister Maliki and his government are capable of pulling the country together?" The Sultan did not directly respond to Admiral Fallon's comment on the need for assistance and investment for Iraq from elsewhere in the region. Instead, he stated that if the Iraqi people helped themselves and invested in their own country, others would follow suit.
4. (C) The Sultan appeared to follow events in Iraq closely. He commented, for example, that the Kurds had apparently "come out well" in recent central government talks on budget issues, and asked about the status of electricity production in Iraq. The Sultan seemed to take a particular interest in Admiral Fallon's discussion of Iraqi Shia leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, including the status of Hakim's health and his possible successors.
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INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
--------------------------
5. (C) In addition to emphasizing the need for outside investment in Iraq, Admiral Fallon highlighted the importance of assistance from regional states for infrastructure development in Afghanistan and other Central Asian nations. Again the Sultan sidestepped the issue and shifted the conversation to the critical role of roads and highways in economic development. He then mentioned infrastructure projects for Oman currently under consideration, including construction of a new dam and a freight rail line from the northern port of Sohar to the planned port in Duqm. The Sultan hoped that the southern port of Salalah could be linked by rail to Muscat and, eventually, to other GCC states.
MUSCAT 00000174 002 OF 003
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IRANIAN ISSUES
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6. (C) The Sultan commented that the Iranians are "not fools," and claimed that Tehran realized there are "certain lines it cannot cross" (i.e., direct confrontation with the U.S.). Regarding GCC relations with the Iranian government, he stated, "Iran is a big country with muscles and we must deal with it." He continued that Iran's "charm offensive" in the region had achieved a degree of success as some GCC authorities (he did not mention names) were now less suspicious of Iranian intentions. The Sultan added, laughing, that "I must say that as long as (the U.S.) is on the horizon, we have nothing to fear."
7. (C) Responding to Admiral Fallon's frustration with Iranian interference in Iraq, the Sultan remarked that Iranian meddling abroad was "almost a game" to the regime in Tehran, and said that Iran's leaders would have to stop this practice if Iran wanted to "join the world as a noble country." The Sultan hoped that Iraqi leaders would clearly tell and convince Iranian President Ahmadinejad during his upcoming visit to Iraq to cease Iran's unhelpful interference in their internal affairs. On the possibility that Iran is waiting out the President's final term before re-assessing its strategy, the Sultan said that Tehran should realize that it has to deal with the U.S. as a country, and not just the current administration.
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THE SEARCH FOR GAS
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8. (C) After noting Iranian dependence on imports of refined fuel, the Sultan described Oman's efforts to obtain more natural gas to fuel growing domestic power needs and large-scale industrial projects. Oman had committed too much of its limited gas production to long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) export contracts. As a result, the government was trying to boost production by taking smaller and less productive gas fields away from Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) -- 60% owned by the government and 34% owned by Royal Dutch Shell -- and awarding them to outside companies such as British Gas and BP. The Sultan claimed these firms were in a better position to increase productivity in these fields, and pointed to the progress of U.S.-based Occidental Petroleum Company in raising oil production in former PDO concession areas, such as Mukhaizna.
9. (C) Looking offshore, the Sultan said he hoped that new gas fields would be found in the Gulf of Oman to help ease the country's natural gas shortage. India's Reliance Industries was currently exploring a deepwater oil and gas block in this body of water, but had made no significant discoveries yet. Qatar would begin supplying gas to Oman by 2013, the Sultan noted, but not in quantities sufficient to meet outstanding needs. He added that Oman was still supplying limited gas from Musandam to Ras al-Khaimah in the UAE due to an agreement he made with its emir -- and which the Sultan felt he could not break -- well before Oman was squeezed for this resource.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION
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10. (C) Sultan Qaboos shared that he placed a great deal of importance on education, and noted that a study of history provided the context needed to better understand present trends and events. Regarding claims that some rulers in the region wanted to keep their people uneducated in order to more easily control them, the Sultan explained that this strategy could easily backfire as it also left the populace more susceptible to influence by extremists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Former Egyptian president and pan-Arabist leader Gamal Abdal Nasser, the Sultan said, had "set the region back" by being "anti-everything" and engaging in vitriolic rhetoric designed to keep the masses ignorant.
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EMPOWERING THE GOVERNMENT AND WOMEN
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11. (C) On domestic politics, the Sultan announced that he would hold the first-ever combined meeting of his Cabinet of Ministers and the Majlis al-Shura (the directly elected lower
MUSCAT 00000174 003 OF 003
house of Oman's bicameral advisory body) on February 26. By meeting together, the Sultan hoped that the Cabinet and the Majlis would learn how to cooperate better and jointly focus on important issues. He commented that both bodies also needed to "demonstrate more leadership" and avoid past foot-dragging on promises made to the populace. "People need to see the results of decisions," the Sultan stated.
12. (C) Letting Admiral Fallon and the Ambassador in on a "secret," the Sultan confided that he planned to call for a conference of all "notable women" in Oman in 2009 in a bid to encourage Omani women to expand their participation and leadership in different aspects of Omani society. Minister of Social Development, Dr. Sharifa bint Khalfan al-Yahyaiya (one of Oman's three female cabinet ministers) will chair the meeting on the Sultan's behalf. Lamenting that no women won seats in the October 2007 election for the Majlis al-Shura, Sultan Qaboos observed that Omani women were stuck in tradition and needed to be empowered to "take more charge" and to be "less shy." "Some customs (regarding women)," he added, "shouldn't be kept." Nevertheless, gradual change is occurring in Oman, the Sultan asserted. His philosophy was to "let it happen," rather than hold it up to public debate, as the latter course of action often led to factional fighting, internal strife, and other ills.
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A RECURRENT THEME: MORE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT
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13. (C) In concluding the meeting, Sultan Qaboos returned to his goal of improving the responsiveness of the Omani government to citizen concerns. He stated that he would be pressing "harder" on his ministers to engage in more and better public relations efforts before the Omani police and to effectively enforce their decisions so that the people could see the benefits of announced actions. Giving one particular example, the Sultan said that rather than simply announce a new development project, the government should explain the downstream employment opportunities the project would generate for Omani citizens. Effective cooperation between ministries and the Majlis Oman was also needed to strengthen the civil institutional framework in Oman, the Sultan added.
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COMMENT
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14. (S/NF) In discussing his desire for operational change in the senior government ranks, the Sultan twice implied (but did not directly state) that such change was needed to prepare the country for his eventual departure from power. The Sultan's comments indicated that he may feel the government is too dependent on his authority and should be empowered to run more effectively without constant direction from the palace. End Comment.
15. (U) This message has been reviewed by Admiral Fallon. GRAPPO
Wednesday, 02 January 2008, 18:07
S E C R E T CAIRO 000009
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, IS, IZ, SY, EG
SUBJECT: CODEL VOINOVICH MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Stuart Jones Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (S) Summary. EGIS Chief Omar Soliman told Ambassador and a visiting Codel led by Senator George Voinovich December 31 that he is optimistic progress will be made on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. However, Soliman was concerned with continuing Israeli criticism of Egyptian anti-smuggling efforts. He was worried that the Egyptians would not be able to work out an arrangement with the Israelis for Hajj pilgrims to return to Gaza. On Iran, Soliman said that the USG's release of the National Intelligence Estimate had altered the calculus through which Arab states are interacting with Iran. On Iraq argued that the Iraqi government needed to amend its constitution and that Prime Minister Malaki should not deal with the Iraqi people in a "sectarian way." End summary.
2. (S) Soliman led off the New Year's Eve meeting by telling the Codel that the region is at a special, critical juncture. Egypt is America's partner. Sometimes we have our differences. But Egypt will continue to provide the USG with its knowledge and expertise on the critical regional issues, such as Lebanon and Iraq. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the core issue; Soliman contended a peaceful resolution would be a "big blow" to terrorist organizations that use the conflict as a pretext. For this reason, President Mubarak is committed to ending the Israeli-Arab "stalemate."
3. (S) Soliman applauded the Administration's efforts, commenting that Annapolis had given hope and begun a process. The timing is right for progress based on four factors. First, the PA leadership is moderate and willing to negotiate. Second, Hamas is isolated and politically cut off in Gaza. Third, the Israelis are ready for peace; Soliman assessed that the GOI coalition is broad and strong, and larger than Rabin's coalition of the mid-nineties. Fourth, Arab states are ready to see an end to "the struggle."
4. (S) Soliman stressed that Egypt stands ready to help the U.S. effort. The GOE knows both the Palestinians and the Israelis, and knows the obstacles to peace. Soliman recommended two steps be taken. First, both the Israelis and Palestinians must be pressed hard to sign an agreement, which the U.S. and international community could endorse, to be implemented at the proper time. Second, the U.S. should insist that "phase one" of the Roadmap should be completed before the end of 2008.
5. (S) Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Soliman opined that the Palestinian Authority was ready to sign an agreement, but that establishment of a state may take between 1-3 years. While Hamas is isolated politically and unable to stop an Israeli-PA agreement, it remains entrenched in Gaza, and it was unclear to Soliman how long that would last. At one point in the discussion, Soliman seemed to imply Hamas may remain in control of Gaza for more than a year; at another juncture, he told Senator Voinovich that if negotiations proceeded briskly, Hamas may be forced to cede power in Gaza in 3-4 months. The bottom line for Hamas, according to Soliman, is that they must be forced to choose between remaining a resistance movement or joining the political process. They cannot have it both ways, he said.
6. (S) Palestinian training: Soliman reiterated GOE willingness to train and support Palestinian security forces. He claimed that the GOE had training facilities ready, but that he was waiting for an answer from U.S. Security Coordinator General Keith Dayton. (Note: We have advised Soliman that initial training of Palestinian security forces will take place in Jordan, and that we will revisit the option of training in Egypt this spring. End note). He continued that the GOE would keep pressure on Hamas but will maintain "low-level" contacts with Hamas. Egypt, he said, wants Hamas isolated. The Qassam rocket attacks must stop. When they do stop, the GOE will ask Israel to "meet quiet with quiet."
7. (S) Border issues: Senator Voinovich asked Soliman why the Israelis continue to report problems with Egypt's anti-smuggling efforts. Soliman said that the Israelis do not complain to him directly, and that GOI-GOE cooperation and exchange of information continues. He was at a loss as to why Israeli politicians continue to criticize Egypt publicly. The GOE would like the USG to be included in the GOI-GOE LAWIO discussions, but the Israelis continue to object. "They don't want a witness in the room," Soliman said. Nevertheless, Soliman was willing to turn the page. "We have a short time to reach peace. We need it. We need to wake up in the morning with no news of terrorism, no explosions, and no news of more deaths. We want everyone happy. That is the Egyptian dream."
8. (S) Syria: Congressman Turner asked if Iran and/or Syria might be play a spoiler role. Soliman answered that Syria wants desperately to halt the United Nations special tribunal on the Hariri assassination. At the same time, the SARG is ready to negotiate with the Israelis, and Soliman believed that the GOI also is ready. Syria, Soliman said, can be induced to play a constructive role but added that there are no guarantees, however, on Syrian performance.
9. (S) NIE: Regarding the USG's National Intelligence Estimate of Iran's nuclear program, Soliman was concerned that many in the Arab world were recalculating their position vis a vis Iran based on an assumption that the NIE represented a USG policy shift. Soliman said the Egyptians are working to correct this misimpression among Arab states. "We tell the Arab world: Don't be happy with the NIE and don't warm up to Iran. We know that the United States will never allow Iran to have a nuclear bomb."
10. (S) Iran: Soliman said that Iran remains a significant threat to Egypt. It continues to influence Shiaa in Iraq and the Gulf. Iran is supporting Jihad and spoiling peace, and has supported extremists in Egypt previously. If they were to support the Muslim Brotherhood this would make them "our enemy," he said. The GOE continues to press the Iranian regime to turn over extremists given "safe harbor" in Iran. This issue, he said, will remain an obstacle to improving Egyptian-Iranian relations. (Soliman met with Iranian former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani earlier in the week. Larijani was in Egypt on a week-long "private visit."
11. (S) Iraq: Soliman said he remains concerned that the Maliki government in Iraq is not representing all Iraqis (i.e. the Sunni population). The GOE has urged Maliki not to deal with the Iraqi people in a sectarian way, and to amend to constitution to allow greater Sunni representation. In addition, the Iraqi government must remove militias from the ranks of the army and police. In the long run, Soliman did not think that the decrease in violence would be sustainable absent these two steps. In addition, Iranian influence is problematic. Soliman said that the GOE had worked to reconcile 21 clans and tribes in Iraq, with good results, and that this kind of efforts had to continue. He assessed that both Sistani and Sadr were practical men, and able to be dealt with.
12. (U) Delegation composition:
Senator George Voinovich (R-OH) Congressman Mike Turner (R-OH) Congressman Steve Pearce (R-NM) Congressman Rob Bishop (R-UT) Congressman Phil Gingrey (R-GA)
13. (U) The delegation did not clear this message. Ricciardone
Friday, 30 November 2007, 10:39
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003895
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LONDON PLEASE PASS TO GAYLE
EO 12958 DECL: 11/29/2027
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, IR, IQ
SUBJECT: UK AMBASSADOR TO IRAN ON IRI NEGOTIATING STYLE,
TACTICS
BAGHDAD 00003895 001.3 OF 003
Classified By: by CDA Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1.(C) UK Ambassador to Tehran Geoffrey Adams, in a series of meetings with U.S. Embassy Baghdad and MNF-I officials, outlined his recommendations on how to negotiate with Iranians. Ambassador Adams thought that Iran had several goals from talks with the U.S., both superficial and substantive. In negotiations, he advised being steady and firm, tough but not aggressive, and at the same time, seeking to engage and draw attention to mutual interests. He outlined Iran,s preconceptions and its obsession with and mistrust of the West, which, he said, can blind it to its interests. He warned that the Iranian participants would likely have very strict instructions what they could say and that it would be difficult to get them off script, though the element of surprise could work. Adams added that the Iranians would be very nervous of negative repercussions if they made a misstep, and they would likely report on each other. Answers to questions and proposals would more likely only come at follow-on meetings, and decision-making in Iran is slowed by the need for consensus, so patience is needed. That said, it was important to rid the Iranians of their standard notion that time was on their side. End summary
2.(C) British Ambassador to Iran Geoffrey Adams offered advice in negotiating strategies with Iran in a series of meetings with U.S. officials and military officers in Baghdad November 24-25. The following is an amalgamation of three meetings, held in advance of the fourth round of Iran-Iraq-U.S. trilateral discussions on Iraq. Adams, who has served in Tehran for almost two years, said his observations were borne of much experience, to include a &master class8 when Iran captured at gunpoint 15 British Navy personnel in March 2007. British Ambassador to Kuwait Stuart Laing also joined the discussions, as well as British First Secretary in Tehran Alex Pinfield. Among those present on the U.S. side at various briefings were Ambassador Crocker, MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus, Pol-Mil Minister Counselor Ambassador Marcie Ries, MG Kevin Bergner, Special Advisor David Pearce, and IRPO Director Jillian Burns. The British ambassador,s views of Iran,s strategic interests and the internal political situation to be reported septel.
3.(C) Iranians, goal, in Adams, view, is to institutionalize talks with the U.S. and keep open the possibility of broadening the agenda. While he heard that the Iranians were disappointed in the &lack of substance8 in previous bilateral talks with the U.S, they felt they derived good publicity from participating. Adams predicted the Iranians will seek to keep them going both to engender their prestige and to keep tabs on what the USG is thinking. He also thought the talks had triggered a useful internal debate in how to make the best use of the talks and their strategic interests. Adams added that he believed there is a significant lobby in Iran against holding talks with the U.S.
Assumptions
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4.(C) In talks with Iranians, Ambassador Adams recommended being steady and firm, tough but not aggressive, and at the same time, seeking to engage. He stressed that Iranians are obsessed with the West and this obsession at times blinds them to their interests. In this light, the US side should be aware of the following preconceptions on the Iranian side:
-- the USG seeks to remove the current regime and replace it with a pro-Western one.
-- USG policymakers spend an inordinate amount of time and energy thinking about (and plotting against) Iran. As such, Iranians assume that everything we do or say has meaning and has been carefully thought out and coordinated, both internally and with the UK; there are no accidents.
-- The current U.S. administration is politically very weak, facing major internal opposition, and as such, the threat of US military action against Iran is not realistic.
-- Iran sees the U.S. as a tough, determined adversary that can be manipulated and wounded.
Mistrust
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5.(C) The legacy of the Iran-Iraq war, when the international community was either silent or sided with Saddam (even when he used WMD against Iranians) must be kept in mind. Iranians mistrust the outside world, to include the very same Western powers and Sunni Arab states that are now seeking to ensure that pro-Iranian Shias do not dominate power in Iraq.
Short Leash
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6.(C) Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) government negotiators arrive with precise and detailed instructions from which they do not deviate, out of fear of professional repercussions. They will go through all their talking points. The USG should not expect substantive responses to questions or initiatives in real time. This problem can be obviated to an extent by scheduling &lots of breaks,8 allowing IRIG officials time to confer amongst themselves and to seek guidance via telephone from Tehran. However, given the fear of a misstep on the IRI side, the USG should not expect real engagement from the IRI outside of their instructions. Answers to questions and responses to suggestions are likely to come at follow-on meetings, although some questions never get answered.
Preparation
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7.(C) IRIG officials will likely prepare in detail for the talks. They may consult with Iranians with extensive experience with Americans, such as academics who have participated in Track Two talks or worked in the U.S. He also mentioned that the head of Iran,s Chamber of Commerce Mohammad Nahavandian is also perceived as a U.S. expert and is likely consulted. Adams doubted that Iran would seek advice in negotiating with Americans from other countries. Adams repeatedly said, &Iranians are not stupid,8 meaning they follow all the issues closely, even if they at times misread the signals.
Slow Process
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8.(C) In light of the short leash negotiators have, plus the collaborative and multi-polar nature of IRI decision-making and the extreme sensitivity of the topic of direct USG-IRIG talks, the USG should not expect immediate &big steps.8 Any progress will be slow and come only after much deliberation and discussion in Iran, with push-back from those circles opposing talks. If the IRIG concludes that a policy shift is in their interests, it can do it and find a way to justify it, but will first have to achieve internal consensus.
Stay Calm
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9.(C) It is important with the Iranians not to lose one,s temper or show that one is upset. Trading accusations allows the IRIG to rely on a familiar script; far better is to ask unexpected questions that will take them &off-script.8 When asked how to best broach continued IRIG support of JAM splinter groups despite IRIG assurances to the Government of Iraq to stop the flow of weapons, Adams recommended keeping the tone matter-of-fact and raising issues in question form, i.e. &given your assurances that you are seeking to help Iraqi forces re-establish peace and security, how can we explain the ongoing training of JAM-related illegal combatants in Iran?8
Agenda
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10.(C) Don,t offer an agenda beforehand, otherwise the agenda itself will become subject to ongoing negotiations.
Establish Mutual Interests
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11.(C) Seek to show a commonality or intersection of national interests that will justify Iran taking actions suggested by the USG. Prove to them that &if we fail in Iraq, they fail too.8 Draw them out on their contradictory tactics in order to spark debate within the IRIG. Assess what the Iranians want out of the talks, beyond their publicly stated position of wanting a timetable for a withdrawal of foreign troops.
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Clock Ticking
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12.(C) IRIG interlocutors assume that time is on their side and hence default towards inaction. Convince them that now is the time to act, and that not doing so will hurt their interests and that the situation could get worse. In a related vein, the IRI must be convinced that the USG is prepared to stop dialogue (although not necessarily close the channel) if there is no progress. At the same time, realize internally that the negotiators cannot take a bold move without consultation, a reasonable degree of patience is required, and progress may take time.
Put the Ball in Their Court
--------------------------------
13.(C) Ask a lot of questions, always put the ball back in their court. Doing so will encourage internal discussion and debate in Tehran, as well as put pressure on them to deviate from their prepared script. Wrong foot them by saying something unexpected to try to take them off script. Focus on accountability, asking for clarifications of actions that contradict their stated commitments. Keep your message clear, including redlines, and do not be too subtle.
Weaknesses
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14.(C) Despite their rhetoric, Iranians understand their weaknesses include a lack of allies and foreign investment.
Publicity
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15.(C) Iran is very sensitive to press coverage that makes them look weak. At the same time, the IRIG has a &high threshold for embarrassment8 when they are accused of illicit activities. After the talks, the IRIG will seek to present the exchange as &businesslike,8 with the US and Iran on equal footing, where the IRIG &gave nothing away.8 BUTENIS
Friday, 31 August 2007, 12:45
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TEL AVIV 002652
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TAGS PREL, PTER, MARR, MASS, KNNP, UNSC, PK, IR, IZ, ZP,
JO, EG, RS, CH, LE, SY, IS
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' AUGUST 17 MEETING WITH ISRAELI MOSSAD
CHIEF MEIR DAGAN
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).
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SUMMARY
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1. (S) In an August 17 meeting, Israeli Mossad Chief Meir Dagan thanked Under Secretary Burns for America's support of Israel as evidenced by the previous day's signing of an MOU that provides Israel with USD 30 billion in security assistance from 2008-2018. Dagan provided his assessment of the Middle East region, Pakistan and Turkey, stressing Israel's (a) concern for President Musharraf's well-being, (b) view that Iran can be forced to change its behavior, and (c) sense that Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are unstable with unclear futures ahead of them. Dagan probed for more detail about U.S. military assistance to the Gulf states, and -- while signaling agreement with the U.S. approach to the Gulf states vis-a-vis Iran -- cautioned that they may not be able to absorb significant military assistance. Dagan reviewed Israel's five-pillar strategy concerning Iran's nuclear program, stressed that Iran is economically vulnerable, and pressed for more activity with Iran's minority groups aimed at regime change. Dagan urged caution in providing assistance to the Siniora government in Lebanon, noting Syrian and Iranian efforts to topple the GOL.
2. (S) Under Secretary Burns cited the MOU as tangible evidence of the USG's commitment to Israel, and stressed that the U.S. would support all of its friends -- Arabs included -- in the Middle East, and will remain engaged in the region for the long term. He described U.S. efforts to support the Musharraf and Karzai governments as they face opposition from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and explained that the Gulf Security Dialogue is meant to bolster Gulf states facing threats from Iran. The Under Secretary reviewed U.S. efforts to isolate Iran and increase pressure on it, stressing that the U.S. is currently focused on the diplomatic track. He shared USG thinking about the Siniora government in Lebanon, and urged that the U.S. and Israel continue to consult on Lebanon. END SUMMARY.
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THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE MOU AND ISRAEL'S QME
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3. (S) Dagan observed that the signing of the MOU on security assistance could not have come at a better time, and stressed that Israel appreciated America's support. The Under Secretary agreed about the timing, noting that the U.S., Israel and like-minded countries were facing multiple threats around the world, and that the Middle East is a very dangerous region. He said that the MOU serves as a concrete reminder that the U.S. stands by its long-term security commitments to its friends, and is ready to help them with their needs. The Under Secretary noted that the Middle East is now at the heart of American interests. Because Egypt also plays a vital role in the region, the U.S. would also renew its security assistance commitment to that country. U.S. relations with the Gulf states were longstanding, and America would stay true to those friendships, as well. The Under Secretary stressed that the USG is committed to Israel's QME. He noted that the majority of systems and equipment that the U.S. would sell to Egypt and other Arab partners would replace items that had been sold to those countries in the past.
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DAGAN REVIEWS MIDDLE EAST, PAKISTAN, TURKEY
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4. (S) Assessing the region, Dagan said Israel sees itself in the middle of a rapidly changing environment, in which the fate of one Middle Eastern country is connected to another. Dagan then said he was concerned about how long Pakistani President Musharraf would survive: "He is facing a serious problem with the militants. Pakistan's nuclear capability could end up in the hands of an Islamic regime." Turning to Iran, Dagan observed that it is in a transition period. There is debate among the leadership between Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad and their respective supporters. Instability in Iran is driven by inflation and tension among ethnic minorities. This, Dagan said, presents unique opportunities, and Israelis and Americans might see a change in Iran in
TEL AVIV 00002652 002 OF 005
their lifetimes. As for Iraq, it may end up a weak, federal state comprised of three cantons or entities, one each belonging to the Kurds, Sunnis and Shias.
5. (S) Dagan said that the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia are concerned about the growing importance of Iran and its influence on them. They are taking precautions, trying to increase their own military defensive capabilities. Referring to the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD), Dagan warned that these countries would not be able to cope with the amount of weapons systems they intend to acquire: "They do not use the weapons effectively."
6. (S) Dagan said that Jordan has successfully faced down threats from the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and that Egypt is struggling with the question of who will replace President Mubarak. He said he sees no hope for the Palestinians, and that Israel looks at Syria and Lebanon, and sees only instability. Further afield, it looks at Turkey and sees Islamists gaining momentum there. The question, he asked, is how long Turkey's military -- viewing itself as the defender of Turkey's secular identity -- will remain quiet.
7. (S) If Israel's neighborhood were not unstable enough, Dagan observed, it did not help that Russia is playing a "very negative role" in the region. He observed that all of these challenges have to be addressed globally -- they could not be dealt with individually. Returning to Jordan as an example, he noted that the more than one million Iraqi refugees in Jordan were changing Jordanian society, and forcing it into a new relationship with Saudi Arabia. This is evidenced by Saudi King Abdullah's recent visit to Jordan, which implies greater understanding between the Jordanians and the Saudis.
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DISCUSSION OF THE GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE
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8. (S) Turning to the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD), Dagan said that enhancing the capabilities of the Gulf states "is the right direction to go," especially as they are afraid of Iran. Such a U.S. commitment will be a stabilizing factor in the region. Dagan clarified that he would not oppose U.S. security assistance to America's Arab partners. He expressed concern, nevertheless, about the current policies of those partners -- especially with regards to Syria and Iran. Dagan added that if those countries must choose between buying defensive systems from the U.S. or France, then he would prefer they buy systems from the U.S., as this would bring them closer to the U.S.
9. (S) Dagan observed that the challenge facing the U.S. now is how to unite the Gulf states under a shared policy, and pointed to Qatar as the weakest link in the chain, trying to play all sides. Under Secretary Burns replied that the U.S. is trying to get Qatar and its neighbors to look at issues from a regional perspective, and to focus on threats in a unified way. Acting PM Assistant Secretary Mull expressed understanding for Israel's frustration with how the region looked, but stressed nevertheless that if America did not engage the Gulf states through the GSD, the situation would become much worse. It is critical to get the Gulf states focused on the Iran threat, and to adopt a regional approach to countering it. Encouraging and supporting their counterproliferation efforts would be crucial. Dagan said he agreed with this approach, stressing that the threat of radical Islam is real.
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IRAN: DAGAN REVIEWS ISRAEL'S FIVE PILLAR STRATEGY
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10. (S) Dagan led discussion on Iran by pointing out that the U.S. and Israel have different timetables concerning when Iran is likely to acquire a nuclear capability. He clarified that the Israel Atomic Energy Commission's (IAEC) timetable is purely technical in nature, while the Mossad's considers other factors, including the regime's determination to succeed. While Dagan acknowledged that there is still time to "resolve" the Iran nuclear crisis, he stressed that Iran is making a great effort to achieve a nuclear capability: "The threat is obvious, even if we have a different timetable. If we want to postpone their acquisition of a
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nuclear capability, then we have to invest time and effort ourselves."
11. (S) Dagan described how the Israeli strategy consists of five pillars:
A) Political Approach: Dagan praised efforts to bring Iran before the UNSC, and signaled his agreement with the pursuit of a third sanctions resolution. He acknowledged that pressure on Iran is building up, but said this approach alone will not resolve the crisis. He stressed that the timetable for political action is different than the nuclear project's timetable.
B) Covert Measures: Dagan and the Under Secretary agreed not to discuss this approach in the larger group setting.
C) Counterproliferation: Dagan underscored the need to prevent know-how and technology from making their way to Iran, and said that more can be done in this area.
D) Sanctions: Dagan said that the biggest successes had so far been in this area. Three Iranian banks are on the verge of collapse. The financial sanctions are having a nationwide impact. Iran's regime can no longer just deal with the bankers themselves.
E) Force Regime Change: Dagan said that more should be done to foment regime change in Iran, possibly with the support of student democracy movements, and ethnic groups (e.g., Azeris, Kurds, Baluchs) opposed to the ruling regime.
12. (S) Dagan clarified that the U.S., Israel and like-minded countries must push on all five pillars at the same time. Some are bearing fruit now; others would bear fruit in due time, especially if more attention were placed on them. Dagan urged more attention on regime change, asserting that more could be done to develop the identities of ethnic minorities in Iran. He said he was sure that Israel and the U.S. could "change the ruling regime in Iran, and its attitude towards backing terror regimes." He added, "We could also get them to delay their nuclear project. Iran could become a normal state."
13. (S) Dagan stressed that Iran has weak spots that can be exploited. According to his information, unemployment exceeds 30 percent nationwide, with some towns and villages experiencing 50 percent unemployment, especially among 17-30 year olds. Inflation averages more than 40 percent, and people are criticizing the government for investing in and sponsoring Hamas, saying that they government should invest in Iran itself. "The economy is hurting," he said, "and this is provoking a real crisis among Iran's leaders." He added that Iran's minorities are "raising their heads, and are tempted to resort to violence."
14. (S) Dagan suggested that more could be done to get the Europeans to take a tougher stand against Iran. Under Secretary Burns agreed, and suggested that Israel could help
SIPDIS by reaching out to the Europeans. Dagan said that Israel is already doing this, and would continue to do so. Dagan reiterated the need to strike at Iran's heart by engaging with its people directly. Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts are important, but more radio transmissions in Farsi are needed. Coordination with the Gulf states is helpful, but the U.S. should also coordinate with Azerbaijan and countries to the north of Iran, to put pressure on Iran. Russia, he said, would be annoyed, but it would be fitting, as Russia appears bent on showing the U.S. that it cannot act globally without considering Russia.
15. (S) Under Secretary Burns stressed that the USG is focused on Iran not only because of its nuclear program, but also because it supports terrorism and Shiite militias in Iraq. The U.S. approach is currently focused on the diplomatic track and increasing pressure on Iran through sanctions. Work in the UNSC helps to define the Iranian nuclear threat as one that affects international security, and not just that of Israel. While UNSC members Russia, China and Qatar will water down efforts to increase pressure on Iran, it is still worthwhile to push for a third sanctions resolution. In the meantime, the U.S. will encourage the Europeans, Japan and South Korea to implement unilateral sanctions against Iran outside the UNSC framework. The U.S.
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will continue to encourage banks and financial institutions to slow down their operations in Iran and financially isolate it. Regarding military pressure, the Under Secretary noted that the U.S. has deployed 1-2 carrier battle groups in the Gulf over the last six months, and that President Bush has stated that he will interrupt Iran's activity in Iraq. As for outreach to the Iranian people, the VOA is now broadcasting programs in Farsi, and the USG is trying to get more Iranian students to visit the U.S. to promote people-to-people relations.
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PAKISTAN: ISRAEL WORRIED ABOUT MUSHARRAF
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16. (S) On Pakistan, Dagan said that President Musharraf is losing control, and that some of his coalition partners could threaten him in the future. The key question, Dagan said, is whether Musharraf retains his commander-in-chief role in addition to his role as president. If not, he will have problems. Dagan observed that there has been an increase in the number of attempts on Musharraf's life, and wondered whether he will survive the next few years. Under Secretary Burns replied that South Asia has assumed vital importance in American foreign policy since September 11. The U.S. is committed to denying Afghanistan as a safe-haven for Taliban and Al-Qaeda activity. The USG will continue to support Pakistani President Musharraf, and is seeking to boost his military defensive capabilities. At the same time, the U.S. is encouraging Pakistan and Afghanistan to work with each other militarily. Turning to India, Under Secretary Burns noted that U.S.-Indian economic cooperation is growing, and that the USG is working effectively to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan.
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LEBANON: DAGAN URGES CAUTION
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17. (S) Dagan urged caution with respect to Lebanon, noting that the results of efforts there to bolster the Siniora government would impact Syria and Iraq. The U.S. and Israel, he said, are on the edge of achieving something in Lebanon, and so cannot afford to drop their guard. What is necessary is finding the right way to support PM Siniora. "He is a courageous man," Dagan said. Syria, Iran and Hizballah are working hard against him. Dagan noted that much of what is animating the leadership of Lebanon to take on Syria is personal: "Hariri, Jumblat and others had their parents executed by the Syrians." This anti-Syrian sentiment has forged an alliance based on personal and national interests. Siniora has worked well with the situation, but Dagan suggested that the odds are against him. Under Secretary Burns replied that the U.S. is trying to give PM Siniora as much support as possible, and that we would continue to consult closely with Israel on Lebanon. He noted that he would return to Israel in October.
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MEETING PARTICIPANTS
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18, (SBU) Accompanying Under Secretary Burns in the meeting were: -- Ambassador Richard H. Jones -- Acting PM Assistant Secretary Stephen Mull -- Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Mary Beth Long -- NEA/IPA Deputy Director Nicole Shampaine -- Embassy Tel Aviv Counselor for Political Research -- Embassy Tel Aviv Political-Military Officer (notetaker)
19. (SBU) Accompanying Mossad Chief Meir Dagan in the meeting were: -- Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Salai Meridor -- Advisor to Foreign Minister Livni Omer Caspi -- Two unidentified Mossad officials
20. (U) Under Secretary R. Nicholas Burns cleared on this cable.
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Thursday, 26 July 2007, 13:52
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002280
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
WHITE HOUSE FOR APHSCT TOWNSEND.
EO 12958 DECL: 07/13/2017
TAGS PTER, PREL, KNNP, KWBG, EFIN, IR, IS
SUBJECT: APHSCT TOWNSEND TAKES STOCK OF BMENA REGION WITH
MOSSAD DIRECTOR DAGAN
Classified By: Charge d'affaires Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4 (B/D).
1. (S) SUMMARY: Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (AFHSC), met Mossad Director Meir Dagan on July 12 for a general discussion of regional security threats. On the Iranian nuclear program, Dagan proved surprisingly optimistic about the effects of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and their impact on Iranian elites. On most other fronts, however, Dagan expressed deep skepticism regarding any near-term solutions. Dagan believes that the Syrians were emboldened by the Second Lebanon War, and argued for a concerted international effort to enforce UNSC resolutions in Lebanon as a means of removing Syria from Iranian influence. In Dagan's personal opinion, present attempts to prop up the government of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad will fail, and "an entirely new approach" with the Palestinians is required. Dagan and Townsend surveyed political developments in North Africa, Turkey, and the Gulf, and shared concerns about Pakistan's ability to withstand the challenge of Islamic radicals. END SUMMARY.
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Financial Sanctions Offer Hope on Iran
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2. (S) Mossad Director Meir Dagan began his two-hour meeting with Townsend by expressing satisfaction with sanctions against Iran. Dagan said UNSC Resolutions 1737 and 1747 caught the Iranians off-guard, and were having an impact on the Iranian elite and financial community. The resolutions had been particularly successful through their indirect consequences, explained Dagan, by stigmatizing Iranian businesses and discouraging risk-averse Europeans from being connected with Iran. Dagan praised ongoing GOI-USG cooperation on this front, and added that domestic economic problems were creating additional pressure on the regime.
3. (S) With regard to their nuclear program, Dagan said the Iranians are attempting to convey a "false presentation" that they have mastered the uranium enrichment process. The reality is that they are not there yet, said Dagan, and they are paying a heavy political price (sanctions) for something they have yet to achieve. Dagan noted growing antipathy in Russia towards Iran and its nuclear program, and said the Iranians were shocked by Russian statements accusing them of supporting terrorism against the United States. In Dagan's view, there is no ideological conflict within the Iranian leadership (all wish to see the destruction of Israel), but there is a growing divide on tactics with some supporting a retaliatory position against the West and others favoring new policies of moderation. Recognizing the growing strength of the moderate camp, Dagan said that the militant followers of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are now trying to target supporters of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as spies.
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Gulf States Await Action (From Others) on Iran
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4. (S) According to Dagan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States all fear Iran, but want someone else "to do the job for them." Townsend and Dagan discussed the current state of affairs in the Saudi royal court, where the Mossad Chief accused Foreign Minister Saud bin Faysal of playing a "very negative role." He also pointed to the recent visit of the Saudi King Abdullah to Jordan as a historical first and turning point for relations between the two countries. Townsend agreed, and said that the Saudi king has a sense of urgency on the political front. Dagan characterized Qatar as "a real problem," and accused Sheikh Hamid of "annoying everyone." In his view, Qatar is trying to play all sides -- Syria, Iran, Hamas -- in an effort to achieve security and some degree of independence. "I think you should remove your bases from there...seriously," said Dagan. "They have confidence only because of the U.S. presence." Dagan predicted, with some humor, that al-Jazeera would be the next cause of war in the Middle East as some Arab leaders (specifically Saudi Arabia) are willing to take drastic steps to shut down the channel, and hold Sheikh Hamid personally responsible for its provocations.
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Syria Taking Dangerous Risks
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5. (S) Dagan echoed other reports that Syria expects an Israeli attack this summer, and has raised its level of readiness. Despite the fact that Israel has no intention of attacking, said Dagan, the Syrians are likely to retaliate over even the smallest incident, which could lead to quick escalation. Dagan believes that Syria's strategic alliance with Iran and Hizballah has not changed, and that Assad views these policies as both "successful and just." There is a tendency to assume that Syria can be separated from Iran, said Dagan, and that this offers the key to weakening Hizballah. Dagan argued that the opposite is true: by enforcing UN resolutions on Lebanon and increasing efforts to disarm Hizballah, the international community can remove the glue that binds Iran and Syria. Enforcing the resolutions would put additional pressure on Assad, who fears being tried for the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri above all else. The advantage of such an approach, continued Dagan, is that the legal ground is already in place for action by the UNSC. This credible threat could sufficiently frighten Syria away from Iran and towards more natural allies in the Arab League.
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Deep Pessimism on Relations With Palestinians
---------------------------------------------
6. (S) Departing from official GOI policy, Dagan expressed his personal opinion that after more than a decade of trying to reach a final status agreement with the Palestinians, "nothing will be achieved." Only Israeli military operations against Hamas in the West Bank prevent them from expanding control beyond Gaza, lamented Dagan, without which Fatah would fall within one month and Abbas would join his "mysteriously wealthy" son in Qatar. Offering what he believed to be a conservative estimate, Dagan said that USD 6 billion had been invested in the Palestinian Authority since 1994. "What did it accomplish, other than adding a few more people to the Fortune 500?" asked Dagan. Although he expressed his personal faith in Salam Fayyad, Dagan said that the Palestinian Prime Minister had no power base. Fatah as a party would have to completely reorganize itself in order to regain credibility, argued Dagan, but instead they have turned once again to the "old guard." The Mossad Chief suggested that a completely new approach was required, but did not provide Townsend any additional details.
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Pakistan...and Other Regional Concerns
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7. (S) Townsend and Dagan then embarked on an informal tour of the region, comparing notes on countries critical to combating terrorism. Dagan characterized a Pakistan ruled by radical Islamists with a nuclear arsenal at their disposal as his biggest nightmare. Al-Qaeda and other "Global Jihad" groups could not be relied upon to behave rationally once in possession of nuclear weapons, said Dagan, as they do not care about the well being of states or their image in the media. "We have to keep (President Pervez) Musharaf in power," said Dagan. In North Africa, Dagan contended that Qaddafi needs to be pushed more in order to put Libya on the right track. Qaddafi faces little domestic pressure, said Dagan, but has traditionally responded to outside threats and runs foreign policy based on his emotions. The only reason Qaddafi moderated his position to begin with, said Dagan, was that he feared that he was "in the crosshairs" for regime change. Dagan viewed the situation in Algeria as more serious, with the south of the country becoming increasingly dangerous and the leadership uncertain as it faces radical Islamic forces. Morocco is coping better with these issues "in spite of the king," said Dagan, who appears to take little interest in governing. In Turkey, Dagan said that Islamists there are not of the same cloth as others in the region, but he does fear that they are slowly breaking down the secular character of the state and could become more radical over time. Dagan argued that if the Turkish military received more direct support from the United States, it would be better able to prevent the rise of Islamists.
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CRETZ
Monday, 08 January 2007, 16:38
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000064
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/05/2017
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, IS, KWBG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 13-15
VISIT TO ISRAEL
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)
1. (S) Madam Secretary, internal tensions among GOI leaders have intensified since your last visit and have reached the point that there appears to be little coordination or even dialogue among the key decision makers. Therefore, we will need to be sensitive to perceptions that we are favoring one faction over another. The divisions at the top here are part of an increasingly gloomy public mood, with a new corruption allegations making headlines virtually daily, and a growing sense of political failure despite Israel's strong economy and a sustained success rate in thwarting suicide attacks. Prime Minister Olmert's approval ratings were only 23 percent in the latest poll, and Israeli interlocutors across the political spectrum are speaking openly of a crisis of public confidence in the country's leadership at a time when Israelis feel an urgent need for strong leadership to face the threats from Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hizballah.
OPTIMISM ERODING
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2. (S) The year 2007 has started off badly for Israelis. The good feeling generated by PM Olmert's long-delayed December 23 summit meeting with Abu Mazen quickly dissipated under the weight of reports of a new settlement in the Jordan Valley (now suspended by Peretz), continued Qassam rocket attacks on Sderot and neighboring kibbutzim, foot-dragging on both sides in implementing the transfer of tax revenues, lack of progress on the release of Cpl. Gilad Shalit, and the unpleasant atmospherics of the January 4 Olmert-Mubarak summit, which was overshadowed by a botched IDF daylight raid in the center of Ramallah in which four Palestinians were killed.
3. (S) The Ramallah operation, which was authorized by the IDF's West Bank commander without informing the Minister of Defense, served as a stark reminder of the lack of coordination between Israel's military and its civilian leadership. When it comes to Israel's strategy for dealing with Palestinians, it increasingly seems that military is military, civilian is civilian and never the twain shall meet! Despite Olmert's belated embrace of Abu Mazen as a peace partner, there is growing concern that moderate Arab willingness to maintain the embargo on Hamas may be eroding, and that Fatah may fail to muster the popular support it will need to depose Hamas, whether at the ballot box or in the streets. Meanwhile, the upcoming release of the results of the Winograd Commission's investigation of the Lebanon war hangs like a sword of Damocles over the heads of Olmert, Defense Minister Peretz, and IDF Chief of General Staff Halutz. Peretz and Halutz have both publicly stated that they will resign if the Commission holds them responsible for serious errors in the conduct of the war, but Olmert has refrained from public comments. Olmert is also awaiting the results of several separate investigations involving corruption allegations, any one of which could further damage him severely, if not force his resignation.
4. (S) While Israeli anxiety over a possible dramatic shift of U.S. policy as a result of the Iraq Study Group's report has been allayed by statements by you and the President, there continues to be deep uneasiness here that the Baker-Hamilton recommendations reflect the shape of things to come in U.S. policy. Israelis recognize that U.S. public support for the Iraq war is eroding and are following with interest the President's upcoming articulation of the revamped policy, but they are deeply concerned that Israeli-Palestinian issues not become linked in American minds to creating a more propitious regional environment for whatever steps we decide to take to address the deteriorating situation in Iraq.
5. (S) Iran's nuclear program continues to cause great anxiety in Israel. Given their history, Israelis across the political spectrum take very seriously Ahmadinejad's threats to wipe Israel off the map. Olmert has been quite clear in his public comments that Israel cannot tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran, a position stated even more emphatically by opposition leader Netanyahu, who compares today's Iran to Nazi Germany in 1938. Despite the worst-case assessments of Israeli intelligence, however, there is a range of views about what action Israel should take. The MFA and some of the think tank Iran experts appear increasingly inclined to state that military action must be a last resort and are taking a new interests in other forms of pressure, including but not limited to sanctions, that could force Iran to abandon its military nuclear program. The IDF, however, srikes us as more inclined than ever to look toward a military strike, whether launched by Israel or by us, as the only way to destroy or even delay Iran's plans. Thoughtful
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Israeli analysts point out that even if a nuclear-armed Iran did not immediately launch a strike on the Israeli heartland, the very fact that Iran possesses nuclear weapons would completely transform the Middle East strategic environment in ways that would make Israel's long-term survival as a democratic Jewish state increasingly problematic. That concern is most intensively reflected in open talk by those who say they do not want their children and grandchildren growing up in an Israel threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran.
LIVNI RISING
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6. (C) FM Tzipi Livni is frustrated by Olmert's continued refusal to coordinate closely, and -- perhaps with an eye on polls showing her popularity at over double the level of the Prime Minister -- suggested to a Ha'aretz interviewer in late December that she would challenge Olmert for the prime ministership if he continued not to give her his full backing. In the same interview, Livni provided an outline of her thinking, but not a detailed plan, on the way ahead with the Arabs, including negotiating an interim agreement with the Palestinians in which the separation barrier would serve as the border, and refusing to engage with Syria unless Asad takes steps to end support for terrorism and distances himself from Iran. Livni's policy adviser has confirmed to us that she has engaged in her own discrete discussions with Palestinians, but very much in an exploratory mode. Livni told Senators Kerry and Dodd that she doubted that a final status agreement could be reached with Abu Mazen, and therefore the emphasis should be on reforming Fatah so that it could beat Hamas at the polls. MFA officials tell us that Livni is also focused on the need to keep Hamas isolated. She and her senior staff have repeatedly expressed concern that some EU member-states are wobbly on this point. Meanwhile, Livni is keenly aware that unlike Olmert, she has little to fear from the Winograd Commission report (nor is she tainted by the corruption allegations that dog Olmert). Her incipient bid to take Olmert's place could become more serious once the report's preliminary conclusions are released next month.
SHIFTING VIEWS ON SYRIA
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7. (S) Olmert and Livni agree that negotiations with Syria would be a trap that Damascus would use to end the international pressure on it and to gain a freer hand in Lebanon. While they see public relations downsides to dismissing Syrian peace overtures out of hand, they continue to insist that no negotiations will be possible until Syria reduces its support for terrorism and/or takes direct steps to secure the release of Israeli prisoners held by Hamas and Hizballah. Olmert and Livni are supported in that view by Mossad chief Dagan, who takes a dim view of Syrian intentions. A significant part of the security establishment, however, appears to be reaching the conclusion that it is in Israel's interest to test Asad's intentions -- possibly through the use of a back channel contact -- and to seek to wean him away from Tehran. They are joined in that view by Defense Minister Peretz, much of the Labor Party and the Israeli left, who argue that Israel cannot afford to refuse to at least explore Asad's offer to negotiate, often comparing that stance to Golda Meir's much-criticized decision to spurn Sadat's offer to negotiate, which then led to the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Press reports January 5 stated that the defense establishment had recommended to Olmert that he open an exploratory channel to Damascus in two months, a timeline reportedly linked to the completion of reviews of U.S. policy toward Iraq and the Middle East, as well as to clearer indications of Abu Mazen's intentions and capabilities vis a vis Hamas.
PERETZ-OLMERT TENSIONS
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8. (C) According to leaks from a recent Labor Party leadership meeting, Amir Peretz said that he feels completely disconnected from Olmert. Ever since Peretz' telephone conversation with Abu Mazen which infuriated Olmert, the two reportedly barely speak to each other. Television news reports on January 4 trumpeted rumors that Olmert had decided to remove Peretz as Defense Minister and replace him with former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who has already announced plans to challenge Peretz for the Labor Party's leadership in late May primaries. Even though the Prime Minister's Office almost immediately denied the reports, there is little doubt here that someone in the PMO was behind them. While much of the Labor Party feels that Peretz has been a failure, both as Defense Minister and as Party Secretary General, and Peretz' popularity with the general public has hit rock bottom, Labor
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members widely condemned the media trial balloon, which they saw as an unacceptable attempt by Olmert's advisers to intervene in their party's leadership contest. In any event, the incident is yet another indication of the intense degree of personal rancor and dysfunction prevailing at the top of the GOI.
PERETZ AND SNEH OUR AMA PARTNERS
--------------------------------
9. (C) Notwithstanding the GOI's internal discord, there is some good news in our efforts to nudge the GOI toward improvements in Palestinian quality of life issues. Despite his political woes, Peretz has proven himself a serious partner in our efforts to implement the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) and more generally in a slow but steady push by the MOD to force a reluctant IDF to accept steps to reduce barriers to Palestinian movement and to revive the Palestinian economy. Deputy Defense Minister Efraim Sneh, who will likely accompany Peretz to your meeting, has emerged as the point man for these efforts. Sneh shares Peretz' conviction that Israel's security stranglehold on the Palestinians is "winning the battle but losing the war," but Sneh, who in a decades-long career served as a military governor of the West Bank, commanded an elite combat unit, and took part in the famed Entebbe raid, also has both an intimate knowledge of the Palestinians and a combat commander's credibility with the IDF that Peretz sorely lacks. Your meeting with Peretz provides an opportunity to express appreciation for his and Sneh's efforts and to encourage them in their struggle to bring recalcitrant elements in the IDF to heel. The more progress we can achieve with them on AMA implementation now, the easier it will be to achieve meaningful results with both parties in the coming year.
********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES
Wednesday, 18 November 2009, 14:30
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002500
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/17/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PTER, EG, CH, IR, RU, SA, LE, TU, IS
SUBJECT: 40TH JOINT POLITICAL-MILITARY GROUP: EXECUTIVE
SESSION (PART 1 OF 4)
Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (S) Summary: During the Executive Session of the 40th Joint Political Military Group (JPMG), U.S. and Israeli counterparts continued discussion on the creation of four new Qualitative Military Edge (QME) working groups. GOI interlocutors continued to raise concerns regarding the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia. Both sides agreed that continued pressure be applied to Iran, especially following the disclosure of the nuclear facility in Qom. GOI participants expressed concern regarding Chinese and Russian cooperation with respect to enhanced Iranian sanctions. The GOI also raised dual citizenship concerns with respect to access to sensitive technology, and noted from its perspective Turkey's disturbing change of course toward Syria and Iran -- and away from Israel. This is the first in four cables (septels) reporting on the JPMG. End summary.
2. (SBU) Israeli Participants:
-- Brigadier General (res) Pinchas Buchris, MOD Director General -- Major General (ret) Amos Gilad, MOD Political-Military Chief -- Brigadier General Ronen Dan, acting Israeli Defense Attache to the United States -- Gad Dovev, Director, MOD Mission, New York -- Alon Bar, MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs -- COL Shimon Arad, IDF J5 -- Rami Yungman, MOD Political-Military Bureau -- Schmuel Royter, Assistant to the MOD Director General
U.S. Participants:
-- Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs -- Luis Moreno, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv -- Dr. Colin Kahl, International Security Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense -- Brigadier General Jefforey Smith, Joint Staff -- Prem Kumar, Director for Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian and Jordanian Affairs, NSC -- Tom Goldberger, Director for Israel and Palestinian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs -- COL Richard Burgess, Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv
Qualitative Military Edge
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3. (S) The Executive Session continued discussion from the September 30 Qualitative Military Edge (QME) meeting in Washington. Both sides presented their primary points of contact for the four newly proposed working groups focusing on previous agreements, mitigation measures for the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia, technical mitigation issues, and intelligence/policy. Agreement was reached to begin working on the details of each working group's meeting schedule and timeline.
4. (S) The GOI continued to express concern over the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia. U.S. participants noted that the USG is unable to provide more detailed information about the sale until Saudi Arabia officially sends a Letter of Request (LOR). The GOI expressed additional concerns about stationing these new aircraft at Tabuk airfield in the northwest corner of Saudi Arabia -- close to the Israeli border. U.S. participants stated the USG understanding that this should not be an issue, as the Saudis are considering stationing new Typhoon aircraft at Tabuk. The GOI also raised AMRAAM sales to Jordan; U.S. participants explained that the new C-7 AMRAAM is an export version with capabilities similar to the C-5 version -- and therefore provides little to no increase in capabilities.
Iran, China and Russia
----------------------
5. (S) Both sides expressed concern over the recent revelation regarding Iran's nuclear facility at Qom, and agreed that increased pressure should be applied directly and internationally against Iran in order to better determine Tehran's motives and next steps. Both sides agreed that the facility at Qom should be inspected immediately. One member of the Israeli delegation expressed the opinion that some consideration be given to "shutting Qom operations down completely" to prevent further progress on obtaining a nuclear weapon. That said, the GOI argued that the international community not become bogged down on the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and Qom, thereby diverting focus from
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the bigger issue of Iran's nuclear program.
6. (S) Several questions were raised about China's position on Iran's efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon. Both sides agreed that continued engagement with China and Russia is needed -- as well as building a consensus in Europe. The USG speculated, and the GOI concurred, that China will follow Moscow's lead. USG participants argued that China would seek to avoid an international confrontation over Iran. The GOI described 2010 as a critical year -- if the Iranians continue to protect and harden their nuclear sites, it will be more difficult to target and damage them. Both sides then discussed the upcoming delivery of GBU-28 bunker busting bombs to Israel, noting that the transfer should be handled quietly to avoid any allegations that the USG is helping Israel prepare for a strike against Iran.
7. (S) The GOI made the case for "crippling sanctions"; cooperation between the United States, Europe, Russia and China will be necessary in order for these sanctions to be effective. U.S. participants stressed the USG position that any discussions with Iran on this subject be finite; the USG will continue to monitor whether negotiations are making progress. The GOI stated that it is not convinced the Iranians will negotiate in good faith unless there are visible and clear threats. U.S. delegation members described eight lanes of sanctions, and outlined a plan to "pivot to apply appropriate pressure" on those points and tracks that have the most impact. U.S. participants concurred that 2010 is a critical year -- but the continued application of pressure is vital.
8. (S) Regarding Russia, the GOI was not confident that Moscow will be helpful in any Iranian sanctions effort -- GOI participants opined that Russia is considered a "mystery" with respect to their views on Iran. The GOI raised the Russian S-300 sale to Iran, noting that the transfer is still pending. GOI participants argued that Moscow seeks a return to superpower status, but there are contradictory trends regarding Russia's internal condition.
Dual Citizenship Issues
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9. (S) The GOI raised the issue of dual citizenship within the context of access to sensitive technology. U.S. participants acknowledged Israeli concerns, noting that the issue is being worked at the highest levels of the USG to reach consensus on how to proceed. The GOI recommended obtaining a waiver similar to the relationship from which Canada or Australia benefit.
Turkey
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10. (S) The GOI raised the current direction the Government of Turkey has taken toward Syria and Iran -- and away from Israel. Israeli participants argued that Turkey has been supportive of Hamas in Gaza while pursuing a more "Islamic" direction with the goal of becoming a regional superpower. The GOI argued that the Turkish military is losing its ability to influence government decisions and strategic direction. After this past year, GOI participants said they have a "bad feeling" about Turkey. The GOI noted that the Israel Air Force (IAF) Commander in the past wanted to speak to the Turkish Air Force Commander, but his Turkish counterpart declined.
11. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared on this cable. CUNNINGHAM
Wednesday, 04 November 2009, 06:44
S E C R E T MANAMA 000642
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 11/04/2019
TAGS PREL, MARR, ENRG, BA, AF, IZ, IR, NATO
SUBJECT: GENERAL PETRAEUS WITH KING HAMAD: IRAQ,
AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, NATO AWACS, ENERGY
Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: In an hour-long meeting on November 1 with CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus, Bahrain's King Hamad said Arab states need to do more to engage Iraq, discussed Afghanistan and the positive role India could play, urged action to stop Iran's nuclear program, and reviewed regional plans for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. END SUMMARY.
2.(C) IRAQ: King Hamad fully endorsed General Petraeus's point that increased Arab engagement and influence would help frustrate Iranian designs in Iraq. He added that the Arabs need Egyptian and Saudi leadership in this matter and that he had tried to make this point to the Saudi government, but with little effect.
3.(C) AFGHANISTAN: General Petraeus praised Bahrain's commitment of a police company for internal security at FOB Leatherneck. King Hamad confirmed that he would personally see the force off at the airport on December 16. This date will be the 10th anniversary of the King's assuming the throne, and General Petraeus said that U.S. air assets would be available on the 16th to transport the company to Afghanistan. King Hamad inquired about the extent of India's involvement in Afghanistan and noted that Bahrain saw India as very positive force in the region. "It's a new era," he said. "They can be of great help."
4.(C) IRAN: King Hamad pointed to Iran as the source of much of the trouble in both Iraq and Afghanistan. He argued forcefully for taking action to terminate their nuclear program, by whatever means necessary. "That program must be stopped," he said. "The danger of letting it go on is greater than the danger of stopping it." King Hamad added that in light of these regional developments, Bahrain was working to strengthen GCC coordination and its relations with allies and international organizations. He specifically mentioned NATO and confirmed that Bahrain had agreed to the Alliance's request to use Isa Airbase for AWACS missions, although the detail on numbers and timing have yet to be discussed.
5.(S/NF) BAHRAIN AIR SHOW AND NUCLEAR ENERGY: King Hamad asked General Petraeus for his help in encouraging U.S. aircraft manufacturers to participate in the inaugural Bahrain Air Show, scheduled for January 2010. He said that France was pushing the Rafale and would be there in force, although he agreed with Petraeus that the French fighter was yesterday's technology. Warming to the subject of French commercial diplomacy and referring to President Sarkozy, King Hamad said, "The UAE will give him a hard time soon," over France's proposed deal for nuclear reactors. "They're not happy with the project he's offered them." King Hamad also mentioned that Bahrain was studying options for using nuclear power to generate electricity. He said he had asked the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Public Works to present him recommendations and invited the Ambassador to discuss with them possible U.S. involvement. Post will do so.
ERELI
Friday, 12 June 2009, 12:11
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000478
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/03/2019
TAGS PREL, PTER, SNAR, ENRG, ELTN, AJ, PK, TU, TX, IR
BAKU 00000478 001.2 OF 003
SUBJECT: IRAN VIEW FROM BAKU: VIOLENCE IN BALUCHISTAN
REDUCING BORDER SECURITY; GOAJ OFFICIAL WARNS AGAINST MANIPULATION OF IRAN'S MINORITIES; IRAN TRANSIT-ORIGIN HEROIN SEIZURES RISE; ALLEGED PROBLEMS WITH IRANIAN GAS EXPORT DEALS
REF: A) KARACHI 145 B) 2008 BAKU 917
Classified By: POL/ECON COUNSELOR ROBERT GARVERICK, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
Summary
--------
1. (C) "Iran view from Baku" is the first in an occasional series from Embassy Baku Iran Watcher that will report on short and/or partially documented items of interest to Iran information consumers, but not necessarily warranting separate cables. This cable includes information on reported increasing security problems in Iranian Baluchistan, including alleged disruption of Iran-Pakistan railroad links; a message from a senior GOAJ military offical about the dangers of stirring up Iranian minorities; the apparent quadrupling in first quarter 2009 (compared to first quarter 2008) seizures in Azerbaijan of Iranian- transited heroin; and skepticism about Iranian gas export contracts, related by industry participants at the recently-completed Baku Oil and Gas show. End Summary.
Baluchi Violence Obstructing Iran-Pakistan Rail Link?
--------------------------------------------- -------
2. (C) Several Iranian contacts, including apolitical businessmen, have told Baku Iran watcher that the recent suicide bombing of a Sh'ia mosque, and subsequent attack on a campaign center in Zahedan, reflect a surge in Baluchi violence in the border area and inside Pakistan that has been building steadily over several years. According to one source, the Iranian security forces may be losing effective control over growing areas in the countryside. All noted that the rising violence in Iranian Baluchistan is mirrored and influenced by similar events on the Pakistani side of the border (recently described in ref(a)).
3. (C) One alleged result is the apparent postponement of completion of the long-planned improved rail link between Pakistan and Iran, designed to run through or near Baluchi territory on both sides of the border. The current rail connection, running between Quetta, Pakistan and Zahedan, Iran is in poor condition and has low freight-carrying capacity. Moreover, according to reports it has recently been repeatedly subject to rocket attacks and other disruption by Baluchi tribes. An improved link also traversing Iranian and Pakistani Baluchi areas was originally supposed to have been inaugurated in March, 2009, with container train service beginning in August. According to Iranian sources in Baku, this deadline is unlikely to be achieved, and regular use of the Iran-Pakistan railway for significant cargo shipment is unlikely in the foreseeable future.
4. (S)[Source removed] quoted the Ministry source as saying that in 2008 Iran asked Pakistan to establish a new, "more secure and modern" route, but that Pakistan has so far refused. The source added that Tehran is rife with rumors about the increasing lack of safety in Baluchi areas, and claimed that many guard and police posts in Sistan-Baluchistan areas are no longer occupied at night due to the increased danger of attack.
5. (C) Another source, [Source removed] blamed the Ahmadinejad administration for pursuing provocative anti-Sunni practices (including harassment of Sunni clergy and congregations and raids on Sunni mosques) and other "arrogant" crackdowns over the last few years. He claimed that these practices, combined with high unemployment, perceived discrimination,
BAKU 00000478 002.2 OF 003
SUBJECT: IRAN VIEW FROM BAKU: VIOLENCE IN BALUCHISTAN REDUCING BORDER SECURITY; GOAJ OFFICIAL WARNS AGAINST MANIPULATION OF IRAN'S MINORITIES; IRAN TRANSIT-ORIGIN HEROIN SEIZURES RISE; ALLEGED PROBLEMS WITH IRANIAN GAS EXPORT DEALS
and few government services, has increased anger among Baluchis, and identification of the central government as an "enemy." He cited the appointment of Ahmadinejad ally Habibullah Dehmordah as a Governor of Sistan-Baluchistan as a typical insensitive blunder, calling him a "stupid, brutal, Sunni-hater." (Note: Dehmordah was replaced as Governor in 2008 by Ali-Mohammed Azad. End Note).
GOAJ Military Figure Opposes Promoting Unrest in Iran
--------------------------------------------- --------
6. (S) At a 12 May meeting with a visiting group of 16 U.S. military general officers, the GOAJ's Special Assistant to the President for Defense, General Vahid Aliyev, related that he had recently met in Iranian Azerbaijan with (unnamed) high-ranking &Iranian General.8 Although he did not provide details, Aliyev strongly implied that the Iranian General raised alleged "foreign-sponsored" efforts to foment unrest among Iranian ethnic groups, including Iranian Azerbaijanis (who make up nearly thirty percent of the Iranian population). Commenting on this issue, Aliyev asserted that "there have been four attempts by Iranian Azerbaijanis to assert autonomy in the last hundred years, all of which were crushed" by the Iranian state. As an example, Aliyev cited the Soviet effort during World War II to establish a breakaway "Republic of South Azerbaijan." The Soviets forces pulled back in 1946, after a "Truman-Stalin Agreement," which Aliyev depicted as a cynical "betrayal" of collaborating Iranian Azerbaijanis. He recounted that the resulting repression by Tehran resulted in the deaths of 60,000 Azeris, and the flight of many more into Soviet Azerbaijan.
7. (S) U.S. military participants agreed that Aliyev appeared to be implicitly signaling that outside fomenting of unrest in Iranian Azerbaijan is opposed by the GOAJ. Aliyev similarly told the U.S. officers that any foreign war with Iran will be bad for Azerbaijan, and result in a flood of refugees entering the country. (Note: The three other "failed Azerbaijani autonomy struggles" cited by Aliyev presumably refer to the early 20th century Constitutional Revolution, Azerbaijani resistance to Reza Shah's centralization policies in the 1920's, and efforts by senior Azerbaijani clerics and activists to obtain local autonomy in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. End note).
GOAJ Iran-Origin Heroin Seizures Continue Rise
--------------------------------------------- -
8. (C) According to [Source removed], export of narcotics from Iran into Azerbaijan continue to skyrocket (see ref b). According to statistics provided to Baku Iran watcher on June 3, 2009 by the UNODC-sponsored counter-narcotics "Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center" (CARICC) headquarters in Tashkent, Iran-origin heroin seizures (i.e., heroin derived from Afghani and Pakistani opium that entered Azerbaijan from Iran) in Azerbaijan nearly quadrupled during the first quarter of 2009, as compared to the first quarter of 2008. According to the GOAJ, virtually all of this heroin had been fully processed in labs and was "ready for market." Total heroin seizures in Azerbaijan during the first quarter of 2008 reflected a sharp increase over the first quarter of 2007; while in 2006 only twenty kilograms of such heroin was officially reported seized in Azerbaijan during the entire year. In contrast, reported GOAJ seizures of Iran-origin heroin during the first quarter of 2009 amounted to nearly 59,000 kilos, as compared to approximately 15,000 kilos of heroin seized in the first quarter of 2008.
Projected Problems in Iranian Gas Links
---------------------------------------
9. (C) The annual Baku Oil and Gas Show, held June 2-5, brought a variety of energy company executives and pundits to Baku, though no senior officials from Iran. An American
BAKU 00000478 003.2 OF 003
SUBJECT: IRAN VIEW FROM BAKU: VIOLENCE IN BALUCHISTAN REDUCING BORDER SECURITY; GOAJ OFFICIAL WARNS AGAINST MANIPULATION OF IRAN'S MINORITIES; IRAN TRANSIT-ORIGIN HEROIN SEIZURES RISE; ALLEGED PROBLEMS WITH IRANIAN GAS EXPORT DEALS
interlocutor told Baku Iran Watcher on the side of the show that a [Source removed] had confided to him in a private conversation on June 4 that he viewed near-term implementation of the Iranian-Pakistani gas link project as "very unlikely." The downbeat comment by the [Source removed] was made despite the recent signing in Istanbul by President Ahmadinejad and President Zardari of an Iranian-Pakistani MOU committing to the gas project. According to this source, [Source removed] indicated that he had several reasons for this opinion, but the only one he elaborated was that "the Pakistanis don't have the money to pay for either the pipeline, or the gas."
10. (C) Meanwhile, during a panel discussion at the conference on the future prospects of Caspian gas, several commentators noted the difficulty of doing business in "unpredictable, overly bureaucratic" Iran, and the alleged historical "unreliability" of Iranian gas supply contracts previously reached with Turkey and Turkmenistan. For example, panelists recounted that, after long negotiations, Iran has four times failed to sign separate Liquid national Gas contracts at the last minute. Two panelists claimed that Iran has repeatedly diverted gas supplies to meet domestic needs, thereby interrupting its contractual gas exports - and has not paid contractual penalties for these violations.
11. (C) A [Source removed] asserted bluntly that Iranian political leaders are totally focused on domestic needs and personal jockeying, and are simply not interested in hearing about the value of optimizing foreign gas exports. The only exception, he claimed, is their interest in the notional prospect of annually exporting ten billion cubic meters (bcms) of gas to Europe. He attributed this interest to a conviction that such a deal will significantly increase Iran's political leverage in Europe and substantially insulate it from future European pressure - a perception he characterized as revealing, and "typically" unrealistic.
DERSE
Wednesday, 13 May 2009, 12:20
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001060
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/13/2019
TAGS PREL, MPOS, KNNP, IR, IS
SUBJECT: REP. WEXLER DISCUSSES IRAN WITH IDF INTELLIGENCE
CHIEF YADLIN
Classified By: DCM Luis G, Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)
1. (S) Representative Robert Wexler (D, Florida), accompanied by Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Rogin and DCM Moreno, met with Israel Defense Forces Intelligence Chief, MG Amos Yadlin, on Sunday 10 May 2009. MG Yadlin focused his discussion on the preparations for the upcoming visit of Prime Minister Netanyahu to the United States and the Iranian nuclear program. MG Yadlin informed Rep. Wexler that the PM was preparing intensely for his upcoming visit to Washington. In addition to hours of policy review, the PM had been provided significant amounts of intelligence from the IDI and Mossad on Iran's nuclear program. The intelligence presented included assessments of the current status of the Iranian program; timelines, effects of sanctions; views of the international community; and outcomes of engagement. The differences that exist between the intelligence community in interpretations of the Iranian nuclear program as well as the relationship between Iran and the Palestinians were also presented. MG Yadlin indicated that the IDF had presented its information last week, leaving the cabinet on Friday 08 May 2009 to consider policy options and how information will be presented during the upcoming visit to Washington. Although no direct feedback was provided, MG Yadlin opined that the PM appears determined on Iran.
2. (S) Rep. Wexler asked MG Yadlin to expand on the differences in the interpretations of the intelligence. MG Yadlin explained that until 2003, Iran had violated the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty by having a weaponization group and although Iran could show civilian uses for a missile program and a fissile program, there was no justification for a weaponization group. He went on to say that Iran halted its program in 2003 after the invasion of Iraq, but reinvigorated the program in 2005. He expressed that some in the US agree with this and others do not. He went on to explain that Israel is not in a position to underestimate Iran and be surprised like the US was on 11 September 2001.
3. (S) MG Yadlin explained that Israel tries to be more precise than the US in estimating Iran's intentions and timeline for obtaining a nuclear bomb. Iran is in the position of wanting to pay only a minimum cost for its current program. It does not want to be North Korea or what Iraq was before 2003. Iran intends to keep resolutions and sanctions at a certain manageable level and continue to produce low enriched uranium until there is enough for several bombs. MG Yadlin stated that Iran could decide to produce a bomb by 2010, but Iran is waiting for the right time in the future and that there are some who will always doubt it despite the evidence.
4. (S) Rep. Wexler then asked about the prospect of engagement. MG Yadlin said he does not oppose engagement, and in fact gave a speech approximately six months ago expressing that Israel needed to find a way to find positives in engagement. He feels there needs to be an agreed upon deadline; a measure for success or failure; and a plan B if engagement does not work in order for engagement to have any chance. He also expressed strongly that engagement should have already started. MG Yadlin outlined four possible outcomes of engagement. Two good outcomes would be the Iranian nuclear program stopped or a failure of engagement that allows Russia and China to see the US made all efforts to prevent the program diplomatically and allows for greater cooperation in the future. Two bad outcomes would be Iran playing for time with no claim of failure on the part of engagement or a bad bargain that still allows Iran to obtain a nuclear bomb even if in a longer timeline. Rep. Wexler went on to discuss that there is a third good option in that the President may have better leverage with the American public to support action if engagement efforts are attempted and failed. Rep Wexler recommended that the Israeli people need to consider the US perspective and public opinion. MG Yadlin responded that he is not recommending the US enter a third front, but it has to be understood that Israel sees things differently and that Israel has to be ready and can not remove the military option from the table. Rep Wexler stated that he expected Israel would be pleasantly surprised by the President's acceptance of all possible options in regards to Iran.
********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv ********************************************* ******************** CUNNINGHAM
Wednesday, 22 April 2009, 11:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000177
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 4/22/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, ECON, ETRD, KDEM, IR
SUBJECT: IRAN REGIONAL PRESENCE OFFICE--WINDOW ON IRAN--APRIL 22,
2009
DUBAI 00000177 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (S/NF) Game of Attrition. Ahmadinejad's defeats on the budget and his plan to distribute cash payments to lower-income Iranians show that power centers, such as the Majles, are actively working to pressure the President prior to the June election, according to [Source removed]. These power centers are also stepping up their lobbying of Supreme Leader Khamenei to get his backing to stall or overturn some Presidential authorities. This game is increasingly being played out in the media, where the sides openly attack each other, and where the President's public defenses are weakening his hand and depleting political capital that he would prefer to save for the bigger fights ahead. The cash payment plan could have garnered AN additional votes, but he continues to "work the rounds" in the provinces and maintain his base of support where it really matters. By June, the current policy debates will matter less, and it is too early to consider these moves decisive to AN's electoral prospects, according to the economist. Comment: If these power centers can get increased backing from Khamenei, we may see some interesting fireworks in Iranian press in the coming weeks. As IRPO has previously reported, identifying the power centers responsible for AN' setbacks on economic policy last month is difficult but could include a broad spectrum of political factions.
2. (S/NF) [Name removed] said the MOIS will sometimes help assemble charges against defendants, direct cases to particular judges, and order judges to rule a particular way. Structurally, he said the Revolutionary Courts are similar to other courts, fall under the Judiciary's authority, and are theoretically supposed to follow the same law. Defendants are allowed to have lawyers during their trials, can defend themselves, and can appeal decisions. Asked about Roxanna Saberi, [Name removed] said he was aware of her case, but had no specific information on it. Comment: The Revolutionary Courts' lack of transparency and seemingly baseless decision making make [Name removed] allegations plausible and perhaps probable. [Name removed] work in the judiciary branch as a public prosecutor [Location removed] also gives his assertions some credibility, but he did not work in the Revolutionary Courts. His accusations are more likely to reflect the legal community's assumptions rather than first-hand knowledge of MOIS influence. [Name removed] was also notable for the depth of his anti-regime sentiment, which probably colors his impressions of the Revolutionary Courts.
3. (S/NF) Mousavi's Economic Program. Moderate presidential candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi announced his economic program to the Iranian press this week, emphasizing economic growth and job creation from a rejuvenated and expanded private sector. Mousavi criticized AN's halting steps at privatization, calling them "the institutionalization of non-productive government management." Stability in government policies and a strict adherence to the planning documents of a restored Management and Planning Organization (MPO) and the "rule of law," are other key planks. The best talking point in the plan, "social justice doesn't mean equal distribution of poverty," challenges AN's key economic goal by inserting economic growth into the equation and highlighting his poor economic management. Mousavi's plan only briefly mentions subsidy reforms, stressing the need to implement them gradually, after careful preparation. Comment: Mousavi's plan mentions Article 44 of Iran's constitution, which defines the role of the state, cooperative, and private sectors in Iran's economy, but his emphasis on a strong private sector may open the plan to criticism that it is in conflict with the constitution. Mousavi also threatens to withdraw Iran's Fifth Five Year Development Plan, currently being drafted, if AN submits it to the Majles before the election. An IRPO contact [Source removed], didn't expect the plan to be finished until later this year.
4. (S/NF)[Name removed] said Iran's Ministry of Commerce has approved the creation of an Iran-Americas Chamber of Commerce in anticipation of improved US-Iran ties. Although the chamber's primary focus is the US, due to political sensitivities, it will not be called an Iran-US chamber. [Name removed] made the following points:
-- Khamenei instructed Ahmadinejad to base the Fifth Five Year Development Plan on a draft from the Expediency Council. [Name removed] alleged that both the Expediency Council and the president submitted drafts of the plan to Khamenei and Khamenei favored the Expediency Council's version.
-- The current year will be positive for Iranian businesses. [Name removed] admittedly in contrast with many of his colleagues, is optimistic because the election allows Iran the opportunity to remove Ahmadinejad and because he believes economic ties with the US will be a positive shock to the Iranian economy.
-- Khamenei moderated his support for Ahmadinejad following Khatami's decision to exit the contest. [Name removed] predicts Mir Hossein Mousavi will win the election.
-- The TCC meetings are more productive than the ICCIM meetings. The TCC has a monthly meeting with government representatives, including ministers; the TCC members prepare for the meetings and, typically, complain a great deal during the meetings about government policy. Although the government is not always responsive to their complaints, following a recent meeting, the oil minister appointed a committee to resolve the TCC's concerns. Participants in ICCIM meetings, which include representatives from the provincial chambers, are typically unprepared.
--Iranians seeking an export license must be a member of a chamber of commerce and both the Ministry of Commerce and a chamber must approve the export license.
Comment: [Name removed] seems well placed to comment on economic and political developments in Iran. However, his assertion that the Expediency Council submitted a draft of the next Five Year Development plan is unusual because normally the president's office drafts the plan and submits it to the Majles. The early involvement of the Expediency Council may reflect Rafsanjani's concern over Ahmadinejad's economic policies. Khamenei in a letter to Ahmadinejad in January outlined the general policies to be included in the plan; it is possible the letter is based on a plan from the Expediency Council.
5. (S/NF) IRIG Suspicion Extends to Its Own Official Delegations: [Source removed] hinted to IRPO local staff that official Iranian delegations can be scrutinized as much as exchange groups headed to the US. [Name removed] implied that IRIG officials had carefully vetted members of the IMF delegation. Separately, he told conoff, sotto voce, that the IRIG had only decided to allow some delegation members to travel two weeks ago, although their visa applications had been ready much earlier, and that was why they were late in applying. Comment: The delay in submitting the
DUBAI 00000177 003.2 OF 003
visa applications may have been simple bureaucratic inefficiency, although [Name removed] indicated he strongly believed that security agencies were scrutinizing members of the delegation before permitting them to travel. RICHARDSON
Friday, 26 October 1979, 07:32
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 01 TEHRAN 11319
E.O. 12065: GDS 10/25/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P
TAGS PINT, SHUM, PINR, IR
SUBJECT: MODERATION: DOES IT HAVE A CHANCE?
1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY: THE MODERATE IRANIAN POLITICAL PARTIES, WHICH WERE ACTIVE DURING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND WHICH HAVE A LONG HISTORY OF OPPOSITION TO THE SHAH, HAVE BEEN PUSHED INTO THE BACKGROUND BY THOSE INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS WHO FOLLOW A NARROW AND AUTHORITARIAN INTERPRETATION OF ISLAM. WITHIN THE PAST FEW WEEKS, MODERATE GROUPS WHO FAVOR A MORE BALANCED SOCIETY RESEMBLING A WESTERN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY, HAVE BECOME MORE VOCAL. WHILE NOT DIRECTLY CRITICIZING AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, THEY HAVE FOCUSED THEIR CRITICISM ON SOME OF THE OBVIOUS FAILURES OF THE PRESENT REGIME. THE POLITICAL POSITION OF THESE GROUPS IS STILL PRECARIOUS. IT EXPRESSES ITSELF THROUGH A FEW SECULAR SPOKESMEN, SOME LIBERAL CLERICS, AND SOME SMALL NEWSPAPERS. ALTHOUGH STILL NOT A MAJOR FORCE ON THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SCENE, THESE GROUPS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ORGANIZE THEMSELVES ENOUGH TO EXPRESS IDEAS CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE RULING ESTABLISHMENT. END SUMMARY.
3. THE ROLE OF SECULAR AND CLERICAL MODERATES -- THE HEIRS IS STILL A MATTER OF DEBATE. SINCE THE REVOLUTION FIGURES SUCH AS MATIN-DAFTARI NAZIH, FORUHAR, SANJABI, AND BAZARGAN HIMSELF HAVE BEEN OVERSHADOWED BY KHOMEINI AND BY HIS ALLIES WHO SHARE HIS VISION OF A THEOCRATIC IRAN. NOT ALL OF THESE SUPPORTERS OF KHOMEINI ARE CLERICS; THEY INCLUDE THE "SECULAR MULLAHS" SUCH AS QOTEZADEH, YAZDI, CHAMRAN, TABATABA'I AND OTHERS. THIS GROUP HAS DOMINATED THE GOVERNMENT, THE PRESS, THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, AND THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS. IT HAS HARRASSED AND IGNORED ITS OPPONENTS. BARZARGAN REMAINS POWERLESS; MATIN-DAFTARI AND NAZIH ARE IN HIDING; FORUHAR IS IGNORED; AND SAXJABI QUIT HIS JOB IN DISGUST AND LEFT THE COUNTRY.
4. ALTHOUGH THE POSITION OF THE MODERATE PARTIES IS STILL VERY FRAGILE, IN RECENT WEEKS THEY HAS SHOWN SOME SIGNS OF LIFE. ALTHOUGH THEIR MOST IMPORTANT ORGANS, INCLUDING THE NEWSPAPER AYANDEGAN AND THE POPULAR HUMOR MAGAZINE AHANGAR, WERE SUPPRESSED IN AUGUST, THEY HAVE BEGUN PUBLISHING SMALL PAPERS SUCH AS KHALO-E-MOSALMAN (FROM THE MUSLIME REPUBLICAN PEOPLES' PARTY); JONBESH (PUBLISHED BY ALI ASGHAR HAJ SEYYID JAVADI), JFBHEH-YE-AZADI FROM THE IRAN PARTY AND AZADI FROM THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT. ALTHOUGH THE CIRCULATION OF THESE PAPERS IS LIMITED AND THEY CARRY MUCH LESS INFLUENCE THAN THE THREE MAJOR DAILIES (SAYHAN, ETTELAAT, AND BAMDAD) THEY DO OFFER SUBSTANTIAL AND CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON EVENT -- A COMMENTARY OFTEN AT VARIANCE WITH THE OFFICIAL VERSION.
5. FOR THE PAST SIX WEEKS, THE MUSLIM REPUBLICAN PEOPLES PARTY (MPRP) HAS ORGANIZED FRIDAY AFTERNOON MEETINGS AT ITS TEHRAN HEADQUARTERS. ALTHOUGH THE FIRST MEETING ATTRACTED ONLY ABOUT 100 PEOPLE, EMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICER AND POLITICAL ASSISTANT ATTENDED OCTOBER 19 MEETING AND FOUND AN OVERFLOW OF OVER 1500. THE CROWD WAS LARGELY MIDDLE-CLASS AND WELL-EDUCATED. THERE WERE MANY WOMEN, SOME VEILED, A FEW CLERICS. THE SPEAKERS INCLUDED AHMAD ALIZADRH, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MPRP, AND KAHMATULLAH MOQOADAM-MARAGHE'I, LEADER OF THE RADICAL MOVEMENT AND EAST AZARBAIJAN DELEGATE TO THE COUNCIL OF MOVEMENT AND EAST AZARBAIJAN DELEGATE TO THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS. ALTHOUGH THE AUDIENCE AND SPEAKERS HAD NO AFFECTION FOR THE OLD REGIME, THERE WERE FEW MENTIONS OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, AND NO ANTI-AMERICAN STATEMENTS.
6. THE SPEAKERS ELICITED THE GREATEST RESPONSE BY THEIR ATTACKS ON AKHUNDBAZI (CLERICAL MEDDLING), ON THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS, AND ON ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH A THEOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP THROUGH THE VELAYAT-E-FAQIM. ONE OF THE SPEAKERS FOUND THE CROWD'S PULSE WHEN HE SAID, "WE WANT THE ISLAM OF DR. SHAR'IATI; WE DON'T WANT THE ISLAM OF ........)" AND LEFT THE END EMPTY FOR THE CROWD TO FILL IN. BOTH MOQOADAM-MARAGHE'I AND ALIZADEH WERE CRITICAL OF THE VELAYAT-E-FAQIH. THE LATTER SAID, "THIS CLAUSE IS AN ACT OF TREASON AGAINST FUTURE GENERATIONS OF IRANIAN PEOPLE. WE HAD A REVOLUTION NOT TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR A DIFFERENT KIND OF DESPOTISM." sPEAKING PRIVATELY AFTER THE MEETING, MOQOADAM-MARAGHE'I SAID THAT EVEN THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP HAS NOW REALIZED THAT IT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SELL THE VELAYAT-E-FAQIH TO THE IRANIAN PEOPLE IN ITS PRESENT FORM. "THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS HAS DECIDED TO REOPEN DEBATE ON THIS ISSUE. I HOPE THAT SOME KIND OF IMPROVEMENT WILL BE POSSIBLE."
7. THE MODERATES, IN CRITICISING VELAYAT-E-FAQIH, HAVE FOUND SOME ALLIES AMONG CLERICS SUCH AS AYATOLLAHS NURI AND SHARI'AT- MADARI WHO SHARE THE VIEW THAT SUCH AN INSTITUTION, IF NOT PROPERLY DEFINED, COULD LEAD TO A DICTATORSHIP. ONE OF THE MOST INTERESTING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HAS BEEN THE ENTRANCE OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S SON, HOJJAT AL-ISLAM AHMAD KHOMEINI, INTO THE DEBATE ON THIS SUBJECT. IN THESE DEBATES, THE YOUNG KHOMEINI HAS TAKEN A POSITION WHICH HAS MUCH IN COMMON WITH THE MODERATE VIEW THAT VELAYAT-E-FAQIH, AS DEFINED BY THE CONSTITUTION, CONTAINS SOME DANGEROUS AMBIGUITIES. EMBASSY WILL DISCUSS THIS QUESTION IN MORE DETAIL IN SEPARATE MESSAGE.
8. IN PART, RECENT OUTSPOKENNESS OF THE MODERATES CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO DISILLUSION WITH SOME ASPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION -- ESPECIALLY TRENDS TOWARD AUTHORITARIAN, CLERICAL RULE. THE MODERATES HAVE ALSO TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S OBVIOUS MISHANDLING OF CERTAIN ISSUES TO ATTRACT ALLIES BEYOND THE NORMALLY MINISCULE CONTITUENCY OF GROUPS SUCH AS THE RADICAL MOVEMENT, THE IRAN PARTY, AND TEH NATIONAL FRONT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE OBVIOUS FAILURE OF A MILITARY POLICY IN KURDESTAN HAS BROUGHT CALLS FOR RECONCILIATION, EVEN BY FIGURES WITHIN THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS. A COLUMNIST IN THE NORMALLY CONSERVATIVE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE TEHRAN TIMES HAS URGED THE WITHDRAWAL OF NON- KURDISH GUARDS FROM THE REGION; THE TUDEH PARTY PAPER MARDOM, STUNG BY ACCUSATIONS OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN KURDESTAN, HAS CALLED FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. ONLY THE RIGHT-WING ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY, THROUGH ITS ORGAN JOMHURI-YE-ISLAMI, HAS CONTINUED TO REFER TO THE KURDISH INSURGENTS AS "AMERICAN MERCENARIES". HOWEVER, THE IRP HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY ISOLATED IN ITS POSITION.
9. THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO ENSURE PERSONAL SECURITY, ITS CRUDE ATTEMPTS AT CENSORSHIP, AND SCANDALS INVOLVING THE REVOLUTIONARY COURT SYSTEM -- LARGE-SCALE BRIBERY AND THEFT INVOLVING NO LESS A FIGURE THAN FORMER TEHRAN PROSECUTOR AYATOLLAH AZARI-QOMI HIMSELF -- HAS ALSO WIDENED THE APPEAL OF THE MODERATE MESSAGE. THE PAPER AZADI OF OCTOBER 18 PRINTED A BITTER ATTACK ON THE REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE SYSTEM ACCUSING IT OF IGNORING THEFTS BY ILYAVI, FORMER ASSISTANT TO PROSECUTOR- GENERAL HADAVI, WHILE SENDING PROSTITUTES AND SMALL-TIME DRUG SMUGGLERS TO THE FIRING SQUAD. THE RECENT ATTACK ON TWO JOURNALISTS AT THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS BUILDING LED THE ULTRA- ESTABLISHMENT PAPER ETTELAAT OF OCTOBER 22 TO WRITE A STRONG FRONT-PAGE EDITORIAL ENTITLED "LET US NOT REPEAT MISTAKES", POINTING OUT THAT THE PEOPLE OF QOM AND TABRIZ REBELLED IN THE SHAH'S TIME BECAUSE FOR DECADES THEY HAD BEEN DENIED THE RIGHT TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES.
10. WHAT DOES ALL OF THIS ADD UP TO? MOST IMPORTANT, THE MODERATES OF THE IRAN PARTY, THE NATIONAL FRONT, AND OTHER GROUPS ARE ONCE AGAIN FINDING THEIR VOICE AND BEGINNING TO SPEAK OUT. IN DOING SO, THEY WILL HAVE TO OVERCOME SEVERAL MAJOR OBSTACLES:
- A) THE MEDIA REMAIN FOR THE MOST PART IN THE HANDS OF THEIR OPPONENTS. JOMHURI-YE-ISLAMI BECOMES MORE RABID BY THE DAY, AND THE OTHER MAJOR PAPERS ARE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS. THE RADIO AND THE TELEVISION, UNDER QOTEZADEH'S OPPORTUNISTIC AND UNENLIGHTENED GUIDANCE, RARELY DEVIATES FROM ITS DAILY MENU OF PSEUDO- RELIGIOUS DRIVEL INTERSPERSED WITH PSEUDO-REVOLUTIONARY DRIVEL.
- B) ALL INTELLECTUALS HAVE BEEN TAINTED BY KHOMEINI'S DENUNCIATIONS. HIS FAMOUS AUGUST DECLARATION THAT "WE DO NOT WANT INTELLECTUALS" IS STILL REMEMBERED. HIS DIATRIBES AGAINST WESTERN DECADENCE HAVE MADE ALL WESTERN MANIFESTATIONS, INCLUDING NICETIES, SUSPECT IN HIS FOLLOWERS' EYES.
11. THESE MODERATE GROUPS STILL LEAD A PRECARIOUS EXISTENCE ON THE FRINGES OF IRANIAN POLITICAL LIFE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY ARE LEFT ALONE TO HOLD THEIR MEETINGS AND PUBLISH THEIR NEWSPAPERS BECAUSE THEY ARE CONSIDERED IRRELEVANT TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS. HOWEVER, IN HIS MOST RECENT SPEECHES, KHOMEINI HAS TAKEN NOTE OF THEM AND HAS CRITICIZED THEM HARSHLY FOR THEIR ATTACKS ON VELAYAT-E-FAQIH AND ON THE CLERGY. IN A SPEECH TO TEHRAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS ON OCTOBER 20, KHOMEINI REFERRED DIRECTLY TO THE MPRP MEETING, SAYING, "RECENTLY, IN ONE OF THEIR MEETINGS, ONE OF THESE MISGUIDED ONES, WHO KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT ISLAM, SUGGESTED THAT THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS SHOULD BE DISSOLVED. AND THE REST CHEERED... YOU, WHO DID NOT EVEN PARTICIPATE IN THE VOTING (FOR THE COUNCIL) HAVE NO RIGHT TO SAY THIS... IT WAS THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHO GAVE YOU (OPPONENTS OF VELAYATI-E-FAQIH) THE FREEDOM TO SAY WHATEVER YOU WANT TO SAY. YOU WERE IN HIDING WHEN THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS WERE STRUGGLING AGAINST THE SHAH AND HIS FATHER. NOW YOU WANT TO DISSOLVE THE ASSEMBLY?... YOU DO NOT HAVE THE POWER TO DO SO. I WILL SLAP YOU IN THE MOUTH. STOP THIS AND JOIN THE RANKS OF ISLAM AND LET THIS COUNTRY PUT ITSELF IN ORDER."
12. KHOMEINI'S ATTACKS ON THIS GROUP ARE STILL ONLY WORDS AND ARE UNLIKELY TO TAKE THE FORM OF ALL-OUT REPRESSION INVOLVING THE CLOSING OF NEWSPAPERS, THE BANNING OF MEETINGS, AND THE ARREST OF LEADERSHIP. MANY OF THESE GROUPS AND THEIR LEADERS HAVE DISTINGUISHED RECORDS OF OPPOSITION TO THE MONARCHY - RECORDS WHICH ARE DIFFICULT TO IGNORE. HOWEVER, THE HARD-LINE CLERGY AND ITS ALLIES HAVE BEEN ISOLATING AND ATTACKING INDIVIDUAL TARGETS FROM AMONG THE MODERATES SUCH AS ??AZIH, METEN-DAFTARI, AND FORUHAR.
13. AS THE AUTHORITIES CONTINUE TO MISHANDLE MATTERS SUCH AS ARAB- IRANIAN RELATIONS, PROVINICIAL AFFAIRS, AND REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE, THE MESSAGE OF THESE MODERATE GROUPS COULD ATTRACT A WIDER FOLLOWING. PERHAPS THEY COULD FORCE SOME CONCESSION TO THOSE WHO DO NOT SHARE THE IMAM'S VISION OF AN IRAN RULED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TEACHINGS OF THAT SPECIALIZED VIEW OF ISLAM HELD BY ONE SECTOR OF A MINORITY SECT OF THAT RELIGION.
14. IN THE LONGER TERM, IF THESE GROUPS CAN PRESERVE SOME COHERENCE THEY MAY PRESENT AN ALTERNATIVE TO A CLERICAL MONOPOLY OF POWER IN POST-KHOMEINI IRAN. AT THAT TIME THEIR REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS MAY BECOME VERY IMPORTANT; BUT FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, THIS GROUP WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE ON THE PERIPHERY OF IRANIAN POLITICS -- ARTICULATE, INTERESTING, BUT WIELDING LITTLE REAL POWER.
LAINGEN
Monday, 13 August 1979, 04:58
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEHRAN 08980
E.O. 12065: GDS 8/12/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P
TAGS PEPR, IR
SUBJECT: NEGOTIATIONS
1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. INTRODUCTION: RECENT NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE EMBASSY HAS BEEN INVOLVED HERE, RANGING FROM COMPOUND SECURITY TO VISA OPERATIONS TO GTE TO THE SHERRY CASE, HIGHLIGHT SEVERAL SPECIAL FEATURES OF CONDUCTING BUSINESS IN THE PERSIAN ENVIRONMENT. IN SOME INSTANCES THE DIFFICULTIES WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED ARE A PARTIAL REFLECTION ON THE EFFECTS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION, BUT WE BELIEVE THE UNDERLYING CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL QUALITIES THAT ACCOUNT FOR THE NATURE OF THESE DIFFICULTIES ARE AND WILL REMAIN RELATIVELY CONSTANT. THEREFORE, WE SUGGEST THAT THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS BE USED TO BRIEF BOTH USG PERSONNEL AND PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVES WHO ARE REQUIRED TO DO BUSINESS WITH AND IN THIS COUNTRY. END INTRODUCTION.
3. PERHAPS THE SINGLE DOMINANT ASPECT OF THE PERSIAN PSYCHE IS AN OVERRIDING EGOISM. ITS ANTECEDENTS LIE IN THE LONG IRANIAN HISTORY OF INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY WHICH PUT A PREMIUM ON SELF-PRESERVATION. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF IT IS AN ALMOST TOTAL PERSIAN PREOCCUPATION WITH SELF AND LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR UNDERSTANDING POINTS OF VIEW OTHER THAN ONE'S OWN. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE TO AN IRANIAN THAT U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW MAY PROHIBIT ISSUING HIM A TOURIST VISA WHEN HE HAS DETERMINED THAT HE WANTS TO LIVE IN CALIFORNIA. SIMILARLY, THE IRANIAN CENTRAL BANK SEES NO INCONSISTENCY IN CLAIMING FORCE MAJEURE TO AVOID PENALTIES FOR LATE PAYMENT OF INTEREST DUE ON OUTSTANDING LOANS WHILE THE GOVERNMENT OF WHICH IT IS A PART IS DENYING THE VAILIDITY OF THE VERY GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE CLAIM IS MADE WHEN CONFRONTED BY SIMILAR CLAIMS FROM FOREIGN FIRMS FORCED TO CEASE OPERATIONS DURING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.
4. THE REVERSE OF THIS PARTICULAR PSYCHOLOGICAL COIN, AND HAVING THE SAME HISTORICAL ROOTS AS PERSIAN EGOISM, IS A PERVASIVE UNEASE ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE WORLD IN WHICH ONE LIVES. THE PERSIAN EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT NOTHING IS PERMANENT AND IT IS COMMONLY PERCEIVED THAT HOSTILE FORCES ABOUND. IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT EACH INDIVIDUAL MUST BE CONSTANTLY ALERT FOR OPPORTUNITIES TO PROTECT HIMSELF AGAINST THE MALEVOLENT FORCES THAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE HIS UNDOING. HE IS OBVIOUSLY JUSTIFIED IN USING ALMOST ANY MEANS AVAILABLE TO EXPLOIT SUCH OPPORTUNITIES. THIS APPROACH UNDERLIES THE SOCALLED "BAZAAR MENTALITY" SO COMMON AMONG PERSIANS, A MIND-SET THAT OFTEN IGNORES LONGER TERM INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF IMMEDIATELY OBTAINABLE ADVANTAGES AND COUNTENANCES PRACTICES THAT ARE REGARDED AS UNETHICAL BY OTHER NORMS. AN EXAMPLE IS THE SEEMINGLY SHORTSIGHTED AND HARASSING TACTICS EMPLOYED BY THE PGOI IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH GTE.
5. COUPLED WITH THESE PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS IS A GENERAL INCOMPREHENSION OF CASUALITY. ISLAM, WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON THE OMNIPOTENCE OF GOD, APPEARS TO ACCOUNT AT LEAST IN MAJOR PART FOR THIS PHENOMENON. SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY, EVEN THOSE IRANIANS EDUCATED IN THE WESTERN STYLE AND PERHAPS WITH LONG EXPERIENCE OUTSIDE IRAN ITSELF FREQUENTLY HAVE DIFFICULTY GRASPING THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF EVENTS. WITNESS A YAZDI RESISTING THE IDEA THAT IRANIAN BEHAVIOR HAS CONSEQUENCES ON THE PERCEPTION OF IRAN IN THE U.S. OR THAT THIS PERCEPTION IS SOMEHOW RELATED TO AMERICAN POLICIES REGARDING IRAN. THIS SAME QUALITY ALSO HELPS EXPLAIN PERSIAN AVERSION TO ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ONE'S OWN ACTIONS. THE DEUS EX MACHINA IS ALWAYS AT WORK.
6. THE PERSIAN PROCLIVITY FOR ASSUMING THAT TO SAY SOMETHING IS TO DO IT FURTHER COMPLICATES MATTERS. AGAIN, YAZDI CAN EXPRESS SURPRISE WHEN INFORMED THAT THE IRREGULAR SECURITY FORCES ASSIGNED TO THE EMBASSY REMAIN IN PLACE. "BUT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TOLD ME THEY WOULD GO BY MONDAY," HE SAYS. AN MFA OFFICIAL REPORTS THAT THE SHERRY CASE IS "90 PERCENT SOLVED," BUT WHEN A CONSULAR OFFICER INVESTIGATES HE DISCOVERS THAT NOTHING HAS CHANGED. THERE IS NO RECOGNITION THAT INSTRUCTIONS MUST BE FOLLOWED UP, THAT COMMITMENTS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY ACTION AND RESULTS.
6. FINALLY, THERE ARE THE PERSIAN CONCEPTS OF INFLUENCE AND OBLIGATION. EVERYONE PAYS OBEISANCE TO THE FORMER AND THE LATTER IS USUALLY HONORED IN THE BREACH. PERSIANS ARE CONSUMED WITH DEVELOPING PARTI BAZI--THE INFLUENCE THAT WILL HELP GET THINGS DONE--WHILE FAVORS ARE ONLY GRUDGINGLY BESTOWED AND THEN JUST TO THE EXTENT THAT A TANGIBLE QUID PRO QUO IS IMMEDIATELY PRECEPTIBLE. FORGET ABOUT ASSISTANCE PROFERRED LAST YEAR OR EVEN LAST WEEK; WHAT CAN BE OFFERED TODAY?
7. THERE ARE SEVERAL LESSONS FOR THOSE WHO WOULD NEGOTIATE WITH PERSIANS IN ALL THIS:
- --FIRST, ONE SHOULD NEVER ASSUME THAT HIS SIDE OF THE ISSUE WILL BE RECOGNIZED, LET ALONE THAT IT WILL BE CONCEDED TO HAVE MERITS. PERSIAN PREOCCUPATION WITH SELF PRECLUDES THIS. A NEGOTIATOR MUST FORCE RECOGNITION OF HIS POSITION UPON HIS PERSIAN OPPOSITE NUMBER.
- --SECOND, ONE SHOULD NOT EXPECT AN IRANIAN READILY TO PERCEIVE THE ADVANTAGES OF A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP BASED ON TRUST. HE WILL ASSUME THAT HIS OPPOSITE NUMBER IS ESSENTIALLY AN ADVERSARY. IN DEALING WITH HIM HE WILL ATTEMPT TO MAXIMIZE THE BENEFITS TO HIMSELF THAT ARE IMMEDIATELY OBTAINABLE. HE WILL BE PREPARED TO GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL, INCLUDING RUNNING THE RISK OF SO ALIENATING WHOEVER HE IS DEALING WITH THAT FUTURE BUSINESS WOULD BE UNTHINKABLE, AT LEAST TO THE LATTER.
- --THIRD, INTERLOCKING RELATIONSHIPS OF ALL ASPECTS OF AN ISSUE MUST BE PAINSTAKINGLY, FORECEFULLY AND REPEATEDLY DEVELOPED. LINKAGES WILL BE NEITHER READILY COMPREHENDED NOR ACCEPTED BY PERSIAN NEGOTIATORS.
- --FOURTH, ONE SHOULD INSIST ON PERFORMANCE AS THE SINE QUA NON AT ESH STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. STATEMENTS OF INTENTION COUNT FOR ALMOST NOTHING.
- --FIFTH, CULTIVATION OF GOODWILL FOR GOODWILL'S SAKE IS A WASTE OF EFFORT. THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE AT ALL TIMES SHOULD BE IMPRESSING UPON THE PERSIAN ACROSS THE TABLE THE MUTUALITY OF THE PROPOSED UNDERTAKINGS, HE MUST BE MADE TO KNOW THAT A QUID PRO QUO IS INVOLVED ON BOTH SIDES.
- --FINALLY, ONE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE THREAT OF BREAKDOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT AND NOT BE COWED BY THE POSSIBLITY. GIVEN THE PERSIAN NEGOTIATOR'S CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS, HE IS GOING TO RESIST THE VERY CONCEPT OF A RATIONAL (FROM THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW) NEGOTIATING PROCESS.
LAINGEN
CONFIDENTIAL
Thursday, 31 October 1985, 14:21
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 LONDON 24287
E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS SOCI, PINS, UK
SUBJECT: URBAN VIOLENCE IN BRITAIN -- THE CHALLENGE
OF A RACIAL UNDERCLASS WORRIES THIS CONSERVATIVE SOCIETY
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. DEPRESSED AREAS IN SEVERAL OF THE U.K.'S INNER CITIES ERUPTED IN RIOTS IN THE PAST MONTH. THE BRITISH SEE MANY OF THEIR DOMESTIC WOES THROWN INTO HIGH RELIEF BY THE RIOTS AND THE SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL DEBATE ABOUT CAUSE, EFFECT, AND WHO IS TO BLAME. THE RIOTS HAVE HIGHLIGHTED:
--- THE LONG-TERM ECONOMIC MALAISE IN BRITAIN, WITH A HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AND A NEAR-COLLAPSE OF THE SMOKE-STACK INDUSTRIES IN THE NORTH OF ENGLAND;
--- RACIAL TENSION BETWEEN WHITE BRITAIN AND THE BLACK AND ASIAN POPULATIONS WHO HAVE SETTLED IN THE U.K. SINCE THE 1950'S;
--- PERSISTENT PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL DISADVANTAGE IN AREAS OF THE INNER CITY, WHICH EXTEND TO HOUSING, EDUCATION, INCOME, AND EMPLOYMENT;
--- A VIGOROUS NEW DRUG CRACKDOWN WHICH IS INADVERTENTLY THREATENING THE UNEASY BALANCE BETWEEN POLICE AND COMMUNITIES IN MANY INNER CITY AREAS;
--- THE PROBLEM OF POLICING THE MULTI-ETHNIC INNER CITIES EFFECTIVELY AND SENSITIVELY WITH A NEARLY ALL-WHITE POLICE FORCE WHICH IS FACING NUMEROUS POLITICAL PRESSURES AT PRESENT;
--- THE LACK OF AN AGREED RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM ON THE PART OF BRITAIN'S NATIONAL POLITICAL LEADERS.
ALL THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE RIOTS ARE AND HAVE BEEN PRESENT IN THE U.S., AND IN GREATER MEASURE, AND THE RIOT DESTRUCTION HERE IS ON A MUCH SMALLER SCALE THAN IT WAS IN THE U.S. URBAN UPHEAVALS OF TWO DECADES AGO. THE AMERICAN RESPONSE (EEO LEGISLATION, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, GIVING MINORITIES GREATER AVENUES FOR POLITICAL EXPRESSION) RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN SOCIETAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICS IN THE U.S. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE BRITISH POLITICAL SYSTEM WILL PROVE FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO MEET THE CHALLENGE THIS UNREST POSES. WITH THE AUTUMN CHILL COMING, THE RIOTS MAY HAVE ABATED, BUT WHEN THE WEATHER GETS WARM AGAIN, IF NOT BEFORE, THERE COULD BE A REPEAT OF THESE INCIDENTS. END SUMMARY
ARE THEY DEPRESSED BECAUSE THEY'RE DEPRIVED?
--------------------------------------------
3. HEADLINES IN THE U.K. IN THE PAST MONTH HAVE RECORDED CLASHES BETWEEN RIOTERS AND POLICE, THE KNIFING TO DEATH OF ONE POLICEMAN, AND CROWDS OF YOUTHS PELTING BRICKS, STONES, AND MOLOTOV COCKTAILS AT RIOT-SHIELDED POLICE IN THE DEPRESSED AREAS OF LONDON, BIRMINGHAM, LIVERPOOL, AND LEICESTER. FOUR YEARS AGO, AFTER SIMILAR SCENES IN THE BRIXTON NEIGHBORHOOD OF LONDON, LORD SCARMAN, THE JUDGE WHO HEADED A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, FOUND THAT THE PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF THE RIOTS WERE: UNEMPLOYMENT, POOR HOUSING, LACK OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROSPECTS FOR YOUTHS, POOR RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND THE POLICE, AND AN INCREASINGLY LARGE NUMBER OF BLACKS WHO FELT ANGRY AND ALIENATED FROM A SOCIETY WHICH THEY PERCEIVED AS RACIST AND HOSTILE.
4. THE RIOT AREAS ARE SHARPLY MORE ETHNIC AND YOUNGER THAN THE POPULATION AS A WHOLE. THE OVERALL PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES HEADED BY A WEST INDIAN, INDIAN, OR PAKISTANI IN BRITAIN IS 4.7 PERCENT, BUT IN THE HANDSWORTH AREA OF BIRMINGHAM, THE FIGURE IS 53.1 PERCENT. THERE IS ALSO A CONCENTRATION OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN THE RIOT AREAS; THE PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION THAT IS BETWEEN 16 AND 24 IN HANDSWORTH IS CLOSE TO 40 PERCENT, WHEREAS IN BRITAIN AS A WHOLE IT IS ABOUT HALF THAT.
5. MUCH OF THE SITUATION IN THE INNER CITIES WHICH SCARMAN POINTED TO AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE RIOTS OF 1981 HAS NOT CHANGED. IN FACT, THE PAST FEW YEARS HAVE SEEN THIS PICTURE GROW BLEAKER. UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES IN HANDSWORTH STAND AT OVER 30 PERCENT, AND IN TOXTETH IN LIVERPOOL, ANOTHER RIOT SITE, AT 47 PERCENT.
6. THE INNER CITIES HAVE THE HIGHEST NATIONAL RATES OF MENTAL HOSPITAL ADMISSION IN BRITAIN, THE HIGHEST PERCENTAGE OF SINGLE-PARENT HOMES (TWICE THE NATIONAL AVERAGE) AND THE MOST HOUSES DECLARED UNFIT FOR HUMAN HABITATION. FOR MANY THE PROSPECTS FOR ESCAPING UNEMPLOYMENT SEEM INCREASINGLY NON-EXISTENT; THE RATIO OF VACANCIES LISTED TO PEOPLE UNEMPLOYED WAS 1 TO 8 IN THE INNER CITIES IN THE DAYS OF THE FIRST BRIXTON DISTURBANCES, BUT THE FIGURE IS NOW 1 TO 491, ACCORDING TO A SEPTEMBER ARTICLE IN THE LONDON TIMES. JUNE FIGURES IN TOXTETH WERE 10,000 INQUIRIES FOR 126 VACANCIES.
IS THERE AN UNDERCLASS?
------------------------
7. A CRUMBLING INFRASTRUCTURE, HARD-CORE UNEMPLOYMENT, AND DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOCIAL FABRIC IN THE INNER CITIES IS NOT A NEW PROBLEM IN BRITAIN: DICKENS DESCRIBED THE SQUALOR, OVER-CROWDING, AND POVERTY IN BRITAIN'S CITIES OVER A CENTURY AGO. WHAT HAS CHANGED IS THAT THE PEOPLE AFFECTED ARE INCREASINGLY LIKELY TO BE MEMBERS OF MINORITY GROUPS. PARTICIPANTS IN THE RECENT RIOTS WERE BOTH BLACK AND WHITE, AND STILL MANY OF THE POOREST PEOPLE IN BRITAIN ARE WHITE, BUT THE NUMBER OF MINORITIES WHO ARE "AT THE BOTTOM OF THE HEAP" IS VASTLY OUT OF PROPORTION TO THEIR TOTAL NUMBERS IN THE POPULATION.
8. NATIONWIDE, THERE ARE STRIKING DIFFERENCES IN THE EXPERIENCES OF WHITES AND MINORITIES IN HOUSING, EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME. A STUDY RELEASED LAST MONTH BY THE POLICY STUDY INSTITUTE, A WELL-RESPECTED GROUP, REVEALED THAT BLACKS AND ASIANS IN BRITAIN ARE ON AVERAGE FOUR TIMES AS LIKELY AS WHITES TO BE PASSED OVER FOR JOBS FOR WHICH THEY APPLY, A STATISTIC WHICH CANNOT BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY DIFFERENCES IN EDUCATION OR TRAINING. WITH COMPARABLE EDUCATION, THE SAME DIFFERENCE PERTAINS. AMONG PEOPLE WITH ONE OR MORE "O" LEVELS (ABOUT THE EQUIVALENT OF A U.S. HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA) THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IS 9 PERCENT FOR WHITES, 18 PERCENT FOR ASIANS, AND 25 PERCENT FOR BLACKS. THE PROSPECTS FOR THOSE WITHOUT THESE QUALIFICATIONS, AND IN AREAS THAT HAVE BEEN HIT HARDEST ECONOMICALLY, ARE EVEN BLEAKER.
9. BIRMINGHAM, THE SECOND LARGEST CITY IN BRITAIN AND UNTIL 15 YEARS AGO THE SECOND WEALTHIEST WHEN MEASURED BY AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD INCOME, IS NOW THE POOREST CITY IN THE U.K. IT LOST 1/3 OF ITS MANUFACTURING JOBS BETWEEN 1978 AND 1984, ACCORDING TO THE FINANCIAL TIMES REGIONAL SURVEY. IN THAT SORT OF ECONOMIC CLIMATE, BREAKING INTO THE JOB MARKET IS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE, AND OF THOSE WHO LEFT SCHOOL AT 16 LAST SUMMER, ONLY 18 PERCENT OF WHITES, 16 PERCENT OF ASIANS, AND 5 PERCENT OF BLACKS HAD FOUND WORK AT THE END OF 6 MONTHS, ACCORDING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT.
10. LIVERPOOL SIMILARLY HAS DECLINED DRASTICALLY IN RECENT YEARS. ACCORDING TO A SERIAL CASE STUDY OF THE AREA PUBLISHED IN THE GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER, THERE WERE 11,000 DOCKWORKERS EMPLOYED IN THE PORT OF LIVERPOOL IN 1972, BUT TODAY THERE ARE FEWER THAN 2,000. INDUSTRIAL PLANTS IN TOXTETH EMPLOYED 22,000 THAT YEAR, BUT NOW EMPLOY 2,000. UNEMPLOYMENT FOR LIVERPOOL AS A WHOLE IS 21 PERCENT, BUT IN CERTAIN POCKETS SUCH AS TOXTETH, THE RATE IS AT 70 PERCENT FOR ADULTS AND 96 PERCENT FOR YOUTHS. FOUR-FIFTHS OF TOXTETH'S CITIZENS RECEIVE SOME WELFARE BENEFITS. CLEARLY IT IS NOT ONLY NON-WHITES WHO FACE MAJOR OBSTACLES, BUT IT IS THE NON-WHITES WHO ARE MOST APT TO FIND THEMSELVES STYMIED AS MEMBERS OF AN ECONOMIC AND RACIAL UNDERCLASS.
11. DIFFERENCES IN HOUSING BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES ARE STRIKING. ACCORDING TO THE POLICY STUDIES INSTITUTE'S COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY "BLACK AND WHITE BRITAIN", BLACK HOUSEHOLDS ARE TWICE AS LIKELY AS WHITES TO SHARE A DWELLING. FOUR TIMES AS MANY ASIANS AND THREE TIMES AS MANY WEST INDIANS AS WHITES LIVE IN OVERCROWDED CONDITIONS, DEFINED AS TWO OR MORE PEOPLE TO A BEDROOM. OVER HALF THE PAKISTANI-HEADED FAMILIES IN BRITAIN LIVE IN HOUSES WITHOUT HOT WATER, INDOOR TOILETS, AND BATHS, WHEREAS THE FIGURE FOR WHITES IS 17 PERCENT.
12. THERE ARE DEEP DIFFERENCES IN THE MEASURED EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT LEVELS OF WHITES AND MINORITIES. CHILDREN OF WEST INDIAN PARENTS ARE FOUR TIMES AS LIKELY AS WHITE CHILDREN TO BE CLASSIFIED AS EDUCATIONALLY SUBNORMAL. AND FEW BLACK YOUNGSTERS GO BEYOND SECONDARY EDUCATION. THE PROBLEM, ACCORDING TO ONE ANALYST, IS NOT SO MUCH OUTRIGHT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE BLACK CHILDREN AS "WELL-MEANING LOW EXPECTATION" ON THE PART OF TEACHERS. TEACHERS DECIDE SUBCONSCIOUSLY THAT THE CHILDREN ARE LIKELY TO BE FAILURES AND GIVE UP ON THEM, LEAVING THEM TO MARK TIME IN REMEDIAL EDUCATION UNTIL THEY CAN LEAVE SCHOOL AT 16.
13. THE AVERAGE WAGE FOR BLACKS IN BRITAIN REMAINS 20 POUNDS LESS PER WEEK THAN FOR WHITES. ASIANS EARN 18 POUNDS LESS, ACCORDING TO THE COMMISSION FOR RACIAL EQUALITY, AND THIS STARTS FROM THE LOW NATIONAL AVERAGE FOR WHITES OF ONLY 139 POUNDS PER WEEK.
14. FROM BEHIND THESE STATISTICS EMERGES A PICTURE OF AN ALIENATED THIRD-WORLD NATION WITHIN BRITAIN, AN UNDER-CLASS OF THE DEPRIVED, THE HOPELESS, AND THE DISPOSSESSED, IN LARGE PART BUT BY NO MEANS ENTIRELY MADE UP OF MINORITES.
WHO ARE THE RACIAL MINORITIES?
-------------------------------
15. UNTIL RECENTLY, MOST IN THE U.K. BELIEVED THEY LIVED IN A RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS SOCIETY. BRITONS LOOKED ON RELATIVELY COMPLACENTLY WHILE AMERICA STRUGGLED WITH RACIAL ISSUES IN THE 1960'S: "WE DON'T HAVE SUCH TROUBLES HERE". THE ONE ACERBIC EXCEPTION CAME IN 1968, WHEN ENOCH POWELL, A CONSERVATIVE M.P., MADE A NOTORIOUS SPEECH IN WHICH HE PREDICTED "RIVERS OF BLOOD" IN THE STREETS IF THE TIDE OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS WAS NOT STEMMED. HOWEVER CRUDELY AND UNACCEPTABLY TO MOST OF HIS AUDIENCE, HE HAD PUT HIS FINGER ON A PROBLEM; BRITAIN APPEARS UNPREPARED TO DEAL WITH THE PROFOUND CHANGE IN THE COMPLEXION OF ITS SOCIETY WHICH HAS BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY AN INFLUX OF IMMIGRANTS. THEY CAME FROM THE COMMONWEALTH AT FIRST, AND WERE FOLLOWED BY IMMIGRANTS RECRUITED FROM THE CARIBBEAN TO FILL WORLD WAR II LABOR SHORTAGES. IMMIGRATION GREW AS TROUBLES AFFLICTED ONE POST-COLONIAL TERRITORY AFTER ANOTHER IN THE 50'S AND 60'S. THOSE WHO WANTED TO MOVE COULD USE THEIR COMMONWEALTH PASSPORTS, A POSSIBILITY WHICH WAS REDUCED BY CHANGES IN THE LAW IN THE LAST DECADE.
16. <u>STILL, THERE ARE ONLY ONE MILLION BLACKS AND BROWNS IN BRITAIN, OUT OF A POPULATION OF 54 MILLION, AND BY NOW HALF OF THESE ARE BRITISH-BORN. BUT THEIR OUTSIDER STATUS PERSISTS. </u>THEY ARE STILL DISPROPORTIONATELY STUCK AT THE THE LOWER END OF THE PAY SCALE, IN SHIFTWORK AND PART-TIME WORK. OF THOSE IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR CHILDREN IN THE U.K. WHO HAVE FOUND WORK, 50 PERCENT ARE ESTIMATED TO BE OVERQUALIFIED EDUCATIONALLY FOR THE WORK THEY DO, ACCORDING TO THE BOOK "STAYING POWER: A HISTORY OF BLACK PEOPLE IN BRITAIN", BY PETER FRYER.
17. BRITAIN HAS ALWAYS BEEN A STRATIFIED SOCIETY, WITH EACH NEW GENERATION INHERITING THE CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTITUDES THAT PRESERVED THE CLASS STRUCTURE AND ITS OWN PLACE WITHIN IT. AS SUCH IT WAS ILL-PREPARED TO IMPORT AND ASSIMILATE MILLIONS WHO WERE OUTSIDE OF THIS FAMILIAR WORLD ORDER, AND WHO IN MANY CASES HAD THEIR OWN CULTURAL TRADITIONS AND DID NOT ASPIRE TO SLIDE HORIZONTALLY INTO THE BRITISH SYSTEM. MANY BRITONS FEAR THE CONFUSING CHANGES THAT THE IMMIGRANTS HAVE HELPED BRING INTO THEIR FORMERLY BOUNDED AND ORDERLY WORLD. THEY VIEW THE NEW-COMERS WITH SUSPICION AND WORSE.
18. POPULAR PRESS REPORTING OF THE RECENT RIOTS HAS REFLECTED THE RABBLE-ROUSING RACISM WHICH IS STILL EASY DISCOURSE IN MODERN BRITAIN. TABLOIDS DESCRIBE THE "ZULU-STYLE WAR CRIES" OF THE RIOTERS AND RE-CYCLE THE COMMENTS OF WHITES CALLING THEM "BARBARIANS" AND "ANIMALS". BUT LIFE IS NOT SO SIMPLE; AT LEAST A QUARTER OF THE YOUTHS IN THE MOB AT TOTTENHAM, AND ONE HALF OF THOSE WHO APPEARED BEFORE THE MAGISTRATE SUBSEQUENTLY, WERE ESTIMATED TO BE WHITE. BOTH BLACK AND WHITE YOUTHS ARE NOW CHARGED WITH THE MURDER OF THE POLICE CONSTABLE AT TOTTENHAM. THE PUBLIC HOUSING NEAR MOST OF THE RIOT LOCALES IS MORE INTEGRATED THAN WAS THE CASE IN THE U.S. IN THE 60'S; BROADWATER FARMS, THE PUBLIC HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AT THE CENTER OF THE RIOTS IN LONDON'S TOTTENHAM AREA, HOLDS APPROXIMATELY A 50/50 RACIAL MIX.
19. IN ADDITION TO THE DIFFICULTY THE LARGER WHITE POPULATION IS HAVING IN ABSORBING IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS (THERE IS NO 'MELTING POT' TRADITION IN BRITAIN), THERE ARE TENSIONS BETWEEN RACIAL GROUPS AMONG THE IMMIGRANTS. THE TWO GROUPS WHICH HAVE IMMIGRATED IN THE LARGEST NUMBERS ARE ASIANS (PRIMARILY INDIANS AND PAKISTANIS) AND AFRO- CARRIBEANS. THE BLACK IMMIGRANTS ARE SAID TO RESENT THE RELATIVELY MORE PROSPEROUS ASIANS. THE ASIANS, WHO TEND TO BE THE ONLY SHOPKEEPERS LEFT IN THE INNER CITIES, HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY HARD HIT BY THE LOOTING AND BURNING THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE DURING THE RIOTS. THE ONLY TWO CIVILIAN FATALITIES AS THE RESULT OF THE RIOTING HAVE BEEN TWO ASIAN BROTHERS, KILLED WHEN THEIR STORE IN HANDSWORTH WAS BURNED TO THE GROUND AFTER THEY WERE LOCKED IN. PRESS ACCOUNTS NOTED THAT THEIR STORE WAS THE PLACE THAT MOST OF THE LOCAL RESIDENTS CASHED THEIR WELFARE CHECKS, AND THUS TO SOME OF THE RIOTERS THE STORE MAY HAVE SYMBOLIZED THE SYSTEM AGAINST WHICH THEY WERE LASHING OUT.
20. IT IS PERHAPS POSSIBLE TO OVERSTATE THE RIVALRY BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS IN BRITAIN. THIS RIVALRY DOES HAVE PARALLELS IN U.S. CITIES, SUCH AS THE RESENTMENT CERTAIN BLACKS EXPRESSED AGAINST CUBANS IN THE MIAMI RIOTS, AND IT HAS SIMILAR CAUSES.
21. BLACKS COMPLAIN THAT THEY ARE LESS LIKELY TO BE GIVEN WHAT FEW FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE FOR SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CITIES. (SINCE 1981 CENTRAL GOVERNMENT HAS ALLOCATED ONLY 200,000 POUNDS FOR THIS PURPOSE TO THE RIOT AREA OF HANDSWORTH, IN SPITE OF THE SCARMAN REPORT, WHICH EMPHASIZED HOW EFFECTIVE SUCH GRANTS WOULD BE IN REHABILITATING THE RIOT AREAS.) THESE COMPLAINTS ARE SUPPORTED BY STATISTICS; OVER 50 PERCENT OF APPLICATIONS FOR GRANTS FOR SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT (INNER CITY PARTNERSHIPS) WERE SUBMITTED BY BLACKS, BUT THEY ULTIMATELY RECEIVED ONLY 13 PERCENT OF THE GRANTS. ASIAN BUSINESSES FOUNDED WITH THESE GRANTS ARE ALMOST INVARIABLY FAMILY OPERATED AND RARELY EMPLOY BLACKS.
22. THERE IS LITTLE IN THE WAY OF A BLACK MIDDLE CLASS IN BRITAIN. THE ONLY ROLE MODELS THAT BLACK PEOPLE HAVE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT ARE MUSICIANS, SPORTS FIGURES, AND A HANDFUL OF T.V. JOURNALISTS, AS THERE ARE NO NATIONAL LEADERS, NO MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, AND ONLY ONE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEADER WHO IS BLACK (AND EVEN HE WAS NOT ELECTED DIRECTLY IN THE STYLE OF U.S. MAYORS). ASIANS, BY CONTRAST, DO HAVE ROLE MODELS IN BUSINESS AND COMMERCE, AND THEY HAVE THEIR OWN RELIGIOUS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS. THUS, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE NOT FULLY ACCEPTED INTO BRITISH SOCIETY, ON THE WHOLE ASIANS ARE "PART OF THE SYSTEM", AS ONE OBSERVER PUT IT.
THE POLICE: ARE THEY THE PROBLEM OR THE ANSWER?
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23. THE ROLE OF THE POLICE, AND THE RISING PRESSURES ON THEM TO RESPOND TO SUCCESSIVE SOCIETAL CHALLENGES IS WORRISOME TO MANY HERE. FIRST IRA TERRORISM, THEN POLICING THE MINERS' STRIKE, AND NOW THE INNER CITY STRIFE HAVE STRETCHED THEM DANGEROUSLY THIN. MEANWHILE, THE POLICE FORCES WHICH ARE NOW BEING ASKED TO CONTAIN THE URBAN UPHEAVALS ARE OFTEN LESS THAN ONE PER CENT BLACK OR ASIAN (OVERALL, 700 MINORITY POLICE OUT OF A FORCE OF 120,000, ACCORDING TO NEWSPAPER SOURCES. LAST YEAR, HOWEVER, OF 1208 TRAINEES IN THE LONDON METROPOLITAN POLICE, 36 BELONGED TO MINORITY GROUPS, A HIGHER PERCENTAGE THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS AND ABOUT IN PROPORTION TO POPULATION. A WELL-PUBLICIZED STUDY PREPARED BY THE INSTITUTE FOR RACE RELATIONS FOR THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND PUBLISHED IN 1979, CHARACTERIZED MANY OF THE POLICE IN BRITAIN AS RACIALLY INSENSITIVE, AND ALLEGED THAT MANY OF THEM USE DEROGATORY LANGUAGE WHEN REFERRING TO MINORITIES, THAT THEY STEREOTYPE BLACKS AS PIMPS AND LAYABOUTS, AND THAT THEY CONSISTENTLY APPLY MORE PRESSURE AND AGGRESSION IN ENCOUNTERS WITH BLACK CI|IZENS THAN THEY WOULD WITH WHITES. THE NEGATIVE IMAGE OF THE POLICE THAT THIS STUDY HELPED CREATE IS ONE FACTOR THAT MAKES THE PRESENT RECRUITMENT OF MINORITIES INTO THE POLICE SO DIFFICULT.
24. A RECENT BBC TELEVISION PROGRAM COMPARED THIS SITUATION TO THAT IN THE NEW YORK POLICE FORCE, IN WHICH 40 PERCENT OF LAST YEAR'S TRAINEES WERE BLACK, AS A RESULT OF INTENSIVE RECRUITMENT EFFORTS AND, MORE PROFOUNDLY, A RETHINKING OF THE ROLE AND RELEVANCE OF THE POLICE IN THE CITIES. NOTHING ON THIS SCALE IS CONTEMPLATED HERE, ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN SOME HALF-HEARTED ATTEMPTS TO BOOST RECRUITMENT OF MINORITIES, AND THE HOME SECRETARY HAS NOW URGED THE METROPOLITAN POLICE TO HIRE MORE BLACKS.
25. ONE MUST ALSO NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT THE POLICE FORCE HAS BEEN THE ONLY INSTITUTION TO TAKE THE 1981 SCARMAN REPORT TO HEART, AND REAL CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED SINCE THEN. POLICE NOW TAKE TRAINING IN CULTURAL SENSITIVITY AND RACE RELATIONS, AND THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY POLICING (GETTING THE POLICEMAN COMFORTABLE AND FAMILIAR WITH THE PEOPLE ON HIS BEAT, AND THE PEOPLE USED TO THE PRESENCE OF THE POLICE) HAVE MADE PROGRESS IN IMPROVING THE CLIMATE ON THE STREETS. PERHAPS IT IS IRONIC THEN, THAT IT WAS POLICE ACTIONS IN TWO INSTANCES WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE SPARKED THE RIOTS. THE FIRST WAS THE ACCIDENTAL SHOOTING IN SEPTEMBER OF A MIDDLE-AGED BLACK WOMAN, OCCASIONED WHEN POLICE BROKE DOWN THE DOOR OF HER HOUSE AND BURST IN, LOOKING FOR HER SON ON A WEAPONS CHARGE. THE SHOOTING HAS LEFT HER A PARAPLEGIC, AND HAS FOCUSSED RESENTMENT AGAINST WHAT IS SEEN AS POLICE HEAVY-HANDEDNESS. THIS INCIDENT WAS FOLLOWED CLOSELY BY THE DEATH OF A BLACK WOMAN DURING A SEARCH OF HER HOME. ALTHOUGH SHE DIED OF HEART FAILURE, HER FAMILY HAS CHARGED THAT THE POLICE WHO WERE CONDUCTING THE SEARCH DELIBERATELY IGNORED HER PLEAS FOR MEDICAL ATTENTION AND ALLOWED HER TO DIE UNNECESSARILY FOR WANT OF AN AMBULANCE.
26. POLICE HEAVY-HANDEDNESS IS CITED REPEATEDLY AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE RIOTS. TWO SOCIOLOGISTS WHO EXPLORED THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IN THE INNER CITIES IN A MONOGRAPH PUBLISHED THIS SUMMER CONCLUDED THAT THE POLICE WERE IN FACT CONSTANTLY MAKING THEIR PRESENCE FELT TO YOUTHS IN THE HANDSWORTH AREA, BY FREQUENTLY STOPPING THEM AND QUESTIONING THEM. THE AVERAGE RATE AT WHICH YOUTHS WERE STOPPED FOR QUESTIONING WAS FIVE TIMES PER YEAR, FOR BOTH BLACKS AND WHITES. WHAT WAS PARTICULARLY STRIKING WAS THAT ALTHOUGH THEY WERE STOPPED AT THE SAME RATE, BLACK YOUNGSTERS DISTRUSTED THE POLICE MUCH MORE, AND THEIR ATTITUDES WERE FAR MORE OFTEN HOSTILE. IT IS INEVITABLE THAT POLICE WILL HAVE TO BE ACTIVE IN NEIGHBORHOODS WITH HIGH CRIME RATES AND A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF YOUTH (THOSE STATISTICALLY MOST LIKELY TO COMMIT CRIMES). IT IS JUST AS INEVITABLE THAT ENCOUNTERS UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES WILL CREATE STRAINS. BUT IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT MANY BLACKS ARE LASHING OUT AT THE POLICE, WHO SYMBOLIZE A SYSTEM WHICH THEY FEEL IS HOSTILE TO THEIR INTEREST.
27. THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE RIOTS HAS BEEN TO CALL FOR MORE SWEEPING POLICE POWER, AND AUTHORIZATION OF THE USE OF TEAR GAS AND PLASTIC BULLETS IN RIOT CONTROL (THE SAME PLASTIC BULLETS WHOSE USE IS BEING SO HOTLY CONTESTED IN NORTHERN IRELAND, WHERE THEY HAVE ON SOME RARE OCCASIONS CAUSED DEATH). THE CONSERVATIVES, AS THE "LAW AND ORDER" PARTY, HAVE MADE THEIR PRINCIPAL RALLYING CRY FOR DEALING WITH THE RIOTS A PLEDGE FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE POLICE, UNDER PRESSURE FROM THEIR RIGHT AND MUCH OF THE MIDDLE CLASS IN BRITAIN, THE "DECENT WORKING PEOPLE."
28. NONETHELESS, THE POLICE HAVE REACTED IN FRUSTRATION TO THE CHARGES THAT HAVE BEEN LEVELED AGAINST THEM. IN AN EMOTIONALLY CHARGED GATHERING LAST WEEK, THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE METROPOLITAN BRANCH OF THE POLICE FEDERATION, THE RANK AND FILE ACCUSED THEIR LEADERS OF COWARDICE, SAYING THAT THEY WERE AFRAID OF MAKING TOUGH DECISIONS FOR FEAR OF POLITICAL OR PROMOTIONAL CONSEQUENCES. THE POLICE ON THE BEAT COMPLAIN THAT THE BRAKES ARE PUT ON THEM BY THEIR SENIOR OFFICERS AND BY LOCAL POLITICIANS. IN TOTTENHAM, THE FIRST RIOT IN THE U.K. MAINLAND IN WHICH GUNS WERE USED AGAINST THE POLICE, AND WHERE ONE POLICEMAN WAS KILLED AND 163 INJURED, THE POLICE WERE RESTRAINED FROM GOING INTO THE AREA EARLY ON TO MAKE ARRESTS. THIS, POLICE CLAIM, WAS BUT A CONTINUATION OF AN OFFICIAL "HANDS-OFF" POLICY WHICH HAS FRUSTRATED THEM SINCE ITS INCEPTION AFTER SCARMAN, AND WHICH THEY BELIEVE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HIGH CASUALTY RATE THAT FOLLOWED.
29. AT THE MEETING LAST WEEK, JOHN NEWMAN, A CONSTABLE AND CHAIRMAN OF THE METROPOLITAN BRANCH OF THE POLICE FEDERATION, DEMANDED AND WAS GRANTED A "THOROUGH REVIEW OF POLICY AND TACTICS" BY METROPOLITAN COMMISSIONER SIR KENNETH NEWMAN.
30. MINORITY AND OPPOSITION LEADERS HAVE COMPLAINED THAT THE POLICE ONLY WANT STUDIES OF THE ISSUES THAT SUIT THEM, AND NOTE THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND THE POLICE HAVE REFUSED TO CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT INQUIRY INTO THE TRIGGERING INCIDENTS OF TWO OF THE RIOTS.
THE POLITICS OF RACE
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31. THE THEME OF HOME SECRETARY HURD'S SPEECH AT THE ANNUAL CONSERVATIVE CONFERENCE IN EARLY OCTOBER, DIRECTED AT MINORITIES, WAS PARAPHRASABLE AS "YOU HAVE THE RIGHTS, NOW EXERCISE SOME RESPONSIBILITY". THE REALITY SEEMS TO BE THAT THESE RIGHTS APPEAR ALL TOO THEORETICAL, AT BEST, TO MOST OF BRITAIN'S MINORITIES.
32. MINORITY VOTERS, ESPECIALLY CARIBBEAN BLACKS, HAVE VOTED FOR THE LABOR PARTY SO CONSISTENTLY THAT THE CONSERVATIVES AND THE ALLIANCE HAVE LARGELY WRITTEN THEM OFF, AND LABOR HAS TAKEN THEM FOR GRANTED.
33. THERE ARE SOME STIRRINGS OF CHANGE. LABOR IS GROPING WITH PLANS TO GIVE BLACKS SPECIAL RIGHTS WITHIN THE PARTY STRUCTURE, A NUMBER OF ETHNIC ASIANS ARE TENDING TOWARDS THE ALLIANCE, AND SOME SUCCESSFUL BLACK AND ASIAN BUSINESSMEN FLIRT WITH THE TORIES. MEANWHILE, LEGISLATION ON THE U.S. MODEL ALLOWING GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW CONTRACTS FROM FIRMS THAT DO NOT EMPLOY A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE OF MINORITIES WAS RECENTLY PROPOSED BY THE HOME OFFICE. THIS PROPOSAL IS CONTROVERSIAL AND UNLIKELY TO BECOME LAW BECAUSE OF QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH MEASURES. NEVERTHELESS, THE RIOTS MAY HAVE FORCED THE PROBLEMS OF RACIAL MINORITIES BACK NEAR THE TOP OF THE AGENDA. ONE JOURNALIST INTERVIEWING AN ANGRY YOUTH ON THE STREETS OF HANDSWORTH CALLED THE RIOTS POINTLESS, BUT THE YOUNG MAN COUNTERED "OH, YEAH? HOW DO YOU FIGURE THAT? SOMETHING WILL BE DONE." AND HE MAY BE RIGHT.
PARTY POLITICS: TOO LITTLE DONE, AND THAT TOO LATE
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34. THE BROAD REACTION AMONG CONSERVATIVES TO THE RECENT RIOTS WAS SPLIT: THE HARD-LINE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTERS RESISTED CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS LINKING POVERTY AND DEPRIVATION WITH THE URBAN UPHEAVALS AND DESCRIBED THE RIOTS AS MERE "CRIMINAL OPPORTUNISM". THIS POSITION WAS PORTRAYED BY THE OPPOSITION AS A SELF-INTERESTED ATTEMPT BY THE TORIES TO WRIGGLE FREE OF THEIR PART OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRITAIN'S CONTINUING ECONOMIC DOLDRUMS AND THEIR RESULTS. OTHER MORE LIBERAL TORIES PARTIALLY CONCURRED WITH THESE SENTIMENTS; THEY CLAIMED THAT THE RIOTS PROVED WHAT THEY HAD BEEN SAYING, I.E. THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S PRIORITIES HAD TO BE RE-EXAMINED AND THE HARD LINE REVISED. PRIME MINISTER THATCHER'S ARGUMENT THAT THE WORKINGS OF AN UNFETTERED FREE MARKET WILL, IF LEFT ALONE, CREATE JOBS TO RENEW BRITAIN HAS BEEN RIDICULED BY THE OPPOSITION PARTIES, WHICH ASSERT THAT UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES THREATEN BRITAIN'S CITIES WITH HOSTILITY AND ALIENATION THAT LAISSEZ-FAIRE ECONOMICS CANNOT RESOLVE. MRS. THATCHER'S RESPONSE TO THE RIOTS WAS TO PLEDGE MORE EQUIPMENT AND MANPOWER FOR THE POLICE, BUT HOME SECRETARY HURD HAS ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE RIOT CAUSES MUST BE TREATED TOO. THE OPPOSITION HAS OFFERED NO CONCRETE SOLUTIONS OTHER THAN THE PRESERVATION AND ENHANCEMENT OF THE WELFARE STATE, WHILE ALLIANCE AND LABOR LEADERS MUST WELCOME THE FACT THAT THEY ARE NOT CURRENTLY IN POWER AND HAVING TO DEFEND THEIR OWN RECORDS IN THE GLARE OF THE BURNING CITIES.
35. THE CONSERVATIVES STRESS THE SIGNS OF ECONOMIC UPTURN THAT OCCASIONALLY ARISE, SUCH AS NEW FIRMS TAKING UP RESIDENCE IN BIRMINGHAM AND LIVERPOOL. THE FIRMS WHICH THEY ARE REFERRING TO DO HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON ECONOMIC STATISTICS, BUT IN GENERAL ARE HIGH-TECH, CAPITAL-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES THAT EMPLOY RELATIVELY FEW PEOPLE AND THOSE, HIGHLY SKILLED, ACCORDING TO A CONGRESS OF BRITISH INDUSTRIES STUDY. THUS THEY HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON THE INNER CITY UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS.
36. THE TORIES HAVE MADE THE REINING-IN OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING ONE OF THEIR PRIME TECHNIQUES FOR REDUCING TOTAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING. IN PARTICULAR PUBLIC SECTOR CAPITAL BUDGETS HAVE BEEN SEVERELY CUT FROM 3.6 BILLION POUNDS IN 1979 TO 2.2 BILLION POUNDS IN 1986. WHEN COMBINED WITH THE SALE OF COUNCIL HOUSING TO ITS TENANTS, THE PUBLIC HOUSING STOCK HAS BEEN REDUCED BY ONE-THIRD DURING A PERIOD IN WHICH FUNDS FOR HOUSING RENOVATIONS HAVE NOT INCREASED IN REAL TERMS. SCARMAN'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN HOUSING HAVE BEEN ALMOST ENTIRELY IGNORED.
37. EDUCATIONAL REFORMS SUGGESTED BY SCARMAN INCLUDED MORE AND BETTER NURSERY EDUCATION, MORE TRAINING OF TEACHERS IN THE NEEDS OF MINORITY CHILDREN, PROGRAMS TO TEACH ENGLISH TO IMMIGRANTS, AND BETTER LINKS BETWEEN PARENTS AND SCHOOLS. NONE OF THESE HAS BEEN FUNDED. IN FACT, ACCORDING TO THE FINANCIAL TIMES, DESPITE A STATIC NURSERY-AGE POPULATION IN BRITAIN, THE OVERALL CAPITAL SPENDING FOR NURSERY EDUCATION HAS FALLEN FROM 41 POUNDS PER CAPITA TO 24 POUNDS SINCE 1981.
38. SCARMAN RECOMMENDED THAT "POSITIVE DISCRIMINATION" MIGHT BE NEEDED TO REDRESS THE EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATIONAL GAPS BETWEEN WHITES AND MINORITIES. (POSITIVE DISCRIMINATION IS BETTER KNOWN IN THE U.S. AS AFFIRMATIVE ACTION.) NO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ACTION RESULTED FROM THESE SUGGESTIONS, ALTHOUGH PROGRAMS WERE ADOPTED AT THE LOCAL LEVEL IN SOME AREAS.
WHAT ABOUT THE ROLE OF BRITAIN'S NEW DRUGS CRACKDOWN?
39. SEVERAL PAPERS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT EFFORTS AFTER THE LAST RIOTS TO FORGE LINKS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE COMMUNITY BY INCREASING POLICEMEN'S SENSITIVITY TO THE COMMUNITIES THEY PATROL HAVE RESULTED IN THE POLICE GOING "SOFT ON CRIME." FOR EXAMPLE, THE POLICE ARE IN A DELICATE POSITION WHEN THEY ATTEMPT TO ENFORCE ANTI-MARIJUANA LAWS IN AFRO-CARIBBEAN COMMUNITIES, WHERE RASTAFARIANS SEE MARIJUANA AS AN IMPORTANT RITUAL SUBSTANCE. INTERFERENCE WITH THIS TRADITION IS LIKELY TO BRING TROUBLE DOWN UPON THE HEAD OF THE OFFICER WHO IS SO BOLD AS TO STEP IN. AT THE VERY LEAST HE INVITES CHARGES OF CULTURAL INSENSITIVITY. MEANWHILE, IN MANY AREAS DRUG SALES HAVE BECOME THE ONLY RELIABLE SOURCE OF INCOME AND ADVANCEMENT FOR YOUNG BLACK GO-GETTERS.
40. IN THE PAST YEAR, HOWEVER, THE U.K HAS FOCUSSED ON THE DAMAGE WHICH DRUG USAGE AND ITS ATTENDANT CORRUPTION CAUSE, MINDFUL OF U.S. PROBLEMS, AND IT IS ADOPTING IN A WHOLESALE FASHION U.S. ANTI-DRUG TECHNIQUES. AS PART OF AN OVERALL POLICY WHICH INCLUDES LONGER SENTENCES FOR DRUG DEALERS, AND NEW TECHNIQUES TO SEIZE PROFITS FROM DRUG SALES, THE POLICE HAVE BEEN PRESSED TO CRACK DOWN ON DRUGS, AND THIS NEW DRUGS OFFENSIVE MAY HAVE BEEN ONE OF THE SPARKS THAT FINALLY KINDLED THE TINDERBOX CITIES. BIRMINGHAM'S RIOTS WERE PRECEDED BY TWO MAJOR RAIDS RIGHT IN THE NEIGHBORHOODS WHICH WERE SOON TO BE THE SCENE OF THE DISTURBANCES. THE HOME OFFICE HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO ACKNOWLEDGE ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DRUGS SWEEP AND THE ERUPTION OF THE RIOTS, BUT A BRIGHT LABOR M.P. FROM BIRMINGHAM TOLD US, WITHOUT IN ANY WAY IMPLYING THAT DRUG DEALERS CAN BE ALLOWED FREEDOM TO OPERATE, THAT HE KNOWS THE CONNECTION IS EXPLICIT. THUS, IT APPEARS THAT THE POLICE ARE CAUGHT ON THE FRONT LINES ENFORCING A NEWLY VIGOROUS AND GENERALLY POPULAR ANTI-DRUGS POLICY, BUT ARE ALSO TRYING TO CATCH UP WITH THE IMPACT THAT IT AND OTHER SOCIAL PROBLEMS ARE HAVING ON BRITAIN'S CITIES.
CONCLUSION
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41. THE RIOTS MAY HAVE FORCED BRITAIN'S POLITICAL LEADERS TO EXAMINE THEMSELVES AND DETERMINE SUBSEQUENT ACTION TO REDRESS SOME VERY REAL AND THUS FAR INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS. BUT IN THE MEANTIME WE ARE LIKELY TO SEE MORE RIOTING AHEAD, WHICH WILL PUT EXTRA STRAINS ON THIS CAUTIOUS, SLOW-TO-CHANGE SOCIETY. WHILE THE ONSET OF WINTER MAY INHIBIT STREET VIOLENCE, SPRING CANNOT BE FAR BEHIND.
SEITZ
Tuesday, 26 January 1999, 03:32
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000495
USIA
FOR NEA, I/GNEA
STATE FOR SA/PAB, D, PA
EO 12958 DECL: 01/23/09
TAGS PREL, PTER, KISL, PK, AF
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: USAMA BIN LADIN
REF: PESHAWAR 031
1. CLASSIFIED BY PUBLIC DIPLOMACY COUNSELOR RICHARD HOAGLAND FOR REASONS 1.5(D)
2. (C) SUMMARY: IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE USG IS NOT DOING AS WELL AS IT MIGHT PROJECTING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ON USAMA BIN LADIN (UBL). WE WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT WASHINGTON CONSIDER A REVIEW OF THIS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORT. END SUMMARY.
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PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS
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2. (C) WE NOTE THE FOLLOWING PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS:
-- THE PRO-TALIBAN AL-RASHID TRUST IN KARACHI CONTINUES TO CHURN OUT PRO-UBL -- AND CORRESPONDINGLY ANTI-U.S./ANTI-WESTERN -- BOOKS, NEWSPAPERS, MAGAZINES, AND POSTERS IN URDU, ENGLISH, AND AFGHAN LANGUAGES AT NOMINAL COST OR FOR FREE DISTRIBUTION. E.G., THE TRUST RECENTLY INTRODUCED A 3' X 2' FOUR- COLOR PRO-UBL POSTER WITH PHOTOS, MAPS, AND IDEOLOGICAL TEXTS AVAILABLE FOR 15 RUPEES, ABOUT 30 CENTS -- JUST A BIT MORE THAN THE COST OF A SIDEWALK HAIRCUT. THIS POSTER BEAT THE USG'S UBL "WANTED" POSTER TO THE STREET.
-- WE FREQUENTLY HEAR REPORTS THAT SOME IN THE LOWER-MIDDLE AND LOWER CLASSES, BOTH URBAN AND RURAL, CONSIDER UBL AN ISLAMIC HERO BECAUSE THE U.S. HAS NAMED HIM "PUBLIC ENEMY NUMBER ONE." THAT SAID, IT'S OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE MAJORITY OF MUSLIMS, AT LEAST IN PAKISTAN, DO NOT NECESSARILY SUPPORT THIS VIEW. THE PENDING USG DISTRIBUTION OF UBL "WANTED" POSTERS AND MATCHBOOKS IN PAKISTAN MAY INCREASE UBL'S STATURE AS A KIND OF FOLK HERO.
-- U.S. AND BRITISH EFFORTS TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN TERRORISTS, LIKE BIN LADIN, AND "GOOD MUSLIMS" ARE SOMETIMES PORTRAYED IN THE MEDIA AND BY RELIGIOUS FIGURES IN THEIR WRITINGS AND SERMONS AS ATTEMPTS TO DIVIDE ALL MUSLIMS BY CO-OPTING WESTERNIZED -- MEANING (TO THEM) "MORALLY CORRUPT" -- MODERATES. (NOTE: THIS REPRESENTS THE PHILOSOPHICALLY ROMANTIC VIEW THAT ISLAM PER SE ERASES ALL DIVISIONS, THAT THE MUSLIM UMMAH IS "ONE," AND THAT AN ATTACK ON ONE IS AN ATTACK ON ALL. END NOTE.)
-- IN SHARP CONTRAST TO THEIR ORDINARY EXECRABLE PUBLIC RELATIONS PERFORMANCE ON THE BIN LADEN QUESTION, THE TALIBAN HAVE PRE- EMPTED US CONSISTENTLY SINCE AUGUST, FIRST BY ANNOUNCING THEIR WILLINGNESS TO HAVE AFGHANISTAN;S SUPREME COURT EXAMINE THE CHARGES AGAINST BIN LADIN AND THEN BY ANNOUNCING THAT NO "EVIDENCE" (BY WHICH THEY MEANT HARD FACTS IN PROOF OF THE CHARGES) HAD BEEN PRESENTED. OUR RESPONSE IN EACH CASE WAS MUTED AND DELAYED. CONTINUING THIS TREND ON THE TALIBAN'S PART, EARLY IN JANUARY, THE TALIBAN SPONSORED A SEMINAR IN KABUL, REPORTED BY RADIO SHARIA, ON THE LIFE, TIMES, AND THOUGHTS OF UBL (REFTEL).
-- ACCORDING TO RECENT PRESS REPORTS, PAKISTANI TALIBS WHO HAVE SERVED IN AFGHANISTAN, ALONG WITH AFGHAN TALIBS, ARE BEGINNING TO ENFORCE THEIR DOGMAS AND SOCIAL CONTROLS IN PAKISTAN'S TRIBAL TERRITORIES AND IN SOME PLACES IN BALOCHISTAN AND NWFP PROVINCES. ALSO, LAST WEEK, THE GOP ENFORCED ISLAMIC LAW BY DECREE IN MALAKAND DIVISION AND IN A PART OF KOHISTAN. ALTHOUGH THESE DEVELOPMENTS ARE RELATIVELY ISOLATED AS YET, THEY SUGGEST A DISTURBING TREND. INDEED, THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE PAKISTANI CONSTITUTION ESTABLISHING SHARIA AS THE SUPREME LAW OF PAKISTAN -- AN AVOWEDLY HIGH PRIORITY OF THE NAWAZ SHARIF GOVERNMENT -- HAS BEEN PASSED BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND IS PENDING BEFORE THE SENATE.
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WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
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4. (C) WE ARE UNLIKELY EVER TO MAKE MUCH INROAD WITH UBL'S HARD-CORE SUPPORTERS BECAUSE THEY ARE TRUE-BELIEVER ABSOLUTISTS AND TEND TO THINK AND REACT LARGELY EMOTIONALLY: FACTS ARE LESS IMPORTANT TO THEM THAN EMOTIONS. THEY ARE NOT OPEN TO PERSUASION. FURTHER, WE FACE A FORMIDABLE FOE AMONG THOSE WHO ARE CHURNING OUT AND WIDELY DISSEMINATING PRO-UBL PROPAGANDA AND TAKING OTHER ACTIVE MEASURES.
5. (C) HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A LARGE MIDDLE GROUND, IN PAKISTAN AND IN AFGHANISTAN, WHICH IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY ANTI- U.S./ANTI-WESTERN AND WHICH IS NOT IDEOLOGICALLY COMMITTED TO UBL AND HIS PAN- ISLAMIST REVOLUTION. THIS MIDDLE GROUND, SOMEWHAT SUSCEPTIBLE TO REASON, OR AT LEAST TO OTHER INFORMATION, SHOULD BE OUR PRIMARY TARGET. THE MESSAGE CRAFTED FOR THEM WOULD ALSO BE WELCOMED BY THE EDUCATED, WESTWARD- LOOKING ELITE OF BOTH PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN WHO FEEL THREATENED BY UBL'S ADVOCACY OF VIOLENCE AND THEOLOGICAL OBSCURANTISM.
6. (C) THE FOCUS OF ANY ENHANCED USG PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORT SHOULD BE TO PORTRAY UBL AND OTHERS AROUND HIM AS CRIMINALS, BOTH BY INTERNATIONAL AND BY ISLAMIC STANDARDS. WHERE POSSIBLE, RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MOVEMENT "AL-QAIDA" SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED, NOT JUST UBL AS AN INDIVIDUAL.
-- WHEN WE FOCUS ON BIN LADIN, AND ESPECIALLY FOR AFGHAN CONSUMPTION, WE SHOULD MAKE THREE POINTS: 1) THE U.S. IS NOT AGAINST AFGHANISTAN AND THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, 2) THE U.S. IS NOT AGAINST ANY PARTICULAR AFGHAN POLITICAL FACTION, AND 3) THE U.S. WANTS UBL EXPELLED FROM AFGHANISTAN TO A PLACE WHERE HE CAN BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE.
-- THE BROADER PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORT COULD INCLUDE, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, A "CHARGE SHEET" OF THE CRIMES COMMITTED BY UBL, BY HIS CLOSEST ASSOCIATES, AND BY HIS FOLLOWERS, NOTING THE FACT THAT MANY OF THEIR VICTIMS HAVE BEEN MUSLIMS OF VARIOUS NATIONALITIES.
-- RECOGNIZING THE NEED TO PROTECT SOURCES AND METHODS AND NOT TO COMPROMISE ON-GOING INVESTIGATIONS AND JUDICIAL PROCESSES, WE SHOULD BE FORTHCOMING TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE ABOUT THE DETAILS OF THE NAIROBI AND DAR ES SALAAM BOMBINGS, AS WELL AS ABOUT UBL'S AND HIS MOVEMENT'S OTHER CRIMES.
-- THIS INTENSIFIED PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORT SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE VALIDATION FROM ISLAMIC SOURCES THAT THESE CRIMES ARE INDEED RECOGNIZED AS CRIMES UNDER ISLAM. RATHER THAN STATEMENTS BY U.S.- OR UK-BASED ISLAMIC SCHOLARS, IT WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE TO USE THE TEACHINGS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF MAJOR ISLAMIC SCHOLARS AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS FROM SAUDI ARABIA, EGYPT, AND ELSEWHERE. IN SELECTING/ELICITING SUCH CITATIONS, IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT UBL AND THE PAN- ISLAMISTS DISMISS SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT AS ONLY NOMINALLY ISLAMIC STATES CAPTIVE TO U.S.-TOADYING, DESPOTIC, AND APOSTATE LEADERS.
-- KEEPING IN MIND THAT IN HIS DECEMBER 23 INTERVIEW UBL JUSTIFIED KILLING MUSLIMS IN HIS JIHAD AGAINST "CRUSADERS AND JEWS," AND RECOGNIZING THE EMOTIONAL ASPECT OF OUR TARGET AUDIENCE, WE SHOULD PREPARE FOR DISSEMINATION MORE HUMAN INTEREST STORIES OF UBL'S VICTIMS, ESPECIALLY HIS MUSLIM VICTIMS OF VARIOUS NATIONALITIES. U.S. MEDIA REPORTS OF BLINDED KENYANS, FOR EXAMPLE, RECEIVED GOOD COVERAGE IN THE PAKISTANI PRINT MEDIA.
7. (7) EFFECTIVE METHODS WOULD NATURALLY INCLUDE THE TRADITIONAL USG PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TOOLS: VOA LANGUAGE SERVICES, INCLUDING INTERVIEWS WITH UBL'S MUSLIM VICTIMS; CAREFULLY TARGETED WORLDNET INTERACTIVES; WIRELESS-FILE TEXTS AND FACT SHEETS FOR TRANSLATION INTO LOCAL LANGUAGES; AND COMMISSIONED ARTICLES FOR PRESS PLACEMENT.
8. (C) CONSIDERATION COULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO PRODUCTION OF A BOOKLET IN LOCAL LANGUAGES ON THE CRIMES OF BIN LADIN AND HIS ASSOCIATES, ALONG WITH VICTIMS' STORIES, FOR NON- CONVENTIONAL DISTRIBUTION IN MOSQUES, MADRASSAS, ISLAMIC STUDY CENTERS, ISLAMIA DEPARTMENTS OF UNIVERSITIES, AND BOOKSTORES.
9. (C) A NON-USG-IDENTIFIED WEB SITE COULD ALSO BE CREATED TO POST THE ABOVE MATERIAL AND THE URL WIDELY DISTRIBUTED. ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD APPEAR TO BE COUNTER-INTUITIVE -- THAT THE MASSES DON'T USE THE INTERNET -- ALMOST ALL ISLAMIC AND ISLAMIST GROUPS DO INDEED HAVE INTERNET ACCESS AND USE IT EXTENSIVELY.
HOAGLAND
Wednesday, 29 October 2008, 12:07
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BISHKEK 001095
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDRESSEE)
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (GORKOWSKI)
EO 12958 DECL: 10/29/2018
TAGS PREL, ECON, KG
SUBJECT: CANDID DISCUSSION WITH PRINCE ANDREW ON THE KYRGYZ
ECONOMY AND THE "GREAT GAME"
REF: BISHKEK 1059
BISHKEK 00001095 001.4 OF 004
Classified By: Amb. Tatiana Gfoeller, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: On October 28, the Ambassador participated in a two-hour brunch to brief HRH the Duke of York ahead of his meetings with the Kyrgyz Prime Minister and other high-level officials. She was the only non-subject of the United Kingdom or the Commonwealth invited to participate by the British Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic. Other participants included major British investors in Kyrgyzstan and the Canadian operator of the Kumtor mine. The discussion covered the investment climate for Western firms in the Kyrgyz Republic, the problem of corruption, the revival of the "Great Game," Russian and Chinese influence in the country, and the Prince's personal views on promoting British economic interests. Astonishingly candid, the discussion at times verged on the rude (from the British side). END SUMMARY.
2. (C) British Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic Paul Brummell invited the Ambassador to participate in briefing His Royal Highness Prince Andrew, the Duke of York, ahead of his October 28 meetings with Kyrgyz Prime Minister Igor Chudinov and other high-level officials. The Prince was in Kyrgyzstan to promote British economic interests. Originally scheduled to last an hour over brunch, the briefing ended up lasting two hours, thanks to the super-engaged Prince's pointed questions. The Ambassador was the only participant who was not a British subject or linked to the Commonwealth. The absence of her French and German colleagues was notable; they were apparently not invited despite being fellow members of the European Union. Others included major British investors in Kyrgyzstan and the Canadian operator of the Kumtor mine.
"YOU HAVE TO TAKE THE ROUGH WITH THE SMOOTH"
--------------------------------------------
3. (C) The discussion was kicked off by the president of the Canadian-run Kumtor mine, who described at length his company's travails of trying to negotiate a revised mining concession that provides a greater stake in Kumtor's parent company to the Kyrgyz government in exchange for a simplified tax regime and an expanded concession. He was followed by the representative of the British owner of Kyrgyzneftigas, who explained his company's role in Kyrgyz oil exploration and production, as well as doing his share of complaining of being harassed and hounded by Kyrgyz tax authorities. One example he gave was that a Kyrgyz shareholder was now suing the company, saying that his "human rights" were being violated by the terms of his shareholders' agreement.
4. (C) The Prince reacted with unmitigated patriotic fervor. To his credit, he diligently tried to understand the Kyrgyz point view. However, when participants explained that some Kyrgyz feel that they were "unfairly" led in the 1990s to sign unfavorable contracts with Westerners, he evinced no sympathy. "A contract is a contract," he insisted. "You have to take the rough with the smooth."
"ALL OF THIS SOUNDS EXACTLY LIKE FRANCE"
----------------------------------------
5. (C) After having half-heartedly danced around the topic for a bit, only mentioning "personal interests" in pointed fashion, the business representatives then plunged into describing what they see as the appallingly high state of corruption in the Kyrgyz economy. While claiming that all of them never participated in it and never gave out bribes, one representative of a middle-sized company stated that "It is sometimes an awful temptation." In an astonishing display of candor in a public hotel where the brunch was taking place, all of the businessmen then chorused that nothing gets done in Kyrgyzstan if President Bakiyev's son Maxim does not get "his cut." Prince Andrew took up the topic with gusto, saying that he keeps hearing Maxim's name "over and over again" whenever he discusses doing business in this country. Emboldened, one businessman said that doing business here is "like doing business in the Yukon" in the nineteenth century, i.e. only those willing to participate in local corrupt practices are able to make any money. His colleagues all heartily agreed, with one pointing out that "nothing ever changes here. Before all you heard was Akayev's son's name. Now it's Bakiyev's son's name." At this point the Duke of York laughed uproariously, saying that: "All of this sounds exactly like France."
6. (C) The Prince then turned to the Ambassador for an American take on the situation. The Ambassador described American business interests in the country, which range from large investments such as the Hyatt hotel and the Katel telecommunications company to smaller investments in a range of sectors. She stated that part of the problem with business conditions in Kyrgyzstan was the rapid turnover in government positions. Some reacted to their short tenures in a corrupt manner, wanting to "steal while they can" until they were turned out of office. While noting the need for greater transparency in doing business, she recounted that she had hosted the American Chamber of Commerce's Members Day last week (attended by the Foreign Minister and the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce) which had been widely attended and a resounding success (see reftel). She then described the beneficial impact on the Kyrgyz economy of the Coalition Air Base at Manas Airport.
"YOU HAVE TO CURE YOURSELF OF ANOREXIA"
---------------------------------------
7. (C) With a mock groan, the Duke of York then exclaimed: "My God, what am I supposed to tell these people?!" More seriously, he invited his guests to suggest ways Kyrgyzstan's economic prospects and attractiveness could be improved. Everyone agreed that in his talks with the Prime Minister and others, he should emphasize the rule of law, and long-term stability.
8. (C) Agreeing with the Ambassador's point about rapid government turnover, they urged him to impress upon his hosts the importance of predictability and the sanctity of contracts in order to attract more Western investment. At the same time, they pointed out that none of this was necessary to attract Russian, Kazakh, or Chinese investments. It appeared to them that the Kyrgyz were satisfied with their level and on the verge of "not bothering" with making the necessary improvements to attract Western investments. Returning to what is obviously a favorite theme, Prince Andrew cracked: "They won't need to make any changes to attract the French either!" Again turning thoughtful, the Prince mused that outsiders could do little to change the culture of corruption here. "They themselves have to have a change of heart. Just like you have to cure yourself of anorexia. No one else can do it for you."
PLAYING THE GREAT GAME (BY EXTENSION THE AMERICANS TOO)
--------------------------------------------- ----------
9. (C) Addressing the Ambassador directly, Prince Andrew then turned to regional politics. He stated baldly that "the United Kingdom, Western Europe (and by extension you Americans too") were now back in the thick of playing the Great Game. More animated than ever, he stated cockily: "And this time we aim to win!" Without contradicting him, the Ambassador gently reminded him that the United States does not see its presence in the region as a continuation of the Great Game. We support Kyrgyzstan's independence and sovereignty but also welcome good relations between it and all of its neighbors, including Russia.
10. (C) The Prince pounced at the sound of that name. He told the Ambassador that he was a frequent visitor to Central Asia and the Caucasus and had noticed a marked increase in Russian pressure and concomitant anxiety among the locals post-August events in Georgia. He stated the following story related to him recently by Azerbaijan's President Aliyev. Aliyev had received a letter from President Medvedev telling him that if Azerbaijan supported the designation of the Bolshevik artificial famine in Ukraine as "genocide" at the United Nations, "then you can forget about seeing Nagorno-Karabakh ever again." Prince Andrew added that every single other regional President had told him of receiving similar "directive" letters from Medvedev except for Bakiyev. He asked the Ambassador if Bakiyev had received something similar as well. The Ambassador answered that she was not aware of any such letter.
11. (C) The Duke then stated that he was very worried about Russia's resurgence in the region. As an example, he cited the recent Central Asian energy and water-sharing deal (septel), which he claimed to know had been "engineered by Russia, who finally pounded her fist on the table and everyone fell into line." (NOTE: Interestingly, the Turkish Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic recently described her analysis of the deal to the Ambassador in strikingly similar language. END NOTE.)
12. (C) Showing that he is an equal-opportunity Great Game player, HRH then turned to the topic of China. He recounted that when he had recently asked the President of Tajikistan what he thought of growing Chinese influence in Central Asia, the President had responded "with language I won't use in front of ladies." His interlocutors told the Prince that while Russians are generally viewed sympathetically throughout the region, the Chinese are not. He nodded, terming Chinese economic and possibly other expansion in the region "probably inevitable, but a menace."
RUDE LANGUAGE A LA BRITISH
--------------------------
13. (C) The brunch had already lasted almost twice its allotted time, but the Prince looked like he was just getting started. Having exhausted the topic of Kyrgyzstan, he turned to the general issue of promoting British economic interests abroad. He railed at British anti-corruption investigators, who had had the "idiocy" of almost scuttling the Al-Yamama deal with Saudi Arabia. (NOTE: The Duke was referencing an investigation, subsequently closed, into alleged kickbacks a senior Saudi royal had received in exchange for the multi-year, lucrative BAE Systems contract to provide equipment and training to Saudi security forces. END NOTE.) His mother's subjects seated around the table roared their approval. He then went on to "these (expletive) journalists, especially from the National Guardian, who poke their noses everywhere" and (presumably) make it harder for British businessmen to do business. The crowd practically clapped. He then capped this off with a zinger: castigating "our stupid (sic) British and American governments which plan at best for ten years whereas people in this part of the world plan for centuries." There were calls of "hear, hear" in the private brunch hall. Unfortunately for the assembled British subjects, their cherished Prince was now late to the Prime Minister's. He regretfully tore himself away from them and they from him. On the way out, one of them confided to the Ambassador: "What a wonderful representative for the British people! We could not be prouder of our royal family!"
COMMENT
-------
14. (C) COMMENT: Prince Andrew reached out to the Ambassador with cordiality and respect, evidently valuing her insights. However, he reacted with almost neuralgic patriotism whenever any comparison between the United States and United Kingdom came up. For example, one British businessman noted that despite the "overwhelming might of the American economy compared to ours" the amount of American and British investment in Kyrgyzstan was similar. Snapped the Duke: "No surprise there. The Americans don't understand geography. Never have. In the U.K., we have the best geography teachers in the world!" END COMMENT. GFOELLER
Wednesday, 22 April 2009, 11:43
C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000677
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
EO 12958 DECL: 04/22/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, SOCI, KCRM, KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN
-- SWEEPING EFFORT OR SELECTIVE TARGETING?
REF: A. 08 ASTANA 0680 B. 08 ASTANA 1309
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Kazakhstani authorities recently launched a well-publicized anti-corruption campaign that has resulted in the arrest of several high-ranking individuals, including the Minister of Environment and a Deputy Minister of Defense, and in convictions of a number of others. The campaign appears to have the full support of President Nazarbayev, who has repeatedly called on the government and the ruling Nur Otan party to battle this "most serious evil." Political analysts and civil society leaders remain skeptical, however, that the government's clean-up efforts will bring permanent results. Most see the campaign simply as evidence of a power struggle among elite groups within the Kazakhstani government and doubt that any of the "biggest fish" will be affected. END SUMMARY.
GOVERNMENT LAUNCHES ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN
2. (SBU) The Kazakhstani authorities recently launched a well-publicized anti-corruption campaign that seems to be aimed at the higher echelons of the government and has already brought down several senior individuals. Over the past two months, the Agency for Fighting Economic Crimes and Corruption (also known as the Financial Police) launched investigations against several government officials on suspicion of corruption and abuse of power. The list includes Minister of Environment Nurlan Iskakov and two of his deputy ministers, the director of the Astana City Construction Company and one of his deputies, the Chairman of the Water Resources Committee, and the Director of the Astana Health Department. All of the officials have been removed from their positions and are currently in detention or under house arrest pending the outcome of investigations against them. Investigations have also been launched against numerous mid-level officials and officials in local government, and two regional governors -- for South Kazakhstan and East Kazakhstan oblasts -- have been replaced and are under investigation. In addition, on April 13, the Committee for National Security (KNB) detained Deputy Defense Minister Kazhimurat Mayermanov on suspicion of abuse of office (i.e., corruption) in connection with government contracts with two Israeli defense firms to design and manufacture new artillery systems.
3. (SBU) Several high-ranking government officials were charged or prosecuted for corruption-related crimes in an earlier "wave" last year. In August 2008, Yuriy Tleumuratov, the Chairman of the Financial Control Committee at the Ministry of Finance, and Ruslan Yusupov, an office director in the same committee, were arrested and charged with bribery and abuse of power. (NOTE: Then-Tax Committee Chairman Nurlan Rahkmetov resigned shortly thereafter, stating that ethics rules demand he share responsibility for the wrong-doings of his subordinates. Some commentators suggested, however, that he had been directly involved in the crimes. END NOTE.) In November 2008, Zhaksybek Kulekeyev, the former chairman of the national railroad company Temir Zholy, was convicted of accepting bribes and abusing his authority (see ref A).
4. (SBU) Perhaps the most high-profile official convicted of corruption-related crimes is Serik Burkitbayev, the former head of KazMunaiGaz and a one-time advisor to President Nazarbayev (see ref B). Burkitbayev was tried in a closed trial and convicted on March 24 for abuse of power, misappropriation of property, and embezzlement. His case, however, is surrounded by political intrigue -- Burkitbayev was at one point a close associate of Rakhat Aliyev, Nazarbayev's exiled former son-in-law, and some press reports have suggested that his conviction was the result of his links to Aliyev rather than his corrupt dealings. Some media accounts claimed that Burkitbayev provided Aliyev with the eavesdropping equipment he apparently used to record embarrassing conversations among senior government officials which were later uploaded to the Internet. Aliyev himself publicly criticized the conviction and vowed to bring the attention of the international community to the case.
ORDER COMES FROM THE TOP
5. (SBU) The anti-corruption drive certainly has the highest backing. On April 1, President Nazarbayev commended Financial Police head Kairat Kozhamzharov for his anti-corruption efforts and told him to continue the fight "irrespective of people's status and connections." Nazarbayev has repeatedly called on the government and the ruling Nur Otan party to battle this "most serious evil," and there is evidence that his words have been taken to heart. Following the President's criticism of the "corrupt state" of the Shymkent Medical Academy, the Health Ministry reorganized it, shutting down all but three faculties and transferring close to three thousand students to other institutions. The Ministry of Interior (MVD) recently announced that in response to "goals set forth by the President," the Ministry will reorganize its hiring and promotion processes to increase transparency. And the Ministry of Education publicly committed to cleaning up corruption at schools and universities.
BIG FISH OR SMALL FRY?
6. (C) Despite the high publicity surrounding the round-up of corrupt officials, independent analysts remain skeptical that the government's clean-up efforts will bring permanent results. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us on April 7 that arrests of individual "wayward" officials will have little effect unless systemic corruption -- "the gray economy in government services" -- is addressed. Evidence of corrupt dealings could be dug up against numerous high-level government officials, argued XXXXXXXXXXX, so the decision about which officials to bring to justice becomes a purely political one. He predicted that the campaign will bring down the level of corruption in the short-term -- "some will think twice" -- but will have little effect on the system as a whole.
7. (C) Political analyst XXXXXXXXXXXX sees the recent convictions more as a sign of intra-elite warfare than evidence of a concerted anti-corruption effort. As evidence, he pointed to the cases of Kulikeyev and Burkitbayev, both of whom XXXXXXXXXXXX believes were convicted on marginal evidence. XXXXXXXXXXXX sees the anti-corruption effort as little more than a fight for property in uncertain economic times -- "the accused are the unlucky losers."
8. (C) Civil society activist XXXXXXXXXXXX also describes the discredited officials as "the weak links in the chain" and believes that the "real sharks" are continuing to operate with impunity. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the criminal investigations themselves are hardly transparent and some, like the investigation against former Vice Minister of Environment Alzhan Braliyev, are border-line illegal. (NOTE: A contact of our Public Affairs Section who knows Braliyev personally questioned the veracity of the evidence against him and maintained to us that he is "taking the fall" for his boss, former Minister of Environment Nurlan Iskakov. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that several of Bralieyev's associates and friends are coming together to fund his defense. END NOTE.)
XXXXXXXXXXXX ascribed the recent "fury of activity" to new management at the Financial Police. Kozhamzharov was appointed in December 2008 and was given what XXXXXXXXXXXX believes were express orders from President Nazarbayev to clean up the government, "within reason, of course."
OPPOSITION LEADERS SEE EFFORTS AS "FUTILE"
9. (C) Key opposition leaders also voiced skepticism about the efficacy of the anti-corruption efforts. XXXXXXXXXXXX sees the campaign as "selective punishment" that will not touch the highest echelons of the government. XXXXXXXXXXXXdescribed it as a power struggle between leading elite groups "with corruption used as an excuse." XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that the campaign was aimed at eliminating the competition of Nazarbayev son-in-law Timur Kulibayev, who XXXXXXXXXXXX believes has been selected as his successor. (COMMENT: XXXXXXXXXXXX's view appears to be a bit off base, since Kulibayev's strongest competitors as potential Nazarbayev successors -- such as Astana Mayor Imangali Tasmagambetov -- have not been affected by the anti-corruption campaign. END COMMENT.) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Kazakhstan's endemic corruption problems can only be addressed through appropriate changes to legislation -- "all else is futile."
10. (C) COMMENT: Corruption is endemic among Kazakhstani officialdom, as it is across the CIS. Blessed with strong tax revenues, government salaries are high in Kazakhstan compared to its neighbors -- for example, Prime Minister Masimov's salary is over $50,000 a year -- but most senior officials live lifestyles that require much higher incomes. In many instances, they receive profits from businesses registered in the names of their spouses or other relatives. In other cases, they're stealing directly from the public trough. The officials taken down by the anti-corruption campaign are thus just a tiny fraction of those with dirt on their hands. The ongoing anti-corruption campaign does appear to be targeting some officials who have gone too far -- and don't have adequate protection from above to ward off the law enforcement authorities. In other cases, however, it seems likely that officials no more corrupt than any one else have been targeted by rivals taking advantage of the anti-corruption campaign to bring them down. END COMMENT. HOAGLAND
Thursday, 17 April 2008, 10:35
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000760
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADD "CLASSIFIED BY" LINE
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/17/2018
TAGS PGOV, PINR, KZ
SUBJECT: LIFESTYLES OF THE KAZAZHSTANI LEADERSHIP
ASTANA 00000760 001.4 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY POL/ECON CHIEF STEVEN FAGIN, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
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Summary
-------
1. (C) Kazakhstan's political elites appear to enjoy typical hobbies -- such as travel, horseback riding, and skiing. Not surprisingly, however, they are able to indulge in their hobbies on a grand scale, whether flying Elton John to Kazakhstan for a concert or trading domestic property for a palace in the United Arab Emirates. This cable recounts several instances in which Embassy officers have learned of, or witnessed, the recreational habits of Kazakhstan's leaders. End Summary.
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Sun and Horses
--------------
2. (C) President Nazarbayev, like many of his countrymen, has a strong affinity for horses. In 2007, emboff visited the presidential horse farm XXXXXXXXXXX. The farm is located on the outskirts of Astana in a residential area, but is surrounded by a high-fence and security guards. Inside the gates are a large stable, indoor and outdoor riding arenas, and a clubhouse with a pool table, sauna, and exercise room. Emboff toured the stable and saw approximately forty horses from various parts of the world. XXXXXXXXXXXX told him that Nazarbayev visits the horse farm on occasion, though not too frequently. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Nazarbayev's wife -- Sara Nazarbayeva -- never accompanies him, XXXXXXXXXXXX Taszhargan, an opposition newspaper, printed a sympathetic article about Sara Nazarbayeva XXXXXXXXXXXX
3. (C) Nazarbayev is also fond of traveling to warmer climes in the region. The UAE Ambassador told emboff that Nazarbayev had traded property in Borovoe -- a mountainous resort area of Kazakhstan north of Astana and sometimes likened to Switzerland -- for a "palace" in the Emirates. He did not make clear whether the transaction was a permanent arrangement or only a temporary one. The head of Turkey's liaison office in Astana, Orhan Isik, told emboff that Nazarbayev has a mansion in Antaliya, which he visits 4-5 times a year. Isik claimed that Nazarbayev received the property as a gift in the early 1990's and now plans to use part of the land for the construction of a luxury hotel.
------------------------
Dancing at the Nightclub
------------------------
4. (C) On March 7, two days after his trip to the U.S. was cancelled, Prime Minister Masimov was spotted by emboff at Chocolat, one of Astana's trendiest nightclubs. Masimov entered at approximately 11:30 pm, accompanied by Presidential Administration head Kairat Kelimbetov, Astana mayor Askar Mamin, three middle-aged Kazakh women (presumably their wives), and a security detail. Although the club offers a VIP area, Masimov chose to sit at a table in full view of all of the club's patrons. Emboff lingered close to Masimov's group XXXXXXXXXXXX Masimov led his companions on to Chocolat's dance floor soon after their arrival. The dance floor holds approximately 100 people, and at the time perhaps 50 patrons were dancing. However, Masimov himself chose to dance on an empty stage above the dance floor. His companions quickly tired but Masimov remained, dancing alone and animatedly on the stage for another 15-20 minutes. At approximately 1:00 am, Masimov and his retinue left the club.
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Skiing with the Oligarchs
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5. (C) In September 2007, Kazakhstani oligarch Aleksandr Mashkevich -- the co-founder of metals and mining giant Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation and, according to
ASTANA 00000760 002.4 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY POL/ECON CHIEF STEVEN FAGIN, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
Forbes magazine, the 334th wealthiest man in the world -- hosted a dinner at his house in Almaty for two visiting U.S. congressmen. Only two Kazakhstanis attended the event, State Secretary Kanat Saudabayev and his assistant. Judging from
SIPDIS the friendly banter between Saudabayev and Mashkevich, the two have a quite cordial personal relationship. Mashkevich told a lengthy anecdote about a ski vacation that he and Saudabayev had taken together in Europe.
6. (C) Saudabayev had hosted a codel at that same Almaty residence in 2005, without Mashkevich in attendance. At that time, when the Ambassador asked Saudabayev whose house it was, he would only say that it belonged to "a friend." Saudabayev has twice hosted visiting USG officials for a meal at Mashkevich's Astana residence -- both times without Mashkevich. It is not clear what Mashkevich is spending his billions on, but it is certainly not culinary talent. On all four occasions the Ambassador has eaten at one of his houses, the menu has been similar and focused on beshparmak (boiled meat and noodles) and plov. The wait staff appeared to be graduates of a Soviet cafeteria training academy. The wine, at least, was somewhat upscale with reasonably good French vintage bottles uncorked for the guests. The Astana residence has wooden plaques on the doors that would fit in nicely in a Wyoming hunting lodge but are somewhat out of touch with the upscale "Euro-remont" that is so popular among the Kazakhstani elite.
-------------------------------
Private Concerts with the Stars
-------------------------------
7. (C) In 2007, President Nazarbayev's son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev, celebrated his 41st birthday in grand style. At a small venue in Almaty, he hosted a private concert with some of Russia's biggest pop-stars. The headliner, however, was Elton John, to whom he reportedly paid one million pounds for this one-time appearance. (Note: The British Ambassador relayed a slightly different story, with an unknown but obviously well-heeled friend arranging and paying for Sir Elton's gig. End Comment.) There have been separate reports that Nelly Furtado performed at the August 2007 birthday bash for Kulibayev's wife, Dinara Nazarbayeva. Kulibayev also appears willing to spend his fortune on others. According to Turkish diplomat Isik, when the Kempinski group recently built luxury villas in Bodrum, Turkey, Kulibayev bought up a number of them -- at a cost of 4-5 million dollars each -- and doled them out as gifts to friends and family.
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Sports and Politics Mix
-----------------------
8. (C) Sports and politics mixed seamlessly in Almaty on April 2, when some of Kazakhstan's most prominent political figures participated in the Beijing Olympics torch relay. Torchbearers included President Nazarbayev, Presidential Administration business affairs head Bolat Utemuratov, Nur Otan party first deputy chairman Adilbek Dzhaksybekov, and Agency for the Regulation of Natural Monopolies head Mazhit Yesenbayev. All of these bigwigs, except Nazarbayev himself, could justify their participation in the relay based not on their high-ranking political offices, but rather on their prominent official positions in the Kazakhstani sports world. Utemeratov just happens to head Kazakhstan's Tennis Federation, while Dzhakysbekov chairs the Football Federation -- a position previously held by ex-Nazarbayev son-in-law Rakhat Aliyev. Yesenbayev heads the Judo Federation. KazMunayGaz chairman Uzakbay Karabalin, who heads the Boxing Federation, and Nazarbayev son-in-law Timur Kulibayev, who heads the Golf Federation, also shared in the glory of carrying the Olympic torch. One prominent sport federation president who missed the torch call was Defense Minister Daniyal Akhmetov. He is head of the scandal-ridden Cycling Federation XXXXXXXXXXXX
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Relaxation the Good, Old Soviet Way
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9. (C) Kazakhstan's political elites also have recreational tastes that are not so exotic. Some, in fact, prefer to relax the old-fashioned way. Defense Minister Akhmetov, a self-proclaimed workaholic, appears to enjoy loosening up in the tried and true "homo sovieticus" style -- i.e., drinking oneself into a stupor. While most of our accounts of Akhmetov's indulgences with the bottle are hearsay, we do have "eyes on" for one episode which supports the rumors. In June 2007, Akhmetov showed up in grand form for a meeting with a visiting senior U.S. Defense Department official. Making no attempt to conceal his condition -- slouching back in his chair and slurring all kinds of Russian participles -- Akhmetov explained to this very senior guest that he had just been at a cadet graduation reception "toasting Kazakhstan's newly-commissioned officers." Who was toasted more -- the Defense Minister or the cadets -- is a matter of pure speculation. Akhmetov's excesses do not solely extend to the bottle. An insider at Astana's Radisson Hotel recently told us about preparations for the unbelievably lavish and expensive wedding of Akhmetov's son. In the Kazakh tradition, the parents of the groom are responsible for the wedding -- so it would seem that Akhmetov must have footed the bill. ORDWAY
Monday, 08 June 2009, 10:08
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 000982
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/A, EUR/CARC, EAP/CM, EAP/K, EEB/ESC
EO 12958 DECL: 06/08/2029
TAGS PREL, ECON, EPET, AF, GG, RS, IR, KN, ZK, KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: CHINESE AMBASSADOR COMMENTS ON KEY FOREIGN
POLICY ISSUES
REF: ASTANA 0678
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On June 5, Chinese Ambassador Cheng Guoping hosted the Ambassador for dinner at the restaurant on the 23rd floor of a striking new hotel built in Astana and owned by the Chinese National Petroleum Company. During a fascinating, wide-ranging, three-hour tour d'horizon, the Chinese Ambassador discussed his government's policy -- and occasionally made personal comments -- on human rights, smart power, President Obama, Afghanistan's reconstruction, Russia's policy in Central Asia, Georgian President Saakashvili, Iran's upcoming presidential elections, North Korea's nuclear tests, Central Asia's energy resources, the Manas air base, and the proposed international nuclear fuel bank. The Chinese Ambassador clearly enjoyed the free and easy, open-ended conversation and invited the Ambassador to meet again, at the restaurant, in the near future. Guoping was joined by an unidentified policy advisor and an interpreter, to whom he addressed his remarks in soft whispers throughout the evening. END SUMMARY.
CHINA'S MFA "SCARED" BY PELOSI'S VISIT
2. (SBU) Guoping was relaxed, wearing short sleeves and no jacket, and clearly eager to engage and entertain his American guests. He began the evening by referring to the recent visit to Beijing of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. Without openly acknowledging or discussing the twentieth anniversary of the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square protests, Guoping said the government was prepared, and also fearful, for the Speaker to raise human rights and democracy issues during her visit. "She had the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) scared to death on the eve of her visit," Guoping said, half-jokingly.
PRAISE FOR SMART POWER
3. (SBU) Without prompting, Guoping praised President Obama's leadership style and approach to foreign affairs. He singled out the President's "effective management" of the financial crisis, for example, calling his decisions to stimulate the U.S. economy "bold and courageous." He called the President's June 4 speech in Cairo - which Guoping was able to download in Mandarin from the Department's website - "a milestone for the use of smart power." Guoping said the President's willingness to employ both military and cultural assets would prove to be a "very effective" approach to foreign affairs. He observed that statesmen require both in order to achieve their policy objectives and said the Administration's use of "smart power is a very good idea."
IRANIAN ELECTIONS
4. (SBU) Guoping perceptively connected the Cairo speech to upcoming elections in Iran. "This speech is very timely," he said. "I predict that it will influence Iran's presidential elections, and will be particularly beneficial for reformers in Iran." He said that President Obama has already played a positive role in rebuilding U.S. relations with Iran and again stressed the importance of the upcoming elections. "The reformists have a chance," he said. Guoping suggested that it would be impossible for Iran to ignore President Obama's overtures for long. "They cannot remain in the background of these global changes in foreign policy. If they do, they will become even more isolated than they already are. And ultimately, if Iran doesn't respond, President Obama will have to change his policy. Iran might be the last country standing for extremism in the Muslim world," he said.
FOCUS ON THE TALIBAN
5. (SBU) About Afghanistan, Guoping said the Taliban is the real enemy of the United States and the "basis for terrorism in South Asia." He argued that the United States must first "eradicate the Taliban in order to defeat terror in Iraq" and said the Administration's emphasis on Afghanistan was a shrewd policy. "You have enlisted the help of all governments in the region to assist
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with the rebuilding of Afghanistan, saying that to do so is to play a part in the war against terrorism. No one is able to say openly that they do not want to combat terrorism, so you have made it very difficult to refuse to help."
NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
6. (C) In particular, Guoping said that the Northern Distribution Network to transport non-lethal supplies to U.S. troops in Afghanistan has enabled many countries to participate in Afghanistan's reconstruction. He said that the Chinese government is aware of the U.S. government's request to transit non-lethal supplies via China and said "we are actively researching this suggestion. In essence, it would mean that the People's Republic of China would be supporting a NATO military operation, which would be an interesting development." Guoping confided that China's MFA and its Ministry of Defense have different opinions on the subject, although he said he expected a decision soon. "My own personal opinion," he said, "is that we will do the right thing and cooperate with NATO and the U.S. government in Afghanistan." Guoping said this would be an appropriate issue to raise in the context of the President's visit to Beijing in July.
RUSSIA'S POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA
7. (C) Guoping said that Russia is experiencing "severe difficulty" now because of the global financial crisis. He suggested that the government of Russia is eager to improve relations with the United States now because Moscow is concerned that the economic downturn will begin to affect the political stability of the country, "even the stability of the Kremlin." Guoping said that Russia does not want or need any foreign policy problems right now; "they need to focus on their domestic, economic affairs." Guoping also said that Russia would like more support from the United States for its insistence on a privileged sphere of influence in Central Asia, in exchange for greater cooperation in Afghanistan. "Russia is convinced that they must dominate Central Asia and the Caucasus. They believe they have vital, strategic, historical interests in the region," Guoping said. When pressed by the Ambassador to express his own opinion, Guoping said, "I personally do not agree that Russia should be granted a special sphere of influence in the region, but that is their view."
ON GEORGIA
8. (C) On Georgia, Guoping said he expects Russia to use military force to overthrow Georgian President Saakashvili. He did not elaborate or offer any specifics, but merely observed that Russia has already established military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and is likely to remain there for the foreseeable future. Guoping worked in Georgia for four years and understands well the history and culture of its people. He observed that South Ossetia has strong cultural ties to Russia, but said it is likely that the Ossetians will ultimately press for greater independence from Russian influence.
9. (C) In unusually blunt language, Guoping said Saakashvili is "not a mature statesman. He overreacted to Russian provocations and gave Russia the opportunity to take Abkhazia and South Ossetia." Guoping suggested that Secretary Rice's July 2008 visit to Georgia before the war in August 2008, might have indirectly encouraged Saakashvili to take military action. He said his understanding was that Saakashvili briefed Secretary Rice on his plans to mobilize Georgian armed forces and when she did not directly object, Saakashvili mistook that as a sign of U.S. support. Guoping said, "Clearly, Russia baited and cheated Georgia. But Saakashvili was impressed with his earlier success in Batumi (Adjara) and he thought he could involve the United States in the war." Guoping said he expects former Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze to become Georgia's next president. "She is much more mature than Saakashvili. He won't stay long," he said.
NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR TESTS, DOMESTIC POLITICS
10. (C) Guoping seemed genuinely concerned by North Korea's recent
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nuclear missile tests. "We need to solve this problem. It is very troublesome," he said, calling Korea's nuclear activity a "threat to the whole world's security." China opposes North Korea's nuclear testing and is working to achieve peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, according to Guoping. When asked about the reunification of Korea, Guoping said China hopes for peaceful reunification in the long-term, but he expects the two countries to remain separate in the short-term. Guoping said the domestic political situation in North Korea is "very complex" and suggested that Kim Jong-il's reported decision to anoint his youngest son as his successor was driven more by Kim's deteriorating health than any carefully planned strategy. "They had no time to plan for this," he said. Guoping said the "military really governs" North Korea and controls domestic politics and foreign policy. He suggested that Kim Jong-il's announcement was designed to send a message to the military and the great powers that he is really in charge and in control. Guoping said China's objectives in North Korea were to ensure they honor their commitments on nonproliferation, maintain stability, and "don't drive [Kim Jong-il] mad."
CENTRAL ASIAN ENERGY
11. (SBU) Turning to a discussion of energy resources and energy security in Central Asia, Guoping said that Russia owns and controls most of Central Asia's pipelines, "but it cannot prevent the ultimate diversification of export routes." He said that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are close to Russia, but they nevertheless understand that they must seek and develop alternatives. He predicted that they will soon "break the Russian monopoly" on the export of hydrocarbons from the region and said the oil and gas pipelines to China now under construction will be "very important" in that regard. Guoping said that Kazakhstan's oil pipeline from Atasu to Alashankou would be completed in July and will initially carry 200,000 barrels per day (bbl/d), but will soon be expanded to 400,000 bbl/d. He said China would encourage Western oil companies to ship their production eastward. He was aware of plans to ship Kazakhstani oil across the Caspian Sea by tanker and said China had no objections to the project, which they considered "strictly commercial." When asked about China's recent $10 billion loan to Kazakhstan, Guoping confirmed that $5 billion was earmarked for investments in the energy sector, including the purchase of 50% of MangistauMunaiGas, while the remaining $5 billion would be delivered to the Development Bank of Kazakhstan as a "soft loan that the government would be free to use as it likes."
POTENTIAL PARTNERSHIP WITH U.S. OIL COMPANIES
12. (SBU) Guoping said China sees "great potential for an energy partnership with U.S. companies in Central Asia," including the development of onshore resources in Turkmenistan. He said that the Chinese MFA is very interested in pursuing these opportunities and suggested that this would be worth including in the China-U.S. Strategic Economic Dialogue. "This is very reasonable," he said, adding, "Our government would actively support such a proposal." The Ambassador noted that Chevron is already working with Chinese companies in western China.
ON NAZARBAYEV
13. (SBU) Commenting on President Nazarbayev, Guoping called him a "wise and mature statesman," who has presided over a period of remarkable stability and economic growth. He praised President Nazarbayev's foreign policy skills and added that China's MFA has "great respect" for President Nazarbayev and holds him in high regard.
MANAS AIR BASE
14. (C) Referring to the Manas air base, Guoping said that the government of Kyrgyzstan has tried to show similar sophistication in balancing the interests of the great powers in the neighborhood, but has been much less successful. He said that according to his information, the United States is prepared to pay an additional $50 million a year to the government of Kyrgyzstan "to make them think
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about" keeping the base open. He said he has seen a subtle shift in U.S. policy in the region, adding, "You've also made important progress in Uzbekistan. We ourselves have noticed a change in Uzbekistan's foreign policy over the last year, especially toward Russia."
NUCLEAR FUEL BANK
15. (C) Guoping did not appear to be well briefed on the subject of the IAEA-administered international nuclear fuel bank proposed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative. He was aware of Russia's earlier proposal to host a fuel bank, but he seemed surprised when told that Kazakhstan has announced its intention to host an IAEA-administered fuel bank on its territory. Indeed, he went so far as to question the accuracy of the Ambassador's information that Iranian President Ahmadinejad supported Kazakhstan's proposal during his state visit to Astana in April. "We are still conducting research on this idea," Guoping said, subtly indicating his unwillingness - or inability - to discuss the subject further.
16. (C) COMMENT: In the past six months, the Ambassador and Guoping have established a relaxed, open, and even frank relationship. Guoping prefers to meet the Ambassador in the U.S. Embassy or in a public place, having explained previously that he believes his own Embassy's temporary quarters are thoroughly bugged -- by whom, he doesn't say. CNPC built the high-rise, pagoda-roofed Beijing hotel as a gift to Astana. The marble lobby is impressive, if a bit too totalitarian-austere. The hotel was supposed to have opened in January, and we are not convinced that it is now fully open for business. We were the only guests in the restaurant, although an untouched full buffet was laid out. The revolving restaurant provides a spectacular panorama of Astana, and the empty steppe beyond, but it seems to revolve at varying speeds and sometimes can be a bit too fast on a full stomach and after a few glasses of wine. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
Friday, 11 December 2009, 10:22
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 003313
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/11/2034
TAGS PREL, PARM, MNUC, PGOV, KN, IR, CH
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS MEETING WITH CCID DIRECTOR
WANG JIARUI ON IRAN, NORTH KOREA
Classified By: Political Minster Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
1. (C) Under Secretary Burns met with Director of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee International Liaison Department (CCID) Wang Jiarui December 9 to discuss U.S.-China cooperation on North Korea and Iran. Wang said that the "ideal outcome" of Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth's current visit to Pyongyang would be a meeting with DPRK leader Kim Jong-il. The very fact of the visit, Wang emphasized, was important because it sent a signal to the DPRK that the United States was serious about negotiating a settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue. The DPRK would be unwilling in the short run to publicly announce denuclearization or an immediate return to the Six-Party talks, but would not want to lose the opportunity presented by Ambassador Bosworth's visit. The important thing was to keep things moving in the right direction and prevent the situation spinning out of control.
2. (C) Wang praised U.S. policy on Iran, calling it a "practical" approach. He said China was in agreement with the United States "in principle" that Iran should not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons and that the consequences of such an event would have a negative impact on Chinese interests. He also said that China would cooperate in persuading Iran to live up to the commitments it made at the October meeting in Geneva with the P5-plus-1 to resume discussions on the nuclear issue and allow third countries to reprocess its nuclear fuel. However, Wang insisted, continued diplomacy, rather than military action or stronger sanctions, was the best option at present. U/S Burns stressed the importance of China's cooperation and would not close the door on diplomacy but that U.S. patience was wearing thin and Iran had to soon show it was complying with international agreements or face real consequences. End Summary.
China Pleased With Bosworth Visit to DPRK
-----------------------------------------
3. (C) Asked his views on the North Korea nuclear situation, CCID Director Wang stated that China was very pleased that Ambassador Bosworth was in Pyongyang, noting that the visit would be "cost effective" because the North Koreans had made clear there could be no resuming the Six-Party Talks without first convening a bilateral U.S.-DPRK dialogue. Ambassador Bosworth's visit effectively "kicked the ball" back to the North Koreans. When asked what the likely outcome of the talks would be, Wang said the ideal outcome would be a meeting with Kim Jong-il, which would send a very positive signal, but it was impossible to predict North Korean behavior through "normal" means of reading public indicators. Wang said that Ambassador Bosworth would likely meet with First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju, who was "a hardliner" with "strong views" and whose opinions were valued by the DPRK's top leaders. However, Kang had to follow orders from above, Wang noted, and would not want to lose such an opportunity to improve relations with the United States. The negotiations with Ambassador Bosworth would be a bargaining process, with each side trying to discern the other's bottom line.
4. (C) The North needed a breakthrough in its relations with the United States, Wang asserted, both because of its domestic situation and the current international environment, but it would not be easy for North Korea to make a specific promise regarding a return to the Six-Party Talks or to announce denuclearization. Ambassador Bosworth's trip itself was important because it demonstrated that the United States was serious about preventing a nuclear Korean peninsula and was committed to a peaceful resolution of the issue. Wang said China was aware that the United States worried that it would be deceived by the North but in China's view there was no need to worry because the current process of promoting dialogue and negotiations was quite transparent and the international community would know what the outcome would be.
5. (C) Wang reiterated China's long-standing position that the key objective at this stage was to prevent the situation on the Korean peninsula from spinning out of control and to establish a positive direction through dialogue and negotiation. He said that Ambassador Bosworth should make clear to North Korea that it was not in U.S. interests to prolong the current state of hostility, that the United States had no intention of promoting regime change in the North, and that international sanctions and relations with the DPRK's neighbors could be changed and they could help
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with North Korea's economic development. This was contingent upon a change in North Korean behavior and an eventual North Korean pledge to the world that it would not embark on the road to nuclear weapons. U/S Burns responded that the United States understood the complexity of the situation and emphasized the great importance of joint U.S.-China and Five-Party efforts to bring North Korea back as soon as possible to the Six-Party Talks and its denuclearization commitments.
Unified U.S.-China Effort Needed on Iran
----------------------------------------
6. (C) U/S Burns emphasized that the nuclear weapons challenge in Iran required a similarly unified U.S.-China and international effort. The United States was profoundly concerned about Middle East stability, which was crucial to both U.S. and Chinese security and economic interests. If Iran continued developing a nuclear capability, Israel would "no doubt" act, and concern among the Arab states might trigger a regional arms race. President Obama had repeatedly reached out to Iran's leaders, but had yet to receive a positive response. Moreover, Iran had not followed through on the understandings reached in Geneva in October, including Iran's commitment to meet with the P5-plus-1 countries for talks focused on the nuclear issue and its initial acceptance of the IAEA's TRR proposal. The United States would continue to take a diplomatic, creative and flexible approach working with our Russian, Chinese and European partners, but time was running short. By the end of the year, President Obama would have to evaluate Iran's actions thus far. If Iran did not live up to its agreements, the United States would work with its international partners to make clear to Iran the consequences of its unwillingness to engage seriously.
Wang Pledges Chinese Support...
-------------------------------
7. (C) Wang had high praise for U.S. efforts in the Middle East in general and the approach to Iran in particular, stating that China viewed U.S. measures in Iran as very practical and as based on realities on the ground. China had economic interests in Iran, but, in principle, China had no differences with the United States on the nuclear weapons issue. China agreed that Iranian nuclear weapons would bring great instability to the Middle East, including possible warfare, even on a global scale, with consequences far greater than China's economic interests. China agreed with the IAEA proposal and that Iran should live up to the commitments it made in Geneva, but unfortunately, Iran had not responded positively to this proposal despite many efforts by the United States, China, and the international community. China had consistently told Iran that China strongly opposed Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. This message, he claimed, has been conveyed in party-to-party and government-to-government meetings and in "all channels." However, Iran maintained it had no nuclear weapons and was simply pursuing the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
...But Urges Continued Diplomacy
--------------------------------
8. (C) Wang pressed U/S Burns for details on when the limits of U.S. patience might be exhausted and counseled further efforts to find a diplomatic solution. Burns replied that U.S. patience was nearly exhausted. Wang acknowledged that there was a potential for an Israeli military strike were the situation not handled properly, which was of grave concern to China, but insisted that harsh actions were not yet warranted. Recent U.S. experience with a military option, he said, should teach some lessons, and the outcome of tougher sanctions was also unpredictable. The United States needed to understand that Iran was not Iraq, and the best way forward was to continue to pursue peaceful dialogue and negotiations and to carefully examine previous diplomatic efforts to see what changes needed to be made.
North Korea and Iran Similarities
---------------------------------
9. (C) Wang also claimed similarities between the North Korea and Iran nuclear issues. The solution in both cases was to persist over the long haul, continuing intensive efforts with the objective of ensuring that the situation did not spin out of control. Wang noted that in his several recent visits to Iran anti-American sentiment was strong, everywhere, and palpable, which, he said, was not conducive to resolving the issue.
10. (C) Wang asked U/S Burns for his views on who made final decisions in Iran, President Ahmadinejad or Supreme Leader
BEIJING 00003313 003 OF 003
Khamenei. He said it would be very helpful to China if the decision-making process in Iran could be sorted out. Wang appeared to agree with the Under Secretary that Khamenei was the final arbiter of Iranian policy and concluded by stating that there might be a way for direct communication with the Supreme Leader. He said direct engagement would avoid the distortions of message that occurred when communicating through an intermediary. Wang noted that there was not one country in the international arena that supported Iran's quest for nuclear weapons and emphasized that there was a need for a unified international view on Iran.
11. (C) U/S Burns responded that the United States had made very clear its willingness for direct diplomacy, but that it took both sides to make direct communication work. He emphasized that this was a core national security issue for the United States, which could not abide greater Middle East instability, and said the United States would continue its diplomatic efforts in a creative and flexible manner. However, he stated, at some point there had to be results and U.S. patience was fast running out.
U.S.-China Cooperation
----------------------
12. (C) Wang said China would continue to make its own efforts on the issue but China was willing to do more to cooperate with the United States to facilitate a resolution to the Iran nuclear problem. He welcomed further U.S. suggestions on measures to achieve a breakthrough and asked what the United States would like China to do or whether there were areas in which China could make a contribution. U/S Burns emphasized that the United States would like to cooperate with China and needed to work closely with China to find a way to persuade Iran to make the right choices. The current focus was on persuading Iran to live up to the commitments it made at the Geneva meetings on the TRR proposal and by meeting again soon on the nuclear issue. The two P5-plus-1 tracks -- diplomacy and sanctions -- were not mutually exclusive. The United States had tried many approaches to Iran in the past 11 weeks, and none had borne fruit. The United States would not close the door on diplomacy, but as in the case of putting pressure on North Korea through UN Resolution 1874, we had to work together to apply pressure to get Iran back to the diplomatic track. Iran had to understand that it faced a clear choice. Iran could choose to pursue the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which the United States supported and would work to implement if Iran demonstrated the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program. But Iran had to understand there were costs to not following this path. Wang agreed that both sides should try very hard to resolve the problem.
HUNTSMAN
Monday, 27 April 2009, 06:35
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000672
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/27/2019
TAGS PGOV, KN, KS
SUBJECT: MND: DPRK MILITARY RHETORIC AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
COMMISSION CHANGES ARE ABOUT SUCCESSION
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: The DPRK's recent restaffing and expansion of the National Defense Commission (NDC) and its hostile military rhetoric over the last several months are related to the DPRK leadership's "top priority" need to stabilize the DPRK internally in preparation for succession, according to Colonel Lee Sang-chul, Ministry of National Defense North Korea Policy Division Director and lead ROKG representative to Colonel-level military-to-military talks in October 2008. A second priority was to achieve improved relations with the United States, which the DPRK regards as its only potential security guarantor, ironically. END SUMMARY.
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Military Statements and the NDC
-------------------------------
2. (C) In an April 23 meeting, Lee told Poloff that the Korean People's Army's (KPA) spate of high-level announcements over the past several months (such as the March 8 KPA Supreme Command report, the first in 15 years, and the four KPA General Staff statements since January, not seen since 1999) should not be misinterpreted as the DPRK military asserting control over the country, because the military could act only in concert with the Worker's Party and the Cabinet. Instead the "generals appearing on TV" was a phenomenon directed at DPRK citizens with two goals: to show that the DPRK's hostile external situation meant citizens had to pull together, and as a "power display" to send a law-and-order message to counter the increasing economic disorder resulting from decades of economic "depression." There was dissatisfaction among some elite groups in the DPRK, who knew of economic reform in China and Vietnam and wondered why the DPRK had instead deteriorated. To tamp down this internal dissent, external tension was needed. The ROKG was not particularly worried about the specific threats to the South contained in the statements because they saw the statements as targeted at the domestic audience, and in any case knew the DPRK would try to achieve surprise if it were to resort to military action, rather than giving warning.
3. (C) The key factor in the background was 67-year-old Kim Jong-il's (KJI) waning health. After KJI's August 2008 stroke, the DPRK was a "different environment that needed stronger leadership." Lee said that before the stroke, KJI was confident that he could rule for years, but afterward he suffered "physical and psychological trauma." KJI had become obsessed with creating political stability to allow an orderly succession, though Lee did not claim to know who was next in line. Immediately after the April 5 missile launch the Supreme People's Assembly had declared the beginning of KJI's third ruling period. But rather than celebrating the renewal of his mandate, KJI was concentrating on changes that would pave the way for succession.
4. (C) The most important of these was the enlargement (from 8 to 13 members) and strengthening of the KJI-chaired National Defense Commission (NDC). The NDC was first established in 1998 with a largely symbolic role, but had since taken on policy and coordination functions. Now it had the lead on succession, Lee believed. KJI brother-in-law Chang Song-taek's addition to the NDC was important for succession preparation, not only because he was married to KJI's only sibling and close confidante 63-year-old Kim Kyong-hui, but also because Chang was seen as having effectively protected and acted for KJI during KJI's fall 2008 recovery period.
5. (C) Another key change was the replacement of National Defense Commission Deputy Chairman Kim Yong-chun with Oh Kuk-ryul, a 78-year old Kim-family loyalist (in relative terms, since all senior officials are loyalists) who Lee thought was consolidating various ROK-surveillance and special operations institutions under his control at NDC. One of these was the Worker's Party's Operations Department, which Oh has headed since 1989. (Lee also referred to an April 21 JoongAng Ilbo newspaper article claiming that "Office 35," charged with intel collection, and the "External Liaison Office," charged with training agents, had both been moved from the Operations Department to NDC/KPA control, saying that ROK intel sources did not think there was
evidence of such a move.) The Operations Department, which formulates actions against the South, was "passive" during the 1999-2007 Sunshine Policy period, but was now becoming more active again. In other words, Oh's job was to keep the South off balance and make sure that it did not disrupt the succession period. Lee said he believed that changes to the DPRK constitution, announced but not yet explained, would also focus on succession-related issues. He alluded to frequent DPRK propaganda aiming for the establishment of a "strong and prosperous" nation by 2012, saying that DPRK authorities believed they had already succeeded ideologically and militarily, so they were concentrating on the economic side, which is where the Kaesong Industrial Complex fit in.
6. (C) The DPRK's determination to maintain internal order meant that it could go so far as to engage in "limited armed conflict" with the ROK. At the same time, the DPRK was well aware that ROK forces were ready for any provocation and would respond with superior force. In addition, the DPRK knew that combined ROK-U.S. surveillance capabilities would prevent it from achieving surprise, so Lee was reassured that no direct military provocation was imminent.
-----------------------
Relations with the U.S.
-----------------------
7. (C) Asked what the ROKG's policy options were, given the above situation, Lee answered indirectly, saying that the main question was U.S.-DPRK relations. Second only to maintaining internal stability to allow for succession was the DPRK's determination to improve relations with the U.S., because only the U.S. could solve both the DPRK's security and economic problems. Lee said this push for improved relations was ironic, given DPRK rhetoric attacking the U.S. as a menace, but was nevertheless high on DPRK authorities' agenda. Lee said the DPRK saw the 1999-2000 rapprochement with the Clinton Administration as the first, failed, chance for peace with the U.S.; that the Bush (43) Administration had turned to negotiations too late for substantial progress; and that the Obama Administration amounted to a "second chance." The DPRK craved a dialogue with the U.S., aiming for a "big deal," but first needed to raise tensions to create the need for dialogue.
8. (C) The scope for inter-Korean relations depended on what happened with U.S.-DPRK relations. Lee was convinced that the DPRK would keep tension high towards the South, while seeking an opening with the U.S. Therefore, his recommendation to ROK policymakers was to stay on an even keel to keep the South-North situation from deteriorating further. The DPRK's April 21 proposal for dialogue about land-use and wages at the Kaesong Industrial Complex was potentially helpful in that regard, but had to be approached carefully, because the DPRK would try to seize the initiative and lock-in economic benefits without offering reciprocal steps. Like other ROKG officials, Lee emphasized the need for continued close U.S.-ROK coordination on all issues related to North Korea.
9. (C) Lee cautioned that China would seek to prevent U.S.-DPRK relations from improving too much, adding with a smile that had it not been for its attitude toward the U.S., China would have moved to prevent the October 2006 DPRK nuclear weapon test.
-----------
Mt. Kumgang
-----------
10. (C) As an aside, Lee commented on the July 2008 shooting death of a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumgang. He said that KPA soldiers and sentries in the area, after frequent contact with South Korean tourists, had a tendency to be too relaxed, so KPA officers periodically conducted exercises to tighten discipline. The shooting had occurred during one of those exercise periods. STEPHENS
Monday, 26 October 2009, 00:33
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 002965
SIPDIS
PACOM FOR FPA PICCUTA
EO 12958 DECL: 09/29/2029
TAGS OVIP (STEINBERG, JAMES B.), PREL, PGOV, PARM, MNUC,
CH, KN, KS
SUBJECT: PRC: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S SEPTEMBER 29,
2009 CONVERSATION WITH STATE COUNCILOR DAI BINGGUO
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1 .4 (b/d).
1. (SBU) September 29, 2009; 3:00 p.m.; Zhongnanhai Leadership Compound; Beijing
2. (SBU) Participants:
U.S.
----
The Deputy Secretary Amb. Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., Embassy Beijing Joseph Donovan, EAP Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rear Admiral Charles Leidig, Joint Chiefs of Staff Amb. Joseph DeTrani, Mission Manager for North Korea, DNI Derek Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Amb. Sung Kim, Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks Pamela Park, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary Nancy Leou, Embassy Political Officer (notetaker) James Brown, Interpreter
PRC
---
State Councilor Dai Bingguo Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei Guan Youfei, Ministry of National Defense, Deputy Director, International Office Zheng Zeguang, Director General, MFA North American and Oceanian Affairs Department Zhang Kunsheng, Director General, MFA Protocol Department Yang Houlan, Ambassador for Korean Peninsula Issues Li Song, Deputy Director General, MFA Arms Control and Disarmament Department Cong Peiwu, Counselor, MFA North American and Oceanian Affairs Department
3. (S) SUMMARY: In a September 29 meeting with State Councilor Dai Bingguo, the Deputy Secretary stressed the importance of persuading Pyongyang to return to the path of denuclearization. Dai said that the U.S.-China relationship was off to a good start under the new U.S. administration and urged the two countries to avoid "setbacks." During his recent trip to North Korea, Dai said, he met with DPRK leader Kim Jong-il for two and one half hours and Kim appeared to be in reasonably good health. Dai said he had urged Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks. Dai's DPRK interlocutors had responded that they wanted bilateral engagement with the United States first and that they would consider next steps, including possible multilateral talks, depending on the outcome of U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks. Dai said that Premier Wen's October 4-6 visit to Pyongyang would be another opportunity for China and North Korea to exchange views on the nuclear issue. On Iran, Dai said China and the United States had the same objectives but that China would work on Iran in its own way. China believed peaceful negotiation would achieve a more meaningful resolution than sanctions would, and, Dai urged, the United States should be more patient. D responded that patience could not be unlimited in light of Iran's continued enrichment program in violation of UNSC resolutions. Dai assured the Deputy Secretary that China and the United States would work together to prepare for President Obama's November visit to China. Dai supported the idea of a "concise and substantive" joint document to be issued in conjunction with the visit. End Summary.
Full Strategy to Address North Korea
------------------------------------
4. (S) The Deputy Secretary met with State Councilor Dai Bingguo for an eighty-minute discussion on North Korea, Iran, and the U.S.-China relationship on September 29. The Deputy Secretary stressed the importance of fashioning a full strategy to address the DPRK nuclear issue and having a unified position among Six-Party Talks partners and allies that would lead to an effective and diplomatic resolution of the problem. He expressed support for Premier Wen Jiabao's October 4-6 trip to Pyongyang and said both countries should work to persuade Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks and to reaffirm the 2005 Joint Statement. The United States was prepared to have meaningful, substantive engagement with
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a senior North Korean official and would use the any bilateral discussion to encourage Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks. The Deputy Secretary expressed appreciation for China's efforts to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1874.
U.S.-China Relations on Positive Track
--------------------------------------
5. (S) State Councilor Dai said that President Obama and President Hu had had several opportunities to meet in recent months. After watching the two leaders interact in New York, Dai observed, the two presidents appeared to be "old friends." Dai thanked the U.S. Government for its "careful arrangements" for President Hu's visit to New York, as well as for National People's Congress Chairman Wu Bangguo's recent, successful visit to the United States. Dai expressed appreciation to President Obama, Secretary Clinton and Treasury Secretary Geithner for their personal contributions in making the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) a great success. Dai was confident that the S&ED would have a positive global impact and confided that China had already begun thinking about the next round. The U.S.-China relationship was off to a good start under the new U.S. administration despite some "unpleasant things." Dai urged the two countries to keep up a good momentum in the bilateral relationship and to work hard t o avoid "setbacks."
Dai's Visit to Pyongyang
------------------------
6. (S) Regarding his recent visit to Pyongyang, Dai briefly recounted his two-hour meeting with DPRK leader Kim Jong-il. Dai said he was on relatively familiar terms with Kim, because he had met with Kim on several occasions in his previous role as Director of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee International Liaison Department (CCID). Dai admitted that in contrast with his discussion with Vice FM Kang (see below) his conversation with Kim was not as direct and candid and joked that he "did not dare" to be that candid with the DPRK leader. Dai noted that Kim had lost weight when compared to when he last saw him three years earlier, but that Kim appeared to be in reasonably good health and still had a "sharp mind." Kim told Dai that he had hoped to invite the Chinese official to share some liquor and wine, but that because of scheduling problems, he would have to defer the offer to Dai's next visit to North Korea. Kim Jong-il had a reputation among the Chinese for being "quite a good drinker," and, Dai said, he had asked Kim if he still drank alcohol. Kim said yes. Dai said he also met briefly with Kim Yong-nam, President of the Supreme People's Assembly, who invited him to attend the performance of a famous Chinese opera, "The Dream of the Red Chamber."
7. (S) Dai said that he had had frank and blunt discussions with DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Suk-ju that totaled over two and one half hours. Dai said he told Kang that denuclearization should be Pyongyang's first choice and that it was important for North Korea to return to Six-Party Talks. He had stressed to Kang that the Six-Party Talks mechanism was useful and explained that the ultimate resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue could not be resolved without the participation of the Six Parties. According to Dai, Kang responded that North Korea was still committed to the goal of denuclearization. Dai believed that the North Koreans had not categorically denied the Six-Party Talks and opined that under the right circumstances, it might be possible to revive the Six-Party Talks process. Dai's North Korean interlocutors had emphasized the strong security threat it faced. The North Koreans told Dai that they wanted to have dialogue with the United States first and that they would consider next steps, including possible multilateral talks, depending on their conversation with the United States. North Korea held "great expectations for the United States," said Dai. DPRK officials had told Dai that North Korea viewed former President Clinton's visit to Pyongyang positively.
8. (S) Even though he had not had an opportunity to visit or observe any place other than Pyongyang, Dai said, his impression of North Korea was that the domestic situation appeared stable and normal. Dai opined that the DPRK
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appeared focused on two issues: improving its relationship with the United States and developing its economy.
U.S.-DPRK Bilateral Engagement
------------------------------
9. (S) China was aware that the United States was considering possible re-engagement with North Korea and supported U.S.-DPRK bilateral discussions, said Dai. With bilateral dialogue, there was "no limit to how far you could go." China appreciated U.S. understanding and support for Premier Wen's upcoming visit to Pyongyang. President Hu had already informed President Obama of the trip. Dai explained that it would have been "impolite" for China to not reciprocate with a high-level visit to Pyongyang after DPRK Premier Kim Yong-il had visited Beijing in March for the 60th anniversary celebration of Sino-DPRK ties. Wen's visit would provide an opportunity for China and North Korea to exchange views on the nuclear issue, stated Dai.
10. (S) The Deputy Secretary thanked Dai for sharing his perceptions of the North Korea nuclear issue and stressed that President Obama wanted to make clear to the North Korean people and to Kim Jong-il that the United States did not have any hostile intent toward North Korea. The United States was ready to move forward to normalize relations with North Korea if Pyongyang moved toward denuclearization. The Deputy Secretary expressed hope that North Korea would agree to a meeting between Ambassador Bosworth and First VFM Kang Suk-ju to achieve that goal.
Iran
----
11. (S) The Deputy Secretary said the United States valued the joint effort it took to create the P5-plus-1 foreign ministers statement on Iran. He acknowledged that the United States and Iran had a long and complicated history of mistrust. The Deputy Secretary explained U.S. objectives and stressed that all sides had to take confidence-building steps that would lead to a diplomatic resolution. Recent disclosures by Iran underscored the need to deal with the issue urgently, and it was important that Iran give a strong signal during the October 1 meeting that demonstrated it was ready for serious engagement.
12. (S) Dai responded that China and the United States saw eye to eye on the Iran nuclear issue. Nuclear states should reduce their nuclear arsenal with the goal of eventual elimination and should work to prevent other nations, including Iran, from developing nuclear weapons. However, China and the United States had different considerations on how we advanced these goals. With a history of mistrust and mutual suspicion between the United States and Iran, it would not be easy to resolve the Iran nuclear issue. Dai urged the United States to have more patience, address Iran's legitimate concerns, and work to identify and expand on the positive areas in the bilateral relationship.
13. (S) Dai characterized President Obama's policy to resolve issues through dialogue and engagement as "wise." Sanctions might work up to a point, but China believed peaceful negotiation would achieve a more meaningful resolution. Dai warned that pressing too hard might risk antagonizing Iran. Iran was not a small country, it had a long history and culture, and its people were not dumb. Dai urged the United States to resolve the issue in a "smart" manner. One meeting would not be able to resolve all problems, so the United States lower its expectation for the October 1 meeting. China would work on Iran in its own way and would urge Iran to seize the window of opportunity. Dai said China and the United States had the same objective, but said that each country would play a different role in achieving that objective.
14. (S) The Deputy replied that it was Iran that was "impatient" in its ongoing program of uranium enrichment in violation of the UNSC resolutions. The U.S. and the P5 1 would be more willing to be patient in discussions if Iran agreed to suspend its enrichment and forgo its overall? program. This would create an appropriate context for all sides to address underlying issues of concern.
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U.S. National Security Strategy
-------------------------------
15. (S) Noting the Deputy's interest in "strategy" Dai asked whether the Obama administration had an overarching national security strategy. the Deputy Secretary said that the National Security Strategy, which would likely be issued before the end of the year, would articulate the administration's global strategy. He noted that the Secretary had recently identified major themes during her speech to the Council of Foreign Relations, including the importance of global cooperation in confronting today's challenges. In that context, the U.S.-China relationship would play a core role. Dai said he looked forward to reading the strategy paper.
President Obama Visit to China
------------------------------
16. (S) Dai said that President Obama had recently told President Hu that he looked forward to having a "magnificent" visit to China. Asked how China could help achieve this, the Deputy Secretary said the two countries should seek to demonstrate to our peoples and to the international community how the U.S.-China relationship would help address global challenges in areas such as public health, nonproliferation and the environment. The two countries should seek to demonstrate how U.S.-China ties were between the two peoples, not just between the governments, diplomats and leaders. Dai assured the Deputy Secretary that China would work with the U.S. to prepare a successful visit. It would be "great," said Dai, if the two sides could agree on language for the joint visit document that would be "concise, as well as substantive."
Global Nuclear Security Summit
------------------------------
17. (S) Asked about U.S.-sought outcomes and goals for the Nuclear Security Summit, the Deputy Secretary explained that President Obama had laid out the three pillars of his nuclear policy during his Prague speech. The Nuclear Security Summit was designed to focus on one of those pillars-the need to safeguard nuclear material against theft or diversion. The risk of proliferation had increased with the expansion of new nuclear power programs and with the existence of unsecured legacy nuclear materials in former Soviet states. We needed to have assurances that the peaceful development of nuclear power programs and nuclear research did not pose proliferation risks.
The Same Boat
-------------
18. (S) The U.S.-China relationship was of crucial importance, said Dai. China would do its best to cooperate with the United States wherever possible. "If we expand the pie for the common interest, the pie will be larger and more delicious." Together, the two sides should work collaboratively for the good of the world, especially since the two countries were "passengers in the same boat." Dai urged careful management of the relationship and respect for each other's core interests and concerns.
19. (U) The Deputy Secretary cleared this message. HUNTSMAN
Thursday, 14 January 2010, 09:40
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000062
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/14/2030
TAGS PHUM, PREL, PGOV, PINR, SOCI, ECON, KN, KS, CH
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY KING'S 1/11 MEETING WITH FM YU
Classified By: Ambassador D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
1. (C) During a January 11 meeting with Special Envoy Robert King, FM Yu downplayed press speculation that a North-South summit is imminent. Yu asserted that Kim Jong-il (KJI) would visit China in late January or early February; the North Korean leader needed both Chinese economic aid and political support to stabilize an "increasingly chaotic" situation at home. An unspecified number of high-ranking North Korean officials had recently defected to the ROK, according to Yu. The foreign minister thanked King for his willingness to press the PRC on the treatment of North Korean refugees. Yu said the ROK would provide "significant" food aid to the DPRK if Pyongyang asked for it and agreed to monitoring. The ROK also planned to help fund work by NGOs to combat TB and multi-drug-resistant TB in the North, which has spread widely within the DPRK's chronically malnourished population. At a lunch following the meeting, Seoul's point man on DPRK issues, Ambassador Wi Sung-lac, reiterated the FM's call for U.S. help in persuading China to go easier on North Korean refugees. Wi also thanked Ambassador King for his willingness to keep the ROK updated on discussions between the American Red Cross and its DPRK counterpart regarding potential reunions between Korean-Americans and their North Korean kin. End summary.
FM Yu on: Prospects for North-South Summit...
--------------------------------------------- -
2. (C) During a January 11 meeting with Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues Robert King, Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan downplayed press speculation that a North-South summit is imminent. The ROK was discussing the issue with the DPRK, Yu said, noting that there were two major Blue House preconditions: the nuclear issue had to be on the agenda and the ROK would not pay the North to hold a summit. Yu speculated that it would "take some time" for the North Koreans to "digest" the preconditions.
...Rumors of a KJI Visit to China...
------------------------------------
3. (C) Yu asserted that Kim Jong-il (KJI) would visit China in late January or early February. The North Korean leader had visited the PRC twice before in that timeframe, Yu related, adding that KJI needed both Chinese economic aid and political support to stabilize an "increasingly chaotic" situation at home. In particular, FM Yu claimed that the North's botched currency reform had caused "big problems" for the regime and that the power succession from KJI to Kim Jong-eun was "not going smoothly." Moreover, Yu confided, an unspecified number of high-ranking North Korean officials working overseas had recently defected to the ROK. (Note: Yu emphasized that the defections have not been made public. End note.)
...Pressuring Beijing on Refugees...
------------------------------------
4. (C) Yu thanked Ambassador King for stating that he intended to work closely with the ROK on the issue of improving human rights conditions in North Korea. Yu also expressed appreciation for Ambassador King's willingness to engage the Chinese on the issue of North Korean refugees. Yu said he has repeatedly raised the matter with PRC FM Yang, only to get a boilerplate response emphasizing that North Koreans in China are economic migrants. Yu claimed that the number of North Koreans fleeing into China XXXXXXXXXXXX continues to increase; 2,952 North Koreans made it to the ROK in 2009 and more than that are expected in 2010. Yu noted that at least 80 percent of the refugees who come to the South are women, adding that they are often abused by human traffickers. XXXXXXXXXXXX Yu added that he was skeptical that the DPRK would engage in dialogue with the EU about human rights.
...and Humanitarian Assistance to the North
-------------------------------------------
5. (C) Responding to a question from Ambassador King, Yu said the North Korean grain harvest was approximately 4 million metric tons (MMT), which was better than expected but still short of the 4.5 MMT the regime needs to ensure stability. (Note: The official ROKG estimate is that the DPRK harvest was approximately 5 MMT. End note.) Given the North's chronic transportation and storage problems, there would be starvation "here and there" during the spring, Yu lamented. The foreign minister said the ROK would be willing to provide "significant" food aid to the DPRK if Pyongyang asked for it and agreed to monitoring. The ROK would not, Yu said, simply give the North a huge amount of grain. Any aid would be given in small amounts, he stressed. The foreign minister also said the ROK would help fund work by NGOs to combat multi-drug-resistant TB in the North, which has spread widely within the DPRK's chronically malnourished population.
Follow-On Lunch with XXXXXXXXXXXX
--------------------------------
6. (C) At a lunch following the meeting with XXXXXXXXXX reiterated the FM's call for the United States to XXXXXXXXXXXX
7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX thanked Ambassador King for his willingness to keep the ROK updated on discussions between the American Red Cross and its DPRK counterpart regarding potential reunions between Korean-Americans and their relatives in North Korea. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that North Korea has made only token efforts to support North-South family reunions and has "reacted badly" to Seoul's repeated calls for the release of the approximately 1,000 abductees and POWs believed to be still held by the DPRK. XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed that Seoul appreciated Ambassador King's effort to keep the family reunion, abductee, and POW issues on the proverbial agenda. STEPHENS
Wednesday, 29 April 2009, 13:30
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001108
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/29/2019
TAGS PREL, RU, UNSC, KNNP, KN
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN SIX PARTY NEGOTIATOR URGES PATIENCE ON
NORTH KOREA
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) Summary. Amidst escalating threats from Pyongyang in response to UN Security Council actions against its April 5 missile launch, Russian Ambassador-at-Large for Six-Party Talks Grigoriy Logvinov during an April 28 meeting urged the U.S. and the other Six-Party partners to remain patient. Reporting that Foreign Minister Lavrov had a difficult trip to North Korea that did not reveal any flexibility in DPRK's position, he assessed that Pyongyang was hunkering down for a succession crisis, while seeking to use Yongbyon's disablement reversal as a bargaining chip for further concessions in the Six-Party talks. Lamenting that no one had good ideas on how to pull North Korea back from its brinkmanship, Logvinov asked for additional consultations with the U.S., particularly on the time it would take for Pyongyang to reassemble its plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In Logvinov's view, the Six-Party partners should use the intervening time to engage in quiet diplomacy to persuade North Korea to return to the negotiating table, though it is possible that we may have to wait until the succession crisis has passed before seeing a softening of North Korea's position. End Summary.
A Rough Trip
------------
2. (C) In an April 28 meeting, Ambassador-at-Large Grigoriy Logvinov characterized Foreign Minister Lavrov's April 23-24 trip to Pyongyang as "rough." Logvinov conveyed that the North Korean leadership was "very angry" and told Lavrov categorically that it was resolved to restart its nuclear program, would never participate in the Six-Party Talks again, and would not trust anything but nuclear deterrence as its security guarantee. In contrast to his 2004 trip, Lavrov did not get a meeting with Kim Jong-Il. Logvinov speculated that the reason could be due to either Kim's poor health or North Korean displeasure at the GOR's support for the UNSC Presidential Statement and sanctions.
3. (C) Indicating that FM Lavrov would be sending personal letters to his Six-Party counterparts regarding his trip, Logvinov urged the U.S. to show patience and not overreact to the latest developments. In his view, Pyongyang's hard line position was either a negotiating tactic or an indication that a power transition was near, but in any case did not represent the final word on the denuclearization issue. Referring directly to Japan, Logvinov warned that if countries were to press for additional UNSC action, it would only provoke the DPRK into further brinkmanship and prove counterproductive.
Wait Out the Succession Crisis
------------------------------
4. (C) Elaborating on his assessment that a power transition was near, Logvinov hypothesized that Pyongyang was being particularly intransigent because it wanted to demonstrate strength to the outside world and mask the power struggle occurring internally. Recalling the political instability around the time of Stalin and Mao's deaths, he indicated Moscow understood the possible fallout of a North Korean succession scenario because "we have seen this before." While noting that Kim Jong-Il appeared to be functioning, if impaired, Logvinov speculated that as long as the "Dear Leader" was technically alive, he could remain the face of a charismatic leadership. Others, whether it's his son or brother-in-law, could wield the power behind the scenes. Should Kim die, however, these people would have to emerge from the shadows and establish their own authority to rule, in which case the situation could become quite unstable. According to Logvinov, the GOR did not have a clear picture of the role the North Korean military would play in a succession crisis, nor did it know what importance to attach to the increased prominence of the military in the official press. Logvinov mused that a collective leadership arrangement might be a more stable option during a North Korean succession scenario.
5. (C) In Logvinov's personal view, nothing was likely to induce North Korea to abandon its current course and return to the negotiating table until the succession crisis passed. The only thing the Six-Party partners could do in the meantime, he stressed, was to wait out the power transition
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while preventing Pyongyang from further wrongdoing. The previous goals of completing a verification protocol and finishing Phase II as soon as possible were unachievable for the time being.
Or Wait Until DPRK Restarts Yongbyon
------------------------------------
6. (C) Logvinov did not rule out the possibility that North Korea, in an attempt to "sell" its nuclear capabilities a third time, would seek negotiations once it reversed the disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. The GOR hoped that Pyongyang's stated intention to restart plutonium reprocessing was a negotiating ploy, rather than a real determination to reopen its nuclear program. In Logvinov's view, the DPRK's dire economic situation was affecting the military programs despite the disproportionate share of resources poured into them. Derisively calling the missile the North Koreans tested "a piece of junk that miraculously flew," he wondered if Pyongyang truly had the capability to restart reprocessing plutonium given Yongbyon's dilapidated condition. Recalling the estimate by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it would take the North Koreans three to six months to reverse fully Yongbyon's disablement, Logvinov asked for consultations with U.S. experts on a more definitive assessment of time frame, stating that the Six-Party partners should use the intervening period to engage in quiet diplomacy to pull Pyongyang back from brinkmanship.
7. (C) Should the North Koreans decide to seek negotiations after reversing disablement, Logvinov saw several complications ahead. First, Pyongyang would likely demand a higher price for resuming the Six-Party Talks, which in his view could include a light water reactor and the exclusion of Japan from the talks as punishment for Tokyo's high profile role in pressing for UNSC action. Even the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and the dissolution of the U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia could be among the DPRK conditions. Second, the Six Party partners should not agree to be blackmailed that way, especially with regard to paying again for Yongbyon's disablement, and would need to secure DPRK agreement to restart from where the process had left off. Third, Pyongyang's disablement reversal would be a clear violation of UNSCR 1718. Whether the Security Council should take action would be an awkward question, as doing so could provide North Korea into further belligerent action. And lastly, North Korea's blatant disregard of the principles of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) posed challenges to efforts to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime as the international community prepared for next year's NPT review conference.
No One Knows What to Do
-----------------------
8. (C) In Logvinov's view, none of the Six-Party partners currently had good ideas on ways forward. He shared that during Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi's just concluded April 26-27 visit to Moscow, the Russian and Chinese sides discussed North Korea in general without putting forward specific proposals. Lavrov and Yang reaffirmed their common positions on the need for patience and restraint, and agreed that the Six-Party Talks must continue. Similarly, the MFA had prepared briefing material on North Korea for Prime Minister Putin's May 11 trip to Japan, but it too "contained nothing special." One prerequisite for jump starting the negotiations again, in Logvinov's view, was the Six-Party readiness to fulfill immediately the Phase II economic assistance obligations.
9. (C) Logvinov stressed the importance the MFA placed on consultations with the U.S. on North Korea, and in this regard expressed appreciation for Ambassador Sung Kim's phone call last week that helped him to provide FM Lavrov a fuller brief for his Pyongyang trip. While welcoming a possible visit by Special Envoy Bosworth to Moscow in the next week, he asked that the U.S. come prepared with proposals or views on the next steps. "We shared our views in Seoul. Now we are ready to hear from our American friends," he stated, referring to the March 7 initial meeting between Ambassador Bosworth and Deputy Foreign Minister Borodavkin in South Korea. He also expressed the view that should the Six-Party partners succeed in persuading North Korea to return to the talks, the U.S. should not continue to insist on completing a
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verification protocol as it would be untimely given the changed circumstances. BEYRLE
Thursday, 30 April 2009, 13:07
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 001176
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/30/2034
TAGS PREL, ECON, EFIN, PARM, PHUM, KUNR, CH, TW, KN, KS,
JA, IR, PK, AF
SUBJECT: VICE FOREIGN MINISTER HE DISCUSSES G-20, DPRK,
IRAN, AF/PAK, UNSC REFORM, TAIWAN, TIBET WITH CHARGE
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Dan Piccuta. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
-------
1. (C) Taiwan's participation as an observer at the upcoming May World Health Assembly (WHA) meetings demonstrated what could be achieved based on "one China, very broadly interpreted," Vice Foreign Minister (VFM) He Yafei said at an April 30 working lunch hosted by the Charge d'Affaires. In his capacity as G-20 Sherpa, VFM He said he would ask for appropriate meetings in Washington to discuss the dates and agenda of the next G-20 summit. VFM He reviewed several issues he hoped to discuss during his upcoming visit to Washington: On North Korea, China encouraged the United States to re-engage the DPRK, but if the Six-Party Talks were suspended for an extended period, we should consider maintaining engagement in other ways. On Iran, Beijing appreciated the "bold steps" taken by Washington and had told Tehran that this represented a good opportunity for Iran to resume a positive role in the region. On Afghanistan/Pakistan, VFM He asked to see a list of items that would be transported via the proposed Northern Distribution Network, given that "non-lethal" is a broad and vague term.
2. (S) Summary Continued: VFM He raised concerns over China's "core interests" of Tibet and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which he said could "derail" bilateral cooperation. The Charge raised the Liu Xiaobo and Gao Zhisheng human rights cases, to which VFM He replied with standard language about Chinese law. The Charge asked for assistance in expediting the exit from China of two North Koreans from the U.S. Embassy compound; VFM He promised to assist. The Charge urged China to press North Korea to release the two detained American journalists; VFM H said China would. VFM He expressed concern over building "momentum" on UNSC reform and asked the United States not to be "proactive" on the matter. The Charge expressed concern that differences regarding a Conditions of Construction Agreement (COCA) II for our new Consulate General in Guangzhou had begun to affect other parts of our support for each other's practical needs including residential leases and asked for VFM He's assistance in stopping this trend. The Charge and VFM He agreed on the importance of high-level meetings to the bilateral relationship and reviewed a number of recent and upcoming visits. End Summary.
TAIWAN OBSERVERSHIP AT WHA
--------------------------
3. (C) The agreement allowing Taiwan to participate as an observer at the World Health Assembly (WHA) meetings in Geneva in May was "one step forward" toward better cross-Strait relations and demonstrated what could be achieved through consultations based on "one China, very broadly interpreted," Vice Foreign Minister (VFM) He Yafei said at an April 30 working lunch hosted by the Charge d'Affaires. Cross-Strait relations were "improving," and as they did, China hoped the United States would feel "less burdened, frustrated and nervous," VFM He said. The Charge congratulated VFM He on the agreement, noting its timeliness in light of concerns over the H1N1 outbreak, while expressing hope that both sides would continue to take steps to increase mutual trust.
IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL VISITS
-------------------------------
4. (C) The Charge and VFM He agreed on the importance of high-level meetings to the bilateral relationship and reviewed a number of recent and upcoming visits. Both concurred that Chief of Naval Operations ADM Roughead's visit to China was a success. The Charge emphasized that, as President Obama told Foreign Minister Yang, the United States wanted to move relations between our two militaries forward. VFM He agreed that State Councilor Liu Yandong's visit, including her meeting with Secretary Clinton, had been productive. VFM He said Liu came away "very impressed" by her interaction with Secretary Clinton and wanted very much to "follow up" on the issues they discussed such as education, something very basic and important to the people of both countries.
5. (C) Although we recognize the importance of the proposed visit by Politburo Member and CCP Organization Department
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Head Li Yuanchao, it would be easier to arrange a successful visit if Li could postpone his travel to a less busy time, the Charge said. VFM He replied that the visit of Li, a "future leader of China," was "very important," so China hoped the United States would provide a full schedule of meetings with senior leaders despite the fact that those leaders recently met with State Councilor Liu. The Charge urged VFM He to arrange a useful schedule for Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, including a trip to Tibet or Tibetan areas, noting that the Speaker was also particularly interested in climate change and environmental issues. China would treat Speaker Pelosi's visit as a type of "state visit," VFM He replied. Nevertheless, given her "tight schedule," the Speaker would likely "not have time" to visit Tibet, VFM He said.
6. (C) Reviewing the upcoming meetings between Presidents Obama and Hu this year, VFM He noted that, over the past 30 years, the U.S.-China relationship had been driven by high-level visits to a greater degree than other bilateral relationships. With these meetings between our two presidents in mind, both sides should be "careful" and act in ways that benefit the long-term interests of the bilateral relationship. Our two presidents would meet several times in the coming months, including at the G-8, G-20 and APEC summits, after which China anticipated President Obama would visit China. We should plan our work for the bilateral relationship in the year ahead with the President's visit to China in mind.
G-20: DATES AND TOPICS
-----------------------
7. (C) VFM He stated that, he would ask to meet with NSC's Michael Froman in Washington and was considering requesting an appropriate meeting with the Treasury Department. The topics would include the dates of the next G-20 meeting, as well as the agenda.
8. (C) In the first two G-20 Financial Summits, U.S. and Chinese positions had been close, closer even than the United States and Europe, VFM He noted. Views on major issues such as the need for fiscal stimulus and reform of international financial institutions were similar. Leading up to the London Summit, VFM He felt that the U.S.-U.K.-China "troika" had been effective: Beijing could persuade the developing countries, Washington could influence Japan and South Korea, and London could bring along the Europeans.
9. (C) The first two G-20 summits, according to VFM He, had succeeded in boosting confidence and agreeing on measures to help international financial institutions cope with the crisis. Now, the G-20 had entered an implementation period. He outlined four objectives that he intended to discuss with Froman:
A) Establish what stimulus and macroeconomic policy coordination the G-20 economies needed to implement to ensure economic recovery;
B) Strengthen the message against protectionism so that leaders did not "break their promises as soon as they returned home";
C) Set a clear timetable for IMF reform, establishing whether the New Arrangement to Borrow (NAB) decisions had any relation to future quota; and
D) Reforming the international monetary system, vis-a-vis the dollar and an alternative reserve currency such as Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).
10. (C) Expounding on this last topic, VFM He stated that a stable U.S. dollar was good for China, and Beijing had no interest in "destabilizing the system." The system, however, was "not perfect and needs reform." He said China had a huge stake in how the United States managed the dollar. Further, VFM He suggested that the RMB could become a component of the SDR. Mentioning that the RMB could compose two percent of the SDR value, VFM He noted that this was more of a symbolic than practical change.
11. (U) Note: VFM He's comments on the Strategic and Economic Dialogue will be reported septel.
VFM HE'S WASHINGTON VISIT: DPRK, IRAN, AF/PAK
---------------------------------------------
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12. (C) VFM He reviewed several issues he hoped to discuss during his upcoming visit to Washington, including North Korea, Iran and Afghanistan/Pakistan. On North Korea, VFM He hoped to hold "informal consultations" in Washington on how generally to approach the North Koreans, not just through the Six-Party Talks. Washington and Beijing nevertheless needed to discuss how to maintain momentum in the Six-Party Talks so as to preserve our common interest in stability of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea wanted to engage directly with the United States and was therefore acting like a "spoiled child" in order to get the attention of the "adult." China therefore encouraged the United States, "after some time," to start to re-engage the DPRK. In this regard, it was good that the New York channel remained open, VFM He observed. Noting that Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth would visit Beijing in May, VFM He said that, if the Six-Party Talks would be on hold for an extended period, then the Six Parties needed to find ways to continue to engage the DPRK and each other, either bilaterally or even perhaps trilaterally. The Charge noted that we should be careful not to reinforce Pyongyang's bad behavior.
13. (C) VFM He also hoped to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue in Washington. Beijing appreciated the "bold steps" taken by Washington. China had told Tehran that this represented a good opportunity for Iran to resume playing a positive role in the region. Though such an Iranian role made moderate Arab countries "jittery," VFM He said, this should be a matter the United States could "manage." What was essential was to get Iran involved positively in the region again.
14. (C) VFM He said he also hoped to discuss Afghanistan/Pakistan. The Charge stated that, even though XXXXXXXXXXXX was unable to announce new money for Afghanistan at the April 17 Pakistan Donors' Conference, China still had an opportunity to contribute to the security and stability of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. One way to do so would be to agree to a re-supply route via China for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. On the re-supply route question, VFM He said China would like to see a list of items that would be transported on the proposed route, noting that "non-lethal" is a broad and vague term.
TIBET AND TAIWAN AS "CORE INTERESTS"
------------------------------------
15. (C) VFM He raised concerns over China's "core interests" of Tibet and Taiwan, which he said could "derail" bilateral cooperation. On Tibet, China had heard "rumors" that the Dalai Lama would attend a "seminar" in the United States in late September or early October, and that President Obama was "likely" to meet with him then. Noting that there was no need for both sides to reiterate our respective positions on Tibet, VFM He said the critical question was whether both sides would agree to "take care" of each other's "core interests." When considering such sensitive issues in the context of the bilateral relationship, they could be viewed either as "obstacles" or as "core interests." It did not matter whether one side "liked or disliked" such matters; rather, in a "mature, close and important" bilateral relationship such as ours, the question was whether the key interests for each side would be accommodated. The United States had its core interests, VFM He asserted, such as U.S. naval vessels that had operated near the Chinese coast. Both sides agreed to "step down" over that issue, despite the strongly held views of the Chinese public. Regarding the Dalai Lama, China hoped the United States would deny him a visa, and if not, then agree to hold no official meetings with him, including no meeting with President Obama.
16. (C) The Charge expressed concern with China's defining Tibet as a "core issue" with the apparent expectation that others would "step back." Instead, our two sides should agree to continue to discuss the issue in an attempt to resolve our differences. The United States recognized that Tibet is a part of China. Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama is a respected religious leader and Nobel Laureate, and U.S. officials meet with him in that capacity. Future meetings by U.S. officials with the Dalai Lama could not be ruled out. Moreover, there were serious concerns among the U.S. public, the Administration and Congress over the situation in Tibetan areas of China. China should take steps to address Tibetans' legitimate grievances and engage the Dalai Lama's representatives in productive dialogue. Denying a visa to the Dalai Lama was not being contemplated.
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17. (C) Another issue that could "derail" relations was arms sales to Taiwan, VFM He said. China had long opposed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, especially advanced weapons sales. China was concerned by reports of possible "very important" and "potent" arms sales to Taiwan, including 60 Blackhawk helicopters and F-16 C/D fighter aircraft. Such arms sales were a "very serious issue" for China, AFM He said. The Charge replied that there had been no change to our one China policy based on the three joint communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). In accordance with the TRA, the United States made available to Taiwan defense articles that allowed Taiwan to maintain a credible defense. The Charge urged China to take steps to reduce military deployments aimed at Taiwan.
HUMAN RIGHTS: LIU XIAOBO, GAO ZHISHENG
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18. (C) The Charge raised two human rights cases, inquiring as to the status, location and treatment of dissident writer and Charter 08 signatory Liu Xiaobo and rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng. VFM He replied that, as a sign of the "maturity" of our bilateral relationship, he had "repeatedly" listened to our concerns regarding these two cases. Both cases would be handled "according to law" and in accordance with China's legal/judicial system. Such cases were "sensitive" and should be handled "carefully," VFM He said, pledging that he nevertheless would look into the cases "to the extent possible."
NORTH KOREAN "GUESTS"
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19. (S) The Charge emphasized the importance of expediting exit procedures from China for two North Koreans who had entered the Embassy compound and asked for VFM He's assistance in doing so. VFM He said he would look into the matter.
U.S. JOURNALISTS DETAINED IN DPRK
---------------------------------
20. (C) The Charge urged China to press the DPRK to release the two American journalists detained in North Korea. VFM He replied that the United States could "rest assured" that China would do so.
UNSC REFORM
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21. (C) China was concerned by "momentum" that was building on UN Security Council reform, which was "not good" for the P-5, VFM He said. China wanted the United States to maintain its position on UNSC reform and not be "proactive" on the matter, which the PRC feared could result in a UN General Assembly resolution on the subject. The P-5 "club" should not be "diluted," VFM He said. If we end up with a "P-10," both China and the United States would "be in trouble." Moreover, it would be difficult for the Chinese public to accept Japan as a permanent member of the UNSC. The Charge replied that the Administration had not completed its policy review on UNSC expansion, so we do not yet have a position on specific proposals. Nonetheless, the United States believed that UN members should be allowed to state their positions freely and openly without undue P-5 influence. Regarding Japan, the Charge said that, while no decision had been made about which countries to support for permanent membership on the UNSC, it was hard to envision any expansion of the Council that did not include Japan, which was the second-largest contributor to the UN budget.
COCA II: AVOIDING A "TRADE WAR"
--------------------------------
22. (C) The Charge expressed concern that differences regarding a Conditions of Construction Agreement (COCA) II for our new Consulate General in Guangzhou had begun to leak into other areas. The Charge asked VFM He to speak with the appropriate PRC officials to stop this trend before significant damage was done. The COCA II team from Washington held good discussions in Beijing last week with MFA DG for Administrative Affairs Li Chao regarding the new CG Guangzhou complex. The U.S. Embassy today had formally invited DG Li to Washington in May for further talks. One serious problem, the Charge noted, was the Chinese having moved to block new housing leases for the U.S. Embassy in
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Beijing in an apparent attempt to gain leverage on office properties. VFM He said this situation sounded like a "trade war." The Charge asked VFM He to help stop this matter before it led to a downward cycle. VFM He said he believed real progress had been made and differences narrowed during the most recent round of COCA II talks and that China did not want a "trade war" over COCA II issues. He pledged to "look into" the matter. PICCUTA
Monday, 26 October 2009, 00:14
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 002963
SIPDIS
PACOM FOR FPA PICCUTA
EO 12958 DECL: AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS OVIP (STEINBERG, JAMES B.), PREL, PARM, PGOV, ECON,
ETRA, MNUC, MARR, CH, JP, KN, KS, IR
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S MEETING WITH VICE
FOREIGN MINISTER HE YAFEI, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1. 4 (b) and (d).
1. (SBU) September 29, 2009; 8:30 a.m.; St. Regis Hotel, Beijing.
2. (SBU) Participants:
UNITED STATES Deputy Secretary Steinberg Laura Stone (notetaker)
CHINA Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei MFA North American and Oceanian Affairs Department USA Division Director An Gang (notetaker)
Summary
-------
1. (S) Summary: Deputy Secretary Steinberg explained U.S. confidence-building and transparency objectives vis-a-vis Iran that we planned to pursue at the October 1 P5-plus-1-plus-Iran Political Directors meeting. VFM He said an MFA Director General-level official would attend for the PRC. He emphasized the importance of sustaining the dialogue, expressed hope that U.S. domestic political pressure would not lead the U.S. to pursue UN sanctions, and affirmed the need for monitoring, supervision and benchmarks. The Deputy Secretary rejected the idea that politics were motivating U.S. Iran policy, and made clear the U.S. position that we need to resolve, not just monitor and supervise, the Iranian nuclear problem. On the upcoming POTUS visit, VFM He suggested that a joint statement reflect the balanced, comprehensive nature of the relationship while also addressing each country's "core" interests. He expressed worry that the Copenhagen climate change meeting could overshadow the trip. VFM He welcomed the institutionalized G-20, downplayed the importance of Premier Wen Jiabao's announced October 4-6 trip to Pyongyang, and bemoaned the U.S. 421 tire safeguards decision. End summary.
Iran
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2. (S) The Deputy Secretary explained U.S. objectives for the October 1 P5-plus-1 Political Directors meeting with Iran. He outlined actions in support of the pillars of confidence building and transparency that Iran needed to undertake to establish its seriousness in addressing the nuclear issue. On process objectives, the Deputy Secretary noted that the nuclear issue would need to remain the primary subject in follow-up experts meetings, although other agenda topics were possible.
3. (S) VFM He Yafei said he could not attend the October 1 talks and would send an MFA Director General-level official. Based on Chinese communications with Iran, VFM He said, he thought it would be difficult for Iran to refuse talks, since entering into dialogue was the only way to diffuse tensions. He was less certain about the prospect of Tehran giving up its nuclear program. VFM He asserted that because the weapons program was "not quite there yet" and the facilities were all dual-use in nature, Iran's assertions that the program was for peaceful use were "50-percent true." The key, according to VFM He, was monitoring and supervision, while establishing benchmarks that Iran should not cross.
4. (S) VFM He suggested that the first objective of the October 1 meeting with Iran should be to keep the dialogue alive. He asked that the United States not reject Iranian attempts to broaden the conversation or create the impression that the talks were not making progress. Noting that President Obama had told President Hu Jintao that resolving the Iran situation was a pressing U.S. interest, VFM He asked how long the United States would remain patient in the face of limited progress. He expressed hope that "domestic political pressure" would not lead the United States to seek new UN Security Council sanctions.
5. (S) The Deputy Secretary stated that domestic political factors were not driving our approach to Iran, but rather a
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conviction -- shared by Britain and France -- of the need to resolve the Iranian nuclear problem. The nuclear issue needed to be discussed up front in talks; the process could not stay alive without Iran committing to some confidence-building measures. Monitoring and supervision were not adequate, as the North Korean case had demonstrated.
POTUS Visit
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6. (C) VFM He asked that the upcoming POTUS visit reflect the balanced, comprehensive nature of the relationship, including economic, security, cultural, economic and people-to-people ties. A joint statement should not be too detailed and should instead mirror the status of two of the world's most important leaders. That said, the statement had to address, in a positive way, both countries' "core" interests. VFM He expressed worry that the early-December Copenhagen climate change meetings could overshadow the POTUS visit, and recommended that China and the United States focus during the visit on our respective national commitments in the realm of climate change.
7. (C) VFM He raised his proposal for a "humanities" MOU that would cover people-to-people, cultural, and science and technology exchanges, saying he hoped to make this one of the "gems" of the visit. He suggested that the presidents sign the clean energy and environmental protection MOU.
G-20
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8. (C) VFM He thanked President Obama for his leadership in institutionalizing the G-20, which had created a "comfortable" platform for countries like China and India to play a larger role. He explained that there had been some domestic criticism of President Hu's participation in the G8-plus-5. He expressed hope that the United States would coordinate closely with China as we established new rules for the organization, and that it would not become an organization that duplicated the United Nations or the G-8. VFM He expressed reservations about how fast the G-20 could expand to handle issues beyond economics and finance, but noted that if the organization was going to stay relevant for leaders it's scope would have to grow. He specifically mentioned the need for a coordinating mechanism on global diseases and counter-terrorism.
North Korea
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9. (S) VFM He downplayed Premier Wen Jiabao's upcoming October 4-6 visit to Pyongyang, stating "we may not like them," but "they (the DPRK) are a neighbor," and the trip was part of the 60th anniversary of relations celebrations. He stated that the Premier would convey a strong message on the need to denuclearize, to come back to the Six-Party talks, and to not abandon the Six-Party Talks framework. He noted that North Korea often tried to play China off the United States, refusing to convey information about U.S.-DPRK bilateral conversations. Clearly seeking a clarification for the record, VFM He asked if the United States were prepared to accept a nuclear-armed but non-proliferating North Korea. The Deputy Secretary stated this was not acceptable or sustainable.
Tires
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10. (C) VFM He lamented the United States' recent 421 tire decision, and expressed concern that lawyers in the United States were preparing additional cases on products such as textiles. He opined that China and the United States relied too much on "technical" negotiators.
11. (U) The Deputy Secretary has cleared this message. HUNTSMAN
Monday, 12 January 2009, 09:12
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000059
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/12/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, KS, KN
SUBJECT: ROK'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE NEIGHBORS: NORTH
KOREA, JAPAN, CHINA AND RUSSIA
REF: A. TOKYO 3114 (TRILATERAL POLICY PLANNING) B. SECDEF DTG261447ZNOV08 (DEFENSE TRILATERAL TALKS) C. TOKYO 3416 (ROK-PRC-JAPAN TRILATS) D. SEOUL 1681 (ROKG ON CHINA) E. SEOUL 1700 (ROK-PRC SUMMIT) F. SEOUL 2461 (ROK-RUSSIA STRATEGIC DIALOGUE)
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
1. (C) Summary: As a presidential candidate, Lee Myoung-bak called for a "creative reconstruction" of Korea's foreign policy. In his February 2008 inaugural address, Lee criticized his two predecessors, saying, "At times over the last ten years, we found ourselves faltering and confused." He vowed to trade ideology for pragmatism as Korea's surest means of improving ties with its neighbors, and he's had some successes, especially with China and Russia, where Lee was able to expand substantially economic and political ties. Lee's efforts on Japan and North Korea are more mixed. With Japan, the South Korean public was not quite ready to accept fully Lee's attempts to compartmentalize history issues. Still, much progress was made in Seoul-Tokyo consultations on a variety of issues ranging from North Korea to economic to even security issues. On North Korea, Lee's conservative agenda was predictably rebuffed by Pyongyang. However, all signs are that President Lee is quite comfortable in sticking to denuclearization and reciprocity as the basis of his North Korea policy, especially as it enjoys considerable support. End Summary.
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DPRK
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2. (C) In a February 2007 speech that has widely come to be known as the "MB Doctrine," presidential candidate Lee Myung-bank firmed up his vision of his administration's North Korea Policy. Lee said his first priority would be to abolish what he described as his predecessors' "unprincipled and unilateral policy of appeasement" toward the DPRK and replace it with a policy that offered generous assistance in exchange for North Korea's complete nuclear dismantlement and Pyongyang's accommodation of South Korea's desire for family reunion, accounting of welfare and whereabouts of POWs from the Korean War and several hundred abductees after the war. Immediately upon taking office, the Lee Administration also made it clear that it would review all commitments from the two South-North summits -- June 2000 and October 2007. Senior Lee Administration officials complained publicly that the October 2007 summit between Kim Jong-il and President Roh Moo-hyun was arranged by Roh to favor the progressive candidate in the presidential election two months later and that therefore President Lee was not bound to fulfill promises amounting to billions of dollars of aid to the North.
3. (C) The response from Pyongyang was predictably swift and severe. Using threatening language not heard since the Kim Young-sam days, North Korea has moved step by step to cut off inter-Korean relations. Initially, all inter-Korean meetings were cancelled, with the North loudly proclaiming that food aid from the South was neither needed nor wanted. Thereafter, Pyongyang implemented a draconian restriction in December of North-South cross-border traffic, stopping Kaesong tourism and severely limiting traffic to the Kaesong Industrial Complex. As the Kumgang tourism had been stopped by the South over the July shooting death of a Southern tourist, the net result has been a crippling blow to the KIC and Kumgang tourism, the two proudest results of the Sunshine policy.
4. (C) With both sides dug in, the outlook for any quick improvement in inter-Korean relations is slim to none. Much more likely is the continued "psychological war," as characterized by Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan in his recent meeting with the Ambassador. President Lee is determined not to give in to North Korean pressure. Our Blue House contacts have told us on several occasions that President Lee remained quite comfortable with his North Korea policy and that he is prepared leave the inter-Korean relations frozen until the end of his term in office, if necessary. It is also our assessment that Lee's more conservative advisors and supporters see the current standoff as a genuine opportunity to push and further weaken the North, even if this might involve considerable brinkmanship. Also favoring the Lee Administration's stance is the the Korean public, which is calm to the point of apathy about the inter-Korean situation.
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Japan
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5. (C) President Lee has made concerted efforts to improve relations with Tokyo, which were significantly strained during the Roh Moo-hyun era over history and territory issues. Lee sought to compartmentalize what he called "disputes over the past", stating in an early policy address that "South Korea and Japan should...try to foster a future-oriented relationship with a pragmatic attitude. Historical truth must not be ignored, but we can no longer afford to give up our future relations due to disputes over the past." Lee's vision was to look beyond the history-bound bilateral issues and create a Korea-Japan partnership active in the regional and global arena on issues like the denuclearization of the DPRK, strengthening of multilateral relationships, trade and economics, and cooperation on projects like alternative energy, communicable diseases, and poverty alleviation.
6. (C) So far, Lee's efforts have yielded some success, although Blue House officials would argue that results would have been far better had Tokyo shown more courage, especially in dealing with the Takeshima/Dokdo issue. For example, Lee pressed ahead with his plan to engage Japan on a more strategic regional and global level. Lee made the decision that Korea would participate in the October U.S.-Japan-Korea Trilateral Policy Planning talks (Ref A) in Tokyo. He then agreed to the U.S.-Japan-Korea Defense Trilateral Talks (Ref B) in Washington in November, the first trilateral defense talks in six years. Lee also initiated the first ever stand-alone China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Summit (Ref C) in Fukuoka in December. Critics will of course point out that there were no substantive results from these meetings, but the fact that the meetings were held at all is a significant result.
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China
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7. (C) President Lee has openly courted the Chinese, and he has chalked up some noteworthy successes. Less than one year into his term, Lee has already met with PRC President Hu Jintao three times, quite unprecedented in the history of ROK-PRC relations (Ref D); typically, in the past, the ROK could expect only one visit in a PRC president's ten-year term. Lee paid his first state visit to Beijing in May 2008 and met Hu again in August when Lee traveled to Beijing for the Olympics. Hu paid a state visit to Seoul August 25-26. President Lee made the relations seem a two-way desire. A Chinese Embassy contact told us that Beijing had been concerned that China-Korea relations would suffer because of the emphasis Lee wanted to put on improving U.S.-Korea relations. Therefore, China was pleasantly surprised that Lee was able to improve both bilateral relationships simultaneously. Kim Heung-kyu, Professor of Chinese Security and Foreign Policy at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, said Lee had effectively leveraged the U.S.-Korea relationship to improve relations with China, which is eager for closer ties with Korea to check U.S. and Japanese interests in the region.
8. (C) During Lee's first visit to Beijing, he and Hu issued a joint statement which upgraded the Korea-China relationship to a "strategic cooperative partnership". Our Chinese Embassy contact gave the clearest explanation of what was now "strategic" about the ROK-PRC relationship: that China's nomenclature to describe its relations with Korea was upgraded according to a roughly five-year schedule. In 1992, relations were normalized; in 1998, the first year of Kim Dae-jung's term as President, the Chinese upgraded the relationship to "cooperative partnership"; in 2002, it was upgraded again to "comprehensive cooperative partnership," and now it is "strategic cooperative partnership."
9. (C) Despite the name, Koreans have found substantive strategic discussions with the Chinese frustratingly difficult. For example, Lee, unlike his immediate predecessors, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, added North Korean human rights to the Korea-China summit agenda in August, asking Hu not to repatriate North Korean refugees against their will. Hu did not respond to Lee's request (Ref E). Also, we understand, Lee asked Hu what China thought about the North Korean domestic political situation and whether Beijing had any contingency plans. This time, Hu apparently pretended not to hear Lee. Still, the ROK did not come away empty, because, despite initial Chinese objections, Lee was successful in including in the summit joint statement a commitment "to promote dialogue and cooperation in the field of international human rights."
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Russia
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10. (C) Lee has largely continued the trend of his predecessors in upgrading economic ties with Russia. ROK-Russia economic ties have grown more than 40% annually for the past three years, with two-way trade exceeding USD 15 billion in 2007. Much of the growth is due to Russia's natural resources. For example, Lee paid a state visit to Moscow in September and agreed to a contract for Russia to supply Korea with 7.5 million tons of natural gas annually for thirty years beginning from 2015, amounting to an estimated 20% of Korea's annual natural gas consumption. And despite doubts about North Korea's cooperation, Lee agreed in principle to Russia exploring plans for a pipeline through North Korea to deliver the gas. The two countries also agreed to investigate the possibilities for linking the inter-Korean railway to the trans-Siberian railway system (Ref F).
11. (C) On his state visit, Lee also signed an agreement to upgrade the ROK-Russia relationship to a "Strategic Cooperative Partnership", the same term used by China to describe this year's upgrade to the ROK-PRC relationship. Ko Jae-nam, of MOFAT's Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, said Korea proposed using the term "Strategic Cooperative Partnership" after China used the term to describe the ROK-PRC relationship. Ko said Korea's objective in using the same terminology to describe the ROK-Russia relationship was to balance the ROK-PRC relationship.
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Comment
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12. (C) During a year in which President Lee faced considerable difficulty advancing his domestic agenda, his foreign policy efforts, if not wildly successful, at least did not get him into trouble. To a considerable degree, relations with South Korea's neighbors are driven by economic realities -- increased regional trade, investment, and tourism -- that mesh with Lee's pragmatic, non-ideological approach. Relations with North Korea were the outlier, as the DPRK took pains in 2008 to demonstrate that it could live without ROK assistance. STEPHENS
Friday, 24 July 2009, 07:38
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001171
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/24/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINR, ECON, KN, KS
SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL'S MEETING WITH ROK UNIFICATION
MINISTER HYUN IN-TAEK
Classified By: Ambassador Stephens. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: In a July 20 meeting, Unification Minister Hyun In-taek outlined Kim Jong-il's health and succession concerns, key figures and the current state of the DPRK for A/S Campbell. Although Kim Jong-il (KJI) remained firmly in control of the regime for now, he was unlikely to live beyond 2015. On succession, Hyun observed the current succession preparations for Kim Jung-un were "rushed," and anticipated additional "fireworks" (either a third nuclear test or missile launches) at the end of the current 150-day campaign, scheduled to end in mid-October. North Korea would return to dialogue afterwards. North Korea is suffering from severe food shortage and devastating economic crisis caused by lack of foreign aid, economic foundation and decent harvest. The situation is worse than the 1996/ 1997 crisis, because the economic uncertainty is taking place during, not after, a power transition period. Desperate for cash, Hyun believed North Korea would sell nuclear technology to potential buyers. North Korea desired to be a "strong state," ideologically, militarily and economically. Nuclear power would allow two of the three: ideological and military strength. The role of the DPRK Foreign Ministry diminished after Kim Gae-kwan failed to "deal with the United States." The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) remained a source for cash for the DPRK; it was also a potential window of opportunity for inter-Korean cooperation, and at the same time a potential political liability for both Koreas. Hyun believed North Korea after KJI's death would look very different than the current state and require economic assistance from South Korea and the United States. Hyun also underscored the importance the U.S.-ROK cooperation and believed a unified Korea should be nuclear free. END SUMMARY.
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KJI's Heath and Succession
--------------------------
2. (C) While KJI's overall political power remained "firm and strong," his health was weakening, Hyun said. South Korean analysts believed that KJI was unlikely to live more than 3 to 5 years, although he seemed to be doing better lately. MOU had not discovered any firm basis for rumored pancreatic cancer, reports of which stemmed from a Japanese press article with a Beijing source. Wang Jiarui, Director for PRC Communist Party International Liaison Department, told Hyun that when he had met with KJI in January, Wang could not detect any scars on KJI's head from his widely reported surgery after suffering a stroke. Also, KJI did not look as though he would die soon when he attended the 15-year commemoration of the death of his father, Kim Il-sung, on July 8. KJI remained for the entire duration of the celebration -- over three hours -- and met with his staff for about 20 minutes after the event.
3. (C) Hyun observed that the current, "rushed," pace of succession preparation in the North was noteworthy. "Semi-officially," Hyun said, the transition had started, with some power and authority already transferred to the youngest son, Kim Jong-un, who had already been recognized publicly as a "young commander" and a "brilliant star." The current 150-day campaign, scheduled to end in mid-October, was to provide a boost to a smoother transition. Hyun said he expected further nuclear and/or missile tests in October; perhaps, after that, North Korea would return to the nuclear talks.
--------------------------------
Return to Dialogue After October
--------------------------------
4. (C) Hyun said it was only a matter of time before North Korea returned to the nuclear talks; the only question was when. North Korea faced a severely degraded economy, serious food shortages, and a shortage of foreign currency. It could resist for a while, but not for a long time. The Five Parties, therefore, should focus on how to manage the return of North Korea to the negotiations. If the return was not well managed, there would be poor results. The United States and South Korea must apply patience and pressure.
--------------------------------
The Current State of North Korea
--------------------------------
5. (C) According to Hyun, North Korea now faced a very difficult economic situation, similar to the conditions in
1996 and 1997. Hyun pointed out that North Korea "produces nothing" and had "no meaningful trade" with the outside world. On food, Hyun said that North Korea was now asking private ROK entities for food assistance. Hyun confirmed that the ROKG did not send food aid or fertilizer to the DPRK from 2008 to present. Having also refused U.S. food aid, the DPRK was severely suffering, and the food situation would not improve soon, Hyun said. Since early July, North Korea had suffered from unusually heavy rainfall, which would have a devastating effect on the harvest this year.
6. (C) On inter-Korean trade, Hyun cited data from the Korea Development Institute (KDI), which showed a sharp decrease in inter-Korean trade over the past six months. Moreover, inter-Korean projects such as Mt. Kumkang and Kaesong city tours, major sources of cash, had dried up completely because they were closed in July and December 2008. The remaining, legitimate, cash flow for the North is now the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), from which the North receives about USD 35 million for its 40,000 workers. Hyun believed that North Korea could, and would, sell nuclear technology, and even plutonium.
7. (C) Hyun assessed that Pyongyang's nuclear and missile tests were to earn "one big deal" with the United States. North Korea wanted to be recognized as a nuclear state. North Korea's goals were to become ideologically, militarily, and economically a strong state. Aiming to achieve "strength" in all areas by 2012, the year when North Korea will "enter the gateway to become a strong and prosperous nation," according North Korean schedule. Hyun said the ideological goal was already achieved through Kim Il-sung's Juche, or self-reliance, ideology. The DPRK's aim to become a military power was "nearly achieved," through the North's nuclear and missile capabilities. In North Korea's view, ideological and military strength would come from becoming a nuclear power. When North Korea would "gain strength" on all three fronts, it would also obtain the recognition and respect from the rest of the world.
-----------
Key players
-----------
8. (C) Hyun identified Jang Sung-taek as the central figure in North Korea at the moment, probably the second-in-command. However, Jang did not oversee serious military issues, including nuclear and missile programs. On military issues, key authority was held by the National Defense Committee. Among the committee members, Hyun said Joo koo-chan was responsible for the rocket launch, and Oh Kuk-ryul and Kim Young-choon were key decision makers within the military. Other National Defense Committee members, such as Cho Myung-rok, who had met President Clinton, were not doing well because of old age. Oh Kuk-ryul and Kim Young-choon were also old, but remained active. According to Hyun's sources, Kim Young-choon suffers from bad hearing, but remained one of KJI's close confidants. Apparently, KJI called for Kim Young-choon twice on July 8, at the celebration of the 15th anniversary of KIS's death -- a clear sign of influence. Hyun also identified Kim Jeong-gak as "very powerful," but underscored that KJI still controls "everything, including the military."
-----------------------------------
Diminishing Foreign Ministry's Role
-----------------------------------
9. (C) In the past, the DPRK Foreign Ministry enjoyed some of influence and power, as a check-and-balance element of the DPRK regime. Currently, that balance system has broken down and the foreign ministry's role has diminished considerably. One reason for this downfall, according to Hyun, was the perceived failure of the Six-Party Talks (6PT) where Kim Gye-kwan did "not deal with the United States successfully." Hyun said that the North Korean authorities expected a lot from Kim Gye-kwan, but he had "failed to deliver."
-------------------------------
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC)
-------------------------------
10. (C) Hyun saw the KIC as a window of opportunity for inter-Korean development, especially in introducing South Korean capitalism to the North. Run by South Korean managers and machines, the KIC provides glimpse of the South Korean way of life to over 40,000 North Korean workers and their external families. The workers' change in appearance and way
of thinking was visible, Hyun said. The 40,000 KIC workers could spread the South Korea's way of life to their families, thus directly affecting some 150,000 people around Kaesong city. Hyun also noted that, the KIC was a divisive issue in South Korea too. The North could use KIC to "divide" the South, Hyun assessed, but still, Hyun said, most of South Korea, including the ROKG, did not want the project to fail.
-----------
Way forward
-----------
11. (C) Hyun believed North Korea after KJI's death would look very different, requiring considerable economic assistance from South Korea, the United States and international community. Hyun advised that in case of a sudden collapse in North Korea, the ROKG and USG should move quickly toward unification of the Korean peninsula. There was "no disagreement" among ROK agencies on this point, Hyun said. The USG could expect "full cooperation" from the ROKG; unification was the goal of South Korea. Hyun underscored the importance the U.S.-ROK cooperation and stated that a unified Korea should be nuclear free.
12. (U) A/S Campbell has cleared this message. STEPHENS
Wednesday, 26 March 2008, 09:48
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 001141
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/26/2033
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PARM, KNNP, MNUC, KN, CH, IR
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL JANUZZI DISCUSSES NONPROLIFERATION, IRAN,
AND DPRK WITH MFA ARMS CONTROL DIRECTOR GENERAL
Classified By: Deputy Political Section Chief Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
Summary
-------
1. (C) Current bilateral cooperation on arms control, nonproliferation and export control is "remarkable," MFA Department of Arms Control Director General Cheng Jingye told Staffdel Januzzi March 24. Nevertheless, there is a "perception" that the United States counts on China's support on nonproliferation issues but does not fully trust China as an equal partner. On Iran, China supports a dual approach which includes applying pressure via Security Council resolutions and focusing on the diplomatic front. China's cooperation with Iran on energy is unrelated to the Iran nuclear issue and Cheng "can't imagine" the consequences if Sinopec is sanctioned. On North Korea, Cheng urged the United States to find a creative resolution to the declaration issue. End Summary.
2. (C) Frank Januzzi and Puneet Talwar, staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, met MFA Department of Arms Control Director General Cheng Jingye March 24 to discuss Chinese views on arms control, non-proliferation, Iran and North Korea.
"Remarkable" Cooperation
------------------------
3. (C) Arms control, export controls and nonproliferation all contribute to China's security, said Cheng. A decade ago, cooperation between China and the United States focused on certain cases, but today's level of cooperation on nonproliferation and arms control issues is "remarkable," Cheng said. For example, China is actively involved in diplomatic negotiation efforts on North Korea and Iran. And in many areas of nonproliferation, said Cheng, the two countries see "eye-to-eye." He referred to multilateral agreements such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement and said that even if China is not a member of these various organizations, China has in place its own export control regime. For example, there is interagency coordination on sensitive exports as well as alleged proliferation cases raised by the United States. Cheng noted that while the pace of implementing arms control agreements has slowed in the past decade, China is prepared to move the disarmament conference forward within the United Nations framework.
Equal Partners
--------------
4. (C) Cheng contended that there is a "perception" that the United States counts on China's support and cooperation on nonproliferation issues but does not fully trust or treat China as an equal partner. For example, in the 1990s, China was invited to join the MTCR and the Australia Group but declined to join. Currently, however, China is "not welcome," despite expressing a willingness to join, Cheng said. China and the United States need to cooperate on a "mutual, equal basis." Cheng also raised the issue of sanctions against China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC). CGWIC has been subject to sanctions for ten years without "solid evidence," said Cheng. Over the past 3-4 years, CGWIC has restructured the company, changed its business model and prohibited contacts with countries of concern to the United States. Cheng expressed hope that the company would make progress during its March 20 meetings in Washington.
Iran
----
5. (C) Cheng said China and the United States share the same goal for Iran: no further proliferation of nuclear weapons. China makes this point very clearly to the international community and to Iran in the context of its private bilateral contacts. PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told Iranian leaders during his November visit to Iran that China is opposed to proliferation in the Middle East. China supports the UNSCRs on Iran and the P5-plus-1 process, emphasized Cheng. After the release of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and IAEA reports on Iran last year, there is a need for more diplomatic efforts, Cheng said. China supports a dual approach which includes applying pressure via UNSCRs and focusing on the diplomatic front.
6. (C) One of the dilemmas of the Iran nuclear issue is that despite three UNSCRs, Iran's capability to enrich uranium
BEIJING 00001141 002 OF 002
continues to expand, Cheng underscored. China and other countries need to be "creative" in devising a proposal "attractive" to Iran. The international community must find a way to ensure its concerns about Iran's nuclear development are addressed and promote the peaceful development of nuclear energy, maintained Cheng. Cheng reasoned that if incentives do not work, then it will make applying pressure easier in the future because it shows that diplomacy was not effective. The P5-plus-1 meeting in Shanghai in April will allow the ministers to discuss strategy on next steps. Cheng noted that a recent proposal from the United Nations Association of the USA (UNA-USA) includes some interesting ideas and that his office is in the process of studying its proposal. Cheng said that Germany has put forward a proposal to "refresh" previous offers. China believes that the P5-plus-1 will need to offer new incentives to Iran.
7. (C) Iran might be more willing to offer a reciprocal positive gesture on the nuclear issue if it does not feel threatened by regime change, Cheng said. Regarding Iran's claim that it did not have a nuclear program prior to 2003, China is not in a position to comment without presentation of evidence and materials, Cheng said. China continues to urge Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and encourages the IAEA to play a greater role. Cheng also discussed possible incentives for Iran after international confidence is restored, including reinstatement as a non-nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) member, education cooperation, normalization of economic relations, etc.
China-Iran Energy Cooperation
-----------------------------
8. (C) Regarding China-Iran energy cooperation, Cheng believes that there is a "misunderstanding" on the part of the United States. China has made clear its need for energy resources and has previously stated that its cooperation with Iran on energy has nothing to do with the Iran nuclear issue. China hopes that the U.S. Congress understands this point, said Cheng. Specifically, the threat of sanctions against Sinopec is a very serious issue, Cheng emphasized. Sinopec is very important to China and Cheng "can't imagine" the consequences if the company is sanctioned. Januzzi noted Cheng's concerns and said that he would pass this message to Washington.
North Korea
-----------
9. (C) Januzzi recounted his meetings with DPRK counterparts during his five-day trip to North Korea and said that he encouraged them to provide a declaration. Cheng said that China does not have specific information on North Korea's alleged purchase of centrifuge technology and that China had received this information from the United States. He urged the United States to focus on the future and not to dwell on the past. The United States is not interested in delving into North Korea's past, Januzzi countered. The United States needs to have clarity on certain issues, however, in order to move forward. According to Cheng, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei urged the DPRK to take advantage of this unique opportunity. The resolution of the declaration issue will require some imagination and creativity, Cheng said. North Korea does not fully trust the United States and remains concerned about admitting to an activity it claims never existed, Cheng claimed.
10. (U) Staffdel Januzzi did not have an opportunity to clear this cable. PICCUTA
Thursday, 18 February 2010, 04:57
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000248
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/18/2035
TAGS PREL, PHUM, PGOV, SOCI, KN, KS, CH
SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL DISCUSSES DPRK FUTURE WITH EXPERTS
Classified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
SUMMARY
-------
1. (C) A group of five ROK opinion leaders and experts on North Korea issues told A/S Kurt Campbell on February 3 it was difficult to predict whether Kim Jong-il's youngest son Kim Jong-un would be able to succeed his father without sparking instability in the North. Of the five experts, one thought the younger Kim might succeed and one argued his lack of leadership experience made it unlikely he would win the support of the ruling elites. They agreed that Kim Jong-il's brother-in-law Jang Song-taek would prove a strong rival for the younger Kim and would probably be tempted to challenge him. Kim Jong-il had used draconian controls and international aid to discourage coups after having foiled three such attempts in the late 90s. China's strategic interests were fundamentally at odds with U.S.-ROK interests in North Korea. End Summary. Succession in Progress but Success in Doubt
-------------------------------------------
2. (C) Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell met on February 3 with Korean opinion leaders with a keen interest in DPRK issues to hear their views on the future of North Korea. The experts agreed that regime succession was fully underway and that the North Korean people had accepted the process. XXXXXXXXXXX said a North Korean diplomat based in Beijing had told him over the phone that morning that the DPRK Foreign Ministry had instructed all of its overseas missions to "lay the foundation for leadership change in Pyongyang." Most of the experts believed the challenge for Kim Jong-il's youngest son and designated heir, Kim Jong-un, would most likely come after his father died. XXXXXXXXXXX recalled the Chosun Dynasty's 500 year history in which political intrigue and tension might simmer for years, but tended to erupt only after the king died. 3. (C) The group agreed that Kim Jong-il's brother-in-law and right-hand man Jang Song-taek was spearheading the succession drive and would be a rival for power once Kim Jong-un's father died, but the group was split on the younger Kim's prospects for holding onto power. XXXXXXXXXXX believed it would be difficult for Jang to wrest power from the younger Kim once the succession process was complete. XXXXXXXXXXX suggested it was unclear whether Jang would be content to control the younger Kim from behind the curtain, or would challenge him directly for outright control. XXXXXXXXXXX
Doubts About Younger Kim's Experience
-------------------------------------
4. (C) There were many reasons to doubt that Kim Jong-un would be able to successfully fend off challenges to his control after his father died. XXXXXXXXXXX noted that Kim Jong-il had twenty years of experience as an official of the Korean Workers' Party before his father died. Furthermore, Kim Jong-il had the benefit of years of guidance from his father after he had been officially anointed in 1980 to eventually succeed him. By contrast, Kim Jong-un had very limited experience and might not get much direct guidance before Kim Jong-il dies. Even now, XXXXXXXXXXX it was not clear that Kim Jong-il's health was good enough to exercise the faculties necessary for day-to-day management of state affairs. Given the limited opportunity the younger Kim had to gain experience, XXXXXXXXXXX doubted his ability to solidify his position in the Party and win the unwavering support of Pyongyang's power elites. XXXXXXXXXXX recalled the tumultuous state of affairs in the ROK following the death of President Park Chung Hee in 1979 and suggested the DPRK succession would be "100 times more troublesome." XXXXXXXXXXX
Tight Control and Aid Kept Regime Afloat
----------------------------------------
5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX opined that brutal repression and international aid had been the secrets of Kim Jong-il's ability to fend off challenges. After three separate coup attempts in the 90s, Kim Jong-il had implemented very strict controls and sent a stern warning to would-be plotters by executing anyone who had been even remotely involved in the plots. Therefore, only the military could even dare consider rising up, but the Security Services had successfully kept the military in check. XXXXXXXXXXXwent on to suggest that the "indulgence" of the international community over the past ten years had also helped sustain the regime. The large-scale assistance provided to the regime by the ROK, China, the U.S., Japan and others had been intended in part to avoid a hard landing, and indeed had kept the regime afloat, he said. [Name removed] suggested that North Korea had skillfully played Washington and Beijing off one another.XXXXXXXXXXX believed that the DPRK had exploited large amounts of assistance from China, taking advantage of a situation in which Beijing was presumed by Washington to have significant influence over Pyongyang. China Complicates the Endgame
-----------------------------
6. (C) The experts agreed that China's obsession with DPRK stability at all costs, was clearly and fundamentally at odds with U.S. and ROK interests. Given a choice between reaching out to Seoul or Beijing, [name removed] believed that Pyongyang elites would reflexively look to China for support if they believed they needed help in maintaining stability. The Seoul option would be unacceptable because of the U.S.-ROK alliance and concerns over becoming subservient to Seoul. China, on the other hand, would gladly provide support with few or no strings attached, just to maintain the DPRK as an independent entity, XXXXXXXXXXX maintained.
7. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXnoted that although Washington had a keen interest in both denuclearization and human rights, the U.S. stake in North Korea was minimal compared to that of China by virtue of its proximity to the North. China did not share American perspectives on these two key issues, considering them somewhat abstract. Rather, Beijing was concerned about what it considered to be more concrete issues, such as a potential flood of "economic migrants" and broader social unrest on its immediate border. Reaching the People and Close Cooperation are Key
--------------------------------------------- ----
8. (C) Negating Chinese influence over the long term, [Name removed] observed, would involve close U.S.-ROK cooperation in winning the hearts and minds of the North Korean people. XXXXXXXXXXX STEPHENS
Thursday, 04 June 2009, 09:08
S E C R E T SINGAPORE 000529
EO 12958 DECL: 06/04/2029
TAGS OVIP (STEINBERG, JAMES B.), PREL, MNUC, ECON, SN, CH,
KN
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S MAY 30, 2009
CONVERSATION WITH SINGAPORE MINISTER MENTOR LEE KUAN YEW
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel L. Shields. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (SBU) May 30, 2009; 6:30 p.m.; The Presidential Palace; Singapore.
2. (SBU) Participants:
United States
-------------
The Deputy Secretary Glyn T. Davies, EAP Acting Assistant Secretary Daniel L. Shields, CDA (Notetaker)
SINGAPORE
---------
Minister Mentor (MM) Lee Kuan Yew Chee Hong Tat, Principal Private Secretary to MM Cheryl Lee, Country Officer, Americas Directorate, MFA
3. (S) SUMMARY: Deputy Secretary Steinberg used his meeting with Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew to stress the importance of Chinese cooperation in addressing the North Korea nuclear issue and to elicit MM Lee's views on China and North Korea. MM Lee said the Chinese do not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons and do not want North Korea to collapse. If China has to choose, Beijing sees a North Korea with nuclear weapons as less bad than a North Korea that has collapsed. MM Lee asked Deputy Chief of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Ma Xiaotian what China can do about North Korea. General Ma's answer was that "they can survive on their own." The Deputy Secretary noted that the DPRK could have a fair and attractive deal if it would change its approach. If not, North Korea faces a change of course by the United States, the ROK and Japan. MM Lee said he believes Japan may well "go nuclear." MM Lee also offered views on the Chinese economy, Taiwan, Chinese leaders, and U.S.-China relations. End Summary.
China and North Korea
---------------------
4. (S) Deputy Secretary Steinberg met with Singapore Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew on May 30 on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the annual international security forum held in Singapore. The Deputy Secretary used the meeting with MM Lee to stress the importance of Chinese cooperation in addressing the North Korea nuclear issue and to elicit MM Lee's views on China and North Korea. MM Lee said the Chinese do not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Chinese do not want North Korea, which China sees as a buffer state, to collapse. The ROK would take over in the North and China would face a U.S. presence at its border. If China has to choose, Beijing sees a North Korea with nuclear weapons as less bad for China than a North Korea that has collapsed, he stated.
5. (S) MM Lee said he asked Deputy Chief of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Ma Xiaotian what China can do about North Korea. General Ma's Delphic answer was that "they can survive on their own." MM Lee said he interpreted this as meaning that even if China cut off aid, the DPRK leadership would survive. This is a leadership that has already taken actions like killing ROK Cabinet Members in Burma and shooting down a KAL flight. If they lose power, they will end up facing justice at The Hague, like Milosevic. They have been so isolated for so long that they have no friends, not even Russia. They have not trusted China since the Chinese began cultivating ties with the ROK, given China's interest in attracting foreign investment, he said. The Deputy Secretary noted that the DPRK could have a fair and attractive deal if it would change its approach. If not, North Korea faces a change of course by the United States, the ROK and Japan. MM Lee expressed worry about the effect on Iran if the DPRK persists. MM Lee said he believes the DPRK can be contained and will not proliferate, but Iran has very high ambitions, ties to Shiite communities outside Iran, and oil wealth.
6. (S) The Deputy Secretary noted that North Korea's decisions will have an impact in Japan. MM Lee said he believes Japan may well "go nuclear." The Chinese must have factored this into their calculations and concluded that the prospect of Japan with nuclear weapons is less bad than losing North Korea as a buffer state. The Chinese take a long-term view and must think that within a few years the DPRK's current leadership will be gone and there will be new leadership, with new thinking. But there will still be a North Korea, he said.
7. (S) MM Lee said he wishes the USG well in its efforts on North Korea, but he would be surprised if the North Koreans agree to give up nuclear weapons. They might give up a first-strike capacity, but they want nuclear weapons in case the USG decides to seek regime change. They are psychopathic types, with a "flabby old chap" for a leader who prances around stadiums seeking adulation. MM Lee noted that he had learned from living through three and a half years of Japanese occupation in Singapore that people will obey authorities who can deny them food, clothing and medicine.
8. (S) MM Lee said the ROK, after seeing what had happened with German unification, does not want immediate unification with the DPRK. There is "nothing there" in the DPRK, other than a military organization. Kim Jong-Il has already had a stroke. It is just a matter of time before he has another stroke. The next leader may not have the gumption or the bile of his father or grandfather. He may not be prepared to see people die like flies. China is calculating all this. They have their best men on the job. They want to help the United States to advance common objectives. But they do not want the South to take over the North, MM Lee said.
Chinese Economy
---------------
9. (C) Regarding the Chinese economy, MM Lee said the global economic crisis has hit many countries, but the feel on the ground differs considerably from place to place. The Chinese economy is reportedly in the doldrums, but when MM Lee visited Jiangsu Province on May 24, his impression was one of continued prosperity. Shanghai has been harder hit, with container port traffic down 30-35 percent, similar to the situation in Singapore. There is no sign of deep unrest in China. The Chinese are very confident they will be able to sustain eight percent growth. The government is pumping resources into the economy, with a focus on developing Western China. Whether such policies can be sustained for three to four years is unclear, but China can certainly sustain these policies for at least a year, he said.
10. (C) MM Lee stated that in the absence of a social safety net in China, the Chinese savings rate is 55 percent, exceeding even Singapore's 50 percent level. Consumption accounts for only 35 percent of Chinese GDP, as opposed to 70 percent of U.S. GDP. The Chinese leadership may be loath to shift permanently to a more consumption-oriented economy, but the leadership will do so temporarily, if only to avoid unrest. 20 million people have moved back to the countryside because of economic dislocations. The government is providing microfinance to facilitate the transition. The pragmatists are in charge. There is nothing Communist about it. They just want to preserve one party rule. The Deputy Secretary expressed concern that current Chinese policies designed to counter the economic crisis could undermine reform. MM Lee said this cannot be helped. China wants to prevent riots like the ones that happened in Guangzhou in March when Hong Kong-connected enterprises suddenly shut down, he said.
Taiwan
------
11. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked MM Lee for his assessment of Taiwan. MM Lee said former President Chen Shui-bian had left Taiwan in a weak economic position, which had enabled President Ma Ying-Jeou to come to power with his pledge to strengthen the economy through means including expanding the three links with China. In Beijing, former President Jiang Zemin was wedded to his eight-point approach, but President Hu Jintao was more flexible. Jiang wanted to show he was a great man by solving the Taiwan issue in his lifetime, but Hu is more patient and does not have any fixed timeline. In Chinese domestic politics, Hu had wanted Vice Premier Li Keqiang from the Communist Youth League to emerge as his successor, not Vice President Xi Jinping, but Hu did his calculations and accepted Xi when it became clear that Xi had the necessary backing from the rest of the leadership. Similarly, on Taiwan, Hu will be pragmatic. It does not matter to Hu if it takes 10 years or 20 or 30. The key is building links with Taiwan. As in the case of Hong Kong, if necessary the tap could be turned off, he said.
12. (C) In this context, MM Lee said, Hu could live with Ma's positions on the '92 consensus and on not addressing the reunification issue during his term in office. What mattered to Hu was that Taiwan not seek independence. If that happened, China has 1,000 missiles and is building its capacity to hold the U.S. fleet at a distance. The implicit question for Taiwan's leaders is if that is what they want, MM Lee said.
13. (C) MM Lee stated that the alternative is Mainland investment in Taiwan stocks and property. The Mainland has already assured Hong Kong that it will help out economically. The Mainland has not said this to Taiwan, but the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Director, Wang Yi, did urge Chinese companies to invest in Taiwan. In four years Taiwan's economy will pick up and Ma will win re-election. The DPP lacks strong potential candidates. Su Zhen-chang is promising, but seems unlikely to be able to win. Meanwhile, even the traditionally DPP-supporting farmers in Taiwan's South need China's market for vegetables and other products. Taiwan's continued participation in the World Health Assembly depends on Beijing. Beijing's calculation seems to be to prevent Taiwan independence in the near term, then bring Taiwan "back to China," even if it takes 40 or 50 years. MM Lee said he is looking forward to visiting Fujian Province, where preparations are underway for a new southern economic area linked with Taiwan.
Xi Jinping
----------
14. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked if in the future a leader like Xi Jinping would continue the policies on Taiwan followed by Hu Jintao. MM Lee responded affirmatively. Xi is a princeling who succeeded despite being rusticated. When the party needed his talents, Xi was brought in as Shanghai Party Secretary. Xi is seen as a Jiang Zemin protege, but in another three and a half years Jiang's influence will be gone. The focus now is on maintaining the system. There are no more strongmen like Deng Xiaoping. Jiang did not like Hu, but could not stop him, because Hu had the backing of the system and he did not make mistakes.
Wang Qishan
-----------
15. (C) MM Lee said Vice Premier Wang Qishan, whom the MM saw in connection with celebrations in May of the 15th anniversary of Singapore-China Suzhou Industrial Park, is an exceptional talent, very assured and efficient. Wang handled SARS superbly when he was in Hainan. He excelled in coordinating the Beijing Olympics. Li Keqiang may not get the Premiership and the Party is looking for a way to keep Wang on past his 65th birthday until he is 70. MM Lee said he had met first Wang back in the 1990s but had forgotten their meeting. This time when they met, Wang told Lee he had reviewed the records of all Lee's meeting with Chinese leaders going back to the days of Deng Xiaoping to see how Lee's thinking had developed. Wang told Lee he respects him as a consistent man.
China's Rise
------------
16. (C) MM Lee said China is following an approach consistent with ideas in the Chinese television series "The Rise of Great Powers." The mistake of Germany and Japan had been their effort to challenge the existing order. The Chinese are not stupid; they have avoided this mistake. China's economy has surpassed other countries, with the exceptions of Japan and the United States. Even with those two countries, the gap is closing, with China growing at seven-nine percent annually, versus two-three percent in the United States and Japan. Overall GDP, not GDP per capita, is what matters in terms of power. China has four times the population of the United States. China is active in Latin America, Africa, and in the Gulf. Within hours, everything that is discussed in ASEAN meetings is known in Beijing, given China's close ties with Laos, Cambodia, and Burma, he stated.
17. (C) MM Lee said China will not reach the American level in terms of military capabilities any time soon, but is rapidly developing asymmetrical means to deter U.S. military power. China understands that its growth depends on imports, including energy, raw materials, and food. This is why China is working with South Africa on the China-Africa Development Fund. China also needs open sea lanes. Beijing is worried about its dependence on the Strait of Malacca and is moving to ease the dependence by means like a pipeline through Burma.
Build Ties with Young Chinese
-----------------------------
18. (C) MM Lee said the best course for the United States on China is to build ties with China's young people. China's best and brightest want to study in the United States, with the UK as the next option, then Japan. While they are there, it is important that they be treated as equals, with the cultural support they may need as foreigners. Why not have International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs for China? Why not have Chinese cadets at West Point alongside Vietnamese cadets and Indian cadets? America's advantage is that it can make use of the talent of the entire world, as in Silicon Valley. China still tends to try to keep the foreigners in Beijing and Shanghai. MM Lee noted that his own experience as a student in the UK had left him with an enduring fondness for the UK. When he spent two months at Harvard in 1968, an American professor had invited him home for Thanksgiving. This was not the sort of thing that happened in the UK, and Lee had realized he was dealing with a different civilization. In the future, China's leaders will have PhDs and MBAs from American universities, he predicted.
19. (U) The Deputy Secretary has cleared this message.
Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm
SHIELDS
Thursday, 13 August 2009, 08:54
S E C R E T ULAANBAATAR 000234
STATE FOR EAP/CM AND EAP/K; NSC FOR JEFF BADER
EO 12958 DECL: 08/13/2034
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MOPS, KNNP, MG
SUBJECT: MONGOLIA'S CONSULTATIONS WITH DPRK VICE FOREIGN
MINISTER KIM
Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew K. Covington, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary: On August 12, Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) Deputy Director for Asian Affairs J. Sukhee briefed poloff on the annual Mongolia-DPRK consultations that concluded on August 11. MFAT State Secretary Tsogtbaatar led the Mongolian side, and the North Koreans met with President Elbegdorj on the sidelines of the consultation. Sukhee noted DPRK delegation head Vice Foreign Minister Kim Yong Il spent much time on the nuclear issue and little on the bilateral relationship with Mongolia. Key themes on the part of the DPRK were the lack of criticism of the United States, indications that the DPRK is seeking bilateral talks with the USG on normalization of relations, that the recent travel of former President Clinton to Pyongyang has greatly improved the prospects for such talks, that Mongolia would be an appropriate venue for these talks, and that the Six Party Talks are no longer an option. End Summary.
2. (S) Poloff met with MFAT Deputy Director for Asian Affairs J. Sukhee on August 12 to discuss Mongolia's annual bilateral consultations with the DPRK. Sukhee was present at the consultations and has been involved with Korean affairs as a diplomat since 1985. Sukhee was candid in his meetings with poloff, referring repeatedly and openly to his handwritten notes from the DPRK consultations.
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DPRK DELEGATION OFFERS NO CRITICISM OF U.S.
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3. (S) Sukhee indicated that VFM Kim met with MFAT State Secretary Tsogtbaatar for the consultations and also held a separate meeting with President Elbegdorj on the margins Monday. The Mongolian Deputy Foreign Minister was to lead this latter meeting but was unable due to an obligation. Sukhee said the meetings were notable for several reasons: the DPRK delegation did not read from a prepared script, they were not aggressive and made no criticism of the United States, and they criticized China and Russia "three or four times" for supporting recent UN Resolutions aimed at the DPRK. What follows in paras 4 through 12 is Sukhee's description to poloff of the DPRK's statements during the course of the consultations:
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DPRK VFM ON DENUCLEARIZATION
----------------------------
4. (S) VFM Kim said the DPRK is spending too much on weapons rather than on its children, but that the current reality dictates that they cannot get away from weapons for now. Kim said the DPRK is not a threat and was only interested in self-protection. The Mongolian side expressed concern that a nuclear DPRK could lead to a nuclear ROK, Japan, Syria, and Iran, and urged that the Mongolian nuclear-free model could serve as an example. Kim stated the United States would not allow Japan or the ROK to go nuclear and that the DPRK is committed to peace and denuclearization.
5. (S) The Mongolians offered the example of the Soviet Union and the United States during the Reagan-Gorbachev era, when the two allowed for nuclear inspections, leading to improved trust and a reduction in the number of warheads. The Mongolians stated that if they were in the DPRK's place now, they would allow inspections, which would lead to mutual confidence and improved relations. The DPRK side offered no reaction to the suggestion.
6. (S) The DPRK side said what is most important is for the United States and the DPRK to come up with a "common language," a "non-aggression agreement," and establishment of diplomatic relations. Kim stated if the sides can take such measures, then denuclearization will be possible and easy, and that relations with Japan and the ROK will normalize thereafter.
7. (S) The Mongolian side counseled that recent "provocations" (this is Sukhee's word to poloff; another word may have been used in the consultations) such as the missile test meant that the present situation was very fragile, and that the DPRK should be careful not to present the wrong signal. Kim agreed that the DPRK must be careful and must build confidence. The Mongolians stated that even if one has peaceful intentions, one can be seen as provocative.
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ON BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE U.S.
--------------------------------
8. (S) Regarding former President Clinton's recent travel to the DPRK to secure of the release of the two journalists, Kim said this action had been prepared for a long time, meaning the groundwork for such a visit was already in place because of the progress the United States and the DPRK made during the Clinton presidency. Kim said forward motion stopped during the Bush Administration but was now able to proceed because of President Clinton's recent involvement in a personal capacity, because President Obama is of the same party, and because former First Lady Clinton is now the Secretary of State. The North Koreans were expecting a dialogue with the United States to start soon as an extension of President Clinton's visit.
9. (S) Kim asked the Mongolians to support a U.S.-DPRK dialogue (Sukhee described Kim as "enthusiastic" at this point), and he stated "there are no eternal enemies in this world."
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ON THE SIX PARTY TALKS
----------------------
10. (S) Kim took a "very hard line" on the Six Party Talks according to Sukhee, stating that the DPRK will never return to the talks, that the talks were dead, but that the door has not closed on an opportunity for negotiations. During discussion of the Six Party Talks, Kim criticized Russia and China for their support of recent UN resolutions aimed at the DPRK. Kim said Japan and the ROK were natural allies of the United States during the talks, and that Russia and China ended up supporting the other three, so that the DPRK felt it was five against one. Kim stated the real intention of the Six Party Talks was to destroy the DPRK regime, and that at present the DPRK wants to talk only to the United States.
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VFM KIM'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ELBEGDORJ
------------------------------------------
11. (S) Sukhee also provided insight into Kim's meeting with Elbegdorj on August 10: Kim refrained from criticizing the United States and stated the DPRK would be happy if the GOM could support a U.S.-DPRK dialogue "in the international arena." Kim said to Elbegdorj, "We are telling you all this because Mongolia understand us." Kim reiterated the notion that there is a "good personal understanding" between former President Clinton and DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il.
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HOW ABOUT U.S.-DPRK TALKS IN MONGOLIA?
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12. (S) Sukhee further noted that a counselor named Choi from the DPRK Embassy in Ulaanbaatar told Sukhee on the way to the airport on August 11 that he had suggested to VFM Kim that it would be good to host U.S.-DPRK talks in Mongolia, but that Kim offered no reaction. Choi also told Sukhee that the timing was right to establish a regional security mechanism whose organization the Mongols should spearhead.
MINTON
Thursday, 31 December 2009, 14:55
S E C R E T STATE 132349
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/31/2034
TAGS PINR, PGOV, AR
SUBJECT: (C/NF) ARGENTINA: KIRCHNER INTERPERSONAL
DYNAMICS (C-AL9-02612)
Classified By: ELISSA G. PITTERLE, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
1. (S/NF) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS ARE INTERESTED IN ARGENTINE LEADERSHIP DYNAMICS, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARDS TO CRISTINA FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER AND NESTOR KIRCHNER. DRAWING ON PREVIOUS REPORTING, AND BUILDING UPON OUR OWN ANALYTIC ASSESSMENTS, WE ARE CURRENTLY PREPARING A WRITTEN PRODUCT EXAMINING THE INTERPERSONAL DYNAMICS BETWEEN THE GOVERNING TANDEM. WE HAVE A MUCH MORE SOLID UNDERSTANDING OF NESTOR KIRCHNER'S STYLE AND PERSONALITY THAN WE DO OF CRISTINA FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER AND WE WOULD LIKE TO DEVELOP A MORE WELL-ROUNDED VIEW OF CRISTINA FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER'S PERSONALITY. AS POST,S TIME AND RESOURCES ALLOW AND TO THE EXTENT POST HAS ACCESS TO THIS TYPE OF INFORMATION, WE WOULD WELCOME ANY INSIGHT INTO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. MANY THANKS, AND REGARDS FROM WASHINGTON.
A. (U) MENTAL STATE AND HEALTH:
1) (S/NF) HOW IS CRISTINA FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER MANAGING HER NERVES AND ANXIETY? HOW DOES STRESS AFFECT HER BEHAVIOR TOWARD ADVISORS AND/OR HER DECISIONMAKING? WHAT STEPS DOES CRISTINA FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER OR HER ADVISERS/HANDLERS, TAKE IN HELPING HER DEAL WITH STRESS? IS SHE TAKING ANY MEDICATIONS? UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES IS SHE BEST ABLE TO HANDLE STRESSES? HOW DO CRISTINA FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER,S EMOTIONS AFFECT HER DECISIONMAKING AND HOW DOES SHE CALM DOWN WHEN DISTRESSED?
2) (S/NF) WHAT IS THE STATUS OF NESTOR KIRCHNER'S GASTROINTESTINAL ILLNESS? DOES IT CONTINUE TO BOTHER HIM? IS HE TAKING ANY MEDICATIONS? LONG KNOWN FOR HIS TEMPER, HAS NESTOR KIRCHNER DEMONSTRATED A GREATER TENDENCY TO SHIFT BETWEEN EMOTIONAL EXTREMES? WHAT ARE MOST COMMON TRIGGERS TO NESTOR KIRCHNER'S ANGER?
B. (U) POLITICAL VIEWS:
1) (S/NF) WHEN DEALING WITH PROBLEMS, DOES CRISTINA FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER TAKE A STRATEGIC, BIG PICTURE OUTLOOK, OR DOES SHE PREFER TO TAKE A TACTICAL VIEW? DOES SHE VIEW CIRCUMSTANCES IN BLACK AND WHITE OR IN NUANCED TERMS? DOES SHE SHARE NESTOR KIRCHNER'S ADVERSARIAL VIEW OF POLITICS OR DOES SHE ATTEMPT TO MODERATE HIS HEAVY-HANDED POLITICAL STYLE?
C. (U) ON THE JOB:
1) (S/NF) HOW DO CRISTINA FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER AND NESTOR KIRCHNER DIVIDE UP THEIR DAY? ON WHICH ISSUES DOES CRISTINA FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER TAKE THE LEAD AND WHICH ISSUES DOES SHE LEAVE TO NESTOR KIRCHNER?
2. (U) PLEASE CITE C-AL9-02612 IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS. CLINTON
Thursday, 31 December 2009, 13:44
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 001311
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 2019/12/31
TAGS PREL, OVIP, ECON, KPAO
SUBJECT: (C) ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TAKES UMBRAGE AT WHA A/S
VALENZUELA'S REMARK REGARDING BUSINESS COMMUNITY'S CONCERNS
DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 B, D
1. (C) Summary: The GOA responded with heavy artillery to a remark WHA A/S Valenzuela made during a December 16 press roundtable. Immediately after the press roundtable, Argentine media started focusing almost exclusively on A/S Valenzuela's remark that the American business community in Argentina had conveyed to him concern about rule of law and management of the economy in Argentina. The press reported that Valenzuela contrasted these concerns "with the enthusiasm and investment intentions" of the American business community in 1996. GOA officials also expressed their dissatisfaction with the remarks. The Ambassador and other Country Team members used a December 17 reception for journalists to stress our desire to work constructively with Argentina, and the Ambassador has reached out to GOA officials to urge a prompt end to their criticisms. Government press is beginning to report a softening tone, but we think that it is too early to tell. End Summary.
2. (C) Immediately prior to departure from Buenos Aires on December 16, WHA A/S Valenzuela met at the Embassy with about a dozen Argentine print journalists. He followed 20 minutes of remarks by taking questions for another 20 minutes, explaining his desire to introduce himself to his regional counterparts and undertake a dialogue with them on regional developments.
Media Zero In on Perceived Criticism
--------------------------------------------
3. (C) Despite the broad range of issues addressed by A/S Valenzuela, Argentine media started focusing immediately after the roundtable almost exclusively on A/S Valenzuela's remark that the American business community in Argentina had conveyed to him concern about rule of law and management of the economy in Argentina. The press also reported that Valenzuela contrasted these concerns "with the enthusiasm and investment intentions" of the American business community in 1996. (A/S Valenzuela's first official meeting in Buenos Aires was with the Executive Board of the AmCham.) As an example of the sensationalist nature of much of the reporting, La Nacion's banner front-page headlines on December 17 read, "Clash with the U.S. over Rule of Law in Argentina" and on December 18, "Protest to U.S. over Obama Envoy's Criticism."
Kirchner Allies Take Umbrage
------------------------------------
4. (C) The GOA response came swiftly. That same night, three GOA ministries publicly commented (in a clearly coordinated fashion) on the Valenzuela remarks. Interior Minister Florencio Randazzo said "Argentina is enjoying a phase of complete institutional and legal guarantees. The country has left behind the times when a foreign official could come and say what needed to be done. There is no lack of rule of law. The difference now is that the Government protects the people, and in the 1990s it protected the companies' interests that took millions out."
5. (C) Following the Randazzo statement, the Foreign Ministry issued a four-point communiquC) saying that: (1) the generalized nature of the Assistant Secretary's remarks about supposed concerns in the American business community made it impossible for the GOA to address the alleged concerns; (2) the MFA had already written Ambassador Martinez to clarify similar remarks that she had made the previous week in Cordoba but had received no reply; (3) Argentine authorities had received no complaints from American companies operating in Argentina; and (4) the GOA reiterates its disposition to analyze "all aspects that allow us to promote reciprocal relations, especially economic, between the two countries. Open and consolidated channels are available to both governments for this dialogue."
6. (C) The GOA's third statement on December 16 came from Justice Minister Julio Alak, who called Valenzuela's statements "unusual
and unjustified." Alak claimed that "rule of law is a fundamental asset in the country that has been protected and rescued from the more adverse conditions coming from the institutional and economic crisis in 2001 and 2002."
7. (C) After the initial salvos, the GOA officials who met with Valenzuela chimed in. Vice Foreign Minister Victorio Taccetti (who received Valenzuela December 15 at the MFA and hosted him for lunch) said, "Valenzuela is free to think as he wishes, but the truth is that 1996 is the prelude of the most important crisis Argentina faced. It is possible that he felt glad in 1996, but that ended in the 2001 crisis that impacted many companies, including some American ones. Argentina doesn't want to set off sparks ("sacarse chispas") with the United States; it is Valenzuela who opines without basing his statements on reality."
8. (C) Cabinet Chief AnC-bal FernC!ndez said, "We are not talking about a statement that comes from American businessmen, but of (Valenzuela's) prejudices, and that is much more sensitive and what worries me most. I was concerned to find out that he was critical of many Latin American democracies, and one of the supporters of the Washington Consensus."
9. (C) Argentine Ambassador to the United States HC)ctor Timerman appeared on television and in the press to claim that he had urged A/S Valenzuela to meet with CGT labor leader Hugo Moyano and the opposition Radical Party (UCR), but that "he met only with the political right: De NarvC!ez, Macri and Cobos. He is sending a message on who are, in his views, the people with whom he needs to have dialogue."
10. (C) Argentine press reported that FM Jorge Taiana, who was in Copenhagen for the COP-15 meetings, used a brief pull-aside with Secretary Clinton to complain about Valenzuela's remarks. Taiana told the press that Valenzuela's words "were unfortunate and show his ignorance of the Argentine reality. His reference to the administration of Menem as a time of great growth, when it was precisely the time when Argentina was hurling headlong toward its worst crisis in history, like a train with no brakes, was even more unfortunate."
11. (C) Former president Nestor Kirchner said "the statements by someone who should come with a different policy for Latin America are deplorable. Valenzuela belongs to the groups that participated in the Washington Consensus; the neo-liberal model that caused so much damage to the whole region." Kirchner ally Deputy AgustC-n Rossi (leader of the FpV bloc in the Chamber) said "Valenzuela's visit was not encouraging. We thought the time when foreign officials came to lecture us was over." Regarding Valenzuela's comparison of the current reality with the one in the 1990s, he said: "it is a fallacy to say we were better with Menem's administration; the cracks of the convertibility plan were evident and led Argentina to bankruptcy." The leader of the FpV bloc in the Senate, Miguel Pichetto, said "Valenzuela keeps adding mistakes to the U.S. relation to Latin America, because a diplomat visiting a country should be much more cautious when commenting on our domestic politics and the economic recovery our government achieved." A couple of days later, at a December 20 political rally, Nestor Kirchner said "disrespectful viceroys" should first criticize what was happening in the United States. He blamed Argentina's loss of rule of law on the U.S. crisis that "left millions of Americans without their jobs, homes or savings."
Opposition is Divided
-------------------------
12. (C) Reaction among the opposition was divided. Some, such as Santa Fe governor Hermes Binner, a highly regarded moderate Socialist and possible presidential candidate, said that Valenzuela's remarks tracked very closely with complaints that, they, too had heard from the business community. Others, such as
Socialist Senator Ruben Giustiniani, who usually coincides with Binner, objected to any foreign official relaying any criticism of Argentina, while Radical congressional deputy Ricardo AlfonsC-n took issue with what he interpreted as Valenzuela's praise for Menem policies in the 1990s: "We, the Argentines, know that during those years there was a looting of national assets. For us, it was a disaster." However, the head of the Radical Party (UCR), Senator Ernesto Sanz (who joined Valenzuela's December 16 lunch with Vice President Cobos) said "it seems it was necessary that a foreigner come to say this. We have been denouncing the lack of rule of law from Congress for four or five years. With each law the Kirchnerists passed, (the country) moved one step towards a lack of rule of law." Another prominent opposition leader, Deputy Margarita Stolbizer (GEN), said, "Unfortunately, Valenzuela is right. This government condemned us to isolation because of lack of rule of law, and Valenzuela only relayed how the world sees us." Leftist congressional deputy and film director Pino Solanas (Proyecto Sur Bloc Leader) said, "I strongly repudiate Arturo Valenzuela's statements. He is the envoy of the empire whose government has legitimized the coup in Honduras. Mr. Valenzuela represents the government that keeps thinking the disastrous and tragic 1990s for Argentina are a model to follow."
Embassy Works to Smooth Feathers
------------------------------------------
13. (C) The Ambassador and other Country Team members used a December 17 reception for journalists to stress our desire to work constructively with Argentina, stressing our common interests and extensive cooperation. The Ambassador's conciliatory remarks received broad press play. The Ambassador called VFM Taccetti, who offered her a long explanation of why the GOA in the wake of the 2001-02 crisis had been forced to "pesify" contracts that had been denominated in dollars at a new exchange rate that was disadvantageous to foreign businesses. (Note: "Pesification" has been a common theme of many of the complaints that U.S. investors took to the World Bank's International Court for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.) Those pesified contracts nonetheless continued to be profitable, Taccetti claimed. He said Argentina's current challenge, however, was to maintain employment levels, which explained the GOA position regarding Kraft and other labor disputes. Taccetti asked if Washington could issue a conciliatory statement. The Ambassador also requested a meeting with Cabinet Chief Anibal Fernandez to urge a prompt end to GOA public complaining about A/S Valenzuela's remarks. Press reported widely A/S Valenzuela's clarification (delivered at his next stop, Montevideo) that he was merely relaying some concerns expressed to him by American businesses operating in Argentina.
GOA Tones Down Its Commentary
--------------------------------------------
14. (C) The GOA's Telam news service sent December 18 a story that led with "Cabinet Chief Anibal Fernandez sought today to lower the tone on the controversy generated by (Valenzuela's) remarks." The wire story quoted Fernandez saying he had "a very good conversation with Valenzuela on important topics, and Valenzuela never mentioned concerns about rule of law." Fernandez claimed that Valenzuela had several years ago made similar claims about Argentine rule of law, suggesting a predisposition to judge Argentina. "But this man is not the United States, no matter how important he is. The United States is the United States." Another wire service reported that VFM Taccetti said "This topic has already passed. Maybe (Valenzuela) knows why he said it. We think it's absurd. We are looking straight ahead... I think the points of agreement between United States and Argentina were aired in the meetings we had. No one else in the region has been more firm on Iran. We are working in Haiti... The agreements are notable. In general, U.S. policies and ours on international matters are in agreement."
AmCham Pleased with Press Coverage
---------------------------------------------
15. (C) AmCham told post's Commercial Counselor that it was taking a positive response to press inquiries, talking up the positive contributions their members make to Argentina's economy and their desire for dialogue with the GOA on the business and investment climate. Subsequently, some AmCham members told us privately that they were pleased a high-ranking U.S. diplomat publicly relayed their concerns. The AmCham President said he intended to take advantage of the opening offered by the MFA's request for specific concerns about the business climate by sending the MFA letter requesting a meeting to review concerns in detail.
Comment
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16. (C) Once again, the Kirchner government has shown itself to be extremely thin-skinned and intolerant of perceived criticism. Concerns about the weakness of Argentina's institutions, and the rule of law in particular, are a dime a dozen in the Argentine press, voiced by academics, business leaders, judges, opposition politicians, pundits, and NGOs. Argentines are well aware that Argentina is not attracting as much investment as are Brazil, Chile, and others in the region. The business community's anxiety about arbitrary and capricious rule changes is well known to the Argentine public and the government. Only die-hard kirchneristas will agree with Randazzo's assertion that Argentina enjoys "full institutional and juridical guarantees," or the MFA's contention that it is unaware of any dissatisfaction on the part of any American company. For most Argentines, those are laugh lines or cynically disingenuous statements. That said, we hope that this contretemps will soon peter out, as has happened in similar such episodes in the past.
17. (U) This cable was cleared by WHA A/S Valenquela. MARTINEZ
Monday, 22 February 2010, 08:54
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000290
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/23/2030
TAGS PREL, PGOV, SOCI, MARR, ECON, ETRD, KN, KS, CH
SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL'S FEBRUARY 3 MEETING WITH NSA KIM
Classified By: Ambassador D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
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1. (C) During a February 3 meeting, National Security Adviser Kim Sung-hwan told EAP Assistant Secretary Campbell the ROKG wished to have discussions with Washington about delaying the planned transfer of wartime operation control to Korea. Kim agreed that turbulence in Sino-American relations meant Beijing would be hesitant to call a new round of the Six Party Talks. It was encouraging, however, that veteran DPRK negotiator Kim Gye-gwan was slated to visit Beijing next week. NSA Kim asserted that Kim Jong-il needed to visit China soon in order to get more economic assistance, as the DPRK's internal situation appeared to be significantly more unstable. NSA Kim acknowledged it was important to reach out directly to key DPJ officials like Foreign Minister Okada and Finance Minister Kan. The North Koreans, Kim said, were clearly using several different channels to "knock on the DPJ's door." President Lee may visit a Korean factory in the United States to help sell KORUS to the American public. Kim suggested that President Obama and President Lee pay a joint visit to the Korean War Memorial in Washington to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Korean War. Campbell asked for ROK understanding for U.S. plans to resume MIA remains recovery operations in North Korea. Kim emphasized that President Lee would never "buy" a summit with Pyongyang. End summary.
OPCON Transfer
--------------
2. (C) During a February 3 meeting with Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, ROK National Security Adviser Kim Sung-hwan said he wished to have discussions with the USG on the planned April 2012 transfer of wartime operation control (OPCON) to Korea. Kim agreed with Campbell's observation that it was important for the Korean public to understand that any change that may be considered concerning OPCON transfer timing, and the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review, would not diminish America's commitment to the ROK's security, and should not be so interpreted. China Unlikely to Call New 6PT Round
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3. (C) NSA Kim agreed with Campbell's observation that the current turbulence in Sino-American relations meant Beijing would be hesitant to call a new round of the Six Party Talks (6PT) anytime soon. Referring to POTUS' upcoming meeting with the Dalai Lama, Kim said the Chinese were "far too sensitive" about the Tibetan spiritual leader's meetings with foreign officials. A few years ago, Kim related, the PRC had crudely pressured the ROK government into canceling a planned speech by the Dalai Lama at a Buddhist conference on Cheju Island.
4. (C) NSA Kim said he was encouraged by reports that veteran DPRK negotiator Kim Gye-gwan was slated to visit Beijing next week at the invitation of Chinese 6PT chief Wu Dawei. NSA Kim said he understood Kim Gye-gwan might also visit New York. Campbell noted it was important for the DPRK authorities to hear from the Five Parties that Pyongyang's attempt to shift the focus from denuclearization to a peace treaty was not working.
KJI China Trip and Deteriorating Conditions Inside DPRK
--------------------------------------------- -----------
5. (C) NSA Kim asserted that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il needed to visit China soon in order to get more economic assistance. The PRC was in the process of delivering a portion of the food aid promised during Premier Wen's visit to the DPRK last fall; approximately 6,000 metric tons (MT) of rice and 20,000 MT of soybeans has been delivered, but the DPRK needed a lot more. The situation inside North Korea, he added, appeared increasingly unstable. The North's currency replacement had created strong resentment throughout DPRK society, Kim said, adding that DPRK Finance Chief Pak Nam-gi had apparently been sacked. Kim asserted there were credible reports of unrest in the North; according to ROK intelligence sources, DPRK police recently found a bomb on a passenger train en route from Pyongyang to Beijing.
U.S.-Japan Relations
--------------------
6. (C) Kim concurred with Campbell's assessment that the DPJ
was "completely different" from the LDP and agreed it was important for the DJP to coordinate with Seoul and Washington as it made preliminary overtures to Pyongyang. The North Koreans, Kim said, were clearly using several different channels to "knock on the DPJ's door." Kim acknowledged Campbell's point that it was important to reach out directly to key DPJ officials like Foreign Minister Okada and Finance Minister Naoto Kan.
FTA Prospects
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7. (C) It was the ROK government's view, Kim said, that there might be a window of opportunity to pass KORUS immediately after the U.S. Congressional elections this fall. Kim added that the ROK Embassy in Washington was working on a possible FTA event for President Lee during his upcoming trip to the United States for the nuclear summit. One idea, Kim explained, was to have President Lee visit a Korean factory to help underscore to the American public that the FTA was about creating jobs in America as well in Korea. Campbell praised ROK Ambassador Han Duck-soo for his public outreach on KORUS and noted that the U.S. business community needed to "stop being lazy" and help get KORUS through Congress.
Korean War Memorial Visit
-------------------------
8. (C) NSA Kim asked if, during the April nuclear summit in Washington, it would be possible to have POTUS and President Lee pay a joint visit to the Korean War Memorial. Campbell acknowledged the powerful symbolism for both the Korean and American audience of such a visit during the 60th anniversary of the Korean War, but cautioned that it would be extremely difficult to arrange during the nuclear summit.
MIA Remains Recovery in North Korea
-----------------------------------
9. (C) Campbell asked for ROK understanding about the U.S. position on resuming MIA remains recovery operations in North Korea. The USG felt strongly, Campbell explained, that this was an important humanitarian issue. Campbell stressed that the U.S. would coordinate closely with the ROK on the issue to "avoid sending the wrong signal" to the DPRK. Pressed by Kim about paying the North Koreans cash to help recover U.S. remains, Campbell agreed it was distasteful; he noted, however, that the United States had made similar payments to the Burmese and Vietnamese governments to facilitate cooperation on MIA issues.
Prospects for a North-South Summit
----------------------------------
10. (C) On prospects for a North-South summit, NSA Kim clarified remarks that President Lee made in an interview with the BBC in Davos. Kim said that, beginning last fall, the ROK has had contact with the DPRK about a summit. The North, however, has demanded that Seoul provide a certain amount of economic aid prior to any summit. That precondition was unacceptable, Kim stressed, noting that the Blue House had emphasized to the ROK press this week that President Lee would never "buy" a summit with the North. STEPHENS
Tuesday, 03 June 2003, 12:50
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 002641
SIPDIS
S/S-O PLEASE PASS NEA A/S BURNS
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/ARN AND NEA/ENA
NSC FOR THEROUX
EO 12958 DECL: 06/03/08
TAGS PREL, EPET, EAID, PGOV, JO, MO, SA, KU, TC
SUBJECT: UAE TO SUPPORT JORDAN OIL NEEDS FOR
THREE MORE MONTHS, PROVIDED $40 MILLION TO RABAT AFTER TERROR ATTACKS
REF: Abu Dhabi 1384
1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).
2. (C) MFA Minstate Hamdan bin Zayid contacted the Ambassador on June 2 to convey information about the UAEG's ongoing assistance to Jordan and Morocco. With regard to Jordan, Hamdan reported that the UAE has agreed to continue supporting Jordan's oil needs for the next three months. Hamdan indicated the level of support would continue to be the cash equivalent of 25,000 barrels per day. The UAE began helping to fill Jordan's oil needs at the outbreak of hostilities with Iraq in March. While the Jordanians, in recent representations to the UAE, asked for support to cover the next year, Hamdan advised that the UAE, due to its own financial crunch, would only be able to provide assistance for the next three months.
3. (C) Hamdan also informed the Ambassador that, following the terror attacks in Casablanca, the UAEG provided $40 million in cash assistance to Morocco. The Moroccans intend to use the money to purchase much needed equipment. The Emiratis have asked the Moroccans to provide an accounting for the money spent. Hamdan confided that he had told his Kuwaiti and Saudi counterparts the UAE's donation was $80 million, in an effort to encourage them to give more. He wanted to make sure that the USG knew the real UAE contribution, in the event that this is raised with us.
4. (C) COMMENT: Jordan and Morocco both enjoy extremely close ties to the UAE. The Emiratis have long felt it important to provide economic assistance and support to these two moderate Arab states. The fact that Abu Dhabi is offering cash assistance, vice assistance-in-kind, is a measure of just how close these ties are since the Emiratis usually balk at writing checks. The UAE's strong official ties with Jordan and Morocco are bolstered by personal relationships between the ruling families. Jordanian King Abdullah II is a close friend of UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff Muhammad bin Zayid Al-Nahyan (MbZ). The two frequently hunt -- in Morocco and Tanzania -- joined, more often than not, by England's Prince Andrew. The ties with the Moroccan monarch are equally warm. Shaykh Zayid and other Emirati ruling family members maintain vacation palaces in Morocco and have poured money into assistance projects there. END COMMENT.
WAHBA
Monday, 25 January 2010, 08:14
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000072
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB
EO 12958 DECL: 01/25/2030
TAGS PGOV, PINR, EPET, EINV, KCOR, RS, CH, KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: MONEY AND POWER
REF: ASTANA 0061
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S) SUMMARY: During a private dinner, KazMunaiGaz First Vice President Maksat Idenov named, in his view, the four most powerful gate-keepers around President Nursultan Nazarbayev: Chief of Administration and General Services of the President's Office Sarybai Kalmurzayev, the President's Chief of Staff Aslan Musin, State Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev, and the tandem of Prime Minister Karim Masimov and Nazarbayev's billionaire son-in-law Timur Kulibayev. According to Idenov, in Kazakhstan, market economy means capitalism, which means big money, XXXXXXXXXXXX. The following details are a single snapshot of one version of current reality. The significant point is that Nazarbayev is standing with Idenov, not Kulibayev, to maintain international standards to develop the massive Kashagan and Karachaganak hydrocarbon projects. END SUMMARY.
2. (S) On January 21, KazMunaiGaz First Vice President Maksat Idenov and the Ambassador had a one-on-one dinner in a nearly empty restaurant (times are still hard!) at the Radisson hotel in Astana. When the Ambassador arrived, Idenov was barking into his cell phone, "Mark, Mark, stop the excuses! Mark, listen to me! Mark, shut up right now and do as I say! Bring the letter to my office at 10:00 pm, and we will go together to take it to (Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, MEMR) Mynbayev at his house." On ending the call, Idenov explained he was talking to British Gas (BG) Country Director for Kazakhstan Mark Rawlings who had missed the deadline to deliver a letter about arbitration on the Karachaganak super-giant oil-field project (reftel). Still clearly steamed, Idenov XXXXXXXXXXXX "I tell him, 'Mark, stop being an idiot! Stop tempting fate! XXXXXXXXXXXX Idenov asked, "Do you know how much he (Rawlings) makes? $72,000 a month! A month!! Plus benefits! Plus bonuses! Lives in Switzerland but supposedly works in London. Comes here once a month to check in. Nice life, huh?"
3. (S) Idenov calmed down and said, "Let's look at the menus." Then he immediately started typing on his PDA and turned the screen toward the Ambassador, saying, "Let's look at the 'four courses.'" On the screen were four names: Kalmurzayev, Musin, Saudabayev, and Masimov-Kulibayev." Idenov said, "The Big Four around Number One." (NOTE: Sarybai Kalmurzayev, currently the head of Administration and General Services in the Presidential Administration, was, among other jobs, a former head of the Financial Police and, before that, in the 1990s, in charge of privatization. Aslan Musin is the current Chief of Staff for Nazarbayev. Kanat Saudabayev, a personal friend of Nazarbayev for nearly 40 years, is Minister of State and Foreign Minister. Karim Masimov is Prime Minister, and Timur Kulibayev is currently the favored presidential son-in-law, on the Forbes 500 list of billionaires (as is his wife separately), and the ultimate controller of 90% of the economy of Kazakhstan. END NOTE.) In response to a question, Idenov said that Masimov has a degree of freedom, but never acts without permission from "the hyphen" (Kulibayev). Then Idenov stood up abruptly and carried his PDA to a ledge about 20 feet from the table and asked the Ambassador to turn off his cell phone.
4. (S) Idenov said he wanted to explain why he has been less visible for at least the last half year. Starting last spring, all the "Big Four" (on the menu) began blocking him from seeing President Nazarbayev. In October, KMG President
ASTANA 00000072 002 OF 003
Kairgeldy Kabyldin told Idenov, "Kulibayev doesn't want to work with you any more." Idenov said he replied, "Fine," immediately returned to his office, wrote his letter of resignation, and packed up his personal files and photos of his family." He said Mynbayev immediately called and asked, "My dear friend, what are you doing?!" Idenov said he was fed up and was going to the Middle East to work -- "I want out of here!" PM Masimov called and said, "Nazarbayev wants to know how you're doing. He'd really like to see you when you have time." Idenov, who said he'd been trying to see the President for months but had been blocked by the "Big Four," went to see the President and told him, "Kabyldin says Kulibayev doesn't want to work with me any more." Idenov said the President told him to calm down: "It's probably just evil gossip. I'll have Karim (Masimov) talk to Timur (Kulibayev). Then Idenov went to Masimov and told him, "OK, I'll stay, but how do I deal with this?" Masimov said he'd talk to both Kabyldin and Kulibayev.
5. (S) Soon, intermediaries arranged an Idenov-Kulibayev meeting. Idenov said they both pretended to ignore the core problem -- Kulibayev's, he alleged, avarice for large bribes. Idenov averred he told Kulibayev, "Please watch your image and reputation. You have a real opportunity to improve your own image and the image of the nation." Idenov said Kulibayev was "like a Buddha with a Paris manicure," and both understood life would continue. Idenov said he believes he has, so far, the president's protection. "But the games continue," he said. Idenov alleged that both XXXXXXXXXXXX-- and Kulibayev is salivating to profit from them -- but, so far, Idenov stands in the way. "So long as Nazarbayev says he wants Kashagan and Karachaganak developed according to international standards, that's what I'll do."
6. (SBU) (NOTE: Fugitive former CEO of BTA bank, Mukhtar Ablyazov, accused of embezzling over $1 billion, recently leaked "documentary evidence" to the international media that China's state companies have bribed Kulibayev over $100 million in recent months for oil deals. END NOTE.)
7. (S) The Ambassador asked if the corruption and infighting are worse now than before. Idenov paused, thought, and then replied, "No, not really. It's business as usual." Idenov brushed off a question if the current maneuverings are part of a succession struggle. "Of course not. It's too early for that. As it's always been, it's about big money. Capitalism -- you call it market economy -- means huge money. Listen, almost everyone at the top is confused. They're confused by their Soviet mentality. They're confused by the corrupt excesses of capitalism. 'If Goldman Sachs executives can make $50 million a year and then run America's economy in Washington, what's so different about what we do?' they ask."
OTHER TIDBITS
8. (S) MODEST WEALTH. Idenov alleged that MEMR's Mynbayev is among the richest in Kazakhstan but "flies under the radar" because he is a relatively modest and very hard-working technocrat. His great wealth derives, in part, from his former ownership of KazKommerzBank -- "But he never flaunts it."
9. (S) VULTURES. Idenov alleged that GazProm and China National Petroleum Company "continue to circle like vultures," hoping that the Kashagan and Karachaganak consortia will implode, and then they can pick up the pieces. "Won't happen on my watch!" Idenov vowed.
10. (C) HOW TO ORDER LAMB. Idenov insisted the Ambassador order a bottle of wine for their dinner but then never touched his first glass. Instead, he gulped three cans of Coca-Cola while inhaling his food. When both he and the Ambassador ordered lamb chops, Idenov advised, "Well done,
ASTANA 00000072 003 OF 003
never rare -- this is Astana, not London!"
11. (S) COMMENT: Idenov is effusive, even theatrical, by nature. When he trusts, he spills his heart. Of course, there's no doubt he also spins his own narrative, as we all do. And so, this dinner is simply a snapshot -- but, we would judge, a relatively accurate glimpse of one version of current reality. The significant point is that Nazarbayev is standing with Idenov, not Kulibayev, to maintain international standards to develop the massive Kashagan and Karachaganak hydrocarbon projects. END COMMENT. HOAGLAND
Friday, 15 February 2008, 11:18
C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000338
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB
EO 12958 DECL: 02/14/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, EPET, PINR, KZ
SUBJECT: CHEVRON INCIDENT REFLECTS CHANGING DYNAMICS IN
KAZAKHSTAN'S ENERGY HIERARCHY
REF: A. ASTANA 65 B. ASTANA 225
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)
1.(C) On January 15, KazMunaiGas First Vice President Maskat Idenov expelled from a meeting Chevron executives Guy Hollingsworth, President for Chevron Eurasia, Europe, and Middle East Exploration and Production, and James Johnson, Chevron Eurasia Strategic Business Unit Managing Director. In press reports, an unnamed source stated that the two were thrown out of the meeting because of "improper comments on Kashagan negotiations and disrespectful conduct towards KazMunaiGas management." Johnson told us later that the incident occurred at the end of a meeting that had gone generally well, and resulted from an innocent issue over the newly-arrived Johnson not having his cell phone number handy to exchange with Idenov. Idenov,s version of the conversation was heavy with descriptions of Hollingsworth £ing on the table8 and Johnson slowly tapping a business card on the table while telling Idenov all he needed was his secretary,s phone number. Idenov almost immediately sent a letter of protest to Chevron CEO Dave O,Reilly, and faxed (twice) a cc to the Ambassador. Knowledge of the incident, and the letter, have been the talk of the diplomatic and business community ever since, with sources ranging from the Indian Ambassador to the local ABN Amro chief raising it with the Ambassador.
2. (C) In subsequent conversations with the Ambassador and Eurasian Energy Diplomacy Coordinator Steve Mann, Idenov emphasized that his actions were not an indication of poor relations with Chevron. In both conversations, Idenov amplified his anger with Hollingsworth by explaining that Hollingsworth does not understand &how we are doing business now8 ) followed immediately by a detailed recitation of Hollingsworth,s extensive contacts with Timur Kulibayev in locations ranging from the Astana golf course to the beach in Spain.
Comment
-------
3. What really appears to be at issue here is Idenov demonstrating that he, not Timur Kulibayev, is now the &go to8 guy in Kazakhstani oil and gas. Idenov, the chief negotiator for Kazakhstan on Kashagan, is now &number 1A8 at KMG, according to one international oil company representative. Under restructuring at KMG, all employees report to Idenov, and only Idenov to KMG President Uzakbay Karabalin. The ascendant Idenov appears determined to show the international majors that they need to deal with him. In an early stage of the Kashagan negotiations, he tossed some less senior ConocoPhillips representatives out of a meeting to deliver the message that he should be dealing with the upper levels of KMG,s corporate partners. In the case of Chevron, he felt secure enough to throw out of a meeting executives from one of Kazakhstan's biggest money-makers. It is difficult to imagine that any KMG official would have so criticized Kulibayev, even in private to American diplomats, if he were not very confident of his position.
4. (C) One very substantive aspect of determining who,s on top is related to the oil pipeline that must be built to connect Kashagan (and Tengiz) to the planned trans-Caspian oil terminal in Kurik. Both Hollingsworth and Prime Minister Masimov have told the Ambassador that discussions are underway to make this pipeline project a joint project between the GOK/KMG and Chevron. Masimov has noted that the Kashagan companies, the natural partners for such a pipeline, have been unable to agree on how to do this despite several years of trying. Chevron, which is not involved with Kashagan, has a major interest in additional transportation routes for Tengiz crude ) which it is 100 percent responsible for marketing. The proposed pipeline would run right past the Tengiz field on its way to the terminal; even a 25 percent Chevron share would give them an inside track at getting their crude into that pipeline if there were capacity problems with both Kashagan and Tengiz volumes. Idenov, by contrast, told the Ambassador and Mann that KMG would build the pipeline &100 percent by ourselves8 and conclude commercial contracts with the Kashagan shippers to transport their oil. He specifically said that it would be a violation of business principles to cut the Kashagan partners out of the process of determining how to build the pipeline ) a direct swipe at the Chevron proposal. To make this mix even more complicated, ExxonMobil country rep told Mann that his company was working with KMG on a new legal basis to build
the pipeline that would allow the Kashagan partners to share ownership.
5. (C) Idenov's actions are designed not only to demonstrate that he,s up, but that Timur Kulibayev is down, if not actually out. We had already concluded that Kulibayev,s influence in the oil and gas sector had been significantly reduced with his removal late last year from a senior executive position at Samruk, the state holding company that owns KMG. Shortly after Kulibayev was fired, Hollingsworth told us that Kulibayev had explained (during a golf game) that it was the desire of the President to &protect8 him from responsibility for the Kashagan negotiations if they went wrong. This appears to be somewhat self-serving: A former USG official told the Ambassador that she had been at a dinner in Astana with the CEO of Samruk, Kanat Bozumbayev, immediately after Kulibayev lost his position. According to Bozumbayev, he had been instructed to personally deliver the news of the firing to Kulibayev, who appeared to have no inkling that it was going to happen.
6.(C) Kulibayev is still the head of Kazenergy, the semi-official trade group, and has obvious links to key government officials, including his father-in-law, the President. Kulibayev is by all accounts a very savvy and effective businessman. Samruk Board Chairman Richard Evans (retired CEO of BAE), told the Ambassador that Kulibayev was the one real businessman he had met in the entire Samruk structure. Our guess is that Nazarbayev, in the aftermath of the Rakhat Aliyev affair, decided to minimize risks to him and his reputation by removing all of his close relatives from major government positions. ORDWAY
Thursday, 11 June 2009, 15:32
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 001385
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/11/2019
TAGS PREL, EAID, PHUM, PINR, NI, CE, FJ, NZ, CA, MY, UK
SUBJECT: COMMMONWEALTH ON FIJI, SRI LANKA, NIGERIA, QUEEN'S
SUCCESSION, AND THE VALUE TO USG OF COMMONWEALTH ENGAGEMENT
REF: LONDON 580
Classified By: Political Counselor Richard Mills, reasons 1.4 (b/d)
1. (C) Summary. During a June 11 discussion with Poloff, Commonwealth Political Director Amitav Banerji offered electoral commission capacity-building as an area where the USG and Commonwealth could be strategic partners; said a Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) would soon discuss and likely recommend full suspension of Fiji; noted concern about the human rights situation in Sri Lanka; and indicated the Commonwealth is keeping a watchful eye on Nigeria because of the constitutional crisis that could ensue if President Yar'Adua dies. While noting that it was not actively being dicussed, Banerji acknowledged that succession of the Head of the Commonwealth would have to be dealt with when Queen Elizabeth passes, as there is no rule stipulating that the British monarch is the head and no procedure for selecting a new head. End Summary.
USG Engagement
--------------
2. (C) Commonwealth Secretariat Director of Political Affairs Amitav Banerji reiterated to Poloff Commonwealth SYG Kamalesh Sharma's desire for "strategic engagement" with the USG on June 11. Noting the important role of electoral commissions in conducting credible elections, Banerji said Sharma hopes to create a network of electoral commissions across the Commonwealth, whereby newer commissions in fragile democracies could receive guidance and support from commissions in more established democracies. He offered this initiative as an example of where the USG and Commonwealth have mutual interests and where the USG could use the Commonweath's technical electoral commission capacity-building capability and independent, "baggage free" status to promote democracy abroad.
Fiji
----
3. (C) Noting that the Commonwealth had past the deadline set at the May CMAG meeting to re-consider full suspension of Fiji (reftel), Banerji said he was very "frustrated" that CMAG had not yet met to discuss Fiji, especially as the Commonwealth's credibility could be damaged by not taking a decision as indicated at the last meeting. He said CMAG had not met purely for scheduling reasons, and that the Secretariat hopes to hold the meeting by the end of the month, though he was not confident it would be possible. He thought CMAG would move for full suspension of Fiji, intimating there had been difficult discussions at the previous CMAG meeting on Fiji with New Zealand pushing hard for full suspension and Malaysia wanting to ensure that Fiji did not withdraw from the Commonwealth to pre-empt a full suspension a la Zimbabwe.
Sri Lanka
---------
4. (C) Banerji said that the human rights situation in Sri Lanka during and after the recent military offensive had been raised "informally and off the record" by the UK during the last CMAG meeting, forcing a difficult conversation with the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister, as Sri Lanka is currently a member of CMAG. Banerji said the Commonwealth continues to watch the situation in Sri Lanka and noted that Sri Lanka's offer to host the next Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) had been turned down over concerns about lending international credibility to the Government's actions.
Nigeria
-------
5. (C) The Commonwealth is also keeping a watchful eye on Nigeria, Banerji noted, as it is "punching well below its weight" and President Yar'Adua's sudden death has the potential to prompt a constitutional crisis. The Commonwealth would like to see Nigeria more active in the region and in the Commonwealth across the board. Banerji noted that Yar'Adua did not make a single intervention at the last CHOGM, contrasting sharply with former President Obsanjo
LONDON 00001385 002 OF 002
who had been active in Commonwealth affairs.
Succession of the Head of the Commonwealth
------------------------------------------
6. (C) Banerji acknowledged that succession of the Head of the Commonwealth would have to be dealt with when Queen Elizabeth passes, as there is no rule stipulating that the British monarch is the head and no procedure for selecting a new head. He acknowledged that heir-apparent to the British Crown, Prince Charles, does not "command the same respect" as the Queen and said the Commonwealth was trying quietly to get him more involved in Commonwealth affairs. Banerji noted Marlborough House, the Commonwealth Secretariat's current location, was a royal property, owned and funded by the British Royal Family, and mused that may be a factor in the discussions. He noted that succession was not actively being discussion within the Commonwealth.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
LeBaron
Thursday, 19 February 2004, 20:55
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001288
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/19/2014
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, IZ, KU, SY, JO
SUBJECT: MUASHER ON PRODUCTIVE KUWAIT MEETING, PERSISTENT
PROBLEMS WITH SYRIA
REF: KUWAIT 539
Classified By: Amb. Edward W. Gnehm for reasons 1.5 (b) (d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
1. (S) FonMin Muasher told the Ambassador February 18 that the Iraq neighbors Foreign Ministers meeting in Kuwait had been frank and productive, with the neighbors arguing strongly for guarantees of Iraqi unity and the rights of Iraqi minorities. Iraqi FonMin Zebari responded that Kurds do not want a separate state, but will seek to preserve some of the independence they have enjoyed for twelve years. Muasher complained to Zebari that IGC member Ahmed Chalabi had spoiled two Jordanian bank deals in Iraq. According to Muasher, Syrian FonMin Sharaa was the only negative voice at the Kuwait meeting, and is increasingly an irritant in inter-Arab relations. END SUMMARY
-----------------------------------
PRODUCTIVE FONMIN MEETING IN KUWAIT
-----------------------------------
2. (S) Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher described the Iraq neighboring states Foreign Ministers meeting to the Ambassador and PolCouns February 18 as "a good honest discussion." He said that for the first time, Iraqi FonMin Zebari had fully participated in the discussions. For their part, the neighboring states had told Zebari that, without a strong Iraqi commitment to unity, Iraqi federalism is a regional -- not only internal -- issue that affects the interests of neighboring states. Similarly, the lack of protection of minority rights in Iraq could cause instability and become a regional issue as well.
3. (S) Zebari responded by saying that -- speaking as a Kurd -- there is no possibility of the creation of a separate Kurdistan, and that Kurds understand there is no support for the idea in the region. However, Kurds have been living a semi-independent existence for twelve years, and will not be willing to give up that status completely. Accordingly, Zebari reportedly argued, Kurds "need to be recognized as a special case." Zebari told the group that Iraqi Shia want not only to rule Shia areas of Iraq, but all of Iraq.
4. (S) Muasher said that Zebari had underscored the desire of the Iraqi government to cooperate closely and cement good relations with Jordan, "regardless of the opposition of Ahmed Chalabi." Muasher said he told Zebari that Jordan, too, wanted close cooperation with Iraq, but blamed Chalabi for spoiling deals negotiated by Jordan's Arab Bank and Export and Finance Bank with Iraq banks. Muasher said he would be raising this issue with senior USG officials on his upcoming trip to Washington.
---------------------
SYRIA THE ODD MAN OUT
---------------------
5. (S) In this frank and productive discussion, Muasher commented, "the Syrians stood out like a sore thumb. Even the Iranians were positive." For example, Muasher said, Syrian FonMin Farouq Sharaa insisted that Syria would not agree to any document that referred to the November 15 agreement between the CPA and IGC, "since it was not approved by all members of the Governing Council." (Muasher said that Zebari shot back that he doubted that all policies of the Syrian government were approved by all segments of Syrian society.) During the meeting, Muasher said that Zebari had asserted -- without specifics -- that terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is "moving freely back and forth between Iraq and Syria," as are other al-Qaeda operatives. Muasher had the impression that Zebari might have been exaggerating a bit.
------------------------
SYRIAN "STARK IGNORANCE"
------------------------
6. (S) Sharaa's behavior in Kuwait, Muasher said, simply underscores Syria's "stark ignorance" of the U.S. and the rest of the outside world. Bashar al-Asad had told King Abdullah on his recent visit to Damascus that he was not worried about who would win the U.S. presidential elections, since even a Democrat could choose to keep on the senior civilian officials in the current administration. Similarly, Sharaa had told the Jordanians accompanying the King a tabloid-like story that showed how out of touch with reality he is: Sharaa told the group that British Prince Charles would soon be implicated in a Scottish judicial investigation into Princess Diana's death, and was consequently planning a trip to Iraq and Iran "to seek the support of the Muslim world." "They just don't get it," Muasher lamented.
-------
COMMENT
-------
7. (S) Muasher was enthusiastic about the frank and positive tone of the Kuwait neighboring states meeting. However, he is focusing more and more on Syria -- and Farouq Sharaa in particular -- as the cause of friction in inter-Arab relations and an impediment to progress.
8. (U) CPA Baghdad minimize considered.
Visit Embassy Amman's classified website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site through the State Department's SIPRNET home page. GNEHM
Wednesday, 08 November 2006, 14:37
S E C R E T JEDDAH 000700
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/08/2016
TAGS PGOV, PINR, SCUL
SUBJECT: TALES OF A PRINCE: CG MEETS WITH GOVERNOR OF
ASIR'S FIXER
Classified By: Consul General Tatiana Gfoeller,for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) On November 7 the CG met with a prominent Western businessman who is close to the Governor of Asir, Prince Khalid bin Faisal. The businessman is known as a "fixer" for Prince Khalid. During their conversation, he recounted to the CG a number of his interactions with the Prince.
2. (S) Their first encounter was at the prince's majlis in Abha, the capital of Asir Province. The businessman described the majlis to the CG and spoke of its largesse, its lavish decor, and its eclectic makeup of people: tribesmen, mutawa, and others. During the proceedings, a waiter approached with coffee and tea. XXXXXXXXXXXX the businessman recalled, he knew that he and Prince Khalid would get along well.
3. (S) The businessman's second encounter with the prince was not actually with the prince. He had been invited to the prince's home to meet with his family. He recalled how surprised he had been at such a gesture. XXXXXXXXXXXX
4. (S) The businessman's third encounter with Prince Khalid coincided with the visit of Prince Charles of the United Kingdom. He informed the CG that Prince Khalid and Prince Charles share a love of painting. Khalid opened a "painters village" in Abha, the capital of Asir, called Al Muftah. People, including faces, as well as objects are painted by Al Muftah artists, just as Khalid does in his own works of art. (Note: This is very interesting since painting is frowned upon by many conservative Saudis, and painting people and faces is forbidden according to the Wahabi interpretation of Islam. End note.) The businessman told the CG about a call that he received from a nervous Prince Khalid because of the party that he had offered to host for Prince Charles. During that time Prince Khalid, who has since built a new palace, was living in his father, the deceased King Faisal's old palace. His mother, Queen Effet, lived upstairs on the second floor of the palace, but the first floor needed attention. The palace was described as aged and in dire need of renovation. The businessman recounted how he was called and asked by the Prince, to take care of renovating the ground floor of the palace for a party that would take place in three weeks from the time of the phone call. The businessman asked whether he had a choice, and when told an emphatic "no," then agreed to do it.
5. (S) According to the businessman, the first thing that he did was cut off all electricity so that no one would be able to turn on the lights and see what was taking place. Secondly, he inserted styrofoam into the holes in the walls. Thirdly, he set up projectors to project colors and designs onto the walls. On the evening of the party candles were the only source of lighting throughout the house. The plan was successful as the Prince of Wales commented on how luxurious and beautiful the palace was, despite the fact that it was not. Prince Khalid was very happy and the relationship between the businessman and the prince was cemented. (Note: The prince's old palace has since become a university. End note.)
6. (S) The next day Prince Khalid phoned this businessman and invited him to meet the Prince of Wales. What the prince did not know was that while the businessman had sacrificed three weeks to renovate the palace, his sister had been visiting from out of the country and he had other obligations, which he disregarded. The businessman ultimately declined the invitation to meet with the two princes. When he received a phone call and a summons, the next day, from Prince Khalid, he was frightened. He did not know what to expect and he feared the worst.
6. (S) When the businessman arrived to meet Prince Khalid he was pleasantly surprised to receive a painting by each of the princes, as gifts. He was also shocked to receive, what Prince Khalid called, a "tip," in the amount of SR50,000 ($13,333). He confided to the CG that Prince Khalid is "known for being extremely cheap." The businessman concluded by reiterating how close his relationship is to Prince Khalid and sharing more fond memories of the "phony dinner" at the prince's palace.
GFOELLER
Tuesday, 06 October 2009, 16:46
S E C R E T LONDON 002303
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/06/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ECON, UK, KNNP, MOPS, IR, PK, AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S OCTOBER 10-11
VISIT TO LONDON
Classified By: Ambassador Louis B. Susman for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C//NF) Summary. The Secretary's visit to London comes on the heels of the Labour, Conservative, and Liberal Democrat political party conferences -- their last before the UK elections which must be held by June 2010. The domestic political situation remains in flux, but with the Conservatives enjoying a consistent lead in the polls. A Conservative victory is not assured, however; the Conservatives have done a better job of criticizing Labour policies than of selling Conservative solutions. The cumulative contraction of the UK economy by 5.7 percent over the last five quarters has focused electoral discussions on economic issues. The major foreign policy issues for the election are the UK's involvement in Afghanistan, which all parties continue to back for now in spite of eroding public support and a lively debate in the media, and the UK's role in the EU, which Labour has been using as an example of the Conservatives' "isolationist" tendencies on economic and foreign policy. Politically, PM Brown and Foreign Secretary David Miliband will want the Secretary's visit to demonstrate the strength of their relationship with the U.S. administration in order to counter domestic press speculation about a perceived decline in the "special relationship" following Megrahi's release and President Obama's reported "snubbing" of PM Brown's requests for one-on-one meetings at the G-20 and UNGA. Some of the key issues of import to the UK Government are Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Northern Ireland, and non-proliferation. End summary.
The UK on Key Issues
--------------------
2. (S//NF) The Secretary's meetings with PM Gordon Brown and Foreign Secretary David Miliband likely will focus on the following key issues:
-- Afghanistan - As the second largest force contributor in Afghanistan, the UK has lost 219 soldiers since operations began in 2001. The up-tick in British casualties in July and August 2009 has contributed to renewed public debate on the UK's engagement there. Public support for the war effort is tepid. Rather than questioning the reasons for the UK's presence in Afghanistan, many critics instead have asserted that Brown has provided insufficient troops and equipment (including helicopters) to get the job done. In his September 25 discussion with the President, Brown said Afghan forces must shoulder a greater portion of the burden and take more responsibility for their own affairs and asserted the UK would not be "cutting out" of Afghanistan, though it lacks the capacity to commit additional troops. Brown and Miliband made similar statements to General McChrystal on October 1 and Admiral Mullen and Admiral Stavridis October 2, and the PM's Foreign Policy Advisor Simon McDonald has asked the USG to show "understanding of the political pressures that the PM is under." However, UK military officials claim that 1,000 - 2,000 additional troops are available for deployment. Brown, Miliband, and British military leaders would like other NATO allies to assume a greater share of combat operations, stressing that the U.S., UK and a few other allies have borne the brunt of the fighting. The PM very much wants to see strong U.S. leadership and is anxious to see the Administration's policy review completed soon.
-- Iran - The UK has privately shared with us that it is ready to proceed with designations of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and Bank Mellat under their Counter Terrorism Act powers, an action that requires parliamentary approval. In the wake of the October 1 P5 1 meeting in Geneva, however, UK officials are likely to want to consult with the U.S. on the best timing for announcing the designation. UK officials may also raise the issue of Nosratollah Tajik, former Iranian ambassador to Jordan, currently under arrest in the UK and awaiting extradition to the U.S. on charges of procuring restricted military items (night-vision goggles) for the Iranian government. Tajik has exhausted all judicial appeals in the UK and all that stands in the way of the extradition is approval by the Home Secretary. Before approving the extradition, the UK wants to be sure the timing is right and will not interfere with our joint efforts through the P5 1 to engage with Iran.
-- Pakistan - Because of immigration and economic ties, Pakistan has an important domestic dimension for the UK and will feature in public debates in the run-up to the UK's 2010 elections. Following the Friends of Pakistan meeting on September 25, the UK announced it will provide an extra GBP 50 million (USD 80 million) to improve infrastructure and security in Pakistan's border areas. However, UK officials later confirmed that these are not new funds and will instead
come from the current GBP 655 million (USD 1 billion) already designated for Pakistan aid. British leaders view a secure Pakistan as key to regional stability. They recognize Pakistan's now more effective response to the Taliban and other extremists, but say more is needed.
-- Northern Ireland - Prime Minister Brown and Northern Ireland Secretary Shaun Woodward will probably ask the Secretary to urge Northern Ireland First Minister Peter Robinson and Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness to accept the "Westminster Package," regarding the devolution of justice and policing powers, which was recently presented by Prime Minister Brown. HMG would like to reach an agreement with the parties this week, before the Secretary's arrival. HMG argues that the proposal is a good deal for Northern Ireland. If the agreement is not completed by the weekend, there is potential that some of the parties could seek to draw in the Secretary. The best approach is to urge all parties to work together patiently to reach agreement. An agreement would be a strong, positive signal to potential investors.
-- Nuclear Non-proliferation - Both PM Brown and FS Miliband welcome U.S. leadership on the global nuclear non-proliferation agenda, including the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. The UK firmly agrees with us on the importance of close P5 and P3 cooperation in the lead up to next year's Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference. At UNGA, Brown emphasized that the onus is on non-nuclear states to prove they are not developing nuclear weapons. He also pledged the UK's support for sponsoring a uranium bank and offering civil nuclear power to non-nuclear states that fulfill their responsibilities. He also announced that, subject to the sustained ability to maintain continuous deterrence, the UK will consider reducing its fleet of Trident nuclear-armed submarines from four to three. The move also is regarded as a cost-cutting measure for a government facing significant fiscal challenges in the coming years.
-- Defense Trade Treaty - The PM and FS Miliband may ask about the status of the Defense Trade Treaty and when the Senate will ratify it. U/S Tauscher told UK officials on September 30 that her goal is to have the Senate act on the treaty by year's end. U/S Tauscher and A/S Shapiro are working to counter the SFRC staff's belief that implementing legislation is necessary to enforce the treaty and to address their concerns about Congressional consultations and notifications.
-- Arms Trade Treaty - Miliband frequently raises with senior U.S. interlocutors the possibility of negotiating an ATT. We continue to have doubts about the possibility of negotiating an effective treaty, but are willing to move forward on the condition that it will proceed on the consensus basis traditional for multilateral arms control and nonproliferation negotiations.
-- Gary McKinnon Extradition Case - The PM will likely raise with the Secretary (as he has with the Ambassador) the extradition case of Gary McKinnon. McKinnon is a 43-year old computer hacker with Asperger's Syndrome who is wanted for prosecution in the U.S.; he is accused of hacking into U.S. government systems in 2001 and 2002. McKinnon has gained enormous popular sympathy in his appeal against extradition; the UK's final decision is pending. The case has also caused public criticism of the U.S.-UK extradition treaty. In August, PM Brown, in a one-on-one meeting with the Ambassador, proposed a deal: that McKinnon plead guilty, make a statement of contrition, but serve any sentence of incarceration in the UK. Brown cited deep public concern that McKinnon, with his medical condition, would commit suicide or suffer injury in imprisoned in a U.S. facility. The Ambassador has raised this proposal with AG Holder and would be happy to brief the Secretary in more detail.
Domestic Politics in Flux in Run-up to Elections
--------------------------------------------- ---
3. (C//NF) The annual political party conferences currently underway have thrust the UK into electoral campaigning mode, with the Labour, Conservative, and Liberal Democrat parties all positioning themselves for the general elections, which must occur before June 2010. The recent conferences have given each party in turn an up-tick in the polls, though with the Tories consistently enjoying a significant overall lead. PM Brown is unchallenged as leader of the Labour Party, but remains embattled by the UK media. Many in his party question if Labour can win the next elections with him at the helm despite his strong showing at the Labour conference. Honing its campaign message, the Labour Party plans to make
the elections about class divisions, highlighting Labour's strong public services record and its economic vision for Britain. At present, the major foreign policy issues shaping the electoral debate are the UK's involvement in Afghanistan, which all parties continue to back for now in spite of eroding public support and a lively debate in the media, and the UK's role in the European Union, which Labour has been using as an example of Conservative economic and foreign policy "isolationist" tendencies.
4. (C//NF) Conservative leader David Cameron's headline message to the media as the Tory conference began October 5 was about the UK's "twin crises" of debt and unemployment and the Tory's to-be-unveiled "big, bold, and radical" scheme to "get Britain working." The Tories' platform during the June European and local elections was based on keeping in focus bedrock issues such as the economy, job creation, and health and education reform; casting Labour as profligate and irresponsible; and portraying the Conservatives as the party of thrift, responsible spending and transparency. Ireland's "yes" vote on the Lisbon Treaty has highlighted internal Conservative party divisions on the EU as the conference gets underway. PM Brown and FS Miliband may ask the Secretary to emphasize U.S. support for a "strong Europe" as a way to highlight Conservative schisms.
5. (C//NF) In response to the summer 2009 parliamentary expenses scandal, which has alienated some voters from the political class and the mainstream parties, Cameron has been credited with reacting more decisively than Brown - a performance that some political commentators have said demonstrated impressive leadership, especially compared to Brown (who throughout his prime ministership has had to fight accusations of indecisiveness). Keeping the public focused on the economy, Cameron has said the Conservatives would be judged by their response to the UK's debt crisis and has called for an "age of austerity." While spending cuts are expected to be a large part of the future Conservative program, neither Cameron nor Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer Osborne has offered details on where government spending should be cut, beyond just saying there will be a ten percent cross-the-board cut with only education and the National Health Services remaining untouched. Many in the UK public remain skeptical of the Tories' unspecified plans for major cuts.
6. (C//NF) The UK's relationship with the U.S. has also become a campaign issue. During the fever pitch of UK media reporting on the release of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi, the Conservatives blamed Labour for damaging the "special relationship." The UK media has refused to let the issue die, continuing its mischievous reporting of recent alleged USG snubs of senior UK officials, particularly during UNGA.
Overview of UK Economy
----------------------
7. (U) The UK officially entered recession in the third quarter of 2008 and has suffered a cumulative contraction of 5.7 percent over the last five quarters. In July, the IMF forecast a further contraction of 4.2 percent in 2009 and growth of 0.2 percent in 2010. HM Treasury expects a contraction of 3.5 percent in 2009 and growth of 1.25 percent in 2010. Unemployment stands at 7.8 percent, its highest since 1995, and is expected to climb to more than 10 percent in early 2010. Unemployment is particularly acute among 18-to-24 year olds at 17 percent. The economic downturn is taking a heavy toll on trade. According to U.S Commerce Department and U.S. International Trade Commission monthly trade statistics, U.S. goods exports to the UK declined by 21.7 percent from January to June 2009, compared to the same period in 2008, and UK exports to the U.S. declined by 25.6 percent. Concerns about employment figures remain high, with unemployment rates near eight percent and expected to peak just in advance of the parliamentary elections.
8. (U) Public debt stands at GBP 800 billion (56.8 percent of GDP), its highest level since records began in 1974, and up from 56.6 percent last month. However, UK debt as a percentage of GDP is still lower than in the other G7 countries. How to manage and finance the UK's debt burden is a key issue dividing the two parties, and is expected to emerge as one of the top economic issues during the political campaign.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN
Monday, 11 January 2010, 02:51
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000005
SIPDIS
PASS TO EAP/CM, EAP/K, INR
EO 12958 DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION
TAGS CM, ECON, EFIN, EIND, EMIN, ENRG, PGOV, PINS, PREL
SUBJECT: FURTHER INSIGHTS ON PRC-DPRK TRADE: DECISIONS, DISPUTES, AND
BACK-DOOR DEALS
REF: A. 10SHENYANG 003 B. 09SHENYANG 167
Classified By: Consul General Stephen B. Wickman for Reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d)
1. (S) Summary: XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff XXXXXXXXXXXX that Kim Jong-il has recently reversed decisions and struggled to implement policies, showing increasing indecisiveness. XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX also reported that the children of high-ranking DPRK and Chinese officials hijack deals and aid projects for their own aggrandizement. Chinese state electric companies are currently bidding to build the grid for the DPRK's planned large-scale increase in power generation and transmission capacity, but apart from the goal to build 100,000 new apartments in Pyongyang, few of the DPRK's other objectives for 2012 will likely be achieved. Construction of the bridge from Dandong to Sinuiju, seems set to begin in 2010, however, China paying for both the bridge and a road on the DPRK side. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that North Koreans having connections and/or money, continue to receive permission to work in Northeast China, despite reports of a recent general recall. End Summary.
PROMISING THE MOON TO "THE SUN"
-------------------------------
2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX PolOff met again with XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Kim Jong-il has become increasingly indecisive since his stroke and other health problems. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed to a recent decision to recall students, scholars, and scientists working or studying in China as a result of a single student's defection in Beijing. XXXXXXXXXXXX said business and trade groups with interests in Northeast China had pressured Kim Jong-il to reverse the decision, which he apparently did, and companies in Northeast China are currently developing "positions needing to be filled" to enable those who left the country to get new visas.
3. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, not only does Kim Jong-il decide to reverse policies on his own, but officials also chart their own course as different factions competing for Kim's attention, making it difficult for Kim to set a firm, clear direction. Wary of China's increasing hold on precious minerals and mining rights in the DPRK, many North Korean officials oppose mineral concessions as a means to attract Chinese investment. However, the former Consul General of the DPRK's Shenyang Consulate, in an effort to fund the construction of the plan to build 100,000 new apartments in Pyongyang, continues to offer mining and fishing rights to Chinese investors. He attracted more than RMB 12 billion in investment, more than enough to protect himself from the direct attacks of these opponents. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, over-reporting of actual value is a common phenomenon on the part of North Koreans charged with securing foreign investment. For instance, a commitment of RMB 10 million is reported to Pyongyang as a commitment of USD 10 million or more and the actual sum (the RMB 10 million) is reported as a first tranche. After the initial investment is realized, the central government is told that the foreign investor demands further preferences in order to inject more money. The reporting officials count on the central government either taking additional steps to attract the extra investment or doing something to upset the Chinese investor. In the latter case, the official can blame the lack of realizing the investment on political factors out of his control. XXXXXXXXXXXX provided no examples of the DPRK central government acquiescing to the demand for additional concessions.
PRC-DPRK INVESTMENT DISPUTES: NOT JUST WITHIN THE DPRK
--------------------------------------------- ---------
4. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said Chinese state-owned enterprises have placed restrictions on investing in North Korea but that a number of privatized Chinese companies in which the state remains a significant shareholder have invested in the DPRK. Disputes with North Korean counterparts develop all the time, XXXXXXXXXXXXnoted. Saying: "It was hard to say" how such disputes are resolved, XXXXXXXXXXXXgave the impression they are seldom, if ever, resolved. Investment disputes related to North Korea also
SHENYANG 00000005 002 OF 002
occur between competing investors in China. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, for example, two Chinese companies - Shandong Guoda Gold Company, Ltd. and Zhejiang-based Wanxiang Group - are battling for access to Huishan Copper Mine, the biggest copper mine in the DPRK. Huishan, near the DPRK-China border is rich in gold, silver, and other valuable metals as well. Though MOFCOM approved both joint-venture deals, each company wants to be the sole developer. XXXXXXXXXXXX believes Wanxiang, which has close ties to Premier Wen Jiabao, will likely win out, Shandong Guoda receiving a payment to quietly go away. Without naming names, XXXXXXXXXXXX also suggested the strong possibility that someone had made a payment (on the order of USD 10,000) to secure the Premier's support.
PRINCELINGS BEHAVING BADLY
---------------------------
5. (S) According toXXXXXXXXXXXX, the children of high-ranking North Korean and Chinese officials hijack the most favorable investment and aid deals for their own enrichment. When the child of a high-ranking official hears of a Chinese aid proposal to North Korea, he will travel to North Korea to convince the relevant official to follow his instructions for implementing the aid project. He will then use his connections to request proposals from Chinese companies to develop the project, returning to North Korea to convince the relevant official to select the favored company. At each step, money changes hands, and the well-connected Chinese go-between pockets a tidy sum. For the offspring of officials in the DPRK, there are also ample opportunities to work in China. In a typical situation, a DPRK official will alert another official to an opportunity for the second official's child to work in China for a DPRK-Chinese joint venture. After signing a contract, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX it is a cheap, easy process to obtain the necessary permit from the Chinese provincial Bureau of Labor and Social Security. He said the system is similar to the "ting xin, liu zhi" system in China in the 1980s, in which officials retained their government position with a suspended salary while going to work for a private company.
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX has seen a number of similarities between the DPRK and China since his first visit in 1998. He compared the impact of the famine on North Koreans to the impact the Great Leap Forward (GLF) had on Chinese in the countryside. Both incidents forced individuals to lose faith in the government's ability to provide a basic standard of living and created a sharp instinct for self-preservation. He also sees similarities between the GLF and current plans in the DPRK to become a strong country by 2012. During his previous meeting with XXXXXXXXXXXX spoke of plans to build 100,000 apartments in Pyongyang by 2012. North Korea also plans to increase electricity generation capacity by building coal-fired power plants and hydropower plants, and to increase transmission capacity by extending grids to all secondary cities. Chinese electric companies are currently bidding on the grid projects. Despite the need for increased electricity in North Korea, XXXXXXXXXXXX said it is almost impossible that North Korea will reach its goals in the next few years. The focus more likely will be on the apartment blocks as these are big, physical things that people can see as a mark of progress. XXXXXXXXXXXX believes the long-planned bridge from Dandong to Sinuiju will begin construction next year and that China will pay for the entire project, including a highway on the North Korean side of the border (Ref B).
WICKMAN
Wednesday, 25 February 2009, 18:46
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000269
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/WCI, S/CT, EUR/ERA, INL, INL/PC, INL/AAE, L/LEI
DRL/MLGA
NSC FOR KVIEN
DOD FOR OSD/OFFICE OF DETAINEE AFFAIRS
JUSTICE FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS
HOMELAND SECURITY FOR OFFICES OF POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/18/2019
TAGS PREL, KAWK, KISL, PTER, EUN
SUBJECT: GUANTANAMO: AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON CONFERS WITH EU
OFFICIALS
REF: A. BRUSSELS 120 B. BRUSSELS 159 C. BRUSSELS 268
Classified By: USEU Political M-C Chris Davis for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: S/WCI Ambassador Clint Williamson and European Union (EU) Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove discussed de Kerchove's upcoming whitepaper for the EU Council on detainee issues and its relevance for developing a common EU position on the topic. The two also spoke about which governments are open to accepting detainees and how, if possible, to mitigate member state concerns regarding detainees' freedom of movement in the Schengen zone. De Kerchove is in favor of an EU blessing of bilateral negotiations between member states and the US on detainee transfers, and said there is an EU precedent for placing travel restrictions on residency permit holders (one possible solution to Schengen concerns).
2. (C) Williamson also met with the EU Parliamentarians responsible for the now ratified EU Joint Resolution on Guantanamo, congratulating them on receiving support from across the political spectrum. Separately, the Ambassador sat down with Riina Kionka, Javier Solana's Personal Representative for Human Rights. She suggested a stronger public information campaign on the nature of the detainees at Guantanamo, and expressed concern that EU Member States were under intense Chinese pressure not to accept Uighur detainees. END SUMMARY.
----------------------------
De Kerchove's EU Perspective
----------------------------
3. (C) On his tenth day of travels within the EU, Ambassador Williamson met in Brussels February 17 with EU Counterterrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove. The C/T Coordinator briefly discussed his upcoming whitepaper on detainee issues, which was tasked to him by the EU Council. It will include 15 "non-controversial" principles to guide EU consensus building, as well as lessons learned from the Church of the Nativity resettlement (ref A), information on previous U.S. policies and the new executive order, and potential resettlement options outside and within the EU. Ambassador Williamson provided general information on the number of released detainees who had reengaged in terrorism, as well as the distinction between "cleared for release" and "cleared for transfer" designations by the USG.
4. (C) On forming an EU position, De Kerchove indicated that a favorable scenario would be a consensus agreement allowing individual members to accept detainees, provided transfers are not forced on any unwilling EU member. Williamson noted that the Czechs, in their capacity as EU president, were committed to developing this consensus position. The two then went on to discuss concerns over former detainees' freedom of movement in the Schengen zone. Williamson stated that it is a common concern among EU members, and floated the possibility of former detainees having restrictions placed on their travel, a stipulation that some of the detainees and their lawyers have consented to in principle. De Kerchove replied that a precedent existed for such restrictions, which he felt could help mitigate Schengen concerns of member states, though they would be difficult to enforce in practice. The Ambassador cited the February 26, 2009 Justice and Home Affairs Informal Meeting as an important near-term milestone in building momentum towards an EU position. De Kerchove was of the opinion that it was a bit early to expect an official position given the complex nature of the issue. He had hoped discussions would occur first among ambassadors within the Committee of Permanent Representatives, however the Czech Presidency insisted on moving forward with discussions among Justice and Interior Ministers.
5. (C) Conversation then shifted to the USG process moving forward. Williamson described two parallel U.S. review processes; (1) review of the files of all 242 detainees at
BRUSSELS 00000269 002 OF 003
Guantanamo, and (2) review of policies involving detention, Guantanamo, and related issues. Files must be collected from multiple departments, agencies, and locations for review by an interagency team, including DOJ prosecutors and representatives from the State, Defense, and Homeland Security departments, as well as the intelligence agencies. The U.S. will prioritize cases of detainees being considered for resettlement by EU governments.
6. (C) Williamson and De Kerchove agreed to consult further after the February 26 JHA Informal meeting and before anticipated travel by JHA Commissioner Jacques Barrot, Czech Interior Minister Langer, and De Kerchove to Washington in mid March.
-------------------------
"We need better pictures"
-------------------------
7. (C) During a subsequent meeting on February 17 with Riina Kionka, High Representative Javier Solana's Personal Representative for Human Rights, Ambassador Williamson briefed on the process called for by the President's recent executive orders on closure of Guantanamo detention facilities, and exchanged views on the state of play regarding EU-level efforts on acceptance of Guantanamo detainees.
8. (C) While emphasizing that EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove had the lead on this issue, Kionka raised a few specific concerns and ideas. She told us that Member States have been under intense pressure from China not to accept Uighurs, and that some are concerned about possible repercussions in bilateral and EU-level relations with China if they accept detainees. She acknowledged that this pressure was not unusual from China, but did not know if it would affect Member State decision-making.
9. (C) Kionka also highlighted the gap between public perceptions of the kinds of detaines at Guantanamo and the reality that many ar very low risk. She felt that this was a message the U.S. had to carry, and urged the administration to "plainly" explain to Americans (and thus Europeans) that while some detainees are very dangerous, many of them do not pose a serious threat. Kionka also commented that whenever a European newspaper ran a story on Guantanamo, they ran the typical picture of a hunched-over detainee in an orange jumpsuit. She said that "we need better pictures" and urged us to turn the story around by showing low-risk detainees in a better light.
---------------------
Parliamentary support
---------------------
10. (C) Amb. Williamson hosted a lunch for three Members of the European Parliament (MEP) who were the principal authors of a recent resolution supporting U.S. efforts to close Guantanamo and EU efforts to assist with detainee resettlement. MEPs Ursula Gacek (EPP-ED, Poland), Baroness Sarah Ludford (ALDE, UK), and Jan Marinus Wiersma (PSE, Netherlands) told us that the results of the vote (542 in favor, 55 abstaining, 51 opposed) show the broad bipartisan support that the EP has for European resettlement efforts. They said that it was difficult to craft a text that all parties could support, but that the EP felt it was important to express a "helpful" sentiment. Williamson expressed appreciation for their efforts in securing passage of the resolution and indicated that it sent a positive message to EU states considering resettlements.
11. (C) The MEPs were careful to point out that the support was not unqualified. Legal issues surrounding the admission of detainees into the Schengen Zone needed to be resolved to the satisfaction of Member States not accepting detainees, they said. MEP Ludford, known to be somewhat outspoken, drew criticism from her colleagues when she spoke of her personal opinion that Member States who participated in alleged CIA
BRUSSELS 00000269 003 OF 003
rendition operations to Guantanamo had a particular ethical responsibility to accept detainees if it would contribute to the closure of the facility. She noted that the EP would adopt a resolution on CIA flights at that week's plenary session.
12. (U) Ambassador Williamson has cleared on this telegram.
MURRAY .
Friday, 15 January 2010, 15:34
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LUXEMBOURG 000005
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/WE VALERIE BELON, S/GC MICHAEL WILLIAMS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/01/15
TAGS PGOV, KDRG, PREL, LU
SUBJECT: TO HELL AND BACK: GITMO EX-DETAINEE STUMPS IN LUXEMBOURG
REF: 09 LUXEMBOURG 328; 09 LUXEMBOURG 288; 09 LUXEMBOURG 302
CLASSIFIED BY: Adam Center, Consul; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) detainee Moazzam Begg met with Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn 14 January 2010 to press the government of Luxembourg to accept GTMO detainees for resettlement. Begg, a British citizen of Pakistani origin, was arrested in Pakistan in 2002 and imprisoned in Kandahar, Bagram, and Guantanamo Bay, before his release to Britain in 2005. In a statement to RTL Television, Asselborn said that Luxembourg will do what is possible and reiterated the government's position to provide financial assistance, training and housing costs, and other technical assistance. Consular officer attended an evening screening of the documentary film "Taxi to the Dark Side," followed by a Q&A session with Begg. When asked if he thought Luxembourg will do more than contribute financially to the resettlement efforts, Begg replied that he was "pleasantly surprised" with his conversations with MFA officials and "hopeful." END SUMMARY
--------------------------------------------
AUDIENCE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
--------------------------------------------
2. (C) Ex-GTMO detainee Moazzam Begg, released from Guantanamo Bay in 2005, is barnstorming throughout Europe, pushing governments to accept GTMO detainees for resettlement. Following his release from GTMO, Begg created an NGO dedicated to this cause, called Caged Prisoners. Representatives from two additional NGOs, Reprieve and Center for Constitutional Rights, accompanied Begg on his visit to Luxembourg. Luxembourg media coverage on the Asselborn-Begg meeting was ubiquitous, but superficial. With numerous reports that the meeting occurred, nearly all media outlets were silent on the actual substance of the meeting. Only Begg provided some limited insight into the outcome of the meeting. Speaking later in the evening (see para 4), he responded to an inquiry about the meeting by saying that "without giving anything away," he was "pleasantly surprised" and "hopeful."
--------------------------------------------- -----------
ASSELBORN: "WE'LL HELP"/BEGG: "DO MORE"
--------------------------------------------- -----------
3. (C) In an interview following his meeting with Begg, Asselborn avoided specifics of the discussion. He reiterated Luxembourg's willingness to provide financial assistance to the resettlement efforts - the GoL party line for many months. Asselborn said, however, that he was in regular contact with American officials, including Special Envoy Dan Fried, as recently as last week. (See refs a and b on the Asselborn-Fried meeting in September 2009 in Luxembourg and subsequent exchange of letters.) In comments to the press following the meeting, Begg only explained what the messages he delivered were - not how those messages were received. Begg's primary message is that European governments have to step up and accept some of the GTMO detainees for resettlement. Begg, an articulate man, argued that there are dozens of prisoners in GTMO just like him - not dangerous to society, able to communicate and assimilate, able to be a contributing and responsible member of society - and they just need governments to stand up and offer them a place to call home. In an interview prior to his meeting with Asselborn, Begg was asked if countries like Luxembourg have a responsibility regarding ex-detainees. Begg reportedly responded that it is a European tradition to offer asylum to refugees, and that this tradition also should be extended to former Guantanamo detainees who have not been convicted of crimes, are not dangerous, and are deemed as releasable.
LUXEMBOURG 00000005 002 OF 003
----------------
TAXI TO HELL
----------------
4. (SBU) Begg later attended an Amnesty International-hosted screening of 2007 Oscar Winner for Best Documentary "Taxi to the Dark Side" (French translation of film title: "Taxi to Hell"). Conoff attended screening and Begg's Q&A session following the film. The film, a harrowing depiction of alleged torture inside Bagram, Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo, was an undisguised attack on the Bush Administration, focusing much of its venom on Former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Former Vice President Cheney. Mr. Begg, on the other hand, presented an image of "forgive, but never forget," and has focused his attentions not on the ill treatment he allegedly received, but on what can be done to resettle the remaining "releasable" prisoners in Guantanamo Bay. Reporting officer estimates 100-150 people attended the filming and Q&A session and noted the complete absence of press, other diplomats, or GoL officials.
--------------------------------------------- -
LOOKING FORWARD, NOT BACKWARD
--------------------------------------------- -
5. (C) During his presentation, Begg spoke almost exclusively of the future, with hardly any mention of the past. He did not discuss the question of legality of torture. Rather than stressing past injustices, he focused on what to do now. He acknowledged that he lives with the past, but that he now wants to be part of the solution, and is working to convince Luxembourg and other governments - and their populaces - to want the same.
---------------------------------------
LUXEMBOURGERS NOT SO SURE
---------------------------------------
6. (SBU) In a 90-minute Q&A session, Begg was asked, how would ex-detainees fit in in Luxembourg. How would it work? Where would they live? How would they be supported? The fear and skepticism was palpable in the audience. Begg and his NGO cohorts stressed that there were Algerians and Tunisians in GTMO who could come to Luxembourg and speak French, one of Luxembourg's official and most-commonly used languages. He stressed that neighboring countries - France, Belgium, Portugal, Ireland - provided examples. Begg even argued that if detainees could fit in in Palau, they could do the same in Luxembourg. Begg deplored that certain people believe the world is not big enough for the ex-detainees. He added that if there were colonies on the Moon, "I'm sure they'd send us there."
7. (SBU) Begg declined to speak about specific physical transgressions against his person. When told how physically well and mentally sound he appeared, he joked, "Well, I used to be taller." Begg spoke articulately, demonstrating minimal ill will toward his captors - even going so far as to say he speaks on the
LUXEMBOURG 00000005 003 OF 003
phone occasionally with his former interrogators. Consular officer took note of the following exchange: Asked if he would ever consider a return to the U.S., Begg replied that he had never been to the U.S., but that the U.S. had come to him. Begg commented that as a British citizen, he could travel to the U.S. without a visa, but that he thinks he would need "a lot more than a visa to get out."
-------------
COMMENT
-------------
8. (C) Mr. Begg is doing our work for us, and his articulate, reasoned presentation makes for a convincing argument. It is ironic that after four years of imprisonment and alleged torture, Moazzam Begg is delivering the same demarche to GOL as we are: please consider accepting GTMO detainees for resettlement. Despite Begg's optimism, the Prime and Foreign Ministers continue to publicly state that the GoL supports the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility and stands ready to assist from a financial and logistical perspective, but cannot accept detainees for resettlement.
9. (U) Please see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moazzam_Begg and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxi_to_the_Dark _Side for extensive information on Moazzam Begg and the film "Taxi to the Dark Side." Stroum
Tuesday, 24 November 2009, 14:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 001580
SIPDIS
STATE FOR THE SECRETARY, EUR/WE, ISN, S/GC, AND AF/C
EO 12958 DECL: 11/19/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, ECON, BE, AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH BELGIAN
LEADERS DURING THE SECRETARY'S DECEMBER 3-4 VISIT TO BRUSSELS
REF: A. BRUSSELS 1498 B. BRUSSELS 1493 C. BRUSSELS 1552
Classified By: Ambassador Howard Gutman, reason 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Madame Secretary, Embassy Brussels welcomes your visit to Brussels on December 3-4 and your meetings with the in-coming Belgian Prime Minister, Yves Leterme, and the Foreign Minister, most likely Steven Vanackere. Your visit occurs at a moment when Belgians are poised to take a leading role in Europe -- their former Prime Minister, Herman Van Rompuy, has just been named as the first European Council President under the new circumstances of the Lisbon Treaty, and the Belgian government is preparing itself to hold the rotating presidency of the EU Council for the six months beginning July 1, 2010. Embassy Brussels believes that properly motivated, Belgium can be a leader in mobilizing Europe to assist the United States in meeting two of the key challenges faced by the Transatlantic community -- Afghanistan and Guantanamo. Hopefully, long-simmering tensions between the Flemish and francophone regions and linguistic communities will not distract Belgium from this opportunity. Other opportunities for cooperation exist on Africa policy, nuclear disarmament in Europe and Iran. The PM or Foreign Minister may try to promote the candidacy of former Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel for the next President of the UN General Assembly and may again raise Belgium's failure to be included as a participant or observer at the G-20 talks, despite being the 18th largest economy in the world. End Summary.
TAKING A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN EUROPE
----------------------------------
2. (C) For the past few months, Embassy Brussels has been working to set the stage for a change in Belgium's self-concept as a small, meek country living in the shadow of France and Germany, to a country that can show leadership in Europe in spite of stretched financial and material resources, mainly by becoming more vocal on the need for Europe to assist in the closing of Guantanamo and on the need to support the new Afghanistan strategy. Your visit is a chance to foster and encourage this transformation. In fact, of course, the transformation began at home in Belgium in 2007 when a new government, made up of a motley coalition of Christian Democrats, Socialists, Liberals and Humanists from both sides of the linguistic border, came to power. The Prime Minister then, and now again with the departure of Van Rompuy to the EU, was Yves Leterme, a Flemish Christian Democrat. Formation of the government was delayed for nearly a year because of difficult issues of power-sharing between the French and Flemish communities, many of which still remain to be solved.
STEPPING UP IN AFGHANISTAN
--------------------------
3. (C) Nevertheless, the new Defense Minister, Pieter De Crem, with sometimes grudging support from Leterme and others in the cabinet, reoriented Belgium's defense policy. Where his predecessor had promoted a mainly humanitarian, EU and UN support role for the Belgian military, De Crem sought to re-establish Belgium as a small but reliable NATO ally. As a result, Belgium's troop commitment to NATO ISAF operations in Afghanistan has increased from about 250 troops to nearly 540, with further increases, perhaps to 680, in the offing. Belgians provide security for Kabul airport, operate and maintain six F-16's in Kandahar, run one Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team in Kunduz with a second due to arrive in January, and participate in a German-run PRT. This increase has been achieved against a background of declining resources which have required a thoroughgoing restructuring of the armed forces and recall of peacekeeping troops in Kosovo and Lebanon. The government has also bucked critics inside and out of government who prefer a more pacifist, less NATO-oriented approach and are ever ready to make political hay out of possible casualties. Minister De Crem moreover has reacted positively to suggestions from the Ambassador that he become more vocal in his support as a way perhaps to help shore up the support of other partners. Belgium deserves your appreciation and praise for its efforts, and although further increases in military contrib SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH BELGIAN LEADERS DURING THESECRETARY'S DECEMBER 3-4 VISIT TO BRUSSELS
4. (C) On the other hand, Belgium's contribuQions to civilian development in Afghanistan have not kept pace. In April 2009, the GOB announced that it was doubling its financial assistance to the country to 12 million euros a year. This figure is only about 0.75 percent of its global budget for official development assistance. The Ministry of Interior has been considering sending 2-4 police trainers to Afghanistan but has hesitated over concerns for their security. Your unambiguous urging of more civilian assistance to Afghanistan with both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister can help to increase resources devoted to Afghanistan.
SPURRING ON CLOSURE OF GUANTANAMO
---------------------------------
5. (C) The Embassy has been encouraging Belgium to take a leadership role in Europe in the closure of the Guantanamo detention center. In October, Belgium resettled one detainee, whose successful integration should be reassuring to Belgian officials. We are discussing the transfer of two Tunisian detainees who have already been convicted of crimes in Belgium, not as part of the "placement" of detainees, but instead as part of our Department of Justice working with the Belgian Ministry of Justice (our hope is that that process will make it easier for Belgian society to accept the return, and also allow us to ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs separately to take others). We have also begun to suggest the possibility of Belgium stepping forward from the chorus line and up to the footlights on Guantanamo. Helping solve the USG's -- and Europe's -- problem with Guantanamo is a low-cost way for Belgium to attain prominence in Europe. There are signs that Belgium's reticence is beginning to chafe its leadership. Complaints about Belgium's exclusion from G-20 membership, and opposition to perceived influence of a "directoire" of large countries in the EU are examples. It is a matter of convincing Belgium that not only does it have self-interest in a more assertive role, but it also has a uniquely trusted character within Europe that permits it to be effective. Embassy Brussels suggests the time is right to ask Belgium to take more than a handful of detainees and ask in coordination with others (as led by Belgium), so that Guantanamo -- which Europeans always so roundly condemned -- is closed once and for all.
POLITICAL PITFALLS IN REGIONAL TENSIONS
---------------------------------------
6. (C) With three regions, three linguistic communities, seven parliaments and a myriad of political parties, domestic politics and the division of powers in Belgium require a complicated and delicate series of compromises. Herman Van Rompuy, though Flemish, was one politician who seemed able to gain the confidence and trust of both Flemish and francophone Belgians. His most likely successor, Yves Leterme, is more identifiably Flemish and does not share that reputation. One difficult issue, Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, or BHV, symbolizes the divisions and carries unusual emotional power in Belgium (ref A). In essence, it is a question of whether residents of the Brussels suburbs should live and vote under Flemish control or have special francophone voting and social rights. The issue impeded formation of a government after the 2007 elections and was kicked down the road ever since. A special effort will have to be made before March 2010 to either once again delay a solution or reach a final compromise. Failure to do so could threaten Leterme's coalition in the first part of the year. The fact that all Belgian politicians dearly want to avoid embarrassment during Belgium's EU presidency will motivate them to find the necessary compromises, but there is no guarantee they can.
INTEREST IN ENHANCED AFRICA COOPERATION
---------------------------------------
7. (C) Central Africa is a special interest of Belgium, as the former colonial power in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Burundi. As such, the GOB is eager to cooperate with the United States on encouraging security sector reform in the DRC, consolidating peace in the Eastern DRC, promoting regional economic integration and cooperation among states in the region on security issues. In particular, Belgium is as interested in preventing sexual violence as we are. It would like us to encourage continued cooperation between Rwanda and the DRC to take a firmer hand with rebel groups that operate in Eastern Congo and far too often commit atrocities. When you met Belgium's former
BRUSSELS 00001580 002 OF 003
4. (C) On the other hand, Belgium's contributions to civilian development in Afghanistan have not kept pace. In April 2009, the GOB announced that it was doubling its financial assistance to the country to 12 million euros a year. This figure is only about 0.75 percent of its global budget for official development assistance. The Ministry of Interior has been considering sending 2-4 police trainers to Afghanistan but has hesitated over concerns for their security. Your unambiguous urging of more civilian assistance to Afghanistan with both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister can help to increase resources devoted to Afghanistan.
SPURRING ON CLOSURE OF GUANTANAMO
---------------------------------
5. (C) The Embassy has been encouraging Belgium to take a leadership role in Europe in the closure of the Guantanamo detention center. In October, Belgium resettled one detainee, whose successful integration should be reassuring to Belgian officials. We are discussing the transfer of two Tunisian detainees who have already been convicted of crimes in Belgium, not as part of the "placement" of detainees, but instead as part of our Department of Justice working with the Belgian Ministry of Justice (our hope is that that process will make it easier for Belgian society to accept the return, and also allow us to ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs separately to take others). We have also begun to suggest the possibility of Belgium stepping forward from the chorus line and up to the footlights on Guantanamo. Helping solve the USG's -- and Europe's -- problem with Guantanamo is a low-cost way for Belgium to attain prominence in Europe. There are signs that Belgium's reticence is beginning to chafe its leadership. Complaints about Belgium's exclusion from G-20 membership, and opposition to perceived influence of a "directoire" of large countries in the EU are examples. It is a matter of convincing Belgium that not only does it have self-interest in a more assertive role, but it also has a uniquely trusted character within Europe that permits it to be effective. Embassy Brussels suggests the time is right to ask Belgium to take more than a handful of detainees and ask in coordination with others (as led by Belgium), so that Guantanamo -- which Europeans always so roundly condemned -- is closed once and for all.
POLITICAL PITFALLS IN REGIONAL TENSIONS
---------------------------------------
6. (C) With three regions, three linguistic communities, seven parliaments and a myriad of political parties, domestic politics and the division of powers in Belgium require a complicated and delicate series of compromises. Herman Van Rompuy, though Flemish, was one politician who seemed able to gain the confidence and trust of both Flemish and francophone Belgians. His most likely successor, Yves Leterme, is more identifiably Flemish and does not share that reputation. One difficult issue, Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, or BHV, symbolizes the divisions and carries unusual emotional power in Belgium (ref A). In essence, it is a question of whether residents of the Brussels suburbs should live and vote under Flemish control or have special francophone voting and social rights. The issue impeded formation of a government after the 2007 elections and was kicked down the road ever since. A special effort will have to be made before March 2010 to either once again delay a solution or reach a final compromise. Failure to do so could threaten Leterme's coalition in the first part of the year. The fact that all Belgian politicians dearly want to avoid embarrassment during Belgium's EU presidency will motivate them to find the necessary compromises, but there is no guarantee they can.
INTEREST IN ENHANCED AFRICA COOPERATION
---------------------------------------
7. (C) Central Africa is a special interest of Belgium, as the former colonial power in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Burundi. As such, the GOB is eager to cooperate with the United States on encouraging security sector reform in the DRC, consolidating peace in the Eastern DRC, promoting regional economic integration and cooperation among states in the region on security issues. In particular, Belgium is as interested in preventing sexual violence as we are. It would like us to encourage continued cooperation between Rwanda and the DRC to take a firmer hand with rebel groups that operate in Eastern Congo and far too often commit atrocities. When you met Belgium's former
BRUSSELS 00001580 003 OF 003
foreign minister, Karel De Gucht, last February, you discussed naming a bilateral task force to meet in Washington to discuss security sector reform in the DRC. This has not yet occurred, because the Belgians opted to wait until the new USG Africa team was in place. We are now ready to move ahead with this. In November, Belgium announced an increase in assistance to Burundi, making it the largest bilateral donor to that country. It plans to do the same for the DRC.
MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT
---------------------------------------------
8. (S) Belgium has a special interest in nuclear non-proliferation issues because it participates in NATO's nuclear forces at the Kleine Brogel air force base. It rejected a recent overture from Germany to join with the Netherlands, Italy and Germany to propose to the rest of NATO that nuclear weapons be removed from those countries (ref B). However, Belgian MOD and MFA officials apparently had to rein in then-Foreign Minister Leterme when he initially responded too positively to the idea. Belgium's official policy rejects a unilateral approach to disarmament and insists that the issue must be discussed among all NATO members at one time, with due regard for U.S.-Russian bilateral discussions and the NPT. The government is also opposing a proposal from the floor of the Belgian parliament to ban nuclear weapons from Belgian soil.
IRAN SANCTIONS IF NECESSARY
---------------------------
9. (C) Belgium shares our concern about Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear capability. It supports strengthened sanctions in the EU and UN if necessary. In that case, at least at first, it prefers to see existing sanctions made more effective, rather than extending them into entirely new areas, with the possible exception of a conventional arms embargo.
FORMER FM LOUIS MICHEL'S CANDIDACY FOR UNGA PRESIDENT
--------------------------------------------- --------
10. (C) One issue the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister may raise is a request for support for the candidacy of former Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel for President of the UN General Assembly (ref C). As you know, we do not discuss our voting intentions for such posts. They have already discussed this issue with Assistant Secretary Gordon and with Ambassador Gutman. .
Tuesday, 03 February 2009, 10:16
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 000290
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/WCI, L/PM AND EUR/WE/UK
DOD FOR OFFICE OF DETAINEE AFFAIRS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/02/2019
TAGS PTER, KHLS, PREL, PINS, PHUM, KAWK, MOPS, KISL, EUN,
UK
SUBJECT: (S) FCO WELCOMES EXECUTIVE ORDERS ON DETAINEE
POLICY; WILL SHARE UK EXPERIENCE RESETTLING DETAINEES WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS, BUT NOT TAKE MORE DETAINEES
REF: A. STATE 6516 B. MILLS/RICCI 01/29/09 E-MAIL
Classified By: Political Counselor Richard Mills, Jr. for reasons 1.4 ( B) and (D).
1. (S) Summary. The UK Government "strongly welcomes" the executive orders concerning Guantanamo Bay and U.S. detainee policy, according to Robert Chatterton-Dixon, Head of the Foreign Office's Counter Terrorism Policy Department. The UK is not willing to resettle any further detainees in the UK -- beyond the two detainees with UK residency ties, Binyam Mohammed and Shaker Amer, that are the subject of current bilateral discussions -- but has offered to share with other European governments the UK's experience and advice on resettlement of detainees. End summary.
HMG Welcomes the Executive Orders
---------------------------------
2. (SBU) Drawing from ref A, PolCouns met with Chatterton-Dixon and senior members of his department on January 29 to discuss UK reaction to the Guantanamo Bay executive orders and UK views on resettlement of Guantanamo detainees. HMG was very pleased with the orders, Chatterton-Dixon stressed, and HMG lawyers are closely reviewing them and their implications for future detainee policy. He acknowledged that there had not been an official HMG statement welcoming the orders, but put that down to the travel schedule of the appropriate ministers. Foreign Office press lines, used in response to press queries, had praised the orders as "a welcome new chapter" and this was "certainly the view across HMG." Chatterton-Dixon speculated that the orders would be raised the next time the Foreign Secretary addressed the Commons and at the time the Foreign Secretary would make clear the UK's positive reaction.
Still Difficult Legal Issues Ahead for Both Governments
--------------------------------------------- ----------
3. (S) Chatterton-Dixon cautioned, however, that there were still serious legal issues ahead for HMG and USG regarding detainee policy. He noted that twelve of the detainees who have returned to the UK have brought a combined action in the UK courts charging named HMG officials with "malfeasance in the use of their public office" because of their involvement in the detainees' incarceration at Guantanamo Bay. Chatterton-Dixon said that the Home Office, not the Foreign Office, had the lead on this case, but it was likely to raise similar issues concerning access to classified information as had been raised in the Binyam Mohammed case. He noted that the Executive Orders would provide "reassurance" to the Court hearing the Binyam Mohammed case, but that court and others would be looking to the results of the inter-agency panels before concluding that legal and human rights issues raised by the defendants were now moot.
Inter-Agency Panels May Want to Consult with HMG
--------------------------------------------- ---
4. (S) Polcouns used ref A guidance to respond to questions concerning whether the USG was considering resettling detainees in the United States and the legal authorities under which detainees were now being held. Chatterton-Dixon, although noting that he understood the focus of the inter-agency groups established under the Executive Orders was on U.S. policy and legal authority, suggested that the policy group examining broad U.S. policy on detainee issues still might find it useful to consult with other governments on an international legal regime to govern terrorist combatants.
HMG Will Not Take Any More Detainees
------------------------------------
5. (S) Reconfirming a message Prime Minister Brown' Foreign Policy Advisor had conveyed to Ambassador Tuttle and DCM a few days before (ref B), Chatterton-Dixon told PolCouns that HMG was not willing to take any additional detainees for resettlement in the UK, beyond the two detainees with UK connections that are currently the subject of bilateral discussions -- Binyam Mohammed and Shaker Amer. HMG had already resettled over a dozen detainees and the UK's available security resources to monitor any additional detainees were already stretched to the limit, he explained. The decision to accept more detainees had been taken at the
LONDON 00000290 002 OF 002
"ministerial level," he added, and after cabinet discussion, so it was not one that Chatterton-Dixon believed was subject to revision.
6. (S) The question of other EU Member governments accepting detainees was, ultimately, for individual governments to decide in consultation with the USG, Chatterton-Dixon said. He said that HMG was not opposed to the EU discussing what steps it could take to assist individual governments that decide to accept detainees. He understood the next step following the discussion on detainees at the January 26-27 EU GAERC meeting was for EU Ambassadors in Brussels to meet and propose possible steps that could be taken to assist Members which choose to accept detainees, as well as proposals to address the legal issues that were raised concerning the detainees' possible freedom of movement across EU borders.
HMG Will Share Its Experiences with Other Governments
--------------------------------------------- ---------
7. (S) HMG has offered to provide other European governments considering resettlement of detainees advice on the UK's experiences, both legal and security, in resettling detainees. Chatterton-Dixon did not know of any government that had yet taken up the British offer, in part he speculated, because to do so would "show a government's cards" about its willingness to take detainees. He thought that most governments were still at a point at which they did not want to reveal to other EU capitals their willingness to resettle detainees, waiting to find out if others would step forward first. "I would expect Washington will learn first which countries are willing, before we do."
8. (SBU) Chatterton-Dixon stressed that HMG appreciates the USG keeping it informed of future developments related to the Executive Orders and the work of the inter-agency panels.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
LEBARON
Tuesday, 22 September 2009, 14:13
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 LONDON 002198
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/21/2019
TAGS PARM, KNNP, PREL, CH, EG, FR, IN, IR, IZ, JA, KN, PK,
RS, SL, UK
SUBJECT: U/S TAUSCHER'S MEETINGS WITH FS MILIBAND AND OTHER
HMG OFFICIALS
Classified By: Political Counselor Robin Quinville for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) Summary: Under Secretary Tauscher held meetings in London on September 2-4 on the margins of the P5 Conference on Confidence Building Measures Towards Nuclear Disarmament with Foreign Secretary David Miliband, Simon McDonald, Head of the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat at the Cabinet Office, Mariot Leslie, Director General, Defence and Intelligence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and Jon Day, MOD Director General for Security Policy. The UK interlocutors expressed broad support for USG goals with regard to nonproliferation and disarmament and highlighted the need for close P3 and P5 coordination in the lead-up to the UNSC Heads of Goverment Summit and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Confererence (RevCon). They also predicted that UK arms control policy would not be affected either by next year's elections or the upcoming Strategic Defense Review. McDonald cited the need to get tough with Iran if it did not respond to overtures by the end of September. U/S Tauscher expressed continued commitment to ratification of the Defense Trade Treaty and noted that she is working with the Senate to resolve questions concerning implementation. End Summary
Welcoming U.S. Leadership
-------------------------
2. (S/NF) While in London for the September 3-4 P5 Conference on Confidence Building Measures Towards Nuclear Disarmament, U/S Tauscher held separate meetings September 2-4 with Foreign Secretary David Miliband, Simon McDonald, Head of the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat at the Cabinet Office, Mariot Leslie, Director General, Defence and Intelligence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and Jon Day, MOD Director General for Security Policy. The British interlocutors underscored that the UK welcomes U.S. leadership on nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control. FS Miliband expressed appreciation for President Obama's Prague speech, observing that the process for getting to "a world at or close to zero in terms of nuclear arms is not a straight line" but is long and complex. McDonald said that for the last forty years the nuclear states have downplayed the obligation to spread civil nuclear power and to disarm; President Obama's leadership presents an opportunity to change that dynamic. DG Leslie observed that UK decision makers are "fired up by how the President has made the (nonproliferation) agenda his own." Prime Minister Brown wants to "refresh and refurbish" the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), she said. DG Day said he was "delighted" that the U.S. has "resumed leadership" on nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament.
Maintaining P3 and P5 Unity
---------------------------
3. (S/NF) Leslie stressed that the UK position is "really very similar to your Administration on nearly everything." The UK's goal is for the P5 to work well together but we should "not scare the horses," which means "not scaring off the French" and "keeping the Chinese and Russians on board." She acknowledged that it was "hard to get everyone together" for the 9/3-4 P5 Conference, but expressed hope that it would help cement P5 unity in the lead-up to the NPT Review Confererence (RevCon). Day acknowledged that the 9/3-4 P5 Conference was not a vehicle designed to make progress by "leaps and bounds." He stressed that "the engagement is valuable" and would help cement P5 unity.
4. (S/NF) We need a strong, but unanimous, signal from the UN Security Council (UNSC) at the UNSC Heads of Government Summit, Simon McDonald stressed, noting that the first draft resolution was a disappointment. The UK interlocutors agreed on the importance of P5 unity at the summit, as well as on the importance of close P3 and P5 coordination in the lead-up to the summit and to the NPT RevCon. McDonald also observed that Libya was on the UNSC and that the P5 should take positive note of the fact that Libya has made a "strategic shift" on nuclear proliferation.
France and P3 Unity
-------------------
5. (S/NF) DG Leslie said that the UK had done a "lot of hard
LONDON 00002198 002 OF 005
work and expressed a commitment to disarmament...and the French are uncomfortable with this." Leslie said that the UK "gets on well" with the French, but the French are "excessively worried about what they view as unilateral UK disarmament." She said that P3 talks would help maintain P3 unity; "We need to reassure France," she said. Leslie characterized closer U.S.-France relations as "extremely healthy."
6. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher, Leslie, and Day agreed to regular P3 meetings, starting in October, to help cement P3 unity. French interlocutors also agreed, during separate bilateral meetings with Tauscher, on the importance of regular P3 consultations.
Missile Defense and the Nuclear Posture Review
--------------------------------------------- -
7. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher described the Missile Defense review underway in Washington, with emphasis on countering the Iranian missile threat to Europe with proven technology. She also described the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which would replace the 2002 NPR and would address questions such as extended deterrence and security assurances. Her UK interlocutors expressed considerable interest in both reviews, and she made clear the U.S. would consult bilaterally and with NATO as soon as the reviews progress to that point.
Political consensus on a Strategic Defense Review
--------------------------------------------- ----
8. (S/NF) Day acknowledged that "the next year will be pretty disruptive" in the UK as the two major parties prepare for the next general election. He stressed that both the Labour and Conservative parties are committed to a Strategic Defense Review after the election. He predicted that neither political conflict between the two major parties nor the defense review would affect arms control policy, although he advised that these factors "may distract the attention" of political leaders. He predicted that "defense will be a bigger issue than it usually is" during the British electoral period. He cited intense debate over Britain's role in Afghanistan and the "defense budget crisis" as two prominent issues.
9. (S/NF) Day opined that "mobilizing" NATO allies after General McChrystal released the results of his review would be "very difficult." "Our message" to the U.S. is "bear with us... we will continue to work closely with you," Day said. He pledged to work closely with the U.S. on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and National Posture Review (NPR) as well as on the UK's Strategic Defense Review. In regard to the UK review, Day observed that he had worked on the last review in 1997-98, and he bemoaned the lack of institutional memory within HMG regarding the review process.
10. (S/NF) Day also promised that the UK had "put measures in place to protect your interests" during the UK inquiry into the causes of the Iraq war. He noted that Iraq seems no longer to be a major issue in the U.S., but he said it would become a big issue -- a "feeding frenzy" -- in the UK "when the inquiry takes off."
Iran
----
11. (S/NF) Tauscher made clear that Iran needed to respond to the P5 1 offer prior to the UNGA, at which point there would be a stock-taking; absent progress, attention would turn to substantially stronger sanctions. FS Milband opined that U.S. Administration is "rightly trying to overcome a deficit of prejudice and mistrust in a relatively short time" by diplomatic outreach to Iran. He continued that the Iranian elections were a "bad outcome" -- an outcome that had given extremists the upper hand and resulted in a "culling of reformists." Miliband said that, in his opinion, Iran's extremist government would not make concessions in a short time. Nonetheless, the U.S. "Administration's support for a diplomatic solution is very wise." He praised the impact of financial sanctions spearheaded by Treasury U/S Levey. Leslie asserted that the Iranian administration is "in a state of flux" and "not focused," so probably unable to respond to overtures.
LONDON 00002198 003 OF 005
12. (S/NF) McDonald stressed that the PM supports the President's outreach efforts to Iran, but this outreach should not be "open ended." The UK view is that "if Iran is not responsive, we have to get serious." UK experts have concluded that stronger sanctions should be in place by the end of the year if Iran is not significantly responsive by the end of September. McDonald observed that it would take some time to negotiate a UNSCR; in the meantime, the UK is considering national steps it could take as well as possible steps the EU could take. HMG shares NSA Jones' view that proliferation problems posed by Iran and North Korea should be addressed together, not as separate, unrelated issues, McDonald said.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
------------------------------------
13. (S/NF) UK interlocutors sought an update from U/S Tauscher on the progress toward U.S. Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) -- and on the President's leadership on CTBT ratification. Tauscher said the ratification of the CTBT had high priority. START had a certain urgency, given the December 5 expiration; we were working in parallel to prepare for ratification of CTBT, including a new National Academy study, a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), and a funded program to modernize our nuclear infrastructure. UK interlocutors made clear they would welcome U.S. CTBT ratification, which would be a tangible sign to the world of U.S. commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. McDonald noted that since the 1993 Executive Order, the U.S. has acted as if the CTBT had been ratified, which he characterized as an argument that could persuade reluctant senators. UK interlocutors also sought an update from Tauscher on the progress of START negotiations and the status of the NPR.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
-----------------------------------------
14. (S/NF) "We need to put some steel in Director General-elect Amano," Miliband opined. Amano has a key role and he "must be a leader and a consensus-builder who reports faithfully what experts tell him." McDonald observed that the IAEA seems more prepared than it has in the past to address Iranian conduct. Tauscher agreed we need to make Amano a success.
Russia-Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
--------------------------------------------- -
15. (S/NF) Leslie commended U.S.-Russian progress on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) talks. She said that the UK was looking for the U.S. to deal with Russia since "our relations (with Russia) are very poor." Leslie said that despite UK-Russia bilateral problems, HMG would be able to work with Russia through the NPT process and she expressed hope that Russia "could do the right thing" to address global proliferation. She noted the Russian proposal for a conference that could help address Egyptian concerns. Day opined that after START negotiations are successfully concluded, Russia might be inclined to seek "another deal" in regard to Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), since such discussions would "keep them at the top table" in terms of negotiations.
China, Pakistan
---------------
16. (S/NF) Leslie flagged the "inconvenient truth" that "China is building its nuclear arsenal." She evoked an arms race in the Pacific in light of India's nuclear program. Nonetheless, Leslie said she was optimistic regarding China's commitment to multilateral cooperation and she suggested that the U.S. and the UK should push China for progress "until they say 'stop it'." She noted that the Chinese had "pretty much" said a year ago that if the U.S. ratifies the CTBT, China would follow suit. Further, China has "dumped" Pakistan in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which is a "good sign." Tauscher urged P5 action to get Pakistan to stop blocking progress in the CD on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
17. (S/NF) The UK has deep concerns about the safety and
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security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, and China could play a big role in stabilizing Pakistan, Leslie said. Pakistan has accepted nuclear safety help, but under the IAEA flag (albeit British technicians). The Pakistanis worry that the U.S. "will drop in and take their nukes," Leslie said.
18. (S/NF) Day expressed support for the development of a "cold war"-like relationship between India and Pakistan that would "introduce a degree of certainty" between the two countries in their dealings. He noted that recent intelligence indicates that Pakistan "is not going in a good direction." Pakistan sees the debate about Afghanistan in the U.S. and the UK as demonstrating that the allies lack the will to maintain their commitment there. The Pakistanis also believe that their recent successes against extremists in the Swat valley validate their belief that they can deal with their own internal problems without changing their approach toward India. Day asked if the U.S. would be "obliged" to cut relations with Pakistan if the military took over again; he said that the last time the military assumed power the UK had maintained military-to-military ties. Day also asked for the U.S. perspective on Nawaz Sharif, whom he described as "potentially less venal" than other Pakistani leaders.
Nonproliferation and Public Diplomacy
-------------------------------------
19. (S/NF) Leslie opined that P5 states are "losing the public diplomacy arguments about nonproliferation" and civil nuclear power, with the P3 and the P5 "being portrayed as the bad guy." Day expressed a similar sentiment, noting that there is "no real recognition" of what the UK has done in terms of nonproliferation and disarmament, "either in our own media or worldwide." U/S Tauscher agreed that we all need to do a much better job of getting our narrative out, and noted that the State Department has brought in new people to help to do that.
20. (S/NF) Leslie acknowledged that there had been divisions within HMG about the strategy for addressing proliferation. In Leslie's view, the risk of proliferation is a bigger threat than terrorism but it ranks lower than terrorism on the public's list of perceived threats. She flagged efforts both by states and by terrorist groups to obtain nuclear weapons. She cited former FS Beckett's speech at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference in June 2007 as setting out the UK's commitment to a nuclear free world. In HMG's view, President Obama's Prague speech expressed the same commitment. Disarmament alone )- without successfully addressing proliferation )- would not make the world safer, so "we need to manage disarmament," Leslie stated. She rejected the French assertion that that the U.S. and the UK are "starting a (public) debate that is not there" by publicly addressing issues of nuclear disarmament.
Civil Nuclear Cooperation
-------------------------
21. (S/NF) UK interlocutors noted HMG's commitment to civil nuclear power and that the nuclear weapons states have done a poor job in terms of Article IV of the NPT. FS Miliband commented that the nuclear weapons states have a credibility problem with the non-nuclear weapons states. Leslie said that the UK had demonstrated its commitment to "moving forward" civil nuclear issues, citing the UK-hosted and organized nuclear fuel cycle conference in March 2009 as an example. Tauscher agreed that we should support nuclear power and nuclear cooperation in a manner that does not lead to the spread of dangerous technologies, citing our agreement with the UAE as an example.
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
-----------------------
22. (S/NF) FS Miliband asked about the status of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), insisting "we are not trying to keep people from bearing arms in the USA." He asked if it was "conceivable" for the U.S. to ratify the treaty. Tauscher stated she was not optimistic given the Second Amendment issues being raised by opponents, but said the Administration was planning to review the ATT and we are prepared to listen to the UK make its case on this issue. FS Miliband said that the UK launched its campaign in favor of the ATT in September 2008 with the support of some U.S. companies.
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23. (S/NF) Day observed that there is "sometimes a sense" that the FCO "pushes" the ATT while the MOD opposes it. He stressed that the MOD and the UK defense industry "support strongly" the ATT. He said that he had personally seen the impact of MANPADS in Sierra Leone, and stated that ground to air missile proliferation is a major problem that the ATT could address. "Given our operational deployments in Afghanistan, we're focused on" the ATT," he said.
NATO - Strategic Concept
------------------------
24. (S/NF) Day raised the NATO Strategic Concept review, predicting a major debate in the Alliance about deterrence and its strategic dimensions. A "major objective" should be "to minimize fallout" on nuclear issues. He noted that the Secretary General (SYG) would prepare the first draft. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) will need to review the final product since the first stage of work is done among a small group of nations and many others will be "suspicious." The direction of NATO's debate will depend on the outcome of the German elections: the Social Democratic Party (SPD) could force a debate, while the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) would not, Day said. Day volunteered that he had been "soured" by the last two Strategic Concepts. Tauscher said that the USG would be addressing some of the issues in developing the Strategic Concept as part of our Nuclear Posture Review.
25. (S/NF) Day said SYG Rasmussen "must not take his foot off the accelerator of reform." The SYG must be a strong leader, needs "some early wins," and must have the kind of access in Washington that former NATO SYG Robertson had, Day said.
Defense Trade Treaty
--------------------
26. (S/NF) UK interlocutors sought an update from U/S Tauscher on the status in the Senate of the U.S.-UK Defense Trade Treaty. Tauscher explained that we are working with the Senate to resolve questions concerning implementation. Day emphasized that the Treaty "matters operationally... this is the sort of stuff that saves lives." McDonald stressed that the Treaty was not just an agreement between two leaders, former President Bush and former Prime Minister Blair, "but an agreement between our two systems." McDonald expressed appreciation for Tauscher's affirmation that implementing legislation is not necessary for the Treaty to go into force. Tauscher replied that the purpose of the Treaty was to cut red tape, and we don,t want to put it back in the implementation. Leslie stressed that the UK did not want to "complicate" the Administration's efforts to get the Treaty fully ratified. The UK interlocutors expressed appreciation for Tauscher's commitment to the Treaty's ratification and her explanation of the Administration's steps to achieve that goal.
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
--------------------------------------------- --------------
27. (S/NF) FS Miliband asked for U.S. support for UK candidate John Freeman as Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Director General.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN
Tuesday, 01 March 2005, 17:30
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001306
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/28/2015
TAGS PREL, FR, PINT
SUBJECT: SARKOZY WATCH: FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER DE CHARETTE
EXTENDS UMP HAND OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION TO U.S.
Classified By: Ambassador Howard Leach, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: In a remarkable initiative, the new head of international relations of the governing UMP party, former Foreign Minister Herve de Charette called on Ambassador Leach March 1 offering a hand of friendship and cooperation. Charette applauded the positive results of U.S. policies across the Middle East -- on Israel/Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon -- and even assigned blame for the "embarrassing" downturn in relations over Iraq to President Chirac. Charette said the UMP would like to establish links with both major U.S. political parties, and connect with official U.S. visitors to Paris, as appropriate. Charette's gesture, unprecedented in our memory, reportedly came at the behest of UMP President Sarkozy. The views he expressed are, just as clearly, those of the politician currently best placed to end Chirac's tenure as President. End Summary
2. (C) Former Foreign Minister Herve de Charette called on Ambassador Leach March 1 in his capacity as head of international relations of the governing UMP party. (Note: UMP President Nicolas Sarkozy recently named Charette to this position. De Charette is also vice-president of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly. He served as Foreign Minister from 1995 to 1997 under Prime Minister Alain Juppe.) Charette, referring to recent events in the Middle East -- Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt -- observed that U.S. policies have prospered. The UMP applauds these positive results. He and the UMP also agree with the USG thesis that "the Middle East is immobile politically because it is immobile economically." He cited Secretary Rice's view -- which he shares -- that it is necessary to work with the world as it is, but we need not accept that it must remain as it is. (This is a view, he added, that comes more naturally to a great power; smaller countries generally must accept the hand they have been dealt.) Charette said that this commonality of views had led the UMP to the conclusion that it should "organize a useful relationship with the U.S." Charette spoke specifically of reaching out to U.S. political parties -- to its natural partner the Republican Party, but also to the Democrats. In addition to contacts with parties, the UMP would be interested in meeting official visitors to Paris, as deemed appropriate by the Ambassador.
3. (C) Commenting further on the current scene, Charette posited that "the relationship with the U.S. is the basis of French foreign relations." The last two or three years have been "embarrassing." Charette pointed the finger of blame in one direction: "The President of the Republic went down a route that didn't make things any easier." (Note: In February 2003, Charette was one of only a handful of French parliamentarians to warn against a French veto of a new UNSC resolution.) The UMP welcomes the positive turn of recent weeks, said Charette. He put particular stress on recent progress on Palestinian-Israeli relations, returning several times to a refrain, commonly heard here, that this is the key issue for European-U.S. relations. France, he said, needs to adjust its approach so that it does not always "fall on the same (i.e. Palestinian) side of the road." The U.S., which tends to fall on the other side, has been right to reproach the Palestinians for never being able to control their terrorist movements. The second intifada was disastrous -- for the Palestinians, for the peace camp in Israel, and because it encouraged the establishment of more settlements. The new Palestinian leadership will not be able to escape the need to settle matters with the terrorists. The Israelis, for their part, cannot hope to keep 250,000 of their own in the Palestinian territories. The situation is extremely complex, said Charette, requiring all the energy of the U.S. and Europe. He said he remains extremely anxious about the situation, and skeptical. It is not at all clear that the conditions for peace are at hand -- bearing in mind the downward spiral that occurred after promising beginnings in the 1990s.
4. (C) Ambassador Leach took the opportunity to ask Charette his views regarding Turkey and the EU, given his chairmanship of the Franco-Turkish Friendship Group in the National Assembly. Charette said that the French people have a "deep and strong conviction against Turkish entry. It is a feeling that will not disappear over time." (Note: This view, in contrast to that of President Chirac, reflects the opposition of UMP President Sarkozy and the majority of the UMP membership.)
Leach
Saturday, 26 January 2008, 11:36
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000102
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/26/2018
TAGS FR, PGOV, PINR, PREL, SA
SUBJECT: SARKOZY IN SAUDI ARABIA
REF: RIYADH 0037
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David Rundell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. French President Nicholas Sarkozy's visited Saudi Arabia on January 13-14 to make clear that Saudi Arabia is now "at the top" of the French Middle East policy list. Pres. Sarkozy met with Saudi King Abdullah, addressed the Shura council and spoke briefly with Saudi business leaders. Topics discussed were Iran's nuclear ambitions, Mid East Peace Process, Syrian meddling in Lebanon, security in Iraq, and French-Saudi cooperation, including the offer of nuclear energy technology. The visit can be viewed as a moderate success for French-Saudi bilateral relations, although no major announcements were made. Press reports of the visit along with a private readout by the French DCM were positive, but our Saudi contacts passed on certain displeasure with the French's conduct. END SUMMARY.
2. (S/NF) French President Nicholas Sarkozy arrived in Riyadh on January 13 for a one night/two day visit. This visit was a follow up to Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud's visit to Paris in June 2007. Pres Sarkozy was accompanied by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, Minister of Defense Hevre Morin, Minister of Justice Rachida Dati, Minister of Culture Christine Albanel and Minister of Education Valerie Pecresse. French DCM in Riyadh Emmanuel Bonne provided a private readout to Acting Pol Counselor of this visit. Topics raised included Iran's nuclear ambitions, Mid East Peace Process, Syrian meddling in Lebanon, security in Iraq, and French-Saudi cooperation, including the offer of nuclear energy technology. Additionally, the main theme was to foster a stronger personal relationship between Pres Sarkozy and King Abdullah. Overall, King Abdullah emphasized multilateral solutions, vice bilateral approaches, regarding the multitude of issues discussed. Readouts from the French and the press were positive, but our Saudi contacts privately shared displeasure with certain French conduct.
IRAN
----
3. (S/NF) Pres Sarkozy reiterated his strong concern with Iran's nuclear ambitions to King Abdullah, asserting sanctions were the best way to put pressure on Iran. Abdullah reportedly does not want to inflame the situation and recommended continued international engagement (P-5 plus Germany) with Iran. He emphasized that Iran must abide by its international obligations, specifically the Non-Proliferation treaty. Abdullah reportedly concurred, noting Iran's destabilizing activities in Iraq and Lebanon, along with Saudi belief that Iran's ultimate goal is to acquire nuclear weapons. However, the Saudis are not yet ready to take any action beyond diplomacy at this point and assured their commitment to French efforts for a diplomatic solution with Iran. King Abdullah stated that Iran knows its obligations and the next step is for the Iranians to comply. The French had hoped to make a joint communiqu on Iran, but the Saudis declined because they do not want to aggravate the Iranian situation. COMMENT: It was not made clear just how the proposed communiqu would have aggravated Saudi-Iranian relations. END COMMENT.
MEPP
----
4. (S/NF) Both Pres Sarkozy and King Abdullah agreed to support the Annapolis initiative to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Abdullah told Sarkozy that the issue of Palestinian refugees must first be resolved and that the Israelis must cease all West Bank settlement construction. Abdullah maintained that East Jerusalem must be the capital of a Palestinian state and that this section of Jerusalem must be solely under Arab control. The French had hoped to issue a joint communiqu on the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, but no consensus could be reached.
SYRIA/LEBANON
-------------
5. (S/NF) The issue of Lebanon was raised by Pres Sarkozy. Abdullah cautioned that everyone should be very cautious in speaking with the Syrians, implying their duplicity. He added the French "should be firm" with Syria in regards to
RIYADH 00000102 002 OF 003
Lebanon. In a separate meeting between French FM Bernard Kouchner and Saudi FM Saud al Faisal, the French supported the Arab initiative on Lebanon. Saud added he was skeptical of the current Lebanese political parties and doubted the Syrians would comply with any accord.
IRAQ
----
6. (S/NF) Regarding Iraq, both Pres Sarkozy and King Abdullah concurred that Iraq's security had dramatically improved since 2006. Abdullah reportedly opined that Iraq must remained a unified state, and that external players, such as Iran, must be dissuaded from interfering.
FRENCH-SAUDI COOPERATION
------------------------
7. (S/NF) General energy policy was discussed, including gas, oil and nuclear power. Pres Sarkozy made an offer to provide civilian nuclear energy technology (Reftel) to the kingdom. King Abdullah was receptive to the offer, but no firm agreement was made.
8. (S/NF) In his speech to the Shura Council (Septel) on January 14, Pres Sarkozy espoused tolerance of different religious faiths, women's rights, and freedom of expression. His speech barely mentioned political issues and instead focused on a "civilization policy" - respect and dignity for all cultures. While some of these themes are at odds with traditional Saudi society, Emb Off present at this event reported that Sarkozy was well-received.
9. (S/NF) The French delegation included various Ministers to strengthen educational, commercial and energy ties with the kingdom. Four cooperative agreements were made: 1) political consultations to coordinate regional activities; 2) energy policy regarding gas and oil; 3) vocational language training increase from 100 to 500 students to help overcome the French-Arabic language barrier; and 4) higher education with the goal to increase the number of Saudi students in France (currently 4000). Pres Sarkozy had a brief (10-minute) presentation to Saudi business leaders.
10. (S/NF) The overarching theme of the visit, according to French Embassy Riyadh, was to strengthen the personal relationship between Pres Sarkozy and King Abdullah. Former Pres Jacques Chirac and King Abdullah had a strong friendship with agreement on a host of issues. Reportedly, the Saudis were concerned by Sarkozy's election last year because of his expressed support of Israel and Jewish background. This visit was to dispel Saudi concerns and to assure the Saudis that Pres Sarkozy could be counted on as strongly as Pres Chirac. Likewise, the French told us they are modifying their Mid East policy. The Levant states have been France's top Mid East focus, while the Arabian Gulf had been at the "bottom of the list." Recognition of Saudi Arabia's emerging influence and status has resulted in the French putting Saudi Arabia "at the top" of the French foreign policy Middle East list.
GOOD VISIT, BUT NOT GREAT
-------------------------
11. (S/NF) COMMENT. Per the French DCM, they were quite pleased with Pres Sarkozy's visit. They were disappointed they could not issue any joint communiqus on any major issues, such as Iran or the MEPP. Still, they viewed the reciprocal state visits were steps forward in French-Saudi relations. Press coverage of Pres Sarkozy was positive with front page newspaper pictures of both leaders smiling together.
12. (S/NF) However, our Saudi contacts provided some negative comments. Minor in substance, but significant to Saudi sensibilities. Initially, Sarkozy's fiance Carla Bruni was expected to accompany him (but finally did not travel), which the Saudis found offensive given their strict, conservative culture against the company of an unmarried woman. Various protocol faux pas were committed by the French delegation during the visit. The French advance made, in Saudi opinion, unreasonable logistical demands. Finally, Pres Sarkozy was viewed as less than gracious, in Saudi eyes, during certain events, such as avoiding tasting traditional Arab foods and a bored look during the televised arrival sword ceremony. While these are minor points, the fact our Saudi contacts mentioned them shows their discontent. These incidents
RIYADH 00000102 003 OF 003
characterized one overarching private comment from the Saudis, that Pres Sarkozy has not replaced Pres Chirac in Saudi eyes. Other usually well-informed Saudi contacts have lamented the overtly commercial nature of the visit. Sarkozy reportedly presented a list of fourteen (14) sales that French firms would like to make to the Saudi government, complete with the original price and discounts that Sarkozy was prepared to negotiate. END COMMENT. FRAKER
Friday, 04 December 2009, 11:49
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001638
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR RIVKIN
EO 12958 DECL: 12/04/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, FR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SARKOZY: THE KEY DECISION-MAKER WHO CAN
BE A FORCE MULTIPLIER ON GLOBAL ISSUES
REF: A. PARIS 1588 B. PARIS 1589 C. PARIS 1521
Classified By: Ambassador Charles Rivkin for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (C/NF) Summary. At the mid-point of his five-year term, French President Sarkozy continues to be the dominant, virtually unchallenged, political force in France. Slowed in domestic reform efforts by entrenched interests and the world-wide financial crisis, Sarkozy is increasingly focused on successfully leveraging France's foreign policy influence on the global stage. Ambitious and action-oriented, Sarkozy doesn't hesitate to break traditional French policies and reach out to new partners, from Saudi Arabia and Syria to India and Brazil. His impatience for results and desire to seize the initiative -- with or without the support of international partners and his own advisors -- challenges us to channel his impulsive proposals into constructive directions with an eye to long-term results. Sarkozy himself is firmly convinced of the need for a strong transatlantic partnership and he has long desired to be THE major partner to the U.S. in Europe, whether on climate change and non-proliferation or Iran and the Middle East. Our effort to secure increased French contributions in Afghanistan offers an interesting perspective on the centralization of key decision-making powers in the French President and how to best work with Sarkozy as a valued, and valuable, partner. With high-profile events like the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prep-com next spring, and Sarkozy preparing to lead France's chairmanship of the G-8/G-20 in 2011, we believe we can best secure our interests across a broad front through continued close consultations with our French partners (including, and perhaps especially, at the highest levels), with an eye to leveraging Sarkozy's strong political standing, desire for action, and willingness to make difficult decisions into force multipliers for our foreign policy interests. End Summary.
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DOMESTIC DRAMA BUT NO DOMESTIC OPPOSITION
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2. (C/NF) Sarkozy's domestic standing is virtually unchallenged despite lagging opinion polls which place his personal approval ratings at 39 percent. His center-right UMP party controls both houses of parliament, and opposition leaders in France have spent the past two years fighting among themselves rather than mounting any serious political challenge to the incumbent president. Sarkozy's policy of "openness" in appointing opposition politicians to high-profile positions has contributed to the leadership drain on the left. IMF President Dominique Strauss-Kahn and FM Kouchner are just two examples of this successful political ploy. Despite this political security -- or perhaps because of it -- there is some internal grumbling about Sarkozy's high-handed style within his own party, revealed by the recent attempt to name his 23-year old son Jean Sarkozy, who is still an undergraduate student, to a position at the head of Paris's most prestigious business development commission. A brilliant political tactician, Sarkozy is raising the profile of the March 2010 regional elections to rally his base and steal voters from the far right as part of a ramp-up to his re-election bid in 2012. While this makes him more sensitive to the near-term domestic political impact of certain foreign policy issues (like Afghanistan), his domestic stature remains fundamentally secure, freeing him to focus on his goal of leveraging French power in Europe and globally.
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FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES
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3. (C/NF) The net result of Sarkozy's dominance of the domestic political scene is that he is also one of the most secure leaders in Europe, with no awkward coalition partner or imminent presidential elections to distract or hinder him. Sarkozy occasionally recognizes that to be heard on the world stage -- whether on strategic questions or the global financial crisis -- France's voice is amplified when speaking in concert with others. Sarkozy has worked hard to successfully parlay an initially awkward personal relationship with German Chancellor Merkel into a smoothly
PARIS 00001638 002 OF 004
coordinated tandem that drives much of European policy. Likewise, he will frequently pair with Merkel and UK PM Brown to add needed clout to messages in Brussels and Washington. Sarkozy's ability to leverage his (and France's) voice on the world stage by building on strategic partnerships is one of his greatest strengths; one of his greatest weaknesses, however, may be his impatience and penchant to launch proposals with insufficient consultation with other major players.
4. (C/NF) Sarkozy's most visible successes to date are largely in the foreign affairs domain, with his greatest achievements within Europe. He championed the Lisbon treaty in his first months in office, helping to end the stalemate over reform of EU institutions. This was succeeded by his leadership of the rotating EU presidency in the second half of 2008, which included the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), the launch of the EU's counter-piracy operation, and his negotiation of a cease-fire after the Russian invasion of Georgia. Characteristically, he didn't hesitate to disregard European sensitivities by attempting to retain the lead on specific portfolios where he doubted the Czech ability to provide the necessary follow-on EU lead after Prague took over the rotating presidency in January 2009. On security issues, Sarkozy is equally bold. He personally authorized additional French troops for Afghanistan at the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit and this year he fought to bring France back into NATO's integrated military command, reversing more than 40 years of bipartisan French policy, in spite of strong skepticism within his own party and intense opposition from others.
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NEW PARTNERS, NEW IDEAS
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5. (C/NF) In a departure from previous French leaders, Sarkozy has also devoted a great deal of effort to reaching out bilaterally to countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia and Syria, recognizing that they are major players in the Middle East where French ambitions have been frustrated. French officials are convinced that Sarkozy's outreach to Syria has made Syrian President al Asad a more productive partner in resolving Middle East issues (although they are hard-pressed to provide concrete examples of a change). Sarkozy fully recognizes the growing role played by emerging powers like Brazil (he has meet with Brazilian President Lula nine times in the past two years) and India (whose troops he invited to star in the July 14, 2009 military parade). He lobbied successfully for the G-20 meeting in Washington to address the global financial crisis, and he supports an expanded UN Security Council, which earns him additional popularity among rising powers. The Elysee has also looked to Brazil as a partner in climate change negotiations and a buyer of French defense equipment -- including potentially the first overseas sale of the Rafale fighter aircraft. All of these outreach efforts stem from genuine convictions as well as an eye to the image of France at the center of a global network of influential leaders.
6. (C/NF) Sarkozy is most prone to disappoint when, in his impatience for action, he effectively "gets ahead" of other key players and his own advisors. Sarkozy is firmly convinced that the most intractable diplomatic problems can only be solved by getting leaders together in person to cut through bureaucratic red tape and make bold decisions -- hence his predilection for proposing summits. He has little patience for the incremental steps of diplomacy and once he latches onto an idea he is loath to let it go. Impatient for progress in the Middle East, he has sought ways to make France a player, first through creation of the UfM and second by championing a summit, either in the guise of the UfM or now through other partners (such as the U.S., the Quartet, etc) to achieve his goals. In another example, his surprise announcement last June in support of a new treaty on European security architecture took many allies, and his own staff, by surprise. Although that debate has been channelled into the OSCE Corfu process for the present, Sarkozy is already chafing at what he considers lack of progress on this strategic issue and is continuously tasking his staff to come up with new proposals to address the impasse of CFE, improve the partnership with Russia, and provide other ideas to overcome blocked initiatives.
PARIS 00001638 003 OF 004
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NO ONE TO SAY "NO"
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7. (C/NF) Sarkozy has few restraints -- political, personal or ideological -- to act as a brake on his global ambitions. Domestically, he rewards party leaders prepared to adopt his policies and marginalizes any opponents with a diverse view. Several "favored" cabinet ministers with high profiles early in his administration -- including Rama Yade and Rachida Dati -- were subsequently bumped into secondary jobs after having disagreed with Sarkozy. On the other hand, State Secretary for European Affairs, Pierre Lellouche, willingly muzzled his long-term outspoken support for Turkish Accession to the EU in exchange for his current post. While Diplomatic Advisor (NSA-equivalent) Jean-David Levitte remains a key player, with an extensive background in diplomacy and a calming personality, other advisors like Secretary General Claude Gueant are playing an increasingly public role. Despite having Sarkozy's ear to various degrees, few appear to exercise any significant degree of influence over the activist president.
8. (C/NF) Sarkozy's own advisors likewise demonstrate little independence and appear to have little effect on curbing the hyperactive president, even when he is at his most mercurial. Elysee contacts have reported to us the great lengths they will go to avoid disagreeing with him or provoking his displeasure -- even recently reportedly re-routing the President's plane to avoid his seeing the Eiffel Tower lit up in Turkey's colors on the visit of PM Erdogan (a decision made by the Paris city hall). After two years in office, many seasoned key Elysee staff are leaving for prestigious onward assignments as a reward for their hard work, raising questions as to whether new faces will be any more willQg to point out when the emperor is less than fully dressed.
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WORKING TOGETHER IN THE FUTURE
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9. (C/NF) When he was elected in 2007, Sarkozy was among the first French leaders to openly embrace the United States, despite a U.S. administration very unpopular in Europe at the time. This was due to Sarkozy's conviction that France can accomplish more in cooperation with, rather than opposition to, the United States. When then-Senator and presidential candidate Obama came to France in July 2008, Sarkozy cleared his schedule to meet with him and further broke his own protocol rules and held a joint press conference (a privilege normally reserved exclusively for visiting heads of state). Sarkozy is prepared to be the U.S.'s key partner in Europe and is hoping for intense regular contact with President Obama (which enhances Sarkozy's domestic stature and therefore directly increases his ability to make hard decisions). French journalists are pointing out with increasing frequency that Sarkozy has not paid a White House call on President Obama, and French officials are beginning to express concern over this perceived lack of high-level visits and other regular consultations. Journalists and officials alike are expressing the concern that France, and Europe as a whole, may be of less strategic importance to the United States today (a view that, all things being equal, does not enhance their incentives to work closely with us).
10. (C/NF) On strategic questions, Paris is frequently willing to back U.S. positions, even in the face of general European reluctance. Paris has welcomed U.S. efforts to "re-set" relations with Russia and has consistently emphasized developing a common approach with Washington toward Moscow. On Iran, Presidents Sarkozy remains personally engaged and is willing to work intensely within Europe (both institutionally in the EU and through efforts to persuade individual countries to adopt national measures). On non-proliferation and disarmament issues, the GOF has urged regular consultations in the run up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference and launch of discussions on a FMCT treaty. The most important thing for French officials and Sarkozy himself is to feel like they are part oQthe decision-making process and not simply called in to ratify decisions after they have been made in Washington.
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AFGHANISTAN: AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE
PARIS 00001638 004 OF 004
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11. (C/NF) Our effort to secure increased French contributions to Afghanistan underlines how much decision-making power is vested in the French president and how best we can work with him to achieve desired results. Last year, on our request, President Sarkozy went against all of his political and military advisors to deploy a French OMLT to assist the Dutch forces in Uruzgan, a critical reinforcement of a key ally. It was also Sarkozy alone who made the decision to deploy an additional 700 troops at last year's Bucharest summit -- at the time of the announcement, even key staff were still unsure what the final decision would be. This year, in intense exchanges with all the major French players including FM Kouchner, NSA-equivalent Levitte and French CHOD Georgelin, each one expressed support for U.S. policy but were doubtful about additional French financial or military resources, frequently citing Sarkozy's earlier statement of "no additional troops."
12. (C/NF) However, following a direct conversation with President Obama, President Sarkozy dropped the formerly firm "no" position and moved forward more quickly and proactively than we envisioned, opening the door to military reinforcements "in time" and promising increased financial and training assistance. Although the specifics are not yet provided, the personal outreach to President Sarkozy made the difference between getting a cautious bureaucratic response and a genuine commitment from a key ally when we needed it. The French press led their reports noting Sarkozy was the first foreign leader on Obama's call sheet, thereby increasing the pressure on Sarkozy to respond favorably.
---------------------------------------------
COMMENT
---------------------------------------------
13. (C/NF) Comment: As one of Europe's most politically secure leaders at the head of a country with significant ability to contribute more to global problem-solving across a broad front, from Afghanistan to climate change, economic stabilization, Iran, and the Middle East Peace Process, Sarkozy represents a key actor in the fulfillment of our shared policy goals. We will not always see eye-to-eye, and differences on key issues (such as non-proliferation and disarmament, which are seen as critical to French national interests) are looming. However, though enhanced consultation (including, and perhaps especially, at the highest levels), I believe we can address these differences, minimize unhelpful proposals and foster increased collaboration to better leverage French interests to fulfill ours. France is a like-minded country with a major economy and the second-largest deployed military and diplomatic forces in the world. By striking the right note in our bilateral relationship, we can leverage Sarkozy's strengths, including his willingness to take a stand on unpopular issues, to be a major contributor to U.S. goals. We must also recognize that Sarkozy has an extraordinary degree of decision-making power which is vested in him alone as the French president. In my opinion it will necessitQe periodic PreQntial intervention to reassure Sarkozy of our commitment as an ally and partner and, in many cases, to close the deal. Sarkozy will remain a power to be reckoned with in France and a significant driver of Europe for the foreseeable future. It is clearly in our interest to work hard to channel his energy and initiatives into a constructive form of cooperation that enhances our ability to solve global issues together. End comment. RIVKIN
Friday, 26 October 2007, 10:50
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 11 PARIS 004357
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
NSC FOR NSA HADLEY
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR, NEA, SA, EAP, PM, E, EB, G, WHA, AND AF
EO 12958 DECL: 10/23/2017
TAGS PREL, OVIP, NATO, UNO, YI, RS, IR, IS, LE, FR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SARKOZY'S FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE
U.S.: POLICY COORDINATION WITH A SELF-CONSCIOUSLY INDEPENDENT FRANCE
Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton for reasons 1.4. (b) & (d) .
1. (SBU) Introduction and Summary: The Nicolas Sarkozy who arrives in Washington November 6 is in robust political health. He completely dominates the politics of France. All the levers of institutional power in a highly centralized state are at his disposal. He remains committed to a revitalization of France, through a reform of policies and laws that have acted as a break on French economic growth. The challenge now is to put his ideas and programs into effect. Off to a quick start this summer, with the implementation of a first series of reform measures, Sarkozy is now beginning to feel the full force of French resistance to change. His public support as reflected in the polls is high, but has slipped of late. The political impact of the first direct challenge, last week's national transportation strike, is not yet clear, but strikes in other sectors are threatening, raising the possibility of the kind of crisis atmosphere Sarkozy had hoped to avoid, given his electoral mandate and professed openness to dialogue. The image of a well-oiled, disciplined machine has suffered, as Sarkozy has repeatedly rebuked members of his team, including his own Prime Minister, raising questions about a thin-skinned and authoritarian personal style. The concentration of power and decision-making in the Presidency has made for uneven decision-making and follow-through. The prospect of slower domestic and international economic growth and a tight GOF budget have narrowed his room for maneuver. His appointment to the cabinet of women and minority representatives and the more populist style of his Presidency have been well-received, but his omnipresence and hyper-activity risk overexposure and Sarkozy-fatigue. Finally, freshly divorced from Cecilia, he is deprived of someone who (by his own account) was crucial to his personal equilibrium and served as a valued political sounding board.
2. (SBU) While not central to his Presidential campaign, Sarkozy has quickly asserted French leadership in Europe and staked out new positions and a role for France on the most pressing international issues. He believes that a relationship of trust and close cooperation with the U.S. enhances France's ability to make an impact -- toward the achievement of what are in most cases common objectives. After five months in office he (and his foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner) have begun to make their mark. They have overseen a dramatic shift in French policy on Iraq, reversed declining French support in Afghanistan, have set in motion a possible "return" to NATO, toughened France's approach to Iran and also Russia, and promised a new one toward Africa. The top foreign policy issue for Sarkozy is the environment, which he has embraced as a headline issue, linking foreign and domestic policy. Sarkozy and Kouchner also assign priority to Kosovo, Lebanon, and Darfur. Sarkozy's decision to assist the Dutch in Afghanistan is the latest illustration of a willingness to push a cautious bureaucracy and military and to break the mold of Chirac-era policy. Despite, and perhaps because of, convergence with the U.S. on key issues, and the dramatic improvement in the tone of the relationship, Sarkozy has identified specific areas of disagreement with the U.S.
3. (C) We continue to believe that Sarkozy represents an important opportunity. Energetic, in full command at home, he is determined to make a mark on the international scene. As distinct from Chirac, who advocated multi-polar containment of U.S. hegemony, Sarkozy is well-disposed personally to the U.S. He wants close policy cooperation with us, but in a relationship that gives France its full due as an independent player. "Alliance, not alignment" is the way he usually puts it, although he is not beyond striking a more defiant pose, as recently in Moscow, when he stated publicly that he would not be a "vassal" of the U.S. He will also continue to highlight differences on selected issues --
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such as the environment, GMOs and Turkey's relationship with Europe -- as demonstrations of France's independent policy course. His emphasis of French independence makes less controversial at home both the warming up of the bilateral relationship and the bold policy decisions in such areas as Iraq, NATO, and Afghanistan. A distinct French approach, supportive on many issues, but not in lock-step, is in our interest. A partner with the international bone fides that France retains, as a leading European power close to but proudly independent of the U.S., is one that can enlarge our ability to effect positive outcomes internationally.
4. (U) In addition to setting the scene for Sarkozy's first official visit to Washington, this message iterates the state of play in a long list of issues where opportunities and challenges abound in U.S.-France relations. End Summary
PART ONE: SARKOZY FIVE MONTHS INTO HIS PRESIDENCY
5. (SBU) Nicolas Sarkozy's visit to Washington follows an exceptionally long "state of grace" (as the French call a political honeymoon), one that only began to peter out in October, the fifth month of Sarkozy's Presidency. Through the summer and well into the new French political year that begins in September, Sarkozy seemed incapable of a political misstep. His poll ratings set records both vertically (level) and horizontally (durability). For a politician long attacked as an extremist and a divider, this was no small feat.
6. (SBU) Sarkozy's success is attributable to several factors. While Candidate Sarkozy ran a hard right election campaign geared to winning over the 15-20 percent of the votes that Jean-Marie LePen's National Front had captured in recent years, President Sarkozy quickly made clear he wanted to be a President of all the French, not just the political right. He also made clear that his ambition would not be satisfied with his election to the Presidency. He was determined to use the office to get France moving again -- unleashing its economic potential, allowing it to surmount long-term budgetary, financial and social challenges. He would do this by making good on his program of concrete reform measures, which had received a mandate from the French electorate.
7. (SBU) Immediately after his election in May, Sarkozy embarked on a policy of inclusiveness ("ouverture"), bringing in leading figures of the opposition, including the Socialist Party (such as Foreign Minister Kouchner), the non-Gaullist center-right, and civil society. In addition, he shattered the white-male cast of previous French governments with his appointments of women and minorities, including to key ministries. On the strength of his electoral mandate, and with this inclusiveness as cover, Sarkozy moved swiftly, and with virtually no Socialist opposition, to implement his reform program, moving five major pieces of legislation through Parliament by early October. Sarkozy seemed well on his way to proving that France could embrace change, and that he could imprint on it the "culture of results" that would be the basis for less painful, self-renewing change in the future.
8. (SBU) Over the past few weeks, shadows have entered this unnaturally bright picture. Current polling suggests that while support for Sarkozy remains at historically high levels (in the low 60's, depending on the poll), there has been a slow erosion in his standing, which has perhaps accelerated in the past few weeks. In the first serious push-back against a key reform, French public transport unions engaged in a country-wide strike on October 18 over the generous pensions available to public transport workers. Sarkozy
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insists that this time unions will not be able to scuttle this or any other part of the government's reform program -- while continuing to stress the need for dialogue, not government fiat, as the mode of action. However, international economic uncertainty affords Sarkozy far less room for maneuver as he seeks to reduce both government expenditures and taxes to unleash economic activity, while not fatally exacerbating France's already alarming debt situation.
9. (SBU) Sarkozy's unexpected willingness to compromise on several of his reform measures may signal recognition of the hard economic realities. However, he risks diminishing this image of determination and command -- key components of his political success thus far. Sarkozy appeared critical of both his Finance Minister and his Prime Minister in turn when the former called for "greater rigor" in state spending and the latter described the state as "bankrupt" in parliamentary hearings. Sarkozy, fearing that alarmist pronouncements could undermine the public's confidence, risks creating an impression of friction and hesitation at the top. Sarkozy's close personal association with policy reform has reduced his ability to cast aside the Prime Minister or other officials should his policies lose public support.
10. (SBU) The transport unions are but one of the constituencies Sarkozy will offend in shaking the French economy loose from policies that have held back growth and bloated public spending. As he pushes for reforms that make it easier to fire workers, shrink the size of the state (whose spending represents 52 percent of GDP) by cutting the civil service, and open up retail markets to more competition, he can expect further pushback from well-entrenched constituencies. Sarkozy has set in motion a series of negotiations on these issues that ultimately could lead to important systemic change. But the real impact will only become clear once the negotiations conclude -- probably in early 2008 -- and the government is forced to make politically difficult decisions.
11. (SBU) France's broader economic environment will not make the reform process any easier. Having promised the electorate measures that would bring an extra percentage point of growth to the economy, the Sarkozy government finds itself at a delicate point in the business cycle. The government has already scaled back earlier 2007 growth estimates, and most private sector economists believe the government's 2008 estimates are inflated. Although the fiscal stimulus from tax cuts passed this summer may give the president a short-term boost, he is unlikely to enjoy the political benefit of a strong growth environment in which to pursue his supply-side reforms. He has also promised the French people increased purchasing power, which will be hard to achieve. Some of this he blames on the strength of the dollar.
12. (SBU) Sarkozy is keen on unleashing market forces to reinvigorate the French economy, but he is less than laissez-faire when it comes to restructuring French industry. The French state owns a far smaller share of the economy than was once the case, but it still has effective control of energy and other key sectors. Sarkozy's industrial policy seems to be based on facilitating the emergence of key French firms as leaders in their industries in Europe and globally. While European experience with national champions industrial policies is shaky, the French have done comparatively well of late. Sarkozy does not hesitate to reduce state ownership in these deals. The merger of Gaz de France with Suez creates a European giant in gas and energy but also reduces the French stake in its gas company from 80 percent to 30 percent.
13. (SBU) At the macroeconomic level, Sarkozy has been highly critical of the European Central Bank's tight money, strong Euro policy and he is all but ignoring previously
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agreed Eurozone commitments to brining budgets back into balance. In both cases, Eurozone partners have little recourse and France can ride for free on the budget discipline of its partners, at least for a while. In the meantime, the President's approach plays well at home, and often appears designed for domestic consumption.
14. (SBU) The U.S.-French economic relationship remains robust, with over $1 billion in commercial transactions per day taking place between the two countries' firms. During President Sarkozy's visit, CEOs from some of the most important of these will meet, for the first time in several years as the French-American Business Council (FABC) to exchange views on policy priorities. U.S. firms have been almost unanimously positive about the Sarkozy government. Nonetheless there are a number of regulatory unknowns that could potentially impact U.S. commercial interests. Among these are the GOF's evolving views on genetically-modified organisms, IPR in the digital environment and pricing policy as it relates to pharmaceutical spending.
15. (C) On permanent overdrive and intense in the best of times, Sarkozy's recent divorce raises questions about his ability to maintain his equilibrium and focus. Sarkozy has himself spoken of his dependence on Cecilia -- "my source of strength and my Achilles Heel," as he put it. During their separation in 2005, a highly irritable, darker Sarkozy came into view -- the same one that reappeared at the Lisbon Summit the day after the announcement of the divorce. How much Cecilia really anchored him, personally and politically, should soon become evident, but we are betting on Sarkozy's ability to bounce back.
16. (C) Notwithstanding the debate swirling around him and his slight decline in the polls, Sarkozy's political health remains strong. He controls all the main levers of power: the Presidency, the Parliament, the dominant political party, and the omnipresent agents of the French state. The opposition Socialists are in disarray, incapable for the moment of taking unified policy positions. Sarkozy is in a position to reassert French leadership in Europe and in international affairs generally. He (and Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner) have also begun to make their mark, unevenly, on French policy. The foreign policy equivalent of his domestic "rupture" are his Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and possibly NATO. On Iraq, Sarkozy and Kouchner have made a dramatic difference, offering political support and associating France with reconstruction efforts -- and prompting surprisingly little opposition or criticism. On NATO, Sarkozy has challenged his bureaucracy -- and the U.S. -- to find a way to fashion a win-win approach for NATO and ESDP that would entail a full French "return" to NATO, although the specifics of Sarkozy's conditions have not yet been worked through. Sarkozy will be calculating the political cost of any shift on NATO, knowing that he would be breaking a foreign policy consensus that has long enjoyed the support of the Gaullist right, much of the center, and all of the left. Other issues already showing Sarkozy's imprint include: Russia, where he is less willing to accommodate and is increasingly concerned about Russian intentions and objectives; the Middle East, where he has introduced a new emphasis on Israel's security into the inhospitable ground of France's "politique Arabe"; and, Africa, where Sarkozy appears intent on finally making a break from France's post-colonial reflexes and relationships. Other high priority issues which Sarkozy will also want to discuss include his top issue, climate change, along with Iran, Kosovo, Burma, Darfur, counterterrorism and climate change. Sarkozy's approach to these and other international issues of concern to both France and the U.S. are discussed in the second section of this cable.
PART TWO:
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KEY POLICY ISSUES: WHERE THEY ARE AND WHERE WE WANT THEM TO BE
17. (C) The White House has already publicly enumerated key topics on the visit agenda: Afghanistan, Iran, Middle East Peace, Lebanon, Darfur, Burma, Kosovo, counterterrorism, and the promotion of democracy. Herein follows a snapshot of where the French are on each of them and on some additional areas, and where we would like to move them. Our list is topped by thee priority policy issues -- Iraq, NATO, and Russia -- sufficiently sensitive not to have been publicly highlighted in the White House announcement, along with Afghanistan, followed by climate change, which will likely be highest on Sarkozy's list.
18. (C) Iraq: The sudden and dramatic French decision, days following the President's meeting in Kennebunkport, to break with previous policy and reengage with Iraq has uncertain paternity -- with both Sarkozy and Kouchner claiming credit. Following Kouchner's three-day visit to Iraq in August, the GOF has already hosted both President Talibani and FM Zebari. Last week, Sarkozy told Talibani that France wanted to help Iraq across the board -- politically, diplomatically, educationally, and culturally. French assistance will not include any commitment of French troops in Iraq, but it could include training for Iraqi security/police units as well as counterterrorism forces. The French have promised other, initially symbolic measures such as opening a diplomatic office in the northern city of Irbil and aid for a hospital in the same area. Kouchner has already pressed the EU to become more active in multinational efforts at reconstruction, which France would like the UN to head up. Any U.S. diplomatic conference or initiative could garner French support: Kouchner plans to attend the upcoming ministerial meeting in Istanbul of Iraq's "neighbors." In fact, the French are just starting to figure out how they can best help Iraq, especially to relieve what they see as a harsh humanitarian situation. Sarkozy would likely be open to detailed discussion on this topic: Given his and Kouchner's identification with the new policy, and abiding lack of enthusiasm in at least parts of the bureaucracy, he is in fact the best place to start. Regarding the U.S. role, Sarkozy and Kouchner do not share their predecessors' fixation on our continued troop presence. They understand and acknowledge the reality that a hasty pullout of U.S. troops would lead to a worsening, not a lessening, of the violence with potentially grave implications for the larger region. We should push Sarkozy to implement humanitarian and reconstruction programs in Iraq, starting with an already promised medical clinic in the Kurdish north, as soon as possible.
19. (C) Iran: Sarkozy's blunt language on the "unacceptability" of a militarily nuclear Iran, and the need to maintain maximum pressure on the Iranian regime over its nuclear program has only been exceeded by that of his foreign minister. The degree to which France has taken a public lead with the EU to press for additional European sanctions should the UNSC be unable to act has been as impressive as has Sarkozy's willingness to confront Russian President Putin over this issue. French officials make the point that Paris has a "normal" diplomatic relationship with Tehran despite sharp disagreements on the nuclear question. In this context, the French have particularly valued their quiet dialogue over Lebanon, which has convinced them that, by contrast with Syria, Iran has no interest in renewed internal violence that might accompany failure to elect a new president. Sarkozy has proven impervious to Iranian blandishments aimed at softening France's position or even to break it away from the P-5 1 group, much to Iran's chagrin. The meetings with Sarkozy offer an opportunity to bolster France's tough line, and it can be expected that Sarkozy will want to get a sense from the President of his analysis of our
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ability to influence Iranian choices, and how best to maintain international pressure toward that end. Having just met with Israeli PM Olmert to discuss the same issue, Sarkozy will be keen to understand the limits of our patience while we pursue the diplomatic track, which, like us, France prefers to exhaust before considering military options.
20. (C) NATO: In one of his first acts as President, Sarkozy launched a defense "white paper" commission to review France's defense and security priorities; one component of the report (expected in March 2008) is a review of France's relationship with NATO. The defense white paper could set the stage for a possible full re-integration into the NATO military command. President Sarkozy and Defense Minister Morin launched a public debate over a deeper French role in the Alliance in September in two major foreign policy speeches. Sarkozy clarified that French rapprochement to NATO would be tied to two conditions: 1) strengthening European defense structures by developing Europe's own capabilities to plan and carry out defense and security operations, and 2) seeking French representation in the highest "decision making posts of NATO." The MFA and defense establishment uniformly caution us against raised expectations, with some in the Sarkozy Administration (reportedly including Prime Minister Fillon) concerned that abrupt moves toward NATO could be controversial domestically. All, beginning with Sarkozy, argue that, at a minimum, ESDP needs to be strengthened in parallel. The idea seems to be that a French embrace of NATO will ease U.S. concerns about a more robustly structured European defense, while progress on that front will help ease opposition at home to France's "return" to NATO. Sarkozy will likely use his speech before Congress to further refine his public approach, casting France's willingness to move ahead in terms of working with the U.S. as an independent ally and partner (not automatically "aligned" to U.S. positions). We believe this visit offers an unprecedented opportunity to identify with Sarkozy the common ground on which a mutually beneficial "bargain" on NATO and European defense might be elaborated. In addition to addressing the substance of Sarkozy's two "conditions," we will want to learn how open he is to modifying France's narrowly military, Europe-focused vision of NATO, and whether he will be on a sufficiently fast track to implement or in some way foreshadow elements of a "bargain" at Bucharest in April.
21. (C) Afghanistan: After a moment of hesitation during his Presidential campaign, Sarkozy now publicly highlights the importance of French efforts in Afghanistan. France has recently stepped up military commitments by deploying 3 additional Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) to complement the 2,000 military personnel (ISAF and OEF) now deployed (largely in and around Kabul). Significantly, Sarkozy recently responded positively to the Dutch Prime Minister's pleas for a French presence in Uruzgan, needed to secure parliamentary approval for renewing the Netherlands' participation in ISAF. In agreeing to deploy a French OMLT, Sarkozy again demonstrated his willingness to move ahead of more cautious advisors and a bureaucracy that prefers slow adaptation to bold moves. France has taken other decisions to bolster its presence in Afghanistan including moving six French Mirage planes from Dushanbe to Kandahar. On September 10, the French and Germans reaffirmed plans to support the German-led EU police training mission in Afghanistan despite delays. On July 30, SACEUR officially requested six medium-lift helicopters to provide rotary-wing support in ISAF (to replace the U.S. helicopters which are scheduled to depart early 2008). France is considering still this request. We should use the opportunity of the visit to persuade the French to broaden and deepen their efforts in Afghanistan, including by standing up a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). We understand the Presidency favors this proposal, while civilian leadership at the MOD opposes a French PRT. Sarkozy may echo recent MFA and MOD
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calls for a more "comprehensive Afghanistan strategy," integrating military support and civilian reconstruction, and including a timeline for shifting the burden from the international coalition to the Government of Afghanistan.
22. (SBU) Environment/Climate Change: Climate Change: On his election day, Sarkozy called for a greater U.S leadership role on climate issues. He will want to come out of his meeting with the President able to say that he again pushed the President to lead. The Embassy, backed closely by Washington agencies, has impressed on not only Sarkozy and his staff, but also officials across France that the U.S. has been leading and continues to lead in the fight against climate change. We've impressed on them -- and Sarkozy should be told again -- that the U.S. has spent $37 billion in the past six years -- more than any other country -- for climate science and energy research. We've developed new international partnerships, part of a real strategy of international engagement to reduce carbon emissions. We've shown the French that even with considerably greater economic and population growth than in Europe, we're doing a better job at reducing both energy intensity and carbon emissions. After the President's Major Economies Meeting (MEM) in late September in Washington, French officials offered to host the next meeting while expressing some disappointment with both the lack of agreement on a post-Kyoto emissions goal and U.S. reluctance regarding market-based cap and trade measures. Areas of potential conflict include concerns that a failure for a broad adoption of similar carbon reduction schemes will put European industry at a competitive disadvantage and the possible French advocacy of a European imposed carbon tax on imported goods. Despite extensive U.S.-French collaboration in developing next generation climate-friendly technologies, the French also criticize what they see as U.S. over-reliance on yet-to-be-developed technologies (carbon capture and storage, second generation bio-fuels, and advanced nuclear) to address emissions. France is skeptical that China and India and other major emerging economies will take steps to reduce emissions unless the U.S. moves first. This is an opportunity to convince Sarkozy that we take this issue seriously and have a concrete plan to make real progress.
23. (C) Democracy Promotion/Burma: Under President Sarkozy, the French position on Burma has converged with that of the U.S. France vigorously condemned the regime's crackdown on peaceful protesters; pushed through as UNSC president a presidential statement supporting the democracy movement; supported toughening EU sanctions; and, bilaterally pressed ASEAN members to take a tougher stand on Burma. FM Kouchner will have visited ASEAN countries and China in the week before Sarkozy's visit to Washington to push the Burmese leadership to reconcile with Aung San Suu Kyi and the political opposition. While Sarkozy seems forward-leaning (he reportedly considered French disinvestment before being dissuaded by advisors), thus far France remains unprepared to implement unilateral sanctions. Sarkozy, however, has urged French companies to freeze future investments. In our efforts to work with France to promote democracy, we should appeal to Sarkozy to redouble French efforts within the EU to push for tough sanctions against the Junta and for measures in support of the democracy movement.
24. (C) Russia: During his first presidential visit to Russia on October 9-10, Sarkozy's advisors were reportedly struck by Putin's defiant and distrustful attitude toward the U.S. and his "revisionist" desire to dismantle or undermine the perceived anti-Russian institutional framework -- regional and international -- that has prevailed since the fall of the Soviet Union. Sarkozy made little or no progress with Putin on a broad range of topics including Iran, missile defense, Georgia and Kosovo. Sarkozy's positions tracked with U.S. views except on Georgia, where he favors future status that is short of NATO membership. Sarkozy's visit to Moscow highlights a sea-change in Franco-Russian relations
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from the Chirac era. Sarkozy has abandoned Chirac's notion of Russia as a counterweight to the U.S., and does not shy away from directly addressing difficult issues, including democracy, human rights and rule of law problems in Russia, Chechnya and energy policies. Sarkozy, for example, took the unprecedented (for a French President) step of visiting human rights activists while in Moscow. France is concerned about both Putin's increasingly authoritarian style and Russia's increasing willingness to defy international opinion, as on CFE and Georgia. Sarkozy is also less willing than Chirac to allow energy security and trade priorities to dominate France's appoach. That said, the French never fail to remind us of Russia's relative proximity and France's and Europe's need to come to terms with a newly assertive Russia. Sarkozy will want to address how the U.S. can work with France, in cooperation with its major European partners, to find a new modus vivendi with Russia. We should use the meetings with Sarkozy to solidify a common approach of tough engagement with Russia and highlight the need for the closest cooperation on four related subjects: Georgia, Kosovo, Missile Defense and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.
25. (C/NF) Georgia: In Moscow October 9-10, Sarkozy told Putin that France opposes full NATO membership for Georgia (although we have been assured he did not address MAP for Georgia with him). High-level French interlocutors have emphasized in recent meetings that France remains open to "something less than membership." The GOF has maintained that NATO membership "should not create new lines of division" and that territorial conflicts should be resolved prior to membership -- and that Georgia does not meet these criteria. France is considering whether NATO could offer Georgia a different kind of status and a different approach to regional security, possibly combined with incentives including abolishing visas with the EU. While we are aware of reports that Sarkozy told Georgian President Saakashvili that he supports MAP for Georgia, the GOF continues to oppose MAP which would, in its view, create additional tensions with Russia and exacerbate Georgia's problems with its separatist regions. It also talks about the need to define the territorial limits of NATO and its Article 5 collective security obligations.
26. (C) Kosovo: This is an opportunity for the President to reaffirm Sarkozy's commitment to an independent Kosovo. Sarkozy has stated numerous times that he supports Kosovo's independence and has instructed FM Kouchner to actively seek EU consensus on the matter. The French also remind us from time to time that Kosovo is a European issue which Europeans bear primary responsibility for solving. The GOF is pessimistic that Serbia and Kosovo will come to a status agreement and is working closely with the U.S. and the Contact Group on post-December 10 actions. The French remain concerned that while EU member-states may agree to not publicly oppose Kosovo's independence, the EU may fail to reach consensus on a legal basis for an ESDP mission in Kosovo. The GOF has accepted UNSCR 1244 as a basis for an international force in Kosovo and agrees with the U.S. that it would not be advantageous to seek a new UNSCR. Sarkozy lobbied Putin in Moscow for more Russian flexibility, but received no commitments. The U.S. and EU, Sarkozy will argue, must publicly demonstrate that a good faith effort was made to come to an agreement. The French are not prepared to recognize independence before the end of 2007 and are hopeful that the U.S. will assist in convincing the Kosovars that it is in their interest to be patient with the EU. Sarkozy will likely ask that the U.S. work closely with Kosovar authorities to take a coordinated (U.S, EU, Kosovo) approach to Kosovo's now almost inevitable unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), and avoid dramatic rhetoric that will further embarrass Serbia, encourage similar UDIs by Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and put internal political pressure on EU states like Greece and Cyprus to publicly oppose Kosovo's
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independence.
27. (C) Missile Defense: The French agree that Russia's objections to the planned system are politically driven, reflecting a Russian view of its relationship with its former satellites that is at once "revisionist" but is also informed by real fears of NATO encirclement. The GOF is interested in U.S. plans for NATO to adopt a complementary system to protect the exposed southern flank of Europe from short- and medium-range threat, although it has warned that there is "not one Euro" allocated to pay for such a system. Sarkozy will be interested in learning of the status of U.S.-Russian discussions and our analysis of prospects for bringing Moscow around to support a cooperative effort. We should urge Sarkozy to use his leadership position in Europe to promote understanding of the true nature and scope of the MD initiative, one that in no way threatens Russia.
28. (C) CFE: The French government remains concerned over the Russian threat to suspend participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in December and strongly supports a unified Allied position in support of the U.S. "parallel actions" plan. FM Kouchner recently wrote to Secretary Rice to propose an informal CFE seminar in Paris on
SIPDIS November 5-6 to promote constructive dialogue leading to a comprehensive political solution. These efforts are seen as key to keeping allied solidarity and building pressure on Russia to recognize the consequences of pulling out of a major arms control treaty. Despite these efforts, the French are increasingly pessimistic; Political Director Gerard Araud was told recently in Moscow that "the decision was already made" by Putin and the MOD to suspend participation, due in part to Russian views that it is "humiliating" to have flank limits imposed on Russian forces within its own borders. We should welcome French initiatives to help resolve the CFE issue and continue our close collaboration.
29. (C) Lebanon: Sarkozy has not been as closely associated as FM Kouchner with French efforts to help Lebanon elect a new president and emerge from its present political crisis, but he has played a key supporting role. Initially unimpressed with the March 14 majority leaders he met, Sarkozy?s view of Saad Hariri has improved with subsequent meetings. After their last session, Sarkozy authorized announcement of France?s tranche of more than $6 million for the Special Tribunal, which France had been withholding pending a formal request for contributions by the UN Secretary-General. Our close consultations with the French
SIPDIS over Lebanon continue, although we differ over tactics and the risks attached to any strategy that would allow the majority to elect a president via simple majority. The French emphasize finding a "consensus" candidate acceptable to all Lebanese and external parties and place more trust than we believe wise in Lebanese parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri, despite his association with the pro-Syrian minority. While the French have revived limited contact with Syria to discuss Lebanon, we do not believe they intend to go further at this stage. We will want to discuss with Sarkozy how to keep pressure on the Lebanese to elect a president by the November 24 deadline without compromising the gains we have made over the past two years in terms of reducing Syrian influence and reasserting Lebanese independence. We will want to impress on him that the election of a President -- whether by majority of consensus -- by November 24 is a must; fear of the repercussions of election of a President by a "mere" majority should not be ruled out if it is the only way to prevent a void that the Syrians would only be too happy to fill.
30. (C) Middle East Peace Process: Sarkozy will want to hear about our efforts to convene a regional meeting in support of Israeli/Palestinian efforts at achieving a two-state solution. The French have generally supported our efforts and not tried to get out in front. They are,
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however, eager to play some sort of role. Sarkozy has taken to using his bona fides as a "friend of Israel" to call on it for more "creativity" and "gestures" toward the Palestinians in the run-up to the meeting. The GOF recently announced its intention to host a donor's conference for humanitarian assistance to help the Palestinian people -- as an end in itself and in support of the political process. Sarkozy will mostly be in a listening mode, though as someone who has sought since taking office to underscore his readiness to listen at least as attentively to the Israeli point of view as the Arab one.
31. (C) France-EU: President Sarkozy was instrumental in re-activating the moribund political reform process in the European Union with the June negotiation for a shortened "reform treaty" that will simplify some of the EU's operating procedures, while side-stepping efforts of deepened political integration that doomed the EU constitution in 2005. This "reform treaty" was approved by EU leaders in Lisbon last week and is scheduled to be signed in December with ratification over the course of 2008. Sarkozy has said publicly he wants France to be the first country to ratify the simplified treaty; the process of parliamentary ratification will begin in December. The French will also take over the rotating EU presidency from July-December 2008 and plan to focus on immigration, energy, the environment and European defense during their term. While Sarkozy remains firmly opposed to EU enlargement to include Turkey, he has effectively sidestepped this issue by supporting continued negotiations on the acquis communautaire that do not pre-suppose membership. He also conditioned his position on EU support for a "Committee of Wise Men" to reflect "without taboos" on the broader questions about the European future: i.e., what is the European identity, what should the EU's borders be, how to handle common issues, and how deep can political integration go.
32. (C) Colombia: Sarkozy promised during his presidential campaign to work for the release of Franco-Colombian FARC hostage Ingrid Betancourt. He would sorely like to be able to achieve in a few short months what Chirac couldn't despite years of effort. In June of this year, the French pushed Colombian President Alvaro Uribe to release 200 FARC prisoners in an effort to move forward negotiations for the release of FARC hostages. While the prisoner release did not achieve the desired results, the French are now backing Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's offer to negotiate a hostage deal between the Colombian government and FARC guerillas. Sarkozy invited Chavez to Paris in late November. The French admit Chavez is a difficult political actor but accept a "bargain with the devil" to advance prospects for the release of an iconic hostage. Sarkozy may ask us to return two FARC leaders in U.S. prison to a third country in order to obtain the release of French hostage. We should ask Sarkozy not to take any steps that would result in separate treatment for Ingrid Betancourt and put U.S. hostages in harm's way.
33. (SBU) GMO Moratorium: When Sarkozy came into office not only did he create a 'mega' environment ministry, but he also directed it to undertake a process, the 'Grenelle', involving all sectors of the economy to reshape French environmental policies. Among the topics considered in the Grenelle was what to do about Genetically Modified Organisms, a subject of considerable domestic concern in France. The result is that France is currently considering a moratorium on biotech planting that would significantly undermine U.S. agricultural exports to Europe. We believe President Sarkozy may support the politically popular moratorium in order to gain capital to use in his reform efforts.
34. (C) Darfur (and Chad, Central African Republic): Sarkozy demonstrated an immediate renewed interest in Africa
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upon entering office, with France calling for and organizing the June 25 ministerial conference on Darfur, which served to refocus international attention on that country. The French followed up with a ministerial meeting on Darfur on the margins of the UNGA in New York in September and then hosted a broader Security Council session on Africa for heads-of-state/government. France has been instrumental in organizing a separate Security Council-blessed EU-UN peacekeeping mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT). Paris hopes to deploy this force as soon as practicable. In addition, the French have firmly supported the deployment of the hybrid UN-AU force in Darfur (UNAMID). We should thank Sarkozy for French leadership on Chad and the C.A.R.. Sarkozy may ask for enhanced U.S. financial contributions to MINURCAT.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton
Monday, 19 May 2008, 14:41
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 PARIS 000957
SIPDIS
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR STAPLETON
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
EO 12958 DECL: 05/19/2018
TAGS ECON, FINR, KPAL, NATO, OVIP, PGOF, PREL, PTER, SENV,
AF, CH, CO, FR, IR, IS, IZ, LE, LG, RS, SR, SU, YI
SUBJECT: YOUR JUNE 14-16 VISIT TO PARIS
PARIS 00000957 001.2 OF 008
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)
SUMMARY
---------------------------
1. (C) Mr. President, you will arrive in France as Nicolas Sarkozy begins the second year of a five-year term as President. You will meet a Sarkozy chastened by the experience of a first year marked by a sharp drop in his political stock at home, but during which he nevertheless reclaimed French leadership in Europe and moved France closer to the U.S. Sarkozy was elected in May 2007 on a platform of fundamental domestic reform, promising to unleash France's economic potential and to adapt the country to globalization. He has undertaken a range of domestic reforms but the results have been somewhat disappointing -- to supporters who advocated more daring implementation of a more ambitious set of measures, and to a public that expected an immediate positive impact in household purchasing power. Though the public by and large continues to support Sarkozy's reform effort, his personal popularity has plummeted, mostly as a result of his "unpresidential" parading of his personal life and his weakness for glitz -- an image he is now seeking to repair.
2. (C) Sarkozy was not elected on a foreign policy platform, but this is where he has thus far left his clearest mark, repositioning France to work alongside the U.S. to meet common challenges and leading Europe to its next institutional advance in the form of the Lisbon Treaty. While stressing France's independence of action, Sarkozy has sought to enlarge French influence by working constructively with the U.S., setting aside France's Gaullist vocation of tempering the United States' "hegemonic" position in world affairs. This "repositioning" (Sarkozy's term) vis-a- vis the U.S. is seen most clearly in Sarkozy's articulation of the stakes for France, NATO and the West in Afghanistan, his commitment of more troops to NATO's stabilization efforts there, and his declared intention to re-join NATO's integrated military command structure in the context of an invigorated European effort on defense. Your visit provides an opportunity to support and give further impetus to Sarkozy's refashioning of the U.S.-French relationship, and to demonstrate to the French public that Sarkozy was right in positing that a closer relationship with us increases France's influence without undermining its independence. A discussion of France's approach to key international issues closes out this message. END SUMMARY.
SARKOZY'S LEADERSHIP: FRANCE
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3. (C) It remains to be seen if Nicolas Sarkozy will prove able to reform France economically and socially, unleash its competitive potential, and help it embrace globalization. Sarkozy was elected president in May 2007 on a wave of public recognition of the need for such change and enthusiasm for Sarkozy as the person to bring it about. After a year in office Sarkozy has undertaken many of the across-the-board reforms he promised, but the effect -- particularly with regard to the critical issue of purchasing power -- has yet to be felt by the French public. Widespread disappointment with the meager results of reform, along with dismay at Sarkozy's penchant for a flashy, "unpresidential" lifestyle, has driven down Sarkozy's approval ratings, now stuck below forty percent. Notwithstanding his personal unpopularity, Sarkozy's reform policies still enjoy broad public support. It remains to be seen if he can summon sufficient authority to implement a package of reforms that will produce the desired impact by the end of his term. Sarkozy believes he can: You will be meeting an embattled, but determined president, who remains primarily focused on delivering what he promised in his campaign -- modernizing and economically liberating France -- and who is determined to succeed, deploying the considerable, largely unchecked powers of the French Presidency.
4. (C) Sarkozy's first year in office is the story of how a spectacularly successful presidential candidacy gave way to a
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spectacularly unpopular presidency. The collusion and antagonism between Sarkozy and the media are key, persistent themes of this story. For the first six months of his administration (May - October) Sarkozy enjoyed the longest political honeymoon and best polls of any French Presidency on record. He dominated the French political landscape, personally driving all government policies and setting the tone for the media's coverage of his national and international presidential activities. Then (from November through February), in a major miscalculation in image management, Sarkozy paraded for media coverage his billonaire-life-style affair with former supermodel and current First Lady Carla Bruni-Tedeschi, whom he married within weeks of meeting her following his divorce from his second wife, Cecelia Sarkozy. The media that he had drawn in to project himself as a hyper-energetic, no-nonsense reformer dedicated to solving the problems of ordinary French people, took its vengeance, portraying Sarkozy as a vulgar, insecure celebrity-worshipper focused only on himself and his place in the limelight. The ensuing, widespread sense among the public that Sarkozy didn't really care about the problems of ordinary people sent the president's popularity plummeting. (His cause was not helped either by the embarrassing week-long visit to Paris last fall by Libyan leader Qadhafi, whose pronouncements and antics chipped away the notion that Sarkozy's approach to such leaders and to human rights issues would be markedly different from his predecessor's -- and contrasted sharply with Sarkozy's earlier public pronouncements.)
5. (C) Since March Sarkozy has sought to reassure his partisans and the country that he remains committed to reform, despite setbacks, and that he has drawn appropriate conclusions concerning the visibility of his private life. Sarkozy re-fashioned his image, hewing somewhat more closely to public expectations for French presidents as soberly distant, near-regal figures who officiate at civic rituals. This return of a more traditional presidency has coincided with Prime Minister Fillon's emergence from under the shadow of Sarkozy as a national leader in his own right and of the Fillon government's ministers finding firmer footing as policymakers and implementers of reform. In a prime-time television appearance in April, Sarkozy re-launched reform, promising his continued, personal engagement. However, any return to the political dominance Sarkozy once enjoyed will be very difficult, will take time, and will depend largely on showing results -- reforms that enhance the prosperity and opportunities of ordinary citizens. In sum, his first year in office has highlighted three Sarkozys who will likely continue to co-exist through the end of his term: the hyper-activist reformer and commanding political figure, the self-absorbed and frenetic individual, and the statesman, matured by the exigencies and burdens of office, who perseveres to achieve his leadership vision.
SARKOZY'S LEADERSHIP: U.S.-FRANCE
-----------------------------
6. (C) France remains a world power and a leader of Europe. With global military and diplomatic reach, it generates significant economic wealth and still enjoys envied cultural prestige. Even though he was not elected on a foreign policy platform, Sarkozy's most significant achievement thus far is his re-positioning of France to work alongside the U.S. to solve problems, removing the Gaullist imperative of keeping a critical distance from Washington. From the outset of his presidency, Sarkozy was intent on improving relations with the U.S. and, more broadly, bringing France back -- as he put it in a key foreign policy address -- to full membership in the "the West's family" of democratic nations. Sarkozy considers the re-positioning of France alongside the U.S. -- no longer advocating alternative poles to American leadership -- will increase France's influence as we together address the grave challenges facing the international order. Sarkozy identifies those challenges as religion-based political extremism, nuclear proliferation, non-inclusion of the world's poor in economic integration, and environmental catastrophe. In addition, he sees bringing France and the U.S. together as historically fitting and proper. This stems
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both from Sarkozy's full appreciation of the significance for France of liberation from Nazi occupation in World War II and from his personal identification with American social values, in particular, individual opportunity and achievement.
7. (C) Sarkozy's leadership in reinvigorating the bilateral relationship was marked both by powerfully symbolic gestures and concrete actions. Sarkozy's trips to the U.S., including a vacation in New Hampshire last August and an official visit in November, clearly signaled the renewal of trust and friendship between the U.S. and France. Sarkozy said, in the opening of his November 7 speech before a joint session of Congress, "Friendship, first and foremost means being true to one's friends" and France and the U.S. are friends that "have always stood side by side, supported one another, helped one another, fought for one another's freedom." Figuring prominently among Sarkozy's gestures that signaled a new French understanding of key U.S. policies were the dispatch, after your meeting with him in Kennebunkport, of his foreign minister to Iraq and his own Christmas Eve visit to Afghanistan.
8. (C) At the Bucharest Summit, when you last met with him, Sarkozy repeated his intention to "renovate" France's relationship with NATO and to increase its commitment of troops under NATO command in Afghanistan. He was vague, however, as to the exact timing of NATO re-integration, and he understated the size of the French reinforcement for Afghanistan, announcing only the 700-person battalion that will be sent to RC-East. He did not publicly mention the additional 300-350 troops France will send to Kabul in July when it assumes RC-Capital command there (or the possibility of dispatching special operations forces sometime later). Sarkozy's public caution on NATO and Afghanistan reflects his sensitivity to recent criticism that he is aligning France across the board with the U.S. It also demonstrates how his current unpopularity has weakened his ability to brave the opprobrium of the Gaullist conservatives, including many in his own administration. Sarkozy's commitment to a more Altanticist France is not in question. But he does have to factor in the political caution of many around him (including Prime Minister Fillon) and the continuing strength of the Gaullist consensus among the public at large. Finally, a largely powerless Socialist Party-led opposition has found a voice criticizing Sarkozy over Afghanistan and NATO, even if it does not have the political muscle to throw him off course.
WHAT WE CAN DO FOR HIM
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9. (C) You and Sarkozy have brought about an important shift on the world scene: France and the U.S. are acting together in a way they were not before his election on May 6, 2007. Giving Sarkozy full credit for his leadership and bolstering his stature as a world leader of vision and consequence, would be the best way to solidify France's new orientation. We have sought French Government support on a range of issues over the year since Sarkozy became President. The French have responded more positively than in the past, consistent with the Sarkozy-directed shift to a closer and more harmonious working relationship. Your visit would be the best opportunity to show the French we value that relationship and wish to build on it in such a way that it serves our collective and individual interests. Your praise of France's efforts to improve the relationship will have greatest impact if it is coupled with an acknowledgment of its legitimate role in the resolution of the issues that matter most to the French -- beginning with Lebanon, Palestinian-Israeli peace, Iran and Kosovo. The greater the specificity in describing a French role, the greater the impact. This would also be an opportunity to express your support for Sarkozy's vision of an effective Europe, as you did in Bucharest, by endorsing the further development of the EU's defense capabilities alongside NATO -- demonstrating that closeness to the U.S. and sensitivity to U.S. priorities pay off and result in more, not less, influence for France.
FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES
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10. (U) Discussion follows of France's approach to key international issues and how the visit might be used to advance our bilateral cooperation toward the achievement of our policy objectives.
11. (S/NF) IRAN: The French are the most tough-minded of our allies, and Sarkozy has more than erased the doubt in France's position stemming from Chirac's ill-advised public equanimity about a likely Iranian nuclear capability. Sarkozy's hard line has negatively impacted on France's bilateral relationship with Tehran, and France has paid a commercial price, although the Iranians, more than the French, are the ones seeking to preserve some sort of discreet channel between Paris and Tehran. France has hammered away at other EU countries concerned about protecting their economic interests to implement measures to enforce UN sanctions and complementary EU sanctions. Despite the overall positive French position on Iran, they were very upset over what they considered our maladroit handling of the release of the NIE last fall on Iran's nuclear program. This, in their view, greatly complicated the P-5 plus 1's efforts to pass UNSCR 1803 and maintain a solid front in the face of Iranian intransigence. The French share our skepticism about ElBaradei and the IAEA. Given an unchanged French estimate of Iran's nuclear capabilities (perhaps more influenced by Israel's), Sarkozy will listen carefully to your views on the way forward with Iran. He and many other French policymakers share our concerns about the regional threat Iran poses in the Gulf, Iraq, and Lebanon.
12. (C/NF) NATO: President Sarkozy,s closest advisors have made clear that he has already made the decision for France to rejoin NATO,s integrated military command. However, he faces opposition and reluctance, including from within his own party, as many prominent French policy makers cling to the self-image of an independent France as symbolized by its singular position in NATO. The grand bargain -- a full return to NATO in return for a U.S. embrace of an enhanced EU role in European defense ) is viewed as essential to make the move politically palatable to the broader French public. For this reason, President Sarkozy was deeply grateful for your support at Bucharest. French officials are preparing to make European defense a priority of the EU presidency in the second half of this year, and are tentatively citing the 60th anniversary NATO summit as the target date for a French announcement on reintegration. As noted above, a further statement during the visit of U.S. support for a strengthened European defense would be welcome as Sarkozy seeks to move forward on NATO. The French continue to doubt Georgia's and Ukraine's readiness for MAP, but have not completely closed the door to a NATO Ministerial decision granting MAP to one or both of them in December.
13. (C) AFGHANISTAN: At the Bucharest NATO summit, Sarkozy publicly announced 700 new troops for Afghanistan, a supplemental battalion for RC-East. As noted, in July France will also be adding some 300-350 troops to bolster the French presence in Kabul, as France assumes command of RC-Central beginning this summer. Finally, a deployment of Special Forces may also still be on the table, although not before the July reinforcement of France's command presence in Kabul. Although still the largest increase announced at Bucharest, Sarkozy understated France's additional contribution in the face of rising public and political opposition. (Most polling shows only a minority of the French public supports increased deployments to Afghanistan, and there is little public appreciation of the stakes involved.) To increase support for Afghanistan, the French government is co-hosting the Afghanistan support conference, to take place on the eve of your visit. The conference will follow up on the 2006 London donor,s conference and address broader questions of counter-narcotics, effective distribution of aid, good governance and anti-corruption efforts. Your public statements need to address the widespread perception that the international effort in Afghanistan is failing and explain why success there must be a European imperative.
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14. (C) IRAQ: French reluctance to commit military troops to Iraq remains a constant, as does France's hesitation to increase bilateral assistance or engagement as long as the security situation and prospects for national reconciliation are seen as fragile. The French have, however, begun to re-engage, opening an embassy office in the Kurdish city of Irbil (which they have suggested would be used as a national center for training and assistance). FM Kouchner participated in the last two "neighbors" meetings as a means of encouraging Arab states to shore up diplomatic and other relations with Baghdad. France staunchly backs UNAMI and the idea of the UN leading international reconstruction in Iraq. The French have not, however, had much success achieving a significant change of view within the EU and may use their upcoming presidency to push harder. Commercial ties are growing, but only slowly. The French are eager to talk about Iraq, but we need to do more by way of a sustained and realistic dialogue. Iraq Coordinator David Satterfield started such a dialogue last December, but we should consider intensifying it and making it more of an interagency undertaking, with State and DoD in the lead. French concerns about Iran's role in radicalizing Shi'a elements in Iraq and elsewhere is something we should factor into these discussions.
15. (C) LEBANON/SYRIA: They French Presidency learned its lesson from its failed attempt to work with Syria late last year to secure election of a new president in Lebanon. France has resisted repeated Syrian appeals to resume that effort or start a new one and the French have publicly blamed Syria for the continued impasse. However, they are out of ideas as far as how best to move things forward and have adopted the public line that the only diplomatic initiative in play is the one the Arab League (with Syria's assent) adopted. The recent fighting in Lebanon saw the French at once eager to work with us but determined to seek as a priority the minimum necessary to calm the situation and resume dialogue among the parties; the safety of their UNIFIL contingent weighed heavily in their policy deliberations. The current crisis has underscored a key divergence in the French approach from ours, i.e., the degree to which it supports the majority March 14 movement as well as the Lebanese government. Repeatedly, the French have asserted that they support the government led by PM Siniora but do not accept that the movement behind him, which they see as one unstable faction among many, deserves the same full support. Maintaining a channel to Hizballah, which Sarkozy and Kouchner have called a terrorist organization despite French reluctance to designate it as such, is another reason the French refuse to "take sides" in a way that would put pressure on Hizballah despite their firm view that March 8 and the Syrians are responsible for Lebanon's political stalemate. Despite frequent tactical disagreements at the UN, we and the French largely share the same view that it is vital that the UN investigation into the many political assassinations in Lebanon lead as rapidly as possible to indictments and prosecution. Your visit offers an important opportunity for policy coordination.
16. (C) ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE: As always, France remains eager to play an important role in bringing peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Under Sarkozy, the French needling of the U.S. and Israel has largely disappeared from the government's daily script. The French hope that Sarkozy's warm embrace of Israel (unprecedented over the past fifty years), and his strategic rapprochement with the U.S., have increased its credibility as a partner in peace-making. It was in this context that the French offered to follow up the Annapolis conference with a donors conference in Paris. Sarkozy, who is an unabashed admirer of Israel but keen that Palestinians are treated justly, will listen carefully to what you have to tell him about your recent visit to the region and how his own Middle East trip at the end of June can reinforce your message to the parties.
17. (C) KOSOVO: France recognized Kosovo,s independence immediately, but is hesitant about full implementation due to the potentially destabilizing role of Serbia (and Russia) in
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the region. It is important to reassure Sarkozy that, while we must proceed with full implementation of the Ahtisaari plan, we agree with France on the importance of Serbia in maintaining regional stability, and that U.S. policies will remain consistent with our vision for Euro-Atlantic integration of the entire Western Balkans, including both Serbia and Kosovo.
18. (C) EU PRESIDENCY: France will chair the European Union from July to December 2008. As President of the European Council, Sarkozy will be the most visible face of the EU and will have a major opportunity to advance French policy priorities. Sarkozy's goals for France's presidency include strengthening European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), in which he will seek to increase European defense capabilities in parallel with normalizing France's role in NATO. Sarkozy's other priorities include building a European consensus on energy and environment, immigration, and agricultural policy, as well as developing the Union for the Mediterranean. France seeks to create a comprehensive, cohesive European energy policy, promoting energy security along with environmental aims such as reduction of greenhouse gases and promotion of renewable energies. Similarly, a common European pact on immigration would help EU member-states present a consistent front to those seeking asylum or immigrant visas. Sarkozy also wants to set the stage for a revision of the EU Common Agricultural Policy, which provides French farmers with important subsidies. The French EU presidency will also inherit ongoing initiatives, such as the internal process of ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, or simplified EU treaty, for which Sarkozy takes credit. France will also during its presidency help shape EU responses to crises or other foreign policy issues that may emerge. The presidency will thus raise Sarkozy's global visibility, increase his influence, and give him an opportunity to improve his image as a statesman both overseas and domestically. We enjoy good communication with the French on their EU presidency preparations, and such openness will remain key during their presidency. Transparency regarding defense capabilities is particularly important as we seek, with other NATO allies, to ensure that ESDP development is carried out in harmony with NATO. Sarkozy continues to oppose Turkey's entry into the EU, in line with French public opinion, but he has not sought to bring the issue to a head. France will seek to use its influence as EU President to break through the Turkey-Cyprus impasse on NATO/EU cooperation.
19. (C) UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN: This new organization, Sarkozy's brainchild, will be established at a Paris summit meeting on July 13. Built on existing cooperative structures, it is intended to bring the EU member-states together with countries from around the Mediterranean basin to work on concrete economic, environmental and infrastructure projects. The focus on specific projects is likely to be a productive approach, for which we can signal our interest and support. Though the U.S. would not be eligible, nor seek to join the Union for the Mediterranean, we could eventually participate in specific projects or work in tandem with them. Sarkozy significantly revised his initial vision for the Union to allay the concerns of Germany and other European partners that a new cooperative body could split or otherwise weaken the EU. The linkage of the Union for the Mediterranean to pre-existing structures that have by most accounts proven ineffective, coupled with a lack of public-sector funds for the new initiative, may mean the new organization's impact will be less than intended.
20. (C) TERRORISM: Fighting terrorism remains among the GOF,s top priorities. France is one of the few countries in Europe that &gets it,8 and remains dedicated to increasing its capabilities ) in both defense and intelligence. France has been a target of terrorism for decades and is Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) number one foreign target. The improvement of our bilateral relationship over the past year has meant more substantive discussions on many of our common threats. The visit is an opportunity to signal to Sarkozy that the U.S. appreciates our increased C/T cooperation and
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would like to see that collaboration expand further.
21. (C) FARC HOSTAGES/BETANCOURT: Sarkozy raised the profile of the Betancourt issue during the election campaign and over the first year of his Presidency, hoping to accrue political credit for succeeding where his predecessors had failed. Instead he has only raised the Betancourt's value to the FARC as a prisoner. The French continue to search for possible options to negotiate a release of Franco-Colombian hostage Ingrid Betancourt (and other hostages). In an attempt to increase international concern over Betancourt,s health and possibly secure a hostage release, the French Government sent a medical mission to Colombia in early April. The FARC rejected this effort, saying that any release would have to be coordinated in advance with them. Foreign Minister Kouchner visited Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela at the beginning of May in an effort to find new solutions to the hostage issues; however, Kouchner told journalists after his return that he is not optimistic that Betancourt will be released. The French believe the Colombian airstrike on March 1 which killed senior FARC member Paul Reyes may have derailed ongoing efforts to free Betancourt. Sarkozy may raise his concern that the Colombian military might undertake additional operations -- that could threaten the safety of Betancourt -- and he may well seek your assistance in securing Betancourt's release given perceived U.S. influence with President Uribe.
22. (U) CLIMATE CHANGE: Ninety percent of the French public considers climate change as one of the gravest issues facing mankind and many still cannot understand why the U.S. failed to accept the Kyoto Protocol. When Sarkozy was elected President, he challenged the U.S. to assume a leadership role. Over the past year, the French have begun to appreciate our active engagement on this issue. Following the U.S. proposal for a Major Economies Meeting process to further the UN climate process, the French at first expressed a mixture of skepticism and interest. They are now fully on board, with France hosting the third Major Economies Meeting (and the first to be held overseas) in mid-April, where Sarkozy made a major address. France anticipates additional productive MEM sessions leading up to the summer's Leaders Meeting. This does not mean that the French share all U.S. positions in the MEM. For example, they thought our medium-term greenhouse gas emissions reduction target (capping emissions at 2025 levels) much too modest. France will seek strong language on climate change in the upcoming G-8 statement, in addition to the language on climate change in the Leaders Statement under the MEM process. This would be an opportunity to sensitize Sarkozy and the GOF further to the seriousness and breadth of U.S. efforts.
23. (C) DARFUR/AFRICA: Sarkozy came to office in 2007 with an ambitious agenda for Africa, including an international conference on Darfur that the French hosted shortly after he became president. The French have focused on stabilizing Chad and the Central African Republic as their response to the broader Darfur problem. They were responsible for obtaining European approval of the French-proposed EU peacekeeping mission in those countries, intended to complement UN peacekeeping in Darfur. The French provided essential support to our Embassy in Chad and to Americans in-country during the rebel attacks in February 2008. Concurrently, the French have been working to modernize relations with Africa, seeking to develop a more business-like model free of the trappings of the colonial and immediate post-colonial eras. Their reflexive suspicion of U.S. competition in Africa has diminished, especially as China's presence and influence has increased.
24. (C) CHINA: Sarkozy has tried to balance domestic political pressure to take a tough stand on Chinese human rights violations with competing economic interests and a strategic approach to China that favors engagement, over isolation or alienation. He has yet to rule out boycotting the opening ceremonies of the Olympics and has said that as France will hold the EU Presidency during the Olympics he will consult with EU partners on the decision. While France
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continues to support lifting the EU arms embargo against China, it is unlikely that it will press this issue as there is little EU support, which the Tibet/Olympics controversy has only further dampened.
25. (C) RUSSIA: Sarkozy has been decidedly pragmatic in his relations with Russia, though his advisors say he enjoys a good personal rapport with Prime Minister Putin. The Sarkozy government has consistently been firmer than its immediate predecessor in criticizing Russian international provocations (CFE, Georgia) as well as domestic human rights abuses. That said, Sarkozy continues to see his relationship with Moscow through the prism of needed cooperation with Russia on Iran and other major international issues, and the French are sensitive to the energy security concerns of Germany and other European partners. We should assure Sarkozy that we are equally conscious of Russia,s critical role in certain areas, but stress that it is not in our collective interest to submit to deal-making with an increasingly authoritarian and unpredictable regime in Moscow.
26. (C) International Economy: Elected on a platform of economic reform, President Sarkozy has taken steps to make France,s labor market function more efficiently and to create a more auspicious policy environment for business. But Sarkozy,s economic instincts are Gaullist and populist, rather than free-market. While the French government has generally been a helpful interlocutor during recent global financial turmoil, Sarkozy has blasted &financial capitalism8 and speculators, insisting on a need for the &moralization8 of capitalism. He has shown a willingness to defend French national corporate champions, most recently letting it be known that French bank Societe Generale would not be for sale to foreigners in the wake of a large-scale trading scandal. His minister of agriculture has used the recent spike in global food prices to call for the strengthening -- not liberalization -- of administrative oversight of food markets through the EU,s Common Agricultural Policy. He speaks enthusiastically about defending EU &community preferences8 and mentions the Doha round only in terms of defending agricultural interests (despite the considerable potential gains for the service-oriented French economy). And he allows populist views to prevail on agricultural biotechnology by maintaining a WTO-inconsistent ban on MON810 corn. The French are extremely concerned about exchange rates and their competitiveness with a weak dollar. When Prime Minister Fillon visited Washington in May he was fishing with FRB Chairman Bernanke and Secretary Paulson for any hints that the USG might agree to some sort of exchange rate management or intervention. Our message to President Sarkozy should underscore that reducing market distortions and maintaining open economies will be essential to meeting common economic challenges and fostering long-term growth.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON
Tuesday, 17 November 2009, 15:21
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001526
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/12/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, MASS, BR, FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE AND BRAZIL: THE START OF A LOVE AFFAIR
Classified By: Classified By: Kathleen Allegrone, Minister Counselor, r eason 1.4, b and d.
1. (C) SUMMARY: Considered "a love fest" by the MFA, the growing Franco-Brazilian relationship under Presidents Sarkozy and Lula is likely to result in more political, diplomatic, economic, and military engagement in the next three years and throughout Sarkozy's time in office. Committed to expanding France's role as a global player, Sarkozy is preparing for the French G-8 and G-20 presidency in 2011 with a foreign policy of reaching out to emerging powers in an effort to promote France's international clout. His direct involvement in the not yet concluded Rafale fighter jet sale to Brazil highlights his use of his personal ties with Lula to persistently court the regional giant and will serve as a model of French entree into Latin America and beyond. In Paris on November 14, Lula and Sarkozy met to address climate change issues which included an announcement that Sarkozy will travel to Latin America next week which we view as a continuation of the French President,s charm offensive. Septels will address economic and environmental aspects of this bilateral relationship. Post welcomes Embassy Brasilia's comments on this assessment. END SUMMARY.
MOBILIZING THE EMERGING POWERS
------------------------------
2. (C) Highly encouraged by the growing importance of the G-20 precipitated by the economic crisis, President Nicholas Sarkozy is recalibrating his policies by increasingly courting populous, non-aligned states in the hopes of extending French international influence. Ahead of assuming both the G-8 and G-20 presidency in 2011, Sarkozy has been wooing what he calls "countries which are bridgeheads," or states with which France has traditionally not had a close relationship, and forming a body of allies that will help the GOF refashion its image as a key leader in a multi-polar world. (See septel on economic and G-20 issues.)
3. (C) In his August 26 annual address to French diplomats, Sarkozy declared that the G-8 should be expanded to include Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa, and Egypt to form the G-14, or what he has dubbed with Lula as the &Alliance for Change,8 promising to implement the change during the French G-8 presidency. Even before becoming President, he has demonstrated a policy of actively pursuing the potential six new members of the G-14 formation, starting with Brazil. Employing multi-billion dollar military and civilian trade deals as his calling card, Sarkozy has successfully managed to forge extremely close ties with Brazil in the past two years, picking up from where his predecessor Chirac left off in a previous attempt to woo the world,s fifth most populous nation of 200 million.
LIKE "LOOKING IN THE MIRROR"
----------------------------
4. (C) Having first met in 2007, Brazilian embassy contacts in Paris described the initial bilateral meeting as the "start of the love affair" where Sarkozy and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva discovered that they shared "a vision of a new multilateralism" in global governance and the view of Brazil as a vast market and regional platform for France. Sarkozy has often remarked that the two agree on a "near totality of issues," including economic recovery, climate change, and security. Brazilian diplomats noted that the two men have very similar personalities and that Lula has often commented that looking at Sarkozy is like "looking in the mirror." The two leaders have put an emphasis on their warm personal chemistry and France's status as the only EU country sharing a border with Brazil, with French Guiana located just north of South America's largest country. The "unique" bilateral partnership and close friendship between the energetic Sarkozy and the charismatic and popular Lula is of particular note given that the Brazilian president does not speak English or French and the relationship is conducted almost exclusively through interpreters. Nonetheless, Brazilian diplomats based in Paris commented that the two men speak "a distinct common language" motivated by their drive to reshape the world order.
5. (C) Explaining that Chirac was responsible for starting the strategic relationship with Brazil based on the two countries' long history of common values, MFA Assistant Secretary for the Americas Elisabeth Beton-Delegue echoed the Brazilians on October 7, calling the friendship between Sarkozy and Lula a real "love story" and noted that Brazil represents one of France's diplomatic and commercial priorities in the Americas under the current French President. Sarkozy met with Lula four times in 2008 and has already held four bilateral meetings with his Brazilian counterpart in 2009. First Lady Carla Bruni did not participate in the French President's most recent trip to Brasilia to the disappointment of the Brazilian public, who reportedly greatly appreciate the fact that France's first couple often vacation in their country, according to the Brazilian embassy in Paris. Comment: We judge that Sarkozy takes full advantage of Carla Bruni,s individual popularity and their popularity as a couple to advance French national interests in Brazil.
FRANCO-BRAZILIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS
------------------------------------
6. (C) The close relationship between Sarkozy and Lula grew from solid foundations. As France's leading trade partner in Latin America, Brazil hosts over 420 French companies which employ approximately 400,000 people. French exports totaled over $5 billion and Brazilian exports to France over $6 billion in 2008. The Brazilians have a well established military relationship with the French that dates back to the mid-1980s, most recently including a $12 billion arms and technology transfer deal passed by the Brazilian Senate on September 3, in which France will help Brasilia establish their nascent nuclear submarine program, according to Brazilian Embassy sources in Paris.
7. (C) In addition, Brazil is France's leading regional partner for cultural, scientific, and technical cooperation. Three French secondary schools in Sao Paolo, Rio de Janeiro, and Brasilia have a total of 2,200 students, half of which are French nationals. Considered the most culturally influential foreign country by our Brazilian diplomatic contacts, the Alliance Francaise in Brazil constitutes the oldest and most extensive in the world, with 74 establishments in 52 towns. Brazil is currently celebrating the "Year of France," with a series of cultural and cooperative events in commerce and technology to reciprocate the "Year of Brazil" in France in 2005. Their embassy in Paris noted that Brazil is currently engaging in tri-lateral cooperation with the French on agricultural projects in a host of African countries (Cameroon, Mozambique, Uganda) and are interested in developing their foreign policy initiatives in the region, as they have a large Afro-Brazilian population. Further illustrating the strength of the existing Franco-Brazilian ties, Paris mayor Bertrand Delanoe was made an "honorary citizen" of the city of Rio de Janeiro on October 27 by his counterpart mayor, Eduardor Paes, after the two men signed an agreement focused on the revitalization and renovation of Rio's port areas. Both countries also shared recent grief over the loss of 228 people onboard Air France Flight 447 in June, when the Airbus A330 disappeared over the Atlantic Ocean during a Rio de Janeiro-Paris flight. Over 500 relatives of the victims and 40 members of Air France held a memorial service on November 7 in Rio, with junior French minister Alain Joyandet, in charge of overseas cooperation, representing the GOF.
THE "F-X2" PROJECT
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8. (C) Paris used the positive political climate to try to position the Rafale as the winner in the competition to equip the Brazilian Air Force with new fighter aircraft, in the hopes of edging out the American F/A-18 Super Hornet and the Swedish Grippen. Politically motivated, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry decision to publicly announce their intention to go with French company Dassault, which makes the Rafale, over the Brazilian Air Force's preferred Super Hornet stemmed from Lula's close relationship with Sarkozy. Although the deal known as "F-X2" or the fleet expansion is still unsettled, the French President did much to persuade his Brazilian counterpart to lean toward the French-made fighter jets in his two-day trip to Brasilia, where he dined with Lula and was the special guest at Brazil's September 7 Independence Day celebrations, which featured French Foreign Legion troops and an over-flight of French planes. In so doing, he attempted to demonstrate that his political ties with Lula are ultimately reinforced by industrial deals. Sarkozy presented the myth that France is the perfect partner for states that do not want to rely on U.S. technology, even though the U.S. has agreed in principle to transfer relevant technology if Brazil purchases the F-18. However, if the Rafale sale goes through, Dassault may have to request export-control licenses from the U.S. for parts built with American technology. Although the F-X2 decision has yet to be confirmed by Brazil, the GOF appears confident that it has beaten out the American and Swedish competition thanks to Sarkozy's diplomatic efforts. Moreover, Brazilian poloff Bruno de Lacerda Carrilho in Paris revealed on October 8 that Brasilia has been particularly receptive to such personal engagement at the Presidential level by France, posing the question of whether Obama would become personally involved. Marking his fifth visit to Brazil this year, Sarkozy is scheduled to travel to Manaus on November 26 for the Summit of Amazon countries and is expected to advance his broad political and commercial objectives with Brazil.
9. (C) Leveraging his personal rapport with Lula to advance the bilateral relationship, Sarkozy depicted the union as "a balanced partnership with two legs, one civilian and the other military. The military has progressed faster but the civilian will eventually win out." The two leaders have already signed off on the $12 billion purchase of five submarines, four conventional and Latin America's first nuclear-propelled submarine, to be built in a new shipyard at Itaguai, as well as 50 military transport helicopters that will be assembled in Minas Gerais. (Comment: The conventional submarines incorporate U.S.-origin GE Marine engines.) At the same time, Brazil announced its intention to begin negotiations to purchase the 36 Rafale fighter jets which could increase the financial transaction to $20 billion if the deal officially goes through. The French have from the start guaranteed to give the Brazilians Rafale software source codes that represent the very digital heart of the aircraft, a step we understand the others bidders were reluctant at first to take. After Lula complained to Sarkozy about the "absurd price" of the Rafales at $80 million each, MFA sources state that the French president sent him a personal letter stressing French willingness to participate in the "unrestricted transfer" of technological intelligence" that the Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim had made known was a prerequisite for major arms deals in April. Labeled the "French comparative advantage," the technology transfer appealed to Brazil's desire to not only purchase the Rafale but to manufacture the aircraft in-country and possibly sell them throughout Latin America by 2030, stated the Brazilian pol-mil attache Marcus Rector Toledo Silva in Paris to poloff on September 11.
10. (C) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX the fighter jet saga was spurred by the release of the Brazilian National Defense Strategy in December 2008. He noted that the Brazilian Air Force has 110 jets dating from the 1970s and 1980s that are too old and outdated for a country whose needs include patrolling 5 million square miles of territory, 10.5 million miles of national border, and vast offshore oil platforms. Brazil's most modern aircraft are 12 French Mirage 2000s, purchased second-hand and approaching their retirement dates. By contrast, neighbors Chile and Venezuela have 29 F-16s and 24 Sukhoi 30s respectively, both representing the most advanced models available. With Hugo Chavez recently buying over $3 billion in aircraft, tanks, and assault weapons from Russia, Brazil also seeks to enhance its regional military capabilities. Thus the deal brokered by Sarkozy was key for Dassault, bilateral defense ties, and boosting civilian sector trade over the long term. In the middle of all the media uproar however, two Rafale jets fell into the Mediterranean, provoking much discussion in the French and Brazilian press about the fact that the jets had never been sold outside of France. The crash also raised questions about why the Rafale's trade deal during the Moroccan fighter competition in 2008 fell through.
FRENCH CONTRIBUTION TO CREATING A MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
--------------------------------------------- ----------------
11. (C) As Lula has repeatedly stated, Brazil has ambitions of becoming a world power in the coming decades and believes the key is through the acquisition of certain technological and military autonomy. MFA contacts claim that unlike the U.S. relationship, France is ready to address Brazil's trade and technological development needs. Consequently, the recently signed bilateral agreements symbolize more than the purchase of armaments, commented Brazilian poloff de Lacerdo Carrilho. Rather, he stated that they denote the creation of the largest military industrial complex in the southern hemisphere for the emerging industrial superpower, home to the seventh largest oil reserves in the world and the largest area of natural biodiversity in the Amazon. In the last two years, Brazil has announced the discovery of huge offshore oil reserves called Pre-salt in ultra-deep waters in the Atlantic that could finance its rise to first world status, according to Lula. The country also has vast natural resources in timber, gold, and uranium in the Amazon, allegedly being exploited illegally by groups said to include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Brazil seeks to protect its riches and assert itself as a new military power and France is "ready to fully support Brazil as an emerging power," said MFA Assistant Secretary for the Americas Beton-Delegue to poloffs on October 7.
12. (C) Under Sarkozy, France has become a consistent champion of all Brazilian aspirations, backing efforts for Brazil's ascent to a permanent seat on the UNSC, a long-standing Brazilian ambition. France also voted for and strongly supported Rio de Janeiro to host the 2016 Olympics in early September and was one of the first countries to congratulate Brazil on its victory. MFA Brazil desk officer told poloff that as usual, Sarkozy had the foresight to develop good relations with Brazil, which is set to showcase two of the world's greatest sporting events with the 2014 World Cup final scheduled to be played in Rio. Embassy Brazil contacts in Paris believe that the Franco-Brazilian relationship is only getting started and envision an expansion of the civilian cooperation to possibly include industrial contracts for aerospace and transportation in the upcoming months, once the Rafale deal is concluded. Hinting at rumors that Brazil could buy as many as 100 French-made fighter jets, Brazilian poloff de Lacerdo Carrilho suggested that there is much more to come of the bilateral relationship, whether the F-X2 deal goes through or not.
13. (C) COMMENT: The deepening partnership with Brasilia provides France with greater entre into Latin America. A strategically symbiotic relationship, French interest in Brazil seems to benefit both countries. Lula's decision to back the purchase of French fighter jets indicates the deepening Franco-Brazilian relationship and demonstrates the increasing political, diplomatic, and specifically commercial success of Sarkozy's courtship. Sarkozy is expected to shift into diplomatic overdrive in 2011 to boost his 2012 re-election campaign and can point to his foreign policy triumph with Brazil as an indication of his prowess. As the Brazilians continue to hold bidders in suspense over their fleet renovation project due to be finalized by the end of the year, look for Sarkozy to reappear in the southern hemisphere with his familiar calling card of military and civilian contracts. Post welcomes Embassy Brasilia's perspectives on this Paris-based assessment of the growing Franco-Brazilian relationship.
RIVKIN
Friday, 20 March 2009, 16:07
S E C R E T PARIS 000410
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CHARGE D'AFFAIRES MARK PEKALA
EO 12958 DECL: 03/20/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, MOPS, NATO, FR, AF, RU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S BILATERAL MEETING
WITH PRESIDENT SARKOZY ON THE MARGINS OF THE NATO SUMMIT
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Mark Pekala for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ).
1. (S/NF) Key points:
-- Your visit comes at a historic time. Nicolas Sarkozy is the most pro-American French President since World War II and is, at the moment, arguably the most influential leader in Europe. Sarkozy,s goodwill and your prestige give us an unprecedented opportunity to cement the positive changes he has already made and to strengthen the relationship for years to come.
-- Sarkozy is unquestionably the driving force in all of French foreign and domestic policy. A pragmatist and an activist, he can be brilliant, impatient, undiplomatic, hard to predict, charming, innovative, and summit-prone. He strongly believes that it takes political leaders to slice through the &Gordian knots8 that bureaucracies can often be unable to resolve. He has no qualms about jettisoning policies that, from his perspective, have outlived their usefulness.
-- Your personal rapport with Sarkozy will be a factor in the overall relationship, and he is eager for a genuine friendship in addition to a working relationship. He was disappointed not to have been the first EU leader invited to Washington.
-- Expect Sarkozy to pitch big ideas on everything from the financial crisis to the Middle East peace process. In turn, he will respond well to your bold, inventive proposals.
-- Sarkozy should get a clear sense of your priorities and, as appropriate, red lines. Sarkozy wants to get off on the right foot with you and will respect your goals.
End key points.
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EARLY FOREIGN POLICY GOALS: RETURN TO EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP AND THE ALLIANCE WITH THE U.S.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
2. (C/NF) Since the beginning of his Presidency in 2007, Sarkozy has targeted his foreign policy efforts on re-establishing France,s image as a leader in Europe (and the world), following the debacle of France,s "no" vote on the EU constitution in 2005. Through personal intervention, often at the cost of ruffling the feathers of his German and British rivals, he sought to make the EU a more dynamic and active world player. His personal intervention and leadership during the Georgia crisis, the economic crisis, and the Gaza fighting won grudging acceptance and even approval from European leaders who, even though offended by his brash dominance of the limelight, recognized that he was making the EU an effective player. He pursued a similar campaign to return to the heart of NATO and the Atlantic alliance. He focused French and European attention on strengthening the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), taking advantage of crises in Africa and off the Somali coast to cobble together effective responses with a European imprimatur. At the same time, he stage-managed a year-long review of France,s security posture for the 21st century, which will re-allocate resources across the French military and use money saved to modernize its equipment. These efforts culminated in a forced political march toward a domestic debate and a (successful) Parliamentary vote, not only on France,s full reintegration into NATO but on the totality of Sarkozy,s foreign policy.
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MOVING FORWARD IN AFGHANISTAN
-----------------------------
3. (C/NF) With France,s full return to NATO assured, Sarkozy will want to want to show that France and Europe have a more effective voice in decisions, particularly on Afghanistan (where French leadership can galvanize other allies to do more). Sarkozy is a strong supporter of the allied action in Afghanistan, but there is little popular support for the policy or public understanding of the threat. Sarkozy,s recent appointment of Pierre Lellouche to mirror
the role of SRAP Holbrooke is a positive signal that France will be engaged and active; at Sarkozy,s behest, Lellouche is seeking to organize a gendarme training unit in Afghanistan, in advance of the NATO Summit. But France is constrained by issues of operational tempo and the financial crisis, as well as by concerns about the strategy, goals, and time-line for success in Afghanistan.
4. (S/NF) Sarkozy, who plans to visit Afghanistan and Pakistan in May, will likely delay any announcement of increased commitment, civilian or military, until after that trip. Ironically, announcement of increased U.S. force participation has lifted some of the urgency from our allies, including France. Your discussion will be important to help Sarkozy demonstrate to his public that the U.S. is consulting with him before acting and that there is a new strategy that will be better coordinated and more effective. Addressing the summer Afghan election plans -- and pledging better coordination among allies in theater, while pressing for a stronger civilian commitment -- will be key to securing increased French participation. French officials view Pakistan as intrinsically linked with the challenges and issues in Afghanistan. However, France is a relative newcomer to Pakistan and relies heavily on the U.S. and United Kingdom for information and analysis. France has proposed regular trilateral consultations with France, the UK, and the U.S. to better coordinate our policies in the region.
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SEEKING A GREATER ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
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5. (S/NF) Sarkozy shares most of our strategic objectives in the Middle East, from achieving Israeli-Palestinian peace to preserving Lebanon,s independence and sovereignty to dissuading Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. When he differs with us on tactics, he is not -- as was sometimes the case with previous French leaders -- being difficult simply for the sake of appearing distinct from the U.S. To the contrary, Sarkozy,s approach is fueled by pragmatism; to get results, he has abandoned policies that, from his perspective, have outlived their usefulness and launched others (e.g., engaging Syria) that have sometimes put him out in front of Washington. He views our own effort at talking to Damascus with a certain sense of vindication and would respond well if you were to ask his assessment of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. Be prepared to hear that the glass is half-full. Although Sarkozy feels stung by Asad,s failure to send an ambassador to Beirut as promised, he and his advisors have opted to downplay this failure and remain convinced that engaging Syria has paid dividends. As for Lebanon, Sarkozy hosted Lebanese President Sleiman in Paris March 16-18 for a state visit timed to bolster Sleiman in advance of Lebanon,s parliamentary election. Whatever the election outcome, France wants to see another unity government in Beirut -- not out of love for Hizballah and its allies, but to avoid subjecting Lebanon to additional fighting that Hizballah would almost certainly win and which could also spark a more serious regional crisis.
6. (S/NF) By the same token, Sarkozy sees no credible alternative to Palestinian reconciliation. He agrees with the ideals expressed in the Quartet Principles, but assesses that the status quo hurts Fatah and the Palestinian Authority more than Hamas. He would welcome any initiative to repackage the Quartet Principles -- indeed, he allowed FM Kouchner to propose that the EU take a less dogmatic approach on engaging Hamas -- in a way that allows the international community to work with the next Palestinian government. Sarkozy respects Special Enjoy Mitchell but may tell you, as he told Secretary Clinton, that Mitchell is &too wise.8 Sarkozy favors bold steps and has not abandoned his idea of convening a Middle East peace summit. Though he understands that the timing is not optimal, you can expect him to press for action. He is also keen to take up President Asad,s offer that the U.S. and France co-sponsor a resumption of Syrian-Israeli negotiations. On Iran, Sarkozy is the toughest of the EU leaders, yet he harbors no illusions about the likelihood of further UNSC movement at the moment; he will likely suggest that you postpone engaging Tehran until after Iran's upcoming presidential election.
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RUSSIA - DIALOGUE, NOT ISOLATION
--------------------------------
7. (C) Sarkozy came to power determined to do away with the personal diplomacy of previous French presidents and to take a hard look at French interests in the relationship with Russia. However, during the Georgia crisis that erupted at the start of the French EU presidency, he fell back again on his penchant for personal engagement and testing the word of his counterparts. While wary of Russian intentions in Georgia, Sarkozy has made clear his belief that Georgia and other areas of disagreement with Russia are best handled through diplomatic engagement and not through isolation. He has thus pushed for talks on a partnership accord between Russia and the EU to proceed (they are currently on a very slow track) as an inducement for better Russian behavior. Sarkozy has also sought to engage and cultivate Russian President Medvedev, over Prime Minister Putin, in the apparent hope of strengthening relative moderates in Moscow.
8. (C/NF) Like other French officials, Sarkozy is looking for some indication of where we want to take U.S.-Russian relations and how we concretely intend to "reset" the relationship. While Sarkozy surprised aides and allies by responding positively to Medvedev,s initiative to renegotiate Europe,s security architecture, his gambit that this should take place inside the OSCE (where the focus will be on Russian behavior and not the structure of the western alliances) seems to have won some traction. Sarkozy may warn of the political consequences, including in foreign policy terms, of a steady deterioration of socio-economic conditions in Russia caused by the financial crisis. He might also couple any advocacy of sustained engagement with Moscow with criticism of the feckless and divided leaderships, as he sees them, in Georgia and Ukraine.
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AND BEYOND
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9. (C/NF) Sarkozy is trying to activate French policy and influence elsewhere but with less success. In Latin America, he sees Brazil,s Lula as a key partner with a shared interest in helping transform Cuba. His Asia policy is a shambles. The Chinese are still seething that Sarkozy vacillated about attending the Olympics last August and met with the Dalai Lama in Gdansk in December. The Japanese have told us they feel neglected, particularly compared with the attention lavished by Sarkozy,s predecessor. And Sarkozy,s determination to turn around French Africa policy is still a work in progress )- but one where we and France can continue to cooperate closely. Sarkozy will also be interested in your onward travel to Turkey, where bilateral relations have long been soured by France's and Sarkozy,s opposition to full EU membership.
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ECONOMIC ISSUES
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10. (C/NF) President Sarkozy sees the current crisis as vindication of the French model of state interventionism in the economy. Although domestically he has set in motion reforms designed to open the economy to more market-friendly forces, his Gaullist instincts, never dormant, have been on prominent display during the crisis. In the run-up to the G20 London Summit, he and his government have used the United States as public foil to rally support for tighter global regulation of the economy. He boasted repeatedly of having "imposed" the initial G20 meeting in November on Washington and generally has downplayed U.S.-supported work on crisis-related issues in the Financial Stability Forum and elsewhere.
11. (C/NF) With EU partners, he has had mixed success in pushing for a more robust state role in defending industry, a case he often makes by invoking vague arguments that "the Americans do it, so we should, too." He gets more traction in Europe from his government's support for regulating trade based on &societal8 preferences (against U.S. agriculture for example) or a priniciple of European preference. You will have had the chance to discuss economic issues in
London, but a reminder to President Sarkozy that our economic relationship is central to our broader partnership would be timely.
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DOMESTICALLY
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12. (C) Sarkozy dominates the French political landscape. As in foreign policy, he is the driving force. He charged into office in 2007 pledging to reform everything from labor laws to the university system. But the sharp economic downturn has slowed many of these ambitious initiatives, and Sarkozy,s approval ratings languish between 40 and 45 percent, never having recovered from an early wave of bad publicity about his personal foibles. His energetic, occasionally impulsive leadership style has been a lightning rod for criticism, as has his propensity to rely on a relatively small group of advisors. Nonetheless, Sarkozy remains fully in command of the politics, policy, and direction of France; he will continue to do so at least until the 2012 presidential election.
13. (U) Mr. President, everyone at Embassy Paris (and, indeed, all of France) looks forward with great excitement and profound pride to welcoming you to Strasbourg next month.
PEKALA
Tuesday, 15 May 2007, 09:13
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001938
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2017
TAGS PREL, FR, EUN, PGOV, ETRD, UK, GM, TU, PINR
SUBJECT: UK READOUT OF BLAIR-SARKOZY MEETING
Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: UK PM Blair's May 11 meeting with French President-elect Sarkozy focused primarily on next steps on the EU constitutional treaty in advance of Sarkozy's May 16 meeting with German Chancellor Merkel, according to UK DCM Hitchens; the UK hope is that the Blair, Sarkozy and Merkel will reach a quiet agreement on the way forward. He said French and UK positions were close on avoiding new referenda, qualified majority voting, and no social charter, but they differed on establishing an EU "President." On Turkey, Blair had stressed the importance of not interrupting Turkey's accession negotiations, with Sarkozy not clear on his intentions. There was little discussion of trade issues and none of European defense. Hitchens surmised that Sarkozy's operating style within the EU would seek to make deals with major capitals above the heads of the smaller states, and saw Sarkozy's Mediterranean Union as a way for France to deal with the Turkish question. He said it remained to be seen whether Sarkozy intended to act on his campaign rhetoric criticizing the European Central Bank. Personal chemistry between Blair and Sarkozy was excellent; the relationship with Brown will take time to build, not least because he speaks no French. Blair also had a short and unremarkable meeting with Chirac. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) POL M/C and Deputy met May 14 with UK Embassy DCM Tim Hitchens for a readout of UK PM Tony Blair's May 11, late-afternoon meeting with French President-elect Nicolas Sarkozy. This was President-elect Sarkozy's first meeting with a foreign visitor following his May 6 election; he had met with Saad Hariri the previous day. His first official meeting as President will occur May 16 in Berlin with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, following the transfer of power ceremony earlier that same day in Paris with outgoing President Jacques Chirac. The press has speculated that the focus of both meetings is on overcoming the EU's current loss of momentum following the French rejection in 2005 of the EU constitutional treaty. (Incoming Presidential Diplomatic Advisor and National Security Advisor-equivalent Jean-David Levitte confirmed this in a conversation with POL M/C re scheduling for the Deputy Secretary.)
MOVING THE EU FORWARD
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3. (C) Hitchens confirmed press reports that the discussions focused primarily on how to overcome the EU's current blockage on institutional reform. Blair's main objective, he said, was to ensure that the way forward toward a new constitutional treaty would not require a referendum in the UK. The mood of the discussions was positive, and UK experts would be meeting with their French counterparts in the next day or so to try to close the distance between French and UK positions to the greatest extent possible in advance of Sarkozy's May 16 meeting with Merkel. While Sarkozy would not arrive in Berlin with a French-UK "common position," the idea was that Sarkozy would have an understanding of UK red lines. The hope was that, by the end of the week there would be a clear sense in London, Paris, and Berlin about what might be possible.
4. (C) POL M/C asked if Merkel would be speaking for the 18 countries that have ratified the current draft constitutional treaty. Hitchens responded that Merkel would want a deal by the end of her presidency, and the tradition was that the Presidency was forced to settle for less than it ideally wanted. (Comment: Hitchens demurred when asked whether the Germans were running a less "neutral" Presidency than had the British. End comment.) If all went well, the German presidency would end with a mandate for intensive negotiations on a document to be approved by the end of the Portuguese presidency, leaving ratification for 2008. He thought it would be difficult for Portugal and Slovenia, as small countries, and France, as the country that had rejected the EU constitutional treaty, otherwise to reach a deal.
FOUR UK CONCERNS; SARKOZY CLOSE ON THREE
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5. (C) On substance, Hitchens described four UK "conditions" for reaching an agreement, on three of which he believed that the UK and France could succeed in narrowing their differences. First, the UK would insist on an amending treaty rather than a new constitutional treaty, in order to avoid a referendum; Sarkozy appeared to agree. Second, the UK wanted less qualified majority voting than did France, but Hitchens judged the differences as bridgeable. Third, the UK said the UK did not favor symbols which gave the impression that the EU was a state, and therefore does not support an EU "foreign minister." Similarly, the UK was concerned by a new Sarkozy proposal for an "EU President" that would go beyond the rejected draft constitutional treaty. (Comment: This is the first we have heard of this idea. End comment.) On
PARIS 00001938 002 OF 003
reflection, Hitchens speculated that Sarkozy was using the idea as a negotiating ploy that would please his French domestic audience. Finally, the UK was not in favor of a social charter. Hitchens said they believed that Sarkozy also was not keen on the idea, but that this was a high priority for Merkel.
TURKEY THE TOUGHEST NUT
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6. (C) On Turkey, Hitchens described Blair's position as wanting to ensure that Turkey's accession negotiations would continue uninterrupted, as the UK viewed the negotiations as virtuous in themselves. Hitchens acknowledged that Sarkozy was a fierce opponent of Turkish membership, which he had made clear right away. Hitchens said the UK hoped that Sarkozy did not perceive a political reason to cause trouble in advance of the June 26 EU decision whether to open new chapters for negotiation, or that, if he chose to do so, he would make waves only in Paris and not Brussels. POL M/C asked whether Sarkozy's idea of a Mediterranean Union was intended as a face-saving way out. Hitchens affirmed that the initiative was primarily aimed at Turkey, notwithstanding claims to the contrary. He added it was typical of Sarkozy to take a strong position on a subject, and simultaneously offer an escape route. Hitchens agreed that France also saw a benefit in a Mediterranean vocation as a way to balance Germany's ties in Eastern Europe.
LITTLE ON TRADE
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7. (C) Hitchens said there was no in-depth discussion of trade. He said the UK supported the role of EC Commissioner Mandelson, whereas Sarkozy had argued that it was illegitimate for an unelected Commissioner to negotiate on behalf of Europe. Otherwise the discussion was unsurprising; or it was surprising only in the sense that Sarkozy presented a "normal" French position, i.e., consistent with what Chirac would have said. He allowed that the UK had been hoping for signs of more flexibility, and suggested that the UK would want to revisit this topic once a new government was formed.
NO ESDP
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8. (C) On European defense, Hitchens noted that, surprisingly, there had been no discussion.
SARKOZY AND EUROPE
------------------
9. (C) Asked about the impact of Sarkozy on Europe more generally, Hitchens expressed hope for a better UK-French working relationship, although he hastened to add that UK-French relations would never threaten to overtake the Franco-German tandem. Indeed, the UK hoped for good trilateral cooperation between Europe's main powerhouses. Hitchens thought there was a risk that Sarkozy would make deals with "other major" interlocutors such as the UK or Germany, without taking adequate account of the views of the smaller states; he described Sarkozy as "not good at dealing with unimportant people." Hitchens said Sarkozy would discover that he did not like European diplomacy with its emphasis on process and consensus. The UK was waiting with bated breath to see what kind of attitude Sarkozy would take toward the European Central Bank now that the election campaign was over. On a more "political" Europe, Hitchens predicted that Sarkozy would want above all to put France back at the heart of European decision-making, although the UK's main priority was that the French economy do better. While a more successful France might mean a more difficult France, this was still unquestionably preferable to an unsuccessful France.
ORIGINS OF MEETING
------------------
10. (C) Hitchens said the idea of a meeting came up during one of Blair's and Sarkozy's phone conversations, with Blair offering to meet Sarkozy at a venue to be determined. Once it became clear that it would be Paris, Blair also arranged a meeting with President Chirac. The British were frankly surprised that Sarkozy agreed to see Blair before Merkel, although Sarkozy's trip to Berlin would be his first official visit. Noting that it was a pity that French and British timing were not in synch -- Blair would be leaving as Sarkozy arrived -- the meeting also made sense as a way for the British to make up for the fact that their government would change in a few weeks, and thus would "fall behind" other European countries in engaging with the new French government. Sarkozy was accompanied at the meeting by likely PM Francois Fillon and Sarkozy's chief of staff, David Martinon (to be the Presidential spokesman). The interpreter who came was not needed: as is customary, theirmeeting was entirely in French.
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SARKOZY-BLAIR, -MERKEL, -BROWN
------------------------------
11. (C) Hitchens said the chemistry between Blair and Sarkozy was good, much because they related to each other as politicos. Over the years, they have enjoyed comparing notes on party organization, how to work with labor and business, and how to appeal to the extremes. (Note: The suggestion was that Sarkozy may have learned quite a little from Blair on this score.) Hitchens noted that Sarkozy also traveled frequently to London with his wife for personal reasons. Hitchens suggested that, while Blair and Merkel talked frequently, their different personalities (she was far less outgoing) made for a more distant relationship. But Blair had great respect for her, based on the "brilliant hand" she had played during the EU's budget discussions. Hitchens hinted that Sarkozy would not immediately get on as well with Brown as he had Blair, if only because Brown did not speak French.
MEETING WITH CHIRAC
-------------------
12. (C) Hitchens described Blair's meeting with Chirac as uneventful. Chirac spoke as an old friend, noting that the UK and France sometimes differed while praising their cooperation on climate change and Africa. Hitchens noted that Blair and Chirac would probably continue to cross each other's paths in the future, as both of them were setting up foundations to deal with these same issues.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX In the Russian view, there is another serious threat that should be discussed: Pakistan. Pakistan is a nation with nuclear weapons, various delivery systems, and a domestic situation that is highly unstable. Russia assesses that Islamists are not only seeking power in Pakistan but are also trying to get their hands on nuclear materials. Russia is aware that Pakistani authorities, with help from the U.S., have created a well-structured system of security for protecting nuclear facilities, which includes physical protection. However, there are 120,000-130,000 people directly involved in Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs, working in these facilities and protecting them. However, regardless of the clearance process for these people, there is no way to guarantee that all are 100% loyal and reliable.
63. (S) In addition to the Islamist interest in these facilities, Russia also is aware that Pakistan has had to hire people to protect nuclear facilities that have especially strict religious beliefs, and recently the general educational and cultural levels in Pakistan has been falling. Due to these facts, extremist organizations have more opportunities to recruit people working in the nuclear and missile programs. Over the last few years extremists have attacked vehicles that carry staff to and from these facilities. Some were killed and a number were abducted and there has been no trace seen of them. Also, even if places are well protected, transportation of materials is a vulnerable point. In Pakistan, it is hard to guarantee the security of these materials during transportation. For these reasons, Russia thinks Pakistan should also be a particular focus of discussion.
XXXXXXXXXXX
Friday, 14 December 2007, 16:21
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 004722
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/13/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, EUN, GM, FR
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX DESCRIBES CAUTIOUS,
CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso ns 1.4 b and d.
1. (S) SUMMARY. In a December 10 meeting, XXXXXXXXXXXX, said the December 7 Merkel-Sarkozy meetings in Paris were very productive even though Merkel and Sarkozy's personalities are like "fire and water." XXXXXXXXXXXX described Sarkozy's management style as exhausting and said many expected a reshuffling of the cabinet in January. XXXXXXXXXXXX described Germany's views of the French Mediterranean Union initiative as "cautious."XXXXXXXXXXXX described close French-German cooperation leading up to France's EU Presidency in the second half of 2008, which was echoed in a separate meeting withXXXXXXXXXXXX. END SUMMARY.
2. (S) In a December 10 meeting, XXXXXXXXXXXX, said the December 7 Merkel-Sarkozy meetings in Paris were very productive even though Merkel and Sarkozy's personalities are like "fire and water."XXXXXXXXXXXXsaid tension is felt throughout the room when the two are together, then added that just being in a room with Sarkozy is enough to make anyone's stress levels increase. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Chirac and Schroeder also did not connect personally, but still had a constructive partnership. XXXXXXXXXXXX remarked that Sarkozy has the unique tendency to disconnect policy areas in a way that normal, interagency coordination would never permit, and that Sarkozy often seems to dismiss the responsible bureaucracies from the policy-making process. The ensuing, less-than-holistic results can provoke dissent in the government (for example, regarding Libyan leader Qadhafi's current visit to France). According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, fatigue is also a byproduct of the chaos that goes with Sarkozy's hyper-activism on every front. Apprehension about imminent changes in the ministerial line-up adds to the tension. XXXXXXXXXXXX said many expected a reshuffling of the cabinet in January, adding that XXXXXXXXXXXX sensed ministers and their staffers are "afraid to go on vacation because something might happen to their jobs while they are away."
3. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX described Germany's views of the French Mediterranean Union initiative as "cautious." XXXXXXXXXXXX said the French government, and the press, have characterized Germany as supportive of the initiative following the December 7 meeting. However, a close read of Chancellor Merkel's "very diplomatic" statements following the meeting indicates no shift from the cautious views Germany had previously espoused. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that French Ambassador Alain Le Roy, charged with shepherding the initiative, had recent consultations in Germany that provoked "very negative" reactions. Germany does agree that the issues the Mediterranean Union is intended to address are very important, but continues to prefer the Euromed dialogue established through the Barcelona Process, in part because funding for the Mediterranean Union initiative would be difficult to assure. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that some Germans view France,s Med Union proposal as "parochial," since Germany,s own backyard is not the Mediterranean but Eastern Europe.
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said President Sarkozy seems to have come around to previous leaders' conclusions that French-German cooperation is the "engine" of the EU. French-German exchanges are intensifying in preparation for the French EU Presidency in the second half of 2008. Just as the November 12 joint Council of Ministers meeting focused on one of France's Presidency priorities, immigration and integration, the next intergovernmental meeting will focus on the French Presidency priority of energy and environment. France and Germany are also working closely on the third French priority, ESDP, with frequent contacts at the Political Director level and between planning staffs. XXXXXXXXXXXX characterized France as seeking to translate high-level, theoretical consensus on ESDP goals into concrete projects such as the planned ESDP mission to Chad.
5. (C) Also on Dec. 10, XXXXXXXXXXXX, echoed XXXXXXXXXXXX in describing close French-German cooperation leading up to the French EU Presidency. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that the next in the series of regular "Blaesheim" meetings involving French and German heads of government and foreign ministers will focus on both bilateral and European questions of security and defense.XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Germany participated in the French planning seminar for the EU Presidency in November, drawing on its recent experience with the EU Presidency (Jan.-June 2007). On other points,XXXXXXXXXXXX said word in the German Embassy was that the atmospherics of the Merkel-Sarkozy meeting were positive and that the French clarification that all EU member-states could participate in the Mediterranean Union initiative was well-received.
PARIS 00004722 002 OF 002
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON
Wednesday, 13 August 2008, 17:08
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 PARIS 001568
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/13/2018
TAGS PREL, PINR, ECON, MARR, PHUM, XA, FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE'S CHANGING AFRICA POLICY: PART II (FRENCH
IMPLEMENTATION AND AFRICAN REACTIONS)
REF: PARIS 1501
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen Allegrone, 1.4 (b/ d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: France's new Africa policy has received mixed reviews from Africans uncertain as France moves away from the "France-Afrique" model. Some Africans seem to accept the outlines of the new policy, some have expressed misgivings about replacing the familiar with the unknown, and some have pushed back, with the French having to make their own adjustments in both tone and substance. Meanwhile, the French continue to refine their policy and to implement it, with a few notable stumbles along the way, such as the Bockel case involving Gabon. They have tried to give fresh impetus to difficult relations with countries such as Angola, Rwanda, Djibouti, and Madagascar, with mixed results. In broader terms, the French are also working to put in place revamped structures, particularly their military presence in Africa (Part III, septel), to reflect the new policy. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Reftel describes "France-Afrique," the model that dominated France's Africa policy for most of the 20th century. Believing that globalization, the fading of colonial and post-colonial sensibilities, and economic and political realities called for a new model, President Nicolas Sarkozy initiated change soon after taking office in May 2007. He announced a new policy based on transparency, accountability, arms-length dealings, a calculation of interests, and a dialogue among equals. He sought to strip relations of what he viewed as sentimental and historical relics of the colonial era, which had stifled relations and fostered an unhealthy cycle of dependency and paternalism. Both sides would henceforth conduct relations crisply, efficiently, and openly. This cable discusses African reactions to Sarkozy's policy and French steps to implement it. Part III (septel) focuses on structural changes the French are making as part of the new policy, centered on France's military presence in Africa.
Pre-Election Image Problems
---------------------------
3. (C) Sarkozy's new Africa policy may have been a disquieting change in course for Africans, yet not a surprise to them. Many Africans were wary of Sarkozy before he took office. As Interior Minister, a job he held twice under President Chirac, Sarkozy was well known for his no-nonsense law-and-order views. At Interior, Sarkozy made remarks that raised flags about his sensitivity toward France's minorities, particularly those with origins in Africa, either the Maghreb or sub-Saharan Africa. In June 2005, after the killing of a young boy in a troubled Paris suburb with a high number of minorities, Sarkozy said he would clean the area out "with a Karcher," referring to a German high-pressure, water-hose cleaner. At the time of the November 2005 riots in France, Sarkozy described the rioters as "voyous" (thugs) and "racaille" (scum, rabble), the latter term generating strong critical responses from France's minorities and from others worried about their Interior Minister's (and possible next President's) views on ethnic issues.
Immigration and Africa
----------------------
4. (C) Sarkozy compounded these concerns during a visit to Mali and Benin in May 2006 as Interior Minister. Shortly before the trip, he had proposed changes in France's immigration laws, which became the focal point of his visits and prompted demonstrations against him in both countries. Malians and Beninois perceived as anti-African his proposals for tightening the system then in place. During the trip, Sarkozy contrasted his vision of relations with Africa with that of Chirac, and defended his immigration bill as a harbinger of a "new relationship" with Africa, "cleaned up, simplified, and balanced away from the slag of the past." In Benin on May 19, 2006, he stated: "We must get rid of this network from another time, these officious emissaries who have no mandate other than the one they invent for
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themselves. The normal functioning of institutions should prevail over the officious networks that have produced so much that is bad." Africans criticized the substance of his immigration proposals while the French press noted archly that Sarkozy was obviously campaigning for the Presidency and saying things normally within the French President's proper domain.
5. (C) Immigration remains an important sub-theme to Sarkozy's Africa policy, and is one of the hottest of hot-button issues in France. Advocates of stricter controls fear the prospect of floods of Eastern Europeans and migrants from all corners of Africa, the Arab world, and the Mediterranean entering France and then benefiting from its generous social programs and taking jobs, without assimilating and becoming "French." Sub-Saharan Africans are a visible, and to some French, an unwelcome presence in France's urban areas, with much social commentary from left and right on their long-term effect and their ability to integrate and assimilate. Some wonder whether a French national sports team can really be "French" with so many players of Arab or African origin (notwithstanding the recent successes of French teams of diverse origins).
6. (C) Upon becoming President, Sarkozy installed close associate Brice Hortefeux as Minister of Immigration, Integration, National Identity, and Co-Development, a ministry that had never previously existed. Combining issues relating to immigration, integration, and, especially, "national identity" into a single executive body raised eyebrows among some observers, who believed that creating such a ministry not only indicated the priority Sarkozy placed on these matters but also carried overtones of the appeal Sarkozy made to right-wing, nationalist voters (i.e., Le Pen's National Front camp) during the final stages of his campaign duel with Socialist Segolene Royal.
7. (C) Sarkozy and Hortefeux have emphasized the benefits that a reformed immigration policy would provide Africans. The French have concluded agreements with several African countries establishing new procedures. One such agreement is with Gabon, concluded on July 5, 2007, during a visit by Hortefeux. The accord (1) facilitates travel between the two countries by business persons, professionals, family members, and those with medical needs; (2) enlarges employment possibilities for Gabonese in certain professions desiring to establish themselves in France; (3) extends residency permits for French in Gabon to five years; (4) prescribes procedures for treating clandestine entrants; and (5) increases bilateral cooperation in countering fraudulent documents. The agreement, which on its face provides advantages to both sides, nonetheless became part of a France-Gabon spat that included other issues, as described later in this message.
8. (C) Some Africans have disapproved of another part of Sarkozy's immigration policy -- the program to test DNA to verify kinship as a basis for immigration. Legislation for such a program was initiated when Sarkozy was at Interior and has since been enacted after overcoming legal and political obstacles. African reaction has been negative, with one article -- from Mali in October 2007 -- capturing Africans, dismay: "We have known, since the Second World War, after the success of our ancestors, the Senegalese riflemen, in the liberation of France from the hands of Nazi Germany, that our compatriots along with so many other Africans have no longer been welcome on the banks of the Seine. But to go so far as to examine the blood of people to control the migratory flow represents an unqualified case of cynicism and lowers France to the level of nations where racism gains more and more ground."
9. (C) The DNA testing program appears to be going forward. In June 2008, Hortefeux announced during a visit to Cape Verde that France would begin its first pilot program there in September. Cape Verde is one of nine countries (with Angola, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, and Pakistan) where France plans to start
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the program in the September 2008 timeframe. Cape Verde authorities reportedly responded that they "took note of this demarche of consultation" but chose not to comment on this "unilateral French decision." Hortefeux said that "our new immigration policy is understood and shared by our African friends."
Dakar, July 2007
----------------
10. (C) With his stints at Interior, his provocative remarks, and the outline of this new immigration policy as backdrops, Sarkozy went to Dakar in July 2007. He had just won favorable reviews for organizing an international conference on Darfur in June, one of his first acts as President, which ostensibly demonstrated his interest in Africa. On July 26 at the University of Dakar, he delivered the first of three speeches outlining France's new Africa policy. He did so carrying a fair amount of baggage, certain to face a skeptical, if not hostile, audience. Consistent with his aggressive image, he gave a hard-hitting speech, which, as noted reftel, was written by Special Advisor Henri Guaino and not cleared through normal MFA and Presidency channels. The Dakar speech is worth examining because it was the public introduction to Africans on their turf of both Sarkozy as President and of the policies he planned to pursue. That the speech was not vetted by GOF staff perhaps lends it an air of authenticity that would have been absent had it been sanitized.
11. (C) In the Dakar speech, Sarkozy said: "I did not come to erase the past, which can't be erased. I did not come to deny either the faults or the crimes, for there were faults and crime.... I have come to propose, to the youth of Africa, not to have you forget this tearing apart and this suffering, which cannot be forgotten, but to have you overcome and surpass them.... Africa bears its share of responsibility for its own unhappiness. People have been killing each other in Africa at least as much as they have in Europe.... Europeans came to Africa as conquerors. They took the land and your ancestors. They banned the gods, the languages, the beliefs, the customs of your fathers. They told your fathers what they should think, what they should believe, what they should do. They cut your fathers from their past, they stripped them of their souls and roots. They disenchanted Africa."
12. (C) Sarkozy said that the colonist "took but I want to say with respect that he also gave. He constructed bridges, roads, hospitals, dispensaries, schools. He rendered virgin land fertile, he gave his effort, his work, his knowledge. I want to say here that not all the colonists were thieves, not all the colonists were exploiters.... Colonization is not responsible for all of Africa's current difficulties. It is not responsible for the bloody wars Africans carry out with each other. It is not responsible for the genocides. It is not responsible for the dictators. It is not responsible for fanaticism. It is not responsible for the corruption, for the lies. It is not responsible for the waste and pollution.... The problem of Africa, and permit me as a friend of Africa to say it, is there. The challenge for Africa is to enter more into history. It is to draw from within itself the energy, the strength, the desire, the willpower to listen to and to espouse its own history. The problem of Africa is to stop always repeating, to stop always trotting out, to free itself from, the myth of the eternal return, to understand that the Golden Age, which Africa never stops longing for, will never come back because it never existed."
13. (C) Many African critics viewed the speech as condescending and paternalistic, two aspects of France-Afrique Sarkozy said he wanted to banish. Prominent Africans faulted Sarkozy's ideas, including then-AU Commission Chairperson Konare, who said: "This speech was not the kind of speech we were hoping for.... It reminded us of another age, especially his comment about peasants." Konare was referring to a passage that critics found
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especially demeaning: "The drama of Africa is that the African man has not entered enough into history. The African peasant, for millennia, lives with the seasons, where the ideal life is to be in harmony with nature, and he knows only the eternal recycling of time marked by the rhythm of repetition without end of the same gestures and the same words. In this imagination, where everything always recycles, there is no place for either human adventure or for the idea of progress."
14. (C) South Africa President Mbeki, one of the few African leaders to react favorably, reportedly wrote to Sarkozy: "What you have said in Dakar, Mr. President, indicates to me that we are fortunate to count on you as a citizen of Africa, as a partner in the protracted struggle to achieve the renaissance of Africa within the context of a European renaissance and the rest of the world." Perhaps not coincidentally, Sarkozy chose Cape Town as the site for the third speech in his Africa policy series (to the dismay of francophone Africa), identified South Africa as a strategic partner, and, upon France's assuming the EU Presidency in July 2008, sponsored, as one of the Presidency's initial acts, the first EU-South Africa Summit (in Bordeaux on July 25). As Presidential Advisor Romain Serman has observed, one of Sarkozy's operating principles is "reward the good, punish the bad."
Reining Him In and Slowing Him Down
-----------------------------------
15. (C) After Dakar, Sarkozy went to Gabon, where elder statesman and France-Afrique supporter President Bongo received him with full honors. Sarkozy reportedly hesitated before going; visiting a France-Afrique stronghold, site of a French military base, and source of valuable commerce (especially petroleum) could smack of the old-style courting and role playing he claimed he wanted to forego. In the end, he relented: "Omar Bongo is the dean of African heads of state and, in Africa, being the dean, that counts." Bongo offered full pomp and circumstance, with festive crowds chanting "vive la France, vive Sarkozy, vive l'amitie franco-gabonaise," and banners proclaiming this friendship prominently displayed. To some observers, the message was clear: "You say that France-Afrique is a thing of the past but, if Africans really are equal partners, we have some say in the matter as well, and we say that France-Afrique is not in all respects so bad." Sarkozy reportedly did not expect that kind of visit or that Bongo would offer a different reality.
16. (C) Sarkozy has in other ways shown himself to be out of step, with his bedside manner needing fine-tuning. Presidential Advisor Remi Marechaux says that when Sarkozy is confident on substance or at ease with an interlocutor, he speaks freely without relying on briefing material. This occasionally causes problems when he strays from "official" policy, with others then steering the discussion back on course. When he is less familiar with an issue or with an interlocutor, he will read talking points verbatim, with little attempt to disguise what he is doing, sometimes thumbing through briefing books looking for information while his interlocutor is speaking.
17. (C) Sarkozy does not like to waste time and likes to get to the point, perhaps to excess. When President Obiang of Equatorial Guinea met with Sarkozy in November 2007, support staff on both sides were tardy in settling into place. Sarkozy did not wait and launched into his talking points as the staff filed into the meeting. Sarkozy engaged in no small talk and the meeting was over in minutes, to the bewilderment of his visitors. Our contacts at the Presidency indicate Sarkozy has since made an effort to be more "diplomatic," but one wonders whether he would ever dare to treat a Western head of state in such a cursory manner, under any circumstances.
18. (C) Flush with his early success at helping liberate Bulgarian medical workers long detained in Libya on dubious
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charges, Sarkozy decided to intervene personally in Chad after the Zoe's Ark effort to smuggle supposed Darfur orphans to France was discovered and the perpetrators detained. Sarkozy went to Chad early in November 2007 and negotiated the release of some of the detainees. After returning to Paris, he thought of going there again to free those still in custody but decided against it. He was advised not to make a second trip as France could not afford having him set a precedent by personally rushing off and responding to and managing a relatively low-level crisis. Chad President Deby no doubt appreciated the visit Sarkozy did make, which probably increased Chad's leverage, as Sarkozy had put his own prestige in play.
Bongo Up, Bockel Down, France-Afrique Still Kicking
----------------------------
19. (C) Jean-Marie Bockel became State Secretary for Cooperation and Francophonie (reporting to the Foreign Minister) when Sarkozy took office. Bockel, a Socialist, is a veteran politician and Mulhouse's mayor since 1989, and was Commerce Minister 1984-1986. On January 15, 2008, he gave an interview to Paris daily Le Monde, stating boldly (and perhaps rashly) that "I want to sign the death certificate of France-Afrique." Asked why it seemed that not much had changed despite Sarkozy's promise of a new Africa policy, Bockel said: "France-Afrique is moribund.... It's not a question of morale, but helping with development. For, because of the faulty governance in certain countries, our policy of cooperation, despite its many forms, doesn't allow for progress commensurate with our effort."
20. (C) Continuing, Bockel said that ineffectiveness prevailed because "bad governance, the wastage of public finds, the carelessness of certain administrative and political structures, the predation of certain leaders -- everybody knows these factors or supposes them. In total, of USD 100 billion annually in aid for Africa, USD 30 billion evaporates. Certain countries have important petroleum resources, but their populations don't benefit. Is it legitimate that our aid is distributed to countries that waste their own resources? We must re-examine conditionalities, to evaluate the effectiveness of our aid."
21. (C) Bockel's comments did not sit well with some Africans, notably Gabon President Bongo. A slow-moving French judicial investigation of the holdings in France of certain African leaders, among them Bongo, was in progress even before Sarkozy went there in July 2007. The investigation reportedly indicated that Bongo owned or was involved in the ownership of 33 properties in France, including a Paris mansion valued at 18 million euro (currently, about USD 27.15 million). The French press picked up this case and did some investigating and reporting of its own. The Gabonese took umbrage, with their MFA stating its intention to "reflect" on the course of Franco-Gabonese relations and mentioning a "cabal" and a "plot against Gabon and its president."
22. (C) Relations took a turn for the worse when, early in March 2008, France expelled two Gabonese for apparent visa/residency problems. Gabon immediately responded, noting that "there are many French in Gabon in irregular situations. They can be taken to the border if, during police controls, they don't justify their presence with proper documentation." Gabon then raised the reciprocity provisions of the immigration accord signed the previous July (para 7, above). The noise level, mostly on Gabon's side, increased.
23. (C) And then the noise suddenly stopped, after the March 18 announcement that Bockel would no longer be Secretary of State for Cooperation and Francophonie, to be replaced by Alain Joyandet. Although officially denied, it was commonly accepted that Bockel had to go in order to make peace with figures such as Bongo. Media reports on the French holdings of African leaders also seemed to disappear at that time and so did the investigations. For his part,
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Bockel issued a "no regrets about anything I said" statement, as he trundled off to his new job as Secretary of State for Veterans Affairs.
24. (C) The Bockel case is significant because it shows that "killing" France-Afrique is easier said than done; that France-Afrique has a life of its own, with vested interests on the African side that the French perhaps underestimated when deciding on the new policy; that African leaders can manipulate France-Afrique for their own ends as well as the French can or could; that a clever, skillful leader like Bongo can fight far above Gabon's weight and humble a French politician of Bockel's stature; and that France should take care in not trifling with Africans (which is what Sarkozy said in Dakar that France would no longer do). Bold talk of "signing France-Afrique's death certificate" ended with Bockel's departure and has not resurfaced. Bongo made his point.
Wins, Losses, Draws, and ???
----------------------------
25. (C) Sarkozy indicated that implementation of his new policy would take place on a clean slate, that he would not be a prisoner of the past or the problems that existed prior to his presidency. Bongo partly refuted that notion. The Sarkozy government has tried to improve problematic relations from earlier times, with only limited success.
-- ANGOLA: Relations were long frozen because of the Falcone Affair, the complex arms trafficking case that dates to the Mitterrand and Chirac eras. French commercial activities in Angola after the scandal broke have continued without much hindrance but political relations have been very limited. Frustrated that the Falcone issue continued to influence relations and with an eye toward expanding business with resource-rich Angola, Sarkozy broke the ice with a short meeting with President Dos Santos during the September 2007 UNGA, and followed up with a visit to Angola on May 23, 2008. One shared issue of concern is the trial in France of some 42 defendants (including high-profile figures such as Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, President Mitterrand's son and a former "Mr. Africa" at the Presidency) and what that trial may reveal in terms of Angolan culpability in the affair. Angolans now appear ready to handle whatever dirty laundry the trial brings to light. Although still at an early stage, Sarkozy's outreach to Angola seems promising, and should be considered a "win" for both sides.
-- RWANDA: Relations, precarious even before the 1994 genocide, collapsed in November 2006 when then-anti terrorism Judge Bruguiere issued an investigative report that implicated President Kagame and other senior Rwandans in the events of 1994. The Rwandans immediately broke relations with France. The French have since tried to improve relations, arguing that neither side should hold the other hostage over events dating to 1994 and before. They stress that France's judiciary (i.e., a judge such as Bruguiere) enjoys an independence that renders it immune from internal GOF attempts to influence it. Seeking reconciliation, Foreign Minister Kouchner met with President Kagame on January 26, 2008, in Kigali. Despite French optimism that the two sides can "compartmentalize" the genocide issue, Rwanda is not amenable to doing so, landing another hammer blow with the August 2008 report accusing French officials at the highest levels of complicity in the genocide. With relations getting worse and not better, Rwanda must be considered a "loss."
-- DJIBOUTI: The Borrel Affair, involving the 1995 death of French judge Bernard Borrel, who was working on assignment in Djibouti when he committed suicide (or was killed), continues to cloud relations. Both sides long considered his death a suicide but Mrs. Borrel was convinced he was murdered for having found evidence of Djiboutian wrongdoing. She filed several legal proceedings in France; one resulted in the March 2007 conviction in absentia of two senior Djiboutian figures for witness tampering.
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-- DJIBOUTI (cont,d): Despite periodic upheavals, the two sides managed to isolate the case until the convictions, which took place a few weeks before Sarkozy's inauguration. Soon after becoming President, Sarkozy met with Mrs. Borrel and the GOF abruptly shifted position, saying that Borrel's death was not a suicide but the result of foul play. It is not clear if the shift stemmed from a new evaluation of the evidence or from Sarkozy's desire to ally himself with Mrs. Borrel, whom the French public and media have viewed sympathetically. Djiboutians protested, countering that Borrel, if not a suicide, died because of involvement in a pedophile ring. Relations seemed destined to deteriorate but then France provided important help to Djibouti during its June 2008 border dispute with Eritrea. France's military base in Djibouti so far has not been a bargaining chip in the Borrel case. Relations with Djibouti, while delicate, seem to be holding in place, with both sides enjoying a "draw." That said, the Borrel issue remains unresolved and its unfolding will likely continue to affect relations.
-- MADAGASCAR: To these wins, losses, and draws, one must add an abject "surrender" -- Sarkozy's agreeing to Madagascar President Ravalomanana's recent request that then-Ambassador to Madagascar Gildas Le Lidec be replaced after some six months at post. Ravalomanana reportedly thought that Le Lidec was "unlucky," citing negative developments in other countries that coincided with Le Lidec's postings. One of France's most experienced diplomats, Le Lidec had been ambassador in Japan, Cambodia, C.A.R., DRC, and Cote d,Ivoire before Madagascar, where he announced his departure at this year's July 14 fete. When asked, most GOF contacts shake their heads and sigh, making muted comments about Sarkozy's bending backward too far to placate Ravalomanana and ending a veteran public servant's honorable career by humiliating him. Whether Le Lidec's dismissal represents a one-off or signals a new-found intention on Sarkozy's part to please African leaders remains to be seen.
One Year Later
--------------
26. (C) Over a year into Sarkozy's five-year term, his Africa policy has yielded positive results for both French and Africans but has not been the clean-sweeping "out with the old, in with the new" success he was first seeking. In our view, he underestimated the scope of the challenge and overestimated his abilities as a relative outsider bringing his fabled dynamism to the task. He was tone-deaf to some of the dynamics developed over decades of France-Afrique and his pace and rhythm (let alone his policies) did not accord with that of many African counterparts. In saying openly that he wanted to end France-Afrique, Sarkozy inadvertently gave it a new spark of life, as Bockel learned the hard way.
27. (C) Nonetheless, the energy that Sarkozy is imparting stands in favorable contrast to the stagnation characterizing Africa policy during Chirac's final years. Sarkozy's main shortcoming concerning Africa may be that in his haste to end an admittedly shopworn policy, he launched himself into doing so without having completely integrated the lessons that were to be learned from it.
28. (C) Part III, the final segment of this series (septel), will explore other aspects of France's implementation of its new Africa policy, focusing on its military posture in that region.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Fran ce
STAPLETON
Wednesday, 06 September 2006, 15:39
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 005975
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD,
AND EB
DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA
DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB
EO 12958 DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS PGOV, ELAB, EU, FR, PINR, SOCI, ECON
SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER SARKOZY ON EVE OF HIS TRIP TO
THE U.S.
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy told Ambassador September 5 he was "proud and honored" to be meeting with President Bush on September 12. President Chirac had pressured him "not to go to the U.S.," Sarkozy said, but this would not stop him from "affirming my loyal friendship" for the U.S. Moreover, it was appropriate for him to have "informal exchanges with the world's super power since I, after all, have one chance in two of becoming France's next president." Sarkozy asked for overviews of the current U.S. position on Iranian issues and the U.S. domestic political situation. Turning to French domestic politics, Sarkozy said "things are going well" for him, "the polls are good and the party is united." He shrugged off the challenge Socialist Party frontrunner Segolene Royal might pose. "She doesn't bother me," he said, while also underlining his conviction that the election would be very, very close. The meeting, punctuated by the visit of Sarkozy's nine-year old son Louis, offered a rare glimpse of a relaxed Sarkozy. End Summary.
"Proud and Honored to Meet with President Bush"
--------------------------------------------- --
2. (C) Sarkozy underlined to the Ambassador his gratitude to the President for making room in his schedule for a meeting with Sarkozy (a drop-by in a meeting with NSA Hadley scheduled for September 12). Sarkozy said he felt "proud and honored to meet with President Bush." Sarkozy confided that President Chirac had pressured him "not to go the U.S.," but then highlighted why he believed his trip to the U.S. and meeting with the President was appropriate and important. In typical combative, self-assertive fashion, Sarkozy said, "I did not hesitate for an instant" to go ahead with the trip. Sarkozy went on to explain that he considers it an opportunity to "affirm my loyal friendship for the U.S., which, though it may be unpopular" (in France), "I nevertheless openly avow." Sarkozy then recalled how, in a major campaign speech before eight thousand Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) party supporters two days earlier, he had held out as an example to young French people the way "the citizens of the United States, a nation of immigrants, listen to the national anthem and salute the stars and stripes with their hands over their hearts."
3. (C) Sarkozy and the Ambassador discussed the importance of Sarkozy's establishing "informal contacts" with U.S. leaders before the French presidential elections, before -- if Sarkozy should become president -- the constraints of high office condition outreach to other leaders. Sarkozy judged that it was very fitting and proper for him to meet with the President "of the world's super-power, since I, after all, have one chance in two of becoming France's next president." Iran was the only international issue raised by Sarkozy during this meeting with the Ambassador.
Confident about his Own Prospects
---------------------------------
4. (C) Turning to French domestic politics, Sarkozy exuded confidence about his own presidential prospects. He was uncharacteristically relaxed during the meeting, as he assessed his chances of prevailing through both rounds of France's upcoming presidential contest. Sarkozy nonetheless underlined that "whoever the Socialist candidate might be," the election would still be very close, "fifty-one, forty-nine -- very tight." Sarkozy dismissed as "unlikely" the possibility that extreme-right National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen might repeat his performance of the first round of the 2002 election. Sarkozy said that "overall, things are looking good for me," and he pointed to his consistently high poll numbers and his unification of the UMP party as pillars of what he expects should be a successful electoral effort. That said, he affirmed that Chirac remains an adversary who seeks to trip him (Sarkozy) up on his way to the French presidency.
5. (C) Sarkozy was nearly cavalier in his dismissal of the capabilities of Poitou-Charentes Region President and Socialist Party frontrunner Segolene Royal. He said, "she doesn't bother me," meaning that he did not believe that she would be a formidable opponent. He explicitly pointed to her "lack of experience," both in withstanding the rigors of high office and those of presidential-level electoral politics, as crippling shortcomings in her ability to mount a credible
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presidential candidacy against his. (Comment: Ever since her emergence as a highly popular presidential contender a year ago, Royal has been underestimated by all of France's professional politicians. End Comment.) Sarkozy mentioned former prime minister Lionel Jospin as a possible alternative to Royal, but did not venture a view on Jospin's chances of upsetting Royal. He added that he felt Royal's candidacy was facing increasing turbulence in the run up to the socialists' primary election (in mid-November), and that this, along with her dominance of the popularity polls with him, "protects me." (Comment: By absorbing so much of the attention of press and public, Royal is shielding Sarkozy from the sort of criticism and scrutiny that might undercut his candidacy. Sarkozy is making good use of this 'blocking effect,' using it to set the agenda for the upcoming campaign in a series of speeches that articulate both principles for action and concrete proposals. End comment.)
An Unforgettable Scene
----------------------
6. (C) As the Ambassador was about to leave, Sarkozy went to the line of floor-to-ceiling windows that open from the interior minister's office to the gardens of the interior ministry, and called over his nine-year old son, Louis, who was playing on the lawn (Sarkozy lives with his family in apartments above his office). Sarkozy was clearly happy -- and proud -- to be in the company of his young son and seemed tickled to be able to introduce him to "the Ambassador of the United States." Louis appeared at the threshold with a small dog at his feet and a large rabbit in his arms. To shake hands with the Ambassador, Louis put down the rabbit -- and the dog started chasing the rabbit through Sarkozy's office, which led to the unforgettable sight of Sarkozy, bent over, chasing the dog through the ante-room to his office as the dog chased the rabbit, and Louis filled the room with gleeful laughter. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON
Wednesday, 23 September 2009, 16:24
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 LONDON 002214
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/22/2019
TAGS PREL, PARM, KNNP, CH, EG, FR, IN, IR, KN, PK, RS, UK
SUBJECT: U/S TAUSCHER'S BILATERAL MEETINGS IN LONDON WITH
RUSSIAN, CHINESE, AND FRENCH OFFICIALS
REF: A. (A) LONDON 2198 B. (B) LONDON 2199
Classified By: Political Counselor Robin Quinville for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) Summary: U/S for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher and Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation Ambassador Susan Burk held bilateral consultations in London September 3-4, on the margins of the P5 Conference on Confidence Building Measures Towards Nuclear Disarmament, with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs He Yafei, and French Director for Strategic Affairs Patrick Maisonnave. (Refs) All interlocutors agreed on the need for close P5 coordination in the lead-up to the UNSC Heads of Government Summit and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon). French interlocutors expressed a particular need for closer, more efficient P3 coordination. All interlocutors were supportive of the President's proposed Nuclear Security Summit. End Summary.
Russian Perspective -- NPT
--------------------------
2. (S/NF) U/S for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher and Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation Ambassador Susan Burk held bilateral meetings in London September 3-4, on the margins of the P5 Conference on Confidence Building Measures Towards Nuclear Disarmament, with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs He Yafei, and French Director for Strategic Affairs Patrick Maisonnave. Ambassador Burk opened the first meeting, with Russian DFM Ryabkov, by presenting an outline of U.S. objectives for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon). DFM Ryabkov stated that Russia and the U.S. are "very much in line with each other" regarding the NPT RevCon. He confirmed that Russia seeks a P5 consensus with a results-oriented NPT conclusion. "We cannot allow the NPT to fail," he said. Ryabkov cited the "good experience of being almost there" in terms of the chair's recommendations from the third Preparatory Committee (PrepCom). "We must focus while moving toward the NPT RevCon on realistic deliverables in all areas," he said, which means avoiding pretexts for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to balk. Russia seeks to avoid "prescriptive outcomes." He expressed the view that the UK draft text was a good basis for a P5 statement. Ryabkov said Russia would stress universal adherence to the NPT, universal adherence to the Additional Protocol, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and negative security assurances. He noted the importance of "progress" on CTBT ratification, preferably before the end of the conference. He stated the importance of developing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification and control mechanisms, and that negative security guarantees are key. Russia would think positively about the development of a legal instrument.
Egypt
-----
3. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said the Egyptian position gives Russia "serious concern." Russia regularly engages with the Egyptians, but the Egyptians do not seem to understand the gravity of the situation. Ryabkov expressed hope that the U.S. would support ideas such as a special coordinator and comprehensive IAEA coverage of facilities in the Middle East. He noted that Middle Eastern countries need to ratify the CTBT. Russia has been in touch with Israel to see if it would consider becoming part of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which would "play well" with the Egyptians. U/S for Arms Control and International Security Tauscher said she had been working with Egypt, including with Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit, and would continue to do so in the coming weeks. She said that some Egyptians consider their approach last year to be a mistake, and that we were working to get Egypt and Israel to come together on an approach that would command consensus. Ryabkov said Russia had not detected reconsideration by Egypt, and promised to "explore"
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Tauscher's suggestion that the U.S. and Russia meet jointly with the Egyptians to show U.S.-Russia coordination and to explain concerns to the Egyptians.
Multilateral Approaches to the Fuel Cycle
-----------------------------------------
4. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said Russia was surprised by opposition to initiatives, "both yours and ours," at the most recent Board of Governors (BOG) meeting. Russia will continue to push forward on its Angarsk idea. Russia will soon circulate a draft agreement and will consult with the U.S and as many other potential co-sponsors as possible to increase the chances of a positive outcome. U/S Tauscher made clear the U.S. supports the Angarsk initiative and wants to push it forward at the November Board as the first step; other steps could follow using the Angarsk precedents. Ryabkov expressed appreciation for U.S. expressions of support for Angarsk and asked the U.S. to make positive remarks at the next BOG meeting.
"Creative Ways" to Present Arguments Needed
-------------------------------------------
5. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said it is important in the lead up to the RevCon to find "creative ways" to present our arguments, citing Egyptian skepticism. U/S Tauscher agreed that we need to find better ways to get our narrative out, and proposed that the two of them write an op-ed that could run in New York at the time of the UNGA. Ryabkov responded that such a piece could make clear that the U.S. and Russia stand together on fuel assurances. He said it was a "good idea," and they should look for the right occasion. Ryabklov also raised the 13 steps, suggesting that some elements were "OBE" and the context was now different.
Nuclear Security Summit
-----------------------
6. (S/NF) Senior Director for WMD Terrorism and Threat Reduction at the National Security Council Laura Holgate briefed on plans for the Nuclear Security Summit in April. Ryabkov expressed appreciation and said the summit should seek a result that is both "political and technical," which he characterized as "a huge task requiring thorough preparation." He stressed the importance of early exchanges on summit preparations. He promised that Russia would work to develop ideas by the Sherpa meeting or shortly thereafter. However, the time frame is "extraordinarily short," even if the summit is postponed until April. The summit should seek a "defendable niche" that will not take away from NPT, he said.
CTBT, FMCT
----------
7. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher said the U.S. was carefully preparing for ratification of the CTBT by the Senate, including a new study by the National Academy. Another key priority for the U.S. is the FMCT. We were encouraged by the steps in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in May, but Pakistan has blocked implementation. She said the P5 must work together to preserve the work plan in January and commence actual negotiations. Ryabkov responded that Russia would welcome early U.S. CTBT ratification. Russia had talked to the Pakistanis about the FMCT, but DFM Ryabkov indicated that they were "quite evasive." He urged the U.S. to engage the Pakistanis. Tauscher said we would continue to do so and encourage the rest of the P5 to do so as well.
Iranian Threat, Missile Defense
-------------------------------
8. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher proposed that Russia and the U.S. implement together the understandings reached by the two Presidents in Moscow regarding missile defense, joint threat assessment and the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC). Responding to her proposal to send a team to Moscow to get Russia's intelligence assessment on the Iranian missile threat, Ryabkov said that missile defense remains a difficult
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issue for Russia; the Presidential text was good guidance, but Russia needed more time to consider the U.S. view regarding the missile threat from Iran and issues of their missile technology. Russia has "objective data" and the differences between the Russian and U.S. views are "considerable."
9. (S/NF) Tauscher described the missile defense review underway in Washington. Ryabkov expressed appreciation, and suggested that they revisit the joint threat assessment and the JDEC after the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) review has been completed.
Nuclear Cooperation
-------------------
10. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher welcomed Head of Federal Atomic Energy Agency Sergei Kiriyenko,s planned visit to Washington and the establishment of the working group on nuclear energy and nuclear cooperation. She pressed for approval and signature of the plutonium disposition agreement. DFM Ryabkov replied that the situation with respect to plutonium disposition was the same as it was during the President,s visit to Moscow. The issue of financing had precluded real progress before the POTUS visit. Russia needs to figure out what is realistic. There are no political constraints. Russia is disposing of highly toxic materials. Ryabkov expressed interest in information about what the U.S. was doing in that regard.
S-300 Air Defense Missiles
--------------------------
11. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov asked about the status of the Russia 123 agreement. U/S Tauscher responded that some in Congress are interested in moving forward on the 123 agreement, and that further discussions could be held in October. It is crucial that Russia not transfer the S-300 system to Iran if Congress is to allow the agreement to come into force, she added. Ryabkov said Russia had a valid contract for the sale of the S-300s, and acknowledged that Russia needed to make a decision regarding the S-300 sale to Iran, an issue that has been the subject of "utmost attention in many places." Russia is in a position of growing difficulty for not honoring its contractual obligations and, finances aside, Russia is getting "no points in Iran." Ryabkov said Russia understands the U.S. and Israeli arguments and wants to be transparent on the topic, and noted that the U.S. and Russian presidents have discussed it. The current situation is not sustainable; Russia cannot hold up the sale indefinitely. At some point Russia will have to make up its mind, Ryabkov said. Russia did not agree to sell surface-to-surface missiles but has a contract to sell Iran air defense systems.
Votkinsk
--------
12. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said that Russia and the U.S. have different views on whether continuous monitoring at Votkinsk should be continued in the Stategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) follow-on agreement. Russia considers the importance of switching off the system to be quite high. The run-up to the end date of START could create difficulties. U/S Tauscher stated that we have the right to monitor until December 5, to which Ryabkov replied, "That goes without saying." Tauscher went on that we see merit in continuing with the Votkinsk system in the new agreement. If the final decision is not to continue the system, we are prepared to work out an arrangement that maintains our rights through December 4. Contractors can box and ship the equipment; there are ways to manage this, she said.
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
-----------------------------------
13. (S/NF) DFM Ryabkov said that Russia circulated its ideas on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty in Vienna on May 5. "We don't want to abandon the CFE regime altogether," he said. Russia has the sense that NATO is "becoming comfortable" with the current situation. Russia,
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however, does not want to return to the old treaty. CFE adaptation plus more is required. Flank limitations are the core problem. Ryabkov said Turkey is not that concerned about flank limitations but wants to keep the system for its own reasons. There could be a chance to "move innovatively" regarding CFE, but the current situation is unsustainable.
14. (S/NF) Ryabkov concluded by saying Russia wants someone on the U.S. side who will deal with this issue on a regular basis with MFA Security and Arms Control Director Anatoly Antonov. Russia wants to move forward and wants to reinvigorate the Vienna process without undermining the bilateral process.
Australia Group
---------------
15. (S/NF) Ryabkov asked for a "fresh look" regarding the Australia group, since the U.S. and Russia are now cooperating in many ways. U/S Tauscher said she has seen no interest on the part of the other members of the Australia Group in Russian membership given the concerns with respect to Russian implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Ryabkov responded that he thought they had dealt with those questions.
MANPADS -- Venezuela
--------------------
16. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher asked that Russia look further into the end-use controls on Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) transferred to Venezuela to ensure they do not wind up with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC). Ryabkov affirmed Russia's commitment to ensure legitimate end-user certificates and the ability to conduct inspections; this is true for MANPADS. The information provided was fragmentary, he said. Russia concluded that the factory marks on the munitions made it difficult to determine if they were part of the equipment sold to the Venezuelan government. Ryabkov said Russia understood the tense situation between Venezuela and Colombia.
Chinese Perspective -- CTBT
---------------------------
17. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher opened the discussion with Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affiars He Yafei with a description of U.S. preparations to seek ratification of the CTBT in the Senate. VFM He asked "Are you there yet?" Tauscher asked if China would follow with its own ratification, and He replied that it is "likely" that China would follow if the U.S. ratified the CTBT.
U.S.-China Cooperation
----------------------
18. (S/NF) VFM He said China and the U.S. have many common interests and "we're flooded with issues." President Obama's Prague speech "caught the attention of many." The NPT is "important but we must improve on it" and must "start and restart" issues of disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful use. The Chinese President's vision is to study issues in the context of Chinese and U.S. cooperation. "I have a mandate to work with you," He said. Nonproliferation issues have been dormant for a dozen years, but the context has changed. China's goal is a "serious reduction of the nuclear threat." The time to act is now since "we have a mandate and a consensus at the top level."
P5 Consultation in Advance of the NPT RevCon
--------------------------------------------
19. (S/NF) VFM He said the P5 may not always see eye-to-eye but should closely consult in the lead-up to the NPT RevCon. The P5 should "stand together" and unite since the P5 countries are a "target." He added that is important to improve communications with non-nuclear states.
20. (S/NF) VFM He raised the issue of the Egyptian Middle East nuclear-free zone. U/S Tauscher responded that the U.S.
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was working hard with both Egypt and Israel to find a common approach and avoid confrontation at the IAEA General Conference and the NPT RevCon. He said China was prepared to support that effort. He added the P5 should carefully review Iran and the DPRK but deal with them separately from the upcoming UNSC Summit and the RevCon.
FMCT, Pakistan
--------------
21. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher outlined the problem caused by Pakistan in blocking implementation of the CD program of work. She said the U.S. was talking to Pakistan and arguing that Pakistan could make its points in the negotiations but should not block the beginning of talks. VFM He agreed that the Pakistanis "have concerns" regarding the FMCT negotiations. He said he understood Pakistani "hesitancy," as well as their "logic" and "illogic." The solution is to address the underlying problem, which is that India and Pakistan view each other as enemies. Nuclear weapons are crucial to Pakistan. Indeed, a Pakistani military leader said his army was no match for the Indian army. "India is the lynchpin" to assuaging Pakistan's fears and the U.S. could influence India. China has resolved all border issues except those with India, He observed. In response to Tauscher,s expression of appreciation for China's efforts in the CD with Pakistan, He said China would engage the Pakistanis.
UNSC Summit
-----------
22. (S/NF) VFM He said that the U.S. draft for the UNSC Summit was fairly good, but that China had amendments. China's Ambassador to the UN has authority to negotiate on the draft resolution which, unfortunately, does not mention China's disarmament efforts, though the efforts of other P5 countries are noted. China should get credit for, for example, its no first use policy. VFM He also said that China has a different view on the proposed moratorium on the production of fissile material. China supports a ban, but not a moratorium, which raises questions concerning definition, how long, verification, and the like.
Nuclear Security Summit
-----------------------
23. (S/NF) Senior Director Holgate briefed on planning for the Nuclear Security Summit in the spring. VFM He said China supports this initiative, which he described as a "huge, daunting job." He advised the U.S. to consider establishing a "small, informal group to resolve issues" before the summit--U.S., UK, China, Russia, and a few others--to make sure the major parties are comfortable.
DPRK
----
24. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher mentioned Ambassador Philip Goldberg,s useful talks, which would continue. She asked where the DPRK stood. VFM He responded that the United States is the DPRK's main preoccupation. The country views normalization of its relations with the U.S. as the only way out of its current "mess." China believes the DPRK leadership is anxious about economic development but they believe their security concerns override their economic concerns. Nonetheless, there are signs the DPRK is reaching out. DPRK wants bilateral talks with the U.S., not Six-Party Talks. China wants the Six-Party Talks to continue. The DPRK wants "something in return" to restart the talks. VFM He asserted that China is encouraging the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks. China is also trying to convince the DPRK not to go back on its promise to denuclearize. The DPRK leader appears to be in good health and control.
Civil Nuclear Cooperation with Pakistan
---------------------------------------
25. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher asked about the status of civil nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. VFM He responded that all
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cooperation is for civil purposes, under safeguards, and that China is not going out of that mode. It is not in China's interest to proliferate nuclear technology. Tauscher asked about Pakistan,s financial situation. VFM He replied that Pakistan was hit hard by the financial crisis, but it is a largely agrarian society that needs little cash to survive and is in no danger of going broke. China is the only country that has given cash support to Pakistan, he said.
French Perspective -- P3 Coordination
-------------------------------------
26. (S/NF) In a final meeting, French Director for Strategic Affairs Patrick Maisonnave expressed a need to reinforce P3 coordination. Maisonnave noted his disappointment at the current negotiating process in New York, stating that "P3 coordination could be more efficient." U/S Tauscher agreed the P3 needed to stick together and suggested frequent telephone calls. Maisonnave said he looked forward to frequent phone contact among the three countries.
UNSC Summit
-----------
27. (S/NF) Regarding the September UNSC Heads of State Summit, Maisonnave observed that it could be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve consensus on specific language regarding the DPRK and Iran, but "a strong generic message would help." This was important to French political authorities. U/S Tauscher agreed, and asked if there were other political messages France wanted to send. DAS-equivalent for Disarmament and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Martin Briens said France wanted the text of the Summit's resolution to put the issue of nuclear nonproliferation in a broader context. He suggested a short sentence asserting that "we need to make progress on other forms of disarmament." Briens said that France wants a paragraph in the resolution setting out concrete measures against proliferation. He also noted "some technical problems" that needed to be resolved, such as issues surrounding the return of property and equipment.
Defining Language and Minimum Objectives
----------------------------------------
28. (S/NF) DAS-equivalent Briens noted the "political requirement" of sending a message to Iran and the DPRK, of "not letting them off the hook." Maisonnave said that one red line for France was that there must be nothing in the final text of the resolution that would weaken deterrence. He expressed support for a "balanced result" and called for managing expectations. Maisonnave stressed the importance of supporting access to civil nuclear energy. P3 consultations would provide an opportunity to clarify goals and to "define minimum objectives." Briens said that when the P3 meets in early October, there would be an opportunity to set "minimum goals" and "work on our statetgy." The October 8-9 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Conference in Washington would potentially be a good time for experts to meet, Briens said.
29. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher noted the importance of coordinating public diplomacy messages. Brien concurred on the importance of better public outreach.
Nuclear Security Summit
-----------------------
30. (S/NF) Senior Director Holgate briefed on plans for the Nuclear Security Summit. Maisonnave expressed support for the summit next spring and sought details about timing and goals. He described it as an "excellent initiative" and said that French officials would have their first planning meeting September 8. Briens said that the summit would give political momentum and help provide political will to reenforce nonproliferation mechanisms. Briens expressed "one small caveat" about such mechanisms, citing French displeasure with the Global Partnership and remarking that it provides a "huge benefit for Russia" by paying for its
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disarmament while Russia builds submarines. "Let's leverage what we have rather than spend money" at the summit, Briens said. Maisonnave expressed appreciation for reassurance that the President's summit would not be a pledging conference.
FMCT: P3 Coordination and Red Lines
-----------------------------------
31. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher provided an update on START negotiations, Administration strategy regarding CTBT ratification, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) review, and Pakistan's actions to prevent the beginning of negotiations on the FMCT at the CD. Briens agreed that Pakistan had been a problem regarding the FMCT. He added that France shares some common interests with the U.S. regarding the FMCT but said that "we need to discuss some technical details." He stated that France would be reluctant to agree to terms regarding transparency of fissile material stockpiles. He underscored the importance of not raising expectations and stressed that there are "sensitive issues that we must coordinate carefully with the P3" and discuss in detail. He said that national experts should talk directly on sensitive technical issues, and that France has some red lines that need to be discussed.
IAEA
----
32. (S/NF) U/S Tauscher encouraged support for the new IAEA Director General Amano, saying we need to make him a success and make sure he has the budget to do his job. Briens agreed that the U.S. and France should talk to DG Amano regarding shared priorities, "and make sure he does the right thing." He also agreed that the U.S. and France should consult with each other regarding the IAEA budget. The U.S. and France should also think about what can be done to improve IAEA verification safeguards.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN
Tuesday, 24 November 2009, 12:59
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002840
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/06/2019
TAGS MNUC, KNNP, PREL, PGOV, PTER, PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTANI VIEWS ON FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY
(FMCT) STILL MALEABLE
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)
1. (C) Summary: Pakistani officials do not appear to have coalesced on a strategy or position for the mid-January resumption of Conference on Disarmament (CD) discussions on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) interlocutors continue to stress the need for consensus language to bring Pakistan on board a CD work program that includes FMCT negotiations, while Strategic Plans Division (SPD) officials urge a cautious approach that leaves plenty of time for deliberations. In the absence of a formal decision, continued delay along procedural lines is the most likely default approach. Overt U.S. pressure may solidify this tactic, according to a non-governmental contact who follows disarmament issues. The GOP strongly desires the resumption of U.S.-Pakistan talks on nonproliferation, security, and strategic stability before the next CD session in order to discuss perspectives on the FMCT and come to an "understanding" on each side's positions. In order to take advantage of internal GOP deliberations, Post recommends high-level interventions with Pakistan's military leadership to help build support for proceeding with FMCT negotiations. End summary.
2. (C) Over the last two weeks, PolOff canvassed GOP officials in the Disarmament Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Director General Dr. Irfan Yusuf Shami and Director Kamran Akhtar), the Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate at the Strategic Plans Division (Director Khalid Banuri and Deputy Director Adil Sultan), as well as one non-governmental contact (Maria Sultan of the South Asia Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)) who follows nonproliferation issues, for views on Pakistan's likely approach to Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty discussions at the Conference on Disarmament when the 2010 session convenes in January. The discussions with Pakistani interlocutors suggest that Pakistan's FMCT position remains somewhat malleable and that GOP officials have not yet coalesced on a specific position for the next CD session. They also underscored the importance of bilateral discussions, particularly with high-level Pakistan military officials, if the USG is to secure Pakistani support for beginning CD negotiations.
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Strategic Considerations
------------------------
3. (C) According to Pakistani counterparts, Pakistan's FMCT position is shaped by four strategic considerations, which point to a degrading of the deterrent value of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and thus make an FMCT difficult for Pakistan. First, Pakistani officials perceive the U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation initiative as having unshackled India's nuclear weapons program. Prior to the initiative, they said, India faced a significant uranium supply constraint that forced it to choose literally between nuclear weapons or nuclear power. Now, however, India is able to secure foreign-supplied uranium for its civil nuclear power reactors, leaving it free to devote a greater share of its domestically-sourced uranium to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. This perceived growth in nuclear weapons production capability blunts any numerical advantage in nuclear weapons Pakistan may have.
4. (C) Second, the increase in high-technology defense and space trade between India and the United States, Russia, and others has improved the quality of India's nuclear systems, according to Pakistani thinking. While Pakistan continues to face significant trade barriers and is subject to export denial regimes, Pakistani officials believe India is no longer held back by these constraints and is using market access to improve its nuclear delivery vehicles.
5. (C) Third, India's growing conventional military superiority, coupled with its Cold Start military doctrine of fast mobilization and rapid strike capability, poses a new level of threat, according to Pakistani counterparts. Indian plans and capabilities have forced Pakistan to rely more on nuclear weapons and less on conventional military capability to balance Indian force. Maria Sultan of SASSI suggested that Pakistani military planners now focus on the possibility of a two-front war and believe that Pakistan needs to transform its arsenal to smaller, tactical weapons that could be used on the battlefield against Indian conventional capabilities. The result of this trend is the need for greater stocks of fissile material to feed Pakistan's nuclear weapons requirement.
6. (C) Finally, Pakistani counterparts point to India's interest and investment in missile defense, even if it will take many years to field a capable system. They believe this indicates that India is not interested in a balance of power, but intends to degrade the value of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent.
7. (C) Taken together, these strategic considerations point Pakistan in the direction of a larger nuclear force that requires a greater amount of fissile material, Pakistani officials argue. By this logic, agreeing to a production cutoff now does not meet Pakistan's interests. It is unclear whether GOP officials believe Pakistan is ahead of India in terms of nuclear capability, but they point to the combination of India's capabilities and intentions, as well as its stockpile of fissile material (even if spent nuclear reactor fuel is not as useful in nuclear weapons), to suggest that there is little advantage for Pakistan in trying to lock India into an FMCT now, since both countries' arsenals appear set to grow. Maria Sultan suggested that this is not the consensus view, however, and that at least some part of the Pakistani military establishment believes it better to agree to an FMCT now since India has a much greater long-term fissile material growth potential than Pakistan. In either case, the argument that the FMCT is a global disarmament imperative seems to have no currency in Islamabad; Pakistan's position, as described by Pakistani counterparts, is shaped exclusively by its own regional concerns.
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FMCT Policy Circle
------------------
8. (C) While GOP officials would not comment directly on internal FMCT policy deliberations over the summer, Maria Sultan argued that Pakistan's surprising reversal at the CD can be chalked up to two factors: a CD Ambassador too eager to join consensus and a lethargic policy process driven more by personalities than institutions. By her account, Pakistan's initial support of the CD work program in the spring of 2009 was a decision made by Ambassador Zamir Akram without the benefit of a full policy review in Islamabad. Akram, she suggested, is part of the old guard of MFA ideologues and a long-time supporter of the Shannon mandate, which identified parameters for international consensus on an FMCT. However, Pakistan's position to support FMCT negotiations based on the Shannon mandate was outdated, she said. The advent of the U.S.-India civil nuclear initiative, in particular, had changed the terms for Islamabad, but its CD strategy had never been updated. Military officials in Islamabad intervened, she stated, and it was left to MFA to extricate Pakistan from a dilemma of its own creation, which is why Pakistan sought to tie up the CD on procedural grounds.
9. (C) According to Sultan, there are several camps within the GOP policy circle on FMCT. MFA officials, she said, tend toward continuing to support negotiation of an FMCT. In addition to Foreign Secretary Bashir and Irfan Shami, other officials, such as MFA spokesman Abdul Basit and Ambassador to Beijing Masood Khan, are Akram protgs and will continue to be consulted on negotiating strategy even though they are not directly tied to the Disarmament Division, she suggested. While important, MFA officials probably are not the most influential voices on FMCT, she argued; the views of high-level military officials, in particular Gen. Kayani and SPD Director General Khalid Kidwai, carry more weight within this circle. Kayani, she indicated, is aware of the issue but is not prepared to make a decision. Kidwai, on the other hand, favors delaying negotiations as long as possible, presumably to leave time and space for the investments made in expanding Pakistan's fissile material production capacity to bear fruit. SPD Arms Control Director Khalid Banuri indicated this preference for delay, telling PolOff that the current momentum on FMCT should not be used to rush the process and "there needs to be plenty of time for deliberations."
10. (C) Sultan argued, however, that Kidwai does not monopolize the debate on this issue and that other critical inputs come from the Strategic Forces Command, the Director General for Military Operations (DGMO), the Minister of Defense, and some National Defense University experts. In particular, she stated, "the DGMO (Maj. Gen. Javed Iqbal) takes a view on the FMCT 180 degrees apart from Kidwai's," believing that it is better to bind India to current fissile material levels than wait for the full effect of the U.S.-India nuclear initiative, which will allow India to produce even greater amounts of plutonium.
11. (C) When asked how she rated overall government support for these two positions, Sultan assessed 70% favor further delay while 30% support negotiation. However, she cautioned, overt U.S. pressure on Pakistan will firmly tip the balance toward delay. To bring Pakistan on board, she said the U.S. needs to focus on addressing Pakistan's strategic concerns and the slow degradation of deterrence. In particular, she argued for opening the high-technology defense market for Pakistan on early warning capabilities, such as the AWACS platform.
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Next Steps and Post's Recommendations
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12. (C) Looking ahead to January, MFA Disarmament Director General Irfan Shami expressed a strong desire to resume bilateral talks on nonproliferation, security, and strategic stability before the CD session in order to discuss perspectives on the FMCT and come to an "understanding" on each other's positions. He would not elaborate on what that "understanding" might constitute, but stated Pakistan needs time to explain its position. While it is unlikely such discussions will turn Pakistan's policy around, they should have the effect of forcing more internal discussions on the issue, which provides some opportunity for USG influence.
13. (C) It seems clear that, beyond MFA, Pakistan's military leadership is a crucial audience. While direct U.S. pressure is unlikely to convince them to support FMCT negotiations, and may even hurt efforts to move forward, mil-mil discussions on Pakistan's strategic concerns, particularly with COAS General Kayani and DGMO Major General Javed Iqbal, could help build the military's confidence that Pakistan's interests will be taken into account. As part of these interventions, it may help to provide Pakistani military leaders with an analytical case for why an FMCT makes more sense for Pakistan now than in the future in terms of the strength of the its deterrence vis-a-vis India. PATTERSON
Tuesday, 16 February 2010, 13:45
S E C R E T NEW DELHI 000295
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/01/2020
TAGS PREL, PTER, MOPS, IN, PK
SUBJECT: COLD START - A MIXTURE OF MYTH AND REALITY
REF: IIR 6 844 0101 10 (COLD START - A DAO PERSPECTIVE)
Classified By: Ambassador Tim Roemer. Reason: 1.4 (b,d).
1. (S/NF) Summary: The Indian Army's "Cold Start Doctrine" is a mixture of myth and reality. It has never been and may never be put to use on a battlefield because of substantial and serious resource constraints, but it is a developed operational attack plan announced in 2004 and intended to be taken off the shelf and implemented within a 72-hour period during a crisis. Cold Start is not a plan for a comprehensive invasion and occupation of Pakistan. Instead, it calls for a rapid, time- and distance-limited penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan, possibly in response to a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear response. It was announced by the BJP-led government in 2004, but the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has not publicly embraced Cold Start and GOI uncertainty over Pakistani nuclear restraint may inhibit future implementation by any government. If the GOI were to implement Cold Start given present Indian military capabilities, it is the collective judgment of the Mission that India would encounter mixed results. The GOI failed to implement Cold Start in the wake of the audacious November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in Mumbai, which calls into question the willingness of the GOI to implement Cold Start in any form and thus roll the nuclear dice. At the same time, the existence of the plan reassures the Indian public and may provide some limited deterrent effect on Pakistan. Taken together, these factors underline that the value of the doctrine to the GOI may lie more in the plan's existence than in any real world application. End Summary.
What It Is and What It Is Not
-----------------------------
2. (S/NF) As we understand it, Cold Start is an operational plan devised by the Indian Army and designed to make a rapid and limited penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan over some event, such as a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear response. Cold Start is not a plan for the comprehensive invasion or occupation of Pakistan. Cold Start is said to have been formulated after the Indian Army's slow and drawn-out 2002 mobilization in response to the fatal 2001 Pakistan-linked terror attack on the Indian Parliament. The lengthy process of mobilization, lack of strategic and operational flexibility, and the resulting lack of any element of surprise drew criticism from Indian politicians and opinion leaders, which prompted Indian Army planners to devise Cold Start. (See Reftel for further details on Cold Start's genesis).
3. (S/NF) In order to avoid the Indian Army's slow and lumbering military mobilization process and preserve the element of surprise in attack, Cold Start attacks could begin within 72 hours after the attack order has been given, and would be led by armored spearheads launched from prepared forward positions in Punjab and Rajasthan. As described, the plan emphasizes speed and overwhelming firepower: armored formations and accompanying infantry would advance into eastern Pakistan with limited goals in terms of distance and in terms of duration. Although the plan reportedly has a significant air support component, it is unclear to us how much joint versus parallel planning has taken place. We have not heard of a major operational role for the Indian Navy or parallel sea-launched attacks. (Reftel provides further analysis of the military aspects of Cold Start doctrine and implementation).
4. (S/NF) A positive attribute of Cold Start from the Indian perspective is that the short 72-hour time period between decision and attack could shield the GOI from international pressure to refrain from taking military action against Pakistan. India's prolonged 2002 mobilization period gave the international community notice of Indian troop movements and allowed plenty of time for a series of Western interlocutors to lobby GOI leaders. Even if the plan is never actually implemented -- and there is considerable question as to GOI intent to ever implement it -- news of Cold Start's existence has already paid dividends to Indian policymakers by providing reassurance to the Indian public that the GOI has the means to punish Pakistan for attacks on Indian soil without triggering potential mutually-assured nuclear destruction. From the Indian perspective, the unimplemented plan has the added virtue of accentuating Pakistani discomfiture and angst, which in theory may have some deterrent value.
Prospects for Cold Start
------------------------
5. (S/NF) As noted above, GOI intent to ever actually implement Cold Start is very much an open question. The Cold Start doctrine was announced in April 2004 by the BJP-led government that was replaced shortly thereafter by the Manmohan Singh government, which has not since publicly embraced Cold Start. A political green-light to implement Cold Start, fraught as it is with potential nuclear consequences, would involve a highly opaque decision-making process and would likely necessitate broad political consensus, a factor that could prolong the time between a precipitating event such as a Pakistan-linked terror attack and Cold Start deployment (which in turn could reduce the element of surprise). We lack firm details of the decision-making process that the political leadership would use in the event of an incident that would trigger consideration of Cold Start or other military action against Pakistan. The precise function of the Cabinet Committee on Security in ratifying decisions to take military action, the character of the military's advisory responsibilities to the Cabinet, the possible ad hoc nature of decision-making in the upper levels of the Indian government and the role of Congress Party figures like Sonia Gandhi in this process are not clearly understood.
6. (S/NF) If the GOI were to implement Cold Start given present Indian military capabilities, it is the collective judgment of the Mission that India would likely encounter very mixed results. Indian forces could have significant problems consolidating initial gains due to logistical difficulties and slow reinforcement. Reftel sets forth in detail the various resource challenges that India would have to overcome, challenges that range from road and rail transportation to ammunition supply. In addition, Cold Start's reliance on swift mobile advance would have to contend with a large number of built-up populated areas in Pakistan that the Indian Army did not have to face in 1971, the last time it advanced in force into Pakistani Punjab and Sindh.
7. (S/NF) Indian leaders no doubt realize that, although Cold Start is designed to punish Pakistan in a limited manner without triggering a nuclear response, they can not be sure whether Pakistani leaders will in fact refrain from such a response. Even in the absence of a Pakistani nuclear response, GOI leaders are aware also that even a limited Indian incursion into Pakistan will likely lead to international condemnation of Indian action and a resulting loss of the moral high ground that GOI leaders believe India enjoys in its contentious relationship with Pakistan.
Comment
-------
8. (S/NF) We think that the November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in Mumbai and its immediate aftermath provide insight into Indian and Pakistani thinking on Cold Start. First, the GOI refrained from implementing Cold Start even after an attack as audacious and bloody as the Mumbai attack, which calls into serious question the GOI's willingness to actually adopt the Cold Start option. Second, the Pakistanis have known about Cold Start since 2004, but this knowledge does not seem to have prompted them to prevent terror attacks against India to extent such attacks could be controlled. This fact calls into question Cold Start's ability to deter Pakistani mischief inside India. Even more so, it calls into question the degree of sincerity of fear over Cold Start as expressed by Pakistani military leaders to USG officials. Cold Start is not India's only or preferred option after a terrorist attack. Depending on the nature, location, lethality, public response, and timing of a terrorist attack, India might not respond at all or could pursue one of several other possible options. Finally, several very high level GOI officials have firmly stated, when asked directly about their support for Cold Start, that they have never endorsed, supported, or advocated for this doctrine. One of these officials is former National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan, who has recently been replaced. While the army may remain committed to the goals of the doctrine, political support is less clear. ROEMER
Monday, 29 October 2007, 16:44
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001657
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/29/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MO, FR
SUBJECT: SARKOZY SWEEPS MOROCCO OFF ITS FEET
Classified by DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: French President Sarkozy's October 22-24 visit to Morocco was viewed as a success by both sides. During a star-like visit and speech to the Moroccan parliament, Sarkozy offered the most explicit French statement to date in support of Morocco's autonomy plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement to the Sahara dispute. Sarkozy also essentially conceded the loss of the sale of French Rafale fighters to a "better offer" to Morocco for U.S. F-16s. Sarkozy and entourage completed nearly 3 billion Euros worth of commercial deals and military sales during the visit, including a naval frigate. The French Ambassador in Rabat downplayed the commercial aspects of the trip, instead emphasizing Sarkozy's "Mediterranean Union" summit proposal and his support for Moroccan democratic and economic reforms. The visit received mainly favorable attention in the local media, featuring images of two heads of state interacting as equal partners and friends. End summary.
---------------------------------
Leaning Farther Forward on Sahara
---------------------------------
2. (C) In an interview with the pro-Palace daily Le Matin just before his arrival, Sarkozy described Morocco's autonomy proposal for the Sahara as "serious and credible." Addressing a joint session of parliament in Rabat on October 23, Sarkozy appeared to take explicit French support for Morocco's plan a step further, describing it as "a new element," in a long deadlocked process, using the USG formulation that it could "serve as a basis for negotiation in the search for a reasonable settlement to the Western Sahara issue." Sarkozy's remarks on Sahara appeared to move France closer toward the Moroccan position, and were embraced as such by most of the Moroccan press, which characterized the president's remarks as a breakthrough for French policy on the Sahara question. (We understand the Polisario leadership has protested Sarkozy's remarks.)
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Mediterranean Union and Other Themes
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3. (SBU) During an October 26 briefing, French Ambassador Jean-Francois Thibault emphasized to the DCM and other members of the diplomatic corps the excellent atmospherics of the Sarkozy visit while downplaying its commercial aspects. Thibault stated that Sarkozy came to underscore French support for Morocco,s democratic development, reforms not only in the economic realm but also in human rights, and Morocco,s importance for Europe.
4. (SBU) In that context, Thibault spent several minutes describing the proposed Mediterranean Union Summit in June 2008. While noting that the union is not intended to replace the Barcelona Process, he said that the themes would be political, security, energy, educational and agricultural cooperation. In response to a question, Thibault opined that the African Union and Arab League would be invited to send observers as would some European nations that do not border the Mediterranean.
5. (SBU) Queried about international issues, Thibault said there had been little discussion beyond the public statements about Iran and the Middle East Peace Process. Amb. Thibault also confirmed that France and Morocco also signed agreements on extradition, prisoner transfer, social security, and sanitation.
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Economic Agreements and Military Sales
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6. (SBU) Though downplaying the economic issues that received the greatest coverage in local media, Thibault confirmed that French companies had completed a "draft" agreement to construct a high-speed rail line (&train a grande vitesse or TGV8) from Tangier to Marrakech and from Casablanca to Oujda in three phases. The first phase would be to provide the engineering, equipment and rolling stock for the Tangier to Rabat to Casablanca portion; phase two would extend the line to Marrakech; finally, the TGV would link Casablanca to Rabat, Meknes, Fes, and, ultimately, Oujda. The agreement relates to the initial 200-km Tangier-Kenitra portion of the route, at a cost of 2 billion euros, half of which will go to
RABAT 00001657 002 OF 002
French companies Alstom, SNCF, and Reseau Ferre de France.
7. (SBU) The proposal, which has been under study since 2004, was apparently seized on as a centerpiece for the visit once it became apparent that Rabat was determined to proceed with purchase of American F-16 fighters rather than the French Rafale, though the project is not expected to be commissioned until 2013. Perhaps chastened by the Rafale experience, the French president told French attendees at a Moroccan-French economic forum in Marrakech on the last day of his visit that they cannot rest on their laurels. Instead they must aggressively outbid and outhustle the competition, conceding (according to the Moroccan press) that if the French lost the Rafale aircraft deal, "it is because the Americans made a better offer." Responding to a press question Sarkozy proudly defended his good relations with the U.S.
8. (SBU) Other military contracts concluded during the visit included the sale of a French frigate and the upgrade of 25 Puma helicopters and 140 armored vehicles. In addition, an energy contract was signed to build a 200 million Euro power plant near Oujda in Morocco's northeast and the French nuclear group Areva signed a deal with the National Phosphate Company (OCP) to extract uranium from Moroccan phosphoric acid. In a press release, the company noted that Morocco's reserves of the material total 6 million metric tons, twice the world reserves of actual uranium ore.
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Press Coverage - Ecstatic, with Exceptions
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9. (SBU) The visit generated numerous positive images and sound bytes. During Sarkozy's address to parliament he called for "a real partnership without arrogance" - and promised "France will be at your side" as Morocco moves forward with its economic and political agenda. These and other sound bytes resonated in numerous headlines above glowing articles in the Moroccan press, as did images of Sarkozy affectionately greeting the King, the royal family, Moroccan officials, and citizens in carefully managed photo-ops.
10. (SBU) Though press coverage of Sarkozy's visit was overwhelmingly positive, some commentators voiced resentment - the independent (Arabic) daily Al Massae groused that French diplomacy "remains governed by traditional and obtuse concepts" and accused the President of patronizing Morocco by issuing a "certificate of good conduct" to the regime. A leading Islamist daily deemed insulting Sarkozy's assertion during his address to parliament that Islam stands for goodness, tolerance, and peace, while political Islam stands for separateness and engenders hostility toward "the other." The Arabic daily affiliated with the Islamist PJD denounced Sarkozy's remark as a slap in the face to the Islamist MPs present in the audience.
11. (C) While Sarkozy was generally well received, there was much gossip in Moroccan salons about a "too relaxed" President slouching comfortably in his chair as he and the King presided over an October 22 signing ceremony at the Royal Palace in Marrakech. In one image, Sarkozy was seen crossing his legs and pointing the sole of his shoe at the King - a taboo gesture in the Islamic world. Sarkozy was accompanied throughout the visit, including at a banquet with the royal family by his Justice Minister (of Moroccan heritage) Rachida Dati.
***************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat *****************************************
Riley
Tuesday, 21 October 2008, 17:03
S E C R E T LONDON 002651
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 10/20/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINR, UK, ECON, KNNP, MOPS, PTER, AF, FR,
GG, PK, RS, UP
SUBJECT: USDP EDELMAN'S OCTOBER 15 MEETINGS IN LONDON
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 b and d
1. (S/NF) Summary. The UK is pessimistic about Pakistan, especially in light of President Zardari's poor leadership and the bad economy, although they praise efforts by Pakistani President Zardari to cooperate with Afghan President Karzai, UK senior officials at the Ministry of Defense (MOD), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and Cabinet Office told DOD Under Secretary for Political Affairs (USDP) Eric Edelman and CENTCOM J5 Major General Robert Allardice during October 15 meetings in London. The officials stressed the importance of maintaining public support for efforts in Afghanistan as casualties mount there. They agreed that financial pressure has had an impact on the Iranian regime. The UK needs a SOFA in Iraq and may require U.S. support to obtain one. HMG supports NATO Membership Action Plans (MAPs) for Georgia and Ukraine but, in an effort to maintain allied unity, is preparing a compromise "Bucharest Implementation Plan" for the December NATO Ministerial that will contain the elements of a MAP. HMG has been "pleasantly surprised" by the pragmatism of the French EU Presidency. According to the Chief of the Defense Staff Jock Stirrup, the MOD did not welcome the unexpected cabinet reshuffle that replaced Defense Minister Des Browne with John Hutton, but Stirrup described the new Defense Minister as "keen on defense, keen on his job." End Summary.
2. (SBU) USDP Edelman and Major General Allardice met with UK officials in London October 15 on a broad range of issues including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Russia/Georgia. At the MOD, Edelman and Allardice met with the Chief of the Defense Staff Jock Stirrup and Policy Director John Day; at FCO with Permanent Under Secretary for Security Affairs Peter Ricketts; and at the Cabinet Office with Foreign and Security Adviser to the Prime Minister Simon McDonald and the Cabinet's Deputy Head of the Foreign and Defense Policy Secretariat Margaret Aldred.
Bleak Situation in Pakistan -- But a Few Glimmers
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3. (S/NF) Although UK interlocutors were generally pessimistic about Pakistan's prospects, including the government's ability to manage the financial crisis, they expressed cautious optimism about President Zardari's efforts to cooperate with Afghanistan President Karzai. McDonald noted that Prime Minister Brown wants to "encourage communications" between Zardari and Karzai since he "believes that if the top levels can work well together, the lower levels" will follow suit. Ricketts, who had just returned from a visit to Pakistan, praised Zardari's efforts to reach out to Karzai.
4. (S/NF) Ricketts characterized Zardari as having "not much sense of how to govern a country...I fear he talks and talks but not much happens." Ricketts stated that HMG would "like to believe in Zardari...he says the right things, but he faces big challenges," including the economy, which "is in a really bad way." Stirrup stated that Pakistan is "arguably worse" now than a month ago, asserting that although Zardari has "made helpful political noises, he's clearly a numbskull." Real progress in Pakistan requires "a government with stability and self-confidence" with a goal beyond "hanging on to power." Stirrup stated that a major obstacle to progress is an "enormous strand of deep anti-Americanism among the public" although such views have diminished considerably among the political classes. According to Day, Zardari's principal strategy appears to be asking for "lots of development aid...and meanwhile circumstances on the ground are getting worse." Day described Zardari as a "more positive and stable leader than we'd feared and his relations with Karzai are a plus," but Zardari "does not know what to do and is waiting for someone to provide him a solution." McDonald also deprecated Zardari's "passing the hat quite energetically" and stated that during a recent meeting with British officials he presented a "specific shopping list." Despite "encouraging first signs" when Zardari took office, it has become clear he is "not running the country."
5. (S/NF) McDonald acknowledged U.S. concerns about former Premier Nawaz Sharif, including ties to Islamists, but asserted that "he's indicated he's willing to change and some in the system believe he has already done that." Although Sharif's "moment may not come for a couple of years" he is in line to be Pakistan's next President, McDonald said. Ricketts observed, however, that many members of the opposition are "publicly irresponsible" although some, like Sharif, are "reasonable in private."
6. (S/NF) Stirrup agreed that "clear intelligence" has demonstrated that U.S. Predator drone strikes in Waziristan have had an impact on terror networks. Ricketts noted that cross border operations are "resonating hard" in Pakistan's political world, but Ricketts and other interlocutors concurred that the Pakistani leadership was not presently troubled by U.S. Predator strikes that kill "Arabs" and Taliban, although Stirrup cautioned that such attitudes could change.
7. (S/NF) Stirrup asserted that General Ahmed Pasha's recent appointment as head of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the army spy agency, by Pakistani Army Chief Ashfaq Kayani (former ISI head) reflects Kayani's efforts to "get control of the ISI" and make sure that Zardari won't control the ISI. Stirrup claimed that HMG has urged Zardari and civilian leadership to get control over ISI but "when we put pressure on the Pakistanis they rearrange the furniture." Ricketts' described Pasha as "Kayani's man," but also noted that during his recent trip to Pakistan "everyone spoke highly" of Pasha.
Afghanistan: Getting the Message Right
--------------------------------------
Q (C/NF) Several interlocutors expressed concern that rising casualties in Afghanistan could result in waning public support in allied countries for the mission there. McDonald stated that in Great Britain the "electorate wants some movement" in Afghanistan; public sentiment could turn against the "good war" as casualties mount, he asserted. Consequently, the public in allied countries requires "a realistic narrative" that explains the goals in Afghanistan. Stirrup noted that JCS Chairman Mullen's October 9 Congressional testimony, in which he predicted that 2009 would present increased challenges in Afghanistan and that "trends across the board are not going in the right direction," was "headline news" in the United Kingdom.
9. (C/NF) "Security is our top concern, but we need political progress," in Afghanistan, Stirrup emphasized. Ricketts asserted that "we're holding our own" in the fight against the Taliban and that a uniquely military solution is not sufficient, as we "need to find social and economic solutions." Part of the problem, he continued, is that in Afghanistan the "perception of security is diminishing" and "fear of Taliban reprisals" impede progress. Consequently, efforts to build civil-military links are crucial to building stability, Ricketts stated.
10. (S/NF) Day stated that HMG continues to feel "deep frustration" with Karzai, wryly adding that "I remind people that we -- the international community -- selected him." For all Karzai's faults, Day continued, the real question concerning Karzai's future is whether there is a "constitutional alternative." One dire possible scenario would be "failed elections (in 2009) with Karzai having reduced legitimacy and with violence attributed to the campaign." Stirrup remarked on the importance of ensuring "respectable elections." McDonald stated that building up the Afghan National Army to the goal of a well-trained force of 122,000 soldiers plus 12,000 in training would take a long time. Aldred wondered whether one solution might be to follow Pakistan's model and "give the army some sort of economic benefit." Some interlocutors shared their disappointment at the performance of UN envoy Kai Eide. Ricketts qualified his critique of Eide with the observation that he had "weak back up" from the UN system.
Iran: Bigger Carrot, Bigger Stick?
----------------------------------
11. (S/NF) All UK interlocutors agreed that fiscal pressure against Iran has had an impact on the regime and that the international community needs to keep up the pressure, even if immediate changes are unlikely. Ricketts observed that "pressure on Iran's financial sector" coupled with falling oil prices have been effective and that the "squeeze" against Iran should continue. According to Ricketts, "Supreme Leader (Ayatollah Khameini) feels that (President) Ahmadinejad has not delivered...and the bourgeoisie in Tehran is openly dismissive of Ahmadinejad," also concluding that he has not delivered. Therefore, we must "plug along" with sanctions and "our advice is to increase the size of the carrot and the
stick" in dealing with Iran. He raised the possibility of the United States opening a "visa section" in Tehran, suggesting that "lines of people around the block" queuing for visas would send an "effective message" to Iran's leadership.
Iraq SOFA: UK Looks to U.S. for Help
-------------------------------------
12. (C/NF) McDonald stressed that the UK could not have an "orderly transition" of its forces in Iraq without a SOFA to provide a legal framework and the UK seeks to "piggyback" on the U.S.-Iraq SOFA. Day noted that Prime Minister Brown seeks a "low key transition" of British forces in Iraq. Stirrup emphasized that "from a military perspective a UK soldier cannot show up in an Iraqi court," expressing concern that he was "not sure the SOFA will get through the Iraqi system." USDP Edelman provided an update on the progress of the U.S.-Iraq SOFA and reassured his interlocutors that the U.S. and UK shared similar concerns on jurisdiction issues.
Avoiding a "Wretched Row" over MAP
----------------------------------
13. (C/NF) McDonald stated that HMG rejects the view of "some partners who want to get back to business as usual with Russia." He continued that Prime Minister Brown shares President Bush's emphasis on the "importance of allied unity on the Georgia crisis." Although the UK supports MAPs for Georgia and Ukraine, HMG does not believe the Alliance will agree on MAPs at the December 2-3 NATO Ministerial. Consequently, HMG is "working up a Bucharest Implementation Plan" that will contain the elements of a MAP but would not be "as frightening a word as MAP" to some allies. McDonald stressed that such a plan would help cement Alliance unity and he said he would raise it with NSA Hadley during his meeting with him in Washington in a few days. Day characterized the plan as "like MAP, but without the name," also noting that "the risk of allied disunity is huge." Ricketts affirmed HMG's support for a Georgian MAP, but allies should seek a compromise in order to maintain unity and "avoid a wretched row." Aldred observed that, depending on the result of Ukraine's elections, Ukraine may not have a government come the ministerial, temporarily mooting the question of a MAP for Ukraine.
France: EU Presidency -- and NATO
----------------------------------
14. (C/NF) Ricketts stated that HMG has been "pleasantly surprised" by the pragmatism of France's EU Presidency. Day remarked that the current French plan to reintegrate into NATO's military command is the third such effort. "I am not sure France understands the implications of what they need to do to provide officers and staffers for NATO integration."
The New DefMin...
------------------
15. (S/NF) Stirrup offered a preliminary assessment of new Defense Minister John Hutton, who replaced former DefMin Des Browne in the October 3 cabinet reshuffle. He stated that the reshuffle was unexpected at the MOD and that Defense was the only portfolio Hutton would accept when Peter Mandelson replaced Hutton as Business Secretary. Citing "political considerations" that dominated the Cabinet reshuffle, Stirrup opined that it was "disappointing from our perspective that so little thought was given to what was best for (the Ministry of) Defense" since "we did not need a change" at the MOD. However, "we were lucky we got who we got," since Hutton is a military historian who is "keen on defense and keen on his job."
16. (U) USDP Edelman cleared this message.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
LEBARON
NNNN
End Cable Text
Wednesday, 23 September 2009, 15:09
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 002295
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 09/23/2034
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, PINR, MOPS, EAID, PK
SUBJECT: REVIEWING OUR AFGHANISTAN - PAKISTAN STRATEGY
Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 b and d
1. (S/NF) Summary: In response to queries posed by the National Security Council, Embassy Islamabad believes that it is not/not possible to counter al-Qaeda in Pakistan absent a comprehensive strategy that 1) addresses the interlinked Taliban threat in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2) brings about stable, civilian government in Afghanistan, and 3) reexamines the broader role of India in the region. As the queries presuppose, the ending of Pakistani establishment support to terrorist and extremist groups, some Afghan-focused and some India-focused, is a key element for success. There is no chance that Pakistan will view enhanced assistance levels in any field as sufficient compensation for abandoning support to these groups, which it sees as an important part of its national security apparatus against India. The only way to achieve a cessation of such support is to change the Pakistan government's own perception of its security requirements. End Summary.
2. (S/NF) Al-Qaeda can operate in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) largely because the Taliban-related groups in these areas continue to challenge the writ of the Pakistani government. Unilateral targeting of al-Qaeda operatives and assets in these regions is an important component of dealing with the overall threat. It is not/not, however, sufficient in and of itself to force al-Qaeda out of the FATA, so long as the territory remains largely ungoverned space. Increased unilateral operations in these areas risk destabilizing the Pakistani state, alienating both the civilian government and military leadership, and provoking a broader governance crisis in Pakistan without finally achieving the goal. To be effective, we must extend the writ of the Pakistani state into the FATA in such a way that Taliban groups can no longer offer effective protection to al-Qaeda from Pakistan's own security and law enforcement agencies in these areas. We should be under no illusion, however, that this effort will not require a multi-year, multi-agency effort.
3. (S/NF) Taliban groups in Pakistan and the regional threat posed by al-Qaeda, however, cannot be effectively dealt with absent a broader regional strategy that leads to stability in Afghanistan. Fear that the ISAF mission in Afghanistan will end without the establishment of a non-Taliban, Pakhtoon-led government friendly to Pakistan adds to the Pakistani establishment's determination not to cut its ties irrevocably to the Afghan Taliban. They fear that withdrawals of NATO countries on a date certain from Afghanistan is only the thin edge of a wedge that will be followed by other coalition partners, including the United States. Discussions of deadlines, downsizing of the American military presence, or even a denial of the additional troops reportedly to be requested by Gen. McChrystal are taken as evidence that reinforces this perception. General Kayani has been utterly frank about Pakistan's position on this. In such a scenario, the Pakistan establishment will dramatically increase support for Taliban groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which they see either as ultimately likely to take over the Afghan government or at least an important counter-weight to an Indian-controlled Northern Alliance.
4. (S/NF) Most importantly, it is the perception of India as the primary threat to the Pakistani state that colors its perceptions of the conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan's security needs. The Pakistani establishment fears a pro-India government in Afghanistan would allow India to operate a proxy war against Pakistan from its territory. Justified or not, increased Indian investment in, trade with, and development support to the Afghan government, which the USG has encouraged, causes Pakistan to embrace Taliban groups all the more closely as anti-India allies. We need to reassess Indian involvement in Afghanistan and our own policies towards India, including the growing military relationship through sizable conventional arms sales, as all of this feeds Pakistani establishment paranoia and pushes them closer to both Afghan and Kashmir-focused terrorist groups while reinforcing doubts about U.S. intentions. Resolving the Kashmir dispute, which lies at the core of Pakistan's support for terrorist groups, would dramatically improve the situation. Enhanced USG efforts in this regard should be considered.
5. (S/NF) Money alone will not/not solve the problem of al-Qaeda or the Taliban operating in Pakistan. A grand bargain that promises development or military assistance in exchange for severing ties will be insufficient to wean Pakistan from policies that reflect accurately its most deep-seated fears. The Pakistani establishment, as we saw in 1998 with the nuclear test, does not view assistance -- even sizable assistance to their own entities -- as a trade-off for national security vis-a-vis India. The lack of faith in USG intentions in Pakistan and in relation to India makes such a bargain untenable in the eyes of the Pakistani establishment. Development assistance in the context of the Pakistani counter-insurgency strategy must be accelerated and refined in order to extend the government writ to the FATA, to stabilize regions at-risk for insurgent activity and recruitment, and to offer incentives for those that desire to leave terrorist groups. It can and should not/not be viewed as a pay-off for behavior change by the Pakistani establishment.
6. (S/NF) In the final analysis there is no short-cut to dealing with the al-Qaeda problem in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is inextricably linked to and cannot be divorced from the Taliban problem in both countries. Nor can we hope to develop a strategy for minimizing Taliban influence and thereby al-Qaeda operational space in Pakistan's FATA absent a strategy that brings about stability in Afghanistan; the notion that precision or long-range counter-terrorism efforts can suffice are equally illusory. Afghan instability by definition leads the Pakistani establishment to increase support for the Taliban and thereby, unintentionally, create space for al-Qaeda. No amount of money will sever that link. Rather, we must reassess our regional approach and find ways to reassure the Pakistanis that they can address their long-standing national security objectives most effectively -- both to the east and to the west -- by working closely with the U.S. PATTERSON
SECRET
Thursday, 19 February 2009, 16:17
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ISLAMABAD 000365
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, MOPS, MARR, EAID, PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL KAYANI'S VISIT TO
WASHINGTON
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (S) Summary. Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Kayani's February 20-27 visit to Washington comes on the heels of the government's loss of control over Swat, continued Pakistani Army/Frontier Corps operations in the tribal areas, and still-simmering Indo-Pak tensions in the wake of the Mumbai attacks. We expect Kayani will request increased intelligence sharing (real-time SIGINT and ISR), help to modernize his helicopter fleet, increased support for civilian law enforcement, and financial compensation for Pakistanis displaced by combat. He likely will complain about delays in Coalition Support Fund payments, suggest that U.S. policy on strikes in the tribal areas be amended, and request information about plans for a U.S. troop surge in southern Afghanistan.
2. (C) We should recognize growing Pakistani casualties in the fight against militants, praise Kayani's support for the civilian democratic government in Islamabad, re-iterate the long-term U.S. commitment to support Pakistan, and thank him for agreeing to send his intelligence chief and director of military operations to the Holbrooke/Riedel U.S.-Pakistan strategic review meeting in Washington. We should also thank Kayani for the GOP's effort to ensure that U.S./NATO continues to deliver fuel and dry goods through Pakistan for our forces in Afghanistan.
3. (C) But we need to lay down a clear marker that Pakistan's Army/ISI must stop overt or tacit support for militant proxies (Haqqani network, Commander Nazir, Lashkar-e-Taiba). We should preface that conversation with an agreement to open a new page in relations; Kayani, who was ISI Chief from 2004-2007, does not want a reckoning with the past. Given the GOP surrender of Swat to local taliban, we need to press Kayani to commit his now reluctant Army to retake the area after the "peace deal" inevitably fails.
4. (C) We should press for Pakistani prosecution of the Mumbai suspects, encourage expanded USG training of Army and Frontier Corps forces, raise the prospect of embedding U.S. military observers/advisors with the Frontier Corps, support a prioritized needs-based FMF request that builds COIN capability, ask Kayani to explain how Pakistan plans to back U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, and probe for what Indian action would allow him to redeploy troops from his eastern front to support increased combat in the Pak-Afghan border area. Suggested talking points and bio are included at paras 28-30. End Summary.
Supporting Democratic Governance
--------------------------------
5. (C) The civilian government headed by Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani, elected one year ago, is now stable. President Zardari's elected position is politically secure and Gilani has a majority in parliament. The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and its coalition allies rule in three of the four provinces and effectively control all three branches of federal government. Opposition leader Nawaz Sharif is by far the most popular politician in Pakistan (with an 83% approval rating compared to Zardari's 20% in the latest IRI poll), but he does not have the votes to bring down the government.
6. (C) Zardari is cementing leadership alliances so he can avoid another election until he receives international assistance to address food and fuel inflation, electricity blackouts and high unemployment. Pakistan has met its first-quarter targets under a $6.7 billion IMF Standby Agreement but the economy remains too weak to support the Pakistani military's appetite for expensive weapons systems (particular F-16s).
7. (C) President Zardari and Kayani are the key decision-makers in Pakistan; they have developed a respectful if not entirely trusting working relationship. Kayani has gone out of his way to publicly defer to Zardari because he needs political support to wage successful military
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operations. After eight years of military rule under Musharraf, Zardari is re-shaping civilian-military relations in the shadow of Pakistan's history of repeated military coups. It is in USG interests for the Zardari/Gilani government to complete its full five-year term, and we should praise Kayani's efforts to support civilian democracy.
8. (C) Kayani may advocate for pending legislation (Kerry-Lugar) in the U.S. Congress to triple non-military assistance to Pakistan and robust USG support for an IMF/World Bank Donors' Conference to provide $4 billion in social safety net programs to compensate for IMF-imposed budget cuts. We anticipate that Special Representative Holbrooke will attend a Donors' Conference in April. Kayani may request additional U.S. support for civilian law enforcement; in addition to the over $40 million of equipment and training delivered to the Frontier Corps, we are providing $15 million in additional equipment for the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) police and are working to re-program another $55 million in FY2009. There is a FY2009 supplemental request pending for another $95 million for the police. 9. (C) Kayani will request cash to assist more than 300,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have fled fighting in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Swat, NWFP. Through USAID, State/PRM and DOD, we already have provided over $10 million in assistance and are preparing to respond to new UNHCR/ICRC/World Food Program appeals for Pakistan. Of particular interest will be U.S. plans to continue/expand the delivery of $2 million in (CERP-like) assistance from DOD through the Frontier Corps to IDPs in support of Kayani's counter-insurgency strategy.
10. (C) Security concerns are limiting our ability to operate, but today USAID contractors are building schools and wells, hiring workers for short-term jobs, training teachers and increasing the capacity of the FATA Secretariat to deliver services that demonstrate the writ of government in FATA.
The Big Strategic Questions
---------------------------
11. (S) Zardari and Gilani agree that Pakistan's biggest threat comes from a growing militant insurgency on the Pak-Afghan border. The military and ISI have not yet made that leap; they still view India as their principle threat and Afghanistan as strategic depth in a possible conflict with India. They continue to provide overt or tacit support for proxy forces (including the Haqqani group, Commander Nazir, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, and Lashkar-e-Taiba) as a foreign policy tool.
12. (S) The single biggest message Kayani should hear in Washington is that this support must end. It is now counterproductive to Pakistan's own interests and directly conflicts with USG objectives in Afghanistan--where Haqqani is killing American soldiers and Afghan civilians--and the region--where Mumbai exposed the fruits of previous ISI policy to create Lashkar-e-Taiba and still threatens potential conflict between nuclear powers.
13. (S) Kayani will want to hear that the U.S. has turned the page on past ISI operations (he was ISI chief from 2004-2007). We should ask for his views on what political end state in Afghanistan would convince him to end proxy support for militants and probe for what would be required by India to allow him to redeploy forces from the Indian border for the fight in FATA. The reality is that, without a redeployment, he does not have the forces (however poorly trained) to combat the insurgency in FATA.
Pakistani Will. . . .
---------------------
14. (C) The good news is that the Army/Frontier Corps are engaged in combat in Bajaur and Mohmand, FATA. Zardari is committed to the fight; he knows that Osama bin Laden has publicly targeted Pakistan and admits "the militants are
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after me and my job." The bad news is that the militants increasingly are setting the agenda.
15. (C) The government's anti-terrorism strategy is based on "dialogue, deterrence and development;" however, it lacks the military capacity to deter militants and the financial resources to develop the FATA and NWFP. Its historic fallback has been to play for time by conducting negotiations with militants, a disastrous tactic that only has made the extremists stronger. The government insists it will negotiate with tribal leaders but not with militants.
16. (C) However, in the latest agreement in Swat (once a tourist resort approximately 90 miles from Islamabad), the provincial government agreed to negotiate for peace in exchange for imposition of Shari'a law with the Taliban. This was recognition of de-facto Taliban control, which produced beheadings, closure of girls' schools, a growing exodus of terrified citizens, and the desertion of outgunned and outmanned police. Ham-handed military tactics, which included indiscriminate artillery bombardment, have further alienated a population that simply wants the fighting to end. Under international pressure, Zardari has not yet signed off on the deal pending assurances it really will deliver peace; a similar negotiation in 2008 failed.
17. (C) Kayani, who supported the Swat deal, will argue that he does not have the forces to battle on multiple fronts, so he is picking his battles and negotiating to preserve later options. We should push back hard, noting that it will be difficult for international donors to support a government that is not prepared to go all-out to defend its own territory.
. . .vs Capability
------------------
18. (S) Now absorbing combat losses against formidable militants, Pakistan's Frontier Corps (FC) and military finally have begun to accept more USG training and assistance in support of counter-insurgency (COIN). Kayani will appreciate U.S. recognition of the casualties his men have suffered, and this is an opening we should exploit to press for expanded FC and special forces (SSG) training. Kayani remains leery of too large a USG military footprint in Pakistan, but to win he must be able to fight without creating the level of civilian casualties his forces' blind artillery and F-16 bombardments are now producing. We are responding to Pakistan Air Force requests for Close Air Support training to improve the precision of F-16s they are using in FATA. We should probe for the possible introduction of U.S. military observers/advisors to improve the COIN capability of this 1940's force.
19. (S) Kayani will repeat his requests for increased intelligence sharing, notably SIGINT, in support of ongoing military operations in FATA. Pakistan has agreed to build additional tripartite Border Coordination Centers (BCCs), and this month we will expand real-time tactical/target-focused intelligence sharing through the Torkham BCC. We continue to work on delivering Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aerial capability (two B350-ERs) that Kayani has raised with all his high-level visitors.
20. (C) The Bush administration's commitment to provide Pakistan with $300 million annually in FMF expires in 2009, and we need to come to agreement with Pakistan on how to restructure its FMF program to meet its long-term COIN needs. The Pakistan military has requested $1B per year for five years (FY10-14) in FMF.
21. (C) Kayani may request additional U.S. support for Pakistan's F-16 program, the flagship symbol of post-9/11 re-engagement. We are about to send to Congress notification for an additional $142 million in FMF support for one part of this complex program. But we do not believe Pakistan can afford to complete a $2 billion plus program to buy 18 new F-16s, upgrade 35 older aircraft, upgrade a new base, and fund a munitions package. Given the funding and production
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line implications of either bailing out the GOP or canceling the program, U.S. agencies are reviewing our options.
22. (C) We could not agree more with Kayani on the need to modernize Pakistan's helicopter fleet; on any given day, they have perhaps 2-3 attack helos flying in support of COIN operations. We now are delivering spare parts for their Cobra and Bell 412s, overhauling and upgrading their MI-17s, and assessing ways to improve overall helicopter maintenance.
U.S. Strikes
------------
23. (S) As recent media reports indicate, the U.S. has eliminated 10 of the top 20 al-Qaida operatives in Pakistan over the last year. However, the strikes have put increasing political pressure on the Pakistani government, which has struggled to explain why it is allowing an ally to violate its sovereignty. The GOP so far has denied recent media reports alleging that the U.S. is launching the strikes from bases in Pakistan. Kayani knows full well that the strikes have been precise (creating few civilian casualties) and targeted primarily at foreign fighters in the Waziristans. He will argue, however, that they undermine his campaign plan, which is to keep the Waziristans quiet until the Army is capable of attacking Baitullah Mehsud and other militants entrenched there. In recent meetings with Special Representative Holbrooke, a variety of Pakistani interlocutors (and now the press) suggested that the U.S. work jointly with Pakistan and target Mehsud or other militants who are killing Pakistanis.
Afghanistan
-----------
24. (C) Pakistan-NATO/Afghan cooperation and coordination across the border has improved dramatically in recent months. This includes exchanges of tactical intelligence that allows NATO forces to block passes in support of Pakistani operations and has helped lower attacks on U.S./NATO forces. In recent meetings with ISAF Commander McKiernan, Kayani raised concern about the effect of a U.S. troop build-up in southern Afghanistan, which could push militants and refugees across the border into Balochistan and prompt an influx of foreign fighters. Pakistan currently has only one Army brigade and perhaps 15 Frontier Corps wings stationed along the vast and largely unpopulated Pak-Afghan border in Balochistan.
25. (C) Following embarrassing militant attacks on U.S./NATO convoys last year, Pakistan has made efforts to secure Khyber Agency/Torkham Gate, through which U.S./NATO trucks deliver 30% of the fuel and 80% of the dry goods for our forces in Afghanistan. The troop surge will require us to send additional supplies through the Chaman (Balochistan) border crossing in Afghanistan; CENTCOM is now evaluating ways to improve delivery of supplies through Pakistan.
India
-----
26. (C) Indo-Pak tensions are still simmering, but to avoid a potential Indian military strike, the GOP needs to continue to show progress on prosecuting those Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operatives responsible for the Mumbai attacks. India has welcomed the GOP decision to file formal charges against the key masterminds of Mumbai; Islamabad now awaits an Indian response to requests for additional information (forensics, ballistics reports, etc) from New Delhi to support prosecution.
Nukes
-----
27. (S) Although he has remained silent on the subject, Kayani does not support Zardari's statement last year to the Indian press that Pakistan would adopt a "no first use" policy on nuclear weapons. Despite increasing financial constraints, we believe that the military is proceeding with
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an expansion of both its growing strategic weapons and missile programs. Pakistan's strategic assets are under the control of the secular military, which has implemented extensive physical, personnel and command and control safeguards. Our major concern has not been that an Islamic militant could steal an entire weapon but rather the chance someone working in GOP facilities could gradually smuggle enough fissile material out to eventually make a weapon and the vulnerability of weapons in transit. Despite a court decision to "free" nuclear proliferator A.Q. Khan, the GOP continues to assure us he remains under significant travel and media restrictions.
28. (S/Rel Pak) Suggested Talking Points:
-- (S/Rel Pak) What is in the past is behind us. What we seek going forward is an all-encompassing bilateral relationship based on what we can accomplish for the future. We recognize your sacrifices and are well-aware of the trust-deficit that exists on each side. We must both work to overcome it.
--(C/Rel Pak) We appreciate your efforts to support stable civilian democracy in Pakistan and are working to provide a democracy dividend that improves both economic conditions and the law and order situation.
-- (S/Rel Pak) We must succeed in Afghanistan. What is your vision for what constitutes an acceptable outcome?
-- (S/Rel Pak) We want more Pakistani forces deployed to the western border to fight the militants. What conditions are necessary for you to reposition forces from the eastern to the western border?
-- (S/Rel Pak) It is time to cut your ties to extremist groups/proxy forces and urge the permanent severing of ties. Such ties hinder trust and our ability to move forward together.
-- (S/Rel Pak) Our security relationship must move beyond the provision of equipment, and we seek opportunities to expand training throughout the military.
-- (S/Rel Pak) Our ability to deliver sustained security assistance also depends on the Administration securing Congressional approval. Congress is likely to prioritize assistance to counterinsurgency-related equipment and training, as well as align its support with Pakistani performance in the field.
-- (S/Rel Pak) Strikes in the FATA are succeeding in eliminating the enemy senior leadership and collateral damage has been minimal. We are working to provide you with tactical battlefield intelligence to support your operations in FATA.
Bio Notes
---------
29. (U) General Ashfaq Kayani was born in Punjab in 1952, grew up in a working-class family and is the son of a former junior officer. He was commissioned in the Pakistan Army after graduating from the Pakistan Military Academy in 1971. His long career has included command at every level from Company to Corps. He has served in key staff positions, to include Military Assistant to the Prime Minister under Benazir Bhutto from 1988-1990, Director General of Military Operations (DGMO), 2000-2003, Director General, Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) from 2004-2007, and Vice Chief of Army Staff in 2007. In November 2007, he became Chief of Army Staff (COAS). He is the only officer ever to have served as both DG-ISI and COAS. His term as DGMO coincided with the intense military standoff with India of 2001-2002.
30. (C) C) In interactions with post, Kayani is often direct, frank, and thoughtful. He has fond memories of his IMET training at Fort Leavenworth and values his personal relationships, particularly with U.S. military leaders. Kayani is married and the father of two children, a son and a
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daughter. An avid golfer, he is President of the Pakistan Golf Association. He smokes heavily and can be difficult to understand as he tends to mumble.
PATTERSON
Wednesday, 31 January 2007, 12:21
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ISLAMABAD 000528
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/29/2017
TAGS AF, IN, MOPS, PK, PREL, PTER, XF
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF MEETS SPEAKER PELOSI AND 110TH
CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and(d)
1. (C) Summary: In a January 27 meeting lasting more than an hour-and-a-half, Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi and Committee/Sub-Committee Chairs of the Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence and Appropriations Committees called on Pakistani President Musharraf. The Speaker noted that this was her first foreign travel in her new position, underscoring the importance the Congress places on the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Acknowledging that this was an important visit, the President offered to describe Pakistan's strategies to defeat terrorism and extremism and to clarify U.S. misperceptions about Pakistan's commitment.
2. (C) At the CODEL's request, the President reviewed his recent visit to Middle Eastern capitals, where he promoted his vision of enlightened moderation for the Muslim world; he also counseled Syrian President Assad to abandon his confrontational approach and reconcile with the international community. Musharraf offered a detailed analysis of the security situation along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan and his strategy to win the support of local tribes through economic and social development, while eliminating al Qaeda and Taliban leadership cells through security operations. Musharraf told the CODEL that critics who suggest that Pakistan's intelligence agencies are playing a double game in Afghanistan are wrong, saying that such criticism only emboldens our common enemies. The President specifically requested Congressional support for Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs)and U.S. support for his FATA economic initiative of USD 150 million per year, noting Pakistan's own heavy commitment of national funds toward economic development in the border areas; he also reviewed his government's programs to increase spending on education and health care, as envisioned in the U.S.-Pakistan Shared Objectives. Musharraf cast a hard gaze on narcotrafficking in the region, while highlighting Pakistan's anticipated achievement of "poppy free" status in 2007. He was optimistic regarding the prospects for improved relations with India. Finally, Musharraf told the Speaker that provisions of H.R. 1 (Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007) concerning Pakistan weaken his position vis-a-vis extremists fighting for Muslim hearts-and-minds in the long war on terror; the Speaker was non-committal in response. End summary.
3. (U) Meeting Participants:
U.S.
----
Rep. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House Rep. Ike Skelton, Chair - House Armed Services Committee Rep. Tom Lantos, Chair - House Foreign Affairs Committee Rep. Silvestre Reyes, Chair - House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Rep. John Murtha, Chair - Defense Appropriations Sub-Committee Rep. Nita Lowey, Chair - State and Foreign Operations Sub-Committee Rep. David Hobson, Defense Appropriations Sub-Committee Mr. Michael Sheehy, National Security Advisor to Speaker Pelosi Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker Mr. John Gastright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Pakistan
--------
President Pervez Musharraf
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LTG Hamid Javaid, Chief of Staff BG Shafqat Ahmad, Military Secretary
Outreach to Middle East: Empower Moderates in Muslim World
--------------------------------------------- -------------
4. (C) When the Speaker asked about Musharraf's January 20-25 visit to Middle Eastern capitals (Riyadh, Cairo, Amman, Damascus and Abu Dhabi), Musharraf initiated a description of a Muslim World beset by tension. An incipient Iraqi civil war along sectarian lines, sectarian strife in Lebanon, the Shi'a dimension in the U.S.-Iran conflict and, at the core, the unresolved Palestinian question have led the President to believe the time is ripe for a new Muslim voice of moderation. In his talks with his Arab interlocutors, Musharraf laid out his goals: promoting sectarian harmony, organizing joint action against terrorist organizations and building partnerships with Europe and the U.S. The next step is to engage the major non-Arab Muslim states -- Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey. (Note: Musharraf is visiting Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur this week. End note.) He will then seek to develop a statement of common principals; if this succeeds, Saudi King Abdullah has pledged to host an event to launch the initiative. "I am trying to lead on this issue," Musharraf said, admitting that he cannot say whether his efforts will succeed.
5. (C) While in Damascus, Musharraf said that he had a "frank exchange" with Syrian President Bashar Assad, telling the Syrian President that his policies are contributing to instability in Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq. "Are you for confrontation or not?" Musharraf demanded, noting that Syria now has few friends left. Bashar responded by saying that he wants to reconcile with the international community and work to solve problems. Musharraf pointed to the need for peace between Hamas and Israel, obtaining Bashar's word that Syria would not obstruct communications between the two. Musharraf offered to help Bashar regain standing in the international community, if Syria is serious about a new direction. Representative Hobson asked whether the U.S. should take a different approach with Bashar. Musharraf advised the U.S. to engage Bashar; he also believes that moderate Muslims could influence the Syrian. He observed that Bashar displayed a sense of being overlooked by the international community: for example, Bashar told Musharraf that the entire world supports the Palestinians, but has forgotten the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights. Musharraf wondered whether observers credit Bashar with wielding more power than he actually has, speculating that other forces may be at work. Musharraf perceived Bashar as facing problems similar to those along the PAK-AFG border, quoting Bashar as saying that more than 1 million tribal refugees have flowed into Syria from Iraq. (Note: On hearing this, Musharraf offered Bashar some friendly advice: "Look into fencing." End note.)
Straight Talk on Pak-Afghan Border Security
-------------------------------------------
6. (C) Responding to Chairman Skelton's desire to hear the President's perspective on efforts to secure the Pak-Afghan border, Musharraf decried the "tremendous misunderstandings and misperceptions" that have led U.S. critics to accuse Pakistan's intelligence agencies of collusion with the Taliban, al Qaeda and other extremists. Musharraf frankly acknowledged that remnants of al Qaeda remain hidden in the mountainous border region. Pakistan is now also focused on the Pashtun tribes who live on both sides of the PAK-AFG border. Of the seven tribal agencies in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), populations in North and South Waziristan openly cooperate with Taliban insurgents. Al Qaeda elements are concentrated in Bajaur. The other four agencies, Musharraf contended, are relatively peaceful, although the Taliban has made an effort to infiltrate Kurram, where it has encountered local resistance. In contrast, Musharraf continued, Pashtuns residing in Balochistan are generally peaceful; the trouble ther are Afghan Taliban commanders and foot soldiers who have found safe haven in lawless refugee camps, from which they can operate with impunity.
7. (C) Speaker Pelosi asked the President whether he knew the whereabouts of Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Musharraf replied that Mullah Omar and the Taliban movement emerged from Kandahar, where he presumably remains. "I do not believe Omar has ever been to Pakistan," Musharraf said, contrasting this to al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Ladin and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, who may be ensconced in the mountains along the Frontier. Musharraf proceeded to describe Pakistani efforts to locate and apprehend other al Qaeda leaders and Taliban commanders, including Afghans Mullah Dadullah Lang and Jalaluddin Haqqani and Pakistani Baitullah Mehsud; these leaders, Musharraf said, come and go from Pakistan, where they recruit and motivate militants.
8. (C) What is required to defeat the Taliban? Musharraf answered his own rhetorical question, saying that in Afghanistan, the Coalition must deploy military and political resources, while Pakistan controls movement across the PAK-AFG border. The President painted a vivid picture of the on-the-ground challenges: there is no easy way to identify Taliban fighters amongst the 30,000 people who cross the Chaman border crossing in Balochistan daily, only one of 23 crossing points along the province's 2300 km border with Afghanistan. Even with 954 border posts, the government has not been able to control dozens of informal crossing points in Balochistan and the FATA. The strategy must therefore penetrate deeply into the border regions, focusing on (a) eliminating safe havens, including refugee camps; (b) launching military action against the militants' command-and-control targets, and (c) winning the loyalty of local tribes through economic growth, social development and political reform.
9. (C) Arguing that military operations alone will alienate the tribes, Musharraf segued into an overview of the FATA Sustainable Development Plan and a description of the traditional leadership roles of maliks (who represent tribal authority) and political agents (who represent federal and provincial authorities). To ensure that political agents and maliks have the necessary muscle to reinforce their authority to impose law and order, the government is bolstering the numbers and capacity of tribal levies, the Frontier Constabulary and the Frontier Corps. As the Speaker described Chairwoman Lowey's leadership of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Sub-Committee, the President expressed appreciation for her support for Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs), and appealed for USD 150 million/year for five years for FATA development to supplement the national funds already budgeted.
10. (C) Political engagement is crucial, Musharraf said, shifting to a discussion of the September 2006 jirga accord in North Waziristan. "This agreement is much maligned," Musharraf admitted, but it was critical for the government to reach out to local tribal and religious leaders. Re-establishing the writ of the government is imperative, but the authorities must work with the local tribes to make this a reality. The greatest failure, Musharraf continued, has been controlling cross-border movement and expelling foreign fighters from the agency; the government is now pushing the tribes hard to live up to their side of the bargain. If they do not, the President said, we will take military action. "When we locate a target, we will hit it," Musahrraf promised, noting that Pakistani forces had done just that ten days earlier. Candidly assessing the agreement as only 25 percent successful so far, Musharraf was adamant that the jirga agreement is/is the only way forward. He said he believes that the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) Governor should pursue a similar accord with tribes in South Waziristan.
11. (C) Shifting back to preventing unlawful border crossings, Musharraf addressed the possibility of selective deployment of fences and/or land mines along the border. "Mining has problems," Musharraf acknowledged, but said he wants to proceed with fencing. Military experts have estimated that some 32 km in FATA and 295 km in Balochistan would be appropriate for fences. When Chairman Reyes noted the controversy generated by proposals to fence the U.S.-Mexican border, Musharraf nodded in agreement, then cited Pakistan's long experience with fences and mines along its eastern border with India.
12. (C) Expanding his comments to include Pakistani plans to close lawless Afghan refugee camps, Musharraf asserted that "nobody wants to assist us in this task." Frustrated that "all the ideas I put forward for controlling the border" are opposed by both the international community and the government in Kabul, Musharraf said that he welcomes other ideas. "Either help me control the border or help me move the refugees out," he said.
Defending Pakistan's Commitment
-------------------------------
13. (C) Musharraf told the CODEL that the government is committed to fighting terrorism, as Pakistanis do not want to see their country succumb to creeping Talibanization. Musharraf detailed the heavy losses sustained by Pakistan's security forces, as well as the multiple assassination attempts against the country's political leadership, "We are not a banana republic and the ISI is not a rogue agency," Musharraf said, explaining that he could retire any active-duty general officer with a swipe of his pen: "ISI is a disciplined service staffed by seasoned military officers who follow my orders."
14. (C) Later in the conversation, the President expressed concern about H.R. 1 (Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act). Musharraf said that language in the bill questioning Pakistan's reliability as an ally of the U.S. directly damages his ability to wage war on our common enemies ("This weakens me!") and to inoculate his country against the infection of Islamic extremism.
Shared Objectives and Enlightened Moderation
--------------------------------------------
15. (C) Chairwoman Lowey asked the President to explain why Pakistan has not met mutually-agreed targets for budgetary support for education set forth in the bilateral Shared Objectives. Musharraf defended his record, saying that since he assumed power, he has embraced human resource development as essential for sustained growth. He opted for an inital focus on economic development to generate revenue for health and education, and this is happening. Education spending is increasing from 2.6 to 4 percent of GDP under his leadership. Chairman Murtha raised the subject of madrassas, to which the President responded that the appeal of a madrassa education will decline as the public education system improves. Musharraf also highlighted the government's record in improving health care delivery, particularly maternal-pediatric services.
16. (C) Speaker Pelosi raised the specter of suicide bombings, seeking the President's advice on persuading all societies that such attacks are unacceptable. Musharraf agreed, terming suicide attacks as un-Islamic. All countries must find a way to deal with extremism," the President said, "but such terrorism must be addressed by force." He then outlined his multi-point strategy for combating extremism and promoting "enlightened moderation":
-- Prevent the misuse of mosques -- Prohibit speech that incites the public to violence -- Ban extremist organizations and their leadership (a delicate business, the President admitted, as the government must not/not be seen as anti-religion) -- Revise the national curriculum -- Reform madrassa education, introducing a standard curriculum that includes secular subjects (math, language, science, etc.)
A Poppy-Free Pakistan
---------------------
17. (C) Chairman Murtha also complimented Pakistan's achievements in fighting the drug trade, asking the President to explain Pakistan's success in contrast with the record poppy harvest in Afghanistan. Musharraf responded: "There is no effective government control in Afghanistan." Pakistan was able to implement a coordinated strategy of eradication and destruction, complemented by programs to offer alternative livelihoods. The poppy leads only to narco-fueled financial flows supporting the insurgency. Musharraf suggested that the international community provide funds to buy the Afghan poppy crop directly from the farmers.
Earthquake Relief
-----------------
18. (C) Chairman Lantos asked the President whether Pakistan needs the U.S. to do more to support relief/reconstruction efforts in the areas devastated by the October 2005 earthquake. Musharraf assured the Chairman that Pakistan is managing the reconstruction process well, noting that prompt intervention had prevented the predicted post- disaster plagues of epidemics, famine and exposure. Now well into the reconstruction phase, the government has allocated USD 3000 to 500,000 families, whose use of the funds to rebuild their homes also injects capital to the recovering local economy. The government has built many temporary schools and university buildings, many of which are better facilities than those which were destroyed.
Indo-Pak Relations
------------------
19. (C) Chairman Lantos asked about the state of Pakistan's relations with India. Musharraf was upbeat in his response, saying that he has his fingers crossed. The two countries have made progress with confidence-building measures and have successfully maintained a cease-fire along the Line-of-Control in Kashmir, but the process had stalled on conflict resolution. Now, Musharraf indicated, he and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh are on the verge of an agreement..."Soon -- sooner than anyone might think." Musharraf appreciated Singh's flexibility, relating Singh's personal invitation for the President to attend the SAARC Ministerial in New Delhi in April. Musharraf explained his decision to decline the invitation, saying that there is too much euphoria and expectation at present. "If I went to Delhi, but we didn't sign an agreement, the people would think we had failed," he said. Musharraf said that he has conveyed two options to New Delhi: either PM Singh comes to Pakistan before April to sign an agreement or the two hold a signing ceremony at the SAARC Ministerial. Musharraf shared his enthusiasm for the just-concluded visit to Pakistan by three Jammmu and Kashmir leaders of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, noting that he had advised them to egage and bring on board other Kashmiris. "An agreement should not land like a bombshell," said Musharraf. Leaders must prepare their publics, as he is doing in Pakistan.
Iraq's Shadow over the Region
-----------------------------
20. (C) Speaker Pelosi described the current situation in Iraq as the most important foreign policy issue confronting the U.S., citing the terrible loss of life and the consequences for America's global reputation. President Musharraf opined that dividing Iraq would be disastrous, citing Turkish opposition to an independent Kurdistan. He believes that Iran is abetting the growing Sunni-Shi'a schism. Referring back to his initiative to build a movement of moderate Muslim voices, Musharraf said this must be done by partners who have credibility in the region, something that the U.S. does not currently enjoy. If a consensus could be endorsed by Sunnis, Shi'as and Kurds, Musharraf mused, perhaps an all-Muslim security force could backfill following the withdrawal of U.S. and British forces.
21. (U) The CODEL did not have an opportunity to clear this cable. CROCKER
Tuesday, 17 February 2009, 08:27
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000288
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/16/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, IN
SUBJECT: INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY: "HUGE STAKE" IN SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE HOLBROOKE'S SUCCESS
Classified By: AMB David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary. In a meeting between Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon and Special Representative Richard Holbrooke on February 16, Menon:
-- stated that India "has a huge stake" in the Special Representative's success in his new role and promised to support Holbrooke's efforts publicly to alleviate negative media speculation about the Special Representative's mandate; -- gave his assessment that the intentions and capabilities of the Pakistan Army were the key determinants of Pakistan,s internal situation and the cause of friction between India and Pakistan; -- said that India wishes to collaborate closely with the U.S. on Afghanistan, and offered support for U.S. views on the suitability of an August 20 election date; -- suggested that after consulting internally, he may travel to Washington to provide GOI input into the U.S. review of Afghanistan policy; and -- provided a brief on the GOI's initial reaction to Pakistan's response to the Mumbai terror attacks. End Summary.
2. (C) Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, accompanied by Ambassador, met February 16 with Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon. Also in attendance from the U.S. side were Paul Jones, Deputy for Holbrooke; Ashley Bommer, Representative Holbrooke's assistant; and an Embassy notetaker; the Indian side also included Joint Secretary (Americas) Gaitri Kumar and Joint Secretary (Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran) TCA Raghvan. Holbrooke explained his responsibilities as Special Representative and emphasized the importance of Indian views in the formulation of the new administration,s Afghanistan and Pakistan policy. He also provided Menon with a brief readout of his trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan
3. (C) Menon cited the numerous times he had worked both publicly and privately with Holbrooke in the past, and said he was very happy to see Holbrooke in his new incarnation. The Indian government, too, was pleased with Holbrooke's appointment, he stated, adding "We have a huge stake in your success in this role." He agreed with Holbrooke's assessment that in regard to the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan "you can't solve one without the other."
4. (C) The Indian government was aware of the suspicions the media had created about Special Representative Holbrooke's mandate (i.e., that it included Kashmir), Menon said. While the media would always speculate, Menon promised that the GOI would publicly support Holbrooke's efforts, adding that it would repeat the message "India has a huge stake in your success" in its public comments.
5. (C) Turning to Pakistan, Menon observed that the mood there had deteriorated over the past year, saying it had gone from euphoria after the return of a civilian government to worries over security and the economy. The U.S. has influence, however, "where it matters most," Menon said, referring to the Pakistan Army, arguing that most of the problems in Pakistan can be traced to the capacity and intentions of Pakistan's military. Not only must Pakistan's army shift its attention from east to west, Menon asserted, but it must also cut its links to jihadi organizations, who have gone global over the past five years. Supporting Pakistan's army is not the answer, he said, suggesting that changing its operating assumptions would be more effective. Menon noted that the Indians had felt last week's meeting at the Munich Security Conference between National Security Advisor MK Narayanan and General Petraeus had been especially productive.
6. (C) Menon pointed out that in the wake of the Mumbai terrorist attacks, India had consciously not attempted to take any measures to destabilize Pakistan's civilian government, and had made every effort to continue trade and travel relations. However, Pakistan's Army continued to make things difficult for India, through ceasefire violations, infiltrations and continued support for terrorist groups.
NEW DELHI 00000288 002 OF 002
Menon noted that India, in the wake of the Mumbai attacks, had consciously not built up troops on the border with Pakistan, as it had following the 2001 attack on its Parliament.
7. (C) Turning to Afghanistan, Holbrooke noted that the focus now was on the elections. He lauded India for the effective contribution it had made to Afghanistan reconstruction, which Menon said is now up to $1.5 billion. Menon acknowledged Pakistani suspicions about India,s intentions in Afghanistan and explained that India has made numerous efforts over the past few years to try to allay Pakistan's concerns, only to be rebuffed. Menon said that he, as High Commissioner, had offered to President Musharraf to sit down and explain exactly what India was doing in Afghanistan, without even asking for a reciprocal explanation from Pakistan, but that Pakistan officials -- not just Musharraf -- "have avoided it in every way."
8. (C) India has no interest in any specific candidate in Afghan elections, Menon stated, but believes the upcoming election process should not add to instability. Equally important is that the election process is credible, therefore making Afghanistan's democracy credible. Menon noted that Afghan Lower House Speaker Mohammad Yunis Qanuni was currently in Delhi, and said India supported the Election Commission,s proposal for August 20 polling. Menon stated that the GOI was also planning to tell Qanuni that controversy over the exact date of the election should not be allowed "to bring the house down," adding that to do so would only be in the Taliban's interest. Holbrooke urged Menon to tell Qanuni to accept the August 20 election date. (Note: Menon offered to brief Post on the Qunani meeting, and Post will report septel on any readout provided. End Note.)
9. (C) Responding to Holbrooke,s brief of the Afghanistan policy review currently underway in the USG, Menon said he would consult with his government on what would be the best way for India to provide input. He suggested that, after consultations, he would like to travel to Washington for high level talks with the new team. Menon assured Holbrooke, that on the issue of Indian cooperation with the U.S. on Afghanistan, we could be assured that India wished to work closely with us.
10. (C) Menon asked if the U.S. was considering including Iran in a Core Group on Afghanistan. Holbrooke referred to his interview with Tolo TV where he emphasized the need for all of Afghanistan's neighbors to be part of the solution, but said no policy decisions had been made. Menon said he believed a contact group did not have to be formally set up yet, but rather if we "let it cook," it would form itself. Menon noted the interest China has had in such a group for the past two years, and added that Iran has been signaling to India for the last four months that it was interested.
11. (C) Menon offered an initial GOI assessment of the Pakistani response to India's dossier on the Mumbai terror attacks. Saying that it was "remarkable that we got this far," Menon thanked the U.S. for its role in pressing Pakistan to act. Still, Menon maintained, Pakistan has further to go to bring justice to the perpetrators of the attack, and it is not clear whether Pakistan will continue on this positive track or, citing the Daniel Pearl case, recede when public pressure wanes. Menon also speculated that many of the "30 questions" submitted by Pakistan were added after the investigation by politicians in response to domestic pressures. "We haven't reached the point of no return yet" for Pakistan's government to positively conclude the investigation, Menon stated. Menon also offered that he did not believe the Mumbai attacks themselves would play a major role in India's upcoming elections, because efforts to capitalize politically on such a heinous event would likely backfire on any political party.
12. (SBU) Ambassador Holbrooke has cleared this message. MULFORD
Friday, 28 December 2007, 16:40
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 005388
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 12/28/2017
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, PINR, SHUM, PK, PINS
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN'S NEXT PRIME MINISTER?
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4(b)(d).
1. (S/NF) The Pakistan Muslim League has unofficially selected former Punjab Chief Minister and current head of the party's Punjab chapter, Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi, as its candidate for the Prime Ministership following the January 2008 national elections. Elahi, who until the November 15 dissolution of the provincial governments served as Punjab's Chief Minister, has long been a prominent figure in center-right politics in the Punjab province. While Elahi lacks the personal charisma of other major political leaders, such as the late Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, his political instincts and organizational skills more than compensate for this deficiency. Unlike Bhutto and Sharif, who run their parties as personal fiefdoms based on the sheer force of their personalities, Elahi and his cousin/brother-in-law Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain have a history of deal-making and coalition-building with Pakistan's center-right, that has created personal and political ties between them and most of the Punjab's feudal and industrial elite.
2. (S/NF) Elahi first came to prominence along with his older cousin and brother-in-law Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain as supporters of center-right leader Nawaz Sharif. As Lahore-based Kashmiris who relied primarily on the army and intelligence agencies for political elevation, the Sharifs lacked personal ties and common ground with most of Punjab's center-right politicians who hailed from the province's traditional feudal and industrial families. The Chaudhrys, industrialists from Gujrat, were among the first to recognize the Sharifs' rising influence in center-right politics and first formed business and later political ties to the family. For this reason, both Ch. Pervaiz and Ch. Shujaat were ultimately admitted to the Sharifs' inner circle, making them arguably the second most powerful family in the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. The Sharifs came to rely on the Chaudhrys for much of the political strategy and deal-making that kept the coalition of Punjabi feudals and industrialists -- on which the party was based -- working in tandem (despite Nawaz Sharif's notoriously difficult personality).
3. (S/NF) The Chaudhrys' major rift with the Sharifs came following the 1997 elections. Nawaz Sharif had ostensibly promised Ch. Pervaiz and Ch. Shujaat that, in return for engineering an election campaign that resulted in a two-thirds majority for the party in the National Assembly, Ch. Pervaiz would be made Chief Minister of the Punjab. Following the party's victory, however, Nawaz broke his word and instead elevated his brother Shahbaz to the Chief Ministerial office -- leaving Elahi as Speaker of the Provincial Assembly. While Elahi remained loyal to Nawaz and the PML-N, the relationship between the two families never fully recovered. Ch. Pervaiz has raised this story on more than one occasion with the Principal Officer, as evidence of Sharif's lack of trust in non-family members, and as a reason for the break between the two families following the 1999 coup.
4. (S/NF) The decision to remain with the PML-N in 1997, despite differences with the Sharifs, was largely due to the Chaudhrys' distaste for the Bhutto family -- a rivalry that pre-dates the current generation. The Chaudhrys hold Benazir Bhutto's father responsible for the death of Ch. Pervaiz Elahi's father and for the imprisonment and torture of Ch. Shujaat Hussain's father during the elder Bhutto's tenure as Prime Minister. Both Ch. Pervaiz and Ch. Shujaat were briefly detained by the elder Bhutto. Ch. Shujaat's father was a close advisor to Gen. Zia-ul-Haq following his 1979 coup against Bhutto, and is believed to have encouraged Gen. Zia to have Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto executed. Rumor in Lahore is that Ch. Shujaat's father loaned Gen. Zia his pen to sign Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's death warrant. Ch. Pervaiz ostensibly purchased the same pen at an auction some years later. The Chaudhrys are believed to have actively opposed a pre-electoral deal devised between Benazir Bhutto and President Musharraf in September 2007, largely due to their personal animosity for Bhutto. Since her death, Elahi, in conversation, has suggested that he would be able to form a solid working relationship with either of her likely successors, Amin Faheem or Bhutto's husband, Asif Ali Zardari.
ISLAMABAD 00005388 002 OF 003
5. (S/NF) Following the 1999 coup both Ch. Pervaiz and Ch. Shujaat were detained by the National Accountability Bureau on corruption charges relating to unpaid state-owned bank loans that were made to their companies. Charges against both were dropped following an agreement they made to defect from the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz and assist President Musharraf in building a new center-right Muslim League in Punjab. The Chaudhrys are believed to have been offered this deal at the behest of National Security Council Secretary Tariq Aziz -- who they once counted as a close
SIPDIS political ally (they have since fallen out over differences relating to the award of PML tickets in 2002 and 2005, and Musharraf's negotiations with the late Benazir Bhutto). The Chaudhrys carried out this new role in much the same manner as they had for the Sharifs, putting together a party based upon personal ties between them and other Punjabi feudals and industrialists. While the party had no grassroots supporters, its candidates in both 2002 and 2005 performed well due to their personal influence in their local areas.
6. (S/NF) As a reward for his political service, Ch. Pervaiz was appointed as Punjab Chief Minister following the 2002 national elections -- the post earlier denied to him by Nawaz Sharif. By all accounts, Elahi performed exceptionally well in his role as an administrator. He clearly defined his government's priorities (health care, education, and infrastructure development); devoted significant financial resources to these priority areas; and appointed capable, competent ministers to head these departments. International donor agencies have certified that Elahi's government achieved significant improvements in many of the key indicators in these areas.
7. XXXXXXXXXXXX
8. (S/NF) Elahi has been a strong supporter of President Musharraf's enlightened moderation agenda and favors swift, decisive law enforcement action against terrorists and extremist organizations. Senior law-enforcement officials, who worked with Elahi as Chief Minister, claim that he gave clear instructions that significant resources were to be devoted to infiltrating and dismantling terrorist organizations and to monitoring and curtailing the activities of religious leaders believed to have extremist tendencies. Under his leadership, the Punjab police were successful in bringing down a number of terrorist cells in the province.
9. (S/NF) At the same time, Elahi believes that the government must make a clear distinction between terrorists, and conservative religious figures. While Elahi and his family are followers of moderate Sufi traditions, he has, largely for political reasons, built ties with more conservative Deobandi religious institutions, particularly the Deobandi madrassa board and the Tablighi Jamaat. These individuals, who had been traditionally ignored by Punjab's center-right politicians (almost all of whom follow the Sufi school of through), have provided Elahi with a source of influence in these communities -- unparalleled by other main-stream politicians. Elahi has used this influence to encourage reform within Punjab's madrassas and obtain strong statements from these leaders condemning terrorist violence and declaring its un-Islamic. Absent the support he enjoyed in these quarters, it is doubtful that the government could have proceeded with its admittedly incomplete
ISLAMABAD 00005388 003 OF 003
religious-reform agenda.
10. (S/NF) Elahi is a close advisor of President Musharraf, and is regularly consulted by him on political strategy. This advice, however, is not always followed -- leading to a certain degree of tension in their relationship. Elahi believes that if he and Shujaat had been listened to, the entire Chief Justice episode and the state of emergency could have been avoided. If elected Prime Minister, Elahi will not content himself with the titular role played by his predecessors and will insist on full control over broad aspects of domestic policy and political strategy. This will inevitably bring him into conflict with the President, although given their prior relationship, these issues can probably be resolved quite amicably.
11. (S/NF) Elahi was born in 1945 and educated at Lahore's Forman Christian College and Watford College of Technology in London. He is married with two sons. The elder is a Sufi religious scholar, who avoids politics and public appearances. The younger, Moonis Elahi, attended the Wharton Business School and is being groomed by his father as the family's political heir, Moonis is contesting his first provincial assembly elections in January 2008, for seats in both Lahore and the family's base in Gujrat.
PATTERSON
Thursday, 19 February 2009, 16:07
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000364
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS ASEC, PTER, PGOV, PK, CASC
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON SOLECKI CASE
REF: ISLAMABAD 354
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (C) Summary. Ambassador and UN Resrep Akcura met February 19 with Interior Minister Malik to follow up on the Solecki kidnapping case. Akcura expressed concern about Solecki's deteriorating health, as noted by the kidnappers' spokesman in a February 18 statement rejecting direct negotiations with the UN. The group agreed that: Solecki's mother would be asked to issue a video-taped appeal for his release on humanitiarian grounds and cite the medications he needed; Pakistan TV would air a report suggesting the kidnapping brought shame on the Balochi people and jeopardized the UN's humanitarian work in Balochistan; UNSG Eide would follow up on his request to Karzai to pressure Brahamdagh Bugti on Solecki's release; Ambassador would request that Legatt London follow up personally with Hyrbyair (aka Hyrbiyar) Marri; Malik would send his brother to reach out to Mir Gazin Marri (aka Kaiaga Marri) in Dubai; and Malik would coordinate with ISI to allow the kidnappers and Solecki to cross the border into Afghanistan. End Summary.
2. (C) Ambassador and UN Resident Representative Fikret Akcura met jointly Feburary 19 with Interior Minister Rehman Malik to discuss the latest on the John Solecki kidnapping case. On February 18, Mir Shahak Baloch, self-proclaimed spokesman for the the Baloch Liberation United Front (BLUF) called reporters through a satellite phone to issue a statement saying that Solecki's health had worsened and spurning a plea by the UN for direct negotiations. "Instead of cooperation with us, the government is trying to move the missing persons to more secretive places," Baloch said. "We want the UN to formulate a team and come to Balochistan to see the actual situation about the missing persons." The press reported that appeals had been made by Jamil Akbar Bugti, Sardar Akthar Mengal and Hairbayar Marri--leaders of the three key Baloch tribes--on behalf of Solecki.
3. (U) Akcura confirmed press reports that the UN had been in contact with veteran Baloch nationalist leader Nawab Khair Baksh Marri, aged 90, in Karachi. Akcura expressed growing concern about Solecki's health and the need for quick resolution of the kidnapping. Ambassador noted that UNSRG Kai Eide had called President Karzai, who finally admitted that Brahamdagh Bugti was in Kabul and agreed to press Bugti on Solecki's release. Akcura said that Eide plans to follow up with Karzai on this request. U.S. Embassy London Legatt had reached out to Hybyair (aka Hyrbiyar) Marri via Scotland Yard.
4. (C) Malik confirmed that the Balochistan Frontier Corps had cordoned off an area in which they believed Solecki was located near Quetta. They were surveilling an individual connected to kidnappers; this individual reported the "friend" was in failing health and referred to moving west, i.e. into Afghanistan. Malik expected to hear additional information from this individual February 20. The MOI, however, did not have geo-coordinates on the individual who had called the press; he appeared to be continually moving on a motorbike.
5. (C) Malik asked for guidance on whether the MOI should facilitate or block the kidnappers' movement across the border. He was concerned that the kidnappers' failure to steal an ambulance and Solecki's deteriorating health meant that time was of the essence and clearly did not want the GOP to be blamed for failing to rescue Solecki. Noting the U.S. had more assets on the Afghan side of the border, Ambassador said our preference was that Solecki should be allowed to cross; Akcura cautiously agreed. Ambassador agreed that the GOP had jurisdiction over the case but thought that the family should be consulted before any proposed, and obviously risky, rescue attempt. MOI Secretary Kamal Shah noted that the kidnappers likely would not be anticipating any problems at the border so they likely could be taken by surprise.
6. (C) Malik continued to insist that Brahamdagh Bugti was primarily responsible for the kidnapping. However, he also suggested that the Bugtis and the Marris, although rivals,
ISLAMABAD 00000364 002 OF 002
were in fact colluding in this case and that their accusations against each other were only stalling tactics. He proposed efforts to split them by telling each side the other was privately accusing it of kidnapping Solecki. He also urged that the U.S. (through intermediaries) begin to threaten Bugti with extradition to Pakistan in the event something happened to Solecki. Ambassador said in that case Bugti would be extradited to the U.S. to be tried for allegedly murdering a U.S. citizen.
7. (C) The group agreed on the following actions:
--Akcura would arrange for Solecki's mother to issue a video-taped appeal for Solecki's release on humanitarian grounds. This sort of appeal would resonate particularly well in the Baloch culture; in it she would mention the medications Solecki needed and urge that the militants provide those medications. Akcura would recommend that UNSYG Moon follow up with another televised appeal.
--Pakistan TV would tape and air a feature describing all the relief efforts the UN was providing in Balochistan, pointing out that the kidnapping jeopordized those efforts and reflected shamefully on the Baloch people.
--Malik would send his brother as an emissary to contact Mir Gazin Marri (aka Kaiaga Marri) in Dubai. He also planned to meet with the Governor of Balochistan.
--Ambassador agreed to ask Legatt London to follow up in person with Hyrbiyar (aka Hyrbyair) Marri. (see reftel).
--Malik requested any information the U.S. could provide about phone numbers called in Pakistan by the Afghan cellphones previously identified as belonging to the alleged kidnappers.
--Malik would contact ISI DG Pasha to coordinate instructions that Solecki and his kidnappers be allowed to cross the Afghan border (although it is clear that Malik would prefer to launch a rescue operation himself).
PATTERSON
Monday, 28 January 2008, 09:30
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 000405
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/28/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S CONDOLENCE CALL ON ASIF ZARDARI
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1, (C) Summary. During an hour and a half conversation with Ambassador on January 25, Pakistan People's Party Co-Chairman Asif Zardari called for deployment of the Army to prevent fraud on election day, asked for a UN investigation into Benazir Bhutto's assassination to identify the forces behind the attack, said he would create a national unity government if his party was elected, shared his concerns about spreading talibanization, voiced support for privatization and continued economic growth, indicated he would run for the National Assembly in a by-election and said that the PPP had not yet chosen a candidate for Prime Minister. He sought U.S. blessing for his leadership. Although Zardari delivered what he knew his audience wanted to hear, overall he demonstrated more poise and competence than we had expected. End Summary.
2. (C) Ambassador and Polcouns January 25 paid a condolence and introductory call on Asif Ali Zardari, widower of Benazir Bhutto and Co-Chairman of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). The meeting at Bilawal House in Karachi lasted an hour and a half. Roukhsana Bangash took notes for Zardari; PPP Sindhi President Nisar Ahmad Khuro also attended the meeting. Wearing a western blazer and slacks, Zardari appeared relaxed and focused through a wide-ranging discussion, referring only once to his prepared notes.
3. (C) Ambassador expressed condolences over the death of Benazir Bhutto and recounted how she had first met Bhutto just a few months ago in the same room. She asked about the Bhutto children, and Zardari said that Bilawal, in particular, was being besieged by well-meaning but stressful requests to attend memorials or speak to the press. Bilawal wanted to come home for his school holidays, but Zardari was still considering what was best. He had just visited the daughters in Dubai. Zardari himself planned to live at least part time in Lahore after the mourning period was completed.
4. (C) Zardari opened his remarks by saying that the U.S. is "our safety blanket" and recounted how Benazir had returned despite the threats against her because of support and "clearance" from the U.S. However, Zardari quickly moved on to the PPP succession. He shared a photocopy of a one-page handwritten will from Benazir in which she bequeathed the party to him. This document, Zardari said, would be published in an upcoming book authored by Benazir. Zardari said that for symbolic reasons he passed the PPP leadership to his son, Bilawal. Although Bilawal was only 19, Zardari noted that Benazir had taken over the PPP when she was only 22 years old. Benazir's enemies, he said, do not understand that she is now even stronger as a martyr.
Taliban Threat
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5. (C) The challenge today, said Zardari, was to convert Benazir's energy and the sympathy from her death into a positive outcome for Pakistan. He warned that what happens in Pakistan has a spillover effect in Afghanistan, Iran, and India. Pakistan has a population of 175 million people that is growing at 3-4% per year, so the effect of talibanization here can have a profound impact on the entire region.
6. (C) According to Zardari, there was no such thing as a "moderate Taliban" which had warped the concept of Islam. Zardari expressed concern about the increasing level of Saudi money even in Sindh and said that mosques and madrassas had become a "cottage industry" in Pakistan. It was important to reverse the impact of former President General Zia's Islamization, and he noted that in helping the mujahideen fight the Soviets we had "taught people to fish" and were now reaping the consequences. Ambassador noted that Benazir, more than most Pakistani politicians, had understood the creeping threat of extremism. That threat was now exhibiting itself, not only in the tribal areas, but in the settled areas of Swat and through suicide bombings around the country.
Planning to Run
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7. (C) Zardari agreed, saying that democracy was the way
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forward. He had opposed former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's announcement (twice) of a boycott and had not launched a FIR (first incident report) against the government over Benazir's death. Pakistan did not need any more chaos. Zardari said he would support PPP participation even if the party was weak or he was not in parliament. Zardari volunteered that the PPP had not yet chosen any candidate for Prime Minister and said it was premature at this stage. He noted that his sister is a member of the National Assembly from Nawabshah, and said she could give up her seat within two months so that he could contest it. Zardari was struggling, however, with how to explain to PPP rank and file the idea of continuing to work with a superpower which supported Musharraf. He was trying to convince his party that the U.S. supported democracy.
8. (C) Ambassador responded that the U.S. most definitely is supporting the democratic process in Pakistan and believes that, as the broadest based party in Pakistan, the PPP must be part of that process. We were working to make the elections as free and fair as possible. It did not go unnoticed in Washington that Zardari had agreed to a delay in elections and publicly had spoken out against violence.
Call in the Army
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9. (C) In response, Zardari ticked off the litany of PPP complaints about the election process: the intelligence agencies were going to rig the voting; the caretaker government was a sham and the former Musharraf government effectively was still in place at the national and provincial levels; PPP workers were being falsely arrested on charges connected to the post-assassination riots in Sindh; and the Chief Election Commissioner was weak and took his power from a Supreme Court that has now been hand-picked by Musharraf.
10. (C) What was needed, Zardari believed, was to have the Pakistan Army deployed at all voting places on election day to supervise the process. He was appealing to Chief of Army Staff General Kayani, Prime Minister Soomro and the Election Commission to put a solider in every polling booth on election day. Ambassador cautioned that in a recent meeting with CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon, General Kayani had made it clear that the Army wanted to stay out of politics. Zardari responded "out of politics, yes but not out of security for the process." There was precedent from former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's era to deploy the Army. It was needed to stop intimidation of voters by the local gangs belonging to some ruling party elites (he cited the Chaudhrys in the Punjab). Zardari said that the ruling party controls the police and could easily throw out the poll watchers so the process can be rigged.
11. (C) Noting that many western officials would see deployment of the Army as a negative development, Ambassador pressed Zardari on this point. He confirmed that the PPP believed the Army was a national institution that could be counted upon to preserve security and prevent electoral fraud. However, Zardari admitted that he was "scared" that the closer he gets to General Kayani, the weaker Kayani will become.
Bhutto Investigation
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12. (C) Zardari confirmed that PPP officials were in the U.S. to push for a UN investigation of Benazir Bhutto's assassination. He was not interested so much in who the sniper was or exactly how Benazir was killed. This was not as important as finding out who financed the killing, who were the "hands behind" it. Zardari had met with Scotland Yard as a courtesy, and the PPP provided some assistance, but the Scotland Yard mandate did not extend to what the PPP wanted to know. Ambassador said that we believed Baitullah Mehsud was responsible; Zardari dismissed this by saying that Mehsud was "just a pawn" in the process.
13. (C) Ambassador noted that our experience with the Hariri investigation was not promising; after three and a half years and great expense, there was still no final verdict. Moreover, it would still require an investigative body, and the UN had to pull together a disparate group of
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law enforcement officials and prosecutors to actually conduct the investigation. We believed it was important to hear the results of the Scotland Yard investigation before considering any other inquiries.
Post-Election Alliances
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14. (C) In response to Ambassador's question, Zardari said he could work with the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) as "they were not all bad." He cited former Foreign Minister Kasuri as an example of someone with whom he could interact. The Chaudhrys continued to issue false campaign statements and unnecessarily stir up Sindhi-Punjabi emotions, but Zardari insisted he had been careful "not to name names" or close out options. He continued to talk to National Security Advisor Tariq Aziz and confirmed that Aziz wants them to meet in Islamabad. Zardari also confirmed meeting with ISI Director General Taj.
15. (C) As for other party politicians, Zardari described Nawaz Sharif as a shy man. He had welcomed Nawaz's condolence visit to Sindh, although he recounted that Nawaz had put him in jail on false charges. Still, given the history of Zulfakir Bhutto's death, the PPP doesn't "condemn or hang former prime ministers." Zardari dismissed the electoral prospects of Fazlur Rehman, leader of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam party, by saying Fazlur was afraid for his life, hiding out on a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. Zardari questioned whether the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) really had the support of more than 20% of Karachi, but said that it ruled through gerrymandering of districts. The same was true of the PML's support in Punjab. Zardari said he didn't like the aggressive side of MQM but could work with the party and wanted to form a "national unity" government to heal the country.
Economic Policy
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16. (C) Zardari lamented that, despite economic growth, Musharraf had wasted an opportunity to improve social conditions in Pakistan. The country had received $62 billion in international assistance since September 11, 2001, but it wasn't clear what the government had done with the money. There was a $6 billion shortfall, and poverty had increased.
17. (C) Ambassador said that we shared the same concern. In particular, funds we provided for the military were not reaching the forces who needed them to fight extremism. She noted that there was some concern that PPP's traditionally populist ideas might undermine sound economic policy. Zardari responded that he supported increased privatization and economic expansion to build the middle class. The PPP, he insisted, had evolved beyond the days of Zulfakir Bhutto's slogans to give the people "roti, kapra, makan" (bread, clothing, shelter).
Request for Endorsement
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18. (C) In closing, Zardari said flatly "I am not Benazir, and I know it. The people respect me only because I spent eleven years in prison." Therefore, "I need help, especially from the U.S." to continue her legacy. Ambassador responded that we continued to support the PPP and our shared struggle against extremism and in favor of the democratic process in Pakistan.
Comment
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19. (C) Zardari had prepared for this meeting and knew what his audience wanted to hear. Nevertheless, he was calm, articulate and demonstrated a good grasp of issues and politics. Missing was the egotism and emotional bombast that we expected. He referred to conspiracy theories far less than Benazir had done and appears ready to deal with a variety of political actors in a practical way. Zardari's decision to name his son as head of the party was a savvy recognition of his own negatives, and it demonstrated a deliberate willingness to continue exploiting the Bhutto name. By sharing a copy of what purportedly was Benazir's
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will (it has not been shared with the public despite numerous media requests), Zardari appeared to be trying to convince us that Benazir indeed had anointed him as her successor.
20. (C) Zardari seemingly wants to be the PPP's candidate for Prime Minister, with the USG blessing. Law is not necessarily an obstacle to politics in Pakistan; however, the law requires that candidates have a university degree to run for office, and the Election Commission has disqualified the Sharif brothers (and other candidates) for being convicted/accused of crimes. Zardari has no university degree and spent eleven years in prison on various charges ranging from corruption and extortion to murder. He benefited from the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) that gave Benazir and others immunity from prosecution, but the NRO is due to expire on February 4. In deciding whether to extend the NRO, Musharraf thus has leverage over Zardari, his candidate eligibility, and his possible role in a future government.
21. Within PPP party circles, there is still a great deal of suspicion and dislike of Zardari. For now, most PPP members are lining up behind him as party leader. The focus of infighting has been over who, other than Zardari, will be the PPP candidate for Prime Minister. If Zardari presses his own candidacy, he will place further strains on a party that already is showing signs of fracture. As for running in his sister's constituency, it is not clear if the government will schedule by-elections until several months (possibly not before June) after the February 18 elections. At a minimum, it still appears that the PPP will need another candidate for Prime Minister if and until Zardari can sort out his eligibility.
22. (C) The government already has announced that the Army will be stationed at "sensitive" polling places to maintain law and order on election day. A wholesale deployment of the Army designed to prevent vote rigging by the Musharraf government, however, could very much politicize the Army in a way that General Kayani has been seeking to avoid. It would also place additional duties on forces increasingly overstretched in dealing with extremist militants in and around the tribal areas. Politically, however, the call for Army deployment is a clever move that puts the government in a no-win position, especially if/when election-day violence breaks out.
PATTERSON
Friday, 30 May 2008, 16:03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001998
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/30/2018
TAGS PGOV, PK, PREL, PTER
SUBJECT: CODEL SCHIFF MEETS WITH PPP LEADER ZARDARI:
POLITICAL MOVES AND BALANCING AID
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: On May 26, Codel Schiff -- U.S. Representatives Adam Schiff (D-CA) and Allyson Schwartz (D-PA) -- met with Pakistan People's Party (PPP) Co-Chairman Asif Zardari, Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, NSA Ambassador Mahmud Ali Durrani and Ambassador-designate to the U.S. Husain Haqqani. Zardari thanked the Codel for USG support of credible national elections. As he has previously, he committed Pakistan to the war on terror, insisting this was Pakistan's fight. He argued more needed to be done by the U.S. and international community to promote economic development in the frontier. Building on that point, Zardari suggested a new blend of USG assistance, increasing aid to "civilian forces" like the police and promoting civilian engagement. He warned that public opinion was unalterably against President Pervez Musharraf and that, for the sake of the new GOP, Musharraf needed to contemplate an "honorable exit." End summary.
"We are because of you."
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2. (C) Meeting May 26 in Islamabad, U.S. Representatives Schiff and Schwartz met with PPP leader Zardari and his foreign policy team. Zardari thanked the USG for its support of credible parliamentary elections, which brought his party to power: "We are here because of you." Zardari noted that his late wife, Benazir Bhutto, maintained close relations with many of member of Congress, and he encouraged more codel visits to Pakistan to improve mutual understanding.
Pakistan's War
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3. (C) As he has before, Zardari stressed that the Global War on Terror (GWOT) was "Pakistan's war." The fall of Bhutto's second government was financed by Osama bin Laden, he claimed, noting that she and her father Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto were assassinated by religious extremists. But counterterrorism initiatives lacked popular Pakistani support, Zardari lamented, and terrorism fostered profiteers who had an interest in the struggle continuing.
4. (C) Zardari argued that Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) leader Nawaz Sharif had "walked into the vacuum" as opposition leader when Bhutto was assassinated just weeks before national elections. For stability, however, the PPP continued to cooperate with the PML-N at the federal and Punjab provincial levels.
5. (C) Zardari described the general distrust of the U.S. by the public and in political circles, "fearing you will leave us again." Post 9/11, however, he believed this was no longer an option; the USG would have to make a commitment of decades, calling for a Marshall Plan for Pakistan. There were already success stories, noting that his progressive PPP even won a National Assembly seat from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
6. (C) Zardari advocated attacking the root cause of radical insurgency: economic under-development. He lobbied the Representatives to quickly take up and pass reconstruction opportunity zone (ROZ) legislation. There should be U.S. tax breaks for companies producing "made in Pakistan" products, noting that Pakistan's textile industry would be more competition to other countries than to U.S. manufacturers. Without creating more jobs, Pakistan just could not match the taliban's reported USD 300 per month to tribals in the frontier regions. The tribals, though, wanted peace, Zardari claimed.
A New Blend
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7. (C) Asked if he felt USG assistance over the past seven years had been military heavy, Zardari noted that democracy promotion had been the smallest component of aid. He quickly added that military aid was still badly needed but more should also go to "civilian forces," e.g., police. USG assistance should support social development, e.g., more higher education scholarships to Pakistanis studying in the
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U.S. All in all, he wanted to see more civilian engagement than military-to-military exchanges. Zardari also said he wanted the U.N. (with support from the U.S. and other western countries) to establish a compensatory fund for the families of the victims of terrorist acts.
On Musharraf
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8. (C) Transitioning, Zardari blamed President Pervez Musharraf for not taking enough responsibility for the GWOT in Pakistan; the public, instead, believed Pakistanis were dying for the U.S. Zardari then said, "Anti-U.S. feelings will go away when the old faces go away," adding that the USG should no longer rely on just Musharraf in fighting radicalism.
9. (C) Zardari admitted that his public statements in the last week had been more anti-Musharraf. He was afraid that he and his party were losing popular support, while Nawaz was able to pretend to be the populist by supporting restoration of the pre-November 3 judges. "But he doesn't want the Chief Justice (Iftikhar Chaudhry) back in, just Musharraf out." Zardari revealed that he hoped to discuss privately with Musharraf the possibility of an "honorable exit" and believed Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Ashfaq Kayani would stay out of such political discussions.
10. (C) Zardari feared, however, that Musharraf was misguided by "smooth-talking advisors," who were protecting their own personal interests. The public was against the President, the institution and the man, adding the PPP needed to "change the face of Pakistan" or it too would be kicked out of power. "We won't act without consulting with you," Zardari concluded.
11. (U) Codel Schiff did not clear this cable.
PATTERSON
Wednesday, 25 February 2009, 15:14
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 000415
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/25/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINR, KJUS, EAID, PK
SUBJECT: SHARIFS DISQUALIFIED FROM OFFICE
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 378 B. ISLAMABAD 141 C. LAHORE 11 D. LAHORE 9 E. 2008 LAHORE 221
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Gerald Feierstein for reasons 1.4 (b), (d).
1. (C) Summary and Comment: Pakistan's Supreme Court ruled February 25 that both Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif from the opposition Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) party are ineligible to hold public office. President Zardari told Charge that he had temporarily appointed PPP Governor Taseer as Chief Executive pending an election to replace Shahbaz, that the government would consider additional legal appeals, and that he did not expect significant political fallout from the Court's decision. The street reaction will be "in the hundreds, not the millions," claimed Zardari. Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif told Principal Officer Lahore that the decision, which they claimed was entirely Zardari's, was a declaration of war; they would not seek legal appeals and instead would take their battle to the streets. In a press conference, Nawaz revealed that Zardari had offered to drop the case in exchange for PML-N agreement to extend the tenure of the current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; he called on Pakistanis to come out into the streets to protest.
2. (C) Even before the press conference, there were sporadic demonstrations in Punjab, particularly Lahore, and Islamabad/Rawalpindi; we expect additional demonstrations tomorrow. Both Embassy and Consulate Lahore held EAC meetings and sent LES staff home early to avoid traffic problems. Following the decision, PML-N certainly will participate in the lawyers' march, planned to begin in Karachi on March 12 and end on March 16 in Islamabad with a proposed sit-in.
3. (C) The decision comes as no surprise as Zardari has been telling us for weeks that he was going to move against Nawaz. This was a controversial move within the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and one that PM Gilani tried to forestall two days ago in talks with Shahbaz that apparently were not blessed by Zardari. Before moving, Zardari expanded the coalition's seats in the National Assembly and worked out deals in three of four provinces to ensure the PPP will increase its seats in upcoming Senate elections.
4. (C) The ruling will open up the battle for control of the Punjab Provincial Assembly and prompt renewed rounds of inter-party negotiations. If Zardari is right and the street reaction remains modest, we expect little real political change to emerge from this Court decision. If Nawaz's gamble pays off and he can bring significant crowds into the streets, the Army could possibly be called out to maintain law and order. We expect a renewed rush of predictions that this will prompt the Army to replace Zardari; certainly, the military will consider the Court decision as unnecessary and ill-timed, but we still have no indications the military would move to oust Zardari or pave the way for a PML-N government. With the ongoing debacle in Swat and a high-level Pakistani delegation in Washington, few will challenge the perception of the bad timing of this move. It also demonstrates, disappointingly, that Zardari continues to play politics while his country disintegrates. End Summary.
The Decision
- - - - - - -
5. (SBU) On February 25, a three-judge panel of Pakistan's Supreme Court effectively ruled that both opposition Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) leaders Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif were disqualified from holding public office. The judges issued an oral ruling from the bench, dismissing all of the appeals by Sharif proxies; one anti-Sharif petition was not struck down. The Sharifs themselves had refused to appeal the original rulings against them, questioning the legitimacy of this Court, which took oath of office under Musharraf's November 2007 provisional constitution order (PCO). To settle ruffled political feathers when the LHC decision was announced, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) government
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decided to represent the Sharifs in an appeal to the Supreme Court.
6. (SBU) By dismissing the pro-Sharif appeals, those original, adverse rulings stand, Attorney General Latif Khosa told PolOff February 25. The Lahore High Court (LHC) ruled in June 2008 that Nawaz was disqualified to run for a National Assembly seat because of his previous hijacking and corruption convictions. The LHC held that Nawaz had not proven the Musharraf administration pardoned these convictions instead of simply commuting the prison sentence.
7. (C) There is continuing confusion over Shahbaz's case. The Lahore Elections Ruling Officer decided in December 2007 that Shahbaz was disqualified to run for a Punjab Provincial Assembly seat because of a previous loan default. According to Khosa, today's decision automatically throws out the later decisions by the Ruling Officer, as well as by the Lahore Election Tribunal, allowing Shahbaz to run in a June 2008 by-election. PML-N spokesman Ahsan Iqbal, however, told Polcons that the disqualification was based on a technical fault when Shahbaz failed to announce which seat he would claim from his victories in the June by-election. In any case, Shahbaz is disqualified from serving in the Punjab Provincial Assembly, and this is the prerequisite for being Chief Minister.
PPP Reaction
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8. (C) The decision was no surprise; Zardari advised Ambassador weeks ago that he felt he had to move to rein in Nawaz (Ref ). However, in a phone call, Zardari--just back from his latest trip to China--told Charge February 25 that he had "nothing to do with the decision" and had been surprised by Shahbaz's disqualification. He noted that the Court had ruled against the government, which had been representing the Sharifs. He said he had ordered PPP Punjab Governor Taseer to temporarily take over the Punjab government until new elections for a Chief Minister could be held. He expected the PPP would have a candidate and thought the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) party would also be interested in running a candidate.
9. (C) Asked about any further legal steps, Zardari indicated the government might consider going back to the Lahore High Court to appeal the decision. He said he was not concerned about political fallout, as the initial reaction had been for hundreds, not millions, of people in the streets. Interior Minister Malik told Charge essentially the same thing and reiterated that the government had not anticipated that Shahbaz would be disqualified.
10. (C) After the ruling, AG Khosa today noted to PolOff that the PML-N could always negotiate with the PPP to amend the qualification/disqualification provisions of Pakistan's Constitution. Information Minister Sherry Rehman told PolCouns, however, that the decision was "unsettling" and the reaction "would be volatile." PPP parliamentarian Farah Ispahani (Zardari confidant and wife of Pakistan's Ambassador to the U.S. Husain Haqqani) told PolCouns February 25 that today's Court decision "is not the end of the story." The GOP might even appeal the decision. (Note: There is a provision for "review" of Supreme Court decisions but only by the same bench.)
11. (C) Ispahani confided that Zardari would take further actions to ensure the March 12-16 lawyers' march/sit-in "would not cause problems." She hinted at proposals affecting former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and Shahbaz Sharif. Asked why Zardari chose now to move on this long-stalled decision, Ispahani said the PPP-led GOP "had no choice" because Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani had entered into discussions with Shahbaz on February 23. "We are very unhappy with the way Gilani has gone off the reservation" while Zardari was in China, she said. According to unconfirmed press reports, Gilani had assured Shahbaz that the PPP would not try to remove the Sharifs from power in Punjab and suggested Chaudhry might lead a new "Constitutional Court," proposed by the 2006 PPP/PML-N Charter of Democracy.
PPP Moves in on the Punjab
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12.(C) Despite Gilani's assurance to Shahbaz earlier in the week, Zardari is already moving in on the Punjab government. In addition to temporarily (for two months) appointing Governor Taseer as Chief Executive pending an election to replace Shahbaz, he has fired the Punjab Chief Secretary and replaced him with Kamran Lashari, a long-time PPP supporter. MOI Malik told Charge that the Punjab Inspector General of the Police technically was not fired but since he was so close to the Sharifs, he has voluntarily vacated the office. Both the Chief Secretary and IG Police are federal appointees.
Opposition Reaction
-------------------
13. (C) Principal Officer Lahore met February 25 with Shahbaz and Nawaz Sharif (septel) to hear their reaction. The Sharifs pre-briefed what Nawaz said in his press conference, namely that they laid the decision at Zardari's door and it was not in the interests of Pakistan's democracy. As proof of Zardari's complicity, Nawaz revealed to PO and later in his press conference that Zardari had offered Shahbaz a "business deal" -- if the PML-N would agree to extend Supreme Court Justice Dogar's tenure and agreed to stop attacks on the PPP, then Zardari would drop the Supreme Court cases against the Sharifs.
14. (C) Shahbaz told the PO that this was now "war" with the PPP, and the PML-N would take their battle directly to the streets. The Sharifs would not appeal the decision in Musharraf's PCO courts. PML-N would not resign from the Punjab Assembly and might run its own candidate for Chief Minister. If they did, PML-N could succeed without the support of the PML.
15. (C) In Nawaz's press conference, he carefully tried to create friction against Zardari on several levels. He said the PML-N did not blame the PPP rank and file for this decision, expressed concern that it was a "slap in the face" to Punjabis, and declared there was no chance of rapprochement with Zardari. He suggested that Zardari was obsessed with concern that a reinstated Chief Justice Chaudhry would declare invalid the National Reconciliation Order that absolved Zardari of corruption charges. He said it would be "catastrophic" if Pakistanis did not take to the streets to protest this decision, and he affirmed that the PML-N would fully participate in the March 12-16 lawyers' long march.
16. (C) PML-N Spokespersons Ahsan Iqbal and Siddiq-ul-Farooq declared, "We do not recognize this court." Iqbal went even further, charging Zardari with "assuming the mantle of Musharraf," a theme we expect the PML-N to press in the coming days. Religious Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) party leader Qazi Hussain disavowed the Musharraf court. The leader of Musharraf's Pakistan Muslim League (PML) party, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, declared the Court's decision was "nothing to be happy about" but noted that the PML would respect the decision. The Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT) had named an "independent observer" to watch the case; PILDAT issued a statement questioning whether justice had been served with this verdict.
Public Reaction
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17. (C) The public's reaction was swift. Sporadic demonstrations began in Lahore, and other cities throughout Punjab saw large crowds. In Lahore, streets were blocked with tire fires and PPP posters were torn down. PO Lahore reported a tense mood as well as limitations on movements around the city. The Islamabad Police briefly shut down Constitution Avenue around official buildings to warn against spontaneous demonstrations. The capital's Abpara Market did attract about one thousand, according to RSO, and the airport road was shut down by crowds tearing down PPP posters and throwing rocks. As of this writing, the airport road remains closed and airport operations are uncertain. Both Embassy Islamabad and Consulate Lahore held EAC meetings and allowed LES staff to depart early. Several bar associations have
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called for strikes. and we expect additional demonstrations in the coming days.
U.S. Reaction
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18. (C) Zardari asked Charge for a readout of PO Lahore's meeting with Nawaz; Charge said that the PO had conveyed the U.S. position that this was an internal matter for the Pakistani government. In his press conference, Nawaz characterized the visit as a courtesy call. PML-N spokesman Ahsan warned Polcouns that Pakistanis would assume the U.S., as a firm supporter of Zardari, had supported the decision and urged that we issue a statement expressing concern.
19. (C) Comment: The decision comes as no surprise; Zardari has been telling us for weeks that it was coming and that he felt he could control the reaction. Before making this move, he coaxed the Muttahida Quami Movement party into the coalition to renew Gilani's majority in the National Assembly (Ref B). He also successfully sealed a power sharing deal in three of the four provinces over seats in the upcoming Senate elections (Ref A) to ensure the PPP will have a majority in the Senate.
20. (C) The game now will be controlling the street, and Zardari has about two weeks if he is to make any repairs to reduce the impact of the March 12-16 lawyers' march. If Zardari is correct and the street reaction is muted, we expect the Court ruling to have no immediate impact on PPP rule. If Nawaz's gamble -- to provoke enough protests to require the Army to come out and restore order -- pays off, we may see a different dynamic. So far, we still have no indication the Army has any interest in ousting Zardari or ushering in a PML-N government.
21. (C) Zardari may indeed win the short-term tactical battle against Nawaz. In the longer term, however, Nawaz is playing his cards well and now has grounds to compare what he will term Zardari's high-handed rule to that of Musharraf. Many in the PPP disagreed with the decision to challenge Nawaz, so Zardari has further alienated party faithful. This decision and promises of additional deals for the former Chief Justice or Shahbaz demonstrate, disappointingly, that Zardari remains focused on political machinations rather than the militant threat in Swat and the tribal areas.
FEIERSTEIN
Thursday, 10 September 2009, 14:40
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 002185
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 09/07/2034
TAGS PGOV, PHUM, PTER, MOPS, MASS, KJUS, PK
SUBJECT: ADDRESSING CONCERNS ABOUT PAKISTAN SECURITY
FORCES' HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
REF: ISLAMABAD 2074
Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, b and d
1. (S/NF) A growing body of evidence is lending credence to allegations of human rights abuses by Pakistan security forces during domestic operations against terrorists in Malakand Division and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. While it is oftentimes difficult to attribute with accuracy any responsibility for such abuses, reporting from a variety of sources suggests that Frontier Corps and regular Pakistan Army units involved in direct combat with terrorists may have been involved. The crux of the problem appears to center on the treatment of terrorists detained in battlefield operations and have focused on the extra-judicial killing of some detainees. The detainees involved were in the custody of Frontier Corps or Pakistan Army units. The allegations of extra-judicial killings generally do not/not extend to what are locally referred to as "the disappeared" -- high-value terrorist suspects and domestic insurgents who are being held incommunicado by Pakistani intelligence agencies including the Inter-Services Intelligence Division (ISI) and Military Intelligence (MI) in their facilities.
2. (S/NF) Revenge for terrorist attacks on Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps personnel is believed to be one of the primary motivating factors for the extra-judicial killings. Cultural traditions place a strong importance on such revenge killings, which are seen as key to maintaining a unit's honor. Senior military commanders have equally and repeatedly stressed their concerns that the court's are incapable of dealing with many of those detained on the battlefield and their fears that if detainees are handed over to the courts and formally charged, they will be released, placing Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps troops at risk. This fear is well-founded as both Anti-Terrorism Courts and the appellate judiciary have a poor track record of dealing with suspects detained in combat operations such as the Red Mosque operation in Islamabad and have repeatedly ordered their unconditional release. Post assesses that the lack of viable prosecution and punishment options available to the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps is a contributing factor in allowing extra-judicial killings and other human rights abuses of detained terrorist combatants to proceed. There may be as many as 5000 such terrorist detainees currently in the custody of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps from operations in Malakand, Bajaur, and Mohmand. As operations in these areas and other parts of the FATA proceed, this number will increase.
3. (S/NF) NWFP Police have also been implicated in the abuse and extra-judicial killing of terrorist suspects that they believe responsible for attacks on police stations and individuals in the run-up to the conflict. This is a separate problem set from those detained in combat by Frontier Corps and Pakistan Army units. The NWFP Inspector General of Police has publicly announced the establishment of a Human Rights Unit within his office to prevent, investigate, and punish human rights violations committed by his forces. As a component of the police training program that we are now standing up for the NWFP, post intends to offer assistance to the Inspector General of Police and his new unit on education and prevention of human rights abuses and investigations and prosecutions where abuses are suspected.
4. (S/NF) In an effort to stem extra-judicial killings and other human rights abuses of these detained in combat by Pakistan security forces, post is proposing a multi-pronged approach as follows:
Short Term:
-- Diplomatic Engagement: Continue to privately raise this issue repeatedly and at the highest levels of the Pakistan government and military. Ensure that expressions of concern over the alleged extra-judicial killings coupled with calls for transparent investigations and, as appropriate, prosecution are included in the talking points of all senior USG civilian and military visitors in meetings with Pakistani civilian and military counterparts. Timeline: Ongoing. Funding: None required.
-- Offer Assistance: Coordinate with the British High Commission on an offer of assistance to the Defense Minister and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). To the Defense Minister propose assistance in drafting a new Presidential Order that would create a parallel administrative track for charging and sentencing terrorists detained by the military in combat operations. Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act are already well underway. To the COAS, propose bringing over a team of American and British experts to evaluate the detainee issue and to determine jointly what assistance is required from coalition partners. If COAS agreement is forthcoming, bring over a team of American military lawyers to meet with Pakistan military officials with a view to obtaining concurrence on training in battlefield evidence collection, investigation and prosecution of human rights abuses by military personnel, and assistance on drafting the new Presidential Order proposed to the Defense Minister: Timeline: Meeting with COAS and Defense Minister by end of September 09. Team deployed by October 09. Funding: Reallocation of existing Foreign Assistance funding.
-- Evaluate Detainee Situation: Local Pakistan military commanders and FATA/NWFP officials have approached various offices with request for assistance on dealing with detained combatants under the guise of reintegration. Post proposes bringing over a senior representative from INL's prison reform office to lay the groundwork for a visiting team that would conduct a formal assessment of conditions and infrastructure/personnel/systems needs of the local prison system for potentially housing these detainees. This report would form the baseline for development of an assistance strategy to help the GOP address the issue. Timeline: INL initial visit in September 2009. Followed by assessment mission in October 2009 with report to be completed by November 2009. Funding: INCLE funds will need to be reallocated.
Medium Term
-- Draft Ordinance: Get UK agreement to lead a team of British, and possibly American, experts to work with the Pakistan Defense Ministry and Army to draft a new Presidential Ordinance for the administrative prosecution and punishment of terrorists detained in combat operations (this process is already underway in Pakistan). Representatives of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will need to agree to participate in the drafting process. Post will approach the HRCP at an appropriate time but will require Washington/Geneva assistance in obtaining ICRC agreement. Adoption of the Presidential Ordinance would offer a credible way for the Pakistan military/government to prosecute and punish terrorists detained in combat operations. Timeline: Deploy team by December 09 with a view to completing ordinance by April 2010. Funding: Reallocation of existing Foreign Assistance funds.
-- Pakistani JAG and Intelligence Officer Training: Offer Detainee Operations training for Pakistan's JAG and intelligence officers. This five-day course would cover evidence collection on the battlefield, proper detainee handling, interrogations, international humanitarian law, laws governing internal armed conflicts, and war crime prosecutions. Timeline: Training courses to begin by January 2010. Funding: IMET funds have been allocated for this training.
Long Term
-- Assist in Implementation of Ordinance: Provide training to Pakistan military and Frontier Corps personnel on collection of battlefield evidence and its use in prosecution. Coordinate with British on providing appropriate training for personnel of administrative structure to be established through Presidential ordinance. Timeline: Training courses to begin by May 2010. Funding: Reallocation of existing IMET and other Foreign Assistance funding.
-- Prison Reform: Design and fund a prison reform program to construct/rehabilitate existing federal/provincial prisons to accommodate terrorists detained in combat operations both pre-trial and post-conviction. Convince other donors to assist GOP in developing post-release programs to reintegrate into their communities detainees deemed not fit for trial or those who have served their sentences. Timeline: Launch prison reform program by October 2010. Approach donors on reintegration by September 2010 through SRAP. Funding: New INCLE funds will be needed.
4. (S/NF) Comment: Post fully recognizes that there is little that the USG can do to change the culture of revenge that underlies many of the extra-judicial killings taking place in the Malakand Division and FATA. However, it is our view that if senior commanders are offered a viable alternate to deal with detained combatants and a credible detention facility under control of the Prisons Department is established, the prevalence of human rights abuses will diminish. Post recognizes that much of this is dependent on goodwill within the Pakistan military and civilian establishment that can easily erode if too much public criticism from USG officials over these incidents is forthcoming. For this reason, post advises that we avoid comment on these incidents to the extent possible and that efforts remain focused on dialogue and the assistance strategy outlined above. End Comment.
PATTERSON
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PESHAWAR 000002
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/3/2019 TAGS: PTER, MOPS, ASEC, PGOV, PK SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX PROVIDES GRIM ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN THE NWFP AND FATA
CLASSIFIED BY: Michael A. Via, Acting Principal Officer, Peshawar, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) Summary
- - - -
1. (C) A senior Federally Administered Tribal Areas official told Acting Principal Officer (APO) that nearly all girls' schools in the FATA would be closed by the January 15, 2009 deadline set by militants; since then, the militants have relented marginally and allowed girls to attend school up to grade four. XXXXXXXXXXXX believes the GOP has given up on Swat, Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) for now. The current Khyber operation was launched to counter local militants who had set up operations near Peshawar as well as to secure truck convoys.
2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he believes the GOP does not understand the gravity of the situation in FATA. The predominantly Shi'a town of Hangu may be attacked by Sunni militants during Muharam celebrations. He believes that if the taliban began to control the NWFP, they could not administer it and XXXXXXXXXXXX might need to join their ranks just to survive. XXXXXXXXXXXX's assessment is less hopeful than most of post's contacts but accurately reflects a growing pessimism and frustration among some concerning the future of the FATA and NWFP. End Summary.
3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX provided his assessment of the situation in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) XXXXXXXXXXXX
Closure Of Girls Schools?
-------------------------
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said some girls schools will likely try to remain technically open after the January 15 deadline set my militants for their closure. However, the practical effect will be that almost all government girls' schools and probably all private girls' schools in the FATA will either close or have no students attending them. He said this was because of the widespread fear of the taliban XXXXXXXXXXXX. (Note: Since this meeting, the local militants have agreed to allow girls to attend school up to grade four.)
Troop Redeployments
---------------------
5. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the decision to pull troops out of Swat was less about needed troops on the border with India as alleged in the press and more about a decision by the GOP to "give up on Swat for now." He asserted "we have given the taliban the north of Swat, so why not give them the city of Mingora too." XXXXXXXXXXXX who has only anecdotal information about other troop pullouts from FATA and the NWFP, opined that these would likely be "token as a show of force for the India situation."
Khyber Operation - FATA A Priority?
-----------------------------------
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX stated what other post contacts have told us, namely the current operation in Khyber was about more than simply insuring the safety of truck convoys between Peshawar and Torkham. Local unnamed militants had set up kidnapping for ransom operations near Peshawar to fund their operations. He claimed funding operations through kidnapping had become a major source of revenue for the taliban in FATA, where previously they had relied more on "outside funding." He reasoned that this was an indication that the militancy had become a true insurgency that had wider implications for Pakistan outside the NWFP, but the GOP in Islamabad did not appreciate the gravity of the situation. He asserted that "FATA as a federal priority has dropped of the list since the India situation has come to light."
PESHAWAR 00000002 002 OF 003
North Waziristan Location Of Hostages?
--------------------------------------
7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX----------------
8. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he wanted to say in an unofficial capacity that he and many others could accept Predator strikes as they were surgical and clearly hitting high value targets. He mentioned that fear among the local populace in areas where the strikes have been occurring was lessening because "everyone knew that they only hit the house or location of very bad people." He wondered why the strikes did not seem to target more of the taliban which he reasoned was needed. He said "our house is on fire and we need to take drastic actions."
In Camera Session And ISI
-------------------------
9. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX confided that ISI, (Note: Pakistan's military intelligence. End note), during the in camera session of the parliament recently, had briefed lawmakers and senior GOP officials concerning the virtues of some taliban elements versus the "real militants." They reasoned small numbers from some of the militant groups could be useful in future operations in Kashmir or elsewhere. XXXXXXXXXXXX said although not everyone present agreed with the assertion it was this line of reasoning that contributed to his fear of the future.
The Future
----------
10. (C) The future, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, was likely to include an attack by Sunni militants on the predominantly Shi'a town of Hangu during the Muharam celebrations. (Note. After Kurram, Orakzai Agency, where Hangu serves as the administrative headquarters, has the second highest concentration of Shi'a in the region, at almost 10 per cent. End note.)
11. (C) In six to twelve months, XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted, a lack of focus from Islamabad could leave the taliban in control of both FATA and NWFP. If that happened, the taliban would need help administering the area. He said the prospect was causing him and others to begin to figure out how to individually survive the coming taliban. He said "for one I am thinking that the taliban could capture the NWFP but they don't know how to administer it so they might need administrators like me and I might have to join the taliban at some point to just survive."
Comment
- - - -
12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX's concerns for the future are not widely expressed by other post contacts, at least not in the dark terms he describes, but accurately reflect a growing pessimism and frustration concerning the future of the FATA and NWFP. Most view the current deteriorating security situation as reversible; for example, XXXXXXXXXXXX is hopeful of being able to defeat the militants in the short term. Others point to the relative successes of recent engagements in Bajaur to support their view that the GOP can turn the tide in both the short and long term.
13. (C) The new level of pessimism from XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Nevertheless, it is disturbing that XXXXXXXXXXXX believes the militants are winning in both FATA and NWFP. VIA
Friday, 09 October 2009, 07:25
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 002449
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/05/2034
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, PK
SUBJECT: (S) PAKISTAN ARMY GHQ AGAIN APPROVES EMBEDDING
U.S. SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL TO SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONS
REF: ISLAMABAD 2116
Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (a)(b)(c), and (d)
1. (S) Summary: The Pakistani Army has for just the second time approved deployment of U.S. special operation elements to support Pakistani military operations. The first deployment, with SOC(FWD)-PAK elements embedded with the Frontier Corps in XXXXXXXXXXXX, occurred in September (reftel). Previously, the Pakistani military leadership adamantly opposed letting us embed our special operations personnel with their military forces. The developments of the past two months thus appear to represent a sea change in their thinking. End Summary.
2. (S) Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ) informed ODRP that it approved a request from the Army's 11 Corps Commander, Lt. General Masood Aslam, for U.S. SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel to deploy to XXXXXXXXXXXX South Waziristan and XXXXXXXXXXXX North Waziristan, in the FATA, in order to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support and general operational advice to the 11 Corps' XXXXXXXXXXXX. The 11 Corps had informally approached ODRP about our providing such support approximately one week ago; ODRP responded positively.
3. (S) SOC(FWD)-PAK support to 11 Corps would be at the XXXXXXXXXXXX and would include a live downlink of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) full motion video. SOC(FWD)-PAK's initial CONOPs envision deployment of six personnel each to XXXXXXXXXXXX. In order to finalize our planning and obtain formal go-ahead from CENTCOM, ODRP has requested additional information on the timing and purpose of the 11 Corps' planned military operations from Brigadier General Amjad Shabbir, the Army's Director General of Military Operations (DGMO).
4. (S) This is just the second time that GHQ has approved deployment of U.S. special operations elements to support Pakistani military operations. In September 2009, four SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel who were embedded with the Frontier Corps (FC) at XXXXXXXXXXXX in the FATA, provided ISR for an FC operation (reftel). This support was highly successful, enabling the FC to execute a precise and effective artillery strike on an enemy location.
5. (S) In recent days, the FC informally approached ODRP for a repeat deployment of SOC(FWD)-PAK personnel to XXXXXXXXXXXX. SOC(FWD)-PAK is preparing a CONOP while the FC obtains approval from GHQ.
6. (S) Comment: U.S. special operation elements have been in Pakistan for more than a year, but were largely limited to a training role. The Pakistani Army leadership previously adamantly opposed letting us embed U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) with their military forces to support their operations. The recent approval by GHQ -- almost certainly with the personal consent of Chief of Army Staff General Kayani -- for SOC(FWD)-PAK deployments to XXXXXXXXXXXX appears to represent a sea change in Pakistani thinking. Patient relationship-building with the military is the key factor that has brought us to this point. The Pakistanis are increasingly confident that we do not have ulterior motives in assisting their operations. In addition, the direct recipients of SOC(FWD)-PAK training appear to have recognized the potential benefits of bringing U.S. SOF personnel into the field with them for operational advice and other support. In addition, the success of the initial deployment to XXXXXXXXXXXX likely helped catalyze the follow-up requests for new and repeat support.
7. (S) Comment Continued: These deployments are highly politically sensitive because of widely-held concerns among the public about Pakistani sovereignty and opposition to allowing foreign military forces to operate in any fashion on Pakistani soil. Should these developments and/or related matters receive any coverage in the Pakistani or U.S. media, the Pakistani military will likely stop making requests for such assistance. End Comment.
ISLAMABAD 00002449 002 OF 002
PATTERSON
Saturday, 23 August 2008, 14:12
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002802
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/23/2018
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, EAID, PK
SUBJECT: IMMUNITY FOR MUSHARRAF LIKELY AFTER ZARDARI'S
ELECTION AS PRESIDENT
REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 2742 (B) ISLAMABAD 2741
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (C) Summary. In separate meetings with Asif Zardari, PM Gilani and Chief of Army Staff Kayani, Ambassador pressed for quick action on immunity for former President Musharraf. Zardari and Gilani said flatly that they were committed to providing immunity, but not until after the presidential election (now scheduled for September 6). Pushing immunity now, they believed, could jeopardize Zardari's candidacy. Kayani expressed concern that if immunity becomes tied up with the ongoing debate over the judges' future, it may never happen. Zardari plans to continue to slow roll action on the judges' restoration but remains confident that Nawaz Sharif will not walk out of the coalition. Nawaz's deadlines for action on the judges continue to pass unfulfilled; the next one is scheduled for August 27. The decision by the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) August 20 to back Zardari for President has strengthened Zardari's hand against Nawaz. Nawaz is left with the option of walking out of the coalition but having little prospect of forcing a new general election in the short term. Zardari is walking tall these days, hopefully not too tall to forget his promise to Kayani and to us on an immunity deal. End Summary.
2. (C) Ambassador met with Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader Asif Zardari on August 23, with PM Gilani on August 21, and with COAS Kayani on August 20.
3. (C) Zardari told Ambassador August 23 that he was committed to indemnity for Musharraf. Ambassador stressed that only the promise of indemnity had persuaded Musharraf to step down as President. We believed, as we had often said, that Musharraf should have a dignified retirement and not be hounded out of the country. Zardari cited a British anecdote about the Spanish empire and said "tell the most powerful man in the world that there is no way that I would go back on what I have said." Zardari noted that he already had firmly committed to the U.S., the UK, and Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Kayani that indemnity for Musharraf would be forthcoming. Ambassador urged him to do it quickly. Zardari said flatly that to do it before he was elected President would lose him votes, but he would do both the legislation and a presidential pardon as soon as he was elected. Zardari revealed that former President Musharraf had approached Chief Justice Dogar about issuing a restraining order against the impeachment motion, but Dogar had refused. Zardari also alleged that Musharraf had planned to replace COAS Kayani if Dogar had blocked the impeachment. 4. (C) Zardari said he was trying to keep Nawaz in the coalition and was candid that he planned to tie up the judges issue for a long time. He said the parliament would debate the restoration of the judges; Chief Justice Dogar would then submit some rulings on the restoration of the judges; all this could take months. In the meantime, he was trying to persuade former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to become Governor of Balochistan. (Note: In a move clearly orchestrated by Zardari, the Governor Magsi of Balochistan resigned on August 20, making it possible to offer the position to Chaudhry.)
5. (C) Zardari said he did not think Nawaz would leave the coalition, but he admitted the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz had become increasingly testy. He said that he had already agreed with Nawaz to curtail the powers of the President and then allow Nawaz to be eligible for a third term as Prime Minister; both measures would require constitutional amendments. Zardari revealed that he also had leverage over Shahbaz Sharif, who through paperwork snafus, had been technically elected illegally for a third term as Chief Minister. This, too, would have to be resolved in parliament, Zardari said. "So I can give them something they want," noted Zardari, "that's what politics is all about."
Kayani Worried
--------------
6. (C) After an August 20 meeting with visiting S/CT Coordinator Dell Dailey, Kayani asked Ambassador to stay behind and discuss his concerns that Zardari was delaying
ISLAMABAD 00002802 002 OF 003
Musharraf,s immunity bill. Kayani had heard the large meeting of coalition partners (chaired August 19 by the newly returned Bilawal Bhutto) had discussed mostly the judges. Then they decided to take a 72-hour "break" to consult party members.
7. (C) As post earlier reported (Reftels), Kayani said he took Zardari,s commitments to now ex-President Musharraf as the most important argument in persuading him to resign. Zardari made very specific commitments to Kayani. Now, for Zardari to delay, it makes him (Kayani) look bad within his own institution "and I have to bring the Army along with me." Kayani also noted that the delay does nothing for Zardari,s reputation for trustworthiness. If this issue gets conflated with the judges and with Zardari,s own desires to be President, it will become too complicated to pass, Kayani said.
Gilani on Immunity, Bajaur, Subsidies
-------------------------------------
8. (C) Ambassador met with PM Gilani and Interior Minister Rehman Malik for thirty minutes August 21, after a graduation ceremony for U.S. trained members of his protective detail. He had been briefed about PDAS Camp's discussion with Ambassador Haqqani.
9. (C) Gilani said the PPP was going to provide immunity for ex-President Musharraf, but timing was important. They were afraid that putting forward immunity legislation would lose them votes for Asif Zardari,s presidential campaign. Ambassador pressed on this issue, saying that Musharraf would never have agreed to resign without the promise of immunity. He assured Ambassador that he and the party did not want vengeance. Regarding immunity, Gilani said "many will say that we have done a deal with America, but still I understand that we have to do it."
10. (C) Regarding the ongoing military operation on Bajaur (in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas), Gilani assured Ambassador that it will continue "to its conclusion," i.e., until all the militants were driven out. Gilani said the next step would be to go after Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud. Gilani wanted President Bush to know that over 500 militants had been killed in the operation and that the GOP had reached out to NATO (during General Kayani's recent visit to Afghanistan for a tripartite meeting). He said Pakistan would do everything possible to encourage cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistani militaries. Gilani noted that Pakistan was using its F-16 aircraft to fight the militants and thanked the U.S. for providing funding for the F-16 mid-life upgrades. However, Gilani pleaded for urgent U.S. assistance in providing relief for displaced people around Bajaur and noted that fighting was spreading to neighboring Mohmand Agency.
11. (C) Malik suggested we hold off alleged Predator attacks until after the Bajaur operation. The PM brushed aside Rehman,s remarks and said "I don,t care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We,ll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it." (Note: The strike has been front page news, but the media is reporting that the targets were nests of Arab fighters.)
12. (C) Gilani said it would be almost politically impossible to reduce fuel subsidies (raise prices) in the short term along the lines Deputy Secretary Kimmitt had suggested to the Finance Minister. The coalition had restoration of the deposed judges, immunity for Musharraf, and the election of the new president on their plate. They were already taking enormous heat for previous fuel price increases.
13. (C) Comment: Nawaz may increasingly be considering leaving the coalition in the center and consolidating his hold in the Punjab because he cannot engineer a new general election in the short term. The addition of MQM's support leaves Nawaz with less leverage over Zardari in the current coalition. The fight over Iftikhar Chaudhry probably is based on Nawaz's expectation that Chaudhry would rule in both Nawaz's and Shahbaz's favor in pending court cases
ISLAMABAD 00002802 003 OF 003
challenging their ability to run as candidates in the National and Punjab Assemblies respectively. Until he can sit in the National Assembly, Nawaz cannot be Prime Minister.
PATTERSON
Monday, 06 October 2008, 05:59
C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 003183
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, PREF, PK
SUBJECT: TASKINGS FOR IDP/REFUGEE INFORMATION
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (U) This is a joint cable from Embassy Islamabad and Embassy Kabul.
2. (C) In recent weeks, Embassy Islamabad and the Regional Refcord in Embassy Kabul have received requests, both orally and through e-mails, from the DAO and USSOCOM (and its XXXXXXXXXXXX contractor) requesting information on camps along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border which are housing Afghan refugees and/or Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
3. (C) The requests apparently are in response to a 'Coliseum tasker' from SOCOM regarding IDP/Refugee camps and NGO activity. They have requested information on camp names and locations, camp status, number of IDS/refugees and ethnic breakdown, and NGO/humanitarian relief organizations working in the camps. DAO apparently has been instructed to reach out to UNHCR (which is not an agency of the USG but of the United Nations), USAID, and State. The purpose of the request for information remains unclear; some e-mails have suggested that agencies intend to use the data for targeting purposes; others indicate it would be used for "NO STRIKE" purposes.
4. (C) We are concerned about providing information gained from humanitarian organizations to military personnel, especially for reasons that remain unclear. Particularly worrisome, this does not seem to us a very efficient way to gather accurate information.
5. (C) Posts would appreciate clarification of the origin and purpose of this tasker. Regardless, SOCOM, DIA or anyone else desiring such information should send a front channel cable to the appropriate Embassy or to DNI's representative, the COS in Embassies Islamabad and/or Kabul.
PATTERSON
Monday, 22 February 2010, 14:22
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 000416
SIPDIS
NEW DELHI PLEASE PASS TO FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER,S PARTY
EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2030
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER'S FEBRUARY 24
VISIT
Classified By: DCM Gerald M. Feierstein, Reasons 1.4 (b)/(d)
1. (C) Summary: Embassy Islamabad warmly welcomes your February 24 visit to Pakistan. You will participate in a trilateral cooperation meeting with Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik and Afghan Interior Minister Hanif Atmar, followed by bilateral meetings with senior Pakistani officials, including Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) Director General Zafarullah Khan, Intelligence Bureau (IB) Director General Javed Noor, and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Director General Ahmed Shuja Pasha.
2. (C) You should express to your Pakistani interlocutors appreciation for ongoing law enforcement cooperation and express our readiness to enhance such efforts. You may want to register U.S. concerns about terrorist threats to U.S. citizens and U.S. interests that emanate from Pakistan, and encourage continued Pakistani action to counter these threats. You should press the Pakistanis to follow through on their prosecution of the seven Mumbai defendants. End Summary.
Domestic Overview
------------------
3. (C) Pakistan continues to face extraordinary challenges on the security and law enforcement front. The country has suffered greater military, law enforcement, and civilian casualties in fighting extremism and terrorism than almost any other country. Pakistan's military is currently engaged in combat operations against militant groups in the Malakand Division of North West Frontier Province (NFWP) and six of the seven agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Pak-Afghan border. At the same time, Pakistan has experienced an alarming increase in terrorist attacks against government and civilian targets in Pakistan's major cities, resulting in several hundred deaths in recent months. In your meetings, you should acknowledge the sacrifices made by Pakistan's law enforcement agencies and the pressure the terrorist attacks have placed on their resources.
4. (C) In the midst of this difficult security situation, Pakistan's civilian government remains weak, ineffectual, and corrupt. Domestic politics is dominated by uncertainty about the fate of President Zardari. He enjoys approval ratings in the 20 percent range and has repeatedly clashed with key power centers, including the military, politically ambitious Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, and opposition leader Nawaz Sharif. In December, the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional the November 2007 National Reconciliation Ordinance, promulgated by then-President Musharraf, which provided legal amnesty for Benazir Bhutto, Zardari, and key figures in their party, enabling them to participate in 2008 elections. The Court's ruling has paved the way for a revival of corruption cases against a number of officials, including Interior Minister Rehman Malik. Whether corruption cases can be revived against Zardari himself is less certain, as Pakistan's constitution includes a clause providing sitting presidents with criminal immunity.
5. (C) While we have had major successes in our military and law enforcement cooperation with Pakistan, cooperation has frequently been hampered by suspicion in Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment about U.S. intentions and objectives. Among other things, the Pakistanis believe that we have favored India over Pakistan -- most notably, by approving civil-nuclear cooperation with India -- and that we aim to dismantle Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, which, in light of their conventional military disadvantage vis-a-vis India, they consider critical to their national security. The military and intelligence establishment is also concerned that we are working with Pakistan's civilian leadership to limit the military's prerogative in determining Pakistan's national security policies. As a result of these concerns, the military and intelligence establishment has taken steps since Spring 2009 to hamper the operations of the
ISLAMABAD 00000416 002 OF 004
Embassy. These steps include holding up the issuance and renewal of Pakistani visas for permanent Embassy staff and TDYers; denying import permits for armored vehicles for Embassy use; sabotaging our contract with DynCorp International to provide enhanced protective support for Consulate General Peshawar personnel; slowing down importation of U.S. assistance for the Pakistani government, including equipment for Pakistani law enforcement agencies; shutting down our Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training program at Pakistan's Sihala Police Academy; putting up roadblocks for our acquiring additional land for the Embassy's expansion; and harassing Embassy personnel by stopping and detaining Embassy vehicles. Some of these problems have recently abated in response to our repeatedly raising them with the highest levels of the Pakistani government. However, we expect we will have to continue to push back against such impediments for the foreseeable future.
Federal Investigation Agency
----------------------------
6. (C) The FBI's primary Pakistani counterpart is the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). On December 7, the government replaced FIA Director General Tariq Khosa with Zafarullah Khan. While Khosa was ostensibly given a promotion by being named Secretary of the Ministry of Narcotics Control, a number of press reports maintained that Khosa was removed from his FIA position for his aggressive pursuit of corruption cases against government officials and businessmen. Khosa had developed close cooperation with the U.S. on a host of law enforcement issues, including on the Mumbai case. While Khan has a strong law enforcement background, he has not shown an inclination to be as forward-leaning on cooperation as Khosa was.
Counter-Terrorism Finance
-------------------------
7. (S) In the past year, Pakistan has made steady progress in combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Earlier this year, the FIA partnered with the State Bank of Pakistan to crack down on large licensed and unlicensed money service businesses that were violating foreign exchange laws and contributing to money laundering. In January, the National Assembly passed new Anti-Money Laundering (AML) legislation; the bill is currently awaiting Senate action. In the interim, the legislation is in force through its promulgation as an ordnance signed by President Zardari. Separately, during a February 12 meeting in Islamabad, Assistant Treasury Secretary David Cohen provided the Pakistanis with a compilation of tearline information on the financial activities of terrorist organizations in Pakistan -- including their use of the formal financial sector -- and affiliated charities, businesses, and individuals. Cohen encouraged the Pakistanis to exploit these leads in the pursuit of additional inform ation to identify key terrorism donors, fundraisers, and financial facilitators. Cohen also passed declassified terrorism finance information to four Pakistani banks.
Law Enforcement Assistance
--------------------------
8. (SBU) Pakistan's terrorism threats necessitate substantial strengthening of the country's law enforcement capabilities. The State Department's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Bureau is providing significant training, equipment, and infrastructure assistance to the police in North West Frontier Province (NWFP), i.e., the province most affected by terrorist attacks. This assistance -- $40.5 million in FY2009 and $34.6 million in FY2010 -- focuses on the NWFP police's Elite Force, a "heavy" police force with SWAT-like capabilities established in 2008. Equipment we are providing the Elite Force includes vehicles, armored personnel carriers, protective vests, night vision goggles, and communications gear. We are hardening police checkpoints with Hesco-like barriers and are rebuilding three police
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stations in NWFP's Malakand Division that were destroyed by militants. INL is also funding a variety of police training courses implemented by the Department of Justice's ICITAP program that are open to nationwide participation.
9. (C) The Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program has separate activities aimed at enhancing the counter-terrorism capabilities of Pakistan's law enforcement agencies. A key component of the ATA program is focused on "hard skills" tactical training, including explosives detection and disposal, quick reaction, and VIP protection. Unfortunately, the ATA program is now under threat of termination. Following false press reports that our ATA trainers are using the training center provided by the Pakistani government, i.e., the Sihala Police Academy, for nefarious purposes -- including to gather information on a nearby Pakistan nuclear installation -- the government has decided to end our use of that facility and has not yet provided an acceptable alternative site.
Mumbai Case
-----------
10. (C) Pakistan's prosecution of the seven suspects it arrested in the Mumbai case -- i.e., XXXXXXXXXXXX and terrorism financiers XXXXXXXXXXXX-- is proceeding, though at a slow pace. The defense lawyers have aggressively filed motions challenging varying aspects of the case. On November 25, an Anti-Terrorism Court finally framed the charges against the seven defendants, allowing the court proceedings, which are being held in camera, to move to the trial phase. Four FBI expert witnesses are expected to be called to testify for the prosecution. The government has continually reassured us that the prosecutors will win convictions against all the defendants after a trial lasting several months, though it has a stronger case against the five LeT operatives than against the two terrorism financers. There are concerns that some of the convictions could be overturned at the appellate level, where the courts set an extremely high evidentiary bar. On October 12, a Pakistani court quashed all remaining cases against Hafiz Saeed, the head of LeT alias Jama'at-ud-Dawa (JuD). Those cases were not related to the Mumbai attack. The government has repeatedly told us that it would need much more evidence of Saeed's direct involvement in the Mumbai attacks to move forward with Mumbai-related charges against him.
David Coleman Headley
---------------------
11. (S) In December, an FBI-DOJ team briefed Pakistani officials from the ISI, Ministry of Interior, FIA, IB, and MFA on the David Coleman Headley investigation, providing them with tear-line information on Headley's statements to U.S. authorities. ISI officials said they had very little information to identify the Pakistanis mentioned in the statements. They discussed their investigation into First World Immigration Service, a business front used by Headley and his co-conspirators. The ISI said while they would not grant direct FBI access to co-conspirator Major (retd.) Abdurrehman Syed, who was in ISI custody, the FBI could submit questions for Syed through the ISI. The FIA and Ministry of Interior informed the FBI that it would be difficult to introduce Headley-related evidence in the government's prosecution of the Mumbai defendants, including because Headley's statements to U.S. authorities would be treated as hearsay with little evidentiary value in court.
Sargodha Five
-------------
12. (C) The Pakistanis continue to pursue their own case against the five American citizens from Northern Virginia who were arrested in Sargodha, Punjab province, on December 8, following suspicions they had travelled to Pakistan to engage
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in jihadist activities. They have not acted on our request that the five be returned to the United States. The Pakistani prosecutor has repeatedly asked for continuations in the case because he is not yet prepared to move forward with charges. The five suspects, who claim to have been abused while in custody, were denied bail at a February 16 court hearing. The next hearing will take place sometime in March.
Aafia Siddiqui
--------------
13. (C) There has been widespread condemnation here of the February 3 guilty verdict against Dr. Aafia Siddiqui, a Pakistani citizen who was tried in Federal Court in New York on charges of attempting to murder U.S. soldiers and law enforcement authorities in Afghanistan. Many Pakistanis were taken by surprise by the verdict because one-sided Pakistani media coverage of the case reported only on her defense and not the prosecution's case, leading local observers to conclude her acquittal was a near certainty. We have stressed to the Pakistanis that Siddiqui received a fair trial and has a right to an appeal. A number of our Pakistani interlocutors have suggested that President Obama consider pardoning Siddiqui, and Prime Minister Gilani told Senator Kerry on February 16 that Siddiqui should be transferred to Pakistan to serve out her sentence here. PATTERSON
Monday, 25 May 2009, 03:49
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001119
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/05/2019
TAGS PREL, PTER, MARR, PK
SUBJECT: KAYANI IS "DESPERATE" FOR HELICOPTERS
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (C) Summary and Action Request. In a two hour conversation with Ambassador May 23, Chief of Army Staff General Kayani told Ambassador he was "desperate" for helicopter support as he had only five MI-17s operational. Kayani insisted that Pakistani technicians were capable of doing required helicopter maintenance. There are two ways for the Pakistani military to acquire additional helicopters relatively quickly: (1) a lease, and we understand a waiver to enable the USG to lease MI-17s now needs only congressional notification; and (2) procurement through Pakistan's FMF account, which also requires a waiver. We expect Pakistan to prefer the first option. Post acknowledges the frustration of dealing with the Pakistani military, but it is critical to our interests that they receive help as soon as possible to clear Swat and move on the Waziristans, the heart of cross-border operations against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Post recommends that we request expedited congressional notification of the MI-17 waiver. In the meantime, we continue to seek Cobra helicopter spare parts. End Summary and Action Request.
2. (C) In a two hour conversation May 23 (septel) Chief of Army Staff General Kayani told Ambassador he was "desperate" for helicopter support. He said he could not move against North and South Waziristan until he had more lift. At that moment, he said he had five MI-17s operational. (This is a lower number than others have told us.) As has been previously reported, Kayani wanted U.S. support to lease MI-17 helicopters, and he needed spare parts for the Cobra helicopters. Ambassador said she wanted to "clear the air" about some of the offers of U.S. assistance that had gone unanswered, such as the helicopter maintenance contract and the ISR platform.
3. (C) Kayani said he did not need U.S. help on maintenance: the Cobras were twenty-five years old and had been maintained by Pakistani technicians. But he needed the U.S. Government to stop the constant stream of leaks from Washington. These always made it appear as if he were taking steps in response to U.S. demands. He said he had been successfully moving troops from the eastern border, but this was undermined by the drumbeat in the U.S. press that he was taking this action in response to U.S. demands. The U.S., he said, is always trying to press on him sophisticated U.S. systems, which the Pakistani military had neither the ability nor the funds to manage. Domestic political support for current combat operations would be eroded by a bigger U.S. military presence, he said.
4. (C) Embassy understands that the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) waiver that enables the USG potentially to procure or lease MI-17s has just been approved by the Department, and the only remaining hurdle is the Congressional notification. The notification process needs to be expedited. The Mission is considering options to assist Pakistan Army in procuring or leasing MI-17s. If the supplemental is passed, our preferred option is to use the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF) to lease nine MI-17s. A U.S. controlled lease of this kind allows us to include necessary maintenance (which any contractor is likely to stipulate) and provides leverage over use of the helicopters in order to ensure the helicopters are applied in counter-insurgency activities. The nine MI-17s the Pakistanis have requested would be leased for the duration of ongoing overhauls of nine Pakistan Army MI-17s and would, in effect, be a 1-for-1 backfill of those helicopters in overhaul.
5. (C) Alternately, if the supplemental is not passed in time, the Mission can advise the GOP to use its FMF to buy or lease MI-17 helicopters. If the GOP chooses to use its FMF for this purpose, the Mission will need to obtain an Offshore Procurement (OSP) waiver from DOD, with State Department and Department of Treasury concurrence, and an agreement with the GOP specifying the conditions on how they intend to use these new MI-17 helicopters, The terms of the agreement will specify use of the helicopters in support of counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the Northwest Frontier Province, and portions of Balochistan. Further, if a purchase, the agreement will require a comprehensive
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maintenance and logistics package in conjunction with the helicopters.
6. (C) Finally, we will require access to the helicopters above and beyond normal End Use Monitoring standards in order to certify the helicopters' use in COIN operations. The Mission's assessment is that because the Pakistan military has not forecast the use of FMF for helicopter procurement, the opportunity cost of using FMF to procure helicopters makes it unlikely that the GOP would choose to do so quickly. In any case, we are fully prepared to assist the Pakistan Army to address the maintenance issues of the MI-17 helicopters if it so desires. If, as General Kayani indicates, only five MI-17s are operational, we can produce the equivalent of 'new' helicopters by assisting the Pakistan Army to repair the helicopters that are non-operational.
7. (C) Other helicopters in Pakistan's aviation fleet face equally troubling operational readiness and availability issues. We are searching for and acquiring specific critical spare items for Cobra helicopters as quickly as possible, and have provided an agreement to resume work on eight Pakistani Cobras now in the U.S. Despite the urgency of the existing situation in the NWFP and FATA, we are waiting for the GOP to sign letters of agreement on Cobra spare parts.
8. (C) Comment: Embassy is aware that U.S. engagement with the Pakistani military has been frustrating. Transparency is often non-existent. Offers of assistance go unanswered or are overruled at headquarters, even as Pakistan's maintenance and training are inadequate. Still, the success of our own troop surge in Afghanistan and the stability of Pakistan's government depend on rolling back the terrorist threat in Swat and eliminating the terrorist safehavens in the Waziristans. The inability of the GOP to control North and South Waziristan has enabled terrorists to operate throughout the country. Kayani confided to an American visitor recently that he would not be able to move to Waziristan until late summer. While that movement will not be determined solely by the availability of helicopter support, it is certainly the case that the availability of helicopters will be a key factor in making the decision to go.
PATTERSON
Tuesday, 03 March 2009, 02:20
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 000454
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/02/2034
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b), (d).
1. (C) Summary: Mission Pakistan warmly welcomes your arrival in Islamabad. You are arriving in the midst of largely self-inflicted political turmoil following the Supreme Court's decision to disqualify from public office Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif, political rivals of President Asif Zardari. Zardari engineered the Sharifs' disqualification and followed that with placing his party's governor in power in the Punjab provincial government to replace Shahbaz Sharif. At the moment, there are multiple efforts to reconcile Zardari with the Sharifs and to elect a replacement for Chief Minister Punjab. Unless the Punjab issue is resolved by March 12, a planned lawyers' demonstration-that is backed by the Sharifs--could become violent. You thus will find your interlocutors distracted by domestic politics at a time when the GOP is struggling to meet IMF-imposed fiscal targets and militants are increasing their control over both the tribal areas and Swat, a once idyllic tourist destination 90 miles from Islamabad.
2. (C) You will be meeting with key interlocutors in our efforts to press the GOP for prosecution of the Mumbai detainees, assistance in effecting the release of kidnapped Americans John Solecki and David Rohde, and expanding law and order cooperation. The issue of FBI access to the Mumbai suspects remains very sensitive; a decision to send an investigative team to New Delhi currently rests on whether/how India responds to Pakistan's 32 requests for additional information. President Zardari has over-reached in this current political crisis, but he remains secular, pro-American and our best ally in Pakistan right now. He likely will assure you that he has established a new anti-terrorism court that will deliver convictions on Mumbai. Zardari will request additional USG support for the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) police; we will brief you on our train and equip plans for this critical part of our counter-terrorism strategy.
3. (C) DG ISI Pasha, whom you met in last week's bilateral and trilateral strategic review in Washington, continues to profess a determination to end ISI's overt and tacit support for proxy forces in the tribal areas, Afghanistan and Kashmir. Interior Minister Malik is Zardari's point man on law and order and also serves as a political negotiator. Malik is very supportive of the U.S., but he wants to control every key issue personally, making it difficult for his staff to take any decisions without his approval. Intelligence Bureau (IB) Director General Suddle was personally selected for the job by Zardari; after a bungled attempt to place ISI under the Ministry of Interior, Zardari brought IB firmly under his control. Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) Director General Tariq Khosa is a well-respected cop, but he must work through MOI Malik. End Summary.
Domestic Situation
------------------
4. (C) The civilian government headed by President Asif Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani, elected one year ago, has been fairly stable. However, President Zardari has been preoccupied with his political rival former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. On February 25, Pakistan's Supreme Court ruled that both Nawaz and his brother Shahbaz Sharif are ineligible to hold public office; Zardari followed that decision by appointing his party's governor to rule in the Punjab (Pakistan's most important province) pending elections to replace Shahbaz Sharif as Chief Minister. This has sparked country-wide protests and general political unrest. Nawaz Sharif is by far the most popular politician in Pakistan (with an 83% approval rating compared to Zardari's 20% in the latest IRI poll), but he does not have the votes to bring down the government. Instead, Nawaz Sharif is using popular outrage at the Supreme Court decision and "governor's rule" to launch street protests. Zardari may win the short-term tactical battle against Nawaz; however, Nawaz is gaining ground by comparing Zardari's high-handed rule to that of former President Musharraf. Nawaz Sharif is inspiring street demonstrations to coincide with a lawyers' "Long March" on March 12-16. The chance for violence and chaos is likely during continued street protests.
5. (C) Although we do not believe Pakistan is a failed
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state, we nonetheless recognize that the challenges the state confronts are dire. The government is losing more and more territory every day to foreign and domestic militant groups; deteriorating law and order in turn is undermining economic recovery. The bureaucracy has settled into third-world mediocrity, as demonstrated by corruption and a limited capacity to implement or articulate policy. The court and legal system is slow to the point of inertia due to almost non-existent case management. These problems extend to law enforcement agencies, where the police are underpaid, lack technical capacity, and face stiff political pressures.
Security
---------
6. (C) The good news is that the Army/Frontier Corps are engaged in combat in the FATA and have just declared victory after a six month long battle in the Bajaur Agency. Zardari is committed to the fight; he knows that Osama bin Laden has publicly targeted Pakistan and admits "the militants are after me and my job." The bad news is that the militants increasingly are setting the agenda. The government's anti-terrorism strategy is based on "dialogue, deterrence and development;" however, it lacks the military capacity to deter militants and the financial resources to develop the FATA and NWFP. Its historic fallback has been to play for time by conducting negotiations with militants, a disastrous tactic that only has made the extremists stronger. The government insists it will negotiate with tribal leaders but not with militants.
7. (C) However, in the latest agreement in Swat (once a tourist resort approximately 90 miles from Islamabad), the provincial government agreed to negotiate for peace in exchange for imposition of Shari'a law with the Taliban. This was recognition of de-facto Taliban control, which produced beheadings, closure of girls' schools, a growing exodus of terrified citizens, and the desertion of outgunned and outmanned police. Ham-handed military tactics, which included indiscriminate artillery bombardment, have further alienated a population that simply wants the fighting to end. In just a few short weeks, the deal is already proving to be an unpalatable one, with the militants demanding more ground and continuing violence against the civilian government.
8. (C) The military's decision in 2008 to strike a deal with Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan helped to reduce the number of suicide bombings in Pakistan but gave Mehsud free rein to infiltrate his forces throughout the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). He has exploited sectarian tensions and sent his fighters into Bajaur via Afghanistan to attack government positions. This has eroded Chief of Army Staff General Kayani's strategy to gradually regain control of the FATA agency by agency. Rival Pakistani Taliban leaders Mehsud, Maulvi Nazir, and Gul Bahadur have formed a new alliance which they claim will focus on cross-border attacks. As recent media reports indicate, the U.S. has been remarkably successful in disrupting al-Qaida operations in Pakistan's tribal areas. In the past year, 10 of the top 20 al-Qaida operatives, including those responsible for the East Africa embassy bombings in 1998 and tied to Islambad's Marriott bombing, have been eliminated.
Police/Law Enforcement
----------------------
9. (SBU) Although Pakistani security forces are now engaged in active combat against extremists, they lack the capability to deal with militants and criminal activity in the FATA and NWFP. The resulting decrease in security is impeding our efforts to implement development projects in support of critical U.S. national goals of eliminating terrorist safe havens in Pakistan and stabilizing Afghanistan. While there is a need for Pakistani military action now to deal with the large number of heavily armed militants operating in the border areas, the long-term solution to ensuring law and order throughout the country lies primarily with the civilian law enforcement agencies, not the military. To strengthen civilian law enforcement, State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) expanded program in 2009 involves two tracks, the first focusing on establishing a gendarmerie style force in NWFP suited for
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engaging and defeating heavily armed militants and criminal gangs. The second track involves expanding the current ICITAP, DS/ATA and other efforts in providing specialist and advanced training to specific elements of the Pakistani police establishment.
10. (SBU) In conjunction with INL's police program, the Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA) will focus on providing expanded training and consultation opportunities to the NWFP, Balochistan, and federal areas to expand rapidly the GOP's antiterrorist capabilities. This expanded training will focus on building tactical, technical, and investigative skill sets in specialized Pakistani law enforcement agencies. Training for these and other units will focus on "hard skill" tactical training (i.e. protecting VIPs, quick reaction forces, explosives detection/disposal) most urgently needed by the GOP given the deteriorating security environment that it confronts. There will also be an expanded effort to develop national and provincial-level forensics and investigative capabilities and anti-kidnapping procedures. ATA was instrumental in establishing and funding the FIA's Special Investigative Group (SIG). In 2007, ATA offered to fund expansion of the SIG by 100 officers and pay salaries for the new officers; we still await an official response from MOI.
11. (C) Through the Rewards for Justice program, the USG is ready to assist Pakistan in establishing a National Safety Hotline, through which MOI can collect information from Pakistani citizens on terrorists and planned/executed terrorist incidents in Pakistan. The GOP would serve as the public "front" of the Rewards program; all U.S. funding and cooperation would remain discreet. The GOP would serve asthe conduit for any eventual reward payments, and a DOD MIST team has developed a media campaign in support of the Rewards program. The GOP will provide daily logistical and administrative support; RSO will provide to administrative personnel to assist in collecting the tip information.
Visa Processing
----------------
12. (C) Post-9/11 changes to improve U.S. border security have dramatically increased the length of time it takes Pakistani citizens to obtain U.S. visitor visas. The local press and many politicians repeatedly criticize delays in visa processing and difficulties encountered at U.S. ports of entry, often citing them as examples of U.S. bias against Pakistan. On a practical level, the delays impair U.S. efforts to train law enforcement and military personnel, and to promote exchanges and academic programs with civilian authorities. While the USG does not comment on the reasons for the delay, Pakistan authorities know that an interagency security clearance process, which includes the FBI, is the main factor. You may hear complaints about this issue during your meetings in Islamabad, as well as calls for more effort on the U.S. part to improve the process.
Mumbai
------
13. (C) Indo-Pak tensions are still simmering, but to avoid a potential Indian military strike, the GOP needs to continue to show progress on prosecuting those Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operatives responsible for the Mumbai attacks. On February 12, the GOP filed official charges against 13 suspects, including LeT leaders Javed Iqbal Laqvi, Zarrar Shah, and Abu al-Qama. Currently the Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) has at least 7 of these suspects in custody; and they face charges under Pakistan's penal code, cyber crimes regulations, and the Anti-Terrorism Act. India has welcomed the GOP decision to file formal charges against the key masterminds of Mumbai; Islamabad now awaits an Indian response to requests for additional information (32 questions, including request for forensics, ballistics reports, etc) from New Delhi to support prosecution. Based on the Indian response, Pakistan will consider sending an FIA team to New Delhi to follow up; we should encourage that team to go to New Delhi and continue to press for additional closures of LeT camps and Jamaat-ud-Dawa "charitable" activities, particularly in Punjab. The issue of FBI access to the Mumbai detainees remains a politically sensitive one you will want to raise directly with MOI Malik.
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Kidnapping Cases
----------------
14. (S) The Embassy appreciates ongoing FBI support to resolve a significant number of kidnapping cases involving Amcits in Pakistan. We will update you on current efforts to secure the release of UNHCR representative John Solecki and New York Times reporter David Rohde. A video of Mr. Solecki was released on February 13 which was accompanied by a statement demanding the release of Baloch prisoners in the hands of the government. The Baloch Liberation United Front (BLUF - a previously unknown group) is holding Solecki and made fresh demands on March 1 that all incarcerated women be released within 72 hours or BLUF will kill Solecki. The GOP continues to insist that Brahamdagh Bugti, a Baloch separatist leader, is responsible for the kidnapping.
PATTERSON
Saturday, 20 June 2009, 16:06
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ISLAMABAD 001364
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/19/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PHUM, EAID, MARR, MOPS, PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR JONES
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Summary: Embassy Islamabad warmly welcomes your visit. Your arrival comes at a moment when Pakistan's political leaders, and its people, are united in support of the military campaign to confront extremist militants in Malakand (including the Swat valley) and South Waziristan, where the offensive has just begun. Popular support for the offensive is broad but thin. Pakistan's military has begun its assault in South Waziristan with the goal of capturing or eliminating taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, whose prominence among Pakistani extremist groups has risen during the last two years. After losing strength in his spring match-off with opposition leader (and former Prime Minister) Nawaz Sharif, President Zardari has regained much of his political capital by garnering national support for the military campaign.
2. (C) The USG is providing the lion's share of international humanitarian assistance being provided to the internally displaced who fled the taliban and the military offensives in Malakand. Some eighty percent of the displaced are staying with relatives or in rented accommodations. The GOP and international humanitarian assistance organizations have so far been able to manage provision of assistance to the roughly two million IDPs. The GOP would like the IDPs to return as areas are cleared. But the longer term challenge of building a capable civilian police force and a robust economy mirrors the needs spread across the nation. The campaign in South Waziristan will play out differently; we expect fewer IDPs, more casualties, and less access for the international humanitarian assistance organizations.
3. (C) In the longer term, the GOP is confronted with a weak economy and a lack of government authority (or government provided security) in much of the country apart of the Punjab. We are planning how to spend USG funds to support Pakistan's civilian institutions, bolster budgetary support, strengthen the military's COIN capabilities, build the capacity of the police, and target impoverished areas where youth are susceptible to militancy and extremism.
4. (C) Pakistan is digging its way out of an economic crisis that came to a head in the fall of 2008, caused by poor policy choices which were compounded by the global economic crisis and high international commodity prices. To set the stage for longer-term prosperity, the government must undertake difficult structural reforms such as eliminating subsidies (electricity, wheat) and broadening tax base.
5. (C) Nuclear cooperation on security issues has decreased after wstatements made in the press about purported U.S. plans to seize nuclear facilities surfaced. Despite Zardari's own inclination to improve relations with India, his need to keep the military on his side (and/or his perceived rebuke from Indian PM Singh in Russia) have kept him from agreeing to meet again with Singh in Egypt. While we grant large amount of aid to Pakistan and its military, even with the arrival to office of the well-perceived President Obama, America is viewed with some suspicion by the majority of Pakistan's people and its institutions. End Summary.
Domestic Politics
-----------------
6. (C) The government headed by President Asif Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani, elected in 2008 after eight years of military rule, is stable. The Pakistani People's Party (PPP) and its coalition allies rule in three of the four provinces. Nawaz Sharif is by far the most popular politician in Pakistan (with an 83 percent approval rating compared to Zardari's 20 percent in the latest IRI poll), but he does not have the votes to bring down the government. 7. (C) Zardari signed Shari'a law in Swat, which precipitated the taliban's emboldened attempt to dominate Swat and bordering areas. He also overplayed his hand when Nawaz and Shahbaz were declared ineligible by the Court. This exposed him to the force of Nawaz' ability to bring the populace into the street during the (lawyer's) "long march." Having managed to stay in office by restoring the Chief Justice and maintain civil order during that period, Zardari has recovered through his so far successful (if not robust) management of relations with the Pakistan Military and by
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piggy-backing on the popular support for the military's offensive against the taliban.
8. (C) While Nawaz is preparing for the next election and appealing directly to the street, a court case considering voiding past convictions against him is winding its way through the Supreme Court. Even though Zardari retains the Presidency, Nawaz can be seen as the real winner of the "long march" stand-off: he demonstrated his popular support; stood firm in his demands; saw the Supreme Court leadership reinstated; and, affirmed his right to run in the next election. During the events leading up to the "long march" there was talk that the Army might feel compelled to step in. Chief of Army Staff General Kayani is determined that a civilian government succeed, however, and while he mistrusts Zardari he despises Nawaz.
9. (C) While far from perfect, you will find Zardari is pro-American, anti-extremist and eager to be seen as working with the USG. Zardari runs the show on the civilian side, although he is not a popular leader and admits himself that he came to high office without previous direct experience as an elected politician. Secular and westernized, Zardari sees himself as viewing the world the way Americans do; this same image works against him with the public.
10. (S) Zardari is less likely to make public announcements chastising the USG for its policies in, and toward Pakistan (including on USG drone activity) than other senior GOP officials. His public (and private) lament is that Pakistan has the will to combat terrorism, but the USG has been miserly in providing resources. In his own fashion, this is Zardari's version of the widely held view that Pakistan has made great sacrifices at the behest of America, for little return and less recognition.
11. (C) Prime Minister Gilani has shown strong leadership skills in building Parliamentary coalitions at times of national crisis and in the absence of public leadership by President Zardari. Gilani has stiched together all party Parliamentary sessions that have forged cross-party unity on the need to tackle terrorism and to endorse the military offensives against Pakistani extremists (often referred to as "miscreants"). He gave the impassioned address to the public May 7 asking the Pakistani people to support military action in Swat and surrounding agrees; a defining moment that marked the beginning of the sea change in public attitudes toward the taliban and granted legitimacy to the military's actions.
12. (C) Gilani was also instrumental in bringing the "long march" crisis to a peaceful resolution, and was the senior GOP official (not Zardari) who announced the reinstatement of the Supreme Court Justice. Like Foreign Minister Qureshi, Gilani comes from the religiously important Multan and is a Sufi saint. His English is somewhat halting and conversation with him can be opaque. He pays great attention to protocol and is an attentive listener, however, when he believes he is being treated as a friend and equal. Reports of Zardari/Gilani tensions are probably exaggerated.
Economic and Structural Challenges
----------------------------------
13. (C) Pakistan is digging its way out of an economic crisis that came to a head in the fall of 2008, caused by poor policy choices which were compounded by the global economic crisis and high international commodity prices. The government sought relief from the International Monetary Fund, and signed a $7.6 billion agreement with them in November 2008. Under the terms of this agreement, the GOP has curtailed borrowing from the central bank and greatly cut back its expenditures, bringing its fiscal deficit down from over 7 percent of GDP to 3.4 percent. The market has responded to these reforms, and foreign exchange reserves, which had fallen to dangerously low levels, have rebounded and the value of the rupee has stabilized.
14. (C) However, to set the stage for longer-term prosperity, the government must undertake more difficult structural reforms such as eliminating unaffordable subsidies (electricity, wheat) and broadening its tax base. The belt-tightening of the past eight months has caused growth to
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slow, however, and it is estimated to be 2 percent for the current fiscal year, down from original predictions of 4.5 percent. The challenge in the coming year will be to stimulate the economy while maintaining a level of fiscal discipline. The situation is complicated by the financial burden of caring for large numbers of internally displaced persons and by the need to significantly step up civilian law enforcement personnel, especially in NWFP, FATA, but also around the country. The GOP is heavily dependent on donor assistance to pay for its development and humanitarian assistance budget, at least for the foreseeable future.
The Swat Military Campaign and IDPS
-----------------------------------
15. (C) The military's effective campaign against taliban in Bajaur last fall was limited in geographical scope. Rumors that taliban leaders were sitting in Swat festered, and the government entered into a series of ill-advised and half-hearted negotiations with extremist leaders residing in the region. These resulted in Zardari's eventual signing of the Nazm-e-Adl regulation in April, which the government sold as meeting the local population's demand for "speedy justice." Politicians were at pains to explain that Swat, as a princely state, had an historically different history and custom and that the deal did not mark an abdication of government authority or an open door to harsh (by Pakistani standards) interpretation of Shari'a law. The wide-spread release of a video showing taliban flogging a young woman in a public square brought doubts about taliban intent home to the public.
16. (S) Zardari, meanwhile, argued privately that he had to sign the deal in order that the GOP be seen to have been willing to try everything before turning the military against its own people. The shocking flogging video circulated at the same time as suicide bombers and terrorist gunmen took on targets including police stations and main boulevard checkpoints in Lahore and Islamabad. In the rural areas, they blew up Mosques and shrines. Public opinion about the taliban, that it was part of the social fabric of parts of the country and if left unperturbed would not damage public life, started to shift. Once the taliban moved out of Swat, where extremists had overrun the streets and beheaded well-known journalists, the view that the Nazm-e-Adl deal had been breached by the taliban grew. PM Gilani gathered cross-party support in Parliament and appealed to the public to support a military campaign in Swat.
17. (C) After military operations started in May in Swat and neighboring areas, some two million Pakistani citizens moved out of the area and became internally displaced. (The wealthier families of Swat departed a year earlier as taliban violence against the feudal elite and the threat of it forced them to retreat to Islamabad and elsewhere.) Senior GOP officials would be the first to say that it was the hospitality of the Pakistani people which kept the IDPs clothed, fed and sheltered in the first instance. Best estimates are that 80 percent of the displaced have been taken in by Pakistanis, not necessarily relatives. NGOs and the UN are serving the population not in camps. A combination of military-run, community volunteer, and UN agency directed camps are sheltering the other IDPs.
18. (C) We have reports of some IDPs returning, including several hundred thousand in Bajaur and up to half the populations in parts of Buner; families traveling with livestock can be witnessed returning to the Swat area via roads leaving Islamabad. However, we do not have hard figures on returns: lack of security, and families' desire to receive the GOP return fund of USD 312 are two of the reasons IDPs have yet to return. Operations in Malakand, though ongoing in some areas, are said to be in the "mopping-up phase" (even as officials acknowledge that sporadic "spot" fighting is likely to continue for another six months.)
19. (C) All of the big international humanitarian organizations are present in Pakistan. Like our own approach to staffing the Consulate, even the recent terror attacks in Peshawar (in which UN officials were killed) have not dissuaded them. Most humanitarian organizations have withdrawn their international staff to Islamabad; leaving
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local staff to implement programs at the camps and in communities. Security continues to be an issue, even in areas the Army has declared "cleared."
Economic Recovery Key
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20. (C) The USG and the GOP are in agreement that the key to maintaining security (and keeping extremists from reemerging) is in economic recovery and improving civilian authority -- not least in law enforcement. Prime Minister Gilani calls this the "hearts and minds" campaign necessary to maintain the gains won by the military campaign and to maintain popular support for those campaigns. The GOP is confronted with a weak economy and a lack of government authority (or government provided security) in much of the country outside of the Punjab, and even in the south of the prosperous Punjab we have seen an increasing trend to extremism among youth.
21. (C) We are planning how to spend USG funds to support Pakistan's civilian institutions, bolster budgetary support, strengthen the military's COIN capabilities, build the capacity of the police, and target impoverished areas where the youth are susceptible to militancy and extremism. What the GOP calls "hearts and minds" we see as part of our broader objective of helping the GOP build an effective COIN capability and policy by using USG resources where the GOP is particularly exposed. The GOP will need to focus on recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction if it is to hold its recent gains. Establishing (or reestablishing long-languishing) government authority and services poses one of the greatest challenges to the GOP. Economic development is the key to Pakistan's success in implementing a broad-ranging counterinsurgency policy.
Waziristan
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22. (S) Pakistan's military has begun its assault in South Waziristan with the goal of capturing or eliminating taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, whose prominence among Pakistani extremist groups has risen during the last two years. We expect the military campaign in Waziristan to be tougher than in Swat, with the military willing to use air power to an extent it was not in the "settled areas." The military strategy is three pronged: isolate Baitullah by putting intense pressure on the Mehsud tribe; incite inter-tribal violence (the leader of the Bhittani tribe has already come out publicly against Baitullah); make deals with other militants to refrain from supporting Baitullah against the GOP. We have some indications that the separation of Mehsud tribe peoples is already underway.
23. (S) The 2007-2008 blockade of the Mehsud area, which was initially quite severe, produced approximately 200,000 IDPs. However, we expect the attack from the military to be more fearsome by an order of magnitudes; meaning much higher casualty rates and less access for the humanitarian relief agencies. Some "shaping operations" designed to contain and weaken Baitullah Mehsud's sphere of operations were undertaken in advance of the campaign.
24. (C) The GOP is wary of international scrutiny through the United Nations which may embroil it in charges of being in breach of international humanitarian law. The USG has made no judgment on this issue, but the GOP would be well-served by seeking to uphold Geneva Convention standards during the conflict, regardless of its own judgment that the military offensives represent domestic law enforcement activities.
Military Cooperation
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25. (S) The campaigns in Malakand (including Swat) and now in Waziristan, have demonstrated Pakistan's will to fight extremism. Faced with its weaknesses against a formidable enemy, the Frontier Corps has accepted USG training (if on a limited and highly-controlled basis), and that has given us new access and opportunities to improve Pakistani counter-insurgency capability. Pakistan has agreed to build additional tripartite Border Coordination Centers (BCCs), and we have expanded intelligence sharing through the Torkham
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BCC. The military remains reluctant to expand the U.S. military footprint, but we now have the basis for increased cooperation. USG efforts to provide Mi-17 helicopters have meant an exponential increase in the Pakistan Military's ability to deploy helicopters in its ongoing campaign against extremists.
26. (S) The campaign itself may prove, over time, to be an event that builds trust and increases U.S./Pak military cooperation. Military and civilian authorities underscore, however, that gains made in the campaign will only be supported by the public if they are perceived as having been made by Pakistan alone.
Nuclear Security
----------------
27. (S) Since A.Q Khan's proliferation activities came to light in 2004, Pakistan has sought to rehabilitate its image as a nuclear technology bazaar. The GOP passed laws regulating exports of sensitive technologies and criminalizing proliferation, established an export control mechanism, joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and strengthened its National Command Authority and security apparatus to govern and protect its nuclear weapons. U.S. support has been instrumental to Pakistan's improved nonproliferation practices. U.S. experts have trained Pakistani counterparts in a wide variety of topics ranging from technology controls to physical protection, provided critical equipment, and encouraged Pakistan's adherence to international nonproliferation instruments.
28. (S) Over the last two months, however, local and international media reporting on U.S. and international fears that terrorists would acquire Pakistan's nuclear weapons has put the GOP on the defensive. These concerns centered on the proximity of some nuclear sites to territory under attack by the taliban, the rumored dispersal of Pakistan's nuclear assets, and the vulnerability of weapons and nuclear materials in transit. The GOP is particularly neuralgic to suggestions that its nuclear weapons could fall into terrorist hands and to reports of U.S. plans to seize the weapons in case of emergency. As a result, Pakistan has begun to pull back from some nonproliferation engagement with the USG, including refusing high-level discussions and delaying implementation of some programs. One effort to remove jointly spent nuclear fuel from a Pakistani nuclear research reactor, for instance, has been put on hold for 3-4 months, or until such time as the media attention has abated.
India
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29. (C) President Zardari is personally in favor of improving Pakistan's relations with India, but efforts early in his tenure (including on opening trade between Indian and Pakistan-held Kashmir) were overcome by the Mumbai terror attacks and India's reaction to what it perceived as Pakistan's complicity in them and by the Pakistan Military's lack of approval for such initiatives which Zardari can not take on his own. Zardari is conscious that he must not be perceived as reopening negotiations on Kashmir now if he wants to keep Pakistan's military focused on the western campaigns -- and not its institutional enemy, India.
30. (C) The June 16 meeting between President Zardari and Indian Prime Minister Singh in Russia was marred by what the Pakistani side viewed as Singh's "rudeness" in telling the press (in front of Zardari) that he was only charged with speaking to the President about the use of Pakistani soil by terrorists aimed at India. PM Gilani will attend the NAM Summit in Egypt in July, instead of Zardari, thus obviating what the GOP had initially said would be the next opportunity for the leaders to meet. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggests that only USG pressure will cause the GOI to reestablish the "Composite Dialogue" -- the bilateral forum meant to develop a series of confidence building measures between the two nations.
America
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31. (S) While we grant large amounts of aid to Pakistan and its military, even with the arrival to office of the well-perceived President Obama, America is viewed with some suspicion by the majority of Pakistan's people and its institutions. We are viewed at best as a fickle friend, and at worst as the reason why Pakistan is attacking its own (although this view may be changing as the popular picture of the true nature of the taliban has shifted in the last several months). While the Army remains fixated on India as Pakistan's mortal enemy, the common man (and most importantly the youth) is just as likely to point to America as the nation which has twisted Pakistan's collective arm, leaving it weak. Much of the financial support and technical advice we give to the GOP is delivered privately and in a low-key fashion: our goal is to strengthen Pakistani institutions and demonstrable ties to the USG have the opposite effect in the public mind. GOP officials are prickly about issues of sovereignty. They too can't be seen as reliant on U.S. largess. How to support the civilian government, strengthen its institutions, economy, and military capacity to engage in COIN, without further provoking antagonism toward the U.S., remains a central challenge. PATTERSON
Tuesday, 10 April 2007, 12:27
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001583
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/10/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PK, AF, IZ, IR, ID, MY, SA, LE
SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF TELLS MCCAIN: DON'T PULL OUT OF IRAQ
WITHOUT TRIPARTITE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
REF: ISLAMABAD 1517
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter Bodde, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (U) On April 3, President Musharraf met with Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and Representative Richard Renzi (R-AZ), Musharraf's third U.S. Congressional delegation of the day (reftel). The group,s discussion focused on Iraq, the broader Middle East, and the Pak-Afghan border region.
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Muslim countries should play lead role in Iraq And help solve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute
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2. (C) Musharraf noted that he and many Middle Eastern leaders were worried that a premature pull-out of U.S. and coalition forces from Iraq would spread sectarian strife throughout the Gulf region. Musharraf underlined the importance of increasing the capacity of the Iraqi armed forces and police. He noted there could be little improvement in the situation in Iraq without broader political participation from the Sunnis. Musharraf agreed with Senator McCain that Muslim countries needed to lead efforts to help Iraq's Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds reach political consensus before a major withdrawal of coalition troops. Musharraf said he understood U.S. public opinion was against prolonging U.S. presence in Iraq, but hoped U.S. leadership could communicate the importance of the mission in Iraq. Turning to the future of Iraq, Musharraf hoped that Muslim peacekeeping troops (including Pakistanis) could replace U.S. forces under a United Nations umbrella.
3. (C) Conflicts outside Iraq also contributed to the unstable situation in the region, Musharraf said. Musharraf noted that in addition to Saudi King Abdullah,s work in forging an Arab consensus on Iraq, he was working on building consensus within the Muslim world on the Palestinian issue ) work that was slowly but surely bringing Syria back into the Arab fold. Alluding to his own outreach to the moderate Muslim world, Musharraf noted there was space for non-Arab nations to play a role on Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and that Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia had agreed to form a united voice to help promote peace in the region. Musharraf said he was the first non-Arab leader invited to address the Arab League Summit.
4. (C) Musharraf said he believed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad could play a positive role in both Iraq and Lebanon, and that Assad could be "handled" if the U.S. understood his issues: &If you want him to play ball, he needs comfort on other fronts -- namely, the Golan Heights.8 Turning to another Iraqi neighbor, Musharraf agreed with the delegation that Iran could not be allowed to create further divisions in Iraq.
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The Pak-Afghan border: Past decisions created present security problem
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5. (C) When asked for his views on Afghanistan, Musharraf
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said Pakistan was facing the fallout from security decisions made in the 1980s. People who came to fight with the mujahideen against the Soviets settled in Pakistan's tribal areas and now had families. These people -- mostly Uzbeks and Arabs -- developed links with al Qaeda. Recently, tribal groups in both South and North Waziristan were taking action against Uzbeks and other foreigners because of the foreigners, cruel and high-handed behavior. Pakistan's military provided covert support in the form of arms and ammunition. Musharraf reported that in South Waziristan, a large group of foreign militants were surrounded on a ridge and would soon surrender.
6. (C) Originally, Musharraf said, the Taliban movement was a reaction against growing tribalism and warlordism in Afghanistan. Since Russia and India supported Afghanistan's (ethnic Tajik) Northern Alliance, Pakistan's natural ally was the (ethnic Pashtun) Taliban. This all changed after 9/11, Musharraf said, and Pakistan had captured and killed hundreds of al Qaeda fighters near Tora Bora.
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We're Going After Militants: Bin Laden May Be Here, But Mullah Omar's Not
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7. (S/NF) Echoing similar statements he,d made during an earlier meeting with CODEL Tierney (reftel), Musharraf said that although he had no direct evidence, he thought al Qaeda leaders Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri were hiding in Bajaur Agency, since it was in (Afghan militant leader) Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's territory and bordered Afghanistan's Konar province. The landscape in videos of Bin Laden and Zawahiri looked similar to Bajaur, Musharraf said, and the area provided comfort, high mountains, positive support, and an absence of U.S. troops in neighboring Konar.
8. (C) Musharraf voiced concern over Afghan President Karzai,s frequent pronouncements about Pakistan's &failure8 to capture Taliban leader Mullah Omar in Balochistan's capital Quetta. &Let me tell you,8 Musharraf emphasized, &Omar would be mad to be in Quetta -- he has too many troops to command in southern Afghanistan to make it feasible. In fact, the only parts of Balochistan where there are Pakistani Taliban are in the province's Afghan refugee camps, which we are planning to shut down.8 Musharraf said that most Pashtuns in Balochistan were traders and had no reason to join the Taliban. &They want roads to increase their trade, not to fight.8 The same could not be said for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Musharraf said.
9. (C) Musharraf said the Taliban were mainly in Afghanistan. Karzai,s policies, Musharraf believed, alienated Afghanistan's Pashtuns by favoring (ethnic Tajik) Panshiris. After Coalition forces joined the Northern Alliance to oust the Taliban government, there was no change in the ethnic makeup of the victors when it came to planning. Panshiris were disproportionately represented in the government, even though they had never ruled before and were, Musharraf believed, the natural enemy of the country's majority Pashtuns.
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A New Strategy in the Tribal Areas And the Ethnic Dimension in Afghanistan
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10. (C) Turning to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Musharraf stated that Taliban militants from Afghanistan drew support from Pakistan for re-supply, hospitals, recruitment, and indoctrination of new troops. Musharraf emphasized military force alone could not deny terrorists safe haven in the Tribal Areas over the long term. That was why, Musharraf explained, Pakistan was pursuing a four-pronged strategy that included military, political, development, and administrative elements. The fencing of the Pak-Afghan border in some parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas would reduce some cross-border movement, he said, but it was not enough. Musharraf described development as the most forward-looking ) and in some ways most complex ) part of the strategy. Pakistan was looking for U.S. assistance and expertise.
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Pakistan's Taliban Problem Is An Extremism Issue
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11. (C) One of Pakistan's biggest concerns, Musharraf said, was the spread of talibanization, especially into settled and urban areas. Countering talibanization required a well thought out strategy to cleanse society of the Taliban culture and to encourage moderation. Modernization and economic development were the way forward, Musharraf noted. Talibanization was even spreading to Islamabad, as you could see by the recent events at the Red Mosque (reported septel).
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Afghanistan's Poppy Industry Should Go Legal
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12. (C) In response to McCain's question about whether Musharraf was worried Afghanistan would become a narco-state, Musharraf answered that he was, especially because if it did it would affect Pakistan. Musharraf thought Afghanistan could follow the example of other countries -- such as India -- where narcotics were purchased legally and channeled into the international pharmaceutical industry. It was a $500-600 million annual industry, Musharraf said, and the profits made from legal poppy sales could go toward poverty alleviation instead of to the Taliban. BODDE
Wednesday, 07 October 2009, 06:21
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003161
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CHANGED CLASSIFICATION TO SECRET)
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD
EO 12958 DECL: 09/27/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, MOPS, UK, AF, PAK
SUBJECT: PAKISTANIS AT KANDAHAR BORDER FLAG MEETING -- THE
QUETTA SHURA IS A FABRICATION
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Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy CooQnator Hoyt Y ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary. The high point of the September 29 Border Flag Meeting (BFM) in Kandahar was the Pakistani delegation leader's assertion that the Quetta Shura is an unsubstantiated fabrication. This BFM was the first at which the 5/2 Stryker Brigade joined officials from Canadian Task Force Kandahar, the Afghan Border Police, and the Pakistani military. The Canadians had a specific border cooperation agenda, the Afghans were more interested in insurgent interdiction, and the Pakistani side did not give either much importance. The next BFM on November 17 will be one among several opportunities for the U.S. to give AF-PAK border issues in the South -- especially reducing Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan -- the serious attention that they deserve. End Summary.
2. (S) The high point of the September 29 Border Flag Meeting in Kandahar was Pakistani delegation leader BG Sajjad's assertion that the Quetta Shura is an unsubstantiated fabrication. When pressed, Sejaad expanded on his position, saying that the Americans had fallen victim to rumors and adding that Pakistani security authorities have more than 80 patrols and checkpoints in Quetta every day and every night, and if there were any Taliban leaders around they would know about them. In a similar vein, he insisted that Taliban infiltration into Afghanistan from Pakistan was negligible, and that the group should be more concerned about terrorists and narcotics moving in the other direction. Recent press reporting on U.S. concerns about the Taliban presence in Baluchistan did not figure directly in the meeting.
3. (S) This BFM was the first in several months, and the first at which U.S. representatives from the 5/2 Stryker Brigade, including the commander, joined officials from Canadian Task Force Kandahar, the Afghan Border Police, and the Pakistani military. TFK Commander BG Jonathan Vance chaired the meeting, and the dynamics between the Afghan and Pakistani sides were so poor it was apparent that the session would have degenerated into acrimony without his multiple diplomatic interventions. The Canadian presentation was intended to advance border cooperation and associated projects based on the Dubai Process, covering the new Joint Border Coordination Center in Spin Boldak, progress with truck surveillance equipment, satellite phones, and construction of a new border facilities at the Weiche crossing to begin in 2010 (maybe).
4. (S) Afghan Border Police 3rd Zone Deputy Commander Col. Sharif was more interested in insurgent interdiction, and credited Blackwater training for the detailed list of seizures that included, among other things, 20 radios, 450 meters of wire, 800 detonators, and 62 prisoners. When Col. Sharif suggested that combined AF-PAK border operations would be the best way to demonstrate true willingness to cooperate, BG Vance reminded the group that policy was to focus on communications and confidence building measures through the JBCC.
5. (S) The Pakistanis essentially rebutted each Canadian point with a complaint or counter-point: 1) the Iridium phones were useless for cross-border communications, because the system was always busy; 2) they would not send any personnel for training on the Canadian-supplied truck surveillance equipment until they received a timeline of when the equipment would be operational; 3) it did not make sense to begin construction on a new border crossing facility when the Afghans kept the current Friendship Gate locked, and all traffic had to go around the side; and 4) the would make no commitment when Pakistani officers would actually arrive to man the JBCC. For their presentation, the Pakistanis displayed a map slide with 171 border stations between the southern edge of the FATA and Iran to demonstrate the excellent control they maintain on their side, along with another listing nine ISAF aircraft border incursions in the past two months with exact duration and meters of penetration, for which they demanded an accounting.
6. (S) The participants agreed in principle that the next BFM would take place on November 17 in Chaman on the Pakistani side. The agenda is to include an update on the JBCC, a 5/2 Stryker brief on their forces array near the, a TFK operations and intelligence brief on Kandahar, and an accounting of ISAF air incursions.
Comment
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7. (S) The November 17 BFM will be one among several opportunities for the U.S. to give AF-PAK border issues in the South the serious attention that they deserve.
Bio notes
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8. (S) There were eight Pakistanis in the delegation, three regular army and five Frontier Corps Pishin Scouts. BG Sejaad, who said he had been deputy zone commander for two months, gave the impression that he spoke with the authority of Islamabad when discussing terrorists and the Taliban. He also mentioned that he had attended NBC training in Germany prior to the first Pakistan nuclear tests. COL Shahzada, a Pashtu-speaking brigade commander from Quetta was the next most senior officer. The Canadians said three ISI officers were among the Pishin Scouts. EIKENBERRY
Wednesday, 04 February 2009, 10:40
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ISLAMABAD 000236
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/24/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, EAID, MARR, MOPS, PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL ENVOY HOLBROOKE
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (C) Summary. Mission Pakistan warmly welcomes your arrival; your appointment comes as Pakistan grapples with internal change and hopes the Ombama administration can support regional solutions to development and counter-terrorism challenges. After eight years of military rule, the civilian government is working, so far successfully, to re-shape civilian-military relations. Although not a failed state, Pakistan needs international help to stabilize civilian rule by building democratic institutions and delivering relief to a population suffering from food inflation, electricity blackouts, high unemployment and deteriorating law and order. Passage of the Kerry-Lugar bill and delivery of U.S. assistance at the upcoming IMF Donors' Conference offer new avenues to combat extremism inside and outside of the tribal areas and reduce anti-Americanism across Pakistan.
2. (S) Now absorbing combat losses against a formidable militant enemy, Pakistan's military finally has begun to accept more USG training and assistance in support of counter-insurgency. Pakistan-NATO/Afghan cooperation and coordination across the border has improved dramatically in recent months and will be even more important if the U.S. raises troop levels in Afghanistan. A surge of U.S. troops across the border may push more militants into Pakistan, creating new challenges especially if Pakistan must defend a new front in Balochistan. As recent media reports indicate, the U.S. has been remarkably successful over the past year in disrupting the al-Qaida network based in Pakistan's tribal areas; we can discuss this issue in greater detail with you. A friendly Zardari-Karzai relationship is creating new opportunities to improve cross-border trade and build an energy corridor that could eventually link Central and South Asia. Improved Pak-Afghan ties offer new prospects for outreach to Taliban reconcilables on both sides of the border.
3. (C) Indo-Pakistan relations are still simmering. In the wake of Mumbai and accelerating militant control of Pakistani territory, the military/ISI faces the need to re-evaluate its historic use of proxy tribes/militant groups as foreign policy tools. Although the conventional wisdom says that Mumbai closed the door on Kashmir discussions, there is no doubt that Pakistan believes tackling the Kashmir issue remains the key to regional security. We offer a detailed update below. End Summary
Domestic Politics
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4. (C) The civilian government headed by President Asif Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani, elected one year ago, is now stable. Zardari's position currently is secure, and Gilani has a majority in parliament. The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and its coalition allies rule in three of the four provinces and effectively control all three branches of federal government. Nawaz Sharif is by far the most popular politician in Pakistan (with an 83% approval rating compared to Zardari's 20% in the latest IRI poll), but he does not have the votes to bring down the government. Instead, Nawaz is rebuilding his party's structure in preparation for the next election and appealing directly to street. Zardari is cementing leadership alliances so he can avoid another election until he receives international assistance to address food and fuel inflation, electricity blackouts and high unemployment.
5. (C) While far from perfect, you will find Zardari is pro-American and anti-extremist; we believe he is our best ally in the government. Clearly, Zardari runs the show, and Gilani has at times chafed at public acknowledgment of this fact. We believe, however, that reports of Zardari-Gilani tensions are exaggerated; Gilani knows his place and will tow Zardari's line.
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX The PPP may also make a power play to take over the Punjab government, which now is ruled by Shahbaz Sharif. During your visit you no doubt will
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hear rumors the Army is unhappy with Zardari and may step in to oust him, particularly if it is needed to restore order.
7. (C) The premise behind these rumors is that Nawaz-inspired street demonstrations timed to coincide with indirect Senate elections and another lawyers' "Long March" on March 9 may get out of hand. We see little evidence this scenario will get out of control; so far, we are encouraged by Chief of Army Staff General Kayani's determination to have the civilians succeed. Kayani dislikes Nawaz far more than he mistrusts Zardari.
Not A Failed State
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8. (C) This is not a failed state. Pakistan has solid albeit weak institutions, a robust if often irresponsible media, established although under-equipped police forces, an increasingly strong civil society, and a population with a proven resiliency to withstand everything from earthquakes to kleptocracy. However, Zardari is more adept at political maneuvering than governing; we believe he is spending too much time on his rivalry with Nawaz and too little time on rolling back a spreading insurgency and improving a weak economy.
9. (C) Although we do not believe Pakistan is a failed state, we nonetheless recognize that the challenges it confronts are dire. The government is losing more and more territory every day to foreign and domestic militant groups; deteriorating law and order in turn is undermining economic recovery. The bureaucracy is settling into third-world mediocrity, as demonstrated by some corruption and a limited capacity to implement or articulate policy.
Security
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10. (C) The good news is that the government has the will to fight extremism and the Army/Frontier Corps is now actively engaged in combat, particularly in Bajaur, Mohmand and Swat. Faced with its weaknesses against a formidable enemy, the Frontier Corps is now accepting USG training, and that is giving us new access and opportunities to improve Pakistani counter-insurgency capability. Pakistan has agreed to build additional tripartite Border Coordination Centers (BCCs), and this month we will expand tactical/target-focused intelligence sharing through the Torkham BCC. The military remains reluctant to expand the U.S. military footprint, but we now have the basis for increased cooperation. We are also delivering Cobra spare parts and upgrading their MI-17 and Bell 412 helicopters so the Pakistanis can operate more than two Cobras on any given day.
11. (C) The bad news is that the militants are driving the agenda; the Pakistan military has too few forces to fight too many battles at one time. They have more troops on the Indian border but felt the need to transfer 5,000-7,000 troops from FATA to the eastern border in the wake of increased Indo-Pak tensions after Mumbai. The latest territorial loss has been in Swat, in the "settled area" of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) about 90 miles from Islamabad, where local/taliban militants are closing schools, beheading opponents, and operating a parallel justice system. The police cannot cope and largely have abandoned locals to their fate.
12. (C) The military's decision in 2008 to strike a deal with Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan helped to reduce the number of suicide bombings in Pakistan but gave Mehsud free rein to infiltrate his forces throughout the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). He has exploited Sunni-Shi'a tensions in places like Kurram and sent his fighters into Bajaur via Afghanistan to attack government positions. This has eroded Chief of Army Staff General Kayani's strategy to gradually regain control of the FATA agency by agency.
13. (S) As recent media reports indicate, the U.S. has been remarkably successful in disrupting al-Qaida operations in Pakistan's tribal areas. In the past year, 10 of the top 20 al-Qaida operatives, including those responsible for the East
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Africa embassy bombings in 1998 and tied to Islambad's Marriott bombing, have been eliminated. We can discuss this issue in more detail during your visit.
Solutions
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14. (C) The government has a strategy of "dialogue, deterrence and development;" however, it lacks the military capacity to deter militants and the financial resources to develop the FATA. Its historic fallback has been to play for time by conducting negotiations with militants, a disastrous tactic that only has made the extremists stronger. The government insists it will negotiate with tribal leaders but not with militants. Many Pakistanis have been closely following reports of Saudi-brokered intervention with Taliban "reconcilables" in Afghanistan and many believe a similar strategy is needed in Pakistan.
15. (C) We share the government's belief that there is no all-military solution to containing extremism. We are implementing a strategy of concurrently building the counter-insurgency capability of the Army and Frontier Corps, providing the police/FATA law enforcement forces with training and equipment, and delivering economic development to raise poor socio-economic indicators in FATA. Security concerns are limiting our ability to operate, but today USAID contractors are building schools and wells, hiring workers for short-term jobs, training teachers and increasing the capacity of the FATA Secretariat to deliver services that demonstrate the writ of government in FATA. Through USAID, DOD and USG donations to UN agencies, we have provided over $10 million in aid to help up to 200,000 Internally Displaced Persons who fled fighting in Bajaur and Swat and now are living in and out of camps, primarily near Peshawar.
16. (C) Extremism, however, is no longer restricted to the border area. We are seeing young Punjabi men turn up in FATA and Afghanistan as fighters recruited from areas of southern Punjab where poverty, illiteracy and despair create a breeding ground for extremism. The phenomenon is spreading into northern Sindh as well. Pashtuns fleeing military action in FATA are destabilizing the always volatile ethnic mix in Karachi. Taliban leaders have been based in Quetta since the days of the anti-Soviet jihad, but they now are expanding their presence in Balochistan. In response, we are redirecting USAID programs geographically to concentrate on areas where the nexus of poverty and extremism is growing.
17. (SBU) Including FATA, USAID will program approximately $500 million in 2009 for Pakistan; if Kerry/Lugar is approved and funded, this will increase to $1.5 billion per year in primarily economic assistance. We have provided over $40 million in equipment to the Frontier Corps and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) police; we are in the midst of programming another $15 million for the NWFP police and await the results of a police assessment team to reprogram another $85 million for law enforcement. Given the urgent requirement to address the absence of law enforcement capacity in the NWFP and FATA, we are proposing that $100 million for law enforcement assistance be included in the Kerry-Lugar legislation.
Afghanistan
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18. (C) Benazir Bhutto met with President Karzai the morning of her assassination; Karzai attended Zardari's inauguration and the two have met repeatedly under much improved bilateral relations. They have signed new economic cooperation agreements, are considering a new transit trade treaty and have tentatively scheduled another round of the peace jirga. We continue to see potential for expanded economic relations and the prospect of building a trade and energy corridor that can link Central Asia through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the rich markets of South Asia.
19. (C) Following embarrassing militant attacks on U.S./NATO convoys last year, Pakistan has made efforts to secure Khyber Agency/Torkham Gate, through which U.S./NATO trucks deliver 30% of the fuel and 80% of the dry goods for our forces in Afghanistan. Cooperation and coordination
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between Pakistani and NATO/Afghan forces across the border have dramatically increased since October. This has reduced cross-border attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. This cooperation will be even more important if the U.S. executes a planned troop surge in Afghanistan. Such a surge, particularly if it is employed along the Helmand-Kandahar/Balochistan border, may send additional fighters into Pakistan and create another front for the Pakistan military to defend.
India
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20. (C) Indo-Pak tensions are still simmering, but to avoid a potential Indian military strike, the GOP needs to show progress on prosecuting those responsible for the Mumbai attacks. Interior Minister Malik will outline to you his plan to prosecute Lashkar-e-Taiba/Jamaat-ud-Dawa (LeT/JUD) suspects now in custody. The key will be whether the military/ISI is ready to turn the Mumbai suspects over to civilian law enforcement, and whether India considers Pakistani actions adequate. Kayani, in particular, wants to avoid a reckoning with his past leadership of ISI. Despite arrests of key LeT/JUD leaders and closure of some of their camps, it is unclear if ISI has finally abandoned its policy of using these proxy forces as a foreign policy tool; we need to continue pressing them to realize this strategy has become counter-productive in Kashmir, Afghanistan and FATA.
21. (C) The Foreign Ministry quashed National Assembly debate of a resolution signed by leaders of most of the political parties urging the U.S. to appoint a special envoy on Kashmir, or add that portfolio to your plate. However, privately, Zardari and FM Qureshi have indicated they would welcome your engagement on Kashmir. Although the conventional wisdom says that Mumbai closed the door on Kashmir discussions; from Pakistan's perspective, there is no doubt that tackling the Kashmir issue remains the key to regional security.
Nukes
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22. (S) Strategic Plans Division Director LtGen (ret) Kidwai can brief you in detail on Pakistan's physical, personnel and command and control safeguards for Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Our major concern is not having an Islamic militant steal an entire weapon but rather the chance someone working in GOP facilities could gradually smuggle enough material out to eventually make a weapon. Islamabad has chafed over the U.S.-India 123 Agreement, arguing it also needs civilian nuclear power to meet energy demand; we have repeatedly advised the GOP that it should not expect a similar agreement because of AQ Khan's proliferation activities.
23. (C) Khan, who now is suffering from cancer, remains a national hero, albeit one who is closely monitored under house arrest. In 2008, he tried and failed to win his freedom through the courts. His network, we believe, has been disbanded, and the U.S. recently imposed additional sanctions on Khan and two of his Khan Research Labs associates. Also worth noting is that China has reportedly agreed to help Pakistan build two additional civilian nuclear reactors, neither of which is grandfathered under Nuclear Supplier Group agreements. Neither project is expected to begin for at least five years, and we have expressed our concerns about this proposed deal to both China and Pakistan.
Program of Record/F-16s
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24. (C) DOD is requesting that Congress create a program of record for Pakistan, similar to that for Iraq and Afghanistan, which would provide consistent funding to implement our Security Development Plan (SDP), the vehicle we are using to train and equip both Pakistani Special Forces (SSG) and the Frontier Corps. Currently, DOD programs are delivered through a variety of separate funds with overlapping and sometimes conflicting authorities. The proposed DOD supplemental for Pakistan will total $400 million; the 2010 request will total $517 million.
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25. (C) The Bush administration commitment to provide Pakistan with $300 million annually in FMF expires in 2009, and we need to come to agreement with Pakistan on how to restructure its FMF program to meet its counter-insurgency needs. A major issue facing the new administration is whether to fund the remainder of Pakistan's F-16 program, a deal that was signed as a symbol of post-9/11 engagement after sanctions were lifted in 2002.
26. (C) Pakistan simply cannot afford to complete this $2 billion plus program to buy 18 new F-16s, upgrade 35 older Excess Defense Articles aircraft, upgrade a new base, and fund a munitions package. Pakistan has been late with several payments, and an Islamabad default would interrupt production lines for other critical U.S., Morocco and Turkey acquisitions. Pakistan originally planned to use the F-16s to offset Indian military superiority; they now are using F-16s against militant targets in the FATA. We are responding to Pakistan Air Force requests for Close Air Support training to improve their now limited precision targeting capability.
Economy
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27. (C) Faced with untenable budgetary deficits, high inflation, and hemorrhaging foreign exchange reserves, the PPP government had little choice but to agree to an International Monetary Fund Standby Arrangement on November 24. This was regarded as an option of last resort, as no past Pakistani government had long survived the implementation of the fiscal austerity measures required by a Fund program. The $7.6 billion arrangement, with a $3.1 billion initial disbursement, has bought the GOP some breathing room, and appears to have somewhat restored market confidence. Foreign exchange reserves and the exchange rate have stabilized, and foreign remittances and direct investment are up slightly. Portfolio outflows continue, however, and the Karachi Stock Exchange remains moribund.
28. (C) While it appears that the GOP will be able to meet the IMF's first quarter targets, the higher interest rates imposed by the Fund, along with higher tax collection targets will make a full economic recovery more difficult. Although the GOP predicts 3 percent GDP growth, several experts predict a flat GDP for the fiscal year ending June 30. The reduction in government spending on social safety programs required by the IMF will not increase the government's popularity, while the elimination of all subsidies on electricity, which the GOP has promised by end-June, is particularly likely to stir popular anger. The severe electricity shortage has caused rolling blackouts throughout the country, and previous rate hikes have brought protesters into the streets. A looming wheat shortage has apparently been successfully avoided through the GOP's purchase of large amounts of Russian grain.
29. (C) The IMF has estimated that the GOP will need an additional $4 billion from donors over the next two years to strengthen the country's social safety net programs and beef up foreign exchange reserves. However, the GOP has never encouraged donor coordination and is having a difficult time coming up with lists of viable projects that donor countries would be likely to support. We understand that most donors are reluctant to provide the GOP with straight budgetary support. Pakistan will provide initial project ideas in February to ambassadors of the Friends of a Democratic Pakistan group; we will evaluate next steps, including a possible Friends ministerial on the margins of the Donors meeting, after receiving those proposals.
PATTERSON
Thursday, 12 March 2009, 04:28
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 000516
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK
SUBJECT: LITTLE MOVEMENT ON RECONCILIATION
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 506 B. ISLAMABAD 508
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (C) Summary. In a last-ditch effort to reduce tensions with the Sharif brothers ahead of the start of the lawyers' march on March 12, President Zardari offered Pakistan Muslim League (PML) leader Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain the post of Senate leader if PML would form a government with the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in Punjab but will do little to pacify Nawaz Sharif or the lawyers. Shujaat is considering the deal, which will be sealed by the March 12 vote in the Senate; it could end governor's rule in Punjab--if Shujaat can keep the PML forward block in line. Other compromise efforts have failed, although the UK High Commission is probing for the various parties' positions in advance of a possible HMG mediation effort. After seeing Interior Minister Malik and Awami National Party leader Asfundyar Wali Khan, Ambassador will see Shujaat March 11 and the Sharifs on March 12.
2. (C) Amid reports of possible targeted killings and Mumbai style attacks during the march, the GOP began arresting Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) members and some civil activists. Interior Minister Malik assured Ambassador he had no plans to arrest the Sharifs or key civil society leaders like Aitzaz Ahsan, but caveated this by saying he might have to arrest Imran Khan or others "who did not obey the law." Lawyers and JI activists already have begun infiltrating Islamabad; if a significant number of demonstrators cannot enter the capital, we expect protests in multiple areas, especially in Punjab, beginning March 12. Accordingly, we are issuing a Warden Notice March 11.
3. (C) During Ambassador's fourth meeting in a week with Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Kayani on March 10, he again hinted that he might, however reluctantly, have to persuade President Zardari to resign if the situation sharply deteriorates. He mentioned Asfundyar Wali Khan as a possible replacement. This would not be a formal coup but would leave in place the PPP government led by PM Gilani, thus avoiding elections that likely would bring Nawaz Sharif to power. We do not believe Army action is imminent. We do believe Kayani was laying down a clear marker so that, if he has to act, he can say he warned the U.S. in advance and gave us ample opportunities to pressure both sides to back down. Kayani is trying to leverage what he considers predominate U.S. influence over Zardari, instead of seeking a direct confrontation that could provoke an unhelpful civil-military clash.
4. (C) Two weeks ago, Zardari was staring at victory on all fronts; today, he recognizes he must compromise with the Sharifs and might well be looking over his shoulder at the Army. Even if the lawyers' march fizzles--and it may--Nawaz retains the high moral ground in public opinion and can continue attacking a now weakened Zardari. We should encourage Zardari to continue efforts to ease tensions and ask the Saudis and the UAE to weigh in with their respective allies. This could be a protracted process. End Summary.
Mediation/Confrontation/Collapse
--------------------------------
5. (C) There are three political scenarios in play as tensions between President Zardari and the Sharif brothers rise ahead of the start of the lawyers' march on March 12: mediation/accommodation, which resolves the Sharifs' disqualification from holding public office, ends governor's rule in Punjab and addresses the judicial issue; confrontation, which leads to violence and possible Army intervention; and a fizzled march that sets the stage for continued conflict.
Mediation/Accommodation
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6. (C) On March 11, Awami National Party (ANP) leader Asfundyar Wali Khan described to Ambassador and Polcouns his
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mediation efforts with Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam leader Fazlur Rehman over the past week. Zardari, he asserted, agreed to request a review of the Supreme Court decision disqualifying the Sharifs, said that after a positive outcome to that review Shahbaz Sharif would be reinstated as Chief Minister Punjab, and agreed to a conference to discuss restoring the judiciary. In return, Nawaz should delay the lawyers' march.
7. (C) Nawaz reportedly agreed but then changed his mind and demanded reversal of the court decision, an end to governor's rule in Punjab and reinstatement of the former Chief Justice. Under pressure, Nawaz relented and agreed to the judicial conference idea but offered only to ask the lawyers to consider postponing the march, and said all this had to be accomplished in a day. Asfundyar noted that it was impossible to demand a immediate review of a Court decision that had not been formally issued. He told Nawaz that he would win the next election and should just be patient; by pressing now, he threatened a political vacuum that would be filled by the Army. This time, warned Asfundyar, Nawaz might not be sent into a comfortable exile. Nawaz refused to budge.
8. (C) Asfundyar said that Zardari was surrounded by advisors who were not politicians, so he was not being encouraged to compromise; Nawaz's chief advisor was Chaudhry Nisar who, with the Sharif brothers disqualified, stood the best chance of being the next PML-N Prime Minister. Nawaz had provoked the Court by launching a campaign over the doctored exam scores of the Chief Justice's daughter, and this had prompted the ruling against Shahbaz. Asfundyar attributed the crisis 70 percent to Nawaz and 30 percent to Zardari. In Asfundyar's view, there was an absence of trust on both sides, and what was needed was a cease-fire in which to conduct reasonable negotiations. If the march fizzled, there could be time to work out a compromise; if the march sparked violence, there was "nothing to do but pray."
9. (C) Asfundyar welcomed the idea of UK mediation but said it was the U.S. view that counted most. He also urged that we contact the UAE to pressure Zardari and the Saudis to pressure Nawaz to back off. ANP had seen PML-N members distributing cash envelopes to a stream of supporters this week; like Zardari, Asfundyar said he believed the money was coming from the Saudis. Asfundyar was open to continue mediating if asked. He reminded Ambassador that Zardari had offered him the job of Prime Minister immediately after the February 2008 elections.
10. (C) In a separate meeting with Ambassador and Polcouns, UK High Commissioner Brinkley said he had received approval to approach the various sides, discern their bottom lines, and report back to London. HMG had not yet decided whether to take on any role of mediator or guarantor. The UK planned to make a public statement today urging the parties to resolve their differences democratically and eschew violence. Brinkley was scheduled to see PM Gilani and possibly Zardari and Shahbaz Sharif on March 11, and Chief of Army Staff General Kayani and Asfundyar Wali Khan on March 12.
11. (C) Late on March 11, the PML confirmed press reports that the PPP had reversed course (Ref B) and now had offered Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain the post of leader of the Senate if PML agreed to join PPP in a coalition government in Punjab. Shujaat will meet PM Gilani later March 11; on March 12, the newly constituted Senate would vote on a party leader. If the deal goes through, it would end governor's rule in Punjab but it is unclear if a PPP-led government will reduce tensions. It remains unclear, however, if Shujaat can hold on to his 28-35 member "forward block" of Nawaz supporters to seal this deal. Without the PML forward block, the PPP cannot form a government.
Confrontation
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12. (C) In a March 11 meeting with Ambassador and Polcouns, Interior Minister Malik described his efforts to mediate with the lawyers to convince them to hold a peaceful march outside of Islamabad, but he said the lawyers so far have spurned the GOP's proposals. Malik plans to block roads into Islamabad
ISLAMABAD 00000516 003 OF 004
beginning March 13. Ambassador warned that efforts to arrest the Sharifs or high-profile activists like Aitzaz Ahsan would not be well received in Washington or elsewhere. Malik denied he had any intention of arresting the Sharifs or Aitzaz but qualified this by saying "unless they do not stop, but I will tell you first. I have to maintain law and order." He said he might have to arrest Imran Khan and some JI activists. (Note: On March 10, Punjab police began arresting 200-250 JI student activists and low-level PML-N workers. Mission contacts report many activists already are going underground. Neither the Sharifs nor Aitzaz Ahsan have been arrested. Geo TV News, which the GOP has criticized for being anti-government, disappeared from cable TV. See septel for updates.)
13. (C) Malik said he had received serious threat information regarding a Mumbai style attack in Karachi on March 13-14 by the Jandallah group that previously had attacked the U.S. Consulate. There were also reports of a proposed targeted killing, against whom was unclear. JI leaders were giving their students "black coats" so they could look like lawyers and already were infiltrating Islamabad. Malik expected crowds of at least 4,000-5,000 in the capital, even with road closures.
14. (S) In four conversations with Ambassador this week, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Kayani hinted that, however reluctantly, he might have to urge Zardari to resign, if conditions deteriorate. He did not offer any red lines. Kayani indicated that Asfundyar Wali Khan or someone else broadly acceptable might be an appropriate replacement for Zardari. We do not believe Army action is imminent, but we do believe Kayani was laying down a marker that, if he had to intervene, the U.S. had been forewarned and given many opportunities to avoid intervention by pressuring both Nawaz and Zardari. Kayani made it clear that regardless of how much he disliked Zardari, he distrusted Nawaz even more. The scenario Kayani hinted at was one in which he would pressure Zardari to resign (and presumably leave the country). This would not be an official Army "coup;" it would leave the PPP government led by Prime Minister Gilani in place and preclude the need for elections that likely would bring Nawaz to power.
15. (S) Kayani hinted at disquiet among his corps commanders who believe Zardari is corrupt and has not been paying enough attention to Pakistan's economic and security challenges. ISI DG Pasha highlighted to Ambassador his concerns about Zardari's alleged corruption on the flight to the U.S. for the strategic review, and we have multiple sources demonstrating Army complaints about Zardari. Kayani believes the U.S. has the most influence over Zardari, and he knows we are Pakistan's most important ally, especially for increasing the capacity of the Pakistani Army. Kayani told Ambassador he has talked directly to Zardari, but he does not appear to have conveyed the seriousness of Army concerns about Zardari or the security situation vis a vis the march. (Note: Kayani may be seeking to avoid a confrontation that would prompt Zardari to make a disastrous decision to try and oust the COAS.)
A Fizzle
--------
16. (C) At this point, everything appears to rest on the outcome of the lawyers' march. PML-N does not have a proven reputation for putting demonstrators on the streets, although JI does. By applying the road closure/detention tactics that worked for Musharraf in 2007 to stop pro-Nawaz demonstrations, the government might be able to avoid a serious clash this time. But if a policeman fires into the crowd or a terrorist attacks protesters, all bets are off.
17. (C) There is also the likelihood that the march will not occur as scheduled. Blocked from Islamabad, there could be multiple flash points in the Punjab, early demonstrations in Islamabad, and a series of confrontations with the police. This could be a protracted clash of wills.
18. (C) Comment: Two weeks ago, Zardari was staring victory in the face after negotiating a PPP win in Senate elections, setting Nawaz up for an entirely legal
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disqualification, and looking toward successful Friends and Donors meetings that would provide the financial support needed to bolster his sagging popularity. By over-reaching to make a grab for Punjab without doing his homework on vote counting in Punjab, Zardari now needs to compromise with the Sharifs and might well be looking over his shoulder at the Army. Even if the march fizzles, Nawaz retains the high moral ground in the public's eyes and will use it to continue attacking a weakened Zardari. Zardari needs to win back the military's confidence.
PATTERSON
Friday, 05 December 2008, 08:31
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 USNATO 000453
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR RPM, SCA/A, SCA/PB
EO 12958 DECL: 12/04/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MOPS, MARR, NATO, PTER, PINR, AF, PK, IN
SUBJECT: ALLIES FIND BRIEFING ON AFGHANISTAN NIE "GLOOMY,"
BUT FOCUS ON RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE SITUATION
USNATO 00000453 001.2 OF 005
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires W. Scott Reid III. Reasons 1.4 (b), ( c), (d).
1. (S/REL NATO) Summary. National Intelligence Officer (NiO) for South Asia, Dr. Peter Lavoy, briefed NATO Permanent Representatives on the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) for Afghanistan on November 25. He said the NIE describes a grim situation in Afghanistan and predicts that negative trends will continue through 2009 if five inter-dependent regional challenges in South Asia are not addressed: defeating al-Qaida in Pakistan, creating stability in Afghanistan, creating stability in western Pakistan, creating stability in Pakistan as a whole particularly in the economy, and improving the bilateral India-Pakistan relationship. Permanent Representatives called Lavoy's report "unrelentingly gloomy," but appeared to agree with his assessment that Afghanistan is "winnable," especially if NATO takes several immediate concrete steps to improve the situation. End summary.
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KEY CHALLENGES
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2. (S/REL NATO) NiO Lavoy opened his briefing to a November 25 informal meeting of NATO Permanent Representatives (PermReps) by saying the situation for 2009 in Afghanistan looked bleak unless the international community addressed five inter-dependent regional challenges: -- Defeating al-Qaida in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan; -- Creating stability in Afghanistan; -- Creating stability in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province, Baluchistan Province, and the FATA; -- Creating stability in Pakistan as a whole, with particular emphasis on Pakistan's economy; and -- Improving the bilateral India-Pakistan relationship.
3. (S/REL NATO) Lavoy described FATA as the command and control center for al-Qaida worldwide, and said a few hundred senior and mid-level trainers, planners, and operators reside there. Despite al-Qaida's presence in the FATA, he continued, it plays a surprisingly insignificant role in Afghanistan, where the numbers of foreign fighters remain relatively low. Al-Qaida is more disrupted than at any time since October 2001, but the organization is damaged, not broken. The international community cannot afford to let pressure off al-Qaida, because it has demonstrated an ability to reconstitute itself in the past, and could easily reverse-migrate back to Afghanistan if the Taliban were to regain control. Lavoy emphasized that the consequences of failing in Afghanistan and permitting al-Qaida to shift its center of gravity to Afghanistan would pose a threat to all nations inside their own borders.
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SOURCES OF INSTABILITY
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4. (S/REL NATO) Turning to Afghanistan, Lavoy underlined that there are more significant factors than al-Qaida that contribute to the bleak security situation. The Afghan government has failed to consistently deliver services in rural areas. This has created a void that the Taliban and other insurgent groups have begun to fill in the southern, eastern, and some western provinces. The Taliban is mediating local disputes in some areas, for example, offering the population at least an elementary level of access to justice. Provincial governors appointed due to close ties to Karzai have proven ineffective, often putting certain tribes or sub-tribes at unnatural disadvantage while promoting others. The Taliban have effectively manipulated the grievances of disgruntled, disenfranchised tribes to win over anti-government recruits. Responding to a question, Lavoy said Karzai reflects the tribal fragmentation of Afghanistan. If there could be more balance of resources at the district level instead of channeling all money and efforts through Karzai, we could have greater success improving government linkages to the population.
5. (S/REL NATO) The Taliban has become more militarily effective and is demonstrating more sophisticated infantry, communications, and command and control techniques. Their marksmanship is more precise, and their explosives more lethal than in previous years. For these reasons, Lavoy noted, violent attacks initiated by insurgents rose 40 percent over the past year, matching a three-year trend for drastic annual increases in insurgent attacks. Norwegian and Turkish PermReps asked about the source of expertise and financing that is allowing the Taliban to become militarily proficient, especially if the number of al-Qaida senior and mid-level personnel is low. Lavoy responded that the opium economy is the number one domestic funding source for Pakistan-oriented and Afghan Taliban organizations. He added that insurgents have proven themselves highly adaptable, and many fighters' veteran status has contributed to opposing forces' improved abilities.
6. (S/REL NATO) Lavoy pointed to the growing professionalism and performance of the Afghan National Army (ANA) as a good news story, but noted that ISAF has a 40 percent deficiency in numbers of trainers needed to constitute a projected Afghan Army force strength of 134,000 troops. There is a similar training deficiency for Afghan National Police (ANP) development, he said. Police are seen in many provinces as a predatory force plagued by systemic problems beyond lack of professionalism, equipment, and training. Extortion of bribes from the populace remains common practice, often to supplement provincial government coffers. While there are cases where police are doing better, the ANP needs more resources.
7. (S/REL NATO) Even if the international community rectifies training gaps in Afghan army and police development, Lavoy concluded, efforts would be insufficient if Pakistan remains a safe haven for insurgents. Similarly, solving the safe haven in Pakistan is necessary but insufficient to "win" in Afghanistan, without simultaneously addressing the severe governance, development, and access to justice gaps.
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PAKISTAN'S PRECARIOUS SITUATION
-------------------------------
8. (S/REL NATO) Lavoy commented on two causes of instability in western Pakistan that could cause Pakistan to completely lose control of its Pashtun territories over the next few years. Traditional Pashtun tribal authority has broken down since the anti-Soviet jihad period, and is no longer capable of resolving social harmony at the community level. Pakistan has also promulgated a policy of neglect of Pashtun areas and still lacks a strategy to deal holistically with social problems of illiteracy, unemployment, and disaffected youth. Both of these situations play to the advantage of insurgent and extremist groups.
9. (S/REL NATO) Although Pakistan now identifies both al-Qaida and the Taliban as existential threats, Lavoy said, Pakistani government institutions still support the Taliban in two key ways. They permit the Quetta Taliban Shura (the Taliban leadership council) to operate unfettered in Baluchistan province. Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) provides intelligence and financial support to insurgent groups - especially the Jalaluddin Haqqani network out of Miram Shah, North Waziristan - to conduct attacks in
Afghanistan against Afghan government, ISAF, and Indian targets. PermReps questioned the rationality of Pakistan's support for the Taliban, which Lavoy explained in three ways. First, Pakistan believes the Taliban will prevail in the long term, at least in the Pashtun belt most proximate to the Pakistani border. Second, Pakistan continues to define India as its number one threat, and insists that India plays an over-active role in Afghanistan. Finally, Pakistani officials think that if militant groups were not attacking in Afghanistan, they would seek out Pakistani targets.
10. (S/REL NATO) Lavoy said that after the storming of Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in July 2007, the Pakistani government had tried to sever ties with insurgent groups that its government institutions had cultivated over three decades. When militants sought al-Qaida support and launched a wave of attacks against Pakistani government and security personnel, Pakistan realized it had lost control of these insurgent groups. Pakistan rapidly approached the various militant groups to reach domestic non-aggression deals. Lavoy claimed that the Pakistani Army's current operations in the FATA's Bajaur Agency are directed exclusively against insurgent groups that refused to cooperate, while the Haqqani network remains untouched and continues a policy of cross-border attacks. Urging militant groups to be outwardly focused, he said, is perceived by Pakistani officials as a method to safeguard internal security. In addition, Pakistan has (probably correctly) assessed that it is only capable of targeting several groups at a time, which leads to a policy of appeasement of other groups in the meantime.
11. (S/REL NATO) Ongoing Pakistani Army operations in Bajaur Agency are missing a counterinsurgency strategy to assist the population post-conflict, Lavoy said. The army requires the population to flee, fights the remaining insurgents, then uses air power to raze all structures associated with militants (tunnels, homes, infrastructure, etc.). The most urgent need for humanitarian international assistance to Pakistan is in Bajaur, where up to 300,000 residents have been displaced. Pakistan needs to be able to repatriate these citizens and effectively rebuild in the wake of operations. It is critical, Lavoy said, that the Pakistani Army succeed in Bajaur Agency. There is a rapidly changing perception in Pakistan's military that coordination with ISAF is critically important.
12. (S/REL NATO) Amidst the problems on the frontier, the Pakistani economy is in tatters, Lavoy continued. The International Monetary Fund's pledge of USD 6.7 billion will only address the immediate balance of payments crisis, but will not alleviate under- or un-employment for over a third of the population Pakistan's population is becoming less and les educated, the country lacks sufficient energy and clean water resources to serve its population, an there is minimal foreign investment. Lavoy addd that despite pending economic catastrophe, Pakstan is producing nuclear weapons at a faster rae than any other country in the world.
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IRAN'S ROLE
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13. (S/REL NATO) Lavoy responded to PermReps' questions about Iran during the discussion. He said Iran calibrates its posture in Afghanistan. It provides welcome development and social services assistance in western provinces and generally acknowledges the Taliban as a long-term threat. However, it also provides some lethal support to the Taliban, hedging bets that the Taliban might prevail.
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POSITIVE POLITICAL SIGNS
------------------------
14. (S/REL NATO) Moving to a more optimistic topic, Lavoy mentioned that political signals from India may indicate a trend of toned-down rhetoric against Pakistan. He said that although India believes without doubt that ISI supported the Haqqani network in orchestrating the Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul that killed over 40 people in July, Indian diplomats and politicians showed restraint in public statements. According to Lavoy, political leaders also seem to realize that India's past tactic of using military pressure to influence Pakistani government to reign in militants may no longer work, especially if insurgent groups are operating against or independently of ISI. Despite this positive political development, Lavoy said India could do more to assuage what one PermRep called "Pakistani paranoia." The Indian military continues "cold start" exercises on the Kashmir border, confirming the Pakistanis' worst suspicions, he added. India would ideally move forces back from the border.
15. (S/REL NATO) On Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, Lavoy characterized Karzai's relationship with Pakistani President Zardari as trustful and allied at a political level. He pointed out that the Pakistani Army remains deeply distrustful of the Afghan president - and of Zardari himself. Lavoy suggested that Pakistan could benefit from creating a civilian-military national security board, because politically progressive ideas on regional engagement with both India and Afghanistan have not permeated the Pakistan military. Helping Pakistan reorient its national defense policy away from India and toward counterinsurgency, he said, could help refocus the Pakistani military to be more successful.
--------------------
PERMREPS' DISCUSSION
--------------------
16. (S/REL NATO) The Secretary General (SYG) thanked Dr. Lavoy for presenting the "expose" on the regional situation in South Asia. Several PermReps noted that "the feel-good factor of the briefing was pretty low," and the report was "chilling" and "unrelentingly gloomy."
17. (S/REL NATO) Several PermReps were interested to know how the NIE affects the ongoing National Security Council strategic review. Ambassador Volker responded that the NIE forms a baseline analysis to inform USG officials as they formulate and evaluate policy options and recommendations for the incoming administration.
18. (S/NF) The Canadian PermRep agreed the importance of a vastly larger and more competent ANA force, and proposed that up to 200,000 troops might be necessary. The Belgian Ambassador proposed that NATO may need to prioritize ANA training as ISAF's number one priority in coming months (Note: Belgium stood in the way last week of enabling the ANA Trust Fund to expand its mandate to accept national contributions to sustain ANA troops. End note). Belgium added that delegations will need help crafting messages for their capitals. He said that parliaments could make generating resources for a long-term commitment even more difficult if PermReps used the NIE assessment to imply we have little control over many regional and systemic factors causing instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
19. (S/REL NATO) The Turkish PermRep said this briefing, while pessimistic in tone, was timed perfectly, and urged the NAC to craft strong messages for the SYG to deliver during an upcoming trip to Pakistan. He commented that in the absence of effective Afghan government leadership, international efforts will make little difference. The Polish PermRep said the report highlighted the renewed importance of Pakistan to
NATO, and an urgent requirement for NATO to put added pressure on Pakistan.
--------------------
WHAT SHOULD NATO DO?
--------------------
20. (S/REL NATO) Ambassador Volker suggested three specific areas where NATO could help improve the regional situation. He said the Alliance needed to ask itself how it can better engage at the provincial and district level; how NATO and ISAF should facilitate better contact among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India; and whether it should encourage nations to commit resources to help Pakistan deal with displaced people and repopulate the FATA post-conflict.
21. (S/REL NATO) Lavoy endorsed these ideas, and added that despite the troubling picture in Afghanistan in 2008, Afghanistan is "winnable," and the international community can help Pakistan turn a corner. The formula is to enhance security, exhibit good governance emanating from Kabul but active at the district level, and empower the tribes to have a stake in development at the lowest levels. These recommendations are logical extensions of the current strategy but require reorganization of resources. He concluded:
-- NATO should consider shifting the ISAF center of gravity to the district level. -- The international community needs to engage tribes without arming them, and reinvigorate the traditional tribal system by instilling confidence in the population. Securing the people will go a long way to improve their willingness to resist the Taliban. -- The ANA needs to be stronger and is the best tool. It will cost more resources and require more ingenuity. -- Anything NATO can do (including strong messages the SYG can carry to Pakistan on an upcoming trip) to encourage closer military-to-military cooperation would be helpful. -- Elections are a critical event and must be successful. September is the right time so that we have enough time to organize to secure the Pashtun population. -- 2009 is the key year to influence Pakistan and Iran to halt lethal assistance to the Taliban by showing Afghanistan's neighbors that the Taliban will not prevail. The international community should be relentless in pressuring Pakistanis on this issue. -- The international community should put intense pressure on the Taliban in 2009 in order to bring out their more violent and ideologically radical tendencies. This will alienate the population and give us an opportunity to separate the Taliban from the population. REID
Thursday, 09 April 2009, 15:51
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 000860
NOFORN
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE AND SCA
EO 12958 DECL: 04/06/2019
TAGS MARR, PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK, AF, IN, UK
SUBJECT: CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADER ON AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN
REF: LONDON 720
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Richard LeBaron, reasons 1.4 (b, d).
1. (C/NF) Summary. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke met April 3 with British Conservative Party leader David Cameron and Shadow Chancellor George Osborne to offer an overview of USG policy in the region and to urge HMG (under possible future Conservative leadership) to engage more on Pakistan and to use British influence more effectively to help tackle corruption, underpin democratic institutions and civil society, as well as encourage greater Pakistani military attention to its western border with Afghanistan. Cameron characterized the large population of British Pakistanis with strong expatriate ties to their home country as not pro-Taliban but certainly radicalized by the Iraq war and militant about Kashmir; he also criticized HMG's counter-radicalization strategy with UK Muslims. Cameron agreed that HMG needed to get UK-Pakistan relations "right" and broadly agreed that any request to a Conservative-led UK government for British troop increases in Afghanistan would likely find the Conservatives, in line with their current policy, receptive but seeking conditions. End summary.
UK Should Play a Larger Role
----------------------------
2. (C/NF) Special Representative Ambassador Richard Holbrooke discussed U.S. and UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan April 3 with Conservative Party leader David Cameron and Shadow Chancellor George Osborne. Charge and Poloff McNicholas attended the meeting, as did Cameron's Chief of Staff Ed Llewellyn. Holbrooke gave an overview of the challenges that the UK and U.S. faced in the region and stressed the need to pay more critical attention to Pakistan in order for us collectively to combat terrorism and radicalization and to strengthen democratic institutions there. Noting the striking connections between the UK's large Pakistani community and its home country (e.g., the large number of flights and remittances between the two countries and abiding ties between families/communities in the UK and Pakistan) and the strong influence Britain continues to enjoy in Islamabad, Ambassador Holbrooke urged Cameron to capitalize on this -- should the Conservatives come into power -- and exercise a stronger role for the UK in Pakistan. Foreign Secretary David Miliband had played a positive role in the recent Zardari-Sharif crisis and there were more opportunities for the UK to examine its relationship with Pakistan and use its influence more effectively. One means, Holbrooke said, was to focus on increasing UK assistance to Pakistan. Holbrooke stressed that the fight against corruption in Pakistan was critical as average Pakistanis considered corrupt leaders more of a concern than the Taliban.
3. (C/NF) Additionally, Holbrooke underscored that it was crucial for Pakistan to focus troops on its western border region; after the Mumbai terrorist attack the GOP had shifted 7,000 troops east to the border with India and had not yet redeployed them to tackle the more serious cross-border activity on the border with Afghanistan. He added that one objective of his and Admiral Mullen's trip was to chip away at the mistrust between the two countries.
UK Pakistani Community: Not Taliban, but Radicalized
--------------------------------------------- --------
4. (C/NF) Cameron, whose Conservative Party currently has a significant lead in UK opinion polls (see reftel), indicated that his foreign affairs team was thinking constructively about Afghanistan and Pakistan and preparing a Conservative government policy for the region. He and his shadow cabinet were focused on asking "constructive" questions in Parliament, and his party was keenly interested in President Obama's strategy for the region. Cameron noted that most of the approximately one million UK citizens of Pakistani origin (mostly Punjabis and Kashmiris) living in the UK were not pro-Taliban but had been radicalized by the Iraq war and were militant over Kashmir. The Conservative Party leader agreed that HMG "must get UK-Pakistan relations right" and stressed the Conservatives' commitment to this goal should they assume power in the next election.
5. (C/NF) On the radicalization of British Pakistanis, Cameron said the UK had "gotten it wrong domestically," and was critical of the UK government's "Prevent" counter-radicalization pillar (part of HMG's broader CONTEST counterterrorism strategy). He argued that PM Brown's policy had been too willing to engage with radicalized but non-violent Muslim groups. Cameron argued that there should be no difference and that both groups should be treated the same and sanctioned if they advocated violence. "We let in some crazies," Cameron said, "and didn't wake up soon enough." Cameron singled out XXXXXXXXXXXX as groups that the government should not be dealing with as conduits to the Muslim communities.
Conservatives Would Entertain More UK Troops
--------------------------------------------
6. (C/NF) Cameron said that if the Dutch and Australians were to reduce their military presence in 2011, the Conservatives (when in government) could be expected to fashion a policy along the lines of the questions they had been posing to PM Brown in Parliament; that is, to be responsive to requests for increased troops if other conditions were addressed, such as the provision for more helicopters and a clear strategy for continued UK engagement in Afghanistan.
7. (U) Ambassador Holbrooke cleared this cable.
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LEBARON
Friday, 15 January 2010, 14:30
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 000086
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EUR/WE FOR MARBURG
EO 12958 DECL: 01/13/2020
TAGS MARR, MOPS, PGOV, PREL, UK, AF, PK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH LIBERAL DEMOCRAT LEADER
NICK CLEGG
REF: 09 LONDON 2569
Classified By: Ambassador Louis Susman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (SBU) Summary. Ambassador Susman paid an introductory call on Liberal Democratic Party leader Nick Clegg on January 12. Clegg may find himself cast into the role of kingmaker if neither of the two main parties wins an outright parliamentary majority in the upcoming general elections, -- though Clegg refused to be pinned down as to what his party would do in the event of a hung parliament. Clegg stressed the tremendous amount of "goodwill" his party has for the Obama Administration, raising no major objections to current U.S. policy objectives and expressing his party's support for the new strategy in Afghanistan. End Summary.
Overly Optimistic
-----------------
2. (SBU) Ambassador Susman paid an introductory call on Liberal Democratic Party leader Nick Clegg on January 12. Clegg may find himself cast into the role of kingmaker if neither the Labour nor Conservative parties win an outright parliamentary majority. As he has done recently with the press, Clegg refused to be pinned down as to which party the Lib Dems would support in the event of a hung parliament, insisting instead that his strategy was to "focus on the long term goals." Despite the fact that current polls indicate that Lib Dems are unlikely to even hold onto the 63 parliamentary seats they currently have, Clegg appeared optimistic that his party would make progress towards his goal of doubling their number of seats.
Afghanistan
-----------
3. (SBU) Clegg noted that while the Lib Dems have been very vocal in their opposition to coalition efforts in Iraq, his party has always supported military action in Afghanistan. Clegg perceived that "a real page had been turned," with Obama's announcement of our new strategy. Clegg particularly welcomed the Obama administration's increased emphasis on civilian engagement. (Note: Clegg has been extremely critical of HMG's prosecution of the war effort. Last summer, for example, he wrote in an op-ed that "recent events have led me to question, for the first time, whether we're going about things in the right way...Our young men and women's lives are being thrown away because our politicians won't get their act together." Reftel outlines senior Lib Dem statesman Paddy Ashdown's views on challenges in Afghanistan and his belief that Lib Dems were "in for the long haul.") Ambassador Susman expressed U.S. appreciation for the important contribution made by UK forces, confirmed our long-term commitment, and stressed the importance of reconciliation in our future efforts.
Relations with the U.S.
-----------------------
4. (SBU) Clegg stressed that one "could not overestimate" the "amount of goodwill" his party has for the Obama Administration. He quickly accepted Ambassador Susman's offer of a briefing on the 2003 extradition treaty. (We believe the Lib Dems misunderstand the facts.) Clegg further noted that of the three major political parties in the UK, the Lib Dems are, and have always been, the biggest supporters of a strong EU. He stressed his belief that the UK had an important role to play in advocating mutual objectives in Brussels. In response to Clegg's question on key priorities the USG would be looking for from any new British government, Ambassador Susman noted the need for support on the full range of mutually-shared foreign policy objectives including, among others: Afghanistan, Pakistan, MEPP, Iran, China and climate change.
Comment
-------
5. (C) Clegg came across as very smooth, a bit like Tory Leader David Cameron. While critical of the previous administration, Clegg expressed considerable admiration for President Obama. He downplayed his party's likely leverage in the event of a hung parliament or minority government, claiming it was "not as much leverage as people think." Nevertheless, should the elections bring that result, Clegg's choices will be critical. Much will depend, however, on whether he can keep his often fractious parliamentarians in line.
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SUSMAN
Thursday, 03 July 2008, 09:48
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 001771
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPART FOR INR/B
EO 12958 DECL: 06/30/2018
TAGS PGOV, PINR, PREL, UK
SUBJECT: LIBERAL DEMOCRAT LEADER NICK CLEGG OUTLINES THE
PARTY'S FOREIGN POLICY
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (SBU) Summary. Nick Clegg, MP and leader of the Liberal Democrats, called for the UK to adopt the UN's "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine in his first major foreign policy address. In his speech, titled "Terms of Intervention" and delivered at Chatham House on June 23, Clegg enumerated criteria that should dictate Britain's overseas military involvement and reasserted his support for a more cohesive European Union. He explained that despite his personal support for the Lisbon Treaty, the EU should not ignore the Treaty,s referendum defeat in Ireland and plow on with its implementation, but neither should the EU let the "no" vote stand as an obstacle to the development of a stronger EU. Clegg attacked the Labour government on a variety of issues, alleging that it had misallocated defense spending and it had lacked candor with the British people about commitments required in Iraq and Afghanistan. He added that it is time for the UK to reassess its military policies with regard to both countries, and called for an immediate withdrawal of British troops from Iraq and increased military and technical support for Afghanistan. Bio info at para 8. End summary.
Criteria for Liberal Interventionism
------------------------------------
2. (SBU) Clegg,s primary message was the UK,s need to adopt a doctrine of what he called "liberal interventionism," similar to the UN's concept of "Responsibility to Protect." This doctrine, explained Clegg, calls for the UK to become involved in foreign conflicts only if a) the cause is just and as a last resort, b) intervention is well intentioned, c) military action is proportional and sanctioned by legitimate authority, and d) there exists a reasonable chance of success. Clegg argued that the UK must adapt its military and strategic resources to the post-Cold War world, and mentioned the need to focus more on supporting troops in the field as opposed to spending money on "outdated" weapons systems such as the Typhoon fighter jet and Trident missile system.
Iraq and Afghanistan
--------------------
3. (SBU) Clegg briefly touched on Iraq, and reaffirmed the Liberal Democrats, position that troop levels must be drawn down. He said that the "unjustified" invasion of Iraq has severely damaged the UK,s moral authority, and will make it difficult to institute his "liberal interventionist8 policy proposals.
4. (SBU) Clegg argued for more aid and assistance to be sent to Afghanistan, underscoring his belief that failure there would lead to greater instability in the region and a proliferation of narcotics production. Moreover, he called for the Brown government to be more forthright with the British people about the costs and length of involvement that will be required to secure a stable Afghanistan.
Zimbabwe
--------
5. (SBU) Clegg also touched on Zimbabwe, and explained that, despite the pressing humanitarian concerns, Western military involvement would be counterproductive, in part because there is no regional support for intervention. Instead, he supported UN involvement, and called on South African President Thabo Mbeki to curtail electricity supplies to the country.
Europe
------
6. (SBU) Clegg argued that the UK must take a stronger role in Europe. He sees in French President Nicolas Sarkozy an unlikely ally in the development of stronger French-UK military coordination, and explained that while the development of an EU military capability cannot be allowed to undermine NATO, the EU should still possess a military force strong enough to act unilaterally if necessary. He also said that, despite the now gloomy prospects for ratifying the Lisbon Treaty, the EU can still move forward. It is time, he explained, to stop "tinkering with the machine and put it to use," and called for Britain to be more involved in major EU decision-making, instead of merely criticizing such decisions from the sidelines.
LONDON 00001771 002 OF 002
Comment
-------
7. (C/NF) Since becoming leader of the Liberal Democrats, Clegg's general foreign policy tone has softened. His earlier hard-line rhetoric against the war in Iraq and on extradition/rendition issues has given way to a slightly more thoughtful and measured approach. These issues have lost some of their domestic vote-getting potency and therefore Clegg and others have turned to new topics. In taking the reins of the Liberal Democrat party, Clegg is restrained by the responsibilities that his leadership role imposes on his rhetoric, though he has not yet succeeded in imposing complete discipline on the members of his own party when it comes to their public comments on foreign policy subjects.
8. (C/NF) Clegg himself spoke confidently and passionately in his address about the UK's need to become involved in a more unified EU. He appeared quite knowledgeable in response to questions about the International Criminal Court and UK military spending, though slightly less sure of himself when asked about Darfur and Burma. Having only assumed the leadership of the Lib Dems last year, he appears to still be broadening his understanding of, and comfort level with, international issues.
Bio Note
--------
9. (C/NF) Clegg, like many Liberal Democrats, is individually articulate, charismatic, and personable. Since taking over the leadership of the Lib Dems, he has become more nuanced and realistic in his approach to domestic and foreign affairs. While he used to focus on Iraq and rendition in Parliament, earning quick applause from his Lib Dem colleagues, he now focuses on domestic issues that matter more to the voting public.
10. (U) Clegg serves as the Member of Parliament for Sheffield Hallam. He was first elected to British Parliament in 2005, and was elected the leader of the Liberal Democrats in October 2007. From 1999 until 2004, Clegg was a Member of European Parliament, and served as Trade and Industry spokesman for the Alliance of Liberal Democrats for Europe. Prior to working in politics, Clegg worked as a journalist and as an aid/relief project manager. He has academic degrees from Cambridge, the University of Minnesota, and the College D'Europe.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom TUTTLE
Monday, 09 March 2009, 15:22
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 000604
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 03/09/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, UK
SUBJECT: LIBERAL DEMOCRATS LOOK AHEAD TO THEIR ELECTION
STRATEGY, POSSIBLE COALITION PARTICIPATION, AND OFFER THOUGHTS ON U.S.-UK RELATIONS
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Greg Berry, reasons 1.4 (b/ d).
1. (C/NF) Summary and comment: Emboffs attending the Liberal Democrats' (Lib Dems) Spring Conference heard much in corridor conversations about the Party's strategy for the next general election (which must occur no later than June 2010) and whether participation in an electoral coalition made strategic sense for the Party:
- The Coalition Calculus - Labour is "competition," but the Conservatives are "opposition:" Most Lib Dems are instinctively hostile to the Conservatives and would not agree to join a Tory-led governing coalition, should the next election produce a hung parliament or an offer from either party to join in a governing coalition. Propping up an "exhausted" Labour party led by Gordon Brown is seen by most Lib Dems as "political suicide" because it undercuts the Lib Dems' appeal as a party of political change. For now, an informal arrangement that does not commit the party to working with either Labour or the Tories in a future government is seen as the approach likely to give the Lib Dems the most policy influence, although a formal coalition with Labour under new, non-Brown leadership has not been ruled out.
- Amplify Cable's Voice on the Economy: Party members are pleased Lib Dem Deputy Vince Cable has become a national voice on the economic downturn and is now garnering retroactive praise for his Churchillian warnings over the past few years about the instability of the UK financial system. The Lib Dems are now working to broaden his credibility so it spills over to the party as a whole and translates into electoral gains.
- The Death of Cameron's Son Changes Election Strategy: The Lib Dem counter-Conservative strategy in the next election was to attack Tory leader David Cameron as "fake" and "out of touch" with real life. The passing of Cameron's son Ivan has eliminated the ability to use that line of attack, according to Lib Dem members, as well as muted the willingness of the UK media to discuss "character attacks" against Cameron. Attacks on the Conservatives will now have to take a different course and most likely be about the issues.
On UK-U.S. relations, the Lib Dems welcome the USG's recent "constructive engagement" with Russia, Iran, and Syria. Several party members saw allowing Prime Minister Brown to be the first European -- though not the first world leader -- to visit the U.S. was a way "to let the (UK) down lightly" in favor of what they expect will be a more multilateral U.S. approach to foreign affairs under the Obama administration and one less focused on bilateral relationships with traditional allies. Lib Dems supported new USG focus on climate change and hoped that it will translate into deliverables in Copenhagen.
2. (C/NF) Summary and comment con't. Although the Lib Dems do not have an electoral issue that can strongly define them as a Party for UK voters in the next election, as the party's opposition to the Iraq war did in the 2005 election, the Party also does not come to the next election with the same baggage that Labour and the Tories both carry with many voters. Distrust over the Conservatives' ability to handle the economy while ensuring social equality remains strong with many voters, and discontentment with Labour's failure to stop the economic downturn continues to grow. Against this backdrop, the Lib Dems hope to gain electoral ground as a party of change, especially amongst blue-collar workers who are frustrated with Labour and distrustful of the Tories. End summary and comment.
Coalition Calculus: Labour is Competition, Conservatives are Opposition
--------------------------------------------- ------
3. (C/NF) The Lib Dems' agenda-light, March 7-8 Spring Conference in Harrogate garnered a brief up-tick in national media coverage for the party; conversations outside the conference hall focused heavily on the party's electoral strategy in the next general election. Lib Dem front bencher Norman Lamb explained to Poloff the party's thinking about participation in any possible governing coalition, should neither Labour nor the Conservatives win an outright majority in the next election: "We see Labour as our competition, and the Conservatives as our opposition." Most Lib Dems, he said, are instinctively and ideologically against a coalition with the Conservatives, including "right-wing members of the party like myself." On the other hand, "propping up" Labour under Prime Minister Brown - after an election in which the
LONDON 00000604 002 OF 003
voters have significantly reduced its number of seats - is "political suicide," especially since the Lib Dems' main campaign message is a call for change. If there is no clear majority in Parliament after the next elections, Lamb said the Lib Dems stand to gain the most by an informal arrangement whereby the Lib Dems could select and negotiate support for various policies, as they do not see the benefit of a more formal coalition arrangement. Lamb admitted, however, that a coalition with Labour under new, non-Brown leadership had not been ruled out.
And Our Leaders Just Don't Get Along
------------------------------------
4. (C/NF) Lamb said that Lib Dem leader Nick Clegg and Tory chief David Cameron do not get along personally. Lamb said Clegg thinks Cameron is dismissive of him and Clegg refused an "aggressive" invitation to dine at Cameron's house.
Upgrading Cable
---------------
5. (C/NF) Chief Economic Advisor and Speech Writer Chris Saunders told us that Lib Dem Deputy leader Vince Cable has become a national voice on the economy, in part because he is now seen as one of the few UK political leaders who warned about the weaknesses in the UK financial regulatory system before the downturn began, but acknowledged that it is unclear if the broader public associates Cable with the Lib Dems or sees him as a lone voice. In order to translate the public's recent faith in Cable's views on the economy into support for the broader party, the Lib Dem leadership plans to work improving Cable's Lib Dem "branding."
A New Strategy Is Required to Attack Cameron
--------------------------------------------
6. (C/NF) Both Saunders and Nick Clegg's Speechwriter and Policy Manager Polly Mackenzie said that Cameron's clear vulnerability was the public perception that he is "fake" and "out of touch" with real life. The Lib Dems strategy had been to attack Cameron on these lines and make much of his insulated, upper class persona. However, the death of Cameron's son Ivan not only eliminated these vulnerabilities in the eyes of the public but also made the media skittish about character attacks that Cameron does not have experience of real life. Mackenzie said the Lib Dems are still recalculating, but their attacks on the Conservatives will have to be focused on the issues, especially the enduring perception that the Conservatives cannot be trusted to run the economy and ensure social equality. Saunders and Mackenzie agreed that Labour would like to hold off calling for general elections until Spring 2010 in the hope that the media's undeclared but apparent gentle approach with Cameron after his son's death will have subsided.
U.S. - UK Relations
-------------------
7. (C/NF) Lib Dem Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Ed Davey, his Deputy Jo Swinson, and Development Spokesperson Michael Moore all welcomed the USG's "new constructive engagement" in foreign policy, especially with regards to Russia, Iran, and Syria. Swinson said the appointment of a Presidential Climate Change Envoy was "a good thing" and hoped it would mean serious deliverables at the Copenhagen conference.
8. (C/NF) Moore said the USG's decision to host Prime Minister Gordon Brown as the first European leader in Washington was a way "to let the (UK) down lightly" in favor of a new Administration preference for multilateralism. Moore thought relations between the U.S.-UK would remain very warm, but that the USG would likely pursue foreign policy objectives through multilateral institutions rather than through coalition building and its traditional partners. (Embassy comment: Former Democratic Party chairman Howard Dean's presence at the Lib Dem conference, as well as his delivery of a keynote address on liberal politics, gave the conference a decidedly more pro-American tone than past Lib Dem conferences have had. End comment.)
Focused on Domestic Issues, but No Clear Message Yet
--------------------------------------------- -------
9. (C/NF) With UK voters' focusing on education, health care, and the UK's sharp economic downturn, the focus of this year's conference was on domestic issues, not foreign policy, in stark contrast to previous conferences where the Lib Dems have been able to raise their profile, and their support among UK voters, by defining themselves in opposition to
LONDON 00000604 003 OF 003
Labour's foreign policy on Iraq and involvement in the rendition of terror suspects. Party leader Clegg's main speech closing the conference appealed directly to voters dissatisfied with Labour and the Conservatives, telling them they should look to the Lib Dems for change and new answers: "If you feel let down by Labour and see the Conservatives will never be a party of change, turn to the Liberal Democrats." Clegg positioned the Lib Dems as an alternative party that would replace the "failed policies of Thatcher, Major, Blair, and Brown." Commenting on the current financial crisis, Clegg called on Britain to break with the past and embrace a new political order - though a new order he never successfully defined -- by supporting the Lib Dems, the only party, Clegg said, open to new thinking on how to guide the country out of economic ruin. Clegg ended by calling on voters to take a "leap of faith" with the Lib Dems. A leap, however, that the UK media's reporting on the conference argued might still be a jump too far for most voters as long as the Lib Dems continue to lack a galvanizing issue or policy that demonstrates "new thinking" and would justify turning away from the UK's two main parties.
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LEBARON
Friday, 31 October 2008, 15:33
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 002765
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EEB PDAS NELSON, MSAKAUE
TREASURY FOR MURDEN, CARNES
EO 12958 DECL: 10/30/2018
TAGS ECON, EINV, PGOV, UK
SUBJECT: CONSERVATIVE PARTY CAUGHT FLAT-FOOTED BY BROWN'S
QUICK MANEUVERS ON FINANCIAL CRISIS, SAYS SENIOR TORY MP
REF: A. LONDON 2666 B. LONDON 2603
Classified By: Economic Minister Counselor Mark Tokola for reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (C) PM Brown's relatively deft performance (ref b) in handling the economic crisis over the past month has caught the Conservative Party off-guard, and the Tories' response to the crisis has been regrettably tepid, Michael Fallon, Tory MP and senior Tory member of the Treasury Committee, House of Commons, told emboffs October 29th. The Conservative Party felt the absence of a strong Shadow Chancellor and, the party's counter-proposals to Labour's plans have been "all over the place." Fallon particularly criticized Shadow Chancellor George Osborne's op-ed piece in the October 28 Daily Telegraph, as a "weak", almost laughable, response to the economic crisis. While Brown was enjoying higher poll numbers because of his perceived solid handling of the crisis, Fallon argued that once the recession worsens and the public feels its effects, Brown would no longer be immune from criticism, and from being held accountable for the failures of an economic system that he supervised for ten years as Chancellor of the Exchequer.
2. (C) Fallon said that Brown should be held responsible for the weakness of the Tripartite Committee, which he implemented and which failed to identify problems in their incipient stages -- and then which failed to respond effectively. The Committee - which consists of Her Majesty's Treasury, the Bank of England, the Financial Services Authority - is charged with maintaining financial stability. When Northern Rock Bank failed, Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling was new to his job, and the FSA was in the closing stages of being led by outgoing chairman Sir Callum McCarthy (Lord Adair Turner took over in September). It would be too harsh to criticize their performance then, Fallon said, given the changes in leadership, but the Tripartite Committee's reaction since then and particularly over the summer to the crisis has been inadequate. Gordon Brown has had to be the architect of the rescue plan for which, Fallon said, he gleefully has taken responsibility. One problem with the Committee during the time of the Northern Rock failure was that the three leaders of the Committee viewed each other with distrust, wanted to keep the others' institutions at arms' length, and even, Fallon contended, disliked each other. As a result, there had been minimal coordination among the three. Fallon himself said he personally dislikes Turner as a rather "soul-less technocrat," but that he was highly competent and the right person for the job. Fallon argued that the Tripartite Committee structure should be disbanded, and that the Bank of England should be given greater authority and the mandate to ensure financial stability, on the order of the mandate of the Federal Reserve Bank. In his view, the FSA should be responsible for business practices, not financial stability.
3. (C) The economic crisis was not near its end, Fallon remarked, saying that he expected even greater shocks in the near-future. He was most concerned about the lack of disclosure about the toxicity on banks' balance books. Once the extent of the toxicity was revealed, he said he expected many more banks to fail. Fallon said the Tories reluctantly acquiesced to the need for recapitalization of some banks, but that this bail-out had to be limited in nature. But what would the government do -- can it do -- when faced with more bank failures? he wondered. The government's rescue plan has raised the risk of moral hazard and the costs of more bank failures would be too high to fund. Fallon also criticized the Labour Government for not having a plan to extricate itself from banks that the government has recapitalized. If there was no timetable for government divestment, there was no incentive for investors to purchase the remaining shares. Furthermore, he argued, the banks could be subject to pressures to fund politically expedient, but not commercially profitable projects, the longer they were owned in whole or part by the government. Fallon said that further drastic steps may be required as the crisis unfolds. For example, he could imagine a nationalized insurance company.
Comment
-------
4. (C) Fallon's comments to us reflected Conservative frustration -- and some grudging admiration -- for Prime Minister Brown's skill, so far, in seizing the high ground during the economic crisis. The image Brown projects of "a
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serious man for serious times," and a "leader born for this hour," has worked so far. The Conservatives, on the other hand, came across as weak junior partners while taking the tack of supporting the Labour government in a time of crisis; and are now coming across as confounded and confused now that they are trying to go on the attack -- so far not being able to articulate an alternative to Brown's actions. Meanwhile, the scandal that has enveloped Shadow Chancellor George Osborne has not helped (ref a).
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LeBaron
Friday, 18 July 2008, 14:23
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 001886
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 07/18/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINR, UK
SUBJECT: UK'S LIBERAL DEMOCRATS: LOOKING FOR INFLUENCE NOT
POWER, FOR NOW
REF: LONDON 1771
Classified By: Political Counselor Richard Mills, reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C/NF) Summary. Britain's third party, the Liberal Democrats, launched July 17 their "Make It Happen" campaign to communicate the party's core values and vision for the UK. In what is clearly Lib Dem Leader Nick Clegg's latest attempt to build an ideologically consistent platform for a party often perceived to have muddled policies, the campaign focuses on moving beyond Labour's approach of big government as service provider to decentralize decision-making to communities and individuals. In a stunning U-turn, Clegg has jettisoned the party's long-held "tax and spend" policy for a more conservative tax regime, looking to eliminate GBP 20 billion in nationally-funded public programs. The aim is to define the Lib Dems on the national political scene as the pro-family, pro-community party of real change through decentralization.
2. (C/NF) Summary continued. At the same time, Liberal Democrat insiders report the party has been clarifying its thinking on foreign policy. To maintain credibility on defense and security issues, while remaining true to its core tenets of libertarianism and responsible multilateralism, the party continues to support Britain's role in Afghan reconstruction while also calling for improved benefits for soldiers. Although Iraq is no longer the high-profile issue it once was, Lib Dem insiders say the issue has changed the way the party makes foreign policy decisions. Lib Dem views on U.S. foreign policy are being shaped by two concerns: the view that the UK's "special relationship" with the U.S. prevents the UK from engaging fully in the EU, a problem for the pro-EU Lib Dems; and that U.S. post-cold war foreign policy has departed from the values the Lib Dems share with the U.S. - democracy and individual liberty. Just a year or so ago, when the polls indicated a real possibility that neither Labour nor the Tories would win an outright majority in the Commons, the Lib Dems were seen as potential power brokers in a coalition government. The Tories' commanding lead in the polls, however, has diminished media and political attention to the Lib Dems, and Clegg's efforts go all but unnoticed. With only 63 of Parliament's 646 seats, the party continues to struggle for a defining voice in Westminster and to differentiate its policies from Labour and the Tories. End Summary.
Clarifying Thinking on Foreign Policy and Security
--------------------------------------------- -----
3. (C) The party sees maintaining "credibility on defense and security issues" as crucial for the party's viability, especially because of the party's stated doctrine of "liberal interventionism," which allows military action only as a last resort and when authorized through multilateral institutions (reftel), according to Greg Simpson, Head of Policy and Research for the Lib Dems. To be seen as "tough on terrorism" and "credible on defense and security," the party plans to continue its support for Britain's involvement in Afghan reconstruction as well as adopting a strong message of support for the individual soldier, calling for better pay, living accommodations, and family support. The Lib Dems do not want to be seen as anti-war, but for responsible military action through credible multilateral institutions. They see the UN as the only institution that should authorize "proactive aggression;" whereas, bilateral use of military force should only be for defense.
4. (C) Acknowledging the Iraq war is no longer a salient issue the Lib Dems can use to rally support against the Labour government, Simpson said the run-up to the war in Iraq has changed the way the party approaches foreign policy issues, especially ones related to UK national security. The party now assesses intelligence judgments differently, considers the legality of international actions, and wants the UK to act so that multilateral institutions maintain their centrality to decisions on international military action. At its September conference, the party will consider for adoption a security policy that outlines these thoughts, calls for more long-term thinking in security policy, and notes the importance of "close consultation" with the U.S., European partners, and NATO.
5. (C) Given the current UK economic crunch, the party does not think that foreign policy will feature prominently in the presumed 2010 elections, according to Lib Dem Foreign Policy Researcher Ben Jones. He characterized the Lib Dem's goal in most of its foreign policy statements as keeping consistent with Lib Dem ideology, but phrasing the message in terms that will attract media and public attention to the party. He
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cited as examples Lib Dem Shadow Foreign Secretary Ed Davey's recent call to strip Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe of his knighthood and characterizing the UK's frosty relations with Russia "as a classic case where the EU cannot get its act together."
6. (C) Simpson said the tension that exists between the Lib Dems and U.S. foreign policy is somewhat intrinsic to the party's anti-establishment roots but has two main veins. First, the "special relationship" with the U.S. is largely seen as the reason the UK does not engage more fully with the EU, which is a problem for the very pro-EU Lib Dems. Secondly, many Lib Dems feel that U.S. post-cold foreign policy has departed from the values the Lib Dems share with the U.S.: democracy and individual liberty.
Making It Happen on Domestic Issues
-----------------------------------
7. (C) In Clegg's July 3 speech to the Local Government Association, he outlined how the Lib Dem's want to decentralize power and taxation to communities, saying "Britain is stifled by our micro-managing, centralizing government." He argued that Labour's big government approach to service delivery increased taxes, but not the quality of services and that local communities could manage service delivery more efficiently. He called for localization of tax rates, the replacement of council tax with local income taxes, significant cuts to central taxes, and for local communities to have the power and freedom to raise their own resources. Danny Alexander, Clegg's Chief of Staff and MP for Inverness, explained to Poloff "devolution needs to go further than to the (states), straight down to the individuals." Cutting central taxes, he argued, gives individuals decision-making authority, and local government should offer flexible services that allow individuals to make choices based on their own needs.
8. (C) Alexander said the Lib Dems are currently reviewing the national budget to find GBP 20 billion (USD 40 billion) in savings, "not through government efficiency, but by cutting entire government programs." He offered the Labour Government's plans to roll-out a several billion pound national identification card program as one example of needless national government expenditure.
9. (C) Simpson said the party is also trying to define itself as the pro-family, pro-community party through decentralization, which resonates well with voters, by calling for greater autonomy for schools, lower tuition rates, universal child-care programs, and work-life balance campaigns. Civil service reform, Simpson said, will also feature prominently in the party's messages because of the large number of civil servants who support the party.
10. (U) In addition to tax cuts, improved government service delivery, and decentralization, Clegg's July 17 "Make It Happen" campaign also highlighted dealing with climate change, privacy and personal information security, and improved community security as core Lib Dem values.
But Why a Third Party?
----------------------
11. (C) Alexander acknowledged the Lib Dems have trouble distinguishing themselves from Labour and the Tories. This has been especially problematic since the Tories have "stolen Lib Dem rhetoric" on social issues and climate change. Alexander said the Lib Dems' only defense has been to argue that the party has a track record on environmentalism and has substance behind its policies, while the Tories do not. At its origin, the Lib Dems were established as a libertarian party, supporting the prudent tax policies of the Conservatives and the liberal social values of Labour. That distinction, however, became muddled in the run-up to the 2005 elections when the Lib Dems, similar to Labour, supported a tax hike.
Comment
-------
12. (C/NF) Holding only 63 of Parliament's 646 seats leaves the Liberal Democrats struggling for an influential voice in Westminster on both domestic and foreign policy issues, and they continue to have problems distinguishing themselves from Labour and the Tories. Clegg is proving to be a decisive leader, having announced the party's new tax policies without consulting the party's rank-and-file. He may be able to increase the party's influence in Westminster in the run-up to the 2010 elections, which seems to be the party's goal at
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present, and thereby increase the Lib Dems' electoral prospects. That said, with support for Labour falling and the Tories resurgent, the Lib Dems find themselves in a difficult pre-election position. They have yet to find a defining issue to replace the boost their strong opposition to the Iraq war gave them over the part several years, and the Conservatives seem to be picking up Labour's loses. Cleggs' new campaign, for all of its fashionable rhetoric on empowering individuals through choice and decentralization, does not, on first glance, appear to provide a new defining issue for the UK public.
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TUTTLE
Tuesday, 07 October 2008, 12:10
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 002556
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/WE/UK
NSC FOR BRADLEY
EO 12958 DECL: 10/07/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, UK
SUBJECT: GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS STEALS THE THUNDER FROM
THE TORY PARTY CONFERENCE
REF: LONDON 2496
1. Summary and comment. (C) The Conservative Party's fall conference, which closed the UK political party conference season on October 1, ended with a whimper rather than the expected bang. Turmoil in the world's financial markets overshadowed Tory leader David Cameron's attempts to portray his party as the government in waiting. Following the initial vote in the House of Representatives against the Bush Administration's financial recovery plan on September 27, Conservative Party Leader David Cameron adroitly moderated his tone and the conference's agenda in an attempt to avoid charges of partisanship. Cameron departed from the conference organizers' planned program to deliver an emergency statement on September 30 in which he promised to cooperate fully with the Government's attempts to shore up the UK's financial markets, offering his party's full support to help the Brown Government address the crisis, in a deliberate contrast to what the UK media described as political partisanship in the U.S. In the event, the Tory party high command's initial fears at the start of conference -- that with a double digit opinion poll lead over a tired looking Labour Government, the Conservatives might end up looking hubristic and over-confident - proved unfounded as Cameron battled to keep his conference in the headlines, and his party looking relevant as the eyes of the public and media turned to PM Brown at a time of financial turmoil.
2. (C) Comment cont. Conservatives were pleased that their unified front contrasted starkly with Labour's conference the preceding week, which had been punctuated by in-fighting and an obsession with the faltering leadership of Gordon Brown, but Cameron had to leave Birmingham troubled that PM Brown's jibe at the Labour party conference -- "now is no time for a novice" -- has gained traction with the voters and given Labour a bump in the polls. Cameron attempted to rebut the charge in his keynote address (ref), but it is clear the inexperience charge is a winner for Labour and that voters, though tired of Labour, are not yet sold on Cameron. Although both parties got what they needed from their annual conventions, Gordon Brown will be the more relieved of the two men that media coverage of the financial crisis has taken the spotlight off his continuing leadership difficulties and off the Conservative Party's attempts to position themselves as the next Government. End Summary and comment.
Conservatives Worry About Over Confidence...at First
--------------------------------------------- -------
3. (C) The Conservatives gathered for their annual fall conference in Birmingham with high hopes. Under the banner slogan, "Plan for Change," this was to be the Party's chance to lay out its plans to govern, providing the UK media and public with the "meat of its policies" and an opportunity to present itself as a credible alternative to Labour. Polls before the conference found that although voters were definitely tired of Labour and wanted change, there were still lingering doubts about Tory policies and ability to govern. Conservative politicians were under strict instructions from the Tory high command not to turn off voters by appearing too cocky or overconfident. But with a sustained double digit opinion poll lead over Labour, that was always going to be difficult. Cameron's fears of appearing "to take victory for granted" soon disappeared, however, as financial markets continued to implode. The UK media turned its attention back to Prime Minister Brown, as the only man in a position to actually influence events, and the conference slogan was quickly dubbed "Change of Plan" by wags in the media as Cameron was forced into a radical and nimble rewrite in order to keep the press interested in events at Birmingham.
4. (C) It all had started off so differently: on the first day of the conference, speeches to conference delegates as well as a succession of meetings with MPs revealed that although Conservative troops might be sticking to their strict instructions not to appear too cocky in front of a watchful press, this would not stop them from "sticking the boot" to the government. Shadow chancellor George Osborne's tax proposals were the main topic of conversation on the first day. He hoped to repeat his success of the previous year when his unexpected and highly popular announcement that inheritance taxes would be radically increased had shaken the Labour Government so much that Gordon Brown canceled his plans to call an early election. This time round, Osborne pleased the party faithful with his announcement that any future Conservative Government would freeze council tax levels (a local taxation) for its first two years. Both the
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party's vice-chairman, Oliver Letwin MP, and the editor of the popular website "Conservative Home," Tim Montgomerie, told us that Osborne's tax announcement was very popular with party members and would be a good plank for the next campaign.
5. (C) By the second day of the conference, the mood had changed dramatically following events in Washington. David Cameron clearly needed to change the narrative to keep the media focus on his conference and to nimbly avoid charges of partisanship. In one swipe, Osborne's tax announcement was wiped off the front pages (although on closer inspection of the small print, much of the media dismissed Osborne's plans as unworkable anyway) and even at the conference itself, the main topic of conversation became events in the U.S. Julie Kirkbride, Conservative MP and spouse of former Shadow Northern Ireland secretary, Andrew Mackay, summed up the conference's real focus by the second day when she told poloffs, "we're all looking at what you'll do."
Changing the Narrative and the Narrator
---------------------------------------
6. (C) In an adroit reaction to world events, Cameron succeeded in keeping the spotlight trained on his conference by giving an unplanned emergency statement on the economy on September 30, in which he pledged full support to the Government, "in stark contrast," he added, to the partisanship of politicians in D.C. Later, in a private meeting, a Cameron insider told poloffs that the decision had been taken that it should be Cameron who delivered the speech rather than shadow chancellor George Osborne as private party polling indicated that the public feel Osborne lacks the necessary "gravitas." Somewhat unfairly, party officials thought, polling indicated that Osborne was seen as lightweight and inexperienced, in part due to his high-pitched vocal delivery. This party insider also revealed that Brown's charge that Cameron was a "novice" at a time of crisis had gained significant traction with voters. Internal Tory spot polling had found, worryingly for the Conservatives, that contrary to the general consensus, if an election were held the next day, Gordon Brown would be re-elected, albeit with a vastly reduced Labour majority.
Tories Still Oppose 42 Day Detention Bill
-----------------------------------------
7. (C) Outside the conference hall, Shadow Home Secretary Dominic Grieve was outspoken in his criticisms of the Government, and scornful of Government plans to continue to push through legislation increasing the time suspects can be held, without charge, to 42 days. The legislation has already passed through the Commons after a very close vote and will be voted upon in the Lords this month, where it is certain to be amended, requiring another vote in the Commons. Grieve expressed doubt that the legislation would pass a second time in the Commons. Tories on Foreign Policy
------------------------
8. (C) In further meetings on the margins of the conference hall, David Lidington, Shadow Foreign Affairs Minister for the Middle East, briefed poloffs on his recent visit to Iran which he summed up as "great people, terrible government." Keith Simpson, another member of Hague's foreign affairs team who referred to his shadow portfolio as covering "the rest of the world," and a strong supporter of the Atlantic relationship, said that Cameron's reaction to world events, and his attempts to moderate the partisan tone of conference, were "spot on," as did Shailesh Vara, the Conservative Party's Deputy leader. Vara was equally frank about the party hierarchy's instructions not to appear cocky, and the "ban on champagne" at receptions in order to avoid charges of hubris - instructions which had proved unnecessary as the financial news darkened throughout the week.
Cameron's Closing Speech
------------------------
9. (C) The conference wound up with a keynote speech by Cameron that, in subsequent press reporting, was viewed as well-judged and providing sufficient, if undetailed, policy discussion to allow the Tories to challenge the Labour claim Cameron is a flash in the pan. He addressed early, and head on, Gordon Brown's central criticism that with the world in economic chaos, "now is no time for a novice" by arguing that what matters more than experience is "character and judgment" (ref). If Cameron's aim was to convince the public that he has serious policies and will bring changes, then he
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succeeded in the eyes of much of the press. Cameron may have faced criticism that his speech failed to lay out, in specifics, the party's plans for government but no doubt he is trying to avoid the fate of previous leaders who, having set out a detailed platform far in advance of any general election, later had their best ideas taken by the Labour Government.
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LeBaron
2010-02-17 EMBASSY LONDON CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN
SUBJECT: BANK OF ENGLAND GOVERNOR: CONCERN ABOUT RECOVERY,
Classified By: Ambassador Louis B. Susman
1. (C/NF) Summary. Reining in the UK's debt will be the greatest challenge facing the party that wins the expected May 6 general election, Bank of England Governor Mervyn King told the Ambassador in a February 16 meeting. While neither party has adequately detailed plans to reduce the deficit, <u>King expressed great concern about Conservative leaders' lack of experience and opined that Party leader David Cameron and Shadow Chancellor George Osborne have not fully grasped the pressures they will face from different groups when attempting to cut spending.</u> King also raised concerns about the global economic recovery, arguing that global growth in 2010 would be anaemic and a double-dip recession remained a possibility. Greece's profound economic troubles will trigger a further consolidation in power within the euro-zone, with Germany and France likely to impose the right to scrutinize if not exercise some control over Greek government accounts in return for an implicit or explicit guarantee, he predicted. The UK has been on the sidelines in the debate over Greece and could have less influence in the EU, as Germany and France will seek greater political cohesion in the euro-zone in the aftermath of the Greek crisis, he stated.
Bleak UK and Global Economic Picture
2. (C/NF) For the next ten months, the UK faces the challenge of adopting deficit-reduction measures, controlling inflation and addressing rising unemployment … <u>Businesses will cut jobs faster this year and eliminate many part-time positions, as employers realize that economic recovery will be a long, drawn-out process</u>, said King …
Conservatives - Not Prepared
4. (C/NF) Conservative leaders <u>David Cameron and George Osborne do not fully grasp the pressures they will face when attempting to cut back on spending, when "hundreds of government officials will make pleas of why their budgets should not be reduced," </u>stated King. In recent meetings with them, he has pressed for details about how they plan to tackle the debt, but received only generalities in return. Both Cameron and Osborne have a tendency to think about issues only in terms of politics, and how they might affect Tory electorability. King also raised concerns that Osborne's dual roles as Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer but also as the Party's general election coordinator could create potential problems in the approach on economic issues.
5. (C/NF) King also expressed concern about the Tory party's lack of depth. <u>Cameron and Osborne have only a few advisors, and seemed resistant to reaching out beyond their small inner circle. </u>The Cameron/Osborne partnership was not unlike the Tony Blair/Gordon Brown team of New Labour's early years, when both worked well together when part of the opposition party, but fissures developed - for many reasons - once Labour was in power. Similar tensions could arise if Cameron and Osborne disagreed on how to handle the deficit.
7. (C/NF) The euro-zone's move to greater political cohesion could poise some disadvantages for the UK, King speculated. During the February 16 ECOFIN meeting, euro-zone governments politely listened to Chancellor Darling when he commented on the situation in Greece, but he was not invited to attend internal discussions since the UK is not part of the euro-zone. It would be incumbent for the UK to demonstrate that it has something meaningful to say and to be constructively engaged in the EU, should this greater political cohesion among the euro-zone governments occur, commented King.
Saturday, 20 January 2007, 12:35
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 000185
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, SCA/CEN, S/CRS,
SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
STATE PASS TO OPIC DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF DULCE ZAHNISER
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT
EO 12958 DECL: 01/20/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, ASEC, MARR, AF, PK
SUBJECT: BOUCHER, MOSBACHER AND KARZAI TALK ENERGY,
INVESTMENT, PAKISTAN AND COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY
Classified By: A/DCM Sara Rosenberry for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
1. (S/NF) On January 10, Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher and Overseas Private Investment Corporation President and Chief Executive Officer Robert Mosbacher met with President Karzai. Mosbacher briefed Karzai on the Investment Corporation's projects in Afghanistan, focusing on energy projects, credit programs, and the 209-room Marriott Hotel planned for Kabul. Boucher called on both Afghan and Pakistani Jirga Commissions to meet as soon as possible. Karzai is doing everything he can to make the jirgas work. The President expressed his opposition to Pakistani mining and fencing of the border and suggested that Pakistan close madrassas and terrorist training camps if it was really serious about terrorism. Karzai wants to rid himself of the Bugti problem but argued that the Bugtis were not terrorists. Boucher briefed on requested budget funding for Afghanistan. He encouraged acceptance of ground spraying of poppy crops in Helmand. Karzai was non-committal and pointed to British reluctance. Karzai believes that 2007 will be a better year for Afghanistan and called for better preparations to show the people that we were ready for the spring offensive. END SUMMARY
Overseas Private Investment Corporation Projects in Afghanistan
--------------------------------------------- ------
2. (SBU) President Karzai began by noting that electricity was becoming increasingly important for Afghanistan. Electric power from Afghanistan,s neighbors was unreliable and countries like Uzbekistan were raising prices, he said. Mosbacher briefed Karzai on his meetings in Kabul on electricity and other projects. He said new power capacity and building private sector development were key. If and when the legal structure for independent power production was established, the Investment Corporation would be able to help with more financing.
3. (SBU) In response to a question from Karzai about projects being considered, Mosbacher explained that industrial consumers were paying too much for electricity. These entities would be good customers for new electricity projects since households were not paying enough to support new investment. At the end of March, the utility industry would be corporatized, but a consistent set of rules will be needed to set a framework for independent power production. Any private power project would take 18-24 months from the time the legal framework was established. Karzai thought this was too long. Mosbacher explained that huge pieces of equipment needed to be brought in, which takes time. They would be run by heavy fuel oil, but natural gas was best as it was a fraction of the cost of diesel. In addition, laws needed to be passed before investment could begin.
4. (SBU) Mosbacher explained that other Investment Corporation projects included a 209-room, four-star Marriott Hotel. The project was on track but outstanding problems on the lease needed to be resolved. He expected that construction could start in the spring and with an opening within 18-24 months. Much of the material and labor will be sourced in Afghanistan. The hotel will employ 400 people.
5. (SBU) Mosbacher briefed that his organization was also going to be providing small and medium-sized business credits for agricultural and manufacturing facilities, through a new commercial and a non-bank lending institution. These two
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projects could start in 6-9 months.
Cross-Border Jirgas
-------------------
6. (C) President Karzai said that Afghanistan had done everything it could on the jirgas, e.g., providing lists and documents to Pakistan. Prime Minister Aziz explained during his visit that a Commission would soon be appointed. Assistant Secretary Boucher urged that both sides get their Commissions together as the next step, the sooner the better. He suggested it shouldn,t be too difficult to work out the local versus national versions of the jirgas and pledged U.S. and international support. Karzai reiterated that he was doing everything he could. Boucher stated that he would nudge the Pakistanis on the jirgas and hoped the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister-level meetings would continue.
7. (C) Karzai described Aziz as a "good man," someone he could talk to openly and frankly. Aziz had the intellectual capacity to talk through the issues. Karzai hoped the U.S. could influence the Pakistanis on the jirgas. Boucher noted that Speaker Quanooni had been invited to Pakistan and Karzai said he would encourage him to go.
Border Mining and Fencing
---------------------------
8. (C) The Assistant Secretary relayed press reports that Pakistan may be reconsidering its proposal for selective mining and fencing of the border. The U.S. had been encouraging Pakistan to use the tripartite meetings to deal with such issues. Karzai said there was speculation that Pakistan was clamping down on the Taliban and the insurgency on the border as a pretext to get to the Balochi refugees who were crossing the border. He observed that there was much domestic pressure in Pakistan against mining and fencing. Boucher interpreted the move as a sign of Pakistani frustration and that Pakistan was taking the border problem seriously. Karzai rebutted that they could close madrassas and training centers if they were really serious about terrorism. Pakistan just needed to check its own intelligence.
9. (C) Karzai noted that some in the Pakistani media were calling for jihad against the United States. He expected more bloodshed in 2007. Assistant Secretary Boucher replied that the Pakistani media said many things but it was important to look at the actual situation on the border. For example, in November, there was actually a decrease in infiltration from North Waziristan, although the reason is unclear. Karzai explained that the media in the region was not like that in the West, as it was easily manipulated by governments. Both the Pakistani and Afghan governments knew well how to use the media.
10. (C) Boucher told Karzai that the United States believed that Pakistan was now doing more on terrorism. He pointed to an increase in arrests of more Taliban and the recent attack on a madrassa in the Bajaur Agency. Boucher acknowledged, however, that some Pakistani authorities also turned a blind eye to infiltrators. He said we needed to keep reminding them of their responsibilities. Karzai responded that we needed to keep reminding them to give up the Pakistani dream of a larger Islamic Pakistani Emirate. Boucher conveyed the United States, view that both Musharraf and Aziz knew well the dangers of not cracking down on terrorism. He said events in North Waziristan have scared them and they now fear they could lose control. Boucher agreed that we needed to see swifter action by Pakistani authorities, but we should not doubt their commitment.
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Bugti
-----
11. (S/NF) Assistant Secretary Boucher asked Karzai if he knew where Bugti was. Karzai responded that a lot of Bugtis come to Afghanistan. In fact, over 200, with their sons and money, have come. Karzai said he advised them to go the United Nations for asylum, but many were frightened and are in hiding. The United Nations declined to deal with the issue, considering it too sensitive. Karzai said he was "not interested in having them in Afghanistan as it was too much trouble."
12. (S/NF) In his meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Aziz, Karzai had said that the Bugtis were not terrorists and represented nobility in Afghanistan, so it would be hard to turn them over to Pakistan. Boucher clarified that it was the grandson that the Pakistanis were after for instigating an uprising. Karzai responded that fomenting uprising does not make one a terrorist. The real terrorists were Bin Laden and Mullah Omar. Afghanistan needs a sign that Pakistan will stop supporting these terrorists. Boucher asked Karzai which side should move first and queried whether Afghanistan could take the grandson into custody or strike some political deal. Karzai explained that the Bugtis would blame the United States if Afghanistan turned them in. There would be disgust toward both Afghanistan and the United States.
13. (S/NF) Boucher asked Karzai if he could assure Pakistan that the Bugtis were not supporting armed struggle and that India was not involved. Karzai said "yes", though he doubted Pakistan would accpet his assurances. Pakistan would continue to think India is involved. There is a lot of misinformation out there, Karzai commented. He said he knew Bugti, who was highly respected in the U.S. Karzai explained that Bugti had once tried to call Karzai but he had refused for the sake of good relations with Pakistan. Now he cannot forgive himself for refusing. Karzai assessed that Pakistan had troubles with many other tribes too, as a result of its trying to divide and conquer and turn the tribes against each other. Pakistan needed to address the bigger picture, Karzai urged. (Note: Halfway through the discussion of Bugti, Karzai signaled that the issue was too sensitive and asked that notetaking be suspended. End Note)
New U.S. Funding
----------------
14. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher briefed Karzai in broad terms on new funding for Afghanistan that we expect to come from a supplemental budget. In addition to an increase in U.S. funding we were working toward, a series of international meetings would focus on funding and other needs for Afghanistan )- the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board Political Directors meeting in Berlin, and the G-8. The United States will be pushing countries to commit to funding where it is needed most. He reported that Presidential Senior Economic Advisor Naderi had agreed to attend a series of meetings to brief on where the money was most needed.
15. (C) Boucher explained that several key elements should move forward to support the new money, namely the Presidential Appointments Commission, improved governance, continuation of the Policy Action Group process (which he said was working well), more government presence around the country such as the Presidential Policy Action Group visit to Kandahar, and dealing with corruption. Karzai expressed his disappointment with the Policy Action Group, asking "What is
KABUL 00000185 004 OF 005
it doing?" He said that when displaced people from Kandahar have been returned and when the youth in the South have jobs, then he will be able to declare that the Policy Action Group was working. 16. (C) On corruption, Karzai called for corrupt people to be punished and to simplify the procedures for doing so. On governance, he believed that the situation was much better than three years ago. Most governors were competent and knew what was going on in their provinces. Karzai felt that the Government of Afghanistan was much more in charge than three years ago. He said the police were better and were becoming more linked to other police in other regions. Organization and training had much improved.
17. (C) Boucher said that the supplemental budget would allow for an expanded target for police expansion and stepped up training. He shared that the budget would be more than the normal USD 3 billion, but possibly broken up between 2007 and 2008, with the police and military portion showing up in 2007. The money would focus on more training equipment, road construction, power grids, and provincial judicial systems. Boucher said that the final figures would be out in a few weeks, possibly around the time of the State of Union Address. Secretary Rice would make an announcement at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting. More details will emerge in February.
Strategic Dialogue
------------------
18. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher apologized that scheduling programs had prevented the travel of Under Secretary Burns for the Strategic Dialogue meeting. With the
SIPDIS expected arrival of Deputy Secretary Negroponte, Burns' schedule should become more flexible, he said. Boucher underlined that Burns was keenly interested in the Strategic Dialogue. Karzai said it would send an important signal.
United Kingdom, Helmand and Poppy
---------------------------------
19. (C) Karzai asked if the United States was "fine with the UK in Helmand? Are they up to something?" Boucher responded that the British were trying to do a good job and were focused on Helmand. Karzai said they need to know that Helmand is part of a bigger picture. Boucher agreed and said it was important to get other countries to look at the country as a whole and to promote national authority, not just focus on the regions where they are operating.
16. Boucher said that everyone needed to accept ground spraying of poppy in Helmand. Karzai stated that the United Kingdom would not accept it. Boucher urged Karzai to focus on poppy this year to show our seriousness in the most serious of places, Helmand. Karzai reported that Helmand Governor Wafa complained that the British were willing to do eradication only in areas where there was government control, but that we needed to eradicate where the Taliban were. Boucher urged Karzai to consider a pilot project in Helmand and offered to approach the British if necessary. Boucher said that he would be meeting his British counterpart soon and would raise the issue.
Spring Offensive
----------------
17. Karzai believes that 2007 will be a better year but called for better preparations to deal with the spring offensive. We need to show the people that we are prepared, he said. Boucher stated that the spring offensive must be "our offensive" and that we need to hit the Taliban hard
KABUL 00000185 005 OF 005
before they can come at us. He commented that all of us were better prepared this year.
18. Karzai asked Boucher to convey to Prime Minister Aziz how grateful he was for his recent visit to Afghanistan. He also noted that he enjoyed Boucher's recent meeting with him in Turkmenistan and he hopes to be the first visitor to Ashgabat after the upcoming election.
19. SCA Senior Advisor Caitlin Hayden cleared this cable.
NEUMANN
Friday, 26 February 2010, 16:18
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000461
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/26/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, PK, AF
SUBJECT: GOP DENIES AGREEMENT TO TRANSFER BERADAR TO
AFGHANISTAN; LAHORE HIGH COURT INTERVENES
ISLAMABAD 00000461 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)
1. (C) Summary: On February 26, the Lahore High Court reportedly barred the Government of Pakistan (GOP) from extraditing Mullah Beradar and four other Afghan Taliban leaders, pending a hearing on March 15 to which both the federal government and concerned provincial governments have been summoned. The LHC's ruling comes on the heels of a February 25 petition filed by Khalid Khawaja, the Chief Coordinator of the Defense Human Rights Commission, challenging the &unlawful8 detention of the Afghan Taliban leaders. The same day of Khawaja's petition, the press had reported that President Karzai's office had released a statement noting that the GOP had agreed to hand over Mullah Beradar and other Taliban to Afghan authorities. During a February 24 tripartite meeting with FBI Director Robert Mueller and Afghan Interior Minister Atmar Hanif, Pakistan Minister of Interior Rehman Malik made no commitment of the GOP handing over to Afghanistan the Afghan Taliban leaders in question, but agreed to study the issue. The Pakistani delegation asked for the "deportation" of Baloch separatists, including Bramdagh Bugti. Malik confirmed to Ambassador on February 26 that the GOP, in fact, has made no such assurances of Beradar's transfer. End Summary.
The LHC Steps Intervenes in Beradar Case
-----------------------------------------
2. (C) The Lahore High Court (LHC) on February 26 reportedly issued an order barring the extradition of Mullah Beradar and four other individuals named in a February 25 petition brought forward by Khalid Khawaja challenging their detention. Khawaja, the Chief Coordinator of the Defense Human Rights Commission, filed a petition dated February 25 in the LHC calling on the Government of Pakistan to treat the detained Afghan Taliban &in accordance with law in the interest of justice, equity and conscience8 and asks that it refuse any transfer of the individuals named in the petition. Khawaja heavily cited various media reports about Beradar's capture as evidence supporting his petition. (Note: Khawaja is currently defending the five Americans arrested in Sargodha and is known to be a pro-extremist activist and lawyer. End Note)
3. (U) Khawaja claims that the detention of the Taliban Afghan in Pakistani custody is against the law, violating Article 4, 10, and 11 of the Constitution. He argues that the individuals have not been brought before any court, that they have not been provided with the grounds for their arrest, and that they have not had access to counsel of their choice. Khawaja further charges that the &raid by the US agencies and investigation by them is against the provisions of the Constitution and humiliation of the sovereignty of the state.8
4. (U) In the petition, Khawaja asks the LHC to "restrain" the GOP from &handing over or escorting the detenus/accused...to America, Afghanistan or any other country as they are to be tried, if need be, under law of the land.8 Khawaja further pleads that the detainees be produced before the courts, that any investigation of the detainees should be done independently of the &FBI or any other foreign intelligence agency,8 that the FBI and other American officials be restrained from interfering in Pakistan's affairs, and that the grounds for the arrest of the individuals in question be produced.
No GOP Assurances at Tripartite of Beradar Transfer
--------------------------------------------- --------
5. (C) The Beradar arrest was raised at a February 24 tripartite meeting of FBI Director Robert Mueller, Minister Rehman Malik of the Pakistan Ministry of Interior, and Minister Atmar Hanif of the Afghan Ministry of Interior in Islamabad. There was no agreement from either side about the transfer of "wanted persons."
6. (C) In the meeting, Malik provided a list of Pakistan's Most Wanted to Atmar, and requested the same from Atmar. Malik named one of the Most Wanted, known Baloch separatist Bramdagh Bugti, and asked Atmar to assist in locating the individual and returning him to Pakistan. Malik also stated
ISLAMABAD 00000461 002.2 OF 003
that both countries had expressed interest in passing prisoner lists naming the nationals of one country being detained by the other country. Atmar said his government did not know where the Baloch separatists were located and would need more information from the GOP to find them.
7. (C) Atmar highlighted that three Afghan Taliban leaders, including Mullah Beradar, had been recently detained in Pakistan and advised that Afghanistan would be interested in developing a dialogue to have these three deported. Malik noted that these detainees currently were not pending in the courts, but the he would seek additional information on the matter. Atmar further advised that pursuant to discussions between Pakistan ISI and Afghan NDS, 38 Afghans were to be deported/repatriated in the near future, but these Afghans had not been sent back to Afghanistan.
8. (C) The two ministers agreed that, in regards to prisoners, the countries needed to draft an agreement to exchange prisoners. Malik agreed to provide a prisoner list to Atmar listing the 38 3. In regards to the Most Wanted Lists, the ministers agreed to share intelligence at the upcoming Focal Point meeting on the "Most Wanted." Atmar invited the FBI to participate in these discussions and work with both countries on the efforts to locate the "Most Wanted" persons. Director Mueller accepted the invitation and pledged the FBI's full support.
9. (C) Director Mueller strongly suggested that, as the two countries moved forward, the "prisoner" and "Most Wanted" lists should not be made public. He urged both Minister Atmar and Minister Malik to restrain from comments to the press (advice which was apparently ignored). The names on the lists could be key to sensitive investigations and making the names public might jeopardize investigations, the FBI Director explained.
Malik Denies GOP Agreement to Transfer Beradar
--------------------------------------------- ---
10. (C) Given all the confusing press reporting, Ambassador contacted Minster Rehman Malik in Dubai on February 26 to ask if there was anything conveyed to the Afghans about deporting Taliban, apart from the discussion in the trilateral meeting in which she, Ambassador Eikenberry and many others had participated. Malik firmly denied that there had been any agreement to extradite or deport Mullah Beradar or any of the other Taliban leaders.
11. (C) Malik claimed Atmar had jumped the gun to the press with his suggestion that some agreement had been reached. Malik said he had told the press that Pakistan would consider a request to deport Beradar and the others if they in fact received such a request. Malik said Pakistan had its "own procedures to follow" and they had to be "sure Beradar hadn't committed any crimes in Pakistan." Malik said he had talked to General Pasha (Ambassador pressed him on this point), and Malik claimed he would not have failed to "coordinate" with everyone in his government.
12. (C) Ambassador asked Interior Secretary (Deputy Minister), Qamar Zaman, the same question on February 26. He was fairly certain that the only exchange on this issue was the one conducted in the February 24 tripartite meeting. He speculated that Minister Atmar might have been under pressure from his local press to put a positive spin on the meeting.
13. (C) Comment: The tripartite meeting was a follow up to the earlier May 2009 meeting in Washington. It made progress on a number of fronts, which will be reported septel. But the issue of "wanted persons" dominated the press play after the meeting. Rehman Malik was at pains to convince us that no deal had been made with the Afghans.
14. (C) Comment Cont'd: As most of our readers know, the presence of Baloch separatists Bramdagh Bugti in Afghanistan has long been a neuralgic one with the GOP, particularly with the GOP military. Accordingly, post believes Øthat we should watch out for consideration of some type of exchange of Berader with Bugti. But we do not believe that the Pakistani
ISLAMABAD 00000461 003.2 OF 003
government, especially those who control Berader's fate--Kayani and Pasha--would willingly lose control of such a huge potential propaganda pawn in Beradar. While Bugti may be a core issue at some political level, the "truths" Berader could tell about ISI, not to mention a host of other Pakistani notables, likely outweigh any potential wins in bringing Bugti to Pakistani justice.
15. (C) Comment Cont'd: To state the obvious, the consistent press leaks in the media about American intelligence operations in the U.S. have lots of unexpected consequences. Most obviously, press leaks enabled the highly unpredictable and anti-American Lahore High Court to issue a judgment decrying the presence of U.S. intelligence agents in the Berader case. End Comment. PATTERSON
Friday, 18 December 2009, 11:04
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003037
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/18/2034
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PREF, PK, AF
SUBJECT: BALOCH REQUEST UNHCR FACILITATE MOVEMENT OF
BRAHMDAGH BUGTI TO IRELAND
Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (S/NF) Summary: XXXXXXXXXXXX, who has been designated by UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres as XXXXXXXXXXXX in Pakistan, met with the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission on December 13 to discuss the U.S. Government's position on the possible movement of Baloch leader Brahmdagh Bugti from Afghanistan to a country of asylum. He requested U.S. intervention with Pakistani authorities if UNHCR agrees to facilitate this movement. XXXXXXXXXXXX Brahmdagh's uncle, reportedly told XXXXXXXXXXXX that the Government of Ireland has agreed to offer asylum to Bugti, although UNHCR has not yet confirmed this offer. At the request of UNHCR, the Ambassador agreed to engage President Zardari and have the Embassy follow up with Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to ensure that the GOP would not act against such a transfer or negatively respond to UNHCR's potential involvement. In a subsequent conversation, however, DGI ISI Pasha registered to COS the Pakistan military's opposition to allowing Bugti to obtain refugee status. While getting Bugti out of Afghanistan is still a good idea, we do not believe UNHCR should be involved. End Summary.
2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX met recently with XXXXXXXXXXXX, who sought UNHCR support in facilitating the movement out of Afghanistan of Brahmdagh Bugti, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti's grandson and head of the Baloch Republican Party. XXXXXXXXXXXX reportedly told XXXXXXXXXXXX that the Government of Ireland was willing to receive Brahmdagh Bugti, who "had to get out of Afghanistan and would not be safe returning to Pakistan." XXXXXXXXXXXX also contended that the USG would be supportive of this transfer. (Note: XXXXXXXXXXXX has met with Embassy poloffs several times to float the idea of moving Bugti, sharing with us that Ireland's Deputy Prime Minister is willing to help Bugti gain asylum there. End Note.)
3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX sought a meeting on December 13 with the Ambassador to discuss the USG position on the potential transfer of Bugti, although UNHCR has yet to verify Ireland's willingness to receive him or to make a determination as to whether Bugti is eligible for refugee status. The British Government has previously refused to consider asylum for Bugti. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, while UNHCR believes that moving Bugti from Afghanistan and from close proximity to and influence in Baloch insurgent activity in Pakistan would be in the Pakistani Government's interest, High Commissioner Guterres is concerned that UNHCR's potential involvement in this transfer could have a negative impact on UNHCR's humanitarian access, operations, and security in Pakistan. UNHCR is seeking assurances that the Pakistani Government will not act against such a transfer or penalize UNHCR's potential involvement in it. XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Ambassador that his meeting with XXXXXXXXXXXX and all UNHCR's interaction with Baloch leaders have been carefully monitored by Pakistani intelligence.
4. (C) UNHCR will hold an in-house meeting to be attended by XXXXXXXXXXXX to discuss more generally what to do with regard to the Baloch in Afghanistan. Besides Bugti, there are "a few hundred" Baloch in Kandahar (largely from Dera Bugti), XXXXXXXXXXXX explained. He said that recognizing these Baloch as refugees would be well received by the Pakistani Baloch community - which believes UNHCR has been insufficiently supportive of them despite Baloch assistance in facilitating the release of kidnapped UNHCR Quetta Sub-Office Head John Solecki -- but would not be well-received by the Government of Pakistan.
ISLAMABAD 00003037 002 OF 002
5. (C) The Ambassador told XXXXXXXXXXXX that the USG would be supportive of moving Bugti out of the region but said that UNHCR would need to confirm first Ireland's willingness to grant him asylum. She and XXXXXXXXXXXX both expressed concern about the possible implications of XXXXXXXXXXXX's stipulation that Bugti would need to be able to freely travel outside his country of asylum. The Ambassador agreed to engage President Zardari and have the Embassy follow up with Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to ensure that the GOP would not act against a transfer of Bugti out of Afghanistan or negatively respond to UNHCR's potential involvement.
6. (S/NF) In a subsequent conversation, DG ISI Pasha told COS that he believed Bugti should return to Pakistan to stand trial for his crimes. While declaring that the decision belonged ultimately to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he made clear that the Pakistan military would not favor allowing Bugti to be accorded refugee status. It was also clear from Pasha's comments that efforts on the part of UN agencies to effect Bugti being provided with asylum in Europe would color the Pakistan military's perception of those agencies and would affect their working relationships.
7. (S/NF) Comment: On the basis of Pasha's remarks, we are advising XXXXXXXXXXXX that it would be better for UNHCR not to pursue this initiative with Bugti. End Comment. PATTERSON
Monday, 09 February 2009, 14:56
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000289
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/09/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PK
SUBJECT: ZARDARI'S PLANNED APPROACH TO HOLBROOKE
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (C) Summary. During a February 8 meeting with the Ambassador, President Zardari outlined Pakistan's need for additional assistance, a message that would figure prominently in his meeting with Special Representative Holbrooke. Zardari outlined the steps he would follow to restrict A.Q. Khan (septel) and reported that the Supreme Court would likely declare Nawaz Sharif ineligible to run for the National Assembly. Zardari believes the international community is not adequately supporting Pakistan's internally displaced persons and police programs in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Zardari reiterated again that he and Chief of Army Staff General Kayani get along well, although he said he was very realistic about the power of the army "given our history." Again, Zardari said that he supported stronger ties with India. He also continues to have serious concerns about his personal security. End summary
2. (C) Ambassador called on President Zardari on February 8 to discuss the upcoming visit of Special Representative Holbrooke. Zardari said he would raise with Ambassador Holbrooke Pakistan's commitment to fighting insurgency, which he expected to get much worse when the GOP really engaged the militants. He would also discuss the need for trade access (Reconstruction Opportunity Zone legislation) for Pakistani products and economic assistance. Zardari said he would not dwell on assistance issues, although he was considering some formulations in which he would invest his own funds for development projects in FATA and NWFP. He realized the United States could not easily provide aid given the current economic climate. Still, as the conversation progressed, Zardari was very worried about the lack of international support for the internally displaced persons and for the police/law enforcement in NWFP and FATA. Zardari said several times that the Special Representative's visit provided an opportunity to "reset the agenda" with the United States.
3. (C) Zardari told the Ambassador "not to worry" about his relations with Prime Minister Gilani. Ambassador said she was not worried, but she believed that the Embassy (and many others) had not been paying enough attention to the PM, and we were going to try to rectify that. The PM was lashing out because everyone saw him playing second fiddle to the President. However, as a longstanding political leader and Sufi saint, he served a valuable role in the Pakistan People's Party.
4. (C) Zardari said he had excellent relations with Afghan President Karzai, but was under no illusions about his forthrightness. Zardari said that he was going to work with Karzai, and he did not see any better options in Afghanistan.
5. (C) Zardari was clearer than in previous meetings about his intention to move against Nawaz Sharif and predicted the Supreme Court would declare Nawaz ineligible to run for the National Assembly. Zardari claimed Nawaz had planned to run A.Q. Khan on a Pakistan Muslim League-N slate, so it was better to confront Nawaz sooner rather than later. Zardari said he had been ready to make a deal with Shahbaz Sharif that would provide for a constitutional amendment to increase the retirement age for the justices - presumably bringing back the former chief justice as a justice -- but Shahbaz had been uncooperative. Zardari said he was convinced that Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Kayani would never support Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister.
6. (C) Zardari said he was struggling over who would be named Chairman of the Senate after the Senate elections, now scheduled for March 4. Zardari said the best candidate would be law minister Farouk Naek, but Ambassador asked who would then be Law Minister. "That's the problem," said Zardari, "we don't have enough good people." He said that Information Minister Sherry Rehman "was dying for the job," but the conservative religious party, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, which would still have thirty votes in the Senate, would never vote for a woman as Senate President. Zardari said he was probably going to pick someone from NWFP or FATA so he would have regional balance.
ISLAMABAD 00000289 002 OF 002
7. (C) Zardari said he was going to replace NWFP Governor Ghani soon. He had not done so to date, as picking a replacement brought with it multiple political problems. He suggested Frontier Corps Inspector Major General Tariq Khan. Ambassador tried to discourage that idea, indicating that Khan was desperately needed in the ongoing fight. Zardari was also considering various names for National Security Advisor, including former Ambassador to the UK and the U.S., Maleeha Lodi ("the party doesn't trust her") and retired COAS and Ambassador to the U.S. Jehangir Karamat ("probably too old and, as a former COAS, Kayani would always have to defer to him.")
8. (C) Ambassador saw Zardari at Bilawal House in Karachi. Zardari's father is in poor health and Zardari was reluctant to leave Karachi. The conversation turned to security in the neighborhood and his personal security. Zardari said his vulnerability was one reason it was important to select a competent President of the Senate. (If the president dies or resigns, the President of the Senate would step in as President until the indirect election for President could be held.) Zardari revealed that, if he was assassinated, he had instructed his son Bilawal to name his sister, Faryal Talpur, as President.
9. (C) Bio Note: Embassy officers have been very impressed with Talpur, who is extremely energetic and well respected. Kayani once told the Ambassador that she would be a better president than her brother.) Zardari described his sister as "tough and committed." Her nineteen year old son had committed suicide and her husband, Zardari said, had never really recovered from his son's death. They also had a daughter who had also been emotionally damaged by her brother's death. The Talpurs had then adopted a child from the Afghan refugee camp, but passed the now six-year old off as their own since it was considered "un-Islamic" to adopt in some circles. PATTERSON
Monday, 25 January 2010, 09:33
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000033
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/SRAP, SCA AND NEA/ARP
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/01/25
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, EFIN, AF, IR, YM, AE
SUBJECT: UAE FM DISCUSSES TALIBAN FINANCIAL FLOWS AND REINTEGRATION
WITH AMB. HOLBROOKE AND TREASURY A/S COHEN
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard G. Olson, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (S/NF) Summary: During a January 11 meeting in Abu Dhabi, visiting Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) Amb. Richard Holbrooke discussed Afghan reintegration with UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (AbZ). AbZ noted the importance of establishing an effective and transparent reintegration trust fund that includes Saudi support. Amb. Holbrooke urged the UAE to do more to disrupt Taliban financial flows. AbZ discussed his recent visit to Iran, noting Iran is acting more confident even as the country moves backwards. He added that Pakistani President Zardari had asked the UAE to take in his family in the event of his death. End Summary.
AFGHANISTAN MEETINGS
--------------------
2. (S/NF) Amb. Holbrooke began by thanking AbZ for hosting the well-timed SRAP meeting in Abu Dhabi on January 12. AbZ said he was looking forward to the Gulf participation, including that of the Jordanian Foreign Minister, particularly following the recent attack in Khost. AbZ said Judeh had told him Jordan plans to send more troops to Afghanistan; Amb. Holbrooke said Judeh had made the same point during his recent visit to Washington.
3. (S/NF) Amb. Holbrooke said the decisions on the Afghan reintegration program and the upcoming elections would be the key deliverables for the Abu Dhabi meeting and would pave the way to success in London. AbZ asked what the role of reintegration fund contributors would be, noting that the UAE did not want to be associated with a fund that Afghans would find ineffective, non-transparent or slow. AbZ said funding must go to programs with clear benchmarks that have strong financial and policy oversight. He added that it is "very crucial" Saudi Arabia donate to the fund, for symbolic reasons. Turning to the elections, AbZ suggested a compromise solution, whereby the Afghan government would ask ISAF when it would be ready to support the elections, rather than having any party dictate to President Karzai.
DISRUPTING TALIBAN FINANCE
--------------------------
4. (S/NF) Amb. Holbrooke stressed to AbZ the importance of UAE efforts to combat Taliban financial flows through the UAE. Amb. Holbrooke noted the productive meeting he and Treasury A/S Cohen had with UAE National Security Advisor Sheikh Hazaa bin Zayed earlier on January 12 and the UAE's efforts to crack down on bulk cash smuggling. A/S Cohen added that the USG is most concerned about Dubai's central role in regional financial flows.
5. (S/NF) AbZ asked several questions about USG concerns and the UAE's response, including if Taliban financial flows are regional and/or transiting Dubai, what is the suspected value of these flows, why the USG does not intercepting the funds in Afghanistan, if incoming or outgoing cash declarations would help, and if the USG believed the UAE was not effectively enforcing existing regulations. Amb. Holbrooke and A/S Cohen explained that the USG is concerned that Dubai is being used for the facilitation of the flow of Taliban funds, goods and personnel to and from Afghanistan. The USG is working with Afghanistan and Pakistan, but that the UAE should also take steps to enforce and investigate inbound cash declarations and amend laws to require outbound declarations. A/S Cohen noted that the planned DHS/ICE cash courier training in February would focus on identifing and intercepting likely couriers.
PAKISTAN - ZARDARI CONCERNS
---------------------------
6. (S/NF) AbZ said he had met with Pakistani President Asif Zardari in Dubai in late December and the latter was "in better shape" than AbZ expected. Stressing the sensitivity of the information, AbZ told Amb. Holbrooke that Zardari had asked AbZ to convey a request to UAE President Sheikh Khalifa (AbZ's half-brother) that Zardari's family be allowed to live in the UAE in the event of his death. (Note: The Bhutto family has lived in Dubai for years and in effect this would be a continuation of a commitment late UAE President Sheikh Zayed made to Ali Zulfikar Bhutto. End Note.)
IRAN - AND YEMEN
----------------
7. (S/NF) Turning to his late December trip to Iran, AbZ said it was his first meeting with Ahmedinejad that did not include a cleric (murshid). He interpreted this to mean that Ahmedinejad is now trusted and does not need constant supervision. Noting that Ahmedinejad had cited Western media criticism of Dubai's financial situation as a plot against Dubai, AbZ told Amb. Holbrooke he believes Ahmedinejad is "crazy but well-educated." AbZ said he felt Tehran is going backwards although he was surprised by the number of women "not covered up properly." The Iranians believe that the United States is now preoccupied in Afghanistan and Iraq, which will prevent any US attack on Iran. AbZ said the U.S. message on Iran in the region is "not loud and clear." Many are acting like Iran is already a nuclear power, and Iran sees the United States is not doing anything about it. If Middle East peace was achieved, AbZ said the Iranians would be unable to suggest they are the defenders of the Palestinian cause.
8. (SBU) AbZ said that FM Mottaki was polite and courteous, "for a change" during the December visit. He added that Mottaki called him on January 3 to convey that the U.S. had promised democracy and development in Afghanistan, but the result was more smuggling, narcotics and terrorist acts. Mottaki went on to discuss Yemen, telling AbZ that Saudi and US forces are attacking civilians in Yemen.
9. (SBU) Amb. Holbrooke's office has cleared this cable. OLSON
Friday, 01 February 2008, 13:41
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000483
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/01/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PK
SUBJECT: "THE BEST THING THAT COULD HAPPEN IN PAKISTAN"
REF: LAHORE 25 07 ISLAMABAD 5138
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (C) Summary. During a meeting with Ambassador January 31, Nawaz Sharif confirmed he was ready to work with the Pakistan People's Party in a post-election coalition government and described this union as "the best thing that could happen in Pakistan." He dismissed reports of threats against his life as attempts by the government to dissuade him from campaigning. Noting that emotions remain high in Sindh, he predicted violence if the election was seen as being rigged for Musharraf's party. As proof of his pro-Americanism, Nawaz reminded Ambassador that he had overruled his Chief of Staff to deploy Pakistani forces with the U.S. coalition in the first Gulf War. Nawaz remained firm in his belief that all of the deposed judiciary must be reinstated. End Summary.
2. (C) Ambassador and Polcouns met former Prime Minister and Pakistan Muslim League-N PML-N) leader Nawaz Sharif January 31 for an hour during Nawaz's recent visit to Islamabad. PML-N leader Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan also attended the meeting. Nawaz met with EU ambassadors the same day and urged them to take preemptive action to prevent rigging in the upcoming election.
3. (C) Ambassador noted the reports about threats to Nawaz's security and said we were pleased to have briefed his staff on measures that could be taken to enhance his safety. Nawaz responded that the GOP has said he is "number one on the hit list" of the militants, but he is not convinced. Citing the belief that an IED planted on the road he was to travel to a rally in Peshawar lacked a detonator, Nawaz insisted he had received information from credible sources that the device was planted by security services to go off hours after the rally. This was another attempt at government intimidation to convince him not to campaign. Ambassador cautioned him to remain vigilant as it was clear that militant extremists wanted to disrupt the election.
PML-N/PPP: "the best thing that could happen"
--------------------------------------------
4. (C) In response to Ambassador's question about whether PML-N could work with the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in a possible coalition government, Nawaz recounted how he had immediately gone to the hospital when he heard Benazir Bhutto had been shot, and he had made a special effort to pay a condolence call on Asif Zardari in Larcana. Ambassador said that Zardari had noted his appreciation for this gesture of support. A PML-N/PPP alliance would be "the best thing that could happen to Pakistan," if it materialized, said Nawaz. The PML-N had reached out to the PPP, and time would tell what alliances could be built. They could also work together in the provincial government of Sindh or Punjab. He predicted that the PPP could win enough seats to rule in Sindh with or without the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM).
5. (C) Nawaz expected both PPP and PML-N would do well at the polls if the elections were free and fair; he dismissed the Pakistan Muslim League party, saying that Pervaiz Elahi would get few, if any votes. Claiming he had no vendetta against President Musharraf, Nawaz said the PML-N had also reached out to the Pakistan Muslim League and they in turn had contacted PML-N (Ref A). (Note: He then launched into a long description of his mistreatment after Musharraf overthrew Nawaz in 1999). The PML-N's goal in government would be to reinstate the deposed judiciary and restore the law and order situation. Without restoring the judiciary, Nawaz argued, you cannot restore law and order and rule of law.
6. (C) Ambassador said we continued to support an independent judiciary and wanted to work with the new government on this issue. It was simply too difficult to tackle before elections. We believed there should be a way to restore some of the deposed judges, but not the former Chief Justice. Nawaz insisted that without restoring the Chief Justice, there was no point to filling other slots on the bench. Ambassador disagreed, noting that many of the provincial judges could be restored for the benefit of Pakistan's judiciary.
ISLAMABAD 00000483 002 OF 002
Emotions High
-------------
7. (C) Despite the decreased level of campaigning due to security concerns, Nawaz and Khan both said that voter emotions were higher than they have ever seen. Sindh, in particular, remains very tense, and could erupt if the election outcome is perceived as being rigged. Nawaz noted that civil society and student groups were politicized in ways they have not been before. The PML-N did not want violence, but it might be impossible to control the people if they felt they had been wronged. Nawaz expressed concern that extremists could take advantage of and exacerbate tensions. He warned that what he described as negatively-preceived U.S. support for Musharraf could create a backlash of anti-Americanism, if the public perceives that the government rigged the elections. "We could be sitting on a volcano, and the next four-five weeks will be critical for the region and for Pak-American relations."
8. (C) The best thing America has done recently, said Nawaz, was arrange to have General Kayani named as Chief of Army Staff. This appointment is helping Army morale and raising the level of public respect for the Army. Noting that Musharraf met the UK equivalent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Khan said the U.S. and the UK need to stop treating Musharraf as if he still ran the military. CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon would have met with Musharaf if the President had not been travelling, asserted Khan. Ambassador replied that we had excellent relations with the Pakistani military and meet them all the time at various levels.
We are Pro-American
-------------------
9. (C) Nawaz and Khan both repeatedly said that the PML-N was pro-American. Nawaz recounted his decision to override his Chief of Army Staff and deploy Pakistani troops to Saudi Arabia in support of the U.S. coalition in the first Gulf War. Meanwhile, Khan noted, the PPP and its leaders were organizing street demonstrations against Pakistan joining with the U.S. coalition. Now, Nawaz said, he was hurt that the U.S. did not remember. Nawaz said he understood that 9/11 had changed things, but urged that the U.S. apply some balance to the relationship. In the past, the U.S. was known as the power that rejected dictatorships, that fought for independence of the judiciary and the rule of law. Why, he asked, did we continue to support a man who fired the Supreme Court, abrogated the constitution, and arrested civil society activists?
10. (C) Comment: The fact that a former Prime Minister believes the U.S. could control the appointment of Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff speaks volumes about the myth of American influence here. Based on our understanding of the current situation, we believe Nawaz can and should take the threats to his life seriously. It comes as no surprise that Nawaz exaggerated his party's election prospects; his willingness to deal with the PPP is, however, a good sign he is ready to cooperate on government formation.
PATTERSON
Saturday, 06 February 2010, 11:26
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000301
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/06/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, PK, AF
SUBJECT: CODEL LYNCH'S MEETING WITH PAKISTAN
TEHREEK-E-INSAF (PTI) PARTY LEADER IMRAN KHAN
REF: A. 09 ISLAMABAD 03029 B. ISLAMABAD 00183
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)
1. (C) Summary: On January 29, a congressional delegation led by Representative Stephen Lynch met with Imran Khan, a former professional cricket player who heads the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf ("Law and Justice") party, at Khan's residence in the hills overlooking Rawal Lake on the outskirts of Islamabad. The meeting's picturesque setting belied Khan's often pointed and critical statements on U.S. policy, which he characterized as dangerous and in need of change. His litany of criticisms ranged from accusations of U.S. failure to support democracy in Pakistan to drone operations being a driving force of militancy and radicalization. Khan urged the U.S. to seek out "alternative points of views" because the GOP can not be trusted to give it an accurate assessment of the real terrorist threat in Pakistan. He also called on the U.S. to engage local tribes to deal with the Taliban and other militant forces, and argued that the U.S. will have to scale back its operations in Afghanistan in order to make way for talks. End Summary.
2. (C) A congressional delegation led by Representative Stephen Lynch met with Imran Khan, a former professional cricket player who heads the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, on January 29. Khan welcomed the delegation to his home located on the outskirts of Islamabad in the hills overlooking Rawal Lake. The meeting was held outside on the immaculate lawn of Khan's sizeable home against the backdrop of the foothills of the Himalayas. The picturesque setting, however, lay in stark contrast to the often pointed and critical statements that were later to come from Khan. What was initially scheduled to be a 30-minute courtesy call stretched into an hour-long, largely one-sided, and somewhat uncomfortable conversation, with Khan delivering blunt views on what he considers to be failings of U.S. policy in Pakistan and, by extension, in Afghanistan.
3. (C) Representative Lynch opened the meeting noting that with the Obama administration had come a new opportunity for change in U.S. policy toward Pakistan and for "resetting" the relationship between the two allies. Lynch stated that both of our countries are facing "real challenges" that have been exacerbated by the poor global economy. He acknowledged facing questions from his constituents about why the U.S. sends economic assistance to Pakistan ("With no returns," quipped Khan). However, Lynch said he understood that, though it would take much work and patience, it was important "to help Pakistan stabilize itself." He highlighted the need to build trust between the two countries and to have more dialogue.
4. (C) Lynch then yielded the floor to Khan, who took the opening to begin his litany of objections to the conduct of U.S. policy in Pakistan, which he characterized as being dangerous and in need of change. Khan noted that he had been in opposition to former President Pervez Musharraf's government and that he was now also in opposition to President Asif Ali Zardari's government. He stated that he had initially supported Musharraf because Musharraf had promised to bring "real democracy" to Pakistan. However, in the end, "Musharraf took us all for a ride." He stated that Musharraf was initially popular with the people because they were fed up with former Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, but he lamented that Musharraf ended up bringing back into his government the same individuals who had served under Benazir and Nawaz.
5. (C) Khan charged that former Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte and former Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Richard Boucher endorsed the controversial National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) (reftels) specifically in order to pave the way for Bhutto's return to Pakistan. Khan further argued that there is a common perception that Bhutto decided to run for office under U.S. pressure. Now, "thanks to the NRO, the biggest criminal in the country (i.e., Zardari) has been brought to power," Khan stated. Khan added that U.S. assistance was going to "a known crook" and said the U.S. should not stand with Zardari because "you need a credible partner to deal with our Taliban."
6. (C) Khan went on to chastise the U.S. for repeating with Zardari a key mistake that, he claimed, it had made during Musharraf's government, which was that "it supported the man and not the democratic process." Khan cautioned the U.S. against giving the impression that it is supporting a puppet government in Pakistan, which will only further alienate the people, he added. Khan claimed that evidence of this alienation can be found in the fact that after eight years of U.S. support to Pakistan, 80 percent of Pakistanis believe the U.S. is a greater threat to Pakistan than India is. He insisted the U.S. should always bank on supporting democracy in Pakistan because, ultimately, whatever government comes to power will "want to play ball with the U.S.," as long as it is "sovereign and trustworthy."
7. (C) Lynch told Khan that leadership in Pakistan has been a "moving target," and acknowledged that a lot of hope had been riding on Bhutto's return to power. However, Lynch emphasized that there was never a calculation on the USG's part to support any one leader over another. He added that U.S. policy toward Pakistan, overall, has consistently been driven by the view of Pakistan as a strategic partner.
8. (C) On the current security situation in Pakistan, Khan advised that the USG should use local tribes to deal with Taliban and other militant forces. He said that, in order to be able to work with tribesmen, we have to understand the "tribal character," which, he said, is primarily marked by hospitality and revenge. He denounced the use of aerial bombings and drone operations, arguing that they have created animosity and caused local tribesmen to join militant forces in order to seek revenge. (Note: Khan also pointedly stated that the GOP allows the "drone attacks" to occur, then lies to the Pakistani public that it has no control over them to deflect the public's anger. End Note.) Khan argued that such operations were radicalizing Pakistani youth, not just among the poor but also among the educated, middle classes. Dialogue, policing, and intelligence gathering should be the cornerstone of anti-militancy efforts in the tribal areas instead of the use of military force, Khan contended. Noting that he was recently in Swat, he went on to accuse the Pakistan Army of extrajudicial killings, summary executions, and "sexual humiliation" of residents in some villages.
9. (C) Khan urged the USG to seek "alternative points of views" about what is happening in the tribal areas of Pakistan, and he recommended speaking with General Orakzai, former NWFP Govenor, for starters. Khan charged that the GOP is "blinded by dollars," and consequently lacks an accurate view of what is happening on the ground. He further claimed that the GOP "whips up the threat of the Taliban" in order to get more money from the U.S. He claimed last year's Swat operation, which he termed a "debacle," was one such exaggeration that was "stage managed" in order to gain U.S. funds; there was no imminent threat of militants marching on Islamabad, he said. Khan also claimed that the Lal Masjid operation was similarly stage managed by Musharraf. He called for an end to Pakistan's "insane military action" in the tribal areas, adding that the Army has failed to secure any significant areas of South Waziristan despite GOP statements to the contrary.
10. (C) On current local politics, Khan predicted Pakistan was heading towards mid-term elections. He also claimed that Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was the most popular man in Pakistan at the moment because the people of Pakistan want NRO beneficiaries to be brought to justice. Regarding Afghanistan, Khan argued that a government of consensus is needed in that country, adding that Pakistan can play a credible role there. He asserted that the government in Afghanistan needs to be "perceived as sovereign." He said our mistake in Afghanistan was failing to isolate Al-Qaeda from the Taliban. Khan called on the U.S. to scale back its operations in Afghanistan to make way for talks.
11. (U) This cable was drafted after CODEL Lynch departed Pakistan.
12. (U) Participants
U.S. Representative Stephen Lynch Representative Bob Inglis Representative Todd Platts Representative Betty Sutton Representative Joe Donnelly Scott Lindsay, Professional Staff Member, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee (HOGR) Bruce Fernandez, Professional Staff Member, HOGR Adam Fromm, Professional Staff Member, HOGR DCM Jerry Feierstein
Pakistan Imran Khan, leader of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party PATTERSON
Thursday, 03 April 2008, 12:23
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 001432
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ADDED NOFORN CAPTION
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/25/2018
TAGS PGOV, PK, PREL
SUBJECT: POST REQUESTS FBI RECALL DEROGATORY INFORMATION ON
FAZLUR REHMAN
REF: IIR 4 201 4569 08
Classified By: CDA Peter Bodde, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 2.
2. (S/NF) Post requests FBI recall information about Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI-F) leader Fazlur Rehman noted in Reftel. Reftel indicates that an individual 'Fasil Ul Rehman' believed to be associated with Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) is behind the March 2008 bombing in Islamabad. Reftel then suggests that 'Fasil Ul Rehman' refers to political party leader Fazlur Rehman of the JUI-F. Post requests that FBI recall this information from all hardcopy and database records due to discrepancies and errors in the report.
3. (C) Prominent Pakistan politician Fazlur Rehman is not associated with the JI, but instead leads his own political party, the JUI-F. From 2002-2007 the two parties allied with other religious parties in the coalition Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). However, the JUI-F and JI retained separate leadership structures as well as separate political objectives and methods.
4. (C) Fazlur Rehman's JUI-F is a conservative Deobandi religious party that recently has joined the new Pakistan People's Party (PPP) led government. Rehman, more politician than mullah, has been a prominent and legitimate figure in Pakistani politics since the 1980s. Rehman has publicly denounced terrorist attacks, but prefers to use negotiations rather than military force against militants. Although he is known to have contacts with Taliban and their sympathizers, he has negotiated with religious militants on the government's behalf, garnering him criticism from the more hard-line religious sectors. Rehman also has been a frequent and cooperative interlocutor with Post and professes his support for cooperation with the United States.
5. (C) The JI is a religious party that appeals to a narrow sector of the educated, conservative urban middle class. JI, which has a vibrant student wing, began as a movement for social change based on Sharia. The JI party policy does not support violence as a means to achieve their political agenda, however, the party quietly has supported jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir by providing recruits from their student corps. The party does not support violence perpetuated within Pakistan, such as the recent attack on the restaurant in Islamabad. In addition, 'Fasil Ul Rehman' and 'Fazlur Rehman" are extremely common Pakistani names, making it impossible to accurately identify the individual in Reftel with the prominent JUI-F politician.
BODDE
Wednesday, 17 January 2007, 06:41
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 000256
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/13/2016
TAGS EAID, MOPS, PK, PREL, PTER
SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF TELLS BOUCHER ABOUT PAKISTAN'S PLANS FOR
BORDER SECURITY
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary and introduction: In his January 12 meeting with Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher, Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf spoke of irritants in Pakistan's relationship with Afghanistan and Pakistan's tactical adjustments to enhance security in the border region. Musharraf described tougher procedures for border crossing, selective fencing and mining of the border region, stronger leadership for local police and plans to close Afghan refugee camps. He also underscored that tribal leaders in North Waziristan have been given a month to improve implementation of the September 2006 agreement or face possible military action. Boucher and Lieutenant General Eikenberry briefed the President on their impression of Afghanistan's readiness to face a strong offensive by the Taliban in the spring, noting that President Karzai is a stronger and more confident leader than only a year ago. Boucher reaffirmed U.S. support for Pakistan's development plans for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and offered assistance as the Pakistani and Afghan Jirga Planning Commissions begin to coordinate. Following the 45 minute meeting with the full American delegation reported here, President Musharraf spoke privately for another 45-minutes with Boucher and Ambassador Crocker. End summary.
2. (C) Meeting Participants:
U.S.
Assistant Secretary Richard A. Boucher, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, Commander, Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan Major General Ronald Helmly, Defense Representative to Pakistan Ms. Caitlin Hayden, Senior Advisor, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Embassy notetaker
Pakistan
President Pervez Musharraf Lieutenant General Hamid Javaid, Chief of Staff Additional Secretary Shahid Kamal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Major General Shafqaat Ahmed, Deputy Chief of Staff
Afghanistan -- Rhetoric and Bugti
3. (C) President Musharraf decried the heated rhetoric emanating from Afghan officials over the past month. Public accusations that al Qaeda and Taliban figures are operating in our border regions are perhaps understandable, Musharraf said, but it is completely unacceptable for Afghan officials to accuse the Government of Pakistan and Inter Services Intelligence of collusion with the enemy. Warming to his topic, Musharraf described Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz's January 4 visit to Kabul as a bad meeting, saying that President Karzai bombarded the Pakistani delegation with outlandish accusations that Pakistan seeks to enslave the Afghans to achieve strategic depth. This is nonsense, Musharraf concluded; to the contrary, Pakistan wants good relations with the Afghan government and with all communities in Afghanistan. Pakistani officials and diplomats are under his personnel instructions not to interfere in Afghanistan's affairs. Boucher advised the President that U.S. officials have noted the aggravated level of cross-border rhetoric and have counseled Afghan interlocutors not to air their grievance in public. All must appreciate the need to address issues responsibly and, when appropriate, privately.
4. (C) Musharraf told Boucher that militant Baloch nationalist and fugitive Brahamdagh Bugti remains at large in Afghanistan, enjoying freedom of movement to commute between Kabul and Kandahar, raising money and planning operations against Pakistani security forces. Boucher said that he had raised Bugti's presence in Afghanistan with President Karzai, who offered assurances that nobody would be allowed to use Afghanistan as a staging ground for terrorist attacks on Pakistan. Musharraf had a simple response: "That's bullshit."
Afghanistan -- Channels of Communication
5. (C) Boucher noted the growth in channels of communication between Kabul and Islamabad, commending the exchange of information that occurs within the military Tripartite Commission and in trilateral intelligence channels. He told his Pakistani hosts that Karzai has agreed to support exchanges between Pakistani and Afghan parliamentarians and encouraged the two countries to seek other opportunities to broaden their relationship. The President agreed, but noted that he was disappointed that the agenda for the January 10 Tripartite Commission plenary session did not address the most critical common challenges facing the two countries: cross-border infiltration, repatriating Afghan refugees and closing camps that have become safe havens for extremists.
Afghanistan -- Better Prepared for Spring Offensive
6. (C) Lieutenant General Eikenberry, who was making farewell calls in Islamabad before relinquishing his command on January 21, shared his impressions of the situation in Afghanistan with Musharraf. Eikenberry told Musharraf that, although the we expect the insurgents to launch a strong offensive in the spring, time is not on the Taliban's side. Afghanistan's security forces -- the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police -- are growing in confidence and capacity. President Karzai is a more confident commander-in-chief and chief executive, replacing corrupt and poor-performing officials. Reconstruction assistance is taking root in districts throughout the country. U.S. forces -- which will reach the highest level of strength in Afghanistan in 2007, despite the inactivation of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan -- stand ready to give NATO all necessary support to achieve it mission. The current winter lull is the time, Eikenberry continued, to move forcefully to disrupt Taliban command-and-control. A strike to the Haqqani network -- which controls some Taliban action from Pakistan -- would deal a serious blow to both Taliban operational planning and recruitment. Responding to Musharraf's concern that the mil-mil Tripartite Commission is not addressing issues such as refugee repatriation, Eikenberry offered the opinion that the Tripartite Commission operates best when its participants can deal with each other soldier-to-soldier; cross-border issues carrying significant political baggage are better addressed through other channels.
7. (C) President Musharraf suggested that NATO forces could enhance the effort against the Taliban in southern and south-eastern Afghanistan by actively enlisting the support of local populations, even to the extent of arming village-level militias against Taliban insurgents. Boucher described an invigorated effort to boost support for Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police through auxiliary police units of local residents serving under the Ministry of Interior. President Karzai is also responding to public frustration with poor governance and corruption by cleaning out corrupt and dishonest local officials. The international community is using the winter months to inject new flows of development and economic assistance out to the provinces. Musharraf applauded this effort, saying that the Taliban will eventually lose popularity the more it is seen obstructing the country's reconstruction.
Time to Close Refugee Camps
8. (C) President Musharraf advised Boucher that he and his senior advisors have taken several decisions in recent weeks to improve security along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, including closing at least one of the large camps inhabited by Afghan refugees. These camps have become safe havens for militant elements, Musharraf explained. As extensive collateral casualties would inevitably follow any military operation to separate the militants from the civilian residents, the only solution is to begin closing the camps altogether. Musharraf has tasked his advisors with devising a camp closure plan that incorporates recommendations on where the refugees could be relocated if they choose not to return to Afghanistan. These measure will then be discussed with Afghan and UN officials under the auspices of the refugee Tripartite Commission. We agree with you that the camps should close, Boucher replied, underscoring the urgency of devising a plan and coordinating with Afghanistan and the UN before spring.
Stronger Border Security Measures
9. (C) Stressing that Pakistan understands that it must take firm measure to gain control over its western border, Musharraf reviewed a range of actions already under way. New senior police officials appointed to posts in Balochistan and North West Frontier Province have been personally instructed by the President to crack down on undocumented Afghans and other militant targets. The Ministry of Interior is also in the process of lowering the number of official border crossings in Balochistan from 33 to 6. Enhanced immigrations procedures, including biometric crossing cards, have been introduced at the Chaman border crossing, where 30,000 individuals transit daily. The Army has been ordered to design a plan for selective fencing and mining along the border. Musharraf assured Boucher that Pakistan has long and successful experience with mining along its eastern border, and that extraordinary measures would be implemented to prevent accidental civilian casualties or misappropriation of mines by terrorists. Of course, minefields will not stop terrorism, Musharraf said, but they can help us control the insurgents' movements across the border. Boucher noted that deployment of land mines is a complicated issue that the U.S. and other Coalition partners will want to discuss with Pakistani military planners. President Musharraf acknowledged that, but said that these are "unusual circumstances" and Pakistan will take "unilateral measures" if needed.
Attack on Insurgents Infiltrating from North Waziristan
10. (S) The American delegation briefed the President on the Coalition assault on a massive infiltration of Taliban fighters from North Waziristan on January 10-11. The fighters massed on the Pakistani side of the border before crossing into Afghanistan, where U.S. forces attacked, killing up to 150. Musharraf shared American concern that the enemy could mobilize such a large force during the winter lull, and expressed some frustration that so large a force had been able to collect on Pakistani territory and then cross the border unimpeded. He suggested that this reflected a need for greater aerial surveillance of the area or night-capable helicopter gunships to attack the enemy, indicating his willingness to coordinate with U.S. forces on deploying whatever air assets are necessary to identify and destroy these enemy movements. (Note: The President was specific in calling for reliance on air assets, saying point blank that ground forces are not an option. End note.)
Re-Assessing the North Waziristan Accord
11. (S) Musharraf briefed Boucher on the government's recent review of the September 2006 North Waziristan agreement. Governor Orakzai convened the jirga that negotiated the agreement in December, dispatching the members to Miran Shah to make clear to North Waziristan's tribal leaders that they must take action to prevent cross-border infiltration in support of the Taliban, eliminate foreign fighters from the Agency and stop any effort to establish a parallel political administration. Tribal leaders were given one month to gain control of the situation or the government would consider taking military action. Musharraf refused to be disheartened, saying that it will take time for the accord to take hold. In the interim, the government has stepped up recruitment and training for tribal levies and has assigned a Frontier Corps wing to the Political Agent. This will give the Political Agent the muscle he needs to enforce the writ of state, while the Army will be at hand to take on Taliban and al Qaeda targets.
Pak-Afghan Jirgas
12. (C) Boucher commended Musharraf for naming strong leaders to Pakistan's Jirga Planning Commission, encouraging the Commission to meet soonest with its Afghan counterpart to discuss each country's vision for the process. Noting that he would discuss the jirgas with Interior Minister and Jirga Commission Chair Sherpao later in the day, Boucher told the President that the U.S. stands ready to support the process once Pakistan and Afghanistan determine what assistance will be required.
Federally Administered Tribal Areas Development Assistance
13. (C) Musharraf also spoke plans for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas Secretariat and Development Authority to funnel near-term development assistance through tribal maliks, to strengthen their stature within their tribes. Asking maliks to identify development needs and direct resources will reinforce his authority with the local population, said Musharraf. Boucher replied that the U.S. hopes to offer substantial financial support for the Pakistani's Federally Administered Tribal Areas Sustainable Development Plan.
14. (U) This cable has been cleared by SCA Senior Advisor Caitlin Hayden.
CROCKER
Friday, 21 September 2007, 10:08
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 004085
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/20/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PK
SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF TELLS DEPUTY SECRETARY PAKISTAN IS
COMMITTED TO FIGHT AL QAEDA, TALIBAN
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (C) Summary. During a September 13 meeting with the Deputy Secretary, President Musharraf reiterated his intention, absent intervention by the Chief Justice, to be re-elected before October 15 by the current National and Provincial Assemblies. He explained the nature and required solutions to what he described as the very different threats posed by al Qaeda, the Taliban and extremism. He expressed frustration that the media and some in Washington did not adequately understand the complex realities of these threats and were questioning Pakistan's commitment to combat them. Musharraf supported speedy follow-up to the Peace Jirga by choosing the right people to participate in the sub-jirgas. Musharraf also urged the U.S. not to undermine the agreement to sell Pakistan F-16 aircraft. End Summary.
2. (C) The Deputy Secretary, accompanied by Ambassador, SCA Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher, and S/CT Coordinator Dell Dailey met President Musharraf on September 13. Musharraf congratulated Negroponte on leading a successful second session of the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue (septel). Musharraf outlined his priorities as: (1) on the political front, to smooth the run up to his re-election as president and then complete parliamentary elections; and (2) after the elections, to focus on political reconciliation, good governance, sustaining economic growth and fighting terrorism.
Re-Election Scenario
--------------------
3. (C) Musharraf said that he expected XXXXXXXXXXXX in attempting to disqualify Musharraf as a candidate. He said that he could be re-elected in uniform and before the current assemblies "legally and constitutionally." The only question is whether he will take off his uniform before or after he takes office again. But it would depend on XXXXXXXXXXXX; Musharraf was hoping that he could engage with him in a positive way in terms of the pending cases. Musharraf said the process of the presidential election would require 18 days; to finish by the October 15 deadline, the process must begin at the latest on September 27. Musharraf reiterated that he has the majority of votes required in the current National and Provincial Assemblies, but it cast a "moral" doubt on the election if the opposition resigned en masse.
4. (C) On the deportation of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the Deputy Secretary noted that the administration understood what had happened, but not everyone in the U.S. appreciated the nuances of Pakistani politics. It was important for Musharraf to be as inclusive as possible and ensure elections were free and fair.
5. (C) Musharraf said that after the elections, it would be important to include Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) leader Fazlur Rehman in the governing coalition. Musharraf described him as moderate and pliable. It would be important, especially if the agreement with Bhutto succeeds, to avoid the optics of religious vs. non-religious political groupings, and Rehman can be helpful in splitting the religious parties.
Afghanistan/India
-----------------
6. (C) Negroponte noted the successful trilateral meeting he hosted on September 11 for Pakistan and Afghan Presidential Advisors Tariq Aziz and Rassoul. He said he was encouraged by what he saw as the shifting attitude and lower rhetoric of President Karzai towards Pakistan. He urged that both sides name and organize meetings of the sub-jirga groups that had been agreed at the Peace Jirga.
7. (C) Musharraf said he agreed and will go ahead with selecting Pakistan's group of 25 for the sub-jirga; these should be the "right" people with good influence. But he suggested it would be even better to have a jirga with five to six participants on both sides to lead their fellow tribesmen; Pakistan had raised this idea with Kabul. The most important outcome of the Peace Jirga, according to
ISLAMABAD 00004085 002 OF 003
Musharraf, was the Afghan recognition that they needed to talk to the "opposition," and this would be more successful with a smaller sub-jirga group.
8. (C) Musharraf asked the U.S. to intervene on one issue of real concern--the "deliberate" attempt of Kabul and New Delhi to destabilize Balochistan. He insisted that Pakistan had ample proof that India and Afghanistan were involved in efforts to provide weapons, training and funding for Baloch extremists through Brahamdagh Bugti and Baloch Marri, two Baloch nationalists, who were living in Kabul. "We have letters instructing who to give what weapons to whom." Musharraf said he had raised this with Karzai, who replied "give me time and I will address it." Musharraf said he was still waiting. Assistant Secretary Boucher noted that he had recently raised the issue with Rassoul. Musharraf added "If India wants to continue, let's see what our options will be." Negroponte asked if, after the elections, there was a possibility to move forward on negotiations with India. Musharraf said yes, especially on Kashmir, where the population was getting restless.
FATA: Al Qaeda, Taliban, Extremism Are Different Problems
--------------------------------------------- ------------
9. (C) Negroponte noted that he had just received Embassy Islamabad's briefing on our plans to support the GOP integrated security and development plan for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Musharraf said the GOP strategy was good, but its application would take time and patience. Noting statements by the media and some administration officials, Musharraf said that Pakistan did not need to be told by the U.S. to take more action against terrorism because "we know it is in our own interests." He said he gives this message every day, everywhere to thousands in Pakistan, and they are starting to listen.
10. (C) Musharraf outlined the differing threats of al Qaeda, the Taliban and extremism. These, he asserted, were three distinct issues that too often are confused by the media or "lower-level" U.S. officials who do not understand the complexities of the challenge Pakistan is facing. Al Qaeda is in the mountains, especially in North and South Waziristan and Bajaur, and the GOP is "trying to deal with the locals to get them out." The GOP is telling the locals to avoid the trouble that comes with associating with foreigners, and there has been some success especially in expelling the Uzbeks. Now, Musharraf wants the tribes to expel the Arabs. The strategy is to do selected attacks and follow up with political efforts; here, too, Fazlur Rehman can help. But the mountains absorb lots of troops, so in the short-term, Musharraf has put a brigade in North Waziristan and two more in the settled areas on the FATA border. At some later point, the GOP will move troops into South Waziristan; the goal there was to break Baitullah Mehsud and his organization.
11. (C) Turning to the Taliban, Musharraf said this was a different issue. Pakistan could fight al Qaeda with troops, but the Taliban were being supported by locals opposed to the foreign presence in Afghanistan. Military action against these locals, explained Musharraf, would require "fighting against our own people," and this was very sensitive. So, the GOP was reinforcing the borders and telling the locals they had no right to cross the border. This problem required a combined military, political and administrative solution. On the politics, again, Fazlur Rehman could help. Musharraf speculated, however, that if Washington heard he was meeting with Rehman, he would be accused of aiding and abetting religious extremists. On the administrative/development side, Musharraf said he was reinvigorating the political agent system, building boarding schools that could remove students from extremist influence, and creating jobs in the marble and olive oil industries. Foreign Secretary Khan reiterated Pakistan's concern about including Article 347 and 348 on textiles (cotton trousers) in pending Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ) legislation. Musharraf noted that Pakistan was also expanding and better equipping the Frontier Corps, Levies and Khassadar forces.
12. (C) Musharraf described extremism in Pakistani society as yet another facet of the challenge, and this required
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changing mindsets. He had attacked the problem in several ways. The GOP had increased control over mosques, banning loudspeakers, collection plates, posters and distribution of pro-jihad literature. The police now understood the importance of this activity; there had been a 90 percent success in shutting down these activities. Musharraf said he had banned 23 organizations (some before 9/11), but they keep changing their names so this was a constant challenge. He has had some success on madrassa reform by introducing new curricula and registering 75 percent of madrassas with the government. The GOP has introduced new secular subjects; 70 percent of the registered madrassas have accepted the new program; and some have begun teaching these new secular subjects.
13. (C) Musharraf thanked the U.S. for approving the five-year $750 million plan for FATA projects but said that the projects and ROZs had not yet materialized. Negroponte noted that we were making progress on the ROZ legislation and had actually proposed more than $750 million over five years in assistance. The funding process moves slowly, but the Pakistanis would be seeing results soon. Musharraf replied that the perceptions were different in Pakistan, and said that U.S. statements and the 9/11 Commission legislation showed that the U.S. had doubts about Pakistan's intentions. Why, Musharraf wondered again, did the media and the U.S. believe he was playing a "double game" and not doing enough?
F-16s: Don't Violate Our Deal
-----------------------------
14. (C) In closing, Musharraf said that the Pakistan Air Force was upset over what they felt was the U.S. undermining "by design" the agreement to sell Pakistan F-16s. Musharraf said, "don't violate this deal as it would unnecessarily upset bilateral relations."
15. (U) The Deputy Secretary's staff has cleared this message.
PATTERSON
Friday, 12 February 2010, 12:15
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000182
NOFORN
SIPDIS
S/SRAP FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE
DOHA FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE
EO 12958 DECL: 02/10/2020
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, KTFN, SA, AF, PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AMBASSADOR
HOLBROOKE'S FEBRUARY 15-16 VISIT TO RIYADH
REF: KABUL 500
RIYADH 00000182 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) Ambassador Holbrooke, Embassy Riyadh warmly welcomes you to Saudi Arabia, which, by virtue of its historical and cultural ties to Central Asia; personal relationships between Saudi, Afghani and Pakistani leaders; financial power; and leadership of the Muslim world, can play a central role in implementing the President's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Your visit comes at a time of great potential but great uncertainty: the Saudi-Afghan relationship appears to be warming up, while the traditionally close Saudi-Pakistani relationship has grown increasingly strained. The Saudis are broadly supportive of our approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan, but occasionally express skepticism about our timing or our approach. Your visit provides an opportunity to mine the Saudis' wealth of experience in dealing with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and extremism, and further explore ways to translate our shared goals into action in the unique Saudi context. We have requested meetings with GIP Director Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz, Assistant Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayif, and Prince Turki Al-Faisal during your visit.
2. (C) SAUDI-AFGHAN RELATIONS WARMING: President Karzai's February 2-3 visit to the Kingdom, although richer in symbolism than substance, was a sign that lukewarm Saudi-Afghan relations may finally be warming up. In his official statement at the London Conference, FM Saud announced a $150 million pledge of additional financial support for Afghan reconstruction. He expressed broad Saudi support for reconciliation, adding that they would be willing to assist at the request of President Karzai-- on the condition that the Taliban sever its relationship with Al-Qaeda and cease providing refuge to its leaders. While not as forward leaning as we may have liked, FM Saud's statement put the Saudis on the record and created an opportunity to put reconciliation talks back in motion--eventually. Saudi participation at the Turkish-led regional conference on Afghanistan on January 26 was further evidence of the Saudi commitment to engagement. Karzai's visit showed that the King was ready to deal with Karzai as a legitimate, Muslim head of state. However, the Saudis continue to have concerns about Afghan corruption and believe greater political incorporation of the Pashtun community is essential. Their apparent wish to downplay Karzai's visit--as compared to the Afghans (reftel)--may also indicate the King's desire to keep some distance and maintain his credibility as a potential reconciliation mediator.
3. (S/NF) BUT MEDIATION NOT READY FOR PRIME TIME: Privately, the Saudis tell us it's still "too soon" to be publicly discussing technical and financial aspects of reintegration efforts. GIP Director Prince Muqrin has made clear that his marching orders are to work through intelligence channels only until progress becomes sustainable, at which point foreign ministries will be brought in. In a recent meeting with the Ambassador, Prince Muqrin hinted at but did not provide details about what appears to be significant movement on the Saudi mediation effort, with visits by high-level Taliban and Afghan officials, since the Hajj. We surmise that Muqrin is reluctant to share information because the talks remain delicate and he fears U.S. involvement could derail progress. He has also voiced concern about how to address UNSCR 1267 prohibitions on dealing with various Taliban members.
4. (C) ZARDARI STILL THE PROBLEM IN PAKISTAN: The Saudis generally agree that there is a need to deny terrorists safehavens in Pakistan, but question whether the methods we have outlined will be effective. Despite tense relations with the Zardari government, close military and intelligence cooperation continues between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The Saudis believe opposition leader Nawaz Sharif can play a "great role" in working with tribal chiefs and that "money is better than bullets" in the fight against the Taliban. They have started to fulfill their pledge from the Tokyo donor,s conference (over half of the $700 million pledged has been disbursed) and have expressed a willingness to continue with financial support for a stable Pakistan. Saudi interlocutors stress the importance of remembering that Pakistan remains
RIYADH 00000182 002.2 OF 003
pre-occupied with issues on its Indian border, coloring its ability to deal with the Taliban.
5. (C) IN THE ARMY WE TRUST: The tumultuous democratic process in Pakistan makes the Saudis nervous, and they appear to be looking for "another Musharraf": a strong, forceful leader they know they can trust. In his January meeting with General Jones, the King cited President Zardari as an impediment to denying terrorist safehavens, calling him an "obstacle" and "a rotten head" that was infecting the whole body. He maintained that the Pakistani Army was capable of being a strong partner for the U.S., and opined that U.S. development assistance would rebuild trust. He asserted that that the Army was staying out of Pakistani politics in deference to U.S. wishes, rather than doing what it "should." FM Saud told General Jones that we must reach out to tribal leaders and separate "those we could work with" from "those we must fight." He believed that using the military to fight extremists posed certain dangers, and that the credibility of the army must be maintained. The Saudis were pushing Pakistan's civilian leaders to work together, but "compromise seemed alien to Pakistani politicians."
6. (C) TURKI'S TAKE: During a recent meeting with Ambassador, former GIP Director Prince Turki Al-Faisal called Afghanistan a "puzzle," where establishing trust with Afghan leaders, and recognizing the links between Pakistan and the Taliban, were keys to success. All financial aid to the Afghan government should be conditional: benchmarks must be set for the leadership, and aid must be withheld until these are met. Recent Saudi efforts to assist in Taliban mediation had failed, he said, when "both sides fell short." He described the Taliban leadership as "fractured," and suggested the U.S. and NATO needed to target criminal elements more vociferously and re-focus our attention on capturing Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri. He suggested Saudi Arabia, the U.S., China, Russia, Afghanistan and Pakistan could join forces and share assets in order to capture or kill bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri. This would break the terrorists' "aura of invincibility" and allow the U.S. to "declare victory" and move on.
7. (S/NF) TERRORISM FINANCE: Terrorist funding emanating from Saudi Arabia remains a serious concern. Over the last year, however, Saudi Arabia has made important progress in combating al-Qaida financing emanating from the country. Sensitive reporting indicates that al-Qaida's ability to raise funds has deteriorated substantially, and that it is now in its weakest state since 9/11. The Kingdom is also cooperating more actively than at any previous point to respond to terrorist financing concerns raised by the United States, and to investigate and detain financial facilitators of concern. Nonetheless, sustained engagement is required to maintain the current momentum, particularly in providing the Saudis with specific details and actionable information. Your visit provides another opportunity to welcome the progress Saudi Arabia has made, and reiterate the importance that President Obama and the USG place on curtailing fundraising activity by global terrorist groups in Saudi Arabia, particularly those that undermine the stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
8. (S/NF) TERRORISM FINANCE, CONTINUED: While in the past the KSA stood reluctant to pursue Saudi donors who backed groups that did not directly threaten the Kingdom, the Saudi Ministry of Interior (MOI) has now demonstrated willingness to take action, and has begun to detain individuals involved in funding networks for groups such as Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT), the Taliban, and in some cases even Hamas. Our TF cooperation with the MOI is of utmost strategic importance to U.S. national security as donors in Saudi Arabia continue to constitute a source of funding to Sunni extremist groups worldwide. Available intelligence reflects that the Kingdom remains an important fundraising locale-especially during the Hajj and Ramadan-for the Taliban, LeT, and other terrorist groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The MOI remains almost completely dependent on the CIA to provide analytic support and direction for its counterterrorism operations. As such, our success against terrorist financing in the Kingdom remains directly tied to our ability to provide actionable intelligence to our Saudi counterparts. In order to enhance the USG's ability to influence and direct Saudi efforts to
RIYADH 00000182 003.2 OF 003
disrupt terrorist financing, in 2008 we stood up a Treasury attach office in Embassy Riyadh. This office actively contributes to the daily intelligence sharing process that is led by CIA.
9. (S/NF) TERRORISM FINANCE, CONTINUED: Saudi Arabia has taken increasingly aggressive efforts to disrupt al-Qaida's access to funding from Saudi sources. An example of recent progress by the KSA is the conviction of over 300 people for involvement in terrorism, including some for providing financial support. News reports suggest that appeals may be opened to the media in order to enhance the deterrent effects of such prosecutions. In addition, Assistant Interior Minister for Security Affairs Mohammed bin Nayif stated that the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) deliberately timed its August 19, 2009 press release regarding the arrest of 44 terrorist supporters to deter potential donors from giving money to suspected terrorist groups during Ramadan. Although a great deal of work remains to be done, Mohammed bin Nayif has given his commitment to work with the United States on Taliban finance, and has said that the MOI will arrest individuals involved in Saudi-based Taliban fundraising activities - even if involved in the reconciliation process - when provided with actionable intelligence.
10. (S/NF) IDENTIFYING OPPORTUNITIES: The Saudis have expressed broad support for the President's strategy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, but often balk when asked to designate an SRAP to coordinate policy with the USG and others. In part, this reflects the centralized Saudi decision-making process and the reality that issues related to Afghanistan and Pakistan policy are not delegated, but rather dealt with directly by the King and members of the intelligence community. While the Saudis are hesitant to delegate authority and tend to make only broad-based commitments to high-profile, multilateral initiatives, they appear ready, willing and eager to share their experiences with us and identify greater opportunities for cooperation on a bilateral basis. Your visit provides an opportunity to further explore how we can best translate our shared goals into action in the unique Saudi context.
SMITH
Sunday, 17 May 2009, 16:06
C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 000670
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/17/2019
TAGS PREL, PTER, AF, PK, SA, YM
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ADVISOR HOLBROOKE'S MEETING WITH SAUDI
ASSISTANT INTERIOR MINISTER PRINCE MOHAMMED BIN NAYEF
Classified By: CDA DAVID RUNDELL, 1.4(b),(d)
1. KEY POINTS:
-- (C) Ambassador Richard Holbrooke met in Riyadh May 16 with HRH Prince Mohammed bin Nayef (MbN), Saudi Assistant Minister of the Interior.
-- (C) Holbrooke emphasized that Afghanistan and Pakistan should be treated as a closely inter-related problem. He stressed U.S. desire for stronger cooperation and a common U.S./Saudi approach to Pakistan based on economic assistance, encouraging cooperation between Pakistani political factions, and transforming the Pakistani army to fight a counterinsurgency war.
-- (C) MbN noted the Saudis viewed the Pakistan army as the strongest element for stability in the country. In reply Holbrooke emphasized U.S. support for Pakistan's democracy and said the U.S. opposed a military coup. MbN said he agreed.
-- (C) MbN described Yemen as a dangerous failed state and a growing threat to Saudi Arabia because it attracts Al-Qaeda (AQ), said Yemeni President Saleh is losing control, and outlined a Saudi strategy of co-opting Yemeni tribes with assistance projects.
-- (C) MbN strongly supported President Obama's decision to oppose release of photographs of U.S. detainee interrogations, saying release would provide a boon to AQ, and would be "the favor of their life."
PAKISTAN MUST NOT FAIL
2. (C) Holbrooke thanked the Prince for Saudi Arabia's $700 million pledge at the April 17 Pakistan donors' conference in Japan. He said he had not come to make demands or requests but simply to begin a consultative process. The fact that three U.S. special envoys (Senator Mitchell, Dennis Ross, and now Holbrooke) have visited Saudi Arabia demonstrates the importance President Obama places on U.S./Saudi relations and the Saudi role in the region. Afghanistan and Pakistan were a major problem the new U.S. administration had inherited.
3. (C) Success in Afghanistan was essential for U.S. security as well as security in Europe and the Middle East, Holbrooke continued. The U.S. might be able to live with some degree of instability in Afghanistan, but not with an unstable Pakistan, because of Pakistan's nuclear arms, fragile politics, and relationship with India. He asked if Saudi Arabia shared this conclusion. MbN said "Absolutely," a comment echoed precisely in Holbrooke's subsequent meetings with King Abdullah and Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal (septels). It's clear that Saudi Arabia has a "unique" relationship with Pakistan, Holbrooke said. He noted that over 800,000 Pakistanis live and work in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia was especially important to Nawaz Sharif, the most popular politician in Pakistan. These were reasons why what happened in Pakistan was of direct concern to both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.
4. (C) Holbrooke said the U.S. and Saudi Arabia shared a common purpose on Pakistan but not yet a "common collaboration." The purpose of his visit was thus to begin a dialogue on Pakistan and seek a common policy. Neither the U.S. nor Saudi Arabia could afford to let Pakistan fall apart. There were three important issues to address:
-- Pakistan desperately needs economic assistance; -- Even though the Saudis preferred Nawaz Sharif, Sharif and Zardari need to be persuaded to work together; -- The Pakistan army needs to restructure itself to fight today's war against the Taliban rather than yesterday's war against India.
If Pakistan fell apart, Holbrooke said, the consequences for Saudi Arabia would be "unimaginable," especially if Pakistan's nuclear weapons fell into unfriendly hands. ("God forbid!" interjected the Prince.) "Under your leadership," Holbrooke told the Prince "Saudi Arabia has defeated terror, but if Pakistan falls apart, the result would be catastrophe."
5. (C) Holbrooke said the U.S. wanted to expand the U.S./Saudi relationship concerning Pakistan. Saudi Arabia could do a lot for Pakistan, he added, noting that economic
and social conditions in Pakistan created fertile ground for extremism. Zardari had many faults but he was democratically elected, so the U.S. tries to get him and Sharif to work together. Meanwhile, Holbrooke said, money for the Taliban flows in from the region.
6. (C) MbN said a vacuum in Islamabad would be dangerous. He described Pakistan army Chief of Staff General Kayani as a "decent man" who wanted to restore dignity to the army, and sought consensus support of all the civilian factions. The army was the Saudis' "winning horse," MbN said, but it needed to prepare to fight the current war against terror. Pakistani soldiers needed to be proud of their service, and not hide their identity as soldiers when they were off duty, MbN said. He had told Kayani that Pakistani troops needed to feel they were fighting for Pakistan and not the U.S. The Pakistani army had a "golden opportunity" because now Pakistan faced an external enemy. MbN emphasized that the army was Pakistan's "best bet" for stability. There were 800,000 Pakistanis and over one million Indians living in Saudi Arabia, MbN said, and millions more visited the Kingdom to make the Hajj pilgrimage, so anything that happened in Pakistan, or between Pakistan and India, was a threat to stability in Saudi Arabia.
7. (C) Holbrooke said he knew Kayani, with the Director of Pakistan's intelligence service (ISI), and General Pasha, and also Musharraf. He recalled the U.S. and Saudi Arabia had decided to support Musharraf in the aftermath of 9/11. This had been the right decision at the time but Musharraf had been a disappointment. The U.S. supported democracy in Pakistan, not any individual leader. Holbrooke repeated that the U.S. supported Zardari because he was elected, and emphasized that the U.S. was "100 percent opposed" to a military coup in Pakistan. MbN assured that Saudi Arabia would not support a coup either.
8. (C) He noted the U.S. agreed that corruption in Pakistan was an issue, but the U.S. had decided it was more important to help Pakistan. Attaching onerous conditions to assistance was a mistake, Holbrooke said. Since the U.S. and Saudi Arabia agreed on Pakistan's importance, the question was how to start working together. MbN answered that U.S./Saudi security cooperation should stay as it is, since it had "never been better" despite past tensions. Each side knew its own business best, and the focus should be on obtaining results. MbN characterized Saudi cooperation with U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies as "one team."
9. (C) Holbrooke reiterated that terrorists in Pakistan were not under enough pressure and pressed the point that U.S./Saudi cooperation on Pakistan needed to rise to a higher level. MbN replied that he had asked King Abdullah for permission to maintain a "security channel" with the U.S. to remain open at all times to facilitate information exchange regardless of other issues in bilateral relations. The Prince added that the King despised the corruption he saw in Pakistan and this colored his views toward that country.
"WE HAVE A PROBLEM CALLED YEMEN"
10. (C) Moving to a new subject, the Prince said "We have a problem called Yemen." AQ has found fertile ground there, he said. The geography was similar to Afghanistan, and many Yemenis were more sympathetic to AQ's goals than were the Afghans. Yemen is also closer to AQ targets and recruiting grounds in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had detected a pattern of individuals coming to the Kingdom for Hajj or Umrah and then traveling south to Yemen ("it's only 400 miles," he noted) for training before returning to their home countries. Saudi forces have arrested Egyptians and Algerians, among others, who were attempting to do this.
11. (C) MbN described Yemen as a failed state that is "very, very, extremely dangerous," and required focus. The Huthi tribes were Takfiri and Shi'a "like Hizballah South," he said. This was a threat forming around Saudi Arabia that required action now. The Saudis would like Saleh to be a strong leader, MbN said, but "his vision of Yemen has shrunk to Sana'a," and he was losing control over the rest of the country. Saleh's old advisors were gone and now he relied on his son and other younger men who did not have good connections with the Yemeni tribes. In contrast, Saudi Arabia had good connections with the tribes, MbN said.
12. (C) MbN said the Saudis had established a bilateral council with Yemen that met twice a year to consider assistance projects. The Saudi representatives were the
Crown prince and the oil minister (Note: Crown Prince Sultan has been incapacitated by illness for at least he past year; it is not clear whether the bilateral council has continued to meet in his absence.) Saudi assistance to Yemen was not in the form of cash payments, MbN said, since cash tended to end up in Swiss banks. Instead the Saudis backed projects in the tribal areas of Yemen where AQ was hiding. The idea was that when Yemenis saw the concrete benefits of these projects they would push their leaders to eject the extremists. Saudi Arabia was counting on this strategy, MbN said, to persuade Yemenis to see extremists as criminals rather than heroes. Holbrooke replied that the U.S. understood Saudi concerns about Yemen, and would work with the Saudis to address the problem there.
TERRORISTS STOLE OUR FAITH
13. (C) Turning to another issue, MbN recalled that the day following President Obama's inauguration, White House counterterrorism advisor Brennan had telephoned to assure him the new president was committed to continuing the war on terror. "Terrorists stole the most valuable things we have," said the Prince. "They took our faith and our children and used them to attack us." It had not been easy to see Saudi involvement in 9/11 and other terrorist incidents, he said. AQ was smart in wanting to hit both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. AQ's strategic goal was to hurt the U.S. and to take control of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina.
14. (C) MbN claimed that in 2003 radicals were present in "90 percent" of Saudi mosques. The current Saudi leadership had decided it needed to be on the front lines of the struggle against terrorism, that the task could not be left to the next generation, since AQ gained momentum every time it succeeded. The Saudis realized they could not fight back without public support, he said, and developed a strategy of working with families of suicide bombers and other extremists who had been killed. This approach involved providing support to the families and telling them their sons had been "victims" and not "criminals." This gave the families "a way out" and provided a public relations advantage to the government. "If you stop five but create fifty" new radicals, "that's dumb." MbN said. The Saudis measure their success against extremism by looking at levels of terrorist recruitment the number of successful operations, and they see a growing rejection of extremist violence. The Prince related an anecdote about an anti-terrorist operation in which the officer commanding Interior Ministry forces had discovered his cousin was the leader of the terrorists inside a surrounded building. MbN said he had offered to relieve the officer, but the latter had refused, and had insisted on leading the attack. The officer succeeded in defeating the terrorists while capturing his cousin alive.
15. (C) Saudi Arabia was not yet free of terrorism, MbN said. Thus it remained important to defeat the terrorists on the ground, in the media, and ideologically. The Saudis wanted to do this in cooperation with the U.S., the Prince said. Time was the key, and it was "not in our favor," he added, so "we need to work fast."
16. (C) On terrorist financing, MbN said "We are trying to do our best." Saudi Arabia has millions of visitors, especially during Hajj. The Saudis are making arrests, but are not making this public. Instead, the Saudi goal is to make the public aware that donations could go to the wrong places. MbN said that "if money wants to go" to terrorist causes, "it will go," and that terrorist attacks were inexpensive, "but let's make it harder." Holbrooke asked what the Saudis would do with Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia who financed terrorism. The Prince replied the suspects would be tried in Shari'a courts with Wahhabi judges so that the results of the judicial process could be used to condemn extremist ideology.
A BIG FAVOR TO AL-QAEDA
17. (C) Holbrooke explained that President Obama had decided to oppose release of 2000 photographs of U.S. interrogations of terrorist suspects on grounds of national security, and asked what the Saudi public reaction would be to publication of these photos. MbN responded "You bet!" it would be bad for security, and noted that following publication of the first Abu Ghraib photos, Saudi authorities had arrested 250 individuals trying to leave Saudi Arabia to join extremist groups in Afghanistan. Release of more pictures would give AQ "the favor of their life," said the
Prince. Saudi Arabia had fought very hard to defeat AQ on the Internet, but he couldn,t see how to fight 2000 new photos.
18. (U) Meeting participants
U.S.
Special Advisor Ambassador Richard Holbrooke Barnett Rubin, Senior Advisor David Rundell, Charge d'Affaires Andrew Roth, Embassy Riyadh Edwin Brown, Embassy Riyadh (notetaker) Jeff Smith, Embassy Riyadh
Saudi Arabia
HRH Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, Assistant Minister of the Interior
Major General Dr. Sa'ad al-Jabri, Senior Advisor, Ministry of the Interior
Major General Khalid al-Humaydan ("Abu Ali"), Counterterrorism Advisor, Ministry of the Interior
Brigadier General Ahmed al-Issa, U.S. Liaison, Ministry of the Interior
19. (U) Amb. Holbrooke cleared this telegram. RUNDELL
Thursday, 16 October 2008, 10:16
C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 001541
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/15/2018
TAGS PREL, PTER, SA, PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTANI RELATIONS WITH SAUDIS "STRAINED"
REF: A. (A) ISLAMABAD 3249 B. (B) RIYADH 1510 C. (C) RIYADH 1175 D. (D) ISLAMABAD 2405
Classified By: CDA David Rundell, reasons 1.4 b & d.
1. (C) SAUDIS UNHAPPY WITH ZARDARI: Echoing Pakistani interlocutors in Washington and Islamabad, in an introductory call with PolCouns, Pakistani DCM Sarfraz Khanzada (protect) characterized Saudi-Pakistani relations as "under strain." This was due, he said, to a lack of Saudi confidence in the Zardari government. He cited a sharp reduction in Saudi financial assistance to Pakistan, and said that the Saudis had not provided "a single drop" of oil at the concessionary terms promised last year (refs c & d). Instead, during 2008, the Saudis had provided assistance in the form of a single $300 million check, considerably less than in previous years, but "beggars can't be choosers," he lamented. Khanzada opined that the Saudi government appeared to be "waiting for the Zardari government to fall."
2. (C) NAWAS FAVORED: Khanzada said the Pakistanis are convinced that Saudi King Abdallah would prefer to see Pakistan run by former PM Nawas Sharif, and were cutting back assistance to Pakistan to hasten this eventuality. Nawas "practically lives" in Saudi Arabia, Khanzada declared, claiming that Nawas had even been favored with reserved prayer space in the Prophet's Mosque in Medina. Because Nawas' daughter is married to a grandson of King Fahd, he has "become a member of the Saudi royal family." (Comment: Embassy is not able to confirm whether this is true. End comment.)
3. (C) AFGHAN MEDIATION: Khanzada claimed that the Pakistani government was not directly informed about the Saudi Afghan mediation effort, though they suspected that Nawas had been present, since he was in Mecca at the same time. While the Pakistani government did not oppose such talks in principle, they believe they have little chance of succeeding without U.S. and Pakistani participation.
4. (C) COMMENT: Khanzada's remarks track with reporting from Islamabad and Washington regarding Pakistani concerns about deteriorating relations with the Saudis. While our Saudi interlocutors tend to be less forthcoming, they've made no secret of their reservations regarding Asif Zardari. Nevertheless, officials continue to insist that Saudi Arabia supports efforts to stabilize Pakistan, and we expect that Saudi officials will participate in the next round of meetings of the Friends of Pakistan. End comment. RUNDELL
Monday, 26 October 2009, 13:18
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 001415
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS SA, PK, AF, PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR ON MILITARY OPERATIONS IN
FATA; SAUDI RELATIONS
RIYADH 00001415 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
SUMMARY:
---------
1. (C) During an Oct. 20 courtesy call with the Ambassador, Pakistani Ambassador Umar Khan Alisherzai highlighted the success of recent military operations in Pakistan's tribal areas; lamented strains on the Saudi-Pakistani bilateral relationship; discussed other regional issues affecting Pakistan; and offered his advice on countering extremism in rural tribal regions. End Summary.
WAZIRISTAN: "REASONABLE RESISTANCE, BUT NOT AS MUCH AS WE EXPECTED"
-----------------------------------
2. (C) Alisherzai described the Pakistani military operations in Waziristan as "progressing well," adding that they had encountered "reasonable resistance, but not as much as we expected." The army faced difficult terrain in the region, he continued, but had already killed over 100 militants. Alisherzai described the extremists as a group of "Chechens, Saudis, Uzbeks and others" who had come across the border from Afghanistan and sought refuge with the local population. Although tribal tradition required the Pakistanis to offer them shelter, he explained, "these people turned out to be monsters," and the local population turned against them.
SWAT VALLEY: A SUCCESS STORY?
-----------------------------
3. (C) Alisherzai pointed to the military's advances against the Taliban in the Swat Valley as one example of success in the region. The cooperation of the local people was a decisive factor, as they provided the most effective intelligence to the military after realizing that "the militants were not interested in Islam at all." In addition, the military and police in Swat provided weapons to local tribes. When pressed about conditions in Swat, Alisherzai admitted that the Pakistani military still faced challenges due to their limited resources. He said that 10,000 soldiers had been relocated from the Indian border to Swat and that 100,000 new soldiers were placed there as well. However, Alisherzai was quick to point out that the 100,000 new soldiers were inexperienced.
4. (C) While upbeat that Pakistan's military and civilian leaders were "truly working in tandem for the first time," Alisherzai was disappointed that action was not taken sooner. "All of this would have been easier if done under (former Pakistani President) Musharraf," he concluded.
"WE NEED MORE ARMS, AMMO AND PLANES"
------------------------------------
5. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question about support from CentCom, Alisherzai replied that the U.S. "does a lot for Pakistan." However, it was not enough to fight this problem. All of NATO was fighting the battle in Afghanistan, he complained, while Pakistan alone was standing up to the extremists within its borders. For this reason he insisted that Pakistan needed more material support from the U.S. in the form of "arms, ammo and planes."
REBUILDING OLD RELATIONSHIPS
----------------------------
6. (C) When asked about the Saudi-Pakistani relationship, Alisherzai admitted that it had been strained since Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari's election. Alisherzai blamed the problems on the Saudi perception that Zardari was pro-Iranian and pro-Shia, which made them apprehensive about working with him. "We have been punished by Saudi Arabia because our president talks to the Iranians," Alisherzai lamented. He claimed that his access to Saudi leadership was good, but that he would have to continue to work hard to rebuild Pakistan,s relationship with the SAG. Alisherzai opined
RIYADH 00001415 002.2 OF 002
that the Saudis were more concerned with their own internal problems than with the problems of Pakistan.
IRAN
----
7. (C) Alisherzai accused Russia of "fully supporting the Iranians' nuclear program," adding that all Shia communities in the region supported this program. He described Iranian nuclear ambitions as a move to consolidate domestic political power and stated multiple times, "they will not leave this subject."
INDIA: "WE ARE NOT EXPECTING ANYTHING GOOD"
-------------------------------------------
8. (C) Alisherzai blamed India for helping to train and fund extremist groups fighting against the Government of Pakistan. He said that India also helped support the Taliban in Pakistan, explaining "They (India) will never let a chance to harm Pakistan go." Alisherzai summed up his feelings about India by saying, "We are not expecting anything good from them."
THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM
-----------------------
9. (C) Asked how to stop terrorism and extremism in Pakistan, Alisherzai said that the people living in the tribal areas "don't know the value of life." He blamed this on their lack of education and knowledge of the outside world, and said that they only know fighting and dying. In his view, investment in education and development was the only way to help the tribal areas, and said that years of "bad luck" had redirected development funds from the tribal areas to the urban population centers. He reiterated his support for military operations, but insisted that a program to educate young boys in the region must also be implemented. He noted that this program should be funded by NATO and added, "I am only here today because of my education. Perhaps I would have been Al-Qaeda too, if not for my education."
COMMENT:
--------
10. (C) Alisherzai is from the Kurram Agency, one of the seven tribal agencies that make up the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) along the Afghanistan border. As such, he is able to offer an insider's view of life along the Pakistani-Afghan border. His observation that intelligence and support provided by the local population has been essential to the success of Pakistani military operations is worth noting, as are his suggestions as to how we might counter the growth of extremism in the region. However, his insights about larger regional issues (ie: Iran, India, Saudi Arabia) appear to be much more limited. End comment.
BIOGRAPHIC NOTE
---------------
11. (C) Alisherzai grew up in the FATA bordering the Afghanistan provinces of Khowst and Paktya. His father served in the British military and insisted that his son attend school. Alisherzai says that at the age of five he walked 8km to school everyday. He has six children, all living in the U.S. and all graduates of George Mason University. SMITH
Wednesday, 02 January 2008, 15:50
S E C R E T RIYADH 000007
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2018
TAGS CIA, KGCC, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PK, PREL, PTER, SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE SITUATION IN PAKISTAN
REF: SECSTATE 170928
Classified By: Ambassador Ford Fraker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) SUMMARY. The Ambassador delivered reftel demarche on the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal at a meeting at the Foreign Ministry January 2. Commenting on the current situation in Pakistan, Prince Saud voiced strong support for holding parliamentary elections. He added that a limited postponement of the elections until February is acceptable, taking into account the current situation. He advised that the Pakistanis should be allowed to resolve their internal political differences without overt, external interference. The Foreign Minister described former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif as "a force for stability" and "a man who can speak across party lines even to religious extremists." END SUMMARY.
2. (S) The Ambassador delivered the demarche contained in reftel regarding Benazir Bhutto's assassination to Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal on January 2. Responding to the demarche, Prince Saud characterized Pakistan's current internal situation as "serious and tense," and described the current political environment there as "poisonous." He emphasized the need to maintain stability, noting that the key challenge for President Musharraf is to maintain the unity of the Pakistani armed forces. He voiced strong support for holding planned parliamentary elections, but also said that a limited postponement would be acceptable, given the current situation in the country. Postponing the elections could be "an opportunity for the Pakistanis to talk things out," he said. Prince Saud cautioned that Pakistan must be allowed to resolve its current political crisis internally, without overt, external pressure.
3. (S) Commenting on the Bhutto assasination, Prince Saud observed that he had been afraid of just such an outcome ever since the former Prime Minister had decided to return to Pakistan. He then cautioned that the USG must not be seen publicly to be influencing Pakistan's internal affairs, lest it inadvertently inflame matters by provoking Islamist extremists to further violence. "People talk about the extremists we have here, but I think they are much worse in Pakistan," he commented.
4. (S) The Foreign Minister stated that former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is a force for stability, in his opinion. He called Sharif a leader who can speak across party lines, even to religious extremists who are not usually open to dialogue. In Prince Saud's view, Sharif can play an important role in stabiizing Pakistan.
5. (S) These views stand in marked contrast to those of Saudi Ambassador to the US Adel al-Jubeir. In a December 31 conversation with the DCM, al-Jubeir was highly critical of Sharif, stating in particular that Sharif had violated a promise made to King Abdullah by publicly calling for President Musharraf to step down. Accrding to al-Jubeir, prior to his return to Pakistan, Sharif had promised the King to avoid questioning Musharraf's recent political decisions in public. Jubeir also compared Pakistan's current situation to Saudi Arabia in 2003, when the Kingdom witnessed a violent campaign by terrorists linked to a-Qaeda. He explained that the SAG was able to push back and eventually quell this extremism, in large part by convincing the Kingdom's religious scholars to condemn terrorism strongly. Jubeir expresed the hope that a similar outcome is possible in Pakistan.
6. (S) COMMENT. The contrast between the views of the Foreign Minister and Ambassador al-Jubeir are worth noting, since they probably indicate that the senior levels of the Saudi government are still debating what the Kingdom's Pakistan policy should be in the aftermath of the Bhutto asassination. It is likely that al-Jubeir's views more closely reflect those of King Abdullah, his patron. END COMMENT. FRAKER
Wednesday, 30 July 2008, 14:24
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 001175
SIPDIS
STATE FOR D JNEGROPONTE
DEPT OF ENERGY PASS TO MWILLIAMSON, GPERSON, AND JHART
TREASURY PASS TO A/S CLOWERY
EO 12958 DECL: 07/30/2018
TAGS EPET, PREL, PK, SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI OIL ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN PROCEEDING SLOWLY
Classified By: CDA Michael Gfoeller for reasons 1.4 (b) (c) and (d).
-------
Summary
-------
1. (S) Recent conversations with the Assistant Minister of Petroleum, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance, and the Pakistani Embassy point to one conclusion: the Saudi offer to assist Pakistan by deferring crude oil payments is proceeding slowly. With King Abdullah, Petroleum Minister Naimi, Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal, and Assistant Minister of Petroleum Prince Abdulaziz all out of the country on vacation, absent USG intervention, the proposal is unlikely to advance substantially until September.
-------------------------------
MinPet Unaware of Any Progress
-------------------------------
2. (S) In a July 30 phone call from London, Assistant Minister of Petroleum Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud was surprised to hear we were interested in discussing the Saudi proposal to defer payments for crude sales for Pakistan. He stated he had heard nothing about the proposal since the June 22 oil summit in Jeddah. Abdulaziz, who led the Jeddah summit and holds the international portfolio for the Ministry of Petroleum (MinPet), promised nonetheless to look into progress on the negotiations, and call us again tomorrow.
--------------------------------------
Deal At Least a Month Away? Saudis Reluctant with Crude Prices so High
--------------------------------------
3. (S) In a July 30 meeting with Pakistan Embassy Commercial Counselor Zia Shams, Shams told us, "The deal is not finalized, it is in negotiations." He clarified that Pakistan did not expect to alter its regular schedule of crude oil deliveries from Saudi Arabia, but had requested a deferred payment scheme. He explained Pakistan could have turned to the IMF for assistance, but had hoped terms would be easier working with Saudi Arabia. Shams told us Pakistan had requested the assistance when oil was about $147/barrel, but negotiations still had not concluded. Shams fretted that, "Muslim brotherhood is not what it used to be, these deals have become very commercialized." The Saudi government had explained they could not do a deal with oil prices so high, Shams noted. Saudi Arabia is concerned that if Pakistan were awarded payment concessions, other major developing nations such as India would make similar demands. Shams believes a deal might be concluded if crude prices continue to slide. At the conclusion of the meeting, Shams whispered that he thought a "deal was likely a month away."
4. (S) Shams indicated any encouragement the USG might offer for the proposal would go a long way to see that it was implemented in time to avoid further chaos in Pakistan. Shams told us that the new Pakistani government had been forced to raise gasoline prices by 60 percent and diesel prices (key to the transport sector) by 100 percent since March. The price increases were pushing the population to the limit and fueling extremism, he said.
-----------------------------
MFA Has No Knowledge of Deal
-----------------------------
5. (S) On July 30, the Charge D'Affaires met with Ambassador Khalid Al Jindan, the third ranking diplomat at the MFA, and the Director of Western Affairs. Ambassador Al Jindan had no knowledge of the deal. Nonetheless, he said there was wide agreement within the Saudi government on the need to do everything possible to support Pakistan's internal stability.
RIYADH 00001175 002 OF 002
--------------------------------------------
Ministry of Finance: Deal Still with MinPet
---------------------------------------------
6. (S) Hamad Najashi from the International Relations Office at the Ministry of Finance shed some light on the process for negotiating such oil relief packages. He verified MinPet was the lead negotiator for such programs. Once a relief package was agreed upon, it would be forwarded to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) for financial processing. After researching the issue with counterparts in the international assistance area, he told us the MOF has not seen the Pakistan proposal, because the agreement was not yet concluded.
--------
Comment
--------
7. (S) Prince Abdulaziz's apparent ignorance of any recent developments on the Saudi offer to assist Pakistan suggests there has been no movement since the June 22 Jeddah summit. Prince Abdulaziz would be aware of, if not leading, any negotiations with Pakistan. Taken together with the comments from the MFA's Ambassador Al Jindan, the Pakistani Counselor, and the MOF, it appears the Saudi offer has been shelved until a decline in oil prices make it more palatable for MinPet to implement. The Saudi royal family and senior officials are on vacation now, to be followed by the September Ramadan season. If we see rapid implementation of the offer as critically important to the Pakistan government's stability, it will likely take USG intervention at the highest levels with senior Saudi officials now in Morocco to secure its rapid implementation.
GFOELLER
Sunday, 24 May 2009, 06:23
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001118
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/23/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREF, EAID, MOPS, PHUM, MARR, PREL, PK, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH AMBASSADOR: THEIR TRILATERALS, FRIENDS,
NATO, IDP AID, AND NAWAZ
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b), (d).
1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador, accompanied by EmbOffs, met May 20 with Turkish Ambassador Soysal and other Turkish counterparts. The Turkish Embassy, which has taken on a coordinating role for NATO in Pakistan, advocated greater cooperation with the U.S. vis-a-vis Pakistan. Soysal described Turkey's own trilateral meetings with Afghanistan and Pakistan. He thought the Af-Pak relationship had improved since the February 2008 elections and credited Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi in particular for this "geographic sensitivity." While Turkey hoped their trilaterals would result in cooperative programs, the real objective was increased trust and transparency between the two neighbors. The trilaterals had matured past joint statements; decisions on specific projects needed to be implemented for the meetings to be worthwhile, Soysal said. Encouragingly, the three countries had already conducted a number of joint training on a range of subjects. Soysal agreed that the "Friends of Democratic Pakistan" initiative should not morph into a donors forum, despite the GOP predilection. He believed a strong secretariat, along the lines of a task force model, was needed to ensure the initiative's policy success. NATO could also contribute to Pakistan's development, sponsoring education initiatives and professional exchanges.
2. (C) Summary continued: Turkish President Gul would call President Zardari May 22 to offer an aid package for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Soysal focused on the July/August timeframe, which this year includes Ramadan, suggesting Turkish aid may be more post-emergency. So far, Turkey was the only Muslim country to contribute to this humanitarian crisis, though Soysal hoped next week's Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) would take action. He was frustrated the GOP had no timeline for the offensive in Swat and thought the Army was moving too slowly to initiate operations in the Waziristans before next year. He was not certain Pakistani politics would be so patient and encouraged international missions to push for a non-partisan climate for as long as possible. Most of the responsibility for this, however, rested with Zardari, who needed to employ confidence building measures within his own party and with other parties, especially leading opposition Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). End summary.
3. (S) Turkish Embassy Participants: Ambassador Engin Soysal, DCM Semih Luffu Turgut, Army/Air Attache Colonel Nuri Gayir, Naval Attache Erhan Sensoy, and Second Secretary Ilker Kucukkurt. US Mission Participants: Ambassador Anne Patterson, DCM Jerry Feierstein, RAO Chief John Bennett, Army Attache Scott Taylor, and PolOff Terry Steers-Gonzalez (notetaker).
Their Trilaterals
- - - - - - - - -
4. (C) Soysal described the trilateral meetings by Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan, dating back to April 2007. Those three meetings had been kept relatively "small and focused," he said; each had its own theme -- (1) dialogue, (2) development, and (3) security and intelligence. The next trilateral meeting, date to be determined, will focus on education. Though Soysal admitted the three countries' education systems were quite different, the exchange was meant to build trust and transparency. He emphasized the meeting would be formatted as parallel bilateral discussions rather than true trilats.
5. (C) The GOT had witnessed first-hand a deterioration in the relationship between the Karzai-Musharraf administrations over the first three trilaterals, Soysal revealed. Since Zardari's presidency, he had observed much improved relations, relatively, between the two countries. While President Asif Zardari deserved some recognition for this positive turn, Soysal credited principally Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani and Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi. They both exhibited "geographic sensitivity," he added, playing up their moderate Sufi credentials and raising universal and/or conciliatory themes.
6. (C) Soysal was proud the Turkish-sponsored trilaterals had
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matured beyond joint statements; now, the three countries needed to implement their decisions. There had already been trilateral training opportunities, he added, including on crisis response, counter-narcotics, and public affairs topics. He also mentioned a number of proposals he hoped would materialize soon, including a "joint" community center in Peshawar and a development center in Ankara. He thought the latter would welcome the visits of American experts. Turkey was additionally proposing a trilateral military exercise or war game.
7. (S) Ambassador Patterson briefed Soysal on our own recent trilateral summit. The U.S.-Afghanistan-Pakistan meetings complemented Turkey's process begun years before. President Zardari had performed well in a high-stakes situation. The Ambassador thought President Obama's focus on counter-insurgency, good governance, and overall support had been received well by the Pakistanis. The RAO Chief noted that Turkey's trilateral on Af-Pak intelligence cooperation may have gone better than our own trilateral consultations. The Ambassador highlighted the transit trade agreement and the commitment to increased border controls and cross-border training. Our next trilateral would likely come in October, the Ambassador mentioned.
8. (C) Turkey was receptive to Zardari's suggestion for a regional summit, not just trilateral, to include all of Afghanistan's neighbors, said Soysal. He confirmed the Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan summit set for May 19 had been postponed to May 24. He recommended Pakistan reach out to even more international partners and suggested Pakistani parliamentarians, not just GOP officials, travel abroad to push Pakistan's case. Zardari would address NATO members at a special session in June. Of course, Soysal added, Zardari might demur depending on how the Army offensive was going in Swat.
Friends of Pakistan
- - - - - - - - - -
9. (C) Speaking of the calendar, Soysal turned to the "Friends of Democratic Pakistan" initiative, informing the Ambassador that the GOP aimed for a July ministerial in Istanbul. (Comment: We have conveyed to the Turks our own concerns that there is not sufficient time to prepare for a ministerial in mid-July. We will continue to discuss.) The British would likely propose a Friends summit on the margins of the usual September UN General Assembly session of heads of government, Soysal relayed. U.N. Assistant Secretary General Jean Arnault would arrive in Pakistan on May 21; he had attended the Friends/Donors meeting hosted by Japan in late April. Soysal hoped he, as well as the Ambassador, would encourage the GOP to stand-up a secretariat for "Friends." While the assignment of Foreign Ministry spokesman Abdul Basit as GOP POC was positive, Soysal really advocated a taskforce.
10. (C) The DCM stressed that Friends not morph in to a donors forum, which was the GOP's inclination. Also, membership in the group had expanded and may now be too broad to work as a coherent group, he added. Lastly, it would be up to the GOP to provide the initiative its "strategic vision." The DCM encouraged the Turkish Ambassador to convey similar messages to the GOP. Soysal concurred: "They have to hear from us."
Initiatives for NATO
- - - - - - - - - - -
11. (C) The Turkish Embassy in Islamabad has taken on the task of NATO coordinator, at least on political issues, among members' missions and with the GOP. In that informal role, Soysal recommended a number of joint initiatives and exchanges. He thought members' respective ambassadors to NATO should jointly visit Pakistan soon. He also noted Pakistani journalists and academics were being sent on study tours (similar to our International Visitors Program) to NATO headquarters in Brussels. Soysal welcomed U.S. suggestions on suitable Pakistani candidates for the trips. Lastly, he had recently learned that a number of Pakistani universities conducted model U.N. competitions; he felt his and other NATO members' missions could sponsor such events.
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12. (C) Turkish Ambassador Soysal noted President Obama's recent trip to Turkey had been very positive and hoped for increased coordination between our two countries and embassies on a spectrum of issues and beyond traditional fora. He also noted his government's recent hosting of other Special Representatives to this region.
The IDP Challenge
- - - - - - - - -
13. (C) The Turkish Ambassador complimented the U.S. on its May 19 announcement to provide $110 million in direct assistance to Pakistan's internally displaced (IDPs). He revealed Turkish President Abdullah Gul would call Zardari May 22 to offer a support package as well. He hinted that Turkish aid may be geared to the post-emergency phase in August/September, which would also coincide this year with the holy month of Ramadan. Soysal noted that Turkey would be the first (and so far only) Muslim country to assist Pakistan with this humanitarian crisis; he was perplexed that Saudi Arabia had not ponied up yet. The GOT would encourage, at the least, a strong statement of support by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) summit during the week of May 25 and was hoping other OIC members would kick in contributions, Soysal said.
14. (C) However, it appeared the GOP did not have a clear timeline for the offensive operations in Swat, Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), Soysal complained. He agreed with the Ambassador that the GOP also needed to identify competent civil administrators to enter recently cleared towns. Soysal was also concerned that the Pakistan Army was moving too slowly to clear militants from other districts and the Waziristan Agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). GOP plans were still "broad brush" and may not realistically be implemented, if at all, until the new year, he analyzed. The Ambassador added that 2500 Waziri families had already reportedly fled their homes in anticipation of Army action, but yet, the GOP refused to give international aid organizations access to the nearest settled district of D.I. Khan, forcing families to move north to Peshawar or farther east into Punjab.
Thoughts on Nawaz
- - - - - - - - -
15. (C) Soysal met one-on-one with opposition Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) leader Nawaz Sharif in Lahore the week of May 11. Nawaz understood the seriousness of the situation in Swat, Soysal concluded. He reported that Nawaz stated the Taliban should be "eliminated." Nawaz warned, however, that Pakistan's democracy needed to deliver soon before the public looked again to alternatives; Soysal did not specify whether Nawaz implied the military or the militants as the likely alternates.
16. (C) While tit-for-tat politics would eventually return, Soysal thought the international community should encourage for as long as possible a non-partisan stance by Pakistan's political parties. But Zardari held much of the responsibility for setting the tone, Soysal argued. He should bring all parties into major decision-making, host party leaders for a session of the next "Friends" meeting, and reconcile with factions inside his own Pakistan People's Party (PPP).
17. (C) Comment: This was the first meeting between the two embassies in this format, which parallels a similar dialogue we have with the U.K. High Commission. But with the Turks playing an increasingly high profile, constructive role in Pakistan, we will continue to develop our dialogue and find opportunities to work together in areas of mutual interest. As a moderate, progressive Muslim state featuring relatively stable, democratic governance, Turkey is well-positioned to be a much more positive role model for the Pakistanis and to neutralize somewhat the more negative influence on Pakistani politics and society exercised by Saudi Arabia. End comment.
PATTERSON
Tuesday, 20 November 2007, 16:17
S E C R E T RIYADH 002320
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, SCA, AND P STAFF
EO 12958 DECL: 11/18/2017
TAGS PGOV, PHUM, PK, PREL, PTER, SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE US ON PAKISTANI
PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES MICHAEL GFOELLER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) A ND (D)
1. (S) On November 20, Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the US Adel al-Jubeir invited the Charge d'Affaires and Executive Office Staff Assistant (note taker) to his residence for lunch. During the meal, Ambassador al-Jubeir said that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf arrived in Saudi Arabia, today, November 20, and will meet with King Abdullah, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, and head of the General Intelligence Presidency Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz after he completes Umra in Mecca. He noted that Musharraf will meet with the Foreign Minister and Prince Muqrin first and thereafter see King Abdullah sometime in the evening. "The purpose of these meetings," said al-Jubeir, "is to get a readout of the situation and present our point of view to him."
2. (S) Al-Jubeir denied that Musharraf had come to the Kingdom to meet with exiled former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, although he carefully avoided ruling out such a meeting. Instead, he boldly asserted that, "We in Saudi Arabia are not observers in Pakistan, we are participants." He asserted that the Saudi government (SAG) had offered Sharif a pledge of protection and asylum in the Kingdom after his ouster by Musharraf in return for a promise that he would refrain from political activity for ten years. He added that Sharif had begun to attempt to test the limits of this promise five or six years in his exile. "Sharif broke his promise by conducting political activity while in the Kingdom," al-Jubeir charged. He added that when the SAG had permitted Sharif to travel to London, he first promised the Saudis not to engage in political activity or return to Pakistan, but he then flew to Pakistan from London in a direct violation of his commitment.
3. (S) Al-Jubeir expressed considerable "disappointment" in Sharif's broken pledges to the SAG. He stated very clearly that the SAG has worked directly with Musharraf to have Sharif arrested on his return to Pakistan and immediately deported to the Kingdom. "We told Musharraf that we would receive him back and then keep him here as an 'honored guest'," al-Jubeir said. He added that Prince Muqrin had been the SAG's point man in restraining Sharif. Prince Muqrin was allowed to reveal the terms of Sharif's asylum agreement, he noted. Al-Jubeir made it very clear that the SAG would seek to control Sharif's movements in he future, even suggesting that he would be kept in a state only a little less severe than house arrest.
4. (S) Al-Jubeir added that he sees neither Sharif nor former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto as a viable replacement for Musharraf. "With all his flaws," he said of Musharraf, "he is the only person that you or we have to work with now." He claimed that Sharif would be unable to control the Pushtun-dominated Islamic insurgency in the tribal region near Afghanistan, while Bhutto would prove to be too divisive a figure to rule the country, which he characterized as "very tribal, much like our own country."
5. (S) Al-Jubeir added that for the SAG, stability in Pakistan is an essential strategic matter. Since Pakistan possesses both nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, from the Saudi point of view, the policy choice to be made there boils down to a drastic choice: "We can either support Musharraf and stability, or we can allow bin Laden to get the bomb, "he told the Charge'.
6. (S) Comment: As a senior royal advisor who has worked for King Abdullah for eight years now, al-Jubeir's views generally track very closely with those of the King. It seems likely that King Abdullah, Prince Muqrin, and Prince Saud al-Faisal will offer Musharraf pledges of strong support in their meetings today. We note that the Saudis have an economic hold on Nawaz Sharif, sine he was reportedly the first non-Saudi to receive a special economic development loan from the SAG, with which to develop a business while here in exile. We will report further information on these meetings as it develops. End Comment. GFOELLER
Saturday, 24 January 2009, 12:28
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000155
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/23/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, MAR, MOPS, PK
SUBJECT: CENTCOM GENERAL PETRAEUS MEETS WITH PAKISTAN COAS
KAYANI
Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
Summary: (C) In a January 20 meeting with U.S. CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus, Pakistan Chief of the Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani reiterated his need for support and asked for changes in the Coalition Support Fund process to allow for more rapid reimbursement. Kayani repeated his concerns about Pakistan's IDP situation, which was undermining military operations, and described candidly the deterioration in Swat and his ongoing operations in Bajaur and Mohmand agencies. Kayani repeatedly expressed concern about the inability of the GOP to "hold and build," which General Petraeus described as the "always unsuccessful clear and leave" strategy. Kayani said he was going to exercise restraint with India, but would respond to an Indian attack. General Petraeus raised the likelihood of an alternative shipment route for NATO through central Asia, stressed the continued need for the route through Khyber, and expressed appreciation for increased cooperation on the border with ISAF forces. General Petraeus indicated that he thought increased measures to control population movements would have to be put in place and assured Kayani of his commitment to support Pakistan military development. Petraeus made clear that the Pakistan military needed to focus on the extremists on the western border, instead of the Indian threat. End summary.
1. (C) U.S. CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus, accompanied by the Ambassador, J5 Major General Robert Allardice and POLAD Michael Gfoeller, met with Pakistan Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Kayani on January 20. Kayani was accompanied by his Director General Military Operations, Major General Javed Iqbal, his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Muhammad Mustafa Khan, and his Senior Aide, Brigadier Zubeir.
Musharraf's Situation
---------------------
2. (C) In opening remarks regarding General Kayani,s likely move into the official COAS residence, Kayani observed that former President Musharraf,s situation seemed to be fine, even though he had been concerned earlier about Zardari,s failure to grant amnesty to Musharraf. Kayani observed that amnesty should have been granted immediately when Zardari assumed office, but it seemed as if the situation had settled down and he was no longer as concerned about President Musharraf,s legal situation. (Comment: Former President Musharraf is visiting his family in the U.S. and also undertaking speaking engagements. The construction of Musharraf's house near Islamabad is well advanced, so he may be able to move out of the COAS house in the next few weeks. End Comment)
Coalition Support Funds
-----------------------
3. (C) Kayani spoke candidly about the process of reimbursement of Coalition Support Funds (CSF). He said it was important to avoid the impression that the Pakistan military is "for hire." Still, the military had little incentive to provide the copious documentation, since only 40 percent of the money had been returned to military coffers in the past. Kayani said the money had mostly supported the federal government's budget. The typical breakdown had been about 60 percent to the federal government, 40 percent to the military, but President Zardari had told him recently that the entire amount would be reimbursed to the military. Kayani suggested that the CSF reimbursement amount "mirror" the system used for the UN's reimbursement of peacekeeping expenses or establish a base period and estimate the increase in military activity from that base. Petraeus indicated that he believed that the prospects for the "Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act" also known as the Biden-Lugar legislation, which would provide $1.5 billion for development activities, were positive, and there were plans underway to fund Pakistan,s military needs.
IDPs: Humanitarian and Strategic Issue
--------------------------------------
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4. (C) Kayani explained that his military budget had been flat lined, and therefore had dropped sharply in real terms; military spending now represented only 16 percent of the government's budget. He said the Pakistan military needed basic equipment like helmets, protective gear, and personnel carriers. Kayani was particularly concerned about the status of internally displaced persons (IDPs), who were displaced from their homes by fighting. This was not only a humanitarian problem, but also a strategic one. Kayani said he had no capacity to compensate civilians who had been injured or whose property had been destroyed. "If we don,t do that," Kayani said, "we will lose the battle for public opinion." Kayani said that the provincial government lacks the capacity to help the IDPs. He emphasized the importance of carrying forward the Bajaur operation. Kayani noted that at first he had thought the army "should stay out of politics," but it was increasingly obvious that the military would have to become involved in the IDP situation. Ambassador noted that the international community had also dropped the ball on providing relief for the IDPs and was now rushing to catch up.
Swat Valley
-----------
5. (C) Kayani was clear that the GOP had lost control of the Swat valley. He said the police had no ability to come in after the army to "hold" territory. He recounted that half of the 600 police officers, supposedly from the NWFP's elite police units, destined for Swat had deserted, largely because there was no command structure. Petraeus replied that the U.S. had confronted this same issue in Iraq, describing it as a "clear and leave" strategy, requiring the retaking of the same ground multiple times. Petraeus observed that the police are the most vulnerable, since they are exposed in communities. Petraeus noted that increased measures to control population movements would probably have to be put in place throughout the country, which would require considerable manpower.
Frontier Corps
--------------
6. (C) Petraeus said that the Frontier Corps (FC) was working well with Special Operations Forces, largely because of the leadership of the Frontier Corps Inspector General Major General Tariq Khan. Petraeus noted that the 11th Corps Chief of Staff Brigadier Amir was less cooperative with U.S. forces, and Kayani took note of that. Kayani said he had concentrated on improving the Frontier Corps and brought salaries and rations on a par with the regular army. He had also extended to the FC a benefit package for the families of those killed in the line of duty. Kayani added that FC successes in combat had understandably increased morale. Kayani mused about the "glorification of terrorism" (particularly the pictures of dead combatants in the press) and said Pakistan needed press laws similar to those in the UK.
7. (C) Kayani and Petraeus agreed that some of the civilian/military projects, which had been impeded at the 11th Corps, needed to be speeded up. Petraeus had given instructions that Special Operations Forces would be deployed regularly and constantly, and the U.S. "needed to move their soldiers in here, so they could engage productively with the FC."
Pakistan/India
--------------
8. (C) Petraeus said the most important threat to Pakistan was on the western border and internally. Terrorists were an existential threat to Pakistan. Kayani agreed. However, Kayani observed that he had postponed a missile test. The Indians, he said, in contrast, had conducted one just a few hours before. Kayani said he had no intention to resume missile testing as long as the current tensions persisted. He promised to be transparent with allies about his plans and had briefed us about his move of 6000 troops to the Indian border. Kayani said he was determined to exercise restraint in his actions with India. He recounted that he had taken no
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action the evening that Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee had supposedly called President Zardari and threatened to declare war. Kayani asked to be alerted if the U.S. had any warning of another attack - he understood that the Indians had been warned about the Mumbai attack. He mentioned that discussion of the consequences of a follow-on attack made both India and Pakistan hostage to extremists and increased the likelihood of an attack. "If there is any clue about another attack," he said, "please share it with us."
Next Steps
----------
9. (C) Kayani returned to the issue of CSF at the conclusion of the conversation, saying that he hoped to have the May CSF submission soon, but we needed to develop a simpler way of handling CSF claims. Petraeus said he would look at options quickly. Kayani and Petraeus agreed that progress had been made on the Border Coordination centers and that additional communications capacity needed to be added. Petraeus pressed Kayani on moving forward with setting up the additional facilities inside of Pakistan.
10. (C) Petraeus said he was looking forward to welcoming Kayani to Tampa during his February 2009 counterpart visit. Kayani said he hoped, after consultation with the Prime Minister and the President, to bring a roadmap for consideration by U.S. officials.
11. (U) This cable has been cleared by CENTCOM. PATTERSON
Wednesday, 07 October 2009, 13:31
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002427
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/06/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH KAYANI AND PASHA ABOUT
KERRY-LUGAR
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary: Ambassador heard a number of complaints about the Kerry-Lugar bill from COAS General Kayani and DGISI Pasha in a two-hour meeting October 6. These focused on the history of Pressler sanctions, particularly a fear that the waiver in Kerry-Lugar would not be used and aid would be suspended. There were several clauses in the bill, such as an American assessment of civilian control over military promotions and the chain of command, that rankled COAS Kayani. DGISI Pasha said Kayani was receiving criticism on the bill from the Corps Commanders. Ambassador emphasized the bill's long-term commitment to Pakistan and made three points: provisions of the bill could be waived; the bill only requires certifications and "assessments;" and the bill does not apply to the large amounts in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund or Coalition Support Fund but only, so far, to non-appropriated Foreign Military Financing. Pasha and Kayani repeated that the Army had taken huge steps this year in its bilateral cooperation with the US and in its campaign in Swat and Bajaur and was getting little public (or private) credit from the US for these historic steps. Kayani said he was considering a statement on the bill, but he was struggling with what to say. He realized that Senator Kerry and Vice President Biden, the original sponsor of the bill, were among Pakistan,s best friends. He predicted the parliamentary debate would be tough, but in the final analysis the government controlled the agenda. Kayani said the language in the bill could undermine political support for the Army's anti-terrorist effort.
2. (S) Kayani said the Pakmil was going into Waziristan in force in two-four weeks. (It is not entirely clear what this meant.) He said Zardari had advised against it for political reasons and wanted to wait until spring. (Ambassador will follow up with Zardari.) Kayani said he had met with PMLN Punjab Chief Minister Shabaz Sharif and PMLN opposition leader Chaudrey Nisar in a much publicized "clandestine8 meeting solely to bring them on board for the Waziristan operation, not to discuss politics.
3. (S) Kayani said we should talk to President Zardari about moving forward the back-channel with India, starting with the provisions agreed to in 2006. Kayani did not have a problem but thought Zardari was unwilling to take it on at this time.
4. (S) Kayani said the most important element for the US in Afghanistan, and for Pakistan, was a &perception of winning.8 There was no incentive for either reintegration or reconciliation without it.
5. (S) DGISI Pasha said that he wanted to convey to Washington agencies that he had been to Oman and Iran to follow up on reports which he received in Washington about a terrorist attack on India. He also had been in touch with the Israelis about information about attacks against Israeli targets in India. His intelligence counterparts in Oman and Iran did not know anything so far but were on alert. Pasha indicated he was willing to meet with his Indian counterpart at any time. End Summary.
6. (S) Ambassador called on General Kayani late evening October 6 to discuss the Kerry-Lugar bill. (Kayani had spoken to Chairman Mullen and General McChrystal earlier in the day.) DGISI Pasha joined most of the two-hour meeting. General Kayani said there were elements in the bill that would set back the bilateral relationship, and critical provisions were almost entirely directed against the Army. Both he and Pasha claimed the bill refused to recognize the enormous progress which had been made bilaterally with the US military and against terrorism within Pakistan: he was particularly irritated at the assessment required on civilian control of the military since he had no intention of taking over the government. "If I had wanted to do this, I would have done it during the long march.8
7. (S) Pasha, who is usually more emotional than Kayani, said the bill had caused a negative reaction among the Corps Commanders and younger officers. Pasha said they could not figure out why these "conditions" on assistance had been raised now when the anti-terrorist efforts had improved so
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much. The &conditions8 were much tougher now than in previous legislation, despite the different situation on the ground.
8. (S) Ambassador said there were no conditions on the assistance, only a requirement for certifications and assessments. We saw the bill as a major victory since it represented a long-term commitment to Pakistan's development. The bill had a provision for waivers, which in her judgment would be exercised if necessary. Kayani replied that the Pressler amendment had a waiver, too, but President Bush had refused to sign it.
9. (S) But most importantly, the Ambassador said, the provisions in the bill did not affect &real8 money going to the security forces: it did not apply to the FY 09 Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund, nor to the FY 10 Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund. (There is a waivable condition in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund FY 10 that the funds cannot be used for F16s). The provisions do not apply to Coalition Support Funds; and Kerry-Lugar would only apply to Foreign Military Financing funds not yet appropriated. Kayani said he understood that, just as he understood that the amount of funding available to the Pakistani military had increased very substantially under the new Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund.
10. (S) Kayani said the Corps Commanders would press him to make a statement about the bill during their October 7 meeting: he had been struggling with how to handle this. He said he recognized and appreciated that Vice President Biden, the original sponsor of the bill, and Senator Kerry were great friends of Pakistan. Ambassador said any negative statements would affect Pakistan,s improving relations with our Congress. Ambassador noted that the Prime Minister had told her that the parliamentary debate on Kerry-Lugar would run for a few days, but it would not result in a vote. The government had defended the Kerry-Lugar bill very aggressively in recent days. Kayani thought the government would have a harder time in the assembly than the Prime Minister had predicted, but he agreed that the government could prevent a vote. Kayani had recommended the government bring the issue before the national assembly, it would enable the government to say it had been "informed" by the debate.
11. (S) DGISI Pasha asked Ambassador to convey to Washington that he had followed up on threat information that an attack would be launched against India between September-November. He had been in direct touch with the Israelis on possible threats against Israeli targets in India. He had also gone to Muscat and Tehran to engage those intelligence services on threats, and they were alerted and working with Pakistan. He reminded Ambassador that information about an attack on India had come his way and he had asked CIA to convey it to the Indians through CIA channels. (Further details about these cases available in other channels.) He said he would meet his Indian counterpart any time, noting that it was critically important that any threat information be shared with him. He emphasized that ISI was doing everything possible to reduce the possibility of an attack on India.
12. (S) Ambassador asked about the likelihood for restarting the back-channel with India, noting that we had received a good readout from former Foreign Minister Kasuri, who was enthusiastic about the appointment of former Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan as the back-channel negotiator. Kayani said that Ambassador should talk to Zardari about restarting the back-channel where it "left off:" he was not sure that Zardari was quite willing to wade into these political waters yet. Kayani and Pasha both said that they wanted this channel to succeed, and Kayani expressed his confidence in Riaz Khan's integrity and intelligence.
13. (S) Kayani said the military was going to move into Waziristan in two-four weeks, although President Zardari had wanted him to delay. (We will discuss this with Zardari.) He had met with PMLN Chief Minister of the Punjab Shabaz Sharif and with PMLN opposition leader Chaudrey Nisar to obtain their support for the Waziristan operation, not for political reasons. (Note: This outreach appears to have been successful. In a recent meeting with PolCouns, Shahbaz
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stated that the Waziristan operation was critical and needed to move forward immediately. End Note.)
14. (S) Kayani went over some of the discussion he had had with General McChrystal about counter-insurgency but said that the most important issue in Afghanistan was the "perception that the US was winning." There was no chance for reintegration or reconciliation unless this took place. PATTERSON
Tuesday, 07 March 2006, 15:10
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 003705
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/07/2016
TAGS EFIN, PK, PREL, PTER, KTFN
SUBJECT: POST REQUESTS TWO WEEK DELAY IN JUD DESIGNATION
REF: A. A. MAIER - QUINN EMAIL MAIL 06 MARCH 06 B. B. LAMBERT - ENGLEKEN EMAIL 21 FEB 06
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) After reviewing the time line presented in ref A and B for moving forward with the UN 1267 and domestic terrorism finance designation of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) as an alter-ego of current terrorism finance designee Lashkar-e-Tayyba (LeT), Ambassador requests a two-week delay in pre-notificaion, presentation to the UN 1267 Committee and in the domestic designation. Post's preferred timeline is:
-- pre-notification: no earlier than 30 March -- request to UN 1267 Committee: no earlier than 15 April -- domestic action: no earlier than 15 April
2. (S) Post's reasoning for requesting this delay is based solely on force-protection considerations. DAC-PAK personnel will continue flying helicopter sorties in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Pakistan-administered Kashmir (AJK) until the end of March; ground support personnel will be deployed in Muzaffarabad, AJK as long as the helicopters are flying. By the end of the first week of April, U.S. military personnel will have redeployed from NWFP and AJK to the Islamabad area, awaiting onward tranport out of Pakistan. In order not to increase the risk to our military personnel as they conclude their successful mission to Pakistan, post recommends that no action on the JuD designation be taken until all DAC-PAK operations have concluded and DAC personnel are in the Islamabad area. CROCKER
Monday, 27 November 2006, 09:55
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 022174
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/25/2016
TAGS AF, EFIN, PK, PREL, PTER, KTFN, UN
SUBJECT: TERROR FINANCE: EMBASSY PRESSES GOP ON UN 1267
COMMITTEE CASES
REF: ISLAMABAD 22000
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: As noted in Ref A, post has raised the ongoing operations of two UN 1267 Committee-designated entities -- Al Rashid Trust, Al Akhtar Trust and Lashkar-e-Tayyba/Jamaat ud-Dawa (LeT/JuD) -- with contacts throughout the Government of Pakistan (GOP). While the Ambassador has pressed the issue with the Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor, emboffs have engaged the MFA's UN Directorate and the Information Ministry. The GOP has responded by reviewing its procedures to disseminate information on the prohibitions that accompany UN 1267 designation to ensure that broadcasters and print media are aware that they should decline requests to purchase advertising space. No GOP official, however, has committed to taking direct action to close the operations of these entities. In addition to raising the issue with GOP officials, post has also shared open source reports of these entities fund-raising activities with like-minded missions in the Islamabad diplomatic community, as well as with the visiting UNSC Counterterrorism Executive Directorate delegation. End summary.
2. (C) In a November 17 meeting, the Ambassador presented Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan with open source material detailing Al Rashid's television solicitations for Zakat donations, a website highlighting federal Minister of Information Durrani's participation in an Al Akhtar Trust Ramadan event, and a press report on the declaration of the Ministry of Defense Parliamentary Secretary that he was proud to be a member of LeT and that he seeks to extend support to jihadi organizations when they seek his "cooperation." Each of these reports is disturbing in itself, the Ambassador said, as they seriously damage Pakistan's image in the international community. These incidents point to a more fundamental question: is the GOP is committed to implementing the sanctions that follow a UN 1267 Committee designation?
3. (S) While the Foreign Secretary recognized the detrimental consequences of the news reports of these incidents, he cited Al Rashid's pending challenge to the GOP's implementation of 1267 sanctions (freezing accounts, closing offices, etc.) as an impediment to more active government intervention. The Ambassador emphasized that this series of incidents could lead reasonable observers to conclude that the GOP is not serious about its UN 1267 obligations; he urged the GOP to take immediate and definitive steps against the designated entities. The Ambassador concluded by stating that without strong public action by the GOP, the U.S. will be forced to formally bring these incidents to the attention of the UN 1267 Committee. (Note: In an aside, the Foreign Secretary asked the Ambassador whether the U.S, has evidence linking JuD to terrorist activity. The Ambassador replied affirmatively, noting that the USG has shared such information with GOP intelligence agencies. The Ambassador also advised the Foreign Secretary that there is a growing concern in the USG about LeT/JuD support to the insurgency in Afghanistan. End note.)
4. (C) A week later, in a November 24 meeting with National Security Advisor Tariq Aziz, the Ambassador presented the same points, supported by copies of the open source reports. (Note: This package of open source material included a
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November 20 report of a full page Al Akhtar advertisement in a Karachi Urdu-language paper solicit donations of meat for the poor during the coming Eid-al-Adha holiday. End note.) The Ambassador reported that he had also raised the issue with the Foreign Secretary, but was not certain that the gravity of these UN 1267 Committee violations had registered with the MFA. The Ambassador observed that the bilateral relationship would not be helped if the U.S. is forced to formally notify the UN 1267 Committee of Pakistan's lax implementation of its international obligations. NSA Aziz agreed that the GOP wished to avoid a formal referral to the UN 1267 committee, expressing serious concern over the broadcast and publication of the Al Akhtar and Al Rashid zakat solicitations and particular irritation over the remarks by the Parliamentary Secretary for Defense. While saying that the GOP cannot close down the accounts and operations of JuD, as the entity is not yet the subject of a 1267 designation, Aziz agreed that there is no similar impediment to taking firm action against designees Al Akhtar and Al Rashid Trusts. Aziz promised the Ambassador that he would pursue the matter within the GOP interagency.
5. (C) Complementing the Ambassador's outreach, Public Affairs Counselor and econoff have raised the issue of 1267 designees' published and broadcast fund-raising solicitations with the Information Secretary and with the MFA Spokesperson and Director General (UN). The Information Secretary pleaded ignorance that UN 1267 sanctions applied to broadcast and print media; once the matter was brought to his attention by the Embassy, he said that he ordered the Information Ministry to advise all state-affiliated media outlets that they must not/not to accept advertising or public service solicitations from any of the 1267 designees. (Note: According to the MFA, a similar effort to reach private media outlets is said to be underway by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority. End note.) Tasneem Aslam, the MFA spokesperson and UN Director General, reaffirmed the GOP's commitment to honoring its UN obligations, but noted that a way must be found to "rehabilitate" designated entities, as their charitable and humanitarian activities are a vital part of Pakistani society.
6. (C) The Ambassador discussed the recent spate of public reports on 1267 designee solicitations with Ambassador Ruperez, who led the UNSC Counterterrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) delegation on a November 17-24 mission to assess Pakistan's commitment to combat terrorism. PolCouns also privately briefed the senior legal advisor on USG concerns over the continued operation of these entities in Pakistan. PolCouns has also shared the open source reports of the 1267-designated entities with like-minded colleagues in the diplomatic community whose Embassies' also engage the GOP on terror finance issues.
7. (SBU) Post's efforts have not gone unnoticed: the November 25 edition of the English-language "The Pakistan Post" carried a front-page article with the headline "Banned Outfits' Ads Annoy US." The article said that the Interior Ministry has instructed relevant government departments "to create awareness" within the press that media should not accept advertising by organization designated by the UN. The Pakistan Post says that the Interior Ministry's report notes that "our each and every paper is monitored by the U.S. State Department that (sic) has a separate section to monitor Urdu newspapers." The Post article also reviews alleged U.S. efforts to include JuD in the LeT 1267 designation, a campaign the paper describes as stymied after China demanded
ISLAMABAD 00022174 003 OF 003
evidence that JuD is connected to terror finance activities. (Note: The Post's story coincided with banner headlines describing dozens of new bilateral Pak-Chinese initiatives announced during Chinese President Hu's November 23-26 state visit to Pakistan. End note.)
8. (C) Comment: Emboffs will continue to engage GOP officials and contacts in the press, financial community, political parties and the diplomatic community to raise awareness and generate multiple points of pressure to demand that the GOP take firm action to terminate the operations of 1267-designated entities. Post recommends reassessing GOP progress on this issue in late December, with an eye to formal notification to the UN 1267 Committee in early 2007 if the GOP response is unsatisfactory. End comment. CROCKER
Friday, 28 November 2008, 12:01
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 003716
EO 12958 DECL: 11/28/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, IN, UK, PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN REACTIONS TO TERROR IN MUMBAI
Classified By: Gerald Feierstein, CDA, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (S) Summary. President Zardari, PM Gilani and FM Qureshi have made all the right public statements condemning the November 27-28 militant attacks in Mumbai; Gilani has agreed to an Indian request and is sending ISI Chief MG Pasha to India to participate in the investigation. Interior Minister Malik told Charge that Zardari is meeting with appropriate cabinet members November 28 to discuss further possible GOP reaction, and NSA Durrani forwarded via Charge a message to NSA Hadley focusing on the need to jointly fight militants that threaten both Pakistan and India. The UK Embassy in Islamabad advises they have reporting that confirms involvement of Lashkar-e-Taiba, which reportedly plans additional attacks in India. The UK High Commission is suggesting to London that they press the GOP for quick, credible action in the form of arrests of LeT leaders to prevent a feared Indian backlash. The UK believes that New Delhi will be pressed politically to respond, at a minimum with increased proxy action in Balochistan, and at a maximum with attacks on LeT training camps in Kashmir. The UK is seeking to coordinate its message with the U.S. and notes that FM Miliband will see the Secretary on December 1.
2. (S) Post notes there is as yet no direct evidence of GOP involvement in the attack, although the press is reporting that India has captured at least one militant of Pakistani origin. We believe the UK here is overreacting but agree a coordinated message urging concrete GOP action against LeT would be welcome. If the militant plan was to ensure that the Pakistan Army would not shift troops from the eastern border to the tribal areas, the horrific Mumbai attacks may have succeeded. End Summary.
3. (C) President Asif Zardari and PM Gilani both condemned the Mumbai attacks on November 27. Zardari called Congress leader Sonia Ghandi and termed the killing of innocent people a "detestable act" and asked her to convey his grief and sorrow to the people of India and to the families of those who had lost their loved ones. Gilani called PM Manmohan Singh and said "I and the people of Pakistan want to share the pain of the people of India and its government" and called for concerted efforts to make the region a peaceful place. FM Qureshi, who was in India to inaugurate the fifth round of the Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue, noted that he had offered to set up hot lines between the two intelligence chiefs to strengthen their joint anti-terror mechanism. He warned, however, against jumping to conclusions and pointing fingers regarding responsibility.
4. (C) Pakistan's National Security Advisor Mahmud Durrani called Charge November 28 and asked that the following points be passed to Washington:
-- Pakistan is extremely sorry about the events that have transpired in Mumbai; -- This is a threat that both India and Pakistan are facing together and they need to fight it together; -- President Zardari spoke to Manmohan Singh this morning (he spoke to Sonia Gandhi yesterday)' -- Prime Minister Gilani also spoke to the Indian PM; -- The Indians have asked the GOP to send ISI officers to India to participate in the investigation; the GOP has agreed; -- India and Pakistan need to avoid being dragged into the militant's agenda.
5. (C) Charge spoke with Interior Minister Rehman Malik, who reported that Zardari was convening a meeting November 28 to discuss the Pakistani reaction to the Mumbai attacks; Malik promised a readout of the meeting. the Pakistani press carried FM Mukherjee's November 28 press conference in which he followed up on PM Singh's comments about a "foreign" hand to say there was prima facie evidence of involvement by Pakistanis in the attacks. Later the press reported that the GOA has one attacker of Pakistani origin in custody. The press also confirmed that Gilani accepted the Indian request to participate in the investigation and is sending ISI Chief MG Pasha to India (date still uncertain) to lead the Pakistani delegation.
6. (S) British High Commission officials in Islamabad told Polcouns November 28 that HMG has evidence the attacks in Mumbai were carried out by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which was planning more attacks. The UK officials noted that after the attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, the GOI halted the Composite Dialogue, but this time speculated they will feel the need to respond with force rather than diplomacy. They fear a response could include, at a minimum, increase GOI covert activities in Balochistan or even an aerial bombardment of LeT camps in Azad, Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). The UK mission here is proposing that Foreign Secretary Miliband call Zardari and Qureshi and their Chief of Defence Staff call Kayani with the message that Pakistan must act now to take proactive steps to "rescue" the Indo-Pak relationship, suggesting that Islamabad should act before New Delhi demands more. The UK mission is suggesting to London that the UK call for credible actions, perhaps to include arresting senior LeT leaders and "permanently closing down the infrastructure of the militancy." The UK is seeking to coordinate its message closely with the U.S. and notes that Miliband is due to see the Secretary on December 1.
7. (S) Polcouns noted that, as yet, there was no evidence linking a presumed LeT attack to ISI or the GOP. The UK Polcouns agreed they had no smoking gun but, nevertheless, believed that the pressure on India to react strongly would be impossible politically to avoid. He admitted that UK concern was being driven in part by the presence of up to half a million UK citizens living in AJK.
8. (U) Pakistani media reacted predictably with denials of Pakistani involvement and demands for proof before accusations were made. Dawn TV, echoing the print media, highlighted statements issued by the President and the Prime Minister that "both countries are victims and must join together to combat a common enemy," and that "the two countries must not fall into the trap of the militants." Zardari is reported to have told Singh that he recognized he was the first to call him after the Marriott hotel attack in Islamabad. Dawn reports officials saying "the blame game must not begin," but its own commentators say the blame game is underway. Local print media November 28 mostly reported the event in straight stories with editorials condemning both the attacks and Indian accusations. Some speculated the attacks were meant to undermine Zardari's outreach to India and juxtaposed the attacks against modest progress in the Composite Dialogue meetings on counter terrorism issues.
9. (S) Comment: For now, we believe the UK Embassy here is overreacting but agree it would be helpful if the GOP could get out ahead of the New Delhi reaction and take proactive measures against LeT leaders.
10. (S) If the militant's plan was to force the Pakistani Army to re-focus on its eastern border and eliminate any chance (however slight) of moving forces from the Indian border to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), then their plan may have succeeded. The Mumbai attacks likely torpedoed any prospect of Indian CBMs on Kashmir in the immediate future. The decision to send ISI MG Pasha to India, however, is a good sign that both sides are trying to prevent these horrific attacks from undermine all the progress made on bilateral rapprochement.
FEIERSTEIN
NNNN
End Cable Text
Thursday, 31 July 2008, 12:09
C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 002586
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/31/2018
TAGS PGOV, PK, PREL, PTER
SUBJECT: EMBASSY LEGAL ATTACHE NAMED IN CASE INVOLVING
ALLEGED BAGRAM DETAINEE
Classified By: CDA Frank Archibald, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: Islamabad attorney Javed Jaffrey filed a habeas corpus petition July 29 on behalf of Dr. Aafia Siddiqui, a Pakistani national who allegedly has been held and mistreated at the Bagram Theater Internment Facility since 2004. The court July 30 ordered Interior Ministry Secretary Shah to report on her alleged detention on September 9. End summary.
2. (C) Islamabad attorney Javed Iqbal Jaffery (who also represents Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khan) filed a habeas corpus petition with the Islamabad High Court (IHC) July 29 on behalf of Aafia Siddiqui a Pakistani national. There have been a spate of press reports about Siddiqui following a July 6 press conference in which UK journalist Yvonne Ridley accused the U.S. of holding and perhaps torturing an unnamed woman in solitary confinement since 2004 at the Bagram Theater Internment Facility. The IHC ordered Interior Ministry Secretary Kamal Shah to report on Siddique's status, but for now the court exempted the other respondents, who include the Embassy's Legal Attach, President Musharraf, and former President Farooq Ahmad Leghari. The IHC adjourned the case until September 9.
3. (C) According to press reports, Jaffrey claims in the petition that U.S. operatives kidnapped Dr. Aafia Siddiqui, with her three children, in 2004 as part of an al Qaeda hunt. It also charged that the U.S. moved her to the Bagram Theater Internment Facility with the help of Pakistani authorities. Jaffrey also petitioned the IHC to ask the respondents whether Siddiqui had been killed in detention. If she is alive, Jaffrey wants her presented before the Court and given compensation for the illegal detention.
4. (C) On July 19 the Senate Functional Committee on Human Rights called on the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to address the issue of any detained Pakistani women in Bagram or Guantanamo Bay. Previously the MFA had denied knowledge of the alleged detention of any Pakistani woman.
5. (C) Comment: It is unclear who is paying Jaffrey and/or orchestrating this campaign on Siddiqui's behalf. Siddiqui has family living in Karachi and noted politicians, including Imran Khan, continue their vocal support for her cause. Bagram officials have assured us that they have not been holding Siddiqui for the last four years, as has been alleged. End comment.
ARCHIBALD
Tuesday, 02 December 2008, 15:09
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003044
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/02/2018
TAGS PGOV, PTER, PHUM, PREL, PINR, KDEM, KISL, PK, IN
SUBJECT: MUMBAI ATTACKS UPDATE: DIPLOMATS IN DELHI DELIVER
UNITED MESSAGES
REF: A. NEW DELHI 3025 B. NEW DELHI 3024 C. NEW DELHI 3018 D. MUMBAI 550
Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary: Diplomatic missions in Delhi have agreed to offer a more sympathetic message to the Indians rather than pound on the government for its massive intelligence failure. Evidence that Pakistani-based extremist group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) was the culprit is still not out in the open, although the question being asked now is whether Pakistan's Intelligence Agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was directly involved in the attack. Dipomatic missions in Delhi are praising Delhi for its restraint while advising Pakistan that now is the time to collaborate. End Summary.
Offering Only Sympathy and Support
----------------------------------
2. (C) At a 2 December meeting with counterparts from the Australian, British, Canadian, and New Zealand High Commissions, these diplomats communicated details of the controlled approach their respective missions in Delhi have taken in their responses to India's reaction to the Mumbai attacks. They concluded that any offers of assistance should be made carefully to avoid being interpreted by the Indians as politically motivated or attempts to monitor their actions. Delhi-based missions are taking extra care at this stage to not get sucked into the blame game Pakistan and India are currently playing.
3. (C) The EU (diplomatic mission heads) are scheduled for a strategic dialogue with India on 5 December to discuss what type of support India would feel comfortable receiving; in addition, the EU plans to send to Delhi a counter-terrorism coordinator in January.
4. (C) The French Ambassador, according to the British High Commission, called the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors (unbeknownst to other EU partners) to discuss assistance to the Indians. President Sarkozy is expected to call Prime Minister Singh to express his sympathy and to offer cooperation at a suitable level.
5. (SBU) The Australian Prime Minister in his speech to his parliament said Australia "stands with India at this time" and offered any assistance that their "friends" in New Delhi may require. He stressed the importance of tracking down those responsible for the planning and execution of the Mumbai attacks, singling out LeT as an separatist militant group which has been a threat to India for a long time, but saying it is too early to speculate on who the perpetrators were.
The Million Dollar Question
---------------------------
6. (C) While Indian press continues to pin blame on Pakistan, observers and diplomats in Delhi are asking the same question: was the ISI behind the Mumbai attacks? While there are clear links between the attacks' perpetrators and the extremist group LeT, and likewise, there are links between LeT and the ISI, there is no clear evidence yet to suggest that ISI directed or facilitated the attacks, according to the British High Commission.
Demarching the Indians and Pakistanis
-------------------------------------
7. (C) A British diplomat told us that UK Foreign Secretary Miliband urged restraint to External Affairs Minister
NEW DELHI 00003044 002 OF 002
Mukherjee when they spoke on 1 December. The call took place only after many delays on the GOI's part. Mukherjee apparently disavowed any interest in raising tensions further, but insisted that Pakistan must take action in response to India,s demands. Our contact stressed that the UK had been very direct in presenting India and Pakistan with specific information regarding those responsible for the attacks. She also noted that the list of names the Indians had put on the "Most Wanted Criminals List" that had been passed to Islamabad included figures such as fugitive crime lord Dawood Ibrahim and Jaish-e-Mohammed Chief Maulana Azhar, who had been on prior lists the Indians had submitted. In her view, this took away from the focus on LeT members implicated in the Mumbai attacks.
8. (C) Narayanan, according to British diplomats, delivered the message that he understands Pakistan's civilian government has no control over the ISI or the army. He said India is not blaming the Pakistani government. The Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is still waiting on the Pakistanis to provide the name of the ISI Director they plan to send as well as a date.
9. (C) The Australian High Commission delivered the message to the Pakistanis that this is a watershed and cooperation with the Indians now is crucial. The Australians have praised the Indians for the past restraint they have shown toward Pakistan and offered assistance, which was "politely denied", according to an Australian diplomat.
Zardari Cornered
----------------
10. (C) An official in the Pakistani High Commission in Delhi told Poloff that he held the Indian press responsible for any deterioration in the Indo-Pak relationship. Following the Indian press coverage which misrepresented the potential visit of the ISI Chief and complicated potential cooperation between the two governments, this diplomat said Zardari's options became more limited and the GOP felt it had no other choice than to backpedal on its initial offer, made before the Mumbai attacks, to send its ISI Chief to India. MULFORD
Friday, 12 February 2010, 13:05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000345
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/06/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, PREF, EAID, PK
SUBJECT: WIDESPREAD CONDEMNATION OF DR. AAFIA SIDDIQUI,S
GUILTY VERDICT
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)
1. (U) Summary: The guilty verdict against Dr. Aafia Siddiqui in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of NY sparked protests and public condemnation across Pakistan on February 4 and 5. The reaction to the Siddiqui verdict was front-page news in all the major newspapers. A number of press articles condemned the U.S. and blamed the verdict on anti-Muslim bias. Criticism was also directed at the Government of Pakistan (GOP) for failing to do more to secure the return of Siddiqui and for its allegedly muted response to the verdict. The Pakistani Government promised to do all that was necessary to secure her release and return her to Pakistan, including providing further legal assistance. The Afghan Taliban issued a statement threatening to execute a captured U.S. soldier if Siddiqui was not released. During a meeting with the DCM and POLOFF on February 8, a group of moderate Muslim religious leaders expressed dismay at the verdict and requested that President Obama step in and release Siddiqui. End Summary.
2. (C) The guilty verdict against Dr. Aafia Siddiqui has sparked public protests and condemnation of the U.S. The response to the verdict has resurrected familiar allegations that Dr. Siddiqui was kidnapped by Pakistani intelligence agencies and the FBI, unlawfully detained by the U.S. in Afghanistan, and physically and mentally abused by American soldiers. (Note: Shortly after Siddiqui was arrested by Afghan authorities in 2008, Ambassador and POLCON met with HRCP Chairman Asma Jehangir who speculated that Siddiqui may have been held by ISI since the time of her disappearance in 2003. Jehangir aslo specualted that she could have gone underground which would also explain her absence from 2003 to 2008. End Note) A number of newspaper articles have criticized the U.S. as anti-Muslim and a violator of human rights, accused the Pakistani government of kowtowing to the U.S., and called on Pakistan to end its cooperation with the USG in fighting terrorism.
3. (U) Senior government officials expressed disappointment at the verdict and declared that they would provide further legal assistance to Siddiqui for her appeal. According to the newspaper "Dawn," presidential spokesman Farhatullah Babar said that President Zardari was "concerned about the verdict and expressed the hope that justice will ultimately be done as the case passes through the subsequent stages in the U.S. judicial system." Foreign Ministry spokesman Abdul Basit said that the government was dismayed over the unexpected verdict and that its main objective was to ensure Siddiqui,s return to Pakistan. On February 9, Prime Minister Syed Yousef Raza Gilani met with Siddiqui,s mother and sister and confirmed that "the Pakistani government will continue to extend diplomatic, legal and moral support to Siddiqui," according to the "Dawn" newspaper.
4. (U) Both the government and the NGO community spoke out against the verdict. In addition to the USG, much of the anger was directed at the GOP for its failure to secure Siddiqui,s release. Protests were held in various cities and towns across Pakistan. Jamaat-e-Islam (JI) women activists demonstrated outside the party,s headquarters in Mansoora. In Islamabad, Pakistan,s Professional Forum (PPF), along with other civil society groups, staged a protest against Siddiqui,s "illegal detention." These protestors claimed that only Pakistani courts had jurisdiction over this case and accused the government of not doing enough to secure her release. On February 5, the Punjab Provincial Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution expressing solidarity with Siddiqui and her family and called on the federal government to provide all diplomatic and legal support to her case. The Lahore High Court Bar Association (LHCBA) passed a resolution "condemning the decision and the indifferent attitude of the Pakistani Government,, towards the case." Supreme Court Bar Association Secretary Raja Zulqarnain also criticized the verdict and repeated similar accusations that the U.S., rather than a champion of human rights, was a violator of human rights.
5. (U) The Afghan Taliban demanded Siddiqui,s release and
ISLAMABAD 00000345 002 OF 002
threatened to execute a U.S. soldier they are holding. In a statement to a local Pakistani paper, "The News," an Afghan Taliban spokesman claimed that Siddiqui,s family had approached the Afghan Taliban seeking their support in pressuring the USG. In Karachi, Siddiqui,s family held a press conference in which they called on the GOP to pressure the USG by shutting down the supply routes for NATO troops in Afghanistan. Appearing on TV talk shows on February 4, Siddiqui,s mother and sister repeated claims that Siddiqui is innocent and is in poor health due to the suffering she has endured throughout her ordeal. They accused the GOP of "doing nothing" and requested that the government pressure the USG to release her.
6. (SBU) During a meeting with DCM and POLOFFs on February 8, a group of moderate Muslim religious leaders expressed very strong feelings about the Siddiqui case and the guilty verdict. The religious leaders were unified in their belief that Siddiqui did not receive a fair trial and called for mercy on the grounds that she was a woman. They claimed that the verdict detracted from President Obama,s efforts to reach out to the Muslim community and that he should step in and release Siddiqui as a show of good faith towards the world,s Muslims. The US Embassy representatives pushed back noting that Siddiqui had receieved a fair trail in the U.S., was given every opportunity to present evidence in her own defense, and was convicted by a jury. Moreover, Siddiqui has the right to appeal her conviction. Nevertheless, the Pakastani participants were assured that their views and concerns would be communicated to Washington.
7. (SBU) Comment: The Siddiqui case has from its outset elicited a strong, emotional response among the Pakistani public, and has regularly been raised with us by senior Pakistani officials. Many Pakistanis were undoubtedly taken by surprise by the verdict as one-sided media coverage of the case reported only her defense and not the prosecution's case, leading local observers to conclude her acquital was a near certainty. We expect this issue to persist for some time as a nationalistic cause with the active involvement of the JI who never tire of anti-American agitation. PATTERSON
Wednesday, 29 October 2008, 13:28
C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 003418
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/29/2018
TAGS PGOV, PK, PTER, PREL, TFIN, ETRD
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CONVOKED OVER U.S. ATTACKS
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b), (d).
1. (C) Summary: On October 29, Pakistani Acting Foreign Secretary Khalid Babar convoked Ambassador to raise several recent hot-button issues. In response to a Pakistani Senate resolution, Secretary Babar raised protests against alleged U.S. attacks inside Pakistani territory. He reiterated MFA requests to repatriate Aafia Siddiqi and pushed back on pending 1267 cases. The protests were largely pro forma but the meeting is already being reported in Pakistani press as MFA's "strong protest" against U.S. violations of sovereignty. End Summary.
2. (C) On October 27, the Pakistani Senate passed a resolution strongly condemning alleged attacks by U.S. drones in Pakistani territory. The Senators called upon the GOP to convey this protest to U.S. and NATO/ISAF authorities. In response, Acting Foreign Minister Khalid Babar convoked Ambassador to register their ongoing complaints. Babar repeated previous GOP statements condemning the violation of territorial integrity and also reiterated that such attacks undermine political solutions in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Ambassador noted the ongoing and successful military cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan.
3. (C) Babar also raised concern about Dr. Aafia Siddiqi's repatriation and the whereabouts of her two young children. Ambassador made it clear that U.S. authorities do not know the whereabouts of the children, who have never been in U.S. custody, and noted that the Pakistani Embassy has been given full consular access to Siddiqi. Babar was aware that Siddiqi is currently being assessed for mental fitness to stand trial in the U.S., but noted that the MFA had been required to report to the Islamabad High Court on a case demanding that the GOP repatriate Siddiqi.
4. (C) Babar lastly raised the issue of 1267 case statements, particularly four new cases including that of former Director General of ISI Hamid Gul. Babar requested that the case statements include more verifiable evidence so that the GOP would not block them. He suggested that more intelligence sharing early in the process would expedite these cases and highlighted cases regarding terrorism financing where technical evidence might be shared. Additionally, he suggested that the cases be disaggregated to allow the easy one to go forward faster. By submitting the 1267 cases in a block, the GOP refuses them in a block as well even if some would pass independently.
5. (C) Comment: Despite the MFA's media statement, Babar delivered his concerns in a pro forma manner. We have told the MFA repeatedly that there currently is no legal basis to repatriate Siddiqi, and we have no idea on the location of her other two children.
PATTERSON
Thursday, 13 November 2008, 11:34
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003586
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/13/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, MOPS, EAID, PK
SUBJECT: GILANI TO CODEL SNOWE: HELP US HIT TARGETS
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b), (d).
1. (C) Summary: Codel Snowe met November 11 with Pakistan's Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani. Gilani thanked the USG for its support in helping transition the country to a full democracy and congratulated the U.S. on its recent election. Gilani reiterated that the struggle against extremism was "Pakistan's war," which had claimed many more Pakistani lives than those of all NATO troops combined. He requested more intelligence sharing from the USG, arguing that the Pakistan Army would then hit the targets. U.S. drone attacks were counterproductive in winning the public's support, Gilani argued. Terrorist acts were also hurting the country's economy and driving away international investments. Gilani claimed good relations with neighbor Afghanistan but complained about the lack of GOA cooperation on a biometric border control system. Gilani made specific requests for gunship and heavy-lift helicopters, night-vision equipment, bullet-proof vehicles, and real-time satellite information. End summary.
A Closer Relationship
- - - - - - - - - - -
2. (C) The Ambassador, U.S. Senators Olympia Snowe (R-ME) and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), as well as Congressional Staff Eric Pelofsky and John Maguire met November 11 with PM Yousuf Gilani, Defense Minister Ahmed Mukhtar, Interior Advisor Rehman Malik and National Security Advisor Ambassador Mahmud Ali Durrani.
3. (C) PM Gilani thanked the U.S. Senate for its support of his country's democracy. He credited the USG for Pakistan's relative free and fair elections on February 18. Pakistan's women had taken on increased leadership roles throughout the new federal and provincial governments, he claimed. Gilani recounted his two meetings with President Bush this past summer and noted that he has also met with candidate (now President-Elect) Barack Obama. He extended congratulations on the recent U.S. elections. Gilani looked forward to a closer relationship with the U.S., ranging from intelligence sharing to educational exchanges.
4. (C) Gilani pressed the USG to share all credible, actionable threat information; "we will hit the targets ourselves," he promised. Gilani added that drone strikes not only violated Pakistani sovereignty, but also fed anti-U.S. sentiment, making harder his own public case that the struggle against extremists was "Pakistan's war." Instead, there was popular pressure on elected officials like himself to forcefully respond to alleged U.S. border incursions, which were "an embarrassment" for the GOP. The "trust gap" should be filled with joint actions, he argued, and, while he might be criticized for such bilateral cooperation, he believed he could effectively convince the public that those targeted were responsible for Benazir Bhutto's assassination and the killing of innocents at schools, shopping centers and police stations.
5. (C) Gilani stated, "we have the will but not the capacity." He claimed the GOP was seeing success in separating militants from the tribals and in supporting local militias (lashkars). The police, Frontier Constabulary and Frontier Corps should be given personnel carriers, weapons, bullet-proof jackets, and training, Gilani urged. The Army, Gilani continued, needed real-time satellite information, gunship and heavy-lift helicopters, and night-vision equipment.
6. (C) "What more proof do you need from us that we are allies against terrorism?," Gilani asked; after all, Pakistan had lost more soldiers (and civilians) than coalition countries combined, he claimed. Pakistan had also taken an economic hit because of its front-line status in the war on terror. International investment had dried up and domestic capital was being transferred out, he worried. He did thank, however, the "Friends of Pakistan" for their support for an international financing program.
7. (C) Senator Snowe reiterated USG support for Pakistan's return to democracy and noted the degree to which Pakistanis had suffered in the war on terror. Pakistan was a "key
ISLAMABAD 00003586 002 OF 002
ally," she added, and both countries must agree on a "common approach to our common enemy." A new U.S. administration was an opportunity for a "reassessment of our joint strategy." Snowe also noted the high opinion in the U.S. and within the USG for Pakistan's new civilian administration, the Army's Kayani, and Inter-Services Intelligence's (ISI) Pasha, and pointed to the establishment of border coordination centers as positive developments.
Afghanistan
- - - - - -
8. (C) "A stable Afghanistan is in Pakistan's interests," Gilani said. He had reached out to Afghanistan's President Karzai (as well as India's PM Singh) in his first days in office, against the advice of his Foreign Ministry, he noted, which wanted the neighbors to visit here first. All sides needed to "get past petty matters" in order to tackle the terrorism "destroying us all."
9. (C) Pakistan supported the Paris Donors' Conference to aid Afghanistan and was moving forward with bilateral talks and jirgas. Gilani noted the continued strain of 3.5 million Afghan refugees inside his country. He complained, however, that Afghanistan had only one border checkpoint to every 10 of Pakistan's. Also, the GOA had not agreed to biometric-based controls at the border crossings.
10. (C) Gilani asked the U.S. to release to GOP custody Dr. Aafia Siddiqui, a Pakistani arrested in and deported from Afghanistan on charges of assaulting a U.S. law enforcement officer. Gilani argued that the needs of her family and reports of her being ill provided humanitarian grounds for such a transfer. He also argued that her case whipped up mass popular support, diverting his government's attention from the counterterrorism mission.
11. (U) Codel Snowe did not clear this cable.
PATTERSON
Monday, 01 December 2008, 11:04
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003733
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR MGN01 MUMBAI TASK FORCE
EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN: MUMBAI SITUATION UPDATE
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (C) Ambassador has returned and will see Chief of Army Staff General Kayani at 3 pm local time. Zardari is unavailable for meetings today.
2. (C) UK PM Gordon Brown is trying to call President Zardari today.
3. (C) NSA Durrani advised DCM that Zardari is meeting this evening with all of the Pakistani military chiefs to bring them up to date on the Mumbai reaction. Given recent disconnects between civilian and military leaders, this is a welcome step.
4. (U) PM Gilani has called for an All Parties Conference on December 2 to discuss Indo-Pak relations in the wake of the Mumbai attacks. Invitees will include Zardari, NSA Durrani, Interior Minister Malik, Foreign Secretary Bashir, and political party leaders plus representatives from the Azad, Jammu and Kashmir Assembly. Gilani plans a press conference after the meeting.
5. (U) Gilaini has canceled his planned trip to Hong Kong today. It is not clear if either Zardari or Gilani will attend the planned tripartite meeting in Ankara with President Karzai on December 5.
6. (U) The press announced that the President, PM and Chief of Army Staff had agreed on a three-pronged policy to handle the situation:
--foster domestic political unity --plead Pakistan's case and clarify Pakistan's position (nfi) to the world --continue doing business with India at various levels
7. (C) Post continues to monitor GOP military activities. COAS Kayani told Ambassador December 1 that the Pakistani military has not increased is alert levels, but we have reporting indicating they are taking some measures to increase readiness. We have no/no indications it has moved any troops to the Indian border.
8. (S) We received a readout from the UK Embassy on their meetings/calls over the weekend. High Commissioner Brinkley and UK COS met President Zardari on Sunday, November 30; during the meeting FM Miliband called Zardari. UK passed the same Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) info to Zardari that they previously had passed to ISI.
9. (S) Zardari's response was positive; he said ISI had to follow up and this was an opportunity. He criticized the Indians for statements that pushed Islamabad to make a defensive response and "made my job harder." Zardari said he thought it was not possible that terrorists could have launched attack boats from Karachi and the operation could not have been implemented without insider help from Indians.
10. (C) In the conversation with Miliband, Zardari said he saw the attacks as an "opportunity to strike at my enemies." The attack, he said, was aimed as much at Pakistan as at India, but India had reacted in an unfortunate way. Miliband said that public messaging would be particularly important to link the Mumbai atrocity with Zardari's own campaign against militants.
11. (C) Zardari told Miliband that "my people" had not brought specific information to him about the individuals named in the information passed to ISI (on the day before). Miliband said that LeT needed to "feel the full force of the law." Zardari responded by saying he was setting up special courts, was contacting all political parties, and would take action (nfi) immediately.
12. (C) Miliband described ISI MG Pasha as a welcome "new broom" and expressed UK support for ISI reform. Zardari said the new ISI leaders were "straightforward" and their roles were proscribed by the constitution, but it would take time for real conversions. Brinkley and Miliband pressed for
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Pasha to go to India. Zardari gave Brinkley a long answer about various levels of directors in ISI but finally confirmed that the Army had vetoed the decision to send Pasha. Zardari told Miliband that it might be possible to send NSA Durrani, as he outranked Pasha. It would not be possible, said Zardari, to send Pasha immediately as Zardari needed to work public opinion first.
13. (C) Zardari commented that he had a gut reaction that the attacks were the beginning rather than the end and went on to talk about Muslim-Hindu differences and attempts to split India. He urged the UK to push back on New Delhi and calm the situation. Miliband said they would do so, but India needs to see real action from Pakistan. India was asking for short-term actions, and this could buy some time for the GOP.
14. (C) Miliband later called FM Qureshi and said the UK would be sure he saw the intelligence passed to ISI. He pressed that India needs actions not words from Pakistan. Qureshi said he would follow up on the intelligence but reiterated the GOP request for the UK to counsel restrain on the part of the Indians.
15. (C) High Commissioner Brinkley also called on Chinese Ambassador to Islamabad Hui over the weekend. Zardari had called Hui, and Hui said he had met with Kayani but did not share much in the way of information gleaned from the meeting. Hui was cagey on how much or what kind of assistance China has provided to help with Pakistan's economic crisis. On the Friends of Pakistan, Hui expressed continuing skepticism that the group did not have a clear enough mandate, is not focused, and will turn into a "talk shop." Hui was noncommittal when Brinkley raised concern about China's reported decision to assist Pakistan build two additional civilian nuclear reactors (Chasma II and III).
16. (C) See septel for special media reaction. Overall, the Pakistani public remains in denial about any culpability for the Mumbai attacks and believes India is unfairly and prematurely accusing Pakistan. PATTERSON
Friday, 19 February 2010, 10:50
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000399
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/17/2020
TAGS EAID, ECON, EFIN, PGOV, PREL, PK
SUBJECT: CODEL KERRY'S MEETING WITH PM GILANI
Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) .
1. (C) Summary: On February 16 Senator John Kerry met with Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani and spoke about the state of Indo-Pakistani relations. Gilani said that Pakistan was willing to resume talks with India but indicated that in order to gain Pakistan's trust India would need to decrease its footprint in Afghanistan and stop interfering in Balochistan. Kerry said that the upcoming talks between India and Pakistan's Foreign Secretaries had the potential to reshape the bilateral relationship and the overall regional dynamic and encouraged the GOP not to allow outside pressures to "derail these efforts." Kerry suggested enlisting international assistance to mediate these dialogues and indicated that the U.S. would be willing to help facilitate this process.
2. (C)Gilani said that Pakistan was committed to fighting extremism but complained that a lack of funding and the continued presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan was impeding these efforts. He added that there was an immediate need to improve social services in the conflict-affected areas. Kerry said that Pakistan needed to fight extremism through military interventions and by providing the Pakistani people with economic opportunities; he suggested that the U.S. and Pakistan conclude a free trade agreement. Kerry emphasized that the FTA could only work if the GOP leadership was willing to "back the USG" when it was being attacked by the media and local politicians. Finally, Gilani asked Kerry to consider releasing Dr. Aafia Siddiqui on humanitarian grounds. Kerry agreed to discuss the matter in Washington. End Summary.
Building Bridges-Relations with India
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2.(C) During a February 16 meeting with Senator John Kerry, Prime Minister Gilani spoke at length about the state of the Indo-Pakistani relationship. Gilani indicated that the GOP was willing to resume talks with the Indian government, and pointed to the upcoming meetings between India and Pakistan's Foreign Secretaries as evidence of such. He added that the GOP and India had also resumed back channel discussions. Gilani said that improving bilateral relations with India was in Pakistan's best interest as it would enable the GOP to focus all of its attention on securing its western border. Gilani, however, noted that in order to gain public support for this process, the U.S. had to "treat India and Pakistan equally." He added that India would need to gain Pakistan's trust and indicated that reducing the Indian footprint in Afghanistan and halting Indian support of militants in Balochistan would be steps in the right direction.
3.(C) Kerry said that the upcoming meeting between the Indian and Pakistani Foreign Secretaries had "enormous potential." He urged the GOP not to allow pressure from the local media and the masses to "derail these efforts." Kerry argued that dialogue with India was an opportunity to "create new security arrangements that could change the regional dynamic." While assuring Gilani that the effort would not be U.S.-driven, Kerry indicated that the USG was open to the idea of serving as a mediator to help facilitate the resumption of the Pakistan-India Composite Dialogue.
4. (C) Kerry said that in light of the recent bombing in Pune, India's politicians were focused on counterterrorism. He suggested that the GOP present the Indian government with its plan to tackle terrorism. He said that this would be a clear "confidence builder" that would make India more willing to move forward in talks about Kashmir and water disputes. He emphasized that India, Pakistan and the United States' futures depended on their governments' willingness to "challenge old suspicions" and work together, and suggested that Pakistan and India sign a non-aggression pact. Kerry said that the U.S. and other countries of goodwill would be prepared to help in any way possible.
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5. (C) Gilani agreed to present Kerry,s proposal to the the GOP leadership. He was amenable to the idea of a rapprochement in the India-Pakistan relation, but expressed concern that the public would not support the idea. Kerry said that in order to gain public support for this initiative, the GOP needed to clearly outline the long-term economic benefits of improved bilateral relations, such as improvements in social development and increased investments and trade, to the Pakistani people.
Fighting Extremism and the Need for Coalition Support Funds
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6. (C) Gilani said that Pakistan was committed to fighting extremism and pointed to the recent success of the military operations in Swat, Malakand and Waziristan as evidence of such. Kerry said that the USG had a great respect and deep understanding of the difficulties involved in waging this war. He praised the GOP for the military's efforts, acknowledged the difference that it was making, and thanked Gilani for the sacrifices that Pakistani troops were making every day.
7. (C) Gilani complained that the large number of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan were destabilizing the western provinces and contributing to extremism. Gilani suggested that the construction of new refugee camps in Afghanistan would dramatically improve Pakistan's security situation by halting the more than 45,000 Afghans who move across the Afghanistan/Pakistan border each day.
8. (C) Gilani also explained that capacity building for law enforcement agencies, the military and the police was an essential part of continuing the fight against extremism. He said the GOP had recently provided $8 million to support capacity building initiatives for the Frontier Corps and law enforcement in NWFP. Gilani expressed frustration at the GOP's inability to provide more money to support this activity due to budgetary constraints. He attributed these constraints to the delayed disbursement of Coalition Support Funds (CSF), and the fact that recent pledges from the Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FODP) member countries had yet to materialize. Gilani urged the USG to disburse CSF funds as soon as possible.
Need to Rebuild Conflict-affected Areas
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
9. (C) Gilani explained that the USG and GOP needed to devise an exit strategy to ensure that militants did not fill the vacuum when the military withdrew from the western border. He emphasized that it was imperative that this strategy focus on civilian assistance. Senator Kerry agreed that there was a need to expedite development efforts in these war torn areas so that efforts made by the military were not lost. Gilani said that the GOP had recently conducted a damage needs assessment in Malakand and Swat and found that there was a desperate need to improve the delivery of social services and the energy sector. He suggested that the USG should help build more modern hospitals and more educational institutions in Swat and Malakand.
Trade Not Aid
- - - - - - -
10. (C) Kerry argued that there needed to be a two-pronged approach to tackling extremism in Pakistan: military interventions needed to be coupled with economic development. Gilani agreed and said the USG needed to fast track Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ) legislation, as this would provide much needed relief for the local populations. Highlighting the fact that a Free Trade Agreement would help jump start the overall economy, Kerry suggested that Pakistan and the U.S. sign an FTA instead of pursuing the ROZ initiative. However, he emphasized that in order for the FTA to succeed the GOP needed to openly "back the USG" and
ISLAMABAD 00000399 003 OF 003
counter inflammatory comments in the media and by some local politicians. Gilani supported the FTA idea wholeheartedly and said that, in the long run, Pakistan would benefit more from an FTA than from aid.
Dr. Aafia Siddiqui
- - - - - - - - - - -
11. (C) Gilani asked the USG to consider repatriating Dr. Aafia Siddiqui on humanitarian grounds. He said that this was a very contentious issue in Pakistan, adding that by returning Dr. Sadiqqui "the U.S. would be in the Pakistani people's good graces." Both Gilani and Interior Minister Rehman Malik assured Kerry that the GOP would honor the terms of Dr. Siddiqui,s jail sentence, and suggested that she complete her jail time under house arrest. Kerry agreed to look into the prisoner transfer issue.
12. (C) This cable was drafted after CODEL Kerry departed. PATTERSON
Monday, 08 June 2009, 16:42
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000762
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/07/2024
TAGS PGOV, PREL, FR
SUBJECT: EUR A/S GORDON'S JUNE 3 MEETING WITH FRENCH NSA
LEVITTE
Classified By: Charg d'Affaires Mark A. Pekala, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) .
1. (S/NF) Summary: In a June 3 meeting with A/S Gordon, French NSA-equivalent Jean-David Levitte previewed the agenda for the POTUS-President Sarkozy bilat at Normandy. He noted that Sarkozy hoped to use the occasion to announce the appointments of two French general officers to high-level NATO positions. On Russia, Levitte expressed concern that Moscow was trying to whittle away at the commitments it made during the Georgia crisis, especially the presence of international monitors. He noted that Russia was "testing" the Europeans through manufactured crises (e.g., the natural gas crisis) as it tried to reassert control over its traditional sphere of influence. "We need to tell them to be careful, because your behavior risks changing the relationship (between Russia and the West)," said Levitte. Gordon observed that while it was comparatively easy for the U.S. and France to maintain a united front in dealing with Russia, the same was not true for all of our European partners. Levitte agreed, adding that the Germans were somewhat divided over how to respond to President Medvedev's proposals. He emphasized that Russia should pay a political price if it refuses to allow international observers to remain in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Turning to Nagorno-Karabakh, Levitte said there was an opportunity to improve the situation, which in turn might facilitate improvement in Turkish-Armenian relations. On Iran, Levitte noted that the French would pass two messages to Iranian FM Mottaki, who was due in Paris later that same day: First, that things "will end badly" if Iran presses forward with its nuclear program; second, that Iran faces "a historic opportunity" with the U.S. that it must not miss. End summary.
Participants
------------
2. (S/NF) Jean-David Levitte was accompanied by Damien Loras, French Presidency Adviser for the Americas. EUR A/S Gordon was accompanied by CDA Pekala and Poloff (notetaker).
POTUS-Sarkozy Bilat
-------------------
3. (S/NF) Levitte began by explaining the French decision not to invite the Germans to the June 6 D-Day commemoration. "It's my fault," said Levitte, who said that President Sarkozy had initially been keen to invite German Chancellor Merkel to participate. "I pointed out to the President that if Merkel came, then Sarkozy would be obligated to invite the heads of state of Italy, Poland, and the Czech Republic as well." Moreover, all of those leaders would have to be given an opportunity to speak as well, which would lengthen an already long ceremony. The cases of the UK and Canada were exceptional, he added, because both Gordon Brown and Stephen Harper were in such political trouble at home that the survival of their governments was at stake.
4. (S/NF) As for the substance of the POTUS-Sarkozy bilat, Levitte previewed the proposed agenda: Iran, the Middle East peace process, Afghanistan/Pakistan, Russia and its neighbors, and finally a broad discussion of economic issues under the rubric of the G-20 (e.g., the economic crisis, regulation, preparation for the next G-8 meeting, the price of gasoline, and climate issues). Levitte stressed that Sarkozy hoped to announce (preferably in person to the press, but possibly through a written bulletin) on June 3 the names of the two French general officers -- the chiefs of staff of the French Air Force and Navy -- receiving high level NATO commands in Norfolk and Lisbon.
Russia/Georgia
--------------
5. (S/NF) Turning to relations with Russia, Levitte suggested that Moscow misconstrued U.S. policy on Georgia. Russian officials seemed to interpret U.S. efforts at improving the atmosphere for talks as a license to walk away from commitments that Sarkozy had extracted from Russia at the height of the Georgia crisis. In specific, Russian obstructionism indicates Moscow's opposition to the presence of international monitors in Georgia and the breakaway territories. While Levitte conceded that Western relations with Russia should not hinge solely on the Georgian question, he nevertheless pointed to the continued need for a firm, united Western front. He noted that Russia was "testing" the Europeans through manufactured crises (e.g., the natural gas crisis) as it tried to reassert control over its traditional sphere of influence. "We need to tell them to be careful,
PARIS 00000762 002 OF 003
because your behavior risks changing the relationship (between Russia and the West)," said Levitte. Gordon agreed that U.S./EU could not afford to be naive in engaging with Russia, and stressed the need for the U.S. and Europe to draw the same red lines in dealing with Moscow. He observed that while it was comparatively easy for the U.S. and France to maintain a united front, the same was not true for all of our European partners. Levitte concurred. He added that the Germans were somewhat divided over how to respond to President Medvedev's proposals. Alluding to the differences between FM Steinmeier and Chancellor Merkel, Levitte said: "It's as if they have two foreign policies." He emphasized that Russia should pay a political price if it refuses to allow international observers (e.g., UNOMIG and OSCE) to remain present in Abkhazia and South Ossetia: namely, increased Western assistance to Georgia.
6. (S/NF) Levitte returned to the question of international observers, saying that the West should push Russia hard in New York and Geneva to let the observers stay. "They (the Russians) will accept it if we stay strong," Levitte noted, adding that the Russians must understand that they will pay a price for changing the status quo.
7. (S/NF) On NATO expansion, Levitte and Gordon discussed the relative merits of giving Membership Action Plans (MAP) to other Balkan countries but not to Georgia and Ukraine. Levitte suggested that the Russians would see such a policy as "a gift," yet he agreed that NATO needed to decide whether to continue with MAP for Ukraine and Georgia or find an alternative mechanism. Levitte proposed eliminating the MAP program altogether, as "each country arrives at membership through its own unique path anyway."
Nagorno-Karabakh
----------------
8. (S/NF) Levitte said he saw a historic opportunity to make progress on Nagorno-Karabakh and -- although the two are not formally linked -- relations between Turkey and Armenia. Gordon agreed that progress between the latter two was unlikely without movement on Nagorno-Karabakh, a reality the Armenians understood but had difficulty accepting. Levitte suggested that the U.S. and France remain in contact on this issue, with an eye toward a possible meeting on the margins of the informal ministerial at Corfu. On the question of Turkey's admission to the EU, Levitte said that the Turks themselves had signaled that the important thing was for the process to continue. Levitte said the French fully agreed, since the EU membership criteria served as an engine for modernizing Turkey.
Iran
----
9. (S/NF) As for the June 3 visit of Iranian FM Mottaki to Paris, Levitte said that Mottaki would be received at the Elysee later that same afternoon. Levitte portrayed Mottaki's visit as the result of Iranian in-fighting after Iranian President Ahmadinejad took umbrage that Ali Akbar Velayati, Supreme Leader Khamenei's diplomatic advisor, had been received in the past by Sarkozy. He noted that the French had already postponed Mottaki's visit once as a result of Ahmadinejad's anti-Semitic rant at the Durban II conference in Geneva, which had prompted the French Ambassador and other EU representatives to walk out of the session in protest. Levitte predicted that Mottaki would have nothing meaningful to say, whereas the French would deliver two messages to the Iranians: First, that things "will end badly" if Iran presses forward with its nuclear program; second, that Iran faces "a historic opportunity" with the U.S. that it must not miss. Levitte pledged that France would "remain the toughest" U.S. ally when it came to imposing sanctions on Iran, adding that the French had no illusions about how difficult it would be to get the Russians and Chinese to support tougher measures. He suggested that October would be the time to begin drumming up international support for new sanctions, and acknowledged that the Russians would likely try to extract concessions from the West on Georgia and missile defense in exchange.
Cuba/GTMO
---------
10. (S/NF) Levitte said that the new Administration's policy on Cuba was great. "How can we help?" asked Levitte, who noted that Sarkozy would travel to the Caribbean in late June. He added that former French Culture Minister Jack Lang was serving as Sarkozy's point man on Cuba, and met with Raul Castro during a recent visit to Havana. "Your open-handed
PARIS 00000762 003 OF 003
policy is producing some interesting movement inside (the regime)," Levitte summarized.
11. (S/NF) Turning to the fate of the Guantanamo (GTMO) detainees, Levitte said that France's acceptance of a first GTMO returnee was not intended to be a one time gesture. To the contrary, the French saw it as the beginning of a process, and they were currently evaluating other candidates as well. However, France would not accept any detainees who posed a threat to French security and would only consider taking those with a legitimate tie to France. Levitte noted that Congressional opposition to the President's plan to close GTMO had given French authorities less room for maneuver on this subject, as the French public wondered why France should accept detainees who were too dangerous to be transferred to the United States.
12. (U) This cable has been cleared by EUR A/S Philip H. Gordon.
PEKALA
Saturday, 21 February 2009, 12:27
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000385
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y
CLASSIFCATION MISMATCH ERROR IN PARAGRAPH 8, 9, 10
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK
SUBJECT: FOCUSING THE U.S.-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC DIALOGUE
ISLAMABAD 00000385 001.3 OF 003
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (C) Summary. As Foreign Minister Qureshi and his team arrive in Washington for coordination on the Holbrooke/Riedel strategic review, Post offers the following thoughts on issues for strategic engagement. In the coming weeks, Post will detail our suggestions on how to expand political, economic, security, and intelligence engagement with Pakistan from the current $2 billion annually to $4 billion beginning in FY2011. End Summary.
2. (C) As we work to prevent Pakistan-based attacks on the U.S. and its forces, we should be clear that al-Qaida (AQ) now wants more than just a safe-haven in Pakistan, and defeating a growing witches' brew of AQ, Taliban, local extremists and criminals will be a long 10-15 year fight. President Zardari has summed it up by saying, "the militants now are after me and my job." The militant takeover of Swat in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) is the most striking example of how far and how fast the government is losing control over its territory. As the fight continues, we expect AQ to increase both its offensive and defensive operations to protect its equities. It simply has nowhere else to go.
Understanding Swat
3. (C) Talks continue between Tehrik Nizam Shariat Mohammed (Movement for Shari'a or TNSM) leader Sufi Mohammad and his son-in-law Maulana Fazlullah, who works with the Tehrik-e-Taliban movement headed by Baitullah Mehsud. The Army appears unwilling or unable to control the area, and the population is fed up with both indiscriminate Army shelling and taliban-imposed terror. So, the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Army are trying a new version of a failed strategy. Through Sufi Mohammad, the NWFP provincial government is trying to split the population from Fazlullah's taliban by offering adherence to a form of Shari'a law, interpreted locally as swift justice. The NWFP offer on Shari'a has not been signed by President Zardari and is conditioned on establishment of peace in Swat. The Army has not withdrawn from its positions, and it insists it will not withdraw until peace is established.
4. (C) Few Pakistanis believe the deal will hold for more than two-three weeks. A similar deal failed in 2008; Post does not believe that Sufi has the clout to deliver. Fazlullah's taliban are not going to lay down their arms--they have already violated their alleged cease-fire. ANP's weak argument is that even a failed deal will expose Fazlullah's real intentions; the Army's view is that the deal at least buys them some time to regroup forces. Post's concern is that by signaling its willingness to surrender, the deal has made it even harder for the inevitable Army re-engagement in Swat. While talks continue, however, we are working through State/USAID/DOD with UN agencies and ICRC to get relief supplies to the beleaguered Swati population. We also are working with the Ministry of Interior to provide the NWFP police with short-term support (salary supplements/death benefits, hardening police stations) while we implement a longer-term plan to deliver additional equipment and training needed to back up Army action.
Establishing Trust
5. (C) The Pakistani team will come hoping, once again, to forge long-lasting ties with the U.S. As Vice President Biden has noted, however, the relationship for too long has been transactional in nature. It also has been based on mutual mistrust. Pakistan hedges its bets on cooperation because it fears the U.S. will again desert Islamabad after we get Osama Bin Laden; Washington sees this hesitancy as duplicity that requires we take unilateral action to protect U.S. interests. After 9/11, then President Musharraf made a strategic shift to abandon the Taliban and support the U.S. in the war on terror, but neither side believes the other has lived up to expectations flowing from that decision. The relationship is one of co-dependency we grudgingly admit--Pakistan knows the U.S. cannot afford to walk away; the U.S. knows Pakistan cannot survive without our support.
Supporting Democracy/Defeating Extremism
ISLAMABAD 00000385 002.3 OF 003
6. (C) Militants will exploit either weak civilian government or a return to military rule that lacks popular legitimacy, so we should help the Zardari/Gilani government complete its full five-year term in office. We can work with Nawaz Sharif if he wins the next election, but Zardari is our best ally in Pakistan right now, and U.S. interests are best served by preventing another cycle of military rule. Qureshi will remind us that the GOP needs an international democracy dividend in the form of economic aid, improved governance, and effective law enforcement.
7. (C) We can respond first by offering robust U.S. support at the IMF/World Bank Donors' Conference in April. We now are providing approximately $2 billion annually to Pakistan, including: $1.2 billion in Coalition Support Fund reimbursements; $150 million to improve socio-economic conditions in FATA; $300 million in ESF aid for the rest of Pakistan; over $10 million for internally displaced persons fleeing combat in Bajaur, Mohmand and Swat; $300 million (not yet received); and an imminent $15 million in aid to the NWFP police.
8. (C) If approved and financed, the Kerry-Lugar legislation will enable us to triple non-military aid to $1.5 billion per year. We will plan in FY 2010 to spend over $100 million to augment civilian police and $873 million to build counter-insurgency capability. This means giving police protective vests and rapid reaction capability, teaching the military how to coordinate ground and air operations and helping the Army keep more than two attack helicopters in the air at one time. We can build trust, address the issue of alleged U.S. strikes, and help Pakistanis target militants through enhanced DOD-based intelligence cooperation at the Torkham Joint Coordination Center. We need to help the GOP implement an effective strategic communications plan.
Changing Mindsets
9. (C) President Zardari and PM Gilani recognize Pakistan's greatest threat has shifted from India to militancy concentrated on the Pak-Afghan border but is spreading to NWFP and beyond. The Army and ISI, however, have not turned that corner. We should press the GOP on the need to stop using militant/tribal proxies as foreign policy tools. It is now counterproductive to Pakistan's own interests and directly conflicts with USG objectives in Afghanistan--where Haqqani's network is killing American soldiers and Afghan civilians--and the region--where Mumbai exposed the fruits of previous ISI policy to create Lashkar-e-Taiba and still threatens potential conflict between nuclear powers. However, we should preface this conversation with a pledge to open a new page in relations. Chief of Army Staff General Kayani, who headed ISI from 2004-2007, in particular wants to avoid a reckoning with the past, and we will not shift Pakistani military/ISI policy without his support.
10. (C) Given recent events in Swat, the Army needs to decide if it is truly prepared to commit the troops and suffer the casualties required to win and accept the training needed to shift from a conventional war with India to a COIN-based strategy along the Pak-Afghan border. We should probe the team for what Pakistan needs from India to enable it to redeploy badly-needed Pakistani forces from its eastern to its western border.
Making Afghanistan a Success
11. (C) We should ask what kind of government Islamabad can accept in Kabul and how Pakistan plans to help the U.S./NATO succeed in Afghanistan. The team will be concerned about the effect of a troop build-up in southern Afghanistan across from Balochistan, where Pakistan has meager forces to defend a long and unpopulated border. We should discuss the reality that the U.S. will be doubling cargo shipments through Pakistan (both the Torkham and Chaman crossings) in support of our troop build-up in Afghanistan.
12. (C) As ISI General Director Pasha has said, "we can't kill all the militants." Qureshi, noting recent comments by Defense Secretary Gates, will suggest it is time to review efforts to reach out to Taliban "reconcilables" on both sides
ISLAMABAD 00000385 003.2 OF 003
of the border. If this initiative progresses, we should consider establishing a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process in both Pakistan and Afghanistan for Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba and other militant fighters.
Thinking Regionally
13. (C) Pakistan's principal strategic focus remains fixated on India, Afghanistan as strategic depth in the fight against India, and the core Kashmir issue. However, the current civilian and military leadership is the most pro-Indian that New Delhi is likely to see, and we should not allow Mumbai to derail rapprochement. Both sides should resume Composite Dialogue negotiations, re-establish back-channel negotiations, and increase trade across both the Wagah border and the Kashmir Line of Control.
14. (C) This presumes that Pakistan, with continued USG pressure, proceeds with prosecution of the Mumbai suspects. Pakistan also needs more clearly to shut down its support for Lashkar-e-Taiba militancy in Kashmir. Qureshi will want to hear a USG commitment to press the Indians to respond to the GOP's list of follow-up questions on the investigation. We should encourage Islamabad to send, and New Delhi to receive, a Pakistani police investigatory team to collect evidence in support of successful Mumbai prosecutions.
15. (C) Qureshi likely will repeat Zardari's pleas for USG intervention with Saudi Arabia, UAE and other Gulf states to deliver oil at concessional prices; to date, our efforts have been rebuffed but the upcoming Donors' Conference would provide another avenue to press for assistance.
16. (C) We should leverage China's interest in a stable Pakistan by urging its continued support at the Donors' Conference but reminding Beijing that efforts to block 1267 designations and give Pakistan two unsanctioned civilian nuclear reactors are not helpful. Zardari would like to accept Iran's offer of financial assistance but we doubt he will proceed without U.S. blessing.
PATTERSON
Wednesday, 05 December 2007, 11:58
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 004472
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
BERLIN AND PARIS PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY PETERS AND
DELEGATION
EO 12958 DECL: 12/05/2017
TAGS EAIR, ICAO, ECON, SENV, ELTN, UK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY PETERS' DECEMBER 7 VISIT
TO LONDON
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT H. TUTTLE FOR REASONS 1.4 B, D
1. (SBU) Summary: Your December 7-8 visit to London comes after Prime Minister Gordon Brown has finished putting his own stamp on the government, following this summer's transition from Tony Blair's tenure, and begins focusing on governing. It also comes at a time during which major infrastructure programs such as Heathrow Terminal 5 are nearing completion and new proposals such as London Crossrail and a new runway for Heathrow are being launched. Ruth Kelly, Secretary of State for Transport, has highlighted security, liberalization, and environmental protection as key priorities. Kelly's tenure began two days before terrorists drove a car with crude explosives into the Glasgow airport terminal, and security remains a key transport concern in the UK. End Summary.
(U) UK Political Scene
----------------------
2. (C/NF) After leading the Labour Party for 13 years and Her Majesty's Government for ten years, Tony Blair stepped down in June and Gordon Brown succeeded him as Prime Minister. Brown had served as Chancellor of the Exchequer (finance minister) throughout Blair's premiership and had always been the obvious choice to succeed him. It was Brown who ran the economy; the New Labour program that made the Labour Party electable again after 18 years in opposition was as much his creation as Blair's. Brown got off to a strong start over the summer. The public welcomed his solid competence as a refreshing change after Blair's perceived slickness, and hoped he would turn the page on the deeply unpopular Iraq war. The new PM responded well to several early crises: abortive terrorist attacks in London and Glasgow; the worst flooding in 60 years; and an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. Brown's unexpected lead in the opinion polls fueled disunity within the main opposition Conservative Party and prompted speculation that he would call a snap election this fall (though he need not do so until May 2010). The prospect of a fourth consecutive general-election trouncing caused the Conservatives ("Tories") to rally behind their leader David Cameron, who delivered a stellar speech to the annual party conference; the Tories got a bounce in the polls, and the Prime Minister decided not to call an election after all. That decision was widely seen as a humiliating climb-down, and his claim that the polls had nothing to do with the decision damaged his reputation for integrity. Ever since then, the bad news has just kept on piling up for Brown:
- the Labour Party General Secretary abruptly resigned after it emerged that a major donor was using proxies to conceal his contributions to the party and the General Secretary knew about it and failed to comply with legal requirements;
- a government agency lost personal data - including bank account details - on 25 million people (out of 60 million) when a junior employee violated security regulations all too easily. Another case emerged recently in which a government contractor kept personal data for a year after finishing its project, leading to serious questions of the government's handling of data;
- the government's loan guarantees in response to the mortgage bank Northern Rock crisis (Britain's first run on a bank since 1866) put over BPS 20 million (equivalent to more than USD 40 million) of taxpayers' money at risk; and
- ministers and civil servants alike are said to be demoralized by Brown's secretive and controlling approach, and parliamentary backbenchers despair at his vulnerability to Cameron's agile taunting.
Key Bilateral Issues
--------------------
3. (C/NF) The UK is our closest and most important ally. PM Brown is much less outgoing than Blair and wishes to avoid being accused - as Blair was - of being President Bush's "poodle," but he wants - and knows that Britain needs - a strong relationship with the U.S. Administration. He considers Afghanistan the primary front in the military conflict against Islamist terrorism and is increasing the UK's involvement there, while emphasizing that the global threat of violent Islamist extremism cannot be defeated by military means. On Iraq, he is reducing the British presence
while insisting that the UK will meet its obligations to the Iraqi people and the international community. He attaches great importance to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and is keen to support economic development in the Palestinian territories. All British nationals detained at Guantanamo have been returned to the UK, and HMG has requested the return of five detainees who have residency ties here; bilateral discussions are ongoing.
Surface Transportation Programs
-------------------------------
4. (SBU) In 2003, the Mayor of London introduced a congestion charge of BPS 5 (USD 10) per day to drive into the central portion of London (50 pence per day for those living inside the zone). The city considers this a fee for service (improved transportation infrastructure, decreased pollution and congestion), and did not grant a diplomatic exemption. After determining that the fee was actually a tax, and therefore not payable under the Vienna Conventions of Diplomatic and Consular Affairs, the Department of State engaged in lengthy negotiations with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the City of London. In July 2005, after negotiations concluded unsuccessfully, the Department instructed the Mission and its members to stop paying the tax. The U.S. Embassy was not the first to refuse to pay, and following the expansion of the congestion zone and increase in the fee to BPS 8 (USD 16) in 2007, a large number of missions, including 23 of the 27 European Union missions in London, now refuse to pay the tax. London Mayor Ken Livingstone has focused his ire publicly against the U.S. Embassy and the Ambassador personally. His position, however, should be seen in the wider context of his anti-American positions on many issues and his coziness to the likes of Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro.
5. (U) In October, PM Brown gave the go-ahead to a major light rail program for London that was first raised in the 1980s. Crossrail will be a new east-west railway linking Maidenhead and Heathrow in the west with Shenfield and Abbey Wood in the east via tunnels under Central London. The track will be 118 kilometers and will house 38 new stations, enabling an estimated 200 million passenger journeys a year. Construction is set to begin in 2010 with the first trains expected to run in 2017. PM Brown said Crossrail will be of "enormous importance, not just for London but for the whole country" and would generate up to 30,000 new jobs. Funding, projected to be BPS 16bn (USD 32bn), will be met by the government, businesses and farepayers, with a BPS 5bn (USD 10bn) grant coming from the Department for Transport. Direct contributions will be made by some of the project's key beneficiaries, including the City of London Corporation. TfL estimates that Crossrail will contribute BPS 30bn (USD 60bn) to the UK economy. Getting approval for this project is seen as a major accomplishment for Ruth Kelly and her department.
6. (U) In 2004 the government announced the creation of the Transport Innovation Fund (TIF), designed to support the costs of smarter, innovative local transport packages. Projects address demand management, congestion charging, and local and regional schemes to benefit national productivity. In 2005, Cambridgeshire successfully bid for BPS 385,000 (USD 770,000) and was awarded a further BPS 1.055m (USD 2.11m) to fund a study looking at transport packages that combine demand management measures with measures to encourage modal shift. The funding was provided on the condition that the local authority study whether a congestion charge would be appropriate in Cambridge. In October 2007 Cambridge submitted another bid for nearly BPS 500m (USD 1bn) which would be used to fund large-scale improvements to public transport, highways and cycling facilities and demand management measures, specifically congestion charging. The government is also considering a bid from Manchester which would involve BPS 3bn (USD 6bn) worth of public transport improvements in exchange for a peak-hour congestion charge of up to BPS 5 (USD 10) a day.
7. (U) On November 14, the first high-speed Eurostar train left the modernized St. Pancras station for Paris. The move to St. Pancras, on the north side of Central London, from Waterloo, on the south side, will make it easier for passengers from Northern England and Scotland to connect to the Continent. The move is the culmination of a BPS 5.8bn (USD 11.6bn) 10-year project designed to speed up travel to Britain from France and Belgium. The new 68-mile high speed single rail line between St. Pancras and the tunnel under the
English Channel is the final section of high speed rail to be completed and enables Eurostar trains to hit 190mph. It cuts journey times by approximately 20 minutes and links London with Paris in two hours, 15 minutes and London with Brussels in one hour, 51 minutes.
(U) London Olympics
-------------------
8. (U) London will host the Summer Olympic Games in 2012. Transportation for the Games will be delivered through a partnership between the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) Transport team, Transport for London (TfL), Department for Transport (DfT), Network Rail and other transport providers. The ODA aims for 100 percent of ticketed spectators to travel to the Games by public transport, walking or cycling. There will be no private car parking for spectators except for some "Blue Badge" disabled parking. An Olympic Route Network (ORN) will be implemented for the transportation of athletes, comprising a network of roads linking competition and key non-competition venues. In general, roads will remain open to the public. However, some traffic lanes will be dedicated for Games vehicles on the busiest sections of the route. An Olympic Transport Operations Center (OTOC) will be established to manage all modes of transport.
Airport Infrastructure and Aviation Liberalization
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9. (U) The UK remains the destination for the highest number of passengers departing the U.S. by air, and Heathrow airport processes more international passengers than any other airport in the world. In the face of continued rapid aviation growth rates, airport infrastructure is a key concern in the UK. Creaking and groaning under the weight of old infrastructure coupled with modern security requirements, Heathrow operator BAA and the flying public will welcome the opening of Terminal 5, on March 27, 2008. This new terminal, which is on time and under budget, will nearly double existing capacity, and is capable of handling the Airbus A-380.
10. (U) While there is light at the end of the passenger capacity tunnel, Heathrow is unique among airports of its size in operating only two runways. In fact, the southeast of England has not seen a new runway since the Second World War, and the government is eager to see a new runway at Heathrow, Stansted, or both. Nor is the issue limited to England, as Scotland's Prestwick airport is the busiest single runway airport in the world. On November 22, the Department for Transport published a consultation on adding a third runway at Heathrow airport by 2020. This has kicked off a lively public debate, with positions crossing party lines. As may be expected, noise and local air quality issues dominate the environmental debate around the third runway, although climate change concerns figure prominently as well. In addition, the new runway would require the demolition of an entire village just north of the airport.
11. (U) BAA (formerly, British Airports Authority, which was privatized in 1984) has also come under considerable criticism for its levels of service and the Parliament's Transport Select Committee has launched hearings on the issue. In addition, the Competition Commission has recently investigated whether BAA's dominance of the London area should be allowed to continue. Finally, the Civil Aviation Authority has just published on November 20 its proposal for fee structures at Heathrow and Gatwick (along with Stansted, fees for these airports are regulated by the CAA because of BAA's near monopoly over London), which neither airlines nor BAA find acceptable. On the whole, airport issues will remain a major topic for Ruth Kelly for the remainder of her tenure.
12. (SBU) Sentiment in the UK regarding the conclusion of the first phase of the U.S.-EU Air Services Agreement was largely negative, and Ruth Kelly and other ministers are under considerable pressure to conclude successfully a second round of negotiations, including concessions on foreign ownership of U.S. airlines. Airlines such as Virgin and BA are eager to gain access to the U.S. market, as you are well aware. Public opinion also plays a role, as the agreement was seen by many as another example of UK interests being subsumed by negotiators in Brussels. Department for Transport officials have raised the desire for a timely and successful conclusion of a second phase on numerous
occasions, and have not been deterred by explanations of the U.S. political climate - especially during an election year. Secretary Kelly may raise this issue with you.
SIPDIS
UK-U.S. Climate Change Differences
----------------------------------
13. (SBU) The predominant environmental concern in the UK is climate change. The UK was disappointed the U.S. did not sign the Kyoto Protocol. Local air quality is a concern, but when faced with a trade-off, UK policy will tend to favor reducing carbon output (as evidenced by the fact that around 50% of vehicles in the UK run on diesel and would not meet most U.S. air quality standards). There is strong support for action on climate change legislation across the political spectrum and among the general public in the UK. The UK participates in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), a cap-and-trade program to help Europe meet its Kyoto Protocol commitments on carbon emissions. The UK is also a key supporter of a European Commission proposal to include aviation in the second phase of ETS, which is working its way through the legislative process. The U.S. and other governments have registered concerns over the legality of this unilateral environmental regulation on aviation emissions, which should be resolved within the International Civil Aviation Organization. Secretary Kelly's office has indicated that she will raise this issue with you.
14. (SBU) Transportation is one of the largest and fastest growing contributors to climate change in the UK, and aviation is seen as unique in that it is not subject to fuel tax and duty (with the sole exception of non-commercial general aviation). In an attempt to be seen to address the growth in aviation emissions and make aviation pay its environmental costs, Her Majesty's Treasury (HMT) recently mooted a proposal to abandon air passenger duty (APD) in favor of a charge on every flight leaving the UK. The proposal aims to include previously excluded categories such as cargo, transfer passengers, smaller aircraft and non-commercial aviation. The proposal still lacks detail, but the intent is to provide incentives to reduce emissions and more closely align the tax with environmental impact. HMT has held several meetings with UK, U.S. and other passenger and cargo carriers. In addition, the Embassy met recently with HMT and DfT officials to seek more information, including HMG's views on the compliance of the proposal with international obligations such as air services agreements and the Chicago Convention. It is clear that UK analysis is not yet well developed, but HMG indicated a willingness to exchange further information and hold discussions with a view to avoiding another conflict over aviation and emissions.
Transportation Security
-----------------------
15. (U) Transportation security remains high on Secretary Kelly's agenda, as transportation security oversight remains within her department. On June 29, just one day after Kelly assumed her duties as Transport Secretary, police discovered two failed car bombs in London's West End. The following day, terrorists drove a flaming vehicle equipped with a crude explosive device into a terminal at Glasgow airport. This incident came less than a year after police foiled an attempt to smuggle liquid explosives aboard U.S.-bound airlines and almost two years to the day after the July 7 London bombings in which 52 commuters were killed on three Underground trains and a bus. UK aviation suffered considerably after the liquid explosives attempt, with massive cancellations and delays. The long term effects of the liquid explosive attempt have been felt far and wide. However, in the UK, the overstretched security infrastructure could not cope with the additional security requirements and passengers were strictly limited to one carry-on bag. Secretary Kelly has announced that this restriction will be lifted next year. This move, along with additional measures, i.e., implementation of new technologies such as ct scans at checkpoints at Heathrow and Gatwick, should improve passenger flow. U.S.-UK transportation security and counter-terrorism cooperation is very strong. We are encouraging UK security officials to focus on soft targets countermeasures, counter radicalization and intelligence sharing.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm Tuttle
Monday, 22 February 2010, 09:32
S E C R E T SEOUL 000272
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2034
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KNNP, ECON, SOCI, KS, KN, JA, CH
SUBJECT: VFM CHUN YOUNG-WOO ON SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS
Classified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
1. (S) Vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo told the Ambassador February 17th that China would not be able to stop North Korea's collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically and would collapse politically two to three years after the death of Kim Jong-il. Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North's economy. Beijing had "no will" to use its modest economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang's policies -- and the DPRK characterized as "the most incompetent official in China" -- had retained his position as chief of the PRC's 6PT delegation. Describing a generational difference in Chinese attitudes toward North Korea, Chun claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control. Chun acknowledged the Ambassador's point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula. End summary.
VFM Chun on Sino-North Korean Relations...
------------------------------------------
2. (S) During a February 17 lunch hosted by Ambassador Stephens that covered other topics (septel), ROK Vice Foreign Minister and former ROK Six-Party Talks (6PT) Head of Delegation Chun Yung-woo predicted that China would not be able to stop North Korea's collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically; following the death of KJI, North Korea would collapse politically in "two to three years." Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North's economy; there was "no substance" to the reports, he said. The VFM also ridiculed the Chinese foreign ministry's "briefing" to the ROK embassy in Beijing on Wang Jiarui's visit to North Korea; the unidentified briefer had "basically read a Xinhua press release," Chun groused, adding that the PRC interlocutor had been unwilling to answer simple questions like whether Wang had flown to Hamhung or taken a train there to meet KJI.
3. (S) The VFM commented that China had far less influence on North Korea "than most people believe." Beijing had "no will" to use its economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang's policies and the DPRK leadership "knows it." Chun acknowledged that the Chinese genuinely wanted a denuclearized North Korea, but the PRC was also content with the status quo. Unless China pushed North Korea to the "brink of collapse," the DPRK would likely continue to refuse to take meaningful steps on denuclearization.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
-----------------------------------------
4. (S) Turning to the Six Party Talks, Chun said it was "a very bad thing" that Wu Dawei had retained his position as chief of the PRC's delegation. XXXXXXXXXXXX said it appeared that the DPRK "must have lobbied extremely hard" for the now-retired Wu to stay on as China's 6PT chief. [NAME REMOVED] complained that Wu is the PRC's XXXXXXXXXXXX an arrogant, Marx-spouting former Red Guard who "knows nothing about North Korea, nothing about nonproliferation and is hard to communicate with because he doesn't speak English." Wu was also a hardline nationalist, loudly proclaiming -- to anyone willing to listen -- that the PRC's economic rise represented a "return to normalcy" with China as a great world power.
...China's "New Generation" of Korea-Hands...
---------------------------------------------
5. (S) Sophisticated Chinese officials XXXXXXXXXXXX stood in sharp contrast to Wu, according to VFM Chun.XXXXXXXXXXXX Chun claimed XXXXXXXXXX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control.XXXXXXXXXXXX, Chun said, were ready to "face the new reality" that the DPRK now had little value to China as a buffer state -- a view that since North Korea's 2006 nuclear test had reportedly gained traction among senior PRC leaders.
...PRC Actions In A DPRK Collapse Scenario...
---------------------------------------------
6. (S) Chun argued that, in the event of a North Korean collapse, China would clearly "not welcome" any U.S. military presence north of the DMZ. XXXXXXXXXXXX Chun XXXXXXXXXXXX said the PRC would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by Seoul and anchored to the United States in a "benign alliance" -- as long as Korea was not hostile towards China. Tremendous trade and labor-export opportunities for Chinese companies, Chun said, would also help salve PRC concerns about living with a reunified Korea. Chundismissed the prospect of a possible PRC military intervention in the event of a DPRK collapse, noting that China's strategic economic interests now lie with the United States, Japan, and South Korea -- not North Korea. Moreover, Chun argued, bare-knuckle PRC military intervention in a DPRK internal crisis could "strengthen the centrifugal forces in China's minority areas."
...and Japan
------------
7. (S) Chun acknowledged the Ambassador's point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul's control. Chun asserted that, even though "Japan's preference" was to keep Korea divided, Tokyo lacked the leverage to stop reunification in the event the DPRK collapses. STEPHENS
Thursday, 24 September 2009, 16:16
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 002225
SIPDIS
NOFORN
NSC FOR FROMAN
TREASURY FOR MURDEN/SOBEL
EO 12958 DECL: 09/24/2019
TAGS ECON, EINV, PGOV, AGMT, UK
SUBJECT: CHANCELLOR DARLING ON BANKERS' BONUSES, UK
RECOVERY, AND LABOUR PROSPECTS
Classified By: Ambassador Louis B. Susman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C/NF) Summary: Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling told the Ambassador during his September 23 introductory meeting that G20 governments must continue to implement stimulus packages and avoid complacency. Darling warned that if banks paid out large bonuses in 2010, they could provoke a political backlash and draconian legislation that would have unintended consequences. Governments needed to pressure the banks to exercise restraint. The Chancellor was cautiously optimistic that the UK economy would return to growth by year-end, but worried that the recovery remained fragile. Darling had sharp words for the Conservatives, who were campaigning on budget cuts, but unwilling to say what they would cut. He said that Labour was losing hearts and minds more than the Conservatives were winning people over. The Ambassador raised the issue of VAT charges on the London Embassy project and subsequently briefed U/S Kennedy by phone. End Summary. Recovery is Fragile and Banker Bonuses Radioactive
--------------------------------------------- -----
2. (C/NF) The Ambassador said that the President was committed to a strong framework for growth at Pittsburgh and asked the Chancellor for his expectations from the G20 summit. Noting he was traveling to Pittsburgh early September 24, Chancellor Darling stressed the importance of continuing stimulus packages and avoiding complacency. Unemployment levels across the developed economies were high, continuing to rise, and risks to growth remained real. He cited IMF predictions that Germany could re-enter recession and expressed concern about the potential for higher oil prices. He noted that high public sector debt levels constrained governments, room for maneuver. On pay and bonuses, Darling cautioned that banks needed to exercise restraint. With spring UK elections in mind, he said that if banks announced large bonuses early in 2010, the pressure for draconian legislation would be politically irresistible. He expressed concern that a political backlash could produce legislation that had unintended consequences and cited Sarbanes-Oxley as an example. He said governments needed to persuade bankers not to do something stupid in the coming months. Cautious Optimism on Recovery
-----------------------------
3. (C/NF) On the UK economy, the Chancellor remained cautious, but expected a return to growth by the end of the year. But he cautioned that it would be &foolish to announce victory." He said that the UK's heavy dependence on services, and especially financial services, meant that UK growth would lag behind other economies and depend on their growth. He added that if businesses and the public see recovery, they will spend. U.S. Committed to Address Climate Change
---------------------------------------
4. (C/NF) The Chancellor asked about the prospects for climate change legislation. The Ambassador referred to the President's September 22 speech at the UN Climate Change Summit and highlighted his commitment to address climate change through strong administrative measures and through legislation. Noting the determination of White House and Congressional leaders, the Ambassador expressed confidence that Congress would pass legislation. Labour Losing Hearts and Minds
------------------------------
5. (C/NF) Responding to a question on the UK election, Darling said that the Conservatives may think they can run a campaign on cutting spending without specifying what they are going to cut, but this will become less and less tenable. He said it is in the nature of the opposition to criticize without offering up specifics. In the meantime, he said that Labour would &fight like hell for re-election." Darling was sanguine about Labour's challenge ) &the problem is not that the Conservatives are winning hearts and minds, rather that we are losing them.8 He said that Labour needed to regain the confidence of the public that they can win. VAT Exemption on New Embassy Unlikely
-------------------------------------
6. (C/NF) Ambassador raised the new embassy project at Nine Elms, noting that the USD 1.2 billion project would spur redevelopment of a blighted area and create jobs. He said that as a matter of principle, the UK should not impose value-added tax on the construction of a chancery building. Darling responded that the government could not exempt the project from VAT, citing the recession, tight budget and elections. Ambassador noted that construction was projected
LONDON 00002225 002 OF 002
to start in 2012 and urged the Chancellor to work with him to find a solution.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN
Friday, 15 January 2010, 12:23
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000032
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB
EO 12958 DECL: 01/15/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PREF, PHUM, PTER, EAID, MOPS, CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA WAR-CRIMES ACCOUNTABILITY: THE TAMIL
PERSPECTIVE
REF: A. 09 COLOMBO 1180 B. COLOMBO 8
COLOMBO 00000032 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)
1. (S) SUMMARY: There have been a few tentative steps on accountability for crimes allegedly committed by Sri Lankan troops and civilian officials during the war with the LTTE. President Rajapaksa named a committee to make recommendations to him on the U.S. incidents report by April, and candidate Fonseka has discussed privately the formation of some form of "truth and reconciliation" commission. Otherwise, accountability has not been a high-profile issue -- including for Tamils in Sri Lanka. While Tamils have told us they would like to see some form of accountability, they have been pragmatic in what they can expect and have focused instead on securing greater rights and freedoms, resolving the IDP question, and improving economic prospects in the war-ravaged and former LTTE-occupied areas. Indeed, while they wanted to keep the issue alive for possible future action, Tamil politicians with whom we spoke in Colombo, Jaffna, and elsewhere said now was not time and that pushing hard on the issue would make them "vulnerable." END SUMMARY.
ACCOUNTABILITY AS A POLITICAL ISSUE
-----------------------------------
2. (S) Accountability for alleged crimes committed by GSL troops and officials during the war is the most difficult issue on our bilateral agenda. (NOTE: Both the State Department Report to Congress on Incidents during the Conflict and the widely read report by the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) also detailed many incidents of alleged crimes perpetrated by the LTTE. Most of the LTTE leadership was killed at the end of the war, leaving few to be held responsible for those crimes. The Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) is holding thousands of mid- and lower-level ex-LTTE combatants for future rehabilitation and/or criminal prosecution. It is unclear whether any such prosecutions will meet international standards. END NOTE.) There have been some tentative steps on accountability on the GSL side. Soon after the appearance of the State Department report, President Rajapaksa announced the formation of an experts' committee to examine the report and to provide him with recommendations on dealing with the allegations. At the end of the year, the president extended the deadline for the committee's recommendations from December 31 until April. For his part, General Fonseka has spoken publicly of the need for a new deal with the Tamils and other minorities. Privately, his campaign manager told the Ambassador that Fonseka had ordered the opposition campaign to begin work planning a "truth and reconciliation" commission (ref B).
3. (S) These tentative steps notwithstanding, accountability has not been a high-profile issue in the presidential election -- other than President Rajapaksa's promises personally to stand up to any international power or body that would try to prosecute Sri Lankan war heroes. While regrettable, the lack of attention to accountability is not surprising. There are no examples we know of a regime undertaking wholesale investigations of its own troops or senior officials for war crimes while that regime or government remained in power. In Sri Lanka this is further complicated by the fact that responsibility for many of the alleged crimes rests with the country's senior civilian and military leadership, including President Rajapaksa and his brothers and opposition candidate General Fonseka.
THE TAMIL PERSPECTIVE
---------------------
COLOMBO 00000032 002.2 OF 003
4. (S) For different reasons, of course, accountability also has not been a top priority for most Tamils in Sri Lanka. While Tamils have told us they would like to see some form of accountability, they have been pragmatic in what they can expect and have focused instead on securing greater rights and freedoms, resolving the IDP question, and improving economic prospects in the war-ravaged and former LTTE-occupied areas. Indeed, while they wanted to keep the issue alive for possible future action, Tamil leaders with whom we spoke in Colombo, Jaffna, and elsewhere said now was not time and that pushing hard on the issue would make them "vulnerable."
5. (S) The one prominent Tamil who has spoken publicly on the issue is Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MP, self-proclaimed presidential candidate, and Prabhakaran relative M.K. Sivajilingam. Breaking from both the TNA mainstream and the pro-government Tamil groups, he launched his campaign because he believed neither the government nor the opposition was adequately addressing Tamil issues. Sivajilingam has focused on creating a de-centralized federal structure in Sri Lanka with separate prime ministers for the Sinhalese and Tamils, but he also has spoken about accountability, demanding an international inquiry to get justice for the deaths and suffering of the Tamil people.
6. (S) Other Tamil politicians have not made public statements on accountability and are generally more pragmatic in their thinking. In our multiple recent discussions with TNA leader R. Sampanthan, he said he believed accountability was important and he welcomed the international community's -- especially the diaspora's -- interest in the issue. But Sampanthan was realistic about the dim prospects for any Sri Lankan government to take up the issue. Granting that governments in power do not investigate their own, Sampanthan nevertheless said it was important to the health of the nation to get the truth out. While he believed the Tamil community was "vulnerable" on the issue and said he would not discuss "war crimes" per se in parliament for fear of retaliation, Sampanthan would emphasize the importance of people knowing the truth about what happened during the war. We also have asked Sampanthan repeatedly for his ideas on an accountability mechanism that would be credible to Tamils and possible within the current political context, but he has not been able to provide such a model.
7. (S) Mano Ganesan, MP and leader of the ethnic Tamil Democratic People's Front (DPF), is a Colombo-based Tamil who counts as supporters many of the well-educated, long-term Colombo and Western Province resident Tamils, and was an early supporter of Fonseka. The general made promises that convinced him that if Fonseka were to win, ethnic reconciliation issues would then be decided by parliament, not the Executive President. On accountability, Ganesan told us that while the issue was significant XXXXXXXXXXXX accountability was a divisive issue and the focus now had to be on uniting to rid the country of the Rajapaksas.
8. (S) TNA MP Pathmini Sithamparanathan told us in mid-December that the true story of what happened in the final weeks of the war would not go away and would come out eventually, but she also said now was not the time for war crimes-type investigations. Finally, on a recent trip to Jaffna, PolOff found that local politicians did not raise accountability for events at the end of the war as an issue of immediate concern, focusing instead on current bread-and-butter issues, such as IDP releases, concerns about Sinhala emigration to traditional Tamil regions, and
COLOMBO 00000032 003.2 OF 003
re-developing the local economy.
COMMENT
-------
9. (S) Accountability is clearly an issue of importance for the ultimate political and moral health of Sri Lankan society. There is an obvious split, however, between the Tamil diaspora and Tamils in Sri Lanka on how and when to address the issue. While we understand the former would like to see the issue as an immediate top-priority issue, most Tamils in Sri Lanka appear to think it is both unrealistic and counter-productive to push the issue too aggressively now. While Tamil leaders are very vocal and committed to national reconciliation and creating a political system more equitable to all ethnic communities, they believe themselves vulnerable to political or even physical attack if they raise the issue of accountability publicly, and common Tamils appear focused on more immediate economic and social concerns. A few have suggested to us that while they cannot address the issue, they would like to see the international community push it. Such an approach, however, would seem to play into the super-heated campaign rhetoric of Rajapaksa and his allies that there is an international conspiracy against Sri Lanka and its "war heroes." BUTENIS
Thursday, 30 October 2008, 11:47
C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 002173
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/UMB,
EEB/ESC/IEC FOR SGALLOGLY AND LWRIGHT
DOE FOR LEKIMOFF, CCALIENDO, RBOUDREAU
DOE FOR NNSA: NCARLSON, CHUNSAKER, TKOONTZ
USDOC FOR 4231/ITA/OEENIS/NISD/CLUCYK
EO 12958 DECL: 10/30/2018
TAGS EINV, ENRG, EPET, PINR, PREL, UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: TOO EARLY TO WRITE OFF ROSUKRENERGO (RUE)
IN 2009
Classified By: Economic Counselor Edward Kaska for reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary. Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko has repeatedly promised to remove all intermediaries in the gas trade with Russia, but Russia appears to be making direct gas dealings contingent upon obligations that Ukraine may not be able to fulfill. Tymoshenko and Russian PM Putin have signed a memorandum calling for direct gas trade, and the heads of state-owned oil and gas company Naftohaz Ukrainy and Russian energy giant Gazprom followed up with an agreement specifically removing shady intermediary RosUkrEnergo (RUE) from gas dealings between Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine must first pay off significant debts to Gazprom, however, which could be a tall order given the country's current balance of payments crisis and its poor track record of paying its gas debts. The high level meetings did set some parameters for the 2009 gas trade, but no final agreement on price has been signed, and GOU sources tell us that Moscow may bide its time to see if snap parliamentary elections result in a new government more amenable to Russia. Hence, it is still too early to write off RUE, or the concept of shady intermediaries as a whole. Some commentators are speculating that the sides may even agree to replace RUE with another, recently established company called KazUkrEnergo. End summary.
Conditions Must be Met before RUE Removed
-----------------------------------------
2. (C) Gas intermediary RosUkrEnergo (RUE), could still play a role in Ukraine's energy sector next year, despite the gas memorandum signed on October 2 by Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin that calls for direct gas relations between Ukraine and Russia. Tymoshenko repeatedly has pledged to eliminate RUE and other gas intermediaries from the gas trade between the two countries. Gazprom owns 50 percent of RUE. Ukrainian businessmen Dmitry Firtash and Ivan Fursin nominally control 45 and 5 percent stakes, respectively, but Ukrainian media several times have reported that the circle of true beneficiaries of RUE is wider and includes Semyon Mogilevich, a Russian organized crime boss wanted by the FBI and currently in custody in Russia.
3. (SBU) The October 2 memorandum aims to establish direct, long-term gas relations between Naftohaz and Gazprom beginning on January 1, 2009. The memorandum makes no mention of intermediaries for cross-border sales, and Ukraine must fulfill several conditions: Naftohaz must pay its outstanding gas debt to Gazprom, Ukraine must commit to paying future gas supplies on time, and Gazprom subsidiary Gazprom Sbyt must be allowed to sell gas to Ukrainian consumers (Note: This is quite a tall order, given that Naftohaz reportedly owes Gazprom $1.8 billion in accrued gas debt, Kyiv has a poor track record for paying its gas bills on time, and Naftohaz reportedly owes Gazprom 11 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas. End note).
4. (U) As a follow-up to the October 2 memo, Naftohaz Chairman Oleh Dubyna and Gazprom Head Alexei Miller last week concluded another agreement, which reportedly will remove RUE from Ukraine's gas market and change the way Ukraine and Russia have conducted gas relations since 2006. So far, few details about the new agreement are known. Neither a 2009 gas import price for Ukraine nor the amount of money Naftohaz owes Gazprom for unpaid gas were specified in the new agreement.
5. (SBU) Both sides did agree that the amount of gas that Ukraine transports across its territory on Gazprom's behalf in 2009 will be the same as this year's. In 2007 Ukraine shipped 112 bcm of Gazprom's gas through its pipelines, and 82 bcm during the first eight months of 2008, representing a 19 percent increase over the same period last year. Gazprom agreed to lower the cost of the 6.4 bcm of so-called "technical gas" that Ukraine annually uses to maintain its gas transport infrastructure. Naftohaz, on the other hand, has pledged to allow Gazprom Sbyt to sell no less than 7.5 bcm of gas in Ukraine to industrial customers and pay all outstanding gas debts, including RUE's to Gazprom.
GOU: Moscow May Wait for New Government
----------------------------------------
6. (C) EconOff spoke with Naftohaz Deputy Chairman Vitaliy Gnatushenko on October 27 regarding the GOU's plans to eliminate RUE from the gas arrangement. Gnatushenko affirmed that Ukraine still intended to sign a long-term gas contract with Gazprom that did not involve gas intermediary RUE. Naftohaz would sign a contract now, but Gnatushenko's contacts at Gazprom told him that Moscow first wanted Naftohaz to pay its outstanding debts, and was waiting for the outcome of snap parliamentary elections, which may or may not take place in December. EconOff also spoke with Deputy Minister of Fuel and Energy Volodymyr Makukha who acknowledged that RUE would most likely be part of the gas arrangement until Naftohaz had satisfactorily cleared all its outstanding gas debts either with cash or in-kind payments. Makukha could not explain how Naftohaz would quickly clear those debts. Makukha agreed that Moscow was waiting for Kyiv to elect a new parliament before it would sign anything. He added that with falling oil prices, Naftohaz's bargaining position for a cheaper gas price was strengthened, but he did not believe any new gas contracts would be signed until the end of December or the beginning of 2009.
KUE To Replace RUE?
-------------------
7. (SBU) While details are few, local press has reported that a new gas intermediary called "KazUkrEnergo AG" could take RUE's place and sell Central Asian gas to Ukraine, possibly after snap elections lead to a new government more amenable to Moscow. Like RUE, KazUkrEnergo (KUE) appears to be a "mailbox" company and could be waiting in the wings until a new Ukrainian PM is confirmed who may be more receptive to the idea of retaining gas intermediaries in Ukraine's gas relations with Russia and Central Asian producers. KUE was registered in May this year in Zurich with a statutory capital of 200,000 Swiss Francs ($194,870) and 20 shares. KazUkrEnergo reportedly is owned by Korlea Invest Holding AG (Switzerland), a company that exports Ukrainian electricity primarily to Central Europe.
Comment
-------
8. (C) Although media report that Tymoshenko -- by concluding this latest gas agreement -- has achieved her long held goal of removing RUE from Ukraine's energy sector, Gazprom could still retain the right to maintain its own contracts with the gas middleman. Ukraine would struggle to pay back $1.8 billion of debt in the best of times, and the current balance of payments crisis will make it even more difficult for Ukraine to settle the debt before negotiations for gas prices in 2009 begin in earnest. In addition, the country's unstable politics make it impossible to gauge whether Tymoshenko will be in power, or strong enough, to truly rid Ukraine of RUE in the coming months. Hence it remains too early to write off RUE. End comment. TAYLOR
Friday, 21 December 2007, 12:04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002282
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/20/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, SP
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH SPAIN'S CELEBRATED AND
CONTROVERSIAL JUDGE BALTASAR GARZON
REF: MADRID 2251
MADRID 00002282 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Eduardo Aguirre Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (b) and ( c)
1. (C) The Ambassador met on December 14 with Judge Baltasar Garzon, a high-profile investigative magistrate in Madrid's powerful National Court (Audiencia Nacional). Garzon was upbeat in his comments and said that he has a good understanding of U.S. law enforcement and counterterrorism policy, even though he does not always agree with it. He appreciates the close contact he has with the Embassy and said he considers the U.S. a friend. He also believes we have much to gain from continued collaboration. In his view however, the U.S. is missing opportunities to cultivate relationships with his five colleagues, all fellow investigative magistrates (Jueces de Instruccion). Garzon explained to the Ambassador that judges in Spain are a hybrid of a U.S. prosecutor and judge, and can lean more to one side or the other depending on their inclination. The six investigative magistrates that preside over National Courts 1-6 are (respectively): Santiago Pedraz, Ismael Moreno, Fernando Grande-Marlaska, Fernando Andreau, Baltasar Garzon, and Juan Del Olmo. The Ambassador informed Garzon that our Embassy Legal Attache did indeed have good working relationships with some of the other investigative magistrates (including Del Olmo, who was lead investigator on the March 11, 2004, Madrid train bombings), but that we were always interested in ways to work more closely together. In that spirit, and because U.S. and Spanish judicial laws are quite different, Garzon said that Spain should have a judicial attache in Washington to streamline cooperation on key cases, similar to relationships his country already has in the UK, France, and Mexico. (Embassy comment: We continue to work closely with the U.S. Justice Department and Spanish government to gain mutual approval for the position of a judicial attache based out of the Spanish Embassy in Washington. End Comment.)
//THE AL-KASSAR EXTRADITION//
2. (C) Garzon then provided the Ambassador with his thoughts on the pending extradition of Syrian arms dealer Monzer al-Kassar (REFTEL). He said that the judicial part of the extradition had been settled in favor of the U.S., but that the Spanish Council of Ministers still had to give its final approval. Al-Kassar would appeal to the Constitutional Court on the grounds that his human rights had been violated, but the court may not order a halt to the extradition during the approximately 30 days it will take to render its decision. Garzon said it was therefore vital that the Council have the chance to decide on the case at its next meeting, scheduled for December 28, so that Al-Kassar could be transferred to U.S. custody as soon as possible. Garzon reminded the Ambassador that he had prosecuted Al-Kassar in the past, and that he regrets not being able to put him away. He believes Al-Kassar will "start singing like a canary" the moment he is in U.S. custody to try and cut whatever deal he can. Garzon clearly has no love lost for Al-Kassar and said "I hope you get him."
3. (C) Judge Garzon ended the meeting by giving the Ambassador a brief readout of his recent visits to Afghanistan and Iraq. Spanish press has reported that Garzon is working with Spanish public television to put together a documentary for broadcast in January that will focus on the current situation in those two countries. Garzon told the Ambassador he was grateful for the treatment and level of access he was given by U.S. officials. He said the security situation in Iraq has improved, but he gives the credit more to the willingness of Iraqi sheikhs and tribal leaders to work with Coalition forces against the terrorists than to the surge in U.S. forces. Although Spanish press reports have speculated the Garzon's documentary would be critical of U.S. CT policy, the Judge did not share specifics on what might be covered in the program.
//COMMENT//
4. (C) Judge Garzon has been a storied and controversial figure in recent Spanish history, whose ambition and pursuit of the spotlight may be without rival. He has investigated everything from corruption in the former Spanish government of Felipe Gonzalez to alleged Dirty War atrocities committed by past Argentine governments, and even went after General Augusto Pinochet for genocide, terrorism, and torture.
MADRID 00002282 002.2 OF 002
However, he has never prosecuted anyone associated with crimes committed during the Franco dictatorship. He clearly has an anti-American streak (as evidenced by occasional scathing editorials in the Spanish press criticizing Guantanamo and aspects of what he calls the "U.S.-led war on terror"), and we are certainly under no illusions about the individual with whom we are dealing. There is a very good chance that his documentary next month will indeed be a hatchet job on the U.S. However, Garzon has also doggedly pursued many important terrorist cases and there have been and will continue to be numerous areas where our interests overlap. For instance, Garzon is very active in investigating terrorist pipelines based in Catalunya that feed would-be suicide bombers to Iraq. One of these individuals was recently detained in Iraq before committing a terrorist act and Garzon will soon take his deposition. This Embassy has a good working relationship with Garzon and his door has always been open to the Ambassador and members of our Country Team. Embassy Legat has tried to foster relationships with all six of the investigative magistrates, with varying degrees of success. Some are responsive to our outreach and attend Embassy-organized conferences and events, others do not. We will continue to explore ways to deepen our cooperation with these individuals, as Garzon is correct that they all wield significant authority and latitude to investigate and prosecute cases of interest to the U.S. AGUIRRE
Friday, 17 April 2009, 06:07
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000392
SIPDIS
EUR/WE FOR ELAINE SAMSON AND STACIE ZERDECKI,
L/LEI FOR KEN PROPP AND CLIFF JOHNSON
CA/OCS FOR PPLATUKIS AND MBERNIER-TOTH
INR FOR JANICE BELL
S/CT FOR MARC NORMAN
EMBASSY ROME FOR MOLLY PHEE
PASS TO NSC'S TOBY BRADLEY, CAROLYN KRASS
PASS TO DOJ'S BRUCE SWARTZ AND DOJ/OIA/PAT REEDY
EO 12958 DECL: 04/16/2019
TAGS AORC, PREL, CASC, CJAN, PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, SOCI,
KCRM, KJUS, KISL, KLIG, SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN: ATTORNEY GENERAL RECOMMENDS COURT NOT
PURSUE GTMO CRIMINAL CASE VS. FORMER USG OFFICIALS
REF: A. MADRID 383 B. MADRID 347
MADRID 00000392 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Arnold A. Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY. On April 16, Candido Conde Pumpido, Spain's Attorney General (AG), publicly stated that prosecutors will "undoubtedly" not support a criminal complaint, filed by a Spanish NGO with the National Court, to investigate six former USG officials, including former AG Alberto Gonzalez, for creating a legal framework that allegedly permitted torture. During a Q&A session of a previously scheduled public address, Conde Pumpido responded to a question on the issue by stating that he will not support the criminal complaint because it is "fraudulent," and has been filed as a political statement to attack past USG policies. The AG noted that the GOS could not pursue a complaint that targeted USG advisors while a similar suit against the Defense Secretary Rumsfeld (see REF B) had failed. While Conde Pumpido defended the GOS's investigation of universal jurisdiction cases to defend human rights, he said that the policy will not be used as a toy or a tool to force the GOS into investigating the decisions of another government. The AG added that if there is evidence of criminal activity by USG officials, then a case should be filed in the United States. Addressing next steps, the AG's press chief subsequently told the media that the Prosecutor's office will deliver the AG's recommendation to the National Court, where it will be up to investigating judge Baltasar Garzon - an outspoken critic of the Guantanamo detention facility who has publicly stated that former President Bush should be tried for war crimes - to decide whether to pursue the case or not. As reported in REFTELs, Conde Pumpido's public announcement follows outreach to GOS officials to raise USG deep concerns on the implications of this case. END SUMMARY.
//BACKGROUND ON THE CASE//
2. (C) As reported in REF B, a Spanish NGO - Association for the Dignity of Spanish Prisoners - in March 2009 requested that the National Court indict six former U.S. officials for creating a legal framework that allegedly permitted torture. The six accused are: former AG Alberto Gonzales; David Addington, former chief of staff and legal adviser to the Vice President; William Haynes, former DOD General Counsel; Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Jay Bybee, former head of the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel; and John Yoo, a former member of Bybee's staff. The NGO claimed that Spain had a duty to open a "universal jurisdiction" case because five Guantanamo detainees are either Spanish citizens or were/are Spanish residents. Although he seemed displeased to have this dropped in his lap, Chief Prosecutor Javier Zaragoza on April 1 privately told Embassy officials the complaint - at first glance - appeared well-documented and in all likelihood he would have no option but to open a case.
//ANNOUNCEMENT FOLLOWS INTENSIVE USG OUTREACH//
3. (C) Following revelations by the Spanish press that the complaint had been filed, the Acting DCM on March 31 and April 1 phoned FM Moratinos' Chief of Staff Agustin Santos, and MOJ Director General for International Judicial Cooperation Aurora Mejia about the matter. Both expressed their concern at the case but stressed the independence of the Spanish judiciary. The A/DCM stressed to both that this was a very serious matter for the USG and asked that the Embassy be kept informed of any developments.
MADRID 00000392 002.2 OF 003
4. (C) As reported in REF A, Senator Judd Gregg, accompanied by the Charge d'Affaires, raised the issue with Luis Felipe Fernandez de la Pena, Director General Policy Director for North America and Europe during a visit to the Spanish MFA on April 13. Senator Gregg expressed his concern about the case. Fernandez de la Pena lamented this development, adding that judicial independence notwithstanding, the MFA disagreed with efforts to apply universal jurisdiction in such cases.
5. (C) Zaragoza on April 14 called Embassy Madrid's FSN Legal Adviser and informed her that a more thorough study had revealed that the complaint was targeted against legal advisors with no executive authority and that it was legally difficult to establish what type of offense the six had committed and the degree to which they participated in the alleged offenses. Zaragoza said the complaint lacked details and was directed against USG policy rather than a specific perpetrator. He said he would ask Conde Pumpido to review whether Spain has jurisdiction in this case and indicated that he hoped the Spanish AG would draft a clear set of rules on how and when Spain should prosecute universal jurisdiction complaints.
6. (C) As reported in SEPTEL, Senator Mel Martinez, accompanied by the Charge d'Affaires, met Acting FM Angel Lossada during a visit to the Spanish MFA on April 15. Martinez and the Charge underscored that the prosecutions would not be understood or accepted in the U.S. and would have an enormous impact on the bilateral relationship. The Senator also asked if the GOS had thoroughly considered the source of the material on which the allegations were based to ensure the charges were not based on misinformation or factually wrong statements. Lossada responded that the GOS recognized all of the complications presented by universal jurisdiction, but that the independence of the judiciary and the process must be respected. The GOS would use all appropriate legal tools in the matter. While it did not have much margin to operate, the GOS would advise Conde Pumpido that the official administration position was that the GOS was "not in accord with the National Court." Lossada reiterated to Martinez that the executive branch of government could not close any judicial investigation and urged that this case not affect the overall relationship, adding that our interests were much broader, and that the universal jurisdiction case should not be viewed as a reflection of the GOS position.
7. (C) Meanwhile, the Embassy has been involved in DOJ-led talks to have Zaragoza - who attended the April 16 press conference - lead a four-person team of GOS officials to Washington for a possible meeting with U.S. Deputy AG David Ogden or AG Eric Holder during the week of May 18. Zaragoza's wife, who is Conde Pumpido's chief of staff, would reportedly be one of the four.
//COMMENT//
8. (C) Although not legally binding on the National Court, Conde Pumpido's announcement puts pressure on crusading judge Garzon, who has not yet accepted the case, not to proceed with the investigation. As described in REF B, Zaragoza has indicated to Post - and reconfirmed this in his April 14 phone call in Para 3 - that he would argue that the case should not be assigned to Garzon and instead would recommend that Garzon's colleague, Investigating Judge Ismael Moreno, should be assigned the case. Zaragoza said the case ties in with Moreno's ongoing investigations into alleged illegal "CIA flights" that have transited Spain carrying detainees to Guantanamo. Zaragoza acknowledges that Garzon has the "right of first refusal," but has told Post that if Garzon
MADRID 00000392 003.2 OF 003
disregards his recommendation and takes the case, the prosecutor will appeal. When a judge disagrees with the prosecutor on how or what to investigate, then the prosecutor has the right to appeal to a higher court, in this case the National Court's Criminal Chamber, led by Javier Gomez Bermudez. During this period in which the jurisdiction of the case is in question, Garzon could still proceed with the case, including preparing MLATs to question to the accused, formally naming the accused as defendants, and issuing arrest warrants against them. Investigating judges in Spain, including and especially Garzon, have used this tactic frequently, particularly when these actions are popular with sizable segments of the Spanish population. This worst-case scenario remains a possibility at this point. Zaragoza has also told us that if a proceeding regarding this matter were underway in the U.S., that would effectively bar proceedings in Spain. We intend to further explore this option with him informally (asking about format, timing, how much information he would need, etc.) while making it clear that the USG has not made a decision to follow this course of action. CHACON
Wednesday, 01 April 2009, 17:01
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 000347
SIPDIS
EUR/WE FOR ELAINE SAMSON AND STACIE ZERDECKI,
L/LEI FOR KEN PROPP AND CLIFF JOHNSON
CA/OCS FOR PPLATUKIS AND MBERNIER-TOTH
INR FOR JANICE BELL
S/CT FOR MARC NORMAN
EMBASSY ROME FOR MOLLY PHEE
PASS TO NSC'S TOBY BRADLEY
PASS TO DOJ'S BRUCE SWARTZ AND DOJ/OIA/PAT REEDY
EO 12958 DECL: 03/31/2019
TAGS AORC, PREL, CASC, CJAN, PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, SOCI,
KCRM, KJUS, KISL, KLIG, SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN: PROSECUTOR WEIGHS GTMO CRIMINAL CASE VS.
FORMER USG OFFICIALS
REF: A. OSC EUP20090329950015 B. OSC EUP20090330950017 C. 06 MADRID 1914 D. 07 MADRID 2282 E. 08 MADRID 409 F. 07 MADRID 911 G. 07 MADRID 863 H. OSC EUP20080828085019
MADRID 00000347 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: ADCM William H. Duncan for reasons 1.4 (b), and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: A Spanish NGO has requested that the National Court indict six Bush Administration officials for creating a legal framework that allegedly permitted torture. The NGO is attempting to have the case heard by Investigating Judge Baltasar Garzon, internationally known for his dogged pursuit of "universal jurisdiction" cases. Garzon has passed the complaint to the prosecutor's office for them to determine if there is a legitimate case. Although he seemed displeased to have this dropped in his lap, Chief Prosecutor Javier Zaragoza told us that in all likelihood he would have no option but to open a case. He said he did not envision indictments or arrest warrants in the near future. He will also argue against the case being assigned to Garzon. MFA and MOJ contacts have told us they are concerned about the case, but have stressed the independence of the Spanish judiciary. They too have suggested the case will move slowly. END SUMMARY.
The Accused
-----------
2. (U) The six accused are: former Attorney General Gonzales; David Addington, former chief of staff and legal adviser to the Vice President; William Haynes, former DOD General Counsel; Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Jay Bybee, former head of the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel; and John Yoo, a former member of Bybee's staff.
3. (SBU) The NGO that filed the criminal complaint is the Association for the Dignity of Spanish Prisoners. According to Spanish press reports, a team of four lawyers worked on the complaint. This team also brought a case for a different Spanish NGO in January 2009 against Ehud Barak and six senior Israeli military officials for alleged war crimes in Gaza in 2002. (Note: In early 2009, the press reported that FM Moratinos had told the GOI Spain would revise its universal jurisdiction laws to prevent such cases; we cannot corroborate this. End note.) Gonzalo Boye Tucet is one of the four lawyers behind the current lawsuit and is taking the lead with the media. Open source material identifies Boye as a Chilean-born lawyer who is a former member of the International Revolutionary Movement. He served eight years in a Spanish prison as part of a 14-year sentence he received for his role in the 1988 kidnapping of a Spanish businessman, a plot which reportedly was financed in part by ETA.
4. (C) The NGO is emphasizing that Spain has a duty to investigate because five Guantanamo detainees are either Spanish citizens or were/are Spanish residents. However, the NGO does not claim to be representing these individuals. Their names are: Hamed Abderrahman Ahmed (known in the media as "The Spanish Taliban"); Lahcen Ikassrien (aka Chaj Hasan); Reswad Abdulsam; Jamiel Abdul Latif al Bana (aka Abu Anas); and Omar Deghayes.
MADRID 00000347 002.2 OF 004
5. (C) The NGO has attempted to steer this case directly to National Court Investigating Judge Baltasar Garzon. For two decades, Garzon has generated international headlines with high profile cases involving Spanish politicians, ETA, radical Islamic terrorists, and crimes against humanity. Perhaps his most famous case was his attempt to bring to trial in Spain former Chilean ruler Augustin Pinochet. Garzon has a reputation for being more interested in publicity than detail in his cases. The NGO's argument for Garzon taking the case is that he investigated some of the individuals named in paragraph four as part of an investigation of al Qaeda cell in Spain. Garzon has passed the NGO's complaint to the prosecutor's office for them to determine if there is a legitimate case. The Complaint
-------------
6. (U) Post has forwarded the 98-page complaint to L. In sum, it alleges that the accused conspired with criminal intent to construct a legal framework to permit interrogation techniques and detentions in violation of international law. The complaint describes a number of U.S. documents, including: a December 28, 2001, memorandum regarding U.S. courts' jurisdiction over Guantanamo detainees; a February 7, 2002, memorandum saying the detainees were not covered by the Geneva Convention; a March 13, 2002, memorandum on new interrogation techniques; an August 1, 2002, memorandum on the definition of torture; a November 27, 2002, memorandum recommending approval of 15 new interrogation techniques; and a March 14, 2003, memorandum providing a legal justification for new interrogation techniques. The complaint also cites a 2006 U.S. Supreme Court case which its says held the February 2002 memo violated international law and President Obama's recent Executive Order on ensuring lawful interrogations.
7. (C) The complaint asserts Spanish jurisdiction by claiming that the alleged crimes committed at Guantanamo violated the 1949 Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocols of 1977, the 1984 Convention Against Torture or Other Cruel, Unusual or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the 1998 Rome Statute. The GOS is a signatory to all three instruments. The complaint cites Article 7 of the 1984 Convention Against Torture, which states that if a person accused of torture is not extradited to the nation that is bringing a case against him or her, then the competent authorities in the country where the person is should bring a case against him or her. There is media speculation that one of the NGO's goals may be to encourage the U.S. to begin judicial proceedings on this matter.
8. (U) The complaint does not specifically call for arrest warrants. Rather, it ends with a call for the Spanish courts to take statements from the accused and to request information from the USG about the various internal documents cited in the complaint (declassification dates and authorities, an official report about the legal nature of memoranda such as the ones cited in the complaint, and an official report on the legal nature and binding force of Executive Orders).
Contacts with Spanish Authorities
---------------------------------
9. (C) On April 1, POLOFF and Embassy FSN Legal Adviser met National Court Chief Prosecutor Javier Zaragoza, who said
MADRID 00000347 003.2 OF 004
that he personally will decide whether to open a criminal case. There is no statutory timeframe for his decision. Zaragoza said the complaint appears well-documented and in all likelihood he will have no option but to open a case (the evidence was on his desk in four red folders a foot tall). Visibly displeased with this having been dropped in his lap, Zaragoza said he was in no rush to proceed with the case and in any event will argue that the case should not be assigned to Garzon. Zaragoza acknowledged that Garzon has the "right of first refusal," but said he will recommend that Garzon's colleague, Investigating Judge Ismael Moreno, should be assigned the case. Zaragoza said the case ties in with Moreno's ongoing investigations into alleged illegal "CIA flights" that have transited Spain carrying detainees to Guantanamo. Zaragoza said that if Garzon disregards his recommendation and takes the case, he will appeal. Zaragoza added that Garzon's impartiality was very suspect, given his public criticism of Guantanamo and the U.S. war on terror (we note that, among other things, Garzon narrated a documentary in 2008 that was extremely critical of the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and its approach to fighting terrorism) and his August 2008 public statements that former President Bush should be tried for war crimes.
10. (C) Zaragoza noted that Spain would not be able to claim jurisdiction in the case if the USG opened its own investigation, which he much preferred as the best way forward and described as "the only way out" for the USG. He cited the complaint against Israeli officials mentioned above and said he would request the investigating judge close that case once he had formal notice that the Israelis had opened their own investigation.
11. (C) On March 31 and April 1, the Acting DCM discussed the case separately with FM Moratinos' Chief of Staff Agustin Santos, and MOJ Director General for International Judicial Cooperation Aurora Mejia. Santos said the case was worrisome. He noted that the Spanish judiciary was independent, but he opined that these universal jurisdiction cases often sputtered out after the initial burst of publicity. He also noted that they tended to move very slowly through the system. Mejia also stressed that the judiciary was independent, and added that the MOJ had no official information regarding the case and knew nothing about it beyond what the media had reported. She said privately that the reaction to the complaint in the MOJ was "horror." A/DCM stressed to both that this was a very serious matter for the USG and asked that the Embassy be kept informed of any developments.
Comment
-------
12. (C) Given Spain's reputation for liberally invoking universal jurisdiction, this may not be the last such case brought here (nor is it the first -- in 2007, a different Spanish NGO brought a complaint against former SECDEF Rumsfeld for crimes against humanity based on the Iraq war and Abu Ghraib. Zaragoza told us that case was quietly dismissed although he could not recall the grounds). The fact that this complaint targets former Administration legal officials may reflect a "stepping-stone" strategy designed to pave the way for complaints against even more senior officials. Both the media and Post's FSN Legal Advisor suspect the complaint was prepared with the assistance of lawyers outside Spain, perhaps in the U.S., and perhaps in
MADRID 00000347 004.2 OF 004
collaboration with NGO's such as Human Rights Watch or Reprieve. It appears to have been drafted by someone who understands the U.S. legal system far better than the average Spanish lawyer. For all the publicity universal jurisdiction cases excite (Garzon's attempt to extradite Pinochet from the UK comes to mind), we only know of one case ever tried here (involving a former member of Argentina's military junta). Based on what Zaragoza told us, we suspect the case will eventually be referred to the National Court for investigation, although that step may not come for some time. Once it reaches the National Court, these cases seem to move slowly, periodically generating publicity as new evidence is taken (as with Moreno's investigation into so-called Guantanamo flights). Whether this case will end up with Garzon, Moreno, or some other judge, we cannot say. Garzon, despite his penchant for publicity and criticism of certain aspects of U.S. policy, has worked well with the U.S. on more routine criminal matters (although we think a direct approach to him on this case could well be counter-productive). Moreno, while his reputation as a judge stands higher among legal insiders, has been cooler in his dealings us. We suspect the Spanish Government, whatever its disagreements with the policies of the Bush Administration, will find this case inconvenient. Despite the pro forma public comment of First Vice President Fernandez de la Vega that the GOS would respect whatever decision the courts make in this matter, the timing could not be worse for President Zapatero as he tries to improve ties with the U.S. and get the Spanish public focused on the future of the relationship rather than the past. That said, we do not know if the government would be willing to take the risky step of trying behind the scenes to influence the prosecutor's recommendation on this case or what their reaction to such a request would be. CHACON
Tuesday, 05 May 2009, 15:34
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000440
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
FOR EUR/WE, ALSO FOR L/LEI AND CA/OCS, DOJ FOR BRUCE SWARTZ
AND PAT REEDY
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS AORC, PREL, CASC, CJAN, PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, SOCI,
KCRM, KJUS, SP
SUBJECT: GARZON OPENS SECOND INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGED
U.S. TORTURE OF TERRORISM DETAINEES
REF: A. MADRID 392 B. MADRID 393 C. 08 MADRID 1280
MADRID 00000440 001.2 OF 002
1. (SBU) Summary: Spanish National Court (Audiencia Nacional) investigating judge Baltasar Garzon has announced he will pursue an investigation into allegations the U.S. tortured terrorism detainees at Guantanamo. He has yet to name any targets of his investigation. This comes days after he was forced to give up a related complaint filed by an NGO against six Bush Administration officials (ref a). At the urging of Spanish prosecutors, the earlier case was reassigned to another National Court judge who now appears to be trying shelve the case. The Chief Prosecutor for the National Court tells us he will also fight Garzon's latest move. Nevertheless, we suspect Garzon will wring all the publicity he can from the case unless and until he is forced to give it up. End summary.
2. (U) Garzon bowed to arguments by Spanish prosecutors and April 17 forwarded to National Court docketing authorities a case recently filed against six Bush Administration officials (ref a). That case was duly assigned to investigating judge Eloy Velasco. We learned May 5 that Velasco has declined to process that case saying that before moving forward the USG should be asked if proceedings are underway in the U.S. He also offered to transfer the proceedings to the U.S. under the MLAT. We are waiting for a copy of Velasco's ruling and will advise further when we receive it. Meanwhile, Garzon announced April 29 that he was commencing a separate investigation into alleged U.S. torture of terrorism detainees.
3. (SBU) LEGATT and Embassy FSN Legal Advisor met May 4 with National Court Chief Prosecutor Javier Zaragoza (protect) to discuss Garzon's latest move. Zaragoza said he had challenged Garzon directly and personally on this latest case, asking if he was trying to drum up more speaking fees. Garzon replied he was doing it for the record only and would let it die. Zaragoza opined that Garzon, having gotten his headline, would soon drop the matter. In case he does not, Zaragoza has a strategy to force his hand. Zaragoza's strategy hinges on the older case in which Garzon investigated terrorism complaints against some Guantanamo detainees. In connection with those earlier investigations, Garzon ordered the Spanish police to visit Guantanamo and collect evidence against the suspected terrorists. Zaragoza reasons that he can use this fact to embarrass Garzon into dropping this latest case by suggesting Garzon in some sense condoned the U.S. approach to detainee issues circa 2004. Garzon took no action in 2004 when the suspects returned to Spain and reported to him their alleged mistreatment. Zaragoza said that if Garzon could not be shamed into dropping the case, then he would formally recommend Garzon do so and appeal if Garzon ignored him.
4. (SBU) Key to Zaragoza's plans is the fact that there is yet another Guantanamo-related case underway in the National Court. That case relates to so-called CIA flights carrying detainees to Guantanamo via Spain and is being heard by investigating Judge Ismael Moreno (ref c). The police officers whom Garzon sent to Guantanamo years ago are expected to testify before Moreno this month, and Zaragoza hopes their testimony will put on record Garzon's role in the earlier cases. (Note: In opening his most recent Guantanamo investigation, Garzon asked that Moreno turn his detainee flights case over to him; Zaragoza thought there was no chance Moreno would agree to do so. End note.) Zaragoza is also banking on the fact that Garzon is already in hot water over his excessive zeal in another case. A few months ago, Garzon opened an investigation into Spanish civil war atrocities. Garzon persisted in his investigation in the face of all advice to the contrary from prosecutors. The case was finally wrestled away from Garzon, but there is now a criminal complaint against him in the Supreme Court, alleging abuse of authority. That complaint has the support of Spanish prosecutors. Zaragoza doubts Garzon will risk a second such complaint.
5. (SBU) As we have reported, with respect to the earlier complaint against six Bush Administration officials, Zaragoza has repeatedly suggested that a USG affirmation that the U.S. is investigating the torture issue could help dispose of
MADRID 00000440 002.2 OF 002
Spanish judicial inquires into the subject. In that regard, the Spanish press reported today that National Court investigating judge Fernando Andreu, who is handling a case against Israeli officials accused of war crimes in Gaza in 2002, has refused to drop the case despite a request from prosecutors. The prosecutors had argued that Israel was investigating the matter. In refusing to close the case, Andreu argued that Gaza was not part of Israel and thus Israeli authorities were not the ones who should be investigating crimes allegedly committed there. The press reports that the President of the Supreme Court and Spain's Judicial Council (Consejo General del Poder Judicial), Carlos Divar, is arguing for reforming the jurisdiction of the National Court to avoid having it turned into the "judicial police of the world." Zaragoza has commented to us that while many talk about limiting Spain's universal jurisdiction rules, it is unlikely politicians will act to do so.
Comment
-------
4. (SBU) We believe Zaragoza is acting in good faith and playing a constructive role. Certainly he knows Garzon better than we do, having sparred with him before. Nevertheless, we do not share his optimism that this problem will go away anytime soon. Having started, it is hard for us to see why the publicity-loving Garzon would shut off his headline-generating machine unless forced to do so. And forcing him to do so could take months. We also fear Garzon -- far from being deterred by threats of disciplinary action -- may welcome the chance for martyrdom, knowing the case will attract worldwide attention. In any event, we will probably be dealing with this issue for some time to come. Zaragoza will be in Washington in early June for LEGATT-organized consultations on CT cooperation. L and DOJ may wish take that opportunity to discuss these cases with him directly at that time. CHACON
Thursday, 21 May 2009, 19:12
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 052368
EO 12958 DECL: 05/19/2019
TAGS MOPS, PREL, PGOV, NATO, UK
SUBJECT: U.S.-UK CLUSTER MUNITIONS DIALOGUE
REF: A. 2008 LONDON 3082 B. 2008 STATE 229199
Classified By: PM/WRA DEPUTY DIRECTOR STEVEN COSTNER For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
Summary
-------
1. (C) Summary: In the latest bilateral consultation on the cluster munitions issue, Department and DoD representatives met with representatives from the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) on May 6 to discuss progress on their national legislation implementing the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), timeline for ratification, outstanding issues related to interoperability, CCM discussion at NATO, and on-going cluster munitions negotiations in the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). The UK's primary focus at this meeting was to inform Washington of an accelerated date for the request of the removal of U.S. munitions from UK territory and to seek reactions to the latest version of the draft letter from Foreign Minister Miliband to Secretary Clinton. They also expressed concerns with our position regarding the treatment of the cluster munitions system excluded from the CCM definition of cluster munitions in the CCW negotiations. End Summary.
2. (C) Nicolas Pickard, head of the FCO Security Policy Group accompanied by his deputy Andrew Ford and Clare Bloomfield from the UK Embassy, visited PM/WRA on May 6. PM/WRA Deputy Director Steven Costner headed the U.S. representation that included David Hodson (OSD), Stephen Mathias (L), Mark Melamed (EUR/RPM), Lindsay Gardner (PM/WRA), and Katherine Baker (PM/WRA). This meeting was a continuation of close bilateral consultations on cluster munitions. The last formal meeting was held in London in December 2008 (ref A), and the group also met on the margins of a multilateral meeting in February 2009 (ref B).
-------------------------------
CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS
-------------------------------
3. (C) Pickard informed the group that the Convention on Cluster Munitions has been put on the draft Parliamentary agenda for the next session (November 2009 to May 2010). Although the Parliamentary agenda will not be final until the Queen makes her speech to Parliament in November and this session will be short due to the May 2010 general elections, it is likely that the CCM will be ratified during the session. Pickard confirmed that the recommended legislation is in line with and does not go beyond the UK legal interpretation of the CCM -- with one exception: UK personnel, even if embedded in non-State Parties' armed forces, will be prohibited from firing cluster munitions. (At the February consultations UK representatives stated that from a legal perspective, UK pilots embedded in U.S. units could fire cluster munitions, but forewarned that the policy position may not allow this.) The prohibition would not apply to other personnel in the chain of command or headquarters positions.
4. (C) Pickard also noted a gap between the UK interpretation of the CCM and its policy decision regarding removal of cluster munitions stockpiles from UK territory. In relation to this request, Pickard stated that the Ministers would like to accelerate the time frame for removal so that all U.S. cluster munitions currently in permanent storage on UK territory would be moved out by the time the UK MOD completed destruction of its own stockpiles in 2013. Originally the FCO had previewed that U.S. armed forces would have until about 2018 to complete the action, in line with the transition period provided in the CCM once the treaty enters into force. Costner noted that the new timeline may have little practical effect on our primary concerns related to operations at Diego Garcia because most of the cluster munitions there are permanently stored on ships, but must transit the base. (Pickard reconfirmed that off-shore storage on U.S. ships would still be permitted.) That said, DoD needs to review the request because, among other factors, resources have not been allocated to remove the munitions in this time frame.
5. (C) In answer to queries about the case-by-case temporary storage exception for specific missions, Pickard and Ford confirmed that the concept was accepted at highest levels of the Government, as that idea has been included in the draft letter from Minister Miliband to Secretary Clinton. The operation-by-operation definition of "case-by-case" is being put forward for approval at the Ministerial level, backed up by precedent in other agreements for U.S. use of UK bases for specific operations. Further discussion clarified that, under the latest UK proposal, any U.S. cluster munitions currently stored on British territory (either UK territory proper, Diego Garcia, or elsewhere) would be permitted to stay until 2013, while any new cluster munitions the USG wanted to bring to those sites after the treaty's entry into force for the UK -- either before or after 2013 -- would require the temporary exception. Any movement of cluster munitions from ships at Diego Garcia to planes there, temporary transit, or use from British territory also would require the temporary exception after entry into force. Pickard noted that it would be better for the USG and HMG not to reach final agreement on this temporary agreement understanding until after the CCM ratification process is completed in Parliament, so that they can tell Parliamentarians that they have requested the USG to remove its cluster munitions by 2013, without complicating/muddying the debate by having to indicate that this request is open to exceptions.
6. (C) Costner requested that Pickard provide confirmation that the requests for temporary storage would be considered on an operation-by-operation basis when it is clear this approach been approved. Pickard requested clarity from DoD on the process for moving munitions at Diego Garcia from the ships where they're stored to the planes, a reaction to the 2013 deadline and specifics as to why the 2013 deadline could not be met if in fact it cannot, and U.S. reaction to the revised draft letter from Foreign Minister Miliband to the Secretary. This draft incorporates changes that we suggested (ref A) as well as the request that U.S. stockpiles be removed by 2013. Pickard requested comments on the letter as soon as possible so that the Government can report that it has been done well in advance of any Parliamentary debate. Costner recommended waiting until this summer to put the letter forward, when appropriate officials within the Department are in place.
-----------
CCM AT NATO
-----------
7. (C) Hodson outlined our concerns about potential proposals at NATO related to next steps on CCM and interoperability. He stressed that we did not think that this was an appropriate issue for the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and that agreement on detailed obligations for NATO members did not seem possible. The most that we could accept - and, likely, the most that could be achieved - would be a simple statement referring to the obligations in the treaty itself, including Article 21, but without interpretation. The note to ROE 38 related to the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel landmines could be an acceptable model. In particular, the ideas Germany floated with U.S. representatives on the margins of the last round of CCW negotiations - including that the NAC recognize that: CCM States Party request the Alliance not use cluster munitions; the CCM has a different definition of cluster munitions; and CCM states have taken certain obligations related to the Convention - are viewed as unhelpful. Pickard agreed that a NAC ruling on cluster munitions would not be helpful and noted that they were satisfied with the October 2008 military advice. They did not think the subject should be discussed at NATO until closer to the CCM entry into force and stated that any iscussion should be kept as brief as possible. Pickard noted that they could probably accept something along the lines of the note in ROE 38.
---
CCW
---
8. (C) Ford expressed UK support for concluding a Protocol on cluster munitions in the CCW, but doubted that it would be possible given extreme positions on both sides of the negotiation. Mathias noted that we have some hope that some progress could be made. Both sides agreed that the input the ICRC provided in advance of the last negotiating session was not constructive or objective. The conversation then focused on treatment of the weapon systems excluded from the CCM definition of cluster munitions in the CCW draft text. The UK noted that it placed additional restrictions on the CCM-excluded weapon making it "CCM plus", rather than "CCM minus" which is how they have come to view the CCW process. Mathias verified that the UK interpretation is correct and that the intent of the provision is to ensure that CCM-excluded weapons are restricted in the same way that CCW protocol-permitted cluster munitions would be. Mathias stressed that there is no conceptual difference in the two types of weapons systems and therefore they should have the same restrictions. He confirmed that we are willing to take on the obligations of the Protocol for our future cluster munitions systems, even those which may meet the CCM exclusions. Ford indicated that accepting additional restrictions on the CCM-excluded weapon would be difficult for the UK because their ministers pledged to ban all cluster munitions upon the UK's signing of the CCM. It would be difficult to explain why additional restrictions were needed on a "safe" weapon. That said, he noted that this was not a red line and is open to on-going consultations. Pickard and Ford additionally voiced concerns that prolonged negotiations could cause states to lose interest in the CCW process, particularly after entry into force of the CCM, to which Costner and Mathias responded that they felt many states did not want to be blamed for negotiations falling apart and are therefore willing to allow discussions to continue without progress.
-----------
WAY FORWARD
-----------
9. (C) Regarding our bilateral conversation, the Department will work with DoD to answer the questions posed about the accelerated timeline and operations at Diego Garcia as well as comments on the latest draft letter. Regarding possible discussions at NATO, the Department recommends that USNATO remain in close contact with UK counterparts on this issue, as they will need to work together to minimize unhelpful initiatives. On CCW, the U.S. delegation will continue close consultations with the UK on the CCM-excluded weapons issue.
CLINTON
Tuesday, 12 February 2008, 10:58
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000245
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/07/2018
TAGS PREL, NATO, PARM, MARR, KACT, FR, UK, CH, EG, IN, RU
SUBJECT: P3 MEETING ON NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT
ISSUES
Classified By: DCM Mark A. Pekala, for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary. On February 7, Acting U/S John Rood and his delegation met his French and British P3 counterparts, Philippe Carre and Mariot Leslie respectively, to discuss a broad range of nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament issues. Unusually, the French were closer to the U.S. than were the British on most issues. The greatest area of divergence involved a strong UK push for complete nuclear disarmament as a long term goal, including using verification measures in P5 countries. Rood and Carre expressed skepticism that this would have a significant impact either on aspiring proliferators or NGO disarmament advocates. They urged the British to join instead in a P3 strategy publicizing our strong nuclear disarmament records, promoting FMCT and START follow-on, and focusing on emerging threats such as nuclear terrorism. On missile defense, the British and French both praised our efforts with Russia as forward-leaning, supported our post-START approach, and expressed concern about Russia's moves to globalize the INF treaty. The British strongly supported the U.S. in seeking NATO endorsement in the Bucharest Communique of our MD efforts in Europe; the French, while remaining reluctant, agreed to support language in the Communique recognizing the threat and the utility of MD as one element of a response, and positively recognizing U.S. interceptors and radars as the core of a NATO capability. The P3 also discussed enforcement of the NPT vis-a-vis Iran, civil nuclear energy cooperation with India, cluster munitions, a proposed UK Arms Trade Treaty and difficulties with Egypt and China. The P3 plan to meet again in April. End Summary.
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A (MODEST) BRITISH PROPOSAL
----------------------------------
2. (S) The meeting began with general agreement that, in the last 10 to 15 years, proliferation concerns have grown and that the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime is under stress. While aspiring proliferators such as Iran constitute the primary threat, the issue of energy security (and the acquisition of nuclear energy by non-nuclear states) has raised a new NPT dimension as well. U/S Rood stated that the USG was interested in creating "rules of the road" to allow for the peaceful use of nuclear energy within the NPT. Leslie agreed, adding that UK FM David Miliband was focusing on using the new demand for nuclear energy to look at safety issues as well as building capacity (some of which can be addressed through PSI).
3. (S) Participants agreed that Iran is the primary problem facing the states in the NPT regime. Carre stated that if the international community is unable to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state, the NPT will lose credibility. U/S Rood agreed, adding that enforcement of the NPT regime must be the first priority, followed by addressing structural defects in the regime that allow nations to acquire enrichment technologies without any justification. Leslie said that, while no one was "on Iran's side," some in the NAM, such as Brazil and Egypt, pay lip service to Iranian arguments for their own political reasons. All agreed that the P3 should do more to mobilize the various constituencies to promote better understanding of the threat and show that the stakes of withdrawing from the NPT are high.
4. (S) There was extensive discussion about a UK proposal to push for complete nuclear disarmament as a long-term goal, to include confidence-building measures by the P5 as a gesture of good will towards non-nuclear states suspicious of our nuclear reduction efforts. Leslie argued that there is a "political danger" within the UK and in NATO if the member states don't live up to the commitments in the NPT, including the final goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Leslie conceded U/S Rood's point that a P5 effort of this kind would not persuade Iran or other nuclear weapons aspirants to give up their nuclear ambitions, but she asserted that it would help bring countries such as Brazil, Egypt and South Africa to greater trust and support for the P5 in this area. The UK is planning to circulate a draft paper with proposals in four areas to help demonstrate the P5 commitment to reducing nuclear arsenals. These areas would concentrate on: (1) Work on definitions of nuclear terms and forces; (2) Greater transparency on warhead production and storage facilities (that would not need to include information on current location of warheads, but more general sharing of information about historic storage facilities); (3) Nuclear accident response; and (4) Verification of disarmament through peer review of technology, including demonstrating the practice of dismantling a nuclear warhead. If initiated, these proposals might build support for additional P5 initiatives like the
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nuclear fuel cycle program, Leslie said.
5. (S) U/S Rood and Carre expressed strong disagreement with the UK proposal, with U/S Rood emphasizing that it was far better for the P3 to adopt a positive agenda by emphasizing our strong nuclear disarmament record, pursuing FMCT and START follow-on, and focusing on emerging threats such as nuclear terrorism. U/S Rood questioned whether the UK proposal would be counter-productive. No one had challenged P5 nuclear disarmament announcements, but focusing on verification of P5 steps could cast doubt on those achievements and raise questions about aspects of the dismantling such as the retention of the plutonium pits at the center of the warhead (which actually renders it less susceptible to therft or diversion than would grinding down the material). Verification is a means of checking compliance; it is not relevant in the context of NPT Article VI, which sets no specific milestones to be checked and leaves it to the P5 to determine their own progress. U/S Rood asked about the demonstration effect on other countries: it could actually be de-stabilitizing for Pakistan, India and Israel to increase transparency through verification and steps advocated by the UK, such as publishing locations of nuclear weapons production and deployment. Carre agreed firmly and added that the UK proposal went far beyond acceptable parameters.
----------------------------------------
CHINESE AND RUSSIAN P5 PARTNERS
----------------------------------------
6. (S) U/S Rood observed that P3 nuclear weapons arsenals had been reduced since signing the NPT in 1968, with the U.S. now at one-fourth of its stockpile at the peak of the Cold War, but meanwhile China is building up its nuclear arsenal and Russia is placing increasing emphasis on nuclear weapons in its doctrine. Unfortunately, the Chinese oppose a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) because they wanted to preserve their freedom of action and ability to make more nuclear weapons. Leslie said that the UK is less concerned about the Chinese nuclear and conventional arms build-up than is the U.S., particularly with respect to Taiwan, but that London wants China involved in the FMCT process, even at the cost of a long transition period and agreement on what type of Chinese arms build-up would ultimately be acceptable. Carre advocated strengthened P5 cooperation and said that the Chinese want to be seen as "equals" with the other P5 members in ensuring world stability and security, and suggested this motivation could be played on to move China's behavior closer into alignment with its own more positive rhetoric.
-----------------------------------------
EGYPT AND MULTILATERAL FORA
-----------------------------------------
7. (S) Leslie proposed having the P5 meet with Egypt before the next Prepcom to allow the GOE to vent its "grievances" and then perhaps engage more productively in the future. The UK fears that the Egyptians are "gearing up for a fight" if they don't believe their concerns are being properly addressed. U/S Rood observed that Egyptian tactics were backfiring; they received fewer votes at the September 2007 IAEA general conference than the year before and seemed genuinely surprised. Furthermore, it is not in their interest to remove the ambiguity of Israel's nuclear status which was stabilizing to the region. Carre agreed and said that there was no benefit to weakening the Israeli pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
-----------------------------------------
INDIA
-----------------------------------------
8. (S) Carre opened the subject of civil nuclear energy cooperation by noting that France had recently initialed an agreement on this subject with the government of India. The provisions of the French-Indian agreement were similar to those in the U.S.-India agreement and the process had presented fewer problems than expected. The GOF had repeatedly emphasized to the GOI that India must obtain the approval of the IAEA and there would be no shortcuts or special exceptions. U/S Rood said that the USG strongly believes that language on safeguards in perpetuity should not be made conditional on fuel supply and we had informed the IAEA of our position. The GOI was still testing the will of the international community to find flexibility on this. Leslie affirmed that the UK was in agreement with both the U.S. and France on this issue and the British would be concerned if India obtained an agreement in which safeguards could lapse if fuel supplies were disrupted. She doubted that the GOI would complete the necessary steps this year.
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Furthermore, China was not blocking progress on Indian civil nuclear cooperation, but the UK fully expects that they will raise the case of Pakistan as soon as the Indian situation is resolved.
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POST-START AND MISSILE DEFENSE
-----------------------------------------
9. (S) U/S Rood noted that the U.S. is continuing discussions with Russia on a post-START regime. Both Russia and U.S. did not want to simply extend the current agreement, which is both cumbersome and expensive. The U.S. wanted to draft a new agreement based on the Moscow Treaty. Unfortunately, Russia wanted conventional weapons to be limited under the agreement as well. The U.S. does not agree; as a compromise, in October we proposed a legally binding treaty with transparency and confidence-building measures. However, in the run up to the Russian presidential election, the Russians are in no mood to compromise. We do not support further efforts on global INF.
10. (S) On Missile Defense, Carre observed that the Russians realized the issue was more complicated than they initially believed. The U.S. offer not to activate the system until the threat matured showed that the MD system in Europe was not oriented towards Russia. Unfortunately, in the Russian government the more moderate diplomatic voices were marginalized by the power of the Russian military. Carre said that France had recognized the missile threat and agreed that missile defense was one element of a broad response to this threat. The French regard the U.S. interceptors and radars as the logical core of a NATO capability. However, an endorsement at NATO raises consequences that the French believe need to be carefully considered. For example, Bulgaria and Turkey were already raising the need for collective financing of an additional NATO-linked system, saying that it was required under NATO's treaty ensuring collective defense.
11. (S) In response, U/S Rood said that there are many examples where individual states have different capabilities that they bring to the Alliance that do not require common funding. A NATO endorsement of MD at Bucharest would simply note that the U.S. system in Europe exists and forms the core of a future Alliance capability. It does not commit the Alliance to any programmatic costs or a common funding mechanism. It is fully in keeping with other weapons programs developed by the allies and would ensure that there is no divisability of security. Leslie agreed, saying that if the threat is recognized and missile defense is effective in combating such a threat, then the alliance should not hesitate to endorse missile defense. The UK does not see the NATO endorsement as any commitment to actual expenditure, but merely a commitment to the principle.
------------------------------------
CLUSTER MUNITIONS
------------------------------------
12. (S) U/S Rood emphasized that the international community was making progress in addressing cluster munitions concerns in the UN-authorized Convention on Conventional Weaposn (CCW) process. The USG was concerned about Norway's efforts to go outside this multilateral track via the "Oslo Process." We believe this is both impractical and unconstructive and would prefer that other countries not participate in this outside mechanism. Leslie responded that the UK was participating in both the CCW and the Oslo Process as a "tactical maneuver" designed to keep activity within the bounds of their "redlines" and at the same time, keep the CCW alive. The UK wants to keep the "smart" type of cluster munitions and would not agree to phase out anything without a transitional period. At the same time, the UK is concerned about the impact of the Oslo Process on the aftermath of a conflict (foreseeing "astronomical bills" handed out to those who used cluster munitions in the past). Carre said that France could not afford to ignore the Oslo Process given the political power of the NGOs on this issue, but like the UK they hope to affect the debate as a participant. Cluster munitions have also attracted the attention of FM Kouchner and the French government is under "heavy domestic pressure" to take action. Unfortunately, once cluster munitions are declared to be unacceptable, it is hard to argue that we still need to use them for awhile.
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ARMS TRADE TREATY
--------------------------------------
13. (S) Finally, Leslie raised the issue of the proposed
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Arms Trade Treaty, saying their motives for support for this agreement were clear and they hoped it could be used to raise the standards of other states and create a more responsible arms trade. As the treaty would deal with export of arms, it should not run afoul of U.S. constitutional concerns as it would not limit the U.S. citizen constitutional right to bear arms. Carre agreed that there was scope for something to be done to further regulate arms transfers. U/S Rood observed that while encouraging responsible behavior in arms transfers in general was good, the risk with a treaty was than an unacceptably low standard for arms transfers would result. Rood also said that the U.S. had concerns about any potential impact on second amendment rights.
14. (U) This cable has been reviewed and cleared by Acting U/S Rood. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON
Tuesday, 12 December 2006, 13:05
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007755
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS PREL, FR, EUN, NATO, RS, UNO, SR, YI, TU, CY
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED AND FRENCH NSA-EQUIVALENT
GOURDAULT-MONTAGNE DISCUSS RUSSIA-GEORGIA, RUSSIA-KOSOVO AND TURKEY-EU
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D).
1. (S) SUMMARY: EUR A/S Dan Fried's December 7 meeting with presidential diplomatic advisor Maurice Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) focused largely on Russia, with France in a defensive posture. MGM raised the aborted Putin-Chirac dinner on the margins of the NATO Riga Summit, saying it had been instigated by Russia, and portrayed France as having attempted to steer in a way compatible with Latvian interests. In contrast to French Political Director Araud (septel), he showed reluctance to see the Kremlin's hand in the Litvinenko poisoning, preferring to ascribe it to rogue elements. MGM claimed to support Georgian independence while suggesting that NATO Article 5 obligations precluded Georgian NATO membership. On Kosovo, he reviewed France's plans to persuade the EU to agree to offer Serbia an SAA agreement not linked to fulfillment of its ICTY obligations but worried above all about Putin's explicit threat to veto a UN Security Resolution mandating independence; there was a risk of instability and partition if the West did not exercise sufficient care in managing the Russians. Fried countered that the West needed to be prepared to proceed in extremis without the Russians, and warned against allowing the Russians to hold up a decision through the threat of a veto.
2. (C) SUMMARY CONT: On other issues, MGM reviewed the Franco-German proposal for a review of Turkey's implementation of its Ankara Protocol commitments between 2007 and 2009, assured Fried that France wanted to avoid a train wreck, but insisted it was incumbent on the Turks to make a gesture. Fried reminded MGM of the strategic importance of keeping Turkey tied to EU; MGM agreed in principle but insisted Turkey had to play by the EU's rules and noted the difficulties of managing domestically public sentiment against Turkey. Fried and MGM agreed that France and the U.S. had worked well together at the NATO Riga Summit. END SUMMARY.
3. (C) EUR A/S Daniel Fried, accompanied by the Ambassador and POL Deputy (notetaker), met December 7 with President Chirac's diplomatic advisor (NSA-equivalent) Maurice Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) to discuss a number of European issues that revolved largely around Russia. MGM was joined by Presidency Middle East advisor Dominique Boche and strategic affairs advisor Laurent Bili.
Putin-Chirac at Riga
--------------------
4. (C) Noting at the outset that he had been directly involved in the aborted Putin-Chirac dinner on the margins of the NATO summit, MGM assured Fried that French actions had been above board. Kremlin advisor Pridhodko had originally proposed that Putin meet Chirac privately at a Paris airport November 29 in order to express his birthday wishes (MGM cited Putin's meeting in Hannover with former Chancellor Schroeder as a precedent). France had agreed, while noting that the dates coincided with the Riga Summit. Pridhodko suggested Riga, which France dutifully vetted with the Latvians with the understanding that they would have to host such a dinner, and assuring the Latvians that France was prepared to say "no" to the Russians if a meeting would in any way cause them embarrassment. The Latvians were prepared to proceed, so long as the Russians also agreed to a bilateral meeting, which MGM conveyed to Pridhodko. Pridhodko had suggested that this could be "difficult" given negative Russian public opinion toward Latvia. The Latvians told MGM that the Russians had refused to meet at the official palace or residence, but were considering the Latvian cultural center. MGM said he had encouraged the Russians to accept the last offering, and they had proceeded as if it might be acceptable. Late Tuesday, however, they balked, apparently because the center was located about 200m from the Latvian museum of occupation.
5. (C) MGM concluded his presentation with the argument that such a meeting would have been positive for Russian-Latvian relations and would have helped to blur dividing lines between NATO and Russia. He complained over Latvia's going "public" with the cancellation by querying NATO SYG Hoop de Scheffer as to whether "we are allowed to receive" the Russian president. He commented that, had they remained silent, the cancellation would have been a non-event. Fried countered that the Latvians had been right to inform NATO and thus avoid a surprise. He contrasted the Russians' clumsiness in managing the dinner with the Latvians' transparency, suggesting that it was time for the Russians to accept the independence of the Baltic states. He added pointedly that the U.S. would no longer accept putative Russian concerns about Latvian treatment of their citizens at a time when they were still rounding up Georgians on the
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basis of ethnicity. MGM commented meekly that the timing had not been right for the visit and agreed that the Latvian government no longer had a problem of non-citizen ethnic Russians.
Litvinenko Case
---------------
6. (S) Fried commented that the short-term trend inside Russia was negative, noting increasing indications that the UK investigation into the murder of Litvinenko could well point to some sort of Russian involvement. MGM called attention to Chirac's statement encouraging the Russians to cooperate in the investigation. He wondered aloud who might have given the order, but speculated the murder probably involved a settling of accounts between services rather than occurring under direct order from the Kremlin. Fried, noting Putin's attention to detail, questioned whether rogue security elements could operate, in the UK no less, without Putin's knowledge. Describing the current atmosphere as strange, he described the Russians as increasingly self-confident, to the point of arrogance.
Georgia-Russia
--------------
7. (C) Fried, noting he had discussed Georgia the previous evening with MFA Political Director Gerard Araud (septel), said it was important to support Georgian sovereignty against Russian pressure for three reasons: the situation overall in Georgia was improving under Saakashvili's leadership; violation of Georgian territorial integrity would set a dangerous precedent; and Germany and Central and Eastern Europe had a strong interest in ensuring that gas and oil pumped from Azerbaijan and Central Asia did not travel exclusively through pipelines owned or controlled by Russia. MGM responded that France supported Georgia's independence but wondered how to accomplish this within existing structures. The heart of NATO was Article 5, and it was doubtful that NATO would declare war on Russia over Georgia; it was therefore important to bypass Article 5 and find a "specific way" that did not involve NATO membership. If Georgia joins, Armenia may follow. Even in the case of Turkey, was its Kurdish problem one for Europeans, MGM asked.
8. (C) Fried assured MGM that the U.S. was not seeking membership for Georgia soon, but it was important not to close the door in order to continue to promote Georgian reform and development. It was incumbent on the West to support Georgian sovereignty and maintain a united front against Russia, he argued. He related that he had urged Saakashvili not to seek crises with Russia, since crisis worked only for Russia, and time was on Georgia's side so long as it moved quietly. In five years, a burgeoning Georgian economy had the potential to dramatically change the politics of the region. MGM agreed in principle, but suggested one could differ on ways and means.
Serbia and Kosovo
-----------------
9. (C) Fried explained that the U.S. had decided to offer PFP to Serbia as a means of supporting democratic forces in the upcoming elections; President Tadic had made a strong case for Serbia's Euro-Atlantic future. Similar considerations had prompted the U.S. to support Ahtisaari's recommendation to postpone tabling his proposals on Kosovo status. But it was critical to move quickly after January 21. Additional delay would encourage the Serbs and others into thinking the West felt intimidated; it was time to push onward to supervised independence. Fried said that while Russia could be expected to cause difficulties, in the end he believed it would abstain on a UNSCR, although he could not be certain. What was certain was that the Russians must not be allowed to believe that the threat of a veto will work, because they would exploit any opening. The West therefore had to send the signal that it was prepared to move without them if necessary, because no signal would be interpreted as tacit acquiescence in Russia's raising the bar. This was a terrible option, but paralysis was worse.
10. (C) MGM reviewed the history of French-Serbian relations (back to the Salonika Front of WWI, on which MGM's grandfather had served), judged PFP as a positive offer, and said Chirac had proposed to Merkel that the EU move to a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia, even in the event of insufficient ICTY cooperation. Merkel had initially responded negatively, citing Tadic's failure to request it, but France continued to believe that offering SAA could make a difference in the January elections. If the Germans were not on board by early January, France would move on its own to propose SAA. As for the Ahtisaari proposals, MGM said Putin had told the French "Russia will not hesitate
PARIS 00007755 003 OF 003
to veto any solution that does not enjoy the agreement of all the stakeholders." MGM urged great caution in moving forward, citing Putin's purported concerns about the risks of a partition and a merging of the north with Serbia and the south with Albania, leading potentially to a radicalized Muslim state in the heart of Europe.
11. (C) Fried responded that the Serbs and Albanians had been told that Kosovo would be independent, and that it would be a mistake to turn back. Perhaps the Russians were bluffing, but even if they were not, wavering would lead to disaster, beginning with riots by Kosovars that risked turning KFOR into an occupying force and could led to the very radicalization we had successfully avoided so far. MGM said France was not advocating further delay, but was nonetheless concerned that independence could have unintended consequences. Public opinion could change, and Russia might become yet more irrational in the run-up to legislative and presidential elections. Fried agreed on the desirability of negotiating a UN Security Council Resolution that would be acceptable to the Russians -- perhaps even leaving out the word "independence" -- but the West needed to be prepared in extremis to move forward without Russian support. Russia would seize on any paralysis to try to raise the bar. MGM agreed in principle, but urged again finding ways to "coddle" Russia.
Turkey-EU
---------
12. (C) During a discussion cut short by a summons from President Chirac, Fried asked MGM how France planned to avoid a Turkey-EU train wreck. MGM said France supported Turkey, but Turkey needed to play by EU rules and fulfill its commitments. It was not the EU's fault that the UN Cyprus plan had not been approved by referendum, but this could not be used as an excuse for not implementing the Ankara Protocol. It was critical that Turkey "start to implement" the protocol through a gesture. MGM said that Chirac and Merkel had agreed (on the basis of the Commission proposal) not to open eight chapters and not to close any other chapters; but they had also agreed to insist on a review of Turkish implementation -- to serve as the basis for a further EU decision -- in the time frame between a 2007 Commission report and 2009 European parliamentary elections. Although Erdogan had told Merkel not to expect any further Turkish gestures, MGM nonetheless hoped the Turks would find a way, as they had so often in the past, to do something at the last minute.
13. (C) Fried described the U.S. approach of encouraging Turkey to respond constructively, expressed the hope that the EU would not be too one-sided in its judgment of the Ankara Protocol implementation, but reminded MGM that the EU also had not followed through on its promises (which MGM hotly denied). Fried continued that the U.S. wanted to be helpful but was avoiding taking a public stance. He reiterated that the stakes were high, given Turkey's strategic value.
14. (C) This message was cleared by A/S Fried.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON
Tuesday, 19 December 2006, 11:38
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAMBURG 000085
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/19/2016
TAGS KCRM, PTER, EAIR, PINR, PINS, KNNP, RS, GM, UK
SUBJECT: HAMBURG POLICE TRACK POLONIUM TRAIL
HAMBURG 00000085 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Duane Butcher, Consul General, Consulate General Hamburg, State. REASON: 1.4 (b)
1. (SBU) Summary: Hamburg State Police (LKA) confirmed December 14 that Dmitry Kovtun had left positive traces of polonium 210 in Hamburg prior to his departure from Hamburg for London on November 1. A senior official in the Federal Interior Ministry in Berlin also confirmed the reports and noted the ongoing investigation. Hamburg police continue to examine where Kovtun was and what he did while in Germany, but are not yet able to confirm if Kovtun was transporting polonium or if he had been contaminated through contact with the substance prior to his arrival in Hamburg on October 28. End Summary.
2. (SBU) Pol/Econ Off and FSN Investigator met Hamburg LKA Criminal Investigation Department (CID) Officer and director of this special investigation Thomas Menzel December 14. Menzel, who is also Director of the Hamburg LKA Organized Crime Unit, explained that the Hamburg investigation started because officers on his team drawing from press reports recognized a connection between the Litvinenko case and the flight from Hamburg to London and began to investigate whether Kovtun or Andrei Lugovoi had been in Hamburg. They discovered that Kovtun was a registered resident at the multi-family building at Erzberger Strasse 4 in Hamburg's Ottensen neighborhood and that he had flown to Hamburg on October 28 on an Aeroflot flight from Moscow. Menzel reported Hamburg authorities are working closely with the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA) and is receiving assistance from the Federal Central Support Unit and the Federal Office of Radiation Protection. Menzel stated that Stuart Goodwin from Scotland Yard has been in Hamburg since December 12 and that cooperation between the British and Hamburg police has been excellent. While the BKA and various German agencies are involved in the investigation, Menzel confirmed that Hamburg is leading the inquiry.
3. (SBU) The investigation's main focus is to uncover Kovtun's whereabouts between October 28 and November 1 and to discover any polonium-contaminated sites in the Hamburg region. Menzel reported that the investigation has revealed:
- Kovtun arrived in Hamburg October 28 on the Aeroflot flight from Moscow and was picked up from the airport in a BMW. He spent that night at the apartment of Marina Wall, his Russian/German ex-wife, at Erzberger Strasse 4. Kovtun has two apartments in the Erzberger Strasse building, his ex-wife's residence and another apartment. Neighbors told police that he had not used the second apartment for years and it has been rented to other tenants. Wall's apartment has tested positive for polonium.
- On October 29, Kovtun spent the night at a house in Haselau outside of Hamburg, which is where police found the BMW. Both the Haselau residence and the BMW are contaminated with polonium.
- On October 30, Kovtun kept an appointment with the Office of Foreigner Registration in Hamburg-Altona, where he signed a document. His signature has tested positive for radiation. After visiting several locations in Hamburg, including a restaurant and gambling hall, Kovtun spent the night at the home of an Italian acquaintance on Kieler Strasse in Hamburg. None of these locations have tested positive for polonium.
- Kovtun again spent the night of October 31 at Wall's apartment on Erzberger Strasse. He departed by taxi for the airport early on November 1 and flew to London on the 6:40 am GermanWings flight.
4. (SBU) Menzel said the investigation is looking into several unanswered questions. Hamburg police are trying to discover whether Kovtun visited Hamburg prior to October 28 and where he was between November 1 and the date he arrived in Moscow. They are also looking into whether Lugovoi or any of the other individuals involved in the Litvinenko case have been to Hamburg in the recent past and have requested airlines to review their passenger lists. Other remaining questions concern whether there are any further contaminated locations in Hamburg or other parts of Germany. Investigators hope to find out more about Kovtun as an individual - what he did for a living, what his personal background was, and whether he had worked at the Russian Consulate in Hamburg in the past. Finally, Menzel was curious about a possible Italian connection to the Litvinenko
HAMBURG 00000085 002.2 OF 002
case and noted that Kovtun had met with an Italian national in Hamburg and that Italians played a role in the London investigation as well.
5. (C) Federal Interior Minister Deputy DG for Counterterrorism Gerhard Schindler discussed the status of the German investigation during a meeting on other topics with EMIN December 14. Schindler explained German officials retraced Kovtun's steps to and from his ex-wife's home in Hamburg. Schindler said Kovtun left polonium traces on everything he touched - vehicles, objects, clothes, and furniture. German investigators concluded Kovtun did not have polonium traces on his skin or clothes; Schindler said the polonium was coming out of his body, for example through his pores. German authorities had tested the German Wings airplane that had taken Kovtun from Hamburg to London; no traces of polonium were found. Germany had wanted to test the Aeroflot plane that flew Kovtun to Germany, and had prepared to ground it upon its next arrival in Germany. Schindler said Russian authorities must have found out about German plans because "at the last minute" Aeroflot swapped planes; Schindler said he did not expect Aeroflot to fly the other plane to Germany any time soon.
6. (U) This message has been coordinated with Embassy Berlin. BUTCHER
Thursday, 24 May 2007, 12:27
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002429
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/23/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINR, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN REACTION TO LITVINENKO MURDER CHARGES
REF: LONDON 1997
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (b and d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: The GOR is highly unlikely to extradite former FSB officer Andrey Lugovoy to Britain, citing constitutional and other legal prohibitions against the extradition of Russian citizens. Official and unofficial Russian reaction to the May 22 British announcement that Lugovoy would be charged with the murder of Aleksandr Litvinenko has been nearly uniform in rejecting the UK request that he stand trial in London. The MFA held out the prospect of further cooperation in the investigation, while citing the impossibility of extradition, but other Russian commentators were more categorical, suggesting that the British charges were politically motivated. A few opposition voices called for Lugovoy to voluntarily submit to British justice. The British Embassy expects a further worsening in the UK-Russia and EU-Russia relationships. We should continue to reinforce to the GOR the damaging consequences to Russia's reputation should this case fail to reach trial. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) On May 22, the UK's Crown Prosecution Service announced that it had sufficient evidence to request Lugovoy's extradition and to charge him with the polonium poisoning of Litvinenko in November 2006. UK Ambassador Brenton told the Ambassador May 23 that the UK Embassy expected to receive the final warrant by the end of the week and would transmit it to the Procuracy shortly thereafter.
EXTRADITION: OBSTACLES AND OPTIONS
----------------------------------
3. (SBU) Both the Russian Constitution and the Criminal Code prohibit the GOR from extraditing Russian citizens, as is the case in several other European countries whose legal systems have evolved from the Napoleonic code. Russia has a 2006 Memorandum of Understanding with the Crown Prosecution Service and is a signatory to the 1957 European Convention on Extradition. Both of these were mentioned in the Prosecution Service's announcement of the charges, but neither of them would supercede the Russian Constitution and obligate Russia to extradite Lugovoy. There is a precedent for the GOR to prosecute Russian citizens in lieu of extradition. Three times it has done so at U.S. request -- two murders and one money laundering case -- but none of these cases led to a conviction, and the British are not apparently considering this option.
4. (SBU) In a May 22 statement on its website, the MFA reiterated its readiness to cooperate further in an objective investigation into Litvinenko's death, but it emphasized that Russia's legal prohibitions against extradition were well known and similar to those in place in other countries.
5. (SBU) Other official and unofficial Russian reaction was overwhelmingly against the British request. Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov said that the Russian parliament would uphold Russian law and not allow Lugovoy to be returned to Britain. International Affairs Committee Chairman Konstantin Kosachev warned that diplomatic relations with the UK would be negatively affected should the charges be politically motivated. Duma Deputy Viktor Ilyukhin, the vice chair of the Duma's Security Committee, rhetorically asked why Russia should even consider Britain's request when it ignored the GOR's efforts to extradite Boris Berezovskiy and Chechen separatist emissary Akhmed Zakayev. LDPR Chairman Vladimir Zhironovskiy thought that Russian law enforcement might want to trade Lugovoy for Berezovskiy.
6. (SBU) Independent Duma Deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov was one of the few who suggested Russia's international interests ought to take precedence over national law and expressed confidence in the results of the British investigation. Protecting Lugovoy would lead to extensive damage to Russia's image abroad, he said. Likewise, LDPR Deputy Aleksey Mitrofonov publicly called on Lugovoy to return to London voluntarily. Mitrofonov said that Russia and Britain needed to resolve the issue or Russia faced the prospect of further deterioration in its relations with the West amid growing suspicions that the GOR was protecting Lugovoy. He suggested that "public" pressure on Lugovoy to voluntarily face British justice might be the best way out of an impasse.
BRITAIN'S NEXT STEPS
--------------------
7. (C) Noting that the UK would be seeking an EU statement of support in urging Russia to agree to extradition (reftel), Brenton predicted that the failure to turn over Lugovoy would create serious problems in London's bilateral relationship
MOSCOW 00002429 002 OF 002
with Moscow, and potentially problems in the EU-Russian relationship as well. Failing any progress, he reiterated the UK may reassess whether it would support a new EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The German and French missions have expressed to us their doubts about this approach, noting the similar constitutional restrictions on the extradition of nationals by some EU countries.
PUBLIC APATHY ABOVE ALL
-----------------------
8. (C) Ekho Moskvy's Aleksey Venediktov told us separately there is little chance of a resolution soon, particularly given the rift in relations between Putin and Blair. Putin believes PM Blair betrayed him over the British refusal to extradite Berezovskiy, and Venediktov said that the GOR has now pinned its hopes for a better relationship with Britain on Brown. Venediktov said Russian public opinion is largely indifferent to the whole affair, based on responses to Ekho's on-air discussions about Litvinenko's death, and doubted it would be a factor in the GOR position. Demos Center's Tanya Lokshina similarly questioned whether there would be anything other than public support for the GOR's position and that the public was more likely to believe that the charge against Lugovoy was one more Western provocation.
9. (C) Comment. It is highly unlikely that the GOR will yield its constitutional principle on extradtion. There is no indication that any Russian offer of cooperation short of extradition will satisfy the Crown Prosecution Service's request. Given the sensational nature of the murder and the uncertainty over where the trial may lead beyond Lugovoy, there has been little official interest expressed in Lugovoy clearing his name in a UK court. Although we know of no other legal mechanisms that would trump the Russian constitution, we should continue to reinforce to the GOR the long-term damage to Russia's reputation if this case fails to go to trial. BURNS
Tuesday, 18 September 2007, 18:06
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004599
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/18/2017
TAGS PGOV, PINR, RS
SUBJECT: ZHIRINOVSKIY'S NEW SIDEMAN: LUGOVOY
Classified By: Political Officer Bob Patterson: 1.4 (d).
Summary
-------
1. (C) The mercurial Vladimir Zhirinovskiy staged yet another impressive act of political theater on September 17 with the surprise announcement that the number two position on his party's ticket would be filled by Andrey Lugovoy, the former FSB officer accused by Scotland Yard of orchestrating the murder of Aleksandr Litvinenko. The announcement made Zhirinovskiy's party, the LDPR, front-page news in virtually all major Russian newspapers and drew greater attention to what had been a lackluster kick-off to the party's Duma campaign. Opinions vary in Moscow as to the reasons behind the move. Zhirinovskiy may hope that the hoopla surrounding the appointment of Lugovoy will revive the apparently flagging fortunes of his party. End summary.
2. (SBU) In the past months, it appeared that LDPR was on the ropes, crippled by high-level defections of top party officials to other parties. The most recent blow was the loss of long-time Zhirinovskiy confederate Aleksey Mitrofanov, who defected to Just Russia (SR) in late August. LDPR had fallen behind in the funding race as well, dropping to last place among the top four parties in the second quarter of 2007, according to the Central Election Commission. Public opinion polling, such as a mid-September survey by the Fund for Public Opinion, showed the party scraping along at the seven-percent minimum required for joining the new Duma. Levada polling showed LDPR losing about a percentage point every month since May.
3. (SBU) One would not have believed that LDPR was in trouble, though, to judge by Zhirinovskiy's swagger and bravado over the past two days. His stem-winding oration before his party's congress in Moscow on September 17 provided a broad overview of Zhirinovskiy's peculiar views on international relations, domestic policies, and party politics, punctuated with his usual histrionics about Western interference and perfidy. He also boldly predicted that LDPR would win a minimum 15 percent of the Duma seats, and that he had hopes for twenty percent. (His electoral math sees United Russia winning half of the seats, with 12 percent for the Communist Party and 8 percent for Just Russia (SR). He dismissed all other parties, including the "liberal" parties of Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces, out of hand.) Moreover, he spun the defection of LDPR members to other parties as a "purge" of the party that served only to strengthen it against its rivals, particularly SR, which he referred to as a party of "mercenaries."
4. (SBU) Perhaps to set the stage for Lugovoy's debut, Zhirinovskiy reserved special vitriol for the role played by Great Britain over the centuries and today in denying Russia its "proper place" in the world, according to press reports. At a press conference on September 18, he launched a diatribe against a hapless reporter from Voice of America, who had asked Lugovoy about the need to deal with the problem of international criminal investigations. During his tirade, Zhirinovskiy blasted the United Kingdom for sponsoring terrorism in Chechnya (implying as well that the U.S. was behind the events of September 11). He criticized London for its campaign of "espionage and lies," insisting that the British government was responsible for Litvinenko's death.
5. (U) Throughout the press conference, Lugovoy appeared uncomfortable in his new role as straight man for Zhirinovskiy. It also appeared that he had been reprimanded by his new boss about the rank order in the party. Lugovoy pointedly retracted his statement of a day earlier that he had ambitions to run for President, coyly saying that every Russian would want to be the leader of such a great country, before gamely insisting that Zhirinovskiy had the mettle to replace Putin. Lugovoy seemed completely surprised by a question about his plans as a deputy were he to win a Duma seat, and he said something about working to be helpful to the government and the Russian people. (Zhirinovskiy interrupted to say that Lugovoy's military and business experience made him an excellent candidate for the Duma committees on defense and security, particularly in dealing with questions of economic security.) When asked, Lugovoy reiterated his statement of September 17 that he was not seeking a position in the Duma in order to win immunity for he was protected, "like all citizens," by the Constitution.
Comment
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6. (C) Embassy interlocutors disagreed on the reasons behind Zhirinovskiy's enlistment of Lugovoy. Chief Editor of "Economy and World Relations" Andrey Ryabov suggested that
MOSCOW 00004599 002 OF 002
the Kremlin had pushed Lugovoy onto the LDPR list in order to somehow provide him with protection. Political technologist Stanislav Belkovskiy told us that it was Zhirinovskiy's idea to bring Lugovoy on board in order to improve LDPR's hand in the campaign. Belkovskiy thought that regional elites would see the selection of Lugovoy who, he said, enjoyed the personal protection of Putin, as a sign of Kremlin favor for Zhirinovskiy and his party. It remains to be seen how Lugovoy's new role will affect LDPR's election prospects. It seems odd that the Kremlin, which presumably would want to see the furor over the Litvinenko matter end as soon as possible, has kept the matter front and center by sanctioning Lugovoy's entry into Russian politics. Burns
Friday, 01 December 2006, 14:44
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012751
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/29/2016
TAGS PGOV, KDEM, PREL, PINR, RS
SUBJECT: LITVINENKO ASSASSINATION: REACTION IN MOSCOW
REF: MOSCOW 11490
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (d).
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Summary
-------
1. (C) The November 23 death by radiation poisoning of former FSB agent Aleksandr Litvinenko in London has spawned a welter of conspiracy theories in Russia. The media have variously traced Litvinenko's demise to XXXXXXXXXXXX, suicide, Putin's Kremlin, Putin himself, those determined to undermine Putin, FSB agents unhappy with Litvinenko's alleged betrayal of their organization, those unhappy with Litvinenko's cooperation with Israel-based businessman Nevzlin on the Yukos affair, and the United States or "other" countries. This message recounts a representative sample of speculation, much of it self-serving. End summary.
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Make Putin Stay
---------------
2. (C) Independent radio station Ekho Moskvy Editor-in-Chief Aleksey Venediktov, like many here, linked the murders of Litvinenko and journalist Anna Politkovskaya. (Politkovskaya, who had accused the GOR of human rights abuses in Chechnya, was murdered in Moscow on October 7 (reftel).) In his telling, both murders, with perhaps more to come, are part of an effort to force Putin to remain in office beyond 2008 by, in effect, making him persona non grata in the West. (Putin has repeatedly insisted he will leave when his term expires in 2008.)
3. (C) Venediktov pegged the two assassinations to rogue or retired FSB or military intelligence agents controlled by forces either within or without the Kremlin. Putin, Venediktov thought, is well aware of the game being played, but is powerless to stop it; in part because he is not certain whom to hold responsible. Venediktov subscribed to the generally-held view here that Putin values his reputation in the West, and that sabotaging it is one path to having him reconsider his decision to leave the Kremlin in 2008.
4. (C) Venediktov did not exclude the possibility that the culprit in Litvinenko's poisoning may have been ex-FSB agent turned businessman Andrey Lugovoy, who has loudly advertised his innocence. Lugovoy met with Litvinenko in London November 1, the day Litvinenko was allegedly irradiated. Lugovoy's rush to the Moscow British Embassy and into the Russian media immediately after the Litvinenko story broke in the press was designed to provide him with a measure of protection, Venediktov thought, should "others" --either those who commissioned the killing or those unhappy with the furor it has caused-- want revenge. Venediktov joined National Bolshevik Party leader Eduard Limonov in finding it suspicious that a Moscow-based businessman and former FSBer like Lugovoy would want to cooperate commercially with a man like Litvinenko who was on the Kremlin's --and the FSB's-- enemy list. Lugovoy may have been dispatched to cultivate, and kill, Litvinenko, Venediktov thought.
5. (C) In a separate conversation November 30, the Moscow Heritage Foundation's Yevgeniy Volk seconded the version of events offered by Venediktov, and was at pains in his remarks to insulate Putin from any association with the murders. Volk described Putin as a "pawn in a larger game" being played by those in the Kremlin as 2008 drew nearer. XXXXXXXXXXXX saw Putin's fingerprints on both the murders, although he admitted he had no evidence to support his allegations. Noting that Putin had appointed Ramzan Kadyrov Prime Minister of Chechnya, XXXXXXXXXXXX offered us his bleak assessment of Putin with the phrase "you know people by the company they keep."
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Make Putin Play
---------------
6. (C) Stanislav Belkovskiy, political analyst from the National Strategic Institute also linked the Politkovskaya and Litvinenko killings, but thought they were designed to influence the succession struggle. In his far-fetched (but indicative of the conspiratorial mood that hangs over Moscow) telling, Kremlin "liberals" XXXXXXXXXXXX had engineered the assassinations in order to embarrass Putin before the West,
MOSCOW 00012751 002 OF 003
and force him to sacrifice someone from his inner circle in order to salvage his reputation. Belkovskiy thought that victim would be Presidential Administration Deputy Head and leader of the so-called "siloviki," Igor Sechin. XXXXXXXXXXXX understand that First Deputy PM Medvedev is a very weak presidential candidate, and that Putin remains unconvinced that he would make an able successor. Undermining the "siloviki" is one way to ensure the inevitability of Medvedev's candidacy, Belkovskiy told us. He suggested that Putin could portray Sechin's ouster as the first serious step in the fight against government corruption, noting, "Putin could credibly tar him with the Yukos machinations."
7. (C) The victims to date, Politkovskaya and Litvinenko, had been selected because they were better known beyond Russia's borders, where it was important that the murders resonate most strongly. Belkovskiy predicted more murders to come if Putin "failed to get the message." He suggested that Garry Kasparov's absence from the Russian media, ties to the U.S., and name recognition abroad made him a likely victim.
8. (C) Belkovskiy offered in support of his theory what he said was indirect proof of XXXXXXXXXXXX involvement. Belkovskiy told us he had been approached the week of October 2 by a longtime contact from XXXXXXXXXXXXX inner circle who warned him that he had been targeted and should leave Russia immediately, which he did. Politkovskaya's murder that weekend had, Belkovskiy believed, the "liberals'" fingerprints on it. He doubted that he had ever been the actual target, and speculated that his contact knew of a plot to kill someone in journalistic circles, and had warned Belkovskiy "just in case."
---------------
Make Putin Stay
---------------
9. (C) The Institute for Globalization Problem's Mikhail Delyagin added the November 18 killing in Moscow of Movdali Baysarov, Chechen "Gorets" division commander and critic of Chechen Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov; and the November 4 "Russian March" to Belkovskiy and Venediktov's lists of recent, linked events. Delyagin joined others here in assuming that Baysarov's killing had not occurred as described by the Moscow police. (Moscow Internal Affairs personnel claimed that Baysarov had threatened them with a hand grenade when stopped on a busy Moscow avenue. Russian blogs and the internet press are filled with alleged eyewitness accounts that claim Baysarov offered no resistance.) Baysarov's protective detail had been suspended just before his murder, something that only could have been done, Delyagin said, by the FSB or "someone higher."
10. (C) According to Delyagin, the killings of Baysarov, Politkovskaya, and Litvinenko combine to create an atmosphere of chaos desired by the "siloviki," who would like Putin to remain in office. Delyagin discounted XXXXXXXXXX as possible authors of the murder of Litvinenko. XXXXXXXXXX In addition, he said, they lack the connections to confidentially procure the polonium 210 allegedly used in the
SIPDIS killing. Delyagin joined Venediktov and Belkovskiy in seeing the polonium as the calling card of someone in Moscow.
--------------------------
XXXXXXXXX--------------------------
11. (C) ------------------
No Theory Suffices
------------------
12. (C) In a December 1 conversation, the Carnegie Moscow Center's Masha Lipman cautioned against falling prey to conspiracy theories. None of the ones available, she thought, fully account for what appears to be happening. She found it unlikely that the killings were being staged in an effort to force Putin to remain in office. If so, the strategy seemed shortsighted, as Putin who felt his hand had
MOSCOW 00012751 003 OF 003
been forced would surely seek revenge if compelled by circumstances he did not create to remain. With little information available, the only thing that could be said with certainty, she thought, was that Russia had again entered a period, perhaps occasioned by the looming 2008 succession, where problems were being solved by force. Lipman noted that recent murders had not been confined to enemies of the Kremlin; she mentioned the assassination of Central Bank Chairman Kozlov, and suggested that factors contributing to the recent re-eruption of violence in addition to 2008 might be corruption, institutions unable to solve the problems of Russians, and the sense, at least in the Kremlin, that Putin no longer is fully in control as his power wanes with the approaching end of his term.
----------
Postscript
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13. (C) The sense of unease here only deepened with news that former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar had been poisoned November 24 while attending a conference in Dublin. United Energy Systems' Chairman Anatoliy Chubais, who talked to Gaidar after he returned to Moscow, alleged that Gaidar had been the victim of foul play even before hearing the verdict of the Moscow physicians. Chubais implied that Berezovskiy was the culprit. Gaidar Spokesman Valeriy Natarov reported the evening of November 30 that Gaidar's Moscow doctors believed that he had been poisoned. Gaidar's daughter Mariya alleged poisoning as well in a November 30 Radio Moskvy interview. However, she cautioned that a complete diagnosis would have to await the arrival of initial tests on Gaidar conducted at the Dublin hospital. Other media report that Gaidar is recovering and expects to be discharged December 4.
14. (C) Masha Lipman believed that the well-connected Chubais's early certainty that Gaidar had been poisoned might mean that he knows, or has reason to suspect that he knows, who was behind the attempt. Gaidar, she hoped, might shed some light on this when released from the hospital next week.
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Comment
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15. (C) All of the above putative versions of events are handicapped by a lack of evidence and by the existence of other motives for the killings and other potential perpetrators. Whatever the truth may ultimately be --and it may never be known-- the tendency here to almost automatically assume that someone in or close to Putin's inner circle is the author of these deaths speaks volumes about expectations of Kremlin behavior as the high-stakes succession struggle intensifies. BURNS
Monday, 29 December 2008, 16:37
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 134777
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/29/2018
TAGS PARM, MOPS, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO AFGHANISTAN ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS
REF: A. STATE 125608 B. KABUL 346 C. KHAN-MORIMOTO E-MAIL (12/10/2008)
Classified By: PM Assistant Secretary Mark T. Kimmitt For Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (U) This is an action request. See para 2.
2. (SBU) Summary and Action Request: Contrary to previous statements to the U.S. Government, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan joined 93 other states in signing the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), December 3-4, 2008 in Oslo, Norway. The United States did not sign the treaty as cluster munitions continue to have military utility. The U.S. Government believes Article 21 of the Convention provides the flexibility for signatories to continue to cooperate and conduct operations with U.S. forces, and in turn for U.S. forces to store, transfer, and use U.S. cluster munitions in the territory of a State Party. The Department requests that Post approach appropriate interlocutors at the Afghan Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense to urge Kabul to interpret Article 21 in a similar manner, minimizing any potential impact of Afghanistan,s signature of the Convention on U.S. operations and military cooperation. Given the political sensitivities in Afghanistan surrounding cluster munitions as well as air and artillery strikes in general, the Department believes that a low-profile approach will be the best way to ensure a common understanding that the CCM does not impede military planning and operations between our two governments. A copy of the CCM will be e-mailed to Post. End Summary and Action Request.
OBJECTIVES
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3. (SBU) Department requests Post pursue the following objectives with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. Post may also draw on points in ref A and the background below. A copy of the CCM text will be e-mailed to Post.
-- Reassure GIRoA the United States shares Afghanistan,s humanitarian concerns and expends great effort to reduce the unintended risk to civilians from cluster munitions during and after armed conflict.
-- Urge GIRoA to take full advantage of the flexibility afforded by Article 21 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) that allows for continued "military cooperation and operations" between a signatory and a non-signatory. Article 21 also covers all preparations for future military operations, transit of cluster munitions through Afghanistan,s territory, and storage and potential use of cluster munitions on Afghanistan,s territory.
-- Emphasize that a narrow interpretation of Article 21 by GIRoA will impair our ability to defend the lives of our soldiers as well as those of Afghanistan and Coalition partners.
-- Share with GIRoA the U.S. Department of Defense Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians, signed by Secretary Gates on June 19, 2008. (Text can be found at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/d20080709cmpo licy.pdf.)
-- Request that GIRoA pass to the USG any concerns impacting military operations in Afghanistan through bilateral channels.
-- IF RAISED: The United States currently has a very small stockpile of cluster munitions in Afghanistan. In certain circumstances, they are the most effective system to use against light armor, wheeled vehicles, materiel, and personnel, while at the same time limiting collateral damage. Not allowing the use of cluster munitions will increase risk to coalition forces engaged in combat from enemy counter-fire, reduce responsiveness, decrease the number of different targets that can be attacked within a specified timeframe, and will substantially increase risks of collateral damage by requiring usage of a greater number of large, unitary warheads to accomplish the same mission. Cluster munitions employment would comply with the laws of war to include a painstaking collateral methodology and target development process, and only when absolutely necessary.
REPORTING DEADLINE
------------------
4. (U) Embassy should report results of efforts by cable to PM/WRA Katherine Baker before January 5, 2009.
BACKGROUND
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5. (C) Despite assurances to the contrary from President Karzai and Foreign Minister Spanta to Ambassador Wood in February 2008 (ref B), the GIRoA joined 93 other states in signing the CCM, December 3-4, 2008 in Oslo, Norway. According to timely Post reporting, President Karzai decided at the last moment to overrule Spanta and sign the CCM without prior consultation with the USG or other key states engaged in operations in Afghanistan. Information from Post and the press indicates that even ardent supporters of the CCM who had been lobbying Kabul for some time were unaware of the change in policy until December 3, when Afghanistan formally signed the treaty. Moreover, at least parts of the Foreign Ministry appeared unaware of the policy change, as of December 10 (ref C). Given the political sensitivities in Afghanistan surrounding cluster munitions as well as air and artillery strikes in general, the Department believes that a relatively low-profile dialogue at the sub-ministerial level will be the best way to ensure a common understanding between the USG and GIRoA that the CCM does not impede U.S. and ISAF military planning and operations.
6. (SBU) CCM signature does not automatically result in restrictions on the plans and operations of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or other organizations engaged in security operations in Afghanistan. The United States interprets Article 21 of the CCM to enable non-signatories to continue to operate with those that have signed the treaty. Furthermore, the United States reads the phrase "military cooperation and operations" in Article 21 to include all preparations for future military operations, transit of cluster munitions through the territory of a State Party, and storage and use of cluster munitions on the territory of a State Party. Many of our NATO Allies and other key partners share this interpretation. The NATO Military Committee advice issued on September 30, 2008 notes that Article 21 provides the necessary flexibility to allow military cooperation among Allies that are party to the Convention and those that are not. Bilateral consultations with military allies and partners during the negotiation of the CCM indicate that ongoing operations in Afghanistan were a major factor in the inclusion of Article 21 by would-be signatories, several being troop contributors to ISAF. A narrow interpretation of the clause by GIRoA would reverse the hard work of our Allies and partners in ensuring that the CCM text included a clause on interoperability and combined operations.
7. (U) The United States did not sign the CCM as it constitutes a near-total ban on cluster munitions, which provide a vital military capability and remain a legitimate weapon when used properly and in accordance with existing international humanitarian law. We believe that the elimination of cluster munitions from our stockpiles would put the lives of our soldiers and those of our coalition partners at risk. Without cluster munitions it becomes more difficult to fulfill our security guarantees to others. We are not aware of any munition that offers the same combination of range, economy of force, responsiveness, and flexibility as cluster munitions. Moreover, there are no easy substitutes, and possible alternatives (carpet bombing, massed artillery barrages, etc.) have pronounced and potentially more adverse humanitarian impacts. We are working to improve our cluster munitions in order to reduce the unintended effects on civilians. While the current security environment in Afghanistan may not necessarily lend itself to employment of cluster munitions, the situation remains dynamic so that the United States cannot permanently preclude its use in the country.
8. (SBU) As the United States expands its forces in Afghanistan, the likelihood of enemy contact will rise due to an increase in operations. It is critical for the United States and Coalition partners to have the effects that cluster munitions can provide for the safety of our forces. The use of cluster munitions depends on the targeting sets and the effects desired against those targeting sets balanced with humanitarian considerations. Targeting sets would normally be light armor, wheeled vehicles, materiel, and personnel. Not allowing the use of cluster munitions will increases risk to Coalition forces engaged in combat from enemy counter-fire, reduce responsiveness, decrease the number of different targets that can be attacked within a specified timeframe, and will substantially increase risks of collateral damage by requiring usage of a greater number of large, unitary warheads to accomplish the same mission. Cluster munitions employment would comply with the laws of war. The rules of engagement would be stringent, and the collateral damage methodology and target development process would be painstaking, balancing military need with humanitarian concerns.
U.S. Attempts to Address Humanitarian Concerns
--------------------------------------------- -
9. (U) The United States is addressing the humanitarian impact of unexploded cluster munitions through multiple channels. On June 19, Secretary Gates signed the new Department of Defense Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians. The primary feature of this policy is the commitment that by 2018, U.S. armed forces will employ only those cluster munitions that, after arming, result in no more than 1 percent unexploded ordnance across the range of intended operational environments. Post-2018, the USG will not transfer cluster munitions that do not meet these criteria and, for any cluster munitions transferred prior to 2018 not meeting this standard, the recipient state must agree not to use them after 2018.
10. (U) In addition, the Department of State and the Agency for International Development will continue efforts to protect civilians from unexploded cluster munitions and explosive remnants of war (ERW) through extensive survey, clearance, risk education assistance, and victims, assistance programs. The U.S. is the largest single donor to these types of activities, providing over $1.4 billion since 1993, including nearly $167.5 million for Afghanistan. (This figure includes assistance for clearance of landmines and all varieties of unexploded ordnance.) State Department programs include both immediate post-conflict response and long-term assistance for affected states, including Afghanistan where the United States has had demining and ERW clearance programs since 1988.
11. (U) Finally, the United States continues to work towards a legally-binding Protocol on cluster munitions within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Unlike the CCM, the CCW includes most major states which use, produce, and/or stockpile the world,s cluster munitions; many of them will not sign the CCM. These states were willing to work towards finalizing an agreement in the CCW that addresses both military and humanitarian concerns. Unfortunately, 25 of the strongest CCM supporters blocked consensus towards a binding CCW Protocol during the November 2008 negotiating session by demanding language virtually identical to that found in the CCM. The United States continues to support the CCW negotiations and will participate in the 2009 GGE sessions (February 16-20 and April 14-17). Afghanistan has signed, but not ratified, the CCW.
12. (U) For more information, please contact Katherine Baker (202-663-0104) in PM/WRA. RICE
Wednesday, 28 April 2004, 14:21
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001868
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/29/2014
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINR, PBTS, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: DINING WITH CHRIS: RANDOM THOUGHTS FROM RELEX
COMMISSIONER PATTEN
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Kyle Scott. Reason: 1.4 (B )(D)
1. (C) Summary: Over rubbery fish at an Adenauer Stiftung affair on April 27, External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten touched briefly on why the EU will never be a "real power," the dubious backgrounds of some of the leaders of the EU's new members, next steps on Cyprus/Turkey, the differences between a union and an alliance, and Russian President Putin's "killer's eyes." His formal remarks focused on the future of the European Commission, where he offered ten recommendations to the next commission. End Summary.
On What It Means to Be a "Real Power"
-------------------------------------
2. (C) To be a real power, Patten said, a country must be ready and able to adopt and implement a policy, even if the rest of the world considers it unwise. Europeans may agree or disagree with US policy, but they admire that the US is ready to carry out the policies it thinks best, no matter what the rest of the world thinks. Under this yardstick, the EU will never be a "real power" because there is always someone in the room who is overly cautious, and will insist on looking at matters "sensibly."
Next Steps On Cyprus/Papadopolous' Dubious Character...
--------------------------------------------- ----------
3. (C) The next steps for the Commission are figuring out how to spend money in Northern Cyprus. Patten expects the EC to open an office to oversee their assistance. While there will be legal hurdles to managing the process, he was confident the Commission would find a way. Patten doubted the Greek Cypriots would openly oppose any efforts, noting that they were "on their heels" diplomatically after their blatant efforts to stifle opposing views on the referendum. This incident, Patten said, was a sad reflection on the realities of EU enlargement: Some of the new members were people you would "only want to dine with if you have a very long spoon." Not that the EU should have been surprised by Papadopolous' behavior, Patten said, since they knew well who they were dealing with: Milosevic's lawyer.XXXXXXXXXXXX ... And on Turkey
-----------------
4. (C) Patten noted that he was the biggest proponent in the Commission for Turkey's admission. In his view, based on the technical merits alone, the Commission has no other option but to give a positive avis to begin accession negotiations. Still, he said the political climate in Europe is not receptive to Turkey's candidacy. The problem, in his view, was not Chirac in France, since "he can change his policies on a whim." Patten considered the opposition of conservative parties in Germany and Spain the most serious obstacles to Turkish admission.
On the Difference Between a Union and an Alliance
--------------------------------------------- ----
5. (C) Patten also said he felt at times the US does not fully appreciate the difference between expanding an alliance like NATO, and a Union like the EU. When a country joins an alliance, it becomes a distinct member of a group committed to a common cause -- but nothing more. When countries join the EU, they become part of the whole, formally and practically indistinct in many areas of EU competence. "We have to be ready to trust their food and sanitation standards, for instance." In this regard, he noted that some of the accession countries were foisted on the EU as part of a larger bargain. Cyprus, for instance, probably should not have been admitted (as Papadapolous' behavior prior to the referendum indicated), but the Greeks insisted on Cypriot admission as the price of agreeing to some of the northern European candidates. Croatia, Patten said, is probably far more prepared for EU membership than either Bulgaria or Romania, who will likely enter the Union earlier. Romania, in particular, was a "feral nation." We noted that we were shocked by del Ponte's clean bill of health on ICTY cooperation while Gotovina still was at large inside Croatia. Patten said he too was surprised by del Ponte's letter, but once the referee had made the call, the EU was bound by her judgement.
On Russia, WTO, Kyoto, and Putin's "Killer's Eyes"
--------------------------------------------- -----
6. (C) Patten was in Moscow last week, and had just concluded EU-Russia ministerial consultations in Brussels this week. He said the EU had become overly dependent on Russian energy supplies, and should become more engaged with the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia in order to diversify supplies. To do so, however, the Union would also have to become more involved in pipeline politics.
7. (C) WTO discussions had not moved forward substantially during these most recent talks. Patten said the EC was sticking with its positions on energy, but he was worried that they may have taken too strong a line, and would be forced to backpedal significantly at a later stage. In his view, this was unfortunate because he was worried the EC was spending too much negotiating effort on energy rather than focussing on other items that really mattered, such as overflights. Patten also said that Putin had explicitly suggested a possible trade-off between the Russian position on the Kyoto Protocol and WTO negotiations during last week's talks, although he was not sure how serious the Russians were on this, or whether it was a convincing trade-off for Commission officials.
8. (C) Patten said Putin has done a good job for Russia mainly due to high world energy prices, but he had serious doubts about the man's character. Cautioning that "I'm not saying that genes are determinant," Patten then reviewed Putin family history: grandfather part of Lenin's special protection team, father a communist party apparatchik, and Putin himself decided at a young age to pursue a career in the KGB. "He seems a completely reasonable man when discussing the Middle East or energy policy, but when the conversation shifts to Chechnya or Islamic extremism, Putin's eyes turn to those of a killer."
Ten Commandments for the Next Commission
----------------------------------------
9. (SBU) Patten's public remarks at the dinner focused on the future of the Commission -- not foreign affairs. He offered ten recommendations for the next Commission to help them improve the EU's image with Europe's citizenry, as follows:
-- 1) Deliver substance: highlight areas where the EU can make a difference in the world, such as the rapid changes in Justice and Home Affairs, or external assistance.
-- 2) Go with the flow of the institutional debate: Don't spend energy trying to stop intergovernmental efforts that have a head of steam behind them. Instead, try to channel these efforts in useful directions.
-- 3) Exploit the "Community Method" where it exists: Make the most of EC strengths, such as on the internal market, trade, or foreign assistance.
-- 4) Be open to new ways of working: The number of regulations passed should not be a measure of success of the Commission.
-- 5) Regulate better: aggesively develop the initiative the Commission launched in 2002. Get serious about consultation and impact assessment rather than just going through the motions.
--6) Get economic management right: There should be no "free riders" in the monetary union, but the EU should seek greater flexibility that takes account of the differences between states. The Commission must also be ready to accept the same sort of management discipline it demands of the Member States.
-- 7) Put more effort into monitoring implementation of EU legislation: use score cards and "league tables" on infractions. Compare best practices. Be ready to be tougher on sanctioning persistent bad performance, perhaps by cutting EU financial programs such as structural funds.
-- 8) Be prepared to scale back or eliminate bad policies: Take a thorough look at the CAP, and focus greater attention on what needs to be done at the Community level, and where "subsidiarity" and national/local administrations would be the better option.
-- 9) Get internal organization right: Create real clusters of issues where Commission Vice Presidents have real authority.
-- 10) Demonstrate that the EU can make a difference to people's lives.
SCHNABEL
Wednesday, 19 November 2008, 06:43
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003343
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/15/2017
TAGS PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, RS
SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV'S ADDRESS AND TANDEM POLITICS
REF: MOSCOW 03265
Classified By: DCM Eric Rubin. Reason: 1.4 (d).
1. (C) Summary. Medvedev's address to the Federal Assembly last week provided a prism for viewing the power relationship in the Medvedev-Putin tandem, refracting opinion amongst our contacts into three, very divergent, camps. The first group views Medvedev as ascendant, slowly accruing power as he plays to his strengths managing the economic crisis. The second, more skeptical, group argues that Medvedev continues to play Robin to Putin's Batman, surrounded by a team loyal to the Premier and checked by Putin's dominance over the legislature and regional elites. Adherents to the third group see no essential difference between Putin and Medvedev, taking at face value the tandem's unanimity in purpose and vision. All are hindered by the impenetrable nature of Kremlin politics and the fertile field of speculation and rumor that the information vacuum creates. Putin's address to United Russia on November 20, which will be televised on Channel 1, could provide an opportunity to make a more definitive judgement on the balance of forces within the tandem. End Summary.
Medvedev's Fans
---------------
2. (C) Medvedev's public bravura as the "commander-in-chief" during the Georgia war and his proactive approach to the darkening economic picture have led some of our contacts to see the president coming into his own in recent months. Aleksey Mukhin, the director of the Center for Political Information, told us that Medvedev's address demonstrated how far the president has come, learning from his predecessor the art of balancing the contradictory elite impulses and interests. Mukhin was not surprised by the strong language directed at the U.S., since Medvedev's rhetoric has toughened since August. Yet, Mukhin saw the aggressive language primarily as a sop to Putin and the hard-liners before Medvedev moved on to his reform agenda. Extending the presidential term will provide Medvedev the possibility of 10 years in power -- enough time for him (or his successor) to implement lasting reform. Mukhin explained that the main thrust of the political reforms is to compel regional leaders to establish closer contact with local assemblies and with voters. He sees this as a first step in Medvedev's plan to build his own constituency within United Russia and the regional elite as the basis for a re-election run in 2012.
3. (C) Mark Urnov of the Higher School of Economics viewed Putin as the principal decision maker, but one who is under increasing pressure owing to the financial crisis. Urnov largely dismissed Medvedev's address as a "PR effort" to demonstrate to a domestic audience that he could deliver a strong speech on foreign policy and security issues. Like Mukhin, Urnov argued that the elements of political reform bear closer examination as Medvedev's first steps in creating his own team. The president's anti-corruption agenda provided a signal to the elite that he has the will and power to target their economic interests. Urnov expects him to use this selectively to begin to remove people in ministries (deputy ministers and above) as well as some regional leaders and to replace them with "his people."
4. (C) Urnov told us that Medvedev's tough rhetoric toward the U.S. was dictated equally by his poor standing in the eyes of the military and by the inability of Putin and his closest advisors to deal with the stresses of the economic downturn. As for the former, Urnov said that recent surveys of military officers -- which are being kept quiet -- indicate the absolute abysmal regard with which the military holds Medvedev. Promises of increased funding will have to be scaled back, leaving Medvedev to turn to words about the importance of the military in protecting Russian interests and belittling the U.S. as acting irresponsibly. On the second point, Putin (and indirectly Medvedev) do not understand how to function politically in an economic crisis. They understand how to exploit the good times to their advantage, but not how to lead and survive in the bad. Urnov noted that rhetoric is only going to get them so far, especially now after the U.S. elections as the Obama victory and a change of administrations makes it much harder for them to put blame on Washington for Russia's travails.
Putin's the Man
---------------
5. (C) Other contacts are less generous toward Medvedev, considering him an instrument of Putin's power rather than an independent player. A review of Medvedev's address by the business paper Vedemosti argued that many of the proposed "liberal reforms," such as having the majority party recommend gubernatorial candidates and making the government answerable to the Duma on some issues, would strengthen the Putin-led United Russia -- indicating that his agenda continues to shape the tandem policy line. Likewise, press reporting pointed out that the other proposals, such as giving 1-2 seats to minority parties that garner 5-7 percent of the vote and measures to ease the registration of parties, would have made no difference in the past election and are unlikely to signal a broadening of political pluralism. In short, those analysts saw Medvedev's reform agenda strengthening Putin and his position, despite the democratic rhetoric in the address.
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX cited the Stalinist credo "cadres decide everything" as justification for dismissing Medvedev as a real contender (indeed, XXXXXXXXXXXX sees the president as the number 3 guy, behind Putin and Deputy Premier Igor Sechin). In his formulation, Putin remains the main arbiter of elite conflict and continues to balance the two, unequal factions against each other. For opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, whose SPS party was bought out by the Kremlin, Medvedev remains the Lilliputian to Putin's commander-in-chief. Insecurity and lack of legitimacy would drive a Putinesque policy, but Nemtsov stressed that it was Putin who pulled all the strings.
Two Peas in a Pod
-----------------
7. (C) Other contacts commented that a search for evidence of dissonance between the two leaders is either the forlorn hope of Western-leaning liberals for a political thaw or a legacy of "Kremlinology" that presupposes inter-leadership conflict as the sine qua non of Russian politics. Perhaps more important, they point to the unity of message between Putin and Medvedev on the most important issues: the revival of Russia's role as a great power, the need for combating corruption within the system, and the goal of improving the quality of life for everyday Russians. U.S. resident, but United Russia-connected analyst Nikolay Zlobin concluded to us that the "tandem works." No one outside Medvedev and Putin were privy to the codicils of this political arrangement, but the lack of transparency, he maintained, did not mean a lack of political efficiency.
8. (C) Tatyana Stanovaya of the Center for Political Technologies is representative of the "tandem as team" camp and sees little reason to read the tea leaves for signs of a split. She pointed to Medvedev's address as the contradictory medley of a "Putin line" seeking to strengthen the state and a "Medvedev" impulse to scale back state involvement. Both the Kremlin and the White House approved the message, and the final product reflected coordination and compromise between the two leaders. Stanovaya underscored that those aspects attributed to Putin, particularly the proposal to extend the presidential term to 6 years, will have an immediate impact, while those considered more "Medvedian" -- lowering the barriers for smaller parties, for example -- will only have significance further down the road. Perhaps most important, Stanovaya emphasized that all of the elements of the address, like all other aspects of policy, enjoyed at least some support from both sides of the tandem, or they would not have been introduced.
Constitutional Changes
----------------------
9. (C) The most controversial moment of Medvedev's address was his proposal to extend the presidential term to 6 years, and that for Duma members to 5 years. The press was, and remains, rife with rumors that the constitutional change is designed to create the conditions for a Putin return to the presidency, either by Medvedev's resignation or through a snap election, brought about by the change itself. Other rumors, including comments by Communist party leader Zyuganov consider the proposed amendment to be a "graceful" way for Putin to leave his post as Premier, before the economy collapses, requiring a new round of Duma elections and the resultant dismissal of the current government. The haste in which the administration is moving forward -- the Duma may accomplish the required three readings and vote its approval by November 21, and there are no apparent obstacles to having regional parliaments ratify the change -- has served to heighten speculation about the reasons behind what would be the first amendment to the 15-year old constitution.
10. (C) Most of our contacts saw the term limit issue in terms of the tandem's longer-term agenda, rather than a short-term plan to shake up the leadership. Stanovaya reminded us that Putin had raised the idea of extending term limits when he was president, but he did not want to lose face with the West or his own society by adapting the constitution. Now that Putin's successor has come to power, she argued, the time has come to make the changes. Urnov sees the pressures of the looming economic crisis driving the timing of Medvedev's proposal. He noted that the constitutional change did not need to be included in Medvedev's address -- indeed, initial drafts did not include it. The decision to go forward now was dictated completely by politics: Putin and Medvedev see that their approval ratings dropping somewhat, and they fear how far they might go. Urnov believes that the tandem decided that is better to use whatever political momentum they still have due to the Georgia conflict to push through the constitutional change now.
11. (C) Few of our contacts gave any credit to rumors about Putin leaving his office. XXXXXXXXXXXX quipped that "Putin is not Ghandi -- having succeeded in achieving major political goals, he would not be content to become the spiritual leader of his party." XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Putin knows he will expose his loyal team to risk, including removal from power, loss of fortune, and even imprisonment if he were to leave the scene. Mukhin also dismissed rumors about a possible Putin resignation, which would represent the abandonment of all that he has built up to this point. He argued that Putin recognizes that his resignation would signal a real clash between the elite clans and likely lead to political, economic, and even social instability. Moreover, there are plenty of scapegoats for Putin to blame if the economic downturn deepens substantially. Zlobin, however, saw the constitutional amendments strengthening the party's oversight of the governors as a preliminary step for preparing Putin's shift to head United Russia on a daily basis, without the responsibility for managing a sinking economy.
Where You Sit is Where You Stand
--------------------------------
12. (C) Broadly speaking, analysis of the tandem reflects the political orientation of the analyst. As noted in earlier reporting, our contacts from the "liberal democratic" camp are dismissive of any proposals from the tandem government, seeing the proposals as further undermining the structure of Russian democracy (Reftel). "Establishment liberals," like Mukhin and Urnov, are inclined to place greater emphasis on ideas, looking at Medvedev's progressive rhetoric as a sign of possible change and ultimately a growing challenge to Putin's statist inclinations. Less ideological analysts focus more on systematic factors and tend emphasize Putin's overwhelming advantage in public opinion, control over cadres policy, and standing as United Russia head as largely precluding a Medvedev ascension. Indeed, these "systemic" analysts downplay competition within the tandem as contradicting the very framework of the power arrangement.
13. (C) The opacity of Kremlin politics and the conspiratorial leanings of Russia's political commentary have created fertile ground for a wide range of speculation and have impaired the emergence of a more broad-based consensus on the tandem's future course. Deeping economic troubles, however, are certain to challenge the tandem and could create new pressures on the unity of leadership. Putin's speech to United Russia's conference on November 20 -- which in an unprecedented display of the strengthened stature of the Premier's position will be televised to the nation -- provides an opportunity to analyze the differences between, or perhaps unaminity among, the two leaders. We will be watching closely to see if Putin uses the public rostrum to paint a different picture of events or to demonstrate a competing agenda to that outlined in Medvedev's address and will follow up with additional reporting.
BEYRLE
Friday, 05 February 2010, 15:09
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000272
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/05/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINR, KDEM, RS
SUBJECT: PUTIN STILL HOLDING THE REINS FOR 2012 ELECTION
REF: A. MOSCOW 199 B. MOSCOW 175
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan Elliott for reasons 1 .4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: While supporters of Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev are pushing him to establish himself as a stronger tandem member (ref A), many political experts increasingly believe that no matter who becomes president in 2012, the road to the presidency still runs through Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Medvedev's personal relationship with Putin, lack of a party foundation, and a small pro-Medvedev bureaucratic cadre limit his ability to be reelected without Putin's consent. With the election not until 2012, wildcards such as political instability, health concerns, or a major economic decline could change the tandem equation, but experts perceive that no matter whether Putin, Medvedev, or someone else becomes President in 2012, Putin will have the final word. End Summary.
----------------------------------
Putin Will Decide 2012, Eventually
----------------------------------
2. (C) Experts across the political spectrum continue to speculate who is most likely to become president in 2012, with every credible scenario reduced to whether Putin wants to return to the presidency. Most contacts cite Putin's desire to control the political sphere as his main rationale for returning. Director of the Center for the Study of Elite, United Russia member, and Kremlin adviser Olga Kryshtanovskaya told us that Putin was a "hostage to the system he had built." She told Ekho Moskvy radio on January 19 that all signs suggested that Putin would return in 2012. General Director of the Agency for Political and Economic Communication Dmitriy Orlov told us January 15 that Putin would "undoubtedly" return as president because he wanted to remain in control of Russia from the more prestigious seat in the Kremlin. He had stepped aside in 2008 merely to avoid unsavory comparisons to authoritarian leaders in Russia's backyard. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Putin often arranged to have the question of his possible return in 2012 asked in public formats because he wanted to return to the presidency. He added that Putin's KGB background precluded him from trusting anyone with a no-Putin-strings-attached presidency.
3. (C) The vast majority of our contacts suggested that unless Medvedev quickly did something drastic, the decision on 2012 would not be made until shortly before the election. In the lead up to the previous presidential election in 2008, Putin kept his decision not to run quiet until the last moment. Delaying the descision would prevent undermining Medvedev in the public sphere, or either of them among the elite.
-------------------------------------
Medvedev Avoiding Destabilizing Moves
-------------------------------------
4. (C) Medvedev's unilateral routes to reelection become narrower as he avoids taking destabilizing steps, such as firing senior Putin loyalists or changing the political system. This in turn increases his dependency on Putin to endorse him for another term. While pundits such as XXXXXXXXXXXX are optimistic that Medvedev has time to build a large contingent of powerfully placed supporters, others increasingly view Medvedev's close personal relationship with Putin as inhibiting his ability and inclination to initiate a dispute over control of the bureaucracy or reform of the political system. To emphasize her view that Medvedev relies on Putin's bureaucracy, Kryshtanovskaya said in her Ekho Moskvy interview that only 2 of the top 75 positions in government were held by Medvedev loyalists.
5. (C) Medvedev's defense of the current political system and (widely believed fraudulent) October elections during his January 22 State Council speech (ref B), moreover, disappointed those who had expected him to set a new course. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us January 29 that a year ago he thought Medvedev was more likely to be reelected, but after the State Council speech he viewed Putin as the frontrunner. The speech had convinced him that Medvedev had failed to garner elite or popular support away from Putin, or create a loyal bureaucratic team or political party. XXXXXXXXXXXX privately told us February 4 that Putin was likely to return as president because Medvedev had not built the political institutions necessary for him to be reelected. He gave Medvedev until the end of 2010 to establish pro-Medvedev political institutions, but seriously doubted that Medvedev, by way of First Deputy Presidential Administration Chief Vladislav Surkov, would overhaul Russia's political party system.
--------------------------------------------- -
Election Tied to Putin's Perception of Control
--------------------------------------------- -
6. (C) Regardless of his lack of informal levers of power, Medvedev could return to the presidency if Putin thought that he could manage Russia from a post other than the presidency. XXXXXXXXXXXX gave Medvedev a 70 percent chance of being "reselected" if stability persisted over the next two years. The decision, she said, was Putin's, and depended on his perception of being able to control Russia's political-economic system and protect his financial interests. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Putin does not want to return to the Kremlin, but needed to be in a position of control. He might be able to do that, much like he has done since 2008, as Prime Minister. Putin, however, needed to ensure that he was positioned to crush anyone who might initiate de-Putinization, or suggest that Putin had a hand in unsavory deeds, such as the murder of journalists or the 1999 apartment bombings.
7. (C) While no one with whom we have spoken knows Putin and Medvedev's future plans, Medvedev recently responded to a question on his possible career path. While not indicative of the future, KROS public relations President and former Presidential Administration deputy Sergey Zverev told us that he had heard that a journalist had asked Medvedev an off-the-record hypothetical question in late January about what position Medvedev would want if he were no longer President. After thinking it over for a moment, Medvedev responded Head of the Constitutional Court or Prime Minister.
--------------------------
Putin in the Driver's Seat
--------------------------
8. (C) Zverev stated that Putin is in total control of the situation and that he had no other option than to remain in a position of power, but not necessarily as president. Zverev said that Putin would be president if he wanted the position. If Putin wanted Medvedev to be president, then Medvedev would be president. Medvedev did not necessarily need to have a bureaucratic team or party support if Putin decided to endorse Medvedev, because Putin would remain in a position of power where he could defend his interests and support Medvedev when needed. A recent joke circulating in Moscow emphasized Zverev's point: Medvedev sits in the driver's seat of a new car, examines the inside, the instrument panel, and the pedals. He looks around, but the steering wheel is missing. He turns to Putin and asks: "Vladimir Vladimirovich, where is the steering wheel?" Putin pulls a remote control out of his pocket and says, "I'll be the one doing the driving."
--------
Comment:
--------
9. (C) Russia's bicephalous ruling format is not likely to be permanent based on Russian history and current tandem dynamics. Medvedev and Putin work well together, but Putin holds most, and the best, of the cards in the tandem relationship. His return to the Kremlin is not inevitable, but should things remain stable, Putin remains in a position to choose himself, Medvedev, or another person as Russia's next president. We should continue to engage where possible with Putin, who will continue to have a significant say in Russian affairs for the foreseeable future, regardless of his formal position. Beyrle
Friday, 04 December 2009, 15:14
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002946
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/04/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, ECON, ETRD, KDEM, RS
SUBJECT: PUTIN EXUDES LEADERSHIP DURING FOUR HOUR Q AND A
SESSION
Classified By: DCM Eric S. Rubin; reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (SBU) Summary: Prime Minister Vladimir Putin displayed thorough knowledge of the issues facing Russia during a live, televised question and answer session which highlighted his role as Russia's dominant political figure. Most of the questions were focused on the economic situation and socio-economic issues (septel), but Putin also repeated his previous statements on his possible run for President in 2012, and his good relationship with President Dmitriy Medvedev. Putin also touched both sides of the coin on Stalin's legacy, infuriating some opposition politicians and human rights activists. Putin's confident performance in front of millions of Russians showcased his image as a practical problem-solver and the tandem leader most in touch with the Russian people. End Summary.
----------------------------
Question and Answer Dynamics
----------------------------
2. (SBU) On December 3 Putin conducted a marathon, four-hour question and answer session during which he answered 80 questions from a variety of formats, including studio audience, telephone, text message, e-mail, and several live video-feeds from across the country. Putin was well prepared for the session, and his spokesman, certainly stretching the truth, stated in the days leading up to the event that Putin had read the "overwhelming majority" of the 700,000 questions received at that point. By the end of the session, Putin received over two million questions.
3. (SBU) Putin appeared comfortable with the event's format, and demonstrated an encyclopedic knowledge of statistics in his answers. As he has done in the past, Putin stared straight at the camera, repeated the names of those asking the questions -- some of whom had met the Prime Minister in the past year -- and responded directly to their questions. In typical Putin fashion, he rarely showed any emotion and some of his attempts at dead-pan humor missed the mark. Putin took control of the event towards the conclusion by personally calling on people in the carefully screened studio audience and responding to questions he had reviewed previously. Although some of the questions were not softballs and did not appear to be scripted, Putin was informed of the general topics ahead of time and the locations for the video-feeds.
4. (SBU) Putin personally selected a controversial question about Stalin's legacy and whether he viewed the former Soviet leader as good or bad. Putin said that Stalin had achieved some positive achievements, such as industrialization, but that the cost was unacceptable and that during Stalin's reign mass-scale crimes were committed.
---------------------------------------
Tandem Politics Show Putin Still on Top
---------------------------------------
5. (C) Tandem politics stood out as an important issue when people asked Putin directly about his plans to run for President in 2012 and his relationship with Medvedev. He answered with the same standard notions he has used previously, leaving vague his future plans. Putin responded that he was thinking about running in 2012, but needed to wait to see what the situation in the country would be like in a couple years. He noted that, given the country's problems, it was better to concentrate on solving them rather than consume energy on an election campaign. Putin said he and Medvedev knew each other well, worked well together, and shared the same principles. Individual experts continue to have varying opinions on the tandem's presidential aspirations. Longtime Kremlin insider Gleb Pavlovskiy stated that Medvedev and Putin's vague statements about their 2012 intentions served as a way to preserve the tandem's balance and effectiveness, however, by early 2011 their intentions, according to Pavlovskiy, would become clear.
6. (C) Putin's excellent performance only added to his cultivated image as Russia's dominant national leader and the one in control of the tandem. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the event had strengthened Putin's political leadership and demonstrated who was the country's practical leader, and who was its theoretical leader. Experts XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that the event showed Russians who was able to resolve concrete, socio-economic issues, such as pensions, jobs, and housing, and who worked on abstract issues less important to the populace. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that although the event was routine and scripted, it served its purpose by portraying Putin in a positive light. Pavlovskiy called it perhaps the most brilliant performance of Putin's entire career.
7. (C) In contrast, Communist Party Deputy Chairman Ivan Melnikov told us that the show was nothing more than "psycho-therapy" for a population worried about salaries, pensions and housing, which clearly showed Putin's interest in reclaiming the presidency. Public Chamber Member Vyacheslav Glazychev, an expert on "mono-gorod" one-industry towns in Russia, called it "a nice public relations event and nothing more." XXXXXXXXXXXX blasted Putin's view of Stalin. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the Prime Minister should have made a more straight-forward assessment of "one of the most terrible criminals in human history."
8. (SBU) A pre-event Levada Center poll emphasized that Russians saw Putin as the country's leader, and his "meat and potatoes" issues as more important. The poll results showed that 28 percent of respondents named Putin as the one who holds power in Russia, while 13 percent said Medvedev. Thirty-eight percent of respondents were likely to watch Putin's address, whereas 27 percent watched Medvedev's nationally televised address in November. Forty-three percent of respondents considered Putin's address to be more important, compared to only 16 percent of Russians who thought Medvedev's address was more important.
-------
Comment
-------
9. (C) Putin's guarded comments about his participation in the 2012 presidential election have helped him retain his position as the national leader and elite faction mediator. His comments on Stalin's legacy have infuriated long-standing critics like Gozman, but are extremely unlikely to result in any major, negative backlash at Putin in Russia. At this point, Putin and Medvedev's recent nationally televised addresses only strengthened the image of a Prime Minister who works on tangible, bread and butter issues, and a President who focuses on big-picture issues and strategic thinking. Beyrle
Thursday, 19 March 2009, 12:19
S E C R E T BAKU 000226
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/PRA-ANITA FRIEDT, EUR/CARC, DAS BRYZA,
INR (PSTRONSKI),DEFENSE FOR OUSD(P) DMELLEBY
EO 12958 DECL: 03/20/2034
TAGS PREL, PGOV, AJ, RU, PINR
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER ON GABALA, ARMAVIR, RUSSIA
Classified By: Ambassador Anne Derse, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary: Defense Minister Safar Abiyev on March 14 told the Ambassador he did not object to exploration of joint U.S.-Russian use of the Gabala radar station, but was deliberately vague on whether the Russians' lease would be renewed on its expiration in 2012. He also shared details of his recent visit to Moscow, which came at the Russians' invitation amid the controversy over allegations of large-scale arms transfers by Russia to Armenia. End Summary.
2. (C) The immediate reason for the Saturday morning meeting was to agree on a procedure for the quick negotiation of the Exercise Support Agreement (ESA) for the planned April-May bilateral exercise REGIONAL RESPONSE 09 (RR-09). While the MoD had been planning on postponing the exercise due to interagency differences in Baku - later shown to be political reservations held by the Foreign Minister personally about the international message sent by the exercise (Reftel), Abiyev was now determined to move forward after a lengthy after-hours meeting with Foreign Minister Mammadyarov after the latter's meeting with Ambassador and DATT. Abiyev offered his full support to the exercise and a visit from a USEUCOM negotiator to finalize the agreement; adding, however, that he was in full agreement with the Foreign Minister's desire to make the exercise appear as multilateral as possible to avoid raising the ire of Russia and Iran.
Gabala Issues
-------------
3. (S) Responding to Ambassador's question about Azerbaijan's future intentions regarding Gabala, Abiyev replied that it was late in 2007 that Russian DefMin Anatoly Serdyukov approached him about extending Russia's use of the site beyond 2012. According to Abiyev, he responded in surprise and asked Serdyukov to explain his request because then-President Putin had said before that Russia no longer needed the site. Serdyukov's response was "(that was a long time ago." Abiyev told the Russians that the time to discuss the renewal of the lease - or the expansion of the facilities or military contingent there - was 2012.
4. (S) Asked about the Armavir ("Voronezh") station Russia recently put into operation in the Krasnodar region, Abiyev said that it is a relatively "weak" station with much less capability than Gabala, regardless of Russian claims about its effectiveness. He claimed this was obvious because Russia had put almost 1 billion USD into improvements at Gabala over the years and had only spent USD 70 million on Armavir; and furthermore the Armavir radar only has a range of 2,500 km compared to 8,500 for Gabala. (Note: Other sources give the cost of Armavir at 2.85 billion rubles, or USD 84 million at current rates, and a range of 4,000 km. Russia built the station to replace the radars at Sevastopol and Mukachevo in Ukraine, which it lost when the GOU refused to continue their leases. End Note.)
Conversations With Serdyukov
----------------------------
5. (S) Abiyev told the Ambassador about his late-January trip to Moscow to discuss Azerbaijan's allegations that Russia had made extensive weapons transfers to Armenia throughout 2008. In formal meetings, Abiyev said, his Russian counterpart stuck to the talking points and denied any involvement. However, "after the second bottle of vodka," that evening, he said, the Russians opened up and admitted to having transferred weapons to Armenia.In an interesting side note, Abiyev quoted Serdyukov as saying: "Do you follow the orders of your President?...Well, I follow the orders of two Presidents."
DERSE
Thursday, 31 August 2006, 06:39
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 009533
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/30/2016
TAGS PGOV, ECON, PINR, RS
SUBJECT: A CAUCASUS WEDDING
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel A. Russell. Reason 1.4 ( b, d)
Summary
-------
1. (C) Weddings are elaborate in Dagestan, the largest autonomy in the North Caucasus. On August 22 we attended a wedding in Makhachkala, Dagestan's capital: Duma member and Dagestan Oil Company chief Gadzhi Makhachev's son married a classmate. The lavish display and heavy drinking concealed the deadly serious North Caucasus politics of land, ethnicity, clan, and alliance. The guest list spanned the Caucasus power structure -- guest starring Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov -- and underlined just how personal the region's politics can be. End Summary.
2. (C) Dagestani weddings are serious business: a forum for showing respect, fealty and alliance among families; the bride and groom themselves are little more than showpieces. Weddings take place in discrete parts over three days. On the first day the groom's family and the bride's family simultaneously hold separate receptions. During the receptions the groom leads a delegation to the bride's reception and escorts her back to his own reception, at which point she formally becomes a member of the groom's family, forsaking her old family and clan. The next day, the groom's parents hold another reception, this time for the bride's family and friends, who can "inspect" the family they have given their daughter to. On the third day, the bride's family holds a reception for the groom's parents and family.
Father of the Groom
-------------------
3. (C) On August 22, Gadzhi Makhachev married off his 19 year-old son Dalgat to Aida Sharipova. The wedding in Makhachkala, which we attended, was a microcosm of the social and political relations of the North Caucasus, beginning with Gadzhi's own biography. Gadzhi started off as an Avar clan leader. Enver Kisriyev, the leading scholar of Dagestani society, told us that as Soviet power receded from Dagestan in the late 1980s, the complex society fell back to its pre-Russian structure. The basic structural unit is the monoethnic "jamaat," in this usage best translated as "canton" or "commune." The ethnic groups themselves are a Russian construct: faced with hundreds of jamaats, the 19th century Russian conquerors lumped cantons speaking related dialects together and called them "Avar," "Dargin," etc. to reduce the number of "nationalities" in Dagestan to 38. Ever since then, jamaats within each ethnic group have been competing with one another to lead the ethnic group. This competition is especially marked among the Avars, the largest nationality in Dagestan.
4. (C) As Russian power faded, each canton fielded a militia to defend its people both in the mountains and the capital Makhachkala. Gadzhi became the leader from his home canton of Burtunay, in Kazbek Rayon. He later asserted pan-Avar ambitions, founding the Imam Shamil Popular Front -- named after the great Avar leader of mountaineer resistance to the Russians -- to promote the interests of the Avars and of Burtunay's role within the ethnic group. Among his exploits was a role in the military defense of Dagestan against the 1999 invasion from Chechnya by Shamil Basayev and al-Khattab, and his political defense of Avar villages under pressure in Chechnya, Georgia and Azerbaijan.
5. (C) Gadzhi has cashed in the social capital he made from nationalism, translating it into financial and political capital -- as head of Dagestan's state oil company and as the single-mandate representative for Makhachkala in Russia's State Duma. His dealings in the oil business -- including close cooperation with U.S. firms -- have left him well off enough to afford luxurious houses in Makhachkala, Kaspiysk, Moscow, Paris and San Diego; and a large collection of luxury automobiles, including the Rolls Royce Silver Phantom in which Dalgat fetched Aida from her parents' reception. (Gadzhi gave us a lift in the Rolls once in Moscow, but the legroom was somewhat constricted by the presence of a Kalashnikov carbine at our feet. Gadzhi has survived numerous assassination attempts, as have most of the still-living leaders of Dagestan. In Dagestan he always travels in an armored BMW with one, sometimes two follow cars full of uniformed armed guards.)
6. (C) Gadzhi has gone beyond his Avar base, pursuing a multi-ethnic cadre policy to develop a network of loyalists. He has sent Dagestani youths, including his sons, to a military type high school near San Diego (we met one graduate, a Jewish boy from Derbent now studying at San Diego state. He has no plans to enter the Russian military).
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Gadzhi's multi-ethnic reach illustrates what the editor of the Dagestani paper "Chernovik" told us: that in the last few years the development of inter-ethnic business clans has eroded traditional jamaat loyalties.
7. (C) But the Avar symbolism is still strong. Gadzhi's brother, an artist from St. Petersburg, ordered as a wedding gift a life-sized statue of Imam Shamil. Shamil is the iconic national symbol, despite his stern and inflexible character (portrayed in Tolstoy's "Hadji-Murat" as the mountaineers' tyrannical counterpart to the absolutist Tsar). Connection with Shamil makes for nobility among Avars today. Gadzhi often mentions that he is a descendant on his mother's side of Gair-Bek, one of Shamil's deputies.
The Day Before
--------------
8. (C) Gadzhi's Kaspiysk summer house is an enormous structure on the shore of the Caspian, essentially a huge circular reception room -- much like a large restaurant -- attached to a 40-meter high green airport tower on columns, accessible only by elevator, with a couple of bedrooms, a reception room, and a grotto whose glass floor was the roof of a huge fish tank. The heavily guarded compound also boasts a second house, outbuildings, a tennis court, and two piers out into the Caspian, one rigged with block and tackle for launching jet skis. The house filled up with visitors from all over the Caucasus during the afternoon of August 21. The Chair of Ingushetia's parliament drove in with two colleagues; visitors from Moscow included politicians, businessmen and an Avar football coach. Many of the visitors grew up with Gadzhi in Khasavyurt, including an Ingush Olympic wrestler named Vakha who seemed to be perpetually tipsy. Another group of Gadzhi's boyhood friends from Khasavyurt was led by a man who looked like Shamil Basayev on his day off -- flip-flops, t-shirt, baseball cap, beard -- but turned out to be the chief rabbi of Stavropol Kray. He told us he has 12,000 co-religionists in the province, 8,000 of them in its capital, Pyatigorsk. 70 percent are, like him, Persian-speaking Mountain Jews; the rest are a mixture of Europeans, Georgians and Bukharans.
9. (C) Also present was Chechnya's Duma member, Khalid (aka Ruslan) Yamadayev, brother of the commander of the notorious Vostok Battalion. He was reserved at the time, but in a follow-up conversation in Moscow on August 29 (please protect) he complained that Chechnya, lacking experts to develop programs for economic recovery, is simply demanding and disposing of cash from the central government. When we pressed him on disappearances, he admitted some took place, but claimed that often parents alleged their children had been abducted when in fact their sons had run off to join the fighters or -- in a case the week before -- they had murdered their daughter in an honor killing. We mentioned the abduction of a widow of Basayev, allegedly to gain access to his money. Khalid said he had not heard of the case, but knew that Basayev had had no interest in wealth; he may have been a religious fanatic, but he was a "normal" person. The fighters who remain are not a serious military force, in Khalid's view, and many would surrender under the proper terms and immunities. He himself is arranging the immunity of a senior official of the Maskhadov era, whose name he would not reveal.
10. (C) During lunch, Gadzhi took a congratulatory call from Dagestan's president, Mukhu Aliyev. Gadzhi told Aliyev how honored he would be if Aliyev could drop in at the wedding reception. There was a degree of tension in the conversation, which was between two figures each implicitly claiming the mantle of leadership of the Avars. In the event, Aliyev snubbed Gadzhi and did not show up for the wedding, though the rest of Dagestan's political leadership did.
11. (C) Though Gadzhi's house was not the venue for the main wedding reception, he ensured that all his guests were constantly plied with food and drink. The cooks seemed to keep whole sheep and whole cows boiling in a cauldron somewhere day and night, dumping disjointed fragments of the carcass on the tables whenever someone entered the room. Gadzhi's two chefs kept a wide variety of unusual dishes in circulation (in addition to the omnipresent boiled meat and fatty bouillon). The alcohol consumption before, during and after this Muslim wedding was stupendous. Amidst an alcohol shortage, Gadzhi had flown in from the Urals thousands of bottles of Beluga Export vodka ("Best consumed with caviar"). There was also entertainment, beginning even that day, with the big-name performers appearing both at the wedding hall and at Gadzhi's summer house. Gadzhi's main act, a Syrian-born singer named Avraam Russo, could not make it because he was shot a few days before the wedding, but there
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was a "gypsy" troupe from St. Petersburg, a couple of Azeri pop stars, and from Moscow, Benya the Accordion King with his family of singers. A host of local bands, singing in Avar and Dargin, rounded out the entertainment, which was constant and extremely amplified.
10. (C) The main activity of the day was eating and drinking -- starting from 4 p.m., about eight hours worth, all told -- punctuated, when all were laden with food and sodden with drink, with a bout of jet skiing in the Caspian. After dinner, though, the first band started an informal performance -- drums, accordion and clarinet playing the lezginka, the universal dance of the Caucasus. To the uninitiated Westerner, the music sounds like an undifferentiated wall of sound. This was a signal for dancing: one by one, each of the dramatically paunchy men (there were no women present) would enter the arena and exhibit his personal lezginka for the limit of his duration, usually 30 seconds to a minute. Each ethnic group's lezginka was different -- the Dagestani lezginka the most energetic, the Chechen the most aggressive and belligerent, and the Ingush smoother.
Wedding Day 1
-------------
11. (C) An hour before the wedding reception was set to begin the "Marrakech" reception hall was full of guests -- men taking the air outside and women already filling a number of the tables inside, older ones with headscarves chaperoning dozens of teenaged girls. A Dagestani parliamentarian explained that weddings are a principal venue for teenagers -- and more importantly their parents -- to get a look at one another with a view to future matches. Security was tight -- police presence on the ground plus police snipers positioned on the roof of an overlooking apartment block. Gadzhi even assigned one of his guards as our personal bodyguard inside the reception. The manager told Gadzhi there were seats for over a thousand guests at a time. At the height of the reception, it was standing room only.
12. (C) At precisely two p.m. the male guests started filing in. They varied from pols and oligarchs of all sorts -- the slick to the Jurassic; wizened brown peasants from Burtunay; and Dagestan's sports and cultural celebrities. Khalid Yamadayev presided over a political table in the smaller of the two halls (the music was in the other) along with Vakha the drunken wrestler, the Ingush parliamentarians, a member of the Federation Council who is also a nanophysicist and has lectured in Silicon Valley, and Gadzhi's cousin Ismail Alibekov, a submariner first rank naval captain now serving at the General Staff in Moscow. The Dagestani milieu appears to be one in which the highly educated and the gun-toting can mix easily -- often in the same person.
13. (C) After a couple of hours Dalgat's convoy returned with Aida, horns honking. Dalgat and Aida got out of the Rolls and were serenaded into the hall, and into the Makhachev family, by a boys' chorus lining both sides of the red carpet, dressed in costumes aping medieval Dagestani armor with little shields and swords. The couple's entry was the signal for the emcee to roll into high gear, and after a few toasts the Piter "gypsies" began their performance. (The next day one of Gadzhi's houseguests sneered, "Some gypsies! The bandleader was certainly Jewish, and the rest of them were blonde." There was some truth to this, but at least the two dancing girls appeared to be Roma.)
14. (C) As the bands played, the marriageable girls came out to dance the lezginka in what looked like a slowly revolving conga line while the boys sat together at tables staring intently. The boys were all in white shirts and black slacks, while the girls wore a wide variety of multicolored but fashionable cocktail dresses. Every so often someone would shower the dancers with money -- there were some thousand ruble notes but the currency of choice was the U.S. hundred dollar bill. The floor was covered with them; young children would scoop the money up to distribute among the dancers.
15. (C) Gadzhi was locked into his role as host. He greeted every guest personally as they entered the hall -- failure to do so would cause great insult -- and later moved constantly from table to table drinking toasts with everyone. The 120 toasts he estimated he drank would have killed anyone, hardened drinker or not, but Gadzhi had his Afghan waiter Khan following him around to pour his drinks from a special vodka bottle containing water. Still, he was much the worse for wear by evening's end. At one point we caught up with him dancing with two scantily clad Russian women who looked far from home. One, it turned out was a Moscow poet (later she recited an incomprehensible poem in Gadzhi's honor) who
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was in town with a film director to write the screenplay for a film immortalizing Gadzhi's defense of Dagestan against Shamil Basayev. By 6 p.m. most of the houseguests had returned to Gadzhi's seaside home for more swimming and more jet-skiing-under-the-influence. But by 8 the summer house's restaurant was full once more, the food and drink were flowing, the name performers were giving acoustic renditions of the songs they had sung at the reception, and some stupendously fat guests were displaying their lezginkas for the benefit of the two visiting Russian women, who had wandered over from the reception.
The Wedding -- Day 2: Enter The Man
------------------------------------
16. (C) The next day's reception at the Marrakech was Gadzhi's tribute to Aida's family, after which we all returned to a dinner at Gadzhi's summer home. Most of the tables were set with the usual dishes plus whole roast sturgeons and sheep. But at 8:00 p.m. the compound was invaded by dozens of heavily armed mujahedin for the grand entrance of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, dressed in jeans and a t-shirt, looking shorter and less muscular than in his photos, and with a somewhat cock-eyed expression on his face. After greetings from Gadzhi, Ramzan and about 20 of his retinue sat around the tables eating and listening to Benya the Accordion King. Gadzhi then announced a fireworks display in honor of the birthday of Ramzan's late father, Ahmat-Hadji Kadyrov. The fireworks started with a bang that made both Gadzhi and Ramzan flinch. Gadzhi had from the beginning requested that none of his guests, most of whom carried sidearms, fire their weapons in celebration. Throughout the wedding they complied, not even joining in the magnificent fireworks display.
17. (C) After the fireworks, the musicians struck up the lezginka in the courtyard and a group of two girls and three boys -- one no more than six years old -- performed gymnastic versions of the dance. First Gadzhi joined them and then Ramzan, who danced clumsily with his gold-plated automatic stuck down in the back of his jeans (a houseguest later pointed out that the gold housing eliminated any practical use of the gun, but smirked that Ramzan probably couldn't fire it anyway). Both Gadzhi and Ramzan showered the dancing children with hundred dollar bills; the dancers probably picked upwards of USD 5000 off the cobblestones. Gadzhi told us later that Ramzan had brought the happy couple "a five kilo lump of gold" as his wedding present. After the dancing and a quick tour of the premises, Ramzan and his army drove off back to Chechnya. We asked why Ramzan did not spend the night in Makhachkala, and were told, "Ramzan never spends the night anywhere."
18. (C) After Ramzan sped off, the dinner and drinking -- especially the latter -- continued. An Avar FSB colonel sitting next to us, dead drunk, was highly insulted that we would not allow him to add "cognac" to our wine. "It's practically the same thing," he insisted, until a Russian FSB general sitting opposite told him to drop it. We were inclined to cut the Colonel some slack, though: he is head of the unit to combat terrorism in Dagestan, and Gadzhi told us that extremists have sooner or later assassinated everyone who has joined that unit. We were more worried when an Afghan war buddy of the Colonel's, Rector of the Dagestan University Law School and too drunk to sit, let alone stand, pulled out his automatic and asked if we needed any protection. At this point Gadzhi and his people came over, propped the rector between their shoulders, and let us get out of range.
Postscript: The Practical Uses of a Caucasus Wedding
--------------------------------------------- --------
19. (C) Kadyrov's attendance was a mark of respect and alliance, the result of Gadzhi's careful cultivation -- dating back to personal friendship with Ramzan's father. This is a necessary political tool in a region where difficulties can only be resolved by using personal relationships to reach ad hoc informal agreements. An example was readily to hand: on August 22 Chechnya's parliamentary speaker, Dukvakha Abdurakhmanov, gave an interview in which he made specific territorial claims to the Kizlyar, Khasavyurt and Novolak regions of Dagestan. The first two have significant Chechen-Akkin populations, and the last was part of Chechnya until the 1944 deportation, when Stalin forcibly resettled ethnic Laks (a Dagestani nationality) there. Gadzhi said he would have to answer Abdurakhmanov and work closely with Ramzan to reduce the tensions "that fool" had caused. Asked why he took such statements seriously, he told us that in the Caucasus all disputes revolve around land, and such claims can never be
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dismissed. Unresolved land claims are the "threads" the Russian center always kept in play to pull when needed. We asked why these claims are coming out now, and were told it was euphoria, pure and simple. After all they had received, the Chechen leadership's feet are miles off the ground. (A well-connected Chechen contact later told us he thought that raising nationalistic irredentism was part of Abdurakhmanov's effort to gain a political base independent from Kadyrov.)
20. (C) The "horizontal of power" represented by Gadzhi's relationship with Ramzan is the antithesis of the Moscow-imposed "vertical of power." Gadzhi's business partner Khalik Gindiyev, head of Rosneft-Kaspoil, complained that Moscow should let local Caucasians rather than Russians -- "Magomadovs and Aliyevs, not Ivanovs and Petrovs" -- resolve the region's conflicts. The vertical of power, he said, is inapplicable to the Caucasus, a region that Moscow bureaucrats such as PolPred Kozak would never understand. The Caucasus needs to be given the scope to resolve its own problems. But this was not a plug for democracy. Gadzhi told us democracy would always fail in the Caucasus, where the conception of the state is as an extension of the Caucasus family, in which the father's word is law. "Where is the room for democracy in that?" he asked. We paraphrased Hayek: if you run a family as you do a state, you destroy the family. Running a state as you do a family destroys the state: ties of kinship and friendship will always trump the rule of law. Gadzhi's partner agreed, shaking his head sadly. "That's a matter for generations to come," he said.
BURNS
Tuesday, 30 May 2006, 09:27
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 10 MOSCOW 005645
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/25/2016
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, MOPS, RS
SUBJECT: CHECHNYA: THE ONCE AND FUTURE WAR
REF: MOSCOW 5461 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason 1.4 (b, d)
1. (C) Introduction: Chechnya has been less in the glare of constant international attention in recent years. However, the Chechnya conflict remains unresolved, and the suffering of the Chechen people and the threat of instability throughout the region remain. This message reinterprets the history of the Chechen wars as a means of better understanding the current dynamics, the challenges facing Russia, the way in which the Kremlin perceives those challenges, and the factors limiting the Kremlin's ability to respond. It draws on close observation on the ground and conversations with many participants in and observers of the conflict from the moment of Chechnya's declaration of independence in 1991. We intend this message to spur thinking on new approaches to a tragedy that persists as an issue within Russia and between Russia and the U.S., Europe and the Islamic world.
Summary
--------
2. (C) President Putin has pursued a two-pronged strategy to extricate Russia from the war in Chechnya and establish a viable long-term modus vivendi preserving Moscow's role as the ultimate arbiter of Chechen affairs. The first prong was to gain control of the Russian military deployed there, which had long operated without real central control and was intent on staying as long as its officers could profit from the war. The second prong was "Chechenization," which in effect means turning Chechnya over to former nationalist separatists willing to profess loyalty to Russia. There are two difficulties with Putin's strategy. First, while Chechenization has been successful in suppressing nationalist separatists within Chechnya, it has not been as effective against the Jihadist militants, who have broadened their focus and are gaining strength throughout the North Caucasus. Second, as long as former separatist warlords run Chechnya, Russian forces will have to stay in numbers sufficient to ensure that the ex-separatists remain "ex." More broadly, the suffering of an abused and victimized population will continue, and with it the alienation that feeds the insurgency.
3. (C) To deal effectively with Chechnya in the long term, Putin needs to increase his control over the Russian Power Ministries and reduce opportunities for them to profit from war corruption. He needs to strengthen Russian civilian engagement, reinforcing the role of his Plenipotentiary Representative. He needs to take a broad approach to combat the spread of Jihadism, and not rely primarily on suppression by force. In this context there is only a limited role for the U.S., but we and our allies can help by expressing our concerns to Putin, directing assistance to areas where our programs can slow the spread of Jihadism, and working with Russia's southern neighbors to minimize the effects of instability. End Summary.
The Starting Point: Problems of the "Russianized" Conflict
--------------------------------------------- --------------
4. (C) Chechnya was only one of the conflicts that broke out in the former Soviet Union at the time of the country's collapse. Territorial conflicts, most of them separatist, erupted in Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, South Ossetia, North Ossetia/Ingushetia, Abkhazia and Tajikistan. Russian troops were involved in combat in all of those conflicts, sometimes clandestinely. In all except Nagorno-Karabakh, Russian troops remain today as peacekeepers. Russia doggedly insists on this presence and resists pulling its forces out. Its diplomatic efforts have served to keep the conflicts frozen, with Russian troops remaining in place.
5. (C) Why is this? The charge is often made that Russia's motive for keeping the conflicts frozen is geostrategic, or "neo-imperialism," or fear of NATO, or revenge against Georgia and Moldova, or a quest to preserve leverage. Indeed, the continued deployments may satisfy those Russians who think in such terms, and expand the domestic consensus for sending troops throughout the CIS. However, while one or another of those factors may have been the original impulse, each of the conflicts has gone through phases in which the conflict's perceived uses for the Russian state have changed. No one of these factors has been continuous over the life of any of the conflicts.
6. (C) We would propose an additional factor: the determination of Russia's senior officer corps to remain deployed in those countries to engage in lucrative activity outside their official military tasks. Sometimes that
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activity has been as mercenaries -- for instance, Russian active-duty soldiers fought on both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from 1991-92. Sometimes it has involved narcotics smuggling, as in Tajikistan. Selling arms to all sides has been a long-standing tradition. And sometimes it has meant collaborating with the mafias of both sides in conflict to facilitate contraband trade across the lines, as in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The officers and their generals formed a powerful bloc in favor of all the deployments, especially under Yeltsin.
7. (C) This "military-entrepreneurial" bloc soon formed an autonomous institution, in some respects outside the government's control. There are many illustrations of its autonomy. For instance, in 1993 Yeltsin reached an agreement with Georgia on peacekeeping in Abkhazia. When the Georgian delegation arrived in Sochi in September of that year to hammer out the details with Russia's generals, they found the deal had changed. When they protested that Yeltsin had agreed to other terms, a Russian general replied, "Let the President sit in Moscow, drink vodka, and chase women. That's his business. We are here, and we have our work to do."
The Secret History of the Chechen War
-------------------------------------
8. (C) The lack of central control over the military, as well as officers' cupidity, may have been a prime cause of the first Chechnya War. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, energy prices in the "ruble zone" were 3 percent of world market prices. Government officials and their partners bought oil at ruble prices, diverted it abroad, and sold it on the world market. The military joined in this arbitrage. Pavel Grachev, then Defense Minister, reportedly diverted oil to Western Group of Forces commander Burlakov, who sold it in Germany.
9. (C) Chechnya was a major entrepot for laundering oil for this arbitrage. It appears to have been used both by the military (including Grachev) and the Khasbulatov-Rutskoy axis in the Duma. Dudayev had declared independence, but remained part of the Russian elite. Chechnya's independence, oilfields, refineries and pipelines made Chechnya perfect for laundering oil. Planes, trains, buses and roads and pipelines to Chechnya were functioning, allowing anyone and anything to transit -- except auditors. In the early 1990's millions of tons of "Russian" oil entered Chechnya and were magically transformed into "Chechen" oil to be sold on the world market at world prices. Some of the proceeds went to buy the Chechens weaponry, most of it from the Russian military, and another lucrative trade developed. Dudayev took much of his cut of the proceeds in weapons. The Groznyy Bazaar was notorious in the early 1990s for the quantity and variety of arms for sale, including heavy weaponry.
10. (C) Chechnya was the home of Ruslan Khasbulatov and served various purposes for his faction of the Russian elite. He took advantage of the army's independence from Yeltsin's control. An informed source believes that it was Khasbulatov, not the "official" Russian government, who facilitated the transfer of Shamil Basayev and his heavily-armed fighters from Chechnya into Abkhazia in 1992, and who ordered the Russian air force to bomb Sukhumi when Shevardnadze went there to take personal command of the Georgians' last stand in July 1993. The Yeltsin government always denied that it bombed Sukhumi, despite Western eyewitness accounts confirming the bombing and the insignia on the planes. Given the confusion of those years, it could well be that the order originated in the Duma, not the Kremlin.
11. (C) After Khasbulatov and Rutskoy were written out of the Russian equation in October 1993, so was Dudayev. Clandestine Russian support for the Chechen political and military opposition to Dudayev began in the spring of 1994, according to participants. When that proved ineffective, Russian bombing was deployed. (One Dudayev opponent recounted that in 1994 a Russian pilot was given a mission to fire a missile into one of the top-floor corners of Groznyy's Presidency building at a time when Dudayev was scheduled to hold a cabinet meeting there. Not knowing Groznyy, the pilot asked which building to bomb, and was told "the tallest one." He bombed a residential apartment building.) When air power, too, proved ineffective, Russian troops were secretly sent in to reinforce the armed opposition. Dudayev's forces captured about a dozen and put them on television -- and the Russian invasion began shortly thereafter.
12. (C) Given the gangsterish background of the war, it is no surprise that the military conducted the war itself as a profit-making enterprise, especially after the capture of
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Groznyy. By May 1995 an anti-Dudayev Chechen could lament, "When we invited the Russian army in we expected an army -- not this band of marauders." Contraband trade in oil, weapons (including direct sales from Russian military stores to the insurgents), drugs, and liquor, plus "protection" for legitimate trade made military service in Chechnya lucrative for those not on the front lines. This profitability ended only with the August 1996 defeat of Russian forces in Groznyy at the hands of the insurgents and the subsequent Russian withdrawal -- a defeat made possible because the Russian forces were hollowed out by their officers' corruption and pursuit of economic profit.
13. (C) Before they lost this "cash-cow" to their enemies, Russian officers went to great lengths to keep their friends from interfering with their profits. On July 30, 1995, the Russians and the Chechen insurgents signed a cease-fire agreement mediated by the OSCE. It would have meant the gradual withdrawal of Russian forces. Enforcing the cease-fire was a Joint Observation Commission ("SNK"). The head of the SNK was General Anatoliy Romanov, a competent and upright officer -- very much a rarity in Chechnya. After two months at this assignment he was severely injured by a mine inside Groznyy, and has been hospitalized ever since. Informed observers believe Romanov's own colleagues in the Russian forces carried out this murder attempt. The cease-fire, never enforced, broke down.
14. (C) When the second war began in September 1999, Russian forces again started profiteering from a trade in contraband oil. Western eyewitnesses reported convoys of Russian army trucks carrying oil leaving Groznyy under cover of night. Eventually the Russian forces reached an understanding with the insurgent fighters. Seeing one such convoy, a Western reporter asked his guerrilla hosts whether the fighters ever attacked such convoys. "No," the leader replied. "They leave us alone and we leave them alone."
No Exit for Putin
-----------------
15. (C) Sometime between one and two years after Russian forces were unleashed for a second time on Chechnya, Putin appears to have realized that they were not going to deliver a neat victory. That failure would make Putin look weak at home, the human rights violations would estrange the West, and the drain on the Russian treasury would be punishing (this was before the dramatic rise in energy prices). Putin could not negotiate a peace with Maskhadov: he had already rejected that course and could not back down without appearing weak. The Khasavyurt accords that ended the first war were the result of defeat; a new set of accords would be seen as a new defeat. In any case, the history of the war (and the fate of General Romanov) made clear that negotiations without the subordination of the military were a physical impossibility.
16. (C) Putin thus found himself without a winning strategy and had to develop one. He has taken a two-pronged approach. One prong was subordinating the military. The appointment of Sergey Ivanov as Defense Minister appears to have been aimed at subjecting the military to the control of the security services. A series of reassignments and firings is the surface evidence of the struggle to subordinate the military in Chechnya. Southern Military District commander Troshev, who led the 1999 invasion, refused outright the first orders transferring him to Siberia in November 2002, and went on television to publicize his mutiny. He was finally removed in February 2003. Chief of the Defense Staff Kvashnin, who had held the Southern District command during the first Chechen war, hung on in a combative relationship with Ivanov for three years until he, too, was replaced in 2004 (and also sent to Siberia as the Presidential Representative in Novosibirsk). The spring 2005 dismissal of General Viktor Kazantsev, Putin's Plenipotentiary Representative in the Southern Federal District, was reportedly the final link in the chain. Military corruption, and feeding at the trough of Chechnya, has not ended, but the corruption has reportedly been "institutionalized" and more closely regulated in Kremlin-controlled channels.
Chechenization, Ahmad-Haji Kadyrov, and the Salafists
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17. (C) The second prong of Putin's strategy was to hand the fighting over to Chechens. "Chechenization" differs from Vietnamization or Iraqification. In those strategies, a loyalist force is strengthened to the point at which it can carry on the fight itself. Chechenization, in contrast, has meant handing Chechnya over to the guerrillas in exchange for their professions of loyalty, the formal retention of Chechnya within the Russian Federation, and an uneasy
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cooperation with Federal authorities that in practice is constantly re-negotiated.
18. (C) Chechenization is associated with Ahmad-Haji Kadyrov, the insurgent commander and chief Mufti of separatist Chechnya. After he defected to the Russians, Putin put him in charge of the new Russian-installed Chechen administration. Chechenization was reportedly agreed between Kadyrov and Putin personally. But the seeds of the policy were sown by a split in the insurgent ranks dating to the first war. That split that took the form of a religious dispute, though it masked a power struggle among warlords. The split is the direct result of the introduction of a new element: Arab forces espousing a pan-Islamic Jihadist religious ideology.
19. (C) The traditional Islam of Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia is based on Sufism, or Islamic mysticism. Though nominally the Sufi orders were the same as those predominant in Central Asia and Kurdistan -- Naqshbandi and Qadiri -- Sufism in the Northeast Caucasus took on a unique form in the 18th-19th century struggle against Russian encroachment. It is usually called "muridism." Murids were armed acolytes of a hieratic commander, the murshid. Shaykh Shamil, the Naqshbandi murshid who led the mountaineers' resistance to the Russians until his capture in 1859, was both a spiritual guide and a military commander. He also exercised government powers. The largest Sufi branch ("vird") in Chechnya is the Kunta-Haji "vird" of the Qadiris, founded and led by the charismatic Chechen missionary Kunta-Haji Kishiyev until his exile by the Russians in 1864. Although the historical Kunta-Haji died two years later, his followers believe that Kunta-Haji lives on in occultation, like the Shi'a Twelfth Imam.
20. (C) When Arab fighters joined the Chechen conflict in 1995, they brought with them a "Salafist" doctrine that attempts to emulate the fundamental, "pure" Islam of the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate successors, especially 'Umar, the second Caliph. It holds that mysticism is one of the "impurities" that crept into Islam after the first four Caliphs, and considers Sufis to be heretics and idolaters. The idea that Kunta-Haji adepts could believe their founder is still alive -- and that they worship the grave of his mother -- is an abomination to Salafis, who believe that marked graves are a form of pagan ancestor worship (Muhammad's grave in Arabia is not marked).
21. (C) Wahhabism-based forms of Islam started appearing in Chechnya by 1991, as Chechens were able to travel and some went to Saudi Arabia for religious study. But the true influx of Salafis (usually lumped together with Wahhabis in Russia) came during the first Chechen war. In February 1995 Fathi 'Ali al-Shishani, a Jordanian of Chechen descent, arrived in Chechnya. A veteran of the war in Afghanistan, he was now too old to be a combatant, but was a missionary for Salafism. He recruited another Afghan veteran, the Saudi al-Khattab, to come to Chechnya and lead a group of Arab fighters.
22. (C) Al-Khattab's fighters were never a major military factor during the war, but they were the key to Gulf money, which financed power struggles in the inter-war years. Al-Khattab forged close links with Shamil Basayev, the most famous Chechen field commander. Basayev himself was from a Qadiri family, but he was too Sovietized to view Islam as anything more than part of the Chechen and Caucasus identity. In his early interviews, Basayev showed himself to be motivated by Chechen nationalism, not religion, though he paid lip-service -- e.g., proclaiming Sharia law in Vedeno in early 1995 -- to attract Gulf donors. Basayev's initial interest in al-Khattab, as indeed with other jihadists starting even before the first war, was purely financial.
23. (C) After the first war, al-Khattab set up a camp in Serzhen-Yurt ("Baza Kavkaz") for military and religious indoctrination. It provided one of the few employment opportunities for demobilized Chechen fighters between the wars. Young Chechens had traditionally engaged in seasonal migrant construction work throughout the Soviet Union, but after the first war that was no longer open to them. The closed international borders also precluded smuggling -- another pre-war source of employment and income. The fighters had no money, no jobs, no education, no skills save with their guns, and no prospects. Al-Khattab's offer of food, shelter and work was inviting. As a result, between the wars Salafism spread quickly in Chechnya. (Al-Khattab also invited missionaries and facilitators who set up shop in Chechnya, Dagestan and Georgia's Pankisi Gorge, whose Kist residents are close relatives of the Chechens.)
Battle Lines in Peacetime
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24. (C) Chechen society is distinguished by its propensity to unite in war and fragment in peace. It is based on opposing dichotomies: the Vaynakh peoples are divided into Chechens and Ingush; the Chechens are divided into highlanders ("Lameroi") and lowlanders ("Nokhchi"); and these are further divided into tribal confederations and exogamous tribes ("teyp") and their subdivisions. Each unit will unite with its opposite to combat a threat from outside. Two lowland teyps, for example, will drop quarrels and unite against an intruding highland teyp. But left to themselves, they will quarrel and split. After the Khasavyurt accords, when Russia left the Chechens alone, the wartime alliance between Maskhadov and Basayev split and the two became enemies. Other warlords lined up on one side or the other -- the Yamadayev brothers of Gudermes, for example, fighting a pitched battle against Basayev in 1999. But the rise of Basayev and al-Khattab undermined Maskhadov's authority and prevented him from exercising any real power.
25. (C) This power struggle took on a religious expression. Since Basayev was associated with al-Khattab and Salafism, Maskhadov positioned himself as champion of traditional Sufism. He surrounded himself with Sufi shaykhs and appointed Ahmad-Haji Kadyrov, a strong adherent of Kunta-Haji Sufism, as Chechnya's Mufti. Kadyrov had spent six years in Uzbekistan, allegedly at religious seminaries in Tashkent and Bukhara, and seems to have developed links to other enemies of Basayev, including the Yamadayevs.
26. (C) The religious division dictated certain policies to each side. The Sufi tradition of Maskhadov and Kadyrov had been associated for over two centuries with nationalist resistance. Basayev, with his new-found commitment to al-Khattab's Salafism, adopted the Salafi stress on a pan-Islamic community ("umma") fighting a worldwide jihad, notionally without regard for ethnic or national boundaries. Al-Khattab and Basayev invaded Dagestan in August 1999, avowedly in pursuit of a Caucasus-wide revolt against the Russians. They brought on a Russian invasion that threw Maskhadov out of Groznyy.
Chechenization Begins
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27. (C) The second Russian invasion did not unite the Chechens, as previous pressure had. Perhaps the influence of al-Khattab and his Salafists, as well as the devastation of the first war, had rent the fabric of Chechen society too much to restore traditional unity in the face of the outside threat. (We should also remember that unity is relative. Only a small percentage of the Chechens actually fought in the first war, and many supported the Russians out of disgust with Dudayev.) Kadyrov and the Yamadayevs separately broke with Maskhadov and defected to the Russians. Kadyrov began to recruit from the insurgency non-Salafist nationalist fighters who were highly demoralized and disoriented by the disastrous retreat from Groznyy in late 1999. Kadyrov began to preach what Kunta-Haji had preached after the Russian victory over Imam Shamil in 1859: to survive, the Chechens needed tactically to accept Russian rule. His message struck a chord, and fighters began to defect to his side.
28. (C) Putin appears to have stumbled upon Kadyrov, and their alliance seems to have grown out of chance as much as design. But they were able to forge a deal along the following lines: Kadyrov would declare loyalty to Russia and deliver loyalty to Putin; he would take over Maskhadov's place at the head of the Russian-blessed government of Chechnya; he would try to win over Maskhadov's fighters, to whom he could promise immunity; he would govern Chechnya with full autonomy, without interference from Russian officials below Putin's level; and he would try to exterminate Basayev and Al-Khattab.
29. (C) If the objective of Chechenization was to win over fighters who would carry on the fight against Basayev and the Arab successors to Khattab (who was poisoned in April 2002), it has to be judged a success. The real fighting has for several years been carried out by Chechen forces who fight the war they want to fight -- not the one the Russian military wants them to -- and who appear happy to kill Russians when they get in the way. The Russian military is "just trying to survive," as one officer put it. Not all the pro-Moscow Chechen units are composed of former guerrillas. Said-Magomed Kakiyev, commander of the GRU-controlled "West" battalion, has been fighting Dudayev and his successors since 1993. But at the heart of the pro-Moscow effort are fighters who defected from the anti-Moscow insurgency.
The Military Overstays Its Welcome
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30. (C) The development of Kadyrov's fighting force, along with that of the Yamadayev brothers, left the stage clear for a drawdown of Russian troops, certainly by early 2004 (leaving aside a permanent garrison presence). But those troops, still not fully responsive to FSB control, did not want to leave. Especially now that Chechens had taken over increasing parts of the security portfolio, the Russian officers were free to concentrate on their economic activities, and in particular oil smuggling.
31. (C) Kadyrov could not be fully autonomous until he -- not the Russians -- controlled Chechnya's oil. He therefore demanded the creation of a Chechen oil company under his jurisdiction. That would have severely limited the ability of federal forces to divert and smuggle oil. On May 9, 2004, Kadyrov was assassinated by an enormous bomb planted under his seat at the annual VE Day celebration. The killing was officially ascribed to Chechen rebels, but many believe it was the Russian Army's way of rejecting Kadyrov's demand. Under the circumstances, one cannot exclude that both versions are true.
In the Reign of Ramzan
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32. (C) Kadyrov's passing left power in the hands of his son Ramzan, who was officially made Deputy Prime Minister. The President, Alu Alkhanov, was a figurehead put in place because Ramzan was underage. The Prime Minister, Sergey Abramov, was tasked with interfacing between Kadyrov and Moscow below the level of Putin.
33. (C) Ramzan Kadyrov has none of the religious or personal prestige that his father had. He is a warlord pure and simple -- one of several, like the Yamadayev family of warlords. He is lucky, however, in that his father left him a sufficient fighting force of ex-rebels. Though they may have been lured away from the insurgency for a variety of reasons, it is money that keeps them. Kadyrov feels little need for ideological or religious prestige, though he makes an occasional statement designed to appeal to Muslims, and makes a point of supporting the pilgrimage to the tomb of Kunta-Haji's mother in Gunoy, near Vedeno (though that is in part to show he is stronger than Basayev, whose home and power base are in the Vedeno region). Kadyrov must only satisfy his troops, who on occasion have shown that, if offended or not given enough, they are willing to desert along with their kinsmen and return to the mountains to fight against him. He must also guard against the possibility, as some charge, that some of the fighters who went over to Federal forces did so under orders from guerrilla commanders for whom they are still working.
34. (C) Kadyrov is also fortunate in that the FSB, with whom he has close ties, has by this time emasculated the military as "prong one" of Putin's strategy. Kadyrov has slowly but surely also taken over most of the spigots of money that once fed the army, and like his father he has started agitating for overt control over Chechnya's oil (while prudently ensuring that others take the lead on that in public). Kadyrov is at least as corrupt as the military, but the money he expropriates for himself from Moscow's subsidies is accepted as his pay-off for keeping things quiet. And indeed Kadyrov and the other warlords are capable of maintaining a certain degree of security in Chechnya. The showy "reconstruction" developments they have built in Groznyy and their home towns demonstrate that the guerrillas cannot or at least do not halt construction and economic activity. Moreover, there is enough security to end Putin's worries about a secessionist victory. That has allowed Putin to demonstrate a new willingness to be increasingly overt in support of separatism in other conflicts (e.g., Abkhazia, Transnistria) when that advances Russian interests.
35. (C) Despite its successes to date, however, Putin's strategy is far from completed. He still needs to keep forces in the region as a constant reminder to Kadyrov not to backtrack on his professed loyalty to the Kremlin. Ideally, that force would be small but capable of intervening effectively in Chechen internal affairs. That is unrealistic at present. The current forces, reportedly over 25,000, are bunkered and corrupt. When they venture on patrol they are routinely attacked. One attempt to redress this is to position Russian forces close but "over the horizon" in Dagestan, where a major military base is under construction at Botlikh. However, that may only add to the instability of Dagestan. A Duma Deputy from the region told us that locals are vehemently opposed to the new military base, despite the economic opportunities it represents, on grounds that the soldiers will "corrupt the morals of their children."
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36. (C) Another approach is the Chechenization of the Federal forces themselves. Recently "North" and "South" battalions of ethnically Chechen special forces -- drawn from Kadyrov's militia -- were created to supplement the "East" and "West" battalions of Sulim Yamadayev and Said-Magomed Kakiyev. Those formations are officially part of the Russian army. The Kremlin strategy appears to be to check Kadyrov by promoting warlords he cannot control, and to check the FSB from becoming too clientized by allowing the MOD to retain a sphere of influence. In Chechnya, that is a recipe for open fighting. We saw one small instance of that on April 25, when bodyguards of Kadyrov and Chechen President Alkhanov got into a firefight. According to one insider, the clash originated in Kadyrov's desire to get rid of Alkhanov, who now has close ties with Yamadayev.
What Can We Expect in the Future?
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37. (C) The Chechen population is the great loser in this game. It bears an ever heavier burden in shake-downs, opportunity costs from misappropriation of reconstruction funds, and the constant trauma of victimization and abuse -- including abduction, torture, and murder -- by the armed thugs who run Chechnya (reftels). Security under those circumstances is a fragile veneer, and stability an illusion. The insurgency can continue indefinitely, at a low level and without prospects of success, but significant enough to serve as a pretext for the continued rule of thuggery.
38. (C) The insurgency will remain split between those who want to carry on Maskhadov's non-Salafist struggle for national independence and those who follow the Salafi-influenced Basayev in his pursuit of a Caucasus-wide Caliphate. But the nationalists have been undercut by Kadyrov. Despite Sadullayev's efforts, the insurgency inside Chechnya is not likely to meet with success and will continue to become more Salafist in tone.
39. (C) Prospects would be poor for the nationalists even if Kadyrov and/or Yamadayev were assassinated (and there is much speculation that one will succeed in killing the other, goaded on by the FSB which supports Kadyrov and the GRU which supports Yamadayev). The thousands of guerrillas who have joined those two militias have by now lost all ideological incentive. Since they already run the country, they feel themselves, not the Russians, to be the masters, and are not responsive to Sadullayev's nationalist calls; Basayev's Salafist message has even less appeal to them. Even if their current leaders are eliminated, all they will need is a new warlord, easily generated from within their organizations, and they can continue on their current paths.
40. (C) We expect that Salafism will continue to grow. The insurgents even inside Chechnya are reportedly becoming predominantly Salafist, as opposition on a narrowly nationalist basis offers less hope of success. Salafis will come both from inside Chechnya, where militia excesses outrage the population, and from elsewhere in the Caucasus, where radicalization is proceeding rapidly as a result of the repressive policies of Russia's regional satraps. There are numerous eyewitness accounts from both Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria that elite young adults and university students are joining Salafist groups. In one case, a terrorist killed in Dagestan was found recently to have defended his doctoral dissertation at Moscow State University -- on Wahhabism in the North Caucasus. These young adults, denied economic opportunities, turn to religion as an outlet. They find, however, that representatives of the traditional religious establishments in these republics, long isolated under the thumb of Soviet restrictions, are ill-educated and ill-prepared to deal with the sophisticated theological arguments developed by generations of Salafists in the Middle East. Most of those who join fundamentalist jamaats do not, of course, become terrorists. But a percentage do, and with that steady source of recruits the major battlefield could shift to outside Chechnya, with armed clashes in other parts of the North Caucasus and a continuation of sporadic but spectacular terrorist acts in Moscow and other parts of Russia.
41. (C) Outside Chechnya, the most likely venue for clashes with authorities is Dagestan. Putin's imposition of a "power vertical" there has upset the delicate clan and ethnic balance that offered a shaky stability since the collapse of Soviet power. He installed a president (the weak Mukhu Aliyev) in place of a 14-member multi-ethnic presidential council. Aliyev will be unable to prevent a ruthless struggle among the elite -- the local way of elaborating a new balance of power. This is already happening, with assassinations of provincial chiefs since Aliyev took over.
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In one province in the south of the republic, an uprising against the chief appointed by Aliyev's predecessor was suppressed by gunfire. Four demonstrators were shot dead, initiating a cycle of blood revenge. In May, in two Dagestani cities security force operations against "terrorists" resulted in major shootouts, with victims among the bystanders and whole apartment houses rendered uninhabitable after hits from the security forces' heavy weaponry. It is not clear whether the "terrorists" were really religious activists ("Whenever they want to eliminate someone, they call him a Wahhabi," the MP from Makhachkala told us). But the populace, seeing the deadly over-reaction of the security forces, is feeling sympathy for their victims -- so much so that Aliyev has had to make public condemnations of the actions of the security forces. If this chaos deepens, as appears likely, the Jihadist groups ("jamaats") may grow, drift further in Basayev's direction, and feel the need to respond to attacks from the local government.
42. (C) Local forces are unreliable in such cases, for clan and blood-feud reasons. Wahhabist jamaats flourished in the strategic ethnically Dargin districts of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi in the mid-1990s, but Dagestan's rulers left them alone because moving against them meant altering the delicate ethnic balance between Dargins and Avars. Only when the jamaats themselves became expansive during the Basayev/Khattab invasion from Chechnya in the summer of 1999 did the Makhachkala authorities take action, and then only with the assistance of Federal forces. Ultimately, if clashes break out on a wide scale in Dagestan, Moscow would have to send in the Federal army. Deploying the army to combat destabilization in Dagestan, however, could jeopardize Putin's hard-won control over it. Unleashing the army against a "terrorist" threat is just that: allowing the army off its new leash. Large-scale army deployments to Dagestan would be especially attractive to the officers, since the border with Azerbaijan offers lucrative opportunities for contraband trade. The army's presence, in turn, would further destabilize Dagestan and all but guarantee chaos.
43. (C) Indeed, destabilization is the most likely prospect we see when we look further down the road to the next decade. Chechenization allows bellicose Chechen leaders to throw their weight around in the North Caucasus even more than an independent Chechnya would. A case in point is the call on April 24 by Chechen Parliament Speaker Dukvakha Abdurakhmanov for unification of Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, implicitly under Chechen domination (the one million Chechens would constitute a plurality in the new republic of 4.5 million). The call soured slowly normalizing relations between Chechnya and Ingushetia, according to a Chechen official in Moscow, though the Dagestanis treated the proposal as a joke.
What Should Putin Be Doing?
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44. (C) Right now Putin's policy towards Chechnya is channeled through Kadyrov and Yamadayev. Putin's Plenipotentiary Representative (PolPred) for the Southern Federal District, Dmitriy Kozak, appears to have little influence. He was not even invited when Putin addressed the new Parliament in Groznyy last December. Putin needs to stop taking Kadyrov's phone calls and start working more through his PolPred and the government's special services. He also needs to increase Moscow's civilian engagement with Chechnya.
45. (C) Putin should continue to reform the military and the other Power Ministries. Having asserted control through Sergey Ivanov, Putin has denied the military certain limited areas in which it had pursued criminal activity -- but left most of its criminal enterprises untouched. He has done little if anything to form the discipline of a modern army deployable to impose order in unstable regions such as the North Caucasus. Recent hazing incidents show that discipline is still equated with sadism and brutality. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) has undergone even less reform. The Chechenization of the security services, despite its obvious drawbacks, has shown that locals can carry out security tasks more effectively than Russian troops.
46. (C) Lastly, Putin should realize that his current policy course is not preventing the growth of militant, armed Jihadism. Rather, every time his subordinates try to douse the flames, the fire grows hotter and spreads farther. Putin needs to check the firehose; he may find they are spraying the fire with gasoline. He needs to work out a credible strategy, employing economic and cultural levers, to deal with the issue of armed Jihadism. Some Russians do "get it." An advisor to Kozak gave a lecture recently that showed he understands in great detail the issues surrounding the growth
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of militant jihadism. Kozak himself made clear in a recent conversation with the Ambassador that he appreciates clearly the deep social and economic roots of Russia's problems in the North Caucasus -- and the need to employ more than just security measures to solve them. We have not, however, seen evidence that consciousness of the true problem has yet made its way to Moscow from Kozak's office in Rostov-on-Don.
47. (C) We need also to be aware that Putin's strategy is generating a backlash in Moscow. Ramzan Kadyrov's excesses, his Putin-given immunity from federal influence, and the special laws that apply to Chechnya alone (such as the exemption of Chechens from military service elsewhere in Russia) are leading to charges by some Moscow observers that Putin has allowed Chechnya de facto to secede. Putin is strong enough to weather such criticism, but the ability of a successor to do so is less clear.
Is There a Role for the U.S.?
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48. (C) Russia does not consider the U.S. a friend in the Caucasus, and our capacity to influence Russia, whether by pressure, persuasion or assistance, is small. What we can do is continue to try to push the senior tier of Russian officials towards the realization that current policies are conducive to Jihadism, which threatens broader stability as well; and that shifting the responsibility for victimizing and looting the people from a corrupt, brutal military to corrupt, brutal locals is not a long-term solution.
49. (C) Making headway with Putin or his successor will require close cooperation with our European allies. They, like the Russians, tend to view the issue through a strictly counter-terrorism lens. The British, for example, link their "dialogue with Islam" closely with their counter-terrorist effort (on which they liaise with the Russians), reinforcing the conception of a monolithic Muslim identity predisposed to terrorism. That reinforces the Russian view that the problem of the North Caucasus can be consigned to the terrorism basket, and that finding a solution means in the first instance finding a better way to kill terrorists.
50. (C) We and the Europeans need to put our proposals of assistance to the North Caucasus in a different context: one that recognizes the role of religion in North Caucasus cultures, but also emphasizes our interest in and support for the non-religious aspects of North Caucasus society, including civil society. This last will need exceptional delicacy, as the Russians and the local authorities are convinced that the U.S. uses civil society to foment "color revolutions" and anti-Russian regimes. There is a danger that our civil society partners could become what Churchill called "the inopportune missionary" who, despite impeccable intentions, sets back the larger effort. That need not be the case.
51. (C) Our interests call for an understanding of the context and a positive emphasis. We cannot expect the Russians to react well if we limit our statements to condemnations of Kadyrov, butcher though he may be. We need to find targeted areas in which we can work with the Russians to get effective aid into Chechnya. At the same time, we need to be on our guard that our efforts do not appear to constitute U.S. support for Kremlin or local policies that abuse human rights. We must also avoid a shift that endorses the Kremlin assertion that there is no longer a humanitarian crisis in Chechnya, which goes hand-in-hand with the Russian request that the UN and its donors end humanitarian assistance to the region and increase technical and "recovery" assistance. We and other donors need to maintain a balance between humanitarian and recovery assistance.
52. (C) Aside from the political optic, a rush to cut humanitarian assistance before recovery programs are fully up and running would leave a vacuum into which jihadist influences would leap. The European Commission Humanitarian Organization, the largest provider of aid, shows signs of rushing to stress recovery over humanitarian assistance; we should not follow suit. Humanitarian assistance has been effective in relieving the plight of Chechen IDPs in Ingushetia. It has been less effective inside Chechnya, where the GOR and Kadyrov regime built temporary accommodation centers for returning IDPs, but have not passed on enough resources to secure a reasonable standard of living. International organizations are hampered by limited access to Chechnya out of security concerns, but where they are able to operate freely they have made a great difference, e.g., WHO's immunization program.
53. (C) Resources aimed at Chechnya often wind up in private pockets. Though international assistance has a better record
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than Russian assistance and is more closely monitored, we must also be wary of assistance that lends itself to massive corruption and state-sponsored banditry in Chechnya: too much of the money loaned in a microfinance program there, for example, would be expropriated by militias. Presidential Advisor Aslakhanov told us last December that Kadyrov expropriates for himself one third off the top of all assistance. Therefore, while we continue well-monitored humanitarian assistance inside Chechnya, we should broaden our efforts for "recovery" to other parts of the region that are threatened by jihadism: Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia, and possibly Karachayevo-Cherkessia. Among these, we need to try to steer our assistance ($11.5 million for FY 2006) to regional officials, such as President Kanokov of Kabardino-Balkaria, who have shown that they are willing to introduce local reforms and get rid of the brutal security officials whose repressive acts feed the Jihadist movement.
54. (C) We also need to coordinate closely with Kozak (or his successor), both to strengthen his position vis--vis the warlords and to ensure that everything we do is perceived by the Russians as transparent and not aimed at challenging the GOR's hold on a troubled region. The present opposite perception by the GOR may be behind its reluctance to cooperate with donors, the UN and IFIs on long-term strategic engagement in the region. For example, the GOR has delayed for months a 20-million-Euro TACIS program designed with GOR input.
55. (C) The interagency paper "U.S. Policy in the North Caucasus -- The Way Forward" provides a number of important principles for positive engagement. We need to emphasize programs in accordance with those principles which are most practical under current and likely future conditions, and which can be most effective in targeting the most vulnerable, where federal and local governments lack the will and capacity to assist, and in combating the spread of jihadism both inside Chechnya and throughout the North Caucasus region. There are areas -- for example, health care and child welfare -- in which assistance fits neatly with Russian priorities, containing both humanitarian and recovery components.
56. (C) We can also emphasize programs that help create jobs and job opportunities: microfinance (where feasible), credit cooperatives and small business development, and educational exchanges. U.S. sponsored training programs for credit cooperatives and government budgeting functions have been very popular. Exchanges, through the IVP program and Community Connections, are an especially effective way of exposing future leaders to the world beyond the narrow propaganda they have received, and to generate a multiplier effect in enterprise. In addition to the effects the programs themselves can have in providing alternatives to religious extremism, such assistance can also have a demonstration effect: showing the Russians that improved governance and delivery of services can be more effective in stabilizing the region than attempts to impose order by force.
57. (C) Lastly, we need to look ahead in our relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia to ensure that they become more active and effective players in helping to contain instability in the North Caucasus. That will serve their own security interests as well. Salafis need connections to their worldwide network. Strengthening border forces is more important than ever. Azerbaijan, especially, is well placed to trade with Dagestan and Chechnya. The ethnic Azeris, Lezghis and Avars living on both sides of the Azerbaijan-Dagestan border and friendly relations between Russia and Azerbaijan are tools for promoting stability.
Conclusion
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58. (C) The situation in the North Caucasus is trending towards destabilization, despite the increase in security inside Chechnya. The steps we believe Putin must take are those needed to reverse that trend, and the efforts we have outlined for ourselves are premised on a desire to promote a lasting stabilization built on improved governance, a more active civil society, and steps towards democratization. But we must be realistic about Russia's willingness and ability to take the necessary steps, with or without our assistance. Real stabilization remains a low probability. Sound policy on Chechnya is likely to continue to founder in the swamp of corruption, Kremlin infighting and succession politics. Much more probable is a new phase of instability that will be felt throughout the North Caucasus and have effects beyond. BURNS
Thursday, 10 July 2008, 16:38
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 001837
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/RUS, EUR/WE
EO 12958 DECL: 07/09/2018
TAGS PGOV, ECON, ENRG, PREL, UK, RS
SUBJECT: FOREIGN OFFICE SEES BROWN-MEDVEDEV TALKS LEADING
TO WARMER UK-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
Classified By: Political Counselor Richard M. Mills Jr. for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary. Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev used their first one-on-one meeting at the G8 summit to build a friendly rapport rather than "score points" on smaller contentious issues, said the Foreign Office (FCO) to members of the diplomatic community. According to the FCO, Brown and Medvedev both expressed frustration at the stalled dialogue between the two governments, and pledged to reopen top-level lines of communication. They agreed on several issues, including support of a post-Kyoto framework, reformation of international institutions, and increased dialogue on climate change. At the same time, the pair did not dwell on more controversial issues, such as Kosovo's independence and the Litvinenko murder. The FCO,s overall assessment of the meeting was positive, and the FCO's Russian Office sees in Medvedev a leader more open to domestic liberalization and cooperation with Britain and the West than was his predecessor.
2. (SBU) Summary continued. Though the Brown-Medvedev meeting touched on important international issues, the FCO said the most important outcome were signs of a thaw in top-level UK-Russian relations. As an example, they pointed to conversations with the Russian government regarding Zimbabwe and progress in gaining Moscow's support for some G8 action. Encouraged by the prospects of improving relations under Medvedev, the FCO believes that now may not be the time to renegotiate items such as the Russia-EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), and that better agreements with Moscow may be reached later, if Medvedev can successfully liberalize parts of Russian society. End Summary.
Litvinenko
----------
3. (C/NF) PM Brown briefly brought up the Litvinenko murder case and the extradition request, and Medvedev apparently sought to bury the matter by referring to it as a "legal issue." Medvedev said that it was a "sad affair," but that it should be a matter left to the courts. FCO reported that no transformative dialogue occurred, and that no progress was made on the issue.
4. (C/NF) In a separate meeting on the day of the briefing, Cabinet Office Director General Margaret Aldred confirmed to the DCM that the Brown meeting had been "fairly relaxed" and not strained. Aldred said the cost of the fall-out to HMG from the Litvinenko issue was an end to close cooperation with Russian intelligence (FSB) on counterterrorism and other global issues.
Visas and Diplomatic Relations
------------------------------
5. (C/NF) Brown and Medvedev made little progress on the issue of diplomatic visas, which are still being restricted by both countries as part of the fall-out from the Litvinenko case. The FCO reported that Medvedev was apparently upset over reports in the British media, appearing the same week as the G8 meeting, on Russian espionage activities in the UK.
6. (C/NF) According to the FCO, HMG has had good reasons to refuse many Russian visa requests. HMG officials see a real "intelligence threat from" Russia (in addition to China), and regret a "missed opportunity" in the late 1990s and early 2000s to assess these intelligence threats. FCO officials explained that the Russian government is still restricting visas to UK diplomats, that HMG is not be able to fully staff its embassy in Russia, and that local Russian hires have been harassed by the FSB. Accordingly, HMG is restricting the number of visas issued to Russian officials. The FCO reports that HMG had proposed a deal on easing visa restrictions, but that Russia is requiring that HMG consult with the FSB on any mutual visa agreement. HMG continues to refuse to engage directly with the FSB, pending resolution of the Litvinenko murder case.
British Petroleum
-----------------
7. (SBU) Medvedev confirmed to Brown that he had met with Russian shareholders of TNK-BP, and indicated to them that they could seek legal recourse through Russian courts, if they had concerns with how the joint venture was operating.
International Institutions
LONDON 00001837 002 OF 002
--------------------------
8. (SBU) Medvedev brought up the need for major reform of international institutions, one of the PM's main international initiatives. Medvedev told Brown that international financial institutions need to be more engaged in managing the global credit crunch.
British Council
---------------
9. (SBU) Medvedev told Brown that while Russia no longer views the British Council in Russia as a "den of spies," there still exist legal issues regarding the British Council,s activities in Russia. Medvedev implied that politicians are not in a position to discuss what is or is not legal, and that Russian courts will make the final decisions regarding the British Council,s Russian operations.
Kyoto Protocol
--------------
10. (SBU) Medvedev indicated to Brown that Russia might be willing to support a 2012 post-Kyoto framework, but expressed concerns about the rapid industrialization of China and India and its potential to undermine any international agreement on carbon emissions.
FCO,s Analysis: Medvedev is not Putin
-------------------------------------
11. (C/NF) FCO officials expressed optimism that Medvedev will bring a partial liberalization to Russian political life. They see signs of a slow break with Putin, including the former President,s failure to attend the G8 summit, the retirement of several high-ranking Putin-appointed generals, and the appointment of Antoly Chubais, a liberal and close Medvedev ally, to the presidency of Rosnanotech, which FCO views as a huge "Kremlin slush fund." On the other hand, several of Putin,s men are still in the upper echelons of the Kremlin, though the FCO believes that they will be removed over the next few years.
12. (C/NF) FCO officials said that the EU should hold off on signing a new PCA, which expires at the end of 2008, and wait to see if Medvedev liberalizes parts of Russian society before agreeing to long-term commitments. The FCO stressed that the next few years should be geared towards improving upper-level UK-Russian relations, and that high-level visits are the way forward. HMG is planning several visits to Russia in the fall, and will receive high-level Russian officials early next year.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
LeBaron
Monday, 20 October 2008, 15:11
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 002643
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/RUS, EUR/WE
EO 12958 DECL: 10/17/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, RU, UK
SUBJECT: UK/RUSSIA RELATIONS: HARD-HEADED ENGAGEMENT
Classified By: DCM Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary. FCO Russia, Caucasus and Central Asia Director Michael Davenport told DCM that HMG was conducting "parallel exercises" involving Cabinet, Intelligence and Foreign Office principals, designed to give PM Brown a clearer picture of Russian foreign policy making processes and recommendations for dealing with Moscow. He said the paper(s) will underline that the UK sees recent Russian foreign policy actions as a "continuum" in Moscow's goal to maintain influence in its "near abroad," but that many of the tactics employed have been "hit and miss," leading to an uncoordinated, opportunistic approach. The paper will therefore recommend "hard-headed, robust when necessary," engagement with Russia, coordinated among NATO and EU allies. End Summary.
HMG Policy Paper on Russia
--------------------------
2. (C) Davenport explained that HMG was conducting "parallel exercises" involving Cabinet, Intelligence and Foreign Office principals, designed to give PM Brown a clearer picture of Russian foreign policy making processes and recommendations for dealing with Moscow. He confessed that "volumes had been produced" in the exercise, but that the Foreign Office contribution had been winnowed down to a single draft which had been passed for review to FS Miliband and other Cabinet ministers the week of October 13.
3. (C) In previewing that text, Davenport explained that the paper included the results of an internal HMG debate over whether there had been a "strategic shift" in Russian foreign policy The process of producing the paper revealed some internal divides within HMG, particularly as to whether a posture of Cold War type "containment" should be employed to counter Moscow's more aggressive stance recently. Those more familiar with Russian policy in HMG were able, according to Davenport, to show the inappropriateness of such a tactic given the more integrated Russian international presence compared to 20 years ago, particularly in the worldwide economy.
Hard-Headed Engagement
----------------------
4. (C) The UK sees recent Russian foreign policy actions as a "continuum" in Moscow's goal to maintain influence in its near abroad and to deter western influence, especially NATO enlargement. The UK therefore reads the military action in Georgia as part of a pattern - exemplified by recent Russian policy on CFE, Missile Defense and other multilateral initiatives - in implementation of the same strategy. Davenport views the tactics employed by Moscow in that regard as "hit and miss," leading to an opportunistic approach, as opposed to a coordinated planning process in the Kremlin. He cites Russia's recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence as "tactical ad-hocery" which many in Moscow might now regret given the lack of support for recognition even from Russia's close friends.
5. (C) Looking ahead, Davenport predicts Russia will use all available levers to pursue its goals. It will prefer employing political, economic, social and intelligence methods and resources, but Georgia has shown that military means are part of the Kremlin's tactical lexicon. The FCO paper will therefore identify areas of "joint advantage" to focus UK and multilateral cooperation with Russia, particularly in the energy and commercial sectors. According to Davenport, the UK proposes a "hard-headed, robust when necessary," engagement with Russia, coordinated among NATO and EU allies, to include dialogue and cooperation where possible so as not to isolate Moscow. Davenport noted that FM Miliband has invited Russian FM Lavrov to visit London at a mutually convenient time.
A More Resilient Approach
-------------------------
6. (C) As examples of this more "resilient" approach, Davenport cites the need for deeper transatlantic engagement with former Soviet states to support their European aspirations without challenging Russia; a coherent NATO policy towards Georgia and Ukraine to advance Bucharest Summit goals; and a more comprehensive European energy policy, to include alternate sources, improved efficiency, and supply diversity as means of countering Russian influence.
Some Kremlinology
-----------------
LONDON 00002643 002 OF 002
7. (C) Within Russia, Davenport underlines that there has been "radical" change in the political and economic landscape over the past 15 years. While the political system is best described as a corrupt autocracy, it is a confident one. The economy is stronger and more vibrant with a far broader industrial base. The Putin/Medvedev relationship is also evolving, with both showing assertiveness during the Georgia conflict. HMG,s view is that Putin still holds the reins, particularly on Ukraine-related issues, but allows Medvedev to control events once broad policy has been agreed.
8. (C) Comment: The broad and high level engagement in this exercise across HMG is an indication of the seriousness with which PM Brown and his close advisors are treating Russian relations. The UK has had more experience lately than most western European countries with Moscow's ire, going back to the Litvinenko poisoning case and continuing through the tit-for -tat diplomatic expulsions and closure of a number of British Council offices in Russia. The UK, through the stock taking and forward looking elements which will be contained within this paper, is clearly trying to put relations back on the right track bilaterally while ensuring Moscow understands the consequences of its foreign policy. End Comment.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
LEBARON
Monday, 31 August 2009, 15:20
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000870
SIPDIS
FOR ALEX MCKNIGHT AND STACIE ZERDECKI OF EUR/WE
ALESSANDRO NARDI OF EUR/ERA
JENNIFER MCELVEEN AND STEPHEN WOROBEC OF INR/TNC
PASS TO BARRY M. BRAUN AND KAREN GREENAWAY OF FBI'S
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
PASS TO BRUCE OHR OF DOJ'S CRIMINAL DIVISION
MOSCOW PLEASE PASS TO ST PETERSBURG
EO 12958 DECL: 08/19/2019
TAGS PREL, PINR, KCRM, KCOR, KJUS, SP, RS, GG, UP
SUBJECT: ASSESSING SPAIN'S EFFORTS TO COMBAT THE RUSSIAN
MAFIA
REF: A. MADRID 869 B. OSC EUP20080708950049 C. OSC EUP20081029950032 D. OSC EUP 20061127123001 E. OSC CEP20070202950277 F. MADRID 517 G. MADRID 551
MADRID 00000870 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Arnold A. Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY. A year after Spanish security services conducted Operation Troika - which supposedly "decapitated" the Russian mafia in Spain - Madrid is still unraveling the extent to which Russian and other Eurasian organized crime (OC) networks have established themselves in Spain and the extent of their influence. As the judicial process in Spain moves slowly, court documents, ongoing arrests, and investigative reporting suggest those arrested in Spain were involved in a complex web of shady business dealings and enjoyed a murky relationship with senior Russian government officials. The GOS in recent months also has pursued additional Eurasian OC suspects through extradition requests and international arrest warrants. (See Ref A.) Convinced that OC is a transnational problem that poses a global threat, Spain wants to prioritize information-sharing on OC during its early 2010 EU Presidency and already has shared a non-paper with Post asking for USG suggestions, initiatives and proposals in this regard. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Embassy Madrid's LEGAT judges that cooperation between the Spanish National Police (SNP) and its paramilitary rival the Guardia Civil (GC), is better on OC than on counter-terrorism (CT) investigations and that the GOS also generally is even more cooperative with the USG on OC issues than it is on CT issues.
3. (C) In a July 15 meeting with POLOFF, Fernando Moreno, Chief of Strategic Intelligence in Spain's Organized Crime Intelligence Center (CICO) - an inter-agency, analytical unit comprised of officials detailed from the SNP, GC, and Spanish Customs - pointed out that CICO considers OC to be transnational in nature and does not analyze OC groups by nationality. In an article published in May, he also warned against the reliability of press reporting on OC issues, stressing that these reports may be motivated by commercial and/or partisan political gain. However, Post notes that investigative reporters for Spanish newspapers from across the political spectrum have provided detailed allegations on Russian OC activities in Spain.
//Spanish Efforts to Dismantle the "Russian" Mafia in Spain//
4. (C) The GOS has conducted two major operations - codenamed Troika (2008-09) and Avispa (2005-07) - against "Russian" OC networks in Spain, which have resulted in the arrest of more than 60 suspects, including four of the top eight to ten Russian mafia leaders outside Russia: Gennadios Petrov, Alexander Malyshev, Vitaly Izguilov, and Zahkar Kalashov (See Ref B). Spain reportedly has more senior Russian OC leaders in jail than any other country besides Russia. Moreno and key aides at CICO on July 15 suggested to POLOFF that these operations have sent the political message that Russian OC is not welcome in Spain, although they also downplayed the threat these networks pose to Spain, arguing that although these mobsters live in Spain, their operations are abroad. Spanish authorities reportedly have left Moscow out of the loop on these raids and Post's LEGAT office confirms that GOS
MADRID 00000870 002.2 OF 003
authorities who combat OC officials are distrustful of their Russian counterparts. Moscow reportedly is interested in learning what exactly the Spanish have as evidence and has sent investigators to Spain for meetings with GOS officials on more than a half a dozen occasions since the Troika Phase I arrests.
5. (C) Over the past year there have been a number of surprising twists in the ongoing battle against the "Russian" OC in Spain, which suggests how complex the "Russian" OC network is in Spain and how pervasive its reach. These updates largely have centered around a series of allegations regarding the extent to which Petrov and his network enjoyed political access to senior Russian officials, the slow-developing judicial process against Kalashov and the rest of the Avispa network, and - most recently - Spain's efforts to secure the arrest and/or extradition of additional key players in the "Russian" OC world. See Ref A for details.
//Key Signposts to Watch For// 6. (C) The way four issues play out is likely to signal the extent to which Spanish efforts to combat Russian OC can be expected to have a meaningful and long-lasting impact:
- Whether "Russian" OC efforts to suborn justice are successful. The court documents presenting charges against the Avispa defendants detail a systematic campaign by the Avispa defendants to manipulate the Spanish judicial system to secure the exoneration of Kalashov, have him granted parole and/or reduce his sentence. In fact, several targets of Op Avispa's Phase II raid - including Alexander Gofshtein of Russia, Kalashov's personal lawyer, and Oleg Voronstov of Ukraine, a former electoral adviser to Russian President Yeltsin - plotted to influence Spanish judicial and security authorities involved in the case through an exchange of gifts and favors. (See Refs C and D.) Post also notes that after Oniani fled to Russia at the time of the Avispa raid in 2005, he was obliged - to prove to the Russian crime world that he was not a mole working for the GOS - to put out contracts on the lives of the Spanish authorities involved in the case. One prosecutor, David Martinez Madero, stepped down from the case shortly thereafter.
- The relative strength of the verdict in the Avispa trial. Post will be watching to see the extent to which the Avispa case - the first trial of its kind against Eurasian "Thieves in Law" - results in maximum penalties which are upheld on appeal. In CT cases, Spain has a history of high-profile arrests of alleged radical jihadists which later result in weak prosecutions that see the defendants set free. An emblematic case is how the GOS judicial system handled Op Nova, which involved a plot by radical Islamists to truckbomb Spain's National Court. Of the 45 people arrested, 30 were charged, which led to 20 convictions, six of which were upheld following the Supreme Court's appellate ruling, although the sentences of four were reduced, leaving the convictions of only two defendants untouched.
- Whether Spain cedes any ground on extradition issues. Some Spanish press reports have suggested that Moscow would only consider extraditing recently detained Op Avispa target Tariel Oniani to Madrid as part of a prisoner exchange for Spanish-Russian businessman Antonio Valdes-Garcia, who voluntarily traveled to Moscow in 2005 to testify in the trial of Yukos founders Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Valdes was detained by Russian authorities - whom he claims tortured him - for allegedly siphoning funds and helping to create bank accounts in which Yukos laundered money. Valdes eventually
MADRID 00000870 003.2 OF 003
escaped and fled back to Spain in 2007 (see Ref E.) Spanish press reports so far have described this prisoner swap as highly unlikely.
- Indicators that the "Russian" OC presence has reconstituted itself in Spain. XXXXXXXXXXX on August 17 told POLOFF that the Russian OC network, although weakened, remains active in Spain. CICO officials in early 2009 privately predicted to POLOFF that a Russian OC network involved in trafficking in persons will reconstitute itself, despite three previous GOS efforts (Op Zarpa, 2006-08) to dismantle it. Post will be monitoring the resiliency of the "Russian" OC presence involved in money laundering in Spain to gauge its current capabilities.
//Implications for the U.S.// 7. (C) The Zapatero Administration, which takes a multi-pronged approach to combating OC (see Ref F), is interested in prioritizing information-sharing on OC during its early 2010 EU Presidency. This presents a number of opportunities for the USG to strengthen bilateral cooperation and to capitalize on GOS leadership of the EU to expand cooperation against OC on a US-EU basis. The GOS on June 23 signed a bilateral agreement with the USG on Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC, see Ref G), which Post will be working on with the GOS to broaden it into a US-EU agreement.
8. (SBU) In May 2009, the Spanish Ministries of Justice and Interior held a preliminary meeting with Post officials on GOS tentative priorities on Justice and Home Affairs issues. They provided a non-paper asking for USG suggestions, initiatives and proposals on "transnational serious crime" as well as EU-US Extradition and MLAT Agreements, data protection and information exchange, civil law cooperation, child protection, CT, and visa and border management. (A copy of the paper was provided to USEU and EUR/ERA.)
9. (C) Magistrate Javier Gomez Bermudez, the President of the National Court's Criminal Chamber, earlier this year privately and constructively offered his suggestions to POLOFF and LEGAT on ways the USG and GOS can strengthen bilateral cooperation. In the judge's view, the most important thing that the GOS and USG can do is to build trust at the working level. He argued that experiences like the FBI-sponsored trip to Washington, DC in September 2008 by a delegation of Spanish legal, judicial, policy and intelligence officials are good for getting to know each other's judicial systems. Gomez Bermudez suggested as a next step that there could be a conference in Spain with US Embassy participation on how to better cooperate bilaterally.
10. (SBU) Embassy Madrid is in the process of organizing with GOS authorities law enforcement conferences in Mallorca and Barcelona on November 12 and 13, 2009, respectively. The focus will be on both sides sharing best practices to combat OC and money laundering. LEGAT intends to contact DOJ and FBI to contribute guest speakers while our Public Affairs Office will be reaching out to U.S.-based authors and academics - with expertise in the activities of "Russian" OC - to give a presentation. CHACON
Monday, 31 August 2009, 14:49
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 000869
SIPDIS
FOR ALEX MCKNIGHT AND STACIE ZERDECKI OF EUR/WE
JENNIFER MCELVEEN AND STEPHEN WOROBEC OF INR/TNC
PASS TO BARRY M. BRAUN AND KAREN GREENAWAY OF FBI'S
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
PASS TO BRUCE OHR OF DOJ'S CRIMINAL DIVISION
MOSCOW PLEASE PASS TO ST PETERSBURG
EO 12958 DECL: 08/17/2019
TAGS PREL, PINR, KCRM, KCOR, KJUS, SP, RS, GG, UP
SUBJECT: UPDATES IN SPAIN'S INVESTIGATIONS OF RUSSIAN MAFIA
REF: A. OSC EUP20080707950031 B. OSC EUP20081019950022 C. OSC EUP20090608178005 D. MADRID 286 E. OSC EUP20050620950076 F. OSC EUP20080708950049 G. OSC EUP20081029950032 H. OSC EUP 20061127123001
MADRID 00000869 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Arnold A. Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY. This cable, which should be read in conjunction with Septel analysis, details updates over the past year in Spain's two major operations - codenamed Troika (2008-09) and Avispa (2005-07) - to combat "Russian" organized crime in Spain. In Spain, the term "Russian mafia" usually applies not only to Russians, but also to many nationalities from the former USSR, according to Carlos Resa, a professor at the Autonomous University of Madrid who formerly worked at the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in Moscow. END SUMMARY.
//Op Troika and its Updates//
2. (U) Phase I of Op Troika, which was executed in June 2008 resulted in the arrest of 20 top leaders of Russia's Tambov-Malyshev crime family for criminal conspiracy, money laundering, document falsification and crimes against public finances. Most of those arrested were "Vor z Konen" or "Thieves in Law," the highest echelon of Russian OC leadership. In particular, Gennadios Petrov, the alleged leader, Alexander Malyshev, Petrov's deputy, and Vitaly Izguilov, a key lieutenant who was out on bail from his arrest in Op Avispa, allegedly formed the leadership of one of the four largest OC networks in the world and the largest Russian OC network. Spain served as the group's safehaven from authorities and rival OC networks in Russia from which they directed their illicit business. Baltasar Garzon, the National Court judge who directed the investigation, accused the group of laundering money in Spain that came from a range of illicit activities conducted elsewhere, including contract killings, arms and drug trafficking, extortion, coercion, threats, and kidnapping.
3. (U) Following the Troika arrests in June 2008, details began to appear in the press on the group's alleged activities and how the investigation developed. Less than a month after the arrests, Spain's flagship daily, center-left El Pais, published a detailed article claiming that Alexander Litvinenko - the former Russian intelligence official who worked on OC issues before he died in late 2006 in London from poisoning under mysterious circumstances - tipped off Spanish security officials on the locations, roles, and activities of several "Russian" mafia figures with ties to Spain. He allegedly provided information on Izguilov, Zahkar Kalashov, and Tariel Oniani to GOS officials during a May 2006 meeting.
4. (U) As reported in Ref A, conservative daily ABC in July 2008 reported that the GOS security services tapped "thousands" of conversations in its two-year investigation. Unnamed sources told the newspaper that 230 of those intercepts "will make your hair stand on end" for their revelations on the Troika defendants' - especially Petrov's - immense power and political connections, as well as the range of criminal activity in Russia that the Troika defendants directed from Spain. According to the article, Troika mafia leaders invoked the names of senior GOR officials to assure
MADRID 00000869 002.2 OF 004
partners that their illicit deals would proceed as planned. The press suggests this "sensitive" evidence could impact bilateral relations and adds that the "extremely delicate" details of Op Troika are so close-hold that barely 10 GOS officials are aware of them all. In the context of the clout that Petrov's network enjoyed and the political connections it had, multiple Spanish media outlets reported that one of Petrov's intercepted phone conversation suggests the Russian XXXXXXXXXXXX reportedly was sailing on Petrov's yacht on September 6, 2007, an allegation that Russia's Ambassador to Spain publicly denied as "completely false."
5. (U) In October 2008, GOS authorities raided the Mallorca vacation mansion of Vladislav Reznik, chair of the Duma's financial markets committee and a Putin ally within the United Russia party (See Ref B). XXXXXXXXXXXX There is some debate about whether Reznik bought the house from Petrov or whether it was a gift. In any event, the two were regularly seen together on the island, according to press reports. Garzon reportedly has ordered Reznik's arrest for money-laundering and for belonging to a criminal organization. Reznik enjoys immunity in Russia, but Garzon's extradition request is valid throughout the EU-27. In August 2009, the Spanish press reported that Garzon is investigating claims that Reznik and the Tambov crime family were involved in a 2008 plot to kidnap the eldest son of Spanish construction magnate Francisco Hernando del Saz (aka Paco el Pocero), one of the richest men in Spain. The plot, disrupted in April 2008, was to ask for a ransom of $30 million dollars. The leader of the would-be kidnappers reportedly alleges that he received his orders from Reznik.
6. (U)XXXXXXXXXXX El Pais on June 7, 2009 (Ref C) claimed that, as a result of Troika, the GOS has compiled a "secret list" of Russian prosecutors, senior military officers, and politicians - including current and former ministers - who may have been involved with the Troika network. According to the article, some of those Russian officials referred to Petrov as "leader." XXXXXXXXXXX
7. (U) Multiple press reports allege that Moscow was left out of the loop on the Troika investigation - whose Phase II raid resulted in the detention of three lawyers in southern Spain in April 2009 - due to Madrid's fear of leaks to GOS OC targets. Moscow reportedly is interested in learning what exactly the Spanish have as evidence and has sent investigators to Spain for meetings with GOS officials on more than a half a dozen occasions since the Troika Phase I arrests. Spanish President Zapatero and Russian President Medvedev have met three times since then, including in Madrid in March 2009, when the two leaders upgraded the bilateral relationship to a strategic partnership and signed an MoU on cooperation on OC matters. (See Ref D).
//Op Avispa and its Updates//
8. (U) Op Avispa ("Wasp" in English) - the predecessor to Troika which was directed by Garzon's colleague, Judge Fernando Andreu - targeted the Russian, Georgian and Ukrainian OC presence in Spain, which allegedly laundered money from illegal casinos in Russia by investing in the
MADRID 00000869 003.2 OF 004
Spanish real estate market. The op had mixed results: Phase I, executed in 2005, arrested 28 suspects, 22 of which were alleged "Vor z Konen" (See Ref E). Phase II in 2006 arrested nine additional suspects while Phase III in 2007 resulted in three more arrests, including the Spanish national government's number-two official in the Catalan region, for allegedly helping members of the "Russian" mafia secure work visas to allow them to enter the country legally. Although GOS officials in 2005 publicly proclaimed Avispa a success, subsequent press reports suggest authorities struggled with leaks and bureaucratic snafus. Zahkar Kalashov and Tariel Oniani - Georgian-born Russian citizens who were the primary Avispa targets - apparently were both tipped off hours before the 2005 raid occurred and fled the country. Recent Spanish press reports suggest the source of the tip-off remains unidentified, although the Russian security services or a corrupt source within the GOS have been cited as possible culprits. Due to the leak, Izguilov was the most senior person arrested, although he later was released on bond from jail due to a technicality. Kalashov - allegedly the top boss of Russia's "Solnstevo" crime syndicate - was detained in Dubai in 2006 and quickly extradited to Spain, which had put out an arrest warrant for him via Interpol.
9. (U) The Spanish media often describes Kalashov as the "most valuable and well-protected prisoner in a Spanish jail" and the "highest level mafia boss arrested outside Russia." Kalashov - like Petrov, Malyshev, and Izguilov from Op Troika - is in an individual cell in an isolation block; all four are in different prisons. Kalashov faces numerous extra security measures and is periodically moved from prison to prison to foil any plots to break him out of jail, according to Spanish press (see Ref F).
10. (U) Investigating Judge Andreu in October 2008 formally charged 15 of the 37 people arrested in the first two phases of Avispa for money laundering, criminal conspiracy, and falsifying commercial documents. He is seeking 3-12 years for the defendants, including 12 years and two months for Kalashov, but a trial date has not yet been set.
11. (U) Against the backdrop of Lukoil's reported interest in acquiring a roughly 30 percent stake in Repsol (See Refs G and H), the Spanish press in November 2008 highlighted that Kalashov owned a "significant" share in Lukoil and that he and Tariel Oniani had acted as consultants during 2003-04 to help bring the Russian energy giant into Spain to open 150 gas stations, among other projects. Citing files provided by Swiss prosecutors, Spanish court documents estimate Kalashov's personal fortune at 200 million euros.
12. (U) Kalashov shuffled his attorneys in December 2008. Days later, one of his new lawyers, Alfonso Diaz Monux, was shot dead in his Madrid garage by unknown hitmen, although by all accounts, Diaz had received death threats for roughly a year due to his work on behalf of another client.
13. (U) In March 2009, the press reported that Spanish prosecutors had secured the cooperation of a protected witness against Kalashov who made a sworn statement in July 2008 that the crime boss had approached him in 2007 - while both were in prison - to launder 300 million euros. The alleged witness, former Galician drug trafficker Pablo Vioque, was released from prison in April 2008 for health reasons and died of terminal cancer in December 2008. Things took yet another unexpected turn when Vioque's adult children - days after his death - publicly claimed that their father had never been a protected witness in the Kalashov case and said that he never made a sworn statement to that effect,
MADRID 00000869 004.2 OF 004
although they acknowledged that police officers met their father at their home in his dying days.
//GOS Seeks Arrest, Extradition of Additional "Russian" OC Figures//
14. (SBU) Spanish press reports suggest that Madrid has expressed interest in the extradition of Tariel Oniani, whom Russian authorities arrested in Moscow in June 2009. Spain has sought Oniani through Interpol since 2005. However,XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested to POLOFF on August 17 that Moscow is unlikely to extradite Oniani to Spain.
15. (C) Madrid in recent months also has sought the arrest of Michael Cherney, a Russian-born, Israeli citizen for whom Spain's National Court has issued an international arrest warrant that accuses him of money laundering and illicit association in connection with Op Avispa. Cherney (aka Mikhail Chernoy) reportedly owns several companies in Spain that the Avispa defendants used to help launder money. Center-right El Mundo on July 6, 2009 published a highly detailed account of the GOS's fruitless efforts to have British authorities arrest Cherney during a visit to London in late May. Post's LEGAT Section confirms the basis of the article. CHACON
Friday, 12 February 2010, 15:39
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000317
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/11/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, ECON, KDEM, KCOR, RS
SUBJECT: THE LUZKHOV DILEMMA
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reason: 1.4 (b), (d).
1. (C) Summary: Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov remains a loyal member of United Russia, with a reputation for ensuring that the city has the resources it needs to function smoothly. Questions increasingly arise regarding Luzhkov's connections to the criminal world and the impact of these ties on governance. Luzhkov remains in a solid position due to his value as a consistent deliverer of votes for the ruling party. Unfortunately, the shadowy world of corrupt business practices under Luzhkov continues in Moscow, with corrupt officials requiring bribes from businesses attempting to operate in the city. End Summary.
Overview: The Kremlin's Luzhkov Dilemma
---------------------------------------
2. (C) Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov is the embodiment of political dilemma for the Kremlin. A loyal, founding member of United Russia and a trusted deliverer of votes and influence for the ruling party and its leader, Prime Minister Putin, Luzhkov's connections to Moscow's business community -- the big and legitimate as well as the marginal and corrupt -- has enabled him to call for support when he needs it, to deliver votes for United Russia, or to ensure that the city has the resources it needs to function smoothly. Luzhkov's national reputation as the man who governs the ungovernable, who cleans the streets, keeps the Metro running and maintains order in Europe's largest metropolis of almost 11 million people, earns him a certain amount of slack from government and party leaders. He oversaw what even United Russia insiders acknowledge was a dirty, compromised election for the Moscow City Duma in October, and yet received only a slap on the wrist from President Medvedev.
3. (C) Muscovites are increasingly questioning the standard operating procedures of their chief executive, a man who, as of 2007, they no longer directly elect. Luzhkov's connections to the criminal world and the impact that these ties have had on governance and development in Moscow are increasingly a matter of public discussion. Although Luzhkov was successful in winning court-ordered damages from opposition leader Boris Nemtsov for his recent publication "Luzhkov: An Accounting," Nemtsov and his Solidarity-movement allies were heartened by the fact that the judge did not award damages on the basis of the corruption accusations themselves, but rather on a libel technicality.
4. (C) Few believe that Luzhkov will voluntarily relinquish his post prior to 2012, when the Moscow City Duma must submit a list of mayoral candidates to Medvedev for his selection. United Russia will probably call on Luzhkov's political machine and his genuine public support to deliver votes for them in the 2011 State Duma elections, as well as the 2012 Presidential contest. With no apparent successor in line, and with no ambitions beyond remaining mayor, Luzhkov is in a solid position. The evidence of his involvement -- or at least association -- with corruption remains significant. This cable presents that side of Luzhkov -- one that bears not only on Luzhkov and his handling of local politics, but on Putin and Medvedev as they move toward the 2012 elections.
Background on Moscow's Criminal World
-------------------------------------
5. (C) The Moscow city government's direct links to criminality have led some to call it "dysfunctional," and to assert that the government operates more as a kleptocracy than a government. Criminal elements enjoy a "krysha" (a term from the criminal/mafia world literally meaning "roof" or protection) that runs through the police, the Federal Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and the prosecutor's office, as well as throughout the Moscow city government bureaucracy. Analysts identify a three-tiered structure in Moscow's criminal world. Luzhkov is at the top. The FSB, MVD, and militia are at the second level. Finally, ordinary criminals and corrupt inspectors are at the lowest level. This is an inefficient system in which criminal groups fill a void in some areas because the city is not providing some services.
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Moscow's ethnic criminal groups do business and give paybacks. It is the federal headquarters of the parties, not the criminal groups, who decide who will participate in politics. XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that the political parties are the ones with the political clout; therefore, they have some power over these criminal groups.
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Crime groups work with municipal bureaucrats, but at a low level. For example, the Armenians and Georgians were formerly heavily involved in the gambling business before city officials closed the gambling facilities. These ethnic groups needed protection from law enforcement crackdowns, so they sought cooperation with the municipal bureaucrats. In such scenarios, crime groups paid the Moscow police for protection.
Luzhkov's Links to Criminal Figures
-----------------------------------
7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
8. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Luzhkov used criminal money to support his rise to power and has been involved with bribes and deals regarding lucrative construction contracts throughout Moscow. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Luzhkov's friends and associates (including recently deceased crime boss Vyacheslav Ivankov and reputedly corrupt Duma Deputy XXXXXXXXXXXX) are "bandits." XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the Moscow government has links to many different criminal groups and it regularly takes cash bribes from businesses. The people under Luzhkov maintain these criminal connections. Recently, ultranationalist LDPR opposition party leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy strongly criticized Luzhkov and called for him to step down, claiming that Luzhkov's government was the "most criminal" in Russian history. This remarkable denunciation, carried on state TV flagship Channel One, was widely seen as an indirect Kremlin rebuke of Luzhkov.
9. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us everyone knows that Russia's laws do not work. The Moscow system is based on officials making money. The government bureaucrats, FSB, MVD, police, and prosecutor's offices all accept bribes. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that everything depends on the Kremlin and he thought that Luzhkov, as well as many mayors and governors, pay off key insiders in the Kremlin. XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that the vertical works because people are paying bribes all the way to the top. He told us that people often witness officials going into the Kremlin with large suitcases and bodyguards, and he speculated that the suitcases are full of money. The governors collect money based on bribes, almost resembling a tax system, throughout their regions. XXXXXXXXXXXX described how there are parallel structures in the regions in which people are able to pay their leaders. For instance, the FSB, MVD, and militia all have distinct money collection systems. Further, XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that deputies generally have to buy their seats in the government. They need money to get to the top, but once they are there, their positions become quite lucrative money making opportunities. Bureaucrats in Moscow are notorious for doing all kinds of illegal business to get extra money.
10. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Luzhkov is following orders from the Kremlin to not go after Moscow's criminal groups. For example, XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that it was only a public relations stunt from Putin to close gambling. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he did not see the sense in suitcases of money going into the Kremlin since it would be easier to open a secret account in Cyprus. He speculated that the Moscow police heads have a secret war chest of money. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that this money is likely used to solve problems that the Kremlin decides, such as rigging elections. It can be accessed as a resource for when orders come from above, for example, for bribes or to pay off people when necessary. XXXXXXXXXXXX postulated that the Kremlin might say to a governor that he can rule a certain territory but in exchange he must do what the Kremlin says.
11. (C) Notwithstanding Luzhkov's solid position, some of our contacts believe that cracks have appeared in his armor, due
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to his corrupt activities. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Luzhkov has many enemies because his wife has the most lucrative business deals in Moscow and many people think Luzhkov has received too much money. XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that Luzhkov is "on his way out," although he acknowledged that the Kremlin has not identified a suitable replacement yet. Issues such as corruption and traffic congestion have, to a certain degree, eroded Luzhkov's popularity. Putin, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, will likely pick the quietest and least expected person to replace Luzhkov.
In Moscow, Everyone Needs a "Krysha"
------------------------------------
12. (C) According to many observers, the lawless criminal climate in Russia makes it difficult for businesses to survive without being defended by some type of protection. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained how bribes work in Moscow: a cafe owner pays the local police chief via cash through a courier. He needs to pay a certain negotiated amount over a certain profit. The high prices of goods in Moscow cover these hidden costs. Sometimes people receive "bad protection" in the sense that the "krysha" extorts an excessive amount of money. As a result, they cannot make enough of a profit to maintain their businesses. If people attempt to forego protection, they will instantly be shut down. For example, officials from the fire or sanitation service will appear at the business and invent a violation. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, everyone has bought into the idea of protection in Moscow, so it has become a norm. In general, Muscovites have little freedom to speak out against corrupt activities and are afraid of their leaders.
13. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that Moscow business owners understand that it is best to get protection from the MVD and FSB (rather than organized crime groups) since they not only have more guns, resources, and power than criminal groups, but they are also protected by the law. For this reason, protection from criminal gangs is no longer so high in demand. Police and MVD collect money from small businesses while the FSB collects from big businesses. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the FSB "krysha" is allegedly the best protection. He told us that, while the MVD and FSB both have close links to Solntsevo, the FSB is the real "krysha" for Solntsevo. This system is not an incentive for smaller businesses and nobody is immune; even rich people who think they are protected get arrested. According to Transparency International's 2009 survey, bribery costs Russia USD 300 billion a year, or about 18 percent of its gross domestic product. XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that the "krysha" system has led to an erosion of police internal discipline. For instance, young police officers spend their money buying luxury vehicles that a normal worker could never afford.
Comment
-------
14. (S) Despite Medvedev's stated anti-corruption campaign, the extent of corruption in Moscow remains pervasive with Mayor Luzhkov at the top of the pyramid. Luzhkov oversees a system in which it appears that almost everyone at every level is involved in some form of corruption or criminal behavior. Putin and Medvedev's dilemma is deciding when Luzhkov becomes a bigger liability than asset. While public sentiment against Luzhkov has grown since the "tainted" elections in October 2009, United Russia's leadership knows that he has been a loyal supporter who can deliver voter support. Ousting Luzhkov before he is ready to go could create major difficulties because he could link others in the government to the corruption. While reforming Luzhkov's questionable activities might seem like the right thing to do, for now keeping him in place, efficiently running the city, is United Russia's best option. Ultimately, the tandem will put Luzhkov out to pasture, like it has done with fellow long-term regional leaders like Sverdlovsk oblast governor Edward Rossel and Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaymiyev.
Beyrle
Tuesday, 24 July 2007, 14:14
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003625
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/24/2017
TAGS PGOV, PINR, SOCI, RS
SUBJECT: MAYOR LUZHKOV - THE CONDUCTOR LEADS ON
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel A. Russell for reason 1.4(d).
1. (C) Summary: In early July, Moscow Mayor Luzhkov took the oath of office for his fifth term, bringing to a close a reported power struggle with the Kremlin. For the past fifteen years, Luzhkov's dominance of Moscow politics has made him one of the most powerful politicians in the country, and an important factor in the ruling party's campaign strategy for the December Duma and March 2008 presidential campaigns. Although President Putin's recent public rebuke during Luzhkov's swearing-in has prompted speculation that the Mayor's power may be waning, Luzhkov has demonstrated a remarkable ability for remaining in power in spite of changes in the city administration and allegations of personal corruption. End Summary.
The Appointment
---------------
2. (C) On July 6, Yuriy Luzhkov was sworn in for a fifth term as mayor - this time, as Putin's man, rather than as a popularly elected official. (Under election laws adopted in 2005, the President appoints the mayors of Moscow and St. Petersburg as positions equal to that of a regional governor, with the approval of the city legislatures. Luzhkov's appointment was the first time since 1992 that Muscovites did not directly elect their mayor.) The inauguration ceremony capped a political power struggle between the Mayor and the Kremlin, with Luzhkov seeking early reappointment (his term was set to expire in December 2007) and the Kremlin reportedly demanding greater political obeisance in return. According to well-connected journalists, Luzhkov first approached the Kremlin in February 2007, but was told that his appointment would come at the cost of his political inner circle. Luzhkov declined the Kremlin offer, and a game of political chicken began. Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Zhukov reportedly was also a contender for the post of mayor. However Dmitriy Badovskiy, Director of Development and Project Planning in the Moscow City government, carefully noted to us that Zhukov's candidacy did not "satisfy all of the requirements" held by unnamed officials. Luzhkov's ambitions and the Kremlin's need for the popular Mayor to deliver votes for United Russia in the December parliamentary and March 2008 presidential elections reportedly drove his reappointment in June.
3. (SBU) In the days following Luzhkov's inauguration, the media speculated whether Luzhkov had agreed to the reorganization of the city government and dismissal of some of his staff in return for another term in office. On July 21, Luzhkov refuted these reports stating, "There was no kind of pressure and no sort of recommendations, neither from the head of the government, nor from the Presidential Administration, nor the administration of the Central Federal District. They gave me the full ability to form my team of the Moscow government absolutely by myself."
4. (C) On July 23, Luzhkov reappointed the majority of his staff to their former positions. Of his senior staff, he dismissed only First Deputy Mayor Petr Aksyonov and Deputy Mayor Yosif Ordzhonikidze. Luzhkov also dismissed Vladimir Obyedkov, Head of the Northern Administrative District of Moscow, because he was reportedly displeased with the job that Obyedkov had done. Even before the changes had been announced, Badovskiy had stressed to us that the changes within the City Administration were not extremely important in the long term. More significant, he argued, were state-owned Gazprom's acquisition of the city energy complex and the changing of the city land laws to the advantage of unnamed businessmen, both of which increased the Kremlin's power over Moscow. Badovskiy added that the new Head of the City Property Council, Vladimir Silkin, would be a key player in Luzhkov's new administration.
The Mayor
---------
5. (SBU) Since becoming mayor in 1992, Luzhkov has presided over the transformation of Moscow from dreary Soviet capital to the world's most expensive city. Luzhkov has improved the city's infrastructure, developed social programs, and supervised the construction of buildings throughout Moscow. His support for social programs such as free public transportation for pensioners and the pension supplements have met with wide approval. During the series of Chechen terrorist attacks in Moscow in 1999, Luzhkov provided the strong leadership for which Muscovites were looking. At the recent inauguration ceremony, Putin praised him for the "real results that we see in Moscow."
6. (C) Although Luzhkov has developed Moscow, controversy surrounds many of his projects. He has not hesitated to
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demolish nearly 650 historical buildings to create space for more lucrative, high-rise offices. To the chagrin of many Muscovites, Luzhkov also placed sculptor Zurab Tsereteli's 300-foot statue of Peter the Great along the Moscow River. The biggest source of controversy connected to Luzhkov's building spree is his billionaire wife Yelena Baturina, who heads the largest construction company in Moscow. After Luzhkov entered office, Baturina became the wealthiest woman in Russia, thanks to the profitable building contracts that her construction company received from the Moscow city government. In the two weeks since Luzhkov's inauguration, Baturina's company has received two more building contracts totaling almost 800 million dollars. As one Muscovite told us, "On one hand, Luzhkov has done a lot for Moscow, but we do not know how much public money has ended up in his personal bank account."
7. (C) Beyond the controversy, Moscow under Luzhkov has become a city of paradoxes, none of which seems to have hurt the mayor's popularity among Muscovites. Luzhkov has expanded the metro system, reconstructed highways, and plans to build a fourth ring road around Moscow, but traffic jams and overcrowded metro lines remain ever-present problems. Thousands of apartments have been built, but average Muscovites cannot afford to buy them. Although Luzhkov claims to support the Kremlin's new social policies, typically pessimistic Muscovites complained to us that "nothing is being done." They reported that medical clinics are overflowing with patients, that there is a shortage of doctors, and that corruption and bureaucracy plague the city. Despite the problems with rising prices and overcrowding in Moscow, quality of life has improved since the 1990s, and many Muscovites believe Luzhkov was the man who "put the city in order."
8. (SBU) Luzhkov is a charismatic and controversial figure. The son of a woodcutter, he cultivates his image as a man of the people. An avid sportsman, Luzhkov neither drinks nor smokes, and his passions include beekeeping, opera, and hunting. He has published numerous short stories and is a dedicated patron of the arts. Although he is forward-thinking with regards to religious diversity and the environment, he refused to sanction a gay pride parade in Moscow, calling it a "Satanic event."
The Politician
--------------
9. (SBU) As a politician, Luzhkov has masterfully played on his relationship with the Kremlin. During the Yeltsin years, he was powerful enough to challenge Yeltsin's authority and many saw him as a serious contender for the presidency because of the economic and political independence he had created. Having failed in his own presidential bid in 1999, Luzhkov was compelled to close ranks with the Kremlin once Putin came to power, becoming a leader of United Russia. It is reported that another quid pro quo for Luzhkov's reappointment was the mayor's agreement to stump more actively for United Russia. However, the rivalry and ill-will between Luzhkov and Putin reportedly remains. Luzhkov is one of the few political leaders whose political popularity is independent of the Kremlin and whose political base gives him the resources and standing to challenge Kremlin directives. In the top-down "vertical" preferred by Putin, Luzhkov's independence remains an irritant, such as when Moscow's city-owned television station continues its criticism of federal ministries (although not of Putin himself).
10. (C) President Putin's remarks at Luzhkov's inauguration ceremony, comparing Luzhkov to a conductor who cannot get his musicians to play well together, were heard as a warning that Moscow cannot remain independent from the federal government. In the joke, the conductor fires the musicians who offer to help. Putin added, "such a scene ought to be an exception in the Moscow government." Using this sort of public criticism as a warning and a way to assert his own power is "classic Putin," according to XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXXXX downplayed the significance of Putin's criticisms and suggested that the criticism stemmed from Putin and Luzhkov's mutual dislike.
11. (C) Although Putin's comments indicate frustration with Luzhkov, the consensus is that the Kremlin needs him to ensure a victory in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections and to maintain stability in Moscow. XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that the Kremlin needs Luzhkov's strong leadership in Moscow to promote stability during the political transition period. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Luzhkov has maneuvered in such a way that Moscow cannot operate
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without his personal oversight. His opponents have sought to undermine Luzhkov's power by emphasizing the systemic problems that plague Moscow, namely, housing shortages, price increases, low pensions, and traffic jams.
12. (C) It is not clear if the 70-year-old Luzhkov will serve the entirety of his fifth term. Luzhkov's wife has sold some of her construction businesses, and rumors are rampant, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, that the power couple has purchased residences in several European capitals -- actions that suggest Luzhkov may not be mayor for much longer. However, the rumors regarding Luzhkov's retirement are unreliable at best, since such speculations have been circulating since the late 1990s. XXXXXXXXXXXX believed that Luzhkov would stay in office for one more year to oversee the elections and put his own business in order. In contrast, XXXXXXXXXXXX did not think Luzhkov would leave office any earlier than 2010 because there are many problems that need to be resolved. In the final analysis, Luzhkov has proved his ability at surviving scandals and changes in the political environment, and it seems that this term may be no different. RUSSELL
Friday, 04 December 2009, 08:28
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 003066
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/25/2019
TAGS PREL, PHUM, PGOV, RU, TH
SUBJECT: RUSSIA LOOKS TO REINVIGORATE BILATERAL RELATIONS
WITH THAILAND, AGAIN
BANGKOK 00003066 001.2 OF 005
Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle, reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
1. (C) Summary: The Thai-Russia bilateral relationship blossomed earlier this decade after years of stagnation during the Cold War but has had little forward momentum since then, despite a November 27 visit to Bangkok by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sobyanin and Thai pledges that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister will travel to Russia in 2010. The resurgence earlier in the decade occurred as a result of a flurry of high-level visits, first by then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to Russia in 2002 and a reciprocal visit by former President Vladimir Putin to Thailand in 2003. For its part, Russia has advocated the construction of a regional energy facility in Thailand to be supplied by Russia, aspired to become a dialogue partner for the East Asia Summit (EAS), and expand arms exports in Southeast Asia. Thailand enjoys a rapid expansion of Russian tourists visiting Thailand but has to deal with an unwanted side effect - the presence of Russian organized crime networks around the popular beach destinations of Pattaya and Phuket. The biggest headline grabber of 2008-09 has likely been the arrest of Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout, whose extradition to the U.S. remains under review by an Appellate Court.
2. (C) Comment: The Thai-Russia bilateral relationship saw a period of re-engagement from 2002-03 during fugitive former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's outward-looking administration (2001-06), with Thaksin pursuing possible arms purchases from Russia in barter deals to boost Thai exports of agricultural products and to lessen Thai military dependence on U.S. systems. However, since Thaksin's ouster in a bloodless coup in 2006, Thailand has primarily been inwardly focused. For his part, Thaksin has continued to travel regularly to Moscow, including a December 2-3 visit, meeting quietly with Putin. With Thailand's foreign policy centered primarily on ASEAN, the U.S., and China, there is little space for Russia to be an influential player. Putin's continued willingness to host Thaksin in Moscow--the Russian government refused to confirm the visit to the Thai Embassy in Moscow, even as Thaksin's brother was announcing it to the Thai media and Thaksin's lawyer and lieutenants were discussing freely with us--certainly will win Russia few favors with the current Thai government.
3. (C) Comment, cont: That said, there is an interesting well-spring of enduring pro-Russian sentiment among many Thai based on historical ties between the Siamese and Russian royal families: King Chulalongkorn and Tsar Nicholas II exchanged reciprocal visits in 1909-1910; and the Tsar provided what many Thai consider a critical boost to Siam's independence in the face of British and French pressure on Siam's borders and sovereignty. Queen Sirikit's 2007 State visit to Russia reminded many Thai of this century-old emotional bond. Some commentators suggest a Thai reluctance to offend Russia by extraditing Viktor Bout to the U.S., manifested in the initial August Lower Court ruling denying the extradition request, may have been grounded in part in this enduring sentiment. End Summary and Comment.
Thai-Russian Bilateral Re-engagement
-----------------------------------
4. (C) 2002-03 was the seminal period for the renewal of Thai-Russia relations, Professor Kantassa Thunjitt from Thammasat University's Russian Studies Program told us recently. Despite warm relations a century ago between Imperial Russia and Siam, the relationship had been largely dormant during the Cold War era and afterwards until Thaksin made an official visit to Russia in October 2002, with Putin reciprocating in October 2003, when Thailand hosted APEC. Kantassa highlighted Putin's audience with King Bhumibol during his visit as particularly significant. Bangkok Post Senior Reporter Achara Ashayagachat told us recently that Thaksin had looked to Russia to expand market opportunities. Achara also believed that Thaksin sought to balance Thailand's relationships with both the U.S. and China through
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engaging Russia, while simultaneously looking at ways to maximize profits.
5. (C) While Thaksin and Putin visits prompted a flurry of diplomatic re-engagement at the most senior levels, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Department of European Affairs official Wacharin Vongvivatachaya told us that Thai-Russian relations peaked during Queen Sirikit's State visit to Russia in July 2007. During the Queen's trip, she visited Moscow and St. Petersburg, met Putin and then First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, and was deeply impressed by the Mariinsky Ballet. As a result, the RTG arranged for the Mariinsky to visit in December 2007 to perform for King Bhumibol's 80th birthday. The ballet performed once during a closed session for the King and the palace, and twice for sold out Thai audiences. Wacharin commented that these performances had led to yearly participation of Russian opera and ballet troupes at the annual September Bangkok International Festival of Dance, which the Queen has attended the past two years.
6. (SBU) The latest Russian effort to reinvigorate the bilateral relationship came November 27, with the visit of Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Sobyanin to Bangkok to meet with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and to convene the Fourth Thai-Russian Joint Commission Meeting with FM Kasit. Sobyanin looked to increase trade and investment, signaled Russia's willingness to cooperate with Thailand in research and development in the oil and natural gas sector, and underscored Russia's desire to cooperate with Thailand on security and culture issues, according to a statement posted on the Thai MFA's website. As a sign of recent drift in Thai-Russian relations, however, the Joint Commission meeting, intended to convene every two years, came after an eight year hiatus.
7. (SBU) DPM Sobyanin also extended an invitation to Abhisit to visit Russia in early 2010, according to the MFA statement. Wacharin told us December 2 that Abhisit plans to accept this invitation and will likely travel to Moscow in the first half of next year, and that FM Kasit would separately travel to Moscow for the Fifth Joint Commission Meeting.
Russia Interested in Economic Ties...
-------------------------------------
8. (SBU) After visiting Thailand for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial Meeting in Phuket July 22-24, and having an audience with King Bhumibol Adulyadej in Hua Hin to reaffirm Russia's historical ties with Thailand, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov delivered a keynote speech at Chulalongkorn University July 24 in which he outlined Russia's key economic goals for further cooperation and integration with the Thai economy. Lavrov highlighted Russia's eastern territories as holding natural resources -- such as oil, gas, and coal -- that could become the means to further engage with countries like Thailand. As such, one of Russia's critical goals was to promote energy cooperation between Russia and Thailand; Lavrov announced Russia's interest in developing a regional facility in Thailand for storing, processing and trading Russian oil and gas.
9. (C) MFA official Wacharin downplayed the significance of Lavrov's proposal for a regional oil facility in Thailand, explaining to us that it was currently only a Russian idea. She commented that this plan was first proposed by the Russians under Thaksin's administration; the MFA in 2008 had previously told us that then Samak government continued to push the idea, even though the Thai state-owned energy firm PTT doubted its economic viability. Wacharin stressed that the energy policy of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's government was markedly different from that of its Thaksin-associated predecessors. She said that while the Royal Thai Government (RTG) continued to study the proposal further, there were many technical issues that needed to be reviewed, such as transportation costs.
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...And a political voice in the region
--------------------------------------
10. (C) Watcharin said that the MFA viewed Russia as eager to become a major player in the Asia Pacific region. Russian Embassy diplomat Andrey Dmitrichenko told us that Russia had previously taken a more active approach in engaging ASEAN in hopes of facilitating Russian participation in the East Asian Summit (EAS) as a dialogue partner. However, Russia currently was now willing to wait, not pushing its case; Dmitrichenko suggested that it was more realistic for Russia to become a dialogue partner at the same time that the U.S. was invited to become a dialogue partner. Dmitrichenko noted that Russia had acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2004, held an ASEAN-Russia Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2005, and looked forward to the second ASEAN-Russia Summit in Vietnam, which would follow on the establishment of an ASEAN Center in Moscow in late 2009.
11. (C) The opinions of non-official Thais we talked to about the Russian diplomatic push was in general rather dismissive. Professor Rom Phiramontri, Director for the Center of Russian Studies at Chulalongkorn University, commented that in general Russia has had very little influence in Asia, particularly in Thailand. In his opinion, Russia was attempting to gain more influence with Thailand, geographically in the center of ASEAN, in an attempt to expand influence throughout the region, especially economically. Professor Kantassa of Thamssat similarly told us that Russia was trying to play a larger role in Southeast Asia, noting it has attempted to raise its status in the region by offering itself as an alternative to the U.S. and China.
Trade, Tourism, and Organized Crime
-----------------------------------
12. (SBU) Wacharin underscored that trade and tourism were the most important elements to the Thai-Russia bilateral relationship. For Russia, Thailand was its number one trading partner in Southeast Asia with trade accounting for over $1 billion annually. (Note: U.S.-Thai trade exceeds $30 billion annually. End Note.) Wacharin stated that Russia's main exports to Thailand were rolled steel, scrap metal, fertilizers, unprocessed minerals, synthetic rubber, diamonds, pulp, and paper. Thailand's main exports to Russia were sugar, rice, gems, clothes, shoes, canned food, and furniture. Thailand's premier multi-national, the CP Group, had invested in Russia by establishing an animal food producing factory in Moscow's suburbs, Wacharin added, though there has been little Russian investment in Thailand, mainly in small businesses.
13. (SBU) Wacharin commented that the number of Russian tourists to Thailand had steadily increased, to 300,000 Russians in 2008. Thailand was the number two destination in Asia for Russian tourists, who did not need visas for short visits. The Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) reported that as of October 2009, six direct scheduled weekly flights are being operated between Moscow and Bangkok by Thai Airways International and Aeroflot Russian Airlines. While traditionally the main destination for Russian tourists was Pattaya, leading to Russia establishing a Honorary Consul covering Pattaya, Rayong, and Chonburi on the eastern seaboard, in the past several years Russians had started flocking to the up-market resorts on Phuket on the Andaman coast in large numbers, where a second honorary consulate has been established.
14. (C) Russian organized crime circles established a presence in Thailand in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. A number of U.S. law enforcement agencies are involved in investigating or monitoring cases involving Russian organized crime in Thailand in cooperation with Thai partners, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the
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Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). These law enforcement agencies report that criminal networks composed of mostly Russian nationals operating in Pattaya and Phuket are responsible for the commission of numerous crimes, including extortion, money laundering, narcotics trafficking, real estate fraud, financial fraud, human smuggling, pandering, counterfeiting, document fraud, cybercrime, and illegal importation of cars.
15. (SBU) While much of the Russian organized criminal activity in Thailand has occurred quietly, three specific cases generated public awareness of the phenomenon. In April 1998, Russian restaurant owner Konstantine Povoltski was found shot dead in a car near one of his two restaurants in southern Pattaya. In August 2003, police apprehended three Russian bank robbers when their speedboat ran out of fuel after they held up the Bank of Ayudhya in South Pattaya, stole 2.4 million baht, and killed a Thai police officer in the process. Rinat Koudaiarov was sentenced to death for the shooting. In February 2007, two Russian women were found murdered on the beach of Jomtien 10 km from Pattaya, amidst speculation that it had been a Russian OC-ordered hit.
Weapons for Sale
----------------
16. (SBU) One area in which potential cooperation has not been fully realized is in military armaments. Thaksin started pursuing possible deals for Russian weapons in 2003 in exchange for debts Russia had incurred earlier in purchasing Thai rice. In 2005 Thaksin had attempted to broker a deal with Putin in which Russia would sell a dozen Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets to Thailand in exchange for 250,000 tons of frozen poultry worth $500 million. In the end, however, the deal fell through; in October 2007, Thailand signed a $1.1 billion agreement to purchase six Saab JAS-39 Gripen jets from Sweden.
Viktor Bout
-----------
17. (C) Russian arms merchant Viktor Bout was apprehended in a joint U.S.-Thai undercover DEA sting operation March 6, 2008 and remains in Thai custody. The U.S. requested extradition in order to try Bout in the Southern District of New York on a four-count indictment charging conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals and officers; acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles; and provide material support to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a designated foreign terrorist organization. The Thai lower court ruled in favor of Bout, and against extradition, on August 11, 2009, with the Thai judge stating that the FARC was engaged in a political cause, not terrorism.
18. (C) Initially, the primary publicly-known Russian interest in defending Bout came from the Russian Duma, but later, the Russian Government took a more active role in pressing Thailand not to extradite Bout. Members of Parliament (MPs) Sergey Ivanov and Vice Chairman of the Duma Vladimir Zhirinovsky have been active in supporting Bout from the beginning. Ivanov testified at Bout's trial as a defense witness, stating that if Bout were to be extradited to the U.S. it would adversely affect the Thai-Russia bilateral relationship. Zhirinovsky has picketed the Thai embassy in Moscow for Bout's release, lobbied the Thai ambassador, disrupted the Thai Ambassador during public speeches, and portrayed Bout as the victim of an anti-Russian witch hunt. The Thai DCM in Moscow, and the Thai MFA's Russian desk, have acknowledged to Embassies Moscow/Bangkok the diplomatic pressure the Russian MFA and Embassy in Bangkok have placed on Bout's behalf.
19. (C) Professor Rom told us he thought that U.S.-Thai relations would not be negatively affected over the long-term if the U.S.'s appeal failed and Bout was able to return to Russia; he stressed that Thailand had already cooperated with the U.S. by apprehending Bout at U.S. request. Professor
BANGKOK 00003066 005.2 OF 005
Kantassa admitted that Bout was a businessman who would sell weapons to anybody, but suggested that the Thai court would take a neutral stance between the U.S. and Russia on the extradition, a sentiment we occasionally heard from MFA contacts since Bout's arrest (Note: the August 11 Lower Court ruling rejecting the extradition certainly could not be characterized as "neutral"; we await the Appellate Court panel decision).
20. (SBU) Note: this cable was coordinated with Embassy Moscow. JOHN
Thursday, 07 July 2005, 07:59
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 SOFIA 001207
SIPDIS
HOMELAND SECURITY PLEASE PASS TO SECRET SERVICE
EO 12958 DECL: 07/07/2015
TAGS PINR, KCRM, PGOV, EINV, ECON, KCOR, BU, Organized Crime
SUBJECT: (U) BULGARIAN ORGANIZED CRIME (C-CN5-00054)
REF: A. A. STATE 99125 B. B. SOFIA 1046
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES PARDEW, FOR REASON 1.4(C).
1. (U) This cable is in response to ref A request for information about organized crime in Bulgaria and the Balkans. Where direct sources are not cited, connections are largely based on information from operational contacts and open-source publications.
-----------------------
OVERVIEW AND ACTIVITIES
-----------------------
2. (SBU) The strength and immunity from the law of organized crime (OC) groups is arguably the most serious problem in Bulgaria today. OC activities underlie corruption and the ineffectiveness of the legal system in Bulgaria, and inhibit the country,s economic development. Bulgarian OC is particularly involved in international money laundering, drug trafficking, and counterfeiting. OC groups range from local street thugs involved in extortion to sophisticated international narcotic dealers and money launderers. An estimated 118 organized crime groups were operating in Bulgaria at the end of 2004, according to the National Service for Combating Organized Crime (NSBOP) of the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior (MoI), though many of these groups are relatively small and the landscape is dominated by a handful of big players. Organized crime continues to be pervasive in many spheres of Bulgarian life, despite domestic and international efforts to combat it. To date, not a single major OC figure has been punished by the Bulgarian legal system, despite an on-going series of OC-related assassinations. U.S. law enforcement agencies with offices in Sofia are supporting the effort to reduce OC in Bulgaria. The Fraud Prevention Unit in Embassy Sofia's Consular Section maintains a list of known and suspected major organized crime figures, and Embassy Sofia has an aggressive policy of preventing OC figures from traveling to the United States.
3. (SBU) OC groups are known to be involved in narcotics trafficking, prostitution, extortion and racketeering, various financial crimes, car theft, and trafficking in stolen automobiles. Human trafficking for sexual exploitation, counterfeiting, and debit and credit card fraud also are some of the most common criminal activities engaged in by Bulgarian organized crime. Crime groups involved in human trafficking are extremely mobile, and victims are often sold or traded amongst various groups. Many groups use a host of legitimate businesses domestically and abroad to launder the proceeds of their illegal activities. Several well-known businessmen linked to organized crime have parlayed their wealth into ownership of sports teams, property developments, and financial institutions. (An organized crime activity that received special attention due to its growth in 2004 was VAT (value-added tax) fraud. The Ministry of Finance estimated that VAT fraud cost the Bulgarian treasury over $700 million in losses annually.)
4. (SBU) Counterfeit currency -- both U.S. dollar and, increasingly, Euro banknotes -- is produced in Bulgaria and distributed primarily in France, Greece, Italy, and Spain by small groups of Bulgarians who return to Bulgaria immediately after making delivery. While there is thought to be cooperation between Bulgarian groups and other international organized crime groups, the couriers, middlemen and distributors are predominantly Bulgarian. The quality of counterfeit currency is continuously improving due to increasingly sophisticated printing facilities and the involvement of professional individuals with considerable printing skills. A June 2005 raid in northeast Bulgaria -- part of a joint operation between Bulgarian law enforcement and the U.S. Secret Service -- netted more than $3 million in high-quality counterfeit $100 banknotes (ref B). This was the second largest counterfeit seizure in European history.
5. (C) U.S.-based investigations of transnational crime groups have dismantled significant drug trafficking organizations run by Bulgarian nationals in Los Angeles and Tampa. These groups imported multi-kilo quantities of cocaine and multi-thousand doses of ecstasy into the United States. They had drug connections through Amsterdam and some financial backing of an Israeli national. While most members of these groups were convicted and imprisoned in the U.S., three who were charged in California and Florida are still wanted international fugitives who may have returned to Bulgaria to exploit the country's current policy of not extraditing its citizens. The three fugitives are IVAYLO ANGELOV PETKOV (Bulgarian citizen born 18 May 1965), IVAN DOBREV (Bulgarian citizen born 25 May 1959), and STEFAN TZVETANOV STOYANOV (Bulgarian citizen born 9 January 1966).
6. (SBU) Other investigations in the U.S. have identified Bulgarian nationals manufacturing and selling false identity documents for use in organized bank fraud, mortgage fraud, credit card fraud, and alien smuggling.
--------------------------------------
WHO'S WHO IN BULGARIAN ORGANIZED CRIME
--------------------------------------
7. (C) Since the fall of Communism in 1989 and the turbulent 1990s, Bulgaria's organized crime scene has undergone major changes, much like the rest of Bulgaria's economic, political, and social landscape. XXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX is thought to have connections to Russian organized crime, including the notorious Russian crime figure, MICHAEL CHORNY (see RUSSIAN INFLUENCE). XXXXXXXXXXX Before he was shot dead in Amsterdam in December 2003, KONSTANTIN DIMITROV (Bulgarian citizen born 21 November 1970, also known as "SAMOKOVETSA") was one of the biggest smugglers in Bulgaria and the country's top drug lord. XXXXXXXXXXXX As the largest player in the drugs market, XXXXXXXXXXXX controls trafficking routes, production facilities, and distribution networks. The group is also involved in trafficking stolen automobiles from Western Europe to the former Soviet Union. Its other criminal activities include extortion and racketeering, illegal arms trading, gambling, prostitution, and smuggling. XXXXXXXXXXXX
The group is thought to have the largest share in Sofia's escort and intimate services businesses, which are used as fronts for prostitution and trafficking in women for sexual exploitation. XXXXXXXXXXXX illegal activities include money laundering, privatization fraud, intimidation, and extortion and racketeering. XXXXXXXXXXXX The group's criminal activities include prostitution, narcotics, and trafficking stolen automobiles.
L. (C) RUSSIAN INFLUENCE
Russia continues to exercise significant influence over the Bulgarian economy through energy imports, including crude oil, natural gas and nuclear fuel. XXXXXXXXXXXX Despite the fact that he is no longer the owner of XXXXXXXXXXXX Russian mobster MICHAEL CHORNY is thought to retain influence over the company through his ties to members of XXXXXXXXXXXX. The court decision suggests that Chorny is still in control of XXXXXXXXXXXX, as the judge presiding over the Supreme Administrative Court panel for the BTC case also revoked the Government,s decision banning Chorny from entering the country. In addition, Chorny has connections to XXXXXXXXXXX CHORNY has also maintained influence over a number of companies by transferring ownership to XXXXXXXXXXXX LUKOIL,s representative in Bulgaria is XXXXXXXXXXX The Russian petroleum company is estimated to be the largest corporate taxpayer in Bulgaria. It also controls Russian oil exports to Bulgaria. Lukoil's Bulgarian operations, through XXXXXXXXXXXX, are suspected of strong ties to Russian intelligence and organized crime.
XXXXXXXXXXX
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POLITICS: THE NEXUS WITH ORGANIZED CRIME
----------------------------------------
8. (C) Organized crime has a corrupting influence on all Bulgarian institutions, including the government, parliament and judiciary. In an attempt to maintain their influence regardless of who is in power, OC figures donate to all the major political parties. As these figures have expanded into legitimate businesses, they have attempted -- with some success -- to buy their way into the corridors of power. During the 2001 general elections, a number of influential "businessmen," including XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX, heavily financed and otherwise supported the XXXXXXXXXXXX campaign.
XXXXXXXXXXXX10. (C) Below the level of the national government and the leadership of the major political parties, OC "owns" a number of municipalities and individual members of parliament. This direct participation in politics -- as opposed to bribery -- is a relatively new development for Bulgarian OC. XXXXXXXXXX Similarly in the regional center of XXXXXXXXXXX, OC figures control the municipal council and the mayor's office. Nearly identical scenarios have played out in half a dozen smaller towns and villages across Bulgaria.
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COMMENT
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11. (C) Despite continuing pressure from the U.S. and the EU, past Bulgarian governments have done little to reduce the presence of organized crime. As a result, OC has increased its influence and is able to operate with virtual impunity. The Bulgarian public recognizes OC,s corrupting influence, and people are clearly frustrated by the government,s inability or unwillingness to deal with the problem. We continue to provide technical assistance to reform-minded elements of the Bulgarian government and judiciary -- and to speak out on the need to fight corruption and organized crime -- but real political leverage on this issue lies with the EU. A delay in Bulgaria,s accession would be politically disastrous for the incoming government. If the EU uses this leverage to demand not only far-reaching judicial reform but effective implementation as well, there is reason to hope that the tide will slowly begin to turn against organized crime in the coming years. PARDEW PARDEW
Thursday, 05 November 2009, 17:41
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002734
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/04/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ETRD, SENV, IR, AF, UK, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: MOVING BEYOND BILATERAL ISSUES, MILIBAND
REOPENED DIALOGUE
Classified By: Political MC Susan M. Elliott for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ).
Summary
-------
1. (C) During Foreign Secretary Miliband's November 1-2 visit, he put an end to the "period of standoff," but had little concrete to show for his visit. In pushing a new framework for cooperation, he set aside the most contentious issues and focused primarily on the international agenda during his meetings with Russian FM Lavrov -- START Follow-on, Iran, Afghanistan, Middle East peace, and non-proliferation -- resulting in three joint statements. Miliband also met with Gorbachev and Russian business leaders and political notables. Moscow had some lingering hesitancy, with Medvedev and Putin declining meetings, due in part to concerns based on previous interaction between Lavrov and Miliband, and a desire to avoid giving Miliband a success that he could use in a potential run to head EU foreign policy. End Summary.
Ending the "Period of Standoff"
-------------------------------
2. (C) On November 1-2, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband ended the five-year hiatus in bilateral visits. In his discussions with Russian FM Sergey Lavrov, Miliband was able to set a new pattern for addressing contentious bilateral issues in the future, while forging ahead on the international agenda. While the Russian press has hailed this as a "reset," it comes after the slow build up of bilateral contacts at all levels, and is therefore less of a breakthrough than a symbolic final hurdle.
3. (C) While the visit succeeded in reestablishing constructive dialogue, President Medvedev and PM Putin had rebuffed British Embassy feelers for meetings with the Foreign Secretary. According to British diplomats, the Russians were unsure that the visit wasn't going to be another round of "slapping them around the face." The diplomats also credited Medvedev as the driving force in ending the "period of standoff."
4. (C) During his two-day stay, Miliband dined with Lavrov on Sunday, followed on Monday by working meetings with Lavrov and First Deputy PM Igor Shuvalov. Miliband also met with Mikhail Gorbachev, lunched with select eminent politicians and held separate round-tables with Russian NGOs and the British business community (including TNK-BP). Miliband and Lavrov issued three joint statements regarding the 2010 Review Conference for Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Afghanistan, and the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP).
International Agenda
--------------------
5. (C) START Follow-On: Lavrov was reportedly upbeat regarding START follow-on negotiations. According to British diplomats, Lavrov said the key issues involved conventional weapons on ICBMs, verification, and the "numbers gap," which was being narrowed. Following this treaty, Lavrov suggested multilateral negotiations on further reductions involving the P5, the D3 (Israel, India, Pakistan) as well as "dormant" nuclear powers such as Japan. He also called for close Russian-British cooperation across the arms-control agenda: the NPT, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. CFE was not discussed. The sides issued a joint statement on the NPT, calling for efforts to ensure the 2010 review conference reinvigorated and strengthened it, and noting that an "agreement before the end of the year on a new legally binding treaty to further reduce Russian and U.S. strategic offensive weapons will be a major contribution to this shared endeavor." The statement also said that both sides were committed to "ensuring the IAEA has the necessary authority and capacity to assure compliance with non-proliferation obligations."
6. (C) Iran: Lavrov claimed Russia had no prior knowledge of the Qom facility and said the S300 deal was in a "holding pattern." Regarding the IAEA negotiations, Lavrov agreed with Miliband's call for continued unity among the 5 plus 1 group and was ready to discuss the substance of a "freeze for freeze" deal. According to British diplomats, Lavrov was slippery about sanctions, saying "we're ready to consider applying sanctions if necessary, but it's too early." Lavrov reportedly added that if sanctions are agreed at the UNSC, there shouldn't be additional unilateral sanctions and sanctions should be limited to "officials" and the nuclear program.
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7. (C) Afghanistan: Lavrov conveyed that Russia wanted NATO to stay and to succeed. He made the usual pitch for formal CSTO consultations with NATO and for Russia to have a seat at the table of "troop contributing" countries. In the joint statement, the sides condemned the Taliban's attempts to disrupt the Afghan electoral process and destabilize the country. The statement "noted" the Afghan government's attempts to reintegrate former fighters, but said that the two governments remained committed to UNSCR 1267. The UK and Russia also made a non-specific commitment to explore opportunities for cooperation in counter-narcotics, which British diplomats said will be pursued at the working level.
8. (C) MEPP: The joint statement urged "Israel to immediately end all settlement activities, including in East Jerusalem, and to allow access to the Gaza Strip." The statement also endorsed the work of the U.S. and the Quartet and restated support for the Russian Moscow conference proposal. British diplomats, however, said that it was clear GOR officials knew the conference would not happen soon.
9. (C) NATO/European Security: Miliband reaffirmed that Georgia and Ukraine remained on the NATO membership track and rejected Russia's concept of a "sphere of privileged interests." Lavrov was on the defensive and sought to redefine privileged interests to mean closer bilateral relations, which Russia sought to develop with a range of countries, not just those in the CIS. Miliband rebuffed Lavrov's calls for a new European security treaty, saying he understood Russia feels uncomfortable but that it was too early for a new treaty; he urged Russia to work this through the OSCE's "Corfu process."
10. (C) WTO/Climate Change: Deputy PM Igor Shuvalov told Miliband that he had offered the U.S. a return to the bilateral negotiating track to facilitate Russis's WTO accession. Shuvalov proposed this during his September visit to Washington, but claimed that the U.S. refused. Miliband lobbied Shuvalov to increase Russia's carbon-reduction commitments from its current offer of 15 percent by 2020. Shuvalov said the Russian position was not cast in stone, but the GOR did not want to be tied to targets that would then restrict the expected surge in Russia's economic growth in the coming decade.
Bilateral Issues
----------------
11. (C) In addition to the joint statements, some progress was made on bilateral economic ties. Foremost was the November 5 visit of Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin to London as part of the bilateral financial working group, during which Kudrin is expected to pitch the sale of Eurobonds to fill part of Russia's projected 2010 budget deficit. The sides had to "agree to disagree" on the more thorny bilateral issues that have poisoned the relationship for the past five years: the British extradition request for Andrey Lugovoi related to the murder of former FSB officer Aleksadr Litvenenko (Nov. 1 was the third anniversary of the murder), and Russian extradition requests for Russian tycoon Boris Berezovskiy and Chechen leader Akhmed Zakayev. Lingering in the background were the tit-for-tat expulsions of British and Russian diplomats over the "rock incident," the closure of the British Council's offices in St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg, the handling of the TNK-BP management dispute, and the prior harassment of British diplomats by Nashi youth activists at the presumed behest of Russian officials. That said, British diplomats noted that Lavrov and Miliband agreed to step up cultural relations (especially in 2011) to make up for the decrease in British Council programs. British diplomats believed that there was an understanding that the British Council would take the lead in these activities, but the technicalities were not discussed.
Comment
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12. (C) While Russia and the UK found some common ground during Miliband's visit, there was a lingering hesitancy on the Russian side, demonstrated by the lack of solid deliverables and the unavailability of the tandem, Putin and Medvedev. The GOR could have gone further in offering the UK transit (either land or air) to support British operations in Afghanistan, but hedged. Although Miliband's visit followed many working-level and even senior-level meetings on the sidelines of international conferences, it was clear that the GOR lowered expectations in the event the tone of the visit returned to that following the 2008 Georgian-Russian war. The Russian press added into the mix the possibility that
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Miliband was in Moscow to demonstrate that he could talk to "even the most difficult of partners," thereby burnishing his credentials for a future post with the EU. If that was the case, the GOR has done little to assist him. Beyrle
Thursday, 15 October 2009, 06:18
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001003
SIPDIS
FOR ALEX MCKNIGHT AND STACIE ZERDECKI OF EUR/WE
ALESSANDRO NARDI OF EUR/ERA
JENNIFER MCELVEEN AND STEPHEN WOROBEC OF INR/TNC
JOHN REGAS OF NIC
THOMAS FIRESTONE OF EMBASSY MOSCOW
SCOTT HARRIS OF INL
PASS TO BARRY M. BRAUN AND KAREN GREENAWAY OF FBI'S
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
PASS TO TOM OTT AND BRUCE OHR OF DOJ'S CRIMINAL DIVISION
EO 12958 DECL: 10/15/2019
TAGS PREL, PINR, KCRM, KCOR, KJUS, SP, RS
SUBJECT: SPAIN: ANTI-MAFIA PROSECUTORS WELCOME USG
OUTREACH, SEEK COLLABORATION
REF: A. MADRID 870 B. MADRID 869
MADRID 00001003 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission William Duncan for reason s 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY. Embassy Madrid POLOFF and POL/GSO Officer from the Barcelona CG on September 29 met Gerardo Cavero, Barcelona's chief prosecutor on counter-narcotics and organized crime, and Fernando Bermejo, the city's prosecutor for anti-mafia, anti-corruption and money laundering issues. They also are dual-hatted as special prosecutors on these issues within Catalonia's Superior Court of Justice who work in conjunction with counterparts from the national government in Madrid. The two welcomed USG outreach to begin a working relationship based on mutual interests. They expressed interest in meeting DOJ and/or FBI officials during proposed travel to Barcelona on November 13 to speak to private audiences on criminal justice issues, money laundering issues as well as the Russian mafia (See Ref A). COMMENT: Separately, Embassy Madrid understands from the US Consular Agent in La Palma that Mallorcan authorities involved in the June 2008 arrest of Russian crimelord Gennadios Petrov (see Ref B) are prepared to host a dinner for visiting USG officials on November 11 or 12. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
//Taking on the Russian Mafia//
2. (C) Bermejo claimed that there is large scale money laundering going on in Catalonia and "many, many" members of the Russian mafia are active in the region. (NOTE: In Spain, the term "Russian mafia" refers to organized crime members from not only Russia but also all other former members of the USSR.) He and Cavero suggested that public declarations by senior Spanish officials in mid-2008 (see Ref A) that the raid that nabbed Petrov and others had "decapitated" the Russian mafia in Spain were optimistic statements made in a moment of euphoria that did not reflect the current reality. They asserted that the Russian mafia presence has not diminished. Bermejo said that Russian mafia leaders were originally drawn to Spain's Costa Brava as a vacation destination. Recognizing the opportunities and lax law enforcement, however, the Russian mafia subsequently started using Catalonia as a base for money laundering and other illegal ventures. He asserted that Catalonia cannot allow itself to become a refuge for the Russian mafia nor can it prejudice the investments of legitimate Eurasian businessmen.
3. XXXXXXXXXXXX
. END COMMENT.
4. (C) Bermejo agreed with the notion that money talks, and added this is especially true when the amounts being offered as bribes are so large. Bermejo related to USG officials a saying that in Italy, the mafia is so powerful that it can buy judges. He then added that Italian author Roberto Saviano, famous for his work on the Italian mafia, has commented that the judicial system in Spain is so corrupt that the mafia does not need to buy judges. COMMENT: USG officials understood that Bermejo believed there was an element of truth in what Saviano said. END COMMENT.
5. (C) Bermejo and Cavero are part of a small office - three prosecutors and 4-5 staffers - that is short-handed because their workload is so extensive. Bermejo was promoted to his anti-mafia post in June. Press commentary prior to his appointment identified Bermejo as the best candidate for the job. He took over for David Martinez Madero, who stepped down following death threats by the Russian mafia (See Ref A). Bermejo stated that he has inherited the death threat, which is against the person filling the anti-mafia prosecutor post rather than the individual per se. Bermejo, who had a bodyguard when he worked as a prosecutor in San Sebastian due to threats from Basque terrorist group ETA, will have a bodyguard in his current post. Bermejo, who mentioned several times in passing that he currently works closely with Austrian and Swiss authorities, indicated his willingness to meet Embassy LEGAT and DEA officials during one of his upcoming trips to Madrid. CHACON
Friday, 26 October 2007, 02:25
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 005154
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/09/2017
TAGS PREL, ECON, MARR, MASS, PARM, PINR, PINS, RS
SUBJECT: ADDRESSING RUSSIAN ARMS SALES
REF: A. STATE 137954 B. MOSCOW 3207 C. MOSCOW 3139 D. MOSCOW 3023 E. MOSCOW 557 F. MOSCOW 402
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: FM Lavrov's disinterest in establishing an expert level dialogue on arms sales begs the question of how best to address our concerns over Russia's arms export policy. Russian officials are deeply cynical about our motives in seeking to curtail Russian arms exports to countries of concern and the threatened imposition of U.S. sanctions has not proven successful so far in modifying Russian behavior. Russia attaches importance to the volume of the arms export trade, to the diplomatic doors that weapon sales open, to the ill-gotten gains that these sales reap for corrupt senior officials, and to the lever it provides the Russian government in stymieing American interests. While Russia will reject out of hand arguments based on the extraterritorial application of American sanctions, Russian officials may be more receptive to a message couched in the context of Russian international obligations and domestic legislation, the reality of American casualties, and the backlash to Russian strategic interests among moderate Sunni governments. In making our argument, we should remember that Russian officialdom and the public have little, if any, moral compunction about the arms trade, seeing it instead as a welcome symbol of Russia's resurgent power and strength in the world. End Summary
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Russian Arms Sales Matter
-------------------------
2. (C) Russian arms sales are consequential, totaling approximately USD 6.7 billion in 2006, according to official figures. This amount reflects a 12 percent increase over 2005, and a 56 percent increase since 2003. Russian arms sales are expected to total at least USD 8 billion in 2007. Russia has made a conscious effort to improve after-sales customer service and warranties, which has added to the attractiveness of its weapons. As a result, Russian weapons command higher prices than previously. Russia is ranked second only to the United States in arms sales to the developing world, and a sizeable portion of its arms trade is with countries of concern to us.
3. (C) While no sales were reported in 2006 to Iran, Syria, or Sudan, in 2007 Iran reportedly paid Russia USD 700 million for TOR-M1 air defense missile systems. While Syrian economic conditions are a natural brake on trade with the Russians, as a matter of principle the GOR is prepared to sell "defensive" equipment such as anti-tank missiles and Strelets (SA-18) surface-to-air missiles, as well as upgrade MiG-23 fighters. The GOR barred the sale of Iskander-E tactical missiles to Syria only after intense international pressure. Venezuela remains a growth market, with arms transfers in 2006 totaling more than USD 1.2 billion, including 24 Su-30MK2 fighter-bombers and 34 helicopters. Russia has an "open arms" approach to Venezuela, and whether it's the transfer of more than 72,000 AK-103 assault rifles or negotiations for the prospective sale of three Amur class submarines (valued at USD 1 billion), Russia is prepared to entertain Chavez's grandiose regional visions.
4. (C) Defense experts emphasize that the American and European domination of traditional NATO markets and capture of new entrants (and old Soviet customers) from Central and Eastern Europe means that Russia must court buyers that fall outside the U.S. orbit. By definition, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela are good markets for Russia because we don't compete there.
5. (C) While concrete numbers are hard to come by, our best figures indicate that Russian arms sales to its traditional big-ticket customers -- China and India -- are growing. Russian experts, however, predict a declining trajectory in the medium term. In 2006, Russia completed approximately USD 1.4 billion in sales to China, including eight diesel submarines and 88 MI-171's, which means the PRC only narrowly edged out Chavez as Russia's most important customer. Russian defense experts underscore that as China's technological sufficiency and political influence grow, the PRC will develop increasing military self-sufficiency and greater ability to challenge Russia as a supplier. At the same time, sales to India totaled only USD 360 million. Russia and India, in fact, have signed arms deals worth USD
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2.6 billion, but not all deliveries and payments have been made. While Russian experts still downplay the ability of the U.S. to displace Russia in the Indian arms market, for reasons of cost and the legacy of decades' old dependence, they recognize increasing American inroads and growing influence. Other notable Russian markets include Algeria, Czech Republic, Vietnam, South Korea and Belarus.
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A Legalistic World View
-----------------------
6. (S) As the recent 2 2 consultations confirmed, Russian officials defend arms sales to countries of concern in narrow legal terms. In answering our demarches, MFA officials always identify whether the transfer is regulated by one of the multilateral arms controls regimes (e.g. Wassenaar Group, MTCR, etc.), UN resolutions, or Russian law. Senior officials maintain that Russia does take into account the impact on the stability of the region in determining whether to sell weapons and shares our concern about weapons falling into terrorists' hands. This Russian decision-making process has led to a defacto embargo on weapons transfers to Iraq, where Russia is concerned over leakages to Iraqi insurgents and Al-Qaida; to a hands-off policy towards Pakistan, the country Russia views as the greatest potential threat to regional stability (with then-Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov ruling out weapons sales to Pakistan as far back as 2003); and to a moratorium on "offensive" systems to Iran and Syria. Concern over leakage has prompted Russia to tighten its export controls, with the recent institution of new provisions in arms sale contracts for Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) that require end-user certificates and provide Russia the right to inspect stockpiles of weapons sold.
7. (S) What Russia has not done is accept our strategic calculus and rule out the possibility of sales to Iran, Syria, Sudan, or Venezuela. The arguments made are broadly similar:
-- With Iran, we are told that that Russia will not sell any weapon that violates a multilateral or domestic regime, nor transfer any item that could enhance Iranian WMD capabilities. Sales, such as the TOR-M1 air defense missile system, are justified as being defensive only, and limited by their range of 12 kilometers. While DFM Kislyak told us October 18 that he was unaware of any plans to sell Iran the S-300 long-range surface-to-air missile system, MFA officials previously told us that such sales, while under review, would not violate any Russian laws or international regimes.
-- With Syria, Russia also argues that its transfers are defensive in nature, and points to its decision to halt the sale of MANPADS. The MFA maintains that Russian weapons used by Hizballah in 2006 were not a deliberate transfer by the Syrian government, but involved weapons left behind when Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon. Russia argues that tightened end-user controls will prevent any future transfers.
-- With Sudan, the GOR denies any current arms trade with the regime, and maintains that Russia has not violated UN sanctions or Putin-initiated decrees. However, based on our demarches, it is clear that -- in contrast to Syria -- Russia has adopted a "don't ask, don't tell" approach to Sudan's adherence to its end-use requirements for its existing inventory of Russian/Soviet weapons.
-- With Venezuela, both MFA officials and Russian experts believe that a "Monroe doctrine" mentality, and not real concerns over regional stability, is behind U.S. demarches.
-----------------------------------
What Is Behind the Russian Calculus
-----------------------------------
8. (C) A variety of factors drive Russian arms sales, but a compelling motivation is profit - both licit and illicit. As former Deputy Prime Minister and senior member of the Duma Defense Committee Anatoliy Kulikov told us, "Russia makes very bad cars, but very good weapons," and he was among the majority of Russian defense experts who argued that the laws of comparative advantage would continue to propel an aggressive arms export policy. While Russian defense budgets have been increasing 25-30 per cent for the last three years, defense experts tell us that export earnings still matter. The recent creation of RosTechnologiya State Corporation, headed by Putin intimate Sergey Chemezov, which consolidates under state control RosOboronExport (arms exports), Oboronprom (defense systems), RusSpetsStal (specialized steel production), VSMPO (titanium producer), and Russian
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helicopter production, is further proof of the importance the Putin government places on the industry.
9. (C) Likewise, it is an open secret that the Russian defense industry is an important trough at which senior officials feed, and weapons sales continue to enrich many. Defense analysts attribute Russia's decision to sell weapons that the Venezuelan military objectively did not need due to the interest of both Venezuelan and Russian government officials in skimming money off the top. The sale of Su-30MK2 fighter-bombers was cited as a specific example where corruption on both ends facilitated the off-loading of moth-balled planes that were inadequate for the Venezuelan Air Force's needs.
10. (C) A second factor driving the Russian arms export policy is the desire to enhance Russia's standing as a "player" in areas where Russia has a strategic interest, like the Middle East. Russian officials believe that building a defense relationship provides ingress and influence, and their terms are not constrained by conditionality. Exports to Syria and Iran are part of a broader strategy of distinguishing Russian policy from that of the United States, and strengthening Russian influence in international fora such as the Quartet or within the Security Council. With respect to Syria, Russian experts believe that Bashar's regime is better than the perceived alternative of instability or an Islamist government, and argue against a U.S. policy of isolation. Russia has concluded that its arms sales are too insignificant to threaten Israel, or to disturb growing Israeli-Russian diplomatic engagement, but sufficient to maintain "special" relations with Damascus. Likewise, arms sales to Iran are part of a deep and multilayered bilateral relationship that serves to distinguish Moscow from Washington, and to provide Russian officials with a bargaining chip, both with the Ahmedinejad regime and its P5 1 partners. While, as a matter of practice, Russian arms sales have declined as international frustration has mounted over the Iranian regime, as a matter of policy, Russia does not support what it perceives as U.S. efforts to build an anti-Iranian coalition.
11. (C) A third and related factor lurking under the surface of these weapons sales is Russia's inferiority complex with respect to the United States, and its quest to be taken seriously as a global partner. It is deeply satisfying to some Russian policy-makers to defy America, in the name of a multipolar world order, and to engage in zero-sum calculations. As U.S. relations with Georgia have strengthened, so too have nostalgic calls for Russian basing in Latin America (which Russian officials, including Putin, have swat down). While profit is still seen by experts as Russia's primary goal, all note the secondary thrill of causing the U.S. discomfort by selling weapons to anti-American governments in Caracas and Damascus.
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Taking Another Run At Russia
----------------------------
12. (C) As FM Lavrov made clear during the 2 2 consultations, Russia will not engage systematically at the expert level on its arms export regime. While the prospect of Russia changing its arms export policy in response to our concerns alone is slim, we can take steps to toughen our message and raise the costs for Russian strategic decisions:
-- Although U.S. sanctions are broad brush, the more we can prioritize our concerns over weapons sales that pose the biggest threat to U.S. interests, the more persuasive our message will be. Demarches that iterate all transactions, including ammunitions sales, are less credible. Since Lavrov has rejected an experts-level dialogue on arms transfers, it is important to register our concerns at the highest level, and to ensure that messages delivered in Moscow are reiterated in Washington with visiting senior GOR officials.
-- In the context of potential violations of international regimes and UNSCR resolutions, Russia needs to hear the concerns of key European partners, such as France and Germany. (In the wake of the Litvinenko murder and subsequent recriminations, UK influence is limited.) EU reinforcement is important for consistency (although Russia tends to downplay the "bad news" that European nations prefer to deliver in EU channels, rather than bilaterally).
-- Regional actors should reinforce our message. Russian weapon sales that destabilize the Middle East should be protested by the Sunni Arab governments that have the most to lose. Given Russia's competing interest in expanding sales
MOSCOW 00005154 004 OF 004
to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, the protests of our moderate Arab partners could also carry a price tag for Russian defiance. The same is true for Latin America, whose leaders to date have not made sales to Chavez an issue on their bilateral agenda with the Russians.
-- The appearance of Russian weapons in Iraq, presumably transferred by Syria, and the prospect of American and coalition casualties as a result could change the calculus of Russian sales to Damascus. The more evidence that we can provide, the more Russia may take steps to restrict the Asad regime. At the same time, we need to be prepared for the Russian countercharge that significant numbers of weapons delivered by the U.S. have fallen into insurgent hands.
-- Finally, providing the Russians with better releasable intelligence when arguing against weapons transfers to rogue states is essential. Our Russian interlocutors are not always impressed by the evidence we use to prove that their arms are ending up in the wrong hands. While we doubt Russia will terminate all its problematic sales for the reasons described above, more compelling evidence could lead the GOR to reduce the scope of its arms transfers or tighten export controls.
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Final Caveat
------------
13. (C) There are few voices in Russia who protest the sale of weapons to countries of concern and no domestic political constraints that tie the hands of Russian policymakers on this score. The pride that Russian officialdom takes in the arms industry as a symbol of Russia's resurgence is largely shared by average Russians. American concerns are interpreted cynically, as the disgruntled complaints of a competitor, and viewed through the prism of a 1990's story line in which the West seeks to keep Russia down, including by depriving it of arms markets. Burns
Monday, 24 November 2008, 06:35
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003380
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, FOR EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND WRIGHT
EUR/CARC, SCA (GALLAGHER, SUMAR)
DOE FOR HEGBURG, EKIMOFF
EO 12958 DECL: 11/21/2018
TAGS EPET, ENRG, ECON, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: (C) OIL TRADERS: PIPELINE EXPORTS TO EUROPE STILL
OPAQUE; SEABORNE TRADE MORE COMMERCIAL
REF: A. MOSCOW 2880 B. MOSCOW 2632
Classified By: Econ MC Eric T. Schultz for reasons 1.4 (b/d)
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SUMMARY
-------
1. (C) The oil trading business in Russia has long been opaque, benefiting politically connected firms such as the secretive oil trading firm Gunvor. Contacts tell us, however, that the business has lately become more transparent because seaborne trade is now largely conducted via commercial tenders and terms. They caution, however, that pipeline exports to Europe remain problematic. XXXXXXXXXXX, for instance, told us he believes the recent supply reduction to the Czech Republic (ref A) was politically coordinated. To the extent that a shift toward greater transparency has taken hold, it is another example of the role of international commerce and finance in forcing Russian businesses to behave commercially. End summary.
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RUSSIAN OIL TRADING OPAQUE
--------------------------
2. (SBU) Oil traders at major Western companies explained to us recently that the market for physical oil trades is very developed globally and has two segments. One is comprised of major international oil companies who trade oil largely to optimize their own global operations -- to ensure the right amounts of oil are transferred to the right facilities at the lowest cost. The other is comprised of companies such as Glencore, Vitol, and others who serve as intermediaries simply trying to make money buying and selling oil using their marketing, shipping, or risk tolerance advantage.
3. (C) According to these experts, oil trading in Russia has had a reputation for secretive deals involving intermediary companies with unknown owners and beneficiaries. Oil exports from state-owned or state-influenced oil companies have reportedly been funneled through favored oil traders, potentially yielding billions of dollars of profits for these companies. Of particular note in the Russian oil trading business is the Swiss firm Gunvor. The company is rumored to be one of Putin's sources of undisclosed wealth, and is owned by Gennady Timchenko, who is rumored to be a former KGB colleague of Putin's.
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX estimates that Gunvor may control up to 50% of total Russian oil exports. He and his lawyer told us recently that it is impossible to know the extent of Gunvor's penetration of the market, however, because the companies involved refuse to disclose this information. (Note: Gunvor claims in its glossy but uninformative brochure that it "handles a third of Russia's seaborne oil exports." End note.) As XXXXXXXXXXX has discovered, verifiable information on the volumes and terms of oil trades is very difficult to come by.
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BUT BECOMING MORE COMMERCIAL
----------------------------
5. (C) Managers at two western oil companies, however, explained to us recently that oil trading in Russia has taken a welcome turn toward greater transparency thanks to open tenders for seaborne exports. XXXXXXXXXXX told us in a recent meeting that oil trading via Russian seaports is now, in his view, "completely commercial." XXXXXXXXXXX explained that during the last year and especially since Medvedev's inauguration, there has been a deliberate and successful push by the state to ensure transparency and commercial terms for most of the oil exported from Russia via ports.
6. (C)XXXXXXXXXXX claimed his view is not just conjecture. He said it comes directly from hard numbers and evidence that he sees from his participation in tenders by Rosneft, Lukoil, and other major Russian oil companies. He said that while
MOSCOW 00003380 002 OF 003
Gunvor rose based on the "administrative support" of the GOR, the government came to realize it could no longer promote Gunvor at the expense of, for example, state-owned Rosneft and Gazpromneft. XXXXXXXXXXX said he believes the trend toward greater transparency in seaborne exports will continue XXXXXXXXXXX.
7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX painted a similar picture of oil trading in Russia, calling seaborne trade "open and transparent." He added that domestic trading, while depending on middlemen, is now also largely commercial. XXXXXXXXXXX told us the Russian oil trading market is among the most difficult in the world, but that it also offers good opportunities and that XXXXXXXXXXX has built a "healthy business" here. He said he has seen great changes in the 1 1/2 years he has been in his current job, and suggested that much of the change has come as a result of the government's push for greater transparency in the economy as a whole. He added that he believes this push has largely been driven by the financing needs of the state-owned companies.
8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX was less impressed by the degree of transparency in the business, even for seaborne oil exports. He told us recently that while there are more open tenders and more participants for seaborne exports, "the same firms seem to often win." He suggested that favored firms may get inside information and a "second chance" to bid. XXXXXXXXXXX agreed, however, that there has been a trend toward greater transparency, but cautioned that it is far from an "open and commercial" market. He highlighted Rosneft as a company that has evolved toward greater transparency, and Surgutneftegaz (another reported source of Putin's illicit wealth) as a company that has not.
------------------------------------------
PIPELINE EXPORTS TO EUROPE STILL A PROBLEM
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9. (C) All three company representatives noted, however, that the trend toward greater transparency stops with seaborne trade. They all said Russian oil exports to Europe through pipelines, especially through the southern Druzhba pipeline, is still a very opaque business. XXXXXXXXXXX said pipeline exports, in general, are inherently more political than exports from ports, and that the trade through southern Druzhba is so opaque that "no one knows who is getting what." XXXXXXXXXXX said many in the business "wonder what goes on between buyers and sellers" along that route.
10. (C) As an example, XXXXXXXXXXX specifically cited the recent oil supply reductions from Russia to the Czech Republic (ref A). He said that despite claims by officials that "middlemen" were the problem, he did not believe that to be the case. He said producers generally offer their oil using formulas that include some premium on top of a base price, depending on the export market. He explained that just prior to the supply reduction to the Czech Republic (where Shell has a stake in a refinery), all producers demanded the exact same premium, $1.25 per barrel, which he said was 4 to 5 times the previous figure for that route. He believed this price increase was coordinated, and resulted in the re-routing of oil exports away from the Czech Republic.
11. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX said that in the case of the Czech Republic, the refineries involved had access to other supplies, but that there was indeed an additional cost associated with obtaining alternate supplies. He said similar demands for higher premiums have occurred with regard to deliveries to a German refinery partly owned by Shell, but that the refinery had more limited access to alternatives. In such cases, XXXXXXXXXXX explained, managers have to decide whether to run refineries at sub-optimal levels, or pay the higher costs.
12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX also noted that oil exports to Hungary, by Transneft decree, must go through "a certain intermediary" (Gunvor), which adds one dollar to each barrel. He said in a competitive market, by contrast, an oil trader might add anywhere from five to 20 cents "maximum" to the price of a barrel of oil.
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COMMENT
MOSCOW 00003380 003 OF 003
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13. (C) Oil traders play an important role in the market, helping provide liquidity and optimizing the operations of oil refiners and producers. However, while it appears that the GOR has realized that the more transparent and commercial the trading business, the better it is for Russia's oil sector, it unfortunately has not decided to apply this realization uniformly. Greed, corruption, and geopolitical concerns still trump efficiency, especially with regard to certain export routes to Europe and with regard to certain connected oil traders, such as Gunvor. End comment. BEYRLE
Wednesday, 10 December 2008, 07:52
S E C R E T KYIV 002414
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/UMB
EEB/ESC/IEC FOR SGALLOGLY AND LWRIGHT
DOE FOR LEKIMOFF, CCALIENDO, RBOUDREAU
USDOC FOR 4231/ITA/OEENIS/NISD/CLUCYK
EO 12958 DECL: 12/10/2018
TAGS EINV, ENRG, EPET, PINR, PREL, POL, UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: FIRTASH MAKES HIS CASE TO THE USG
REF: A. KYIV 2383 B. KYIV 2294
Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary and Comment: Controversial Ukrainian oligarch Dmytro Firtash, best known as co-owner of gas intermediary RosUkrEnergo (RUE), called upon the Ambassador on December 8. Firtash did not explicitly state why he requested the meeting, nor did he ask the USG for anything, but he spoke at length about his business and politics in a visible effort to improve his image with the USG. The soft-spoken billionaire, arguably one of Ukraine's most powerful people, expressed strong support for President Yushchenko and equally strong contempt for Prime Minister Tymoshenko. He claimed that he had thwarted a coalition between BYuT and the Party of Regions (PoR) at the last minute, and was now working to build a coalition between Yushchenko's supporters and the PoR. In a lengthy monolog, Firtash described his evolution as a businessman from his beginnings as a food trader to the creation of RUE. Firtash claimed that Tymoshenko was working with Russia to eliminate RUE, and cited examples meant to prove that she was making political concessions to Russia to gain its support to do so. He acknowledged ties to Russian organized crime figure Seymon Mogilevich, stating he needed Mogilevich's approval to get into business in the first place. He was adamant that he had not committed a single crime when building his business empire, and argued that outsiders still failed to understand the period of lawlessness that reigned in Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He said he cared truly about Ukraine, and saw Russian business interests overtaking the economy as the biggest threat to the country's security. Comment: Firtash's arguments and allegations are clearly self-interested; he sees Tymoshenko as a clear threat to his business. End summary and comment.
Firtash Seeks to Improve His Image
----------------------------------
2. (C) Ukrainian billionaire Dmytro Firtash, best known as co-owner of controversial gas intermediary RUE, sought a meeting with the Ambassador on December 8. Accompanying Firtash to the meeting was political consultant and AmCit Zev Furst, and Andras Knopp, the Hungarian-born number two at RUE. Firtash never specifically stated why he had sought the meeting, nor did he extend any specific requests to the Ambassador, but in the course of the conversation it was clear he tried to use the meeting to portray a positive image of himself. Furst said he was attending as a "friend and advisor" to Firtash and during the course of the meeting stated that the USG might have misperceptions about Firtash. At one point during the meeting, Firtash began to talk about "mistakes he might have made," but diverted the conversation when Furst waved him off.
Firtash's Support for President Yushchenko...
---------------------------------------------
3. (C) In the meeting, which lasted two and a half hours, Firtash told the Ambassador that he was not a public person, but had recently been pulled deeper into Ukrainian politics. He admitted that he has "loyally served" as an unofficial advisor to President Yushchenko during tense gas negotiations with Russia and political crises dating back to the Orange Revolution in 2004. He reported that he met with the Yushchenko at his dacha (cottage residence) three times in the last week at the President's request. He described himself as a close friend and confidante of the President -- someone the President can trust totally. In his view, Yushchenko made a possibly fatal political error during the Orange Revolution in that he and Tymoshenko propagated the concept of two Ukraines -- an orange, more democratic Ukraine, and a blue Ukraine represented by the Party of Regions (PoR) and more focused towards the status quo. He added that this divisiveness throughout Ukraine is exactly what Russia hoped to cultivate in order to control Ukraine. Firtash felt the only way to unify Ukraine during the current political and economic crises was to form a coalition between the President's supporters and the PoR in order to stop what he termed, "Tymoshenko's plans to offer up the country to Russia on a silver platter." (Note: On the evening of December 9, BYuT, Our Ukraine/People's Self Defense Party, and the Lytvyn Block formed a coalition, keeping Tymoshenko in power and rebuffing Firtash's hopes for a coalition between the President's supporters and the PoR. End note.)
...And Contempt for Tymoshenko
------------------------------
4. (C) Firtash defined Tymoshenko as an accomplished oligarch who had made deals with Moscow that would leave Ukraine vulnerable to Russian oligarchs in the future -- something neither he nor Ukrainian billionaire and PoR backer Rinat Akhmetov could stand by and watch happen. Firtash referred to Tymoshenko's title of "gas princess" as a misnomer; he explained that Tymoshenko did make lots of money off of a corrupt, perpetual gas debt scheme during the 1990s, but she knew nothing about the gas business. XXXXXXXXXXXX to give the false impression that she was not actively involved in business. He believed that Tymoshenko's hatred for him stems from Tymoshenko's missed opportunity to develop her own RUE back in 2005, when she was Prime Minister for the first time.
5. (C) Firtash stated that he felt Russia was strongly supporting a BYuT and PoR coalition and that such a coalition was about to be finalized on December 7, with only Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych needing to sign. He claimed that he torpedoed the coalition at the last moment by convincing Yanukovych that an alliance with Tymoshenko would never last. Firtash recounted that on December 6, Tymoshenko was on nearly every Ukrainian TV channel and in every newspaper, prophesying that a BYuT and PoR coalition agreement would be signed on the evening of December 7. Firtash was visibly delighted as he recounted how he used his television station INTER to air an interview in which Yanukovych refuted Tymoshenko's claim that a BYuT and PoR coalition was a done deal (Ref A). Responding to a question by the Ambassador on whether he worked with Akhmetov to derail a BYuT/PoR coalition, Firtash said that they had worked separately, even if they were pursuing the same goal.
6. (C) Firtash said he and Akhmetov both wanted a coalition between the President's supporters and the PoR. He claimed that he had brokered a subsequent meeting between Yanukovych and Yushchenko for the evening of December 8. He was not sure if Yanukovych and Yushchenko could form a new coalition, but saw it as the only way out of Ukraine's prolonged political strife.
From Humble Beginnings...
-------------------------
7. (C) Firtash described himself as a simple person who grew up in the village of Synkiv in the Ternopil oblast in Western Ukraine. Firtash explained he had very humble beginnings -- his father taught driver education and his mother worked in a sugar factory. He added that since his parents hated communism, they did not benefit from valuable contacts that could have helped him get into a university, which was his childhood dream. Firtash said he shared his parents' disdain for the Communist party and only agreed to join the Communist youth movement Komsomol after being locked in a party member's office for two days without food or water.
8. (C) Firtash told the Ambassador he attended an occupational institute before be drafted into the army in 1986 and studied to become a fireman after completing his military service. In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Firtash stated his parents thought it was the end of the world and he was concerned about making a living during unpredictable times. He added that he felt he was "between two countries -- one that had ended and one that was beginning." He described his future as unknown, stating he was "living in a country with no laws and no taxes." Firtash also described himself as a "natural businessman" without a university education who "had a nose" for business opportunities, and who would make the best of the uncertainty.
9. (C) (Note: The Ukrainian newspaper "Ukrainska Pravda" researched Firtash's life and reported that Firtash was not highly educated, but was a highly decorated soldier who had used his contacts to build a canned goods and dry milk business which shipped goods first to Uzbekistan. According to press reports, Firtash's first wife and business partner Mariya Kalinovska was given credit for Firtash's first business success. This business then turned into a profitable canned goods production factory and a transportation company registered in Germany. Firtash and Kalinovska were married from 2002-2005, with Kalinovska reportedly receiving a large divorce settlement, despite efforts by former Fuel and Energy Minister Yuriy Boyko to misrepresent the true scale of Firtash's wealth. End note.)
...To Powerful Oligarch
-----------------------
10. (C) Firtash gave a detailed account of how he got into the gas business. Firtash explained that his food and commodities business, which he started in Chernivtsi in Western Ukraine with his wife Mariya, was first called KMIL, and later expanded into High Rock Holdings. Due to his commodities business, he became acquainted with several powerful business figures from the former Soviet Union. Firtash said he met Ukrainian businessman Igor Bakai in Turkmenistan who was selling cars in Ashgabat, but had bigger plans. According to Firtash, Bakai convinced then Ukrainian President Kravchuk to give him permission to buy gas exclusively for the Ukrainian market in Turkmenistan. Firtash noted that Bakai's success also sparked Firtash's interest in the gas business. (Note: In 1993 Bakai then formed the Respublika company, which later became Intergas, which set the precedent for profitable gas trading between Turkmenistan and Ukraine. Bakai would go on to be the first Head of Ukraine's state oil and gas company Naftohaz from 1998-2001. End note.)
11. (S) Firtash also described the gas business in Ukraine during the mid 1990s as particularly dangerous. Firtash said that then Prime Minister Pavel Lazarenko had hired criminals to run the Ukrainian government and used his position as Prime Minister for corruption. He added that Tymoshenko headed Ukrainian Energy Systems, where she earned her fortune. Firtash claimed that Lazarenko, Tymoshenko, and Lazarenko's Assistant Igor Fisherman divided and conquered the Ukrainian gas market. He stated that Lazarenko ordered the killings of Donetsk Governor Yevgen Scherban in 1996 and the head of Itera in Kyiv for not sharing Lazarenko's gas business philosophy. (Note: Igor Fisherman was known in the Ukrainian press as Mogilevich's right hand man who was also High Rock Holding's financial director during the late 1990s. End note.)
12. (C) Another such businessman was Igor Makarov, who founded the Itera gas trading company in 1992, which provided Turkmen gas to former Soviet republics. Firtash claimed that Makarov hired a former KGB head as his security chief to direct Makarov's gas trading empire in Central Asia. Firtash recounted that he gave Itera food commodities through High Rock Holdings, which Itera used to buy gas in-kind from Turkmenistan. Makarov then paid Firtash in cash with the proceeds of his gas sales. According to Firtash, Makarov refused to pay Firtash $50 million in 2001, which drove Firtash to explore his own gas trading business, ousting Makarov at the same time.
13. (C) According to Firtash, he hired Hungarian-born businessman Andras Knopp to negotiate new gas trading deals with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Since these Central Asian countries trusted Firtash as a reputable businessman, they agreed to sign with Firtash's EuroTransGas (ETG) company, leaving Makarov's business in ruins.
14. (S) Firtash also recounted that Makarov invited him to dinner in Kyiv in January 2002, shortly after Firtash had signed the gas deals with Central Asia. Firtash added he went to that dinner not knowing if he would be beaten up or even killed for having taken Makarov's business from him. According to Firtash, Makarov was there with his head of security, Semyon Mogilevich, Sergei Mikhas, from the Solnstevo Brotherhood, and a Mr. Overin when Makarov told Firtash he would regain his gas business as easily as Firtash had taken it away. Firtash walked away from the meeting alive, and credited his ability to keep his life and his gas business to his good reputation among Central Asian leaders.
15. (C) According to Firtash, by 2002, ETG was the sole transporter of Turkmen gas to Ukraine. (Note: According to media reports, by 2005 Firtash had already created a gas trading empire that allowed him to easily transition into RUE. In addition, Firtash owns majority shares in companies in Ukraine, Estonia, Russia, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Tajikistan, and Austria all under the umbrella of the Group DF which he formed in 2007 (Ref B). He also owns 61% of the Ukrainian Inter Media Group which owns or co-owns 7 television channels and the Ukrainian News Agency. By 2006, Firtash's estimated worth was over $5 billion, but most experts believe that Firtash had low-balled his true worth and estimated it was in the tens of billions. In his conversation with the Ambassador, Firtash gave no indication of the scope of his wealth. End note).
The Future of RosUkrEnergo (RUE)
--------------------------------
16. (C) When asked about Tymoshenko's promise to rid Ukraine of RUE, Firtash responded by making a link between Tymoshenko and Russia. He argued that the Prime Minister was seeking Russian support to get rid of RUE, and was making concessions to Russia to accomplish this goal. He specifically cited what he said was her silence on the August events in Georgia, her avoidance of a stand on the Holodomor and the issue of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, as examples of the political concessions she was making to Moscow. Firtash acknowledged that he was having more and more problems with Russia. He alleged that the Russians had already excused a $600 million debt that she owed from her previous gas business that could be used as pressure to get concessions from her. If Moscow really wanted to get rid of RUE, Firtash added, it could do so as long as Tymoshenko was at the helm.
17. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question, Firtash said Ukraine's current gas debt to RUE was near $3 billion, adding that the debt was owed directly to RUE and not to Gazprom. In his view, Ukraine could only clear the debt to RUE in gas since it didn't have enough cash to pay outright. He added that according to the RUE charter with Gazprom, any shipments or supplies of gas to RUE must be confirmed by two signatures on a gas transfer document -- one signature from Gazprom -- the other from RUE (Firtash). Firtash argued that if he does not sign the gas transfer document, then legally there is no proof that gas has been supplied to RUE or Ukraine, so Gazprom forfeits its ability to demand payment from RUE, thus keeping RUE in the gas arrangement for some time. He estimated that Ukraine would have to pay RUE 12 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas to settle the debt. This could be done by transferring Ukrainian gas already in storage to RUE, bringing RUE's reserves in storage in Ukraine up to 23.5 bcm, since RUE already has 11.5 bcm in storage (Ukraine's maximum storage capacity is 34 bcm). The gas would normally be exported to Europe at market prices, which despite falling world gas prices would still be very profitable. Firtash hinted that if RUE was removed with Russian approval, Ukraine would most likely attempt to take or steal all of RUE's gas in storage.
Ties to Russian Organized Crime
-------------------------------
18. (S) The Ambassador asked Firtash to address his alleged ties to Russian organized crime bosses like Semyon Mogilievich. Firtash answered that many Westerners do not understand what Ukraine was like after the break up of the Soviet Union, adding that when a government cannot rule effectively, the country is ruled by "the laws of the streets." He noted that it was impossible to approach a government official for any reason without also meeting with an organized crime member at the same time. Firtash acknowledged that he needed, and received, permission from Mogilievich when he established various businesses, but he denied any close relationship to him.
19. (S) Firtash's bottom line was that he did not deny having links to those associated with organized crime. Instead, he argued that he was forced into dealing with organized crime members including Mogilevich or he would never have been able to build a business. If he needed a permit from the government, for example, he would invariably need permission from the appropriate "businessman" who worked with the government official who issued that particular permit. He also claimed that although he knows several businessmen who are linked to organized crime, including members of the Solntsevo Brotherhood, he was not implicated in their alleged illegal dealings. He maintained that the era of the "law of the street" had passed and businesses could now be run legitimately in Ukraine. He underscored the importance of unifying Ukraine politically in order to reduce the influence of Russian organized crime bosses on Ukrainian businesses.
TAYLOR
Friday, 21 November 2008, 14:48
C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 002294
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR, EUR/UMB, EEB/OMA
TREASURY PASS TO TTORGERSON
EO 12958 DECL: 11/21/2018
TAGS EFIN, EREL, ETRD, PGOV, PREL, XH, UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: FIRTASH USES CRISIS TO EXPAND INTO BANKING
REF: A. A) KYIV 02080 B. B) KYIV 02207
Classified By: Acting Economic Counselor William Klein for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary. Dmitry Firtash, one of Ukraine's most wealthy and notorious oligarchs, plans to buy a controlling stake in Nadra Bank, Ukraine's seventh largest bank. The acquisition of Nadra, which will join Firtash's international holding company (Group DF) when the deal is final, would be Firtash's first foray into Ukraine's banking sector. The purchase of Nadra Bank continues a recent trend on Firtash's part to diversify his asset base beyond Ukraine's politically risky energy sector. He may also hope to use Nadra to service Group DF subsidiaries, or he may simply see the bank as a financial investment, bought on the cheap in a time of crisis, that can be sold once economic conditions improve. Before establishing himself as a billionaire gas trader in the late 1990s, Firtash managed a failing food processing company. He later broke into the gas trade and established himself as an intermediary through connections to key Ukrainian officials and reportedly to Russian organized crime figure Semyon Mogilevich. As co-owner of gas intermediary RosUkrEnergo (RUE), Firtash is widely believed to be serving as a front man for far broader interests. In the case of Nadra, Firtash is sufficiently cash-rich to finance the purchase on his own, but the suspicion remains that in his major business dealings he remains at least politically indebted to the forces that helped him rise so quickly. End Summary.
Despite Crisis, Firtash Moves Into Banking
------------------------------------------
2. (C) Firtash's international holding company Group Dmitry Firtash, or Group DF, in early November announced intentions to acquire a controlling stake in Nadra Bank, marking Firtash's first bank acquisition. The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) propped up Nadra with a UAH 3.6 billion ($609 million) loan after a run on its deposits ostensibly caused a liquidity crisis at the bank. Various explanations as to the cause of Nadra's problems have circulated in the media, but an Embassy contact told us on November 17 that Nadra Bank did not actually have any liquidity problems until its competitors began spreading rumors about Nadra's financial stability. In any case, a liquidity crunch at Nadra ensued and the NBU pressured Nadra to sell a controlling stake of its shares. No final terms of the Group DF deal have been concluded -- it is scheduled to be completed within the next few weeks -- but Group DF reportedly could pay as little as $50 million for an 86.7 percent stake in Nadra. According to one Nadra Bank stakeholder, Nadra Bank could have been sold for UAH 21.3 billion ($4.23 billion) before Ukraine's recent financial problems began.
3. (SBU) Nadra is the second Ukrainian bank after Prominvestbank (Ref B) to change hands in the weeks since the financial crisis erupted in Ukraine. In both cases, stakeholders in the banks and many other market participants claim that the runs on the banks were orchestrated. In addition, in both cases cash-rich Ukrainian business interests with no significant banking holders got the NBU nod to take a controlling stake in the bank (brothers and Party of Regions deputies Sergei and Andriy Kluyev are universally assumed to have bought Prominvestbank, although they have yet to openly acknowledge the purchase.) While many market commentators question whether such investors are ideally suited to introduce the management and banking know-how that the banks need to restructure in difficult times, it is acknowledged that the NBU did not have much choice if it wanted to sell the banks quickly. Other banks, both foreign and domestic, are struggling with their own problems, and foreign banks in particular would have needed far more time to conduct a thorough due diligence. Many of our banking contacts also criticize what they say is the non-transparant manner in which the NBU sold off the two banks.
4. (SBU) Group DF's CEO, Robert Shelter-Jones, has said that Nadra Bank complements Group DF's strategy to diversify its asset base and that Group DF's businesses probably will become important Nadra Bank customers. Nadra Bank could also help Firtash develop his Ukrainian businesses. Although Nadra mainly is geared toward retail business, it could be restructured to service corporate clients, such as Group DF's current subsidiaries, according to some experts. Others, however, contend that because Nadra specializes in servicing small clients, Group DF is unlikely to use Nadra for Group DF subsidiaries. It is also possible that Firtash sees Nadra Bank as a pure financial investment, bought on the cheap at a time of crisis in the hope of reselling it once conditions in Ukraine's banking sector improve.
What Exactly is Group DF?
-------------------------
5. (C) Established in June 2007, Group DF is an international holding company comprising energy, chemicals, real estate, and construction firms in Eastern and Central Europe. Combined revenues of Group DF's subsidiaries in 2006 totaled $4.6 billion. The most infamous of Group DF's assets is RosUkrEnergo (RUE), the non-transparent natural gas intermediary that handles gas transactions for Russia and Ukraine. Gas intermediaries, such as RUE and its predecessors EuralTransGas (ETG) and Itera, have benefited well-connected businessmen such as Firtash and have not always served an obvious economic purpose. (Note: In 2002, ETG was established with four employees in a Hungarian village. ETG that same year replaced Itera and secured exclusive rights to supply Turkmen gas to Ukraine, reportedly clearing $760 million in profits in 2003; Firtash later claimed to be ETG's founder. RUE replaced ETG and reportedly generated more than $7 billion in 2006. End note.)
6. (C) Gazprom owns 50 percent of RUE, while Firtash and fellow Ukrainian businessman Ivan Fursin -- through Group DF company Centragas Holding AG -- control 45 and 5 percent stakes, respectively. Ukrainian media have reported, however, that Semyon Mogilevich, a Russian organized crime (ROC) figure wanted by the FBI and currently in custody in Russia, has long been linked to Firtash's business activities.
Firtash's Ascent, the Mogilevich Connection
-------------------------------------------
7. (C) The Ukrainian media have reported widely on how Firtash got his start in energy through a network of personal connections to some of the biggest players in Ukraine's gas sector. These included Ihor Bakay, founder and former Chairman of Naftohaz Ukrainy, Yuriy Boyko, the Party of Regions deputy and former Fuel and Energy Minister, and Oleksandr Volkov, a former Prime Minister and Kuchma advisor. Before entering the gas trade business Firtash with his spouse reportedly owned a canned food company called KMIL. By the end of the 1990s KMIL was in deep financial trouble. Firtash subsequently broke into the gas trade business as "food for gas" barter schemes between Ukraine and Turkmenistan increased when Ukraine did not have sufficient foreign exchange to pay for its gas imports. Firtash's firms delivered food products to Central Asian suppliers and received gas in return. They subsequently sold the gas on Ukraine's domestic market for domestic currency, or through other, often complex barter schemes.
8. (SBU) This barter business established Firtash as a gas trader, and the subsequent growth in the business brought to light his reported ties with Mogilevich. The two have been linked through ostensible joint holdings in off-shore vehicles, and through mutual personal relationships. In May 2000, for example, Firtash's KMIL received a license to sell natural gas at unregulated prices. A company called Highrock Holding Ltd was registered in Cyprus in 2001 to facilitate this business. Firtash and his spouse together reportedly owned 33 percent of Highrock. About 34 percent of Highrock was owned by a firm called Agatheas Trading Ltd. Semyon Mogilevich's ex-wife, Galina Telesh, reportedly was the director of Agatheas Trading from 2001 to 2003. Firtash in 2003 became the director of Agatheas Trading. In addition, Firtash and Mogilevich also have shared the same lawyer, Zeev Gordon, also known as Vladimir Averbukh, to represent their business and personal interests. Moreover, Ukrainian media report that former Hungarian Minister of Culture Andras Knopp XXXXXXXXXXXX became business partners with the Firtashs when Dmitry Firtash periodically resided in Germany during the 1990s. Knopp reportedly is the managing director of EuralTransGas.
Group DF's Assets, Besides RUE
------------------------------
9. (C) After establishing a presence in Ukraine's non-transparent gas trade, Firtash and his associates began acquiring assets outside of Ukraine's energy sector. Group DF probably recognized that while the gas intermediary business is very lucrative, the need for diversification in Ukraine is key, given that the political risks involved are very high. Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, for example, has called for the elimination of all gas middlemen and Gazprom Press Secretary Sergei Kuprianov on November 17 said that Gazprom next year would supply gas to Ukraine directly, suggesting gas intermediaries could be on their way out.
10. (C) In Ukraine's chemicals sector, Group DF subsidiary OstChem Holding AG owns a little less than half of Crimean Titan, one of Europe's largest titanium dioxide producers that has distributors throughout the world, including Iran, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the U.S. OstChem this year has struggled with the Ukrainian State Property Fund -- the owner of the controlling stake in Crimean Titan -- for management control. In August, however, OstChem on Crimean Titan's behalf successfully secured a 31 million euro ($45.7 million) loan from Commerzbank (with a guarantee from the German state export insurance agency) to build a new sulfuric acid plant. Firtash also reportedly owns the Kyiv Basketball Club and television channels K1, K2, and Megasport; his real estate assets in central Kyiv alone include the Arena business complex and the Mandarin shopping center, both high-end commercial objects in prime locations.
11. (C) Comment. Like other Ukrainian oligarchs, Firtash's holdings are doubtless suffering from the severe economic downturn. The purchase of Nadra Bank, however, indicates that he remains sufficiently cash rich to expand in spite of Ukraine's economic and financial troubles. The extent to which Kyiv powerbrokers or underworld figures benefit from Firtash's business empire is unclear, but Embassy interlocutors have told us that Party of Regions recently has turned to close Firtash associates, instead of Ukrainian oligarch and Regions deputy Rinat Akhmetov, to finance Regions' political campaigns (Ref A). Given Firtash's swift ascent from failing canned foods company manager to multi-billionaire dollar gas magnate, he might still be beholden to the forces that helped him rise so quickly. End comment. TAYLOR
Friday, 13 February 2009, 10:19
S E C R E T BANGKOK 000385
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/13/2019
TAGS PTER, KCRM, TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR ENGAGES PM ABHISIT AND DEFENSE MINISTER
ON VIKTOR BOUT EXTRADITION CASE
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary. During a February 12 meeting, the Ambassador raised with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva the ongoing extradition case concerning Russian international arms trafficker Viktor Bout and serious concerns that Bout's associates had been able to influence testimony given by [xxxxxxxxxx]. Abhisit told the Ambassador that he would address any "irregularities" in the case through "appropriate channels." The Ambassador also raised USG concerns with the xxxxxxxxx testimony during a February 13 introductory call with Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan. Prawit committed to looking into the testimony in order to determine the truth.
2. (S) Comment. Since Viktor Bout's arrest in Bangkok almost a year ago, moving towards a successful extradition to the United States has been at the top of our bilateral agenda here. In addition to Embassy efforts over the months, President Bush raised it with then-Prime Minister Samak during his August 2008 visit to Bangkok. Overall, our sense has been that while the extradition proceedings have been painfully slow (and have required constant nurturing by our DOJ and DEA personnel every step of the way), they are moving in the direction we want. Lately, however, there have been disturbing indications that Bout's xxxxxxxxxx and Russian supporters have been using money and influence in an attempt to block extradition. The most egregious example was the false testimony of xxxxxxxxxx that Bout was in Thailand as part of government-to-government submarine deal. Thus, we felt it was time to once again raise the matter at the top of the government and make clear that, while we understand the judicial process must take its course without political interference, we insist that the process be free of corruption and undue influence. We will continue to do so in the months ahead. We understand AG Holder may soon call the Thai AG to review the case (as previous AG Mukasey did three times in addition to his visit to Bangkok last summer). Combined with our efforts this week, the call will make for an important one-two punch. End Summary and Comment.
ABHISIT PROMISES TO LOOK INTO IRREGULARITIES IN BOUT CASE
--------------------------------------------- ------------
3. (S) During a February 12 meeting at the Parliament, the Ambassador raised with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva the ongoing extradition case concerning international arms trafficker Viktor Bout. (Note: Bout faces terrorism-related charges in federal court in New York for conspiring to sell millions of dollars of weapons to the FARC for use in killing Americans. He has remained in custody in Bangkok since his arrest on March 6, 2008. End note.) The Ambassador noted that, while the U.S. and Thailand enjoy a strong extradition relationship, our countries must ensure that the bilateral extradition treaty worked in our most important cases, such as those involving terrorism. In this regard, the Ambassador emphasized to Abhisit that the extradition case against Bout is a high priority for the United States. Citing the United Nations' sanctions against Bout, the Ambassador also noted that the extradition case is one of global importance. Abhisit told that Ambassador that he believed that his office had limited means to affect ongoing extradition proceedings, stating that the judicial system was designed to afford due process to the parties and expressing an unwillingness to be seen as "overruling" this process, or "helping one side."
4. (S) Expressing growing concern about the extradition proceedings, the Ambassador then described evidence showing that the extradition proceedings against Bout have become tainted as a result of the efforts by Bout's associates to bribe Thai officials. In particular, the Ambassador detailed false testimony on Bout's behalf from xxxxxxxxxx to the effect that Bout came to Thailand to conduct official business with the Thai government relating to a submarine project; recorded statements by a Thai associate of Bout that he had procured xxxxxxxxxx to testify on Bout's behalf; evidence of bribery schemes gathered throughout the world; and a scheme to arrest and thereby embarrass two U.S. diplomats - i.e., DEA agents assigned to the Bout investigation - on meritless charges of participating in illegal recordings of Bout on the day of his arrest. If the xxxxxxxxxxxx false testimony remained
unrebutted, the court could possibly deny extradition based on an erroneous conclusion that RTG had legitimate dealings with Bout, a U.N.-sanctioned arms trafficker.
5. (S) In light of this evidence, the Ambassador asked the Prime Minster to take steps to ensure that the proceedings in Bout's extradition case were free from the taint of bribery and corruption. In particular, the Ambassador suggested that testimony from an authoritative witness from the Royal Thai Navy or the Ministry of Defense should be offered to repudiate the xxxxxxxxxx statement and make clear that the RTG supports the extradition request. The Ambassador also reminded the PM of the recent case of Jamshid Ghassemi, in which the Thai authorities denied a U.S. extradition request under apparent pressure from Iran, and stressed the importance of avoiding a similar result here. (Note: Ghassemi is under indictment in San Diego for violations of the Arms Export Control Act and money laundering relating to his conspiracy to acquire accelerometers used in missile navigation. End note.) The Ambassador also stated that Thailand's failure to ensure an extradition process in Bout that is free from corruption and undue influence would constitute a major setback to the bilateral relations between the U.S. and Thailand, especially in the area of law enforcement.
6. (S) After listening to the evidence provided by the Ambassador suggesting that bribery had infected the Bout proceedings, Abhisit committed to addressing any "irregularities" in the extradition case through the "appropriate channels." At the conclusion of the meeting, the Prime Minister sought the identity of the individuals involved in the bribery schemes, and the DOJ Attache, who accompanied the Ambassador to the meeting, supplied an aide to the PM with the requested information.
DEFENSE MINISTER COMMITS TO LOOKING INTO TESTIMONY
--------------------------------------------- -----
7. (S) During a February 13 introductory call, the Ambassador highlighted to Minister of Defense Prawit Wongsuwan the importance the USG places on the Bout extradition proceedings. The Ambassador noted that the USG understood that extradition cases take time and that the USG respected the Thai judicial system, but we were concerned about efforts by Bout to improperly influence the proceedings. Of particular concern was the false testimony by xxxxxxxxx the Ambassador told Prawit. Thexxxxxxxxxx testimony was not true and, as such, it was very important that the Thai Navy or the Ministry of Defense correct this falsehood with testimony to the court. Doing so would ensure that the proceedings were kept on track and would publicly clarify that the Thai military was not associated with a U.N.-sanctioned arms trafficker. Prawit told the Ambassador that he was unfamiliar with the case but that he would give priority to looking into the issue to determine the truth regarding the testimony ofxxxxxxxxx. The Defense Minister also committed to examining a non-paper with more details on the testimony of xxxxxxxxxxx that the DOJ Attache provided to an aide to Prawit. JOHN
Thursday, 13 August 2009, 09:18
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 001998
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR BADER
EO 12958 DECL: 08/13/2019
TAGS PTER, KCRM, TH, RS, CO
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON THE VIKTOR BOUT EXTRADITION CASE IN
THE WAKE OF LOWER COURT DEFEAT
REF: BANGKOK 385 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary and comment. The disappointing August 11 Thai Lower Court ruling against the extradition of Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout, and its dubious legal reasoning, requires a multi-pronged effort to seek a successful reversal during the appeals process. The lead judge's foray into foreign policy, rejecting the terrorism label and in effect embracing the FARC's activities as purely political in nature, not criminal or acts of terrorism, has implications for Thailand. His confusion of the "dual criminality" concept with jurisdictional issues similarly raises questions for efforts by Thailand to extradite fugitive former PM Thaksin to face justice. The Embassy is working with Thai authorities to file an appeal of the lower court's ruling and to press home the implications of the court ruling were Bout to walk free. In the early afternoon on August 13, we were assured that the notice of intention to appeal has been filed.
2. (C) At the same time, the Embassy recommends the State Department, Attorney General Holder, and the US Mission to the UN in New York engage the Thai Ambassador in Washington and the Thai PermRep in New York in parallel. In addition, the Department should seriously consider asking Belgium, which issued an arrest warrant for Bout in 2002 for money laundering and conspiracy, Colombia, in the case of the FARC, and African countries which have suffered greatly from Bout's arms trade in the past to weigh in with the RTG. Finally, we recommend consideration of laying down a marker in Moscow about Bout, looking forward to the possibility that Bout may end up back in Russia were the appeal of the Lower Court ruling might not succeed. End Summary and comment.
Thai Lower Court rules against Bout extradition
--------------------------------------------- --
3. (C) On August 11, the judge in the Viktor Bout extradition case ruled against U.S. and Thai government efforts to extradite Bout to the United States. Two key elements of his reasoning were: that the FARC in Colombia, to which Bout was conspiring to send weapons, was a political rather than a terrorist group; and that the "dual criminality" standard of our extradition treaty with Thailand had not been met since Bout could not be prosecuted in Thailand on the charges which the U.S. wants him to face in the U.S. In our view, the judge was wrong on both counts.
4. (C) After the verdict, as the Department has seen, the DCM spoke on the record to press outside the court room and expressed disappointment and mystification over the ruling and stated that we would fully support RTG efforts to appeal the decision. We have continued the same themes in subsequent interactions with the press.
Engaging the Thai immediately
-----------------------------
5. (C) The Ambassador called Foreign Minister Kasit immediately after the verdict on August 11 and expressed deep disappointment, noting that the verdict was not justified on legal grounds and that the judge had clearly been in error on several key points. He reminded Kasit that over the past year and a half since Bout's arrest in Bangkok, the USG had repeatedly underlined the importance of the case, all the way up to the Secretary of State and POTUS levels. In the short-term, the Ambassador told Kasit, we need the Foreign Ministry to do its part in forwarding the necessary documentation to the Attorney-General's office so that the intent to appeal can be filed in the requisite forty-eight hours. (Note: Although the court's ruling and a new extradition law specify that the appeal must be filed within 72 hours, the applicable extradition law sets forth the shorter time frame, which we have followed.) Kasit assured the Ambassador that he had already instructed his legal department to do so. The Ambassador also told Kasit that we
BANGKOK 00001998 002 OF 004
expected Bout would remain in detention during the appeals process. The MFA's Legal and Treaties Department faxed the Attorney General's office late evening August 11 supporting the appeal; at the request of the Office of the Attorney General, the Embassy sent a diplomatic note to the MFA and the OAG on August 13 requesting that the RTG appeal the lower court verdict prior to the forty-eight hour deadline (note: the RTG was closed August 12 for a National Holiday, the Queen's Birthday.) At approximately 1:25 p.m. on August 13, the MFA and OAG advised the Embassy that the requisite notice of intention to appeal had been filed and received by the court.
Next steps
----------
6. (C) The Embassy's "Bout team" met August 13 to review next steps that will help us prevail on appeal. Our immediate priority was to ensure that the notice of intent to appeal was filed on time (within 48 hours of the verdict) and that the appeal itself is filed within thirty days of the verdict.
7. (C) We will make clear to the RTG that we expect Bout to remain incarcerated during the appeals process, as specified under Thai law and the August 11 court ruling. Given that the same judge will rule on any bail motions brought by Bout (we expect Bout's attorneys to push hard on bail), however, his custody status during the pendency of the appeal is a genuine concern. We also intend to make clear to the Thai government (the Ambassador is seeking to call FM Kasit, in Malaysia August 13-14 on a working visit, and will engage the highest available MFA official in Bangkok) that we expect this deficient ruling to receive a comprehensive and meaningful review by the appellate court. Moreover, the Ambassador plans to tell Kasit and other senior Thai officials that, given that the Thai government arrested Bout and sought his extradition to the U.S., the Thai government should be as alarmed by the judge's ruling as we are. Therefore, we would encourage the RTG to issue a public statement expressing disappointment in the judge's decision, its intention to win on appeal, and a reiteration of Thailand's commitment to both the struggle against international terrorism and to its extensive law enforcement relationship with the United States. The Ambassador intends to make similar points to newly appointed NSC Secretary General Tawee and to key figures at the Palace. Without being counter-productively heavy-handed, we will make clear that we see Thai executive branch reaction to the ruling as a test of the relationship.
8. (C) At the same time, however, we believe it is important to remember that our partners in the Royal Thai Police, the Office of the Attorney General, the Foreign Ministry, and even the Royal Thai Navy, largely did everything we asked them to do on the Bout case, including going the extra mile to facilitate our requests. Our posture and actions thus should make clear that we are disappointed with the judge's ruling but not with Thai government cooperation in the Bout case.
9. (C) That said, coming on the heels of the September 2008 Thai appellate ruling affirming a lower court's denial of our request to extradite Iranian Jamshid Ghassemi, who was in Thailand to procure controlled technology in violation of the Arms Export Control Act, the question has to be asked whether we can count on the Thai courts to do the right thing on high-profile extradition cases that will affect Thailand's relations with third countries (we continue to have a perfect record on routine extraditions from Thailand to the United States). Our reluctant conclusion is that we cannot.
10. (S) The Department will recall that in February of this year, after significant indications that the Russians were trying to use bribes to influence the outcome of the case, the Ambassador made representations to Prime Minister Abhisit (reftel) that we expected the process to be free of inappropriate influence and Abhisit undertook to do so. The
BANGKOK 00001998 003 OF 004
Ambassador also intervened at the same time with Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan and the Royal Thai Naval Commander Khamtorn Pumhiran to insist that false testimony by xxxxxxxxx (that Bout had been in Thailand as part of a routine naval procurement) be rebutted. The Thai Navy subsequently issued a letter to that effect. We will remind the Thais of their commitment to a clean process and ask that they assure us again on the front.
What We are Doing here/What We Suggest Washington Do
--------------------------------------------- -------
11. (C) Given the above, we are undertaking the following steps here in Bangkok, most of which should also be reflected when the Department calls in Thai Ambassador Don Pramuwinai, a move we fully support: -- The Ambassador will immediately seek a meeting with Foreign Minister Kasit and other appropriate senior Thai officials to make clear that, while we appreciate the cooperation on Bout over the past year and a half, we are disappointed and mystified by the judge's ruling, which is flawed on several key points. -- In particular, the judge's characterization of the FARC as a legitimate political actor would suggest that insurgent groups in southern Thailand are likewise political in nature, perhaps outside the scope of Thailand's new counterterrorism laws. The ruling also suggests that anyone seeking to send them arms from a third country could not be extradited to Thailand on political grounds. -- Moreover, the judge's misguided analysis of the "dual criminality" standard suggests that fugitives cannot be extradited from Thailand unless a Thai court actually had jurisdiction over the alleged crime, not whether the alleged conduct is viewed as criminal conduct under the laws of both countries. This decision comes at the same time Thailand is pursuing extradition of fugitive former PM Thaksin Shinawatra for abuse of power/corruption-related charges; the judge's ruling would also seem to undermine RTG positions in their Thaksin extradition effort. -- Therefore, we expect that the AG's office will vigorously pursue the appeal of the ruling and that Bout will remain incarcerated during the pendency of the appeal. -- We seek assurances that the case will be afforded a comprehensive and meaningful appellate review, presumably handled by serious, experienced Thai judges. (Note: Appeals are normally handled by a panel of three judges. End Note.) -- We ask that the Thai government issue a statement making clear its own disappointment with the judge's ruling and reiterating its commitment to the fight against international terrorism and to the law enforcement relationship with the U.S. -- We will continue to make our points to the press and we are pulling together a "FARC fact sheet" for public distribution that we will send in to Washington for comment and clearance today.
12. (C) We suggest that Washington strongly consider the following actions: -- In addition to the Department calling in the Thai Ambassador, we recommend that Attorney General Holder also call him in. AG Holder could point out the extensive U.S. commitment of law enforcement resources to Thailand (DEA and other), as well as our judicial training efforts, and that a statement from the RTG as outlined above would be very helpful as the U.S. decides where best to commit its law enforcement resources around the world. A senior DEA official might also wish to sit in to highlight the massive DEA commitment to Thailand. (Note: Our DOJ Attache who has led our legal efforts on Bout here will be in Washington on August 20-21. End Note.) -- Discussion of a POTUS telcon to PM Abhisit has been under way for some time; they have not spoken in the seven months both have been in office. We suggest that the call be accelerated and that it include a serious discussion of our concerns over the implications of the Bout verdict, as outlined above. We believe POTUS involvement on Bout would have significant effect here. -- We suggest Washington engage the Colombian government on
BANGKOK 00001998 004 OF 004
the implications of the Bout verdict. We suggest inquiring whether Colombia considers the FARC to be a terrorist organization, whether it would be willing to submit a brief in the appeals process, and also make public statements to that effect. We also suggest exploring whether Colombia would be willing to ask Thailand for Bout's extradition while he (hopefully) is still in detention during the appeals process. (Note: There is no Colombian Embassy in Bangkok; the Embassy in Kuala Lumpur covers Thailand. We understand the Thais cover Colombia from their Embassy in Lima. End note.) It would be useful if the Government of Colombia also raised its concerns in Moscow. -- We also suggest exploring the possibility of whether governments whose citizens have borne the bloody results of Bout's activities over the years, such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Congo, would be willing to publicly express dismay/engage the Thai government on the verdict and whether any affected government would be willing to ask for his extradition. -- While the Bout focus is now on Thailand, this is at heart a U.S.-Russian matter. The Department may wish to make clear to Moscow our concerns on Bout's activities and seek assurances that they will cease. Also, we should consider asking the Russians to prosecute Bout if, in the end, he walks here in Thailand. At the very least perhaps we could force the Russians to publicly refuse to do so. -- The Thai ruling seems inconsistent with several United Nations determinations on Bout's nature over the years (see below). We suggest our USUN call in the Thai Permrep and lay out how we view the issues in terms of Thailand's standing with the United Nations. Better yet would be for the appropriate UN official to call in the Thai Permrep and seek an explanation of how the verdict can be justified in light of Thailand's support of relevant UN resolutions: - UNSCR 1521 (2003) - Liberia - UNSCR 1343 (March 2001) - Liberia - Report of Experts Panel under 1343 - Final Monitoring Report on Angola Sanctions (2000)
-- Finally, despite the listing by the US and EU of the FARC as a terrorist organization, we understand that the FARC is not listed as such by the UN. A move to have the FARC listed formally by the UN would assist the effort to keep Bout in custody. JOHN
Thursday, 07 January 2010, 07:41
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUBAI 000001
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO
NEA/ARP/BMCGOVERN
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/01/07
TAGS EAIR, ECON, PGOV, PREL, AE
SUBJECT: RAK Airport Sleepy, but with Residual Russian Connection
CLASSIFIED BY: Justin Siberell, Consul General, U.S. Consulate General, Dubai; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) Summary: The Ras Al Khaimah (RAK) Airport is attempting to reinvent itself as a cargo transit point for the RAK Free Zone in the wake of RAK Airways suspension of regular commercial flights in late 2008. The airport is also working to distance itself from its reputation as a transport facilitator for clients such as international arms trafficker Victor Bout, who used the RAK airport as a base of operations. The Wing Air aircraft once linked to Victor Bout are grounded and effectively abandoned. Former RAK Airport CEO Michelle Soliman conveyed continuing concerns about the airport's reputation and client base, however, and is seeking to identify "more desirable" clients as the airport increases its operations. End Summary.
--------------------------
Passengers Slow to Come
-------------------------
2. (SBU) Former Ras al Khaimah Airport CEO Michelle Soliman told ConGen Dubai PolOff and Embassy Abu Dhabi OFAC Attache shortly before her December resignation that RAK Airport's growth has been hindered by the failure of its "national" airline, RAK Airways, which began operations in November 2007, but stopped scheduled flights just over a year later in December 2008 as a result of the economic downturn (Note: RAK Airways still operates a Boeing 757 on a wet-lease basis to Hewa Bora Airlines in the Democratic Republic of Congo. End Note.). Although Oussame El Omari, the CEO of the RAK Free Zone (RAK FZ) recently speculated that RAK Airways would become the UAE's newest bargain airline similar to Fly Dubai and Air Arabia, Soliman saw little prospect for RAK Airways resumption of commercial air services given insufficient operating funds and high management turnover, including seven CEO's in just two years.
3. (SBU) RAK Airways uncertain future is, Soliman believes, dissuading other passenger airlines from establishing regularly scheduled flights to RAK out of concern that the limited air rights available at RAK airport could be rescinded if RAK Airways begins to operate again. Although a new arrival terminal opened on September 1, 2009, the only passenger flights to RAK airport are four tourism-related chartered flights a week from Europe which began in October 2009.
---------------
Focus on Cargo
---------------
4. (U) To boost its cargo business, RAK Airport, according to Soliman, has negotiated with RAK Customs to allow companies in the RAK FZ not to pay customs fees on goods going directly from the free zone to the airport as long as the goods depart within 10 days. Some of the free zone companies utilizing this deal are shipping armored vehicles to Afghanistan on cargo flights. Soliman told Poloff and OFACATT that one idea for future expansion of the airport's cargo business with the RAK FZ would be to make part of the airport a free zone so that goods could transfer directly.
-----------------------
The Russian Connection
-----------------------
5. (C) Soliman told OFACATT that Wing Air Services, a company publicly linked to international arms trafficker and UN sanctions target Victor Bout, is still on the Airport's registration list only because it is the last registered owner of the IL-76 aircraft
and Gulfstream jet now effectively abandoned at RAK Airport on their parking apron. Soliman said Mach Avia Services was at one time identified as the agent of the IL-76, but eventually "washed its hands of it" and claimed that Wing Air Services was responsible for the aircraft. Soliman took EmbOffs on a tour of the airport that included a viewing of Wing Air aircraft. The Wing Air Gulfstream was completely gutted, apparently cannibalized for parts. Soliman said that the Russian companies were kept on short-term lease arrangements so that they could be moved out of RAK as soon more desirable clients could be found (Note: Soliman also pointed out as suspect two new Bombardier CRJ jets worth USD 50 million abandoned by their owners immediately after they arrived. Soliman said the owners are impossible to reach, although sporadically maintenance people show up. End Note).
6. (C) OFACATT asked Soliman if she knew of any links between the Russian maintenance facility at RAK airport, identified on the website azworldairports.com as the Shahed/Aircess facility, and the Sharjah-based Aircess company that served as the headquarters for Victor Bout's network until its designation by the UN in November 2005. Soliman said that as far as she knew, the facility was run by the company Mach Avia Services, but that Mach Avia's General Manager (GM) Hussein Obeid is also the general manager of a company called Shahed, which according to Obeid's business card provides "Air Services". Soliman noted that Mach Avia was originally registered as the agent for the Victor Bout linked Wing Air IL-76 when it arrived at RAK Airport in March 2004, but later advised the airport that the plane belonged to Wing Air Services. Abousaeda Mustafa, a Russian, informed RAK Airport that the Wing Air IL-76 aircraft had been sold on January 14, 2009 by Libyan Arab Air Cargo to ILEX or ELEX Ventures Limited Company (NFI). Soliman said that RAK Airport could not confirm the validity or authenticity of the documents presented by Mustafa, and that consequently the airport submitted them to the RAK Courts.
7. (C) Comment: Despite its lack of passenger traffic, RAK Airport is looking for opportunities to grow, such as focusing on cargo and drawing in legitimate clients. However, it seems that it will not be an easy road ahead as it still has to deal with legacy issues such as the Wing Air services aircraft, a grounded RAK Airways, and semi-abandoned jets with unreachable owners. Soliman's resignation from her post as CEO subsequent to this visit also highlights RAK Airport's inability to keep consistent management at the helm; Soliman is the sixth CEO to leave RAK Airport since 2006. End Comment.
SIBERELL SIBERELL
Tuesday, 26 June 2007, 07:54
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 002725
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR P(BAME) AND EUR
EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2017
TAGS PREL, FR, NATO, EUN, GG, UNMIK, YI, RS, UNO
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS'S JUNE 13 MEETING WITH GEORGIAN
PRESIDENT SAAKASHVILI
REF: TBILISI 1387
Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D).
1. (U) June 13, 2007, 11:00 A.M.
2. (U) Participants:
U.S. Under Secretary Burns Special Envoy for Kosovo Wisner Ambassador Stapleton P Staff Bame POL Deputy Turner (notetaker)
Georgia President Saakashvili Foreign Minister Bezhuashvili Ambassador to France Kudava Chief of Cabinet Sharashidze Daniel Kunin
3. (C) SUMMARY: In a June 13 meeting with Georgian President Saakashvili, U/S Burns confirmed that we would move forward on Kosovo independence, but assured him we would remain firm in discouraging Russia from taking action to recognize Abkhazia's independence. Saakashvili insisted that Putin was personally committed to removing Abkhazia from Georgia. He worried that Russia would attempt to use any Kosovo UNSCR, especially one sweetened to gain Russia's abstention, as a precedent/justification for Abkhazia. Burns assured Saakashvili that any Russian move to recognize Abkhazia would isolate Russia internationally and urged the Georgians to continue to avoid antagonizing them. Saakashvili said the Georgians were doing their part but that Russia could not be trusted; he urged the USG to make clear to the Russians that the Caucasus was a powder keg. He also called for NATO MAP for Georgia as soon as possible as a "deterrent" against Russian adventurism. Burns assured Saakashvili of U.S. support for Georgian aspirations while noting that timing (the December 2007 NATO FM Ministerial, or the April 2008 NATO Summit, or even later) would depend also on building support among European Allies. Saakashvili concluded by stressing the strategic importance of Abkhazia for Georgia and of the Black Sea for Georgia and Ukraine. END SUMMARY.
KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE
-------------------
4. (C) Burns noted at the outset President Bush's strong stance on Kosovo, in private and in public, during his recent visit to Pristina and Sofia. Burns said the President had made clear to President Putin at the G8 Summit that Kosovo would become independent. Russia could perhaps delay this outcome, but it could not stop it. The UN had already taken Kosovo away from Serbia, and it was the Europeans and U.S., not the Russians, who had troops on the ground to keep the peace and were providing financial assistance. Burns termed the Russian threat to recognize Abkhazia in retaliation for Western recognition of Kosovo hollow, given that other members of the international community would not follow (with the possible exception of Belarus; Saakashvili suggested that only Venezuela would support Russia). Burns and Wisner reiterated that Secretary Rice had made clear to Putin and FM Lavrov that it would be a grave mistake to recognize Abkhazia.
IMPACT ON ABKHAZIA
------------------
5. (C) Saakashvili worried about the implications for Georgia of Kosovo independence and related that Putin, in the course of a recent fifty-minute bilateral meeting, had invited Georgia to coordinate with Russia on a response to the U.S. position on Kosovo. Continuing that Putin had a highly personal interest in Abkhazia, Saakashvili claimed that Putin had recalled Russian diplomats in Georgia to prepare documents on Abkhazia. This had led to some strange proposals, including a Russian proposal at the last CIS summit that Georgia approach the IOC to host the Olympic games in Abkhazia. More seriously, a Russian move to recognize Abkhazia risked setting off a powder keg in the Caucasus. Georgia was not interested in provoking the Russians, but emotions were high. The Russians, who only understood frank language, would interpret any flexibility from others as weakness. They needed to be told that they risked setting off an explosion in their own backyard that
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could easily redound against them.
6. (C) Saakashvili asked if there were quid pro quos other than Abkhazia that Russia was seeking for Kosovo independence. Burns said that the U.S. was currently focused on finding ways to encourage a Russian abstention, for instance through the eventual appointment of a UN envoy for Serbian refugee affairs or extending negotiations between the Serbs and Albanians for another 3-5 months. The USG was willing to meet the Russians half-way, provided the end result would be independence. Wisner added that the USG was not proposing a division between Kosovo's Serbian and Kosovar Albanian communities. Saakashvili said it was important that "nothing" in any eventual Kosovo decision be viewed as a precedent for other conflicts; nor did Georgia want to be associated with the process in any way. He worried that Russia would use any negotiations on an amended UNSCR to insert language that could later be cited as justification for its actions on Abkhazia. Burns reiterated the U.S. position that the record of UN involvement in Kosovo put it exactly opposite from the situation in Abkhazia.
EU DYNAMICS, FRENCH PROPOSAL
----------------------------
7. (C) Saakashvili asserted that Putin had promised him to veto Kosovo independence. Burns responded that Putin had stopped short of using the word "veto" in his discussions with the President; Wisner pointed out that the Russians had been careful in their language, saying they were "ready" to veto "this" resolution (as opposed to another one). Burns commented that the Europeans in general were "too" obsessed with the threat of a Russian veto, mainly because of the divisions it would likely engender within the EU itself. For instance, Slovakia and Greece had said they would oppose recognizing Kosovo's independence. Burns reviewed his meetings with French officials in Paris and other aspects of the state of play on Kosovo.
8. (C) Picking up on an earlier comment by Burns that Kosovo was 95 percent ethnic Kosovar Albanian, Saakashvili noted that 500,000 ethnic Georgians had been forced out of Abkhazia. He asked how the USG and others would respond to possible Russian parallel demands for an international presence aimed at postponing until some point in the future a decision on independence for Abkhazia. He urged Burns to reject such arguments out of hand, given that the Russians were responsible for the war in Abkhazia and that this was a merely a stratagem to re-absorb their lost empire piece by piece. They had recovered Chechnya and would like to recover Georgia; failing success on the latter, they would take Abkhazia.
RUSSIAN DESIGNS ON ABKHAZIA
---------------------------
9. (C) Wisner responded that breaking off Abkhazia would call into question the consensual break-up of the former Soviet Union. He urged Tbilisi not to make the same mistake as Belgrade had in refusing to engage, and encouraged the Georgians to have informal contacts with the Abkhaz. Saakashvili responded that the Abkhaz were refusing contact with the GOG, were fully under the control of the Russian FSB, and were already effectively isolated. Georgia's best hope was to develop economically and internationally in a way to show the Abkhaz that they would be better off associating themselves with Georgia rather than the Russians. For the moment, however, Georgia had little leverage. He noted ominously that Putin had once spoken of a possible negotiated solution to Abkhazia, but no longer mentioned it as a possibility.
10. (C) Saakashvili asserted that Putin had originally bet on regime change in Georgia, but that this had failed. His current plan was therefore to use Abkhazia to destroy Georgia. This also served Russia's broader interest in interrupting any alternative energy corridors in the Caucasus. Saakashvili indicated, in contrast to Abkhazia, that the Russians had given up playing the South Ossetia card against Georgia. Putin had told him that he did not care about South Ossetia, so long as Georgia avoided bloodshed and solved the problem quietly. The downside was that this left Abkhazia as Russia's last bargaining chip.
U.S. SUPPORT AND NATO MAP
-------------------------
11. (C) Commenting that Putin viewed the U.S. as his main
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competitor and surmising that Putin wanted his legacy to be one of toughness, Saakashvili said only blunt language from the U.S. could force Putin to modify his "reckless" behavior and realize what was at stake for Russia. He saw a need for two specific "deterrents" in dealing with Russia: 1) the U.S., supported by the Europeans, should on a regular, perhaps monthly basis, warn the Russians against recognizing Abkhazia; and 2) the Russians needed to be told that Russia stood to lose more in any destabilization of the former Soviet space than others. With respect to NATO, Saakashvili stressed that Georgia viewed the conclusion of a Membership Action Plan (MAP) as less a promise for early membership than a key deterrent against Russian adventurism.
12. (C) Burns noted that the issue of when precisely to offer MAP to Georgia was complicated. It would be difficult to ask the Europeans to agree on MAP at the same time they were managing the Kosovo problem. If Kosovo could be put to bed in the early fall, then the December NATO ministerial or following April NATO Summit might be used to push forward on MAP. He advised the Georgians to work quietly and to build more support among European nations through reforms designed to show that Georgia was ready for MAP. Although the U.S. approach viewed the process strategically, the Germans and French were hesitant and afraid to irk Russia.
13. (C) Saakashvili worried that if a decision were postponed until the Bucharest Summit, Allies might be reluctant to displease the recently elected new Russian president. He thought that Secretary Rice would need to make a personal push on Georgia's behalf in European capitals. Burns reminded Saakashvili that the Bucharest Summit also needed to take decisions on the Adriatic Three (Croatia, Albania, and Macedonia), as well as on Ukraine. Burns stated that USG decisions on timing for Georgia would depend on when we could succeed in lining up support among key Allies Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the UK. Saakashvili expressed the hope that there would be no crisis with Russia in the fall, which he called a doomsday scenario. He noted ominously that the Russians mentioned Cyprus a lot, suggesting the possibility of a military adventure.
GEORGIAN REFORMS CAN HELP
-------------------------
14. (C) Burns reiterated the importance of reform in persuading European Allies to support MAP for Georgia, highlighting judicial reforms and free elections. Saakashvili responded that Georgia was working on them and would succeed in achieving them. That said, he predicted that the Europeans would then seek some new excuse to deny Georgia its due.
MANAGING RUSSIA
---------------
15. (C) Burns asked Saakashvili for his views on Russia's CFE-related Istanbul commitments. Without responding directly, Saakashvili said Moldovan President Veronin had told him that he no longer expected the Russians to do anything about Transnistria to resolve the problem, and he would now approach the Europeans for more assistance. Saakashvili nonetheless believed that Russia could eventually be brought to deal on Moldova, as with South Ossetia, if not Abkhazia. Putin was emotionally attached to Sochi and viewed Abkhazia's location as strategic; it had a deep sea port and 900 million barrels of oil on shore, with untold quantities potentially available offshore. The only thing still holding Putin back from recognizing Abkhazia was his fear of the United States, not the Europeans. The USG needed to be tough with Putin, and would need to neutralize European accommodationist tendencies vis-a-vis Russia. Burns responded that sentiment in the Congress was negative toward Russia, but that the President was attempting to strike a balance, cooperating with Russia on counter-terrorism and non-proliferation while criticizing it for lack of press and other freedoms, and for its recent harassment of Estonia.
GEORGIA NOT PROVOKING RUSSIA
----------------------------
16. (C) Burns suggested it was also important that Russia not be able to cite perceived Georgian provocations as grounds for its actions. Saakashvili assured him that Georgia knew how to be patient, citing the quiet Georgian reaction to a recent unidentified attack on Georgian territory most likely perpetrated by Russian forces. Saying that "time works for us, but we should also be given time,"
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he assured Burns that Georgia's preference was for reformers rather than generals, and that even the Russians were fascinated by the pace and breadth of Georgian reforms. Unfortunately, the Russian goal was to kill reforms -- for themselves and others. In a brief discussion of Estonia, Saakashvili commented that Estonian leaders had appeared to be panicking under the pressure. Georgia had seen worse, he added, but would succeed in remaining calm only to a point.
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF ABKHAZIA, BLACK SEA
-------------------------------------------
17. (C) Saakashvili stressed the strategic importance of Abkhazia to Georgia, noting that re-integration of the province had the potential to triple the Georgian economy. The loss of Abkhazia, by contrast, would destroy the backbone of Georgia. Ascribing to Russia a Black Sea strategy, he expressed concern that the USG was underestimating the importance of the Black Sea. Burns agreed that Allies had thus far shown insufficient interest in the region, but that that this was one of the reasons NATO had chosen Bucharest for its 2008 summit. Saakashvili commented that the Turks in particular had wanted to keep NATO out and preserve their own influence, and opined that a greater Western political and military presence in the Black Sea region would deter Russia and bolster Georgia and Ukraine. By contrast, a Turkish incursion into Iraq would only encourage the Russians to follow that example. Burns informed Saakashvili of USG efforts to counter the PKK problem in northern Iraq, Turkey, and elsewhere.
MEETING WITH SARKOZY
--------------------
18. (C) Saakashvili concluded the meeting with a request for advice in dealing with President Sarkozy. Ambassador Stapleton and Wisner described Sarkozy as a plain speaker who should be engaged directly and bluntly. They also noted his skepticism about Russian intentions. They welcomed Saakashvili's decision to meet with him so early in his Administration, as he would likely prove to be a key, perhaps even the dominant, European leader. Burns encouraged Saakashvili to brief Sarkozy on his assessments of Turkey and Russia. Saakashvili agreed that Sarkozy's decision to meet with him was an important gesture.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON
Friday, 20 July 2007, 12:10
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TBILISI 001732
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA AND EUR/CARC
EO 12958 DECL: 06/19/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, GG
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES IN GEORGIA
REF: A. TBILISI 1605 B. TBILISI 1352 C. TBILISI 1100 D. 06 TBILISI 2601 E. 06 TBILISI 2590 F. 06 TBILISI 2425 G. 06 TBILISI 2390 H. 06 TBILISI 1532 I. 06 STATE 80908 J. 06 TBILISI 1064 K. 06 TBILISI 0619 L. 06 TBILISI 0397 M. 06 MOSCOW 0546 N. 06 TBILISI 0140 O. 05 TBILISI 3171
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b)&(d).
Introduction and Comment
------------------------
1. (C) The strains between Russia and Georgia play out in leaders' statements, the Russian economic embargo, the separatist conflicts, and a number of other public ways, but they also play out on a level that is at least slightly below the surface: Russian "active measures" (or covert actions) aimed at Georgia. This cable summarizes some of the suspected Russian active measures undertaken in recent years, ranging from missile attacks and murder plots to a host of smaller-scale actions. It is a long list, and it is very much on the minds of Georgian leaders as they make decisions about how to deal with Moscow. For many of the suspected Russian activities, such as blowing up a Georgian police car or plotting to kill an opposition figure -- or even the missile attack in Kodori in March -- it is difficult to understand what the Russians hoped to gain that would be worth the risk of exposure. Georgian officials often tell us that Russia has set out on a policy of regime change in Georgia. No doubt the Russians' would like to see Saakashvili removed, but the variety and extent of the active measures suggests the deeper goal is turning Georgia from its Euroatlantic orientation back into the Russian fold. Even the smaller of the active measures serve this purpose by promoting a sense of instability, which the perpetrators may hope will scare off Georgia's would-be European partners and/or provoke the Georgian leadership into a rash reaction that separates Georgia further from the West. As a high Russian FSB official reportedly told a Georgian counterpart recently, Russia's goal is not Abkhazia or South Ossetia, but all of Georgia (ref C). While the Russians typically make some efforts to reduce their fingerprints on actions -- making it hard to say with 100% certainty that they are responsible for many of them -- the cumulative weight of the evidence of the last few years suggests that the Russians are aggressively playing a high-stakes, covert game, and they consider few if any holds barred. End Introduction and Comment.
Direct Military Attack
----------------------
2. (C) Probably the most notorious recent incident was the missile attack on Georgian positions in the Upper Kodori Gorge on the night of May 11-12, 2007. As documented by a UN-led joint investigation, the attack included one or more helicopters that apparently fired a missile into the headquarters of the Georgian-backed "Government-in-Exile" of Abkhazia, as well as ground-fired missiles that struck near other targets in the area. UN investigators have told us privately that they agree with the Georgians that only Russia could have launched the attack, noting that while the final written report does not directly assign blame, "any reasonable person" would conclude from it that Russia was responsible (ref B). Russia did not make any serious effort to cooperate with the investigation, claiming its Caucasus radar systems were turned off at the time of the attack, leaving it with no records to share. Georgian officials strongly suspect that a subsequent violation of their airspace May 20 was a Russian attempt to plant false evidence regarding the ground-based firings, although in the end investigators did not visit the area in question.
3. (C) March 11 was not the first time the Russians were believed to have conducted a bombing raid on Georgian territory. Russian planes were widely believed to be responsible for a bombing of the Kodori in October 2001, and for bombings of the Pankisi Gorge, a Georgian area that borders Chechnya, in 2001 and 2002, drawing criticism from the USG and elsewhere in the international community, despite Russian denials of responsibility.
Murders and Attempted Murders
-----------------------------
TBILISI 00001732 002 OF 004
4. (U) On February 1, 2005 a bomb exploded in a car at the police station in Gori, the largest Georgian city close to South Ossetia, killing three Georgian police officers. Following an investigation, Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs Merabishvili said publicly that the bombing was masterminded by Russian military intelligence (GRU) officer Anatoly Sinitsyn (ref E), leader of the GRU team that was subsequently broken up in the September 2006 spy arrests (see paragraph 8).
5. (SBU) On June 8, 2006, neighbors approached a suspicious man loitering around the home of Koba Davitashvili, a leading opposition politician. The man fired two shots from a gun equipped with a silencer, slightly wounding one of the neighbors, and fled. He left behind a small bag that included a newspaper photo of Davitashvili and Russian cell phone company SIM cards. Following a Georgian investigation, Minister of Internal Affairs Merabishvili publicly identified the suspect as Giorgi Kurtaev, a Russian citizen who had been monitoring Davitashvili for several weeks, with one interruption for travel back to Russia. Following the June 8 incident Kurtaev fled again to Russia, from where Georgian officials unsuccessfully sought to extradite him. Georgian officials have stated publicly that the incident was a provocation perpetrated by a foreign intelligence service, and an attempt to discredit the Saakashvili government (ref H).
Sabotage
--------
6. (C) On January 22, 2006, near-simultaneous explosions in the Russian region of North Ossetia ripped into natural gas pipelines running from Russia into Georgia. Later that day, an explosion in the Karacheyevo-Cherkessia republic in Russia knocked out a high-voltage line supplying Georgia with electricity (ref M). The attacks immediately plunged Georgia into a major energy crisis, with virtually no ability to heat homes in the coldest part of winter. The Russian government claimed these were "terrorist" attacks, but Saakashvili repeatedly suggested the Russian government was responsible for the well-coordinated attacks in a heavily monitored part of the North Caucasus (ref N). This impression was further reinforced in Georgian minds by the fact that the gas magically resumed just as Armenia -- which receives its gas through Georgia -- was about to exhaust its reserves.
7. (C) In September 2006, the Georgian government arrested 29 activists of Igor Giorgadze's Justice Party on charges of planning an explosion outside the headquarters of the ruling National Movement, intended to be the prelude to a coup. Evidence included seized bombmaking equipment, recorded conversations, and the testimony of ten witnesses. Giorgadze himself is a former Georgian Minister of Security believed to be living in Russia to avoid a Georgian warrant for his arrest in connection with a 1995 assassination attempt against then-President Shevardnadze. His Justice Party has never been popular in Georgia, and it was widely believed that the party was funded almost exclusively from Russia (refs F and G). It is interesting that one of the defendants, Maia Topuria, has hired two U.S.-based lawyers and a Washington law firm to lobby NATO and NATO capitals over alleged rule of law abuses with regard to the case.
Espionage
---------
8. (SBU) Georgian authorities arrested four Russian military officers and eleven Georgians for espionage on September 27, 2006. The Georgian government subsequently released evidence collected over a long investigation, including video footage showing money being exchanged for documents, as well as audio tapes and transcripts of incriminating conversations between the Russian officers and their Georgian agents (ref D). According to the Georgian government, this Russian operation was conducted by the same GRU team responsible for the deadly Gori bombing in 2005. Georgia released the officers October 2, after which Russia cut air links to Georgia and began a campaign of deportation and harassment of Georgians living in Russia, reportedly resulting in four deaths of Georgian citizens.
9. (SBU) In April 2006, a pro-Kremlin television journalist in Moscow aired recorded cellphone conversations between Givi Targamadze, chair of the Georgian Parliament's Defense Committee, and contacts in the Lithuanian MFA and in Washington, in which Targamadze is critical of Belarusian opposition leader Alexander Milinkevich. In one recording Targamadze appears to speak of having Milinkevich killed. It is widely believed in Georgian political circles that Russian electronic eavesdropping is ever-present; this case appears to confirm that suspicion, with the eavesdroppers apparently deciding that the conversations -- perhaps doctored or
TBILISI 00001732 003 OF 004
selectively edited -- were so embarrassing to Targamadze and Milinkevich that it was worth it to make them public.
Support for Separatists
-----------------------
10. (C) The Russian government has provided direct, if at times thinly veiled, support to the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, without informing or obtaining the consent of the Georgian government. In South Ossetia, many de facto cabinet ministers and advisors to Kokoity are Russian officials -- in most cases believed to be FSB -- serving a rotation in South Ossetia before returning to work in Russia. It is widely understood that Russia is paying, in full or in part, the salaries of police and other civil servants in South Ossetia -- and that Russia recently increased these payments as a disincentive for South Ossetian officials to defect to the Georgian-backed temporary administrative unit of Dmitry Sanakoyev. The South Ossetians have reportedly received arms and equipment from Russia, including GRAD missiles, on various occasions, including during recent tensions (ref A). The Russians undertook a number of unilateral construction projects in South Ossetia in 2006 that they later claimed were in fulfillment of Russia's pledge to the OSCE donors' economic rehabilitation program, but in fact took place outside the donors' program as well as in violation of a 2000 agreement on Georgian-Russian economic cooperation that calls for economic projects in coordination with all sides. Russia is widely reported to be working on projects to connect South Ossetia to Russian gas and telephone networks. Russia has distributed passports widely to residents of South Ossetia (and Abkhazia) to such an extent that Kokoity has claimed to USG officials that 95 percent of the population of South Ossetia is made up of dual Russian citizens (refs I and O).
11. (C) The de facto government of Abkhazia appears to have a somewhat greater degree of independence from Moscow than does its counterpart in South Ossetia; Russia is considered more aligned with the Abkhaz opposition led by de facto vice-president Khajimba, who despite Russian backing lost the 2004 presidential contest to current de facto president Bagapsh. Nevertheless, it is clear Russia has great leverage over Bagapsh, who frequently travels to Moscow for consultations, not to mention a trip to Moscow for emergency medical treatment in April -- getting there, the Georgians tell us, on an FSB plane. Several sources have also told us that a senior FSB officer actually lives in a separate residence on Bagapsh's presidential compound. An Abkhaz representative told the Ambassador in the fall of 2006 that Russia was at the time putting strong pressure on Bagapsh to attack the Georgians in response to their successful operation in July in the Upper Kodori Gorge. Georgian officials do not believe that the Abkhaz were aware of the March Kodori missile attacks in advance, but that the Abkhaz are required to accept the Russians' use of their territory for such incidents. Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia have committed -- or permitted the Abkhaz to commit -- repeated violations of existing agreements (ref L).
Support for Minority Extremists
-------------------------------
12. (C) Georgian officials in Tbilisi and Akhalkalaki, as well as local community leaders and political activists, have confirmed that the Russian government has funded radical ethnic-Armenian nationalists in Samtskhe-Javakheti in a bid to destabilize this mutli-ethnic, politically fragile region. Tensions peaked during spring 2006 when scattered violent demonstrations occurred in Akhalkalaki in March (ref K), following the murder of an ethnic Armenian in the city of Tsalka, and on May 2 (ref J), when protesters briefly halted
SIPDIS the first stage of Russian base withdrawal. As the withdrawal moved ahead, disturbances in Akhalkalaki dropped off precipitously, lending credence to Georgian allegations that the tensions were being stoked by elements operating from within the Russian base.
Disinformation
--------------
13. (C) It is especially difficult to nail down the origin of any of the multitude of rumors, conspiracy theories, and political speculation in Georgia, but Georgian officials are convinced that Russian services are making an active effort to spread false information designed to undercut the Saakashvili government and to deflect responsibility for provocative actions away from Russia onto other alleged culprits. One particularly tangible example of disinformation serving Russian interests was a "Psychological Study" of Saakashvili widely disseminated by e-mail in January 2007 from an address purporting to be the "Georgian Association for Strategic and International Studies." The study makes a number of highly prejudicial judgments about
TBILISI 00001732 004 OF 004
Saakashvili, and diagnoses him as suffering from an "expansive type of paranoid dysfunction...combined with narcissist type of hysteroid personality." Post had never heard of the organization that distributed the study -- many recipients likely confused it with the respected Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, which receives support from the U.S. Embassy -- and a check of the Tbilisi street where it was supposedly located revealed that its address did not exist.
TEFFT
Thursday, 28 August 2008, 17:13
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 002211
SIPDIS
STATE FOR IO/UNP:KMOORE
EO 12958 DECL: 08/28/2018
TAGS ECON, EAID, UNSC, PREL, PGOV, FR, GG, UK, UP
SUBJECT: UK WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT GEORGIA; "ON THE SAME
PAGE" AS U.S. REGARDING OPPOSITION TO SOUTH OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA PARTICIPATION IN UNSC
REF: A. STATE 92325 B. STATE 92371
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Richard LeBaron, Reasons 1.4 b, d.
1. (C) Summary. The United Kingdom agrees that South Ossetian and Abkhazian representatives should not participate in UN Security Council (UNSC) meetings on Georgia, according to Mariot Leslie, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Director General (DG) for Defense and Intelligence. Leslie told the Charge August 28 that the UK shares the U.S. view on the importance of providing support to Georgia, including economic and development assistance. Recent Russian steps in Georgia represent a "strategic, tectonic shift in international relations," Leslie averred, citing Foreign Secretary Miliband's August 27 speech in Kyiv in which he warned Russian President Putin that he has a "big responsibility" not to start a new Cold War. End Summary.
Steps to Support Georgia
------------------------
2. (C) The Charge called on Mariot Leslie, the FCO DG for Defense and Intelligence and Acting Political Director, on August 28 to discuss recent developments in regard to Georgia and deliver ref demarches. Leslie affirmed that the U.S. and UK are "on the same page" that South Ossetians and Abkhazians should not participate in upcoming UNSC meetings on Georgia. She stated that the August 27 G-7 Joint Foreign Ministers Statement, which condemns Russia's recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence, "mostly covers" concerns about recent Russian steps. The UK, she continued, is "absolutely right along with you" and is trying to persuade others to follow the same course.
3. (C) Leslie said that HMG will continue to support economic and development assistance to Georgia. She noted that Foreign Secretary Miliband agreed with Secretary Rice about the importance of economic aid to Georgia and cited the August 25-27 U.S. interagency delegation led by Under Secretary of State Jeffery. She added that a team from the UK Department for International Development (DFID), recently completed a ten day visit to Georgia and is in the process of drafting a report of its mission. HMG will host high level economic discussions with a Georgian delegation soon in London to discuss economic and development assistance. (Note. Separately, Andrew Gleadle, from DFID,s Humanitarian Operations Team told Econoff that DFID would program the remaining GBP 1.5 million ($3 million) of its GBP 2 million Georgia assistance pledge based on the mission,s report. He expected DFID to focus on protection of human rights for displaced people seeking to return to their homes rather than food/shelter, as these needs were already being met by other donors. Also, Karen Pillay, Head of Middle East, CIS and Energy at HM Treasury told Econoff that HMG had received an economic assistance "wish list" from Georgia, but was awaiting the results of an IMF needs assessment. End Note.)
4. (C) Leslie stated that there "is lots going on" within the EU and that the EU Council meeting on Monday will consider the "crucial issue" of the next steps the EU should take regarding Russian actions and in support of Georgia. Within the EU, "one end of the scale" involves discussions of a possible ESDP presence in Georgia, while "economic aid acceleration" is also under discussion.
A Strategic Shift...But Not a New Cold War
------------------------------------------
5. (C) Leslie told the Charge that Russia's actions in Georgia represent a "strategic, tectonic shift in international relations." Citing Foreign Secretary Miliband's August 27 speech in Kyiv, Ukraine, in which Miliband affirmed that Putin has a "big responsibility" not to start a new Cold War, Leslie observed that HMG is "not calling this a new Cold War," although recent events have "strategic consequences" and mark the "end of the period that began in 1991." Leslie stressed that Miliband's clear condemnation in his speech of Russia's actions has helped put the Russians in the defensive position of having to justify
their actions -- "(Foreign Minister) Lavrov is on the run." (Note. Miliband's speech affirms "in the midst of the Georgia crisis...the commitment of the United Kingdom to support the democratic choices of the Ukrainian people" and states that "the sight of Russian tanks in a neighboring country on the fortieth anniversary of the crushing of the Prague Spring has shown that the temptations of power politics remain." The full text of the speech is available on the FCO's website, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/ End Note.)
6. (C) Asked by the Charge whether, in her view, Russia's decision to go into Georgia was part of an overall change of Russian strategy, Leslie replied that she is "still assessing if it was a strategic decision or a tactical decision with strategic consequences." Leslie stated that in her capacity as DG for Defense and Intelligence she would continue to evaluate "the big strategic challenge from Russia."
7. (C) In a separate meeting with Cabinet Office Director General for Foreign and Defense Policy Margaret Aldred to deliver ref points, she pointed to Foreign Secretary Miliband's speech in Kyiv as laying out HMG's strong condemnation of Russian actions in Georgia, including Moscow's recognition of the two breakaway Georgian enclaves. Echoing Leslie's comments, she told Pol Minister Counselor that Moscow's actions represented a "seismic shift" in international relations and a defining break with global relationships in place since the end of the Cold War. Turning to the situation on the ground in Georgia, Aldred said that the six-point peace plan negotiated by the French had "clearly" left room for Russian forces to remain "outside existing boundaries" and the Russians were taking "maximalist" advantage. The West needs to be thinking what its response will be to this, if the Russians continue this approach. She also referred to messages she had seen from Tbilisi indicating that there were voices in Georgia, as well, that wanted to resume military action -- the West had to send a message to Georgia as well warning against this.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
LEBARON
Friday, 18 April 2008, 15:31
S E C R E T LONDON 001115
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR PM ACTION TEAM
EO 12958 DECL: 04/18/2018
TAGS MOPS, MARR, PINR, PREL, UK
SUBJECT: HMG OUTLINES NEW PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING INTEL
FLIGHT CLEARANCES
REF: A. LONDON 1064
B. TREMONT-PM ACTION TEAM EMAIL APRIL 16
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly, reason 1.4, a/b/c/d.
1. (S/NF) Summary and Action Request. The UK Ministry of Defense summoned PolMilOff April 15 to receive the letter in para 2 on new procedures for requesting HMG permission to use UK territory to launch intelligence flights. This letter, evidently what DG Mariot Leslie was referring to in her April 14 meeting with DCM (ref a), requests that ALL future requests to use UK territory for intel flights be conveyed by Embassy London and be accompanied by enough information that ministers can fully consider whether sensitive missions might put the UK at risk of being complicit in unlawful acts. We understand that these additional precautionary measures stem from the February revelation that the USG transited renditioned persons through Diego Garcia without UK permission and HMG's resultant need to ensure it is not similarly blindsided in the future. Embassy London invites relevant USG agencies to convey concerns or questions that should be brought to MOD's attention in an initial meeting on the issue April 22. End Summary.
2. (S/Rel UK) Begin Text of Letter (note internal numbering):
9 April 2008
Dear Ms. Tremont,
UK INTELLIGENCE GATHERING FLIGHTS FROM UK BASES
1. I am grateful for your help in resolving the current issues regarding UK Government authorisation of U2 sorties flown from RAF Akrotiri, Cyprus, over Lebanon. While I am not suggesting that established procedures were not followed in this case, events have demonstrated that we need to set up a more formal mechanism for seeking agreement to the use of UK bases for intelligence flights which will enable any legal and political concerns to be addressed and resolved. This is particularly important for sensitive intelligence gathering operations, for example where information is passed to third parties. We would like to have a single US point of contact through which the requests would be routed. Given that flight missions may be directed by either State Department or the Pentagon (or possibly other agencies), it would seem sensible for all requests to be passed through the US Embassy in London to me.
2. We have a very good working relationship with EUCOM which uses well-established procedures for identifying and discussing the regular intelligence flights that the US undertakes from RAF Akrotiri and from RAF Mildenhall. MOD seeks approval of these missions from Foreign and Commonwealth Office as well as Defence Ministers, every four months (and we clear similar UK flights through the same process). To date, the details of these flights have been discussed at desk level, any concerns have been highlighted and resolved, and staffing action taken here to put the cases to Ministers along with any necessary supporting advice. In many respects, these flights have become routine, and the issues raised have not normally proved complex or overly sensitive.
3. However, recent U2 flights over Turkey/Northern Iraq, and the Lebanon, have highlighted important legal and political issues which require much more careful consideration by HMG. In both cases, intelligence product is intended to be passed to third party governments, and it is important for us to be satisfied that HMG is not indirectly aiding the commission of unlawful acts by those governments on the basis of the information gathered through the assistance we provide to the US. This is a very important point for UK Ministers, and it is now clear that the approvals procedures must be robust enough to capture and deal with these issues at an early stage. There are further forms of risk that we need to assess in putting the case for agreement to our Ministers, including the political risk that other governments become aware of, and potentially object to, the flights (hence our need to know flight profiles). In
particular, there are sensitivities with Government of Cyprus regarding the use of Sovereign Ba se Areas in Cyprus.
4. In the light of this, we feel that a formal approach should be made from the US Government to MOD, seeking approval for specified intelligence gathering flights using UK bases. We envisage this approach setting out the flight programmes, with sortie profiles and the other information provided by EUCOM, but also setting out in as much detail as possible: the purpose and scope of the mission; whether it is a national task or in support of a bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreement; which other nations have been informed of the mission and -- if the intelligence gathered is to be passed to a third party -- the purpose for which this is happening, the expected use to which the information will be put (and by which agencies of the third party), and an assessment of any legal or human rights implications. We would need to be informed of any changes to this information prior to revised missions being flown in order to ensure we had the required Ministerial approvals in place. As now, most if not all such flights can be captured in the current four-monthly approval cycle, but we stand ready to receive additional requests between each cyclical submission should flight profiles and/or missions be amended or added at short notice.
5. We will continue to liaise at the military-to-military level with EUCOM over flight details, but also wish to receive political and legal input, via the Embassy, from the appropriate USG agency. Naturally, approaches need to be made as early as possible to allow time for clearing queries and UK staffing (though we can and do turn round most requests very quickly).
6. I have attached a schedule of the missions that EUCOM have informed us that they would like to fly in the period 1 May - 31 August 2008. In order to start the new process I would be grateful if you could approach the relevant USG authorities to provide the additional information that I have mentioned for each mission type. I recognise that this may be a complex task but I think it will establish a firm foundation for the new procedure I have described.
7. I am sure you will understand the sensitivities involved in the use of UK bases for covert or potentially controversial missions, and hence our desire to formalise the approvals process in this way. I would be happy to discuss mechanics in more detail. We would, however, like to set up the new process as quickly as possible, and in time for the next four-monthly approval due at the end of April. I would welcome a meeting with you and your colleagues to assist in the setting up of the new process.
Yours sincerely,
W M Jessett (Director Counter-Terrorism and UK Operations (Policy))
Annex
A. Flights requested by EUCOM from 1 May - 31 August 2008 (In ref B)
End Text.
3. (S/NF) Comment. Embassy London would welcome other agencies' comments and questions for MOD on these new procedures; our first meeting to discuss this is scheduled for April 22. At first glance, we find them rather burdensome. For starters, we are reluctant to make Embassy London the POC on these requests, which had been worked successfully in mil-mil channels at EUCOM before now; this seems to be an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy. We further believe that the request to provide this amount of additional information for well-established missions scheduled to continue May 1, is an extremely tight deadline and we will push back on this requirement. Embassy London POCs for this issue are Pam Tremont (tremontpm@state.sgov.gov), and Col. Jeff Hosken (dihosja@dia.smil.mil).
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom LEBARON
Wednesday, 14 May 2008, 15:06
S E C R E T LONDON 001350
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR U/S ROOD, PM ACTION TEAM AND EUR/WE/UK
OSD FOR USDP EDELMAN
EO 12958 DECL: 04/24/2018
TAGS MARR, MOPS, PINR, PREL, LE, UK
SUBJECT: HMG RAISES THE BAR ON INTEL FLIGHTS
REF: A. STATE-LONDON SVTC MAY 9
B. LONDON 1159 C. MAY 1 GILLARD-TREMONT LETTER D. LONDON 1115 E. LONDON 1064 F. TREMONT-PMAT EMAIL APRIL 16
Classified By: DCM Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4, b/d.
1. (S/NF) Summary and Recommendation. FCO contacts explained May 14 that HMG's May 1 approval (ref C) for CEDAR SWEEP flights had been widely considered at MOD and FCO, with some departments flagging concerns about the information provided by the USG. HMG is concerned that the request for reconnaissance flights may have been made by the Lebanese MOD, rather than the entire GOL. Embassy will be receiving a new letter from HMG setting out that HMG approval for CEDAR SWEEP was based on the understanding that the flights are approved by the entire GOL. Secondly, FCO is concerned that human rights reports, including the State Department's own, do not reflect the sterling reputation of the LAF as conveyed in our April 14 request for use of Akrotiri airbase. HMG expects the United States to monitor use of the CEDAR SWEEP intel and ensure the LAF lives up to its commitment to maintain high human rights standards. Embassy London is concerned by HMG's piling on of concerns and conditions, which portend a burdensome process for getting the rest of our intel flights approved, per ref B. We recommend high level approaches to MOD and FCO counterparts to register concern about these new conditions. Embassy Beirut may also want to consider having the GOL engage the British directly. End Summary.
Concerns And/Or Implied Conditions
----------------------------------
2. (S/NF) John Hillman of FCO's Whitehall Liaison Department informed PolMilOff May 14 of several HMG concerns/conditions about CEDAR SWEEP that could jeopardize future use of British territory. First, Hillman said that the FCO regional bureau responsible for Lebanon had questioned USG assurances that the reconnaissance missions were requested by "the Government of Lebanon." The regional bureau was concerned that the request for reconnaissance assistance may have only been made by the Lebanese Ministry of Defense, rather the entire Lebanese cabinet, which apparently requires consensus on controversial issues. HMG believed the GOL could disavow assertions that it requested reconnaissance assistance if the flights were made public. Hillman said that HMG was "entitled to accept" the USG understanding that MOD was authorized to make the request on behalf of the entire GOL. HMG has sent Embassy London a follow-up letter (not yet received) emphasizing that HMG's May 1 approval was contingent on the understanding that the request was made by the GOL. Hillman said that, should the GOL disavow the request and it become clear that the entire GOL was not supportive of the flights, HMG would have difficulty approving the involvement of British territory in CEDAR SWEEP.
3. (S/NF) Second, Hillman said the FCO human rights department noted that, despite the Lebanese MOD's assurances that it would not use the shared intel unlawfully, Human Rights Watch and even the State Department's own Human Rights Report had documented cases of torture and arbitrary arrest by the LAF. Hillman underscored that if there were any risk that detainees captured with the help of CEDAR SWEEP intel could be tortured, HMG would expect the USG to impress upon the LAF that assurances of lawful treatment must be upheld in practice. Furthermore, Hillman said, to the extent that the USG becomes aware of arrests made as a result of CEDAR SWEEP intel, HMG expects the USG to ensure the detainees are treated lawfully. If the U.S. became aware of "reasons to doubt LAF assurances," HMG would expect to be notified immediately. Hillman noted that these human rights considerations would undoubtedly be reviewed in the next Cedar Sweep approval cycle.
Comment and Recommendation
--------------------------
4. (S/NF) Hillman emphasized that the decision to approve CEDAR SWEEP had been widely discussed in MOD and FCO, with the decision made by Minister Kim Howells, but even Foreign Secretary had been informed. He noted that "the highly cautious approach is a reflection of Parliamentary, public, and media attention to issues involving UK complicity in human rights violations."
5. (S/NF) Embassy London finds these additional conditions for HMG approval and assumptions about our ability to monitor every CEDAR SWEEP-related apprehension to be not only burdensome but unrealistic. We recommend that DOD and State officials raise with UK counterparts the concern that excessive conditions such as described above will hinder, if not obstruct, our cooperative counterterrorism efforts. While we share HMG's concerns that human rights not be sacrificed for the sake of CT, we cannot take a risk-avoidance approach to CT in which the fear of potentially violating human rights allows terrorism to proliferate in Lebanon. We also recommend that Embassy Beirut consider whether it would help to have the urge the GOL engage the British directly. HMG is supportive of the Siniora government and may be less rigid if asked to assist by the Siniora government itself. Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom TUTTLE
Tuesday, 20 May 2008, 18:08
S E C R E T LONDON 001412
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR U/S ROOD, PM ACTION TEAM AND EUR/WE/UK
OSD FOR USDP EDELMAN
EO 12958 DECL: 04/24/2018
TAGS MARR, MOPS, PINR, PREL, LE, UK
SUBJECT: DOD INTEL FLIGHTS: FCO CLARIFIES
REF: A. LONDON 1350 B. STATE-LONDON SVTC MAY 9 C. LONDON 1159 D. MAY 1 GILLARD-TREMONT LETTER E. LONDON 1115 F. LONDON 1064 G. TREMONT-PMAT EMAIL APRIL 16
Classified By: Political Counselor Richard Mills for reasons 1.4, b/d.
1. (S/NF) Summary. U.S.-UK talks on clearances for DOD intel flights had become "unnecessarily confrontational," FCO Director General for Defence and Intelligence Mariot Leslie told Acting U/S John Rood May 16. After reiterating the political sensitivities surrounding the Sovereign Base Areas (SBA) on Cyprus and the public and parliamentary pressure on HMG to maintain sovereign control of its territories (refs A, C, E, F), Leslie noted the USG use of Akrotiri had gotten "sloppy." She reiterated the value HMG placed on U.S.-UK cooperation, but noted HMG was now asking the USG to comply with the same clearance procedures HMG itself used for intel flights. She made no attempt to hide her annoyance that the FCO working level had ratcheted up conditions as outlined in ref A. Leslie distinguished between ordinary intel flights and those that were also "operational," such as CEDAR SWEEP, but maintained HMG insistence that all intel flight clearances must be sought in gov-gov channels, rather than the mil-mil channels used to date. End summary.
2. (S/NF) FCO Director General for Defence and Intelligence Mariot Leslie told Acting U/S John Rood May 16 that U.S.-UK talks on clearances for DOD intel flights had become "unnecessarily confrontational." She noted that HMG "desperately needs" the SBA for its own intelligence gathering and operations and was committed to keeping them available to the U.S. (and France). However, the Cypriots are hypersensitive about the British presence there and, she said, could "turn off the utilities at any time." That, combined with the "toxic mix" of the rendition flights through Diego Garcia, has resulted in tremendous parliamentary, public, and media pressure on HMG to maintain sovereign control of its territories, especially Akrotiri. Leslie noted that on a couple occasions recently the required process had not been followed, a process HMG requires of its own intel flights. She explained that because CEDAR SWEEP was an operational flight, as well as intel-related, "all sorts of additional UK legal obligations come into play," including the EU Convention on Human Rights. UK law mandates a "dual-key" approach for approving intel flights, requiring both MOD and FCO assent to ensure nothing unlawful is approved.
3. (S/NF) Leslie expressed annoyance at the additional conditions conveyed by the FCO working level on May 14 (Ref A), noting she had not been aware beforehand that such a message would be conveyed. In fact, she regretted the tenor of the discussions had turned prickly and underscored HMG appreciation for U.S.-UK military and intelligence cooperation. To set the record straight, she clarified that the follow-on letter from MOD, dated May 9 (emailed to PMAT Action Team May 19), was merely meant to lay out that the HMG approval for CEDAR SWEEP was based on the U.S. assurance that the operation had been requested by the Government of Lebanon and was being conducted in a permissive environment. The letter was not/not intended to question whether the U.S. had obtained full GOL (vice just MOD) approval for the operation or to put any additional conditions on it. Furthermore, regarding the May 14 expectation that the U.S. must follow up on all cases of alleged terrorists who were detained as a result of CEDAR SWEEP intel, Leslie said that was not at all what HMG intended to convey to the USG. In fact, ministers had merely wanted to impress upon the USG that they take the human rights considerations seriously. Leslie said as long as the USG understood this, the issue needed no further discussion. Rood affirmed that the message was received.
4. (S/NF) Leslie, however, was very frank that HMG did object to some of what the USG does (e.g. renditions) and therefore does have some redlines. Primarily, all requests for intel flights must come in writing from Embassy London to Mr. Will Jessett at MOD; phone calls, demarches, and non-papers will not suffice. A/U/S Rood pushed hard to keep the process in mil-mil channels, but Leslie was insistent that Foreign Secretary Miliband believed that "policy-makers needed to get control of the military." Leslie mandated that, for ordinary intel flights, the grid/chart format that EUCOM previously used would be acceptable if another column was added on the right that offered a very simple explanation and/or justification for the flight (e.g. "in support of the Camp David Accords"). But Leslie drew a sharp distinction between ordinary intel flights and those from which the USG shares intel with third parties. For the latter, she said, the more detailed submission discussed in ref E will be required. If a short notice approval were required, Embassy London should submit it in writing and HMG would do its best to push it through.
5. (S/NF) PolMilOff followed up with MOD contact Steve Gillard, in Will Jessett's office, May 19 to confirm MOD's understanding of Leslie's explanation. Gillard had not received a readout of the Leslie-Rood meeting but confirmed that her instructions would be authoritative. He committed to closing the loop with MOD and FCO working level contacts. Recognizing that DOD had already done much of the work on the expanded submission that now seemed unnecessary for most of the flights, Gillard welcomed more, rather than less, information. PolMilOff expressed concern that submitting unnecessary information could set a precedent and raise unrealistic expectations in HMG for what the USG would submit in the future. Gillard acknowledged this concern and noted he would welcome any additional information offered with a letter caveating that in the spirit of cooperation additional information was being submitted that will not be included in future requests for ordinary intel flights.
Comment
-------
6. (S/NF) A/U/S Rood's intervention has allowed us to obtain authoritative, albeit belated, guidance on HMG's requirements for DOD flight clearances. Despite forceful arguments to keep the approvals process in mil-mil channels, HMG was adamant that requests will have to come from Embassy London (either the Political or Defense Attache sections) to Mr. Will Jessett at MOD. For ordinary intel flights, this will involve OSD- and State-cleared instructions for Embassy London to deliver to MOD the grid normally constructed by EUCOM on a trimester basis, but with an additional column containing an explanation/justification for the operation. Embassy also recommends that another column be added explicitly stating whether the operation entails sharing intel with third parties. Ideally, the answer should be "no" for every operation on the grid, but the column would allow Embassy London to ensure only the ordinary intel flights are contained therein. For flights that involve intel sharing with third parties, a more detailed submission, as described in Ref E, will be required. We understand that DOD has already compiled this additional information as a result of the instructions we received at the working level. We recommend proceeding with the more detailed submission for all flights but including a cover letter noting that the additional information is provided as a courtesy and does not set a precedent for future submissions.
7. (U) A/U/S Rood has not had the opportunity to clear this cable. Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom TUTTLE
Thursday, 07 May 2009, 14:08
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 001082
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS (BINDI PATEL)
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EEB/IFD/OMA (MARLENE SAKAUE)
EO 12958 DECL: 05/07/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, EAID, CE, UK
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: UPDATE ON UK ACTION AND THINKING
REF: A. COLOMBO 479 B. LONDON DAILY - 30 APRIL 2009 C. LONDON DAILY - 13 FEBRUARY 2009 D. STATE 41959 E. LONDON 1041
Classified By: Political Counselor Richard Mills, reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C/NF) Summary. After giving a brief overview of UK Foreign Secretary Miliband's and a British Parliamentary Group's separate visits to Sri Lanka, Foreign Office Sri Lanka team leader Tim Waite and Desk Officer Sharon Diaz said May 7 that the UK plans to continue its "concerted drive to achieve a fully inclusive political settlement." Turning to next steps, Waite said the EU Troika is visiting Sri Lanka next week, and the UK hopes this will maintain "sustained pressure" on the Sri Lankan Government. Miliband and Kouchner plan to jointly host an "informal" meeting on the margins of the Middle East meetings taking place on May 11 in New York. Miliband also plans to raise Sri Lanka with USG officials during his May 12 visit to Washington. Additionally, Waite said the UK supports a special Human Rights Council session on Sri Lanka, and, according to Waite, HMT has decided to support the USG position delaying Sri Lanka's proposed Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF. Waite said that with UK elections on the horizon and many Tamils living in Labour constituencies with slim majorities, the UK Government is paying particular attention to Sri Lanka, with Miliband recently remarking to Waite that he was spending 60 percent of his time at the moment on Sri Lanka. End summary.
2. (C) FCO Sri Lanka team leader Tim Waite and Desk Officer Sharon Diaz told Poloff May 7 that the civilians caught in the conflict zone remain the UK's primary concern in Sri Lanka, followed by humanitarian access and addressing IDP needs. The UK Government has provided GBP 7.5 million (USD 11.25 million) since October 2008, including Prime Minister Brown's recent pledge of GBP 2.5 million (USD 3.75 million) in additional support.
Miliband and Kouchner Visit
---------------------------
3. (C) Waite described Miliband and French Foreign Secretary Kouchner's April 29 visit as "good," though Miliband was "disappointed" that the Sri Lankan Government did not permit Swedish Foreign Secretary Bilt to join the visit. Waite said Miliband's May 1 statement to Parliament highlighted the threefold purpose of his visit: "to highlight the need to bring the conflict to an end in a way that minimizes further civilian casualties; to press the case for the humanitarian relief effort to be ratcheted up, as the UN and EU have been calling for; and to make clear the need for a long-term political settlement that meets the aspirations of all communities in Sri Lanka." These remain the UK's primary objectives and were reflected in Miliband and Kouchner's joint article following the visit (reftel B).
4. (SBU) The UK continues to press on five specific humanitarian points: the need for visas to be issued swiftly to international humanitarian staff; the subject of travel permits for staff working on approved projects inside Sri Lanka; the need for full access to IDPs as soon as they have crossed the front line and the monitoring of all stages of screening; the need for a proper resettlement program with specific deadlines to fulfill the Government's commitment to have 80 percent of IDPs resettled by the year's end; and, to allow the distribution of sufficient food and medicine to meet the needs of civilians trapped in the conflict zone (reftel A).
LONDON 00001082 002 OF 002
Special Envoy Des Browne Finally Makes It to Sri Lanka
--------------------------------------------- ---------
5. (C) Waite said a cross party group of MPs visited Sri Lanka May 4-5 at the Sri Lanka Government's invitation, including the Prime Minister's Special Envoy for Sri Lanka Des Browne, the February 2009 appointment of whom the Sri Lankan Government has rejected (reftel C). Browne's visit was allowed by the Sri Lankan Government on condition that Browne was visiting in his capacity as an MP sitting on the cross party parliamentary group, which the UK agreed to. In their May 6 statement, the parliamentarians echoed the same themes as Miliband. Waite said they had found the situation in the IDP camps to be a "little bit better," but "not nearly as good as it should." Waite also reiterated that the UK Government still acknowledges Browne as the Prime Minister's Special Envoy, noting that Browne had been doing a lot of outreach to the Diaspora community resident in the UK.
India
-----
6. (C) Browne is currently in India, where Waite confessed he was having trouble getting meetings with the Indian Government's political level, presumably because of the elections underway. Waite characterized the Indians as "ambivalent" and unwilling to undertake any heavy lifting on Sri Lanka because it was "too sensitive" an issue during the elections.
Next Steps
----------
7. (C) The UK plans to continue its "concerted drive to achieve a fully inclusive political settlement," Waite said. The EU Troika is visiting Sri Lanka next week, and the UK hopes this will maintain "sustained pressure" on the Sri Lankan Government. Miliband and Kouchner plan to jointly host an "informal" meeting in New York on the margins of the Middle East meetings on May 11 (NFI). Miliband also plans to raise Sri Lanka with USG officials during his May 12 visit to Washington. The UK also supports a special Human Rights Council session on Sri Lanka, and, according to Waite, HMT has decided to support the USG position on delaying Sri Lanka's proposed Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF (reftels D, E).
Comment
-------
8. (C/NF) Waite said that much of HMG and ministerial attention to Sri Lanka is due to the "very vocal" Tamil Diaspora in the UK, numbering over 300,000 and who have been protesting in front of Parliament since April 6. He said that with UK elections on the horizon and many Tamils living in Labour constituencies with slim majorities, the Government is paying particular attention to Sri Lanka, with Miliband recently remarking to Waite that he was spending 60 percent of his time at the moment on Sri Lanka.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
TOKOLA
Tuesday, 08 September 2009, 15:27
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 000694
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/UMB
EO 12958 DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, KDEM, EAID, PINR, RS, MD
SUBJECT: VORONIN OFFERED LUPU A HUGE BRIBE IN
ATTEMPT TO SPLIT NON-COMMUNIST ALLIANCE
Classified by: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
REFS: (A) Chisinau 685;
1. (S) Summary: Presidential hopeful Marian Lupu (strictly protect) told the Ambassador about a private meeting on September 7 in which Acting President Voronin had offered him USD ten million dollars to form a "Left-Center" coalition government with Voronin as Speaker, Lupu as President, and Greceanii as Prime Minister. Lupu had refused, and said he was shocked the President thought he could be purchased that way. Lupu also related how he met in Frankfurt on September 5 with a representative of Russian President Medvedev. Lupu said the Russians were concerned about having Parliament Speaker Ghimpu as Acting President, and seemed to expect early repeat elections in Moldova in 2010. Lupu also said he is concerned that both Filat and Ghimpu will hold key positions, and he may be left with nothing, and so wants to ensure important government posts for members of his party. Lupu said that the Alliance has not yet worked out their plans for a government slate, and did not seem to be aware of the upcoming timeline for the current GOM to be dissolved on September 14. End Summary.
Voronin Offers Massive Bribe for Government Deal
--------------------------------------------- ---
2. (S) In a September 8 meeting with the Ambassador, Presidential hopeful Marian Lupu said that he had been invited September 7 to a private meeting at President Voronin's dacha at Condrita. In this one-on-one session, the Acting President had repeated his earlier proposal (Ref A) for forming a government with Voronin as Speaker, Lupu as President, and (current Prime Minister) Greceanii as PM. Lupu rejected the proposal, repeating his earlier explanation that this scenario would be bad for his party. Lupu said Voronin asked whether others, such as the American Ambassador, were putting pressure on him not to compromise -- Lupu said he had denied that this was the case.
3. (S) According to Lupu, Voronin then suggested that he understood Lupu had "many obligations," and openly offered a sum of USD five million if Lupu would agree to join the Communists. Lupu said he stated that he was not interested. According to Lupu, Voronin then doubled the offer to USD ten million, which he also turned down.
4. (S) Lupu then turned the tables on Voronin, and proposed guaranteed immunity from prosecution for Voronin and his family in return for the PCRM providing the required eight votes for his election as the opposition coalition candidate for President. Voronin again suggested that Lupu should think about his proposal, but Lupu said he had no choice now but to stay on his chosen path, and suggested Voronin think about his proposal. Lupu told the Ambassador that he had whispered this story to his wife, and that the two had been shocked that Voronin would think that Lupu could be purchased that way.
Lupu Met Russian Representative in Frankfurt
--------------------------------------------
5. (S) Lupu also described for Ambassador a secret trip he had taken on September 5 to Frankfurt to meet with a representative of President Medvedev's Administration. Most of the meeting focused on Russia's serious concerns about Ghimpu's pro- Romanian orientation. Lupu said he had given assurances, telling the Russians not to worry about Ghimpu. The Russian had mentioned the upcoming CIS Heads of State meeting (October 9 in Chisinau) and his concern that Ghimpu, who presumably would represent Moldova (in his capacity as acting President), would "say something embarrassing." Lupu had given assurances that he would personally work with Ghimpu on his public statement and ensure that he not say anything inappropriate. Lupu also told the Ambassador that he would tell Ghimpu that he
CHISINAU 00000694 002 OF 002
(Ghimpu) needed to be careful in what he said.
6. (S) Lupu said that during his 45-minute conversation with Medvedev's representative, the Russian had several times mentioned the possibility of early elections in 2010. Lupu presumed that the Russians were getting this notion from Voronin, and took it as a sign that the Communists were likely planning a strategy of forcing early elections.
Lupu Wants Role for His Party in New Government
--------------------------------------------- --
7. (C) Lupu told the Ambassador that he was concerned about the current division of power within the Alliance. He noted that Ghimpu holds the Speaker's job, and would nominate Filat as Prime Minister. If the Parliament failed to elect a President, Lupu said, he would be left with nothing. Lupu thus felt it necessary to secure a visible role for his party in the new government.
8. (C) According to Lupu, not only has the Alliance not yet agreed on the division of posts in their coming government, they have not even agreed yet on the principles for dividing the power. One formula Lupu suggested was the fair distribution of the 16 Minister positions among the four parties, according to the principle of equality, i.e. 4-4-4-4. On the other hand, Filat had earlier proposed that the distribution should be by parliamentary strength, along the lines of 6-4-4-2. Lupu noted that a reported proposal that Filat would compromise by offering one position to Urechean, for a 5-4-4-3 distribution was potentially more interesting, and said he would discuss this with Urechean and Ghimpu.
9. (C) An alternate proposal Lupu suggested for dividing power was to group the ministries, i.e. all law enforcement, all social/health, etc., and then divide these up among the parties according to the principle of which party had the best person for the position. Lupu said that he wanted the position of Minister of Economy for Valeriu Lazar. He said that he knew that Filat wanted the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs for Iurie Leanca. Lupu said he had no problem with Filat's proposal, and hoped Filat would accept his proposal.
10. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question about when the Alliance would resolve the power- sharing formula, Lupu suggested that they would talk about it this week. Lupu said that he and his coalition partners would be working as soon as possible to put together their proposals to have the list ready before Greceanii's government stepped down together with President Voronin on September 14, as is currently anticipated.
Comment
-------
11. (S) Though we have often heard stories of bribery and influence peddling within the GOM, Lupu's claim that Voronin offered him USD ten million to cut a power-sharing deal is the most brazen tale to date. It is possible Voronin did not believe Lupu would take the bribe, but had to be able to go back to his party saying that he had tried everything. At this point, Lupu, while insisting on his loyalty to the Alliance, is clearly not feeling very confident about the unfolding political drama. Lupu fears that the Communists will not vote for him, and that Moldova is on the road to repeat elections. He may be right. Or on the other hand, politics within the Party of Communists may change drastically after Voronin steps down as President. This could possibly encourage the moderate wing within the PCRM that supports giving the votes to Lupu (at least that is the hope being expressed by several opposition MPs).
CHAUDHRY
Friday, 04 April 2008, 06:57
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000932
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/03/2018
TAGS KDEM, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, RS
SUBJECT: SOLZHENITSYN AND METROPOLITAN KIRILL ON RUSSIA,
MEDVEDEV, UKRAINE
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason: 1.4 (d).
1. (C) Summary: In separate conversations recently, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Metropolitan Kirill criticized the decision to recognize Kosovo's independence and sharply condemned plans for Ukraine to move closer to NATO. Solzhenitsyn, who is partially paralyzed by a stroke, but remains alert and very engaged in current events, as his April 2 Izvestiya article on the Holodomor demonstrated, joined Kirill in voicing his concerns about poverty and the widening gap between rich and poor in Russia. Kirill again expressed optimism about prospects for better relations with Roman Catholic Pope Benedict and described his intention to attempt to jump-start an ecumenical dialogue under the auspices of the UN and, in the United States, via the National Council of Churches. Both Solzhenitsyn and Kirill were optimistic about prospects for Russia under Medvedev. End summary.
Solzhenitsyn on Town Hall Democracy, Medvedev, Kosovo, Ukraine and NATO
------------------------------------
2. (C) In a recent meeting, writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn received the Ambassador at his home outside Moscow. Solzhenitsyn, who will turn 90 this December has been in declining health for some time. A stroke has left his left arm paralyzed and his hand gnarled, but Solzhenitsyn's legendary energy was undiminished, and he was alert, spoke clearly, and, as the conversation showed, actively engaged with the events of the day. With Solzhenitsyn was his wife Natalya, who followed the conversation carefully, and did not hesitate to contradict her husband when she thought it necessary.
3. (C) As he had in a 2007 Der Spiegel interview, Solzhenitsyn positively contrasted the eight-year reign of Putin with those of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, which he said had "added to the damage done to the Russian state by seventy years of Communist rule." Under Putin, the nation was re-discovering what it was to be Russian, Solzhenitsyn thought, although he acknowledged that many problems remained; among them poverty and the widening gap between rich and poor.
4. (C) Solzhenitsyn enthusiastically told the Ambassador of the need to develop grassroots democracy through instruments of local self-government. Recalling his time in the United States, Solzhenitsyn called the Vermont town hall meetings he had witnessed the "essence of democracy." Putin's decision, following Beslan, to have governors appointed instead of elected had been a "mistake," Solzhenitsyn thought. He also dismissed the on-again, off-again conversations in Russia about the need to construct a genuine party system as "irrelevant." Solzhenitsyn thought it was necessary to elect officials directly, so that they could be held accountable for their actions.
5. (C) President-elect Medvedev struck Solzhenitsyn as a "nice, young man." Solzhenitsyn had not met him, but he guessed he was up to the "enormous challenge of repairing the damage done to Russian citizens during the Soviet period." His reference to the Soviet period caused Solzhenitsyn to worry that young Russians did not sufficiently appreciate the dangers of Soviet communism. It was essential, as well, that Russia re-assure the former Soviet states that it fully appreciated how "deformed" the Soviet system was, and was aware of the crimes, like the Holodomor, it had committed against Soviet citizens. (Note: on April 2, Solzhenitsyn joined the debate here about the famine in Ukraine in a brief article published in Izvestiya. In it, he recalls the 1921 famine that stalked the Urals and rejects the notion that the 1932 - 1933 famine was a an act of "genocide" against the Ukrainian people. Solzhenitsyn's article sparked a mini-controversy here, with Father Gleb Yakunin taking Solzhenitsyn to task for "attacking the first CIS state that condemned the communist genocide.")
6. (C) Solzhenitsyn repeated to the Ambassador his objection to independence for Kosovo. Why, he asked rhetorically, should the Serbs be held responsible for the sins of Milosevic? He was critical of plans to move Ukraine closer to NATO, although he didn't belabor the point. The more significant moment, he thought, was the reaction of the United States after 9/11, when Putin attempted to extend a helping hand. He cooperated in paving the way for U.S. bases in Central Asia and joined other foreign leaders in extending Russia's condolences to the American people. Solzhenitsyn hoped for a time when that spontaneous gesture by Putin would be fully reciprocated.
7. (C) Solzhenitsyn told the Ambassador that he continues to work actively in the archives, and it was clear from the topical references sprinkled throughout his conversation that he followed current events actively.
Kirill on Ecumenicalism, Medvedev, the Hazards of Prosperity
----------------------------------
8. (C) In a separate meeting, Metropolitan Kirill re-visited themes he had touched on in the media and in earlier conversations with Ambassador. Kirill seemed to be in good health was preoccupied as always with the, in his view, excessive emphasis on the individual in the West, and stressed the need to harmonize traditional human rights concerns with "morality and ethics." Economic progress had been a two-edged sword for Russia, Kirill thought. With prosperity, Russians had "lost something" and Kirill, who is Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, pointed to less prosperous Smolensk as "better preserved" than Moscow or St. Petersburg.
9. (C) Kirill spoke highly of a UN-sponsored effort to bridge the gap between East and West by seeking an alliance of civilizations. Kirill was attempting to interest the UN in his efforts to sponsor ecumenical dialogue especially, he said, in the Middle East. As he has in past conversations, Kirill contrasted Roman Catholic Pope Benedict favorably with his predecessor John Paul II, and again held out the prospect of significant improvement in Russian Orthodox - Roman Catholic relations. Also on the ecumenical front, Kirill reported to the Ambassador efforts, via the Russian Orthodox Church of America and the National Council of Churches to reach out to Protestant denominations in the U.S.
10. (C) Kirill joined Solzhenitsyn in identifying enduring poverty as one of the chief challenges that President Medvedev will face. He called poverty as a by-product of corruption and red tape which were "stumbling blocks" to progress in Russia. Kirill, who unlike Solzhenitsyn has had a number of direct conversations, was optimistic that the President-elect was equal to the tasks ahead, and predicted that he would concentrate on Russia's many socio-economic problems.
11. (C) While Kirill largely echoed Solzhenitsyn's arguments against Kosovo independence, he was even sharper than Solzhenitsyn about NATO expansion. Ukraine was "not ready," and NATO membership could cause a split in that country's population, and created turmoil in Eastern Europe, he maintained. BURNS
Thursday, 23 October 2008, 13:28
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASHGABAT 001399
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB
EO 12958 DECL: 10/22/2018
TAGS PREL, PINR, EPET, EINV, ETRD, EWWT, SCUL, RS, TX
SUBJECT: EXPAT SOURCES SAY THAT ITERA GAVE TURKMENISTAN A
YACHT WORTH 60 MILLION EURO
REF: 07 ASHGABAT 968
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Sylvia Reed Curran for reasons 1. 4 (B) and (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: According to expatriate sources in Ashgabat, a yacht that recently set sail on the Caspian Sea -- reportedly worth 60 million euros -- is actually a gift from Russian company Itera. Itera is working on signing a deal jointly with Russian state-owned companies Rosneft and Zarubezhneft and Turkmenistan's Turkmenneft to develop blocks 29, 30, and 31 in the offshore Caspian area at some point in 2008. According to news reports, Itera is also an enthusiastic partner in the development of the Avaza free tourist zone located on the Caspian Sea, is funding the Ashgabat branch of the Gubkin Oil and Gas University, and is involved in importing farm equipment from Tatarstan, in competition with John Deere and Case New Holland equipment. In addition, the government forced a Swedish-owned shipping company to give up seven of its most valuable employees to become permanent crew on the yacht. Itera's business activities are wide-ranging and difficult to isolate, and the reported gift of the yacht serves as a sign that the company's willingness to go to great lengths to win business should not be underestimated. END SUMMARY.
AT FACE VALUE, TURKMENISTAN HAS A NEW YACHT
2. (U) The top story in the October 1 edition of official Russian-language newspaper "Neytralniy Turkmenistan" announced the acquisition of an Italian-built yacht called "Galkynysh" ("Revival") that will sail on the Caspian Sea. President Berdimuhamedov held a meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers on September 30 on board the ship. The article implied that the ship would be the first in a fleet of boats to float in the Caspian in support of the Avaza Free Tourism Zone (reftel). President Berdimuhamedov appeared in one photograph sporting a navy blue sailing cap, a French-style white and blue striped shirt, and binoculars hanging around his neck.
HOWEVER, ONE EXPAT LOST EMPLOYEES TO THIS YACHT...
3. (C) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Turkmenistan permanently took several of his employees to serve as crew on the presidential yacht. XXXXXXXXXXXX said in a meeting on October 23 that while he was out of the country on holiday, his staff contacted him with the news that the government wanted to borrow or take three important GAC employees: a master, a chief mate, and a chief engineer. The men, however, did not want to go. Less than three days later, his office called him again with the news that security officials were boarding boats as they came into the harbor and taking boat documents, essentially immobilizing them. XXXXXXXXXXXX flew back from Thailand and tried calling Turkmenbashy International Seaport Head Meylis Mutdikov, whose father is a "shadow figure" behind a minister or chairman in the Cabinet of Ministers. Mutdikov wouldn't take XXXXXXXXXXXX's phone calls for several days, but XXXXXXXXXXXX finally made an appointment to meet with Mutdikov in Turkmenbashy. In the middle of the meeting, Mutdikov acted oddly: quite abruptly, he stopped talking and swung his chair around away fromXXXXXXXXXXXX to face the wall. After several moments of awkwardness, XXXXXXXXXXXX asked the interpreter what was the matter, and the interpreter told XXXXXXXXXXXX that Mutdikov was upset that XXXXXXXXXXXX had failed to react quickly to the directive to give up the GAC employees, so now Mutdikov was ignoring XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX practically had to prostrate himself to get the conversation back on track, repeating that the relationship with the harbor authorities is very important, GAC respects Mutdikov, Mutdikov should have called XXXXXXXXXXXX directly, etc. XXXXXXXXXXXX then had to tell Mutdikov that GAC fired the chief engineer because he refused to take the job on the yacht,
ASHGABAT 00001399 002 OF 003
which Mutdikov accepted. After XXXXXXXXXXXX successfully made amends with Mutdikov, the government flew the three former GAC employees to either Mariopol or Rostov to bring the yacht through the canals to the Caspian Sea, at which time the government told GAC to supply four more crew to serve on the yacht. Mutdikov at first said that GAC would only have to loan the personnel temporarily, but a few days later informed XXXXXXXXXXXX that they would not return to GAC. Mutdikov also told XXXXXXXXXXXX that the government is matching the captain's GAC salary of about $2,000 per month in salary.
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that personnel on board the presidential yacht must be ethnic Turkmen, and the professionals must have internationally recognized certificates. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that there are few such professional sailors in Turkmenistan, and there were only four or five in GAC, all of whom were either trained by GAC or whose certificates were financially sponsored by GAC.
5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Turkish company TACO built the ship bay for the presidential yacht, located by the presidential palace in Turkmenbashy. Security forces closed off the entire port for two days for the construction of this ship bay complex, which includes two helipads.
...AND, ACCORDING TO ANOTHER: YACHT WAS A GIFT FROM THE COMPANY ITERA
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said in a meeting XXXXXXXXXXXX that this yacht worth 60 million euros was a gift of Russian firm Itera. He added that the president had originally wanted a larger yacht similar to one owned by Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich, but that yacht would not fit through the canals leading to the Caspian Sea and thus Berdimuhamedov had to settle for this one. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that Berdimuhamedov's pool of automobiles consists of a Bentley, a Mercedes Maybach (gift of a German company), a Range Rover, and a Cadillac Escalade. According to this source, Itera will build a urea/ammonia plant in Belek, Bekdash, or Turkmenbashy.
ITERA'S ACTIVITIES IN TURKMENISTAN IN 2008
7. (U) According to various open source reports, Itera officials have frequently met with President Berdimuhamedov since the end of 2007:
-- On December 27, Itera Holdings Chairman of the Board Igor Makarov and Berdimuhamedov discussed projects such as development of oil and gas fields on the Caspian shelf and in the Karakum, construction of facilities for gas transportation, a carbamide plant, and creation of iodine-bromine production. The same report also said that Itera would fund the Ashgabat branch of the Russian Gubkin State Oil and Gas University in Ashgabat, implement projects in Avaza, construct an office building in Ashgabat, and participate in construction of highways and rail lines.
-- At a meeting on February 18, the president said that Itera has proven itself as one of Turkmenistan's "old and reliable partners." Makarov submitted a project for a five-star, 110-room hotel in Avaza. (NOTE: Turkmenistan celebrated "Flag Day" on the February 19 and held meetings with various companies the preceding day. END NOTE.)
-- A delegation of Itera's top management held talks with Turkmen officials on March 9 to discuss a production sharing agreement for three blocks of the Caspian Sea shelf and to receive a license to survey and develop a new block. The article added, "If Itera gets the license, it is likely to engage Zarubezhneft and Rosneft as partners."
ASHGABAT 00001399 003 OF 003
-- In April, Itera CEO Vladimir Makeyev announced that the company, within the framework of the Zarit joint venture, expected to sign a production sharing agreement to develop blocks 29, 30, and 31 in the offshore Caspian area at some point in 2008. Zarit was set up in 2002 and is comprised of Itera, the Russian state-owned companies Rosneft and Zarubezhneft, and Turkmenistan's Turkmenneft. Makeyev acknowledged in the April report that issues with Iran -- one of the blocks is located in a disputed area of the Caspian Sea -- remain unresolved. Makeyev said that Itera was discussing working on gas extraction in inland areas as well.
-- On June 11 in Ashgabat, Makarov gave the president a report on construction of a hotel in Avaza, a stadium in Turkmenabat, and progress on the carbamide plant construction project. In addition, Makarov updated Berdimuhamedov on preparation for joint activities in the Karakum Desert including development of deposits and construction of relevant infrastructure, in particular laying gas pipelines.
-- The official Turkmen television news program Watan showed Makarov visiting President Berdimuhamedov at the guesthouse in Kazan where Berdimuhamedov stayed during his official visit to Tatarstan on June 28, 2008.
-- On August 16, MRK Energy DMSS, an Emirati-based subsidiary of Itera, announced the sale of 400 Russian-made UAZ39629-016 ambulances worth $8 million to Turkmenistan.
-- On the day of the ship's introduction -- September 29 --Berdimuhamedov discussed the construction of a carbamide plant and a spa, as well as opportunities for Itera's participation in exploration in offshore deposits with Makarov at the Serdar Hotel in Turkmenbashy.
"NOTHING IS FREE IN THIS COUNTRY"
8. (C) COMMENT: Itera has a deal to build a urea/ammonia plant, and also an $8 million deal for ambulances, but there are most likely other deals of which post is not aware. The company undoubtedly really wants a gas exploration contract, especially onshore, and the gift of the yacht is a nice enticement to move the process along. As local businessman XXXXXXXXXXXX said, "The gift of a yacht might be for an onshore gas deal, a chicken farm, or works already in progress. Nothing is free in this country." IPC Group, official distributors of John Deere and Case New Holland equipment in Turkmenistan, have had concerns about Itera and the company's ability to take over the farm equipment market in Turkmenistan at least since Berdimuhamedov's visit to Tatarstan. Itera's business activities are wide-ranging and difficult to isolate, and the reported gift of the yacht serves as a sign that the company's willingness to go to great lengths to win business should not be underestimated. END COMMENT. CURRAN
Tuesday, 13 October 2009, 12:31
C O N F I D E N T I A L ASHGABAT 001288
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN; EEB; NEA/IR
ENERGY FOR EKIMOFF/BURPOE/COHEN
COMMERCE FOR EHOUSE
EO 12958 DECL: 10/13/2019
TAGS PGOV, PINR, ECON, ENRG, TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN: FORMER DEPUTY CHAIRMAN FOR OIL AND
GAS TACHBERDI TAGIYEV ARRESTED
REF: ASHGABAT 0876
Classified By: Charge Sylvia Reed Curran for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Former Deputy Chairman for Oil and Gas Tachberdi Tagiyev was arrested in mid-September allegedly on suspicion of corruption, according to multiple sources in the expat business and foreign diplomatic community. Tagiyev was serving at the time as head of the oil refinery at Turkmenbashi. According to our sources, Tagiyev's houses and vehicles in Ashgabat were also seized.
2. (C) Always also mentioned in the same breath as Tagiyev's arrest is a rumored internal investigation of Berdimuhamedov's son-in-law, Dovlet Atabayev, who heads the London office of the State Agency for Management and Use of Hydrocarbon Resources. Supposedly, the young man is in trouble for having acquired some nice real estate in the London area.
3. (C) COMMENT: When Tagiyev was fired in July (reftel), the suspicion was that it was connected with the dispute with Gazprom. Someone had to take the blame for the problems with Russia, and it could not be the President. Suspected corruption could also have been a factor. It was widely known during Tagiyev's time as Deputy Chairman that in order for energy companies to get high-level meetings (including with President Berdimuhamedov), a little "something, something" should be offered to the various gatekeepers, including Tagiyev. Since many officials are involved in corruption, corruption itself is rarely the issue. Sometimes the official has irritated the President for other reasons, and corruption is the handy excuse for prosecution. Often, as may have been the case with Tagiyev and may be the problem with the son-in-law, ostentatious corruption lands these officials in hot water. END COMMENT. CURRAN
Friday, 18 December 2009, 13:57
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASHGABAT 001633
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
EO 12958 DECL: 12/17/2019
TAGS PGOV, PINR, TX
SUBJECT: BERDIMUHAMEDOV AND TURKMENISTAN'S RULING FAMILY
REF: ASHGABAT 1503
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Sylvia Reed Curran. Reasons 1.4 (B) a nd (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Turkmen President Berdimuhammedov is vain, fastidious, vindictive, a micro-manager, and a bit of an Ahal Teke "nationalist." He also is the only son in a family of eight children. His father is a retired prison guard with the rank of colonel. The father, many in Turkmenistan think, is more intelligent than the son. Berdimuhamedov reportedly has a Turkmen wife and a Russian mistress. He has two daughters and a son with his Turkmen spouse and a daughter with his Russian wife. One of his sons-in-law runs the London office of the Turkmen State Agency for Management and Use of Hydrocarbon Resources. His other daughter lives with her husband, a diplomat, in Paris. XXXXXXXXXXXX 2. (C) President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov is the "decider" for the state of Turkmenistan. Since his word is often law, it is beneficial to understand what makes him tick and to know something about those closest to him, his family. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Berdimuhamedov is vain, suspicious, guarded, strict, very conservative, a practiced liar, "a good actor," and vindictive (reftel). XXXXXXXXXXXX said that while he usually forgets something after a few months or a year, Berdimuhamedov never forgets. Our source described Berdimuhamedov as a micromanager. He said that the president signs off on work schedules for experienced doctors.
3. (C) Our source said Berdimuhamedov is very clean and neat and requires all around him to be the same. XXXXXXXXXXXX When Berdimuhamedov became the head of a dental clinic, he insisted that the other men who worked there had creases in their pants. About 30 years ago, when Berdimuhamedov owned an old Russian car, he would leave it at home if it rained and take a taxi instead.
4. (C) Berdimuhamedov apparently does not think all Turkmen are the same. He once told our source that the true and first Turkmen come from the area between Kaka and Baharly in Ahal Province. Other people are not real Turkmen.
5. (C) Berdimuhamedov does not like people who are smarter than he is. Since he's not a very bright guy, our source offered, he is suspicious of a lot of people. Our source claimed Berdimuhamedov did not like America, Iran, or turkey, but likes China. (COMMENT: Berdimuhamedov probably views other countries in terms of what they can do for him and his country, rather than in terms of like or dislike. END COMMENT.) He also asserted that the president is not fond of either Uzbek President Karimov or Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev.
BORN OF GOODLY PARENTS
6. (SBU) Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov's father, Myalikguly Berdimuhamedov, worked as a senior Interior Ministry officer in a prison guard detachment. He retired as a Colonel of
ASHGABAT 00001633 002 OF 002
Internal Troops. In local public opinion, the father is rumored to be far more intelligent than his son. The president's mother was a housewife. The president's parents now live with their son in the official residence in Firuza Valley, which is 19 km from Ashgabat. His grandfather Berdimuhamed Annayev was the principal of a school in his native village of Izgant.
WIFE, MISTRESS AND CHILDREN
7. (C) Berdimuhammedov is married and has two daughters and one son, Serdar. The oldest daughter is married to Yhlasgeldi Amanov, who is a representative of the Turkmen Agency for Use and Management of Hydrocarbon Resources for Europe, posted in London. His other daughter lives with her husband, who works at the Turkmenistan Embassy in Paris. A local Turkmen entrepreneur claims this daughter has a villa on the Cote d'Azure in southern France. There is a rumor among Ashgabat residents that Berdimuhamedov has a mistress, in addition to his Turkmen wife, who is reportedly very conservative. The mistress is supposedly an ethnic Russian by the name of Marina. She was reportedly a nurse at a dental clinic where Berdimuhamedov worked earlier in his career, and has a 14-year old daughter with the president. Berdimuhamedov's wife has reportedly been living in London since 2007.
SISTERS-HOUSEWIVES, SISTERS-TEACHERS AND SISTERS-BUSINESSWOMEN
8. (SBU) Berdimuhamedov is the only son in his family of eight children. One of the younger sisters teaches at the Turkmen National Economy University; another, the youngest one, is a housewife married to a Central Bank employee. His second oldest sister, Aynabat Berdimuhamedova, actively exploits the influence of her brother.10. (SBU) COMMENT: Berdimuhamedov has gone to great lengths to conceal information about his family and personal life from the public. For a public figure who tries to project an image as a renaissance man, whether it be author, surgeon, pilot, sportsman or statesman, the failure to cultivate a "family man" image leaves a void that the public is ready to fill. END COMMENT. CURRAN
Friday, 17 April 2009, 10:42
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000980
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/16/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, KCOR, KDEM, ECON, ETRD, RS
SUBJECT: C-RE8-02308 LUZHKOV'S FOREIGN POLICY: PERSONAL
MOTIVES CLOAKED IN NATIONALISM
Classified By: Acting DCM Alice Wells. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (SBU) Summary: The Moscow City government has cultivated its influence in far-flung Russian regions as well as in foreign countries, ostensibly for the benefit of its citizens but to a greater extent for the city's well-connected business elites. Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov's personal oversight of these activities exceeds the typical engagement and powers utilized by mayors/governors. Unbeknownst to most Muscovites, Luzhkov uses the huge Moscow City budget and multiple corporate revenue streams to invest in less than transparent economic projects and to promote his nationalist foreign policy agenda including, some contend, separatist movements in the Ukraine and Caucasus. Luzhkov is careful not to stray too far into the policy realm, focusing his efforts, in the name of the city, primarily on financial gains for himself and his influential business supporters. End Summary.
2. (SBU) The Moscow City government, personified by Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, maintains influence in many diverse Russian regions far from the capital, as well as in some foreign countries. Conversations with representatives from the Moscow Mayor's office, think tanks and XXXXXXXXXXXX revealed that Luzhkov's involvement far exceeds the typical powers wielded by other mayors or governors.
Moscow City Government Power and Budget
---------------------------------------
3. (C) The city of Moscow, one of 83 geopolitical units that comprise the Russian Federation, is entitled under the Russian Constitution to conduct its own foreign economic and even political relations. In fact, the city's Department of Economics and International Relations falls directly under the purview of Moscow Mayor Luzhkov. According to that Department's Acting chief, Vladimir Lebedev, while Moscow manages its own "international relations" with foreign countries and institutions, it does not have a right to its own "foreign policy." Lebedev highlighted Luzhkov's interest not in policy, but in directing the huge Moscow City budget, and the many corporate revenue streams that are important to the city's economic well-being in ways that further strengthen Moscow's already widespread influence.
4. (C) According to Lebedev, there are more than 160 international agreements in effect between Moscow and foreign cities and countries. Moscow inherited some agreements from the Soviet period, such as those that govern city-financed projects in Montenegro and the Czech Republic. However, other economic, political, cultural and interregional agreements were concluded more recently with such countries as Moldova, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Lebedev admitted to us that it is sometimes more practical to make agreements, including ones related to construction or health, on a city level as opposed to a federal level. He said that Moscow City's Department of Culture, Department of Health, and Department of Education combined spend about 600 million rubles a year on such international projects. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX however, Muscovites are largely unaware of these projects since they are not mentioned on television and the only public information available about the Moscow City budget is a small uninformative blurb on the Moscow City government website.
Luzhkov Throws His Weight Around in Ukraine and the Baltics
--------------------------------------------- --------------
5. (C) The Russian language plays an important role in Ukraine, while Russian citizenship is a key issue in the Baltics. According to Lebedev, rather than supporting Russian nationalism, the Moscow City government is merely trying to support the flourishing of Russian culture and ethnic Russians in general in these countries. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us April 3 that Luzhkov has been channeling funds to particular ethnic Russian organizations in Ukraine and the Baltics at the behest of the Russian government, thereby giving the GOR plausible deniability when accused of funding certain political parties.
6. (C) Ukrainian President Yushchenko plays a careful game with Russia for domestic and foreign audiences, experts have noted, but drew a clear line when he declared Luzhkov persona non grata. Luzhkov reportedly is undeterred, and has sanctioned the ongoing funding of the Russian nationalist group "The Russian Community in Crimea." The city of Moscow
MOSCOW 00000980 002 OF 003
owns approximately 150 properties in the Crimea, including spas and recreation centers on the Black Sea. Lebedev repeated for us Luzhkov's long, loudly espoused view that Khrushchev's "gift" of Crimea to Ukraine was illegal. While Luzhkov is no longer able to do business in Ukraine, he is closely linked to the entertainer XXXXXXXXXXXX and other allies who reportedly represent Moscow-based mafia business interests in Ukraine. This year, for Victory Day on May 9, the Moscow government will give about USD 30 to 600 Sevastopol war veterans who were disabled in World War II.
7. (C) Lebedev told us that in 2008, the Moscow City government invested in a Latvian auto plant, Amo Plant, as a means of ensuring there would be no interruptions in its supply of parts to Moscow-based auto plants, which could have contributed to unemployment just before year-end holidays. XXXXXXXXXXXX blasted Luzhkov for using city government money for such purposes, charging that oligarchs, especially major industrialists and wealthy oil and gas developers, are in cahoots with the government to finance factories and enterprises in places like Latvia. XXXXXXXXXXXX was outraged over the lack of transparency or control over the Moscow City budget. He argued that the Moscow City government's ultimate goal was to make money, including by renting buildings in other countries to Moscow-based businessmen for their commercial activities there. He charged that such transactions often involve corruption.
Luzhkov's Penchant for Separatist Regions
-----------------------------------------
8. (C) Luzhkov has long been interested in separatist regions of neighboring countries, including South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, and Transnistria in Moldova. According to Carnegie Moscow Center's Greene, he often pairs up with strong men who are regional leaders with an authoritarian leadership style, who are readily available in places like South Ossetia and Adjaria. It is advantageous for Luzhkov to strike deals in these regions because their peculiar legal status provides the Moscow City government with opportunities. Political tension can make for a lucrative business environment, but Lebedev insisted that the Moscow City government's idea is not to fan political issues in these regions and that the involvement is not political. He point blank told us that "the Moscow City government does not try to promote separatist movements." Lebedev used the example of buying vineyards in Moldova to showcase for us how the government is making economic investments.
Dabbling in Other Countries
---------------------------
9. (C) Luzhkov also has directed that the Moscow City government increase investment in Uzbekistan, Kosovo, Bulgaria and Israel. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Luzhkov uses his long-time relations with Uzbekistan President Karimov to play a cautious intermediary role for him with Russian authorities. In Kosovo, Luzhkov used Moscow City government funds to build housing for ethnic Serbian refugees from other parts of Kosovo. In Bulgaria, along the Black Sea, Lebedev stated, the Moscow City government's only interest in real estate acquisition was to give "orphans" a sunny place to vacation. Mitrokhin told us that these Black Sea resorts are exclusively for Moscow City government employees and their children. As for Israel, Lebedev told us that the Moscow City government is considering buying property on both the Israeli and Jordanian sides of the Dead Sea for a medical base. Luzhkov has his hand in pies from Montenegro to Siberia to Vietnam. According to Lebedev, the Moscow City government invests massive amounts of money in the giant company Sistema, which buys and sells real estate in Montenegro. Luzhkov has also concluded deals, on behalf of business associates, for the Moscow city government to import fish and rice from Vietnam, and he has used his influence with Hanoi to assist his business community supporters in capitalizing on Vietnam's inexpensive labor force for cheap auto production.
What's in it for Luzhkov and the Kremlin?
-----------------------------------------
10. (C) When it comes to foreign business dealings, Luzhkov sets his own agenda, not the Kremlin, though he is careful not to contravene Kremlin priorities by consulting closely with foreign policy insiders. By letting Luzhkov take the lead in espousing nationalist views, the GOR unofficially conveys certain ideas while enjoying deniability. Luzhkov is strategic about where and in what he invests. The size and scale of the investments he makes on behalf of the city and
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which he directs private businesses to undertake are clearly political, but also motivated by personal financial interests, especially when they involve construction contracts for his wife's building empire. Critics note that projects outside of Russia will ensure personal returns after he leaves office (should that ever happen). In the end, Luzhkov's powers as mayor are such that he can pursue his own foreign policy agenda at the expense of most Muscovites. Based on the fortune he has amassed using Moscow City government resources and through his billionaire wife's company, Inteko, he is able to operate in Moscow and beyond virtually unchecked. BEYRLE
Tuesday, 27 October 2009, 15:17
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 001187
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/23/2026
TAGS PGOV, PREL, IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: SCANDALS TAKING TOLL ON BERLUSCONI'S
PERSONAL AND POLITICAL HEALTH
REF: ROME 1143
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Classified By: Ambassador David H. Thorne for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C/NF) SUMMARY. Though PM Berlusconi's parliamentary majority is strong, and nobody is yet willing to predict his political demise, a growing list of scandals, adverse court decisions and health issues have weakened him and led some erstwhile Berlusconi allies to begin hedging their bets on his political longevity. In a souring political environment, talk of conspiracy theories often trumps real political debate and distracts the Berlusconi government from pursuing, or even developing, a coherent political agenda. END SUMMARY.
PRIVATE MATTERS WEIGHING ON BERLUSCONI
2. (SBU) After a long hot spring and summer of personal and professional scandals, PM Berlusconi, returning from the August recess appeared briefly rejuvenated by a successful G8 summit and continued popularity with his base. However, the first of several blows fell on October 7 when a civil court ruled that the Berlusconi family's flagship business, Finnivest, must pay a rival company Euro 750 million for damages occurred as a result of a Finnivest lawyer bribing a judge in a decision involving both companies. Two days later, the Italian Constitutional Court concluded that one of the Berlusconi government's first pieces of legislation, a 2008 law postponing criminal investigations against Berlusconi and other senior officials, was unconstitutional (REFTEL). As a result, Italian magistrates have, once again, taken up several long-standing criminal cases against Berlusconi, with one case due to resume as early as November.
3. (C/NF) Two officials personally and professionally close to Berlusconi, in separate conversations with the Embassy, recently described the Prime Minister in strikingly similar terms. Council of Ministers U/S Gianni Letta told the Ambassador October 23 that Berlusconi is "physically and politically weak," describing the normally hyperactive Berlusconi as "not energetic." Longtime Berlusconi friend, Senate Defense Committee President Giampiero Cantoni, told an Embassy political officer October 22 that, "we are all worried about his health," noting that Berlusconi has fainted three times in public in recent years and that his medical tests have come back "a complete mess." Cantoni said Berlusconi's frequent late nights and penchant for partying hard mean he does not get sufficient rest. The Italian press reported October 27 that Berlusconi has a mild case of scarlet fever, which he reportedly contracted from his grandchild. (Note: Berlusconi dozed off briefly during the Ambassador's initial courtesy call in September, and looked distracted and tired at an October 19 event attended by the Ambassador. End note.)
4. (C/NF) Cantonitermed Berlusconi overwhelmed with private concerns. He noted that Berlusconi has felt alienated from his family since his wife, Veronica Lario, set off a public uproar by publishing an open letter last spring asking for a divorce and accusing the 74-year old PM of consorting with minors. Lario is reportedly asking for fifty percent of Berlusconi's personal assets plus Euro 100 million in yearly support. At the same time, according to Cantoni, Berlusconi is afraid he will need to liquidate important business assets to make the Euro 750 million payment ordered by a civil court. Cantoni added that a Palermo-based mafia investigation involving another longtimeBerlusconi ally and confidant already convicted of ties to organized crime could turn into a damaging public spectacle.
LEADING TO CONSPIRACY THEORIES
5. (C/NF) A number of Embassy contacts have described a political environment dominated by conspiracy theories. In the wake of the two court rulings, Berlusconi accused President of the Republic Napolitano of working against him and lashed out emotionally against the judicial system, in general. Letta told the Ambassador that Berlusconi's outburst had led to "frosty" relations with Napolitano and said the episode has made him appear weak. Several PdL officials have hinted darkly to us that "institutional forces" are trying to unseat Berlusconi. (Note: In Italian political parlance, "institutional forces" can serve to mean one of many groups operating and wielding influence behind the scenes: business groups, intelligence services, freemasons, the Vatican, the magistracy, the United States, etc. While Italians are notably conspiracy-minded, their paranoia -- at least as far as Italian domestic politics go -- has historically been well-founded. End note.)
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6. (C/NF) Cantoni confided that Berlusconi believes the Italian intelligence services might have deliberately entrapped him in his alleged affair involving a minor. During Cantoni's conversation with the Embassy political officer, Berlusconi called the senator to confide that an arrest was imminent of four Italian Carabinieri believed to be blackmailing the Lazio regional governor with a sex-tape. (Note: The story of the Lazio governor and a transsexual prostitute exploded in the press a few days later. End note.) Cantoni told the Embassy officer that this case has convinced Berlusconi that he cannot trust his own intelligence services. Separately, on October 21, Northern League leader Umberto Bossi, commenting on Berlusconi's troubles, told the Ambassador that organized crime figures had probably set the trap for Berlusconi on some of the sex scandals, but that nobody denies that Berlusconi willingly went for the bait.
7. (C/NF) In a replay of the foreign press-induced scandals of last spring and summer, a London Times article accusing Italian troops in Afghanistan of paying off Taliban insurgents sparked speculation in and out of the GoI that the USG might have leaked the information to discredit the Berlusconi government. Moreover, it is not uncommon these days for PdL politicians to speculate-- via the press or even directly to Embassy officers-- that the new U.S. administration would like to see the Berlusconi government fall; some even believe the USG is actively undermining Berlusconi. The Ambassador recently probed Letta and Foreign Minister Franco Frattini to determine whether they shared this belief; both averred that they thought Berlusconi's relationship with the US administration was strong.
AND PALACE INTRIGUE
8. (C/NF) One of Berlusconi's would-be heirs, Chamber of Deputies President Gianfranco Fini, picked one of his periodic fights with Berlusconi in September, ostensibly over euthanasia and living wills, but the real issues were Berlusconi's non-democratic leadership style inside the party and the growing weight of the Northern League (LN). More recently, the powerful Minister of Economy, Giulio Tremonti, has openly challenged Berlusconi on fiscal policy, leading to talk simultaneously of his possible resignation as well as the possibility he was seeking to eventually succeed Berlusconi. In response to a direct question from the Ambassador, Gianni Letta said there was a small, but unlikely, possibility the government could fall. Cantonitold us Tremonti, Fini and former Minister of Interior Giuseppe Pisanu are laying the groundwork for a post-Berlusconi succession struggle but felt the government remained stable for the time being.
AS WELL AS ERRATIC DECISIONS
9. (C/NF) Media mogul Berlusconi might be gaffe-prone when speaking off the cuff, but he has historically shown himself astute at strategic messaging. Those skills were noticeably absent in a recent incident which provoked both criticism and head-scratching from Berlusconi friend and foe alike. Ahead of a three-day trip to Russia to celebrate Vladimir Putin's birthday in mid-October, Berlusconi put out a press line that the visit was a "strictly private affair." This announcement was met with disbelief and some mockery. Adding to the mystery, however, the day before his departure, Berlusconi canceled his participation in the state visit of Jordan's King Abdullah of Jordan, staying in Milan with the explanation that he was feeling under the weather. Berlusconi, who prides himself on his personal relationships with key Middle East interlocutors thus, unavoidably, left the impression that, in choosing private fun over statecraft, he was husbanding his flagging energies for a blow-out party at Putin's private dacha. With the further news that Berlusconi was accompanied on the trip solely by Valentino Valentini, an unofficial intermediary/bagman who serves as Berlusconi's interpreter, Italy's political class openly questioned whether Berlusconi was going to Russia principally because the scrutiny of his private time by Italian and foreign photographers had made parties in Italy too risky for the time being.
COMMENT
10. (C/NF) Sex scandals, criminal investigations, family problems and financial concerns appear to be weighing heavily on Berlusconi's personal and political health, as well as on
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his decision-making ability. It is too early to begin speculating about Berlusconi's political demise, and Berlusconi has a well-known knack for rebounding. However, though most are trying hard not to be too obvious about it, some of Berlusconi's own lieutenants have apparently decided it is not too early to begin laying the groundwork for "il dopo," as Italians call the potential post-Berlusconi era. In this souring political environment, conspiracy theories have all but supplanted serious political debate. Septel will address the implications of Berlusconi's fortunes on how we do business with the government. END COMMENT THORNE
Friday, 05 February 2010, 10:39
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000266
SIPDIS
NOFORN
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND GREENSTEIN,
S/EEE MORNINGSTAR, EUR/WE, INR
DOE FOR HEGBURG, EKIMOFF
DOC FOR JBROUGHER
NSC FOR MMCFAUL
EO 12958 DECL: 02/05/2035
TAGS EPET, ENRG, ECON, PREL, PINR, RS, IT
SUBJECT: (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX ON ENERGY INTERESTS,
PUTIN-BERLUSCONI LINK (C-RE9-02730)
REF: A. STATE 8676 B. 09 MOSCOW 1273
Classified By: Econ MC Matthias Mitman for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
----------------------------
PUTIN-BERLUSCONI DIRECT LINK
----------------------------
1. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us during a February 4 lunch that his Embassy and his Foreign Ministry often only learn of conversations between PM Berlusconi and PM Putin after the fact, and with little detail or background. He expressed frustration about the PMs' "direct line," which sometimes leaves the Embassy in the dark. He said if there is action to be taken, the cabinet secretary will instruct the Foreign Ministry or the Embassy without providing any background, and only note that Berlusconi and Putin had agreed on whatever the action item is. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that while the close relationship is not ideal from the bureaucracy's perspective and more detrimental than beneficial, it can be useful at times. He cited the case of the sale to Gazprom by Italian energy giant ENI of its 20% share in Gazprom's oil subsidiary Gazpromneft. He said Gazprom had insisted on paying far below the market price, but that it ultimately paid the market price after Berlusconi weighed in with Putin.
------------
ENI AND ENEL
------------
2. (C/NF) In response to our comment that ENI's Moscow Representative, Ernesto Ferlenghi, won't meet with us, XXXXXXXXXXXX said Ferlenghi "for some reason" doesn't like to meet with foreign diplomats. (Note: We had a very open and friendly meeting with Ferlenghi about two years ago, but ever since, he has deflected our requests for a meeting. See also ref B. End note.) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he believes Ferlenghi may have a directive from ENI headquarters to refer foreign governments to ENI's Rome-based international governmental affairs director. While [XXXXXXXXXXXX, his cell phone rang -- it was Ferlenghi. explained that although major projects such as the proposed South Stream gas pipeline gain the most attention, ENI's main business in Russia is "buying gas."
3. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Italian Embassy is organizing a visit by a trade and investment delegation to Novy Urengoi, the Yamal region city that is a project site of Severenergia, an upstream joint-venture between Gazprom, ENI, and Italy's Enel. Gazprom bought a controlling stake in Severenergia from ENI and Enel, which had set up Severenergia to purchase some of the assets of the former Yukos oil company at its bankruptcy auction. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that in addition to its investment in Severenergia, Enel also has approximately $6 billion invested in the Russian electricity sector and may raise its investment in that sector to $9 billion.
------------------------------
SOUTH STREAM AND SAMSUN-CEYHAN
------------------------------
4. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that ENI XXXXXXXXXXXX and "we" (presumably the Italian government) have regular contact with Russian DPM and "Energy Czar" Igor Sechin. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that lately the discussions relate to an explicit business link between South Stream and the proposed Samsun-Ceyhan Turkish oil pipeline, of which ENI is the operating partner. He explained that ENI, and its Turkish partner (which he said is Turkish PM Erdogan's son-in-law) need Russian oil to make Samsun-Ceyhan a reality, while Gazprom needs Turkish cooperation to move ahead on South Stream.
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COMMENT
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5. (C/NF) On major issues, it seems that Russian-Italian
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economic relations are directed by PMs who have a direct line to each other as well as control over some of the largest assets of their respective economies. To whatever end they direct those assets, it is likely they are not doing so based solely on commercial or rate-of-return calculations. As our contact himself acknowledged -- "it seems that everything that happens at the lower levels is just for show." Beyrle
Wednesday, 20 May 2009, 05:30
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001273
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR INR/I
EO 12958 DECL: 05/19/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ENRG, EPET, IT, RS
SUBJECT: ITALIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS (C-RE8-02675)
REF: A. 08 STATE 134386 B. MOSCOW 572
Classified By: DCM Eric Rubin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
-------
1. (S/NF) Economic ties, especially long-term gas contracts, are a pillar of Russia-Italy relations and affect Italy's policies toward Russia. Italian gas company ENI and Russian Gazprom have supply commitments in place until 2035, as well as a joint-construction agreement for the South Stream pipeline. ENI's company representative is often called Italy's second ambassador to Russia. The personal relationship between Prime Ministers Vladimir Putin and Silvio Berlusconi is the other key element of Russia-Italy relations, with Putin's family spending long visits at the Berlusconi family mansion in Sardinia at Berlusconi's expense. Italian diplomats enjoy excellent access to Russian officials. Should Italy stop seeking to moderate European states' Russian policies, the GOR would likely need to alter its political calculus. End Summary.
Economics affects politics
--------------------------
2. (C) Russia obtains significant economic benefits from Italy, gaining access to its equipment and technology, its stable market for gas and oil, and its highly desired consumer goods. In return, Russia provides Italy good offices for access to Central Asian supplies of gas and consumer markets. Italian companies have also looked to invest in Russia's aviation sector and electricity generation, although the economic crisis put many of these efforts on hold.
3. (C) However, the economic interdependency does not come without other costs. Italian Embassy First Secretary Lorenzo Fanara told us that the countries' economic ties were strong enough to affect Italy's political stance toward Russia. He said Italian leaders, politicians, and businessmen would always be "careful" in dealing with Russia, as Italy exported to Russia over 10 billion Euros worth of goods annually, most of it produced by small and medium-sized companies. "Russia is simply too important of an economic partner for us," Fanara explained. While the GOI understood the shortcomings of the Russian government (read: adherence to democratic values and freedoms), it could not afford to be too harsh in its criticism.
Deep ties on gas
----------------
4. (C) The crown jewels of Italy's business interests with Russia are ENI's gas contracts with Gazprom through 2035 and its 50-50 partnership with Gazprom in the South Stream pipeline project. The mo~97@Q5OQg
Wednesday, 19 November 2008, 10:33
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 001406
SIPDIS
FROM THE AMBASSADOR TO THE SECRETARY
EO 12958 DECL: 11/15/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, NATO, IT
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR DECEMBER 3 VISIT TO ROME
REF: A) ROME 1386 B) ROME 1320
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Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary. 1. (C) Summary. The political conditions in Italy are dramatically different from the conditions that existed when you last visited in July 2006. Silvio Berlusconi has returned to power after two years of a divided and ineffectual Prodi government. Berlusconi enjoys unparalleled levels of public support and his broad base of power has allowed us to make good progress in advancing our agenda, including successfully pressing for significant reductions on caveats imposed on Italian troops in Afghanistan by the previous government and approval of a major and crucial base expansion at Vicenza. During your visit, I hope you can publicly announce the establishment of AFRICOM,s Army and Navy subcomponent commands in Italy, an important symbol of the strength of our close bilateral security relationship.
2. (C) Our reenergized cooperation with Berlusconi, however, does not extend to all issues. Berlusconi's close, personal relationship with Putin has translated into Italian support for nearly every Russian initiative intended to weaken transatlantic support for NATO expansion and our efforts to curb the Kremlin's worst instincts. On Iran, after a period of Italian support for U.S. and EU efforts to resolve the nuclear issue, Italy's policy has become unfocused and even critical of the international process. I hope you can let Berlusconi know that Italy's renegade initiatives to soften international and transatlantic positions on Russia and Iran can only serve to create confusion and reduce collective security. On the economic front, Italy's banks have avoided the worst of the financial meltdown, but the broader economy will suffer from the ensuing global economic slow-down. End Summary.
Domestic Politics: Berlusconi Firmly in Control
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3. (C) Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is in an enviable position domestically, enjoying so comfortable a majority in Parliament that he can pass virtually any legislation without the support of the opposition. He used his first months back in government to deliver results on election promises, though long-term solutions to most problems are still needed. The trash problem in Naples is not yet permanently solved, but the streets are cleared and troops are keeping dumps and incinerators open. Public worries about street crime have been addressed by a sweeping new security law. A public finance law has overhauled the annual budget process, which traditionally has eaten up months of Parliament's time, but Italy's faltering economy casts doubt on whether budget targets will be met. Berlusconi's government drafted and passed these laws mostly without consulting the center-left opposition, which has grown more fragmented and less effective. Most foreign policy initiatives will be directed by Berlusconi personally without the need of any legislation.
4. (C) Berlusconi has made a few missteps, such as his awkward attempt at a joke, in referring to President-Elect Obama as "suntanned", and center-left contacts argue that the honeymoon period may end soon. Clearly Berlusconi's current level of popularity is unsustainable over the long run, but predictions that the wind is changing already are premature. The center right's first major electoral test will be the European elections in June, which will be a critical moment for the center left to evaluate whether it needs new leadership and for the center right to see if it continues to enjoy such high levels of approval from the Italian people.
Transatlantic Relationship: All Russia All the Time
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5. (C) Berlusconi's close personal (and, some suspect, financial) relationship with Putin has led him to champion unquestioningly every initiative the Kremlin has rolled out. Italy's Russia policy is his personal game, one which he conducts on a tactical basis to gain the trust and favor of his Russian interlocutors. He consistently rejects the strategic advice of his demoralized, resource-starved, and increasingly irrelevant Foreign Ministry in favor of his business cronies, many of whom are deeply dug into Russia's
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European energy strategy. As a result of his short-sighted obsession with Russia, Berlusconi has thrown his support behind Medvedev's calls for a new security architecture in Europe to supersede NATO and OSCE, has publicly called for Ukrainian and Georgian NATO aspirations to be put on hold in deference to Russian sensitivities, has called on President-Elect Obama to withdraw support for Missile Defense, and continues to insist that Russia acted properly during the Georgia-Russia conflict. He has even called on the EU to admit Russia as a member. Most disturbingly, Berlusconi has attempted to portray himself inside the EU as the bridge between the U.S. and Russia. In practice, this has meant that the GOI has consistently worked to water down EU stances on Russia, and tried to derail U.S.-led efforts to contain Moscow's worst instincts. His efforts to encourage greater "dialogue" have created more confusion between Russia and the transatlantic community, not less. We have pushed back forcefully on this (ref a) but you can provide a sense of realism to Berlusconi by letting him know that his efforts are working against U.S. and transatlantic efforts.
Muddying the Waters on Iran
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6. (C) Berlusconi came into power with a tough public stance on Iran and showed himself eager to support the P5-plus-1. This initial clarity has given way to an unfocused, even critical policy with respect to building international consensus for further sanctions. FM Frattini recently questioned the efficacy of the P5 1 approach in public comments, and reached out to Iran,s nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, to invite him to Rome for consultations. Even while working within the EU framework to discuss further national measures, working-level GOI officials continue to question the efficacy of further sanctions.
Economic Crisis: Banks OK, but economy suffers
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7. (C) Stodgy, old fashioned banking practices allowed Italy to avoid being directly hit by the global financial melt-down. Italian banks simply did not engage in the kind of sub-prime lending that got others in trouble, and Italian banks did not buy significant amounts of the toxic derivatives that are causing so much trouble around the globe. But Italy is being affected by the results of the financial crisis: Italian stock prices have plummeted, stirring fears of possible foreign buy-outs of Italian firms, and Italy's already shaky economy will be hard-hit by the global recession that was sparked by the financial crisis. As for Italy's preferred response to the crisis, the Italians seem to be following Sarkozy's lead, and seem to share his enthusiasm for major reform of the international finance institutions. As is the case in many other countries, Italy is also looking at the possibility of government support for industries hurt by the recession.
8. (C) Italy's Finance Minister, Giulio Tremonti, often supports protectionist, anti-globalization positions, but in the ongoing discussion of the financial crisis we expect Italy to adhere to the more moderate consensus policies hammered out by the EU.
Little Room for Expanding Presence in Afghanistan
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9. (C) Italy is the sixth-largest contributor to ISAF with 2,200 troops, a PRT in Herat, and command of RC-West. Berlusconi has made good on his pledge to President Bush last June to remove geographic caveats and send 34 Carabinieri to train Afghan police, and he has promised to address allegations of Italian protection payments to insurgent leaders. Additionally, FM Frattini has announced his intention to host a G8 Ministerial on Afghanistan with a special focus on providing a regional solution to the Afghan-Pakistan border region. But the Italians now say that new troop deployments above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 2,300 troops will be impossible for budgetary reasons, and that its only new contribution to ISAF this fall will be in the form of four Tornado jet fighters. Italy has also been cool toward our requests to provide donor support to ANA expansion and election preparation, citing budgetary
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concerns. You should stress that Italy's decision to reduce defense expenditures (which will put them even further below the NATO-recommended threshold of 1% of GDP) is of major concern to us, and it risks making Italy a less reliable partner in international security operations, just at a point when the need for greater contributions from partners may grow in Afghanistan.
Rolling out AFRICOM
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10. (C) Your visit will provide an opportunity to highlight our cooperation on Africa through Italy's hosting of portions of AFRICOM. GOI officials were initially hesitant to sign off, due to concerns over how and under what circumstances U.S. forces in Italy might deploy to potential conflict zones in Africa. The GoI eventually agreed to the establishment of AFRICOM's Army and Navy subcomponent commands in existing facilities in Italy on October 1, but asked us to delay announcing the move (ref b). The South East Europe Task Force (SETAF) in Vicenza has assumed the Army component functions and a component of NAVEUR in Naples is now fulfilling the naval functions. Italian concerns focused on SETAF and hinged on two issues -- one legal and the other local and political. The classified 1954 Bilateral Infrastructure Agreement (BIA) limits U.S. basing in Italy exclusively to troops deployed for NATO purposes. After long negotiations, the GOI accepted our broad interpretation of the BIA and the NATO SOFA as applicable to the AFRICOM subcomponents due to their role in supporting NATO Operations in Africa and their availability for other NATO missions as required. But the GOI asked for us to delay public announcement of the shift due to local controversy over the expansion of the base in Vicenza to the Dal Molin airfield.
11. (C) The GOI responded positively to our proposal for a joint announcement of the shift during your visit to Italy. A joint statement acknowledging the establishment of the two entities would allow us to highlight the security assistance and humanitarian aspects of AFRICOM's mission and also divorce the issue as much as possible from base expansion controversy in Vicenza. It will also provide an opportunity to showcase the synergies between AFRICOM and the GOI's own efforts to encourage stability in Africa and also their excellent work at training primarily African peacekeepers through its Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU), a joint U.S.-Italian G8 initiative which is also located in Vicenza.
When Will the Honeymoon End?
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12. (C) Most of our contacts within Berlusconi's own party as well as in the center left expect this government's honeymoon period to end in the first half of 2009, as Italians focus on the nation's systemic problems that have no easy solution, most importantly the economy. Democratic Party officials tell us that they see the declining standard of living among the middle class as the greatest opportunity to gain strength before the European elections in June. Should the rescue efforts for Alitalia remain unresolved in the face of continued strikes or should the protests against education reform gain traction with a broader segment of the electorate, Berlusconi's popularity will suffer.
Conclusion
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13. (C) Berlusconi's shoot-from-the-hip style and frequent gaffes frequently create bumps in the relationship with the U.S. Nevertheless, he staunchly supports and admires the U.S. and its people. Despite its economic malaise, Italy remains a close and influential partner and will continue to be an important ally for the U.S. in NATO, the region and the world. Your visit will be an important sign of the strength and closeness of the bilateral relationship and I am delighted that you are taking the opportunity to visit Rome. SPOGLI
Thursday, 13 November 2008, 19:16
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001386
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/15/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, NATO, RS, IT
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI'S COMMENTS ON MISSILE DEFENSE AND
KOSOVO CREATE FIRESTORM IN ITALY
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Classified By: Barbara A. Leaf, Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, for rea sons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) During a press conference on the margins of the Italy-Turkey summit in Izmir on November 12, Italian PM Berlusconi said that the U.S. had "provoked" Russia by unilaterally recognizing Kosovo's independence, pressing forward on Missile Defense, and inviting Ukraine and Georgia to have a closer relationship with NATO. While Berlusconi's latest comments are a culmination of a string of inflammatory and unhelpful comments in support of Putin that began shortly after Berlusconi took office this year, these latest statements went considerably further in attempting to place the blame for Russia's paranoia on the U.S. Additionally, Berlusconi appears to be encouraging his own government and Russia to disregard the current administration and lobby the incoming U.S. President to take a softer line on Russia. At the same time, he has attempted to portray himself as the primary interlocutor between Putin and the West, and particularly with the U.S. As a result of Berlusconi's latest comments, post reached out to interlocutors at all levels to register our dismay at the latest barrage of Berlusconisms. Our contacts universally responded with a combination of dismay, dismissal or shoulder-shrugging. In an effort at damage-control, FM Frattini dispatched a senior MFA official the following morning to see the A/DCM and 'clarify' the GOI,s stance. Instead, he took back a terse message to the FM that such comments risk substantial and lasting damage to Italy,s credibility in Washington. End summary.
2. (C) During a press conference with Turkish PM Erdogan on November 12 in Izmir, PM Berlusconi said the U.S. had "provoked" Russia by unilaterally recognizing Kosovo's independence, pressing forward with Missile Defense and encouraging Ukraine and Georgia to have a closer relationship with NATO. Berlusconi's latest comments represent a continuation of a long campaign of support for Putin since the Italian PM returned to power this year. In addition to his latest comments, Berlusconi has supported Russian initiatives to create a new security architecture in Europe to supersede NATO and OSCE, has insisted that Putin acted appropriately during the Georgia-Russia conflict, and has opposed NATO expansion on the basis that it presents a threat to Russia. He has even called for Russia to be a full member of the EU - a comment he made at a time when the EU was considering whether to continue business as usual with Russia in the aftermath of the Georgia-Russia conflict.
3. (C) Most disturbingly, Berlusconi has attempted to portray himself to Russia and the EU as the principal interlocutor between the transatlantic community, and in particular the U.S., and Russia. He has repeatedly called on the U.S. to take a softer line with Russia on virtually all democratic and security issues and has even called on his government and Russia to look beyond the current administration to the incoming U.S. President in order to achieve these goals.
4. (C) Following this latest set of remarks, we reached out to virtually every senior interlocutor on Russia within the GOI and in Berlusconi,s own center-right coalition. The Ambassador called DPM Letta. A/DCM called FM Frattini's chief of staff, the MFA Director General for Europe, the National Security Advisor, and a member of parliament from Berlusconi's party. Poloff reached out to the Acting Director of the MFA Russia Office, the Director of the Security Planning Department, the diplomatic advisors to Berlusconi, and members of Berlusconi's party. We expressed our concern that Berlusconi's attempts at 'creating dialogue' with Russia were, in fact, creating greater tension and undermining common efforts to bring stability to the Balkans, and portraying the successful and peaceful expansion of the Euro-Atlantic space as a threat to Russia. In an apparent effort at damage-control, FM Frattini sent a senior member of his staff, Policy Planning Director Maurizio Massari, the day after Berlusconi,s remarks to call on A/DCM to 'clarify' GOI policy.
5. (C) Massari (as did virtually all of our interlocutors) told A/DCM that the PM was accustomed to making off-the-cuff remarks that should not be interpreted as policy statements per se. Massari said that Frattini was urging the U.S. to
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look to Italy's strong bilateral cooperation rather than Berlusconi's comments as an indication of the strength of the relationship and the direction of Italian policy. Italy's foreign policy remained strongly Atlanticist; Berlusconi, according to Massari, had meant to be constructive and wanted to take a positive role in creating understanding between its key strategic partners, the U.S. and Russia. The comments had not been meant to criticize the U.S.
6. (C) A/DCM countered that the PM's statements risked damaging to our efforts to bring stability to the Balkans by calling into question the basis for Kosovo's independence - a process that Italy had been a part of from the beginning. Additionally, Berlusconi,s comments ran headlong into sensitive negotiations with Russia on confidence building measures, as well as Czech and Polish internal deliberations on ratification of Missile Defense. By characterizing Ukrainian and Georgian NATO aspirations as inherently threatening to Russia, Berlusconi was casting doubt on a process which had produced significant reforms in aspirant countries that are looking to join the community of democratic nations.
7. (C) A/DCM told Massari that the GOI gave every appearance that the U.S. was experiencing a power vacuum. The current administration was still in charge, and the incoming one had made that abundantly clear. By encouraging his own government and Russia to speak past the current administration and offer 'advice' to the President-Elect, Berlusconi was losing credibility for Italy as a reliable partner, which he could ill afford to do, given the challenges ahead of us in Afghanistan and elsewhere. A/DCM added that the new administration would conduct its own diplomacy and would not need Berlusconi as 'a bridge' to engage in a dialogue with Russia on either a bilateral or multilateral basis.
8. (C) Massari, in obvious discomfort, said he 'fully understood' the U.S. perspective on Berlusconi,s recent stream of commentary, said he would take this message back to FM Frattini in detail. He also asked for our thoughts on how to avoid any further 'misunderstandings' of this nature. He said he would recommend that the FM make a statement clarifying Italy's support for Kosovo and NATO expansion. He also said he would advise the FM to talk to Berlusconi about the degree to which his comments on the US/Russia relationship, Georgia, MD and other issues had irritated Washington. A/DCM ended the conversation by suggesting that PM refrain from making any further offers to guide the new U.S. administration in its relationship with Russia.
9. (C) Comment. All of our interlocutors were at visible pains to underscore that they understood the PM's comments in Izmir had crossed the line. All, however, particularly party officials, reiterated that Berlusconi does not listen to the advice of his own experts in crafting his approach with other states. On Russia, Berlusconi takes this to an extreme, not only conducting his own brand of foreign policy, but on a tactical basis, as a way of gaining favor with his Russian interlocutors - with whom many (including his own party officials) suspect he has a personally and financially enriching relationship. All of our contacts stated that it might be difficult to reign him in and, somewhat fatalistically, encouraged us to ignore his comments. One senior MFA official went so far as to suggest Ambassador take up the issue directly with Berlusconi and asked us to let her know what Berlusconi offered as his justification for his remarks, since, she said, she had no insight whatsoever as to what had animated his remarks on Kosovo and MD.
10. (C) It will be all the more important that Berlusconi and his advisors hear a similarly blunt warning about the direction of Italy,s Russia policy during in any bilats or pull-asides on the margins of the upcoming G-20 summit. SPOGLI
Tuesday, 09 June 2009, 08:11
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 000649
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TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
EO 12958 DECL: 05/31/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, IT
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ITALIAN PM BERLUSCONI'S JUNE 15
VISIT TO WASHINGTON
REF: A) ROME 97 B) MOSCOW 1273
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Classified By: Elizabeth L. Dibble, Charge d'Affaires, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
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1. (C/NF) Mr. President, your meeting with Italian PM Silvio Berlusconi comes at a time when his closest advisors fear Italy is losing the credibility and influence that it enjoyed in Washington under the previous U.S. administration. In fact, while Italy has been a stalwart partner and participant in nearly every U.S.-led security operation around the world since the end of the Cold War, domestic political foibles and economic malaise are diluting its international influence. Italy continues to support our efforts in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq, and the Balkans, but its diplomatic, economic and military institutions, which the Berlusconi government and its predecessors have starved for resources, are sorely stretched. Berlusconi and his government have tried to compensate for Italy's failure to invest in its instruments of national power by presenting Italy as a mediator and interlocutor with difficult actors on major international issues. This self-appointed role has sometimes complicated international efforts. On Iran, for example, Italy's role under the previous government gave Tehran the impression that the international community was divided. More recently, GOI actions have provided a European platform for Russia's efforts to challenge NATO security interests in Europe. Berlusconi will certainly present himself as the best hope for moderating Russian behavior and will seek a signal from you that he has a mandate to speak on the West's behalf. He will also seek to use Italy's G8 presidency to address issues far beyond the scope and effectiveness of the organization. We should discourage both instincts. Italy has an important voice in the Euro-Atlantic community, but its efforts have proven constructive only when undertaken in coordination with the U.S. and other key allies.
Berlusconi the Politician
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2. (C/NF) Our relationship with Berlusconi is complex. He is vocally pro-American and has helped address our interests on many levels in a manner and to a degree that the previous government was unwilling or unable to do, since his return to power last spring as well as in his previous turns in government. In his first 90 days in office, he approved a controversial U.S. base expansion that had been halted by bureaucratic inaction and anti-American political opposition; eliminated caveats on Italian troops in Afghanistan; and allowed us to base two of three AFRICOM component commands in Italy. At the same time, he has criticized Missile Defense, NATO enlargement and support for Kosovo's independence as American provocations of Russia. He claimed Russian PM Putin's military push into Georgia in August 2008 was necessary to end the bloodshed of innocents caused by Georgian President Saakashvili. He displays an overweening self-confidence born of stable and strong political popularity that has made him deaf to dissenting opinion. The strict control he exercises over his government and party inhibits his staff from giving him unpleasant messages. His unorthodox governing style, coupled with his frequent verbal gaffes and high-profile scandals (including public bickering with his wife about his alleged philandering), have caused many, including some inside the U.S. government, to dismiss him as feckless, vain, and ineffective as a modern European leader.
3. (C/NF) His shortcomings notwithstanding, marginalizing Berlusconi would limit important cooperation with a key ally. Berlusconi is one of Europe's most enduring politicians whose popularity in Italy will guarantee that he will influence Italian politics for many years still to come. He has arrested the trend of weak, short-lived Italian governments that has plagued this country since the end of the Second World War. When successfully engaged, he has shown the willingness to adopt policies, however unpopular, in line with ours -- including support for an expanded NATO role in Afghanistan and Turkey's membership in the EU. When ignored, he seeks to carve out a visible, international, and
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frequently unhelpful role for himself. Dealing with Berlusconi, therefore, requires a careful balance of close coordination with him and his key advisors while avoiding giving the impression that he can speak on our behalf with many of the world's difficult actors.
4. (C/NF) Italy held elections for the European Parliament on June 6 and 7, which reaffirmed Berlusconi's People of Liberty (PDL) party as Italy's largest party, reaching 35 percent, well ahead of the main opposition Democratic Party's 26 percent. While Berlusconi does not have a competitive rival in the center left, his party missed the 40 percent mark that it was aiming for, and witnessed the growth of xenophobic coalition ally Northern League (LN). PDL is a personality-driven party, whose members tell us that the ideology is little more than "Berlusconismo." The missed target of 40 percent can be attributed to an over-ambitious Berlusconi, as well as the turnout-depressing effects of weeks of personal attacks by the center left in the runup to the election that included allegations of fiscal and sexual impropriety. An enduring result of the election will be the heightened competition between PDL and LN, who now dominate Italian politics. LN's tough stands on security and against immigration have won broad approval, even as Berlusconi has tried to stem the flow of PDL voters to LN by descending to the anti-immigrant rhetoric usually favored by the Northern League. Additionally, after this mild electoral setback, we can expect Berlusconi to use his White House meeting and his hosting of the G8 to underscore to Italians the important figure he cuts on the world stage.
Economic Crisis
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5. (C) Prudent (some would say stodgy) banking practices allowed Italy to avoid the global financial sector meltdown. Italy's banks simply did not engage in sub-prime lending, and they did not buy the toxic assets that caused so much trouble in the U.S. and elsewhere. But Italy has not been able to avoid the pain of the worldwide recession that has followed the financial crisis. Italy's economic growth rate -- which was relatively low even before the crisis -- has dropped precipitously owing to sharp contractions in its export markets and falling domestic demand. Unemployment is expected to exceed eight percent this year and to rise further in 2010. Government tax revenues are, not unexpectedly, off sharply. Italy's already high level of government debt and the debt ceilings that come with EU membership significantly limit the government's ability to provide fiscal stimulus for the economy.
G8
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6. (C/NF) Berlusconi's stewardship of his G8 Presidency has been marked by a proliferation of Ministerial and sub-ministerial meetings coupled with a last-minute change of summit venue from Sardinia to the earthquake-stricken city of L'Aquila that took even his Sherpa by surprise. He and his cabinet tend to regard Italy's G8 year more as an opportunity to curry favor with G8 outsiders such as Egypt, Spain, and Libya than as a tool to address the world's problems. However, his desire to prevent the G8 from taking a back seat to the G20 on his watch has driven an ambitious agenda that may make useful contributions on climate change, Africa, development, and food security. He will be eager to work with you to build a legacy of G8 deliverables that will bear the Italian label. The Major Economies Forum meeting during the G8 summit, which will include the leaders of 17-plus countries that emit over 80 percent of global emissions, will be an important chance to mobilize high-level consensus in the run-up to the December UN climate change talks in Copenhagen.
Guantanamo Detainees
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7. (C/NF) Berlusconi welcomed your decision to close Guantanamo, and has publicly and repeatedly underscored Italy's desire to support the move by taking detainees. FM Frattini recently outlined for AG Holder the efforts Italian officials have been making within the EU to negotiate a
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common EU framework that will open the door to individual country agreements with the U.S. While the junior partner in Berlusconi's coalition opposes taking any detainees, Berlusconi has made it clear that he views this as a moral commitment to support the U.S.
Russia
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8. (C/NF) Dependence on Russian energy, lucrative and frequently nontransparent business dealings between Italy and Russia, and a close, personal relationship between Berlusconi and Putin have distorted the PM's view to the point that he believes much of the friction between the West and Russia has been caused by the U.S. and NATO. Berlusconi believes he, acting as a mediator, can restore a spirit of dialogue and cooperation between Europe, the U.S. and Russia, but largely on Russia's terms, through indefinitely postponing NATO's outreach to Ukraine and Georgia, diluting the EU's efforts to promote democracy in Belarus, and undermining OSCE's important role in promoting human and democratic values across the whole of Europe. Berlusconi has publicly proposed to mediate your relationship with Russian President Medvedev and is hoping you will give him a signal, however small, that he has your blessing to do so. Instead, you can let him know that we believe that issues of security that affect the transatlantic community should be addressed by the Alliance at large, and that the U.S. is not prepared to sacrifice values in exchange for short-term stability predicated on Russian promises of good behavior. And we will react -- and expect others who share these values to do so as well -- when Russia crosses a red-line, for instance in threatening the sovereignty of neighboring states.
Energy
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9. (C/NF) Berlusconi's close personal ties with Putin and the very strong corporate ties between Italian energy parastatal ENI and Russia's Gazprom often put Italy squarely at odds with USG efforts to reduce Europe's dependence on Russian energy. For example, the Italian government is deeply ambivalent about energy projects that would help Europe diversify its energy imports, while at the same time it is supportive of other projects that would increase Europe's Russian energy dependency. ENI, 30-percent owned by the Italian Government, often dictates GOI energy policy and uses its influence, through the GOI, to block EU energy market liberalization plans. Italy is taking some steps, however, in the right direction, by supporting energy projects that will diversify its own energy sources. It would be helpful if you could raise with Berlusconi long-standing USG concerns about European energy security, emphasizing that increasing the flow of Russian gas around Ukraine is not the same as a policy seeking a true diversity of energy sources, routes and technologies.
10. (C) The Berlusconi Government is pursuing plans to bring back nuclear power to Italy. U.S.-based companies Westinghouse and GE face stiff competition from foreign rivals, particularly France, whose governments are heavily lobbying the GOI. A word to Berlusconi that the U.S. expects this to be a fair and transparent competition is critical if U.S. firms are to have a fair chance to bid for Italian nuclear energy projects.
Iran
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11. (C/NF) With Italy frustrated by its exclusion from the P5-plus-1 negotiating circle, Berlusconi will highlight Italy's would-be role as an interlocutor between the West, Israel and Iran, claiming excellent relations with all parties involved. He may also push for the U.S. to drop the P5 1 framework altogether. Italian officials were thrilled by your commitment to embark upon direct diplomatic engagement with Iran, but cannot resist the impulse to try to be "present at the creation." FM Frattini has worked strenuously to lock in high-level Iranian attendance at the June 26-27 Afghanistan-Pakistan Outreach meeting, hoping thereby to play host to the first U.S.-Iranian ministerial encounter in decades.
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Libya
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12. (C/NF) Berlusconi has continued Italy's policy of developing an expanded relationship with Libya, largely in order to stem the tide of irregular migration from Libyan shores, but also to gain advantageous access to Libya's oil reserves for Italian firms, mainly ENI. As follow-up to the 2008 Libya-Italy Friendship Treaty -- which committed Libya to sterner measures to deter irregular migrants from entering Italy from its shores, but also offered 5 billion USD in development assistance -- Libyan leader Qadhafi will pay an historic first official visit to Rome June 10-12, just before Berlusconi's Washington visit. As the current African Union President, Qadhafi will be at the G8 Summit in L'Aquila and we anticipate Berlusconi may lobby you to meet with the Libyan leader during your visit.
A Partner in Security
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13. (C/NF) Berlusconi has maintained a significant military commitment in Afghanistan (2,600 troops, mostly in Italy's Regional-Command West), but has dropped from fourth- to sixth-largest ISAF contributor as other countries like France and Canada have augmented their troop levels. At Stasbourg-Kehl, his government pledged modest increases to cover election security which, if made permanent, would put Italy back in the top tier of ISAF contributors. He has also supported the creation of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, doubling the number of Carabinieri police trainers to over 100. Italy has been an anemic contributor to international aid efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan and has cut overall foreign assistance by more than 60 percent in this year's budget. However, Berlusconi knows this is a priority area for the U.S. and will likely respond positively if you press him to do more in the region.
14. (C) Our shared security interests with Italy go beyond Afghanistan. U.S. facilities in Italy provide unmatched freedom of action and are critical to our ability to project stability into the Mediterranean, Middle East and North Africa. We have 15,000 U.S. military on six Italian bases and these installations host some of our most advanced capabilities deployed outside the U.S. Our bases and activities out of Italy are not uniformly popular, but PM Berlusconi, in this government as in his last, has made preserving this security relationship a priority, and the GOI has invariably come through on our top requests, despite domestic political risks. The GOI has approved the expansion of our base at Vicenza to consolidate the 173rd Airborne Brigade, the deployment of the USAF Global Hawk UAV in Sicily, and the establishment of AFRICOM Army and Navy Component Commands on Italian soil. Italy's leadership in other overseas missions helps us concentrate our forces on our top priorities. In addition to its troops in Afghanistan, Italy currently has 2,300 in the Balkans, 2,400 in Lebanon, and is the leading contributor to the NATO Training Mission in Iraq.
Conclusion
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15. (C/NF) The robust U.S.-Italian relationship provides us with major national security benefits in our military missions overseas, our own power projection, and on a broad law enforcement agenda, but the Prime Minister is an erratic steward. It might be tempting to dismiss Berlusconi as a frivolous interlocutor, with his personal foibles, public gaffes and sometimes unpredictable policy judgment, but we believe this would be a mistake. Despite his faults, Berlusconi has been the touchstone of Italian politics for the last 15 years, and every indication is that he will be around for years to come. When we are able to successfully engage him in pursuit of our common objectives, he has proved an ally and friend to the United States. He respects and admires the U.S., and is eager to build a strong and successful relationship with you. DIBBLE
Monday, 26 January 2009, 11:48
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EO 12958 DECL: 01/19/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ENRG, EPET, RS, IT
SUBJECT: ITALY-RUSSIA RELATIONS: THE VIEW FROM ROME
(C-RE8-02675)
REF: A) 08 STATE 134386 B) ROME 451
Classified By: Ronald P. Spogli, Ambassador, for reasons 1.4 (b), (d).
1. (U) This is a joint Political and Economic Section cable.
2. (C/NF) Summary. Italy's relationship with Russia is complex, encompassing historical ideological sympathies, geostrategic calculations, commercial pressure, energy dependence, and personal relationships between top leaders. The combination of these factors creates a strong tendency for Italy's foreign policy to be highly receptive to Russian efforts to gain greater political influence in the EU and to support Russia's efforts to dilute American security interests in Europe. In its relationship with Russia, energy is the most important bilateral issue and the quest for stable energy supplies from Russia frequently forces Italy to compromise on security and political issues. A not insignificant concomitant factor is PM Berlusconi's desire to be seen as an important European player on foreign policy, leading him to go where others dare not. End summary.
Roots of Italian Russophilia: Ideology on the Left, a Long-Standing Market Opportunity on the Right
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3. (C/NF) Until the 2008 parliamentary elections, the Italian Communist party and various leftist splinter groups were a permanent fixture of the Italian political scene. Throughout the Cold War members of the Italian communist movement maintained close ties with the Soviet Union, other communist countries, and many communist revolutionary movements. Unlike many other communist parties around the world, the Italian communist movement remained unapologetic in its continued belief in Marxism-Leninism as a viable economic alternative to capitalism. While many European leftist intellectuals recognize that -- aside from an authoritarian approach to governing - - Putin's Russia bears little resemblance to Communist ideals, this fact has not deterred Italian communists and other radical left politicians from being openly pro-Russia on the basis of ideological solidarity. This, combined with the advanced average age o most high-level Italian politicians (65-70), prevents many in the far left of Italy's political spectrum from moving beyond a worldview developed (and apparently frozen) during the Cold War.
4. (C/NF) Throughout the Cold War, Italian business interests frequently skirted the line of what was appropriate in their pursuit of the Soviet market. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the explosion of consumer wealth in Russia created massive deman for high-end and luxury Italian exports. From 1998 to 2007 Italian exports to Russia grew by 230 percent, from 2.7 billion Euros to 9.5 Billion. Many of Italy's leading businessmen began to see Russia as a limitless market that could substitute for loss of export revenue from other parts of the world. These businessmen maintain strong ties to the pro-business, free-market-oriented politicians on the right, including the most visible patron of Italy's business elite: PM Silvio Berlusconi.
Putin Most Influential Figure in Italy's Russia Policy
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5. (C/NF) While Italy's political parties, the MFA and ENI exert some influence on Italy's Russia policy, by far the most importan factor is the personal attention Putin devotes to the relationship. By our reckoning, Putin has held more bilateral meetings with sitting Italian PMs in the recent past than any other world leader. He was the first world leader to meet with Berlusconi after the 2008 elections, arriving in Sardegna to visit the PM designate before the latter had even been sworn in. Berlusconi believes that Putin is his close and personal friend and continues to have more contact with Putin than with any other world leader. During the Georgi crisis, Berlusconi spoke to Putin on a daily basis for a period of almost a week. The basis of the friendship is hard to determine, but many interlocutors have told us that Berlusconi believes that Putin, a fellow 'tycoon', trusts Berlusconi more than other European leader. (A contact in the PM's office told us that their frequent meetings are accompanied by exchanges of lavish gifts). Berlusconi admires Putin's macho, decisive, and authoritarian governing style, which the Italian PM believes matches his own. From the Russian side, it appears that Putin has devoted much energy to developing Berlusconi's trust.
6. (S/NF) Contacts in both the opposition center-left PD
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party and Berlusconi's own PdL party, however, have hinted at a more nefarious connection. They believe that Berlusconi and his cronies are profiting personally and handsomely from many of the energy deals between Italy and Russia. The Georgian ambassador in Rome has told us that the GOG believes Putin has promised Berlusconi a percentage of profits from any pipelines developed by Gazprom in coordination with ENI. Whenever we raise the issue of Russia and the P with our contacts in PdL, Berlusconi's own party, they have usually pointed us to Valentino Valentini, a member of parliament and somewhat shadowy figure who operates as Berluscon's key man on Russia, albeit with no staff or even a secretary. Valentini, a Russian-speaker who travels to Russia several times per month, frequently appears at Berlusconi's side when he meets other world leaders. What he does in Moscow during his frequent visits is unclear but he is widely rumored to be looking after Berlusconi's business interests in Russia. Our contacts uniformly deem Valentini, a multilingual former interpreter, close to Berlusconi with regard to Russia, but not a polic person.
7. (C/NF) All of our interlocutors - in the MFA, PM's office, PdL party, and even ENI - report that Berlusconi determines Italy's policy on Russia single-handedly, neither seeking nor accepting counsel. Virtually all are reluctant to confront the PM even when he is at his worst on Russia. In November 2008, after a disastrous press conference in which, inter alia, the PM described NATO expansion, recognition of Kosovo's independence, and missile defense as "U.S. provocations" of Russia, GOI officials did a classic duck- and-cover. In response to our objections, MFA and PM staff sheepishly directed us to the PM himself, rather than deliver the unpleasant news to him that he had angered not only the Americans but other members of the Contact Group for the Balkans, not t mention the Czechs and Poles. Even FM Frattini admits to wielding no influence on Berlusconi on Russia. During an early September visit to Italy, former VP Cheney confronted Frattini on Italy's very public and unhelpful stance on the Georgia conflict. A subdued Frattini noted that, while he had strong opinions on the issue, he nevertheless received his marching orders from the PM.
8. (C/NF) Distressingly, Berlusconi treats Russia policy as he does his domestic political affairs - tactically and day-to-day. His overwhelming desire is to remain in Putin's good graces, and he has frequently voiced opinions and declarations that have been passed to him directly by Putin. One such example: in the aftermath of the Georgia crisis, Berlusconi began (and continues) to insist that Georgia was the aggressor and that the GOG was responsible for several hundred civilian deaths in South Ossetia.
No Institutional Leadership on Russia
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9. (C/NF) Trying to determine who might have some influence on Berlusconi's Russia policy is not an easy task. One thing is certain, however - it is not the foreign policy institutions of the GOI. FM Frattini is widely seen as only the messenger for PM Berlusconi's Russia policy - indeed he termed himself as much to VP Cheney during the latter's September 2008 visit to Rome. Within the professional ranks, resources and expertise are scant. Italy's MFA contains only one full-time diplomat assigned to cover Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union: the Office Director. The Deputy Office Director position and single Desk Officer position assigned to cover all the countries of the FSU are vacant. Italy's dire budget situation is likely to prevent the hiring of additional staff at the MFA for at least two years, according to one MF source. The Office Director's direct supervisor - the A/S equivalent - is also responsible for the Balkans and the rest of Europe, but she, like Frattini, appears to have little or no input to GOI Russia policy. The PM's staff does not fare much better. The Office of the Diplomatic Advisor is thinly staffed - with only one officer assigned to each geographic region. The position covering Russia is staffed by a midlevel diplomat who is in the process of being transferred. No replacement is likely to be named. As a result, the officer covering the Middle East (also the deputy for the office) will be forced to take on those duties in addition to his already overwhelming portfolio and management duties.
10. (C/NF) In 2008 the MFA undertook an effort to produce a long-term foreign policy strategy for the GOI. In a paper entitled "Rapporto 2020" the MFA outlined its strategic vision for the next decade and a half. The document notes that geostrategic realities have created the need for Italy to adapt its foreign policy with regard to Russia and calls for Italy to seek 'a privileged relationship' with Moscow in order to press its overwhelmingly preeminent bilateral concern: energy.
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Energy Becomes Key Bilateral Issue
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11. (C/NF) With virtually no domestic energy reserves, no domestic nuclear power, and an ambitious parastatal energy company, Italy's key bilateral concern with Russia has become the quest for long-term guarantees of energy supplies. The GOI has supported ENI and other energy giants' efforts to create a unique partnership with Russia and Gazprom for long-term cooperation. ENI, Italy's most prominent energy parastatal, wields immense political power; its business strategy has focused on complicated geopolitical environments generally perceived as overly risky by many of its international competitors. ENI's lobbying efforts vis-(-vis the GOI are better funded than most government offices. It hosts one diplomatic advisor assigned from the MFA. Going by press reports alone, we would judge that PM Berlusconi grants its director, Paolo Scaroni, as much access as he does his own FM. ENI's director of government affair recently admitted to us that he meets with Gianni Letta, NSA-equivalent and Berlusconi confidant, on a weekly basis. Members of political parties on both sides of the aisle have told us that ENI is one of the leading financial contributors to Italy's many think-tanks - many of which produce public diplomacy discussions and events on the importance of Italy-Russia relations. At one such event in 2007, a conference on Central Asia, representatives from ENI and Edison were given 30 minutes each to speak, while the four Foreign Ministers and Deputy Foreign Minister of five Central Asian former Soviet states were all crammed into a single hour. There is even suspicion that ENI maintains journalists on its payroll.
12. (C/NF) Members of political parties from both sides of the aisle have told us that ENI does not limit its dialogue with the government to energy issues. One member of the opposition center-left PD party told poloffs that ENI's presence in Russia exceeds that of Italy's understaffed embassy. While it is unclear how much policy coordination occurs between ENI and the Russian political structure, the same PD party members noted that ENI had as much contact with Russian political and economic leaders as the embassy, if not more, and political messages were frequently passed through such commercial/economic channels. Back in Rome, ENI maintains strong contacts with members of the Italian parliament - something the MFA does not do (apart from requested briefings to members of the foreign affairs committees).
An Energy Policy without the Policy
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
13. (C/NF) ENI and other energy giants have managed to press their case quite effectively within the highest ranks of the GOI. Italian leaders on both sides of the aisle seem strangely unconcerned about dependence on Russian energy. They point out that Italy depended on Russian coal during the darkest days of the Cold War with n dire consequence. Italians are also lulled into complacency by the fact that geographic proximity to North African resources means that they are far less dependent on Russia than are the Germans or the former Eastern bloc countries.
14. (C/NF) During a March 2008 visit to ENI Headquarters embassy staff were given a briefing on ENI's Russian energy operations (available on Embassy Rome's Classified web site). ENI's view of the European energy situation was disturbingly similar to that of GAZPROM and the Kremlin, and at times laced with rhetorical flourishes reminiscent of Soviet-era double-speak: according to ENI, the real threat to Western Europe's energy security is not Russia -- it is Ukraine. The real solution to Europe's energy insecurity, according to ENI, lies in more direct pipeline connections to Russian gas fields and a need for pipelines that do not go through Ukraine - the rationale for the South Stream and Nord Stream pipelines (ref b). ENI's engineering arm hopes to construct both pipelines using experience gained in the construction of the Blue Stream pipeline that connects Russia and Turkey under the Eastern portion of the Black Sea. Additionally, ENI seeks full partnership with Russia on the South Stream project. GOI and ENI contacts have reported that the company was having trouble getting a firm Russian commitment to this South Stream partnership. The plummeting price of hydrocarbons may have reduced the economic incentives for this project, but many analysts believe that Russian geo-strategic concerns will trump business considerations on this project. The most recent Russia- Ukraine gas dispute seems to have revived interest in the Nord Stream and South Stream projects, especially among those who see Ukraine as the problem.
ROME 00000097 004 OF 005
15. (C/NF) Italy is not totally blind to the dangers of its dependence on Russia, however, and it is taking some steps that may prevent an increase in the percentage of their energy that they get from Russia. Upon returning to power, Berlusconi announced that he would return the country to nuclear power. While the GOI seems serious, this project will require eye-popping expenditures, long- term commitment, and the resolution of thorny environmental problems. Some fear that the nuclear project was launched in response to an oil price of $140 per barrel, and wonder if the Italian commitment to nuclear power will recede if oil prices stay low. Italy is also increasing its use of Liquid Natural Gas and is finishing work on a new terminal in the Northern Adriatic. While less-than-enthusiastic about the EU's complex Nabucco pipeline, the GOI seems to be supporting the smaller-scale Turkey-Greece-Italy pipeline project designed to bring Caspian gas to Western Europe. Edison, a French company with Italian roots, is trying to determine if it should commit to this project. While Azeri gas supplies and Turkey's willingness to allow the gas to flow West are unresolved issues, Edison believes its project has a chance of succeeding because unlike Nabucco, it is small enough -- it believes -- not to provoke opposition from Russia. The GOI -- especially powerful Minister for Economic Development Scajola -- supports the TGI project (in fact GOI officials complain if the U.S. sometimes seems to imply that Nabucco should have priority). There is fear that a successful launch of South Stream would -- by promising to meet demand -- doom both South Stream and Nabucco.
A Foreign Policy Designed to Deny Russia Nothing
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
16. (C/NF) The combination of historical ideological sympathy, energy dependence, lack of institutional influence, and a close personal relationship between Berlusconi and Putin serve to provide Russia with an apparently trusted ally, overtly willing to work overtime within the EU on Moscow's behalf. Russia can count on Italy to support its efforts to remove irritants in its relations with the West, including:
- pressure on/within OSCE to overlook Russia's lack of compliance with its legally binding Istanbul commitments on frozen conflicts, - weak support or even opposition to NATO efforts to build closer ties to Georgia and Ukraine, - weak initial support for international efforts to recognize Kosovo's independence, - unhelpful comments on U.S. bilateral Missile Defense plans with Poland and Czech Republic, - support for Russian President Medvedev's plans to redefine European security architecture to undermine OSCE and NATO. - support for Russian efforts to undermine EU and US energy security initiatives for Europe.
17. (C/NF) In the past, Berlusconi's highly-prized personal relationship with U.S. President Bush was an important counterweight to Russian influence, but many pro-U.S. Italian party officials on both sides of the aisle have worried to us that Bush's departure could tempt Berlusconi to move closer to Russia. For his part, Berlusconi has publicly stated that he would like to become a bridge between the U.S. and Russia and to "educate a young and inexperienced new American president" on how to deal with the Russians. If the past is any guide, this will likely mean an intensified effort to press the Russian agenda with the U.S.
Mitigating the Problem: Pushing Back on a Corrosive Influence
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
18. (C/NF) To tackle the problem head-on, Post has deployed a robust diplomatic and public affairs strategy targeting key figures inside and outside government. Our aim is two-fold: educate our interlocutors more profoundly on Russian activities and thus the context for U.S. policy, as well as build a counter- weight of dissenting opinion on Russia policy, especially within Berlusconi's political party. . Since the beginning of the summer, wit Berlusconi's return to power and the Georgia crisis, we have been engaging with GOI leaders aggressively at all levels. Pol, PA and Econoffs have engaged party members, GOI contacts, think tanks and even press to provide an alternative narrative to the Berlusconi insistence that Russia is a democratic and stable country that has been provoked by the West. The effort seems to be paying off. The opposition has begun taking jabs at Berlusconi by portraying him as choosing the wrong side of the debate. Some in the PdL have begun to approach us privately to say that they would like greater dialogue with us on the Russia issue, and have indicated their
ROME 00000097 005 OF 005
interest in challenging Berlusconi's giddiness about Putin. While we have a long way to go in changing the narrative, unfortunately, we have help - in the form of a PM who appears increasingly to be the mouthpiece of Putin.
Comment
- - - -
19. (C/NF) The bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Italy is excellent and encompasses tremendous cooperation on many levels and on many fronts. Unfortunately, Berlusconi efforts to "repair" the relationship between the West and Russia (which as he told the Ambassador in their farewell meeting on February 23, "sticks in my gut as a large undigested mass") are threatening his credibility and becoming a real irritant in our relationship. We can help get him back on the right track by sending him a clear signal that the U.S. does not need an interlocutor for its important bilateral relationship with Russia and that his insistence on undermining existin structures and channels based on common interests and shared values within the alliance in exchange for short term stability is not a strategy Washington wishes to pursue.
SPOGLI
Tuesday, 01 April 2008, 09:58
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 000929
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/28/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, IZ, AF, IS, IR, PK, UK
SUBJECT: DAVID CAMERON TELLS JOHN MCCAIN TORIES WON'T BREAK
WITH HMG WHERE TROOPS ARE CONCERNED
Classified By: Ambassador Robert H. Tuttle for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C/NF) Summary: Conservative party leader David Cameron told Senator John McCain the Tories won't break ranks with HMG on policies affecting British troops in battle. Cameron and Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague told McCain and Senators Joseph Lieberman and Lindsey Graham that Prime Minister Gordon Brown had no political support to increase British troops in Iraq. McCain said Basrah was "quiet for all the wrong reasons." (This conversation took place March 20 before the recent surge of violence in Southern Iraq.) McCain thanked Britain for its support. The Senators also discussed Afghanistan, Pakistan and Israel with Conservative leaders. End Summary.
Participants
------------
2. (U) Senators John McCain, Joseph Lieberman and Lindsey Graham, accompanied by the Ambassador, Senate staff Richard Fontaine and Dan Serchuk, and Poloff Kirsten Schulz met March 20 in David Cameron's House of Commons office. Cameron had assembled an eager group from his front bench including Hague, Shadow Chancellor George Osborne, Shadow Defence Minister Liam Fox, as well as Chief of Staff Edward Llewellyn, former party leader Michael Howard, and Dame Pauline Neville-Jones. The room was packed and the atmosphere collegial.
McCain's Assessment of Iraq
--------------------------
3. (C/NF) Senator McCain said the situation in Iraq had improved. He warned that Al Qaeda would put up a fight in Mosul and the Iranians were "not going to go quietly into the night." Maliki, McCain told the group, was weak but getting better. In Anbar province, he added, there was a demand for elections. McCain praised General Petraeus and the quality of the military leadership and mentioned Petraeus' upcoming congressional testimony. Cameron asked what the American troop numbers were likely to be. McCain said the U.S. would "stick at 180,000" and noted, "it's not the number of troops, but the number of casualties" which is of import. Al-Qaeda, said McCain, had taken to using suicide bombers and now to deploying women bombers. He said one woman was asked why she had tried to become a suicide bomber. She replied, "because my husband told me to."
Cameron Asks McCain for Appraisal of Basrah
-------------------------------------------
4. (C/NF) Cameron asked McCain what he thought was happening in the south of Iraq. McCain said he was very worried. He said it was like "Chicago in the 20's" and "could go at any time." The Iranians were there and the Iraqis were likely to find "the going to be extremely difficult." "Just because its quiet," said McCain, "doesn't mean it's good. It is quiet for all the wrong reasons."
Pledge on Troops
----------------
5. (C/NF) Cameron and Hague told the Senators that the Conservatives would never take a policy position that would undermine British policies where troops are involved. Hague noted the Conservatives largely share the Labour foreign policy agenda. Cameron said Prime Minister Brown did not have the political support to increase the British troop presence in Iraq, saying "that moment has passed." Hague seconded Cameron's assessment. Cameron asked McCain whether the British plans for a further draw-down should not go forward, given that HMG could not both maintain a presence in Iraq and build up its role in Afghanistan. In response, McCain thanked Cameron and for Britain's contribution in Iraq and Afghanistan.
6. (C/NF) McCain said he understood the Prime Minister intended to withdraw British troops prior to the next election. Hague confirmed Brown politically could not do otherwise. "I understand that," said McCain, "the British people have my gratitude for all that you have done."
Israel
------
LONDON 00000929 002 OF 002
7. (C/NF) McCain told Cameron that Israel's Prime Minster Ehud Omert was "still paying the price for Lebanon." Cameron asked whether Quartet Leader Tony Blair was optimistic. McCain said he admired Blair for his steadfastness, but what McCain had noticed in international relations was the tendency of statesmen to be optimistic once they become negotiators.
Iran
----
8. (C/NF) McCain told Cameron he saw an increasing, and increasingly damaging role, for Iran in regional affairs. This included an increase in activity in Iraq and in arming Hezbollah. McCain said he advocated gathering Europe to "cut off all credit" to Iran. Not just Europe, but other like-minded nations such as Japan, should be encouraged to take collective action on such matters, he said. Hague responded that he and the Conservatives had been pushing for this for the last two years. Hague and Cameron alleged that the release of the National Intelligence Assessment had set back this effort.
Afghanistan and Pakistan
------------------------
9. (C/NF) Cameron told McCain that he and his party focused on Afghanistan as the key foreign police issue. This was due, not least, to the timeline for when the Conservatives might come into office (2010 or 2009 at the earliest) and the fact that British troops were meant to be out of Iraq by then. Cameron also raised Pakistan, noting that 60,000 individuals travel to Pakistan from the UK each year and that this has implications for the UK's own significant domestic "terror threat." Cameron said he was interested in exploring the idea of whether ISAF and Enduring Freedom operations could be combined, as well as whether an increase in military presence was required or an enhanced civilian presence was more important. McCain replied that Afghanistan is complicated by the uncertainty in Pakistan. "We all like Karzai," he said, "but his is a very weak government." Cameron said NATO troop capacity was "patchy" and there appeared to be perpetual problems with shortages of air transport support. McCain said he was worried about Pakistan. "If they don't cooperate and help us, I don't know what we are going to do," he said. He added, "Waziristan hasn't been ruled for 2,000 years." On a positive note, McCain praised the fighting capacity of Afghans, whom he called "great fighters." Cameron said each year he met with Karzai, and each year he had the sense Karzai's sphere of influence was shrinking.
10. (U) CODEL McCain did not clear this cable.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm Tuttle
Friday, 30 October 2009, 11:53
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002688
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/26/2019
TAGS PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, RS
SUBJECT: IS STALIN'S GHOST A THREAT TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM?
REF: A) MOSCOW 2586 B) MOSCOW 1349
Classified By: Pol Min Counselor Susan Elliott for reason 1.4 (d)
1. (C) Summary: Efforts to sanitize Stalin's role in Soviet history may be potentially damaging to academic freedom and linked to GOR efforts to increase authoritarian rule. Although some recent incidents have caused concern among human rights monitors, thus far GOR efforts to enlist academics to help oppose "falsification of history" have not been strongly enforced. GOR rhetoric on the subject appears largely aimed at scoring political points in arguments with foreign countries. End Summary.
Stalin's ghost haunts the Metro
-------------------------------
2. (SBU) The specter of Joseph Stalin continues to haunt post-Soviet Russia, as the GOR and average Russians alike struggle to reconcile their pride in past Soviet glories with the harsh fact that the Soviet system, especially under Stalin, destroyed the lives of millions of its citizens. This uneasy and ambivalent relationship with the past is further complicated by a GOR policy of occasionally exploiting nationalistic emotions about Soviet history -- especially the Soviet victory over the Nazis -- to buttress support for its own, modern brand of authoritarianism (ref A). The latest dispute flared up after Moscow City Hall announced on October 27 that it would add Lenin's name to artwork in the Kurskaya Metro station which, since August, has carried a restored verse from the 1944 version of the Soviet anthem praising Stalin. Moscow's chief architect, Aleksandr Kuzmin, told local media that he wanted to "return Kurskaya to its original appearance," which would include a monument to Stalin. An article in the daily Komsomolskaya Pravda, a paper not always known for liberal opposition, noted wryly that if the goal was to return things to their original appearance, it might be necessary to blanket the entire city with Stalin's image, as authorities had done during the height of Stalin's totalitarian reign of terror. Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov told Interfax October 28 that the city had no intention of placing a Stalin statue in the Metro, and the Moscow Patriarchate criticized the idea of "Stalinist symbols" in the Metro, calling it "divisive."
Academic freedom under threat?
------------------------------
3. (C) GOR efforts to sanitize Soviet history have continued throughout the year, and have the potential to reach into numerous walks of life and hence to encroach upon academic freedom. In May, the Kremlin announced that it had formed a "Commission to Oppose Historical Falsification," and its state Duma supporters introduced legislation to defend Russia's honor in any discussion of World War II and the subsequent creation of the Soviet Union (ref B). Less than a month later, in June, XXXXXXXXXXXX leaked to us an email allegedly from V.A. Tishkov, the Chief of the History Section of RAN, politely "requesting" all faculty to present him with information in connection with the GOR's May announcement. The information requested included a list of sources of possible "falsification" in their field of study, and information about activity among their students promoting the spread of "falsification" or of "concepts damaging to Russia's interests." More recently, on October 14, the Moscow Times reported that the German government had written a letter to President Medvedev complaining about an investigation into an Arkhangelsk historian, Mikhail Suprun, for "violating privacy rights" by researching deportations of Soviet Germans under Stalin. The police official who gave Suprun access to the archives is also accused of "abuse of office," while Suprun could receive up to four years in prison, and has had what he called "a lifetime's work" on computers and research data confiscated by the Federal Security Service (FSB).
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that she personally knew professors at academic institutions in Moscow who had received such memos during the summer, including memos asking them to "identify falsifiers." She added that the Foreign Intelligence Service also has a presence at RAN. Discussing this potentially disturbing trend, XXXXXXXXXXXX also alluded to the "unpleasant rewrites" found in officially sanctioned textbooks which whitewash Stalin's role in the country's history. While acknowledging the existence of "a broad variety" of history books (approximately 24 schoolbooks on history are available in bookstores), XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the official version outnumbers the others by 250,000 books to approximately 10-15,000. Furthermore, in Russia as in the U.S., parents do not buy their children's history books, but rather the schools order them, which XXXXXXXXXXXX said makes the
MOSCOW 00002688 002 OF 003
choice "pre-determined." On October 24, the liberal Daily Journal reported the release of the latest in a long line of history textbooks rehabilitating Stalin; this one, ironically produced by the "Enlightenment" publishing company, denies the existence of totalitarianism in the USSR. The article noted that every time someone brings up the topic of history, it engendered a furious on-line debate.
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that a "virtual war" has flared up between pro-Kremlin and anti-Kremlin bloggers every time someone published papers on the Internet that they received from state archives 15 years ago detailing Soviet human rights abuses. The papers date back 15 years, XXXXXXXXXXXX explained, because now, "as in Soviet times," people need to complete special applications to receive permission to read such documents. A brief window opened after the fall of the Soviet Union, and just as quickly closed again.
The past is not dead; it is not even past
-----------------------------------------
7. (C) For XXXXXXXXXXXX, such debates tell as much about the present as they do about the past. He believes that the GOR is "trying to create a newly obedient society," which "as in Orwell," only knows history from a standpoint beneficial to the authorities. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, "when the power structure talks about falsification, they are simply attempting to hide part of history." He added that knowledge of the real history carries significant power. He was struck by the "shock" of people who learned historical facts, because "sometimes just one fact can overturn a person's whole world view." For example, XXXXXXXXXXXX daughter, who studied in the USSR and teaches history in high school, upon learning that XXXXXXXXXXXX grandfather had been killed in the 1937 purges, talked of little else for several years afterward. According to XXXXXXXXXXX, "the Kremlin fears people learning about past atrocities and crimes," and hence "tries to manipulate people's consciousness." XXXXXXXXXXX added that he understands the GOR's policy, because "if people knew the extent of Soviet crimes," the Kremlin would not be able to control the populace. XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed a similar view, saying that the GOR prefers to present itself as "infallible, making only correct decisions," and that discussions about Stalin's misdeeds might lead to unwanted questions for today's government.
8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX said he suspected that at least some of the pro-Kremlin bloggers who participate in these historical debates were professionals in the pay of the GOR (and perhaps special services). This notion may not be so far-fetched. On October 21, Interfax reported that a supposedly private citizen named Mikhail Baranov had launched an Internet portal called "Runivers" to fight "falsification of history" by creating a historical and cultural electronic encyclopedia and library. The article describes Baranov's organization as "non-commercial," and does not indicate from where -- during these economically tight times -- it receives its funding. However, a State Duma deputy who is a member of the Runivers board, Vladimir Medinskiy, lamented to Interfax that "Russia does not have an institution that would be dealing in historical propaganda, which is why we are losing in the war aimed to falsify Russian history."
A "wink" is the easiest response to GOR directives
--------------------------------------------- -----
9. (C) The fact that Russia currently lacks such a "historical propaganda" institution has thus far prevented any widespread attacks on academic freedom in the name of "anti-falsification." XXXXXXXXXXXX, told us October 27 that he had heard no reports from any of his MGU colleagues of any pressure on them to present teaching materials or name names in order to ferret out "falsification." He attributed this at least in part to the fact that, in contrast to neighboring Belarus, Russia has no Ideological Department which examines all teaching materials in schools and universities. XXXXXXXXXXXX also cautioned against leaping to Orwellian conclusions, reminding us not to "underestimate the cynicism" involved in administrative requests like the one at RAN. "Everyone knows how to take such requests," she said; the request from the government is "ugly," but unlike in Soviet times, when professors all depended upon the government for their currently there is no way to enforce such decrees. As a result, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, "people wink"; the administrators, while passing along the government's request, make it clear to their subordinates that they themselves do not support it. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that many historians may be outraged at the government's heavy-handedness and its "real falsification of history," but they don't see themselves as a unified force.
MOSCOW 00002688 003 OF 003
The simplest response is to use the power of inertia, and to stonewall passively.
Goal of GOR rhetoric: score political points at home
--------------------------------------------- -------
10. (C) For the GOR's part, it held a session of its Commission during the summer, and its director claimed that participants were "not here to censor, but simply to oppose" perceived attempts by other countries to gain at Russia's expense on the geopolitical scene. Although the stated focus is on international disputes, the GOR's primary audience for its hardline stance is domestic. Rhetoric defending Russia's honor on the international stage scores easy political points for the GOR at home. (Note: This occasionally results in some fancy footwork, as when Putin visited Poland on the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and wrote a conciliatory article for his Polish audience, which -- according to Lipman, by GOR design -- received scant coverage in Russian media. End Note.) As XXXXXXXXXXXX said, "there is a lot of vagueness about the past, but World War II is the one thing everyone in Russia accepts, both liberal and conservative; the narrative is that Germany attacked, and we won." That Stalin continues to have a following, 56 years after his death, is undeniable. After Aleksandr Prokhanov, editor-in-chief of the ultranationalist paper Zavtra, praised Stalin on the "Honest Monday" political talk show on Gazprom-owned NTV, television audience members were invited to phone in their opinions. Of those who participated, 61 percent called Stalin a hero, 32 percent an enemy, and 7 percent "a great, effective manager."
Comment
-------
11. (C) Recent reports of the death of academic freedom in Russia are greatly exaggerated. GOR leaders have shown that they are willing to adopt nationalistic postures when it buttresses their popular support, but attempts to dictate academic terms thus far appear half-hearted. The GOR is no doubt telling the truth when it claims to place greater focus on external quarrels about its past than on domestic debates. It is undeniable that nationalists continue to link Russia's past greatness with its past political system, which showed disdain for the value of individual human life and for freedom of expression, and that this approach places these fundamental freedoms under threat. However, there remain enough Russians both in and out of the government who question the nationalists' logic and strive to keep the memory of Stalin's victims alive. In the meantime, the GOR occasionally remembers to name a street after Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn just to make sure that nobody confuses them with the Soviets. When discussing this issue, Russians frequently refer to the poet Anna Akhmatova, who, when Khrushchev opened the doors to Stalin's prisons, wrote that the half of Russia who had imprisoned the other half would now come face to face with its victims. Since according to a recent Levada poll, 27 percent of current Russians have relatives who perished under Stalin's rule, that "other half" is not going away any time soon. Beyrle
Monday, 08 February 2010, 11:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 MADRID 000154
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE (ALEX MCKNIGHT, STACIE ZERDECKI),
EUR/ERA (ALESSANDRO NARDI), INR/TNC (JENNIFER MCELVEEN,
STEPHEN WOROBEC), INL (ELIZABETH VERVILLE, SCOTT HARRIS), L
(KEN PROPP),
EMBASSY MOSCOW (THOMAS FIRESTONE)
DEPARTMENT PASS TO NSC (GREG GATJANIS)
DEPARTMENT PASS TO ODNI/NIC (JOHN REGAS, MAT BURROWS)
DEPARTMENT PASS TO FBI (BARRY M. BRAUN,KAREN GREENAWAY)
DEPARTMENT PASS TO DOJ (BRUCE SWARTZ, TOM OTT, BRUCE OHR,
LISA HOLTYN)
DEPARTMENT PASS TO TREASURY/OFFICE OF TERRORISM AND
FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE (BOB WERNER)
EO 12958 DECL: 02/08/2035
TAGS KJUS, KHLS, PGOV, PREL, PTER, SP, PINS, KCOR, PINR,
XH, RS
SUBJECT: SPAIN DETAILS ITS STRATEGY TO COMBAT THE RUSSIAN
MAFIA
REF: A. MADRID 76 B. 09 MADRID 869 C. 09 MADRID 870 D. 09 MADRID 1003
MADRID 00000154 001.2 OF 005
Classified By: POLCOUNS William H. Duncan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: National Court Prosecutor Jose "Pepe" Grinda Gonzalez on January 14 gave a detailed, frank assessment of the activities and reach of organized crime (OC) in both Eurasia and Spain and Spain's strategy for how best to combat it in court. As he did so, he evaluated the levels of cooperation that Spain receives from numerous countries. Grinda presented his remarks on January 13 at the new US-Spain Counter-Terrorism and Organized Crime Experts Working Group meeting in Madrid (See Ref A). He provided a 17-page, English-language handout entitled, "The Organized Crime and the Russian Mafia," which he used as the basis for his remarks, which were more explicit than the document is. (NOTE: Post will send a copy of the handout to interested parties.) Grinda's comments are insightful and valuable, given his in-depth knowledge of the Eurasian mafia and his key role in Spain's pioneering efforts to bring Eurasian mafia leaders to justice. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
//Bio Info//
2. (S//NF) Grinda, a Special Prosecutor for Corruption and Organized Crime, in early December wrapped up his prosecution of the alleged OC network led by Zahkar Kalashov, the Georgian-born, Russian citizen who allegedly is a "vor v zakone," ("Thief in Law," the highest echelon of Russian OC leadership) and reportedly the most senior Russian mafia figure jailed outside Russia. The defendants were arrested as part of Operation Avispa (see Refs B and C). A verdict is expected by early February, according to Belen Suarez, Deputy Prosecutor for Corruption and Organized Crime and one of Grinda's superiors. Grinda is known to Post's Legat Office as a skilled and rigorous professional with deep subject matter expertise. He is forward-leaning in his cooperation with the USG and grateful for USG assistance. His work places him under considerable stress, which make him suspicious of penetration attempts by intelligence services and causes him to have heightened sensitivities regarding his physical security. Grinda also will be the prosecutor in the trial for those arrested in Operation Troika (See Refs B and C).
//Nomenclature//
3. (C) Grinda's was the first presentation at the January 13 meeting and his candor set the tone for an open exchange of ideas and information. He began by urging those present to speak frankly with each other in this closed door session. He said that what we are confronting is the "Russian mafia" even if the term "Eurasian mafia" is more socially acceptable and what the Russians certainly prefer. He acknowledged that the term Russian mafia can be a misnomer since these criminal groups sometimes involve Ukrainians, Georgians, Belarusians
MADRID 00000154 002.2 OF 005
or Chechens. He nevertheless questioned the stigma surrounding the phrase "Russian mafia" and noted it is acceptable to say "Sicilian mafia."
4. (C//NF) Grinda stated that he considers Belarus, Chechnya and Russia to be virtual "mafia states" and said that Ukraine is going to be one. For each of those countries, he alleged, one cannot differentiate between the activities of the government and OC groups.
//Identifying The Scope of The Threat the Russian Mafia Poses//
5. (C) Grinda suggested that there are two reasons to worry about the Russian mafia. First, it exercises "tremendous control" over certain strategic sectors of the global economy, such as aluminum. He made a passing remark that the USG has a strategic problem in that the Russian mafia is suspected of having a sizable investment in XXXXXXXXXXXX 6. (S//NF) The second reason is the unanswered question regarding the extent to which Russian PM Putin is implicated in the Russian mafia and whether he controls the mafia's actions. Grinda cited a "thesis" by Alexander Litvinenko, the former Russian intelligence official who worked on OC issues before he died in late 2006 in London from poisoning under mysterious circumstances, that the Russian intelligence and security services - Grinda cited the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and military intelligence (GRU) - control OC in Russia. Grinda stated that he believes this thesis is accurate. (COMMENT: See Ref B on a reported meeting between Litvinenko and the Spanish security services shortly before his death.) Grinda said that he believes the FSB is "absorbing" the Russian mafia but they can also "eliminate" them in two ways: by killing OC leaders who do not do what the security services want them to do or by putting them behind bars to eliminate them as a competitor for influence. The crimelords can also be put in jail for their own protection.
7. (S//NF) Grinda said that according to information he has received from intelligence services, witnesses and phone taps, certain political parties in Russia operate "hand in hand" with OC. For example, he argued that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was created by the KGB and its successor, the SVR, and is home to many serious criminals. Grinda further alleged that there are proven ties between the Russian political parties, organized crime and arms trafficking. Without elaborating, he cited the strange case of the "Arctic Sea" ship in mid-2009 as "a clear example" of arms trafficking.
8. (S//NF) Grinda said what he has read from 10-12 years' worth of investigations on OC has led him to believe that whereas terrorists aim to substitute the essence of the state itself, OC seeks to be a complement to state structures. He summarized his views by asserting that the GOR's strategy is
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to use OC groups to do whatever the GOR cannot acceptably do as a government. As an example, he cited Kalashov, whom he said worked for Russian military intelligence to sell weapons to the Kurds to destabilize Turkey. Grinda claimed that the GOR takes the relationship with OC leaders even further by granting them the privileges of politics, in order to grant them immunity from racketeering charges.
//The Spanish Strategy to Combat the Russian Mafia: Follow the Money//
9. (C) Grinda traced the history of the Russian mafia in Spain to the mid-1990s, when several vory v zakone began to enter Spain. He said that since 2004 Spanish prosecutors have created a formal strategy to "behead" the Russian mafia in Spain. He explained that this has been a top-down strategy done through extensive investigations of criminal actions by these vory v zakone living in Spain. These individuals have no known jobs and unknown sources of income, yet they live in large mansions. Spanish prosecutors have concluded that money-laundering is likely involved and the challenge has been how to prove this. Grinda says that Spain's longtime experience in fighting drug traffickers' use of money laundering has proven valuable in this regard.
10. (C) Grinda says the money-laundering investigations have a two-fold objective: to prevent the targets from profiting from the original crime and to prevent the targets from gaining enough clout to enjoy economic influence, which Grinda suggested sooner or later always reaches political power. This is why Spain's Attorney General has grouped together the prosecutors' office for anti-corruption and organized crime. As part of this strategy to prevent mafiosos from enjoying economic influence, Spain's strategy includes the seizure of businesses, companies, furniture and other assets.
11. (C) Grinda also addressed the challenges of combating OC when it enjoys political, economic, social and - especially - legal protection. Grinda applauded a document provided by the U.S. delegation which addressed the important role the media can play in warning the public of OC's activities and the threat that OC poses. The media can create an environment in which politicians would be reluctant to be friends with and do favors for mafia leaders, whom Grinda argued need to be seen as shady figures to be feared. Regarding legal protection, Grinda stated that a key factor in a government's ability to combat OC depends on the extent to which the country's best attorneys and law firms represent the mafia. In this regard, he asked rhetorically, "Why is Cuatrecases constantly defending Russian mafia members?" (COMMENT: Cuatrecases is one of Spain's leading law firms. Its website, available in English, is www.cuatrecasas.com.)
12. (C) Grinda stated that OC begins to accumulate both economic and political power when it begins to bid for contract tenders on civil works and infrastructure projects.
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He noted, however, that the vory v zakone do not engage in racketeering and murder, preferring to distance themselves from this activity and focus on crimes that are further up in the hierarchy, such as corruption of high-level ministers. The level of power that vory v zakone operate at is indicated by their level of interaction with these public servants, because cabinet-level officials do not spend time with unimportant people and cannot be tempted by those who do not have something important to offer. Grinda commented that Gennadios Petrov, the chief target of Spain's Operation Troika (See Refs B and C), was engaged in a "dangerously close" level of contact with senior Russian officials. COMMENT: In a surprise move, Spanish judges granted bail to Petrov, who is out on house arrest as of January 31, 2010. END COMMENT.
//Thoughts on International Collaboration//
13. (S//NF) Grinda addressed the collaboration Spain receives from other countries regarding the Russian mafia. Early in his remarks, he thanked the U.S. delegation for Washington's assistance to his office on corruption and OC issues. He said that it is important to have the DOJ, FBI, and Post's Legat office as collaborating partners and assessed that he and his U.S. interlocutors collaborate in "a very efficient manner." He added that the close level of US-GOS cooperation on OC issues is known in some circles and has led some to say that he and Spain are "the executing hand of the USG regarding the Russian mafia." He said that description is fine by him.
14. (S//NF) Grinda said that the Spanish National Police (SNP), the Civil Guard (GC), Spain's financial intelligence unit (SEPBLAC), and the surveillance division of the Customs Police together have compiled a solid portfolio of information on the Russian mafia in Spain. He added that Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium and the USG have been valuable partners in supplementing this information to further flesh out Grinda's office's understanding of the Russian mafia's activities. He added that Spain is beginning to collaborate with France on these issues, but singled out the United Kingdom for its lack of cooperation. XXXXXXXXXXXX 15. (S//NF) Grinda described OC as "very powerful" in Georgia and claimed that the intertwined ties there between the government and OC began under former President Shevardnadze, when he alleges a paramilitary group served as a de facto shadow presidency. Although Grinda acknowledged improvements under current President Saakashvili, he said that there are still "limitations" in Georgia's efforts to combat OC. Citing his personal experience in trying to secure Georgian assistance in the prosecution of Kalashov's OC network in
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Spain (See upcoming septel on the Kalashov trial), Grinda said that he feels "completely abandoned" and "betrayed" by Georgia and the explanations that he has received from Georgia regarding its lack of cooperation are "more pathetic than the betrayal itself."
16. (S//NF) To illustrate his thoughts on the level of cooperation Spain receives from Russia, Grinda reviewed Spain's efforts to arrest Tariel Oniani as part of Operation Avispa. (See Refs B, C and D.) In June 2005, Georgian-born Oniani fled to Russia hours before he was to be arrested in Spain and Russia gave him citizenship in April 2006, despite the fact that he had fled Spanish justice. Grinda alleged that the granting of citizenship was neither "innocent" nor "something done for free," and was an example of Russia putting crimelords to work on behalf of its interests. Grinda alleged that the Russian Ministry of Interior and the FSB are closely protecting Oniani in Russia (even in prison). Following Oniani's arrest in Moscow in June 2009, Spain requested his extradition for charges stemming from Operation Avispa, to which Russia replied that Oniani's Russian citizenship prevented him from being extradited. Grinda said that Russia "always tells Spain that it will take away Oniani's citizenship, but it never does." Grinda said that, from his experience, "A virture of the Russian government is that it will always say and do the same thing: nothing."
17. (U) The U.S. delegation to US-Spain Counter-Terrorism and Organized Crime Experts Working Group cleared this cable. SOLOMONT
Friday, 01 January 2010, 15:02
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000001
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2020
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINR, IT
SUBJECT: VISITING WITH A RECUPERATING BERLUSCONI
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Classified By: Ambassador David H. Thorne. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. C) Summary: The Ambassador visited recuperating Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi at his Lombardy estate for a private luncheon December 30. The Ambassador had suggested he visit Berlusconi after the Prime Minister was assaulted at a Milan rally in mid-December. Accompanied by Gianni Letta, the Undersecretary in the Prime Minister's office and effectively Berlusconi's second in command, Ambassador flew up for the meeting on the Prime Minister's plane. Bandaged and bruised from the December attack, Berlusconi was nonetheless upbeat and eager to show off his new project for training Italy's elite and share his thoughts on European leaders and domestic politics. Berlusconi was effusive about U.S.-Italian relations and Letta promised action on roping in ENI operations in Iran and pushing ahead on Megaports. End Summary
The Recuperating Prime Minister
-------------------------------
2. C) Following the Ambassador's call to Gianni Letta suggesting the Ambassador visit the Prime Minister during his recuperation, Letta, the Undersecretary in the Prime Minister's Office, invited Ambassador Thorne to accompanied him to Milan on December 30 for a private afternoon with the Prime Minister. The three hour session, held in Italian, involved only the Prime Minister, Letta and the Ambassador, and included a visit to Berlusconi's latest endeavor, a private training school for Italy's elite, and a wide-ranging lunch with the two top decision makers in the Italian government.
3. C) Berlusconi was still bandaged and scarred from the assault in early December where a mentally unstable man hurled a die cast model of Milan's cathedral at his head. Berlusconi noted that the missile had struck a glancing blow to his cheek, cutting him, breaking his nose and some of his teeth, but if it had hit him straight on "it would have killed" him. Letta recounted separately that Berlusconi had slumped into a depression following the attack - "he's an impresario, he wants everyone to love him " - but that had snapped out of it and was on the mend. Letta also noted that their tour of Berlusconi's new project site was the Prime Minister's first excursion outdoors since his release from the hospital.
U.S.-Italy: A Prized Relationship
---------------------------------
4. C) In luncheon discussions, Berlusconi unabashedly stated that he prized Italy's relationship with the U.S. and that his government stood ready to help us, whatever the issue. He noted that Italy owed the United States a debt of gratitude for salvation during World War II, and for protection throughout the Cold War. On Afghanistan, basing issues, and other tough problems, Italy was committed to helping the U.S. get to the right solution. He noted that he hoped that the Italian increase in Afghanistan would help President Obama and address the situation on the ground.
Berlusconi on European Leaders
------------------------------
5. C) The Prime Minister and Letta also gave their run down of current European political leadership. Berlusconi assessed that Sarkozy's star was clearly waning in European circles and that the French President did not command the same influence he did a year ago. Letta was less convinced, noting to the Ambassador that both Berlusconi and Sarkozy were "big dogs angling for the same spotlight." Berlusconi recounted how he had played an instrumental role in the Spring in persuading a reluctant Erdogan to accept Danish PM Rasmussen as the new NATO Secretary General, overcoming the Turkish President's profound irritation at Rasmussen for not silencing Kurdish language radio stations despite numerous requests. On Russia, Berlusconi felt that Putin and Medvedev got along well, respected each other, and had an effective relationship. In fact, farewells after lunch were unexpectedly cut short by an incoming call from Putin.
Iran: Appalled by violence, Will try to rope in ENI
--------------------------------------------- ------
6. C) On Iran, Berlusconi noted that he was appalled by the Iranian crackdown. He offered the capabilities of the Italian intelligence services and assured full sharing of information gathered on the internal dynamics in Tehran. Letta, as the supervising authority over Italy's intelligence services, assured the Ambassador of a continuation of our
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already excellent bilateral cooperation on the issue. Letta also promised that he would talk to ENI CEO Scaroni about the energy giant's ongoing operations in Iran and, if he could, persuade them to halt activities.
Megaports - GOI to determine POC
--------------------------------
7. C) In response to the U.S. request to move forward on Megaports, Letta told the Ambassador that the issue would be discussed at the Council of Ministers meeting on January 8 and that they would be in contact soon thereafter to convey which ministry would have lead in the GOI for implementing the project and as such be the primary interlocutor for our Embassy.
Italy's Courts - Problem Number One
-----------------------------------
8. C) Berlusconi forthrightly identified the magistratura - Italy's judiciary and courts -- as Italy's "biggest problem" and told the Ambassador that he was ready to forge an alliance with the center left opposition to implement judicial reform. He noted that a legal system where issues were never definitively resolved -- where you can be absolved of a crime and yet have the case resurrected later - sapped Italy's political and economic system. He argued that this is what has happened in his own case, where he has been cleared in the past but the same charges keep on returning repeatedly. He said that he had allies in the opposition on the need for reform, including PD Leader Bersani. Letta cautioned the government won't know if it has the clout to deliver on such an idea unless it secures a decent showing in regional elections in March 2010.
Smart Guys in the Opposition
----------------------------
9. C) Berlusconi and Letta displayed a great deal of respect for opposition leaders. Berlusconi praised the Democratic Party Leader, Pier Luigi Bersani as a "straight shooter" who was fair with a top rate intellect. Separately Letta was also complimentary about former Prime Minister (and archrival) Massimo D'Alema who he credited with showing courage and integrity during the Balkans crisis and taking some very tough decisions. Letta noted that D'Alema's prickliness and "smartest guy in the room" demeanor made dealing with him a chore, but acknowledged his judgment and political effectiveness, which was why Berlusconi backed him for the EU Foreign Minister position despite their differences. Letta told the Ambassador that he did not have a clear judgment on how DiPietro will play in domestic politics and looked forward to future conversations. On other domestic political issues, Letta thought that the current estrangement between the governing PDL party and Sicilian President Lombardo was a minor issue and they would patch it up quickly.
Worried about a flat 2010
-------------------------
10. C) Both Berlusconi and Letta expressed concern about the limited prospects for economic growth in 2010. Berlusconi thought that Italy had weathered the past year of the financial crisis fairly well but thought it would be a challenge to produce enough growth in 2010 to start replacing jobs lost. The Prime Minister was less concerned that a financial meltdown in Greece would have EU-wide impact. He said that he had a good relationship with Greek PM Papendreou and was confident that he could right the situation.
New Media - Important for Liberty
---------------------------------
11. C) In response to the Ambassador's questions to the Prime Minister about the role of the internet, Berlusconi shot back "it's important for liberty." New media - particularly Facebook which has been instrumental in the past month in organizing a national "No Berlusconi Day" and more controversially in continuing to host "Kill Berlusconi" pages - has vexed the GOI, - but the Prime Minister stated that he felt the evolving media was both critical to the future and also to the preservation of liberty. But he felt there needed to be better tuned controls to prevent the most extreme use of the new outlets.
The Berlusconi Leadership Academy
---------------------------------
12. C) The Prime Minister commenced the visit by personally
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conducting a guided tour of his most recent project, a private academy to train Italy's brightest young minds. Berlusconi led Letta and the Ambassador on a personal tour of a newly rehabbed Lombardy estate that will serve as the home of the enterprise. The completely renovated 17th century country mansion, Villa Gernetto, will house a special school set to open in March for one hundred of Italy's most talented young leaders, completely funded from Berlusconi's personal fortune. The Prime Minister intends to choose the students himself and he envisions an environment where Italy's best and brightest live and study, taught by world leaders "like Blair and Clinton."
Comment
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13. C) The Ambassador's intimate afternoon with Italy's two top decision makers was both a testament to the priority Berlusconi gives the U.S.-Italy relationship but also perhaps a sign that the GOI has achieved its long-sought level comfort and ease with the Obama administration. It is also a dividend of the Ambassador's cultivation of the relationship with Letta, which has opened up a personal channel to the Prime Minister. The Italian press coverage of the following day clearly took this message from what they viewed as an extraordinary private session. The Prime Minister was clear that he expects to be called upon to deliver for the U.S., which he will do out of principle, not self-interest. Despite being given numerous openings, neither the Prime Minister nor Letta asked for anything from the U.S. during the lengthy luncheon. A striking aspect of the session was Letta's clear position as co-regent, with Berlusconi deferring regularly to his colleague and with Letta airing opposing points of view to his boss during the luncheon. THORNE
Tuesday, 16 June 2009, 21:42
S E C R E T STATE 062393
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 06/16/2034
TAGS PINR, KSPR, ECON, HU
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: HUNGARY
REF: STATE 18763
Classified By: SUZANNE MCCORMICK, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on Hungary (paragraph 3-end and encourages Department personnel at post to assist in compiling Hungarian biographic information (paragraph 2).
A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the NHCD contained in Ref C and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs focused on Hungary and sets forth a list of priorities intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on Hungary. The priorities may also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).
B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.
C. (S/NF) Important information responsive to the NHCD often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review leading to the NHCD,s issuance. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels.
2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting ) including on Hungary:
A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community's collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination to the IC. State reporting officers are encouraged to report on noteworthy Hungarians as information becomes available.
B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible when they have information relating to persons linked to Hungary: office and organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.
3. (S/NF) Hungarian NHCD: priority issues:
A. Governance and Internal Development 1) Energy Security (ESEC-3H) 2) Financial Stability and Economic Development (ECFS-4) 3) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4) 4) Political Evolution, Extremism, and Human Rights (DEPS-4H) 5) National Leadership (LEAD-4H) B. Foreign Relations 1) Russia (FPOL-4H) 2) Regional Neighbors (FPOL-4H) 3) European Union (FPOL-4H) 4) International Organizations and Other Foreign Relations (FPOL-4H) 5) The United States (FPOL-4H) C. National Security 1) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 2) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H) 3) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness (FMCC-4H) 4) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H) 5) Money Laundering (MONY-5) 6) Proliferation and Counterproliferation (ACWP-5) 7) Information to Support US Military Operational Planning (INFR-5H) D. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H)
4. (S/NF) Reporting and collection needs:
A. Governance and Internal Development
1) Energy Security (ESEC-3H). Policies, plans, and efforts to diversify energy sources and develop, rehabilitate, or expand energy infrastructure, including investment in capacity, efficiency, storage, nuclear power, flex-fuel, or other sources of alternative energy. Details about financing strategies, and openness to foreign investment. Willingness, plans, and efforts to develop and implement unified Europe energy security strategy. Declared and secret energy agreements with Russia, Caspian basin countries, and others. Details about national energy policymakers, key commercial figures in the sector, and their relations with other national leaders. Views about and responses to Russian plans and efforts regarding Hungarian dependence on Russian energy. Factors, including corruption and foreign influence, affecting government decisionmaking on key energy issues. Energy imports, including sufficiency, impact on economy, and influence on bilateral relations. Organized crime involvement in energy sector.
2) Financial Stability and Economic Development (ECFS-4). Plans and efforts to respond to global financial crisis. Public response to financial challenges. Plans and efforts to finance debt. Opposition, extremist, and fringe group plans and efforts to exploit financial crisis to achieve objectives. Plans and efforts regarding economic cooperation with the US, EU, Group of Eight, and international financial institutions, including World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Paris Club. National and regional economic conditions, including real output, domestic and foreign investment, foreign trade, capital flight, monetization, unemployment, and gray economy. Plans and efforts to pursue economic reform, including among monetary and fiscal policies. Plans and efforts to limit capital flight and barter. Economic policy decisionmaker identities, philosophies, roles, interrelations, and decisionmaking processes. Role of private businessmen in economic planning. Published and non-published national budget, including oversight and associated banks and financial institutions. Details about major financial institutions. Plans and efforts to comply with IMF agreements.
3) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4). Policies, plans, and efforts to develop, protect, and strengthen independent and effective judiciary, including advocates, opponents, obstacles, and progress. Government, non-public and public views about, and indications of, impact of corruption and crime on governance, internal development, financial stability, weapons security, military readiness, and foreign investment. Corruption within political parties, especially the ruling party. Details about organized crime groups, including leadership, links to government and foreign entities, drug and human trafficking, money laundering, credit card fraud, and computer-related crimes, including child pornography. Details about cyber crime. Government plans and efforts to combat cyber crime. Details about drug trafficking, including trends, types of drugs, production, identification of trafficking groups and individuals, money laundering, and smuggling methods and routes. Government counter-drug control and enforcement plans, organizations, capabilities, and activities. Government efforts to cooperate with international partners to control illicit drug trade. Illegal acquisition of government documents, such as passports and driver licenses. Links between terrorists, organized crime groups, and cyber criminals. Details about law enforcement organizations and capabilities, including procedures, capabilities, challenges, and plans to remedy obstacles to swift and equal justice. Plans and efforts of law enforcement organizations to use biometric systems. Plans and efforts to combat intellectual property rights crime.
4) Political Evolution, Extremism, and Human Rights (DEPS-4H). Government and public commitment to, and plans and efforts to protect and strengthen, representative government, rule of law, freedom of press, religious freedom, private ownership, and individual liberties. Policies and efforts regarding political, judicial, economic, social, and educational reform. Plans and programs to manage perceptions, including through media manipulation. Identification, roles, goals, and composition of significant societal groups, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Developments within and between political parties and blocs. Details about internal workings of major political parties. Strength and vitality of political parties. Information about opposition and extremist groups, including domestic and foreign support. Information about the Hungarian Guard. Information about, and government policies and efforts regarding, religious and ethnic minorities. Public attitudes toward minorities. Indications of minority issues influencing political developments or internal stability. Indications of human rights abuses. Details about demography, including birth rate, fertility rate, mortality rate, incidence of infectious diseases, and migration. Plans and efforts to respond to declining birth rates, including through promotion of immigration.
5) National Leadership (LEAD-4H). Objectives, strategies, efforts, authorities, and responsibilities of national leaders. Philosophies and motives behind leadership objectives, strategies, and efforts. Identities, motives, influence, and relations among principal advisors, supporters, and opponents, especially regarding the premier,s inner circle. Decisionmaking procedures, including differences under varying circumstances. Relations among national government entities, including president, premier, ministers, national security and defense council, intelligence and security services, legislature, prosecutor general, and judiciary. Corruption among senior officials, including off-budget financial flows in support of senior leaders. Sources of funding for political candidates, and government plans and efforts to ensure funding transparency. Public support for or opposition to administration, as well as government strategies and tactics to increase, maintain, and exercise authority. Assessment, vulnerability, personality, financial, health, and biometric information about current and emerging leaders and advisors.
B. Foreign Relations
1) Russia (FPOL-4H). Policies, plans, and efforts regarding relations with Russia, especially on strategic issues, such as energy, security, transportation, and trade. Details about personal relations between Hungarian leaders and Russian officials or businessmen. Senior leadership, intelligence officials, opposition, and ministerial-level vulnerabilities to Russian influence. Efforts to cooperate with or oppose Russia in support of, or opposition to, US policies. Leadership and public views about relations with Russia. Hungarian perceptions about, and response to, Russian efforts to influence, including through financial assistance, Hungarian political parties. Government and public attitudes about Russia,s strategic objectives in the region, and Hungary,s vulnerability to Russian coercion and influence.
2) Regional Neighbors (FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts regarding relations with regional neighbors, including Germany. Hungarian participation in US-sponsored programs designed to promote regional security cooperation, healthy civil-military relations, and effective management of military resources. Plans and efforts regarding Russian influence in the region, especially on politics, energy, and other domestic issues. Plans and efforts to cooperate with regional neighbors on energy security. Details about disputes with neighbors. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries. Relations with, and military deployments in, the Balkans. Plans and efforts to promote democracy in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Plans and efforts regarding Moldova and Kosovo. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding Ballistic Missile Defense. Plans and efforts regarding Visegrad Group.
3) European Union (FPOL-4H). Philosophies and motives behind leadership objectives, strategies, and efforts regarding the European Union (EU). Priorities, plans, and efforts regarding 2011 EU presidency. Evidence of, and thoughts about, increasing reliance upon EU, and diminishing reliance upon US, regional leadership. Plans and efforts regarding EuroZone. Leadership and public views about levels of influence among European states, including relations between states and EU institutions as well as emergence of a preeminent state or a core alliance in Europe. Details about formal and informal alliances between Hungary and other EU states, including plans and efforts to cooperate on issues of mutual concern. Plans and efforts to cooperate with regional neighbors, EU members, and non-state actors to influence EU policies. Plans and efforts regarding European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Plans and efforts regarding EU expansion. Plans and efforts regarding specific EU policies and decisions.
4) International Organizations and Other Foreign Relations (FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts to pursue national objectives in international fora, such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Plans and efforts regarding leadership opportunities in international organizations. Details about relations with China and nations that are hostile to US interests.
5) The United States (FPOL-4H). Policies, strategies, and efforts concerning relations with the US. Expectations regarding diplomatic, security, and economic relations with the US. Leadership and public perceptions about US regional policies, presence, and activities. Plans and efforts to support or oppose US positions in international fora. Plans and efforts regarding bilateral agreements, such as nuclear non-proliferation agreements, with the US.
C. National Security
1) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.
2) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H). Plans, efforts, and ability to maintain defense spending for force modernization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interoperability, meeting NATO-required spending levels and force goals, and defense capability initiative implementation. Strategy and efforts to win public support for such spending. Plans and efforts to fulfill commitments to NATO, including manpower and equipment for out-of-area operations. Actions to accommodate NATO procedures and methods. Government and public confidence in NATO Article 5 security guarantees. Attitudes toward stationing or long-term deployment of NATO or US forces on Hungarian soil, NATO commands in Hungary, and out-of-country deployments of Hungarian forces. Plans and efforts regarding NATO enlargement, including strategic concepts and future roles of the alliance. Government, including military, intelligence, and security service willingness, ability, and efforts to protect US and NATO classified information. Awareness of and concern about foreign penetration. Implementation and strengthening of personnel-vetting procedures. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding EU defense and security cooperation, including ESDP; views and intentions regarding any conflict between ESDP and NATO obligations.
3) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness (FMCC-4H). Details about threat assessment, including agreement and disagreement among civilian and military leaders. Perceptions about, and response to, cyber warfare threat. Plans and efforts to support or oppose US objectives in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Willingness and capability to participate in NATO, EU, and other multilateral relationships, including out-of-area operations, multinational peacekeeping force in Southeast Europe, and humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Policies and efforts regarding access, overflight, and transit of US military forces and equipment. Disposition, readiness, and mission of military forces. Plans and efforts regarding force structure, military reform, and modernization, including future roles, strengths, and compositions of military services. Details about military cooperation with other nations and actors. Details about defense industry, including plans and efforts to cooperate with foreign nations. Weapon system development programs, firms, and facilities. Types, production rates, and factory markings of major weapon systems. Decisionmaking regarding acquisition of US or other nation weapon systems. Military and paramilitary manpower, structure, budget and expenditure by service and function, mission, doctrine, tactics, order of battle, command and control, equipment, maintenance, training, exercise participation, support for international peacekeeping operations, professionalism, non-commissioned officer development, health care, pay, housing, loyalty, and morale. Civil-military relations. Perceptions about, and commitment to, intelligence sharing agreements with the US. Indications of national-level denial and deception program, including doctrine, targets, goals, organizations, and activities. Location, mission, organization, associated personnel, funding, development, and use of underground facilities and other hardened structures, including for protection of command and control networks, civil and military leaders, and critical resources. Details about, and transfer of, advanced engineering techniques to harden key facilities, including by use of specialty concretes. Details about dual use of underground civil infrastructure. Plans and efforts to help other states develop underground facilities and other hardened structures.
4) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H). Government counterterrorism policies, plans, capabilities, and efforts. Government and public support for or opposition to US efforts, including military operations, in the war on international terrorism. Government willingness, capability, and effort to establish and protect legislative framework to combat terrorists; control borders; detain terrorists; seize terrorist-associated bank accounts; share intelligence; and protect weapons, associated facilities, and energy and other critical infrastructure against terrorist attack and intrusion. Terrorist plans to attack US and other persons, facilities, or interests. Terrorist plans and efforts to acquire or transship chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Terrorist identities, motives, objectives, strategies, locations, facilities, command structures, links to other groups or states, associations with humanitarian or medical groups, use of forged and/or modified travel documents, telecommunication methods and modes, transportation, funding, finance and business operations, security, recruitment, and training. Indications of foreign entity, public, or local support for terrorists. Details about terrorist involvement in illicit drug and other criminal trade.
5) Money Laundering (MONY-5). Government plans and efforts to implement anti-money laundering legislation, enforcement, and prosecution. Money laundering, including methods, techniques, transactions, locations, and associated individuals, organizations, and institutions. Use of shell corporations and non-financial intermediaries, such as lawyers, accountants, and casinos, as well as related bank accounts to launder criminal proceeds. Links between money laundering groups and terrorists. Drug traffic involvement in money laundering. Use of money laundering as an influence-gaining measure.
6) Proliferation and Counterproliferation (ACWP-5). Commitment, plans, efforts, and ability to manage a secure military export regime, including details about monitoring end user activities and imposing penalties for violations. Organizational readiness and capability of border police and customs officials to control borders. Plans and efforts to adhere to international control regimes. Plans and efforts to implement legislation and enforce effective export licensing regimes. Willingness and efforts to cooperate with the US to prevent proliferation. Foreign use of Hungary as weapons transshipment point. Details about weapons transportation, including associated firms, agents, modes, methods, routes, nodes, schedules, and communications. Details about organizations, groups, and individuals engaged in sales of weapons or technologies to states that are hostile to US interests or non-state entities. Plans and efforts to circumvent antiproliferation treaties and arrangements.
7) Information to Support US Military Operational Planning (INFR-5H). Information to support US contingency planning, including for noncombatant evacuation, and humanitarian and medical relief operations. Current status, vulnerability of, and plans to modify, critical infrastructures, especially transportation, energy, and communications. Civilian and military medical and life science capabilities and infrastructures. Military medical research and development, including new vaccines, therapeutics, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear medical defense. Information, including statistics, about infectious diseases, such as avian influenza, tuberculosis, human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome, hepatitis A, and tickborne encephalitis. Locations and levels of chemical and radiological contamination of food, water, air, and soil. Locations and types of industrial facilities with chemicals stored onsite. Descriptions and locations of potential evacuation sites, police and fire stations, hospitals, hotels, and diplomatic facilities. Plans and capabilities of government and NGOs to support, including provision of security for, relief operations. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding detained, captured, and arrested US persons, including prisoners of war and missing in action.
D. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H). Current specifications, vulnerabilities, and capabilities of, and planned upgrades to, national telecommunications infrastructure and information systems, networks, and technologies used by civilian and military government authorities, including intelligence and security services. Details about command and control systems and facilities. National leadership use of, and dependencies on, dedicated telecommunications infrastructures and information systems. Details about national and regional telecommunications policies, programs, regulations, and training. Information about current, and planned upgrades to, public sector communications systems and technologies, including cellular phone networks, mobile satellite phones, very small aperture terminals, trunked and mobile radios, pagers, prepaid calling cards, firewalls, encryption, international connectivity, use of electronic data interchange, and cable and fiber networks. Information about wireless infrastructure, cellular communications capabilities and makes and models of cellular phones and their operating systems, to include second generation and third generation systems. Details about the use of satellites for telecommunication purposes, including planned system upgrades. Details about Internet and Intranet use and infrastructure, including government oversight. Details about foreign and domestic telecommunications service providers and vendors. Plans and efforts to acquire US export-controlled telecommunications equipment and technology. Plans and efforts to export or transfer state-of-the art telecommunications equipment and technology. Details about information repositories associated with radio frequency identification enabled systems used for passports, government badges, and transportation systems. Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and e-mail addresses of principal civilian and military leaders.
CLINTON
Tuesday, 16 June 2009, 21:45
S E C R E T STATE 062395
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 06/16/2034
TAGS PINR, KSPR, ECON, RO
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: ROMANIA
REF: STATE 18770
Classified By: SUZANNE MCCORMICK, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C)
1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on Romania (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued DOS reporting of biographic information relating to Romania (paragraph 2).
A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the NHCD contained in Ref C and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs focused on Romania and sets forth a list of priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs (paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on Romania. The priorities may also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).
B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.
C. (S/NF) Important information responsive to the NHCD often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review leading to the NHCD,s issuance. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels.
2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting ) including on Romania:
A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community's collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination to the IC. State reporting officers are encouraged to report on noteworthy Palestinians as information becomes available.
B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible when they have information relating to persons linked to Romania: office and organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.
3. (S/NF) Romanian NHCD - priority issues:
A. National Leadership and Governance 1) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4) 2) National Leadership (LEAD-3H) 3) Political Evolution and Democratic Reform (DEPS-4H) B. Financial Stability, Energy Security, and Societal Challenges 1) Financial Stability and Economic Development (ECFS-5) 2) Energy Security (ESEC-3H) 3) Money Laundering (MONY-5H) 4) Demographics, Minorities, and Human Rights (DEMG-5H) C. Foreign Relations 1) Black Sea, Balkans, and Other Regional Neighbors (FPOL-4H) 2) Russia (FPOL-4H) 3) European Union (FPOL-4H) 4) The United States (FPOL-4H) 5) International Organizations and Other Foreign Relations (FPOL-4H) D. National Security 1) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 2) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H) 3) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness (FMCC-4H) 4) Proliferation and Counterproliferation (ACWP-4H) 5) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H) 6) Information to Support US Military Operational Planning (INFR-5H) E. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H)
4. (S/NF) Reporting and collection needs:
A. National Leadership and Governance
1) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4). Policies, plans, and efforts to develop, protect, and strengthen independent and effective judiciary, including advocates, opponents, obstacles, and progress. Government, non-public and public views about, and indications of, impact of corruption and crime on governance, internal development, financial stability, intelligence and security services, weapons security, military readiness, and foreign investment. Details about organized crime groups, including leadership, links to government and foreign entities, drug and human trafficking, money laundering, credit card fraud, and computer-related crimes, including child pornography. Details about cyber crime. Government plans and efforts to combat cyber crime. Details about drug trafficking, including trends, types of drugs, production, identification of trafficking groups and individuals, money laundering, and smuggling methods and routes. Government counter-drug control and enforcement plans, organizations, capabilities, and activities. Government efforts to cooperate with international partners to control illicit drug trade. Illegal acquisition of government documents, such as passports and driver licenses. Links between organized crime groups, cyber criminals, and terrorists. Details about law enforcement organizations and capabilities, including procedures, capabilities, challenges, and plans to remedy obstacles to swift and equal justice. Plans and efforts of law enforcement organizations to use biometric systems.
2) National Leadership (LEAD-3H). Objectives, strategies, efforts, authorities, and responsibilities of national leaders. Philosophies and motives behind leadership objectives, strategies, and efforts. Identities, motives, influence, and relations among principal advisors, supporters, and opponents. Decisionmaking procedures, including differences under varying circumstances. Relations among national government entities, including president, premier, ministers, national security and defense council, intelligence and security services, legislature, prosecutor general, and judiciary. Corruption among senior officials, including off-budget financial flows in support of senior leaders. Sources of funding for political candidates, and government plans and efforts to ensure funding transparency. Public support for or opposition to administration, as well as government strategies and tactics to increase, maintain, and exercise authority. Assessment, vulnerability, personality, financial, health, and biometric information about current and emerging leaders and advisors.
3) Political Evolution and Democratic Reform (DEPS-4H). Government and public commitment to, and plans and efforts to protect and strengthen, representative government, rule of law, freedom of press, religious freedom, private ownership, and individual liberties. Policies and efforts regarding political, judicial, economic, social, and educational reform. Plans and programs to manage perceptions, including through media manipulation. Popular attitudes about Romania,s evolving political, philosophical, and regional identity. Identification, roles, goals, and composition of significant societal groups, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Developments within political parties and blocs. Details about internal workings of major political parties. Strength and vitality of political parties. Information about opposition and extremist groups, including domestic and foreign support.
B. Financial Stability, Energy Security, and Societal Challenges
1) Financial Stability and Economic Development (ECFS-5). Plans and efforts to respond to global financial crisis. Public response to financial challenges. Leadership concerns about, and efforts to avoid, economic collapse. Opposition, extremist, and fringe group plans and efforts to exploit financial crisis to achieve objectives. Plans and efforts regarding economic cooperation with the US, EU, Group of Eight, and international financial institutions, including World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Paris Club. Plans and efforts to pursue economic reform, including among monetary and fiscal policies. Plans and efforts to develop national infrastructure, and private sector and market institutions, including financial system. Plans and efforts to adopt international investment norms, protect intellectual property, and support entrepreneurs, especially in small and medium businesses. Plans and efforts to attract and retain foreign investment. Plans and efforts to protect foreign investors from government corruption and inefficiencies. National and regional economic conditions, including real output, domestic and foreign investment, foreign trade, capital flight, monetization, and gray economy. Plans and efforts to limit capital flight and barter. Economic policy decisionmaker identities, philosophies, roles, interrelations, and decisionmaking processes. Role of private businessmen in economic planning. Published and non-published national budget, including oversight and associated banks and financial institutions. Details about major financial institutions. Plans and efforts to comply with IMF agreements. Plans and efforts regarding Euro adoption.
2) Energy Security (ESEC-3H). Policies, plans, and efforts to diversify energy sources and develop, rehabilitate, or expand energy infrastructure, including investment in capacity, efficiency, storage, nuclear power, flex-fuel, or other sources of alternative energy. Details about financing strategies, and openness to foreign investment. Willingness, plans, and efforts to develop and implement unified Europe energy security strategy. Declared and secret energy agreements with Russia, Iran, other Caspian basin countries, and others. Details about national energy policymakers, key commercial figures in the sector, and their relations with other national leaders. Views about and responses to Russian plans and efforts regarding Romanian dependence on Russian energy. Factors, including corruption and foreign influence, affecting government decisionmaking on key energy issues. Energy imports, including sufficiency, impact on economy, and influence on bilateral relations. Organized crime involvement in energy sector.
3) Money Laundering (MONY-5H). Government plans and efforts to implement anti-money laundering legislation, enforcement, and prosecution. Money laundering, including methods, techniques, transactions, locations, and associated individuals, organizations, and institutions. Use of shell corporations and non-financial intermediaries, such as lawyers, accountants, and casinos, as well as related bank accounts to launder criminal proceeds. Links between money laundering groups and terrorists. Drug traffic involvement in money laundering. Use of money laundering as an influence-gaining measure.
4) Demographics, Minorities, and Human Rights (DEMG-5H). Information about, and government policies and efforts regarding, religious and ethnic minorities, especially Hungarians, Roma, and Turks. Public attitudes toward minorities. Indications of human rights abuses. Details about demography, including birth rate, fertility rate, mortality rate, incidence of infectious diseases, and migration. Plans and efforts to respond to declining birth rates, including through promotion of immigration.
C. Foreign Relations
1) Black Sea, Balkans, and Other Regional Neighbors (FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts regarding relations with Black Sea and other regional neighbors. Plans and efforts to jointly respond to challenges regarding counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and illegal migration. Plans and efforts regarding cooperative agreements, especially Black Sea FOR, Harmony, Enhanced Black Sea Security Proposal, and Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone. Romanian participation in US-sponsored programs designed to promote regional security cooperation, healthy civil-military relations, and effective management of military resources. Plans and efforts regarding Russian influence in the region, especially on politics, energy, and other domestic issues. Plans and efforts to cooperate with regional neighbors on energy security. Details about disputes and rivalries with neighbors. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding Romanian minorities in neighboring countries. Relations with, and military deployments in, the Balkans. Plans and efforts to promote democracy in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, especially Macedonia. Plans and efforts regarding Moldova and Kosovo. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding Ballistic Missile Defense.
2) Russia (FPOL-4H). Policies, plans, and efforts regarding relations with Russia, especially on strategic issues, such as energy, security, transportation, and trade. Details about personal relations between Romanian leaders and Russian officials or businessmen. Senior leadership, intelligence officials, and ministerial-level vulnerabilities to Russian influence. Efforts to cooperate with or oppose Russia in support of, or opposition to, US policies. Leadership and public views about relations with Russia. Government and public attitudes about Russia,s strategic objectives in the region, and Romania,s vulnerability to Russian coercion and influence.
3) European Union (FPOL-4H). Philosophies and motives behind leadership objectives, strategies, and efforts regarding the European Union (EU). Evidence of, and thoughts about, increasing reliance upon EU, and diminishing reliance upon US, regional leadership. Leadership and public views about levels of influence among European states, including relations between states and EU institutions as well as emergence of a preeminent state or a core alliance in Europe. Evidence of Romanian mismanagement of EU funding, and government efforts to ensure transparent management of foreign aid. Details about formal and informal alliances between Romania and other EU states, including plans and efforts to cooperate on issues of mutual concern. Plans and efforts to cooperate with regional neighbors, EU members, and non-state actors to influence EU policies. Plans and efforts, including investment strategies, regarding European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Plans and efforts regarding EU expansion. Plans and efforts regarding specific EU policies and decisions.
4) The United States (FPOL-4H). Policies, strategies, and efforts concerning relations with the US. Expectations regarding diplomatic, security, and economic relations with the US. Leadership and public perceptions about US regional policies, presence, and activities. Plans and efforts to support or oppose US positions in international fora.
5) International Organizations and Other Foreign Relations (FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts to pursue national objectives in international fora, such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Plans and efforts regarding leadership opportunities in international organizations. Details about relations with China and nations that are hostile to US interests.
D. National Security
1) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.
2) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H). Plans, efforts, and ability to maintain defense spending for force modernization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interoperability, meeting NATO-required spending levels and force goals, and defense capability initiative implementation. Strategy and efforts to win public support for such spending. Plans and efforts to fulfill commitments to NATO, including manpower and equipment for out-of-area operations. Actions to accommodate NATO procedures and methods. Government and public confidence in NATO Article 5 security guarantees. Attitudes toward stationing or long-term deployment of NATO or US forces on Romanian soil, NATO commands in Romania, and out-of-country deployments of Romanian forces. Plans and efforts regarding NATO enlargement, including strategic concepts and future roles of the alliance. Government, including military, intelligence, and security service willingness, ability, and efforts to protect US and NATO classified information. Awareness of and concern about foreign penetration. Implementation and strengthening of personnel-vetting procedures. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding EU defense and security cooperation, including ESDP; views and intentions regarding any conflict between ESDP and NATO obligations.
3) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness (FMCC-4H). Details about threat assessment, including agreement and disagreement among civilian and military leaders. Perceptions about, and response to, cyber warfare threat. Plans and efforts to support or oppose US objectives in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Willingness and capability to participate in NATO, EU, and other multilateral relationships, including out-of-area operations, multinational peacekeeping force in Southeast Europe, and humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Policies and efforts regarding access, overflight, and transit of US military forces and equipment. Disposition, readiness, and mission of military forces. Plans and efforts regarding force structure, military reform, and modernization, including future roles, strengths, and compositions of military services. Details about military cooperation with other nations. Details about defense industry, including plans and efforts to cooperate with foreign nations and actors. Weapon system development programs, firms, and facilities. Types, production rates, and factory markings of major weapon systems. Decisionmaking regarding acquisition of US or other nation weapon systems. Military and paramilitary manpower, structure, budget and expenditure by service and function, mission, doctrine, tactics, order of battle, command and control, equipment, maintenance, training, exercise participation, support for international peacekeeping operations, professionalism, non-commissioned officer development, health care, pay, housing, loyalty, and morale. Civil-military relations. Perceptions about, and commitment to, intelligence sharing agreements with the US. Indications of national-level denial and deception program, including doctrine, targets, goals, organizations, and activities. Location, mission, organization, associated personnel, funding, development, and use of underground facilities and other hardened structures, including for protection of command and control networks, civil and military leaders, and critical resources. Details about, and transfer of, advanced engineering techniques to harden key facilities, including by use of specialty concretes. Details about dual use of underground civil infrastructure. Plans and efforts to help other states develop underground facilities and other hardened structures.
4) Proliferation and Counterproliferation (ACWP-4H). Commitment, plans, efforts, and ability to manage a secure military export regime, including details about monitoring end user activities and imposing penalties for violations. Organizational readiness and capability of border police and customs officials to control borders. Plans and efforts to adhere to international control regimes. Plans and efforts to implement legislation and enforce effective export licensing regimes. Willingness and efforts to cooperate with the US to prevent proliferation. Foreign use of Romania as weapons transshipment point. Details about weapons transportation, including associated firms, agents, modes, methods, routes, nodes, schedules, and communications. Details about organizations, groups, and individuals engage in sales of weapons or technologies to states that are hostile to US interests or non-state entities. Plans and efforts to circumvent antiproliferation treaties and arrangements.
5) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H). Government counterterrorism policies, plans, capabilities, and efforts. Government and public support for or opposition to US efforts, including military operations, in the war on international terrorism. Government willingness, capability, and effort to establish and protect legislative framework to combat terrorists; control borders; detain terrorists; seize terrorist-associated bank accounts; share intelligence; and protect weapons, associated facilities, and energy and other critical infrastructure against terrorist attack and intrusion. Terrorist plans to attack US and other persons, facilities, or interests. Terrorist plans and efforts to acquire or transship chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Terrorist identities, motives, objectives, strategies, locations, facilities, command structures, links to other groups or states, associations with humanitarian or medical groups, use of forged and/or modified travel documents, telecommunication methods and modes, transportation, funding, finance and business operations, security, recruitment, and training. Indications of foreign entity, public, or local support for terrorists. Details about terrorist involvement in illicit drug and other criminal trade.
6) Information to Support US Military Operational Planning (INFR-5H). Information to support US contingency planning, including for noncombatant evacuation, and humanitarian and medical relief operations. Current status, vulnerability of, and plans to modify, critical infrastructures, especially transportation, energy, and communications. Civilian and military medical and life science capabilities and infrastructures. Military medical research and development, including new vaccines, therapeutics, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear medical defense. Information, including statistics, about infectious diseases, such as avian influenza, tuberculosis, human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome, hepatitis A, and tickborne encephalitis. Locations and levels of chemical and radiological contamination of food, water, air, and soil. Locations and types of industrial facilities with chemicals stored onsite. Descriptions and locations of potential evacuation sites, police and fire stations, hospitals, hotels, and diplomatic facilities. Plans and capabilities of government and NGOs to support, including provision of security for, relief operations. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding detained, captured, and arrested US persons, including prisoners of war and missing in action.
E. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H). Current specifications, vulnerabilities, and capabilities of, and planned upgrades to, national telecommunications infrastructure and information systems, networks, and technologies used by civilian and military government authorities, including intelligence and security services. Plans and efforts to acquire US export-controlled telecommunications equipment and technology. Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and e-mail addresses of principal civilian and military leaders.
CLINTON
Tuesday, 16 June 2009, 21:48
S E C R E T STATE 062397
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 06/11/2034
TAGS PINR, KSPR, ECON, SI
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: SLOVENIA
REF: STATE 18774
Classified By: SUZANNE MCCORMICK, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on Slovenia (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued DOS reporting of biographic information relating to Slovenia (paragraph 2).
A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supercedes the NHCD contained in Ref C and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs focused on Slovenia and sets forth a list of priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs (paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on Slovenia. The priorities may also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).
B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.
C. (S/NF) Important information responsible to the NHCD often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review leading to the NHCD,s issuance. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels.
2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting ) including on Slovenia:
A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community's collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination to the IC. State reporting offiers are encouraged to report on noteworthy Palestinians as information becomes available.
B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible when they have information relating to persons linked to Slovenia: office and organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.
3. (S/NF) Slovenia NHCD outline -- priority issues:
A. Foreign Relations and Energy Security 1) Regional Neighbors (FPOL-4H) 2) European Union (FPOL-4H) 3) Energy Security (ESEC-4H) 4) The United States (FPOL-4H) 5) International Organizations and Other Foreign Relations (FPOL-4H) B. Financial Stability, Economic Development, and Societal Challenges 1) Financial Stability and Economic Development (ECFS-4H) 2) Money Laundering (MONY-5H) 3) Demographics, Minorities, and Human Rights (DEMG-5H) C. National Security 1) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H) 2) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness (FMCC-4H) 3) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H) 4) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 5) Information to Support US Military Operational Planning (INFR-5H) D. National Leadership and Governance 1) National Leadership (LEAD-4H) 2) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4H) 3) Political Evolution and Democratic Reform (DEPS-5H) E. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H)
4. (S/NF) Reporting and collection needs:
A. Foreign Relations and Energy Security
1) Regional Neighbors (FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts regarding relations with regional neighbors, including Russia. Plans and efforts to cooperate with regional neighbors on energy security. Details about disputes with neighbors, especially Croatia. Relations with, and military deployments in, the Balkans. Plans and efforts to promote democracy in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Plans and efforts regarding Moldova and Kosovo. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding Ballistic Missile Defense.
2) European Union (FPOL-4H). Philosophies and motives behind leadership objectives, strategies, and efforts regarding the European Union (EU). Leadership and public views about levels of influence among European states, including relations between states and EU institutions as well as emergence of a preeminent state or a core alliance in Europe. Details about formal and informal alliances between Slovenia and other EU states, including plans and efforts to cooperate on issues of mutual concern. Plans and efforts to cooperate with regional neighbors, EU members, and non-state actors to influence EU policies. Plans and efforts regarding European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Plans and efforts regarding EU expansion. Plans and efforts regarding specific EU policies and decisions.
3) Energy Security (ESEC-4H). Policies, plans, and efforts to diversify energy sources and develop, rehabilitate, or expand energy infrastructure, including investment in capacity, efficiency, storage, nuclear power, flex-fuel, or other sources of alternative energy. Details about financing strategies, and openness to foreign investment. Willingness, plans, and efforts to develop and implement unified Europe energy security strategy. Declared and secret energy agreements with Russia, Caspian basin countries, and others. Details about national energy policymakers, key commercial figures in the sector, and their relations with other national leaders. Views about and responses to Russian plans and efforts regarding Slovenian dependence on Russian energy. Factors influencing government decisionmaking on key energy issues. Details about personal relations between Slovenian leaders and Russian leaders and businessmen. Energy imports, including sufficiency, impact on economy, and influence on bilateral relations. Organized crime involvement in energy sector.
4) The United States (FPOL-4H). Policies, strategies, and efforts concerning relations with the US. Expectations regarding diplomatic, security, and economic relations with the US. Leadership and public perceptions about US regional policies, presence, and activities. Plans and efforts to support or oppose US positions in international fora.
5) International Organizations and Other Foreign Relations (FPOL-4H). Plans and efforts to pursue national objectives in international fora, such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Plans and efforts regarding leadership opportunities in international organizations. Details about relations with China, Iran, and nations that are hostile to US interests.
B. Financial Stability, Economic Development, and Societal Challenges
1) Financial Stability and Economic Development (ECFS-4H). Plans and efforts to respond to global financial crisis. Public response to financial challenges. Opposition, extremist, and fringe group plans and efforts to exploit financial crisis to achieve objectives. Details about major financial institutions. Plans and efforts regarding economic cooperation with the US, EU, Group of Eight, and international financial institutions, including World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Paris Club. National and regional economic conditions, including real output, domestic and foreign investment, foreign trade, capital flight, monetization, and gray economy. Plans and efforts to pursue economic reform, including among monetary and fiscal policies. Plans and efforts to limit capital flight and barter. Economic policy decisionmaker identities, philosophies, roles, interrelations, and decisionmaking processes. Role of private businessmen in economic planning. Published and non-published national budget, including oversight and associated banks and financial institutions. Plans and efforts to comply with IMF agreements.
2) Money Laundering (MONY-5H). Government plans and efforts to implement anti-money laundering legislation, enforcement, and prosecution. Money laundering, including methods, techniques, transactions, locations, and associated individuals, organizations, and institutions. Use of shell corporations and non-financial intermediaries, such as lawyers, accountants, and casinos, as well as related bank accounts to launder criminal proceeds. Links between money laundering groups and terrorists. Drug traffic involvement in money laundering. Use of money laundering as an influence-gaining measure.
3) Demographics, Minorities, and Human Rights (DEMG-5H). Information about, and government policies and efforts regarding, religious and ethnic minorities. Public attitudes toward minorities. Indications of human rights abuses. Details about demography, including birth rate, fertility rate, mortality rate, incidence of infectious diseases, and migration. Plans and efforts to respond to declining birth rates, including through promotion of immigration.
C. National Security
1) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (FMCC-4H). Plans, efforts, and ability to maintain defense spending for force modernization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interoperability, meeting NATO-required spending levels and force goals, and defense capability initiative implementation. Strategy and efforts to win public support for such spending. Plans and efforts to fulfill commitments to NATO, including manpower and equipment for out-of-area operations. Actions to accommodate NATO procedures and methods. Government and public confidence in NATO Article 5 security guarantees. Attitudes toward stationing or long-term deployment of NATO or US forces on Slovenian soil, NATO commands in Slovenia, and out-of-country deployments of Slovenian forces. Plans and efforts regarding NATO enlargement, including strategic concepts and future roles of the alliance. Government, including military, intelligence, and security service willingness, ability, and efforts to protect US and NATO classified information. Awareness of and concern about foreign penetration. Implementation and strengthening of personnel-vetting procedures. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding EU defense and security cooperation, including ESDP; views and intentions regarding any conflict between ESDP and NATO obligations.
2) Force Structure, Modernization, and Readiness (FMCC-4H). Details about threat assessment, including agreement and disagreement among civilian and military leaders. Perceptions about, and response to, cyber warfare threat. Plans and efforts to support or oppose US objectives in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Willingness and capability to participate in NATO, EU, and other multilateral relationships, including out-of-area operations, multinational peacekeeping force in Southeast Europe, and humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Policies and efforts regarding access, overflight, and transit of US military forces and equipment. Disposition, readiness, and mission of military forces. Plans and efforts regarding force structure, military reform, and modernization, including future roles, strengths, and compositions of military services. Details about military cooperation with other nations. Details about defense industry, including plans and efforts to cooperate with foreign nations and actors. Weapon system development programs, firms, and facilities. Types, production rates, and factory markings of major weapon systems. Decisionmaking regarding acquisition of US or other nation weapon systems. Commitment, plans, efforts, and ability to manage a secure military export regime, including details about monitoring end user activities and imposing penalties for violations. Foreign use of Slovenia as weapons transshipment point. Details about weapons transportation, including associated firms, agents, modes, methods, routes, nodes, schedules, and communications. Military and paramilitary manpower, structure, budget and expenditure by service and function, mission, doctrine, tactics, order of battle, command and control, equipment, maintenance, training, exercise participation, support for international peacekeeping operations, professionalism, non-commissioned officer development, health care, pay, housing, loyalty, and morale. Civil-military relations. Perceptions about, and commitment to, intelligence sharing agreements with the US. Indications of national-level denial and deception program, including doctrine, targets, goals, organizations, and activities. Location, mission, organization, associated personnel, funding, development, and use of underground facilities and other hardened structures, including for protection of command and control networks, civil and military leaders, and critical resources. Details about, and transfer of, advanced engineering techniques to harden key facilities, including by use of specialty concretes. Details about dual use of underground civil infrastructure. Plans and efforts to help other states develop underground facilities and other hardened structures.
3) Counterterrorism and Terrorism (TERR-4H). Government counterterrorism policies, plans, capabilities, and efforts. Government and public support for or opposition to US efforts, including military operations, in the war on international terrorism. Government willingness, capability, and effort to establish and protect legislative framework to combat terrorists; control borders; detain terrorists; seize terrorist-associated bank accounts; share intelligence; and protect weapons, associated facilities, and energy and other critical infrastructure against terrorist attack and intrusion. Terrorist plans to attack US and other persons, facilities, or interests. Terrorist plans and efforts to acquire or transship chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Terrorist identities, motives, objectives, strategies, locations, facilities, command structures, links to other groups or states, associations with humanitarian or medical groups, use of forged and/or modified travel documents, telecommunication methods and modes, transportation, funding, finance and business operations, security, recruitment, and training. Indications of foreign entity, public, or local support for terrorists. Details about terrorist involvement in illicit drug and other criminal trade.
4) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.
5) Information to Support US Military Operational Planning (INFR-5H). Information to support US contingency planning, including noncombatant evacuation, and humanitarian and medical relief operations. Current status, vulnerability of, and plans to modify, critical infrastructures, especially transportation, energy, and communications. Plans and efforts regarding Pan-European transport corridor. Civilian and military medical and life science capabilities and infrastructures. Military medical research and development, including new vaccines, therapeutics, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear medical defense. Information, including statistics, about infectious diseases, such as avian influenza, tuberculosis, human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome, hepatitis A, and tickborne encephalitis. Locations and levels of chemical and radiological contamination of food, water, air, and soil. Locations and types of industrial facilities with chemicals stored onsite. Descriptions and locations of potential evacuation sites, police and fire stations, hospitals, hotels, and diplomatic facilities. Plans and capabilities of government and NGOs to support, including provision of security for, relief operations. Policies, plans, and efforts regarding detained, captured, and arrested US persons, including prisoners of war and missing in action.
D. National Leadership and Governance
1) National Leadership (LEAD-4H). Objectives, strategies, efforts, authorities, and responsibilities of national leaders. Philosophies and motives behind leadership objectives, strategies, and efforts. Identities, motives, influence, and relations among principal advisors, supporters, and opponents. Decisionmaking procedures, including differences under varying circumstances. Relations among national government entities, including president, premier, ministers, national security and defense council, intelligence and security services, legislature, prosecutor general, and judiciary. Corruption among senior officials, including off-budget financial flows in support of senior leaders. Sources of funding for political candidates, and government plans and efforts to ensure funding transparency. Public support for or opposition to administration, as well as government strategies and tactics to increase, maintain, and exercise authority. Biographic, personality, health, biometric, financial, assessment, and vulnerability information about current and emerging leaders and advisors.
2) Rule of Law, Corruption, and Crime (CRIM-4H). Policies, plans, and efforts to protect and strengthen independent and effective judiciary, including advocates, opponents, obstacles, and progress. Government and public views about, and indications of, impact of corruption and crime on governance, internal development, weapons security, military readiness, and foreign investment. Details about organized crime groups, including leadership, links to government and foreign entities, drug and human trafficking, money laundering, credit card fraud, and computer-related crimes, including child pornography. Details about drug trafficking, including trends, types of drugs, production, identification of trafficking groups and individuals, money laundering, and smuggling methods and routes. Government counter-drug control and enforcement plans, organizations, capabilities, and activities. Government efforts to cooperate with international partners to control illicit drug trade. Illegal acquisition of government documents, such as passports and driver licenses. Links between terrorists, organized crime groups, and cyber criminals. Indications of fraud or corruption in implementation of private property restitution policies. Details about law enforcement organizations and capabilities, including procedures, capabilities, challenges, and plans to remedy obstacles to swift and equal justice. Plans and efforts of law enforcement organizations to use biometric systems. Plans and efforts to combat intellectual property rights crime.
3) Political Evolution and Democratic Reform (DEPS-5H). Government and public commitment to, and plans and efforts to protect and strengthen, representative government, rule of law, freedom of press, religious freedom, private ownership, and individual liberties. Policies and efforts regarding political, judicial, economic, social, and educational reform. Plans and programs to manage perceptions, including through media manipulation. Identification, roles, goals, and composition of significant societal groups, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Developments within political parties and blocs. Details about internal workings of major political parties. Strength and vitality of political parties. Information about opposition and extremist groups, including domestic and foreign support.
E. Telecommunications Infrastructure and Information Systems (INFR-5H). Current specifications, vulnerabilities, and capabilities of, and planned upgrades to, national telecommunications infrastructure and information systems, networks, and technologies used by civilian and military government authorities, including intelligence and security services. Plans and efforts to acquire US export-controlled telecommunications equipment and technology. Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and e-mail addresses of principal civilian and military leaders.
CLINTON
Thursday, 06 December 2007, 15:45
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 164120
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/06/2017
TAGS PGOV, PHUM, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: (C) EUR DAS KRAMER'S MEETING WITH XXXXXXXXXXXX
Classified By: EUR DAS David Kramer, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: On December 4, EUR DAS David Kramer met with XXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXX was highly critical of the recent Duma elections, alleging the Kremlin had resorted to all methods to secure an overwhelming victory for United Russia. XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX speculated that Putin would not remain a third term as president, but is nervously trying to secure his future immunity from potential law enforcement investigations into his alleged illicit proceeds. XXXXXXXXXXX argued that the recent anti-western rhetoric that featured in the election campaign did not reflect the views of most Russians and urged the West to continue to assist Russian society in its transformation into something more open, tolerant, and Western. END SUMMARY.
Election Results
----------------
2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX expressed pleasant surprise at the sharply critical assessment of the elections leveled by OSCE PA and PACE. XXXXXXXXXXX noted that from everything he had heard prior to the elections, PA and PACE were prepared to offer a positive assessment. XXXXXXXXXXX pointed to tension between OSCE PA and ODIHR, XXXXXXXXXXX He commented that given the many irregularities and fraud that took place during the campaign and on election day, the elections were not legitimate. He acknowledged that the U.S. could not say this, but welcomed any strong public statements the U.S. might make.
3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX said the reaction across Russia shows that for the educated electorate, the elections left a bad taste and smell. He said the Communist Party was justifiably upset about fraud, as the party,s real results should have been closer to 20 percent in some regions. XXXXXXXXXXX added that the Kremlin had resorted to all methods to secure the vote for Putin and United Russia, mobilizing the homeless, police, falsifying results in regions such as Tatarstan, Bashkiria and the North Caucasus, controlling the media and whipping up hysteria against foreign enemies. However, despite these efforts, Putin, according to XXXXXXXXXXX, suffered poor results, garnering 7 million fewer votes than he did for his presidency four years ago. He argued the regime was undergoing a real crisis as nearly 70 percent of the population, according to Levada polls, did not believe the elections to be free, and the support was one based on loyalty, not genuine support.
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX explained the success of LDPR Vladimir Zhirinovskiy by the fact that the Kremlin had forced all other charismatic politicians out of the race (naming Rogozin, Khakamada, and others). He argued that those who didn,t want to vote for United Russia or the Communists voted for Zhirinovskiy as a protest vote. He said that some protest votes also went to Just Russia.
XXXXXXXXXXX
----------------------------------
5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX
Succession
----------
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX said that popular opinion in Moscow believes that Sergey Ivanov is out of the running for President. He commented that Putin was afraid of Ivanov, deeply distrustful, and that he needed a weaker figure to succeed him instead. He argued that Putin understands that under the system he has created there is no real rule of law and that at any time anyone can be arrested or businesses destroyed. Since Putin reportedly had secret assets tied up abroad (working through proxies like XXXXXXXXXXX) he worried that with a strong successor like Ivanov the tables could be turned on Putin, making him the object of law enforcement investigations and Interpol warnings. XXXXXXXXXXX rejected speculation that Putin would attempt to stay a third term, saying that Putin did not want to be seen as a Central Asian dictator. He asserted instead that Putin would become the head of United Russia and that the party would transform into something akin to the former Communist Party. He noted that the campaign for President had begun and United Russia was, according to Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, prepared to nominate a candidate on December 17. XXXXXXXXXXX dismissed the recent &For Putin8 demonstrations breaking out across the country as long-planned and financed events that were meant to preempt any attempt at a &color revolution8 in Russia.
7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX noted the effect of a law on the Duma passed two years ago that would allow Putin to decide to take or refuse the Duma mandate not only in the next five days, but also anytime in the next four years. He speculated that this could be done in the interest of gaining immunity as a Duma deputy should Putin want security from his successor. XXXXXXXXXXX argued that this issue, e.g., security, was the driving motivation behind the Kremlin,s heavy-handed approach to electoral manipulation during the Duma elections. XXXXXXXXXXX commented that politically, Putin only trusts his spokesman Aleksey Gromov and Presidential Administration aide Sergey Sobyanin, and possibly the head of the presidential security force, Viktor Zolotov.
Anti-Western Rhetoric
---------------------
8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXX acknowledged the large volume of anti-Western rhetoric that has figured prominently in the recent months leading up to the election. However, he said that the Russian public does not necessarily share these sentiments, and is rather more neutral, if not positive, toward the U.S., despite the drumbeat of propaganda. XXXXXXXXXXX argued that Russian society is not aggressive, but instead suffers from passivity and apathy. Nonetheless, XXXXXXXXXXX added, he was optimistic that while the leadership was moving backwards in many senses, society was advancing and transforming into something more open, tolerant, and Western. He encouraged the U.S. to continue to work with society to progress in this direction for the long term. RICE
Tuesday, 07 July 2009, 15:59
C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000322
SIPDIS
FOR D(S), P, T, S/SANAC, IO, AND ISN
DOE FOR NA-20, NA-24, NA-25, NE-1, NE-6
NRC FOR OIP DOANE, HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN
NSC STAFF FOR SCHEINMAN, CONNERY
ALSO FOR LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/04/2019
TAGS AORC, KNNP, IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA LEADERSHIP TEAM TRANSITION AND U.S. INFLUENCE
IN THE AGENCY
REF: A. UNVIE 148 B. UNVIE 102 (NOTAL) C. UNVIE 089 D. UNVIE 076
Classified By: CDA Geoffrey R. Pyatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: The IAEA transition that will come as DG ElBaradei's term ends November 30 provides a once-a-decade opportunity to overcome bureaucratic inertia, modernize Agency operations, and position the new director general for strong leadership from the DG's office. Yukiya Amano's arrival as DG will undoubtedly see some turnover at the Deputy DG level, but we see a mixed picture as to the depth and breadth of change in senior management changes further down. Despite whatever intentions Amano may harbor upon taking office, a renewal in some key positions will take time, as several senior IAEA officials recently received promotions or extensions of their contracts, or both. This "burrowing in" will ensure continuity of some experienced leaders but may also confront the next DG with fixed networks of collaboration that resist supervision. Identifying a desirable DDG for Nuclear Safety and Security should be a top U.S. priority. End Summary.
DG Succession a Reform Opportunity
----------------------------------
2. (C) The entry into office of Ambassador Yukiya Amano as IAEA Director General (to a four-year term to begin December 1, 2009) should trigger a reordering of senior management posts throughout the Agency over the months that follow. IAEA departments are headed by the six Deputy Directors General, all of whom are under contract into 2010. We understand from the Japanese Mission that Amano would want most senior personnel to remain in place for some time, to brief him in and provide a smooth transition. However, some turnover of the current DDGs in the first year of Amano's term is to be expected and encouraged. A combination of (not always ironclad) IAEA-mandated retirement for positions below the D level at age 62 (60 for those hired before 1990), national and gender balance, and other factors complicate what should otherwise be the appointment of the most qualified people, committed to modernizing the Agency for anticipated challenges and for adopting new modes of networking, financing, and building excellence in fields where the Agency should be the lead. The current roster of DDGs, profiled below, requires our consideration in this light.
3. (C) Safeguards (SG), Olli Heinonen, Finland - By tradition this department is not be held by an NPT nuclear weapons state. Heinonen's current contract runs through summer 2010 and he has told Msnoff in the past he expected to retire at that time, based largely on personal considerations (but see next para). After the DG's slot, the DDG/Safeguards position is the most important at the IAEA to achieving high-priority U.S. national security objectives related to Iran, DPRK, Syria, and the generally rigorous application of IAEA safeguards globally. DDG Heinonen has played a particularly important role under ElBaradei by working to keep key safeguards investigations on an appropriate technical path. The DDG/Safeguards position will remain essential under Amano's leadership, however, as we expect the new DG to apply less of a political filter to the conduct of safeguards investigations. Thus, the decisions of the DG/Safeguards on Iran, Syria, and other sensitive cases may be the de facto final word for the Agency's safeguards approach in the states about which the U.S. cares the most.
4. (C) Mission assumes the USG would welcome extending beyond 2010 the close and constructive relationship we have had with Heinonen, and we have queried Heinonen as to his availability. He said early this past spring he did not discount the possibility he could stay until 2012, but not longer. He plans to review his situation over the summer "once the dust has settled" from the DG election and it is more apparent what other personnel changes will take place in the DG's office and other senior ranks of the Agency. In light of Heinonen's ongoing personal decision process, Mission recommends we confine within the USG any early thinking about possible replacements. Mission will continue to touch base with Heinonen on his thinking as it evolves.
5. (C) Management (MT) - Incumbent David Waller, U.S., in the job since early 1993, recently reaffirmed to Charge he wishes to remain under a new contract. As in analogous positions in the UN system, there is long tradition for the U.S. holding this job, which has potential oversight of all IAEA programs as well as management policies and budgeting. The Management DDG is the Agency's second-in-command, and Waller is usually the Acting DG when ElBaradei travels outside Vienna. His role has been especially critical in the ongoing debate over budget and resources. The Japanese Mission tells us Japan understands the management DDG to be the "American seat" and that Amano would personally favor keeping a U.S. national in this role. In the latter years of the ElBaradei administration, DDG Waller has not always exercised influence over programmatic areas or staffing as the USG had hoped. On staffing, however, the history of top-floor overrides of the Agency's own recruitment process predates the current leadership. The true final say and veto power on personnel appointments, down to the level of program manager jobs, resides with the DG, but this was true in the Hans Blix era as well. In broader management terms, the Agency has made significant but uneven progress in reform, measured for example against the UNTAI agenda: "little to no" progress on disclosure of internal audits to member states or whistleblower protections; "some" progress on an independent ethics function, implementation of IPSAS, and on program support costs (a running sore with USG); better performance on independence of internal oversight, financial disclosure by senior officials, and public access to information about the agency.
6. (C) Safety and Security (NSNS). Incumbent Tomihiro Taniguchi, Japan, informed UNVIE's Nuclear Safety Attache early in 2009 that he was under contract through November 2010 and intended to stay; Taniguchi's DDG colleague Olli Heinonen affirmed to us in late March his understanding that Taniguchi wants to remain perhaps even beyond that date. However, after his election on July 2, DG-designate Amano told Russian IAEA Governor Berdennikov and U.S. Charge that Taniguchi would step down concurrent with Amano's succession to the DG's office, emphasizing that "Japan is a modest country" and would not seek to hold the DG and a DDG slot concurrently. (Note: Taniguchi's early departure would be a matter of appearances for Japan; there is no legal provision barring a DDG serving under a DG of the same nationality. End note.) Taniguchi has been a weak manager and advocate, particularly with respect to confronting Japan's own safety practices, and he is a particular disappointment to the United States for his unloved-step-child treatment of the Office of Nuclear Security. Moreover, of the twenty-four management positions in the department, the U.S. holds only one, a P-5 position as head of the Incident and Emergency Center. That is, there are no U.S. managers anywhere in the IAEA's safety and security technical areas.
7. (SBU) This DDG position requires a good manager and leader who is technically qualified in both safety and security. The DDG needs to be an activist to institutionalize and insist on broad member state acceptance of nuclear security -- preventing terrorist or criminal diversion of material from civil nuclear facilities -- as a core Agency mission. However, the DDG must also have a strong safety background. The department can and should exercise a direct and substantial impact of the levels of safety and security in all of the Member States. This department is writing draft safety and security legislation and draft regulatory and security guidance documents that are being used by Member States to create their nuclear programs. "NSNS" performs safety and security peer reviews of facilities and provides recommendations for improvements. It also performs an enormous amount of training on all areas of safety and security. As Washington colleagues have pointed out, the new DDG must instill a culture of cooperation with other Agency elements, including Nuclear Energy and Technical Cooperation, in order to improve these services. We are aware of differing views in Washington on the advisability of "elevating" nuclear security, potentially as a separate department (ref D), an idea that Iran now advocates. Our bottom line is that the U.S. should push for technical competencies in both safety and security.
8. (C) Technical Cooperation (TC), Ana Maria Cetto, Mexico. TC is the department most in need of a change in culture and
process. It administers assistance projects as entitlements, in which the proposals of the beneficiary states rather than an independent analysis of development needs and capacities are decisive. Although some of her subordinates are much stronger, Cetto's reputation is as an enabler of TC's "entitlement" approach. Ms. Cetto, the only female DDG at present, may be prepared to depart in 2010. The United States should encourage selection of a manager committed to implement the management structures put in place by Cetto's predecessor, which have become mere formalities under Cetto. Japan knows that China is interested in returning to the ranks of the DDGs, and the Chinese may have a strong candidate for the TC DDG position who is currently serving as TC Director for Asia. If the Chinese secure this position, the new incumbent would likely be male, creating an imperative for the purpose of gender balance to appoint a woman to another of the DDG positions (see also para 17, below).
9. (C) Nuclear Energy (NE), Yury Sokolov, Russia - With the right mix of expert authority, impartiality, and material assistance, this department can play an even greater role in ensuring that wherever nuclear power is developed, it is done so responsibly, safely, securely, with proliferation consciousness and safeguards by design. Agency veterans recall the NE department was established by hiving off nuclear energy from the earlier department of nuclear energy and safety, which was led by a Russian DDG. As reported in ref B (captioned), the Russian Federation will likely be determined to retain this DDG position regardless of Sokolov's personal availability.
10. (C) Nuclear Sciences and Applications (NA), Werner Burkart, Germany - Burkart has indicated he will leave the Agency at the completion of his current contract, which we understand to be November 2010. Burkart is generally viewed as a nice guy and skilled scientist but an unambitious bureaucratic leader. He advocates rationalizing staff and structures that he finds wasteful. One example -- for technical cooperation (TC) projects in which his department or NE are required to assign project officers, the parallel TC project officers are, like those in NA and NE, typically from a nuclear engineering background, and consequently apt to cut out their redundant counterparts in the technical bureaus. A second example -- the IAEA's laboratory structure, including the safeguards analytical laboratory (SAL), falls organizationally under NA (i.e., for management and personnel policies) as a service to the Safeguards Department, but is paid for with safeguards funds. A transfer of the SAL to the Safeguards Department, which Burkart supports, is underway, based on a recommendation by a Canadian management consultant.
The DG's Outer Office - Perpetuating Team ElBaradei?
--------------------------------------------- -------
11. (C) As IAEA Secretariat staff consider the future under a DG Amano, many are musing about "Who runs the agency?" in that circumstance. We reported ref C that a Spring 2009 STAFFDEL visitor heard from Secretariat officials the concern that a Japanese corporate model of management and internal communication could come to the Agency. However, speaking with Charge on July 2, Amano emphasized (unprompted) that it would not be his intention to pack his inner office with Japanese nationals, as "that would send the wrong message." Whatever their presumptions about the changes ahead, several senior IAEA officials have secured their positions in the Agency for a period into the post-ElBaradei era. Among those burrowing in are some of the Mission's most frequent and policy-relevant interlocutors (and ElBaradei's high-level troubleshooters), some of whom have not always been helpful to U.S. positions.
12. (C) In early February 2009, Vilmos Cserveny of Hungary, chief of the Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination (EXPO), was promoted to the title of Assistant Director General (ADG) while retaining his function running EXPO. Cserveny shared with DCM that his contract was extended through 2013. The ADG title is considered a "personal promotion" according no enhancement of authority, and it would likely return to disuse after Cserveny's tenure. As background, current DG ElBaradei held the same title while he was EXPO chief 1993-7. While Cserveny is viewed as a partisan of ElBaradei, we know him to be a consummate
bureaucratic survivor who is likely to tack strongly towards Amano in the new structure.
13. (C) In late 2008, Cserveny's deputy Tariq Rauf of Canada received a personal promotion, from the P-5 to D-l level, and contract extension through 2011. As in the case of his boss, Rauf's job duties remain the same. The practice of granting "personal" D ranks to senior P-5 personnel is not uncommon in the Agency. Rauf's title is Head, Verification and Security Policy Coordination within EXPO. Among other duties, he is the coordinator of Secretariat efforts to develop mechanisms for IAEA-administered assurance of nuclear fuel supply to states that may suffer a politically-motivated cutoff, e.g., an international nuclear fuel bank. XXXXXXXXXXXX 14. (C) Among others staying on is the Director of the Office of Legal Affairs, Johan Rautenbach, whose contract in late 2008 was extended through 2011. Cautious to the point of reticence in most settings, Rautenbach generally projects an image of standing apart from the political fray. However, he has been known to render legal opinions in furtherance of his "client's," i.e., ElBaradei's, interest, and involves himself unhelpfully in Agency-internal debates over tactics in the conduct of sensitive safeguards investigations. Rautenbach's Amcit deputy, safeguards expert Laura Rockwood, is also likely to stay on.
15. (SBU) Other key Mission interlocutors will or may move from current roles under a new DG. One significant loss will be that Kwaku Aning of Ghana, who intends to depart the IAEA at the end of 2010. Aning holds the D-2 position as Secretary of the Policy Making Organs (chief interpreters of rules of procedure and the drafters of most chair's or rapporteur's summaries). This is the only D-level position held by a G-77 country. British national Graham Andrew, Special Assistant to the DG for Science and Technology, is under contract through August 2011. He has told Msnoff privately he would like to support the next DG over a transition period and beyond, but would move to other duties in the Agency for the duration of his contract if required. Andrew would need a new contract to stay in the Agency beyond August 2011 to 2013, when he would reach the IAEA retirement age (62). ElBaradei's Chef d'Cabinet, Dutch diplomat Antoine Van Dongen, also has been extended through 2010. Having known ElBaradei since their time together at NYU Law School in the 1970's, Van Dongen is a strong ElBaradei loyalist whose role in an Amano cabinet remains to be determined.
Comment and Recommendation
--------------------------
16. (SBU) Mission enjoys an excellent relationship with U.S. DDG Waller and counts him as an asset. He provides insight into Agency operations and is an interpreter and advocate of the Agency to important audiences, for example from the U.S. Congress. Waller has been highly successful in bringing Amcits into positions in his department, though much less so in other departments. In Management the U.S. currently holds two Director positions, one D-1 and one D-2, and five Section Head positions, with a total of 24 Amcits working in the department. The signals from both Waller and DG-designate Amano are that we may rely on Waller remaining in this function for the time being, should Washington so decide.
17. (C) The expected departure of DDG Taniguchi requires that we search for a compelling individual to lead the safety and security department in fashioning and institutionalizing (politically and financially) the IAEA role in combating nuclear terrorism and embedding safety culture in the (potentially) fast-growing global nuclear power sector. The safety and security of nuclear facilities and material around the world over the next ten years will be very important to the U.S., involving potential issues of regional security, energy policy, and growth in the commercial nuclear industry at home and globally. It is in our interest to be directly involved in the selection of a next DDG through whom we can increase the complement of U.S. nationals performing these crucial functions. There are rumors that Canadian Ambassador
Marie Gervais-Vidricaire is interested. As she lacks technical experience, this would not be a helpful outcome from the perspective of our subject-matter experts, but the USG could be in an awkward position if confronted with a determined request for support from Ottawa. Also on the Vienna scene there are rumors that France, a country with a heavy technician presence and influence already in the safety and security areas, may move to build upon this predominance.
18. (C) With regard to the DDG/Safeguards, Olli Heinonen, Mission recommends that we remain discrete but open to an extension of his tenure should he seek it and similarly discrete in USG-internal brainstorming on potential successors. Relevant to our deliberations on the Safety and Security as well as Safeguards Departments, ref A examined approaches to staffing, reviewed current opportunities for American citizen employment at professional levels across the Agency, and noted some key positions for which U.S. citizens would not be eligible (due to national balance or traditions against staffing from nuclear weapons states) but where U.S. interests require that competent incumbents fulfill those roles.
19. (C) In weighing replacements for DDGs Cetto and Burkart, leading Technical Cooperation and Nuclear Applications, respectively, we must try to address the overlap in their two Departments that has created stubborn redundancies and inefficiencies. These have not been resolved despite years of investigations, reports, and recommendations. Both Departments have fierce political defenders in the G-77, preventing serious reform efforts (particularly in the case of TC). Mission recommends we pay vigorous attention to the future leadership of these two Departments, as the only way to fix their management will be from the inside.
PYATT
Friday, 10 July 2009, 15:41
C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000331
SIPDIS
FOR D(S), P, T, S/SANAC, IO, AND ISN
DOE FOR NA-20, NA-24, NA-25, NE-1, NE-6
NRC FOR OIP DOANE, HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN
NSC STAFF FOR SCHEINMAN, CONNERY
EO 12958 DECL: 07/09/2019
TAGS AORC, KNNP, IAEA, TRGY, JA, IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/DG: AMANO SKETCHES AMBITIOUS TRANSITION AGENDA
REF: A) UNVIE 322 AND PREVIOUS B) UNVIE 321
Classified By: CDA GEOFFREY R. PYATT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D
Summary
---------
1. (C) IAEA Director General-designate Yukiya Amano expressed gratitude for U.S. support during a July 9 congratulatory lunch and engaged Charge in a wide-ranging discussion of senior personnel, budget and compliance issues. Amano attributed his election to support from the U.S., Australia and France, and cited U.S. intervention with Argentina as particularly decisive. The Japanese Mission has set up a small transition team to quietly interface with the IAEA and Amano plans to stay in Vienna through the September IAEA General Conference, though he will shortly hand off his Ambassadorial functions to DCM Takeshi Nakane. Speaking as DG-designate, Amano supported a reasonable budget increase (supplemented by voluntary funding from the G-8) and saw the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) as the main priority, along with establishing the principle of regular budget funding for nuclear security. He agreed to speak to "zero growth hawks" France and Germany in his new capacity, urging flexibility. Amano shared his expectations for senior personnel/ Deputy Director General positions and strongly advised the U.S. to not/not relinquish the Management DDG slot for the less influential Safety DDG position; he also offered a senior nuclear security post to the U.S. While Safeguards DDG Heinonen would remain at least a year, Amano was contemplating eventual replacements, recognizing that Heinonen would not "stay forever." Amano was also considering a possible role (undefined) for his former opponent, South African Governor Minty. Asked about DG term limits, Amano reiterated his campaign commitment but was cautious about the timing of such an initiative, fearing that the G-77 might link this to DDG appointments.
2. (C) Citing high-level U.S. interest, Amano identified nuclear security as his highest priority and was already planning IAEA participation in the March Nuclear Security Summit. He also recognized the need to highlight G-77 priorities such as technical cooperation. Overall, however, Amano's emphasis is clearly on verification and security issues. He distinguished his approach on Iran from that of ElBaradei; Amano sees the DG/IAEA as a neutral and impartial party to Iran's safeguards agreement rather than as "an intermediary" and saw his primary role as implementing safeguards and UNSC/Board resolutions. He stressed that the IAEA could not replace the P5 1 political framework for dialogue with Iran, nor vice versa. End Summary.
Transition Planning
-------------------
3. (C) Japan has set up a three-person transition team within its Vienna Mission to interact with the IAEA Secretariat (they will do so quietly prior to General Conference approval of the Board's appointment of Amano.) Meeting with Amano July 8, DG ElBaradei was receptive and designated EXPO Director Vilmos Cserveny as the IAEA point-of-contact for the Amano transition team. Separately, we learned that at a July 10 senior staff meeting DG ElBaradei encouraged all to rally around Amano, reportedly saying that "whatever you thought of Amano as a candidate, this is now about the institution."
4. (C) Amano expects instructions from Tokyo "very shortly" to hand off to current Japanese DCM Nakane, who will take over formally as Ambassador. After a short congratulatory visit to Tokyo next week, Amano will stay in Vienna until the September GC approves his appointment; he does not expect any trouble on that score but will remain here "just in case." Following the General Conference, he will go back to Tokyo and return to Vienna in early November for the transition.
Election Post-Mortem
--------------------
5. (C) Amano attributed his election to the very strong support he had received from the United States, Australia and France. While Australia was an early proponent, France was instrumental in securing the support of EU Board members with the exception of Spain. Grateful for U.S. efforts, Amano twice cited, in particular, our crucial influence on Argentina's fifth-round abstention, for which FM Nakasone had also personally thanked the Secretary.
6. (C) Amano admitted some unease that Japan can only authoritatively identify 10 of the 12 countries that voted for Minty in the first three head-to-head ballots July 2, and is not sure whether the two unknown countries made their decision at a national level or by the Governors in Vienna; Japan has not been able to identify any discrepancies between positions in capital and Vienna that could help identify the two "betrayals." (Note: Based on discussions with the Japan Mission, they suspect Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, but will never know for sure. We counted Malaysia in Minty's camp. Saudi Arabia was one of only two Board members that did not deliver a congratulatory statement during the Appointment Stage July 3, the other being Albania which associated with the EU statement. End Note.) Recounting Japan's expectations between the July 2 vote and July 3 appointment, Amano now claims that Japan was fairly confident that rumors of a challenge in the Appointment Stage would not materialize. Japan had confirmed with the Secretariat that there would have been a vote by simple majority (which Japan would assuredly have won) on the question of holding an additional vote to confirm the two-thirds result during the Appointment Stage. Rather than entertain the ultimately unfounded rumors, Japan simply demarched Board capitals (i.e. Minty supporters) July 2 to deliver congratulatory messages during the Appointment Stage, a tactic that resulted in unified statements of support for the DG-designate.
Budget
------
7. (C) Charge assured Amano that the United States would do everything possible to support his successful tenure as Director General and, to that end, anticipated that continued U.S. voluntary contributions to the IAEA would be forthcoming. He also stressed the need to bring budget negotiations to a close as soon as possible. Asked for his views in his capacity as Director General-designate (rather than a national capacity), Amano offered that a "reasonable increase" in the regular budget would be helpful, but that the current proposal would not command consensus. A compromise at a "little lower" level (five to six percent), could be complemented with voluntary funding. Amano lamented that this year's G-8 did not produce a budget consensus and suggested that the G-8 could be a source of extra-budget support for IAEA nonproliferation programs and peaceful use, comparing the relatively small amounts involved to the 20 billion USD the G8 raised for Nuclear Threat Reduction. He added that Japan could help influence the sherpas in this regard, noting that we would have time to better prepare for the 2010 G-8 Summit.
8. (C) Among IAEA budget priorities, Amano cited funding for Seibersdorf/ Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) as the most important, in addition to establishing "the principle" of regular budget funding for nuclear security. He had already met with the Austrian Ambassador to solicit host-country support for SAL. Importantly, Amano also agreed to the Charge's suggestion that he speak to budget hawks France and Germany on these points in his DG-designate capacity, stressing that agreement on the budget would be helpful to starting his tenure on sound footing.
9. (C) It was apparent that Amano had more work to do to lock down the presumed Japanese "dowry" (ref b) to the IAEA following his election; he would not identify a specific amount, even in confidence. Japanese Msnoff noted that he was trying to get a first installment of 2.4 million USD in unused extra-budget contributions to the IAEA released for this purpose. Amano will use his celebratory reception in Tokyo next week to lobby senior policy-makers (to include PM Aso), capitalizing on the "extremely positive" reaction to his election (with more than 2.3 million entries and growing on Yahoo.) He plans to underscore that all international organizations are not equal and Japan should accord priority to the IAEA, and secondly that his success as Director General would be synonymous with the success of Japanese diplomacy.
DDGs/Senior Staff: Keep Management DDG Slot
--------------------------------------------
10. (C) Turning to the most immediate order of business for the DG-designate, Amano shared his expectations with respect to Deputy Director General and senior staff positions. His first point was that Russia insists on keeping the Nuclear Energy DDG position. Amano solicited U.S. views with respect to retaining the Management DDG position, and strongly advised doing so, stressing that once ceded the U.S. could "never" expect to get it back, as there were lots of takers waiting in the wings. He noted that he was comfortable working with the current American incumbent DDG but open to considering anyone else the U.S. might propose. Recounting an earlier discussion with former Ambassador Schulte, Amano noted that the Safety and Security DDG position would be a poor substitute and nowhere near as influential across the board as Management. Current Japanese DDG for Safety Taniguchi would stay on for several months until the end of his contract (summer 2010); Amano did not speculate on successors, only that the position would certainly not/not go to a developing country. Rather than Safety DDG, Amano offered the U.S. a senior position that does "real work" in Nuclear Security, recognizing this as a U.S. priority.
11. (C) With respect to Safeguards, he expected that DDG Heinonen would stay for at least another year, and while welcome to stay as long as possible, Amano recognized that this would not "be forever" and had started thinking about possible successors. While Operations C Director Nackaerts "was not bad," Amano also had a couple of good outsiders in mind (he intimated they were Northern European or Nordic but did not name individuals.) Msnoff noted that while Safeguards "insiders" might have institutional knowledge, they also have "baggage" particularly on Iran. Amano did not opine on other DDG slots, Nuclear Applications and TC, but Charge noted the need to shake up the TC Department and modernize its assistance philosophy. (Note: The TC DDG position was traditionally a G-77 slot and there are rumors that Asia Division Director Dazhu Yang (China) might be considered to replace Cetto. Nuclear Applications could be another possible G-77 slot. End Note.)
12. (C) Among other senior positions, Amano underlined that XXXXXXXXXXXX "was out" and that he sought a good replacement who was closer to his own line of thinking. The UK had already approached Amano about the DG's Scientific Advisor Graham Andrew, who enjoyed a very good reputation and Amano was happy to retain. (Comment: We wholly agree with Amano's assessment of these two advisors and see these decisions as positive first signs. End comment.)
A Role for Minty
----------------
13. (C) Amano also shared that he had spoken to South African Governor Minty about continuing to be involved in the IAEA. He did not specify in what capacity but asked for Minty's cooperation (to which Minty agreed), saying he was prepared to work with him. (Comment: It was clear that Amano would like to carve out a role for Minty, as a symbolic gesture and in a further effort to unify the IAEA behind his Director General-ship. While we would not expect Minty to be interested in a DDG slot such as Technical Cooperation, he could be involved in any future IAEA role in FMCT verification, for example. End Comment.)
Setting Priorities
------------------
14. (C) Amano underscored that nuclear security would be his highest immediate priority. He planned to attend the March Nuclear Security Summit and had already summoned DDG Taniguchi to discuss plans for IAEA participation. Coupled with this emphasis on nuclear security, Amano also recognized the need for a sop to the developing world that would be of equal stature, but was still thinking about what that might be. He noted that he was taking pains to stress the importance of technical cooperation as a developing country priority. Amano liked to refer to the Statute's dual emphasis on non-proliferation and peaceful use rather than to "balance" among "three pillars," remarking that the more pillars you have the more you dilute non-proliferation.
15. (C) In a separate conversation, we learned from Israeli Ambassador Michaeli that he had consulted with Amano immediately after his appointment and was fully confident of the priority Amano accords verification issues. Michaeli understood that Amano had to persuade those who did not support him about his "impartiality" and had read Amano's remark to the press soon after his appointment -- that there was no evidence of Iran pursuing a nuclear weapons capability -- in that context (and did not ascribe any weight to it.) Amano had already agreed to consultations with the Director General of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission on the margins of the General Conference.
16. (C) Amano inquired about U.S. expectations on the fuel assurance issue. He indicated that this issue might take more time than we think and may require a change in method, but did not provide specifics. Amano listened instead to Charge's explanation of U.S. views, including our preference for the Russian eligibility criteria, and remarked rhetorically, "How may fuel banks do we need ?"
Iran
-----
17. (C) Asked about the Director General's role with respect to Iran, Amano distinguished his approach from that of ElBaradei. For Amano, the IAEA is first and foremost one of two parties to the IAEA-Iran Safeguards Agreement. As a party, the IAEA cannot also play the role of intermediary without there being a conflict of interest. He noted that when ElBaradei was accommodating, Iran welcomed him as an intermediary, but was furious with him when he was not. Amano had no such confusion over his (the IAEA's) role as one who implements safeguards, including clarification of past activities, and responsibilities deriving from UNSC/Board resolutions. How far safeguards can be implemented depends on Iran (the other party to the agreement), but among the "must-do's" are implementation of Code 3.1 modified and the Additional Protocol. Amano added that the IAEA role with respect to UNSC requirements for suspension of enrichment activities was limited. This was more a question for the political (P5 1) dialogue with Iran. He stressed that the IAEA cannot substitute itself or this dialogue nor vice versa.
18. (C) Overall, Amano would position himself as Director General neither as "tough" nor "soft" on Iran but as a neutral, impartial and professional party to the safeguards agreement.
Term Limits
-----------
19. (C) Finally, Charge solicited Amano's views on implementation of term limits for the IAEA Director General, which Japan understands (and shares) as a longstanding U.S. priority for international organizations. Charge indicated that there was discussion of raising term limits at the September Board with a view toward adoption by the General Conference. (Note: To have this included in the GC agenda, a Supplementary Item would need to be requested by August 13, i.e. in advance of any Board discussion. End Note.) Amano reiterated his campaign pledge about not seeking a third term but was not sure about the timing of such an initiative. He preferred that the issue be raised after the new DDG leadership team is in place (i.e. several months into his term), fearing that the G-77/NAM could link the issue of DG term limits to geographic distribution and tenure of DDG positions. Amano would prefer to have a free hand in making these determinations. (Comment: While the G-77/NAM may be more receptive to terms limits in the aftermath of his election, Amano makes a valid point and we would not want to undermine his decision-making authority on DDG slots. The G-77/NAM already linked DG term limits to distribution of senior positions in the March Board discussion of the issue. End Comment.)
A Strong Partner
----------------
20. (C) This meeting, Amano's first bilateral review since his election, illustrates the very high degree of convergence between his priorities and our own agenda at the IAEA. The coming transition period provides a further window for us to shape Amano's thinking before his agenda collides with the IAEA Secretariat bureaucracy. PYATT
Friday, 02 October 2009, 15:20
C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000457
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR P, T, ISN/RA, IO/GS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/01/2019
TAGS PREL, AORC, KNNP, IAEA, IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: CONSULTING BOARD MEMBERS ON QOM
REF: A) UNVIE 447 B) STATE 100153
Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d
Summary
--------
1. (C) Following outreach to JUSCANZ (ref a) and EU Ambassadors earlier in the week, P-3 Ambassadors/Charges continued consultations on the disclosure of the Qom enrichment facility September 30-Ocotober 1 with the majority of Board members, the Egyptian NAM Chair and Malaysian Board Chair Arshad. The first questions on everyone's mind concerned the timing of an IAEA inspection of Qom, whether this would warrant a Special Board meeting prior to the regularly scheduled November 26 Board session, and if so what outcome (i.e., a resolution) we would expect from the Board. Board members, including the Board Chair and NAM Chair, fully supported IAEA inspections as soon as possible. Board members agreed that this was prima facie a Board issue and many felt the Board must react in some manner, though there were differing views as to the need for a Special Board. Ambassador Davies noted that the November Board meeting was a long way off and P-3 counterparts left open the possibility of a Special Board without committing to one. The P-3 also sought to steer the discussion away from legalistic debate as to the applicability of Code 3.1 modified to the more fundamental questions raised by a covert facility as a breach of confidence and violation of five UNSCRs and nine Board resolutions. All of these discussions occurred against the backdrop of the October 1 P5 1 - Iran talks in Geneva, with Board members anticipating the impact of those talks on how we proceed in Vienna. Expectations were low as to a breakthrough in Geneva but regardless of the "grey smoke" arising from the talks, all agreed an IAEA inspection must proceed. Mission will follow up with Board members post-Geneva and informed by DG ElBaradei's Tehran visit.
2. (C) Meanwhile, Egypt and other NAM members expected Iran would use the opportunity of a previously scheduled October 2 NAM Plenary to plead its case as to reporting the facility to the IAEA. According to an Egyptian readout, Iran addressed the issue under Any Other Business in response to questions from other NAM members. Holding up a copy of Iran's letter to the IAEA, Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh bitterly complained that after he informed ElBaradei and DDG Heinonen, the letter was referenced in the press two days later; he argued that something must be done about this breach of confidentiality. The press leak makes it more difficult domestically, he added, to settle on a date for an IAEA inspection but Iran hoped to "clarify the issue" before the November Board meeting. Soltanieh reportedly also made familiar arguments as to the Secretariat being notified of the facility even earlier than the obligatory six months (prior to introduction of nuclear material) under the old Code 3.1, and explained that it was built in a mountain because of documented threats of attack against Iran's nuclear facilities by the U.S. and Israel in the past six years. Soltanieh reportedly made no reference to the outcome of the Geneva talks the day before. End Summary.
Inspections ASAP
----------------
3. (C) In a September 30 conversation with UK and U.S. ambassadors and French Charge d'Affaires, IAEA Board of Governors Chairman Arshad (Malaysia) agreed that the sooner inspectors are given access, the better, and pledged that as a NAM member country Malaysia would encourage Iran to facilitate this so as to "defuse tension." In separate conversations, India and The Philippines expressed concerned that Iran would use a pre-scheduled October 2 NAM Plenary to plead its case as to having reported the facility in compliance with its IAEA obligations. The Philippines, which recently left the Board, committed to using its voice in the NAM and G-77 to counter any "business as usual" response to the Qom disclosure and stressed the need for outreach to pro-Iran Board members. NAM Chair Egypt fully agreed with the P-3 that the next step was an IAEA inspection and would await the results of an IAEA probe, as it had nothing but news reports on the Qom facility. Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi reiterated Egypt's firm opposition to any non-peaceful Iranian program, seemed genuinely appreciative of being among the first to be consulted by the P-3, and said he would immediately report to capital.
4. (C) The broad consensus among Board members, including many NAM countries, was that an IAEA inspection should take place as soon as possible. India expressed concern that Iran would seek to delay using the military nature of the site as a pretext. Afghanistan affirmed that if Iran is sincere, it would be possible to have an IAEA inspection and Board report before November, adding that the IAEA/Board must react "as a matter of principle." In a larger group meeting, Mongolia and Brazil noted that much would depend on the nature of Iran's response to the IAEA request for inspections, when the inspection(s) would occur (now or in six months) and what conditions Iran would attach. Argentina was willing to countenance a two to three-month delay while the IAEA works out the details of an inspection, and the P-3 pushed back on this point.
5. (C) Most NAM Board members seem to acknowledge the gravity of the Qom disclosure while awaiting confirmation on the basis of an IAEA report. According to a UK readout, South African Ambassador Gumbi affirmed that construction of the Qom facility was a direct violation of UNSCRs. New to the Board, Azerbaijan was among the least constructive NAM members, towing the Iranian line. Recalling its opposition to the February 2006 referral of Iran to the UNSC, Azerbaijan likened the Qom disclosure to that of Natanz and allowed that inspections could prove that all is well, "as with Natanz." Azerbaijan further questioned the purpose of any Special Board meeting, noting divergent views on the Board. The new Pakistani Ambassador professed to be a "blank slate" on the Iran nuclear file (despite having just served in Tehran for three years) according to a UK readout, and the UK was not convinced Pakistan would play an active role on the Board in this matter. (Note: P-3 consultations did not include pro-Iran NAM members Cuba and Venezuela, whom Safeguards DDG Heinonen plans to brief directly. End Note.)
Some Caveats - Code 3.1, Information Sharing
--------------------------------------------
6. (C) During our consultations, the P-3 were careful to note that the disclosure of a clandestine enrichment facility should not be obfuscated by legal technicalities as to the applicability of Code 3.1. modified of the Subsidiary Arrangements to Iran's safeguards agreement (requiring Iran to notify the IAEA upon taking a decision to construct a nuclear facility). Without prompting, Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi reminded that Egypt's statement at the September Board called on Iran to implement Code 3.1 modified. By contrast, Board Chair Arshad argued in his separate meeting with the P-3 that the IAEA Legal Advisor's "opinion" on Code 3.1 could be challenged. However, Arshad acknowledged Ambassador Davies's point that in March 2007 the IAEA had formally rejected Iran's unilateral claim as to having reverted to the earlier version of Code 3.1. Among Latin Board members, Argentina was the most querulous as to Code 3.1, having heard DG ElBaradei's statement in a CNN interview that Iran was "on the wrong side of the law." Argentine Ambassador Curia questioned whether there was a grey area with respect to the applicability of Code 3.1 to new facilities, but also recognized that this would be a moot issue if construction of the Qom facility began before March 2007.
7. (C) In what may be a preview of other potential NAM arguments, Board Chair Arshad also unhelpfully focused on the lack of timely information sharing with the Agency, i.e., that the IAEA was not taken into confidence earlier when information was known about the Qom facility for 2-3 years. Going further, Arshad drew parallels to the late provision of information to the IAEA in the Syria case. A senior Secretariat member present in our meeting also unhelpfully chimed in that his colleagues felt blind-sided by such late disclosures. The UK referred to the information-sharing methodology in the DG's last Iran report and the need for a judgment call as to providing information to the Agency in a useful manner. Ambassador also stressed "not to shoot the messenger" but to keep the focus on Iran's action, apparently over many years, of constructing something in secret that it now states will be an enrichment facility. The French Charge added that Iran's letter provided confirmation of our information - it was not just "allegations." The P-3 similarly explained the decision on information sharing to other Board members but no one else raised this issue in our consultations thus far.
Next Steps: Special Board or Not?
----------------------------------
8.(C) The P-3 assured Board Chair Malaysia and Board members that we were not seeking an immediate Board meeting but cautioned that the November 26 Board may be too long a wait given the seriousness of the issue. Allowing for various scenarios, the UK anticipated a Special Board would be especially warranted should Iran not grant inspectors immediate access. The French held out the possibility that timely inspections, followed by an IAEA report (including an action plan for safeguards) could take us into November. Board Chair Arshad was not supportive of a Special Board absent an IAEA report, as this would be "nothing but a blame and shame exercise." Other NAM, including South Africa, did not rule out a Special Board once the IAEA had something to report. Mongolia saw a role for the Board in either scenario, whether Iran cooperates with inspections or not.
9. (C) The prospect of convening a Special Board prompted pertinent questions as to what outcome one might expect. Brazil argued that there would be no point to a Special Board without a Board action (though Brazil did not endorse particular Board action in advance). Pending the outcome of the Geneva talks, Ukraine supported firm Board action. Argentina was skeptical and cautioned that any Board resolution should garner at least as many votes as the 2006 referral of Iran to the UNSC. (Comment: This standard is a bit specious since the Board composition has changed since 2006. End Comment.) Others, including Peru and Ukraine, asked if there was any chance of UN Security Council action prior to a Board meeting. Ambassador Davies advised that for now, everyone was looking to the IAEA to address the Qom disclosure.
10. (C) Comment: In light of Iran's commitment in Geneva to an early inspection of Qom, Board members will now likely expect the normal sequence of an IAEA inspection followed by a Board report. As developments warrant, we should not exclude the possibility of a Special Board, especially if Iran reneges on its commitments in Geneva. DAVIES
Friday, 16 October 2009, 16:12
C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000478
SIPDIS
FOR T, IO, ISN, EAP, AND INR/B
DOE FOR NA-20, NE-6
NSC FOR SAMORE, SCHEINMAN, HOLGATE, CONNERY
NRC FOR OIP
TOKYO FOR PEKO
EO 12958 DECL: 10/15/2019
TAGS AORC, PREL, KNNP, IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA: AMANO READY FOR PRIME TIME
REF: A. STATE 91301 B. UNVIE 472 C. UNVIE 476
Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (SBU) In several meetings with USG officials before he departed Vienna at the end of the IAEA General Conference, DG-designate Amano displayed remarkable congruence of views with us on conducting the Agency's missions in safeguards verification, nuclear security, and promoting peaceful uses of the atom as well as on reforming Agency management. Latest information from the Japanese Mission is that Amano will return to Vienna in late November and occupy an office in the IAEA during his final, intensive preparation to assume office December 1. This report responds directly to instruction ref A. End Summary.
DG of All States, But in Agreement with Us
------------------------------------------
2. (C) In a meeting with Ambassador on the eve of the two-week Board of Governors (BoG) and General Conference (GC) marathon of mid-September, IAEA Director General-designate Yukiya Amano thanked the U.S. for having supported his candidacy and took pains to emphasize his support for U.S. strategic objectives for the Agency. Amano reminded Ambassador on several occasions that he would need to make concessions to the G-77, which correctly required him to be fair-minded and independent, but that he was solidly in the U.S. court on every key strategic decision, from high-level personnel appointments to the handling of Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program.
3. (SBU) Amano shared with Ambassador Davies his public stance on the role of the IAEA and the Agency's contribution to the global issues of proliferation, security, power, human health and water management. More candidly, Amano noted the importance of maintaining a certain "constructive ambiguity" about his plans, at least until he took over for DG ElBaradei in December. With a bow to the G-77, Amano felt obliged to emphasize the importance of "balance" regarding the Agency's work in peaceful uses of nuclear technology. For staff morale reasons, Amano planned to work on improving the quality of management while publicly praising the current standards and commending staff members for their dedication.
4. (SBU) In the course of conversation, Amano was careful to highlight the April 12-13 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington as "the biggest event for me in the coming months." The Summit coming in spring would drive his winter agenda, including events in Davos and the IAEA's March meeting of the Board of Governors. Again for political considerations, Amano said he would balance visits to the U.S. with trips to South Africa, Egypt and Malaysia. Were he not to secure the cooperation of these countries, Amano felt he would make little progress on top priorities upon taking office. While acknowledging the increasing polarization between IAEA Member States, Amano was quick to point out areas of agreement, such as the need to upgrade the Seibersdorf laboratory complex, promote cancer therapy and safely introduce nuclear power. Amano promised to "treat Iran with dignity," but followed up firmly with the claim that he had been granted the post of Director General "to implement safeguards." He emphasized that Iran had specific obligations which the IAEA would enforce; he did not see himself as an intermediary between Iran and the rest of the world.
Shaping IAEA Leadership
-----------------------
5. (C) On staffing issues at the Deputy Director General (DDG) level, Amano stressed his pleasure that DDG for Management David Waller had agreed to stay on in his current position. Amano described Waller as "an old friend, an effective manager and a good speaker." Referring to his long-standing acquaintance with DDG for Safeguards Olli Heinonen, a manager he described as "reliable and professional," Amano had also planned to retain Heinonen in his current position. He also intended to appoint another Russian to replace DDG for Nuclear Energy Sokolov. Amano noted that DDG for Security and Safety Taniguchi would be leaving during the summer of 2010 (when his contract expired) and said he hoped to identify a "reliable person from a reliable country" to succeed Taniguchi. Amano acknowledged that finding replacements for DDG Cetto (Technical Cooperation) and DDG Burkart (Nuclear Applications) would be trickier, as the jobs were rife with G-77 political considerations and he needed at least one DDG from a developing country. Amano described the complex issue of staffing at the IAEA - from technical expertise to geographical representation and gender balance - as a "jigsaw puzzle." He planned to appoint only one advisor from Japan, someone who was "not too visible." (Note: From subsequent USG-GOJ consultations in Tokyo we know the individual in question to be Satoshi Suzuki, whom we expect to serve as Special Assistant to the Director General for Management. End Note.)
Holding Agency to Verification Responsibilities, Not Politics
------------------------------
6. (C) Subsequently, White House WMD Coordinator Gary Samore and NSC Senior Director Laura Holgate met with Amano on September 15 on the margins of the General Conference. Amano noted that he knows everyone will be focused on the March 2010 Board of Governors meeting, his first as the new DG, to see what he does and says about Iran and Syria. He affirmed it was most important for the IAEA to stick strictly to its verification responsibilities and not offer political "proposals" or "negotiations." Amano said that he would insist Iran to implement fully all Safeguards obligations and extend full cooperation with the IAEA, although he does not believe Iran will completely change its current position of stalemate.
7. (C) Amano indicated he had begun reaching out to key individuals in the IAEA, seeking their advice on managing tough issues. He said that, in particular, he had spoken to DDG Safeguards Olli Heinonen about whether or not the IAEA needed to change how the Iran and Syria reports were written. Amano also reaffirmed to Dr. Samore that he plans to keep DDG Management David Waller and Heinonen in their current positions, especially as it is important to maintain some level of consistency and continuity with the turnover of a new DG.
8. (C) Amano echoed these themes in a September 16 meeting with U.S. NPT Special Representative Susan Burk. Citing his own election, Amano noted warmly that "if you are determined, the U.S. can do anything!", and he hoped the U.S. also be a driving force in the NPT Revcon. Asked about the need for increased IAEA authorities, Amano affirmed his commitment to keep pushing on the Additional Protocol. He also argued for greater work on the back end of the fuel cycle, suggesting that it would be useful to develop something analogous to the IAEA multilateral fuel assurances arrangement that deals with waste issues while reassuring developing countries that "it's not just about new restrictions to be imposed."
Winning 'em over, gradually
---------------------------
9. (SBU) Comment: By the time he departed Vienna with the GC's confirmation of his appointment, Amano appeared comfortable in his "Director General" shoes. He speaks with increasing confidence and clarity, having mastered his talking points and grown accustomed to his new title. Apprehensions linger among IAEA staff and diplomatic missions regarding his communications and leadership abilities, but with his performance during the GC he made progress in winning over skeptics. His wisdom in downplaying Japanese visibility among his senior advisors will also assuage staff fears that Amano would subvert the Agency with a Japanese corporate management style. On a grander stage, Amano's global political savvy was clearly in evidence, and his willingness to speak candidly with U.S. interlocutors on his strategy and various balancing acts bodes well for our future relationship. For example, his description of President Obama's Nuclear Security Summit as the biggest event of his early tenure was a deliberate and gratifying gesture.
10. (U) Amano's conversations with Energy Secretary Chu and NRC Chairman Jaczko are reported refs B and C.
DAVIES
Saturday, 22 November 2008, 10:09
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003030
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR MCGRAW
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-101 POLAD
EO 12958 DECL: 11/21/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, EAID, AF
SUBJECT: POLITICAL AND SECURITY SITUATION IN HELMAND:
SPANTA AND SPENZADA VIEWS
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
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Summary
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1. (C) President Karzai is willing to consider a combined ISAF-ANA (with key roles for the U.S. and UK) security plan to improve stability in Helmand, but is convinced reinstating Sher Mohammad Akhunzada (SMA) as governor is the best way to achieve stability (and bring out votes in next year,s election). There is no known decision or timeline for replacing Governor Mangal with SMA. Spenzada welcomed international collaboration with Mangal to increase aid projects in Alizai areas to bolster Mangal,s tenuous position.
2. (SBU) The subject of Helmand security, Sher Mohammad Akhunzada and the role of PRTs came up in two recent meetings: an 11/18 meeting between FM Spanta and the Ambassador and an 11/17 meeting between Deputy NSA Ibrahim Spenzada and Polcouns.
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London visit: Karzai challenges UK for a Helmand security plan
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3. (C) FM Spanta confirmed that Helmand security was the top issue of Karzai,s London discussions. The exchange centered on the best means to bring Taliban-controlled areas under government control (according to the NDS, five of Helmand,s 13 districts are undr Taliban control). The UK and Afghanistan discussed a combined ISAF-ANA approach (with implicit understanding of lead roles for the U.S. and UK) and an Afghan-led solution.
4. (C) Deputy NSA Spenzada put it in starker terms -- Karzai told the British that he wanted to see their Helmand security plan. If the UK didn,t have one, he would take a &tribal solution.8 Spenzada confirmed &tribal solution8 meant reinstating Sher Mohammad Akhunzada (SMA) as Helmand governor.
5. (C) UK General Richards told Spanta the UK was prepared to offer to send 2000 additional soldiers to Helmand once Karzai requested it officially. Spanta said the London visit helped reduce misunderstandings, but he expressed disappointment in the British, contending they were not ready to fight as actively as American soldiers.
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Karzai,s view on SMA and the Alizai
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6. (C) Spenzada said there was no decision or timeline for reinstating SMA as Helmand Governor. He explained that Karzai sees control of the Alizai as key to improving stability in the province, and he was convinced only SMA could bring control t the Alizai. The Alizai are the majority and hold control in the troubled districts of Kajaki, Musa Qala and Sangin. Karzai believes the Alizai dominate the Barakzai, Poplazai, Ishakzai and other Helmand tribes. In Karzai,s calculation, control of the Alizai translates into control over all the weaker tribes, too.
7. (C) At a 10/31 meeting with the Ambassador, Governor Mangal disputed SMA,s monolithic control of the Alizai. Mangal pointed to his recentsuccess in installing an Alizai ally as chiefof Kajaki district. Despite SMA,s continuingefforts to undermine him, Mangal appeared upbeat about winning more Alizais to his side.
8. (C) Spenzada agreed the Alizai were split ontheir support for SMA, and that the non-Aliza tribes strongly opposed SMA,s return. Spenzada described SMA as &part of the problem8 and recognized that unrestcould return if Karzai reinstated him. Spenzda said he and other Karzai advisors have failed to change Karzai,s mind on reinstating SMA.
9. (C) Although unsaid by Spenzada, a key underlying factor i Karzai,s calculation is his belief that SMA can deliver Alizai votes in next year,s election. Karzai,s Helmand vote accounted for six percent of his total support in 2004.
10. (C) Spenzada characterized Governor Mangal as a good official and a good person. He encouraged the United States to continue to work through Mangal to increase aid projects
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in Alizai areas, to bolster Mangal,s political position.
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Musa Qala: Perceptions of unfulfilled promises
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11. (C) Musa Qala District sub-governor Mullah Salam has complained that the international community has failed to deliver on reconstruction pledges to Musa Qala. Spenzada also suggested the United States do better. He suggested we bear in mind the promise/deliver problems from Musa Qala as we examine our plans for assistance to the Alizai.
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Karzai comments on PRTs undermining local governance
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12. (SBU) On November 16, Karzai stated at a press conference that PRTs were weakening the government by controlling resources, implementing projects and making arrests. Spenzada explained that Karzai believed the local people were going directly to PRTs for resource requests, and undermining the authority of local officials. Polcouns informed Spenzada that PRTs make an extra effort to redirect requests to local authorities, collaborate confidentially on those requests, and then turn to local authorities to inform the public on those decisions. Spenzada promised to pass along this information to Karzai.
WOOD
Tuesday, 07 July 2009, 13:29
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001767
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/03/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: KARZAI ON THE STATE OF US-AFGHAN RELATIONS
Classified By: Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ).
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. In a series of meetings this week, I discussed with President Karzai a number of issues, including Karzai's concerns with the future of US policy on Afghanistan, and his opinions on where US policy here had failed. The meetings were cordial, but raised certain concerns for me about the status of the US-Afghan relationship, both in the lead up to the election and over the long term, should Karzai win reelection. Karzai's comments reinforce my belief that our relationship must be a two-way partnership of obligations and responsibilities. We must also convince Karzai to put his backing behind democratic institutions and professionalized security forces are better equipped to lead Afghanistan into the future, rather than Karzai's preference for tribal structures and informal power networks. This cable summarizes the content of these four recent meetings, as well as a subsequent conversation with Interior Minister Atmar. End Summary.
2. (S/NF) I met with Karzai on four occasions this week: on June 30 with COMISAF Gen. McChrystal and most of Karzai's national security team, and three times on July 1, with SRAP Special Advisor Barnett Rubin, in a one-on-one meeting, and finally with CODEL Ellsworth. Karzai maintained a calm demeanor throughout, but at several times displayed views that troubled me with their potential implications for US-Afghan relations. I also called on Atmar on July 2.
Kandahar Incident
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3. (S/NF) At the June 30 meeting with Karzai and his national security advisors, Gen. McChrystal and I briefed Karzai on a June 29 incident in which a USG-funded, equipped, and mentored paramilitary force attacked a Kandahar courthouse. The incident resulted in the deaths of several Afghan National Police officers. Karzai had earlier received phone calls from high-level US officials regretting the incident, so was calm and did not display the type of emotive anger he has shown following civilian casualty incidents. In the later one-on-one meeting with me, I reminded Karzai that he had selected and introduced this paramilitary unit's recruits to the USG in 2002, a fact that he had conveniently omitted in larger group settings.
4. (S/NF) Karzai insisted that units operating outside of the Afghan armed forces must be brought under the legitimate control of the Afghan government. Gen. McChrystal and I agreed that both counterterrorism paramilitary units and private security companies (PSCs) require more rigorous oversight and be brought under the eventual control of the Afghan government. PSCs required stronger regulations, yet the government should also adopt more transparent licensing procedures.
US Policy on Afghanistan
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5. (S/NF) Karzai declared in all four meetings that he believed the US was not speaking clearly to Afghans on its goals in Afghanistan. Karzai contended that in 2002 the US had stated a clear purpose for being involved in Afghanistan but had lost its purpose over the past six years. As he has in past meetings with us, Karzai either stated his belief in or repeated rumors questioning the US commitment to a strong partnership with Afghanistan.
6. (S/NF) Karzai reported Pakistani intelligence officials had alleged to Afghan officials that the US intended to divide Pakistan and weaken Afghanistan in order to pursue its fight against terrorist groups. At the same time, Karzai accused Iran of trying to weaken Afghanistan by supporting the presidential campaign of Abdullah Abdullah in order to promote a decentralization agenda that would strip power from the central government to give to sub-national actors over whom Iran believed it would have more control. Incredulously, Karzai appeared to accept so-called rumors that the US and Iran were working together to support Abdullah against him.
7. (S/NF) I pushed back strongly on this misinformation in the June 30 meeting with Karzai's national security team, reiterating to Karzai that there was no overt or covert US program to support any presidential candidate. I then asked Karzai if he took me at my word on this issue. Karzai, perhaps not wanting to back down in front of his advisors, said that he did not. Karzai said the US had actively encouraged Abdullah, Ashraf Ghani, and Zalmay Khalilzad to run for the presidency. At one point Karzai joked that I should "consult my (above) buddies" on national security issues. I repeated that the US had no favored candidates in
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the race and the formal setting of the meeting was not a proper forum to make such inappropriate comments. He was embarrassed and helpfully shifted the conversation to another topic. I also urged Karzai to move away from conspiratorial thinking and instead focus on bringing ideas for the future into his campaign. Introducing a clear platform now will put him in a better position to move forward if he wins reelection.
US Mistakes in Afghanistan
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8. (S/NF) Karzai and I held a one-on-one meeting shortly before meeting CODEL Ellsworth. Karzai agreed with my suggestion to make a better effort to present the case for continued and productive US engagement in his meetings with USG visitors from Washington. However, as the CODEL meeting began, Karzai reverted to old form and launched into a familiar review of the many instances where he believed the US had miscalculated its policies in the region. In summary: The US had failed to formulate an effective post-2001 policy on Pakistan, had pulled out of southern Afghanistan (particularly Helmand) too soon and given too much responsibility to ill-equipped and casualty-averse NATO allies, had failed to effectively engage with and pay respect to the importance of tribal leaders in Afghan society, and had allowed tribal leader networks to be decimated by insurgent attacks. I spoke up then, observing that I had visited Helmand several years ago before other NATO forces took over military operations there and witnessed signs that governance and security were declining under then-Gov. Sher Mohammed Akhundzada.
Atmar on Karzai's Paranoia
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9. (S/NF) I told Interior Minister Atmar at our July 2 meeting that with his conspiratorial behavior, Karzai would run the risk of leaving USG interlocutors with the impression that we have accomplished very little here and that the Afghan government believed most of the failures lay with us. This is not a dialogue that will lead to an effective partnership. The US has been clear in its past shortcomings in Afghanistan, but we have yet to see Karzai admit to the serious shortcomings in his administration.
10. (S/NF) Atmar agreed with the importance of Karzai presenting himself as a better international partner. He also detailed three existing paranoias that affected Karzai's worldview: (1) Karzai did not understand US policy in the region and suspected ulterior motives in our relationship with neighboring countries; (2) he suspected the US was contemplating a short-term strategy in Afghanistan that would result in our disengagement within the next two years; and (3) the US was intent on dumping Karzai and supporting another candidate. A fourth emerging paranoia was of a US plot to divide and weaken Pashtuns on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. Despite these paranoias, Atmar assured me that Karzai had confidence in his personal relationship with me and recognized the need to meet more frequently to work through his misperceptions of US policy and intentions.
Our Relationship with Karzai
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11. (S/NF) In these meetings and other recent encounters with Karzai, two contrasting portraits emerge. The first is of a paranoid and weak individual unfamiliar with the basics of nation building and overly self-conscious that his time in the spotlight of glowing reviews from the international community has passed. The other is that of an ever-shrewd politician who sees himself as a nationalist hero who can save the country from being divided by the decentralization-focused agenda of Abdullah, other political rivals, neighboring countries, and the US. In order to recalibrate our relationship with Karzai, we must deal with and challenge both of these personalities.
12. (S/NF) The danger of long-term damage to our relationship with and thus our influence over Karzai ) who for now is the clear favorite to win the election ) is real, but not irreversible. We need to carefully ensure that the distance between us and Karzai does not grow over the remaining weeks before the election. Karzai has invited me for a series of one-on-one meetings in the near future. According to Atmar, Karzai recognizes the importance of a closer dialogue. I will use this opportunity and others to re-focus our dialogue on several points that can improve our mutual understanding, including:
13. (S/NF) We need to seriously examine the issue of armed groups that currently operate outside of the purview of
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official Afghan government control. The activities of paramilitary units and PSCs, combined with civilian casualties, night searches, and others issues related to the presence of foreign forces, play into the manifestation of Afghans' anger that they are not in control of their own country. Karzai claims only to be a vessel for his peoples' anger. All hubris aside, he is expressing a legitimate concern of his constituents. These problems will be a barrier to moving forward in other areas of our relationship until we have properly addressed them.
14. (S/NF) At the same time, we must convince Karzai that the US-Afghan relationship is a two-way street of obligations and responsibilities. While we accept our own responsibilities, Karzai must accept and act on our expectation that he elucidate a clear vision for how he intends to lead Afghanistan over the next five years in a way that encourages democratization, promotes economic development, and recognizes the poisonous effects corruption has had on his government's ability to win the trust and respect of its people. If reelected, it is my hope that a Karzai who no longer needs to run for reelection will be better positioned and in a healthier frame of mind to pursue this agenda, as well as a meaningful national reconciliation.
15. (S/NF) I will work now to lay the foundation for improved trust and advances on the two key themes outlined above. I will work in tandem with Gen. McChrystal on both of these fronts. On the discussion of shared responsibilities, I will begin a frank, collaborative (and perhaps, at times, confrontational) dialogue with Karzai. No alternative approach is now evident. Karzai's current vision for Afghanistan's future relies too strongly on warlords, tribal chiefs, and other personalities of the past who would be difficult to reconcile with our commitments to build strong government institutions and professional security forces. EIKENBERRY
Saturday, 27 June 2009, 11:46
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001677
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/RAP HOLBROOKE, SCA/FO, SCA/A
STATE PASS USAID
EO 12958 DECL: 06/16/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: HELMAND GOVERNOR MANGAL UPBEAT, HOPEFUL IN MEETING
WITH AMBASSADOR
Classified By: Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (c )
1. (U) Helmand Governor Gulabuddin Mangal was upbeat, yet realistic during a June 16 call on Ambassador Eikenberry at the U.S. Embassy. The Ambassador gave Mangal a set of photos taken during last month's grand opening of the Bost Commercial Airfield in Helmand. Mangal thanked the Ambassador and promised to share the photos with Helmand leaders. Mangal said many Helmandi leaders had sent messages of support for the Ambassador's speech, and that local media had rebroadcast the speech several times. The Ambassador was encouraged by this news, telling Mangal that he wrote the speech himself based on both his knowledge of the new U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and his desire to bolster the confidence of Helmand's residents in the United States and the international community.
2. (SBU) Mangal offered a brief overview of the security situation in Helmand since he was appointed in early 2008, describing security throughout the province as bad, and pointing specifically to the complete lack of security in provincial capital Lashkar Gah. He said fear among Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), led them to fire shots randomly in the streets. He added there was a complete lack of coordination with coalition forces. Mangal said narcotics traffickers operating with impunity lived within 100 meters of the police station in the capital. Mangal's arrest of these characters was met with strong resistance from the local Chief of Police and National Directorate of Security (NDS) chief, who had warned him that taking on drug traffickers was too dangerous. Mangal said he proceeded anyway, because he "knew that they were not stronger than the law." Mangal admitted that the crackdown on narcotics traffickers in the city had created problems, and that his effectiveness as governor has suffered because of it. Nevertheless, he said he would never give up on maintaining security - and by extension - prosperity, in Helmand. Mangal also said coordination between ANSF and NATO forces had improved greatly under his watch. He reported a good relationship with RC-South Deputy Commanding General Nicholson, and said he senses commitment from the United States to continuing coordination against drug trafficking. Mangal thanked the United States for its continuing counter narcotics support.
3. (SBU) Mangal spoke of the success of the Food Zone Program, which he hopes will be renewed for a second year. He reported he has achieved buy-in from many community leaders, including the line minister of health, tribal elders, and religious leaders, who issued a fatwah reminding Helmandis that drugs are prohibited in Islam. He also touted his public awareness campaign, which has included posters telling youth of the dangers of drugs, and informing farmers of alternative livelihood options. Mangal assured the Ambassador that poppy production would fall to zero this year.
4. (C/NF) Mangal reminded the Ambassador that five districts in Helmand are currently under control of enemy forces. He expressed hope that those would soon be under GIRoA control, with help from the incoming Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). He recalled successful Marine operations in Garmsir last year, which is now a secure district, and said elders at Bost were very complementary about the U.S. efforts. However, when the Ambassador asked him to assess the British, Mangal said people are not optimistic. Mangal stressed he admires British sacrifices and what they have done, but that the public is not happy because of unfulfilled goals. Mangal said Sangin district looks like a "military compound" due to the high number of UK troops, and opined this should not be necessary to maintain security there. He also complained that the UK has done nothing to advance reconstruction goals in the province. He qualified these observations by saying that he admires the new techniques of British special forces and hoped they would "change everything" by continuing to fight narcotics traffickers.
5. (C) Referring to the successful counter narcotics operation at Marja last month, Mangal told the Ambassador that some people had misinformed President Karzai. (Note: Mangal was referring to tribal leaders who reportedly misinformed Karzai that the operation had resulted in civilian casualties, rather than supporting the success of the operation. End note). Mangal proudly said he told
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Karzai directly that the operation had targeted enemies and accomplished a major success. He also said civilian casualties had, in fact occurred, but not as many as Karzai's friends reported. Mangal said Karzai's friends - of which there are many in Helmand, Kandahar and Urugzan - often tell him the "wrong things."
6. (C) Mangal at first deflected the Ambassador's inquiry on the status of his relationship with Karzai, saying only that "I am working hard at doing my job." He added that Karzai had attempted to replace him with Sher Mohammed Akhunzada, a known warlord and criminal, only three months after Mangal's appointment last year. Mangal described a discussion he had with Karzai at the time, in which he said to Karzai "If you trust me, you must give me three more months to prove myself." Karzai, according to Mangal, backed down, telling Mangal his anger was really directed at British Forces. Mangal opined that Karzai remains jealous of his good relationship with ISAF and coalition forces, but recognizes that Mangal is the best pick to make progress in Helmand. Mangal admitted that his relationship with Karzai has suffered since he was governor of Laghman. The Ambassador said the fact that Karzai assigned Mangal to such an important province was a signal of confidence and trust, but recognized that tensions would always exist due to Karzai's personal connections. The Ambassador said he can see Mangal's strong relationship with leaders in Helmand and reaffirmed that British confidence in Mangal is very high. He also reassured Mangal that United States sees him as a superb governor in a dangerous role, who is both wise and brave. He said Afghans and the international community alike see Mangal among the rising generation of leaders in a new Afghanistan.
7. (SBU) The Ambassador told Mangal that new ISAF Commander, General Stanley McChrystal, is a long-time professional colleague and personal friend, and promised to brief General McChrystal on the history of Helmand before his first visit. For the U.S. and UK, Helmand is one of the top two or three provinces for our strategy in the next year, which is reflected in the deployment of our Marines there. The Ambassador said in his new civilian role, he would increase the focus on reconstruction, governance and development, including programs that increase capacity and reduce unemployment. He stressed that in order to combat unemployment, we will work hard on agricultural productivity and programs that help farmers bring those products to market road development. Small scale irrigation systems will also be emphasized. At the same time, we will take all measures we can to reinforce programs to establish better governance and to increase communication with Karzai. The Ambassador encouraged Mangal not to lose faith. He invited Mangal to stop by any time he is in Kabul, and said on his next visit to Helmand, they would walk through the bazaar together. Mangal thanked the Ambassador for his kind words and vowed to keep pushing forward change in Helmand.
EIKENBERRY
Friday, 28 November 2008, 15:46
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 002964
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/WE AND SCA/A
EO 12958 DECL: 11/28/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, PTER, AF, UK
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: PRESIDENT KARZAI NOT CONFIDENT ON
ELECTIONS; CLAIMS FINANCIAL RESERVES "BEST IN WORLD"
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Greg Berry for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).
1. (C/NF) Summary: During a November 25 meeting in Kabul, Afghan President Karzai told FS Miliband that it would be difficult or impossible to hold a credible Presidential election. He said that Afghanistan's USD 13.4b of reserves, were the &best in the world." Miliband commented to Karzai that, after seven years, it was important to offer a perspective on how all expected the conflict to end. Reconciliation, subject to strict conditions, would obviously be part of that. Karzai had had a good talk with Pakistan President Zardari November 24 and was looking forward to him paying a state visit in December. He was concerned that the failure to act quickly on police issues had undermined the trust which the Afghan people had in their government and in the international community. Miliband noted that the UK was determined to work with Helmand Governor Mangal, and to give him support in engaging with the tribes. He emphasized the need to maximize the advantages which the arrival of more U.S. troops would bring. End Summary
2. (C/NF) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Miliband saw Karzai for about an hour in Kabul on November 25, with Foreign Minister Spanta, National Security Advisor Rassoul , Chief of Staff Daudzai, and Spokesperson Hamidzada present on the Afghan side. UK Ambassador Cowper-Coles joined Miliband.
ELECTIONS
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3. (C/NF) Karzai told Miliband that it would be difficult or impossible to hold a credible Presidential election, not just in Helmand, but also in the provinces of Zabul, Farah, Kandahar and Ghazni. Although Zabul was small, in many ways it was as difficult as Helmand. That made a spring date proposed by the Parliament impossible. Karzai was confident that early agreement on a date would be reached.
AFGHAN/U.S. RELATIONS
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4. (C/NF) Karzai related to Miliband that President-elect Obama had been "very supportive, very committed8 during their telephone conversation the previous week. He said Obama had promised to send a team to Afghanistan soon after the inauguration. Karzai noted that his government was preparing three papers for the U.S. and the international community on security, governance, and economic issues. The security paper had already been sent to the U.S. It covered civilian casualties, and ending house searches and arbitrary arrests of Afghans by coalition forces. Karzai instructed Rassoul to see that the paper was also sent to &NATO headquarters8.
GOVERNANCE/ECONOMY
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5. (C/NF) Karzai told Miliband that the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) were in the course of preparing a paper which would call for an end to parallel structures. He said that Afghanistan's USD 13.4b of reserves were the &best in the world8. The paper on economic issues would be for the Americans alone and would deal with some of the abuses to which their aid was subject. In particular, Afghanistan wanted to end the way in which the Americans sub-contracted major parts of their aid program to "doubtful contractors." He was also concerned that many of the private security companies were little more than "criminal organizations." The same applied to some of the transport companies used by the U.S.; it had become apparent to Karzai that the transport companies were responsible for much of the insecurity on the highways, in order to extract higher fees and insurance payments from the Americans.
RECONCILIATION
---------------------------
6. (C/NF) Miliband commented to Karzai that, after seven years, it was important to offer a perspective on how all expected the conflict to end. Reconciliation, subject to strict conditions, would obviously be part of that. Karzai agreed, saying that he had consulted &the whole Afghan people,8 and they were all in favor of reconciliation. They wanted to "bring over the good guys, while excluding the bad guys." Karzai realizes that the U.S., Russia and Iran had doubts about reconciliation, but this was something that the Afghan people wanted, and which he was bound to press ahead
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7. (C/NF) Miliband welcomed the warm relations between Karzai and Zardari, and spoke of the need to extend that relationship into other areas, and systemize it. It would be important to underpin contacts at the highest level with a clear work plan, and timeframe, for practical contacts at other levels. The Pakistanis were now fighting the Taleban, Miliband continued, and needed to be encouraged and supported in this. The UK stood ready to help in any way it could with the Af/Pak relationship. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Karzai welcomed all this. He had had a good talk with Zardari November 24 and was looking forward to him paying a state visit in December. Karzai opined that Pakistan wanted to cooperate with Afghanistan, without the Americans being involved. Spanta explained that there were three levels to Af/Pak cooperation: bilateral, trilateral and multilateral. Miliband added that Zardari seemed genuinely committed to tackling terrorism, and to working with Afghanistan, and seemed gradually to be extending his control over other parts of the Pakistani state, including the military. Karzai expressed skepticism about how far Zardari,s writ yet ran, but said that he hoped the UK would get involved energetically in supporting Af/Pak cooperation.
AFGHAN INTERNAL ISSUES
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8. (C/NF) Miliband welcomed Interior Minister Atmar,s appointment , and said that the UK would give him "every support, " which Karzai welcomed, noting that he had given Atmar a &blank check8 to deal with corruption. His only advice to Atmar had been to maintain the ethnic balance in the Interior Ministry. Miliband also welcomed the dismissal, for corruption, of the Transport Minister. Karzai said that he had had no option, but it had been a "regrettable step."
ANA/ANP
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9. (C/NF) Miliband noted recent improvements in the ANA, and the fact that the units in Helmand had reached "Capability Milestone One," but progress on the ANA had not been matched by progress on policing. Karzai agreed, saying that the failure to reform the Afghan Police (ANP) had been the fault of "Afghanistan's friends." Karzai underlined that the international community had at last realized what needed to be done on the police, and said he was concerned that the failure to act quickly had undermined the trust which the Afghan people had in their government and in the international community.
POLITICAL OUTREACH
-----------------------------------
10. (C/NF) Karzai said that political outreach needed to start at village level, and extend through the district and provincial levels. Communities needed to be re-empowered, in the name of the war on terror. Those communities had been damaged by the Soviet invasion, and by radicalization, much of it paid for by the West. The IDLG was now trying to address this. Karzai added that he had replaced all but five or six governors. He was also busy signing new appointments of district governors. Miliband noted that the UK had agreed to support the Afghan Social Outreach Program in three districts in Helmand. Karzai said that he was a "greedy man" in respect to Helmand; he wanted the whole province to benefit. Miliband added that the UK was determined to work with Helmand Governor Mangal, and to give him support in engaging with the tribes. He emphasized the need to maximize the advantages which the arrival of more U.S. troops would bring.
11. (C/NF) Karzai emphasized that more U.S. troops were not the answer. He hoped the Americans would consult the Afghan Government before sending more troops. Karzai said that the U.S. had failed to send the troops for which Karzai had asked in 2002, but now it might be too late. He hoped the ANA and coalition forces would cooperate more closely, and that the increase in the ANA could be delivered much sooner than 2012. The ground in the east was well covered, but there were not enough troops in other parts of the country. According to Karzai, the Afghan population did not want more foreign troops at this stage.
12. (C/NF) Miliband ended the meeting by underlining that
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the UK public needed reassuring about the "Afghanistan project." Karzai,s own prestige in Britain meant that he was uniquely well placed to do this. Miliband hoped therefore that Karzai would consider writing an open letter to the British people. Cowper-Coles promised to follow up on this with Karzai,s spokesman.
SOUTH WITH SPANTA
----------------------------------
13. (C/NF) After the meeting with Karzai, Miliband and Spanta flew to Camp Bastion. During the flight Spanta emphasized to Miliband the need to address the suspicions which the Afghan people still had of Britain. He also lobbied for the UK to do more with ethnic groups other than Pashtuns (Comment: Spanta is a Tajik. End comment). Spanta suggested that the UK should engage with the universities in Heart and Mazar-e-Sharif, and have a much higher profile among Tajiks. Britain was suspected among many in Afghanistan of having a pro-Pashtun policy. Spanta also argued for Britain to do more to help restore the electricity supply to Kabul. Minister of Energy Ismael Khan needed USD 42m to address Kabul,s energy problems.
HELMAND
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14. (C/NF) Miliband and Spanta carried out three engagements in Helmand: a visit to Garmsir, to review progress since its liberation from the Taleban earlier in the year; a visit to Lashkar Gah, to meet the Governor Mangal and other provincial notables; and a visit to the ANA training camp at Camp Shorabak, adjacent to Camp Bastion.
GARMSIR
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15. (C/NF) In Garmsir, Miliband was received by the District Chief, Abdullah Jan, and gained a variety of insights into &good enough8 governance, Afghan-style. A large number of local elders turned out, at virtually no notice, and then accompanied Miliband and Spanta on a walkabout through the bazaar, during which Miliband bought locally-produced pomegranates. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, none of this would have been possible only a few months ago and is a reflection of the improving security situation. Miliband and Spanta also reviewed and met troops of the ANA, and of the Queen,s Dragoon Guards and 1 Rifles, the latter the lead unit for mentoring the ANA in Helmand.
GOVERNOR MANGAL
---------------------------------
16. (C/NF) In Lashkar Gah, Miliband assured Mangal of continuing UK support. Mangal spoke of his many achievements, and expressed gratitude for support from HMG. During a joint press conference, Spanta voiced strong support for Mangal, which XXXXXXXXXXXX considers a significant sign of Karzai's personal stake in seeing Spanta succeed in Helmand.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
TUTTLE
Friday, 22 August 2008, 15:03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 002181
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/WE, SCA/A; NSC FOR BRADLEY
EO 12958 DECL: 08/22/2018
TAGS PREL, MARR, PTER, AF, UK
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: BROWN URGES KARZAI TO KEEP HELMAND
GOVERNOR; PRAISES UNSYG REP
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Greg Berry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C/NF) During what was described by FCO Afghanistan Desk Officer Tom Burns as a mainly "morale boosting" trip to Afghanistan on August 21, Prime Minister Gordon Brown met with UK and Afghan military commanders and Governor Mangal in Helmand, and with President Karzai and UNSYG Special Representative Kai Eide in Kabul. Mangal confided to Brown, who was accompanied by Foreign Policy Advisor Simon McDonald, that he was worried about job security given that others close to Karzai, including former Helmand governor Sher Muhammed Akhunzada, were plotting against him and encouraging Karzai to replace him with Akhunzada. Burns said that in Kabul Brown took up Mangal's cause, telling Karzai that Mangal enjoyed the UK's confidence and that Akhunzada was not an acceptable alternative, given his history of corruption and involvement in drug trafficking. UK Ambassador Sherard Cowper-Cowles will continue to push Mangal's case with Karzai.
2. (C/NF) Brown reportedly emphasized to Karzai that the security assessments he had received from British and Afghan commanders in Helmand were more positive in tone than those Karzai may have been receiving from his political advisors. The general view from the military in Helmand, Brown told Karzai, was that security overall in the province was improving, but that major roads were still very dangerous given the increase in insurgent use of IEDs and suicide bombers. Karzai and Brown spent a significant portion of their meeting talking about the situation in Pakistan and the September 6 presidential elections. Karzai is reportedly "warm" on PPP leader Zardari but encouraged the U.S. and UK to "open channels" to PML leader Nawaz Sharif. Karzai averred that given the increase in AQ training activity on the Pakistan side of the border, Pakistan is actually a more violent country than Afghanistan.
Meeting with UNSYG Representative Eide
--------------------------------------
3. (C/NF) Brown spent an hour with UNSYG Special Representative Kai Eide, who expressed concern over slow progress on the security situation, which was impeding development, particularly in the south, and the lack of Afghan capacity to absorb what aid was getting through. He was also worried about diminishing support for Karzai in the government and population in general, and complained that Karzai was incapable of making the "tough decisions." Eide suggested that he, Cowper-Cowles and Ambassador Wood work together to keep the pressure on Karzai. Eide also cautioned against working too closely and directly with tribal leaders, as this may undermine Karzai/central government authority and credibility. Brown praised the coordinating work Eide had undertaken thus far, and pledged continued UK support for his mission.
Cabinet Office Readout
----------------------
4. (C/NF) In a subsequent conversation with the Cabinet Office's Afghan Officer Helen Evans, she echoed the FCO readout, but stressed that the Prime Minister's statements while on the ground about the UK commitment to support ANA training were "a general statement of intent" not a specific pledge of additional UK military and financial resources at this time. Brown received a useful briefing from the AFSouth commander, who gave the PM a "half-glass full, half empty," overview of the situation, according to Evans. The commander described how security is improving in the region overall, but the lack of security along transport routes makes it difficult to build on the security improvements. Brown also heard from several interlocutors that the road security situation could affect the ability to hold credible elections.
5. (C/NF) Brown's traveling party was struck by UNSYG Eide's downbeat assessment of the Afghan leadership, including Karzai, according to Evans. Eide raised whether the UK and U.S. Governments should be working to find a new chief of staff for Karzai, an issue that Brown later took up with the UK Embassy in Kabul. Eide also raised with Brown concerns about the humanitarian situation developing as a result of the current drought, which has affected nearly all of the country.
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Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
LEBARON
Monday, 26 May 2008, 05:48
UNCLAS KABUL 001275
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS PREL, PGOV, AF
SUBJECT: PRT LASHKAR GAH, HELMAND PROVINCE: GOVERNOR MANGAL TAKES
CHARGE
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Governor Mangal's first two months in Helmand have been productive, building solid support for his administration. His public outreach efforts are excellent, and he continues to meet regularly with residents of Lashkar Gah and the tribal and civil leadership of Helmand. Mangal has an impressive understanding of government operations and is pushing his provincial ministry directors to improve their planning and implementation capacity and to take charge of reconstruction and development efforts. He has an effective working relationship with the British-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), and Afghan security forces have responded well to his leadership. During a May 24 dinner, which included senior Afghan government officials, visiting British Secretary of State for Defense Des Browne registered HMG's strong support for the Helmand governor. Mangal's experience and determination to improve Helmand's provincial government sends a strong signal to area residents that the Afghan government can be effective.
2. (SBU) Upon his arrival in Helmand, Governor Mangal immediately focused on improving the performance of the provincial government. He has pushed provincial ministry directors to improve their operations and is personally reviewing the capacity of each director. Mangal chaired his first Helmand Provincial Development Committee on May 20 and was not pleased with the directors' reports. He told the directors to coordinate all government, NGO and international development activities within their areas of responsibility. The fight against corruption is a primary goal of his administration; he called for their support in eliminating it. Mangal told PRT officers that some local officials enjoy political or family connections and their removal from office will be difficult; however, with sufficient proof of non-performance, changes can be made in Helmand's provincial government.
3. (SBU) Public outreach is a key part of Mangal's efforts to bring the government closer to the people. He makes a point of traveling around Lashkar Gah and makes regular visits to the city bazaars to speak with the merchants and shoppers. In conjunction with the Ministry of Information and Culture, he organized a Public Poetry Festival in Lashkar Gah on May 15. The event took place at the women's park with several thousand people in attendance. Mangal delivered the opening address and called upon the audience to help promote a better image of Helmand, and to work with him to attract business, visitors and investments to the province. Residents were pleased by this effort and Mangal's support among the populace is growing.
4. (SBU) Mangal has established an effective relationship with the PRT, which has provided him with expanded internet service, computers and office furniture to improve his office's capacity. Mangal told the PRT additional investment in government infrastructure is required in Lashkar Gah and the District Centers to reestablish the government across Helmand. His relationship with the security leadership is good, and he participates in weekly security briefings from Afghan and UK security forces. He occasionally maintains longer office hours to meet additional guests and build better ties across the province.
5. (SBU) Mangal's first two months in Helmand have been impressive. The provincial government is coming to life and he is pushing ministry directors to produce results. Residents of Lashkar Gah readily express support for Mangal and his efforts and have high hopes he can continue to improve the functions of Helmand's government.
WOOD
Friday, 29 January 2010, 20:49
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 MEXICO 000083
SIPDIS
PASS TO DOD/OSD STOCKTON
PASS TO DEPT NSC
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/01/29
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PHUM, SNAR, KCRM, MX
SUBJECT: Scenesetter for the Opening of the Defense Bilateral Working
Group, Washington, D.C., February 1
DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 B, D
Classified Secret.
1. (SBU) Summary: The inauguration of the Defense Bilateral Working Group (DBWG) on February 1 comes at a key moment in our efforts to deepen our bilateral relationship and to support the Mexican military's nascent steps toward modernization. On the heels of our bilateral joint assessments in Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana, as well as the GOM's move to replace the military with the Federal Police as lead security agency in Juarez, the DBWG can help ensure that the GOM stays focused on making the kinds of institutional improvements - including greater attention to human rights and broader regional participation - that are needed to bolster its effectiveness in the immediate fight against organized crime, and to position it to become a twenty first century military in one of the leading democracies in the region. End Summary
2. (SBU) The DBWG is an important component of our overall bilateral Merida strategy for 2010. We ended 2009 with an unprecedented commitment from the Mexican government to work closely with us on an ambitious effort to move beyond a singular focus on high value targets and address some of the institutional and socio-economic constraints that threaten to undermine our efforts to combat the cartels. A truly joint effort to implement a new U.S.-Mexico strategy is yielding stronger organizational structures and interagency cooperation on both sides and a deeper understanding of the threat posed by the drug trafficking organizations. In the coming year, we will help Mexico institutionalize civilian law enforcement capabilities and phase down the military's role in conducting traditional and police functions. The DBWG will also provide a vehicle for Washington to brief the GOM on the importance of human rights issues to U.S. security policy, thus reinforcing a new formal Bilateral Human Rights Dialogue with the GOM that will include SEDENA and SEMAR.
Political and Economic Context
-----------------------------------------
3. (SBU) It is a challenging moment to address some of the institutional weaknesses that dot the Mexican political landscape and which periodically impede our larger efforts. President Calderon has entered the last three years of his six-year term facing a complicated political and economic environment. His National Action Party (PAN) emerged seriously weakened from a dramatic set-back suffered in the July congressional elections and was unable to recoup any real momentum during the last legislative session. Calderon's bold plan for ten ambitious areas for reform, announced in September, has yet to translate into politically viable initiatives. His personal popularity numbers have dropped, driven largely by massive economic contraction and a public sense that there is little strategy to create new and sustainable jobs. Overall, Calderon's approval ratings are still well above 50 percent, sustained largely by his campaign against organized crime. Increasingly, Mexicans realize that combating DTOs is a matter of citizen security, and thus support a tough stance. Yet the failure to reduce violence is also a liability.
4. (SBU) Meanwhile, the opposition Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) is in the ascendency, cautiously managing its illusory unity in an effort to dominate the twelve gubernatorial contests this year and avoid missteps that could jeopardize its front-runner status in the run-up to the 2012 presidential elections. With a
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strategy best described as political pragmatism, PRI insiders indicate that the party is unlikely to support any major reform efforts over the next several years - no matter how necessary - that could be publicly controversial. Slow economic recovery and budgetary pressures are reducing government resources and complicating the government's ability to balance priorities and come up with a compelling and sustainable narrative that ties the fight against organized crime to the daily concerns of most Mexicans. Mexico's rapidly declining oil production, a projected six to seven percent GDP contraction in 2009, a slow recovery in 2010, and a 47 percent poverty rate all present difficult challenges for the Calderon administration in 2010. Still, we see no "softening" of the administration's resolve to confront the DTOs head on.
Security Challenges
-------------------------
5. (C) Calderon has aggressively attacked Mexico's drug trafficking organizations but has struggled with an unwieldy and uncoordinated interagency and spiraling rates of violence that have made him vulnerable to criticism that his anti-crime strategy has failed. Indeed, the GOM's inability to halt the escalating numbers of narco-related homicides in places like Ciudad Juarez and elsewhere - the nationwide total topped 7,700 in 2009 - has become one of Calderon's principal political liabilities as the general public has grown more concerned about citizen security. Mexican security institutions are often locked in a zero-sum competition in which one agency's success is viewed as another's failure, information is closely guarded, and joint operations are all but unheard of. Official corruption is widespread, leading to a compartmentalized siege mentality among "clean" law enforcement leaders and their lieutenants. Prosecution rates for organized crime-related offenses are dismal; two percent of those detained are brought to trail. Only 2 percent of those arrested in Ciudad Juarez have even been charged with a crime.
6. (S) The failure to reduce violence has focused attention on the military's perceived failures and led to a major course change in January to switch the overall command in Ciudad Juarez from the military to the federal police. The military was not trained to patrol the streets or carry out law enforcement operations. It does not have the authority to collect and introduce evidence into the judicial system. The result: arrests skyrocketed, prosecutions remained flat, and both the military and public have become increasingly frustrated. The command change in Juarez has been seen by political classes and the public as a Presidential repudiation of SEDENA. When SEDENA joins you at the DBWG, it will be an agency smarting from the very public statement of a lack of confidence in its performance record in Juarez.
7. (C) Below the surface of military professionalism, there is also considerable tension between SEDENA and SEMAR. SEMAR succeeded in the take down of Arturo Beltran Leyva, as well as with other major targets. Aside from the perceived failure of its mission in Juarez, SEDENA has come to be seen slow and risk averse even where it should succeed: the mission to capture HVTs. The risk is that the more SEDENA is criticized, the more risk averse it will become. The challenge you face in the DBWG is to convince them that modernization and not withdrawal are the way forward, and that transparency and accountability are fundamental to modernization. There is no alternative in today's world of information technology.
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8. (C) The DBWG is just one mechanism for addressing the challenge of modernization. SEDENA's shortfalls are at times quite noticeable and serve for dramatic charges on human rights and other grounds. We have actively sought to encourage respect for the military's role in Mexican society and tread carefully with regard to the larger theme of military modernization. What SEDENA, and to a lesser extent SEMAR, need most is a comprehensive, interactive discussion that will encourage them to look holistically at culture, training and doctrine in a way that will support modernization and allow them to address a wider range of military missions. This is where the DBWG can help.
9. (C) Currently, the military is the lightening rod for criticism of the Calderon Administration's security policies. We are having some success in influencing the GOM to transition the military to secondary support functions in Juarez. Still, the GOM's capacity to replicate the Juarez model is limited. They simply lack the necessary numbers of trained federal police to deploy them in such numbers in more than a few cities. There are changes in the way that the military can interact with vetted municipal police, as we have seen in Tijuana, that produce better results. But in the near term, there is no escaping that the military will play a role in public security.
10. (C) Military surges that are not coordinated with local city officials and civilian law enforcement, particularly local prosecutors, have not worked. In Ciudad Juarez, a dramatic increase in troop deployments to the city early last year brought a two-month reduction in violence levels before narcotics-related violence spiked again. The DTOs are sophisticated players: they can wait out a military deployment; they have an almost unlimited human resource pool to draw from in the marginalized neighborhoods; and they can fan complaints about human rights violations to undermine any progress the military might make with hearts and minds.
11. (SBU) SEDENA lacks arrest authority and is incapable of processing information and evidence for use in judicial cases. It has taken a serious beating on human rights issues from international and domestic human rights organizations, who argue with considerable basis, in fact that the military is ill-equipped for a domestic policing role. While SEDENA has moved to address human rights criticisms, its efforts are mechanistic and wrapped in a message that often transmits defensiveness about bringing a hermetically sealed military culture into the twenty-first century. The military justice system (fuero militar) is used not only for a legitimate prosecutorial function, but also to preserve the military's institutional independence. Even the Mexican Supreme Court will not claim civilian jurisdiction over crimes involving the military, regardless of whether a military mission is involved. Fortunately, the Mexican military is under increasing pressure to change on a number of fronts. A recent Inter-American Human Rights Court ruling found Article 57 of Mexico's code of military justice, which effectively allows the military to keep all violators within its own justice system, violate Mexico's constitution and mandated improvements in the way cases involving alleged human rights abuses by the military are handled. A report issued by Amnesty International in December noted that complaints to the National Commission on Human Rights against the military increased from 367 in 2007 to over 2000 from 2008-June 2009.
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Change on the Horizon
---------------------------
12. (SBU) Calderon has undertaken serious reforms since coming to office, but he also must tread carefully in dealing with the Mexican military. With our help, he has refined his anti-crime strategy and made significant progress in a number of important areas, including inaugurating a new Federal Police command and intelligence center, establishing stronger vetting mechanisms for security officials, and constructing information-sharing databases to provide crime fighting data to various federal, state, and local elements. Calderon also has recognized that the blunt-force approach of major military deployments has not curbed violence in zones like Ciudad Juarez, and has replaced SEDENA forces with Federal Police officers as the lead security agency in urban Ciudad Juarez.
13. (C) These steps reflect the GOM's willingness to respond to public pressure and to focus on building strong, civilian law enforcement institutions that are necessary for sustained success against organized crime in Mexico. Indeed, Public Security Secretary Genaro Garcia Luna has sought to raise the standards of his Federal Police so it is capable of gradually replacing the military's role in public security through improved hiring, training, and vetting practices. With new authorities granted under federal police reform legislation passed last year, including a broadened wire-tapping mandate, the SSP is well-placed to significantly expand its investigative and intelligence-collection capabilities. The GOM is exploring new ways to bring local and state police up to standards to support the anti-crime fight. Federal judicial reform has been slower in coming, but the Attorney General's Office (PGR) is looking to modernize as an institution. For example, PGR created with USG assistance the Constanza Project (Justicia Para Todos), a $200 million dollar initiative designed to transform PGR's culture, in part by promoting transparency, training attorneys to build stronger cases, and digitizing files in order to incorporate a paperless system less susceptible to corruption.
14. (C) USG assistance has been crucial to these efforts, and we are looking ahead to ensure that we help Mexico build its most key institutions with seamless integration of operations, investigations, intelligence, prosecutions, and convictions. Joint assessment missions -- one to Tijuana and San Diego and one to Ciudad Juarez and El Paso - were designed to further guide our bilateral efforts and address one potential weakness -- the dysfunctionally low level of collaboration between Mexican military and civilian authorities along the border. The Tijuana assessment was completed December 3-4 and Ciudad Juarez's January 14-15. Mexico also has agreed to explore a task force model for joint intelligence and operations, and Mexico's intelligence civilian intelligence service, CISEN, has been charged with overseeing such efforts. We need to develop new programs to build a greater intelligence fusion capability, and continue to support the Federal Police's own institutional development and training capacity, and swifter implementation of judicial reform. Moreover, with many of our federal programs well underway, we are broadening our efforts to include work at the state level.
Military Modernization Key
-----------------------------------
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15. (S) In this context, it is absolutely necessary that we intensify our efforts to encourage modernization of the Mexican military. General Galvan Galvan, head of SEDENA, is an impressive military man with an appreciation for the uncomfortable, non-traditional challenges facing the Mexican military forces. But he is also a political actor who has succeeded, at least in part, by protecting the military's prerogatives and symbolic role. His experience provides him with little guidance on how to manage change and modernization against a backdrop of criticism and often vitrolic accusations. Historically, suspicion of the United States has been a prime driver of a military bureaucratic culture that has kept SEDENA closed to us. We believe Galvan is committed to at least following orders when it comes to Calderon's vision of a more modern Mexican state and a closer relationship with the United States. Our ties with the military have never been closer in terms of not only equipment transfers and training, but also the kinds of intelligence exchanges that are essential to making inroads against organized crime. Incipient steps towards logistical interoperability with U.S. forces are ongoing related to Haiti relief. SEDENA, for the first time and following SEMAR's lead, has asked for SOF training. We need to capitalize on these cracks in the door. Any retreat on engagement on our side will only reinforce SEDENA's instincts to revert to a closed and unaccountable institution.
16. (C) Our engagement on human rights in the DBWG must also be carefully structured. Presentations from the U.S. side on how human rights play into our conduct of military and security policy will be constructive. It will be useful to transmit to SEDENA the kinds of systemic human rights concerns that arise in Washington. But neither SEDENA nor SEMAR will engage in a dialogue on human rights in the DBWG. That will be reserved for the ad hoc meeting of the Bilateral Human Right Dialogue with Paul Stockton scheduled for Mexico City on February 12.
17. (C) SEDENA and SEMAR still have a long way to go toward modernization. The DBWG can go a long way in addressing a number of key points. We have seen some general officers, in Tijuana for example, who are looking for ways to build links between units in the field and local prosecutors, but this has not been done systematically. It needs to be encouraged. Encouraging the Mexican military to participate more actively in the international arena, such as through greater security cooperation outreach to Central America and Colombia, and even with limited participation in regional humanitarian ops to possibly peacekeeping, will also be key to helping the military transition from a mentality of "Protecting the Revolution" to a more active, dynamic, and flexible force. SEDENA and SEMAR share the parochial, risk-averse habits that often plague their civilian counterparts in Mexican law enforcement agencies. While the Navy's capture of Beltran Leyva may up the ante and encourage innovation by competition between security services, both SEDENA and SEMAR have serious work to do on working more effectively and efficiently with their security partners. FEELEY
Wednesday, 14 January 2009, 11:52
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000071
SIPDIS
KABUL FOR USFOR-A COS,
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR WILKES
CG CJTF-101 POLAD
EO 12958 DECL: 01/14/2014
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, KDEM, AF
SUBJECT: FRUSTRATIONS CONTINUE IN SANGIN DISTRICT
Classified By: PRT Director Valerie C. Fowler for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d)
Summary
--------
1. (SBU) The UK PRT/Task Force Helmand (TFH) transported Helmand Governor Mangal, several of his staff and members of the local media to the Sangin District for an extensive outreach program. January 5, 2009. The visit lasted six hours and included visits to the District Center, Sangin School, Sangin Bazaar and the under-construction industrial park. It was the Governor,s second trip to the city in three months. In practical terms the visit was a serious setback for the British PRT,s relationship with Governor Mangal as the lack of visible progress in Sangin is clearly frustrating Mangal.
Governor Mangal's Frustrations
-------------------------------
2. (U) The Governor has been pushing the PRT/TFH to expand the secure areas in and around the city but during the visit to Sangin he was only allowed about 200 meters beyond the FOB perimeter and was unable to walk through the bazaar. He had sent his security staff forward to work with the UK Stabilization officer in anticipation of having 500 people attend the event. However, a Taliban threat the previous night affected coordination for the event and only 100 local residents attended the Shura.
3. (SBU) Prior to departing Sangin, the Governor called a meeting with the UK leadership and US PRTOFF and expressed his displeasure with the situation and PRT/TFH efforts in Sangin. He said, "Stop calling it the Sangin District and start calling it the Sangin Base, all you have done here is built a military camp next to the city. I asked you people to do reconstruction and yet the District Governor remains in the FOB and how can you expect a city to recover if the Bazaar is not in the security zone." Mangal said he would direct the District Governor to establish a compound in the city and he wanted the PRT to deliver reconstruction, schools, clinics, and roads, with the bazaar being the heart of an economic zone, as it is in Garmsir.
4. (SBU) Also present during the day were the ANA commander and District Governor who leveled several charges that UK troops were searching compounds, walking on the roofs of homes and treating the local population badly -- including pointing weapons at people and going into areas where women were working. These comments were raised during the Shura and in early meetings the Governor had with the elders. In the public forum of the Shura, Mangal strongly defended the ISAF forces, work and called upon the local community to work with ISAF to defeat the Taliban. In the private meeting these comments from the local leadership inflamed an already tense situation, and caused Mangal to say that PRT coordination must be improved as well as the attitude toward the local population. PRT/TFH noted that there has been progress in many other areas of Helmand, and reminded the Governor that Musa Qala, Garmsir and Nad Ali operations all occurred since the UK had liberated Sangin and there have never been sufficient, ISAF or Afghan forces, to control the whole district.
PRT/TFH Frustrations
--------------------
5. (C) Following the visit, the PRT and Task Force leadership convened to review the day's events. It was clear from the discussion the UK is also frustrated with the situation in Sangin and all had hoped for greater progress by this point. UK leadership seems to be divided into two camps. The first wants to do no more in Sangin and move resources from the area into Gereshk and Garmsir where progress is possible and the population is more supportive; the military seems to favor this route. The second camp (the civilian approach) wants to simply hold what they have and wait for the U.S. to interject troops and funds they think will allow them to re-allocate forces and perhaps expand the Sangin Zone.
Comment
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6. (C) Enemy forces are still within 500-600 meters of the District Center and UK soldiers told DOS PRTOFF that at the edge of the city, "Cowboy Country begins." Any sizeable reduction in UK forces would almost certainly bring the District Center under regular indirect fire and further destabilize an already tenuous situation. The UK effort in Helmand is already in a "wait and see" mode, wildly speculating when and where U.S. troops will go, obsessed about CERP amounts, and doing nothing to correct the difficult situation already in Sangin.
7. (C) During the visit, Mangal made a strong reconciliation push to the assembled body, saying he was willing to meet with anyone and guarantee their safety if they wanted to discuss reconciliation. The message was clearly directed to the absent Alizai leadership, leaving the next move up to them. The offer was well received by the group and DOS PRTOFF believes that if Mangal can sustain his outreach efforts to Sangin, and deliver more reconstruction and development programs, he has a chance to bring in the fence sitters and undermine some of the Alizai support still reserved for Sher Mohammid Akunzda. WOOD
Tuesday, 09 December 2008, 03:21
S E C R E T KABUL 003176
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA FOR A/S BOUCHER AND PMOON
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/CDHA/DG
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR SECRETARY GATES, USDP EDELMAN AND WILKES
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82 AND POLAD
EO 12958 DECL: 12/08/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, AFIN
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DECEMBER 10-11, 2008 VISIT TO
AFGHANISTAN BY SECDEF ROBERT M. GATES
Classified By: Acting DCM Valerie C. Fowler for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) Embassy Kabul warmly welcomes your visit to Afghanistan. The overall state of the security situation here is more nuanced than the negative drumbeat coming from the media. Steady advances in success by Coalition and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) do not grab the headlines that a spectacular suicide attack does. Progress in development in support of a balanced COIN strategy continues below the radar screen. Those achievements, however, are hindered and ultimately threatened by poor performance on the governance front.
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The Fundamental Challenge of Governance
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2. (C) Karzai is at the center of the governance challenge. He has failed to overcome his fundamental leadership deficiencies in decisiveness and in confidence to delegate authority to competent subordinates. The result: a cycle of overwork/fatigue/indecision on the part of Karzai, and gridlock and a sense of drift among senior officials on nearly all critical policy decisions.
3. (C) Karzai struggles with striking the correct balance between institutional and traditional (i.e. tribal) governance. In fairness, there are no easy answers. He has given a notional nod to General McKiernan,s proposal to support formal agreements between Afghan authorities and district-level councils. The latter would be responsible for certain governance and security functions in their districts. This proposal is aimed at ensuring freedom of travel along the Ring Road, the lack of which undermines public confidence in the Afghan government and in the international community's efforts. Some questions remain on how to ensure district security arrangements do not create independent local militias.
4. (SBU) Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) Director Popal has earned and maintains Karzai,s backing to improve sub-national governance. Popal has launched the Afghan Social Outreach Program (ASOP), to form local councils (separate from McKiernan,s plan) to strengthen ties between sub-national institutional government and the tribes. We will be one of the largest donors to this new and ambitious plan, providing $6 million for ASOP in three provinces.
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Elections
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5. (C) Next year,s presidential and provincial council elections will be the defining event for 2009. Election factors already dominate nearly everything political here. Karzai,s popularity has fallen through the floor, but the absence of a credible opponent means it is still Karzai,s election to lose. Public ill ease over personal (not national) insecurity and disgust over unconstrained corruption are Karzai,s greatest vulnerabilities. He installed Hanif Atmar as Interior Minister to turn up the heat on both problems. Atmar is talented and may turn around perceptions, but after seven years of unmet expectations Afghans will be hard to convince.
6. (C) Politicians and the Kabul punditry are fascinated with the political jockeying between Parliament and the Independent Election Commission (IEC) over the election date. In the end, we expect all will agree to the IEC,s proposal for an August vote, based on security and logistical reasons.
7. (C) More problematic is the insecurity in the south and east, which is prompting some ) including Karzai, other Pashtuns and some RC-South partners ) to raise the specter of Pashtun disenfranchisement and the possible illegitimacy of the vote. It is much too early to judge the prospects of failure. We and Karzai agree the British are not up to the task of securing Helmand, but we also think the expected arrival of additional U.S. combat brigades this spring and summer, in tandem with the constant flow of newly-minted Afghan troops to the field will provide an adequately secure environment for the election.
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Taliban reconciliation
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8. (C) Karzai's senior-level Taliban reconciliation initiative is more about strengthening his political base and his relationship with the Saudis than anything else. "Negotiations" have been much less tangible in reality than is depicted in the press. The public is split: many welcome the promise (whether real or not) of reduced violence and instability via a possible reconciliation with the Taliban, while others (mainly non-Pashtuns, women, and certain civil society groups) fear a Karzai backroom deal that could harm their political interests or set back hard-fought human rights advances. We have advised Karzai to negotiate from a position of strength and to restate our shared &red lines.8
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Karzai and civilian casualties
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9. (C) Karzai's recent heated public statements about "bringing down NATO aircraft" and timelines for coalition withdrawal reflect both deep and heartfelt anger, as well as a certain amount of elections grandstanding. Civilian casualties anger him most. General McKiernan has directed substantial changes to coalition tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), but those cannot eliminate the possibility of civilian casualties, especially when the Taliban has clearly adopted "human shield" tactics. ISAF and the Embassy work increasingly more effectively with Afghan counterparts on improved post-incident response (to affected communities and the media), and investigations.
10. (C) Karzai hears of these efforts, but is not mollified. You can address his upset by acknowledging the problem and recognizing such mistakes hurt us all. In the months since the Shindand incident, and specifically as a response to civilian casualties, the Afghans have drafted a technical framework agreement on security measures, as a means to exert greater control over coalition operations. The Ambassador told Spanta that Washington cannot take this up until after the new Administration is in place, a point you should underscore with Karzai.
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Steps to Improve Security
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11. (C) The Coalition and Afghan security forces have increased our area of control and taken the fight to the Taliban, with increasing effectiveness. The Taliban response has been a forced shift in tactics from insurgency to terrorism to challenge the will of Afghans and the international community. Taliban acts of violence are highly visible and the immediate effect is that ordinary Afghans do feel less safe with random violence - particularly kidnappings - on the rise, and travel around the country more insecure. Atmar is countering, by looking to accelerate reform of the police. We are supporting him. The Focused District Development (FDD) program to retrain and equip the police is going well and will broaden to include the Border Police. Nonetheless, professionalizing the Afghan National Police (ANP) and reforming the Ministry of Interior are ongoing challenges. We also are working with the IDLG, NDS, and the Ministry of Defense to engage community support for security along the highways.
12. (C) Our greatest success on the security side is the advances in numbers and capabilities in the Afghan army. The army is the most trusted governmental entity, and is currently leading more than 60 percent of joint military operations. The International Community recently agreed to support the expansion of the army force structure to 134,000 (which includes a 12,000-troop trainee, transient, patient "float"). Army expansion will help meet future security requirements and take some of the pressure off of the police to conduct counterinsurgency operations. The principal challenge for both the army and police training program is a shortage of trainers, either from the U.S. or Allied nations. Karzai recognizes and is grateful for the central role of U.S. security assistance in developing the Afghan security forces. He will welcome reaffirmation of our support for eventual Afghan self-sufficiency and independence in the security and law enforcement fields; however, the army will continue to depend for some years on Coalition enablers such as close air support and intelligence assets.
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Survey of Security in Afghanistan by Region
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13. (SBU) RC-East remains focused on a balanced COIN approach synchronizing operations to protect the populace and push the insurgents out while pursuing mutually reinforcing efforts in development and governance assistance; the Embassy, USAID and CJTF-101 are coordinating more closely than ever USG efforts in RC-East. The Commanders, Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding is critical to delivering quick, effective assistance projects, which, in coordination with USAID and local officials, supports both locally identified needs and longer term development goals. In RC-South, the number and lethality of IED attacks is up dramatically; significantly, in some areas the number of IEDs reported by the public to ANSF or ISAF forces is also up, reflecting public support for the Government. The approximately 2300 Marines of the recently departed 24th MEU carried out successful operations in the Garmsir District in Helmand. The insertion of other U.S. forces into the South could have a positive impact on Karzai,s confidence and quiet concerns about whether the presidential election can be safely held.
14. (SBU) RC-West and RC-North remain relatively quiet, although RC-West has become less stable in the past few months. A rash of kidnappings in Herat, combined with a series of insurgent attacks, including at least one that upset public access to basic needs, had resulted in a widespread lack of confidence in local governance. The GIRoA apparently recognized the danger of leaving this key region that borders Iran (and will eventually be linked to Khaf, Iran by rail service) open to growing insurgent movements and the appeal of a parallel source of governance. MoI Minister Atmar has just sacked a number of senior security officials in Herat in response to this popular unrest.
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Afghan-Pak relations
-------------------------
15. (S) There,s been a sea change in bilateral ties since Musharraf,s exit. Karzai and Zardari have warm relations, which has spread to other parts of the bilateral civilian-side relationship. We also see promising signs of cooperation on the security side ) increased coordination and communication between the respective security forces along certain parts of the border, and a November meeting in Islamabad between NDS Director Saleh and ISI Director General Pasha. The two governments also convened a largely symbolic but positive &mini-jirga8 meeting in October. Continuing - though reduced - infiltration from the FATA and the recent Mumbai attacks have done little, however, to diminish Afghanistan,s ongoing distrust of the Pakistan Army and conviction that ISI is supporting rather than countering terrorism.
16. (U) We very much look forward to your visit.
DELL
Tuesday, 20 January 2009, 05:56
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000095
SIPDIS
STATE FOR P, SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, NEA/IR
EO 12958 DECL: 01/19/2029
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF, IR, RS, KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: CENTCOM CDR PETRAEUS MEETS PRESIDENT
NAZARVAYEV, JANUARY 14
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B), (D)
1. (S) SUMMARY: President Nazarbayev told CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus:
-- the situation in Afghanistan greatly worries him; the Taliban should never be allowed to become a coalition partner in the Afghan government;
-- Iran cannot be allowed to become a nuclear state, but the United States needs to talk directly with Tehran, and he is willing to be helpful;
-- Kazakhstan will never again be "colonized," but has excellent relations with Russia and China
-- the West has underestimated the depth of Russia's wounded pride, but he is willing to be helpful if the Obama administration has "a wise response" to Russia. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) U.S. Central Command Commander General David Petraeus met with Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev on January 14 for twice the scheduled time, 70 minutes. The U.S. side included Major General Robert Allardice (CENTCOM J5), POLAD Michael Gfoeller, and the Ambassador (note taker). Security Council Secretary Kaibek Suleymenov, Presidential Foreign Policy Adviser Khairat Sarybay, and Magzhan Ilyassov of the presidential administration accompanied President Nazarbayev.
AFGHANISTAN
3. (S) General Petraeus thanked President Nazarbayev for the recent formal ratification of the long-existing over-flight and divert agreements, as well as for Kazakhstan's willingness to participate in the Northern Distribution Network for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. He briefed the president on Iraq and Afghanistan. Nazarbayev responded, "Afghanistan greatly worries us. I am often in touch with (Afghanistan President Hamid) Karzai. He says the situation is good and the economy is growing; but I know he controls only 30% of his territory, and if the Afghan economy is growing, it's based on drugs. We are already providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, but we need better security in Afghanistan if we are to do more. The United States and Kazakhstan have a common interest in strengthening Afghanistan." Nazarbayev said he knows Karzai wants to involve the Taliban in his government and commented, "That would be greatly dangerous." General Petraeus explained that Karzai's position is more nuanced: the goal would be to break up the Taliban and reconcile some, "but we have no illusion that Mullah Omar could ever join the government." Nazarbayev replied, "If there's a chance to break up the Taliban, that's fine; but the Taliban leadership will never change its position."
4. (S) Nazarbayev told General Petraeus, "You're aware of Afghan history; no foreign country ever succeeded in invasion. Afghans have to govern themselves." Calling the situation in Afghanistan "very complicated," Nazarbayev said he knows some the potential candidates to succeed Karzai, but none of them could unify and lead Afghanistan. "Karzai is weak, but it's better to keep him on." Nazarbayev added he's heard Karzai claim the Taliban are trained in Pakistan and said he accepts that as credible. Nazarbayev added Central Asia needs a common policy on Afghanistan, "but that hasn't happened." He alluded to Uzbekistan's support for the ethnic Uzbek leader Dostum.
IRAN
5. (S) Nazarbayev judged that Iran is a problem in the region, and General Petraeus fully agreed. Nazarbayev said, "I have good contacts among the leadership in Iran. I've tried to explain to them that Kazakhstan was once nuclear but
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fully gave up that status. I tell them it would be to their benefit to be non-nuclear. That would draw new assistance and investment." General Petraeus said he again fully agreed with the president, but noted Iran's policy is determined by the Revolutional Guard al-Quds Force commander, not by President Ahmedinejad or the Foreign Ministry. Nazarbayev noted he had once talked to Ahmedinejad for two and a half hours about such issues, "but in the end I realized I had just wasted my time." He said Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameni told him that even if Iran compromises on the nuclear issue, the United States would always find another reason to criticize "because they hate us -- all the United States wants is to conquer the entire region and steal the oil." General Petraeus interjected, "We could have bought all the oil in the region for 100 years for what we've spent in Iraq!" Nazarbayev, looking a bit amused, said, "I know. I'm just telling you what he said." Without specifying his interlocutor, Nazarbayev said he'd asked if Tehran is willing to talk to the United States, "and they said yes. I conveyed this to President-elect Obama during our (post-U.S. election) phone call." General Petraeus commented the United States had had three rounds of talks with Iran about Iraq but had gotten nowhere. Nazarbayev said, "I have no illusion U.S. negotiations with Iran would be easy or fast, but we cannot let Iran have nuclear weapons. I want to be helpful with Iran."
6. (S) Nazarbayev added he has discussed Iran's nuclear ambitions with Russian President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin: "I emphasize to them a nuclear Iran is in no one's interests." General Petraeus responded that it's important to get Russia to be helpful with Iran: "They seem conflicted. Sometimes they help; sometimes they send weapons." Nazarbayev said, "I told Obama that he has a good chance to have good relations with Mevedev. That's important for us, too, since Russia and Kazakhstan are neighbors."
RUSSIA
7. (S) General Petraeus told President Nazarbayev Kazakhstan's special relationship with Russia is not a problem for the United States. "It's not a zero-sum game for us. You can have good relations with Russia and China as well as with us." Nazarbayev said he fully agreed, adding, "I tell Russia and China we have our own resources. We are Kazakhs. We were colonized for over 500 years, first by the Golden Horde, then by the western Chinese, then by Russia. We've been independent for only 17 years, and we do not want to be colonized again. We will never be 'under' Russia or China. We have enough resources and a reasonably educated population to make our own choices. We want stability, development, and cooperation. We all have to have Russia 'inside the tent.' I'd like the United States and the European Union to help with this."
8. (S) Nazarbayev said the West had made real mistakes after the collapse of the Soviet Union by not treating Yeltsin with respect. He said Yeltsin had once gone to the NATO-Russia Council where he had been "teased." Nazarbayev explained Russia has great, but now injured, pride. It was once a great empire, and Russian soldiers had played a large role in winning the Great Patriotic War (WW II), but the West seems to refuse to understand this. For Russia, maintained Nazarbayev, "face" is everything. Nazarbayev said he had frequently told President Medvedev that being an energy superpower is not enough; it's essential to develop international leadership with a spirit of cooperation. Nazarbayev said Medvedev was "almost there," but then the "Georgia mistake happened." Nazarbayev concluded, "If the new U.S. administration has a wise response to Russia, I'd be glad to help" with the relationship.
9. (S) NOTE: While waiting for Nazarbayev to enter the meeting room, General Petraeus ask Foreign Policy Adviser Sarybay why Kazakhstan had moved its capital from Almaty to
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Astana. Sarybay answered, "There are probably 20 different reasons people give. In fact, in the first few years of independence, several maps appeared that made our northern border unclear, and so the President 'planted the flag.'" This is the first time we are aware that a senior official has confirmed Nazarbayev moved his capital to prevent Russian nationalists from annexing the northern third of Kazakhstan, which hotheads, including some in the Duma at that time, claimed was historically part of Russia. END NOTE.
10. (S) COMMENT: Nazarbayev looked as fit as ever and was very well-briefed, discussing details of the U.S.-Kazakhstan military relationship without notes. He was not shy that he sees himself as an international statesman. We know he was genuinely pleased with President-elect Obama's telephone call, and we judge his offers to be helpful for the United States with Iran and Russia are genuine. END COMMENT.
11. (U) General Petraeus has cleared this cable. HOAGLAND
Wednesday, 03 February 2010, 13:58
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000436
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/02/2020
TAGS PREL, IR, AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN'S OUTLOOK ON IRAN: A KARZAI INSIDER'S
VIEW
KABUL 00000436 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: D/Ambassador Ricciardone; Reasons (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary: President Karzai's Chief of Staff and former Ambassador to Iran, Omar Daudzai, offered the Palace's outlook on Iran's role in Afghanistan. Daudzai suggested that Karzai could provide "an open door" for the United States to engage Iran, at such time as the U.S. may judge this useful. Daudzai had found in Iran that paradoxically, the Iranian people hate foreigners, except for Americans; but that the Iranian revolution survives on its animosity towards the United States. He said that the Iranians no longer deny their support for the Taliban. While there is room for "indirect" U.S.-Afghan cooperation on Afghanistan, Daudzai cautioned that at best the Iranians would only "tolerate" our presence in Afghanistan. End Summary.
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We Can Help Open the Door to Iran
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2. (S) At a meeting within the GIRoA with COS Daudzai, D/Amb. Ricciardone asked for Afghanistan's outlook on the anti-coalition Jundullah organization (Septel), and Karzai's and Daudzai's assessments of Afghanistan's interests with Iran. Daudzai confirmed February 2, that only he and President Karzai had any substantial political engagement with the Iranian government. Karzai does pay close attention to Iran, Daudzai said, and he suggested that Karzai could help "open a door" for the United States to engage Iran "perhaps after Ahmadinejad leaves the scene," or at any time the USG may judge useful. He explained that Karzai had maintained excellent relations with Iran and Khatami personally, and that Karzai had obtained the former Iranian president's support for Daudzai's appointment as Afghan Ambassador to Tehran. Relations had become more complicated with Ahmadinejad's election. Daudzai went on to serve about a year and a half in Tehran, from 2004-2005.
3. (S) D/Amb. Ricciardone posited that, while President Obama and Secretary Clinton had made clear the United States' willingness to discuss our differences with the Iranians, Iran evidently is not ready to engage with us. Even though we believe that many Iranians desire more normal relations with the United States, the Iranian government appears out of touch with its people, in particular an increasingly angry middle class.
4. (S) Daudzai related that after the first and only time he was "summoned to the MFA" for a complaint on alleged GIRoA support for Jundullah (Septel), and his categorical denial later proved true, he developed excellent relations with Iranian officials. Nonetheless, living in Tehran had been "challenging". At first, Iranian intelligence shadowed Daudzai's every move; after he told the Iranians that he was annoyed that he was being followed, the Iranians became more subtle in their approach. He was astonished that while there were no Sunni mosques in Tehran, an estimated 30 to 40 percent of its population was Sunni (combining Iranian and Afghan Sunnis residing there). He established an informal mosque in the basement of the Afghan Embassy, an act that drew much appreciation from the Sunni population.
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Iranian People Dislike Foreigners, Except Americans
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5. (S) Reflecting on his time in Tehran, Daudzai said he had reached two main conclusions: 1) "Common" Iranians hate foreigners, except for Americans, whom they "miss". To illustrate, he said that even his wife's doctor told her, "Please tell the Americans to bring their soldiers to our country next." 2) paradoxically, the Iranian revolution lives on its animosity towards the United States. If this animosity ends, then the revolution will end. The national leadership knows this and thus do all they can to sustain "the revolution." While Daudzai did not foresee that the Iranian revolution would end under Ahmadinejad's tenure, he predicted that Ahmadinejad's influence over the remainder of his term would wane. Therefore, he said, it was opportune to now start "preparing the ground" for U.S. relations with Iran under a better leader who would replace Ahmadinejad even though the Supreme Leader really "calls the shots." Daudzai said that Iran's "real" Foreign Minister is not Motaki, but rather Ali Akbar Velayati, who reports to the Supreme Leader.
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The Two Sides of Iranian Influence in Afghanistan
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6. (S) Daudzai said Iran's influence in Afghanistan, like
KABUL 00000436 002.2 OF 002
Pakistan's, has been both helpful and hurtful. (Last year, Daudzai had acknowledged that Iran paid limited amounts of money to the Palace only episodically and unpredictably. He contrasted this with sustained U.S. financial support to Afghanistan with far more than the Iranians' occasional cash payment.) Iran and Pakistan each had supported their own favored Afghan Mujahedin groups against the Soviets, largely along religious affiliations. Likewise, in the current conflict, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia were each supporting their "preferred" Taliban groups. This time, however, Iran's support was driven by "a war of objectives" not religious sympathies: Iran would even support Sunni Taliban to counter Western influence in Afghanistan, so long as the Taliban factions they supported were not affiliated with Mullah Omar.
7. (S) Daudzai said that two years ago when he raised with the Iranians their support for Afghan Taliban, they had flatly denied any involvement. However, over the past half year, the Iranians, including their Ambassador in Kabul, no longer deny this assertion -- now they remain silent, he said. Daudzai attributed the Iranian change in posture to their awareness that the GIRoA has evidence of Iranian support for some Taliban elements.
8. (S) Daudzai said that on occasion, young Afghan males are allowed to cross into Iran, where they are recruited and trained before returning to Afghanistan to fight against the GIRoA and Coalition Forces. The Iranians also recruit Afghan university students and graduates. Daudzai said that approximately 7,000 Afghans hold Iranian university degrees, including three of President Karzai's cabinet picks, who "fortunately" Parliament did not confirm. He claimed that Iran is also offering three-year visas to Afghans who deposit USD 100,000 in an Iranian bank account.
9. (S) According to Daudzai, Iran grooms thousands of Afghan religious scholars. After completing their education in Iran, they return to Afghanistan to work in Madrassas, where they continue to receive "support packages" from Iran. The support package included a monthly salary. Daudzai claimed that a man named Ibrahim directed this program from the Supreme Leader's office. He also asserted that in addition to financing Afghan religious leaders, Iran had provided salary support for some GIRoA deputy ministers and other officials, including "one or two even in the Palace." Daudzai claimed that some of these officials had been relieved of their duties because "you can't be an honest Afghan if you receive a (Iran) package."
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U.S.-Iranian Convergence of Interests is Complicated
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10. (S) Daudzai opined that there could be room for indirect, but not direct, cooperation between Iran and the U.S. regarding Afghanistan. Iran at best would "tolerate" the U.S. participation in an area of common interest here, he said. He would reflect further on the subject and would look forward to continuing the conversation. Eikenberry
Thursday, 06 August 2009, 05:28
S E C R E T KABUL 002246
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/A, INL, EUR/PRM, INR, OSD FOR
FLOURNOY, CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICENT KABUL FOR
COS USFOR-A
EO 12958 DECL: 08/01/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, AF
SUBJECT: COMPLAINTS TO GIROA ON PRE-TRIAL RELEASES AND
PARDONS OF NARCO-TRAFFICKERS
REF: REFTEL KABUL 02245
Classified By: DEPUTY AMBASSADOR FRANCIS J. RICCIARDONE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (S) SUMMARY: On numerous occasions we have emphasized with Attorney General Aloko the need to end interventions by him and President Karzai, who both authorize the release of detainees pre-trial and allow dangerous individuals to go free or re-enter the battlefield without ever facing an Afghan court. On July 29th, Legal Adviser Harold Hongju Koh and Deputy Ambassador Frances Ricciardone demarched Attorney General Muhammad Ishaq Aloko about our concern over pre-trial releases and presidential pardons of narco-traffickers (Reftel Kabul 02245) In Spring 2008, Post had previous demarched National Security Advisor Rassoul about our concern over pre-trial releases. Despite our complaints and expressions of concern to the GIRoA, pre-trial releases continue. END SUMMARY
2. (S) Transfers from Bagram Theatre Internment Facility (BTIF) to the Afghan National Detention Facility (ANDF) began in Spring 2007. During that year, there was only one pre-trial release. In 2008, there were 104 pre-trial releases, almost all of which took place after President Karzai formed the Aloko Detainee Commission in April 2008. From January to March of 2009, there were 12 pre-trial releases; and 23 pre-trial releases between April and June 2009. So far in July 2009, there have been 10 pre-trial releases.
3. (S) An August 2005 exchange of diplomatic notes between the USG and the GIRoA provides the legal basis for the GIRoA,s detention and prosecution of detainees transferred into Afghan custody. Even though a multi-agency GIRoA delegation under the Aloko Detainee Commission screens all BTIF detainees who are transferred to the ANDF and assures the USG that these detainees will be prosecuted in an Afghan court, there have been 150 detainees released from the ANDF without trial since 2007, including 29 former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) detainees. The total number of transfers to date from BTIF to ANDF is 629 detainees, plus 41 from GTMO.
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PROTECTION OF NARCOTRAFFICKERS
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4. (SBU) In April, President Karzai pardoned five border policemen who were caught with 124 kilograms of heroin in their border police vehicle. The policemen, who have come to be known as the Zahir Five,, were tried, convicted and sentenced to terms of 16 to 18 years each at the Central Narcotics Tribunal. But President Karzai pardoned all five of them on the grounds that they were distantly related to two individuals who had been martyred during the civil war.
5. (S) Separately, President Karzai tampered with the narcotics case of Haji Amanullah, whose father is a wealthy businessman and one of his supporters. Without any constitutional authority, Karzai ordered the police to conduct a second investigation which resulted in the conclusion that the defendant had been framed. Daudzai told DAMB he was ashamed,, of the president for his interference in this case and the case of the Zahir Five.
6. (S) In another case, a CJTF investigation concluded that 26 kilograms of heroin seized from a vehicle search belonged to Col. Jaweed, Chief of the Highway Police for Badakshan Province. Jaweed is the nephew of a powerful member of Parliament. Eventually, he was arrested and is currently serving in Pol-i-Charkhi prison. But, there is credible, but unconfirmed, intelligence indicating that President Karzai has signed a letter pardoning Jaweed that has not yet been delivered to the Supreme Court. Daudzai denied any significant pressure in this case.
7. (S) Unconfirmed intelligence also indicates that President Karzai is planning to release drug trafficker Ismal Safed, who is serving a 19-year sentence in Pol-i-Charkhi. Safed is a priority DEA target who was arrested in 2005 in possession of large quantities of heroin and a cache of weapons. In 2008, DEA conducted an operation in which an undercover officer purchased approximately three kilograms of heroin directly from Safed. Daudzai told the Deputy Ambassador that President Karzai will not pardon Safed, and that Post,s concerns about this case will reaffirm President Karzai,s decision not to interfere. EIKENBERRY
Tuesday, 23 February 2010, 13:05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000672
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD
EO 12958 DECL: 02/23/2020
TAGS PGOV, KDEM, KCOR, PREL, MOPS, CAN, AF, PK
SUBJECT: ELECTIONS, KANDAHAR AND KARZAI
Classified By: Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (C) Begin Summary. In a frank discussion, Canadian Ambassador Crosbie explained to Ambassador Eikenberry that getting the electoral process right is a bottom-line position for Canada, and said we must be prepared for confrontation with Karzai on this issue, or risk losing credibility among our own population if we go along with a rigged election. While accepting the need to seek electoral reform Ambassador Eikenberry cautioned that despite private statements, Afghans will not support a dominant international role, and that if we dig ourselves deeper into Afghan politics, we'll entrench ourselves deeper into the country with fewer options. They also agreed that it would make sense to restructure the reporting relationship of the Kandahar PRT to have it report directly to Regional Command-South rather than the Canadian-led Task Force Kandahar to ensure coherence and integration of all civilians in Kandahar. They agreed that the jury is still out on whether current coalition efforts in the South will work, but if Karzai becomes more confident and the government has the space to focus on sustainable national governance, there will be progress. End Summary.
Electoral Reform
----------------
2. (C) Ambassador Eikenberry and Canadian Ambassador Bill Crosbie shared a frank exchange of views during a breakfast meeting at the U.S. Embassy on February 20. Ambassador Crosbie said that Canada is very concerned about the electoral reform process. He said they had not seen the copy of the final decree submitted to the Parliament on electoral reforms. Ambassador Eikenberry explained the key issues: conflicting Constitutional process issues (no action allowed the year of an election but requirement to act on emergency decrees within 30 days); the lack of a specific mention of an ISAF or coalition role in the vetting process; and the proposed formula of two of five ECC members being internationals appointed by UNAMA (either South African judge, Bangladeshi expert or Palestinian expert are the likely choices).
3. (C) Ambassador Crosbie told the Ambassador that getting this right is a bottom line issue for the Canadians. He was emotional, saying the issue "makes my blood boil," as he described the Canadian view that the international community must stand up for the silent majority or be blamed for letting Karzai and his family establish across the country the system of patronage and control that exists in Kandahar. We must be prepared for confrontation with Karzai on this issue, he said, or risk losing credibility among our own population if we go along with a rigged election. He argued that a new generation of Afghans is working to run for Parliament and they are watching to see if the electoral changes will happen. "We can't be seen to collude with it," he said. He argued that we need to give the Afghans looking to make a difference space to speak out and be able to turn the course of their country.
4. (C) Ambassador Eikenberry questioned Canada's assessment, noting that Afghans will not stand up publicly to support a dominant international role in their election process, regardless of what might be said privately. The reality, he said, is that leaders like Abdullah and Mirwais Yasini are not interested in reform but rather their own political interests and alliances in Parliament. He cautioned that if we dig ourselves deeper into Afghan politics, we'll entrench ourselves deeper into the country with fewer options. We need to focus on what is "good enough" while still supporting key institutions.
5. (C) Crosbie conceded these points, but said we cannot go backwards in terms of the last election. Ambassador Eikenberry agreed, noting that having less Coalition/international ownership of the election is also a measure of progress. We need to focus, he said, on strategic options rather than being mired in Afghan politics. For example, increasing the competence and level of the ANA and ANP are clear priorities, and we must avoid losing the coming spring and summer mired in election reform issues. Ambassador Crosbie did not dispute this, but said that for Canada a red-line has to be ensuring improvements over the last election.
Kandahar
--------
6. (C) Crosbie said we need to have a discussion in Kabul to complement work in Kandahar by the Canadians, the NATO ISAF
KABUL 00000672 002 OF 003
RC-South Commander, and the Senior Civilian Representative for the South. He said we need to get discussion organized for addressing power brokers (Note: A discussion was started during a meeting held at the Canadian Embassy two weeks ago attended by Ambassador Wayne, the UK, Netherlands, Australia, and the NATO ISAF IJC. End Note.). The strategy, he said, must address how we manage malign actors and improve the management of contracts.
7. (C) They also discussed the proposals to realign the reporting structures of the Canadian-led PRT in Kandahar. Crosbie said that Canada is willing to be integrated into a new organization and won't stand on form. He agreed with the objective to bring coherence and integration of all civilians in Kandahar. While he has not talked yet to Ottawa about these issues, he believes that the following changes will be acceptable: 1) Canada will continue to lead the PRT, with the U.S. serving in the Deputy role (co-leads don't work, he said); 2) the PRT will report to RC-South as opposed to Task Force Kandahar; 3) civilians will report up the civilian chain, which they view at the RC-South level as the U.S. Senior Civilian Representative Frank Ruggiero -- he proposed dual-hatting Ruggiero to be both a U.S. and ISAF SCR; 4) the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) and the PRT head should be me Ambassador to Argentina will be the next senior Canadian and will be based at the PRT; and 5) Canada will place more civilians at the PRT to enhance integration, but he understands that the U.S. will lead the effort in certain areas/districts where U.S. resources are focused.
8. (C) Ambassador Eikenberry said he too was flexible on how to reorganize and believed that we have reasonable structures in the South and East. He also strongly endorsed the concept of RC-West and RC-North adopting the same model. While we're putting a lot of resources in the South and East, he said, the system needs to work regardless of whether there is an American flag. It's a mistake for NATO to see the Afghan issues only through the prism of the military; the SCR structures need to be enhanced. Ideally, the Spanish and Italians would create a regional SCR in the West, and the Scandinavians and Germans would create one in the North. He also encouraged Crosbie to consider placing Canadian civilians at Regional Platform-South. SCR Ruggiero would mix them into his staff, he said, which would ensure greater coordination. Crosbie promised to review this and thought it probably made sense. He also noted that additional Canadians will go to Kandahar in March to support the civ-mil planning activity underway for governance and development in the wake of the upcoming military operations in Kandahar.
Strategy in the South and Impact on Overall Effort
--------------------------------------------- -----
9. (C) Crosbie said that Canada is comfortable with the overall strategy in Kandahar, which envisions additional pressure and activity in Kandahar in April-May. He said the police mentoring by U.S. Army Military Police and Canadian police, who live and work with the ANP in their district police stations, has proved effective. This effort is contributing to the sense of Afghan authority expanding in the city, he said, although he noted that it is proving difficult in Dand district where there are continued IEDs and security issues. Still, there's a sense we're on the right path, he said.
10. (C) Ambassador Eikenberry noted that the efforts in Helmand and the troop surge generally are intended to reverse the malaise and enhance the confidence of the Afghan leaders. He recounted a recent meeting with Abdullah Abdullah in which he described his perceptions of better security from a year ago. The operation in Helmand, Abdullah said, is not yet getting the national effects but it could when the ANA and ANP officers return to their homes and share accounts of their operations. Similarly, Abdullah said that the security in Kunduz is much better than six months ago. The jury is still out on whether current coalition efforts will work, but if Karzai becomes more confident and the government has the space to focus on sustainable national governance, there will be progress. A key problem, though, is the limited human capacity in most ministries and at the provincial and district level, Ambassador Eikenberry said. He noted the Embassy is working on a cable to better outline the limits of Afghan (and even U.S.) capacity to accomplish the strategies we have laid out. For example, the Minister of Agriculture is really only about one-two staff deep and he relies heavily on foreign advisors.
11. (C) Crosbie agreed, citing the example of ANP literacy.
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We're never going to make them literate but can make them "literate enough." He cited two examples of progress: 1) in Kandahar, some police are starting to at least be able to read license plates when investigating cases; and 2) in a recent customs officer training, the officers at least acknowledged corruption exists and that it's wrong, which he said is not the case in many third world countries. Crosbie said that we'll win when the Afghans have confidence they can run this country, but we can't get too dug into supporting Karzai; it's critical we build support for others. Crosbie said he has a sinking feeling whether Karzai is actually in control, or whether it's his brothers and other advisers who are running him.
12. (C) Ambassador Eikenberry agreed and said that while we support efforts to press him to be a more visible Commander and Chief and push him to get outside of the Palace, we need to avoid self-delusion that he is really stepping up to lead the country and embrace mutual strategic goals until he clearly does so of his own volition. As the meeting ended, Crosbie mentioned the former ANA senior command and former Kandahar Governor General Raufi (Note: He served as Governor from August 2008 - December 2008 before being sacked reportedly for taking on Karzai's half brother and Kandahar powerbroker Ahmed Wali Karzai (AWK)) and noted that he would be a good person to use in a position of interest. Ambassador Eikenberry said he knew him and agreed he could contribute in a positive way. RICCIARDONE
Saturday, 10 November 2007, 06:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003800
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT,
EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR USDP EDELMAN AND DASD SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD
EO 12958 DECL: 11/08/2017
TAGS PREL, MARR, SNAR, PGOV, AF
SUBJECT: USDP EDELMAN NOV 7 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KARZAI:
IRAN, COUNTERNARCOTICS, MUSA QALA AND PAKISTAN
Classified By: Ambassador William Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: In his November 7 office call on President Karzai, USDP Edelman expressed condolences for the victims of the November 6 bombing in Baghlan Province and highlighted the opportunity presented by this heinous act to reinforce Afghan national unity and action against the Taliban. Karzai welcomed FBI assistance in investigating the Baghlan bombing. Edelman urged that the IRoA act in concert with the U.S. to end Iranian lethal support to the Taliban before it reaches the same levels as in Iraq. Karzai agreed that Iran has to be confronted, adding without elaboration that we need to do so "effectively." In response to Edelman noting intense Congressional interest in the counternarcotics situation, Karzai said Helmand Province (which produces 50 percent of Afghanistan's opium) must be liberated before poppy production can be addressed, and he added that the people there are tired of Taliban control and want to be liberated. He did not dismiss the need for ISAF to use air power "at the risk of politically difficult civilian casualties" to get the job done. On Pakistan, Karzai expressed the hope that Musharraf,s extra-constitutional approach will work, but it was not clear to Karzai that Musharraf is ready to follow through in the short term on elections and a deal with Benizir Bhutto. Karzai welcomed the prospect of a visit by SecDef Gates before the end of the year. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) USDP Edelman, accompanied by Ambassador Wood, called on President Karzai on November 7. Karzai was accompanied by Defense Minister Wardak, National Security Advisor Rassoul, and two staff. Edelman and Wood were accompanied by DASD Shivers, Deputy Commander of the Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) BG George, two OSD staffers and an Embassy notetaker.
Baghlan Bombing: FBI Assistance Welcomed
-----------------------------------------
3. (C) Edelman opened by expressing his deepest condolences for the victims of the November 6 bomb attack in Baghlan Province that killed six parliamentarians and up to 40 other victims, including as many as 15 children. (NOTE: An authoritative assessment of casualties was not available at the time of the meeting.) Clearly shaken by the tragedy, Karzai described it as a terrible and sad event and noted that the basic facts of the attack were still under investigation. He recalled briefly the names and his personal association with most of the six murdered parliamentarians and expressed concern for the security of a parliamentarian still hospitalized. In response to Edelman,s question, Karzai affirmed his conviction that if initial reports that this was a suicide attack are confirmed, it was definitely the work of the Taliban, which had carried out many other such attacks, e.g., in Kandahar.
4. (C) Later in the conversation, Karzai said he wanted the U.S. to help out with the investigation, and he welcomed Ambassador Wood,s offer to request FBI assistance with the investigation of the bombing. Karzai offered to include U.S. personnel in the IRoA delegation being dispatched to investigate the attack site, led by Interior Minister Zarar and including Parliamentary security representatives and the National Directorate for Security (NDS).
An Opportunity for National Unity and Decisive Action
--------------------------------------------- --------
5. (C) Edelman observed that the Baghlan bombing also presented an opportunity to stress national unity and rejection of terrorism. Wood added that this is an opportunity to bring the Afghan people together not only to
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mourn the victims but also to affirm a confident outlook for the future. In spite of Karzai,s difficult relations with Parliamentary Speaker and political rival Qanooni, Wood pointed out that Qanooni is making unifying statements, e.g., supportive of IRoA security measures for the Parliamentary delegation visiting Baghlan; he is not using the occasion to seek to divide the nation for personal political gain. Karzai and Qanooni should join in bringing the nation together and use this as a basis for renewed, decisive action to counter the insurgency and take the hard decisions needed to advance good governance goals.
Iran
-----
6. (C) In this regard, Edelman noted the military situation in Farah Province and asked Karzai whether there might be an Iranian hand behind recent Taliban attacks. Edelman recalled maps of the myriad smuggling routes from Iran into Afghanistan and reports of Taliban recruits training at sites in Iran, although there was no concrete evidence of direct Iranian involvement. He added that ISAF Commander GEN McNeill will want to respond, and he will be seeking to work with Karzai on an effective military strategy.
7. (C) Karzai agreed that Iran is "busy." It is seeking to undermine the U.S. in Afghanistan, and it is trying to undermine development and reconstruction in western Afghanistan. Karzai asserted that Iran is bothered that Afghanistan is becoming an important transit hub for the region, and it wants to forestall Pakistani and Indian natural gas imports from Central Asia in order to protect its own market.
8. (C) Edelman asked how best to deal with Iran. The explosively-formed projectile weapons (EFPs) intercepted by British troops are worrying; even small numbers, if effectively employed against a small Ally such as the Dutch, could have a strategic effect. EFPs have been a major cause of U.S. casualties in Iraq. Reports of MANPADS coming out of Iran are also of concern. Recalling his conversation with Karzai in March on Iran, Edelman said Iranian meddling is getting increasingly lethal. He appreciated this was a complicated issue and that Afghanistan wants to avoid a two-front war, but Iranian actions, if not checked, will result in a two-front war in any event. We need to work together to put the Iranians back on their heels, adding that the USG is implementing new financial sanctions on the IRCG Quds Force. Iranian lethal assistance to the Taliban must be stopped before it reaches the levels of similar assistance to insurgents in Iraq; Edelman underscored that we need to make clear that Iranian support for the Taliban is equally dangerous to Tehran and Afghanistan.
9. (C) Karzai agreed that Iran has to be confronted, adding without elaboration that we need to do so "effectively." They are supporting those who are killing Afghan and U.S. personnel, so we cannot keep quiet, he said. Edelman agreed that pressure is what the Iranians understand. The British and French are with us; we need to bring the Germans along. Without going into detail, Karzai said he discussed Iran with Chancellor Merkel when she visited Afghanistan last week.
Governance and Counternarcotics
-------------------------------
10. (C) Edelman said the perception in Washington is that Afghan and ISAF forces have had tactical successes in disrupting the Taliban, and Congress has appropriated significant new funding to sustain the train-and-equip programs for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. He noted that Congressional committees plan to hold hearings in the near future on Afghanistan and will be asking
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what the IRoA and USG are doing to take advantage of the tactical successes to advance police training and reform, extend governance to the provincial and local levels, create economic opportunity and counter the narcotics trade. Interest in counternarcotics action will become particularly acute in the wake of the UN report on record poppy crops during the last growing season.
Musa Qala and Airpower
----------------------
11. (C) Karzai responded by highlighting public frustration in parts of Helmand Province with Taliban control. He recounted a recent phone call he received from a tribal chief in Helmand urging that Afghan and ISAF forces launch an attack on the Musa Qala District center. Karzai said there are 300 shops that sell opium paste and 65 heroin labs in Musa Qala. He added that the people are sick and tired of the situation and want to be liberated. Karzai said that Helmand must be liberated in order to stop poppy production. In response to Edleman,s observations about recent polling results showing significant public opinion against poppy cultivation and trafficking, Karzai said the Afghan people want a better, honest government, and they support the international community,s presence in Afghanistan. The point, he added, is to use this opportunity properly. The more we can bring security to the people and force the Taliban out, the better.
12. (C) Wood noted that GEN McNeill is developing a plan for Musa Qala, but it will likely require air power, which in the past has created political issues due to unintended civilian casualties. Karzai agreed that the plan would have to be discussed, but he reiterated that the people in Musa Qala are fed up, and we need to act.
Pakistan
--------
13. (C) Karzai emphasized that the issue of Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan has to be solved, noting with dismay that the Taliban flag has been raised in three districts in the FATA. He observed that while Afghanistan has a national identity and a weak state, Pakistan has a strong state with no coherent national identity. Noting that he had discussed Pakistan in his November 7 telephone call with President Bush, Karzai expressed the hope that Musharraf's imposition of extra-constitutional rule will work; Musharraf must be sincere because he has no further room for "more games."
14. (C) Edelman noted that U.S.-Pakistan Defense Consultative Group (DCG) talks were postponed to underscore U.S. dissatisfaction with the imposition of the Provisional Constitution Order; it was also not clear that our Pakistani interlocutors would be able to focus on the DCG agenda, given the current political turmoil. The USG and Afghanistan share an interest in Pakistani authorities moving against terrorist sanctuaries and the Taliban,s Quetta Shura; arresting lawyers will not help in this regard. We are urging Musharraf to focus on keeping to the election schedule, completing the deal with Bhutto, and taking off his uniform. Although there are special interests that are seeking to extend the period for martial law, it must be kept short. If not, Musharraf's interests and those of the Pakistani Army may begin to diverge. Karzai agreed the situation is complicated. Musharraf recognizes that if/when Bhutto takes power, he will be out, and he may not be ready yet to take that step.
Possible Gates Visit
--------------------
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15. (C) Edelman conveyed the warm regards of SecDef Gates and said the SecDef hopes to visit Afghanistan before the end of the year. Karzai welcomed the prospect of his visit. WOOD
Friday, 26 February 2010, 11:38
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000699
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/25/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: PRESSING KARZAI FOR ELECTORAL REFORM
REF: A. KABUL 645 B. KABUL 692
Classified By: Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary: Ambassador Eikenberry and Deputy Ambassador Ricciardone demarched President Karzai and his inner circle on the problems of the final version of the electoral decree February 24-25, stressing the need for an independent Electoral Complaints Commission with international commissioners, protection of the vetting process, and change in Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) leadership. They cautioned that a successful U.S. visit hangs in the balance. End Summary.
--------------------------------------------- ----------
To the Advisors: Protect Democracy and the Relationship
--------------------------------------------- ----------
2. (S) On February 24, Deputy Ambassador Ricciardone separately called on Presidential Chief of Staff Omer Daudzai, Education Minister (recently named as the Peace Jirga coordinator) Farouk Wardak and Agriculture Minister Rahimi. Ricciardone made the following points with each:
-- the election issue is a potential spoiler to a successful U.S. trip - and fixing it should be an urgent priority. Worse, it threatens to turn 2010 back into 2009 - derailing the strategic course agreed on and established from Karzai's inauguration through the London conference. -- for elections to be credible the ECC and IEC cannot be seen to be in the pocket of the President. -- what matters now is how Karzai acts on the IEC, ECC and candidate vetting process.
He left a non-paper (para 15) with Daudzai and Wardak, who promised to raise this issue "the Afghan way."
3. (S) Daudzai made excuses for having "missed the import of the decree," which we had raised with him prospectively on February 8. He said it had been discussed in the Cabinet but gotten changed before its final presentation. He had spoken to Karzai-supporting Parliamentarians who were concerned about it and had told them to make their concerns public so the President understands. Ricciardone noted Parliament is confused over its right to review the decree, and this adds to our concerns about undue expansion of the President's powers. Daudzai said he would add further Palace signals to Parliamentary leadership that they are empowered to review the decree. Ricciardone reiterated that this issue could undermine the prospective Karzai trip to the U.S. by compelling Karzai to explain and defend his actions at every turn, rather than focusing on the strategic opportunities and challenges ahead of us in 2010. Karzai must act in the next week or so (on the items cited above) in order to remove U.S. and Afghan concerns over the meaning of the decree. Daudzai alluded elliptically to his dinner meeting the previous evening with Minister of Interior Atmar and other supporters of the President who shared "serious concerns" about Karzai's actions.
4. (S) Minister of Education Wardak agreed that the decree gives Karzai's critics the evidence they want that he is not committed to democracy, and that it posed a serious problem in Karzai's standing abroad as well as at home. Ricciardone noted that Afghan democracy would look different from other versions but that the foundation has to be based on credible institutions. He reiterated the need for changes at the IEC, a "genuinely independent" ECC, and a vetting process which can ensure no unreconstructed Taliban are eligible for office. Wardak agreed with these points and claimed that our "inseparable partnership" would be greatly served by a good U.S. visit. He promised to go directly to the President and to press Karzai to withdraw the decree in its entirety, and "improve it" before it is resubmitted. Frankly, Wardak said, this behavior was comparable to the power-grabs of the mujahedin in 1991-1992 - and he and Zakhilwal had already protested against it.
5. (S) On February 25, Ambassador Eikenberry called on Minister of Finance Omer Zakhilwal who told him that he could "almost guarantee" that he could persuade Karzai to act as we had urged regarding the ECC, candidate vetting, and Ludin,s replacement. He affirmed that the Ambassador was pursuing this agenda in the best way, by approaching Karzai clearly but respectfully and then allowing his inner circle of Ministers to prod him in the right direction. Zakhilwal noted that he was then meeting with Parliamentarians on the issue of the Presidential decree and that he was building support and a case for the points that Eikenberry had raised.
6. (S) Apparently echoing Daudzai, Zakhilwal went on to speak
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candidly about Karzai, saying that he was an "extremely weak man" who did not listen to facts but was instead easily swayed by anyone who came to him to report even the most bizarre stories of plots against him. Whenever this happened, Karzai would immediately judge the person to be loyal and would reward him. He warned against former FM Spanta pursuing his narrow self-interest at the expense of national ones, but in general affirmed to Eikenberry that the "inner circle" -- now including Daudzai -- had decided they must collaborate to influence Karzai when they see him going astray on such matters. They reportedly pledged that if Karzai took umbrage at them raising such sensitive issues, they would defend each other.
--------------------------------------------- ---
Message to Karzai: Don't Put Success on the Line
--------------------------------------------- ---
7. (S) Meeting with Karzai, National Security Advisor Spanta and Deputy NSA Spinzada February 25, Ambassador Eikenberry asked Karzai what he wanted his trip to be about and how he wanted it to be perceived in the United States. He said he hoped it has become obvious to Karzai that the U.S. wants Karzai and Afghanistan to be strong. Eikenberry noted that the success of the visit would require that Americans to gain confidence that we have a reliable partner who is leading Afghanistan forward.
8. (S) Eikenberry went on to explain that democracy-building in Afghanistan could be among Karzai,s strongest legacies to the future and what he will be remembered for; and democracy promotion is in America's "DNA" and how we judge institutional strength in any country. Reminding Karzai of the political risks our own President took on December 1 when he announced his strategy of deepened engagement in Afghanistan in the face of very real domestic opposition, Eikenberry pointed out that Karzai has always reminded us of Afghanistan's domestic politics -- now it is his turn to be aware of American domestic politics.
9. (S) At this point, before the planned one-on-one session, Karzai said he wanted Spanta to remain present. However, Spanta demurred, apparently sensing a difficult message would follow. Alone with Karzai, the Ambassador told Karzai that we want his visit to be about long-term strategic and political issues, including Karzai,s political vision and reintegration/reconciliation. It should lead us towards a stronger Afghanistan and a stronger Karzai. Eikenberry said that the sooner Karzai addresses pressing issues like electoral reform, the sooner he can remove distractions from his agenda in Washington. If he did nothing before his departure to allay our concerns about his decree and intent on electoral reform, he wouldn't be able to talk about reintegration and reconciliation with Congress, with the media, or with anyone in Washington. Karzai said he wanted to speak in Washington about "civilian casualties" but then added the long-term, strategic partnership as well.
10. (S) Karzai appeared more attentive and Eikenberry went into greater detail. He said that the election is very important for us and that if Americans and our allies believe that Karzai is weakening in the building of democratic legitimacy in Afghanistan, our support inevitably will weaken. He urged Karzai to make and announce well before departing for Washington the needed changes regarding the Chair of the IEC, placing internationals on the ECC, and retaining internationals from UNAMA and ISAF as observers on the candidate vetting board (DIAG). He asked Karzai if he had anyone else in mind for the IEC Chair. Karzai said he did not and that he couldn't make a "quick decision" about it. Eikenberry suggested that he could easily make an announcement prior to his visit to Washington about having accepted Ludin,s resignation and having begun a talent search for Ludin,s replacement. Karzai agreed that that was something he "could" do and said he would meet with Ludin on February 27.
11. (S) Eikenberry continued that Karzai could also announce before his trip that he would be appointing two internationals to the ECC to which Karzai, apparently confused about the law, said he could not make this announcement now, he could only form the ECC three months before the election date. The Ambassador told Karzai he was mistaken on this point (according to the new Presidential decree, the ECC must be established no later than three months before the election date. There is no injunction against establishing it earlier than that.) Karzai alleged that the ECC had tried to "steal the election" and had not performed well in the Provincial Council audits. Eikenberry replied that while the ECC had not performed perfectly, looking to the future with some high-quality international commissioners (such as Justice Kriegler) was very important.
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He added that the IEC had performed poorly, a point Karzai agreed with.
12. (S) He then asked Karzai to keep UNAMA and ISAF on the candidate vetting commission as observers. He pointed out that there are a lot of very bad actors who want political power and that it was always good to have impartial internationals available to be the ones drawing the line against those people. Karzai challenged the Ambassador on the grounds that the USG pays the contracts of some of these "bad actors" to which the Ambassador responded that while that was a fair point, it didn't mean Karzai shouldn't keep UNAMA on the candidate vetting commission.
13. (S) The Ambassador then pointed out to Karzai that the appointment of independent internationals on these electoral bodies could be helpful to Karzai politically: if Karzai appointed every official involved, he would be the one blamed entirely for an election which will certainly be flawed. Eikenberry noted again that this was Karzai's legacy and would be judged by future generations, and then asked Karzai if he was really completely positive that Afghanistan and its institutions are strong enough to not need any foreigners playing any roles. Karzai ended the meeting by saying that Ludin had told him he wanted to step down. Eikenberry replied that that was good and once more pressed Karzai to ensure the ECC Commissioners are independent, reminding him that Karzai had separately told SRSG Eide and Eikenberry several weeks prior unambiguously that he would retain two foreigners on the ECC in accordance with a formula developed by Eide.
14. (S) Comment: We will continue our engagement over the next several days with key Karzai ministers supportive of pragmatic electoral reform, as well as with interested Parliamentarians. As noted above, Minister Zakhilwal told Ambassador Eikenberry he would rally like-minded ministers and attempt to reach a favorable outcome by Monday. The electoral reform issue provides a good test of the future potential and limits of Karzai as a partner. U.S. interests, the imperatives of Afghan-statebuilding, and Afghanistan's long-term developmental interests will occasionally require Karzai to make difficult choices. This is such an instance. Also to be validated is his coterie of reform-minded ministers' ability to adroitly manage Karzai behind closed doors as occurred during his decision to accept a second round in last fall's election. A strong, empowered group of such ministers will be crucial to U.S.-Afghan success in the months ahead.
15. (U) Begin non-paper text:
Electoral Reform
President Karzai made a firm commitment at the London Conference to put in place meaningful electoral reforms which reflect lessons learned from 2009 and to ensure measures are in place to tackle the electoral abuses witnessed last year. Strengthening the independence of the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) is vital to ensuring that these institutions are impartial and effective.
The following three key measures are essential to ensuring the credibility of the Parliamentary electoral process and the success of the future Parliament, an institution integral to strengthening Afghanistan's democracy. They are also measures that will enable the international community to convince their governments to help fund and otherwise support these and future elections.
-- Replacing the IEC chair with an independent and qualified official -- Maintaining the integrity of the ECC through a combination of independent Afghans and international experts -- Establishing a strong candidate vetting process that involves the participation of both Afghans and the international community
The following key reforms would represent important steps towards constructive electoral reform that draw on the lessons learned in 2009:
-- IEC staff committing or complicit in electoral offenses are dismissed -- IEC sessions are opened to accredited observers -- IEC-recommended fraud deterrence plans are implemented -- A comprehensive Ministry of Interior and IEC-endorsed security plan is established 60-90 days before the election -- Polling stations are announced at least 90 days before elections -- Conditions are in place to maximize the participation of
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women and vulnerable groups in elections, both as candidates and voters -- Domestic observers and political party agents are supported and their participation in election day activities is facilitated.
End non-paper text. RICCIARDONE
Tuesday, 03 March 2009, 12:08
S E C R E T KABUL 000495
NOFORN
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION
EO 12958 DECL: 03/04/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, AF, IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN INFLUENCE AT PARLIAMENT
Classified By: CDA Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Iranian government officials routinely encourage Parliament to support anti-Coalition policies and to raise anti-American talking points during debates. Pro-Western MPs say colleagues with close Iranian contacts accept money or political support to promote Iran's political agenda. Some staff members believe Iranian intelligence officials have infiltrated the Parliament's legal and information technology support offices, compromising the professional staff's legal advice and the legislature's electronic communications. Allegations are difficult to verify and may be inspired more by conspiracy theories and inter-ethnic rivalries than actual facts. However, the number of MPs willing to tell us of first-hand encounters with Iranian agents appears to confirm a dedicated effort by Iran to influence Afghan attitudes toward Coalition forces and other issues. End Summary.
Iranian Embassy Relations with Parliament
-----------
2. (S/NF) Iranian Embassy officials exploit contacts with a number of Afghan politicians to influence Parliament's agenda. Many MPs accuse Hazaras, who like Iran's leaders are mostly Shia Muslims, of having the closest ties with Iran. Moderate Hazaras insist Iranian outreach influences only conservative Hazaras, many of whom received religious educations or lived in Iran while in exile. MPs single out Sayed Hussein Alemi Balkhi (Kabul), Ahmad Ali Jebraili (Herat), and Ustad Mohammad Akbari (Bamyan) as the Hazara MPs who receive the most support from Iran. The Iranian Embassy has also cultivated deep relations with members of opposition groups (including the United Front), Tajik Sayeds, and MPs from Herat and other western provinces.
3. (S/NF) Iranian Embassy officers frequently visit Parliament, but rarely sit in the public gallery and usually avoid high-traffic morning hours, according to Parliament watchers. After Iranian-influence allegations exploded a few years ago, the Iranian Embassy began hosting MPs more often at off-site meetings, where other MPs suspect payments are delivered in exchange for commitments to advocate Iranian policies.
4. (S/NF) According to several contacts, Iran's top policy goals in Parliament are: increasing criticism of civilian casualty incidents caused by Coalition forces, encouraging the Afghan Parliament to "legalize" foreign forces, advocating rights for Shia (including a separate judicial system), promoting "Persian culture," and limiting Western support to Afghan media. These subjects often dominate parliamentary debates, even when not on the official agenda.
Iranian Official Hands Over Talking Points to Deputy Speaker
-----------
5. (S/NF) Lower House Deputy Speaker Mirwais Yaseni (Nangarhar, Pashtun) told PolOff an Iranian intelligence officer visited his office in mid-February, coinciding with the visit of Iran's vice president to Kabul, to pressure him to allow a debate on the status of Coalition forces that would push other scheduled items from the 2/17 agenda (Speaker Yunus Qanooni was out of town, leaving Yaseni to chair the session). The intelligence officer offered to provide "support" to Yaseni if he cooperated. Yaseni declined, only to face the wrath of MPs Balkhi and Akbari, who raised the issue during debate on another item. When Yaseni suggested the MPs wait for a better time to discuss foreign forces, Balkhi accused the deputy speaker of "betraying his country" and being a Western puppet. Yaseni said Balkhi's and Akbari's remarks were identical to the talking points provided to him by the Iranian official earlier that day.
6. (S/NF) Other MPs have described similar interactions with Iranians they believe to be embassy-based intelligence officers. Some believe Iranian officers work in conjunction with Karzai's Palace staff to stir up heated reactions from MPs following civilian casualty incidents. Pro-Western MPs worry that Iran exploits such incidents to decrease public support for Coalition troop presence. The Iranian Embassy plays a lower-key role on social issues, paying MPs to support Persian cultural programs and oppose Western countries' support to local media. Despite Iran's ambitious lobbying efforts, there are limits to MPs' willingness to toe the Iranian line. A Lower House debate last November on water rights quickly struck a nationalistic tone, with several MPs accusing Iran of "stealing Afghanistan's water." No MP spoke up to disagree.
Suspicions With Staff, Too
----------
7. (S/NF) Parliamentary staffers believe the Iranian Embassy has planted moles in Parliament's legal and information technology offices. An employee in the Lower House's legal affairs and research office told PolOff last fall that his new supervisor was editing the staffer's responses to questions from MPs to reflect Iran-friendly interpretations of Afghan law. Lower House Secretary General Gulam Hassan Gran has repeatedly complained to PolOff that most IT staffers have been trained in Iran and pass electronic communications to the Iranian Embassy. As a result, Gran and other Pashtun staff refuse to use Parliament's email system. Gran's deputy keeps a list of MPs who criticize the U.S. and analyzes trends in anti-U.S. rhetoric.
Comment
----------
8. (S/NF) If Iranian efforts to influence MPs are as dedicated as some believe, it means the Iranian government has successfully identified and exploited Parliament's greatest strength: the bully pulpit. The four-year-old Parliament has often struggled to find its role and usually comes out on the losing end in battles with the judicial and executive branches. Still, MPs have been quick learners when it comes to using the media to draw attention to their causes, even if their views are at times incoherent or serve no other purpose than to bad-mouth the government or political rivals. Iran has deftly taken note, forgoing attempts to influence actual legislation and instead exploiting MPs' proclivity for media coverage. By strong-arming MPs to incorporate Iranian talking points into their public statements, Iran has opened a potential channel to influence public and elite opinion against U.S. goals and policies for Afghanistan. At a minimum, Iranian interference has helped keep Parliament bogged down in unproductive debates and away from more pressing matters. DELL
Saturday, 08 September 2007, 14:23
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 KABUL 002998
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A. CG CJTF-82 POLAD
EO 12958 DECL: 07/10/2017
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, ECON, IR, AF
SUBJECT: BOUCHER AND KARZAI, SPANTA ON JIRGAS, DRUGS, ECON
COOPERATION, GOVERNANCE, IRAN
Classified By: Charge Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher's August 27 meetings with President Karzai, Foreign Minister Spanta, Lower House Speaker Qanooni and National Security Advisor Rassoul spanned a range of key topics. Boucher, Karzai and Rassoul agreed to focus on themes of economic cooperation, intelligence- sharing, refugees, controlling illicit border traffic, and engaging the tribes during the upcoming trilateral meeting between Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte, Rassoul, and Pakistani National Security Advisor Aziz. Karzai's vision of a UN Special Envoy to Afghanistan largely mirrors U.S. thoughts on the issue. Discussion of counternarcotics and governance led Karzai to make a pitch for the international community to give the Afghan government room to do governance "the Afghan way." Boucher pressed Spanta and Qanooni to ensure that Iran's role in Afghanistan is limited to a constructive one. End Summary.
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JIRGAS
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2. (C) Karzai seemed pleased when Boucher shared that the recent Afghanistan-Pakistan jirga had been portrayed favorably in the U.S. media. Karzai commented that six months would be an ideal time frame after which to host the next jirga in Pakistan. Both agreed that the Afghan jirga was an important confidence-building measure, but Boucher expressed his hope that the next jirga in Pakistan might produce more concrete agreements. He raised the upcoming visit of Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte as an opportunity to capitalize on the momentum of the jirga and ensure continued progress towards the next one. Boucher raised the idea of having the Afghan and Pakistani National Security Advisors meet together with Negroponte during his visit to Jalalabad near the Afghan-Pakistani border and proposed that the three work together to identify specific issues where the greatest cooperation is needed (such as economic cooperation, intelligence-sharing and controlling illicit border traffic). Boucher also pushed for a discussion of how to engage the tribes along the border, whose buy-in is essential to the staying power of any future jirga agreements. Karzai, Spanta and Rassoul were each on board with this.
3. (C) Karzai shared that there was a recent gathering of Pakistani tribal chiefs in Peshawar during which the chiefs expressed a desire for the same rights and freedoms as ordinary Pakistani citizens. However, Karzai noted that these same tribes had recently refused to celebrate Pakistani Independence Day. Karzai said the Pakistani government needed to pull tribal leaders into a system of formal representation, while Boucher noted that Pakistani Interior Minister Sherpao did not think a political party system within the Tribal Areas would be feasible in the near term.
4. (C) In a separate discussion with Boucher, National Security Advisor Rassoul said Karzai had initiated the process of finalizing the list of participants in the commission that will implement the agreements from the first jirga. Boucher seconded Sherpao's desire to see a commission comprised of those "who can get things done." In an encouraging sign, Rassoul acknowledged that Sherpao had been a very helpful partner in the lead-up to, execution of and follow-up to the first jirga. Rassoul stated that the first task would be to work on the continuation of dialogue with the "opposition," including Taliban. Boucher pushed specifically for the jirga commission to identify who the opposition is and relayed Sherpao's interest in bringing those "who are not part
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of the Taliban but sympathetic to them into the jirga process." Both agreed that Afghanistan's official reconciliation process (commonly referred to as "PTS") is not appropriate for high-level leaders and large groups, so the jirga commission could play a role in defining a more appropriate process for people in this category.
5. (C) Boucher shared his opinion that Pakistan is "making a real effort now by going after the hardest targets, including Pakistani and Arab insurgents," which has already yielded results. Rassoul noted that his government is considering using the Provincial Communications Center model (currently used to coordinate information among the Afghan National Security Forces at the provincial level) to set up a nexus for intelligence-sharing between the Afghan and Pakistani governments. Pakistan is concerned about Baluch rebels who are operating in and supported from Afghanistan, and Boucher stressed the importance of the Afghan government doing all it can to crack down on this.
6. (C) During the meeting with Spanta, the Foreign Minister indicated that while he had been skeptical about the jirga himself, he had considered it a major success in the end. He said that the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs was sending five newly appointed diplomats to Pakistan for training -- a significant goodwill gesture following the jirga, as Afghanistan has refused educational assistance from Pakistan in the past. Spanta said Musharraf's appearance at the end of the jirga was a real high point. Boucher emphasized that it was Karzai's urging that changed Musharraf's mind. Boucher clarified that Musharraf's initial decision not to attend was not a snub to the jirga itself but a cautionary move by Musharraf, who feared the Pakistani Supreme Court would rule to allow former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to return to Pakistan. Spanta conceded that, "We know Sharif is bad news. He is the author of Islamic radicalism in our region." Boucher agreed that Sharif could return to lead a movement that is pro-Islam, anti-Musharraf and anti- U.S.
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UN SPECIAL ENVOY
----------------
7. (C) When Boucher asked Karzai his thoughts on the best role for a UN Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Karzai stated, "If it would be a UN Envoy that would bring better coordination among the international community at capitals and also cause better coordination in Afghanistan, and within the Alliance on Afghanistan, then good. But if it is someone who would set up a parallel government of internationals, then no." At one point Karzai stated, "I do not want a stronger UN," then clarified that "I want the UN to be a stronger coordinator of the international community, yes, but not a parallel government in Afghanistan." (Note: The British have indicated their vision of a Special Envoy who would be based in and work primarily in Afghanistan, whereas the U.S. and Afghan sides envision an envoy who would spend a great deal of time fund-raising and coordinating donor strategies in donor country capitals. End note.)
8. (C) During his meeting with Rassoul, Boucher commented that the French government had been considering running a Provincial Reconstruction Team and that the French Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs plan to visit Afghanistan soon. Boucher, Rassoul, and the Ambassador discussed future prospects for other donor country involvement in Afghanistan, noting that the Canadians were "iffy" and that the Dutch may leave after 2009. The British, French, Australians and U.S. will likely stay
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for longer periods. Rassoul asserted the importance of "Afghanizing" the war in Kandahar both in order to reduce Canadian casualties, which might encourage the Canadians to stay longer, and to prepare the Afghan National Army and police for Canada's likely withdrawal. Boucher noted that after a withdrawal of maneuver troops, the Canadians may still be willing to run a Provincial Reconstruction Team focused on development, as well as the training and equipping of Afghan National Security Forces. Boucher noted that as 2009 is an election year, it would be good to encourage donor countries to stay throughout 2009- 2010. He also expressed hope that efforts to engage Pakistan now would increase security significantly in the next year or two, perhaps encouraging other countries to stay present in Afghanistan.
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LOOKING AHEAD ON ERADICATION EFFORTS
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9. (C) Boucher noted that the UN Office of Drugs and Crime had released its latest assessment of drug production in Afghanistan. He highlighted the report's findings that while the number of poppy-free provinces had increased from six to thirteen, overall production in Afghanistan had increased by 34 per cent, particularly in Helmand. Karzai reiterated his position against an aerial eradication campaign. When Boucher asked Karzai for his thinking on ground-based spray, Karzai replied, "We have not said no, but we're not saying yes either. We would have to inform the population and do it in a way that does not create enmity." The Ambassador noted the difficulties in relying on manual eradication and pointed out that 16 of the 135 eradicators had been killed last year. Boucher assured Karzai that the aerial spray decision was one for another year. "Another few years," Karzai interjected. Boucher planted the idea of eventually doing aerial spray in Taliban controlled areas and manual eradication in those parts still loyal to the central government. Karzai gave no immediate reaction.
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KARZAI ON DOING GOVERNANCE "THE AFGHAN WAY"
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10. (C) The discussion on increased drug cultivation in Helmand sparked Karzai's thoughts on establishing and maintaining central government authority in the provinces. According to Karzai, "The question is why do we have Taliban controlling these areas now when two years ago I had control of Helmand? When Sher Mohammad was governor there, we had girls in schools and only 160 foreign troops. The international community pushed me to remove him and now look where we are." Referring to Sher Mohammad, Karzai retorted, "My question for you is, do you want a bad guy on your side or working for the Taliban? Where Afghans are in charge, drugs are less but where the international community is in charge, drugs are up." The Ambassador countered that the scenario is more accurately read as the international community has invested its resources and manpower in the tougher provinces where, not coincidentally, the Taliban have stepped up their counterinsurgency and drug cultivation efforts to discredit both the Afghan government and international community. Karzai conceded but added that the Afghan people do not see it that way from the ground.
11. (C) Pressing the issue more firmly, Boucher asked Karzai whether it is possible to have the Afghan government in control using good guys, rather than the likes of Sher Mohammad as its agents. "Yes, but that is a gradual process," said Karzai. Maintaining that
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"the most important thing is bringing the tribes to our side," he explained that the problem with the international community's approach to date is that "You are trying to pick and choose tribal chiefs (who will expand the presence of the central government into rural areas), but that is not how the tribal system works. A tribal chiefdom is jealously guarded. It cannot be taken by force and it cannot be imposed from the outside. When we distort tribal structures, the vacuum is filled by the Taliban, and that is exactly what has happened in Helmand and Uruzgan." He noted that Kandahar is an exception because of his outreach to all the tribal chiefs there. According to Karzai, "the people in Helmand and Uruzgan are uneducated, so you have to fight the Taliban with local ingredients," unlike in more developed Kandahar. He added, "We cannot bring tribal chiefs on board with governors because we say to them that we want you to support the governor, but we single out particular chiefs and say we don't want them involved in the process. Whether we like it or not, we have to work with these people." Karzai and Rassoul both indicated that Karzai is currently focused on an outreach campaign to win backing from tribal leaders in Helmand.
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ROLE OF IRAN, LOCAL OPPOSITION MUST BE CONSTRUCTIVE
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12. (C) Boucher informed Karzai that he would meet with Lower House Speaker Qanooni later that day. Boucher told Karzai that his message to Qanooni would be: "Political opposition is okay, but it has to be constructive." Karzai's advice was to remind Qanooni that he would not hold his position without U.S. backing. As the conversation turned to political parties, Karzai commented, "I will not be a political party man, but I will support parties," presumably referring to his rumored alliance with the newly formed Republican Party.
13. (C) During the meeting with Qanooni, Boucher emphasized that Iran and Russia should not be given inroads for influence in a way that would disrupt the system. Boucher clarified that while Iran's investment in cultural and educational institutions was acceptable, its role in smuggling weapons into Afghanistan was not. Qanooni responded by assuring Boucher and the Ambassador that Afghanistan continues to see the U.S. as its "long-term partner." Stressing that "We are not asking Afghans to choose sides," Boucher expressed U.S. understanding for Afghanistan's need to cultivate cooperative economic, business, cultural, and "normal" political relationships with Iran but reiterated that the line should be drawn at any activities that are disruptive to the establishment of a strong central government in Afghanistan. Qanooni indicated that, aside from Iran and Russia, people allied with the Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin party continue to seek more positions of influence within the Afghan government administration.
14. (C) Pointing out that, "The security problems in southern Afghanistan are spreading to the north," Qanooni added that, "While others think the security situation will remain in control, I and other members of Parliament have some concerns." He pointed to recent Taliban activity in Kapisa, Nuristan, and Baghlan as evidence of this. "Only Panjshir is protected," he stated. When Boucher asked how Taliban are able to operate in the north, where Pashtuns are a minority, Qanooni insisted that the Taliban have located and begun to infiltrate the predominantly Pashtun districts which are scattered around the north.
15. (C) Qanooni mentioned the formation of a special committee from the Lower House that will be
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investigating why decisions made by Parliament are not implemented by the executive branch. (Note: He was referring primarily to the decision of Parliament to impeach Foreign Minister Spanta and Minister of Refugees Akbar. Karzai mentioned that the Palace has also established a committee of six ministers to settle the issue with Parliament. End note.)
16. (C) The topic of Iran also surfaced during Boucher's meeting with Spanta, who acknowledged, "We agree with the U.S. and U.K. that Iran is engaged in a lot of interference, but our interest in dealing with Iran is to be careful not to open a second front along the Iranian border with Afghanistan." Spanta noted the Afghan government's recent decision to reject a Memorandum of Understanding on military cooperation proposed by Iran. Spanta also shared that Karzai had raised the issue of Iran's involvement in smuggling weapons into Afghanistan with Iranian President Ahmedinejad, who Spanta said, "denied it, of course, but the point was made." Spanta noted that Iran was primarily invested in supporting political parties, mobilizing Shia mullahs, influencing the Afghan media, and providing material support to the Taliban. He added that Iran is funding the completion of a railway that will go from Iran into Afghanistan and end outside Herat City. Spanta expressed his uncertainty about the complicity of the Iranian Foreign Minister in providing material support to the Taliban, stating that "He promised me he is not involved, but said that he is involved in supporting political parties in Afghanistan."
17. (C) Spanta commented that his biggest problem is that Iran continues to send back Afghan refugees - both those who are registered and those who are not - and added that Iran does not coordinate with the Afghan government on the forced returns.
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REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION
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18. (C) Spanta explained that Afghanistan continues to work with Pakistan on transit trade and updating their formal treaty from the 1960's. They would also like to address this in the framework of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Afghan Commerce Minister Farhang will travel to Pakistan shortly in hopes of making some progress. Spanta moved next to a request for U.S. financial assistance for the upcoming conference of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), October 16-20, 2007 in Herat, which is focused on regional economic cooperation between Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan. Boucher promised to pass on the request but cautioned Spanta that the prospects were not good given how soon the conference would take place and the lack of U.S. membership in the organization.
19. (C) Boucher stressed to Karzai and Spanta the need to follow-up on the success of the Tajik- Afghanistan bridge opening with a trucking and transit agreement that allows Afghan and Tajik vendors and distributors to transport their goods across the border. The Ambassador pitched the idea of a truck leasing consortium project that would allow small- scale distributors, who could not afford to own trucks, to rent them when transporting their products. Both Karzai and Spanta welcomed the idea. Spanta noted that Afghan Commerce Minister Farhang will soon travel to Pakistan to discuss similar issues.
20. (C) Spanta also noted that the Chinese are increasingly interested in becoming a regional economic partner as well as knowing more about what the larger international community is doing to invest in Afghanistan.
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21. (C) Note: Renewed focus on regional economic cooperation will be part of the agenda for the upcoming Afghanistan Ministerial Meeting on September 23 (co-chaired by President Karzai and Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon) that will precede the UN General Assembly. The October 3 meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board will also focus on regional economic cooperation. This will be an important follow-up to the success of the Tajik- Afghanistan bridge opening and an opportunity to capitalize on the momentum of the jirga, with economic cooperation presenting a clear win-win for all parties involved. End note.
22. (SBU) The Office of the Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs has cleared this cable. DELL
Tuesday, 20 January 2009, 10:40
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000140
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR WILKES
CG CJTF-101 POLAD
EO 12958 DECL: 01/15/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, MARR, MASS, AF
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT-ELECT BIDEN AND SENATOR GRAHAM
DISCUSS SECURITY IN HELMAND
REF: A. KABUL 65 B. KABUL 71
Classified By: By Ambassador William Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY. Vice President-elect Joseph Biden and Senator Lindsay Graham visited Camp Bastion in Helmand Province January 11 and were briefed by Brigadier General Gordon Messenger, the British Commander of Task Force Helmand, and UK Senior Civilian Advisor Hugh Powell. COMISAF General McKiernan, RC-South Commander Major General Mart De Kruif and British Ambassador Sherard Cowper-Coles also attended. Helmand Governor Mangal also discussed security and U.S. assistance with Biden and Graham. During the UK briefings, Ambassador Wood and U.S. Brigadier General Nicholson met separately with Mangal to hear his concerns and recommendations for next steps. End Summary.
Task Force Helmand Briefing for Biden and Graham
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2. (C) The UK leadership briefing was somber. Senior Civilian Advisor Hugh Powell noted the UK had only 4000 troops in Afghanistan's largest province, equaling one-third the troop density of RC East. British troops were covering the bulk of the population centers, but Powell noted that, given stretched resources, the British were aiming for "good enough." (This is a phrase that is being used more often by the UK civilian and military leadership.) BG Messenger explained that his forces and the Afghan National Army were largely fixed to their Forward Operating Bases and PBs.
3. (C) Powell raised the issue of building governance and Biden broke in to press Powell on what "building governance" meant in practical terms. Powell described governance as having a few key people in the right places. Biden asked for more specifics about what was needed. Powell made a strong pitch for a unified command of the police mentors under CSTC-A. Biden asked where these mentors would come from and Powell suggested that non-troop contributing countries could provide them.
4. (C) Senator Graham asked attendees for a definition of success (in establishing greater security). BG Messenger defined coverage of more area as a key element of success. COMISAF and RC-S MG de Kruif added that Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) control of Afghanistan's large cities - even in unstable provinces - is now the norm.
Mangal Presentation to Biden and Graham
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5. (C) Governor Mangal, accompanied by Afghan National Army (ANA) General Mohaidan and Helmand Police Chief Colonel Shirzad, briefed the visiting officials on his efforts to combat terrorism, corruption and narcotics in Helmand. He welcomed increased support from the U.S., and described significant progress in Helmand, noting eight out 13 districts were now under government control. However, Mangal quickly added there was still much to do to improve security in the province. Even in the eight districts under GIRoA control, the security footprint was far too small; more forces could expand the security zones around the cities to allow communities room to promote commerce and civil engagement. Mangal observed there was still no presence in Baghran and Vashir in northern Helmand or in Kanashin or Dishu in the south.
6. (C) The Governor made clear his view that U.S. forces are urgently needed. New forces should help secure the open border with Pakistan, while the capabilities of the ANSF could be strengthened to support any mission. He praised the work of the ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP) and said that with additional help they would take on more missions. He noted that the October attack against Lashkar Gah was repulsed by the ANSF, well supported by ISAF forces. Coordination between these security forces was excellent and he expressed full confidence the U.S. forces would work well with Helmand's ANSF leadership.
7. (C) Thanking Mangal for his efforts and praising his hard work, Biden then discussed President-Elect Obama's desire to establish "a new contract" with Afghanistan, a message Biden had already shared with President Karzai (Ref A). Biden
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stressed the importance of improved governance by the central government and the need for increased capacity in the ANSF; international forces alone could not bring security and prosperity to Afghanistan. The U.S. was prepared to increase assistance and would sustain existing commitments, but the GIRoA needed to actively tackle corruption and support more effective governors and military leaders - like Mangal and Mohaidan.
8. (C) Biden continued, saying the U.S. government was committed to long-term support for Afghanistan. He cautioned, however, that if the Afghan government failed to effectively address key problems, such as poor governance, poppy cultivation, and corruption, it would be difficult to retain the strong U.S. public support necessary to continue large-scale assistance to Afghanistan.
Mangal Calls for Extension of "Garmsir Model"
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9. (C) While the Helmand Task Force briefed Biden and Graham, Governor Mangal met with the Ambassador and BG Nicholson. The Ambassador thanked the Governor for his hard work and congratulated him on the large Counter Narcotics Shura he conducted January 4 in Lashkar Gah. Mangal stressed he was fully engaged in improving security, fighting corruption and building the capacity of the Afghan security forces. He was confident incoming U.S. forces would be able to achieve progress in extending security in north and south Helmand.
10. (C) Raising concerns regarding the UK security strategy, Mangal described his disappointment during a recent visit to Sangin. He noted that the bazaar in central Sangin was still outside the security zone; the situation in Kajaki was much the same. "I do not have anything against them (the British) but they must leave their bases and engage with the people." He said even in Nad Ali the area of control was still too small.
11. (C) The Ambassador asked if the problem in Sangin was rooted in the civilian or military approach. Mangal said he thought both elements were at fault because there was "neither development and nor security" for the town. Mangal explained that the approach of the U.S. Marines in Garmsir was the right model for promoting community security in Helmand. The forces had remained in place for enough time to allow the bazaar, schools and clinics to reopen and then they planned a successful handover to ensure the new security zone could be maintained by the UK and the ANSF. Unfortunately, the UK has not built on the U.S. achievement by expanding the security zone around Garmsir still further.
12. (C) Mangal said he had told the UK team that even if they brought in thousands of additional troops, they would need a new plan and a shift of focus to connect to the people. As in Garmsir, success lay in clearing a large enough area around the town to encompass the bazaar, establishing visible reconstruction and development projects and engaging directly and often with local residents.
13. (C) The Ambassador thanked the Governor for his detailed and frank assessment, agreeing the situation posed a serious challenge. He said the UK was working well with the U.S. and that he was confident the British shared our vision for the region. Now, we must emphasize to them that the bazaar equals the city and the city equals hope - together this represents Afghanistan delivering security and economic development to its people.
Mangal: Promoting Successful Communities and Undermining SMA
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14. (C) The Governor appreciated the chance to share key concerns with Ambassador and BG Nicholson. The Governor is a skilled politician and clearly had no intention of embarrassing the UK leadership, but wanted to highlight the Garmsir model as the right formula for Helmand. His focus on Sangin also has a strong political element. If he can successfully move Sangin into a "Garmsir Model," he knows opposition strongman Sher Muhammad Akhundzada (SMA) will be weakened and some Alizai may move away from his camp. Progress in Sangin would be a preemptive political strike against SMA. This will become more important as poppy eradication kicks off and efforts are launched against narco facilities in the upper Sangin Valley.
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WOOD
Saturday, 21 February 2009, 04:27
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000376
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/16/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, SNAR, AF, PK, IR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KARZAI PREVIEWS STRATEGIC REVIEW IDEAS
FOR USD/P FLOURNOY
1. (C NF) President Karzai on February 15 told Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Flournoy that his government welcomed the opportunity to join in the USG's strategic policy review. He suggested his team likely would advocate for: 1) greater efforts to target terrorist leaders and sanctuaries in Pakistan; 2) additional work to strengthen Afghan communities to enhance security; and 3) new multilateral talks with individual groups of Taliban who agree to respect the Afghan constitution. On the contentious issue of civilian casualties, Karzai expressed satisfaction with the recent agreement on specific military operations and a willingness to move forward. The President predicted Iran would respond positively to the new US administration's offers of dialog.
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FOCUS ON PAKISTAN
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2. (C NF) The fight for stability in Afghanistan must be taken to the terrorist planners and their sanctuaries in Pakistan, Karzai said. He noted he had long argued for greater efforts in this direction, including in public remarks in Kabul in 2005. Karzai expressed frustration that the close relationship between the United States and Pakistan had yet to yield a serious campaign against terrorist leaders operating there. Instead, he argued, Afghanistan paid the price of perceived US and Pakistani reluctance to grapple with the problem. Pakistan, of course, had long used Islamic fundamentalism as a policy tool. But "Pakistan is a puzzle to me now," Karzai admitted. "I see things happening on a massive scale in the northwest that are not the work of ISI," the Pakistani intelligence service.
3. (C NF) On cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Karzai said, "Zardari is of a different (positive) mindset." The Pakistani President has yet to move, however, from good intentions to implementation, and is weak. Karzai asked Flournoy whether the US strategic review envisioned more direct bilateral military cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the US or NATO as broker, or whether only greater US-Pakistan military cooperation was under consideration. Flournoy replied that the regional strategic review, while urgent and extremely important to the new US administration, was only just underway.
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RENEW COMMUNITY SUPPORT
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3. (C NF) The President underscored his analysis that the support of communities was key to countering the insurgency. When I first returned to Afghanistan, Karzai mused, I had only 14 American soldiers with me. But we had the Afghan people with us, they believed in the moral correctness of what we were doing, and even Helmand was safe for girls to go to school. Now, 4000 (sic) British soldiers are in Helmand, and the people are not safe. "We must stand on a higher moral platform than the bad guys," the President said.
4. (C NF) Community empowerment is not about the arming the tribes, Karzai noted. Media speculation about this approach is misleading. We need ordinary people, the elders and the villagers, to trust in the government's ability to do the right thing, and give them what they need to be able to defend themselves, the President said. In turn, the government must minimize civilian casualties, limit night raids, and make sure women and children are protected during military operations. Increasing the numbers and capabilities of the police and army, and strengthening government institutions, are also important, Karzai added.
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TALK TO AFHGAN TALIBAN
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5. (C NF) Afghanistan and the US together should formally launch a process of peace-making with those Taliban who are not al Qaeda or part of any terrorist network, Karzai proposed. There are groups and individuals who would accept the Afghan constitution, who have "run away" from us because of our own failings, he said. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and religious leaders have the right resources to make such a process work and should participate. But US partnership with Afghanistan is key to success and has been the missing element in efforts to date.
6. (C NF) If there really was a Taliban movement, Karzai said, I would be greatly worried by US reports that Iran is supporting the Taliban. But I do not think the Taliban is really a movement. It is the result of three decades of past Pakistani policy, plus a lot of poor, desperate kids who lack
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connection to a family or community.
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FRIENDS DESPITE FRICTIONS
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7. (C NF) On several topics, Karzai said, recent frictions in the bilateral relationship represent "annoyances" between "friends." "We have been hurt by some recent statements," he said, and also I know my "loud speeches" on civilian casualties hurt your feelings. Still, the two nations have common interests, and the two peoples are friends. Afghanistan is very grateful for the generosity of US aid in reconstruction and development. The agreement on civilian casualties is a "good start" and we can now move forward to implement it and so speak with one voice on this issue. On Iran, Karzai said, Afghanistan cannot be a channel, but we can help you convey the nuances of your demands. Iran is likely to respond positively to US offers of dialog even though it will never give up its nuclear programs. Progress in curbing poppy cultivation this year probably largely reflects market forces such as high wheat prices. Afghans consider poppy "not respectable," however, and with stability and hope for the future will respond to international efforts to replace its cultivation with alternate livelihoods.
8. (C) Comment: Coming in the immediate aftermath of Special Representative Holbrooke's visit, this meeting reflected Karzai's effort to stick by his agreement to re-found the relationship. His calm, constructive comments on civilian casualties contrast sharply to his attitude previously.
9. (U) Undersecretary Flournoy cleared this cable. WOOD
Sunday, 21 December 2008, 06:24
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003237
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR MCGRAW
CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT
EO 12958 DECL: 12/20/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, MASS, KDEM, AF, PK
SUBJECT: KARZAI URGES CODEL MCCAIN TO SUPPORT ZARDARI AND
WELCOMES INCREASE IN U.S. FORCES
Classified By: A/DCM Val Fowler for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY. Accompanied by the Charge d'Affaires, Senators John McCain, Joseph Lieberman and Lindsey Graham dined with President Karzai at the Presidential Palace December 6. Flanked by many from his cabinet, including the Foreign and Defense Ministers, Karzai urged the Senators to secure strong U.S. support for Pakistan President Zardari in his efforts to free Pakistan from extremism, noted the progress Afghanistan has made with the support of international assistance, welcomed incoming U.S. forces and described efforts to combat widespread corruption. He also stressed the toll that civilian casualties took on public support for military operations.
APPRECIATION FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN
2. (C) Karzai thanked the Senators for U.S. assistance and shared his optimism regarding the future of the bilateral relationship: "Never before has a country welcomed a foreign presence so much. (Our cooperation) will be a great success." Karzai then joked that "reconstruction is something we complain about, but inside we are very happy with it. We complain because we want more money from you." Karzai went on to describe how small businesses have sprung up all around the country in the last four years as a result of international assistance, and how those businesses are vital to Afghanistan's sustainability. Karzai also touched on other areas of progress, claiming that this year Afghanistan would see 50,000 students graduate from college whereas a few years ago, there were not 50,000 college graduates in the country.
PAKISTAN'S ZARDARI: A GOOD MAN TRYING TO FREE HIS COUNTRY OF EXTREMISTS
3. (C) Responding to Senator McCain's comment that the delegation had just arrived from meetings in Islamabad, Karzai stressed the importance of U.S. support for Pakistan's president, calling Zardari "a good man who wants to free his country from extremists." Karzai noted that he had an excellent relationship with Zardari and felt the two had a special rapport, adding "never in 60 years of Pakistan's history have we had such good bilateral relations." Karzai described how, when he arrived in Istanbul for trilateral talks earlier this month, Zardari called him directly and asked to meet with him privately before their official meeting the following day. Zardari came to Karzai's room where they chatted over dinner for hours, "covering all topics imaginable." Returning to the issue of U.S. support for Zardari, Karzai said the Pakistani President felt "lonely, threatened and under siege." Zardari believed he received too little support from the international community: India was still wary because of historic enmity between the two countries; Russia withheld its support because Pakistan had helped the Afghans defeat the Soviets; China disapproved of Zardari's close relationship with the U.S.; and the Arab countries wouldn't support him because he wasn't "one of them." Karzai urged the Senators: "America is the only place he can turn - help him. Give him all you can; forget his past."
NEED TO FOCUS ON COMMUNITIES AND FIGHTING CORRUPTION
4. (C) Calling himself "a traditional Afghan," Karzai said his government won the previous election because of the backing of the tribes, but lack of progress and growing insecurity at the local level had left many communities disillusioned and vulnerable to militants. The government needed to re-establish those ties and focus on strengthening local infrastructure. Karzai said he had raised this issue with Senator Biden when Biden suggested sending more troops and more civilians to support Afghanistan's reconstruction and security efforts. Karzai agreed those elements were important, but told Biden that even more important was shifting the assistance focus to the community or village level and concentrating on capacity-building to bolster the traditional element of Afghan society.
5. (C) Karzai acknowledged the scope of corruption that plagues the country, saying "the more we dig (into corruption), the more scared we get." The President told the Senators he had fired Governor Raufi of Kandahar after a three-month investigation (the same amount of time Governor Raufi was in the position following the dismissal of the
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previous governor). He also noted his recent firing of the Minister of Transport for embezzling funds linked to construction of Kabul's new airport. Responding to the question of whether either of these men would be prosecuted, Karzai confirmed prosecutors were pursuing a case against the Minister of Transport. Karzai also tied the prevalence of widespread, but low-level corruption to the despair of many impoverished Afghans: "When someone doesn't have hope for the future, he will steal." On the other hand, Karzai related a story from a trip to Paktya when residents challenged him on his "negative" radio addresses: "Things are better than you say, don't you know that?" Karzai told them he recognized the improvements but just wanted everyone to do still better.
AFGHANISTAN WELCOMES INCOMING U.S. FORCES
6. (C/NF) Karzai welcomed the incoming U.S. brigades, but took the opportunity to question the effectiveness of the British in Helmand. "Freeing Helmand from the Taliban is important: Helmand is not with us." He then semi-seriously suggested that everyone stop taking notes, "especially my people," and related an anecdote in which a woman from Helmand asked him to "take the British away and give us back the Americans." He said there was a broad understanding among Afghans of the value of American forces, and that he regularly hears requests from the South to increase U.S. troop presence there. "Afghans don't recognize NATO, they recognize America," said Karzai. He offered the example of a villager from Uruzgan who gave the Dutch Task Force Commander a present, saying, "Take that back to Washington with you."
KARZAI: AFGHANS WILLING TO DIE IN BATTLE BUT DO NOT UNDERSTAND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
7. (C) Karzai raised the issue of civilian casualties, stressing the impact these deaths had on public opinion and support. "Freeing Afghanistan from terrorists is important and building institutions is important, but even more important is making sure Afghan civilians don't suffer in the pursuit of these terrorists." He emphasized that these incidents were "pushing our population away from us." The Afghan people will be your best allies, he asserted, but we have to find a way to solve this. "Afghans will die on the field of battle a thousand times (fighting militants), but civilian casualties they do not understand."
ELECTIONS: KARZAI PRAISES SENATOR McCAIN'S GRACIOUSNESS
8. (C) Karzai praised Senator McCain for what he called "a marvelous concession speech" and noted that he had called Senator McCain immediately afterward to congratulate him on the speech. Karzai added, "I hope that if (Afghanistan's) election results go a different way next year, I will have 20 percent of the guts you showed and be able to concede as graciously as you did."
9. (U) CODEL McCain did not have the opportunity to clear this message.
WOOD
Friday, 06 April 2007, 10:45
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001132
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
OSD FOR KIMMITT
ONDCP FOR DIRECTOR
STATE FOR INL/AP, INL/FO, AND INR
CIA FOR CNC
EO 12958 DECL: 04/04/2017
TAGS SNAR, KCRM, AF
SUBJECT: ONDCP DIRECTOR WALTERS' MARCH 17-20 VISIT TO
AFGHANISTAN
REF: KABUL 1014
Classified By: DCM Richard B. Norland for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (U) SUMMARY: Director of the Office of Drug Control Policy John Walters visited Afghanistan March 17-20 to discuss with senior Afghan and international officials this year's progress on reducing the poppy crop. Senior ISAF officials told Walters that although eradicating poppy would, in their estimation, increase the security threat, it needed to be done and they would be as supportive as their mandate allowed. ISAF is also increasingly convinced of the links between narcotics traffickers and insurgents. Senior Afghan government officials agreed with the need to take strong action against growers and traffickers but acknowledged that widespread corruption and the weakness of the justice system made that difficult. Many made the point that considerable progress in other parts of the country was at risk of being overshadowed by the lack of progress in Helmand. They all emphasized the importance of increasing development aid, and pitched the idea of funneling more assistance through government ministries instead of international contractors. Lastly, Walters visited the Afghan Eradication Force base camp in Helmand, where discussions with Deputy Minister of Interior for Counter-narcotics Mohammad Daud and local elders illustrated how difficult it is for the central government to exert its authority on controversial issues. END SUMMARY.
KARZAI NEEDS TO TAKE ACTION
---------------------------
2. (C/NOFORN) ONDCP Director Walters met with COM ISAF General McNeill in Kabul, and separately with RC South Commander Major General Van Loon (Dutch) in Kandahar. McNeill told Walters there had been a lot of action on counter-narcotics, but little progress. He was particularly dismayed by the British effort. They had made a mess of things in Helmand, their tactics were wrong, and the deal that London cut on Musa Qala had failed. That agreement opened the door to narco-traffickers in that area, and now it was impossible to tell the difference between the traffickers and the insurgents. The British could do a lot more, he said, and should, because they have the biggest stake.
3. (C/NOFORN) McNeill thought the missing ingredient in the counter-narcotics effort was Karzai. Despite some public statements, he had failed to take a real stand. Karzai needed to keep his support base happy, and as a result, he placated many of those involved in the drug business, especially in the west and south of the country. However, by not taking the issue on, Karzai was tacitly signaling his OK for poppy production. While the international community could come down harder on Karzai, McNeill observed that for the time being, Karzai is the only one who can lead, so for now we have to ride with him. The counter-narcotics effort has to have an Afghan face, and that is going to take time.
HIGH VALUE TARGETS
------------------
4. (C) To Walters' question on going after high value targets, McNeill said it was necessary to prosecute a few to keep faith with the general public. But he was skeptical it would have any real effect on the trafficking networks, as those arrested would simply be replaced by others. McNeill described having been called to answer questions before the Afghan parliament, and said that during the session, the parliament had come down hard on MOI Zarar for not doing more on narcotics arrests and basic law enforcement. McNeill also criticized the timing and conduct of eradication, arguing that farmers eradicated in the spring would be fighting by summer. He asserted that Governor-led eradication was extremely disorganized and said that, for now, eradicators are only going where the local power brokers allow them to go. He suggested that there be a more direct link between eradication and provision of assistance, so that a compact with the people could be created.
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VAN LOON AGREEMENT ON TIMING, NEED FOR ASSISTANCE
--------------------------------------------- ----
5. (C) In a meeting the next day in Kandahar, RC South commander Major General Van Loon, who was accompanied for part of the meeting by Kandahar Governor Asadullah, argued that provision of alternative livelihoods needs to start much earlier. Once the poppy seeds are in the ground, there is no option for the farmer. Provision of licit crops and other assistance needed to start early in the summer, before farmers made planting decisions. Both Asadullah and Van Loon thought cooperation among the central government, assistance providers, and eradication elements was poor. While farmers are promised alternatives, they do not often see results on a local level. There needs to be more active involvement with local councils, and there should be more of a direct link between development assistance and non-cultivation of poppy. Van Loon suggested this approach would work in Kandahar, where farmers were making their own decisions on what to grow, but would probably not work in Helmand, where large-scale traffickers were in charge.
GOVERNOR-LED ERADICATION AND PROBLEMS OF CORRUPTION
--------------------------------------------- ------
6. (C) Following Asadullah's departure, Van Loon agreed that the Governor was making progress on eradication, but he took issue with his targets and methods. Asadullah was using Afghan Police (ANP) to do eradication, which further damaged the already corrupt reputation of the police among average people, and allowed Asadullah to pocket the funding he had been given to hire local labor to carry out eradication. The employment of ANP in eradication means they are not out in the community performing their security functions. In addition, Van Loon said Asadullah has been careful to eradicate only those fields not controlled by powerful people in the Province.
7. (C/NF) Van Loon was somewhat defensive in discussing the failure of Uruzgan Governor Monib to take any action on eradication. He argued that the security situation was outside the Governor's control, and prevented him from moving around much. In addition, the province is extremely poor, and so until more alternative livelihoods are available, the international community should not push too hard on eradication. He said that Monib understood the need to do something, and plans were now being drawn up with the British Embassy Drugs team and the Ministry of Counter-narcotics.
8. (C) RC South has begun developing information on ties between traffickers, insurgents, and government officials. They recognize that going after corrupt officials may be too difficult, given the delicate tribal and other balances needed to keep the Afghan government generally intact. But they hope to use the increasing connections between traffickers and insurgents to their advantage; the latter are a legitimate target for ISAF, while pursuing the former is not within ISAF's direct mandate.
VISIT TO HELMAND
----------------
9. (C) On March 20 Director Walters visited the INL-funded Afghan Eradication Force's (AEF) forward operating base in Helmand. During the visit he discussed Helmand eradication with Deputy Interior Minister Daud and members of the provincial eradication commission, who represented tribal elders and the poppy growing communities in the operating areas of the AEF base. Walters told Daud and the commission members that he was disappointed with the recent lack of eradication progress in areas with the highest concentration of poppy cultivation, like Marja sub-district. The commission responded that Helmand needs time--a few growing seasons--to wean farmers away from dependence on the poppy crop. Walters acknowledged that eradication affects farmers, but he reminded the commission that Helmand enjoys other
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agricultural options and has the potential to become Afghanistan's "bread basket." All farmers, he said, know that growing poppy is illegal, and they must also learn that poppy cultivation feeds insecurity in the province and throughout Afghanistan.
GOA MINISTERS - MORE ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE GOVERNMENT
--------------------------------------------- ---------
10. (C) Walters met over dinner with a number of Afghan officials, including the Ministers of Interior, Agriculture, Counter-narcotics, and Education, the Chief of the National Directorate of Security, and a member of Parliament. The wide-ranging discussion included talks on the kinds of alternative crops that could profitably be grown around the country, the challenge of fighting corruption and creating a functioning judicial system, and the general pre-requisite for licit livelihoods of energy, irrigation, and roads.
11. (C) Two themes emerged. First, there should be much more active involvement by local government in decision-making on what kind of assistance is provided. Billions are being spent around the country, but the perception at the local level is that little is being done. Involving local government, whether through Provincial Development Councils, the Governors, or other mechanisms, will help address this problem. Second, Ministers unanimously called for more assistance to be channeled through the government, rather than through international contractors. They argued that unless this happened, capacity in the Ministries would never be built. It would also lead the population to conclude that central government officials, rather than Taliban or other insurgents, could deliver now and in the future. While all acknowledged the challenges of maintaining accountability for vast sums, they argued that at least some measure of assistance should be disbursed in this way.
COMMENT
-------
12. (C) Director Walters' meetings with GOA and international community officials highlighted the complexity of Afghanistan's poppy dilemma. Little consensus exists on how to solve the problem: the GOA wants time, more development assistance, and greater discretion on how to spend development funding; ISAF wants to see poppy elimination programs become more integrated with security strategy; the UK Embassy argues for incremental improvements within a broader capacity-building enterprise. These debates rage within a political environment where power is diffuse and Kabul competes for regional and local influence with provincial offices and tribal structures. Every decision requires inordinate time and effort as we work to broker agreements between competing interests.
13. (C) In the background, the poppy continues to grow, and Walters' aerial surveillance of rich poppy fields in Helmand offered immediate and powerful visual evidence of the scope of the problem. The difficulties of eradicating poppy in the same area where complex ISAF military operations are in full swing were also exposed. The long-term challenges are immense but should not overshadow the short-term necessity of political engagement, and Director Walters' visit highlighted the great importance of making poppy elimination one of the GOA's central priorities. No one ministry can win this battle alone. It requires concerted government will, and President Karzai needs to take control of this effort and publicize its importance for all of Afghanistan. Ambassador stressed this point during President Karzai's counter-narcotics meeting on March 27 (reftel). As of the first week in April, we are approaching the end game of this season,s eradication efforts in Helmand and will soon be evaluating the campaign's impact in the light of Walters' observations during his recent visit. END COMMENT
14. (U) Director Walters's party cleared this cable.
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NEUMANN
Monday, 28 December 2009, 15:40
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 004182
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD
EO 12958 DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: PERVASIVE CORRUPTION UNDERMINING GHAZNI PROVINCE'S
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
REF: A. (A) KABUL 4088 B. (B) KABUL 2807
Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Coordinator Scott Kilner for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1.(C) SUMMARY: In recent weeks Ghazni Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) leadership engaged Afghan provincial and district government officials, law enforcement commanders, and civil society representatives on the extent and nature of corruption in the area. A graphic picture of criminal enterprise masquerading as public administration emerged. The consistency and scope of explicit and detailed allegations lends veracity to charges that pervasive corruption defrauds the people of meaningful government services and significantly undermines popular support for the Afghan government (GIRoA). Credible sources indicate that some of the most senior government officials in the province have chronically engaged in significant corrupt acts: embezzling public funds, stealing humanitarian assistance, and misappropriating government property, among others. The law enforcement resources needed in Ghazni and at the national level to address corruption effectively are lacking, and building that capacity will take time. In the meantime, the PRT will work with the Embassy to develop non-judicial mechanisms to bring greater civil service reform, budget and programmatic transparency, and non-judicial forms of accountability to address systemic corruption. End Summary.
GOVERNMENT AS CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE?
---------------------------------
2. (C) In recent weeks the Ghazni Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) engaged extensively with provincial and district-level government officials, law enforcement commanders, and civil society representatives regarding the scope and nature of corruption in Ghazni Province. This report includes those examples of recent and possibly on-going corrupt practices that were raised by multiple, credible senior GIRoA officials in Ghazni Province. Most individuals the PRT spoke with were willing to speak openly about corruption in the province; many are well aware of the push by the international community to root out corruption, and may have their own motivations in highlighting corruption by others officials and minimizing attention to themselves. XXXXXXXXXXXX even provided a written summary of information contained in NDS files. These conversations paint a picture of criminal enterprise masquerading as public administration in Ghazni. Although the PRT has no capacity to confirm the allegations raised, the consistency of reports alleging corruption among senior government officials is striking. Long-standing criminal operations centered on Deh Yak District Governor Hajji Fazil, Ghazni City Mayor Hakimullah Ghazniwal, Meshrano Jirga member and Tajik community leader Mawlana Abdul Rahman, and Director of Reconstruction and Rural Development Sanai Mayel -- with significant involvement by current Ghazni Governor Usman Usmani.
THE GHAZNI ARBAKAI
------------------
3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX informed us that Governor Usmani and some district governors embezzled funds intended to pay local Afghan "Arbakai" security forces who worked during the election period securing polling sites. (Per reftel B, community based security payments were problematic in many provinces, and there was little transparency relating to the payment mechanisms.) According to these sources, approximately USD 160,000 was dispatched from the Presidential Palace to Governor Usmani to pay the Arbakai. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that Usmani kept approximately USD 100,000, dividing the rest between the district governors of Deh Yak, Giro, Zanakhan, Gelan, Qarabah, Ab Band, Moqur, and Ghazni City. XXXXXXXXXXXX said these district governors submitted fictitious lists of Arbakai from their districts and have not distributed any of the payments. (Comment: Considering the general lack of security in these districts, with the exception of Ghazni City and parts of Qarabagh, and our assumption that little or no voting actually took place there on election day, we doubt there were any Arbakai working in these districts in the first place. End Comment.) XXXXXXXXXXXX similarly affirmed that no payments were disbursed there to pay 50 legitimate Arbakai.
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MISAPPROPRIATING REFUGEE LAND
-----------------------------
4. (C) According to both XXXXXXXXXXXX, Afghan government officials appropriated land in 2005 outside Ghazni to create a "returnee village," where refugees and Internally Displace Persons (IDP) originally from Ghazni could return and receive a small plot of land on which to build a home. XXXXXXXXXXXX The commission divided the land up into four large sections, each consisting of many small plots. Two of the sections are on a hill and are generally undesirable as real estate, while the other two sections are flat land nearer Ghazni city and ideal for building and development. Most of the land in the flat sections was given to government officials, their relatives -- some of whom were minors, and fictitious refugees. Allegedly, they were later sold for profit. The report of XXXXXXXXXXXX was sent to then-Chief Prosecutor of Ghazni, who appointed a team to investigate cases which included the director of refugees and the deputy governor. No indictment was ever issued. XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed that these allegations are largely true.
THE WHEAT HEIST
---------------
5. (C) According toXXXXXXXXXXXX, senior government officials have long corrupted the World Food Program's (WFP) emergency wheat shipments and Work for Food Program. According to these sources, the governor, RRD line director, and certain district governors are engaged in a scheme to divert WFP wheat and other food items to the black market to be sold. Part of the scheme involves pocketing the money from WFP to pay for transport of the wheat, thus providing the RRD director an excuse to tell the farther out, predominantly Hazara districts that he cannot deliver because he cannot pay for transportation. The Governor allegedly signs transportation contracts, but the wheat is sold and the money embezzled.
6. (C) Former Zanakhan District Governor Mohammed Hassan was arrested attempting to sell a shipment and released on order from the governor. (Note: Ref A reports on Mohammed Hassan, who was fired as District Governor of Qarabagh district after he was arrested and charged with rape in the spring 2009; he was released under questionable circumstances and secured an appointment from Governor Usmani as District governor of Zanakhan. Hassan was fired from this post on December 2. End Note.) According to sources, Deh Yak District Governor Hajji Fazil also sold wheat intended for 1,788 families in Deh Yak. Provincial Reconstruction Team officials also recently prevented RRD from diverting wheat intended for Ajiristan District to Qarabagh, where the suspicion was it would either have been sold by the district governor or police chief, or "intercepted" by the insurgency.
CHROMITE SMUGGLING TO PAKISTAN, CONTRACTOR SHAKE-DOWNS, PERSONAL ENRICHMENT
---------------------------------------------
7. (C) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Governor Usmani has long been running a chromite smuggling operation into Pakistan from mines in Zanakhan District, as well as Wardak and Logar Provinces, sending his personal security force to escort trucks carrying chromite so they can pass Highway One checkpoints without inspection. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the chromite trafficking is arranged by Hajji Pacha Han, an Usmani associate from Kandahar who lives in the Governor's official residence. XXXXXXXXXXXX said, for example, that Usmani and Hajji Fazil intervened early this year when eight trucks carrying chromite were seized by the NDS in Ghazni. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Usmani and Fazil secured the release of the trucks and the detained smuggler, Hajji Ibrahim. XXXXXXXXXXXX
8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX informed Task Force representatives that Governor Usmani and RRD Director Mayel extort bribes and kickbacks from local businesses and PRT contractors. A simple "shake-down," they allege, entails contractors who must pay a bribe to obtain official approvals; harassment for not paying includes having workers chased off job sites by armed men, sometimes by uniformed members of the ANP, is also common.
9. (C) Most credible interlocutors also assert that Governor Usmani and his accomplices in GIRoA routinely embezzle government funds and international aid money intended for public administration and humanitarian assistance. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the governor receives 1.4 million Afghanis per month for administrative and representational expenses, but pockets it; additionally, he allegedly received kickbacks from vendors for official purchases. XXXXXXXXXXXX admitted to the PRT that he similarly funds personal living expenses in Ghazni city.
COMMENT
-------
10. (C) It is difficult to imagine sustainable gains in security, governance, and development agendas without addressing the pervasive corruption that plagues Ghazni's public administration. The foundation of security and governance strategy in Ghazni, as in Afghanistan as a whole, requires popular acceptance of and support for GIRoA authority. Obtaining such support is very unlikely given the current situation -- where sub-national government officials' attitude toward citizens is largely predatory. PRT efforts in Ghazni have been focused on bringing GIRoA officials back to Pashtun districts where they have been absent for years. It is becoming increasingly difficult, however, to convince local Pushtuns that GIRoA presence and development programs portend stability and prosperity. The venality of provincial administration instead turns historical Pushtun skepticism of central government authority into outright hostility. Ongoing and new efforts to link the population of Ghazni to legitimate governance -- short, concerted, and effective efforts to root out corruption -- will pose significant challenges.
11. (C) On their own, dismayed provincial law enforcement and judicial institutions are clearly unwilling and incapable of dealing with the scope of corruption they face. Ghazni's provincial ANP and NDS chiefs want to clean up public administration, but admit they remain powerless to tackle the most egregious corruption cases. Senior government officials act with impunity; minor officials use bribery and political influence to avoid prosecution. XXXXXXXXXXXX is blunt about the road ahead: XXXXXXXXXXXX. Mindful of the above, the impetus and resources needed to address provincial corruption in the near-term must come from outside Ghazni. XXXXXXXXXXXX The Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) of the Major Crimes Task Force, which itself is limited in terms of the number of vetted prosecutors, investigators, and judges, has yet to extend its reach into the provinces; a system of effective and direct anti-corruption mechanisms is largely lacking within the international community.
12. (C) While public corruption in Ghazni appears pervasive in scope, it lacks significant complexity; much is considered an open secret. Consequently, effective legal action would not require years of work by skilled investigators -- short-term assignment of the right mix of Afghan prosecutorial staff and supporting ANP and NDS investigators, as well as USG mentors, could be sufficient to break the criminal cycle of corruption in Ghazni. However, a major challenge to successful legal action by the GIRoA will be the Afghan legal system's limited institutional capacity. The Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) currently has four vetted prosecutors and a limited number of vetted investigators to numerous pending corruption cases from all over the country. As a result, the PRT and Task Force will work with the Embassy to develop not only investigative and prosecution tools, but also non-judicial mechanisms to bring greater civil service reform, budget and programmatic transparency, and non-judicial forms of accountability to address systemic corruption. Trusted interlocutors in Ghazni, as is the case elsewhere in Afghanistan, provide us insight into the activities of nefarious government officials, but they do so at considerable risk to themselves, their families, and associates. Should we not quickly develop mechanisms to root out the current corrupt practices and take a firm stand in Ghazni where corruption is rampant, corrupt government officials will be emboldened and the population further alienated. 13. (U) This message was drafted by PRT Ghazni. RICCIARDONE
Sunday, 27 December 2009, 11:34
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 004150
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD
EO 12958 DECL: 12/27/2019
TAGS KDEM, PGOV, PINR, KDEMAF, AF
SUBJECT: ABOVE THE LAW: CORRUPT GOVERNOR THWARTS GOVERNANCE
AND DEVELOPMENT IN PAKTYA PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN
REF: KABUL 1345
Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Director Hoyt Yee for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Paktya Governor Juma Khan Hamdard has the skills and charisma to be a successful politician. However, his Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) connections, alleged meddling in political affairs in Balkh Province, leadership of a province-wide corruption scheme, and suspected contacts with insurgents make him detrimental to the future of Afghanistan. Through an investigation of corruption involving a local (Afghan) engineer assigned to the U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the province, Patkya's National Directorate of Security (NDS) Chief informs that Hamdard is the central point of a vast corruption network involving the provincial chief of police and several Afghan ministry line directors. Alleged skimming of USG development funds occurs at four stages of a project: when contractors bid on a project, at application for building permits, during construction, and at the ribbon-cutting ceremony. These allegations of corruption hamper USG relations with GIRoA officials, as well as contractors, and are being reviewed by U.S. Embassy law enforcement officials. As with other corruption cases, a major challenge to successful prosecution will be the Afghan legal system's limited institutional capacity -- the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) currently has four vetted prosecutors and a limited number of vetted investigators to work this and numerous other pending corruption cases from all over the country. End Summary.
GOVERNOR'S PEDIGREE AS HIG COMMANDER
------------------------------------
2. (S) Governor Hamdard was born in 1954 and is an ethnic Pashtun from Balkh Province. He is a member of the Wardak tribe from Mazar-i-Sharif. He supposedly completed high school, but has poor reading and writing skills. During the war with the Soviets, Hamdard fought under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's leadership and was a HiG commander. In 1994, he fought with General Dostum against the Taliban until he defected to the Taliban's side and assisted in their victory over Dostum in 1997-98. Following the U.S.-led coalition's invasion in 2001, Hamdard rejoined Dostum's forces, although relations were uneasy. Following the war, he served as Number 8 Corps Commander in Balkh. Hamdard was later appointed governor of Baghlan and then Jowzjan provinces. He became governor of Paktya in December 2007. Hamdard also is one of President Karzai's Tribal Advisors. He is affiliated with Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan (HiA), a political party, and is its leader in northern Afghanistan. Sensitive reporting indicates that Hamdard is still serving as a HiG commander and leads a faction of HiG fighters in the north. He often signs memos with the military title "Lieutenant General."
3. (C) In Paktya, Hamdard has shown himself to be a very charismatic leader. Nevertheless, he spends more time outside the province than in it, leaving most governance responsibilities to Deputy Governor Abdul Rahman Mangal. Prior to the August 2009 elections, he stated on several occasions to U.S. representatives that he expected to leave Paktya for a governorship in another province or a national position following the elections. Rumors in Gardez and Jalalabad place him as a top candidate for the governor of Nangarhar. (Comment. As Nangarhar's governor, he would have access to significant revenues generated at the Torkham Gate border crossing with Pakistan. End comment.)
THREATENING THE USE OF FORCE DURING ELECTION CAMPAIGNING
--------------------------------------------- ----
4. (C) During the pre-election period for both the August 20 elections and the subsequent planned run-off, Hamdard spent a significant amount of time outside of Paktya reportedly campaigning for President Karzai. According to Afghan and international press, his activities in Balkh Province during this period created potential for armed conflict. Abdullah Abdullah supporters claimed that Hamdard abused his government position by campaigning in the northern provinces and distributing weapons to Balkh's Pashtun districts in order to destabilize the province. Hamdard denied these charges and armed clashes were avoided because the run-off was canceled, but his activities in Balkh demonstrated the strong support base that he continues to maintain in the north.
UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR 2007 DEATHS OF DEMONSTRATORS
KABUL 00004150 002 OF 003
--------------------------------------------- -
5. (C) Hamdard's own comments on his governorship in Paktya leave the impression he was "banished" to this southeastern province. In May 2007 he was forced to resign as governor of Jowzjan when thousands demonstrated against him. Forces under his command shot at demonstrators in the Uzbek town of Shibirghan, killing thirteen and injuring more than thirty, reportedly further straining relations with Dostum because many of the demonstrators were Junbesh party members and Dostum supporters. XXXXXXXXXXXX informed us that the Ministry of the Interior Administration Deputy requested his assistance in arresting Governor Hamdard and bringing him to trial for the charges. No action has been taken to carry out this request.
CENTER OF PAKTYA CORRUPTION SCHEME
------------------------------
6. (S) On August 23, the Paktya office of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) arrested PRT Paktya's local national engineer Jawid Khairudeen, an Afghan citizen, for engaging in corrupt contract practices. Investigations surrounding the Jawid case reveal an extensive network of corruption throughout the province of which Hamdard and his Office Director/Chief of Staff Hashmatullah Yousifi are allegedly at the center. Paktya NDS Chief Ali Ahmad Mubaraz and eyewitnesses have accused Hamdard of soliciting bribes from contractors by having contractors arrested at job sites and held until the bribes are paid. NDS also accuses Hamdard of being an active member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) in Balkh Province, funneling money he receives from bribes and smuggling (drugs and jewels) to HiG operations in his home province of Balkh. He allegedly has illicit contacts with insurgents in Parwan, Kunar, and Kabul provinces, as well as Pakistani intelligence (ISI) and Iranian (affiliation unknown, possibly IRGC) operatives, through his business in Dubai; he is allegedly a business partner with Gulbaddin Hekmatyr's son in Dubai. Evidence collected in the case points to corruption involving U.S. funds and actively undermining GIRoA counter-insurgency policy.
7. (C) On October 29 XXXXXXXXXXXX came to Forward Operating Base Gardez to speak with the PRT about corruption in Governor Hamdard's office. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, there are four opportunities at the provincial level for illegally skimming USG funds during the life cycle of a PRT development project: the first is during the bidding/selection process. At this stage Afghan ministry line directors, who are part of the contractor selection process, receive payments to rig the scores assigned to contractors so that they will receive the highest scores and qualify for the contract. The second opportunity occurs when the contractor requests a permit to start work. The Governor's signature is needed for the permit, so payments are made to intermediaries to secure the governor's signature. The third occasion occurs during the quality assessment/quality control (QA/QC) process. At this stage, workers may be arrested at the construction site and held until the requesting QA/QC government official is paid a bribe; the other possibility is that the contractor must pay off the public works official conducting QA/QC on the project in order to receive a positive report. The final opportunity for graft occurs at the ribbon-cutting ceremony where significant sums of money are sometimes passed during the gift-giving part of the ceremony.
STRONG SENSE OF IMPUNITY
---------------------
8. (C) Based on evidence collected, Hamdard and his accomplices allegedly act with complete impunity, blatantly placing themselves above the law. Contractors have informed the PRT that Hamdard told them he does not care about possible repercussions of his corrupt practices "because he's under investigation already;" if contractors "complain to the PRT about him, he will have them chained and dragged to his office." Adding salt to the wound, on October 19, the Governor called PRT leadership and the maneuver commander to his office to confront them with an e-mail Hamdard obtained in which a PRT officer asked a contractor constructing border police checkpoints questions about corruption involving Paktya's chief of police and Hamdard. (Note: The e-mail was apparently leaked to Hamdard although he stated he received it from a GIRoA source. End Note.) During the meeting Hamdard waxed indignant and, in a memo dated soon after,
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proscribed ministerial line directors from meeting further with UNAMA or PRT officials, or answering queries from them. Word has consequently spread about the corruption investigations; and interlocutors are reluctant to talk to NDS and Coalition Forces representatives -- many stating that their lives are threatened.
COMMENT
-----
9. (C) Allegations of corruption surrounding Governor Hamdard have come from all quarters including the private sector, public employees, and XXXXXXXXXXXX. Afghans throughout the province generally regard him as corrupt. Hamdard's ham-fisted approach to intimidate international partners and the PRT, while not an admission of guilt, illustrates his contempt for the international donor community, GIRoA, the lawful processes for development within ministry line directories in particular, and the rule of law. His reported statement that he wants to "declare a jihad against the PRT" is illustrative of the strained relations with the PRT. Somewhat fortunately, Governor Hamdard is often away in Kabul or Balkh Province and Deputy Governor Mangal is a capable administrator and thoughtful intermediary.
10. (C) If Hamdard's case comes to trial, his political influence and HIG ties make it possible or perhaps likely that corruption among other high-ranking government officials in the Province and beyond will be exposed. The PRT has briefed this case to the embassy via appropriate channels and will share the investigative documentation to date. U.S. law enforcement officers based in Kabul will work with the Afghan Attorney General's office to develop this case further. As with other corruption cases, a major challenge to successful prosecution will be the Afghan legal system's limited institutional capacity. The Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) currently has four vetted prosecutors and a limited number of vetted investigators to work this and numerous other pending corruption cases from all over the country. 11. (U) This message was drafted at the Paktya PRT in Gardez. RICCIARDONE
Monday, 19 October 2009, 13:58
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003364
SIPDIS
DEPT PASS TO S/SRAP, S/CT, EEB, and SCA/A
EO 12958 DECL: 10/19/2019
TAGS EINV,EFIN, KTFN, PGOV, AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: CAPITAL FLIGHT AND ITS IMPACT ON FUTURE
STABILITY
REF: A. KABUL 2791 B. KABUL 3326
Classified By: CDDEA Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1.(S) SUMMARY: Afghanistan's is a cash-based economy, relying on historic trade linkages with neighboring and regional partners. Given Afghanistan's strategic location, ongoing conflict, and deep involvement in illicit trade (e.g., narcotics), as well as some neighboring country currency exchange policies, vast amounts of cash come and go from the country on a weekly, monthly, and annual basis. Before the August 20 election, $600 million in banking system withdrawals were reported; however, in recent months, some $200 million has flowed back into the country. In terms of total money leaving the country, analysts are uncertain whether it is generated within Afghanistan or is moving through Afghanistan from other countries such as Pakistan (Pakistan's strict currency controls makes smuggling through Kabul International Airport (KIA) an attractive option). Experts also do not know the ratio of licit and illicit monies leaving the country. Given Afghanistan's general political uncertainty, lack of credible and safe investment opportunities, and unsettled election, it appears that individuals moved more money than normal out of the Afghan banking sector and country as a hedge before the elections. While some of the money appears to be returning, Mission -- with support from Washington agencies and other posts in the region -- will work to closely monitor the cash movements, both as a sign of public confidence in GIRoA and for possible illicit financial activities. End summary.
Recent Trends
-------------
2. (S) While reports vary widely, records obtained from Kabul International Airport (KIA) support suspicions large amounts of physical cash transit from Kabul to Dubai on a weekly, monthly, and annual basis. According to confidential reports, more than $190 million left Kabul for Dubai through KIA during July, August, and September. Actual amounts, however, could be much larger. An official claiming first-hand knowledge recently told the Treasury Attache some $75 million transited through KIA bound for Dubai in one day during the month of July. The primary currencies identified at the airport for these three months include (in declining order): Saudi riyals, Euros, U.S. dollars, and UAE dirhams. Some Pakistani rupees and British pounds were also declared, but in much smaller amounts. Comparatively, in 2008, approximately $600 million was declared at KIA and another 100 million Euros and 80 million British pounds were declared bound for Dubai, according to available reports compiled by the Central Bank's Financial Intelligence Unit. According to our sources, established couriers primarily use Pamir Airlines, which is owned by Kabul Bank and influential Afghans such as Mahmood Karzai and Mohammad Fahim who is President Hamid Karzai's current vice-presidential running mate.
One Factor: Election Unease
---------------------------
3. (S) In an October 7 meeting, Afghan Central Bank Governor Abdul Qadeer Fitrat stressed there are no indications of significant capital flight. He pointed to a stable exchange rate and increasing assets in the formal financial system as supporting his perspective. Fitrat also mentioned that the formal banking system is well capitalized and the regulatory capital ratio of all banking institutions is above the minimum threshold (12 percent of risk-weighted assets.) Nevertheless, Fitrat did note the Central Bank was aware roughly $600 million had left Afghanistan's banking system before the elections, due, he said, tainty as to the outcome of the election and the prospects for the new government. Fitrat could not say what percentage of this money actually left the country. (Note: Nor are there statistics showing how much was withdrawn or transferred through the more informal hawala network. End note.) As of October 7, more than $200 million has returned to the banking sector according to Fitrat. The Central Bank Governor restated this figure in an October 13 meeting between Fitrat and the Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs (ref B).
4. (C) Separately, and in the same timeframe as the meeting with Fitrat, CEOs from several leading banks approached the Treasury Attache with concerns over significant cash withdrawals and wire transfers to other accounts in Dubai and Europe. In separate meetings October 12, several bankers reported deposits are growing and appeared positive about future prospects. However, the various bankers noted widespread uncertainty about the ongoing election process and overall security situation will likely continue to spook Afghanistan's existing and potential investors, and as a result, undermine growth. One experienced banker flatly said no legitimate business person would keep significant sums of money in Afghanistan right now given the overwhelming risks of doing so.
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Illicit Versus Licit
--------------------
5. (C) Taking capital out of Afghanistan (physically through cash or value or by using wire transfer) is not illegal, as long as it is declared. For example, formal financial flows (e.g., wire transfers) over $10,000 are recorded by banks and submitted to the Central Bank's Financial Intelligence Unit for analysis. All 17 licensed banks submit these reports on a monthly basis. Similarly, cash couriers transiting KIA or crossing the land border must declare carried cash if it exceeds $20,000. This regulation is better enforced at KIA than along Afghanistan's porous borders, which further complicates full-understanding of this already complex problem-set.
6. (S) While it is impossible to know for sure at this point, our sense is the money leaving Afghanistan is likely a combination of illicit and licit proceeds. Drug traffickers, corrupt officials, and to a large extent licit business owners do not benefit from keeping millions of dollars in Afghanistan and instead are motivated (due to risk and return-on-investment) to move value into accounts and investments outside of Afghanistan. For example, the United Arab Emirates government revealed, as part of an ongoing Drug Enforcement Administration/Afghan Threat Finance Cell investigation, that it had stopped Afghan Vice-President Ahmad Zia Masood entering the country with $52 million earlier this year -- a significant amount he was ultimately allowed to keep without revealing the money's origin or destination. Moreover, Sher Khan Farnood, the Chairman of Kabul Bank, reportedly owns 39 properties on the Palm Jumeirah in Dubai and has other financial interests spread widely beyond Afghanistan. (Note: Many other notable private individuals and public officials maintain assets (primarily property) outside Afghanistan, suggesting these individuals are extracting as much wealth as possible while conditions permit. End note.)
Comment
-------
7. (S) The sense among Mission elements is that significant volumes of cash leave Afghanistan through wire transfers, the hawala network and physically through the airport. We do not know, however, whether this money is generated within Afghanistan or brought in from other countries such as Pakistan for transfer (Pakistan strictly enforces currency controls, making smuggling through KIA an attractive option.) We also do not know the ratio of licit and illicit monies leaving the country (with the former more likely to return at some point.) Given Afghanistan's general political uncertainty, lack of credible and safe investment opportunities, and unsettled election, we are inclined to believe several individuals moved more money than normal out of the Afghan banking sector and country as a measure of protection before the elections. We will continue to monitor and engage on the issue here. However, input from Washington agencies as well as from other missions in the region will be key in developing a clearer understanding of the composition, size, and directions of these cash flows. End comment.
EIKENBERRY
Friday, 26 February 2010, 19:23
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000141
SIPDIS
NOFORN
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA DAS JACOBSON, MEX LEE AND PPC NSC FOR RESTREPO AND O'REILLY
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/02/26
TAGS PREL, OAS, KSUM, KPIN, CACM, CDB, XM, XR, XS, XL, MX
SUBJECT: Mexico's Latin American Unity Summit -- Back to the Future?
REF: 10 MEXICO 127; 10 SANTIAGO 51; 10 SANTO DOMINGO 67
DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 B, D
1. (C) Summary: Mexico's ambitious plan to use its final Rio Group Presidency Summit (Cancun 22-23 February) to create a new more operational forum for regional cooperation failed dramatically. The two-day event was dominated by press accounts of ALBA country theatrics and their usual proclivity towards third world, anti-imperialist rhetoric. Nothing practical was achieved on the two pressing regional priorities - Haiti (President Preval did attend but the discussion was an obscured footnote) and Honduras (Pres. Lobo was not even invited in deference to Venezuela/ALBA) - and Brazil and the ALBA countries outmaneuvered the Mexicans, leaving the details of the new organization in the hands of a Latin American and Caribbean Summit (CALC) structure that will be managed by Brazil and Venezuela in 2011. End Summary
2. (C) Notwithstanding President Calderon's best intentions to create a more practical regional forum for regionally dealing with Latin American priorities (ref A), Mexico's Latin American Unity summit in the tourist resort of Cancun (22-23 February) was poorly conceived, inadequately managed, and badly executed. The Cancun Declaration presents a long laundry list of issues without specifying any details on how they will be operationally translated into effective international action. The meeting did not agree on a name for the new organization (see below), on a date for when it will be launched, or on any practical details (secretariat, funding, etc.) that would indicate how the new organization would develop. Worse yet was the press play and unofficial commentary from informed sources, that were downright derisive of the meeting and the contradictory message it sent about Mexico's interests and foreign policy.
3. (C) Already at the ceremonial opening on Monday (22 February) it was clear that things were not going well. Negotiations on the declaration had ground down on the operational details of the communique and Brazil and the ALBA countries were firmly resisting Mexico's proposal that the new forum be constituted immediately with agreement on institutional details. Brazilian President Lula did not want to see the CALC be subsumed before the end of his Presidency and Venezuelan President Chavez wanted to leave his CALC Summit (Venezuela assumes the CALC Presidency from Brazil in 2011) on schedule, and available for a grand launching of the new forum that, as he said to the press, would commemorate the realization of the Bolivarian themes of Latin American solidarity in the birthplace of the "Great Liberator." Chavez was his usual, over the top self in proclaiming the death of the Organization of American States (OAS), in lending a hand to Argentine President Kirchner's protest against British drilling for oil in the Malvinas, and in almost coming to blows with Colombian President Uribe over the latter's protest of Venezuela's economic embargo against Colombia. Bolivian President Morales played the supporting role as Chavez' factotum, parroting Chavez' speeches and lavishing praise and compliments on Raul Castro's Cuba. Ecuadorian President Correa used the meeting to try and divert money laundering allegations leveled against Ecuador, by suggesting the need for a new "more balanced" regional mechanism to address the issue.
4. (C) Even Calderon's own PAN party officials were privately dismissive of the event. PAN international affairs coordinator Rodrigo Cortez characterized the meeting as a "sad spectacle that does nothing to project our party's views on international priorities and the importance of the relationship between Mexico and the United States." He decried the public images of Calderon "hugging and cavorting" with Chavez, Morales and Castro and was pessimistic from the start that anything practical would come from the meeting. "We did not even invite Honduras, leaving them out of the meeting in order to ensure ALBA participation - a decision that turned the meeting upside down with regard to our concrete security and other interests."
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5. (C) The low point of the meeting was the verbal exchange between Uribe and Chavez at the opening day official lunch. Uribe raised Venezuela's economic embargo on Colombia, terming it unhelpful and inconsistent with the region's economic interest and at odds with Venezuela's strong criticism of the U.S. Embargo on Cuba. Colombia's Ambassador in Mexico, Luis Camilo Osorio, told the polmincouns that, contrary to press accounts, Uribe raised the issue in a non-confrontational way. According to Osorio and press accounts, Chavez reacted emotionally accusing Colombia of having sent assassination squads to kill him and ended a verbal and physical tirade with "You can go to hell; I am leaving (the lunch)." Uribe responded, "Don't be a coward and leave just to insult me from a distance." Verbal and body language continued to escalate, until Raul Castro stepped in to urge civilized discussion. Outside of the dining room, Venezuelan security officials were scuffling with Mexican security guards in an attempt to assist their President.
6. (C) Osorio was very critical of the Summit, terming it the worst expression of Banana Republic discourse that blames all of the regions problems on others without any practical solutions of their own. Osorio said the Colombians had proposed working jointly on a concrete agenda during Calderon's recent visit to Colombia. The Mexicans, he said, were not interested, confident that they had everything under control. Osorio opined that "Calderon had simply put a bunch of the worst types together in a room, expecting to outsmart them. Instead, Brazil outplayed him completely, and Venezuela outplayed Brazil." There was no practical planning, there was no management of the agenda, and there was none of the legwork that would have been needed to yield a practical and useful outcome.
7. (C) Brazilian DCM Antonio Francisco Da Costa E Silva Neto conveyed his country's view that Brazil had done a better job of managing the summit than the Mexican hosts. Brazil was able to ensure that the new Rio Group would emerge, not from the Summit, but from ongoing discussions in the Rio Group and the CALC, where Brazil could exert its influence. The CALC survived and Brazil would be managing that process as part of the troika when it turned over the presidency to Venezuela.
8. (C) We heard similar themes from ex-Ambassador Jorge Montano, a PRI-connected, former respected senior Mexican diplomat. He echoed Cortez' criticism, channeling it into an elegant but critical op-ed in Mexico daily Universal (Feb 26). Montano's piece, entitled "With or Without the OAS," reviewed briefly the history of Latin American regional forums, also criticizing U.S. lack of attention to the region (e.g. Summit of Americas) but noting the practical achievements realized in the OAS. He called the Summit unnecessary and inconsistent with Mexico's interests and called for immediate damage control. Montano told us that he received separate calls from Calderon and from Foreign Secretary Espinoza, irate over his criticism.
9. (C) The media coverage did not in any way suggest a practical forum and there was a good supply of criticism, in addition to Montano's piece, which was respectful in its choice of words. The most damning criticism was a political cartoon in the leading daily Reforma (Feb 24) which depicted a large Chavez gorilla, with a small Castro perched on his back playing an accordion labeled "CanCubaZuela Group" with a small image of Calderon dancing to the music and waving marimbas. Osorio told us at a same day Central Bank event with leading Mexican businessmen that there were abundant references to the cartoon and its apt characterization of the Summit's result.
Comment
------------------
10. (C) In the end Mexico was limited to agreement on a new forum but without any specific commitments on institutional details. The Cancun declaration is a bulging rhetorical exercise
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that reflects the lack of agreement with its general and non-specific language. The press play leaned towards the critical side and even those who recognized Calderon's well-mentioned effort focused more attention on the paltry results. Even on the issues that Mexico argued to us before the summit were reasons for bolstering the Rio Group -- success on Colombia-Venezuela-Ecuador problem - the Summit result was directly contrary to hopes for a new more operational mechanism in the region.
11. (C) We have not had yet received the official GOM post-Summit read-out from our SRE and Presidency sources - they have been busy finishing the Declaration and doing follow up work with the Latin American Missions. We will be shortly following up with their analysis and comments on the way ahead, and their plans for deepening trade and investment through a new arrangement with Brazil, announced at the end of the Summit. Whatever their read out, this is not playing here as a "diplomatic success," except in some very general sense of raising the need for more effective regional action. Unfortunately, the Cancun Latin American Unity Summit was not an example of a new and bold step into the future but rather a reminder of Mexico's at times conflicting message on how it sees the future of the region and Mexico's role as one of its leaders. PASCUAL
Wednesday, 24 June 2009, 11:37
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001651
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/A, INL, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR FLOURNOY
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICENT
KABUL FOR COS USFOR-A
EO 12958 DECL: 06/23/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, MASS, AF
SUBJECT: 06/23/09 MEETING, ASSISTANT AMB MUSSOMELI AND MOI
MINISTER ATMAR: KUNDUZ DYNCORP PROBLEM, TRANSPORT FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND OTHER TOPICS
REF: KABUL 1480
Classified By: POLMIL COUNSELOR ROBERT CLARKE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND ( D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Assistant Ambassador Mussomeli discussed a range of issues with Minister of Interior (MoI) Hanif Atmar on June 23. On the Kunduz Regional Training Center (RTC) DynCorp event of April 11 (reftel), Atmar reiterated his insistence that the U.S. try to quash any news article on the incident or circulation of a video connected with it. He continued to predict that publicity would "endanger lives." He disclosed that he has arrested two Afghan police and nine other Afghans as part of an MoI investigation into Afghans who facilitated this crime of "purchasing a service from a child." He pressed for CSTC-A to be given full control over the police training program, including contractors. Mussomeli counseled that an overreaction by the Afghan goverment (GIRoA) would only increase chances for the greater publicity the MoI is trying to forestall.
2. (C) On armored vehicles and air transport for presidential candidates, Atmar pitched strongly to have the GIRoA decide which candidates were under threat and to retain control of allocation of these assets. He agreed with the principle of a level playing field for candidates but argued that "direct support by foreigners" demonstrated a lack of confidence in GIRoA. If GIRoA failed to be fair, international assets and plans in reserve could be used. On another elections-related issue, Atmar claimed that two Helmand would-be provincial candidates (and key Karzai supporters) disqualified under DIAG rules had actually possessed weapons as part of a GIRoA contract to provide security for contractors.
3. (C) Atmar also was enthusiastic about working out arrangements with the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) in RC-South to partner with the Afghan Border Police (ABP) on training and joint operations to extend GIRoA governance south. He is considering giving BG Melham, a highly regarded Afghan officer, responsibility for ABP in Nimruz and Helmand provinces. END SUMMARY.
KUNDUZ RTC DYNCORP UPDATE
4. (C) On June 23, Assistant Ambassador Mussomeli met with MOI Minister Hanif Atmar on a number of issues, beginning with the April 11 Kunduz RTC DynCorp investigation. Amb Mussomeli opened that the incident deeply upset us and we took strong steps in response. An investigation is on-going, disciplinary actions were taken against DynCorp leaders in Afghanistan, we are also aware of proposals for new procedures, such as stationing a military officer at RTCs, that have been introduced for consideration. (Note: Placing military officers to oversee contractor operations at RTCs is not legally possible under the currentDynCorp contract.) Beyond remedial actions taken, we still hope the matter will not be blown out of proportion, an outcome which would not be good for either the U.S. or Afghanistan. A widely-anticipated newspaper article on the Kunduz scandal has not appeared but, if there is too much noise that may prompt the journalist to publish.
5. (C) Atmar said he insisted the journalist be told that publication would endanger lives. His request was that the U.S. quash the article and release of the video. Amb Mussomeli responded that going to the journalist would give her the sense that there is a more terrible story to report. Atmar then disclosed the arrest of two Afghan National Police (ANP) and nine other Afghans (including RTC language assistants) as part of an MoI investigation into Afghan "facilitators" of the event. The crime he was pursuing was "purchasing a service from a child," which in Afghanistan is illegal under both Sharia law and the civil code, and against the ANP Code of Conduct for police officers who might be involved. He said he would use the civil code and that, in this case, the institution of the ANP will be protected, but he worried about the image of foreign mentors. Atmar said that President Karzai had told him that his (Atmar's) "prestige" was in play in management of the Kunduz DynCorp matter and another recent event in which Blackwater contractors mistakenly killed several Afghan citizens. The President had asked him "Where is the justice?"
6. (C) Atmar said there was a larger issue to consider. He
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understood that within DynCorp there were many "wonderful" people working hard, and he was keen to see proper action taken to protect them; but, these contractor companies do not have many friends. He was aware that many questions about them go to SRAP Holbrooke and, in Afghanistan, there is increasing public skepticism about contractors. On the other hand, the conduct of the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is disciplined. Looking at these facts, he said, he wanted CSTC-A in charge. He wanted the ANP to become a model security institution just like the Afghan National Army (ANA) and National Directorate for Security (NDS), and the contractors were not producing what was desired. He suggested that the U.S. establish and independent commission to review the mentor situation, an idea he said Ambassador Eikenberry had first raised. Atmar added that he also wanted tighter control over Afghan employees. He was convinced that the Kunduz incident, and other events where mentors had obtained drugs, could not have happened without Afghan participation.
ARMORED VEHICLES (AND AIR TRANSPORT) FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES
7. (C) Atmar expressed strong opinions about the use of armored vehicles for travel by presidential candidates that he has requested be provided to MoI by the U.S. and UK. He said it was up to MoI to decide whether a candidate was under threat or not. Atmar opined that it should be an MoD responsibility to provide air transport for presidential candidates. Amb Mussomeli explained that we want a level playing field, which Atmar agreed was necessary. However, Atmar said there were two important considerations: 1) some of the electorate will view that the candidates are controlled by foreigners if provided non-GIRoA transport; and 2) bypassing the MoI or MoD with "direct support by foreigners" demonstrated a lack of confidence in the Afghanistan government. When Amb Mussomeli said MOD lacked adequate aircraft to cover all candidates, Atmar responded that MoD could ask ISAF for help but should retain control of the travel. Amb Mussomeli pointed out that some reasonably worried that such a plan will falter or will not be fairly implemented. Atmar answered "Just give us a chance. If we fail, then you have your own planes and plans in reserve."
DIAG-DISQUALIFIED CANDIDATES IN HELMAND
8. (C) In a discussion on two would-be provincial election candidates in Helmand who were disqualified by the Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) program, Atmar said he had looked into requests to stand firm against their reinstatement, but it was a "big, contentious issue that is not explainable to President Karzai." Atmar said that the only reason these two candidates were barred was for having weapons, apparently against DIAG rules. In fact, he said, they were "contracted by the state" to have those weapons in order to provide security for contractors. He acknowledged that the "contract" had not been properly registered, and suggested that the GIRoA would take care of the registration.
AFGHAN BORDER POLICE (ABP) AND PARTNERING WITH THE MARINES IN RC-SOUTH
9. (C) Atmar enthusiastically proposed an MOI meeting with the leadership of the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and CSTC-A to work out arrangements for good partnering, training, and joint operations with Afghan security forces in RC-South. The MEB would like two ABP companies (approximately 250 police) currently located near Lashkar Gah to move south, and to be mobile enough to move further south when opportunities arise. The MEB would like a customs officer to be attached to these ABP companies so that the reach of GIRoA governance can be extended when insurgent-controlled or dominated territory is opened. Atmar stopped short of making a final promise to give a highly-regarded Afghan officer, BG Melham (whom he personally respects), responsibility for the ABP in Nimruz and Helmand provinces, but he was aware of concerns about the current responsible officer (BG Noorzai).
KABUL INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL (ISK)
10. (U) Amb Mussomeli expressed concern over a plan by a District Police Chief to remove security barriers at ISK (an primary and secondary school partially dependent on USAID and other Mission funding support) that keep the road closed to
KABUL 00001651 003 OF 003
normal traffic. Removing the barriers could endanger the kids and teachers who walk between two compounds. Atmar said that he was very familiar with ISK and "no barriers would be touched," although he added that perhaps an arrangement could be made to unblock the road and have the ISK security personnel search vehicles.
EIKENBERRY
Thursday, 31 July 2008, 06:53
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 001975
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC PASS FOR WOOD
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT
EO 12958 DECL: 07/30/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, PINR, AF
SUBJECT: EX-TALIBAN SEEK MEDIATION ROLE
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Jeremiah Howard, for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
SUMMARY
-------
1. (C) On July 29, President Karzai gave the Ambassador a plan for negotiations with the Taliban that he had received from Taliban reconcilees (SEPTEL). In a meeting arranged by the presidency at our request the next day, prominent ex-Taliban said they are well-placed to mediate reconciliation with the insurgency, but argued they are hampered from doing so by their inclusion on U.N. List 1267. In earlier discussions, former Taliban government officials told us they reject Mullah Omar's fanaticism, rigidity and alliance with Al Qaeda, but that they fear the Taliban are in the ascendant and becoming more extreme. They stressed they accept the current constitution in general, but do want amendments to make clear the primacy of Islam.
Presidency Wants to Exploit Ex-Taliban as Mediators
--------------------------------------------- ------
2. (C) On July 30, Deputy National Security Advisor Engineer Ibrahim Spinzada, who is seeking U.S. support in convincing Russia to allow removal of names from United Nations List 1267, responded to our earlier request to arrange a meeting for Political Officers with reconcilees from the former Taliban government. He convoked to the meeting ex-Foreign Minister Maulavi Ahmad Mutawakkil, the Taliban nominee for ambassador to the United Nations Abdul Hakim Mujadid (Note: The Taliban regime was never accepted as sovereign by a preponderance of the world community), ex-Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Habibullah Fawzi, and ex-Deputy Education Minister and current Afghan Senator Arsala Rahmani.
3. (C) The four ex-Taliban mentioned the plan for negotiations that had been given to President Karzai, and, without referring directly to its text, emphasized several key points: -- Force alone cannot defeat the Taliban in either Afghanistan or Pakistan, but since the roots of Taliban insurgency lie in Afghanistan, resolution of conflict here would undermine Taliban rebellion in the FATA and NWFP; -- If the Taliban are reconciled, allied opposition groups, including those led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar or the Haqqanis, would disappear; -- Ex-Taliban are an unused resource for President Karzai and the international community, since they alone have access to both political leaders and command levels of the insurgency, and are willing to mediate in negotiations; -- There should be no preconditions for negotiations, which could take place in the Gulf or Saudi Arabia, or in Afghanistan in the presence of international forces; -- Negotiations should be an incremental process, avoiding initially issues such as ceasefire or the prison at Guantanamo, and stressing instead the cessation of Taliban attacks on NGOs, schools or roads, government commitment to minimize civilian casualties and good-will detainee releases; -- Reconcilees represent a silent majority in the Taliban who simply want to end the war, and had publicly accepted the constitution though they would favor amendments to enhance the constitutional role of Islam; -- Negotiations, reconciliation and restoration of security can and should be followed by elections, and some ex-Taliban would like to be candidates. -- Only when key moderates are removed from the 1267 List will they have the credibility needed to convince insurgents they can guarantee agreements they broker with Karzai or the international community.
Ex-Taliban Moderates as an Inchoate Movement
--------------------------------------------
4. (SBU) In the weeks leading up to our July 30 meeting, we established contact with numerous senior ex-Taliban. We provide the paragraphs below to give a sense of what they are thinking about how to end the insurgency and how best to achieve democratic -- but Islamic -- governance.
5. (SBU) Former Foreign Ministry aide Waheed Mujda has written a book on the Taliban ("Ahmed Rashid wrote from the outside, but I wrote from inside"). In the summer of 2001, he says he went to the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad to warn that Al Qaeda planned to use "massive explosives" to attack the U.S.
6. (SBU) Mujda repots that immediately after 9/11, the Taliban began to fracture over the wisdom and morality of attacking civilians, over lost economic opportunities if the Taliban isolated itself from the West, and over dangers to be faced if the U.S. occupied Afghanistan. There was also concern about growing reliance on Pakistan's ISI and deepening ties to Al Qaeda. Mujda hoped at the time that the U.S. would wait to attack the Taliban, since he predicted there would be "within the year" a definitive split between urban intellectuals led by Foreign Minister Mutawakkil, and Mullah Omar's village-based obscurantists. After the U.S. "installed" Karzai, though, he saw moderates' chances evaporating, while many lower-ranking Taliban with little commitment to either Mutawakkil or Mullah Omar proved opportunistic, waiting simply to see if the international community and Karzai could govern.
7. (SBU) Mujda lamented that Karzai named governors who harassed ex-Taliban of all ranks rather than open a dialog. Meanwhile, Mujda alleged, international forces committed atrocities, such as breaking down doors and searching women, that "even the Soviets taught soldiers to avoid." Afraid of "death or Guatanamo," some moderates concluded they had n alternative but to return to Mullah Omar. Wth the war ongoing, he contends, the Taliban as expanded its original commitments to "sharia, security and territorial integrity," to enompass an international dimension including demands that the U.S. leave Saudi Arabia.
Civilian Casualties and "Hunger Suicides"
-----------------------------------------
8. (C) The Taliban's Attorney General, Maulavi Jalal-u-Din Shinwari, agrees the Taliban is growing even more militant. Taliban ideologues have no serious doctrinal competition, he complained: the Karzai-allied Ulema Council is slow and inactive, meeting "only once a year, and that's in the presidential palace." Since moderates have limited effective intellectual or spiritual leadership, the Taliban and hardline mullahs in Pakistan have commandeered the right to define jihad, and channeled the jihadi impulse into "radical and violent forms."
9. (C) Shinwari lambasted international forces for repeated civilian casualty incidents, which make the Taliban's recruiting and ideological tasks easier. These "indiscriminate attacks" enable the Taliban to argue the U.S. does not care about Afghans or Islam, and that Karzai is in complicity with the U.S. or incapable of curbing U.S. excesses. As if this intense anger were not enough, he sputtered, there is also the despair of deepening poverty and inequality, creating for the first time "hunger suicides," who kill and die either to collect a Taliban payment or simply to lighten the economic burden on their families by removing one more mouth to feed.
Not a Loose Cannon
------------------
10. (SBU) Parliamentary Deputy Mullah Abdul Salaam Rocketi, whose name derives from his deft touch with a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, warns that the U.S. has not carefully identified its enemies. If the U.S. continues to "fight everyone," including Al Qaeda, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and both Taliban radicals and moderates, then he warns we cannot win, and that Pakistan, Iran or Russia will dominate Afghanistan.
11. (C) Rocketi counsels that "Karzai is lost," a feckless ally for the U.S. whose cabinet, he argues, is driven by members' separate and competing interests, unconcerned by the public's needs. On the infrequent occasions when Karzai works up the courage or is forced to "fire the thieves," Rocketi mutters, "he just replaces them with new thieves." Karzai's failure, he concludes, is "expanding the Taliban's once narrow doors of entry into wide gates." The U.S. must identify who within the Taliban is moderate or amenable to dialog, and work with them to seek peace and agree on how Afghanistan is to be governed.
Alternatives to Mullah Omar
---------------------------
12. (SBU) Two figures generally recognized as heading the ex-Taliban moderates are ex-Foreign Minister Mutawakkil, and ex-Ambassador to Pakistan Abdul Salim Zaef, who spent four years at Guantanamo and whom some see as the stronger of the two. We talked to them separately in late July.
13. (C) Mutawakil said the U.S. must realize there are two kinds of reconciliation. One, which he calls the U.S. strategy, is designed to entice insurgents into supporting Karzai. The other, he distinguished, is designed to end the war and achieve an understanding between the two warring Afghan sides. The war is being driven by foreign allies, he explained, but the U.S. on one side and Al Qaeda on the other have their own priorities. Mutawakil said he had advised Karzai to carry out negotiations with the insurgency, but to aim for incremental progress, concentrating first on small resolvable issues. Further, he had told Karzai, any negotiations must be conducted in private, with no interfering media coverage. The mediators, he half-joked, can be only "those whom neither the government nor Taliban want to be killed," and who maintain impartial contact with both warring sides. To make mediation possible, Zaef and Mutawakkil agree, U.N. 1267 restrictions must be lifted.
14. (C) Mutawakkil and Zaef believe firmly that the international community is distancing itself irreparably from ordinary Afghans. Mutawakkil argues that, as the U.S.-led coalition intensifies military operations, it drives the Taliban to seek self-preservation by attaching itself more closely to Al Qaeda and the Pakistani ISI. Zaef warns that the U.S. lacks cultural knowledge and sensitivity necessary to run Afghanistan through Karzai, and that given the difficulty of running legitimate and credible elections, it should allow the transfer of governing authority to a Loya Jirga. He warns that to be effective and bring peace, the members of this Jirga cannot be named by Karzai or seen to be puppets of the U.S., and that they should be named by a pre-Jirga representing tribal and religious leaders from the entire country. He says there should also be a jirga commission to discuss "flaws" in the current constitution.
15. (C) Mutawakkil elaborated on what the Afghan constitution should be like. Democracy, he stipulated, is a means to a better and peaceful life, and is not a means in itself. An Islamic base can be built for a better life, and the Taliban's biggest mistake was in not understanding the need to avoid meddling in private lives. The Department for Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice did not understand proportionality: it used major force and applied severe punishments for even minor violations, and in so doing lost public confidence.
16. (C) The constitution, Mutawakkil continued, is as it stands now "a piece of paper," which even Karzai's nominal allies and opponents in Parliament fail to respect. He thinks the constitution should be amended to garner wider respect. The primary article to be amended is the commitment to freedom of religion, since Islam must be acknowledged as paramount. This would not affect the country's Hindus and Sikhs ("there are no Afghan Christians and only one Jew"), who would continue to be allowed freedom of religion. No Muslim, though, Mutawakkil continued, could be allowed to abandon Islam without punishment in the form of prison or banishment.
WOOD
Thursday, 14 January 2010, 22:48
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 004108
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/14/2019
TAGS AF, MARR, MOPS, NATO, PREL
SUBJECT: CLARIFYING THE TRANSITION TO AFGHAN LEAD
PROVINCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Classified By: Acting A/S Nancy McEldowney for Reasons 1.4(b,d)
For the Ambassador or Charge
SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST
--------------------------
1. (SBU) The Department requests action addressees clarify for host governments at the highest possible level the planning process for ISAF transition to Afghan lead at the provincial level, emphasizing that discussion of this issue must not be mischaracterized as a plan for the imminent withdrawal of ISAF forces. In order for provincial transition to occur, certain criteria pertaining to security as well as governance and development will have to be met. As the President stated on December 1, it is important that we increase our commitments to the mission now in order to create the conditions to begin to draw down international combat forces beginning in mid-2011.
BACKGROUND
----------
2. (C) NATO is currently developing an annex to the ISAF Operational Plan that describes the process for a conditions-based, province-by-province transition of Afghan responsibility for security. NATO will discuss the plan, including political considerations, with the intent of achieving North Atlantic Council (NAC) approval prior to the January 28 London Foreign Ministers' conference on Afghanistan. Welcoming this plan or progress toward it is a key deliverable of the London conference.
3. (C) It is vital that in public messages the transition plan not be confused with an exit plan or timetable. ISAF is currently in Phase 3 (Stabilization) of its five-stage Operational Plan. Phase 4 is Transition and Phase 5 is Redeployment, culminating in withdrawal. Transition has at times been erroneously equated with Transfer of Lead Security Responsibility (TLSR). ISAF Phase 4 Transition refers to a tangible demonstration of progress in the overall stability and security of Afghanistan and Afghan ownership and responsibility, based on rigorous security, governance, and development conditions. Transition will proceed on a province-by-province basis and be gradual. TLSR is an early tactical step in the partnership between Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and ISAF, controlled in theater at the operational level. It is part of the ANSF development process to encourage and accelerate ANSF capability, responsibility, and ownership, not an indication of changes in either ANSF capabilities or the security mission.
4. (C) It is important that our Allies and partners counter erroneous misunderstanding that international support for the Government of Afghanistan is wavering and any false expectation of an imminent withdrawal of ISAF forces. Using the London conference to lay out an exit strategy would send the wrong message to the people of Afghanistan as well as to Allied and partner publics.
REPORTING DEADLINE
STATE 00004108 002 OF 003
------------------
5. (SBU) The Department requests that action addressees report the results of their efforts by front channel cable slugged for EUR/RPM Aaron Cope, S/SRAP, and SCA/A by January 17.
TALKING POINTS
--------------
6. (SBU) Action addressees should draw on the following points:
-- NATO is currently developing an annex to the ISAF Operational Plan describing the process for a conditions-based, province-by-province transition in consultation with the Government of Afghanistan and other stakeholders as appropriate. After discussing the plan and relevant political considerations, the North Atlantic Council aims to adopt the transition plan prior to the January 28 London Foreign Ministers' conference on Afghanistan.
-- Transition is a tangible demonstration of progress in the overall stability and security of Afghanistan and Afghan ownership and responsibility. Transition will proceed gradually on a province-by-province basis based on rigorous security, governance, and development conditions.
-- The specific conditions for provincial transition are the focus of ongoing planning processes and have not been finalized. Transition of individual provinces should be undertaken with extensive consultations among NATO/ISAF, the Afghan government, UNAMA, and other key stakeholders, and only when it is clear that security, governance, and development conditions have been met and can be sustained.
-- Transition is not an exit strategy for ISAF, although it is an important step toward fulfilling ISAF's mission. ISAF will retain supporting, enabling, and mentoring/advising roles throughout transition. International civilians will remain in place and may, in fact, increase as the international mission is civilianized and as conditions allow. The duration of the post-transition international presence will depend on local conditions. ISAF forces no longer required in one province may need to shift to other provinces that are in earlier stages of the transition process. Affected nations participating in the provinces in which transition is taking place will be consulted regarding any necessary changes in force posture.
-- It is important to distinguish Transition from Transfer of Lead Security Responsibility (TLSR), which is an early tactical step in the partnership between ANSF and ISAF whereby ISAF forces gradually assume the "supporting" role and ANSF take greater leadership. This process is controlled in theater at the operational level. It is part of the ANSF development process to encourage and accelerate ANSF capability, responsibility, and ownership, not an indication of changes in either ANSF capabilities or the security mission.
-- In the wake of President Karzai's positive commitments in his November 2009 inaugural address, it is particularly important that in publicly discussing transition, ISAF countries neither imply that the commitment of the international community is wavering nor create unrealistic
STATE 00004108 003 OF 003
public expectations of an imminent reduction in ISAF forces.
-- On the contrary, now is the time to reinforce our contributions in Afghanistan, as President Obama stated in his December 1 address, in order to create the conditions that will allow us to begin the process of drawing down combat forces in the summer of 2011.
-- Welcoming NATO's progress in developing a plan for provincial transition could be one useful deliverable of the January 28 international conference in London.
-- We expect the conference also will welcome and pledge support for an Afghan-led program of reintegration.
-- The conference will have a broader range of outcomes in governance and development as well as civilian coordination, not only security. It will provide Foreign Ministers an important opportunity to welcome GOA plans for initiatives on anti-corruption, sub-national governance, and economic development and to welcome the announcement of the new UN SRSG. The United States believes that the conference also should be able to welcome NATO's plans to strengthen the mandate for its Senior Civilian Representative.
-- While this will not be a pledging conference, we will welcome any additional civilian or military contributions that Allies or partners might announce there. At NATO's Defense Ministerial meeting on February 4-5 in Istanbul, we will encourage nations to clarify previously pledged commitments to ensure that forces deployed in 2010 have an operational impact. CLINTON
Thursday, 10 September 2009, 15:34
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002768
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/10/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: ABDULLAH THOUGHTFUL ABOUT HIS NEXT MOVE
REF: KABUL 2767
Classified By: D/Ambassador Francis Ricciardone, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) In a meeting September 9, presidential challenger Dr. Abdullah Abdullah told Ambassador Eikenberry that he had not anticipated the elections process taking so long. While he wanted to let the process play out completely he might rethink his next move in view of whether a second round would occur sufficiently soon truly to benefit the country. End Summary.
-------------------------------
Still Under Pressure - But Calm
-------------------------------
2. (S) We met Abdullah late at night, alone with one notetaker, after his long day which included a ceremony commemorating the eighth anniversary of the death of his mentor, Massoud. Tired but relaxed, Abdullah exhibited some of his usual humor -- he noted that he'd said hello to IEC Chairman Ludin but not kissed him at the ceremony; Ludin said "don't turn your face from me" and Abdullah had replied "I won't if you don't turn YOUR face from Mecca" - a Dari expression for lying. The ceremony had been well-attended by former Mujahedin, who are currently on either side of the presidential race; Abdullah said that "only Massoud's spirit" could have unified such a group. He claimed he was the only one who got standing ovations from the crowd.
3. (S) Abdullah complained that the Ministry of Interior was circulating a letter accusing him and his supporters, such as Balkh Governor Atta, of distributing weapons (reftel). He called this an "irresponsible" allegation and counter-accused the government of distributing weapons to self-defense groups in Konduz and Balkh as part of a widespread program. Saying that he doesn't want "anything to ignite anywhere" he added that in this highly emotional time, the difference between rumors and facts must be clarified. Eikenberry said that we have looked into these allegations and found no areas of concern. Abdullah added that he has recently completed his round of consultations with all his provincial supporters and has discouraged demonstrations since they could become excuses for violence.
------------------------------------
I Didn't Think it Would Take So Long
------------------------------------
4. (S) Ambassador Eikenberry stressed to Abdullah that his conduct during the campaign, and now, has made him a national figure with a real future in Afghan politics. He reiterated the U.S. position that we are committed to a credible process and noted that the most senior U.S. leadership was interested in learning about Dr. Abdullah's thoughts on a way forward. Eikenberry noted that we were now faced with an issue that complicates the process: the possibility that the partial recount that the ECC has ordered could extend into the winter season; if so, a second round, if it were ordered, could not be held until Spring 2010. He noted that a failure of the elections process would have a huge impact in the United States, given the many years of effort and commitment we have given to Afghanistan. A successful campaign process and good day of voting, all led by the Afghans for the first time, are being overshadowed by the current stalemate.
5. (S) Abdullah appeared subdued as he responded that he didn't want such a long period of uncertainty; he thought that disqualifying obvious fraud would have brought Karzai's number below 50 percent long before now. "I can take it for longer, but what about the country?" he asked, noting that Karzai would keep making decisions anyway during the period of uncertainty, and that his own followers were in danger of harassment or worse, and some teachers who supported him had lost their jobs. The ECC "has guts" he said - but "how long will it take?" A process dragging on until April could jeopardize public opinion in the United States, which like all public opinion is "fickle." U.S. support, once lost, will not come back, he said. Abdullah also admitted the strong possibility of Karzai winning a second round.
--------------------------------------------- -
Abdullah on Karzai: Holding the Nation Hostage
--------------------------------------------- -
6. (S) Abdullah indulged in a variety of criticisms of Karzai, saying that he was working for his own interests against those of the whole country. Abdullah said Karzai reportedly asked his Defense Minister "Your ANA can manage without the Americans, can't it?" but the answer was "We get 400,000 liters of petrol a day from them; without them, we'd end our operations in two days."
KABUL 00002768 002 OF 002
7. (S) When Karzai's people had approached him three months ago, Abdullah said, he refused to join them because "I couldn't influence him when he had good people around him, and now he has bad people advising him." He gave Karzai two messages at that time: don't run for president, you will have a great legacy and wipe away all your mistakes if you give up power; or if you do run, don't try to rig the elections. Now, Abdullah said, Karzai will keep digging in, whatever the damage to Afghanistan, and "we're all stuck" with him. Abdullah ended with the acerbic note that "the one thing that bothers me is that we shouldn't allow one person to hold the destiny of the nation hostage."
----------------------------------
What Next? The Good of the Country
----------------------------------
8. (S) Abdullah admitted that he had been "approached" recently by Karzai's National Security Advisor about a deal to end the election standoff, but clarified that it was "not a dialogue" since he wanted to take his time and let the process run its course. He was also approached by the brother of Karzai's Vice Presidential running mate (and fellow Panjshiri) Marshall Fahim, who warned him that he would not have support in a second round and should make a deal now. Abdullah said that Karzai has talked to some of his supporters, such as former President Rabbani, but that he sees no way that he "himself" would take part in a Karzai government -- leaving open the possibility that one of his associates may do so. The Ambassador noted that despite rumors that the United States was pushing a national unity government, we have never done so; Abdullah said he believed us and appreciated our support for the process.
9. (S) Looking at his future, Abdullah said that while he wanted to create a national and cross-ethnic movement which could become a true political party, he could not see any point in focusing on Parliamentary elections in 2010 given the IEC's corruption and double-dealing in this election. Some "good MP's" told him they won't survive the next election due to IEC corruption, he said. The IEC has had to put aside ballots in this election because the results can't possibly be entered into their computers due to the fraud controls - but then they "play with words" and refuse to invalidate those ballots. Their actions are a "tragic joke" he said, adding that the problem for Karzai's camp and the IEC turned out to be that they had planned on a higher turnout which would have covered up fraud. Abdullah expressed anger at some of the most egregious examples of fraud -- noting that rural Paktika province apparently had the same number of voters as Balkh (whose capital is populous Mazar-e-Sharif).
10. (S) Being in the opposition would be a hard and vulnerable position, Abdullah said, but capitalizing on this new political movement was crucial because it is the only "healthy" movement with a chance to expand. Abdullah noted that he had supported a large number of Provincial Council candidates during the election, after vetting them carefully first. He believes that many did very well in their provinces and can become a base for future political leadership; he is maintaining a network of linkages for such a future movement. Karzai had had a 'golden opportunity', Abdullah said, but ruined it and is only "declining." The country is vulnerable to ethnic fascism, extremism, drug trafficking, and organized crime -- all of which interests will oppose the national movement he hopes to create, and all of which are allied with Karzai, he alleged.
11. (S) Abdullah exhorted the U.S. not to give up on the process yet, saying that "expediency for immediate concerns" could undermine the rule of law and that longer term interests should not be sacrificed to shorter term ones. Eikenberry acknowledged that there were competing imperatives of the credibility of the process and pressures of time, telling Abdullah he should make political choices to help the situation knowing that he is at a period of maximum influence. Abdullah gave no immediate indication of his next move but agreed to remain in close contact. EIKENBERRY
Tuesday, 01 September 2009, 14:52
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002658
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/25/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: FM BILDT AGREES ON NEXT STEPS IN AFGHANISTAN
REF: KABUL 2636
Classified By: PolCouns Annie Pforzheimer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt agreed, in an August 31 meeting with Ambassador Eikenberry, to a post-election course of action for the international community in Afghanistan. Minister Bildt expressed his fears over Afghan perceptions of the upcoming conference of Special Representatives for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) to be held in Paris September 2. We corrected his misperceptions over a reported rift between SRAP Holbrooke and President Karzai. End Summary.
------------------------------
Looking at the Next Five Years
------------------------------
2. (C) Looking ahead to the resolution of the presidential election, Ambassador Eikenberry laid out five key steps which we recommend that the international community should observe, as we have, when engaging with both Abdullah and Karzai, but particularly the incumbent:
-- first, both leading candidates should understand we are paying close attention to their conduct in this interim period before the certification of the vote, and that their conduct will impact their relationship with the international community thereafter, whether as President or in another capacity. -- secondly, the next President shoudl understand that we will scrutinize closely his ministerial appointments for competence and commitment to good governance. -- third, the next President's first major policy speeches, including his inauguration speech, will set the tone for his second administration and offer an opportunity to establish a compact with his people. Minister Bildt noted that Karzai might use such a speech to confront the international community. -- fourth, as the President begins his new administration, he must take significant, visible acts to deliver his compact, for example by acting boldly against corruption. -- fifth and finally, if the next President accomplishes the first four steps well, we should accept an invitation from him to a ministerial conference in Kabul, to solidify the relationship between the international community and the new administration and to bolster its legitimacy domestically and internationally.
3. (C) Minister Bildt assented to all five points, and noted that the conference of foreign ministers could be a key moment in which to emphasize more Afghan ownership of the political landscape following the election.
--------------------------------------------- -
Setting the Stakes for a Second Administration
--------------------------------------------- -
4. (C) Expressing concern that President Karzai still seems to think that we are here on an expeditionary mission to kill foreign fighters operating in Afghanistan and that he is just renting land to us for that purpose, Ambassador Eikenberry proposed that the second administration could be an opportunity to clarify anew the relationship between the international community and the Karzai administration. First, we must disabuse President Karzai of the notion that we are just another imperialist force or that we are really here because of China and because we want bases here for strategic regional purposes. Heretofore, President Karzai has expressed negligible political interest in the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), key components of a successful sovereign nation. We need to give him long-term security guarantees so that he will understand the importance of investing in these institutions, Eikenberry said, while assuring him that we will continue to support Afghanistan's security infrastructure as an element of their sovereign nation.
5. (C) A key agenda item for a second Karzai administration could be the reconciliation process. Ambassador Eikenberry questioned Bildt whether this would pose a public relations problem with the domestic audiences of the European Union. The reconciliation effort, he noted, could be a key opportunity for the Karzai administration to show progress in the development of Afghan governance. Until now, the reconciliation process has been marred by a lack of infrastructure and resources, both of which the international community could help to provide. Bildt assured us that reconciliation would not be a problem in Europe unless it was perceived as rolling back women's rights, educational development, and other key human rights issues. He noted
KABUL 00002658 002 OF 002
there were constitutional constraints in Europe to supporting programs representing an erosion of human rights in Afghanistan, but affirmed that he did not see any evidence that could support an argument along those lines. The delegation called for the Afghans to establish a precise concept for integration before the process can begin.
-------------------------------------------
Maintaining the Legitimacy of the Elections
-------------------------------------------
6. (C) Minister Bildt expressed concerns that the legitimacy of the election was being called into question. He noted that while the conference in Paris of special representatives was "perfectly normal and routine," it had been "blown up" by the press, who were insinuating that the special representatives would emerge from closed doors at the conference and declare the winner of the election. Ambassador Eikenberry said that the same message had been relayed to him by a group of pro-Karzai parliamentarians who had called at the Embassy on August 30 (reftel). Likewise, Eikenberry noted that Karzai has begun to express great frustration with the international media, whom he claims are pitted against him and are trying to undermine the credibility of the elections by exaggerating claims of fraud. Eikenberry also noted that Karzai and his supports may attack the findings of the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) as biased, because it has foreigners in key leadership positions.
-----------------------------------
Smoothing Relations with the Palace
-----------------------------------
7. (C) Responding to Minister Bildt's statement that both President Karzai and Foreign Minister Spanta had "stern words" that were "not directed at me," on the subject of post-election posturing, Eikenberry explained the miscommunication that had occurred between Karzai and SRAP Holbrooke regarding the possibility of a second round of elections: Holbrooke had stated in a phone call with other Special Representatives that, if there were to be a second round, the international community would need to coordinate to support the effort. This was misreported to the Afghan government as USG advocacy for holding a second round, no matter the final results of the IEC's election process. Eikenberry reassured Bildt that he had worked closely with FM Spanta and President Karzai to dispel this myth; the story seemed to have blown over, and relations between the U.S. and President Karzai were and back on track. EIKENBERRY
Tuesday, 25 August 2009, 09:26
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 002523
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/25/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: S/SRAP HOLBROOKE'S AUG 22 MEETING WITH SRSG KAI
EIDE AND DSRSG GALBRAITH ON ELECTION SCENARIO PLANNING
Classified By: Amb. Timothy M. Carney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary. Ambassadors Holbrooke, Eikenberry, and Ricciardone discussed post-election day scenarios with SRSG Kai Eide, DSRSG Galbraith, and UNDP two days after election day. They agreed that candidates would most likely use rationales of fraud and Pashtun disenfranchisement to discredit the outcome of elections. UNDP's Margie Cook expressed confidence the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) could together effectively detect fraud and invalidate ballots where necessary. Participants agreed that the IEC, UN, and international partners should all strive to remain silent when it came to predictions or probabilities of various outcomes. There was shared concern about the specter of a disgruntled candidate preemptively declaring victory and sparking civil unrest. End Summary. 2. (C) On August 22, Ambassadors Eikenberry, Holbrooke, and Ricciardone met with UNAMA SRSG Kai Eide, DSRSG Peter Galbraith, and UNDP Chief Electoral Advisor Margie Cook. The focus of the meeting was scenario planning for the outcome of the election results. Principals exchanged views on the outcomes that were likely in terms of the two key candidates. They noted that the two rationales that would likely be used by the leading candidate camps to challenge the legitimacy of the elections would be fraud and the disenfranchisement of Pashtuns. While there are various accounts of voter turnout in Pashtun areas, the general view is that the numbers were far lower than in the rest of the country. 3. (C) S/SRAP Holbrooke, evaluating the prospect of the election being stolen through fraudulent behavior, expressed concern that this would undermine the legitimacy of the government and paralyze it from carrying out the priorities the government urgently needs to address. Ms. Cook noted that fraud had already been detected, including in the Pul-e-Charkhi area of Kabul where ballot boxes had been stuffed days before the elections. UNDP and IEC have already decided to nullify these ballots, she reported. She expected fraud occurred in a number of insecure areas of the country. Ms. Cook reassured the group that there were seven different trigger points in the IEC's tally process to detect fraud and expressed confidence that this process could quarantine and make void fraudulent ballots, even those from insecure areas. She expressed confidence that the ECC would have the will to disqualify a large percentage of votes, even if there would be significant political consequences. 4. (C) The principals agreed that it was important not to say anything publicly about the probability of either Hamid Karzai or Abdullah Abdullah securing the "50 plus one" percentage of votes necessary for a first round win. There was general concern about one of the campaigns preemptively declaring victory and potentially setting off a chain of disruptive events as witnessed in Iran, Kenya, or Zimbabwe. There was particular concern that one of the candidate's supporters might orchestrate protests and unrest in the major provincial centers. There was concurrence about the importance of stressing to all of the major candidates that they should not make announcements claiming victory until the results were announced by the IEC and that they would respect the process. Ambassador Holbrooke noted that he would stress this point with all three candidates. 5. (C) The meeting participants also agreed that it was important to ensure the Chairperson of the IEC not make any predictions about the outcome of the elections until the preliminary results were announced. It was agreed that Ambassador (Ret.) Tim Carney would visit Dr. Ludin to reinforce the point that he should stay on message for the sake of integrity of the process. (Note: Amb. Carney delivered this message on August 24. End Note.) Ms. Cook expressed concern that IEC Chairman Ludin had indicated to the press that he would start providing some details of results elections on August 22 and she opined it would take at least until August 25 for enough information to be collected to make a correct preliminary partial announcement. The IEC now plans to announce partial preliminary results, perhaps of ten percent of the tally, late afternoon of August 25. EIKENBERRY
Wednesday, 16 December 2009, 09:57
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 004027
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/15/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: KARZAI ON ANSF, CABINET, AND 2010 ELECTIONS
REF: KABUL 3973
Classified By: Ambassador K. Eikenberry reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary: President Karzai reiterated to Admiral Mullen and Ambassador Eikenberry on December 14 his commitment to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) development, Interior Ministry (MOI) reform, and to obtaining sufficient security force recruits and training. Although Karzai's reported cabinet picks appear generally positive, he is still considering Ismail Khan for Energy and Water. He told us that a few months' delay in the 2010 Parliamentary elections is necessary and that he is considering holding a Loya Jirga afterwards. End Summary.
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Karzai Focused on ANSF
----------------------
2. (S) In a meeting with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen, Ambassador Eikenberry, Defense Minister Wardak, Presidential Chief of Staff Daudzai, National Security Advisor Rassoul, Deputy National Security Advisor Shaydah, Presidential Press Spokesperson Houmanzada, and Afghan National Army Chief of Staff Bismillah Khan on December 14, President Karzai appeared relaxed although admittedly tired and in need of a vacation. Karzai said he planned to take three or four days vacation in Europe between conferences in London, Munich and Davos. He appeared more helpful and committed to ANSF development than ever, expressing interest in obtaining sufficient recruits to reflect geographic and ethnic balances, and a commitment to establishing a training timeline.
3. (S) Defense Minister Wardak said Army recruitment was improving; last month's return of 873 formerly AWOL soldiers to their units was a promising sign. Admiral Mullen noted that the 2011 drawdown date was not a political decision, but rather, a U.S. military recommendation. Karzai said that if the Afghan government was over half way to the 2011 ANSF recruitment and training goals, it would be a success. (Comment: Although Karzai was clearly attempting to manage expectations, he also seemed to be personally vested in this endeavor -- a positive, and relatively new development. End Comment.) Karzai said he will have his Defense Minister and Chief of Defense, "on the road frequently" to ensure this project moved forward.
4. (S) Karzai inquired whether ANSF expansion would include only an increase in training, or also an increase in more sophisticated military equipment for Afghan internal defense. Admiral Mullen said the United States would continue to equip the Afghan forces for counter-insurgency operations, since the territorial defense was not currently a priority, especially considering the U.S. strategic defense relationship with Afghanistan. Wardak further noted that more heavy weapons were need for the ANA over time to increase their capability to defend themselves, and could also be used to fight the Taliban. Admiral Mullen responded that Afghanistan's military requirements will naturally evolve over time, but emphasized that heavy weaponry was not needed at present.
5. (S) Ambassador Eikenberry mentioned how successful the 2003 Ministry of Defense (MOD) reform was to this institution, noting that the 2006 MOI reform was neither as comprehensive nor as successful. President Karzai agreed, and noted -- characteristically -- that this was due to the failures of UNAMA, the United States, and the E.U. When Eikenberry noted the serious problems in the senior MOI leadership, Karzai acknowledged this was also an important issue. He preferred, however, to work on MOI reform with the United States, not the E.U. or UNAMA.
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Non-U.S. NATO Troops Can Stay Home
----------------------------------
6. (S) Karzai asked if the other NATO countries were committed to sending 7,000 non-U.S. NATO troops, and if so, would those numbers be several contributions of 100-200 troops, or larger commitments by a fewer countries. He remarked that if the commitments are small contingents from many nations, it would be more of a "headache." He quipped that if these countries only announced their plan to deploy additional troops, without actually sending them, it would be easier. Admiral Mullen noted the political significance of these troop commitments, despite the challenges they might entail. Admiral Mullen asked Karzai for his assessment of NATO ISAF efforts to limit civilian casualties. Karzai responded that General McChrystal was doing an excellent job
KABUL 00004027 002 OF 003
with his instructions to limit civilian casualties because of the emphasis he placed on restricting the use of aerial bombardments. However, he said more needed to be done with the Special Operations troops, noting recent reports from Laghman Province of civilian casualties during two separate operations.
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Skepticism on Pakistan
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7. (S) Karzai expressed concern over Pakistan, noting that the Taliban may decide to lay low there until 2011. Admiral Mullen replied that if the Taliban decided to give that security space to the Afghans, it would be to our advantage, as it would allow time for the ANSF and security to be built up sufficiently to defend themselves. Karzai appeared to accept this answer. Ambassador Eikenberry emphasized that the United States shared Afghan concerns over Pakistan providing sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban, but noted Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi had stated publicly at the recent IISS Manama Dialogue in Bahrain that there was an Afghan-Pakistani Taliban nexus -- a possible signal of an evolution in their thinking. He also stated, however, that Pakistan was focused, at present, on its greater threat, the Pakistan Taliban. Minister Wardak said he had received contrary reports that the Pakistani Army was helping the Afghan Taliban obtain sanctuary in cities "deeper into Pakistan."
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Cabinet Selections
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8. (S) President Karzai told Eikenberry after Admiral Mullen's departure, with FM Spanta and NSC Rassoul in attendance, that he still had no date for his cabinet announcement but that he had asked the Parliament to remain in session for the time being. He plans on giving Parliament about 75 percent of the cabinet list and expects Parliamentary support for "almost all" of his nominations. He said the National Security Ministers would stay on (reftel), as well as the Finance, Commerce, Communications, Agriculture and Health Ministers.
9. (S) Karzai said the current Higher Education Minister Dafur would be replaced by the current Governor of Kabul Zabihollah Mojadedi, or an unnamed senior university official. Education Minister Wardak would move to the Palace's Office of Administrative Affairs (OAA), while MRRD Zia would be given an ambassadorship and his deputy Wais Ahmad Barmak would replace him. He said he would appoint a technically qualified individual as the Minister of Mines, and that Nangarhar Governor Gul Agha Sherzai would be given a position involving the construction of roads in urban areas (Note: it was unclear whether this would be Urban Planning or a new position. End Note.) Karzai said the Ministry of Public Works would go to a qualified engineer with a masters degree from a prestigious U.S. university, while Transportation would go to Junbesh party's Batash (rumored to be a Dostum ally).
10. (S) Karzai invited the group's views on placing Commerce Minister Shahrani in the Ministry of Mines. Spanta's endorsement was lukewarm; Ambassador Eikenberry noted Shahrani's extravagant home, suggesting that the Afghans knew best who is corrupt, a concern Karzai shared. Karzai claimed he would split the Ministry of Information and Culture into just the Ministry of Culture and "downgrade" information responsibilities to an agency. He said he wanted Spanta to stay on, but Spanta said he was not interested in a cabinet-level position. Karzai said Jalali was a possible choice for NSA, but claimed that he insisted on keeping his $13,000/month National Defense University salary. Eikenberry responded that if this were the case, it hardly seemed like a sign of patriotism. Karzai said Atmar was politically "hanging on by a thread" because he was highly disliked for his former communist and excessively pro-Pashtun reputation.
11. (S) Karzai said Ismail Khan was still his choice for Minister of Energy, claiming that Secretary Clinton "agreed to a compromise" after Karzai promised to keep Atmar and appoint competent deputy ministers under Khan. Ambassador Eikenberry countered that Secretary Clinton did not endorse Khan -- underscoring that the United States has indicated that Energy and Water is a key U.S. development priority, and that our policy was not to invest in ministries not competently led. Eikenberry added that during his Congressional testimony, all members of the U.S. Congress expressed great concern over the long-term costs of Afghanistan, especially during the current financial crisis.
KABUL 00004027 003 OF 003
If incompetent and corrupt ministers were appointed, it would provide a good reason for them to limit funding. The Ambassador urged Karzai to consider the tradeoffs, and make a decision on what would most benefit the Afghan people and their economic future. He should worry less about pleasing political factions or foreigners, and more on the objective long-term interests of his citizens. Karzai said he would further consider this choice.
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2010 Elections
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12. (S) Karzai mentioned that the 2010 District Council elections could be postponed past 2010, but the Parliamentary elections should only be delayed three to four months. In response to the Ambassador's concerns about addressing the unsustainable electoral calendar that would eventually bankrupt the Afghan government, Karzai replied that he would like to hold a Loya Jirga sometime in the fall of 2010 to resolve these constitutional issues. He referred to "conspiracy theories" he had heard about the international community's intentions in delaying the elections that Eikenberry flatly rejected. The Ambassador said the Afghans would have to make the decision whether to delay the elections or not.
13. Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not clear this cable.
EIKENBERRY
Tuesday, 09 February 2010, 10:54
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000503
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/08/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: MULLAH ZAEEF: PEACE NOW A NECESSITY
REF: A. KABUL 0484 B. KABUL 0441
KABUL 00000503 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Acting Deputy Ambassador Joseph A. Mussomeli; Reasons ( b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary: Former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan Abdul Salam Zaeef advocates peace as "the only option now" for Afghanistan. While encouraged by the latest attention to achieving peace in Afghanistan, he believes action and sincerity, not talk and good intentions, are required to make progress. He also wants negotiations among all involved parties, including armed Taliban and those who are active within the constitutional order, and that obstacles such as the UN and U.S. "blacklists" must be removed before these talks can start. Zaeef's viewpoint could reflect his annoyance at the pace of reconciliation talks that may have left him on the sidelines. End Summary.
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Negotiations First
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2. (S) In a recent meeting on February 8 with former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan Abdul Salam Zaeef at his modest residence in Kabul's Pasthun-dominant Khush-Haal neighborhood, Zaeef told us he was convinced that there is no longer any other option than peace for Afghanistan: peace is "a requirement" for Afghans, Americans, and the international community at large. However, while encouraged by the latest attention to political settlement in Afghanistan, "talk and good intentions are not enough; rather, action, strategy, and sincerity are required to make progress." In particular, Zaeef expressed skepticism about Karzai's true intentions, because "Karzai is deceiving all sides. "When he sits with me, he tells me he wants the foreign troops to leave, then he tells you he wants them to stay forever, and he tells yet a third story to Islamic leaders of other countries," Zaeef said. Karzai's only clear objective is to remain in power; he thinks the presence of foreign troops will help him do so, opined Zaeef.
3. (S) Zaeef posited that the peace process must first start with negotiations among all involved parties, including armed and disarmed Taliban, and that "hurdles" must be removed before entering these talks; only after successful negotiations can reintegration and reconciliation occur, he asserted. To our query regarding which hindrances must be removed, he listed ending the Taliban's isolation by removing them from the UN (1267) and U.S. blacklists (Zaeef continues on the 1267 list) and the cessation of foreign hostilities against the group during the negotiations.
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Taliban Saved Afghanistan from Disintegration
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4. (S) While most Afghans want an end to hostilities, Zaeef said, warlords do not and they were the reason the Taliban seized control of the country to begin with. Without Taliban intervention and its imposition of a strong dictatorship, Afghanistan would have been divided between Pakistan and Iran. Zaeef said when the Taliban seized power, their first priority was to instill order and governance by ruling with a strict hand. They had also tried to establish a central government to defend against "challenges from the region," and had attempted to "clear the country of warlords" who had ruled pieces of the country and had committed horrible human rights abuses. "Unfortunately, we were unable to even achieve our first goal," he lamented. Zaeef insisted that if the Taliban had remained in power, it would have gradually become more moderate.
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Taliban Are Not Misogynists
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5. (S) Like Muttawakil (Ref. A), Zaeef asserted that the Taliban were not misogynists who opposed women's education and the right to work, as long as their actions did not violate Islam. While acknowledging the Taliban made some mistakes, he countered that saving Afghanistan from disintegration far outweighed the Taliban's negative actions. Moreover, now that conditions in Afghanistan had changed, he believed if peace were made with the Taliban, the "old strict rules" would not return. He asserted that Mullah Omar's intention was not to topple the Afghan government; rather he sought reforms to the Constitution and other laws so they could be in accordance with Islam. (Comment: While some "ex-Taliban" assert that the Taliban seek only minor - unspecified - Constitutional revisions, others insist that
KABUL 00000503 002.2 OF 002
the changes must be so far-reaching, such as reversing equal protections for women and elevating Sharia law above other constitutional provisions, that it amounts to a full revision. End Comment.)
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Foreigners Will Never Win A Military Victory
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6. (S) Responding to our reference to extreme versus moderate Taliban elements, Zaeef suggested that we should instead differentiate the Taliban by whether they choose force or peace to achieve their objectives. Ultimately, however, the armed Taliban obey the orders of their political leaders; therefore, only a political solution will work, reasoned Zaeef. Furthermore, while Americans have attempted to make the war an international cause, it is "clearly America's war" and the Iranians, Russians, Chinese, and Pakistanis, and even the British, are content for various reasons to see you mired in a quagmire here, he said. Foreigners have never won a military victory in Afghanistan, Zaeef warned.
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Comment
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7. (S) Zaeef has been relatively quiet during the government's formulation of the reintegration/reconciliation policy unveiled in London, although he is certainly one of Karzai's informal advisors in this regard and appears to maintain contact with Taliban leadership. He appeared annoyed at not being more engaged in the policy development and also may be waiting less patiently for his delisting in view of the January 25 breakthrough which delisted five other Afghans.
8. (S) In a February 5 Inter Press Service (IPS) article by Gareth Porter, titled "Peace Talks May Follow Ex-Taliban Mediators Plan," Porter claimed that Karzai had personally asked ex-Taliban officials to help start the peace negotiations through a "road map" for a political settlement and mentions Zaeef, Muttawakil, and former Taliban commander Arsullah Rahmani (currently a Parliamentarian) as "ex-Taliban" liaisons. The article also suggests that Mullah Omar may have selected Zaeef as his point of contact for talks with the Americans and NATO and laid down some initial conditions of settlement. Some of those conditions coincide with President Karzai's call at the London Conference for an end to night raids and detentions by foreigners. No matter how reconstituted, the Taliban mentality remains one that many Afghans fear (Ref. B), and the Government of Afghanistan should increase its efforts to assure the whole population that there will be no peace deal at the expense of non-Pashtuns and women's rights. End Comment. Eikenberry
Friday, 28 August 2009, 06:58
S E C R E T KABUL 002597
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/27/2029
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINS, AF
SUBJECT: POST-ELECTION POSTURING AND THE U.S. MESSAGE:
KARZAI ADVISORS
Classified By: Ambassador Francis Ricciardone, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary: In a series of meetings August 27, Deputy Ambassador Ricciardone stressed to the Karzai government that we are concerned about any attempts to pressure the elections process and institutions. He pressed the GIRoA publicly to reaffirm its support for the integrity of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) processes, which must be free of interference from any quarter. The three senior Karzai advisors all stated that they knew fraud had been committed - "on both sides" - and warned of the possibility of violence. End summary.
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MOI Atmar: The Other Side is Arming
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2. (S) MOI Hanif Atmar told Ambassador Ricciardone of an urgent need to investigate growing intelligence reports that Balkh Governor Atta and other warlords/powerbrokers are arming their followers in possible preparation for violence. He gave us a two-page report (forwarded to RAO) in Dari, detailing names and numbers of AK-47's and RPGs - totalling 2-300 weapons, he said. While there is no immediate need for action, he said, he expressed concern that the warlord "standard practice" is to keep some of his militia demobilized but ready, and place the rest of it in the police force. Governor Atta, therefore, has the means at his disposal to call up a small force of armed men, Atmar said. Atmar asked the international community to watch Mazar and Kabul closely, as well as Konduz, for subversive activities there. He said he had also asked RC-North Commander to join in investigating the deaths of two IEC officials on election day, and the disappearance of the balloting materials they were carrying, in Nahr-i-Shaki district.
3. (S) Atmar stated that the GIRoA believes Abdullah himself is sincerely trying to keep his followers from violence, but that Atta and others do not necessarily plan to obey him. Atmar was less concerned about Rabbani and Qanooni, who he termed "no longer the key players". Ricciardone emphasized that we had delivered firm messages to Abdullah, Atta and others that their political future rested on their restraint during this period.
4. (S) Turning to the issue of fraud and the possible quarantine of thousands of ballot boxes coming from disputed areas, mainly in the South, Atmar complained that the result will be disenfranchisement of Pashtuns who will be bitter that they are on the front line of terror but that their votes are not counted. He urged that whole provinces not be quarantined for this reason. He also said it was important at this point to avoid any public speculation about a second round of votes. The international community should protect the "rule of law" by encouraging everyone to bring their fraud complaints to the ECC; and the international community should also speak out publicly against any violence or preparation for violence. He alleged that stories of a falling out between the U.S. and Karzai immediately after the election had been a "green light" to Atta and others.
5. (C) In response, Ricciardone warned against any GIRoA attempt to personalize a serious foreign policy issue over the integrity of the election process. He noted the incredible sensitivity of the Pashtun vote, but pointed out that the international community was in a very difficult position - there are so many credible allegations of fraud we cannot pretend these alleged acts didn't happen and should not affect the outcome, he said. The IEC must be allowed to do its work without pressure, Ricciardone said. Some of its officials reportedly feel under pressure to ignore or obscure fraudulent interference. Atmar agreed and said that all must take an aggressive line against fraud. When asked if President Karzai would state publicly his support for the IEC and ECC, however, Atmar said that the Presidential spokesman had already made such statements in an August 26 press conference, as Atmar on August 25 promised Ricciardone to make happen. However, Karzai remained unwilling to make sure a public statement personally - in part due to suspicions that the USG and UNAMA were pushing for a second round "no matter what" the actual results might be. Karzai's suspicions were renewed by statements attributed to UNAMA Deputy Peter Galbraith, in which he allegedly told the ECC to quarantine twenty percent of the vote. Nonetheless, Atmar promised to ask Karzai again to make such a statement. "Karzai is trying to make the international community worried," Atmar said, which Riccardone said was akin to holding a gun to his own head and threatening to shoot.
6. (S) On the subject of the integrity of the process, Atmar admitted he had to be careful about any contact that he has with the ECC or others that could be construed as pressure. (Ricciardone had pressed Atmar the night of August 25 regarding the "threat" perceived by FEFA chief Naderi from Atmar's "warning" to him earlier that day against inciting violence.) He did not attempt to deny that some are trying to make the IEC "just lose" votes that are over-the-top fraud on Karzai's behalf. However, Atmar bristled at the implication that anyone in the IEC, ECC or NGO community was under serious pressure or threat, and offered police protection to anyone who felt they needed it. Ricciardone repeated the U.S. position that we supported the process, whether or not that leads to a second round, because our strategic goals in Afghanistan can only be accomplished through a partnership with a president considered to be legitimately elected.
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Omer Daudzai: On Message - We Support IEC, ECC
--------------------------------------------- -
7. (S) Earlier on August 27, Ambassadors Ricciardone and Carney raised election issues with Presidential Chief of Staff Omer Daudzai. They stressed the need for a visible legitimate process to counter the reality of many reports of fraud, both from the Karzai side and from Abdullah,s side. They argued that overzealous supporters risk harming President Karzai's eventual chances, since he might have won even without cheating. By resorting to fraud, such Karzai supporters were running a serious risk of an "own goal." Daudzai emphasized that any possible fraud on Karzai's behalf had not been directed by the Palace.
8. (S) After some discussion of President Karzai,s perceptions of U.S. desire for a second round, Daudzai underscored the requirement that no one undermine the authority of the two commissions, IEC and ECC. &We will not,8 he affirmed, adding that they just need to do their job. Ambassador Ricciardone urged that the presidential spokesman or Karzai himself publicly respond to charges of electoral fraud with a vigorous affirmation of support for the IEC/ECC to do their jobs without intererence. Such a statement might chastise even the president,s own supporters if, in an excess of zeal, they committed fraud. This also might help protect Karzai when the IEC/ECC announces a quarantine of ballots supporting President Karzai. Daudzai nodded but did not commit to a statement.
9. (C) The two also discussed the risk of any possible elections-related demonstrations getting out of hand. Daudzai, speaking "on instructions", asked for the Embassy and Palace to work together to prevent such demonstrations. Daudzai said that a plan is needed and asked the Embassy to speak to Dr. Abdullah. Ambassador Ricciardone noted that Ambassador Eikenberry recently and repeatedly had stressed to Dr. Abdullah and other candidates and supporters the need for stability and peace; SRAP Holbrooke likewise had pointed out to Governor Atta the need for calm to ensure the country stays together. Ambassador Carney added that he had spoken to Mirwais Yasini and to minor candidate Sarwar Ahmedzai on August 26 with the same message of the need to ensure calm. Yaseni had agreed completely, saying that even a five-person demonstration could get out of hand.
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FM Spanta - No Fair Losers in Afghanistan
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10. (C) Visiting CODEL Bordallo, with D/AMB Ricciardone, pressed the same issue on August 27 with FM Spanta. Spanta candidly stated that "there are no fair losers" in Afghanistan and every side is ready to claim fraud or foreign interference. That said, he argued that the dimensions of fraud (that he readily admitted had occured) were not so much that the elections will be derailed. Pressed further, Spanta said that he thought the eventual loser of the election would come around to support the winner - if the international community helps. To ensure peace, he said, the final outcome should somehow "not exclude" the losing side. Spanta, who said Karzai had "never had a policy to commit fraud" emphasized his support for the work of the IEC and ECC.
11. (S) Note: Our contacts among Karzai's insiders report that Karzai's side is in some disarray. Karzai family and friends reportedly are keeping their families and their funds out of the country and two of Karzai's brothers are preparing U.S. refugee petitions. Their personal protection if violence occurs is probably not the army, but instead the network of private security companies -- especially the Asia Security Group, owned by Karzai's family. The sources allege that Karzai side's fraud had not been centrally organized - and in fact was so obvious that it had become counter-productive. In one source's hearing, a Karzai campaign manager was teased by others that he'd clearly "stacked" the papers in one box, when you are supposed to make it look like 300 individuals dropped the papers in. End Note.
12. (U) CODEL Bordallo did not clear this message. EIKENBERRY
Saturday, 18 October 2008, 10:06
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002782
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR MCGRAW
CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT
EO 12958 DECL: 10/17/2018
TAGS PTER, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: QAYUM KARZAI AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS SAUDI
RECONCILIATION TALKS
REF: A. KABUL 2746 B. RIYADH 1510
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY. On October 13, Abdul Qayum Karzai described to the Ambassador the potential Saudi reconciliation process. He and Abdullah Anas developed the current initiative a year ago and secured Taliban engagement through Anas' connection to Mullah Abdul Salam Zaif (former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan). He led a recent Afghan delegation of 17, including former Taliban officials, to Saudi Arabia for an informal meeting of mullahs and an iftar dinner with the King. Qayum expressed concern about the fragility of the process and its vulnerability to being "usurped" by the government. Saudi Arabia agreed to continue facilitating talks, but was firm it would not serve as an intermediary for the Taliban - they must work directly with Afghanistan. Qayum said the King is concerned about being too closely linked to the Taliban and that media speculation regarding the recent Saudi-hosted event made some officials there nervous. Qayum assured the Ambassador the U.S. would be consulted at every step and asked that the U.S. urge the Saudis to remain engaged. (Qayum is President Karzai's brother and an American citizen.)
2. (C) For the past two and a half years, Qayum said he had been seeking a "bottom-up" process for engagement with reconciliable Taliban outside a governmental framework. Although many senior Taliban were interested in ending hostilities, individual reconciliation was not an option for them politically. In October 2007, Qayum met with Abdullah Anas (former Algerian mujahideen commander now living in London) to discuss Anas' proposal of engaging Muslim clerics and scholars to create a framework for talks with the Taliban. Qayum suggested Saudi Arabia or Dubai. Anas agreed and began to consul prominent Muslim scholars, rallying them around their shared concern that Taliban violence gave Islam "a bad name" throughout the world.
SEEKING SAUDI INVOLVEMENT
3. (C) Anas and Qayum met with Dr. Mansour, advisor to King Abdullah, to ask Saudi Arabia to host the first engagement in this process: gathering a "group of mullahs." Mansour reacted positively to Saudi Arabia serving this role, in part because as it would dilute Saudi Arabia's identification with Pakistan - and extremism. According to Qayum, Mansour stated "the international community sees us as a front." Qayum noted that the Saudis see a directly link between Afghanistan's security and their own stability concerns.
TALIBAN MULLAH ZAIF AGREES TO PARTICIPATE
4. (C) In April 2008, Qayum hosted Dr. Mansour, Anas and Mullah Abdul Salam Zaif, former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan and informal line to Mullah Omar, at his home in Kandahar. Qayum said that when his guests arrived the television was showing footage of a Taliban bombing attack on a mosque earlier that day. The men were visibly upset by the carnage, including Zaif. The shared reaction to the bombing set the tone for constructive talks and Zaif agreed to participate. Qayum shared his view that Zaif is trying to carve a political space within the Taliban for reconciliation.
QAYUM PREPARES THE GROUND AND THE SAUDIS ENGAGE - CAUTIOUSLY
5. (C) As a result of Qayum's, and then President Karzai's, meetings with Dr. Mansour, King Abdullah called Karzai directly to discuss the proposed process. (The King's role energized Karzai's interest in the process for the first time.) Over the next few months Qayum hosted a number of Taliban representatives in Kandahar to continue preparations.
6. (C) Through the spring and summer representatives from both Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan shuttled back and forth. Qayum and former Kandahar Governor Asadullah Khalid worked
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closely together, traveling to Saudi to meet with Mansour and Prince Miqrin, head of Saudi intelligence. Mansour made more visits to Kabul and Anas continued to serve as go-between with Zaif and Taliban. In August, Saudi Arabia agreed to host an initial contact meeting during Ramadan -- stressing the importance of maintaining a low profile. While indicating the King Abdullah's desire to assist, Miqrin made it clear the King was approaching the process cautiously and did not want to be linked too closely to the Taliban. Miqrin said Saudi Arabia didn't want "to be alone in this," highlighting the importance of keeping the U.S. and U.K. informed. Miqrin also stressed the Taliban leadership should not see Saudi Arabia's willingness to support the talks as an indication the country would serve as an intermediary; the Taliban must pursue the reconciliation process directly with Afghanistan.
THE SEPTEMBER MEETING
7. (C) In organizing the trip, Qayum, Mansour and Zaif agreed the focus would be on religious activities and peaceful exchanges, in keeping with the Ramadan season. Both sides agreed a large group would not be advisable so there were 17 in the Afghan delegation, and only a subset would attend all meetings. In addition to Zaif, Maulavi Ahmad Mutawakkil (Taliban ex-Foreign Minister), Maulvi Abdul Hadi Shinwari (former chief justice) and current Afghan senator Arsala Rahmani agreed to attend. Qayum denied reports that Hekmatyar sent a representative; he said Hekmatyar's nephew was in Saudi Arabia at the same time, but did not participate in the talks.
8. (C) Qayum said the Saudis orchestrated the encounter carefully. When the Taliban group arrived, Qayum went to his room while Mansour remained with the group to welcome them. Mansour, like Miqrin, made opening points to the Taliban: Saudi Arabia condemned the killing of innocents in Afghanistan and viewed the Afghan constitution with the same respect as its own; both share a common basis in the Koran. The Saudis further clarified they would not support any Taliban proposals that infringed on the authority of the central Afghan government - such as the establishment of autonomous regions.
9. (C) Qayum said Prince Miqrin called him just before dawn to brief him on the dinner and meeting. Miqrin said a large group had come from Medina to meet the Afghan delegation and there had been an enthusiastic response from the Quetta participants. Qayum said everyone reacted nervously when details of the process first leaked to the media - especially the Taliban participants and the Saudis. Miqrin suggested an alternative location might be needed for talks - perhaps Dubai.
QAYUM DETERMINED TO KEEP PROCESS DISCIPLINED AND OUT OF GOVT HANDS
10. (C) The Ambassador praised Qayum's leadership on this important issue. He stressed that such talks require discipline and patience. Afghanistan must deal from a position of strength. Qayum agreed, saying that if the military pressure on the Taliban eased the process would fail. He confided what he had told Dr. Mansour - that the engagement must be kept simple and focused at the beginning - with the same facilitators guiding it until it matured. It would collapse if too many people - or governments - became involved. Qayum repeatedly expressed concern that the government might "usurp" the process: "An Afghan government-based negotiation would lead to everyone at the table demanding a slice (of the government), but the government would be unable to satisfy all of these competing demands and would take the blame for the negotiations' failure."
11. (C) The Ambassador asked that the U.S. be advised if Afghanistan engaged any Taliban with ties to Al Qaeda and/or global terrorism in the reconciliation process - figures like Mullah Omar and Mullah Barader. The U.S. did not oppose this
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process, stressed the Ambassador, but would not be a participant either. Qayum accepted this and commented that he saw no way for Mullah Omar to survive the process - he didn't have the intelligence or popular support to emerge on top. He and Barader were hated by too many elements within the Pashtun spectrum. Perhaps exile was an option for them. In closing, Qayum assured the Ambassador that the U.S. would be kept informed of all developments.
COMMENT
12. (C) Qayum has President Karzai's confidence, but is a neophyte in such a process. The encounter in Saudi Arabia was with Afghan and Taliban proxies, rather than decision-makers. It is especially unclear what connection Zaif and the other so-called Taliban representatives have with the Taliban leadership, although there are reports that Zaif met with two representatives from the Quetta Shura who had shadowed the delegation to follow developments and report back. President Karzai is interested in this process at least as much because it represents a step forward in support from King Abdullah as because it holds some prospect for neutralizing some or all of the Taliban. That said, this encounter could bring Saudi Arabia closer to Afghanistan and could have some benefits with the Taliban, especially if other pressures on the Taliban continue to grow. We intend to be supportive, but without unrealistic expectations, and certainly with no direct U.S. involvement.
WOOD
Thursday, 03 September 2009, 10:41
S E C R E T KABUL 002681
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/02/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: KARZAI ON ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE: SEPTEMBER 1
MEETING AT THE PALACE
Classified By: Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary: In our weekly meeting September 1, President Karzai was confident, lucid and open to areas of post-election cooperation should he be named the winner. We discussed the need to support the ongoing elections process, and he indicated that his negotiations with other candidates was entering a final phase. He is likely to attend the UNGA. On the post-election compact he was aware of the need to rebuild trust with the international community, in particular through merit-based appointments to the Cabinet and at a sub-national level. He appears committed to some form of a "Jirga" to solidify his government's legitimacy. End summary.
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Elections End Game
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2. (S) A relaxed President Karzai met with me for over an hour on September 1, accompanied only by National Security Advisor Rasoul. We touched on the media back-and-forth over the alleged SRAP/Karzai rift (a recent Cabinet meeting was reportedly acrimonious about U.S. "intervention" in the elections, but Karzai finally rejected the idea of a confrontational press conference) and Karzai accepted my statement that this was "old news" which we should put behind us. I reiterated our support for the elections process and institutions.
3. (S) Karzai told me that at his meeting with Ghani the night before, Ghani had offered to play the role of "intermediary" with the United States. I told Karzai that he had many of those already. Karzai said that Ghani had stopped short of pledging his support but wants to play a "useful" role. Mirwais Yasini, with whom he met on August 30, had allegedly been offered USD 100,000 by Abdullah but is close to accepting a role in Karzai's team, Karzai said. Karzai then raised concerns about Iranian influence in the election, through funding of Abdullah to the tune of USD 80-100 million. I replied that we think Iran had given money to all the candidates; Karzai did not disagree. On Iran's motivations, I said that it seemed less logical for them to want instability in Afghanistan but that we are more concerned than we were a year ago. Karzai stated that he sees Pakistan and Iran potentially collaborating to destabilize Afghanistan and act against the United States.
4. (S) Karzai said that "reports" indicated that the United States was also funding Abdullah. I strongly challenged him and stated that we are not funding any candidate. I further noted that repeating these kinds of rumors and unsourced reports was unproductive.
5. (S) We discussed the international media and the renewed focus on "warlords", particularly Fahim Khan. I said that while newspapers are independent and the timing of their articles is not under our control, our position on Fahim was well known and we would not dissimulate. I pointed out that, in fact, Karzai was not above using this issue to his own advantage. He gained considerable political advantage by bringing Dostum back to Afghanistan on the eve of elections, but that thanks to international attention to Dostum's past and Dostum's fear of arrest on human rights crimes, he immediately went back to Turkey and would not pose an internal political problem. Karzai agreed, noting that Dostum's ability to rally the Uzbek vote had exceeded his own expectations. When asked if this was loyalty or fear, Karzai said it was hard to say but it was very clear that in five years, Dostum's kind of influence would be far less as his party (Jumbesh) matures and old affiliations become diluted.
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Attending UNGA
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5. (U) Karzai asked my advice about attending the UN General Assembly. I noted that even if the final election results are not known, he is head of state and should attend as such. However, I said, there would likely be no meetings at that time in Washington, per the normal procedures of the UNGA period. We did not discuss any possibilities of a bilateral meeting.
--------------------------------------------
Looking Ahead: A Promise to Vet Appointments
--------------------------------------------
6. (S) I laid out with Karzai the way forward in five steps for a new government to win credibility and legitimacy, both at home and with international partners. First, I said, the credibility of the elections is vital not least in view of the extraordinary efforts and investment of the international community. Karzai agreed, and said that he was sure of victory - at 53-54 percent, a much lower figure than he has used previously. I said we were aware that insecurity had worked against the turnout in areas he normally would have expected to be his strongholds. Karzai said he plans to make a speech September 2 that will affirm his government's support of the process; however, he immediately added, can the U.S. do anything to make the ECC and IEC work faster to produce a final result? I replied that we are keeping our distance from the IEC and EEC in order to make sure we are not viewed as in any way trying to influence their work, and advised him to do the same since a credibile election process helps the next president be viewed as legitimate. (Note: Karzai decided on September 2 not to make a public statement. End Note.)
7. (S) The second step will be the restoration of trust with the international community and the Afghan people through merit-based appointments of key ministers and governors to carry out the work of the new administration. For example, I said, re-appointing Ismael Khan based on political favors rendered will send entirely the wrong signal - he is not competent to run a ministry, much less one in which there is considerable donor support and interest. He also mentioned the possibility of giving Nangarhar Governor Gul Agha Sherzai a key ministry, for example Transportation (which may be reorganized into sector-specific Ministries combined with the Ministry of Public Works). I strongly objected to this idea and Karzai admitted that Gul Agha would probably "destroy civilian aviation" if given control of it. I also flagged the importance of the Ministry of Mines, one of Afghanistan's key areas of potential wealth generation, and he noted the Ministry of Higher Education. Karzai gave his word that he will "absolutly consult with the United States" before making new appointments. He expects that his political supporters will give him lists of constituents for the posts they were promised, so he can choose the best qualified ones.
8. (S) Karzai took on board the three final steps I outlined - announcing his "compact" with his own people in his inaugural speech; delivering early results on that compact, for example by prosecuting high-level targets on corruption, drug trafficking, terrorism or other major crimes; and finally, hosting a ministerial conference on Afghanistan in Kabul -- which Afghanistan's major supporters would accept provided a re-elected Karzai accomplishes the first four steps. On the "compact" idea, Karzai understood the example of the 1994 "Contract with America" and saw how it could serve at the same time as an agreement with the international community.
9. (S) He asked me if the U.S. opposed a Jirga, and if we do, if it is because we fear the possibility of a Jirga asking for a Status of Forces Agreement with the United States. I pointed out that we do not necessarily oppose a Jirga but we do see this as potentially undermining the institutions that are in place for consultation, such as Parliament. Karzai said that Jirgas have a strong traditional resonance and its purpose would be to renew Afghan support for the international presence, and give that support a real "grassroots" basis. I noted that a SOFA at this point is not a reasonable step, given the state of Afghanistan's legal system, but that some kind of new operational understanding could be a good idea.
10. (S) Finally, on the issue of reconciliation, Karzai affirmed that he wants to move ahead and to keep Afghanistan in the lead, within the existing guidelines that reconciled Taliban must reject international terrorism, forswear violence, and promise to abide by the constitution. He sees two basic levels - the commanders and fighters in the field, and the high-level approaches, including the Quetta shura. The initiative should be announced as a nation-wide policy, but be conducted at local levels as appropriate. I concurred and asked who would be in the lead within the GIRoA; he said that the Independent Directorate of Local Government, and the Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups, as well as the National Directorate of Security, were the right mechanisms. I said that the international community and especially the United States would like to help with funding and organizational support, but that our funding has restrictions which make it vital that we understand which Afghan structures will conduct reconciliation efforts. EIKENBERRY
Wednesday, 03 February 2010, 15:56
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000052
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/03/2020
TAGS MOPS, MASS, MCAP, PREL, PGOV, NATO, AF, GM
SUBJECT: RFG: GERMAN DEMARCHE ON DISBURSEMENT OF
CONTRIBUTION TO ANA TRUST FUND
Classified By: A/PolAd A. "Hoot" Baez. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (SBU) This is a request for guidance. Please see para 8.
2. (C) SUMMARY: On February 3, German PermRep Brandenburg demarched Ambassador Daalder regarding concerns Berlin has over the disbursement of 50 million Euros it donated in October 2009 to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund. He said that money for earmarked projects had not been disbursed, resulting in delayed projects. He also said that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was charging a 15 percent administrative fee. He said that German parliamentarians were beginning to ask questions about how this money has been handled, adding that this could make it difficult for Berlin to provide additional contributions in the future. Ambassador Daalder said that he believed there were some factual inaccuracies in the German demarche, but promised to forward it to Washington for a formal response. We request Washington guidance NLT Monday, February 8, on how to respond to Brandenburg. We ask that in drafting this guidance Washington take into consideration appropriate political factors, as well as technical budget and project management ones. END SUMMARY
Germany: Why Has Our Money Not Been Used on Our Projects?
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2. (C/REL GERMANY) On February 3, German PermRep Brandenburg demarched Ambassador Daalder regarding 50 million euros that Berlin had donated to the Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund in October 2009, handing over a non-paper reported in para 10 below. According to Brandenburg, this money had been earmarked for use in several specific projects -- the ANS Logistics School in Kabul, an engineering school in Mazar-e-Sharif, and an ANA Barracks in Feyzabad -- but so far no money had been disbursed for these projects. He argued, for example that construction of the logistics school had come to a halt.
And Why Are You Charging Us an Administrative Fee?
--------------------------------------------- -----
3. (C/REL GERMANY) Brandenburg said that he had been instructed to raise this with us because of the unique role of the U.S., particularly the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in this process. He said that there was a particular concern in Berlin about a 15 percent administrative fee allegedly being charged by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. At the same time, he acknowledged that Berlin also had issues with how SHAPE and the NATO Office of Resources was handling the issue, adding that Germany would also be raising this issue with NATO officials.
Creates Problems for Future Donations to the ANA Trust Fund
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4. (C/REL GERMANY) Brandenburg said that this was more than a technical budget and project management issue He said that several German parliamentarians were asking questions about these funds. He said that the German Government was in the process of preparing its 2010 budget and would like to be able to make an additional contribution to the ANA Trust Fund, but that parliamentary questions and concerns about how the initial 50 million euro contribution was being handled could make this increasingly difficult. He added that -- since this was becoming "the talk of the town" in Kabul -- it might also create difficulties in our ability to get other countries to contribute to the ANA Trust Fund.
5. (C/REL Germany) Brandenburg said that this demarche would be delivered in Washington, as well as other places. (Note: We understand it was also delivered to the Embassy Berlin.)
German FM to Raise with SecGen
------------------------------
6. (C/REL GERMANY) Brandenburg said that since this money came from the MFA, German FM Westerwelle had taken an interest in the issue and would likely raise this with NATO
USNATO 00000052 002 OF 003
Secretary General Rasmussen when he sees him at the Munich Security Conference.
Daalder: Inaccuracies, but Will Seek Washington Guidance
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7. (C/REL GERMANY) The Ambassador said that there appeared to be some factual inaccuracies in the German demarche, but promised to forward it to Washington with a request for a formal response.
REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE
--------------------
8. (C) RFG: We request Washington guidance NLT Monday, February 8, on how to respond to the German demarche.
9. (C/NF) COMMENT: As the Ambassador said to Brandenburg, there do seem to be some inaccuracies in the German demarche. At the same time, it is important we also recognize the serious political concerns the demarche raises. For example, while there may be good reasons for the 15 percent fee -- we understand it is a contingency fee not an administrative one -- the appearance that the U.S. is charging Allies an excessive fee for the use of monies they have donated to the ANA Trust Fund may be difficult to explain away during a parliamentary debate. Brandenburg is probably correct in arguing that issues such as this could make it more difficult to encourage nations to donate to the Trust Fund. Indeed, it took us months to even work out the agreements we needed to get the original German donation to the Trust Fund. We therefore urge Washington to look into this issue from a political, as well as technical/financial, dimension and with as much transparency as possible. END COMMENT
The Demarche Text
-----------------
10. (C/REL Germany) The text of the German non-paper is reproduced in full below:
BEGIN TEXT
3 February 2010
-- Refer to GER Agreement dated October 1st with NATO acting through its Office of Resources by which GER has committed to a voluntary contribution of Euros 50 mio to the ANA Trust Fund. Funds had been transferred to a SHAPE account in late October 2009.
-- Note the agreement that the GER contribution should be used exclusively for the aims set out in the ANA TF Project Document dated September 15th 2009, among them three prioritised projects mentioned in Annex 10 of the Project Document (1. ANS Logistic School Kabul, to the amount of Euro 2 mio in 2009; 2. Engineering School in Mazar-e-Sharif, to the amount of Euros 4 mio in 2009, 3. ANA Barracks in Feyzabad, to the amount of Euro 1 mio. in 2009). As of today, no project financing has occurred.
-- Note that, at variance with the GER/IS agreement and the overarching MoU between the US, NATO and SHAPE on the "Management and Administration of Trust Fund Donations for support and sustainment of the ANA", transfer of the German ANA TF contribution to an US treasury account (resulting in the prevalence of US procurement procedures, including assignment of the US Army Corps of Engineers and an administrative fee of 15 percent) would be made without due consideration of the German donation caveat, thereby hindering the early funding of the prioritised projects and thus the application of the German/IS Agreement.
-- Note that the issue has been raised already in the German Parliament leading to questions why the Federal Government had donated money without any tangible effect on the prioritised projects yet. Likewise, charging a 15 percent fee for managing and executing ANA TF, especially when
USNATO 00000052 003 OF 003
applied to the funding of projects pursued by Germany, will inevitably attract heavy criticism by German audit bodies and parliamentary commissions.
-- Request partners, given construction delays that have already occurred and the urgency of respective funding requirements, to revert to the letter and spirit of the GER/IS Agreement and make sure that funds earmarked for the prioritised projects totalling Euro 7 mio will be transferred without any further delay. As laid down in the GER/IS agreement the earmarked funds (with regard to the prioritised projects to the amount of Euro 7 mio, in particular with regard to the ANA Logistic School, Kabul, to the amount of Euro 2 mio., as the financially most pressing case, since construction is already under way) need to be re-allocated at the Kabul level to the GER Einsatzverwaltungsstelle ISAF in order to allow for a swift implementation of the prioritised projects.
-- Urge partners to expedite the execution of funds donated by GER to the ANA TF aside from the prioritised projects and submit proofs of employment of funds in accordance with the US/NATO/SHAPE MoU as soon as possible.
-- Express concern about the fact that any further delay in allocating funds to the prioritised GER projects and executing the remainder of funds donated by GER must substantially impair prospects for any further German contributions to the ANA TF.
END TEXT HEFFERN
Monday, 22 June 2009, 02:39
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001592
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE, SCA/FO, SCA/A
STATE PASS USAID ASIA/SCAA
EO 12958 DECL: 06/21/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, KDEM, EAID, AF
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: COIN SUCCESS IN ALASAY BEGINS TO
FRAY - LESSONS FOR A NEW APPROACH TO AFGHANISTAN PART III
REF: A. KABUL 1233 B. KABUL 954
1. (S) Summary. There are sobering lessons to be drawn from the Alasay Valley in Southern Kapisa, where the strategic dynamics have shifted back in favor of the insurgency just shy of three months after U.S. and French forces assisted the ANA to reestablish Afghan government presence there. This reversal is not a defeat; combined security forces are in a secure hold phase with the district center under government control, and they retain sufficient offensive capability to continue disruption operations elsewhere in the province. However, the Taliban and Hezbe Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) still control the upper half of the valley, they have rejoined their ruthless contest for authority over the population, and they have launched an IED campaign against coalition forces that extends from Southern Kapisa to the gates of Bagram Air Field. This is the nature of the Afghan conflict. The explanation in counterinsurgency (COIN) terms lies in the constraints that force ratios place on ISAF and ANSF, along with the current limitations of force employment; the powerful effects of insurgent asymmetry; and most importantly, the need to strengthen organizational and political competence on the part of GIRoA and its international allies. End Summary.
2. (S) The key question that the fraying of initial COIN success in Alasay raises is, what does it take to break out of the cycle of 'clear and clear again' to achieve sustained success in an area of persistent insurgency? Southern Kapisa has been the site of numerous counterinsurgency campaigns during the past eight years of Operation Enduring Freedom. Although the insurgent revival for this summer's fighting season was anticipated, it is possible to measure some counterinsurgent progress, for example, in the relative freedom of movement that now prevails on the road between the provincial capital and Southern Kapisa. This was not the case one year ago. As reported in Ref (A), the reoccupation of Alasay prompted the local population to rally to the government in a rush of shuras, a reconciliation initiative that brought several dozen accidental guerrillas off the field, and a clear sense that people welcomed the opportunity to come off the fence in rejection of the Taliban and HIG insurgents who had ruled their lives for over a year. As reported in Ref (B), this initial success continued behind the line of consolidation that the ANA and French Task Force Tiger established just above the district center, where unarmed political competition quickly emerged, while civic action and PRT quick impact projects brought the promise of further development. It was also evident that this success was provisional on making the restoration of security permanent. 3. (S) Now with the fighting season in full swing, the insurgents have not yet attempted any major direct attacks against superior coalition and ANSF forces, nor are they able to operate freely in the main population centers. Instead, the Taliban and HIG have successfully generated instability by operating indirectly with a sophisticated IED campaign and armed intimidation that includes, for example, holding anti-government shuras in the villages, patrolling to demonstrate presence, delivering threats through night letters, and forcing cell phone towers to shut down at night to prevent citizens from informing on their activities. Counterinsurgent forces must now respond with more aggressive enemy-centric operations that will include a new counter-terrorism focus aimed against the IED cells and their supporters. Correspondingly, the pace of population-centric operations will slow. With the insecurity and the distraction from governance and development, popular disaffection has resurfaced in Alasay. The Kapisa Provincial Security Council meeting on June 6 offered a symbolic conclusion to the phase that began with the reopening of the Alasay district center in mid-March. At the meeting, Governor Abu Bakr begged U.S. representatives to launch a new campaign to kill or capture insurgent leaders, like the one that removed 24 targets in four months during late 2008 and early 2009. The current target list is longer than the previous one. 4. (S) The following counterinsurgency lessons from Alasay draw on examples that are representative, but they are by no means comprehensive: Force ratios matter: Kapisa is the western-most extension of the insurgency north of Kabul. With approximately 760 coalition forces and 1850 ANSF arrayed against an estimated 250 ) 300 Taliban and HIG insurgents, the magic guerrilla warfare ration of 10:1 favors the counterinsurgents. The insurgents have reached back over 150 kilometers across the Hindu Kush to Pakistan to fully
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replenish their losses, and senior Taliban commander Qari Baryal is reportedly intent on recruiting at least an additional 200 fighters to launch a direct offensive in Alasay and other parts of Southern Kapisa. The actual numbers of U.S., French, and ANSF troops available for force projection amounts to no more than 500, the remainder being dedicated to support or population-focused duties. Surge capacity is available for specific operations, but the ability to hold more than the main population centers, lines of communication, and selected forward operating bases and combat outposts among the four valleys that constitute the conflictive zones of Southern Kapisa is limited. The Alasay operation was the province,s main counterinsurgency effort during the first half of 2009. Once established in the relatively open bottom half of the valley, forces have not been available to move further into the populated insurgent-held territory in the Skhien and Schpey Valleys above Alasay proper. There, steep mountainous terrain makes clearing maneuvers, let alone holding, much more difficult and dangerous. Fire support is currently limited to mortars, and even with abundant air support, any offensive to decisively remove the insurgency and secure the population in just this one part of the theater will have to await additional combat forces and dedicated reserves. 5. (S) Force employment is the key force multiplier: For the insurgents, force ratios and the terrain favor their indirect approach. The line of consolidation established just above the District Center in Alasay has proven entirely permeable. Insurgents have recovered relative freedom of movement well inside putative secure areas, as long as they avoid direct confrontation, and passively manned police check points do little to restrict discrete passage. To focus on one area of counterinsurgent force employment, there are a number of unexploited options for employing assets forward beyond the line of consolidation in Alasay into insurgent territory. A plan to mount a commando operation against identified insurgent concentrations has not won approval due to troop restraints. Special Forces with a foreign internal defense mission could operate alongside small ANSF units in contact with the local population. Multiple delegations, including from inside the Skhein and Schpey valleys, have pleaded for assistance in setting up self-defense units, but AP3, the one current option, is making its way tentatively forward in Wardak. A larger and more complex issue that is rightfully the subject of a separate analysis is the need to better synchronize COIN campaigns that will integrate all assets and resources from direct action to development projects. 6. (S) Asymmetry works: The Taliban and HIG have mastered irregular warfare techniques that allow them to achieve maximum effect with minimum numbers and cost. There are multiple reports from elders, shura members, local officials, and security forces that intimidation in Alasay and neighboring Tagab and Nijrab Districts has generated a renewed atmosphere of insecurity and fear. It only takes a few small groups of armed and determined insurgents moving among the population to have this impact. 7. (S) The ongoing IED campaign has had significant effects on coalition forces operating out of BAF and surrounding districts, as well as in Kapisa. A sophisticated new crop of IED experts and facilitators, plus three suicide bombers, achieved six IED strikes during the last two weeks in May, with a total of 14 KIA and 9 WIA, both U.S. and Afghan, but not including bystanders or suicide bombers. One SVBIED killed the commander of PRT Panjshir and three others; an RCIED wiped out a vehicle and members of the new Marine ETT. In a telling incident, insurgents were able to implant four RCIEDs behind a rule of law team that had entered a rural lane in Southern Kapisa on a mission to arrest an IED facilitator. One RCIED exploded wounding four. In response, U.S. forces have gone to MRAPs, with the tangible effects of slowing missions and restricting vehicle access in remote locations, along with the intangible effects caused by the need to exercise greater caution. There is no choice to meeting the challenge in detail, by using Route Clearance Packages (RCPs) and slowing down to conduct foot movements, while collecting intelligence and conducting investigations to eliminate the current crop of IED makers and facilitators. The going rate to emplace an IED is reported to be $100. 8. (S) Critical advantage belongs to the side that demonstrates superior organizational competence: In addition to adapting their tactics rapidly, Taliban and HIG appear to be collaborating effectively with each other in Southern Kapisa. Their organizational competence is on display in their ability to replenish their leadership and soldiers after suffering decimation from direct action operations and resistance to the retaking of Alasay. There
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are no signs that attrition has degraded their will or their capabilities, even if their freedom of operation has been affected. 9. (S) As for the Afghan government, nowhere are its organizational short-comings more apparent than in the failure to reinforce permanently the ANP presence in Alasay beyond the 15 officers, compromised by collaboration with the Taliban, who were present when the ANA and French arrived on March 14. It turns out that more than half of the officers from Alasay,s 38-man roll are serving as body guards for local politicians who fear for their lives. The provincial government has been both unwilling and unable to do anything about that, or to reallocate within its own forces from the less-threatened north of the province to the south. Alasay is scheduled for the 10th FDD cycle about one year from now, and a proposal to send a temporary detachment of ANCOP to maintain civil order has gone nowhere. Although the Ministry of Interior is well-aware of the problem and Minister Atmar has received multiple high-level entreaties, they have been reluctant to grant any increase to Kapisa, given the scale of nationwide demands for additional police that it cannot meet. 10. (S) Comparable organizational challenges range across the spectrum of governance and development. In mid-May, the district police chief of Tagab (who wants to do his job) apprehended a known bomb maker with IED components, but he hesitates to transfer the suspect from his jail, because judges in Kapisa's provincial capital habitually release captured insurgents after setting the literal price of justice. Until they are fixed, organizational failures by Afghanistan's international partners will also compromise the effectiveness of COIN. The absence of flexible tools to deliver stabilization and development assistance to Alasay immediately following PRT Kapisa's two rounds of quick action projects contributed to the gap that has opened up between the population and the government, which in turn helped enable the return of the Taliban and HIG. The deployment of OTI promises to help remedy this situation, at least in the other parts of Afghanistan where they will be stationed. 11. (S) The side with the most political competence ultimately succeeds: The insurgents have sanctuary, resources, a certain Pashtun ethnic base, limited religious charisma, resilience, and asymmetric warfare skills that give them staying power. However, the insurgency cannot hide its fatal vulnerability: the vast majority of the people of Afghanistan fear a Taliban to return to power. Because winning hearts and minds is not a viable strategy, their only option is to impose authority through their harsh and coercive brand of social justice wherever the government is unable to offer protection. It is protection that the people seek, together with an end to war. This is why the military operation into Alasay proceeded quickly through the thickly populated valley. This is why the people of Alasay rallied as soon as government authority was restored to the district center, and it is why elders from the Shkein and Scphey Valleys want to form a militia. 12. (S) Unfortunately, the GIRoA's own corroded governance casts a shadow over Alasay and the rest of Southern Kapisa. If the provincial level justice system lacks integrity, in Alasay it barely exists at all. The new District Administrator, who like the Tagab chief of police courageously wants to do a good job, has been appealing for help to U.S. officials with increasing desperation, because the government has yet to pay him his salary or even make his appointment official after over two months in his job on the front line. The provincial governor has been to Alasay only once since March. His agenda is to assiduously favor his HIG political associates there, and it did not take long for allegations of corruption to surface. It is not clear what effect the presidential and provincial council elections on August 20 will have on these issues of legitimacy in Southern Kapisa. 13. (S) There is also an international dimension. Alasay, along with Tagab and Nijrab, are designated as "Focused Districts," part of a small number of districts selected to receive special attention and resources as part of a partnership between ISAF, UNAMA, and GIRoA called the Integrated Approach. The concept is that the Integrated Approach will be a comprehensive channel for coordination and executive decision making. The problem is that to date the Integrated Approach has not resulted in concrete action. 14. (S) The relationship between security and governance in irregular warfare is at once fundamental and elusive. One thing is certain. We will not kill or capture our way out of the Alasay Valley any more than we will out of the rest of Afghanistan. As we replace economy of force with a full court press, we are still in for a protracted struggle. No matter how effective military performance may be, the insurgents will readily fill any vacuums of governance, and without
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political competence, lasting COIN success in Alasay will remain one more operation away. 15. (U) This three-part series of reports on counterinsurgency lessons from Alasay represents the views of the brigade commander and State Department Representative of Task Force Warrior, the battle space owner for Kapisa Province. EIKENBERRY
Thursday, 28 January 2010, 13:20
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 000163
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/18/2020
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PK, AF, IN
SUBJECT: SRAP HOLBROOKE DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
WITH INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY RAO
Classified By: Ambassador Timothy J. Roemer. Reasons: 1.4(B, D).
1. (C) Summary: In a January 18 meeting with Special Representative Richard Holbrooke, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao described the Indian effort in Afghanistan as focused on strengthening governance by building Afghan capacities. She said Indian engagement is transparent and should not be threatening to Pakistan. She urged U.S. pressure on Pakistan to break its ties to the terrorist groups and to permit Afghanistan's economic links with India to grow. Rao said India needs some deliverables on terrorism before it can engage bilaterally with Pakistan. Holbrooke pledged transparency with India on U.S. activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He noted that the increase in U.S. troops has helped stabilize the security landscape, saying that the top security focus now is on unified training of Afghan army and police personnel. He identified agriculture as the highest civilian priority for the quick returns it promises, which Rao welcomed. Rao expressed Indian reservations on reintegration programs, saying they are unlikely to change Taliban thinking. Holbrooke drew a distinction between reintegration and reconciliation, saying that there will be no power sharing with elements of the Taliban. Rao was neutral on postponing Afghan parliamentary elections, saying the decision should be left to the Afghan government. She said that Iran could play a positive role and should be engaged in finding a solution in Afghanistan. End Summary.
Transparency With India
-----------------------
2. (SBU) Special Representative Holbrooke met with Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao for nearly two hours over breakfast on January 18 to exchange views on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Holbrooke said at the outset that the important underlying principle of his visits to India is the need for complete transparency on U.S. activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He noted that he comes with a clear vision of the centrality of India to the strategic landscape in the region. He reiterated that his portfolio explicitly excludes India, policy for which rests with SCA Blake and Ambassador Roemer. Holbrooke was accompanied in the meeting by Ambassador Roemer and SRAP Advisor Vali Nasr. Rao was joined by Joint Secretary (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran) Sinha and Joint Secretary (Americas) Gaitri Kumar.
Holbrooke Briefing on Afghanistan
---------------------------------
3. (C) Holbrooke said that the mission in Afghanistan continues to be difficult but the situation has been stabilized, primarily as a result of the President's politically courageous decision of more than tripling the number of American troops in the country. In his view, the Afghanistan Presidential election cast a shadow on 2009. The election was untidy, but it produced a legitimate President. Rao offered that there was less fraud and rigging in this election than in previous post-Taliban Afghan elections.
4. (C) The agenda for 2010, according to Holbrooke, is to strengthen the government. On the security side the effort will be to improve the army and police, primarily through unified ISAF training instead of dispersed and uncoordinated training by many countries. Holbrooke described this as the most important part of the international challenge. Rao accepted his offer of a detailed joint State/Pentagon briefing on the redesigned training plan for the Afghan army and police.
5. (C) Holbrooke said that on the civilian side, the number one priority is agriculture because it produces the quickest payoff. He noted that investment in mining, power, and other sectors is important but the gestation and payback periods are longer. Besides, he observed, Afghanistan has traditionally been an agricultural export country, with India as its biggest market. With revival of an agricultural credit bank and other agriculture support programs, the
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international community expects a quick return in terms of employment and incomes in rural areas. Holbrooke described this as a sharp contrast with the previous administration, which focused on poppy eradication. On narcotics, the USG effort now is to target the traffickers and the kingpins, not ordinary farmers.
6. (C) Rao responded that supporting Afghan agriculture is a high priority for India as well, with Joint Secretary Sinha on his way to Kabul on January 19 to explore opportunities to build Afghan capacities in this sector. She noted that the GOI is considering establishment of an agriculture college and enhanced training, in part through scholarships to Indian agricultural colleges. Holbrooke offered to arrange a briefing for Sinha in Kabul on the USG's agriculture support programs and plans.
Indian Approach to Afghanistan
------------------------------
7. (C) Rao described the Indian effort in Afghanistan as a focus on strengthening governance by building Afghan capacities through training and infrastructure such that the country can develop a functional administration. In her view, the international community should resist the temptation to micromanage in Afghanistan. Instead, the effort should be to build institutions and let them manage the country. Rao observed that India has the resources and the willingness to assist Afghanistan and is prepared to explore areas that the may assist the U.S. effort.
8. (C) Rao observed that each year the GOI provides about 1,300 scholarship to Afghans for education and training and is considering increasing this number sharply. She noted that security assistance was minimal, limited to 150 training scholarships to Afghan army personnel in various Indian Army training facilities, including the Staff College. Rao readily agreed to Holbrooke's request for a briefing on Indian training for Afghan security personnel, emphasizing that this engagement is completely transparent. She supported her argument by noting that the GOI had previously provided a detailed briefing on this at the U.S.-India Defense Policy Group meetings. "We have nothing to hide," she declared. Holbrooke assured Rao that he is in favor of Indian assistance programs in Afghanistan and is not influenced by what he hears in Islamabad.
Reintegration
-------------
9. (C) Rao and Sinha raised grave concerns about Taliban reintegration plans currently under discussion. Sinha argued that no amount of monetary incentives would induce the Taliban to alter its core beliefs of intolerance and militancy. He was particularly troubled by the British plan which, in his view, takes Afghanistan back to the pre-1990s. Rao expressed skepticism that such a plan would work unless Pakistan changes its policy on supporting the Quetta Shura and other Taliban elements. She observed that it had failed to bring in the Maoists in Nepal and was likely to fail for similar reasons in Afghanistan.
10. (C) Holbrooke explained that some of the anxiety stems from confusion between reintegration and reconciliation. He noted that the reintegration program is not a political negotiation designed to give Taliban elements a share of power. The United States cannot be a party to any such arrangement, in his view, because the Taliban is allied with the Al Qaeda and the social programs of the Taliban are unpalatable. He noted further that the Taliban leadership appears to have no interest in talking to the international community in Afghanistan. Holbrooke also allayed Indian concerns that UNSCR 1267 policy would be altered with respect to Taliban and LET leaders such as Mullah Omar, Gulubuddin Hekmatyar, and Hafiz Saeed.
11. (C) Holbrooke said it is important that the Afghan
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government have in place a program to respond to frequent ceasefire calls at the local level. Such a program should involve laying down of arms and commitments to participate peacefully in society. He outlined the public rollout of the reintegration plan, with a Karzai announcement soon, to be followed by the London conference where a reintegration fund would be established, and to be capped by a conference in Kabul where funding pledges will be solicited. He urged Indian support and contributions. Rao said reintegration could work if it is Afghan-led, if it is painstaking in its selection, and if it involves real commitments to respect human rights and the constitution. She underscored her skepticism by noting, "these are big if's."
Parliamentary Elections
-----------------------
12. (C) Holbrooke identified the upcoming Parliamentary election as the most important political event of 2010. He offered the USG view that the election be postponed to the fall because of inadequate preparation and insufficient ISAF troops on the ground to ensure a peaceful and smooth election in May. He noted that Afghan law allows for such changes in election dates. He requested India's support for this proposal. Rao responded that it must remain the Afghan Government's responsibility to make the call on postponement of elections. "Unlike Pakistan, we do not interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan," she quipped with a smile. She offered Indian assistance in administering the elections.
Pakistan Role in Afghanistan
----------------------------
13. (C) Rao said that Afghanistan has the potential to prosper as a hub or transit point for energy, agriculture and trade if it could be connected to its natural market in India. She said it was unfortunate that Pakistan does not allow this to happen. She asked that the U.S. apply pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting the Afghanistan Taliban and to allow Afghanistan to develop through trade and commercial links. Holbrooke responded that Pakistan views certain Taliban groups, particularly the Quetta Shura, as an insurance policy to protect its strategic interests in Afghanistan and it is not clear that anyone can easily influence Pakistan to turn on these groups, although the U.S. is exerting tremendous pressure. Rao said she was alarmed at this continued Pakistan support for terrorist groups, noting that the LET was "ideologically fused" with both the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network. As evidence, she pointed to the Haqqani group's 2008 bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul. She was also disturbed at the length to which Pakistan had gone to exclude India from the Istanbul conference on Afghanistan, citing it as an example of unwarranted Pakistani insecurity over Indian intentions in Afghanistan. Citing the USG's own difficulties in dealing with the Pakistan government, Holbrooke suggested that many people overestimate the U.S. influence in Pakistan.
India-Pakistan Relations
-----------------------
14. (C) Rao expressed concern that there has been a sharp increase in unseasonal Pakistan-inspired violence and preparation for violence. She pointed to incidents of cross-border shelling along the line of control and in Punjab, increased infiltration, and transfer of terrorist hardware. They are clearly trying to "stir the pot" in Kashmir, she added. In her view, Pakistan is trying to deflect attention to its eastern border from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, where the focus ought to be. Yet, Rao argued, India has not turned its back to Pakistan but needs some Pakistani progress on terrorism to reengage. Holbrooke noted that India and Pakistan working together is obviously in the interests of the region and the international community. He said that Foreign Minister Qureshi was very pleased at the phone call with Foreign Minister Krishna. He reassured Rao that he understands
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clearly where the U.S. strategic interests lie. Holbrooke and Special Advisor Vali Nasr briefed Rao on the evolving political landscape in Pakistan with a weakening President Zardari and the fluid dynamic between the various centers of power, including COAS Kayani, Prime Minister Gilani, PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif and Chief Justice Choudhary.
Iran-Afghanistan; Iran-India
----------------------------
15. (C) In response to Holbrooke's query, Rao and Sinha suggested that Iran could play a positive role in stability in Afghanistan. They cited Iran's common border with Afghanistan, its strong links with the Hazara ethnic group and its economic and cultural connections as reasons for involving Iran in shaping a solution. She said that India was willing to play a helpful role in enabling Iran's engagement with the international community and this had been conveyed by the Prime Minister to the Iranian Foreign Minister. India, however, does not want to be a mediator in any capacity, she declared. Rao said Iran-India relations were good -- civilizational ties, India's large Shia community, petroleum trade -- but "not as good as you may expect" because Iran is difficult to deal with.
China in South Asia
-------------------
16. (C) Holbrooke and Rao agreed that the Chinese have a big interest in Afghanistan but it is focused on exploitation of the country's natural resources. They also agreed that China does not use the influence it has in Pakistan to shape responsible Pakistani behavior. Referring to the U.S.-China joint statement issued during President Obama's China visit, Rao disclosed that Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao had told Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Copenhagen that China has no intention of playing any mediating role in South Asia.
17. (U) SRAP Holbrooke has cleared this message. ROEMER
Tuesday, 19 January 2010, 05:40
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000170
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/20/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: SRAP MEETING WITH KARZAI: MOVING REINTEGRATION
POLICY TOWARDS LONDON
Classified By: Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary: President Karzai told S/SRAP Holbrooke January 16 that he wants to announce a reintegration policy before London but save the details of the plan for a rollout at the Kabul conference in late spring. Karzai is still conflicted about finalizing the policy, according to several observers, but has apparently grasped that a pre-London announcement can leverage donations and other support from key nations, especially the Gulf. He said that elections "were likely to slip a few months" although media reports indicated that he told Holbrooke (and UK FM Milliband, who he saw later that day) that the elections would be "on time." On transition and a NATO SCR, Karzai's position tracks with ours and he promised to raise his concerns with the UK. End summary.
--------------------------------------------- --------
Reviewing 2009 - New Policies Literally Bearing Fruit
--------------------------------------------- --------
2. (S) In a relaxed one-hour meeting with President Karzai, his newly-confirmed Foreign Minister Zalmay Rassoul, and four other senior advisors, SRAP Holbrooke, Ambassador Eikenberry and SRAP Senior Advisor Barney Rubin discussed developments since Karzai's November 2009 inauguration. Karzai spoke first about the Haiti earthquake and expressed sympathy at the tragedy from "a country that truly understands." He said that one of his servants had asked him to do something for Haiti and he planned to do so - the Palace announced a gift of $200,000 later that day.
3. (C) Holbrooke noted that the night before the Embassy/ISAF team had briefed President Obama on progress since the elections; this was also a moment to review the nearly one year of the Obama Administration's work in Afghanistan. Since the new Obama strategy was articulated, Holbrooke said, the impact on areas such as agriculture have been tremendous. Karzai agreed and said that the recent visit by Agriculture Secretary Vilsak had been extremely positive. Holbrooke said that with about $400 million in U.S. assistance, and more from other key donors such as Japan and India, Afghanistan's agricultural sector was poised to succeed. The next stage, Karzai and Holbrooke agreed, would be the re-establishment of an Agricultural Development Bank by the end of 2010.
4. (C) Karzai said that Afghanistan does have excellent ministers such as Minister of Agriculture Rahimi, who Holbrooke said Vilsack had praised as "world-class" but lacks capable administrators on almost every level. The brain drain of the war years was enormous, Karzai said, and claimed that luring back expatriates would not succeed since now they were "too costly" to keep.
---------------------------------
Conferences: "Will Kabul Happen?"
---------------------------------
5. (C) Karzai will attend the Munich Security Conference; Holbrooke noted that he and NSA Jones would likely attend and that the Germans hoped to make it a productive event. He said that the recent Abu Dhabi conference of Special Representatives for Afghanistan and Pakistan had been very useful, especially with the presentations by Foreign Minister Spanta and Mosoom Stanekzai, the architect of the new reintegration policy. Holbrooke noted than an unusually high number of Muslim nations had been represented in Abu Dhabi, with Saudi Arabia sending a lower-level delegate (for mainly internal reasons.)
6. (C) While the original intention had been to hold the Kabul meeting ahead of London, Holbrooke said, our interest now was to make the January 28 London conference a success. This is a time to rally world support for Karzai and for the new U.S. strategy, he said. A "big headline" that showed the way forward and consolidated this support is the desired outcome of this conference, Holbrooke said, rather than pledging of money or troops; the best headline would be something like "the world community supports President Karzai and his reintegration plan."
7. (C) Karzai agreed but asked,"will a Kabul conference actually happen" in view of the international focus and efforts that have been expended on London. The U.S. visitors turned the question around to ask Karzai if he plans to hold the conference and invite international attendees. Karzai countered by asking "will the Secretary attend," we answered that this is the current U.S. intention and he said that his proposed timing would be in April.
----------------------------------------
Reintegration: Reassurance from the U.S.
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----------------------------------------
8. (S) Regarding progress to date in establishing both a reintegration policy and a reconciliation approach for Taliban fighters and political leaders, respectively, Karzai indicated that he was close to finalizing the new Afghan policy. Claiming that he had only read the new draft National Security Council policy papers the night before, Karzai said that he "liked this plan more than the previous ones." He believes that this approach will given foot soldiers lots of incentive to turn, while Rassoul noted that during his lobbying efforts he had spoken to nearly 200 MPs and eighty percent were in favor of reintegration. Holbrooke asked if this applied to women MPs who are especially important to this effort; Rassoul said that if they are given the full information about the program they are less skeptical. (Note: SRAP Holbrooke met with seven female MPs on January 17 - septel.)
9. (S) Despite his positive feeling about the plan, Karzai said, before "technicalities" are figured out he wants to be sure he has understanding and political backing from all relevant quarters - most importantly from the United States. Next, he wants Saudi Arabia's political support as well as any financial resources they might contribute. Rubin noted that the Saudi officials he had visited a week ago are prepared to not only back the plan politically but to offer Hajj/Umrah "packages" to reintegrees, which would offer a strong religious motivation and undercut the Taliban. The Saudis may also offer deradicalization program advice, Rubin said. (Note: Karzai said that Saudi programs were probably too "hard core" for the "country bumpkins" they believe are currently filling the Taliban ranks, but the offer is appreciated. End note.)
10. (S) Karzai turned to the issue of ensuring Pakistan's support for the policy since "neither reintegration nor reconciliation would work without them." If they are not on board it will be "the same vicious cycle of trial - failure - trial - partial success" that previous reintegration plans have faced. In Abu Dhabi, Holbrooke said, senior U.S., Jordanian, Afghan, Saudi and Pakistani officials discussed this issue and all had stressed to Pakistan that they had to support this policy. Pakistan countered that the "totality of the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship" should be reassessed; Karzai said that "we are beginning to see that point."
11. (S) Holbrooke assured Karzai that Afghanistan's current reintegration draft policy has the backing of the U.S. and seems to have strong Gulf buy-in, which Karzai flagged as crucial to psychologically undermining the Taliban. The U.S. would not prevent this from happening as it had in the past, Holbrooke said; on the contrary we plan to help fund the plan. However, "we are all waiting on you" to announce exactly what the plan will contain, he said to Karzai, and to make maximum use of London that announcement should occur before January 28. Karzai asked whether the plan was really for London or Kabul - Eikenberry explained that to leverage the window of opportunity that was now open for contributions by the Japanese, Gulf states and Europe there should be a conceptual plan in time for London. Real implementation, especially given donor funding mechanisms, could wait for the Kabul Conference announcement of modalities.
12. (S) Karzai gave more details about his concept for a "Loya Jirga" which would reaffirm the Afghan partnership with the international community and also endorse the reintegration plan and reconciliation efforts. It could occur before the Kabul Conference, he said, and would involve 500-1000 people including MPs and traditional leaders. He compared it to the gathering of 1200 people who approved the 2005 Strategic Partnership Agreement before he flew to Washington to sign the Agreement with President Bush. He reassured Holbrooke and Eikenberry that "some people will shout" but that the Afghan way is to complain first, then support.
------------------------------------
Elections: I Won't Mention In London
------------------------------------
13. (S) Holbrooke noted the ongoing "confusion" over 2010 elections, and advised that in order to avoid a pointless debate in London Karzai should either clarify his position on the timing of elections or take the issue off the table. Krazai said that he is not planning to mention elections in his speech at London - there is no time to discuss this issue and that it wasn't the right venue to bring up such an internal matter. The Independent Electoral Commission, with reference to the Constitution, would come up with a new date that is likely to be "a few months" after May, he said.
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Eikenberry noted that while it was clear that elections should stick to the constitutional timeframe of 2010, the exact date and the conditions - including reforms - still have to be determined. Karzai pushed for U.S. funding of the elections on the grounds that "democracy in Afghanistan has been your big achievement." In a later aside, Chief of Staff Daudzai told Eikenberry that if the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior make the case for an election delay, the IEC would accept it. Eikenberry offered to have international community representatives then meet with the IEC to be briefed on the reasons for the new election date and show our support.
14. (S) In later discussions with FM Milliband, he indicated his concern that the elections would take place without any reforms, and in fact expressed his view that a 2010 date was not his preference since it would not allow for significant changes. Eikenberry noted to him that without improvements we were not planning to fund the elections. Eikenberry said that he had pressed Karzai in an earlier meeting on the issue of the IEC having mishandled the elections at a provincial level. Even with Karzai's myopia (Karzai absolves the IEC at a national level from wrongdoing and blames the ECC for the allegations of fraud) he accepts that the IEC provincial authorities mishandled their duties. Daudzai noted that IEC Chairman Ludin 'should have returned by now' but is still outside Afghanistan.
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NATO SCR and Transition
-----------------------
15. (S) On another potential point of discussion in London, the civilian "counterpart" to General McChrystal, Karzai said that he did not understand or accept the concept of a high-level NATO "Senior Civilian Representative" with powers and responsibilities commensurate with COMISAF. "In fact, I don't meet with the current NATO SCR," Karzai said, adding that he would foresee "conflict" if there were two empowered NATO representatives. For PRT coordination the nation who controls the PRT should take the lead on development in that area, Karzai said.
This cable was cleared by Ambassador Holbrooke. EIKENBERRY
Sunday, 10 January 2010, 09:12
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000085
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/10/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: KARZAI AND CODEL MCCAIN ON PROGRESS, ELECTIONS,
AND REINTEGRATION
Classified By: Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Reasons. 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (S) Summary: In a positive and free-ranging discussion, President Karzai and visiting CODEL McCain agreed that more should be done to tell Afghans and Americans about the progress in Afghanistan since 2002 and the positive role of the international community. On the timing of parliamentary elections Karzai held firmly to 2010 but conceded that a few months could, and probably should, be added to the projected date of May 22. He explained the parameters of Afghanistan's projected reintegration program, promising that it would be unveiled before the January 28 London conference, and consulting with the CODEL on the right way to gain U.S. acceptance of the plan. The CODEL and Karzai discussed the situation in Pakistan and potential for violence that would affect Afghanistan. End summary.
2. (U) CODEL McCain (Senator McCain (R-AZ), Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), Senator John Thune (R-SD) and Senator John Barrosso (R-WY)) met with President Karzai and his senior security leadership, including the Ministers of Defense, Interior and Foreign Affairs, as well as National Security Advisor Rassoul, on January 6, accompanied by Ambassador Eikenberry, Deputy Ambassador Ricciardone, and COMISAF McChyrstal.
--------------------------------------------
The Bad Old Days ... And The Better New Ones
--------------------------------------------
3. (S) Karzai and the CODEL, who maintained a positive mood throughout the meeting and a dinner immediately following, discussed the American political debate over the health care bill and what Karzai termed the "unbelievable" status of uninsured Americans. Karzai told McCain that he'd been "inspired" by McCain's gracious November 2008 concession speech and that "if it had not been for that speech I would not have accepted a second round" in the recent Presidential elections. Karzai added that his acceptance of the second round ("even though I know I had won") would be what he was remembered for in Afghan history; McCain said Karzai had been in his thoughts during that difficult period.
4. (S) McCain and Lieberman reminded Karzai that they had met in a tent at Bagram Airbase in January 2002, with flashlights instead of electricity; all three mentioned the "treasured" bilateral relationship and tremendous accomplishments in Afghanistan over the past eight years. "In 2001 Kabul was in darkness and misery; now it is amazing and vibrant," Karzai said. At another point he noted that it was "wrong" to make statements that the Bush Administration had only made mistakes; there had been real development during those years. As one example, he said, he had been given a list of women to consider for his next Cabinet nomination slate - having such a list shows progress from just five years ago.
5. (S) The CODEL noted that President Obama's December 1 speech on the Afghanistan strategy had brought about a more favorable U.S. opinion about the war and our goals here, and a recognition that "a threat to you is a threat to us." Karzai responded that while he was somewhat concerned with any discussion of end dates he had publicly emphasized to the Afghan people that we "have to do this for ourselves" and continue the "struggle against terrorism."
6. (S) In view of the need to do more to tell both Afghans and Americans about what is going right in Afghanistan, Karzai noted his extremely positive impression of his January 2 trip to Helmand, accompanied by COMISAF McChrystal. He said that it had been his "best trip in seven years" and McCain noted that the trip had been covered by U.S. media, reinforcing the positive message. Karzai complained, mildly, that while he knew that media statements were out of our direct control, U.S. leaders should also make statements that recognize Afghan progress. "We will get the army and other institutions built, even if there are setbacks," he said, but it is vitally important that we "bring back" a sense of shared purpose. Afghanistan had seen incredible developments in education and the treatment of women, Senator Thune said, noting the particular potential of agriculture. Karzai agreed but pointed out that climate change was a new and growing concern - at this point in the year there should be abundant snow and there had been none to date.
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Elections: Confidence-Building
------------------------------
7. (S) Karzai linked the issue of Afghan perceptions to elections by saying "progress is there but confidence isn't" among the people because they hear rumors of an election delay that would undermine the constitution. He said that
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"talk in diplomatic circles" is of an election delay which makes the Afghan people "extremely frightened." A delay would be a "dangerous" opening that the Taliban would exploit, he said, and "pleaded" with the CODEL to help him. Senator Lieberman emphasized that this was an Afghan decision, but pointed out the security issues involved. Karzai responded that then-President Bush had asked him two years ago to delay the Presidential elections until 2010 and he had refused since such a delay by the sitting President would amount to a coup. This applies again to Parliament (NFI) and "if we'd had a second round I'd be less worried now" (because he would have a more certain mandate from the people.)
8. (S) Conceding that a few months' delay would not engender the same fear and uncertainty, Karzai said that although he could announce a delay, he had to do so in a way that would "convince" the people that elections really will occur. "The MPs want to stay in their jobs, but the country would suffer" if the delay were indefinite, he said. Lieberman agreed, noting that President Obama's message had also emphasized the importance of democracy in Afghanistan and that comparison of the Taliban's approach to democracy with Karzai's was "night to day". Senator Barrosso pointed out that in a second term the "clock starts to tick" and asked Karzai how he would contribute even further to Afghan democracy. Karzai replied that his two contributions would be being the first Afghan leader to hand over power peacefully to his democratically-elected successor and defeating terrorism.
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Peace and Reintegration
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9. (S) Karzai noted that the peace process and reintegration efforts help in the fight against the Taliban by working with those who are willing to come back, especially the "foot soldiers". Reconciliation would extend to more senior level Taliban (not Mullah Omar, he clarified) who are not linked to Al Qaeda, "some of whom are willing" to talk. Lots of contacts are taking place, Karzai said, but no common reconciliation policy has emerged. McCain noted that for this to be successful the other side should be convinced they can't win and this should probably be timed to work with the new influx of troops now underway. He agreed that those fighting for reasons other than ideology should be helped to return and that the fight should continue against the ideologically-motivated Taliban, stressing the importance of educating the country that both efforts were ongoing at the same time.
10. (S) Lieberman pressed him to explain the concept of offering incentives to the Taliban, and emphasized that this outreach could be problematic if it,s not explained right to the American people and the importance of Karzai articulating his plan before the U.S. could support it. The "carrot and stick" aspect (rewarding those who want to end their allegiance, punishing those who abuse human rights and embrace terrorism) has to be understood, Lieberman said. Karzai said he was currently revising the methods and would soon announce a strategy in which sub-commanders might be induced to reintegrate into Afghan society but reconciliation would need Pakistan to end its support for high-level Taliban. Later in the conversation, Karzai said he could refer to American history and the "lenient" terms extended to members of the Confederate Army, including General Robert E. Lee, when they surrendered after the Civil War.
11. (S) Karzai asked the CODEL how the U.S. Congress will receive this plan, to which McCain said it would be supported in view of the success of the comparable Anbar Awakening in Iraq. Lieberman, however, noted that outreach to the Taliban could be misunderstood so it would be vital to have Karzai first explain it, in clear terms, as part of Afghanistan,s own approach to peace and justice. Karzai told a story about a Taliban atrocity against a woman in Oruzgan as an example of some excesses which should be punished and would not be tolerated. But "innocent country people" fighting for the Taliban should be treated differently, he said. (Note: Embassy information is that the perpetrator of this atrocity was a Talib but that it was a case of domestic violence, not a political act as Karzai indicated.) Karzai said that the "mainstream" is against the Taliban and on our side. McCain noted that while there was concern over governance and corruption in Afghanistan the people don't want the Taliban and do participate in elections. He and Karzai pointed out the absence of religious and sectarian violence in Afghanistan as a very positive sign.
--------------------
Pakistan Predictions
--------------------
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12. (S) The group reviewed current developments in Pakistan, and Karzai said that the overall bilateral relationship, while an improvement over past years, was "held back" by the Army and ISI who continue to help the Afghan Taliban. He said that he wants to engage more and have U.S. support in doing so, since "the war won't end easily without Pakistani cooperation." He was pessimistic about the internal situation, as was his intelligence chief, Amrullah Saleh. Saleh noted that Pakistan's energy sector was in decline and that discontent in Pashtun areas was higher than it had been in the volatile 1960's and 1970's; meanwhile, he said, President Zardari is using Baluch nationalists as his base of support. Saleh predicted that neither the army nor Nawaz Sharif would bring Zardari's term to an abrupt end.
13 (U) CODEL McCain was unable to clear this message. EIKENBERRY
Tuesday, 12 January 2010, 18:24
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000104
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/12/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINS, MARR, AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN MOMENTUM ON REINTEGRATION PLANNING
REF: SECSTATE 815
Classified By: AMBASSADOR KARL EIKENBERRY FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) & (d)
SUMMARY
-------
1. (S/Rel UK) At President Karzai,s direction, the Afghan Office of the National Security Council (ONSC) has taken on the task of interagency coordination of reintegration planning, forming an Interagency Policy Working Group (IPWG) which produced a draft &National Reconciliation Policy and Reintegration of Armed Opposition Groups8. The draft ) essentially a statement of reintegration principles which crosses no U.S. redlines ) recommends an appointed cabinet-level lead, a single office to oversee all reintegration/reconciliation efforts and a peace &jirga8 (grand council) to sanction an implementation plan for Karzai,s approval. Deputy National Security Advisor Shaida Abdali presented the draft paper to deputy ministers January 9. Previously, Presidential Advisor Masoom Stanekzai, the once and possibly future GIRoA lead on reintegration, on January 5 produced a concept paper derived from the draft ONSC principles paper, which fills in broad implementation details. (Note: as of January 10, it appears Stanekzai may gain a ministerial post unrelated to reintegration.)
2. (S/Rel UK) GIRoA will present Stanekzai,s reintegration concept paper to the international community at the January 13 Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) security sub-committee meeting and for endorsement at the full JCMB meeting on January 20. We expect that participants will acknowledge the paper at the January 28 London Foreign Ministerial on Afghanistan. While this process indicates Afghan movement on and commitment to developing a reintegration policy, none of these documents has yet been officially adopted and GIRoA has yet to designate a clear reintegration lead. In a January 6 meeting, Deputy Ambassador Ricciardone and ISAF Reintegration Advisor Graeme Lamb reiterated to Stanekzai that GIRoA should outline its integration strategy to the Afghan public prior to London, so that the international community can be seen as responding to an Afghan initiative (including with promises of financial support) rather than driving it. President Karzai told CODEL McCain and Ambassador Eikenberry on January 6 that he would announce a reintegration policy framework prior to London. END SUMMARY
Progress on Papers, But Not a Complete Policy
---------------------------------------------
3. (S/Rel UK) At President Karzai,s direction, the Office of the National Security Council (ONSC) has taken on the task of interagency coordination of reintegration planning, forming an Interagency Policy Working Group (IPWG) which produced a draft &National Reconciliation Policy and Reintegration of Armed Oppositions8 (sic). The draft ) essentially a statement of reintegration principles which crosses no U.S. redlines ) recommends an appointed cabinet-level lead, a single office to oversee all reintegration/reconciliation efforts and a peace jirga (grand council) to sanction an implementation plan for Karzai,s approval. The ONSC paper is a statement of principles with an accompanying assessment of prospects for reintegration,s success and a list of reasons why past efforts have failed. It emphasizes the need for Afghan leadership over programs resourced by ISAF. It leaves the door open to insurgents joining the security forces, though it specifies that GIRoA will not create autonomous militias.
4. (S/Rel UK) Presidential Advisor Masoom Stanekzai, the once and possibly future designated GIRoA lead on reintegration, on January 5 produced a concept paper derived from the draft ONSC principles paper, which fills in broad implementation details. (Note: as of January 10, it appears Stanekzai may gain a ministerial post unrelated to reintegration, throwing into question the identity of the next reintegration lead.) Stanekzai,s paper builds on the ONSC paper, laying out basic criteria for communities, inclusion in a reintegration program by which they would receive development support. (Participating communities would accept the return of reintegrees and supervise their progress.) It stresses the need for education and vocational training for ex-fighters and their economic reintegration within their communities. It cites, without elaboration, &links8 to &public protection force initiatives8, and the National Solidarity Program (a GIRoA initiative which provides grants to communities to fund development projects selected by locally elected development councils), which is one possible source of development support for this program. The paper also lays out general timelines and roles for GIRoA and the international community to follow. It distinguishes between different tiers of insurgents and argues, again
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without elaborating, that different packages and approaches will be necessary for each. Both papers recommend that GIRoA establish a single office with a cabinet-equivalent lead with full authority for reintegration and reconciliation efforts under the direct supervision of the President. ISAF's Force Reintegration Cell (F-RIC) recommended to the ONSC that this lead be staffed by a full-time organization supported by ISAF, the UN and the international community. GIRoA will also create an Afghan and international supervisory commission for financial oversight. (Note: we are emailing both ONSC and Stanekzai papers to SCA/A and S/SRAP.)
TIMELINES...
------------
5. (S/Rel UK) ONSC officials told us on January 4 (and Stanekzai confirmed to us January 6) that they will present Stanekzai,s paper for discussion at the January 13 JCMB security sub-committee meeting and for endorsement at the full JCMB meeting on January 20. President Karzai also told Ambassador Eikenberry and CODEL McCain on January 6 that he would announce a reintegration policy framework prior to the London Conference. ONSC expects to develop more detailed implementation plans and see a Presidential decision on a reintegration lead after the London conference.
6. (S/Rel UK) GIRoA may convene a peace jirga to discuss and ratify the implementation plans, although probably not until May. GIRoA would seek donor pledges at the Kabul conference, which will likely be held in April or May. Both drafts state that the reintegration program will run for four to five years. The Stanekzai paper notes that tactical reintegration will precede higher-level &political engagement8 (reconciliation), and an evaluation phase where GIRoA will assess its progress.
...AND REDLINES
---------------
7. (C/Rel UK) Both documents respect U.S. &red lines8 on insurgent reintegration (insurgents must lay down arms and renounce violence, reject al Qaeda, and abide by the Afghan Constitution) but there are some passages that we will suggest ONSC amend prior to release. Both drafts, but especially Stanekzai,s, seem so focused on reconciling insurgents that they ignore the rights of victims, and largely ignore the issue of perverse incentives. A vague reference to "amnesty" for former insurgents in the Stanekzai paper is confusing. (The ONSC paper states that criminals are not eligible for benefits and insurgents not immune from prosecution for violations of human rights.)
8. (/Rel UK) On January 6 Deputy Ambassador Ricciardone and ISAF Reintegration Advisor Graeme Lamb called on Stanekzai at his request for a stock-taking session. Key takeaways:
--All reiterated the importance of ensuring that the international community sticks to its collectively stated intention of supporting an Afghan-led reintegration process.
--Stanekzai detailed ongoing GIRoA discussions over how best to structure a trust fund for handling funds earmarked for reintegration programs. D/AMB noted that the USG would not wish to work its contributions via UNDP, one scenario under consideration. (Note: on January 9 UK emboffs shared with us a proposal for a &dual window8 method, through which donors could choose to have their contributions handled either by UNDP or a commercial bank. We expect this to be a topic for discussion among SRAPs at Abu Dhabi.)
--D/AMB took the opportunity to update Stanekzai on the internal USG processes related to the release of CERP and USAID funding for reintegration, including the requirement that the Secretary certify that GIRoA had a workable plan and that the Department had consulted with GIRoA on it. Stanekzai evinced confidence that the ongoing, extensive GIRoA interagency discussions would result in broad acceptance of the plan, with the looming London conference serving a &forcing function8 to get interested ministries to move beyond &personality issues8 to commit.
--D/AMB and LtGen (ret'd) Graeme Lamb recommended that the Karzai administration publicly outline its reintegration strategy prior to the London conference, which would then serve as a venue for the international community to offer concrete support. Stanekzai agreed and said that he had discussed this two days earlier with President Karzai, who planned to make such an announcement in Kabul.
--Stanekzai cautioned that reintegration of potentially tens of thousands of &foot soldiers8 would be a long-term proposition ) a five year-plan. Much work needed to carried
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out, including development of a communications strategy, engagement with clerical leaders, and a plan for engagement with the Government of Pakistan. Stanekzai was eager to apply lessons learned from reintegration experience in other countries, such as Colombia, Thailand, and the Philippines.
9. (S/Rel UK) COMMENT: ONSC is delivering the long-awaited &Afghan lead8 on reintegration, though on timelines that some international supporters will find frustrating. We believe that the time GIRoA puts into building interagency coordination and consensus before moving out on reintegration is time well spent, particularly given the ongoing cabinet rebuilding effort. We will work with GIRoA and ISAF to encourage some fine-tuning of the papers (e.g. deleting gratuitous swipes at Pakistani ISI support for insurgents and purported ISAF insensitivity to civilian casualties). Whether or not Stanekzai ) a talented individual and open interlocutor ) remains the lead official on reintegration, we are pleased to see reintegration planning becoming institutionalized across ministry/agency lines. Coupled with ONSC,s engagement on banning ammonium nitrate (septel), its emergent lead on reintegration signals a welcome evolution of Afghanistan,s interagency process.
10. (S/Rel UK) The idea of a peace jirga to ratify GIRoA reintegration planning, if well handled, can be a good source of political support. Credible reintegration efforts require buy-in from non-Pashtuns who might otherwise be suspicious of a Pashtun-only &separate peace.8 Considering the scale of development money being earmarked for reintegration support, we are cognizant of the danger of creating perverse incentives, short-changing individuals and communities that have not fed the insurgency, and the potential for a lack of coordination with other governance and development initiatives targeting the same areas. Moreover, as a post-jirga plan could look considerably different than the GIRoA plan that is submitted to it, we should appropriately caveat our release of funds should a post-jirga plan cross U.S. redlines. END COMMENT EIKENBERRY
Sunday, 06 December 2009, 09:53
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003890
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE, SCA/FO, SCA/A
STATE PASS USAID ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD
EO 12958 DECL: 11/30/2019
TAGS KDEM, PGOV, PTER, AF
SUBJECT: KANDAHAR POLITICS COMPLICATE U.S. OBJECTIVES IN
AFGHANISTAN
REF: A. KABUL 3748 B. KABUL 3595
Classified By: Coordinator Director for Development and Economic Affair s E. Anthony Wayne, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: As we step up engagement with GIRoA leadership in Kandahar, it is important to understand the dynamics of political power and how fundamental Kandahar is to the fortunes of the Karzai regime. It is from Kandahar that President Karzai's claim to national legitimacy originates and from the province that the Karzai family's position as a semi-modern aristocracy stems. As the kingpin of Kandahar, the President's younger half-brother Ahmed Wali Karzai (AWK) dominates access to economic resources, patronage, and protection. Much of the real business of running Kandahar takes place out of public sight, where AWK operates, parallel to formal government structures, through a network of political clans that use state institutions to protect and enable licit and illicit enterprises. A dramatic example is the Arghandab river valley, an agriculturally rich and heavily-populated district strategically located at the northern gate to Kandahar City, where the President's direct intervention in the Alikozai tribal succession increased Karzai political dominance over two of the most valuable resources in Kandahar -- fertile land and water. The tribal power structure in Kandahar seriously complicates our efforts to bring formal justice and modern governance to the region. In the absence of GIRoA initiatives to bring key individuals closely linked to the Karzai regime to justice, RC South is pursuing a bottom-up approach to the Arghandab shura. End Summary.
2. (C) As we step up engagement with GIRoA leadership in Kandahar in pursuit of U.S. security, stabilization, development and anti-corruption goals, it is important to understand the dynamics of political power and how fundamental Kandahar is to the fortunes of the Karzai regime (Ref A). It is from Kandahar, not Kabul, that President Karzai's claim to national legitimacy originates, and where, through leadership of the royal Durrani Popalzai tribe, he has a true political base. In Kandahar, political clans consisting of personal, tribal, marriage and economic alliances engage in balance of power competition and cooperation. At the pinnacle of Kandahar's political clans, the Karzai clan functions as a semi-modern aristocracy, with the President ultimately presiding over the nation.
3. (C) As the kingpin of Kandahar, the President's younger half-brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, rules over political deal and decision-making at the provincial level and thereby dominates access to economic resources, patronage and protection. The overriding purpose that unifies his political roles as Chairman of the Kandahar Provincial Council and as the President's personal representative to the South is the enrichment, extension and perpetuation of the Karzai clan, and along with it their branch of the Popalzai tribe. This applies equally to his entrepreneurial and his alleged criminal activities. AWK derives authority and legitimacy from his relationship to President Karzai, from the relative discipline and elite position of the Popalzai tribe and from his access to resources. In Kandahar's political realm, he is an unrivaled strongman. For example, the Kandahar Provincial Council, which is made up largely of individuals who are personally beholden to him, wields serious influence, despite its lack of statutory powers. It is currently going about its business unhindered despite the fraud charges that have prevented the IEC from certifying the recent Provincial Council election results (Ref B). Preceded by the removal of three successive provincial governors who challenged Karzai dominance, Tooryalai Wesa, a political novice, family friend and former agriculture professor, has proven adequately compliant.
4. (C) Much of the real business of running Kandahar takes place out of public sight, where AWK operates parallel to formal government structures through a network of political clans that use state institutions to protect and enable licit and illicit enterprises. At its core, this clan network has a caste-like division of labor. The Popalzai occupy the leadership pinnacle. The Barakzai, with Gul Agha Sherzai as their leader, compete for power and business, which includes, for example, contracting at Kandahar Air Field and transport on Highway 4 from the Pakistan border at Spin Boldak. The Noorzai occupy key positions in the ANSF and are the traditional racketeers (with ties to narcotics trafficking). The Achekzais along the border are the traditional smugglers, and the Alikozai are the traditional
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warriors.
5. (C) Among Karzai family-run businesses are alleged control of trucking on Highway 1 (the Ring Road) through Kandahar Province and beyond, private security contracting and real estate. The last notably includes Ayno Mina, an ostentatious Karzai property development for Afghan elites east of Kandahar City, built on land obtained from the government at rock bottom prices, with financing guaranteed by OPIC. In a land of popular strongmen, AWK is widely unpopular in Kandahar, because he rules exclusively rather than inclusively; he is not perceived as caring about the population at large but rather, as a traditional Pashtuns Khan using his power to "feed his tribe."
6. (C) A good example of how the Karzais' power plays out in Kandahar can be found in the Arghandab river valley, an agriculturally rich and heavily populated district strategically located at the northern gate to Kandahar City, where the Alikozai tribe makes up 60 percent of the population. They received the valley as a reward for assisting the founder of Afghanistan, Ahmed Shah Durrani, conquer Kandahar in the mid-1700s. As the guardians of Kandahar, the Alikozais have prevented all invaders from occupying Arghandab. The Soviets fought hard but never took it and as a result were never secure in Kandahar City. The Taliban's rise to power began in Kandahar, when the powerful Alikozai leader Mullah Naquibullah decided to give them the keys to the city, and he turned on them to assist their overthrow in 2001. When Mullah Naqib died of a heart attack in 2007, President Karzai took the unusual step of flying to Kandahar, where he anointed Naquib's son Karimullah as the new leader of the Alikozai. However, the move had significant blowback. Mullah Naqib had never designated his young and inexperienced son as his successor, and Karzai's intervention generated resentment among senior Alikozai elders. The resulting split weakened tribal unity, a vulnerability the Taliban quickly exploited, and it remains a present source of instability.
7. (C) The Arghandab story appears on the surface to be a case of bungled tribal exploitation. On the contrary, by intervening in the Alikozai succession, the Karzais linked the most important tribal faction to control over the provincial government in a line that runs from AWK to their putative leader Karimullah, who in turn holds sway over the District Administrator and local shura. The Karzais also increased their influence over two of the most valuable resources in Kandahar (which is largely desert) -- fertile land and water. The Arghandab river valley, contains some of the best agricultural land in Afghanistan; it famously produces 80 percent of the country's pomegranates. Production and land values there will increase greatly as a result of Canada's "signature" rehabilitation of the Dahla Dam and irrigation works, originally constructed by the U.S. in the 1950s. Karzai businesses are also set to acquire multiple patronage benefits from Dahla Dam construction and security contracts, but the main prize will be political control over long-term allocation of water flows, including to Popalzai and Barakzai areas that lie well downstream, via underground canals to the south.
8. (C) It is no accident that AWK lobbied the project's Canadian sponsors on behalf of the Watan Group, the eventual winner of the Dahla Dam security contract, whose CEO is his cousin, U.S. national Rashid Popal. More than business is involved; most of the project lies in Alikozai majority areas, but the Popalzai will control security, and Alikozai leader Karimullah was incensed over this treatment by his Karzai sponsors when he found out. A follow-on to warlord militias, private security companies today also serve personal interests as camouflaged vehicles for protection rackets in construction, transportation and drug smuggling. AWK's determined but so far unsuccessful efforts to acquire MOI-sanction to license all contractors and their weapons through the Provincial Council has the potential to arm the Karzai clan with a non-state entity that can insure against whoever should come to power in Afghanistan.
9. (C) Comment: The traditional tribal power structures in Kandahar have many implications for U.S. objectives in the region. Initiatives that rely on GIRoA to take the lead in bringing to justice major corrupt figures or negative influences in Kandahar contain a serious dilemma: they would include some of Karzai,s closest relatives and allies and require the prosecution of people on whom we often rely for assistance and/or support. Second, any efforts to bring these individuals to justice could compromise the informal
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governing networks to which Kandaharis have become accustomed, without necessarily replacing them with effective GIRoA officials or improving the delivery of services. A focus on bottom-up local solutions, such as identifying and reaching out to the multiple factions in Arghandab as well as the official shura, which RC South is pursuing, could offset this problem to some degree. End Comment.
10. (U) This assessment, derived from multiple sources including information provided by over a dozen knowledgeable Afghans, presents a perspective that is widely perceived among the Afghan public and consistent with documentation in open sources and intelligence analyses. MUSSOMELI
Monday, 15 February 2010, 10:50
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000571
SIPDIS
E.O. 12598: DECL: 02/15/2020
TAGS PGOV, KJUS, KCOR, PREL, EAID, AF
SUBJECT: NEW CIV-MIL EFFORT TO INFLUENCE BEHAVIOR OF CRIMINAL AND
CORRUPT AFGHAN OFFICIALS
Classified by Acting Deputy Ambassador Joseph A. Mussomeli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C//REL ISAF) Summary: The first Nexus-Corruption Leadership Board, co-chaired by Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs, Ambassador Wayne, and ISAF J2 (Intel), Major General Flynn, met on February 4 to consider possible courses of action ("COAs") that U.S. military and Embassy personnel may employ against criminal and corrupt Afghan officials in an effort to change their behavior. These recommendations were developed through the joint effort of the Embassy's Nexus-Corruption Coordination committee (NCC) and ISAF's Anti-Corruption Task Force (ACTF). The Leadership Board approved three recommendations: (1) to apply a set of minimum COAs against high-profile corrupt officials to signal a change in U.S. policy on corruption; (2) to begin a series of high-level demarches to persuade the Karzai government to follow through on promises to tackle corruption; and (3) to consider at the next Leadership Board meeting recommendations on applying appropriate COAs, including possible law enforcement actions, against three prominent Afghan malign actors in southern Afghanistan: Abdul Razziq, Ahmed Wali Karzai, Asadullah Sherzad. End Summary.
2. (C//REL ISAF) The purpose of the NCC is to develop policy recommendations on ways to reduce and combat official corruption and "nexus" criminal activities (i.e., insurgency, narcotics and criminality). The membership of the NCC includes representatives from U.S. law enforcement agencies, U.S. Treasury, and a cleared American from ISAF. ISAF's ACTF works in partnership with the NCC and the international community (e.g., the UK and the UN) to develop policy goals, prioritize policy towards important malign actors (i.e., corrupt/criminal Afghan officials), and determine appropriate courses of action to change their behavior.
Board Considers Courses of Action (COA) Policy
--------------------------------------------- -
3. (C//REL ISAF) In the first meeting of the Leadership Board, co-chairs Ambassador Wayne and MG Flynn approved the concept of applying non-law enforcement COAs to corrupt officials on a case-by-case basis. Possible COAs can run the spectrum from refusing to appear in a picture with a corrupt official, to cutting off USG funded assistance, to seizing ill-gotten assets, to applying Presidential Proclamation 7750, which prevents the corrupt official and his/her family from obtaining U.S. visas. No COAs are intended to preclude or replace prosecutions when appropriate, but to serve as tools to be considered to alter illicit behavior in addition to prosecution, or when prosecution is not possible or has a low likelihood of success. The policy also provides that no COA is recommended that will hinder, prevent, or interfere with an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution. However, in many cases, the proposed measure may be as or more effective than law enforcement actions in influencing the conduct of officials involved in corruption or nexus-related activities, particularly at the local level.
4. (C//REL ISAF) Ambassador Wayne and MG Flynn also agreed to the recommendation to develop a "basket" of minimum COAs that would be applied as a default to all corrupt officials that are prioritized as persons of interest by NCC and/or ACTF. These minimum COAs include: (1) no public meetings with the official (and no photos), and no high-profile public visits from CODELs and other dignitaries; (2) no giving or receiving of gifts; and (3) restrictions on opportunities for corrupt officials to participate in U.S.-funded training, travel, and speaking engagements. Applying minimum COAs is designed to help change perceptions held by parts of the Afghan public that the U.S. supports, explicitly or implicitly, known corrupt officials.
Positive Incentives for Positive Acts
-------------------------------------
5. (C//REL ISAF) The COA policy approved by the Leadership Board also provides for positive incentives for Afghan officials who have demonstrated that they are not corrupt, who facilitate U.S. efforts and are positive influences in a given province or district. Examples of positive courses of action include recognition for a notable activity, project funding, consideration for training opportunities, media opportunities, etc.
Board Will Consider Application of COAs at Next Meeting
-------------------------------
6. (C//REL ISAF) The meeting decided that ACTF and NCC will meet prior to the next Leadership Board meeting (convened monthly) to consider intel and law enforcement files assembled on three powerful officials operating in the south of the country who are believed to be corrupt: ABP Commander at Weesh Chaman border crossing Colonel Abdul Razziq, Ahmed Wali Karzai, and Chief of Police Asadullah Sherzad. ACTF and NCC will make a joint policy recommendation on how these officials should be addressed, taking into consideration second and third order effects and the input of military and civilian experts in the field. Ambassador Wayne and MG Flynn will review the
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recommendations at the next Leadership Board meeting, and their decision will be reported septel. They will also consider recommendations on a series of high-level demarches intended to encourage President Karzai to honor his public commitment to fight corruption. (Note: Work on formulating these recommendations is underway. End Note)
Background: NCC, the ACTF, and the Leadership Board
--------------------------------------------- ------
7. (C//REL ISAF) The NCC learns of corrupt and criminal actions through regular field reporting, law enforcement and intel activities, policy meetings, and from international partners. The National Level Civ-Mil Anti-Corruption, Counternarcotics, and Illicit Finance Working Groups also refer information to, receive referrals from, and coordinate actions with the NCC. When incriminating information is obtained about an Afghan official of national prominence, or whose actions have a destabilizing effect on the U.S. mission, the NCC considers possible COAs in cooperation with ISAF's ACTF. NCC members include working level representatives from FBI, DEA, DOJ, POL, SIGAR, Afghan Threat Finance Cell (AFTC), RAO, and Treasury, as well as other U.S. agencies. Cleared Americans from ISAF, IJC J2, CJIATF-NEXUS and targeting staff are also invited to participate.
8. (C//REL ISAF) As described above, the NCC will make recommendations to the Leadership Board, comprised of General-level officers from the Embassy and ISAF. Currently, the Leadership Board meetings are co-chaired by CDDEA Ambassador Wayne or Deputy Ambassador Ricciardone and ISAF J2 MG Flynn. The Leadership Board will review recommendations on nexus-related or corruption issues involving situations that could negatively impact the U.S. relationship with key government officials or ministries. At its discretion, the Leadership Board may forward a case up to the Leadership Team, consisting of the U.S. Ambassador and the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan/Commander ISAF, or their designated representatives. The Leadership Team will review any nexus-corruption report involving a prominent official or having implications that would negatively impact the U.S. relationship with key government officials or ministries. At any time, the Leadership Team may convene meetings to discuss sensitive cases or to review Leadership Board decisions and recommendations as part of the weekly Principals Meeting.
Comment
-------
9. (C//REL ISAF) Recognizing the major limitations of law enforcement actions in Afghanistan at this time (due to lack of capacity and lack of political will), this civ-mil effort will use pragmatic courses of action to end tacit American support for corrupt Afghan officials and to attempt to change the illicit behavior of officials and influential Afghans. Given the fluidity of developments on the ground (e.g., rumors of Ahmed Wali Karzai's appointment as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia or Oman, and Abdul Razziq's initiative to form an anti-corruption task force in Spin Boldak), the time is right to determine an appropriate policy for dealing with such officials. End comment.
EIKENBERRY
Monday, 25 January 2010, 12:03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 000159
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR SUSMAN
EO 12958 DECL: 01/22/2020
TAGS MARR, MOPS, PGOV, PREL, UK, AF, PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: YOUR VISIT TO LONDON JANUARY 27-29
Classified By: Ambassador Louis Susman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: We are delighted to welcome you back to London for the conferences on Afghanistan and Yemen this week. PM Brown is our strong ally on both issues, despite some early difficulties in coordinating conference details with us, especially in regard to Yemen. He assured me that they were mistakes made "in good faith" and that his team is now sensitized to the need for close consultation. Brown genuinely wants the Afghanistan conference to result in substantial movement on our agenda with Kabul and the international community. But he also likely hopes to burnish his image as a world leader with the British voting public. UK general elections must take place by June (most believe they will be held on May 6). With his Labour party trailing in the polls by some 10 to 13 points, Brown faces an uphill battle. But it will be a battle largely on domestic issues; Afghanistan is not the lightening rod for Labour that Iraq was in the UK's 2005 polls. Though public support is tepid, the opposition Conservatives support UK military involvement and will continue to do so.
2. (C/NF) Your visit is an opportunity to underscore the importance of progress in Afghanistan to international security and demonstrate the continuing value of the U.S.-UK "special relationship." Your personal involvement in Northern Ireland issues is well-known; Shaun Woodward is looking forward to discussing the latest developments with you. My staff very much appreciates that you have set aside valuable time to meet them; the Embassy team is really looking forward to it. I also suggest you tape a segmant for the widely-viewed Andrew Marr Sunday morning show. END SUMMARY.
UK Gearing Up for Elections
---------------------------
3. (C/NF) Our contacts are confident PM Brown will call for UK general elections on May 6, the same day as local elections are already scheduled. PM Brown easily survived an early January challenge to his Labour leadership by a few disgruntled MPs, but it highlighted party divisions and weakened his standing in the polls. Those divisions remain, and have, on occasion, caused a disconnect between the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister's office. However, while the election will largely be fought on domestic issues, (Brown is touting his leadership in preventing an economic meltdown and restoring growth), the pre-election atmosphere affects the approach of both major parties to global challenges -- and their relationship with us.
4. (C/NF) Since Labour and the Conservatives largely agree on the importance of continued UK engagement in Afghanistan, electoral differences over foreign policy will appear on two fronts: history and resources. Public hearings in the on-going inquiry into the UK's highly unpopular involvement in Iraq have bitten Labour hard as members of the Brown government defend their decisions under former PM Blair (Blair is expected to appear before the public inquiry January 29). PM Brown has volunteered to appear himself prior to elections to defend his own decisions on resources and his advice to Blair while Chancellor of the Exchequer under Blair. Resources for foreign affairs and defense will be an electoral theme, as Conservatives promise unspecified budget cuts to reduce the deficit. Both parties are committed to increasing official development assistance to 0.7% of GDP -- in line with the Millenium development goals. Pakistan and Afghanistan will remain a major focus of assistance; under a Conservative government that could even increase. But since both parties accept the need for deficit reduction, funds will likely be scarcer for all projects -- defense or civilian -- in coming years. Both Labour and Conservative leaders agree on the need for a Strategic Defense Review, shortly after the election, to analyze defense priorities and to match resources to these priorities.
Foreign Police Priorities as Elections Approach
--------------------------------------------- --
5. (C/NF) Afghanistan and Pakistan are key priorities for PM Brown. Despite tepid public support, Brown pledged additional troops ahead of the President's December announcement (which Brown strongly welcomed). Brown is open about the fact that he would like other NATO allies and the
LONDON 00000159 002 OF 002
Afghans to assume a greater share of combat operations, stressing that the U.S., UK and a handful of others have borne the brunt of the fighting. Brown and his close advisors view the January 28 London Conference as a venue for Karzai to confirm the pledges he made in his inaugural address and to provide momentum to international efforts to support Afghan stability. Brown also proved flexible on his original candidate for NATO's senior civilian administrator, making our preferred candidate available.
6. (C/NF) In our recent conversation, PM Brown acknowledged early mis-steps over the Yemen conference -- but since then we have coordinated closely on our goals and objectives. There is no formal agenda for the two-hour meeting on January 27. PM Brown plans to give opening remarks, followed by the Yemeni PM. Foreign Secretary Miliband will then take over. Discussion will be based on three themes: shared analysis of the challenges, political and economic reform, and improved donor coordination. FM Miliband is hosting a lunch for GCC members prior to the meeting. He hopes GCC members will deliver the difficult messages on reform that he fears they will not want to deliver in front of the larger group.
7. (C/NF) On other foreign policy issues, our close cooperation continues. The UK agrees with our approach on Iran sanctions, shares our commitment to a robust counterterrorism agenda, and supports our non-proliferation objectives (U/S Tauscher will hold consultations with the Pakistanis in London on February 1). The government's commitment to the Middle East peace process is behind its efforts to ensure that universal jurisdiction concerns are addressed so that Israeli officials can travel to the UK. The UK government has made stabilizing Somalia a priority and recently increased its programming to GBP 35 million (USD 56 million). In addition, the UK works closely with us on Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zimbabwe.
8. (C/NF) PM Brown may take the opportunity to discuss Northern Ireland with you during your visit; he appreciates your personal involvement. At the moment, the situation is in flux; we expect a clearer view within 48 hours. Brown has pressed hard for renewed progress on devolution of policing and justice. You will also have an opportunity to review progress with Brown's Northern Ireland minister Shaun Woodward during your stay. As we write, the situation is fluid, with the two sides meeting on Monday in Belfast, and PM Brown meeting PM Cowan in London.
Public Diplomacy
----------------
9. (C/NF) On the public diplomacy side, I hope you can take some time out to tape an interview with leading British journalist Andrew Marr, to be broadcast on his Sunday morning BBC TV talk show. The program, which reaches 1.5 million live and millions more on the web, is essential weekend viewing for Britain, often setting the week's news and political agenda for the nation. The program could be taped at your hotel, at my residence or at the BBC studios in West London. It would be a powerful way for you to set out our priorities for Afghanistan/Pakistan, and underline our premier partnership with the United Kingdom. Marr is a congenial and knowlegable interviewer who will offer maximum impact for your investment of time.
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SUSMAN
Friday, 28 August 2009, 10:12
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 002005
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/28/2019
TAGS EAID, ECON, PGOV, PK, AF, UK
SUBJECT: UK'S ASSISTANCE STRATEGY - CUT POVERTY, ADDRESS
NEEDS OF FRAGILE STATES; THE PRIME MINISTER WANTS TO KNOW WHAT IS BEING DONE (CORRECTED COPY)
REF: A. LONDON 1788 B. DOHERTY-MARBURG-HOVENIER EMAILS 8/20/09
Classified By: MINISTER COUNSELOR RICHARD ALBRIGHT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AN D D.
1. (C/NF) Summary. The UK's development assistance ministry, DFID, is seeking to ramp up programs in conflict and fragile states, especially in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen, while fulfilling its legal mandate to reduce poverty and operate within budgetary limits, Martin Dinham, Director General, International, told EMIN and ECOUNs on August 14. Prime Minister Brown and Development Secretary Alexander are personally involved in defining and refining DFID's development strategies, giving the Ministry the highest political support in its history. PM Brown is also seeking President Obama's participation in two upcoming international development events, in New York at the UN General Assembly and in South Africa. DFID recently released a White Paper outlining its priorities for the next decade, with a particular focus on education and child and maternal health. DFID officials are confident that even if the Conservative Party were to win the next election, the UK would remain on track to meet its commitment to provide 0.7 percent of GDP for development assistance by 2015. End Summary.
Fragile States - Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan
---------------------------------------------
2. (C/NF) Dinham explained to EMIN and ECOUNS that HMG had made a policy decision to allocate fifty percent of DFID's GBP 6.3 billion budget to conflict or fragile states. The definition of both is broad, and includes countries from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Yemen. Regarding the latter, Dinham said the UK is concerned that Yemen combines all the conditions of a potential failed state. DFID intends to funnel more aid to Yemen, with a focus on governance and justice programs. On a broader political level, HMG sees assisting Yemen as way to improve relations with the Middle East. The Saudis, he said, share the UK's concern about the fragility of Yemen and its potential for greater political instability, and the prospect that a more unstable Yemen would act as a contagion for the region. However, he noted that given the history between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, the Saudis can not play a constructive role in promoting change in Yemen, and that other donors would need to step in to fill the vacuum.
3. (C/NF) In a separate meeting on August 19, Matt Baugh, Principal Private Secretary to Development Secretary Douglas Alexander noted that Alexander had been pleased with his meetings held in Washington on July 28-29, and believed that his discussions on Afghanistan were fruitful, though he came away with some uncertainty how much Washington was willing to direct more aid programming in Afghanistan through national and local government, as the UK was advocating. Baugh said the UK recognizes there is a significant problem of corruption. But the UK believes that the government needs to be able to deliver basic services if it is ever to gain legitimacy, and therefore, the UK will increase its direct assistance to the government. (see Ref A on UK aid to Afghanistan.) Alexander also was interested about the broader "aid review" that Washington is conducting, said Baugh, and DFID is looking for ways where the UK and the U.S. could collaborate further. Baugh said Pakistan might represent an opportunity where the two countries could combine their resources and have greater impact.
Post-Conflict Strategies - Inter-Ministerial Cooperation
--------------------------------------------- -----------
4. (C) HMG has created mechanisms to ensure coordination between the Foreign Ministry (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MoD) and DFID on development strategies, particularly for conflict or fragile states. The Stabilization Unit is jointly owned, run and financed by DFID, FCO and MoD, and its mandate is to improve the UK's ability to support countries emerging from conflict. It has its own budget of GBP 269 million, and is physically housed in DFID's headquarters, with staff from all three Ministries. This unit and other departments within DFID are involved in internal HMG analysis of extremism and what drives radicalization in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen and elsewhere, commented Dinham. In Pakistan, HMG has identified the lack of education opportunities and the poor
LONDON 00002005 002 OF 003
quality of education in general as primary contributors to radicalization. For this reason, DFID is focusing on assistance to education in Pakistan, said Dinham. In a separate August 19 meeting with Matt Baugh, Alexander's private secretary, stressed the importance of supporting secondary and tertiary education, as fragile states need skills. Baugh said it was important to avoid scenarios in which children leaving primary school lack secular options to further their education and are forced to rely on madrassas. The UK sees the U.S. as particularly strong in counter-insurgency, both civilian and military activity in this area, and the UK is interested in working further with the USG in this area. The Stabilization Unit, said Baugh, is working with the UK Defense Academies to develop training and curriculum for civilian and military leaders on assistance and counter-insurgency issues.
DFID White Paper
----------------
5. (C) Dinham provided EMIN and ECOUNS with an overview of the DFID White Paper, released on July 8. By law, UK development assistance must target poverty reduction. In the White Paper, DFID spells out its spending priorities and framework, within the context of poverty reduction. It reiterates HMG's commitment to dedicate 0.7 percent of GDP to aid by 2015 (a UN Millennium Development Goal), that half of future UK direct support will go to public services; that education and maternal health will be key focus areas. Of DFID's assistance budget, 42 percent is delivered through multilateral mechanisms, 50 percent is direct bilateral aid; the remaining amount is used for emergency projects. Of DFID's overall budget, 90 percent must go to low-income countries; 10 percent for middle-income countries. Dinham noted that the decision to ramp up assistance to Iraq required DFID to reduce funding for other middle-income countries. The White Paper highlighted GBP 800 million that HMG is making available to support climate change adaptation. Dinham commented that climate change adaptation needs in poor countries were enormous and that governments would need to establish dedicated funding for this purpose to prevent it from overwhelming aid budgets. The White Paper states that at least fifty-percent of DFID's assistance budget of GBP 6.3 billion for this fiscal year will go to conflict or fragile states, with a tripling of investment in security and justice in these countries. DFID will also continue its focus on sustainable growth, by providing assistance to help 50 million poor through the global economic downturn, to deliver on its commitment to double agricultural research, and to invest GBP one billion for African regional development. As noted in the White Paper, DFID will be shifting funding away from some countries to others in the next few years, with aid to China, for example, likely to be reduced; China received GBP 81 million in assistance in fiscal year 2007/2008.
6. (SBU) DFID's engagement with other multilateral donors is also a major focus of the paper, underlining HMG's plan to spend more money through the UN system, to increase support for UN emergency response funds to meet growing humanitarian demands, to push for the creation of a UN agency for Women, and to press the EU to create a single Commissioner for Development and re-prioritize resources to fragile states. DFID also will focus on enhancing the effectiveness of the World Bank, by pressing for governance reform, pushing environmental sustainability at the core of the Bank's work, encouraging changes in the Bank's health programs to focus on maternal and child health, and mainstreaming gender equality in all the Banks work. DFID also supports new World Bank lending instruments.
7. (C) Dinham explained that DFID works under legal constraint; by law, the UK's assistance must target poverty deduction. Anything done must fall under that rubric, so while there has been internal pressure to conduct more "hearts and minds' programs, especially in conflict areas, DFID could only do so if it can be proven that these programs directly improve the health and benefit of the population.
The Prime Minister - Early Morning Emails on Malaria
--------------------------------------------- -------
8. (C/NF) The Prime Minister is personally engaged on assistance issues, Dinham noted. It is not unusual, he said, for DFID officials to receive emails sent before dawn from
LONDON 00002005 003 OF 003
the Prime Minister, inquiring about bed net programs to combat malaria, or sharing his latest idea on education programs. Assistance issues have never before enjoyed such high-level political support, and DFID as an institution has benefited from this, especially in discussions with MoD and FCO on post-conflict strategies, said Dinham. DFID has also benefited from having Douglas Alexander as Secretary of State of Development, commented Matt Baugh, since Alexander also is Gordon Brown's General Election Coordinator. He has political savvy, can work Parliament's corridors, and shares the PM's commitment to assistance, said Baugh.
Showcase Events - PM Would Like High-Level USG Participation
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
9. (C/NF) Prime Minister Brown is planning to co-host an event focused on maternal and child health with World Bank President Robert Zoellick during the UN General Assembly in New York, probably on September 23 in the afternoon. DFID officials said that the UK Embassy in Washington had passed on the PM's request for either the President or Secretary of State to participate. (Note: Dinham noted that the wife of French President Sarkozy, Carla Bruni, was also proposing a separate event at UNGA on HIV/AIDs. The UK is trying to de-conflict the events, possibly by combining them.)
10. (SBU) The PM also has asked for the President's participation in 1-Goal, a global education event to take place in South Africa and several other sites worldwide on October 6, supported by FIFA and linked to South Africa's hosting of the 2010 Soccer World Cup. Dinham shared with us the PM's joint letter with FIFA President Joseph Blatter to the President (which Post has shared with the desk and National Security Council, Ref B) asking the President to be involved in the event, in person, though Dinham said the Prime Minister would also appreciate the President's appearance by satellite.
Conservative Party on Assistance
--------------------------------
11. (C/NF) There is an all-party consensus on development assistance for the first time ever, noted Dinham. Opposition Leader David Cameron in a recent white paper on development said the Conservatives are committed to fulfilling the UK's pledge to meet the UN goal of providing 0.7 percent of GDP in development assistance. To do this, the Conservatives would have to maintain DFID's projected budget increases from GBP 6.3 billion this year to GBP 8 billion in 2010 to GBP 11-12 billion in 2012. Publicly, Cameron has stated that only two ministries would not be subject to a mandatory 10 budgetary cut: DFID and the National Health Service. The Conservatives are more likely, however, to be more skeptical toward combining UK assistance funds with those of the EU, given their natural skepticism toward Brussels, said Baugh. Labour and the Conservatives do face the challenge of "selling" assistance to a skeptical British public, said Dinham. For that reason, DFID recently coined the phrase UKAID and produced some effective PR materials for the public that spell out the benefits of development assistance and how individuals can do their part to help.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN
Thursday, 10 December 2009, 17:21
UNCLAS LONDON 002770
SIPDIS
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS ELAB, ECON, UK
SUBJECT: UNION LEADER: CONSERVATIVE VICTORY NO DISASTER
1. (SBU) The UK's trade unions are preparing for the possibility of a Conservative government, but are not yet ready to predict a certain and convincing Tory victory, Brendan Barber, head of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) told the Ambassador during a December 9 meeting. Noting that recent polls showed a narrowing of the Conservatives' lead, Barber said that voters were fatigued with the entire political process, and David Cameron has been unconvincing in demonstrating that he was the best person to lead the UK.
2. (SBU) If the Tories were to win, trade unions do not expect a return to the Thatcherite days of hostility to labor, when she called unions the "enemies from within," stated Barber. Cameron, in contrast, has publicly stated that he wanted a sensible relation with the unions, that he did not have an anti-union basis. Barber stated that the Tories have actually been "courting" the unions a bit, because they know they would need union support in any effort to reduce public sector employment as a deficit-fighting measure. If the election were to result in a hung parliament, the union movement might actually be in the strongest political position, since all three parties would need its support, stated Barber. He predicted a small Conservative majority as the most likely outcome of the election.
3. (SBU) When asked whether he thought elections would be called in March, rather than May, as has been rumored in some circles, Barber viewed this as highly unlikely. The Labour government will announce its budget in March, and will want to use that budget to draw a clear dividing line between its policies and those of the Conservatives. With the economy starting to show signs of recovery, Labour would also want a few more months of positive news before calling the elections.
4. (SBU) Background on Barber and the Trades Union Congress. Barber is General Secretary of the TUC, with 58 affiliated unions representing approximately seven million members, many of whom work in the public sector. Barber acknowledged that membership has "taken a dive" this year, primarily because of the private and public sector layoffs. While there is no formal link between the TUC and the Labour Party, fifteen trade unions are affiliated to the Labour Party, and provide a major share of Labour's funding, amounting to GBP 3.2 million, 73 percent of overall funding, in the second quarter of 2009.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
Susman
Friday, 20 November 2009, 08:05
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 002598
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS ECON, PGOV, EFIN, MOPS, PINR, UK
SUBJECT: LITTLE ENTHUSIASM FOR LEGISLAITVE PRIORITIES IN QUEEN'S
SPEECH
REF: LONDON 02582
LONDON 00002598 001.2 OF 002
1. (U) Summary. In an annual tradition, the Queen formally opened the new session of Parliament November 18 and laid out the Government's legislative priorities for the coming Parliamentary session. In a speech drawn up by the Government, the Queen announced plans for 10 new bills, two draft bills, and three bills carried over from last year - a long way behind the 38 bills contained in the Queen's Speech prior to the 2005 general election. The majority of bills focused on economic recovery. PM Brown hoped the measures would lay out clear battle lines for the electorate between his Labour government and the Conservative opposition in the run-up to next year's general election. Opposition leaders criticized the speech as an election vehicle for the Labour Party. There may not be sufficient time in the parliamentary calendar to pass many of the proposed bills prior to adjournment six weeks prior to the next general election, which must take place on or before June 3, 2010. End Summary.
Financial Reforms, Debt, and Social Measures
-------------------- -----------------------
2. (U) The Queen announced that a new Financial Services Bill would create a Council for Financial Stability and strengthen the role of the Financial Services Authority (FSA). The bill would also increase consumer financial education programs and consumer protection measures. As previously announced by the FSA, the bill would also include provisions on compensation policies and put in place tougher requirements on systemically important financial firms, requiring them to set up recovery and resolution plans (or "living wills".) The Conservative Party has already said, if elected, it will shut down the FSA and fold it into the Bank of England. Financial firms cautioned against legislation that would put the UK at a disadvantage via-a-vis other financial centers. KPMG said that the idea of a living will, while attractive as a concept, would not be easy in practice since bank structures have developed over 20-30 years and are extremely complex.
3. (U) The Fiscal Responsibility Bill would halve the UK's deficit over four years, as previously announced by the Chancellor. HMG will have no further details, however, until the Pre-Budget Report launch on December 9. Among the new social measures, a Personal Care at Home Bill will guarantee free at home care for 280,000 elderly and needy people. A City Council member for Westminster, however, commented that the proposed social care bill fails to recognize that local governments are already facing large cuts and budget shortfalls. Also planned are new measures to tackle youth unemployment. On education, parents and children will be given new guarantees about children's schooling under the Children, School and Families bill. Under the Child Poverty Bill, carried over from the last Parliamentary year, the Government plans to codify its commitment to end child poverty by 2020.
Low Carbon and a Digital Economy
--------------- ----------------
4. (U) The Government's Energy Bill would support carbon capture and storage (CCS) and help the most vulnerable households with energy costs through price subsidies and rebates. The new bill would supplement the government's July Low Carbon Transition Plan, which aims to cut emissions by 34 per cent on 1990 levels by 2020 on the way to achieving a reduction of at least 80 per cent by 2050. The bill would support the construction of up to four commercial-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS) demonstration projects in the UK. In addition, a new bill on the Digital Economy would aim to improve digital infrastructure, and provide for greater government investment in cell phone, digital radio, and wireless broadband technologies. It would also address intellectual property concerns through the creation of a legal and regulatory framework to combat illegal file sharing and online copyright infringement.
Reforming Government
--------------------
5. (U) The Queen said "the Government will publish draft legislation on proposals for a reformed second chamber of Parliament with a democratic mandate." Many parliamentary reformers, however, were disappointed this legislation remains in draft form only: the Government remains undecided on how to conclude the reform process started 12 years ago. The Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill, carried over from the last session, aims to rebalance the relationship between parliament and the public, but appears at this stage more aspirational than a concrete legislative proposal.
Defense and International Aid
-----------------------------
6. (U) The Queen's legislative program included a bill on banning cluster munitions. This was unsurprising as the ban is one of the only issues which all three major political parties firmly support. The UK signed on to the Cluster Munitions Convention in December
LONDON 00002598 002.2 OF 002
2008, and this bill would fulfill the UK's commitment to ratify the treaty. The UK was instrumental in shaping the Convention, including adding Article 21, which allows signatories to cooperate in military actions with non-signatories, even if the non-signatories are using cluster munitions.
7. (U) The Queen said her government would present legislation to make binding the UK's previous commitment to appropriate 0.7 percent of national income on international development by 2013. This would implement the commitment the UK made at the G-8 Summit in Gleneagles in 2005. She further reaffirmed UK commitments to support efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan, peace in the Middle East, and nuclear disarmament. On corruption, the Queen said there would be a new bill on bribery. This legislation would criminalize bribery in the UK or abroad, in the public or private sectors, and it would make bribery of a foreign public official to obtain or retain business an offense (see reftel LONDON 02582).
Initial Reactions
-----------------
8. (U) Even prior to its delivery, Conservative Leader David Cameron and Liberal Democrat Leader Nick Clegg called the Queen's Speech a waste of time because there were so few days in the Parliamentary year prior to the election. The press clocked the speech as the shortest in 100 years. As expected, Cameron dismissed the remarks as "half-baked" and called it a "Labour press release on Palace parchment." He complained that real proposals - such as a plan to reduce the deficit, welfare reform, reform of the national healthcare system, and measures to implement the Kelly report curbing MP expenses - were glaringly absent. Nick Clegg blasted Brown for squandering the opportunity to reform Parliament. He called the financial responsibility legislation to halve the deficit in four years absurd, adding "It's like passing a law promising to get up early every morning." Some Labour MPs privately expressed surprise that no measures were included on the health services, a strong Labour battleground.
9. (U) Media reports questioned where the money would come from to pay for costly measures like the personal care bill for the elderly. Of Brown's supposed omission in tackling political and parliamentary reform, the left-leaning Guardian said that Brown "seems to have no grasp of the scale and importance of public dissatisfaction with MPs and the political system." The Times said that "all the hard choices were left."
10. (U) Prime Minister Brown robustly defended his measures yesterday afternoon in Parliament, saying his measures were not an electoral tool but "in the national interest." Brown dismissed Conservative plans for dealing with the economy and accused the party of not having any policies to close the gap between rich and poor. He criticized a Conservative commitment to pass an inheritance tax cut, saying "99 per cent of the benefit goes to the richest few in the country."
Comment
-------
11. (SBU) Yesterday's Queen's Speech was the Government's last chance to show the electorate its priorities for the upcoming general election and to attempt to set out clear dividing lines with the opposition. The general response, however, from media and pundits was that Labour had missed the mark with a mixed bag of populist proposals that there was little time to pass.
SUSMAN
Wednesday, 06 May 2009, 10:34
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 001064
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/06/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, UK
SUBJECT: UK POLITICAL SNAPSHOT: A "RESILIENT" GORDON BROWN
IS DOWN - AGAIN - BUT NOT OUT
REF: A. LONDON 956 B. LONDON 831 C. 08 LONDON 2163 D. 08 LONDON 2010
Classified By: PolMinCouns Gregory Berry, reasons 1.4 b, d
1. (C/NF) Key points:
-- Westminster seethed with rumors over the May 2-4 holiday weekend that one or more members of Gordon Brown's cabinet were preparing to unseat him as Prime Minister/Labour Party leader following a disastrous two-week period (Ref A). By the evening of May 4, however, all of the potential successors had publicly declared their support for Brown and ruled out a challenge against him.
-- Many of our Labour Party contacts argue that the crisis was largely media-provoked, because replacing Brown before the next general election is next to impossible according to Labour Party rules that require a would-be successor to challenge him publicly (Ref C). Our contacts agree that there is virtually no chance that Brown will step down on his own, and point instead to his "resilience" in the face of the continuing onslaught of crisis and criticism he has faced during his premiership.
-- The crisis does reflect a high degree of worry among backbench MPs that they will lose their seats in the next election if Brown continues his downward trend in the polls. These MPs therefore have increasingly less reason to follow Brown's lead in Parliament on controversial issues, such as privatization of the Royal Mail. It is likely that a weakened Brown will be forced to compromise on such issues in order to maintain a semblance of discipline on the Labour backbench, but this is unlikely to have an effect on key UK, or U.S., foreign policy priorities.
-- Brown still has a chance - albeit a slim one - to win the next general election, some of our Labour Party contacts argue, if he waits to call the election until the economy shows some signs of recovery. Brown could take credit for these "green shoots," and argue that his economic expertise makes him the best person to lead a recovery.
-- Brown and Labour are expected to suffer heavy losses in the June 4 elections for the European Parliament and local councils. Labour contacts tell us they worry that disaffected Labourites may turn to fringe parties such as the fascist British National Party (BNP) to cast their protest vote.
End key points.
Another Tempest Over Replacing Brown
------------------------------------
2. (C/NF) Gordon Brown has suffered a wretched two weeks, during which he was implicated in the "Smeargate" scandal; suffered his first defeat in the House of Commons after a massive defection of his own party members over the issue of Gurkhas' rights; and was forced into a public last-minute change of policy to avoid a second defeat on reform of the Second Homes Allowance for MPs (Refs A and B). The latest polls show Brown and Labour 18 points behind David Cameron and the Conservative Party; if a general election were held now, Cameron would win with a 150-seat majority in Parliament. This disastrous series of events led to rampant media speculation over the May 2-4 holiday weekend that members of Gordon Brown's own cabinet, including Communities Secretary Hazel Blears, Health Secretary Alan Johnson, Justice Secretary Jack Straw, and Deputy Labour Leader Harriet Harman, were ready to mount a leadership challenge to replace Brown. By the evening of May 4, however, all four had publicly declared their support for Brown and ruled out any challenge against him.
3. (C/NF) Many of our Labour contacts, including House of Lords Deputy Leader Lord Brian Davis and Special Advisor to the Leader of the House of Lords Jonathan Pearse, tell us the crisis over Brown's leadership was largely due to inflated media reporting over a slow holiday weekend, while acknowledging the PM needs to "get back on message" in coming weeks. In any case, replacing a sitting Labour PM is a daunting task, since any possible successor would have to challenge Brown publicly, according to Labour Party rules. A successor to Brown would face the added difficulty of public pressure to call a general election as soon as s/he took office, an election that Labour would have little chance of winning in the current political climate. So while it is
LONDON 00001064 002 OF 003
technically possible to replace Brown, a thorough study of the mechanics of doing so explains why his rivals have been so cautious in moving against him - and why getting rid of Brown, as unpopular as he is, might hasten Labour's fall from power rather than prevent it. (Note: For more on the mechanics of replacing a sitting Labour PM, see Ref C. End note.)
4. (C/NF) The only other option - that Brown will step aside voluntarily in the face of criticism - is extremely unlikely, according to Lord Davis and prominent Labour member Lord Bruce Grocott, with whom Poloffs met, along with other Labour Lords, on May 5. In fact, they point to his personal "resilience" in the face of the continuing criticism he has endured since becoming PM, praising his rebound after Labour's unexpected defeat in the July 2008 Glasgow East by-election and myriad other political setbacks. This same cycle played out after that by-election defeat, in August 2008, when Foreign Secretary David Miliband appeared to challenge Brown for the Labour leadership, but then backed down (Ref D). Then, as now, the crisis was largely made by the media, and was quickly resolved when Miliband disavowed any leadership challenge and publicly backed the PM.
Backbench is Nervous Now
------------------------
5. (C/NF) A new and worrisome element this time for Brown is the defection of his backbench. Many of these MPs hold their constituencies by narrow margins. With time growing increasingly short until Brown must call the next election (Embassy note: Brown must call an election before May 10, 2010, and hold it by June 3, 2010), they are growing increasingly concerned that he might not be able to turn Labour's fortunes around. There is less incentive, therefore, for them to vote with their party on controversial issues such as Gurkhas' rights, the Second Homes Allowance, or the upcoming vote on government plans to partly privatize the Royal Mail, the UK's postal network. According to May 5 media reports, up to 100 rebel Labour MPs plan to revolt against Brown's plans to sell a 49 percent stake of the company to the private sector. New Labour "modernizers" in Brown's cabinet (thought to be led by Business Secretary Peter Mandelson) are said to be pushing the PM not to back down over the issue, but the left-wing of the party is urging him to shelve the sell-off and save himself from fresh humiliation, which may completely end his ability to impose any discipline on his party backbenchers. Aides of the PM have reportedly been considering compromise proposals to turn the Royal Mail into a not-for-profit company, along the lines of the BBC Trust, a claim denied today by Downing Street.
How Brown Could Win the Next Election
-------------------------------------
6. (C/NF) Brown still has a chance - albeit a slim one - to win the next general election, some of our Labour Party contacts argue, if he waits to call the election until the economy shows some signs of recovery. Brown could take credit for these "green shoots," argue that the recovery is still fragile, and that the UK public does not want to risk turning to a new government that might not have the economic expertise to ensure a recovery. Lord Grocott argued that this strategy gives Labour a hope of victory. "If the economy turns up in the spring, the public will want Labour in power. They won't want an untried Conservative leadership in charge," he told us. The election, he argued, will boil down to the public's faith in who will best manage the economy. Lord Charles Falconer, a leading Labour advisor to former PM Tony Blair, added that if Brown can point to recovery, the issue for voters will be where to then make the cuts in government spending necessary to restore the country's budget balance and "voters can be convinced those cuts should be made by a progressive, left of center government, rather than by a pro-business, Tory government."
British National Party May Be Stealth Victor in June EU Elections
--------------------------------------------- -------------
7. (C/NF) Some within Labour ranks are concerned that the fascist British National Party (BNP) may be the big winner in the EU Parliament and local council elections on June 4, leading Labour MP Jon Cruddas told us May 1. Given that many UK voters use the EU elections to register a protest vote, Cruddas said no one "has any illusions but that the results will be a bloody punch to us," but what is a worrisome surprise are "the growing indications" that the BNP will be the beneficiary of Labour voters, anger with their own party, not the Tories or Liberal Democrats. Angry
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Conservative voters who want to register a protest will vote for the UK Independence Party (UKIP), but angry working-class Labour voters turn to the BNP, Cruddas said, and this year there are a lot of angry Labour voters. Cruddas feared that voter turnout, especially among minorities, will be low, helping the BNP gain EU seats under the complicated proportional representation system used in the EU elections. Cruddas said his constituents are battered by the recession and frustrated by competition for jobs and social services from EU and non-EU immigrants. According to Cruddas, the BNP will likely do well in the economically hard-hit North-west in the EU elections, where the party will win at least one seat for its chairman, Nick Griffin, and likely one more of the region's eight EU seats unless the tide is "turned" (in the 2004 EU election, the BNP won 6.4 percent of the votes in the North-west, but failed to win a single seat). The BNP will also do "better than many expect now" in local elections in urban working class councils in Manchester, Birmingham and parts of London, such as Cruddas, own constituency. The danger is not the brief public relations boost victory gives the BNP, Cruddas added, but that with an EU Parliamentary seat comes access to several hundred thousand GBPs in funds from the EU which the BNP can use in any way it chooses. When asked, Cruddas said he did not believe Green Party candidates in the North-west were viable alternatives that might tamp down BNP support, although he acknowledged the Green Party is making that argument in its campaign.
8. (C/NF) Other Labour leaders with whom Poloffs spoke acknowledged the threat of a strong BNP vote in the June 4 elections but were split on how serious the threat was. Lord Falconer dismissed the idea that the BNP would benefit from an anti-Labour protest vote, noting that the Conservatives are, "for better or worse," the clear opposition party to vote for if you are unhappy with Labour -- the Conservatives have been out of power for 12 years. Lord Davis, on the other hand, perceived a trend toward the BNP in his former Commons constituency and feared that, in periods of economic downturn, extremist parties do well. All the Labour leaders agreed, however, that a bad result in the June elections, though disheartening, was now expected, and that bad results in EU elections in any case have much less impact on the Labour backbenchers' views than a by-election defeat, as was the case with last summer's Glasgow East result. The Lords predicted another round of media speculation on Brown's future in June, but dismissed its real impact.
Comment
-------
9. (C/NF) A wounded, but still standing, Gordon Brown remains at the helm of his party and is likely to do so until the voters speak in the next election, increasingly likely now to be postponed until the latest date possible next spring. The only viable alternative to oust Brown -- a delegation of Labour wisemen and women advising him to leave for the sake of the party -- is not likely to occur, for the plain fact that no one expects Brown to step down voluntarily, no matter how savage the media and party criticism he endures. The man who has nursed his dream -- and grievance -- of being Prime Minister since 1994 is not going to walk out of Downing Street now. As a Guardian political journalist told Poloff, "Brown is a tough-skinned Scot, who believes dreams come true, but not free, and he will pay the personal price to keep his alive."
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TOKOLA
Friday, 24 April 2009, 16:40
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 000956
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/24/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, UK
SUBJECT: UK POLITICAL SNAPSHOT: GLOOMY BUDGET AND A NEW
SCANDAL TORPEDO BROWN'S POLL NUMBERS
REF: A. LONDON 949 B. LONDON 831 C. 08 LONDON 2163
Classified By: PolMinCouns Gregory Berry, reasons 1.4 b, d
1. (C/NF) Key points:
-- Poll numbers for PM Gordon Brown and his Labour Party have dropped following the April 22 budget presentation, with an April 24 poll showing the opposition Conservative Party with an 18 point lead over Labour. If an election were held now, according to these poll numbers, the Tories would win a staggering 150-seat majority in Parliament.
-- The past two weeks have been wretched for Brown and Labour, who have endured a gloomy budget presentation and a particularly ugly new scandal, popularly known as "Smeargate," involving a top Brown advisor's plan to plant false rumors on the internet about senior Conservative Party figures. Even after the PM personally apologized for Smeargate, the media and the Tories have sought to implicate more of Brown's close allies. The scandal also may have forced Brown to cancel what a plan to call the next general election this spring, when he had hoped to capitalize on his successful performance at the G-20 summit.
-- Brown's attempts to close loop holes in the parliamentary Second Homes Allowances, which according to media reports many of the most senior members of Brown's Cabinet have used for personal gain, have been opposed by the Conservatives and third-party Liberal Democrats; one Tory MP told us Brown's plan would allow "endemic featherbedding and graft." End key points.
Labour Poll Numbers Collapse Following Gloomy Budget, New Scandal
--------------------------------------------- --------
2. (SBU) David Cameron and the opposition Conservative Party have an 18 point lead in the polls over Gordon Brown and the Labour Party, according to the first poll following the April 22 presentation of the budget. A YouGov poll for the Daily Telegraph published April 24 found the Conservatives are at 45 percent, up four points from March, while Labour is down four points to 27 percent and the third-party Liberal Democrats are at 18 percent. According to these figures, if the elections were held today, the Tories would sweep to power with an astonishing 150-seat majority in Parliament - more than double the 63-seat majority that Labour now holds. Sixty-nine percent of respondents said they were dissatisfied with Brown's performance as Prime Minister, while 56 percent said they were satisfied with Cameron's performance as Tory Leader. Thirty-nine percent thought the Conservatives would be more likely to run the economy well, while only 24 percent approved of Labour's current handling of the economy.
3. (C/NF) The causes of this collapse in Brown and Labour's poll numbers, which had rebounded slightly following the G-20 before subsiding again (Ref B), are a gloomy budget presentation by Chancellor Alistair Darling on April 22 (Ref A), mounting media reports of MP abuse of a parliamentary allowance for second homes which has engulfed Brown and many members of his cabinet (Ref B) -- and a new and particularly ugly scandal. Dubbed "Smeargate" by the media, it erupted on April 10, when the media obtained leaked emails from PM Special Adviser Damian McBride in which McBride attempted to launch an internet smear campaign against Cameron, Shadow Chancellor George Osborne, Osborne,s wife Frances, MP Nadine Dorries, and another unnamed Tory MP. The smears themselves, which have been described in salacious detail on the internet, were more delicately described in the April 14 Guardian as including "rumors involving the wife of the Shadow Chancellor, the health of Cameron, the personal relations of MP Nadine Dorries and accusations that a Tory MP was promoting his partner's business interests in the Commons."
4. (C/NF) McBride resigned on April 11, claiming that he had merely written up a list of "stories doing the rounds in Westminster," and that he had never actually intended them to be published. Unpopular within the Labour Party according to our contacts, and a particularly unpleasant person based on our own experiences with him, McBride was one of Brown's closest advisors, having followed him to No. 10 Downing Street from the Treasury. Brown disclaimed all knowledge of McBride's antics, but critics were quick to point out McBride's close relationship to Brown, and that McBride had used his No. 10 email account to send the smear rumors. In any case, they argued, PM Brown holds final responsibility
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for any such tactics coming out of No. 10. After private written apologies to the parties concerned didn't work, Brown apologized personally for Smeargate on April 17. Nonetheless, his poll numbers dropped, with 37 percent of voters in an April 19 poll by News of the World saying they found Labour less trustworthy than before Smeargate broke. The media sought to implicate more members of Brown's inner circle, including Education Secretary Ed Balls, who was forced to deny that he runs a "smear unit" inside Downing Street. Former Labour MP Alice Mahon resigned from the Labour Party April 18, telling the press, "I can no longer be a member of a party that at the leadership level has betrayed many of the values and principles that inspired me as a teenager to join." Although Mahon maintained a low profile during her tenure in Parliament, her resignation was head line news. And Unison, a public-sector union representing 1.3 million workers, announced publicly that it would withhold GBP 1.8 million in annual dues to the Labour Party - one-tenth of Labour's yearly funding - if Brown didn't put a stop to smear tactics.
"Smeargate" Wrecks Gordon Brown's Plans for Early Elections
--------------------------------------------- --------------
5. (C/NF) Perhaps most damaging of all, however, Smeargate effectively ended what may have been Brown's plan to call a general election this spring, based on the rise in the polls he received following his solid performance at the G-20. Labour Prospective Parliamentary Candidate for Burton Ruth Smeeth (strictly protect) told us April 20 that Brown had intended to announce the elections on May 12, and hold them after a very short (matter of weeks) campaign season. Labour had been "just" 7 points behind the Conservatives in some polls taken right after the G-20 Summit, which other Labour contacts had told us was close to an acceptable standing from which to launch a campaign, but the drop in Labour's poll numbers following Smeargate forced Brown to abandon his plan, a despondent Smeeth said. (Note: This information has not been reported in the press. End note.)
Opposition Parties Oppose Plans To Abolish Second Homes Allowance
---------------------------------
6. (SBU) At the same time as the budget and Smeargate dominated the headlines, Brown and Labour were continuing to take media fire over the controversial Second Homes Allowance, which is designed to cover the costs that MPs incur by maintaining a home in their constituencies as well as a residence in London. In recent weeks, the media has highlighted attempts by prominent Government ministers to maximize their claims against this allowance in ways that, while not strictly illegal, amount to bilking the tax payer. The politicians in the UK snared in the public outrage over the practice include Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling, Home Secretary Jacqui Smith, and even Brown himself. Talks among party leaders on the PM's plans to abolish the Second Homes Allowance and replace it with a daily attendance allowance was rejected by both the Tories and the Lib Dems, however, during a tense and heated meeting April 22 that broke down after 40 minutes. Tory MP Keith Simpson (strictly protect) told us April 23 that the Conservatives at first thought they would have no option but to back the proposed reforms or face criticism from Labour. Once the Tories understood, however, that the public perceived the proposal for a daily allowance as a copy of the system used for European Parliamentarians - a system which he described as allowing "endemic featherbedding and graft" in Brussels - the Tory leadership decided it was politically acceptable to attack the reform proposals. Simpson told us that the inability of the Brown Government to achieve cross-party support for the reforms is a sign of how "listless and ineffective this government has become," because this kind of reform is something "any effective government could have been able to nail down long before going public with it."
Comment
-------
7. (C/NF) While the media has begun to trot out the usual pundits who claim that Brown can't last until the next election, as we have reported, there is virtually no chance either that he will step down voluntarily, or that an alternative leader will step forward to challenge him. Not only is replacing a sitting Labour leader an arduous task procedurally (Ref C), but we assess it unlikely that any Labour politician with his or her eye on the future would want to take on the sinking ship that is the current Labour Party at this time of crisis. It is more likely that Labour will go down in the next election - and then will begin the
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process of rebuilding.
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LEBARON
Friday, 06 February 2009, 16:25
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 000339
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPART FOR AF/FO, AF/W, AF/E, AF/C, AF/S, AF/RSA, AF/SPG,
AND AF/EPS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/04/2019
TAGS PREL, EAID, MASS, KISL, ZI, SO, NI, SU, SF, XA, UK
SUBJECT: AFRICA: U.S. VERSUS UK PRIORITIES, LONDON THINK
TANKS COMMENT
REF: A. 08 LONDON 1426 B. 08 LONDON 2477 C. LONDON 289 D. LONDON 266 E. 08 LONDON 2882 F. 08 LONDON 3165 G. 08 LONDON 2917
Classified By: Political Counselor Richard Mills, reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (SBU/NF) Summary. During the transition to the Obama Administration, London think tanks have been active in discussing USG and HMG priorities in Africa. Poloff took the opportunity to poll opinions among Africa specialists at Chatham House, RUSI, the Royal Africa Society, Africa Confidential, the Commonwealth Policy Studies Unit, and International Crisis Group (please protect). The following are issue-by-issue consensus summaries from those discussions:
-- HMG's Africa policy lacks focus and is unable to internally prioritize its Africa policy.
-- Zimbabwe should/will remain a priority for the UK for historical reasons, but the USG's focus is "surprising," as it is largely a contained crisis that should be treated as a regional issue. A "tough and quiet" approach should be considered.
-- Somalia should be more of a priority for HMG, given the UK's history with the region, the large number of Somali Diaspora in the UK, and the real security threats that community may present to the UK.
-- Nigeria, especially the Niger Delta and corruption issues, should be a greater HMG priority because of Nigeria's financial links to the UK, large UK-based Diaspora community, and energy potential.
-- Sudan, including the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Darfur crisis, should remain top USG and HMG priorities because of the regional impact destabilization would have on the Horn.
-- South Africa's desire for a permanent UNSC seat should be the leverage point for the USG and HMG to actively improve relations with South Africa.
-- The global economic downturn will have a greater affect on Africa than the IMF and World Bank are predicting.
-- Engaging African Diaspora communities should be a key USG and HMG focus, as Africa is the most politically globalized continent.
-- Engaging Muslims in Africa may be a mechanism to also improve relations with the Middle East and South Asia. End summary.
UK Africa Policy Lacks Direction, Unable to Prioritize
--------------------------------------------- ---------
2. (SBU/NF) Most London-based think tank Africa specialists thought HMG had lost its ability to prioritize on Africa, especially since the October 2008 departure of Prime Minister's Special Advisor on Africa and Development Justin Forsyth. HMG's creation of an inter-agency Defense-Foreign Office-International Development Cabinet Sub-Committee on Africa, they thought, had not succeeded in resolving internal HMG disputes over priorities in Africa. Given the UK's credit crunch and diminishing international influence, the Chatham House Africa specialist asserted, HMG should be trying to burden share on Africa with the French and the EU. HMG, however, has not done that effectively and is therefore spreading itself too thin, resulting in a lack of tangible impact in areas of strategic British interest.
3. (C/NF) Embassy comment: Forsyth, while hit-or-miss on follow through, was generally able to corral UK government departments into setting African priorities: Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria. FCO Minister for Africa Mark Malloch-Brown has tried to provide direction (ref A), but his "nice guy" approach of dealing directly with African leaders through his well-established network of contacts, coupled with the lack-luster direction of the new FCO Africa Director Adam
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Wood (ref B), has meant no serious consideration of the UK's priorities in Africa. The UK's National Security Strategy also failed to provide any direction, though efforts are underway to improve the document (ref C). Brendan Cox, former Crisis Action head, is due to replace Forsyth at No. 10 in mid-February, but many of those with whom we spoke questioned if he will have the political capital to make any real impact on the UK's Africa policy, given Prime Minister Brown's standing in the domestic polls and need to focus on the global economic situation. End comment.
Zimbabwe
--------
4. (SBU/NF) Several think tank analysts thought that Zimbabwe should and will remain a top priority for the UK, but that HMG's history of bombastic statements has only served to solidify President Mugabe's status as a colonial liberation leader and rallied South Africa's unwavering support. From a strategic perspective, these analysts termed the USG's focus on Zimbabwe as "surprising" because Zimbabwe is not a threat, but largely a contained crisis. They said that Zimbabwe's crisis should be treated as a regional issue, not an international one, and that the USG should not sacrifice it's relations with South Africa, the more strategic partner, over Zimbabwe, even if the political events in Zimbabwe run contrary to the USG's democracy agenda. They recommended the international community take a "tough and quiet" approach to Mugabe and ZANU-PF, sanctioning and obstructing their personal freedoms but without commenting publicly. They asserted that the international community's concern about Zimbabwe being a regional destabilizer is largely unfounded, as most of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) - especially South Africa - "can take of themselves."
Somalia
-------
5. (SBU/NF) Given the UK's history, the large number of Somali Diaspora in the UK, and the real security threats that community may present to the UK, think tank security specialists thought Somalia should be more of a priority for HMG. HMG, they argued, should be more innovative on Somalia policy, focusing on local community engagement and finding humanitarian and social initiatives where material benefit can be derived without deployment of an excessively large peacekeeping force. The RUSI Africa specialist said HMG and the USG's previous entry point to Somalia was through Ethiopia. With the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, a new entry point should be found quickly. He thought both IGAD and the AU could serve in this capacity. He also asserted that recognition of Somaliland should be considered to allow it access to international mechanisms for development and capacity support, as well as to support its democratic development in the face of increasing Islamic militant pressures.
6. (C/NF) Embassy comment. Cabinet office officials have told us that they consider Somalia a serious security concern, but they have not been able to induce other HMG departments to move on it, in large part because of the failure of the HMG process to set Africa priorities. HMG's budget crunch also seems to be hindering the decision-making process (ref D). End comment.
Nigeria
-------
7. (SBU/NF) Think tank West Africa specialists, citing Nigeria's significant financial links to the UK, large Diaspora community, and energy potential, said that the country, especially the Niger Delta and corruption issues, should be a clear HMG priority, but it has not been. HMG's capacity for political analysis on Nigeria, they thought, was both "weak and shallow." The RUSI security specialist said Nigeria, as well as Africa as a whole, needs better maritime security and should be able to secure its ports. Weak land and maritime security, combined with fragile state and government institutions, is an integrated problem in Nigeria, he asserted.
8. (C/NF) Embassy comment: Although the Foreign Office appears interested in developing a more focused and strategic policy on Nigeria, the Home Office's drive to conclude a
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prisoner transfer agreement has prevented HMG from moving forward on any other meaningful issues (refs E, F, and G). End comment.
Sudan
-----
9. (SBU/NF) All the think tank analysts consulted agreed that Sudan, including implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and finding a political solution to the Darfur crisis, should remain top HMG and USG priorities because of the regional impact destabilization of Sudan would have on the entire Horn of Africa.
South Africa
------------
10. (SBU/NF) These analysts also all agreed that now was the time for both HMG and the USG to improve relations with South Africa. It is time to mend fences, especially for the UK, and South Africa's desire for a permanent UN Security Council seat as part of UNSC reform, should be the leverage point, they asserted. South Africa, they assessed, has the potential to break up unhelpful African voting blocks in the UN, in spite of its "diplomatically difficult" time during its recent rotation on the Security Council.
The Global Economic Downturn and Africa
---------------------------------------
11. (SBU/NF) Royal African Society specialists thought the global economic downturn would affect Africa significantly, much more than the IMF and World Bank have been reporting, because of falling commodity prices. Increased unemployment, they thought, would likely increase urban unrest and destabilize individual nations' security.
Engaging the Diaspora
---------------------
12. (SBU/NF) Several think tank specialists noted the importance of the African Diaspora. With the global credit crunch, they thought, the African Diaspora's role will be increasingly important, both economically and politically. They asserted that Africa is the most politically globalized continent, even if it is not economically globalized. They indicated that HMG and the USG should find ways for the Diaspora to constructively engage on the continent, which will influence African governments in favor of Western values, as most large, affluent African Diaspora communities are based in the West.
Islam
-----
13. (SBU/NF) The RUSI Africa specialist suggested that HMG and the USG should do more to engage Muslims in Africa, as it is an easier entry point for fostering goodwill that may transmit to more difficult geographic areas, like the Middle East and South Asia.
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TUTTLE
Wednesday, 15 October 2008, 14:03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 002603
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/15/2018
TAGS ECON, EINV, PGOV, UK
SUBJECT: BROWN RECEIVES BOUNCE FROM BAIL-OUT PLAN;
INVESTORS STILL CAUTIOUS
Classified By: Classified by Acting Minister Counselor Kathleen Doherty for reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (SBU) Summary: The U.K. government's agreement to pump GBP 37 billion into three of Britain's largest banks, along with similarly dramatic moves undertaken in the U.S. and in the rest of Europe, buoyed, at least temporarily, London's stock markets, with minor gains posted in the first two days of this week. PM Gordon Brown's stock has also risen in recent days, with the President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso publicly calling the nearly Europe-wide, multi-billion dollar bank bail-out plan as "the Brown Plan," and pundits across the political spectrum at home hailing the PM as "the man who saved the financial system." Most in London are waiting to see if the recovery in stock market prices will be sustained throughout the week (the FTSE is down 4 percent in trading on October 15th) before even considering whether the "worst is over." Bleak economic news continues to trickle in: U.K. inflation reached 5.2 percent in September, up .5 percent from August figures, with the annual rate of inflation of energy and other household utility bills reaching 15 percent - the highest since 1989. End Summary.
Pumping Up The Volume
---------------------
2. (SBU) Following a weekend of talks with Britain's largest banks, HMG agreed to inject GBP 37 billion into three banks: Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), Lloyds TSB and HBOS. The government will own a majority stake, up to 70 percent in RBS, and more than 40 percent in Lloyds and HBOS. The three banks have shelved their dividend payments on ordinary shares until they fully repay the GBP 9 billion in preference shares issued by the government. The banks will face restrictions on executive pay and have agreed to pay their 2008 executive bonuses in shares. (Comment: The restrictions on executive pay have been particularly welcomed by British unions, which have long-called for bonuses to be curbed. End Comment.) The government and the banks are in discussions about how many board seats the government will have and about other managerial decision-making. In contrast, Barclays has rejected the government's recapitalization plan for the bank, saying it would, instead, raise GBP 7 billion and cancel its quarterly dividend to raise GBP 2 billion. The Bank also plans to raise more than GBP 6 billion in preference and common shares. On October 8, HMG had indicated that it stood ready to partially nationalize seven UK banks, including Barclays, by investing GBP 50 billion in preference shares, ordinary shares, or permanent interest-bearing shares.
Waiting to Exhale
-----------------
3. (C) Although stock prices have made some gains, and inter-bank lending has started - though just a trickle in volume - industry leaders believe it would be premature to call the crisis over. Gary vonLemden, Corporate Head, Europe, Citigoup (Please protect), told econoff that the rescue plan will not directly move to re-open the bond and commercial paper markets, and until they re-open, banks will be remain under pressure. There has not been a single corporate bond issue since August, he stated. "The government's scheme protects the taxpayer and is likely to make money. It will also make finance easier to obtain that it would otherwise have been. Whether that gets immediately in market prices, whether on inter-bank or retail lending, is harder to judge," observed Ben Broadbent, chief economist, Goldman Sachs. Even the Chairman of the Treasury Select Committee, John McFall, has expressed concerns that the GBP 37 billion being injected into three of Britain's largest banks, might not be enough. "It is a minefield we are tiptoeing through," he stated, and called on banks to provide greater detail of their exposure to derivatives and other complex assets.
4. (SBU) Others are concerned about the macro-economic situation. Inflation has jumped to 5.2 percent in September, above the BOE expected 5 percent rate and significantly above the two percent target rate. Surging household utility and food prices were the key factors behind this jump. The declining price in oil is expected to bring inflation down below the five percent mark in October, but inflation will remain a significant concern. In September, unemployment recorded its biggest rise in 17 years, jumping by 164,000
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workers to 1.79 million, the largest rise since 1991. The weakening global economy is also affecting the UK's trade deficit. Although it narrowed slightly in August to GBP 4.7 billion from GBP 4.8 billion, the gap was GBP one billion higher than analysts had expected. The effects on the real economy have also to become evident: car sales were down 21 percent in September alone and house repossessions are set to rise by 50 percent to 45,000 this year.
A New Dawn For Brown
--------------------
5. (SBU) After a year of plummeting poll numbers and questions about his ability to lead, Gordon Brown is suddenly riding high. On October 13, the same day that he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics, Paul Krugman published a New York Times op-ed entitled, "Gordon Does Good," praising the PM and his team for his quick actions to stave off a further collapse of the financial industry and to lay down the foundation for a new global financial system. Brown's plan to recapitalize banks, first announced on October 9, and then fine-tuned over the weekend was heralded by Krugman and many others as the missing element in all previous rescue plans - and a step subsequently adopted in several other countries. Brown has also received praise for riding to the rescue of the European Union. President of the European Commission Barroso told the media October 14: "We needed a global solution for a global problem and we ended up with what I will call the 'Brown plan'...The UK was amongst the first to propose comprehensive plans for working together in Europe."
6. (C/NF) Brown and Labour are up in the polls: a YouGov/Sunday Times , poll released on October 13 showed Labour popularity at 33 percent, up 3 points, and the Conservative Party at 43 percent, down three points. Brown and his economic team were also judged as better able to handle the crisis than their Tory counterparts. Even Tory political leaders are ruefully acknowledging Brown's achievements. At an Ambassador-hosted breakfast for NY Times journalist Tom Friedman on October 14, Gregory Barker, MP, Shadow Minister for the Environment, stated that if Brown were to successfully stabilize the economy, he would not be surprised if the PM called for early elections, to try to capitalize on his helmsmanship of the economic recovery. This sentiment was echoed by Labour MP Jamie Reed, who told emboff privately that the government could call elections as early as spring of 2009, and would unlikely wait until the term ends in 2010. He did give a caveat, stating that election planning remained in flux, and noting that discussions on timing were ongoing.
Consensus For Now - But The Gauntlet Is Laid Down
--------------------------------------------- ----
7. (C/NF) The Tories have expressed support for the bail-out package, acknowledging that there was no other option when faced with the collapse of the banking system. "Now was the time for all political leaders to be bi-partisan," stated Barker, and "the Tories have told the PM he has their support for the financial measures recently announced." However, when the dust settles, he argued, it will be time to take a hard look at how "we got to this position, how do we get through the crisis stronger and better, and what can we achieve realistically in the longer-run?" The Labour Party is particularly vulnerable on the first part of that question, he contended, and pointed to improper regulatory oversight among the many perceived failings of the Labour government. He added that the challenge for everyone, now and in the immediate future, is to determine the right strategy for getting through the crisis and then to tackle the real problems brought on, or aggravated by, the crisis: a greater debt burden, collapsed housing prices, higher inflation, greater personal bankruptcies. This "is no moment of triumph for the government - for it is the British people who have now been landed with the bill for the boom that turned to bust," recently remarked George Osborne, Shadow Chancellor.
Comment
-------
8. (C) Reaction in London to the U.K. economic rescue plan has been more muted than expected, with the stock market down nearly 3 percent in trading the morning of October 15th. Skepticism remains whether the measures adopted will be
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sufficient to unlock paralyzed inter-bank lending and to start restoring credit in the faltering financial system. The U.K. government and investors are also watching closely the U.S. response to the crisis and the effect of the U.S. plan on both Wall Street and Main Street. U.K. officials have little room to maneuver should the rescue plan prove to be inadequate, since they have adopted measures that were to be called upon only in extremis. A worsening of the crisis would be bad news for the PM, who is enjoying a brief respite from the bashing he has received regularly in the press. While Labour's poll numbers are slightly up, the Tories would still win a majority if the elections were held today.
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LEBARON
Friday, 25 July 2008, 11:45
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 001939
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SENSITIVE
EO 12958 DECL: 07/25/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINR, UK
SUBJECT: A POLITICAL BODY BLOW TO GORDON BROWN AS LABOUR
LOSES SCOTTISH BY-ELECTION
REF: LONDON 1913
Classified By: Political Counselor Rick Mills for reasons 1.4 (B) and ( D).
1. (C) Summary. The Scottish National Party's 365 vote victory in yesterday's Glasgow East by-election over Labour is another body blow to Gordon Brown's political fortunes and, in the immediate aftermath, has fueled speculation that Brown could face a leadership challenge this fall, when MPs return to the Westminster Village from the summer break. A Labour MP and close advisor to Brown told us the morning after the vote that Brown will be "hunkering down" with his allies over the summer to fend off Labour party opponents, which Brown "can successfully do for now," but the Glasgow result cannot be explained away as anything other than "a referendum on Labour" and Brown must react. This advisor said Brown has to use the summer vacation period, with MPs out of London, to develop a new political strategy. For now, in part because of the Parliamentary recess, a challenge to Brown's leadership is not imminent, but the Glasgow defeat - the third Labour by-election loss since Brown took power -- might embolden his opponents to act in the fall if Brown cannot turn around Labour's dismal political standing. End Summary.
A Political Earthquake
----------------------
2. (U) In what the winning Scottish National Party candidate called a "political earthquake," Labour went down to an unanticipated defeat in yesterday's Glasgow East by-election, coming in second to the SNP, 11,277 to 10,912. With a higher than expected voter turn out of 42 percent, SNP candidate John Mason's victory over Labour's Margaret Curran represents an astonishing 22 percent swing from the last general election in 2005, in what had been the Labour party's 25th safest seat. The Conservatives came in third with 1,639, with the Liberal Democrats a distant fourth at 915 votes.
3. (C) Forsaking its traditional soapbox issue of Scottish independence, SNP leader and Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond personally spearheaded the party's campaign, turning the by-election into a referendum on Brown and the Labour Party. Although Labour sent a collection of party heavyweights and Cabinet ministers to campaign for Curran, she could not overcome what appears to have been a lethal mix of Brown's unpopularity, a strong SNP which benefited from Alex Salmond's frequent appearances in the constituency, and voter frustration that the impoverished district has not benefited more from ten years of Labour rule in London. Labour's attempts to market the by-election as a "local" -- in order to keep the focus off the Prime Minister -- went unnoticed. Nick Brown MP, a close advisor to Brown and his Deputy Labour Whip in the Commons, told Poloff the morning after the vote that "there are no quirks we can use to explain this defeat away" and the party has to see the vote as "a referendum on Labour -- that we lost." For now, Labour party spokesmen sent out to speak publicly on the defeat, like DFID Secretary Douglas Alexander (a Scotsman himself), are repeating the now oft-heard Labor refrain that the party "will have to reflect long and hard on the results and try to understand the message" voters have sent.
The Winners
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4. (C) The winner in yesterday's election is clearly the SNP. The vote is an enormous boost for the party and its leader, Alex Salmond, who staked a considerable amount of personal prestige on the outcome -- visiting the district ten times during the campaign. The SNP presented the election as a chance to register a referendum on two governments - the SNP-led government in Hollyrood or the Labour government in Westminster, and the SNP can now claim victory. The party will have to be careful about not becoming too cocky, however, as the SNP's signature issue, Scottish independence, was not highlighted during the campaign and most observers agree that, for most voters, their vote was more anti-Labour than a strong embrace of the SNP.
5. (C) The other winner the morning after are the Conservatives, despite their third place finish. The Conservatives are pleased to have done better than expected in this constituency. Conservative leader David Cameron had traveled to the district before the election and delivered a speech on the social causes of poverty and deprivation, stressing a need for personal responsibility rather than
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government action. Many Conservatives thought making the speech in the district was a mistake, but it appears not to have harmed the Conservative vote. Michael Fabricant, a Tory MP, told Poloff that the third place finish is important to the Tories because it indicates that Cameron's appeal and message is making inroads even in traditionally Tory-hostile Scotland. Cameron himself reacted to the vote by calling for the Prime Minister to hold an immediate general election, a call which the Prime Minister's office termed ridiculous.
What's Next for Gordon Brown?
----------------------------
6. (C) Nick Brown, Labour's Deputy Chief Whip, told Poloff that Gordon Brown will use the summer months to "hunker down" and keep his party allies close and his party opponents "in line." Nick Brown, who is one of the Prime Minster's closest political advisors, said that as "terrible" as the election outcome was, it would not spark an immediate leadership challenge to the Prime Minister within the Labour Party. The Prime Minister, however, has to use the summer parliamentary recess, now underway, to develop a new political message and consider a cabinet shakeup in order to stop his political freefall. Nick Brown reported that there are "unconfirmed rumors" of a small number of Labour party members considering whether to gather signatures for a letter to the Prime Minister asking that he step down -- supposedly the plotters intend to present the letter on September 5 to the Prime Minister, the date in 2006 on which Labour party rebels presented a similar letter to then Prime Minister Tony Blair -- but Nick Brown said the Prime Minister and his allies would be able "to slap down" the effort, "if it got off the ground at all."
7. (C) Nick Brown acknowledged that many Labour members were hoping that an election victory in the Glasgow by-election, no matter how narrow, would "cauterize" Labour's political wounds, but with Labour's loss, many Labour members will be panicked that the party's political decline has not yet bottomed out and willing to consider "drastic action." As Deputy Whip, Nick Brown will be speaking to many MPs over the weekend to "keep their heads about them." Ultimately, Nick Brown claimed, a leadership challenge to the Prime Minister is "highly unlikely" for the practical reason that, were the Labour party to change its leader and give the UK a third Prime Minister in three or four years, it would be politically impossible for the party not to call a general election shortly afterwards -- it would be "historically unheard of to have two unelected Prime Ministers back to back." Labour MPs understand, Brown continued, that they would still go down to defeat in such a case so many will be willing to stick with the Prime Minister in the hope he can turn the party's fortunes around before spring 2010, when a general election must be called.
Comment
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8. (C/NF) With Parliament on recess on until October 6, Labour will have time for "long and hard" reflection. Attention now turns to the September party conventions, where Labour, and possibly more importantly Brown, will have another (and possibly final) opportunity to convince voters that Labour has "listened and learned." However, unless Brown takes dramatic action, whether a leadership shuffle or new bold policy direction, he may not be able to fend off grumbles from an increasingly anxious party and, though still unlikely, a possible challenge to his position as party leader.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
TUTTLE
Friday, 25 April 2008, 16:40
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 001176
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS EAID, EAGR, PGOV, UK
SUBJECT: UK FOOD SUMMIT HIGHLIGHTS PM BROWN'S CONCERN
1. (SBU) Summary: At an April 22, PM Brown-hosted meeting to address increases in food prices, participants disagreed about future trends and the impact of biofuels, agreed that action needed to be taken both for immediate social protection and longer-term agricultural investment, and that care should be taken not to talk up a "crisis." The UK press release following the meeting included a broad range of proposed actions that the UK plans to pursue both domestically and internationally, ranging from increased assistance to a WTO trade deal and improved World Bank and IMF effectiveness. DFID also announced a new GBP 455 million ($910 million) five-year assistance package. In DFID's view, the current crisis is being caused by high and rising food prices, not a shortage of food. End Summary.
2. (SBU) On April 22, PM Brown hosted a one and a half hour meeting to discuss ways the international community could respond to the growing global food price crisis. Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Director Simon Maxwell, who was called on to set the stage at the meeting, told us he was surprised that the meeting, which was originally intended to be a small private event, was publicized and expanded to include more international players. Participants included UK government ministers, international organizations such Josette Sheeran from the World Food Program, business, academics and others. For the full list, see paragraph 16.
3. (SBU) PM Brown opened the meeting, introducing the list of action areas he had asked the Japanese Prime Minister to put on the G8 agenda, including short tern measures to deal with immediate hardship and long term structural measures as outlined in paragraph 13. (see also www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page15321.asp). UK Development Secretary Douglas Alexander concluded the meeting by
SIPDIS emphasizing the need for the international architecture to keep up. He noted that this had been a key theme at the World Bank Development Committee in Washington earlier in April. He also expressed surprise there had not been more discussion about concluding a WTO trade deal as a means to address food price concerns.
Food Prices and Biofuels
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4. (SBU) Participants disagreed about likely food price trends and the impact of biofuels. UK Environment Secretary Hilary Benn noted that the futures market for wheat showed the price falling more than 25 percent from current levels by next year. Cargill's Ruth Rawling predicted that wheat prices would come down quite quickly, noting that there is a harvest somewhere on the planet every sixty days, except for rice. ODI estimated that prices would fall back from their current peak to roughly what they had been in the early 1990s. (See ODI's discussion paper on the topic at http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/briefing/ bp37-april08-rising-food-prices.pdf)
5. (SBU) On the other hand, Stefan Tangermann from the OECD Trade & Agriculture Directorate said their modeling showed maize prices for the next ten years would be 60 percent higher than during the past decade and that half of this increase was due to biofuels. Joachim Von Braun, Director General, Inter Food Policy Institute Research (IFPRI) suggested a moratorium on maize for biofuels. Their modeling showed it would reduce maize prices by 20 percent immediately and wheat prices by 10 percent, with further reductions because it would discourage speculation.
6. (SBU) Others defended biofuels. Benn wanted to see hard facts and analysis on biofuels. Mike Bushell, from agri-business company Syngenta, argued against demonizing biofuels. Rawling argued against rigid mandates and in favor of buy-out clauses for biofuels. She also noted that flexibility is essential since biofuel targets are fixed in terms of fuel markets not food markets, and 2.5 percent of the fuel market can represent as much as 20 percent of a food market.
Causes and Remedies
-------------------
7. (SBU) Maxwell told us the headline messages about social protection in the short run and agricultural investment in the long run were clear to the participants, but everything else about causes and remedies was contested. Paul Collier, Oxford University, argued that the main cause was growth in China, which no one wants to reduce. He also pointed to "follies" that he wanted to undo, specifically U.S. biofuels subsidies, and the EU refusal to accept genetically modified
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crops. Collier wanted to see large-scale farming in Africa along the lines of the Brazilian model. (For details, see Collier's April 15 article in the Times: Food Shortages: Think Big. www.timesonline.co.uk) On April 24, Malcolm Bruce, MP and chairman of Parliament's International Development Committee (IDC), speaking at an IDC evidence session dismissed Collier's suggestion that African countries adopt the Brazilian model as a "professorial point of view, not a politician's."
8. (SBU) At the meeting, Maxwell stressed that the crisis had macro-economic as well as humanitarian dimensions. Low Income Food Deficit countries face import bills some $20bn higher this year, and food price increases are resulting in double-digit inflation in many countries. Donald Kaberuka, President, African Development Bank, also focused on macroeconomic impacts, as governments could respond to higher prices by increasing subsidies and wages, which would lead to higher budget deficits.
9. (SBU) Josette Sheeran, World Food Program (WFP) director, made a case for the importance of the humanitarian case load. She said the additional cost of maintaining WFP,s operations this year has now risen to $700 million, compared to $500 million in February. (WFP has had to pay up to $1000 per ton for rice). She raised concerns about low planting in poor countries, constrained in part by high input costs (e.g. planting in Kenya is one third down). She also said WFP is transitioning from being an agency that deals only with food aid logistics to one that addresses the broader causes and remedies to address hunger itself, a project which is slowly gathering donor support. Jacques Diouf, UN Food and Agriculture Organization, talked about the Food Summit he is convening from 3-5 June in Rome. He said the priority was the current growing season, and endorsed Sheeran,s points about the negative impact of high fertilizer and seed prices.
10. (SBU) Several participants focused on the need for immediate social protection for those in need. Phil Bloomer from Oxfam argued against food subsidies for and in favor of targeted social protection for those in need. David Mepham from Save the Children talked about the need to scale up existing social protection programs (e.g Ethiopia), but noted that there are countries where the issue is building programs rather than scaling them up. Bruce was also concerned that small farmers would buy more inputs because food prices were high, and then be unable to cover these costs if prices fell. He wanted to see some kind of insurance to prevent this outcome.
11. (SBU) Kaberuka said the regional development banks were working on a harmonized approach to support agriculture. Speaking in a Parliamentary committee meeting on April 24, DFID Parliamentary Secretary of State Gillian Merron outlined DFID views on the African Development Bank's role to address the food crisis. She praised Kaberuka's participation in the summit, noting that it showed a willingness to adapt the AfDB's role to fit the situation. She stressed that the AfDB is not set up to lend directly to farmers, nor should it be, but there is the potential for AfDB to play a role in agricultural infrastructure projects. She said DFID would work with AfDB toward this goal.
Messaging
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12. (SBU) Maxwell urged participants to get the messaging right, so as not to talk up a crisis, and instead present this as a manageable problem with short and long term solutions, with implications for the international system. Tangerman endorsed the point about messaging and said there was a danger of talking up the bubble. He pointed to recent unhelpful remarks from IMF Managing Director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, about prices going even higher.
UK Food Crisis Announcement
---------------------------
13. (U) A UK statement -- apparently not coordinated with the other participants -- following the meeting said it had addressed the short and longer-term factors causing increased food prices at home and abroad and possible policy solutions. It noted the following issues were discussed at the meeting: -- We will work in the G8 for an international strategy. An international strategy will need to include: more and better support for agricultural and rural development in the poorest countries; more and better research into methods for increasing yields and productivity; a review of the wider economic and environmental impacts of biofuel production;
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commitment to increase social protection programs which take people out of long-term dependency on food aid; consideration on how to maximize the effectiveness of IMF and World Bank support; and reform of relevant international institutions.
-- We will increase support to the poorest. In addition to the GBP 50 million per year we already spend on social protection and safety net programs in Africa, the UK has today pledged an extra GBP 30 million to support the World Food Program, and extra GBP 25 million to Ethiopia for their national safety net program. We will work to encourage other donors to make additional humanitarian assistance available and monitor the need to step up support.
-- We will work together to address domestic price rises. The Government has called on consumer groups, food producers, manufacturers and retailers to consider how we can collectively meet the challenges posed by the global food crisis.
-- We will increase research into improving yields. The UK has today announced new funds for agricultural research over the next five years. This will be critical if agricultural production is to keep pace with increased demands for food.
-- We will work to achieve a successful WTO deal, including a substantial 'aid for trade' package to help build the trading capacity of the poorest countries. The WTO round offers a major opportunity to increase trade flows in agricultural (and other) goods, particularly for developing countries. We want a WTO deal which reduces significantly reduces agricultural tariffs and trade distorting subsidies. High transport costs also push up local food prices and restrict trade in Africa.
-- We will work within the EU to further reform the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), through the CAP Health check and the EU budget review. It is estimated that the CAP costs UK consumers GBP 3.5 billion (2005) through higher prices. Reductions in EU agricultural tariffs and CAP reform would reduce the cost of food to EU consumers and increase the capacity of developing countries to produce and export agricultural commodities.
-- We will review our approach to biofuels. We need to look closely at the impact on food prices and the environment of different production methods and to ensure we are more selective in our support. If our UK review shows that we need to change our approach, we will also push for change in EU biofuels targets.
DFID Assistance
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14. (U) Also on April 22, DFID announced a GBP 455 million ($910 million) five-year aid package to address rising global food prices. The package is designed to address both short term needs and long term solutions. The UK aid package includes: $60 million in support of recent appeals by the World Food Programme for countries most at risk; $800 million (GBP 400 million) over five years devoted to agricultural research, that will double DFID's current spend and help poor countries grow more food for themselves; and $50 million (GBP 25 million) this year to boost the incomes of the poorest people in Ethiopia.
15. (U) In DFID's view, the current crisis is being caused by high and rising food prices, not a shortage of food. The solution is to improve access to food for poor people. Prices are rising because of increasing demand for food due to population growth, and increasing oil prices and their impact on the cost of food production, processing and distribution.
16. (U) Participants at the April 22 event were: Prime Minister Gordon Brown; Rt Hon Douglas Alexander MP, Secretary of State for International Development; Rt Hon Alistair Darling, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rt Hon Hilary Benn MP, Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs;
SIPDIS Rt Hon Malcolm Bruce MP, Chairman, International Development Committee; Prof John Beddington Chief Scientist; Phil Bloomer, Oxfam; Dr Mike Bushell, Syngenta; Paul Collier, Oxford University; Professor Ian Crute, Rothamsted Research Institute; Jaqcues Diouf, Food and Agricultural Organisation, UN; Andrew Dorward, School of Oriental and African Studies; Lawrence Haddad, Institute of Development Studies; Paul Hodson, European Commission Transport & Energy; Donald Kaberuka, African Development Bank; Reijo Kemppinen, Head of Mission, EC Rep of the UK; Peter Kendall, National Farmers Union; Justin King, Sainsbury's; Simon Maxwell, Overseas
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Development Institute; Jill Johnstone, National Consumer Council; David Mepham, Save the Children; Kanayo Felix Nwanze, Vice President ) IFAD; Ruth Rawling, Cargill plc; Josette Sheeran, World Food Program; Stefan Tangermann, OECD Trade & Agriculture Directorate; Goran Trapp, Morgan Stanley; and Joachim von Braun, Director General IFPRI Inter Food Policy Institute Research.
17. (SBU) Comment: Brown's hastily arranged "summit" had no other government leaders represented. It came at a time of unremittingly bad political news for the PM and offered him a chance to assert leadership on a widely supported international issue. Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom TUTTLE
2008-07-31 EMBASSY LONDON CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN
Thursday, 31 July 2008, 10:30
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 LONDON 001991
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/WE, NSC FOR BRADLEY
EO 12958 DECL: 07/31/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINR, UK
SUBJECT: (C/NF) WHO WOULD REPLACE GORDON BROWN AS UK PRIME
REF: A. LONDON 1939 B. LONDON 1704
Classified By: Ambassador Robert H. Tuttle, reasons 1.4 b, d.
1. (C/NF) Summary. As Gordon Brown lurches from political disaster to disaster, Westminster is abuzz with speculation about whether he will be replaced as Prime Minister and Labour Parxty leader, and, if so, by whom. Right now, Foreign Secretary David Miliband and Justice Secretary Jack Straw are the two most frequently mentioned, and likely, successors -- Miliband as the "Labour David Cameron" to represent the Blairite wing of the party or Straw as a Labour elder statesman to bind the Party together. Other credible names in circulation, in Post's view, are Brown confidante Secretary of State for Children and Schools Ed Balls, House of Commons Labour Leader Harriet Harman, Secretary of State for Work and Pensions James Purnell, and Health Secretary Alan Johnston. These would-be successors are a diverse group, but they all have one thing in common: unless Brown steps down voluntarily, which is highly unlikely, one of them will have to mount a public challenge to Brown, and none of the candidates has so far been willing to wield the knife - or at least not yet. End summary.
Talk of Ousting Brown Reaching Fever Pitch
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2. (C/NF) A terrible by-election defeat in Scotland on July 23, in which a formerly rock-solid Labour seat with a 13,000 majority fell to the Scottish National Party (Ref A), has left the Labour Party reeling and fueled fears among MPs that Brown's leadership of the party, and his premiership, may now be beyond repair. For the first time in Labour's eleven-year reign, Labour MPs are experiencing what it is to be truly unpopular and fear they are facing meltdown at the next election, which must be held no later than June 2010. According to a July 28 YouGov poll, if a general election were called now, the Tories would receive 46 percent of the vote, while Labour would take just 26 percent and the Liberal Democrat Party 17 percent; 74 percent of respondent said they were dissatisfied with Brown's performance as PM. In this febrile atmosphere, Westminster is buzzing with news that dissident MPs are canvassing their colleagues to find a new leader, while at the same time Cabinet ministers are lining up to warn MPs to stop plotting and unite behind Brown (Ref A). While rumors have been afloat for several months, our contacts tell us now that those considering getting rid of Brown are no longer confined to a small rump of bitter ex-Ministers, such as Charles Clark (Ref B). With no sign yet that Brown has a clear plan to turn the party's woes around, commentators wonder if he can hold out until 2010, and are already turning their attention to who might replace him.
How Would It Happen?
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3. (C/NF) There are two ways to oust Brown. First, he could step down on his own, perhaps at the behest of a group of close advisors and party elders. We judge this possibility to be extremely unlikely; Brown has wanted Downing Street for too long to go quietly - a point London Mayor Boris Johnson, a Conservative, made in a widely-read op-ed piece earlier this week. Second, another candidate for party leader could force a leadership election by identifying him- or herself publicly and producing the names of 20 percent of sitting MPs (70 of 346 Labour MPs) who support his/her candidacy. Labour would then hold an election at its party conference for a new leader, in which Brown could conceivably run himself to regain the leadership. In the event of a leadership election, one-third of the vote would be allocated to MPs; one-third to Labour Party members; and one-third to the trade unions. Many MPs have told us that, regardless of the scenario, they candidly hope a change in leadership is still a long way off. They acknowledge - as Labour Deputy Whip Nick Brown did to us just days after the Glasgow election -- that changing PM for the third time in 18 months could lead to calls for an immediate general election, which would be hard to ignore and would not give Labour the time it needs to recover under a new leader.
When Would It Happen?
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4. (C/NF) Before the catastrophic July 23 by-election defeat, uppermost on MPs, minds was heading home for the summer recess. The fact that Parliament is now out until
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early October gives Brown some breathing space. On the other hand, Labour MPs now have a lengthy period to hear out their constituents' wrath while gnawing over the problem of their party's collapsing popularity and their leader's seeming inability to turn its fortunes around. There is rampant speculation by media and pundits alike that a move against Brown will occur before the party meets for its annual conference at the end of September - early September 2006 was when the plot that eventually forced then-PM Blair to announce a date for his departure from Downing Street took place. While that scenario still remains highly unlikely, another possibility rapidly gaining credence among Westminster watchers has Labour replacing Brown closer to a general election in 2009 or 2010, thus giving a new leader a few months time to settle in and get the party's poll ratings back up.
The Candidates
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5. (C/NF) In the order of frequency, and Post's assessment of their credibility as potential successors, below are the names we are hearing most often from Labour Party contacts and from UK media observers:
David Miliband
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6. (C/NF) Foreign Secretary David Miliband is a high-flying young member of the Government whose name inevitably tops "future leader" lists, with some going as far as to call him Labour,s "heir apparent." A former Kennedy Scholar, Miliband at 42 years of age has been at the center of power for a long time, serving as Blair,s Head of Policy from 1994 to 2001 before winning a seat in Parliament.
7. (C/NF) Miliband's appointment as Foreign Secretary in June 2007 makes him the second-youngest UK Foreign Secretary ever. His appointment came as a surprise to many who had expected Brown to purge the cabinet of so-called "Blairites." Miliband's fortitude is widely viewed as a testament to how successfully he has bridged the Blairite/Brownite division that still hamper the Labour Party. He steers clear of well-known Blairite rabble rousers Charles Clarke, Alan Milburn and John Reid, all of whom are suspected of trying to unseat Brown, and resisted pressure from "Blairites" to stand against Brown before last year,s leadership handover. More Machiavellian voices within the Labour Party say that Brown gave Miliband the high profile job of Foreign Secretary not as a reward for his loyalty, but as a way of keeping Miliband removed from domestic politics where he might start to build up an alternative power base for any future job vacancy.
8. (C/NF) Miliband certainly has the most high-profile portfolio of all Brown's would-be successors. Added to that, his Labour credentials are impeccable and his intellect unquestioned. Some consider Miliband, whose nickname at Number 10 was "egghead," as too brainy to be leader. Rumor has it that he has entered into an electoral pact with Cabinet colleague and another would-be successor James Purnell (see para. 15), who reportedly told Miliband he would stand aside in order to give Miliband his full backing.
9. (C/NF) Long viewed as too young or too reticent to challenge Brown, Miliband may be changing this perception. An op-ed piece he published in the July 29 Guardian, in which he laid out his ideas of how Labour can still win the next election, has triggered wide-spread media speculation that he is positioning himself at long last as a possible successor. In the op-ed, Miliband was careful not to criticize Brown - but neither did he call for party unity behind the PM, and Miliband is canny enough to know how this omission would be interpreted. Miliband's Principal Private Secretary told us July 30 that Downing Street had "been told in advance about the article" and explained that the op-ed piece reflected that Miliband is "concerned and doing a lot of thinking about the party's standing," but said the Foreign Secretary was not the kind of man to "plot behind someone's back on his own." The PPS declined to respond when asked if that meant the Foreign Secretary was the kind of man who might join a delegation of plotters who ask the Prime Minister to step down for the good of the party.
Jack Straw
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10. (C/NF) Could the party unite around caretaker leader Jack Straw, a wise old man of the party? In the wake of the
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July 23 by-election meltdown, the media was awash with rumors that 62-year-old Straw, currently the Justice Secretary, was being lined up by disgruntled Labour MPs to confront Brown and force him to quit before taking over as caretaker leader of the party while a younger replacement is groomed. After Gordon Brown himself, Straw is the second most senior member of the Cabinet, having previously served as both Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary, holding the latter post during the September 11 terrorist attacks and overseeing the beginning of military action in Afghanistan and Iraq. Outwardly an amiable and affable man, Straw is viewed with less affection by some cabinet colleagues who say they have been at the receiving end of his whispering campaigns regarding their abilities. Critics are also quick to note that he was one of the first of Blair,s closest allies to jump ship in favor of Gordon Brown when he sensed the political winds were shifting in Brown,s direction.
11. (C/NF) Over the July 26-27 weekend, Straw interrupted his U.S. holiday following widespread rumors that his supporters were collecting names of MPs to force Brown into a leadership challenge, announcing that he remains "absolutely convinced" that Brown is "the right man to be leading the Labour Party." Despite his public endorsement of the PM, No 10 advisors are reportedly enraged by the actions of Straw,s supporters who they suspect of organizing a coup, with or without Straw's active participation.
Ed Balls
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12. (C/NF) Super bright, relatively young, Ed Balls, now Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families, has seen his star rise and fall in recent years but remains a credible front-runner to succeed Brown. Since becoming an MP in 2005, he has enjoyed a meteoric political rise into the Cabinet in only 3 years, not least because of his close friendship with Brown. Brown plucked Balls out of his job as an economist at the Financial Times and installed him as a senior advisor in 1994. Balls became Brown,s most trusted lieutenant at the Treasury, where he was unofficially known as the Deputy Chancellor., He continues to remain Brown,s closest confidante, and it is an open secret according to Labour party contacts that Balls is Brown,s choice as his successor - a charge Balls vehemently denies. He is married to another Labour high-flying minister, Yvette Cooper.
13. (C/NF) While his financial credentials and close relationship to Brown weigh in his favor, Balls has performed badly as Schools Secretary and is accused of shirking responsibility for the failings of his department (the most recent blow to his reputation was a delay in reporting standardized test scores to UK schoolchildren, which Balls at first publicly minimized then belatedly apologized for). Critics point out that since coming out from the shadows and entering the public arena, Balls has shown himself to be less than suited to the top job: his public speaking is derided as "dull," his slightly awkward manner as "charmless," and he has many enemies within the party, precisely because of his relationship with the PM. Party insiders accuse him of cowardice because he tells Brown what he thinks Brown wants to hear. It is this close relationship that may make a leadership challenge difficult for Balls, since of all the would-be successors, Balls will face the harshest criticism if he turns on his mentor. On the other hand, in the unlikely event that Brown steps aside voluntarily, Balls might very well catapult to the top of the possible successors.
Harriet Harman
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14. (C/NF) Deputy Leader Harriet Harman, the only woman mentioned as a possible successor, is a relative policy light weight but an adept inter-party operator. A Brownite, she has reportedly been discreetly attempting to gauge how much support she has among Parliamentary colleagues ever since Brown's star started to wane earlier this year. Harman faces a rough ride with most of the UK media, especially the more widely read tabloids who criticize her aggressive championing of women,s rights and say that she is obsessed with political correctness. On July 29 Harman had to publicly deny reports that she told her aides, "This is my moment (to rule)," following the July 23 by-election disaster. She has recently begun to speak on the need for the party to underscore its commitment to equality and fairness, which may be a sign of her reaching out to the party's anti-Blairite,
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left wing.
James Purnell
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15. (C/NF) Work and Pensions Secretary James Purnell is another strong candidate, although he is often described as Labour,s "next leader but one." Like many of the other contenders, 38-year-old Purnell was one of Blair,s closest advisers at Number Ten before entering Parliament in 2001. Purnell is already a darling of the UK media, having taken on Britain,s so-called "benefit cheats" by announcing plans for the long-term unemployed to retrain and take on work.
16. (C/NF) Purnell,s political radar is finely honed and colleagues describe him as astute and able. He went to work for Blair when Blair was a relatively unknown MP in the late 1980s; now, after just a year in the cabinet, Purnell has gained a reputation for handling difficult briefs with aplomb, although he is sometimes criticized for coming across as smug. Purnell may have support within Parliament, but he lacks a strong constituency base outside Westminster - crucial for any successful party leader. Because Purnell was "parachuted" into a safe parliamentary seat, he has no local ties and therefore limited local backing; and because he is not from a trade union background, he also can,t count on the support of union leaders, who aren't impressed with his planned social security cuts.
Alan Johnson
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17. (C/NF) For many in the Labour Party, Health Secretary Alan Johnson pushes all the right personal buttons. Born into poverty, orphaned, and married with two kids by the age of 18, Johnson went on to become the boss of one of the UK,s biggest trade unions - the Communication Workers Union - where he worked his way up from postman to union baron. Johnson, who has a reputation as an inclusive and collegiate boss and is most often described as "amiable," is happy to let junior ministers in his department shine rather than taking their ideas or their limelight - but it is this lack of killer instinct that, commentators note, make Johnson more suitable to serve as a deputy prime minister, rather than for the top job itself in which he has shown remarkably little interest.
Andy Burnham
------------
18. (C/NF) On paper, Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport Andy Burnham,s rise through the party mirrors that of James Purnell. At 38 years old, Burnham has only been an MP since 2001, following a career as a special advisor to PM Tony Blair. He is also another "Blairite" who, like Miliband, successfully survived the cull when Brown became PM. Burnham is a dark horse favorite among Labour members. The Cambridge-educated father-of-three has a common touch his rivals envy and is married to his university sweetheart, Dutch-born Marie-France.
Jon Cruddas
-----------
19. (C/NF) MP for Dagenham Jon Crudas is a wild card. Although not well known outside the party, he fought a brilliant campaign in last year,s Labour deputy leader contest, eventually losing out to Harriet Harman, but not before winning the crucial backing of some of the country,s biggest trade unions as well as the endorsement of Labour,s "Tribune" magazine. Cruddas, elected to Parliament in 2001, has already shown himself to be a highly astute and wily politician. Prior to becoming an MP, Cruddas was one of Blair,s closest advisors, working as his deputy political secretary at Downing Street where he was responsible for the Government,s relations with the trade unions. On becoming an MP, Cruddas cleverly began to disassociate himself from Blair, rebelling against the Government on key issues, opposing the Government's initiatives to pay for university education, more rights for asylum seekers, and the renewal of the UK Trident nuclear submarine system. He has described himself as "mistaken" over his decision to vote for British participation in the 2003 Iraq conflict. One of Cruddas, biggest assets is his wife, fellow party activist Anna Healy, who has worked for many of Labour,s best known cabinet ministers in recent years. However, Cruddas - who is believed to have turned down ministerial roles from both
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Blair and Brown - may find that his lack of previous any ministerial experience counts against him.
John Hutton
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20. (C/NF) 53-year-old Business Secretary John Hutton was until recently seen as another strong contender - until he upset the powerful and influential trade unions by arguing earlier this year that the UK should "celebrate the fact that people can be enormously wealthy in this country." The unions were further infuriated when Hutton said the Government had reached "the end of the era" on considering new regulations, although this sentiment has earned Hutton the respect of the business community, who see him as a key ally. The unions now say there has been a complete breakdown of trust, and have called on Hutton to be removed from his post in any Brown government reshuffle (widely expected in September as part of the Prime Minister's effort to re-energize his political standing). These requests put Prime Minister Brown in a difficult position - he would look weak were he to move Hutton; the answer may be to move him to another cabinet spot, such as the next Defense Secretary.
21. (C/NF) While union fury won't particularly bother Hutton, who has always been to the right of the Labour Party and one of Tony Blair,s closest allies, a lack of union support would stop any leadership challenge he might be considering. Hutton has told us in confidence that he is fed up with government work and considering standing down at the next election to go into the private sector.
Comment-------
22. (C/NF) Given the improbability that Brown will step down voluntarily, the chances of any one of this group of would-be successors, or any dark horses that might emerge, taking over before the scheduled election in 2010 depends on one of them challenging Brown openly for the party leadership. So far, none of them have been willing to wield the knife, most likely afraid that such a move would cause a party split that would in the end be an even greater fiasco for Labour. We don't see a clear tipping point on the horizon - but given Brown's abysmal track record over the last year, that day could come when Labour MPs return from vacations in late August/early September.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
TUTTLE
Tuesday, 08 April 2008, 12:05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 001001
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/WE
EO 12958 DECL: 03/25/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, EAID, ECON, UK
REF: A. LONDON 825 B. EMBASSY LONDON DAILY REPORT - APRIL 3 (NOTAL) C. EMBASSY LONDON DAILY REPORT- MARCH 20 (NOTAL) D. STATE 33008 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C/NF) Summary. Criticism and indifference from British political leaders, foreign policy analysts, and media greeted the publication of HMG's first National Security Strategy (NSS), an initial reaction echoed in many of the Whitehall ministries to which the NSS was directed. UK opposition leaders and most of the UK media criticized the NSS as an undifferentiated "laundry list" of possible security and natural disaster threats that provided no strategic guidance on how to address these challenges or how to prioritize resources among them. The NSS' publication was little more than a 24-hour news cycle story for the UK media and produced surprisingly little op-ed comment. An FCO contact tells us the NSS is at the moment "collecting dust" in drawers. In two recent high-profile speeches on UK foreign policy priorities (ref A and B), Foreign Secretary Miliband made no explicit reference to the NSS. Several Whitehall officials noted that their suggestions for the NSS were ignored by the Cabinet Office drafters and so there is little "buy-in" from Whitehall ministries. So far, there has been no movement on implementing the NSS' recommendation to create a "National Security Forum." The other major NSS recommendation for government action -- creation of 1000-strong civilian reconstruction corps -- was dismissed by the head of HMG's existing Stabilization Unit as simply a pulling together of existing programs under a new name undertaken without consultation with him. In the end, whatever the future of the NSS' specific recommendations, what is disappointing, and troubling, about the NSS' indifferent reception is that the Brown Government -- and UK political establishment writ large -- may have missed the opportunity for a national discussion on the evolving security threats that do face the country. Full NSS text is available at . End Summary.
Released with Fanfare
---------------------
2. (SBU) Given a high profile launch on the floor of the House of Commons March 19 by Prime Minister Brown himself, the NSS, subtitled "Security in an Interdependent World," was the product of a six-month effort by a specifically tasked Cabinet office team to draft HMG's first comprehensive national security strategy. Members of the Brown Cabinet were dispatched immediately following the release of the NSS to discuss the document with British media; copies of the NSS were made available on government websites. Although members of the drafting team cited the USG's own National Security Strategy document as a model, the NSS they produced has little in common with its U.S. counterpart. The NSS is a 60-page document that declares up front that national security has "broadened beyond protection of the state and its vital interests from attacks by other states" to "include threats to individual citizens and to our way of life." For that reason the NSS deals with issues such as trans-national crime, global poverty, pandemics, and flooding, as well as addressing traditional national security threats like terrorism and hostile states. Instead of stating a half dozen broad principles and tactics to guide the approach to countering current threats, as the U.S. security strategy does, the NSS lists with great specificity the range of threats facing the UK and details all the various resources -- domestic and international -- to be used to counter them.
But Greeted with Disdain
------------------------
3. (SBU) Although one media commentator speculated that the inclusion of issues like preventing a repeat of the floods that struck the UK last summer and avian flu outbreaks was meant to make the NSS "more relevant and interesting to the broader British public," the result in reality was to spark a round of criticism of the NSS as nothing more than committee-drafted laundry list of the issues du jour: The Times, in an editorial, summed up this vein of attack when it called the NSS "a maypole dance of warnings woven together with none dominant." The Daily Telegraph agreed and said that the result was a "damp squib" that gave no guidance or sense of priority on how to counter the "Chinese menu" of threats it listed.
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4. (U) Opposition political leaders were willing to praise the Brown Government's effort to develop a security strategy, but echoed the charge the NSS failed to outline a real strategy. Conservative Party leader David Cameron, in his response in the Commons, said a NSS was necessary and offered the Labour Government praise for taking on the "challenge of providing strategic direction," singling out the NSS' discussions of the threats from global terrorism and nuclear proliferation as useful. But Cameron went on to charge that the NSS failed to provide meaningful long-term strategic thinking on how to address the list of threats it outlined. Cameron was critical that the NSS proposal to create a "National Security Forum" -- an organization to bring together representatives from local and central governments, joined by experts from parliament, academia and the private sector, to discuss emerging threats and how to address them -- merely set up "another talk shop." Cameron instead called for the creation of a UK body modeled on the National Security Council in the United States to better coordinate HMG and other governments' work on security issues. Liberal Democratic Leader Nick Clegg echoed Cameron's remarks when he said the NSS was valuable, but "failed to provide useful guidance on how to prepare long-term" to address the UK's security threats.
5. (SBU) A March 20 roundtable discussion on the NSS, hosted by King's College London, captured well the reaction of UK foreign policy commentators. Dr. John Gearson, a professor of international relations at King,s College, welcomed the effort to draft a security strategy and said the NSS offered a "good description of the 21st century threats" the UK faces, but, he told the audience, "unfortunately, it is not a strategy" and called the NSS as drafted "a lost opportunity." John Reid, former Labour Home and Defense Secretary, while admitting that the NSS "did not do itself
SIPDIS justice," argued that it was possible to "extract some strategic guidelines" from the text. Reid welcomed the NSS as an attempt to think long-term and praised it for recognizing that, because of the nature of the threat of terrorism, the UK needs more national effort in crafting its response. Reid acknowledged, however, that while all of these points are mentioned in the NSS, it was "a pity" that they are not more clearly enunciated. Echoing these comments, Sir David Ormond, a former Security and Intelligence Coordinator within HMG, called the NSS a "necessary step," but added that "given its length and detail" it will take time for many to understand the big concepts that he found in the document -- the need to strengthen the ability to respond to threats from cyber attacks and national disasters, building healthy communities to resist radicalization, and developing guidelines for the responsible use of power overseas. Ormond praised the NSS for posing these challenges as part of government thinking and the national debate on what security means in the 21st century, but added that the NSS lacked "long-term strategic thinking on how to actually move these concepts forward."
Off the National Front Page Quickly
-----------------------------------
6. (SBU) The NSS gained little media traction and was off the front pages within a day of its release. It has thus far produced little op-ed or political commentary in mainstream UK media or journals. Neither of the two leading general political magazines of the left and right in the UK -- The New Statesman or The Specator -- gave the NSS editorial coverage. The opposition parties, after providing the initial responses discussed above, gave it no more public attention and it was not taken up by any of the political parties for further parliamentary discussion or debate.
Whitehall's Response
--------------------
7. (C/NF) The indifferent political and media reaction was matched by that of the Whitehall ministries at which the NSS was directed. An FCO contact in the North America Office told us the NSS already "is collecting dust in drawers" and would have no effect on his office's work or its long-term planning. Post found this reaction in a range of FCO offices and at the MOD when the NSS was raised (Embassy comment. We caution, however, that Post has not had an opportunity to raise the NSS with the domestic security ministries -- Home Office or intelligence agencies -- so cannot speculate on whether the document had more effect at these offices. End comment.) Several HMG contacts described how their input to
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the Cabinet Office drafters of the NSS was ignored or rejected, which accordingly produced little sense of buy-in for the document from Whitehall ministries. Others noted that they were not consulted regarding the NSS' specific recommendations for action that affected their direct responsibilities. Richard Teutten, head of HMG's existing Stabilization Unit for post-conflict reconstruction (please protect), for example, told his USG counterpart, Ambassador John Herbst, the U.S. Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, during a March 20 meeting in London, that the NSS' language on stabilization activities was not cleared by him. Teutten also said that the 1000-strong Civilian Stabilization Corps announced in the NSS was a re-hatting of existing programs. The Corps would be military reservists, not civilians, Teutten claimed, and the 269 million pounds (approx. 540 million USD) identified in the NSS for post-conflict stabilization work was "somewhat misleading" -- the figure was for three years and was already budgeted, including through the UN.
8. (C/NF) Shortly after the NSS' public release, a senior staffer in the Foreign Secretary's office told Poloff that the ideas and themes in the NSS were intended to be worked into the long-term planning and thinking at the Foreign Office and that the Foreign Secretary's office would be responsible for "incorporating" the NSS into the Foreign Office's work. The FCO staffer, however, could not identify any specific steps being taken to reflect the NSS findings in the Foreign Office's work. It may be indicative of a disconnect that the Foreign Secretary himself has given two major speeches on UK foreign policy priorities -- one shortly before the release of the NSS and one two weeks later -- that contained no explicit mention of the NSS (refs A and B).
No Action Yet on Specific Recommendations
-----------------------------------------
9. (C/NF) According to a member of the Cabinet Office unit responsible for drafting the NSS no action has been taken yet on the NSS' specific recommendations for government action. No steps have been taken, for example, to identify participants in the National Security Forum. According to the NSS, HMG will publish an annual update of security threats and the progress made in implementing the NSS strategy. HMG was also to begin consultations with the political parties and Parliamentary authorities about how Parliament can play a role in implementation of the NSS strategies, but so far there has been no publicly announced action to move these plans forward.
Comment
-------
10. (C/NF) The NSS was a major initiative of the Brown Government, which established a specific unit in the Cabinet office to oversee the drafting and coordination of the document, and gave the finished product a high-profile launch by Brown himself. The document's unenthusiastic reception is as surprising as it must be frustrating to Downing Street. It is tempting to read the NSS as a reflection of the Brown approach to governing -- lots of detail, ensuring all possible policy factors are identified before decisions are reached, focused on improving Government process over articulating broad new strategies, and designed to be relevant to middle Britain at the risk of blurring its focus. It is a document that reflects the substantive strengths and communication failings of the Brown Government and may have little influence in or out of government. Wherever the blame is placed for the NSS' indifferent reception, what is troubling is that the Brown Government -- and UK political establishment more largely -- may have missed an opportunity for a necessary national discussion on the evolving security threats that do face the UK.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm Tuttle
Monday, 03 March 2008, 17:06
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 000639
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 03/03/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINR, UK
SUBJECT: UK LABOUR SPRING CONFERENCE: GOOD INTENTIONS BUT
FEW GOOD VIBRATIONS
REF: LONDON 453
Classified By: Ambassador Robert Tuttle, reasons 1.4 b, d
1. (C/NF) Summary: The Labour Party Spring Conference, held February 27 - March 2 in Birmingham, was characterized by low energy, poor attendance, and a lack of charismatic leadership, despite serving as a kick-off to the party's campaign for the May 1 local elections in England and Wales. In his March 2 key note speech, Prime Minister Brown emphasized the need to prepare for the economy of the future and counted the opportunity costs for Britain of poverty, substandard education, and poor health care vowing that his "purposeful and progressive" government would continue to battle those scourges. Brown's vision excited no opposition, but it excited no enthusiasm either at a pre-campaign conference that suffered from low attendance and, seemingly, straightened finances. Aimed primarily at Labour's local level activists, the conference focused on recruiting female candidates, improving communications with minority communities, and enhancing Labour's performance in local government. Media reporting focused on the irony that Secretary for Communities and Local Government Hazel Blears
SIPDIS lauded Mayor Ken Livingstone for "revitalizing London" ahead of the hotly-contested May 1 mayoral race, without recalling that only eight years ago Labour expelled Livingstone from the party for insisting on running as an independent. Foreign Secretary David Miliband provided rare moments of star power for a party that seems increasingly to miss Tony Blair's charisma. End Summary.
Brown: "Use the Opportunity of Power"
----------------------
2. (C/NF) Labour's Spring Conference February 27-March 2 in Birmingham, billed as the launching event for the May 1 local elections, featured a keynote speech by Prime Minister Gordon Brown intended to fire up the Labour faithful. In the event, Brown's speech, eloquent as it was in articulating his vision of the party's purpose, failed to move the audience beyond more than polite applause. Opening with an admission that the last few months had been difficult, Brown talked about the series of challenges his government had faced as soon as it came into office: floods, foot and mouth disease, avian flu, and the global credit crunch. He made no mention of the decision not to go to early elections that precipitated Labour's plummeting poll numbers (see ref). Instead, Brown talked about the global economy of the future, in which skilled workers and entrepreneurs would reap high-value returns, and declared that higher standards of education would equip Britons to succeed in globalized future economy. He emphasized his view that poverty, particularly among children, was a "scar on Britain," and he graphically listed the ways in which the denial of potential through inadequate health and education costs Britain talent and achievement. A Labour government that was "purposeful and progressive" (Brown slipped and said "powerful and progressive" but corrected himself) had to use the "opportunity of power" to bring the "power of opportunity" to those elements of British society in need.
3. (SBU) While Brown's speech focused largely on domestic issues, he did extend his analysis to the costs of poverty to the rest of the world, noting that 72 million children have no access to schools, and vowing to eliminate diseases such as diphtheria, tuberculosis, and malaria. Brown called for an extension of sanctions on Sudan and for the release of Burmese dissident Aung San Suu Kyi.
4. (SBU) In a Q&A session that followed Brown's remarks, many of the questions from the audience had to do with the Labour government's management of school standards and health care - the bread and butter issues for Labour members at the local level. (Embassy comment: Discussion of educational issues became rather detailed: one Birmingham MP told Poloff that the "Labour Party is made up of teachers," explaining that their parochial concerns tend to dominate party events. End comment.) Curiously, given media reports of an imminent possible rebellion against the government on pending security legislation to extend the legal detention period from 28 to 42 days, the subjects of terrorism, police powers, and civil liberties were not raised. And while Brown pounded the Conservative Party on its plans for tax cuts and opposition to the Lisbon Treaty's plan for EU reform, he made little reference to the upcoming battles for local councils in which the Liberal Democrat Party poses as large a threat to Labour as do the Tories. A number of "Labour Students" from Cardiff rose to say she had been eight years old when Labour came to power, and asked what should she tell people now about what makes Labour a radical force? Brown reiterated his calls for
ending poverty and eliminating disease globally. A Palestinian asking what Brown would do to end the conflict in Palestine provoked a rare outburst of applause; Brown responded by noting a planned upcoming investment conference.
Labour's Financial Woes
-----------------------
5. (C/NF) The lack of energy that hung like a pall over the keynote speech was evident elsewhere, either because of low attendance or the party's financial woes. Labour members groused that conference organizers had chosen a bad weekend -- Welsh members stayed away to attend the March 1 St. David's Day festivities back home (St. David is the patron saint of Wales and his feast day is a Welsh nationalist obligation). And the March 2 observance of Mother's Day in Britain put many prospective attendees in the position of choosing between the Labour Party and their "mums." Judging by the turnout, Mum won in many cases. Labour Party workers, who have been living on a shoestring for the past several years, were scarce on the ground. Those who were present were not particularly motivated: asked for a copy of the Prime Minister's speech, one party worker referred Poloff to the website version which, several hours later, had not yet been updated to reflect extensive changes in delivery. Some Labour members, noting the party's financial straits, asked why so much money had been spent on the Labour deputy leader race in 2007, noting that the money raised by the candidates would have been better spent to support the party's local campaigns this year.
Female Recruitment
------------------
6. (C) Organized around three key themes, the Conference focused on recruiting female candidates, improving communications with minority communities, and enhancing Labour's performance on local government. The three areas were selected with a view to preparing for local elections but there seemed to be a disconnect between the state of those efforts and the imminence of the May elections. Regarding women's empowerment, MP Barbara Follett provided advice on presenting oneself effectively as a woman candidate to an audience of about 25 women that included only one prospective, not active, candidate. (Embassy comment: While Labour rightly congratulates itself on having more female MPs that the Tories, the recruitment/empowerment process at the conference appeared to be still in its early stages. End comment.) Local Labour organizations and the trades unions, according to other speakers on women's issues, are where women have to rise through the ranks without much help from the central party apparatus.
Reaching out to Muslim Voters
-----------------------------
7. (C) Ten people (including Poloff) showed up at an event aimed at improving Labour outreach to Muslim communities. (Embassy comment: Given Labour's loss of Muslim support following the Iraq War, the low turnout by party activists at this event was inexplicable. End comment.) Manchester Councilor and former Lord Mayor Afzal Khan provided recommendations to Labour candidates looking for votes in Muslim communities, including: use "As Salam Aleikum" as a greeting; don't get hung up on shaking hands with females; call into Muslim radio programs; send cards for Muslim religious holidays; and wait outside mosques on Friday to hand out leaflets. Labour MEP Gary Titley from Bolton also provided the earnest advice to avoid assuming that all Muslims hold identical views and to maintain links with community-based organizations. One British Muslim from Nottingham rose to describe what he felt was suppression of a large Muslim contingent in his local Labour party; Khan told him there was a democratic process and the Muslims in Nottingham should use it.
8. (SBU) Secretary for Communities and Local Government Hazel Blears led the way on Labour's achievements in local government. Birmingham's revitalized town center, including the conference center that was the venue for the event, were held up as Labour achievements, as was London Mayor Ken Livingstone's record in "revitalizing London." In break out groups, however, there was one ominous session on "effective opposition." Labour members complained that for Labour councilors - who are on the front lines, so to speak, against Tory and LibDem-dominated councils - there is little or no support from the party in either substantive policy terms or personal assistance.
Miliband's Star Power
---------------------
9. (C/NF) In an otherwise low key conference, the frisson of excitement whenever Foreign Secretary David Miliband appeared was palpable. The European Parliament Labour Party lunch-time event on the Lisbon Treaty that featured Miliband as speaker drew a packed hall. He followed that appearance by a session with over a hundred Labour Students who clearly idolized him. Stumbling into what was belatedly revealed as a "private session," Poloff heard Miliband outline his criteria for a "successful country" of the future: openness, empowerment of the whole population, and global linkages. There is increasingly less of a distinction between foreign and domestic policies, he told the students, and the challenge is to mobilize people to change. The lessons of the 80s and 90s are that "rainbow coalitions don't work;" in order to mobilize "dynamic forces," political leaders must develop a unifying narrative or ideology. In this respect, Labour must decide if it is the party of the working class or the party of the middle class. Answering questions on foreign policy, Miliband supported UN reform and noted the "real issue" at the UN is the UN's failure to deliver on its "responsibility to protect," because most threats to civilians come from their own governments and not foreign invasions. He defended UK participation in China's Olympic games as an opportunity to shine a light on "the real China, warts and all." He emphasized that Iran represented dangers not just in nuclear weapons development and support for terrorism but also through its own domestic human rights practices; for example, he noted that Iran has the highest per capita rate of capital punishment in the world.
Comment
-------
10. (C/NF) Labour members have been increasingly asking themselves the same question raised by the student from Cardiff: what makes Labour "radical" after nearly 11 years in government? For a party that still contains a large element who feel more comfortable in opposition, such self-questioning contributes to a feeling of post-Blair rudderlessness. Even though Blair ended up unpopular, he was the sun around which the party orbited, and his speeches, no matter the content, sparked an emotional response. Brown's earnest and praiseworthy vision excites no opposition and yet it seems to excite no great enthusiasm either. With two months to go before local elections, a financially-constrained Labour hardly seemed on the verge of mobilizing for a campaign that will not only determine Labour's fortunes on the local level, but may also affect Gordon Brown's own tenure as leader. The poorly attended conference lacked the buzz that a strong parliamentary party representation would have provided and, Miliband's star power notwithstanding, there was no catwalk of prospective challengers to Brown. But the irony of Labour's holding up Ken Livingstone as a model of Labour achievement, only eight years after his expulsion from the party for running for London mayor as an independent, was not lost on the UK media.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm TUTTLE
Thursday, 29 January 2009, 18:25
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 000271
NOFORN
FOR INR/B AND EUR/WE
EO 12958 DECL: 01/29/2019
TAGS ECON, PGOV, PINR, UK
SUBJECT: (C/NF)SHRITI VADERA - BROWN'S OUTSPOKEN CONFIDANT
AND ADVISOR
REF: A. 07 LONDON 4389 B. 07 LONDON 1525 C. 08 LONDON 260
Classified By: Econ Minister Counselor Mark Tokola for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C/NF) Summary: Shriti Vadera, junior minister at the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), catapulted into the spotlight on January 14 with a roundly-criticized comment that she saw potential "green shoots" of economic recovery. The comments sparked a series of press profiles focusing on her close relationship with PM Brown, her private sector background, and her reported abrasiveness with the civil service. Vadera bears watching as she has long been a close advisor of Gordon Brown, and is particularly active in developing responses to the economic crisis, as seen by her presence at the small meeting Brown held with Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke on January 13. End Summary.
Green Shoots
------------
2. (SBU) Vadera's comments on January 14 drew immediate and fierce criticism. Asked specifically when the UK could expect to see some "green shoots" amid the economic downturn, she replied that would not want to predict, but added "I am seeing a few green shoots, but it's a bit too early to say exactly how they'd grow." Conservatives called the remarks "insensitive and out of touch" coming, as they did, on a day when UK firms announced large-scale job losses and share prices slumped by almost 5 percent. In her own defense, Vadera said she had been referring to improvements in the credit market, saying she was aware of a company that managed to raise hundreds of millions of pounds in the capital markets, which would not have been possible even two months ago. The gaffe forced the PM to issue a statement that he is "never complacent" about the economy. Business Secretary Lord Mandelson defended Vadera, saying she is "the least complacent" member of his team, although he added that she failed to grasp the political implications. The "green shoots" phrase became politically toxic when then Chancellor Norman Lamont used it in 1991, more than a year before the UK came out of its last recession.
Outspoken
---------
3. (SBU) The press took the opportunity of Vadera's gaffe to profile her. BBC's Radio 4 Today program described her as Gordon Brown's "most trusted economic advisor" and someone everyone should know, saying she is known in the "Westminster Village" as "Gordon Brown's representative on Earth." As part of the interview, former business minister Digby Jones described her as an, "intensely loyal person who (Brown) can totally rely on." Peter Jones, millionaire businessman, said she "listens, takes advice, but more importantly, delivers." Other press reports said she can be abrasive, but gets the job done. She was also described as extremely good at her job, and relentlessly hard working.
4. (C/NF) We understand she speaks to the Prime Minister almost daily by phone, often de-briefing him on her meetings, advising on political strategy, and offering economic advice. In meetings with USG officials while at the Department for International Development (DFID), (e.g. Ref A) Vadera was not shy about offering to have "Gordon" make a call if it was necessary to make something happen. Although more in the shadows since moving to BERR, Vadera clearly remains one of Brown's closest advisors. She joined the Prime Minister, Chancellor Darling, and G8 Sherpa Jon Cunliffe in the January 13 meeting with Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke; she interrupted the PM on several occasions to make a point about the economic crisis.
5. (C/NF) Others profiles were less sympathetic. Press stories picked up what civil servants have reportedly coined as Vadera's nicknames "Shrieky" and "Darth Vadera," and Vadera herself has been quoted as saying she finds working with the civil service "challenging." The press has noted the high turnover of officials in her private office. One Private Secretary told us Vadera would regularly scream from her desk, "Get me a cup of coffee" with a string of expletives attached, something almost unheard of in the polite British civil service and prompting three scheduling assistants to leave her office in three months. She also reportedly had screaming matches in front of subordinates with Development Secretary Douglas Alexander while she was at DFID. Insiders tell us she was moved from DFID at Alexander's request, though the move was billed as a promotion to the media. It is worth noting that Vadera can also be charismatic and charming, especially with external visitors. She is also very active in trying to bolster her international image, including visits to Washington and questioning USG visitors for information on other key USG decision makers she should meet.
6. (C/NF) HMG officials universally recognize Vadera's intelligence and ability to implement policy. During her short time in DFID, she completely re-vamped the Country Action Plan (CAP) process, one of the most bureaucratic acts of HMG's most bureaucratic department, and gave DFID's strategic planning a crisp, business-like approach. She also has an insatiable appetite for details, constantly asking officials for longer briefings and more explanation. The model briefing from her DFID Private Office contained over 130 pages. In meetings with USG officials while at DFID, Vadera enjoyed brainstorming with visitors, and her meetings invariably started late and ran long. She often mentioned her private sector roots, and, at least at DFID, she focused on getting the private sector more involved in government work.
Biographic Details
------------------
7. (C/NF) Brown recruited Vadera in 1999 following her efforts to eradicate debt in her native Uganda as part of the 14 years she spent as an investment banker for UBS Warburg. As an advisor to then Chancellor Brown at HM Treasury from 1999-2007, she helped develop the poverty reduction and debt programs that were the centerpiece of the 2005 G-8 Gleneagles summit. She was also a Trustee of Oxfam between 2000-2005. Most recently, the BBC profile credited Vadera with having a hand in the nationalization of Northern Rock, bank recapitalizations and efforts to guarantee loans to small business -- and described her as Brown's "economic deal-maker."
8. (C/NF) Shriti Vadera has been a junior minister at the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) since January 2008, where she is currently Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Competitiveness and Small Business (jointly with Cabinet Office). As one of Brown's insiders (Ref B), she first became a government minister when Brown became Prime Minister -- as Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Department for International Development from June 2007 to January 2008. Since she is not an MP, to become a minister she had to be elevated to the House of Lords, with the title of Baroness, a title her staffers have told us to avoid using with her. At DFID, she was responsible for Brown's first key development initiative as Prime Minister, the Millennium Development Goals Call to Action, and in particular, focused on engaging business (Ref C).
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TUTTLE
Friday, 15 May 2009, 07:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 001156
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/13/2029
TAGS MARR, MOPS, SENV, UK, IO, MP, EFIS, EWWT, PGOV, PREL
SUBJECT: HMG FLOATS PROPOSAL FOR MARINE RESERVE COVERING
THE CHAGOS ARCHIPELAGO (BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY)
REF: 08 LONDON 2667 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Political Counselor Richard Mills for reasons 1.4 b and d
1. (C/NF) Summary. HMG would like to establish a "marine park" or "reserve" providing comprehensive environmental protection to the reefs and waters of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), a senior Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) official informed Polcouns on May 12. The official insisted that the establishment of a marine park -- the world's largest -- would in no way impinge on USG use of the BIOT, including Diego Garcia, for military purposes. He agreed that the UK and U.S. should carefully negotiate the details of the marine reserve to assure that U.S. interests were safeguarded and the strategic value of BIOT was upheld. He said that the BIOT's former inhabitants would find it difficult, if not impossible, to pursue their claim for resettlement on the islands if the entire Chagos Archipelago were a marine reserve. End Summary.
Protecting the BIOT's Waters
----------------------------
2. (C/NF) Senior HMG officials support the establishment of a "marine park" or "reserve" in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), which includes Diego Garcia, Colin Roberts, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's (FCO) Director, Overseas Territories, told the Political Counselor May 12. Noting that the uninhabited islands of the Chagos Archipelago are already protected under British law from development or other environmental harm but that current British law does not provide protected status for either reefs or waters, Roberts affirmed that the bruited proposal would only concern the "exclusive zone" around the islands. The resulting protected area would constitute "the largest marine reserve in the world."
3. (C/NF) Roberts iterated strong UK "political support" for a marine park; "Ministers like the idea," he said. He stressed that HMG's "timeline" for establishing the park was before the next general elections, which under British law must occur no later than May 2010. He suggested that the exact terms of the proposals could be defined and presented at the U.S.-UK annual political-military consultations held in late summer/early fall 2009 (exact date TBD). If the USG would like to discuss the issue prior to those talks, HMG would be open for discussion through other channels -- in any case, the FCO would keep Embassy London informed of development of the idea and next steps. The UK would like to "move forward discussion with key international stakeholders" by the end of 2009. He said that HMG had noted the success of U.S. marine sanctuaries in Hawaii and the Marianas Trench. (Note: Roberts was referring to the Papahanaumokuakea Marine National Monument and Marianas Trench Marine National Monument. End Note.) He asserted that the Pew Charitable Trust, which has proposed a BIOT marine reserve, is funding a public relations campaign in support of the idea. He noted that the trust had backed the Hawaiian reserve and is well-regarded within British governmental circles and the larger British environmental community.
Three Sine Qua Nons: U.S. Assent...
-----------------------------------
4. (C/NF) According to Roberts, three pre-conditions must be met before HMG could establish a park. First, "we need to make sure the U.S. government is comfortable with the idea. We would need to present this proposal very clearly to the American administration...All we do should enhance base security or leave it unchanged." Polcouns expressed appreciation for this a priori commitment, but stressed that the 1966 U.S.-UK Exchange of Notes concerning the BIOT would, in any event, require U.S. assent to any significant change of the BIOT's status that could impact the BIOT's strategic use. Roberts stressed that the proposal "would have no impact on how Diego Garcia is administered as a base." In response to a request for clarification on this point from Polcouns, Roberts asserted that the proposal would have absolutely no impact on the right of U.S. or British military vessels to use the BIOT for passage, anchorage, prepositioning, or other uses. Polcouns rejoined that
designating the BIOT as a marine park could, years down the road, create public questioning about the suitability of the BIOT for military purposes. Roberts responded that the terms of reference for the establishment of a marine park would clearly state that the BIOT, including Diego Garcia, was reserved for military uses.
5. (C/NF) Ashley Smith, the Ministry of Defense's (MOD) International Policy and Planning Assistant Head, Asia Pacific, who also participated in the meeting, affirmed that the MOD "shares the same concerns as the U.S. regarding security" and would ensure that security concerns were fully and properly addressed in any proposal for a marine park. Roberts agreed, stating that "the primary purpose of the BIOT is security" but that HMG could also address environmental concerns in its administration of the BIOT. Smith added that the establishment of a marine reserve had the potential to be a "win-win situation in terms of establishing situational awareness" of the BIOT. He stressed that HMG sought "no constraints on military operations" as a result of the establishment of a marine park.
...Mauritian Assent...
----------------------
6. (C/NF) Roberts outlined two other prerequisites for establishment of a marine park. HMG would seek assent from the Government of Mauritius, which disputes sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago, in order to avoid the GOM "raising complaints with the UN." He asserted that the GOM had expressed little interest in protecting the archipelago's sensitive environment and was primarily interested in the archipelago's economic potential as a fishery. Roberts noted that in January 2009 HMG held the first-ever "formal talks" with Mauritius regarding the BIOT. The talks included the Mauritian Prime Minister. Roberts said that he "cast a fly in the talks over how we could improve stewardship of the territory," but the Mauritian participants "were not focused on environmental issues and expressed interest only in fishery control." He said that one Mauritian participant in the talks complained that the Indian Ocean is "the only ocean in the world where the fish die of old age." In HMG's view, the marine park concept aims to "go beyond economic value and consider bio-diversity and intangible values."
...Chagossian Assent
--------------------
7. (C/NF) Roberts acknowledged that "we need to find a way to get through the various Chagossian lobbies." He admitted that HMG is "under pressure" from the Chagossians and their advocates to permit resettlement of the "outer islands" of the BIOT. He noted, without providing details, that "there are proposals (for a marine park) that could provide the Chagossians warden jobs" within the BIOT. However, Roberts stated that, according to the HGM,s current thinking on a reserve, there would be "no human footprints" or "Man Fridays" on the BIOT's uninhabited islands. He asserted that establishing a marine park would, in effect, put paid to resettlement claims of the archipelago's former residents. Responding to Polcouns' observation that the advocates of Chagossian resettlement continue to vigorously press their case, Roberts opined that the UK's "environmental lobby is far more powerful than the Chagossians' advocates." (Note: One group of Chagossian litigants is appealing to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) the decision of Britain's highest court to deny "resettlement rights" to the islands' former inhabitants. See below at paragraph 13 and reftel. End Note.)
Je Ne Regrette Rien
-------------------
8. (C/NF) Roberts observed that BIOT has "served its role very well," advancing shared U.S.-UK strategic security objectives for the past several decades. The BIOT "has had a great role in assuring the security of the UK and U.S. -- much more than anyone foresaw" in the 1960s, Roberts emphasized. "We do not regret the removal of the population," since removal was necessary for the BIOT to fulfill its strategic purpose, he said. Removal of the
population is the reason that the BIOT's uninhabited islands and the surrounding waters are in "pristine" condition. Roberts added that Diego Garcia's excellent condition reflects the responsible stewardship of the U.S. and UK forces using it.
Administering a Reserve
-----------------------
9. (C/NF) Roberts acknowledged that numerous technical questions needed to be resolved regarding the establishment and administration of a marine park, although he described the governmental "act" of declaring a marine park as a relatively straightforward and rapid process. He noted that the establishment of a marine reserve would require permitting scientists to visit BIOT, but that creating a park would help restrict access for non-scientific purposes. For example, he continued, the rules governing the park could strictly limit access to BIOT by yachts, which Roberts referred to as "sea gypsies."
BIOT: More Than Just Diego Garcia
---------------------------------
10. (C/NF) Following the meeting with Roberts, Joanne Yeadon, Head of the FCO's Overseas Territories Directorate's BIOT and Pitcairn Section, who also attended the meeting with Polcouns, told Poloff that the marine park proposal would "not impact the base on Diego Garcia in any way" and would have no impact on the parameters of the U.S.-UK 1966 exchange of notes since the marine park would "have no impact on defense purposes." Yeadon averred that the provision of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea guaranteed free passage of vessels, including military vessels, and that the presence of a marine park would not diminish that right.
11. (C/NF) Yeadon stressed that the exchange of notes governed more than just the atoll of Diego Garcia but expressly provided that all of the BIOT was "set aside for defense purposes." (Note: This is correct. End Note.) She urged Embassy officers in discussions with advocates for the Chagossians, including with members of the "All Party Parliamentary Group on Chagos Islands (APPG)," to affirm that the USG requires the entire BIOT for defense purposes. Making this point would be the best rejoinder to the Chagossians' assertion that partial settlement of the outer islands of the Chagos Archipelago would have no impact on the use of Diego Garcia. She described that assertion as essentially irrelevant if the entire BIOT needed to be uninhabited for defense purposes.
12. (C/NF) Yeadon dismissed the APPG as a "persistent" but relatively non-influential group within parliament or with the wider public. She said the FCO had received only a handful of public inquiries regarding the status of the BIOT. Yeadon described one of the Chagossians' most outspoken advocates, former HMG High Commissioner to Mauritius David Snoxell, as "entirely lacking in influence" within the FCO. She also asserted that the Conservatives, if in power after the next general election, would not support a Chagossian right of return. She averred that many members of the Liberal Democrats (Britain's third largest party after Labour and the Conservatives) supported a "right of return."
13. (C/NF) Yeadon told Poloff May 12, and in several prior meetings, that the FCO will vigorously contest the Chagossians' "right of return" lawsuit before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). HMG will argue that the ECHR lacks jurisdiction over the BIOT in the present case. Roberts stressed May 12 (as has Yeadon on previous occasions) that the outer islands are "essentially uninhabitable" and could only be rendered livable by modern, Western standards with a massive infusion of cash.
Comment
-------
14. (C/NF) Regardless of the outcome of the ECHR case, however, the Chagossians and their advocates, including the "All Party Parliamentary Group on Chagos Islands (APPG)," will continue to press their case in the court of public
opinion. Their strategy is to publicize what they characterize as the plight of the so-called Chagossian diaspora, thereby galvanizing public opinion and, in their best case scenario, causing the government to change course and allow a "right of return." They would point to the government's recent retreat on the issue of Gurkha veterans' right to settle in the UK as a model. Despite FCO assurances that the marine park concept -- still in an early, conceptual phase -- would not impinge on BIOT's value as a strategic resource, we are concerned that, long-term, both the British public and policy makers would come to see the existence of a marine reserve as inherently inconsistent with the military use of Diego Garcia -- and the entire BIOT. In any event, the U.S. and UK would need to carefully negotiate the parameters of such a marine park -- a point on which Roberts unequivocally agreed. In Embassy London's view, these negotiations should occur among U.S. and UK experts separate from the 2009 annual Political-Military consultations, given the specific and technical legal and environmental issues that would be subject to discussion.
15. (C/NF) Comment Continued. We do not doubt the current government's resolve to prevent the resettlement of the islands' former inhabitants, although as FCO Parliamentary Under-Secretary Gillian Merron noted in an April parliamentary debate, "FCO will continue to organize and fund visits to the territory by the Chagossians." We are not as sanguine as the FCO's Yeadon, however, that the Conservatives would oppose a right of return. Indeed, MP Keith Simpson, the Conservatives' Shadow Minister, Foreign Affairs, stated in the same April parliamentary debate in which Merron spoke that HMG "should take into account what I suspect is the all-party view that the rights of the Chagossian people should be recognized, and that there should at the very least be a timetable for the return of those people at least to the outer islands, if not the inner islands." Establishing a marine reserve might, indeed, as the FCO's Roberts stated, be the most effective long-term way to prevent any of the Chagos Islands' former inhabitants or their descendants from resettling in the BIOT. End Comment.
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TOKOLA
Monday, 19 January 2009, 12:01
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000131
SIPDIS
KABUL FOR USFOR-A COS,
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR WILKES
CG CJTF-101 POLAD
EO 12958 DECL: 01/17/2014
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: OUTRAGE AGAINST COALITION SPECIAL OPS INCREASES IN
ZABUL
Classified By: PRT Director Valerie C. Fowler for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d)
Summary
--------
1. (C) A series of Coalition special operations in Zabul province during December 2008 and January 2009 heightened emotions and public outcry against coalition forces (CF). This situation provided an opportunity for select provincial leaders to promote their own political agendas. Governor Delbar Jan Arman and his deputy Gulab Shah diffused several tense situations with angry village elders, and convinced residents from Arghandab and Shar-e-Safa districts that Coalition operations benefit provincial security in the long run. Arman's efforts tempered but did not stop the growing public disapproval of how coalition operations are conducted. He cannot match the anti-coalition public information campaign of Senator Zalmay Zabuli, Provincial Council, and the behind-the-scenes influence of Lower House member Hamidullah Tukhi in Kabul.
2. (S) PRT, Task Force Zabul, and OEF Special Forces representatives engaged the governor and tribal elders to ease tensions and hear the concerns of affected and displaced communities. However, two messages ring loud and clear: Zabul residents want Afghan forces involved in coalition operations and Zabul security forces want better coordination and cooperation when targeting the enemy. Without "error free" coalition operations and a serious provincial government-led information campaign highlighting successful combined Afghan-CF operations; the coalition, PRT, and Governor Arman may soon lose public support in Zabul. End Summary.
Afghan Discontent
------------------
3. (C) At least six operations since mid-December caught the Afghan public's attention for their "civilian casualties" and "wrongful detentions." Two special operations missions in December 2008 in Arghandab district allegedly displaced up to 200 families, who fled to Qalat. The Arghandab elders complained to Arman, as well as UNAMA, and their parliamentarians in Zabul and Kabul.
4. (C) A January 9 operation in Jaldak, southwest of Qalat, resulted in five deaths and the capture of three suspected militants. The Jaldak elders maintain the innocence of the dead and detained, to the point that they refused to bury the bodies and threatened to display them on Highway 1, until Arman convinced them that this would not benefit their communities. Arman reported that among the five dead males were an 80 year-old, a 70 year-old, an 18 year-old, a 20-year-old and 30 year-old -- leaving no men in that household. The governor suggested to PRT that they were not enemies but allies of the government. Arman provided 1000 dollars for burial and calmed the village. The villagers requested the PRT find out the status of the prisoners and have them released.
5. (SBU) The media regularly highlighted the civilian death toll, and select Zabul politicians used the events as a platform to condemn inappropriate conduct during coalition operations (echoing Karzai's recent statements condemning civilian deaths). Senator Zalmay Zabuli appeared on television several times in December, surrounded by Zabul residents, calling for coalition accountability and strongly condemning civilian casualties. Provincial Council Member Fawzia spoke on Afghan national television January 11 against coalition operations and declared the Provincial Council would close for a week in protest. Local and national news published comments from the Zabul Provincial Council chief after the closure, calling the operations "willful and obstinate" and noting that coalition forces did not heed earlier requests to stop killing civilians.
6. (C) Arman informed the PRT that he heard rumors that in Kabul, Lower House member Hamidullah Tukhi, an open opponent of the governor, complained to Minister of Interior Atmar about coalition operations and encouraged threats of protests.
Coalition Attempts to Assuage...
-----------------------------
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7. (S) PRT, ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Special Forces met repeatedly with Arman, Gulab Shah, ANSF and village elders to diffuse situations and listen to public claims of wrongful deaths and detention. PRT is ready to provide humanitarian assistance to the displaced Arghandab families. An OEF representative visiting January 10-12 spelled out carefully for Arman the precautions taken to avoid civilian casualties, but noted that when assault forces come under fire, they will return fire. He also met with the NDS chief in an effort to improve communication and intelligence sharing.
8. (S) Arman understands the Coalition's procedures to minimize civilian deaths, and has been a forceful public advocate for the Coalition's anti-terrorism efforts. However, he repeatedly asks for improved coordination and cooperation when targeting the Taliban. He has frequently asked for advance notice of sensitive operations to help with coordination, and, when possible, an Afghan security force presence during the operations to ensure that searches and detentions are done in a "culturally appropriate manner." His security team -- NDS, ANA, and ANP -- has made the same suggestions at different times.
...But Is Unsuccessful
---------------------
9. (C) Community leaders seem more determined than ever to get a satisfactory response from Arman and ISAF, or make their case against Coalition operations louder, more public, and more disruptive. Arghandab and Jaldak elders present at a January 13 provincial security meeting argued that Afghan participation in night raids would shift the accountability to Afghan security forces. Like the governor, they requested more coordination and cooperation. The elders were quick to emphasize they did not support the Taliban or welcome a Taliban presence in their communities. However, when Coalition operations hurt innocent civilians, "the Taliban wins." They suggested "the Taliban is laughing at the Coalition" and the Afghan government every time a civilian is killed.
10. (SBU) Several Provincial Council members and Lower House member Abdusalam Roketi spoke in support of the elders' demands for more carefully executed operations. Said Roketi, "When asked, what is sweeter than Islam? The prophet responded, 'Security.' But the people of Zabul are far removed from this sweetness. And in the name of security, the coalition is doing things that drive our people from their homes, and leave women and children in the cold." The PRT responded by offering condolences to the village elders on the loss of lives and property. To counter accusations that all coalition operations were killing civilians, the PRT noted many operations that arrested or killed insurgents were confirmed to be good operations by the Provincial Government and ANSF.
Comment
--------
11. (C) Perception is reality, and the Zabul public is increasingly convinced that Coalition Forces are disregarding civilians in their quest to fight the Taliban. Community elders and provincial leadership are unanimous in their call for increased cooperation on targeting missions. Without some evidence that coalition forces are concerned about civilian casualties and more efforts to include Afghan partners on missions, public support will continue to move away from the Afghan government and coalition. At this point in time, village elders from Arghandab and Jaldak districts are willing to accept this was a coalition mistake. However, the atmospherics in the province are becoming increasing fragile, and any positive effect special operations hope to achieve may be countered by a spread of discontent in the local populace.
12. (C) Missing from all the talk about coordination and communication is a provincial government strategic communications campaign to respond to the anti-government and anti-coalition propaganda. The PRT will push news releases to local media contacts in an effort to tell the other side of the story, and work with Arman's office to counter rumors and grandstanding from his political opponents.
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13. (U) The PRT Commander has reviewed this cable. WOOD
Thursday, 12 February 2009, 11:14
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000321
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR WILKES
CG CJTF-101 POLAD
EO 12958 DECL: 02/12/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, KDEM, AF
SUBJECT: PRT ZABUL: IT'S HOT IN QALAT
REF: KABUL 131
Classified By: DCM Christopher Dell for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
Summary
--------
1. (C) The situation in Zabul province grows increasingly tense, following a February 6 Special Forces operation near Shar-e-safa that killed six, captured three, and garnered national and international media attention. Tribal elders, religious leaders and Provincial Councils members issued polite but determined ultimatums about coalition operations: change the way special operations are conducted at night and cooperate with Afghan security forces, or we will fight you the way we fought the Soviets. Zabul's provincial police, army and intelligence chiefs admitted the mood at an 800-person rally February 8 at the Qalat mosque "frightened" them. Governor Arman asked the PRT for advice in how to diffuse the situation, but noted that President Karzai's anti-coalition rhetoric makes it hard for him, Karzai's appointee, to counter Taliban propaganda in the media. End summary.
Special Ops in Zabul
---------------------
2. (SBU) The February 6 operation in Torri Kalay, Shar-e-safa is only the latest in a series of coalition attacks against insurgents that resulted in casualties and public outrage (reftel). According to CENTCOM, when the force arrived at the targeted compound, it conducted a call-out and all women and children exited the buildings to safety. Coalition forces pursued suspected militants to a nearby cave; the ensuing engagement killed six militants and captured three.
3. (SBU) The following day (February 7), the PRT shared with Deputy Governor Gulab Shah Alikhel releasable intelligence. National and international media outlets picked up Provincial Council Chief Haji Mohammed Hashim's statements calling the victims innocent civilians. More than 300 Shar-e-safa residents took to the streets in protest, and threatened to bring the bodies to Kandahar (where Hashim and Shar-e-Safa district chief Shodi Khan, a close associate of the Karzai family, were conferring with Ahmed Wali Karzai), rather than bury them according to Islamic custom, to show their outrage. Gulab Shah dispatched additional police from Qalat, who diffused the situation and convinced the residents to bury their dead.
Public demonstrations
---------------------
4. (C) Gulab Shah denied protesters permission to demonstrate in the streets February 8, but told them they could gather in the mosque, provided it remained peaceful. Prior to the meeting, he warned the PRT that he might not be able to control a spontaneous demonstration, if the protesters decided to block Highway 1. The Afghan police estimated that 800 people attended the rally. Several Afghan security leaders told PRT staff at a private dinner at the governor's residence February 9 that the atmosphere at the mosque was unsettling. "It was frightening," said Zabul's Army chief and commander of the 2d Brigade of the 205 Corps MG Jamaluddin. "It was scary," said the NDS deputy, who said that although the protesters had promised to remain peaceful, "foreigners" (meaning Pakistanis) heated up the rhetoric. The ANSF agreed that the tension had not passed, and that future gatherings would need to be closely monitored.
A clear message delivered . . .
-------------------------------
5. (SBU) Over the last weeks and in the past days, PRT Afghan contacts ranging from mullahs, elected Provincial Council members, the local UNAMA head, members of the ANSF to tribal elders delivered the same recommendations:
-- Cooperate with the Afghan national security forces on operations so they have an Afghan component for public credibility.
-- Stop the night raids which terrify women and children; conduct arrests during the day, when most of the recent victims are easy to find in their shops and fields.
KABUL 00000321 002 OF 003
-- Respect Afghan culture and Islamic values, protect our civilians.
6. (C) Provincial Council Chief Mohammed Haji Hashim and Provincial Council Member Abdul Salam asked the PRT February 8 to meet with the Shar-e-safa elders "to give them comfort" after many district families had abandoned their homes and livestock. They said the residents did not want humanitarian assistance or development projects, only security in their homes. They alleged that when the villages hear the sound of helicopters at night, the men flee into caves out of fear, not guilt. Hashim suggested that the Afghan army, police, and possibly the deputy governor participate in the shura, along with the PRT, ISAF and Provincial Council.
7. (SBU) They also requested that CF coordinate their operations with the Afghan security forces. PRT informed them that we had an outstanding request with Governor Arman and NDS to assign trusted agents to work with special forces, but had yet to receive names, despite repeated reminders. Haji Hashim said he would bring this up at the next provincial security meeting.
A second time, louder, more forcefully . . .
--------------------------------------------
8. (SBU) A six-person delegation of two tribal elders, two Provincial Council members, and two religious leaders brought a similar, but more severely worded message, to the PRT February 9: stop the special operations at night that kill civilians and terrify our women and children. If you don't, you will lose our support. We will close our shops, block the streets, move to the mountains and fight you the way we fought the Soviets. We want to help you fight the Taliban who terrorize us during the day, but the special operations are doing more harm than good.
9. (SBU) Using provocative, sometimes aggressive language, they questioned the legality of the operations under the Afghan constitution. (Note: Article 38 of the Constitution stipulates, "No one, including the state, shall have the right to enter a personal residence or search it without the owners permission or by order of an authoritative court, except in situations and methods delineated by law.") They emphasized that they do not object to special operations that capture insurgents, but they wanted them conducted according to Afghan cultural values. They noted that the current operations benefited the enemy. "The Taliban call and laugh at us every time civilians die." They also agreed to meet with coalition forces and Afghan government representatives in a shura.
And a third time
----------------
10. (SBU) Governor Arman, recently returned from Kabul, asked PRT to address a group of 45 Shar-e-safa elders February 10, again to "offer to console the people." Several elders spoke out against the operations which forced their families to seek refuge in Kandahar, and questioned why the United States couldn't catch the enemy, but instead killed the innocent. "You came to bring peace and security, but we don't want it, if it comes at the cost of our culture and religion."
11. (SBU) Echoing previous comments by Provincial Council members, mullahs, and tribal elders, the Shar-e-safa residents expressed the firm conviction that special operations were violating Afghan culture and against Islamic principles. They shook their heads in disbelief when PRT explained that special operation forces took special precautions to protect women and children. They suggested that if CF were not more respectful, they would be perceived the same as the Soviets. &We stood against the Soviets for nine years, when they attacked our religion and culture. Don't force us to do the same to you.8 (Note: PRT is hearing comparisons to the Soviets more and more frequently. End note.)
Help us help you
----------------
12. (SBU) PRT made the point in all three meetings that the operations were intended to break up a cell that was planting bombs on Highway One, killing civilians as well as CF, ANA and ANP, and destroying the infrastructure by blowing bridges and culverts. Coalition forces needed community involvement
KABUL 00000321 003 OF 003
and the support of the elders in identifying IEDs and the people who placed them. The PRT also pointed out to the elders that the U.S. also stood against the Soviets, and since SOF operations were conducted no bridges or culverts were destroyed. The PRT also promised to attend a shura in Sara-e-Safa next week as part of Task Force Zabul's "First Step" operations. Governor Arman will also attend. In addition, the PRT promised to convey their concerns to ISAF and U.S. Embassy.
13. (C) In a private meeting February 9, Governor Arman turned to the PRT for advice. PRT recommended that he or his deputy help counter Taliban propaganda by publicly reassuring the Zabul residents about coalition operations, and asking for their support. He noted ruefully that he would have to be "a little careful" about getting ahead of President Karzai, who criticized the Zabul operations. Arman said he needed to speak with the Shar-e-safa elders and mullahs and other provincial authorities before deciding a course of action for provincial shuras or other gatherings.
Comment
-------
14. (C) Another special operation with casualties could tip the balance in Zabul towards anti-coalition forces. If Coalition Forces (CF) disregard the clear warnings and specific requests for cooperation, they risk endangering all of their stabilization and reconstruction efforts, and creating a more hostile environment as the U.S. plans on increasing troops in the province. Equally important, CF are losing the public relations campaign in Zabul -* no matter how Special Operation Forces (SOF) operations are actually conducted, the firm public conviction that CF are killing civilians and treating women badly works against them. The Taliban has the upper-hand in media relations, by declaring all casualties &civilians.8 PRT is working with Zabul local media to set the record straight, but will need robust support from ISAF. End Comment.
15. (U) This cable has been reviewed by the PRT Commander. WOOD
Thursday, 09 April 2009, 04:22
S E C R E T STATE 034688
EO 12958 DECL: 04/07/2019
TAGS OVIP (CLINTON, HILLARY), UAE
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's April 7, 2009 meeting
with UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed
1.(U) Classified by Bureau Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
2. (U) April 7, 2009; 1:30 p.m.; Washington, DC.
3. (U) Participants:
U.S.
----
The Secretary Acting Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman Jake Sullivan, S staff Barbara Masilko, NEA Notetaker
UAE
---
UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ) Ambassador Yousef al Otaiba Abdullah al Saboosi, UAE Notetaker
4. (S) SUMMARY. The Secretary reviewed the status of the US-UAE 123 agreement and additional action the UAE can take to encourage a positive Congressional review. The UAE request for participation in the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF) is under serious consideration. The Secretary expressed her interest in participating in a GCC plus three meeting in Baghdad in the near future. The UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ) also suggested a GCC plus 3 and P5 plus 1 joint meeting to discuss Iran. AbZ confirmed his intention to participate in the Pakistan Donors conference in Tokyo and expressed concerns about Saudi back peddling. The Secretary thanked the UAE for the positive support for both the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Palestinian Authority. AbZ noted that Qatar wants the Arab League to request a meeting with the Quartet focused on settlements and East Jerusalem. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------
Nuclear Cooperation and Export Control
--------------------------------------
5. (S) The Secretary expressed the Administration's commitment to the U.S.-UAE Agreement for Cooperation on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (aka 123 Agreement). She emphasized that our goal is to get the agreement completed as smoothly as possible. AbZ said that he is delighted with the progress on the agreement. He added that the UAE's goal is to create a gold standard for a nuclear power program. Then, because of the strong commitments the UAE has made, it will be impossible to have improper use of its nuclear facilities.
6. (S) Turning to the need to be prepared to respond to Congress, the Secretary committed to form a State Department committee including H, NEA and ISN to work on the notification. The Secretary noted the importance of implementing the UAE export control law and continued UAE efforts against illicit Iranian trade and Iranian front companies. The Secretary encouraged action on nonproliferation treaty commitments as especially helpful actions the UAE could take to support our efforts. AbZ noted that the UAE would formally join the additional protocol on April 8.
7. (S) AbZ agreed that the August 2007 export control law had some "loopholes" and said that the UAE Cabinet "revisited" the issue last week. Otaiba said that AbZ had personally intervened to ensure timely action. Otaiba elaborated that the committee charged with implementing the export control law will have its first meeting later this month to begin operations.
8. (S) Otaiba noted that, even in the absence of a formal implementation committee, the UAE is taking action - citing a recent case involving German-made Siemens computers and a Chinese ship bound for Iran interdicted in port in the UAE.
---------------------
Major Economies Forum
---------------------
9. (S) The Secretary noted UAE interest in the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF). While noting that the UAE does not technically meet the criteria for the meeting, based on size of the economy alone, the Secretary said there are many criteria that make it important for the UAE to attend, adding she will make a recommendation for UAE participation as an observer. AbZ said the UAE bid to host the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) headquarters would be very difficult to achieve if the UAE is locked out of the MEF preparatory meeting in Washington and promised "we will remember your help."
----
Iran
----
10. (S) The Secretary said the U.S. is looking to see if Iran can be engaged in any productive manner and noted that Special Advisor Ross would travel to the region soon for consultations. AbZ told the Secretary that UAE feels threatened by Iran today, even though Iran does not yet have a nuclear capability. AbZ asserted that the UAE is even more worried about Iranian intentions than is Israel. AbZ encouraged the U.S. to consider a GCC plus 3 and P5 plus 1 joint meeting.
----------------
Iraqi GCC plus 3
----------------
11. (S) The Secretary expressed interest in the Iraqi invitations for a GCC plus 3 meeting in Baghdad, at a date to be determined. She noted the value of the GCC plus 3 mechanism not only for furthering Arab engagement with the Iraqi government during a time of transition, but as a way to send a message to Iran that Iraq has broad support in the Arab world.
--------------------
Afghanistan/Pakistan
--------------------
12. (S) The Secretary told AbZ that the U.S. needs help to stem the flow of funds from the Gulf to the Taliban. She noted that one area of potential action is reviving training related to bulk cash smuggling.
13. (S) Thanking the UAE for hosting the Friends of Pakistan preparatory meeting, the Secretary said she hopes AbZ would attend the April donors conference in Tokyo. AbZ confirmed that he plans to attend and said that the UAE will make a "strong" pledge, but no decision has been made on an exact dollar figure.
14. (S) AbZ express concern over Saudi Arabia's decision not to make a pledge at the Tokyo conference. AbZ said that the Saudis have never liked the Pakistan Peoples Party, and support Nawaz Sharif. In addition, AbZ posited that Saudi Arabia suspects that Zardari is Shia, thus creating Saudi concern of a Shia triangle in the region between Iran, the Maliki government in Iraq, and Pakistan under Zardari. Feltman noted a pattern of Saudi behavior of withholding financial assistance - not supporting March 14 in Lebanon, not sending funds to the PA, and not planning a pledge for Pakistan. Otaiba added that Saudi Arabia also failed make a commitment at the G20 meeting.
-------
Lebanon
-------
15. (S) The Secretary noted the need to support Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the run up to the elections with concrete displays of support. Feltman added that the UAE had been particularly helpful already by funding the delivery of the first ten refurbished tanks for the LAF. AbZ noted that he would meet with visiting Lebanese Minister of Defense Murr later on April 7. AbZ said the UAE will purchase additional munitions for LAF helicopters, donated by the UAE to LAF last year, but is waiting for France to provide a price estimate.
-------------------------
Middle East Peace Process
-------------------------
16. (S) The Secretary thanked the UAE for its strong financial support for the Palestinian Authority (PA). The Secretary asked if AbZ had an update on the status of Palestinian unity talks. Acknowledging that Hamas and Fatah are not coming to an agreement, AbZ replied with a smile that things are "going well."
17. (S) AbZ said that in addition to financial support for the PA it is important that the new Israeli government reach out to President Abbas. AbZ said that the Secretary should expect the Qatari Prime Minister to request an Arab League meeting with the Quartet focused on settlements and East Jerusalem. AbZ said the Quartet will need to use the same standards for the new Israel government as already applied to the Palestinians regarding respecting previous agreements. The Secretary agreed. AbZ said that it is important to create a road map of Israeli and Palestinian actions towards an end game. The Secretary agreed on the importance of simultaneous reinforcing actions in support of negotiations. AbZ said that the UAE candidacy to host IRENA could yield political benefits, if successful. Israel is already a signatory to the agreement, so it would have a representative IRENA mission in Abu Dhabi should the UAE be chosen to host headquarters.
CLINTON
Tuesday, 15 September 2009, 06:12
S E C R E T SANAA 001669
SIPDIS
NOFORN
NSC FOR APDNSA JOHN BRENNAN AND DENISE MORAGA
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD
EO 12958 DECL: 09/08/2019
TAGS PTER, PGOV, PINR, KDRG, PINS, SA, YM
SUBJECT: BRENNAN-SALEH MEETING SEP 6, 2009
REF: SANAA 01549
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b), (c), and (d).
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. In a September 6 meeting with Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan, President Saleh pledged unfettered access to Yemen's national territory for U.S. counterterrorism operations, suggesting that in the process, the USG assumed responsibility for the success - or failure - of efforts to neutralize AQAP in Yemen. Saleh expressed dissatisfaction with the USG's current level of aid for CT and security operations and insisted the ROYG began its war against the al-Houthi rebellion in northern Yemen on behalf of the U.S. Saleh stated his preference for Saudi Arabia over Jordan as a potential rehabilitation site for Guantanamo detainees of Yemeni origin, but claimed the ROYG was willing and able to accept them in Yemeni prisons. In a one-on-one that followed, Brennan extended an invitation to Saleh to visit President Obama at the White House on October 6. END SUMMARY.
"OPEN LAND, AIR, AND SEA" FOR U.S. STRIKES AGAINST AQAP
--------------------------------------------- ----------
2. (S/NF) In a September 6 meeting with Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan, President Saleh insisted that Yemen's national territory is available for unilateral CT operations by the U.S. Dissatisfied with current levels of USG funding and military training provided to the ROYG's CT forces, Saleh asserted that the USG has produced "only words, but no solutions" to the terrorism issue in Yemen. Saleh repeatedly requested more funds and equipment to fight al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), while at the same time placing responsibility for any future AQAP attacks on the shoulders of the USG now that it enjoys unfettered access to Yemeni airspace, coastal waters and land. (NOTE. The USG has been actively engaged since 2001 in training elements of Yemen's CT forces, including the Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU), the Yemen Special Operations Force (YSOF), the Presidential Guard, the Yemeni Border Troops, Yemen Air Force (YAF), and the Yemen Coast Guard (YCG). The USG has expended over $115 million equipping CT forces since FY02. In 2009 alone, U.S. teams have instructed Yemeni CT forces in training valued at $5 million. END NOTE.)
3. (S/NF) While Saleh offered assurances that the ROYG is "determined to continue the war against al-Qaeda because they're targeting U.S. and Yemeni interests," he continued to link increased U.S. access to AQAP targets with full responsibility for achieving CT goals. Highlighting the potential for a future AQAP attack on the U.S. Embassy or other Western targets, Saleh said, "I have given you an open door on terrorism, so I am not responsible." THE SA'ADA WAR: "THE HOUTHIS ARE YOUR ENEMIES TOO"
--------------------------------------------- -----
4. (S/NF) President Saleh expressed his frustration with the USG refusal to view the Sa'ada war against the al-Houthis in the north in the same light as the fight against AQAP. Claiming a need for increased aid and support, Saleh asserted that "this war we're launching is a war on behalf of the U.S....the Houthis are your enemies too," citing videos of al-Houthi followers chanting, "Death to Israel, death to America." (NOTE: The Houthis have not attacked U.S. interests or personnel in the six rounds of fighting between the ROYG and the Houthis that began in 2004. END NOTE.) The USG's failure to view the Houthis as terrorists and equip ROYG forces to fight them in Sa'ada undermines the USG's claims of friendship and cooperation, according to Saleh. Commenting on the status of ROYG forces in Sa'ada, Saleh said, "we are suffering a lot of casualties and loss of material." Renewing his requests for armored personnel vehicles, aircraft, and medical evacuation vehicles, Saleh echoed his criticism of U.S. efforts. "We need deeds, not only words," he said. Brennan responded that the USG is prohibited by law from providing military support to the ROYG to be used against the Houthis since the USG considers the group a domestic insurgency.
5. (S/NF) Restating claims of Iranian support to the Houthi movement, ROYG officials present said they had provided files supporting an Iranian-Houthi connection to USG officials and would provide more if necessary. (NOTE. The Ambassador acknowledged receiving a file that was reviewed here and in Washington; however, no conclusive evidence of an Iranian-Houthi link has been made from these or other records. Brennan said that he would request a fresh scrub of all available intelligence to see if it turned up any evidence of Iranian involvement. END NOTE.) Saleh said, "Iran is trying to settle old scores against the U.S. by ruining relations between Yemen and GCC countries and the U.S." He also made a tangential reference to Hezbollah, claiming the organization's influence in the region also rendered the ROYG-Houthi war a fight on behalf of the U.S. Referencing the high poverty rate and illicit arms flows into both Yemen and Somalia, Saleh concluded by saying, "If you don't help, this country will become worse than Somalia."
MUDDLED MESSAGES ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES
----------------------------------------
6. (S/NF) Saleh expressed his preference for the existing Saudi Arabia option as a potential site for rehabilitating Guantanamo detainees of Yemeni origin over a proposed Jordanian option, citing closer familial ties and cultural bonds in Saudi Arabia as mechanisms for more effective treatment. Saleh commented that he thought the Jordanians were &too poor8 to support a rehabilitation program, but did not dismiss Jordan as an option. However, he signaled that rehabilitation is not his concern, but rather "the U.S.'s problem" as he is ready and willing to accept all Yemeni detainees into the Yemeni prison system. (COMMENT. Saleh would, in our judgment, be unable to hold returning detainees in jail for any more than a matter of weeks before public pressure ) or the courts ) forced their release. END COMMENT.) Saleh urged the USG to design and implement a rehabilitation and education program for the detainees and to build a rehabilitation center in Yemen, but reiterated that the U.S. would have to fund these projects, repeatedly asking, "How many dollars is the U.S. going to bring?" However, when Brennan offered $500,000 as an initial investment currently available for the crafting of a rehabilitation program, Saleh dismissed the offer as insufficient. Saleh also assured Brennan that he was committed to "freeing the innocent people after a complete and total rehabilitation," suggesting a lack of clarity on his own policy and on the status of Guantanamo detainees in the ROYG legal system.
ECONOMIC REFORM AND CORRUPTION
------------------------------
7. (S/NF) Saleh welcomed the letter from President Obama that Brennan hand-carried, and expressed appreciation for U.S. concern over the stability and economic hardships facing the country. He agreed to move forward with the 10-point plan outlining necessary economic reforms (reftel) but did not provide details regarding dates or implementation goals. Responding to Brennan's concerns that economic and other assistance might be diverted through corrupt officials to other purposes, Saleh urged the U.S. to donate supplies and hardware rather than liquid funds in order to curb corruption's reach. Saleh also told US officials that they could have full access to financial records to ensure proper usage of donor funding. (COMMENT. Saleh's preference for infrastructure and equipment over cash displays a lack of confidence in his own regime's ability to handle liquid assets and hardly provides a viable solution for stemming the curb of corruption in the long run. END COMMENT.)
VISIT TO WASHINGTON & OTHER ISSUES
----------------------------------
8. (S/NF) Saleh again asked to visit the U.S., arguing that it was necessary to resolve issues regarding the Guantanamo detainees and increased military assistance. "We see this visit as very important to reach mutual understanding and so that you understand our requests and demands." Brennan undertook to look into Saleh's claims of "promised" military equipment that has not been delivered. In a one-on-one session that followed the formal meeting, Brennan extended an invitation to Saleh to meet President Obama at the White House on October 6. Saleh also stated that there would be no more delays in the U.S. Embassy's request to purchase lands for the building of more secure housing facilities and that the Shari'a Council would approve the transfer of the lands from waqf (or publicly held) status to free-hold status.
COMMENT
-------
9. (S/NF) COMMENT. Saleh was in vintage form during the two hours he spent with DNSA Brennan, at times disdainful and dismissive and at others, conciliatory and congenial. One might easily conclude that his repeated assertion that Yemen's national territory is open to the US to conduct operations against AQAP reflects his interest in outsourcing the CT effort in Yemen to the USG, especially in view of his somewhat ominous claim that, should AQAP attacks occur in the future, they will be the result of the U.S. having failed to do enough to put the organization out of business. Additionally, a concerted USG anti-terrorism campaign in Yemen will free Saleh to continue to devote his limited security assets to the ongoing war against Houthi rebels in Sa'ada. The net effect, and one we strongly suspect Saleh has calculated, of both the American and ROYG "iron fist" unleashed at the same time in Yemen will be a clear message to the southern movement or any other party interested in generating political unrest in the country that a similar fate awaits them.
10. (S/NF) COMMENT CONTINUED. Not surprisingly, Saleh was far less animated when Brennan attempted to focus his attention on the need for immediate action to relieve Yemen's deteriorating socio-economic situation, largely limiting his response to a pitch that the USG persuade recalcitrant donors to speed up and increase their assistance to Yemen. After stating petulantly in the group session that he was no longer interested in an invitation to the White House, telling Brennan that "my relationship with you is sufficient," Saleh's mood changed noticeably for the better when the invitation was extended, and he had captured the prize he has been chasing after for months. END COMMENT. SECHE
Friday, 19 June 2009, 17:17
S E C R E T STATE 063860
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: MR
TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DAILY
Classified By: Derived from Multiple Sources
SECRET//FGI//NOFORN
Declassify on: Source marked 25X1-human, Date of source: June 18, 2009
1. (U) Diplomatic Security Daily, June 19, 2009
2. (U) Significant Events ) Paragraphs 6-10
3. (U) Key Concerns ) Paragraphs 11-19
4. (U) Cyber Threats ) Paragraphs 20-27
5. (U) Suspicious Activity Incidents ) Paragraphs 28-31
6. (U) Significant Events
7. (S) EUR - Bosnia-Herzegovina - Emergency Action Committee (EAC) Sarajevo met June 17 to discuss a large protest by veterans groups scheduled for June 18 at the Bosnian Government building adjacent to the U.S. Embassy,s Chancery building. The RSO made a number of recommendations, to which the EAC concurred. The protest began at 10 a.m. on June 18 with over 2,000 war veterans and supporters disputing reductions in pensions. Local law enforcement blocked the street in front of the Embassy at 9:30 a.m., and the Mission was placed on essential personnel status. At one point, 20 to 30 protesters tried to storm the government building, breaking some windows. Host-nation media reported two people were injured in an altercation with local police in this attempt. The demonstrators maintained their distance from Post, which will be open for normal operations today, June 19. (Appendix source 1)
8. (C) AF - Eritrea - The UN security officer in Asmara reported to the U.S. Embassy,s Regional Security Office that he has recently instructed all UN personnel to avoid walking in Asmara and is upgrading residential security at all houses to include around-the-clock guard coverage in response to the rise in crime in the capital. Post continues to see an increase in crime as economic conditions in Asmara continue to deteriorate, water/food/fuel shortages persist, and unemployment increases. Although the Embassy is still able to purchase water for Mission use, it is becoming increasingly more difficult. (Appendix source 2)
9. (SBU) Mali - At 12:30 p.m. on June 18, RSO Bamako was notified by the Surveillance Detection Team that a man was closely observing the Chief of Mission,s (COM,s) residence. The man then walked over to the guard post and questioned the guards about the COM and why so much security was needed. An investigator interviewed the man and discovered that he is an Indian national with an Indian passport that displayed extensive travel to West Africa. (RSO Bamako Spot Report)
10. (SBU) Zimbabwe - Jocelyn Chiwenga, wife of Defense Forces Chief Constantine Chiwenga, called the U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe June 18 and insulted and threatened him. On other occasions, she has spoken with Embassy staff and criticized the U.S. with profanity and abusive language. Post does not believe Chiwenga poses a physical threat; however, the RSO has been briefed and is scheduled to meet with contacts at the Zimbabwe Republic Police. This incident will be addressed in a diplomatic note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Harare 0502)
11. (U) Key Concerns
12. (S//NF) AF - Somalia - TFG minister of national security killed in suicide bombing: On the afternoon of June 18, Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Minister of National Security Omar Hashi was killed by a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device while in the Medina Hotel in Beletweyne. Former Somali Ambassador to Ethiopia Abdikarim Farah was also reported to be dead. Initial open source reports from a local hospital indicate the attack resulted in 20 casualties; later reporting shows more than 50 dead and 100 injured. No group has publicly claimed responsibility for the attack, but an intelligence report of limited credibility alleges al-Shabaab operatives are to blame.
13. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA notes this is first suicide attack in Beletweyne, and, if al-Shabaab operatives are indeed responsible, it further suggests the group is altering tactics in its fight against the TFG, specifically to incorporate the use of suicide operations. Recently received Ethiopian intelligence suggested al-Shabaab operatives were preparing to use a number of car bombs in suicide attacks against various targets in Mogadishu in late June.
14. (S//NF) Suicide bombs are increasingly common in Somalia. According to press reports, 30 lethal suicide bombings have occurred since five went off in October in Somaliland. Tearline from May 26 stated, &The Somali extremist group al-Shabaab employed the use of a suicide bomber against TFG soldiers in Mogadishu on May 24, resulting in at least six soldiers and one civilian killed. The attack was the first suicide attack against supporters of moderate Islamist President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed.8 The death of Hashi in addition to the June 17 killing of Bandadir Region Police Chief Ali Said will likely demoralize and impair the struggling TFG in the near term, as could al-Shabaab,s possible increasing willingness and ability to utilize suicide attacks on TFG leadership in Somalia. (Open sources; Nairobi 1237; Appendix sources 3-6)
15. (S//NF) NEA - Persian Gulf - Possible fabricator warns of Iranian threat: According to information provided during a liaison exchange by an Emirati Government service originating from a suspected fabricator, as of mid-June, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was planning an unspecified attack in the United Arab Emirates. Iranian agents allegedly shipped four weapons to the port at Jebel Ali circa March, with a final destination to the emirate of Ajman. Additionally, the IRGC planned to conduct attacks in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain using different teams. No further information was provided regarding these alleged operations.
16. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA agrees with the CIA assessment included in the full report, which states the information is likely fabricated. Concern over possible Iranian sleeper cells is nothing new for Gulf governments; a volume of reporting illustrates the mistrust of Sunni regimes in the region regarding their Shi,a communities. However, DS/TIA/ITA assesses it is unlikely Tehran will conduct a major (or attributable) operation against U.S., Western, or Gulf-nation interests lacking a significant regional event such as a military strike against Iran. (Appendix source 7)
17. (S//NF) SCA - India - LT member Shafiq Khafa possibly preparing for operations: Tearline reports, &Hussein, an India-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) member, continued operational planning on three tasks in early June. The tasks were associated with a possible operation against Gujarat Chief Minister Narendar Modi, the establishment of a training camp, and unspecified work involving a car. Hussein would coordinate his activities with an India-based colleague identified as Sameer.8
18. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Separate tearline indicates, &Pakistan-based Shafiq Khafa prepared in mid-June with India-based associate S J for possible operations in India. Khafa was looking for information on possible training sites in the Indian states of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Kerala.8
19. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA notes earlier credible tearline suggests Khafa,s network is striving to stand up two teams in southern India that rely on the support of LT members based in India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Nepal. Although specific details of planned LT attacks remain unknown, late-May intelligence indicates Khafa,s cells were engaged in surveillance activities of potential targets, likely in southern India. Early-May reporting further suggests Kerala or Tamil Nadu may be used as a base of operations following the establishment of a facilitation team in Sri Lanka, with the estimated time of completion for setting up the facilitation route and camps to be two to three months. (Appendix sources 8-18)
20. (U) Cyber Threats
21. (SBU) Domestic - DoS staff targeted by spear phishing as climate change talks are underway:
22. (C//NF) Key highlights: The UNFCCC aims to commit developed nations to a plan for reducing GHG emissions. U.S.-PRC talks are in progress to reach consensus on new GHG emission requirements. DoS personnel have been targeted with socially engineered climate change-related e-mail. It is probable that receipt of climate change-themed socially engineered messages will persist as negotiations continue.
23. (U) Source paragraph: &China and the U.S. failed to achieve a breakthrough at their latest round of climate talks on Wednesday (June 10), raising the stakes in the global effort to fight global climate change. The two countries responsible for almost half of the world,s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions ended three days of negotiations in Beijing.8
24. (SBU) CTAD comment: In June 1992, a United Nations Conference on Environment and Development -- informally known as the Earth Summit -- was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. During this conference, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) -- a treaty intended to &achieve stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a low enough level to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system8 -- was produced. The UNFCCC, primarily focused on the voluntary stabilization of GHG emissions by industrialized countries, was ratified and put into effect March 21, 1994. In order to evaluate the progress of UNFCCC signatories, the parties involved gather annually in meetings dubbed Conferences of the Parties (COPs). At COP-3 held in Kyoto, Japan, in December 2007, a protocol to the UNFCCC called the &Kyoto Protocol8 was adopted, outlining in part legally binding commitments for the reduction of GHG emissions for developed nations. The terms of this protocol are set to expire in 2012, and the goal of this year,s COP-15, which will be held December 1 to 18 in Copenhagen, Denmark, is to establish a new agreement among concerned nations prior to the Kyoto Protocol,s end.
25. (S//NF) CTAD comment: Currently, the U.S. and People,s Republic of China (PRC) -- two of the world,s largest contributors of GHGs -- are conducting specific negotiations on the topic in attempts to come to an agreement on what level of cuts in GHG emissions should be attained. As these negotiations have been underway, evidence of an attempt to gain unauthorized entry to computer systems operated by DoS personnel involved with climate issues has surfaced. Though the incident has not been attributed to any known hostile actor, the event appears to be a targeted spear-phishing attempt and may be indicative of efforts to gather intelligence on the U.S.,s position on climate change issues.
26. (SBU) CTAD comment: On June 1, CTAD,s Technical Analysis/Special Operations monitoring detected a malicious e-mail massage targeting five DoS individuals employed within the Division of Ocean Affairs, Office of the Special Envoy for Climate Change. The socially engineered message had the subject line &China and Climate Change8 and was spoofed to appear as if it were from a legitimate international economics columnist at the National Journal. In addition, the body of the e-mail contained comments designed to appeal to the recipients as it was specifically aligned with their job function, and a signature block with contact information for the spoofed sender was present. Attached to the message was a PDF file, also titled &China and Climate Change,8 which harbored malicious code designed to exploit the Adobe Collab getIcon(), JavaScript vulnerability (CVE-2009-0927). This vulnerability, if executed successfully, would have allowed malicious actors to remotely execute arbitrary code on a victim computer. The PDF document also contained the Poison Ivy Remote Administration Tool -- a malicious software program that provides a remote user with nearly complete control over a comprised system. However, since the DoS users targeted in this intrusion attempt were operating with currently patched versions of Adobe software, there was neither compromise nor data lost as a result of this incident (for technical information about the incident, see CTAD Report TR-09-034).
27. (C//NF) CTAD comment: DoS employees dealing with sensitive diplomatic matters are often targets of social-engineering schemes conducted by actors seeking to harvest sensitive information from DoS computer systems and networks. As negotiations on the subject of climate change continue, it is probable intrusion attempts such as this will persist. CTAD recommends personnel involved with climate change issues or topics relating to the upcoming COP-15 continue to remain aware of the elevated risk of targeted socially engineered e-mail and report any suspicious messages to their information systems security officer (ISSO). (Financial Times (http://www.ft.com), &Biggest emitters fail to show the way forward,8 June 10, 2009; Appendix source 19)
28. (U) Suspicious Activity Incidents
29. (SBU) SCA - Uzbekistan - A vehicle with two occupants was parked across the street from U.S. Embassy Tashkent June 2. During the cited period, VIP visitors arrived at Post for a meeting with the Ambassador. The diplomatic police were asked to check the vehicle, but they did not act. Five minutes later, the vehicle moved about 80 meters from the Embassy and parked. After several more requests, the police finally walked over to the car and spoke to the driver. He indicated he was waiting for his friend who was &visiting8 the Consular Section. Shortly afterward, the vehicle departed the area without picking anyone up.
30. (SBU) RSO Action/Assessment: It is possible this was some sort of surveillance activity by the host government or others. All relevant information was passed to the police; however, it is highly unlikely the Embassy will hear anything. The Uzbeks do not share information or reveal the results of their investigations.
31. XXXXXXXXXXXX SECRET//FGI//NOFORN
Full Appendix with sourcing available upon request. CLINTON
NNNN
End Cable Text
XXXXXXXXXXXX
Monday, 04 January 2010, 13:33
S E C R E T SANAA 000004
NOFORN
DEPT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ARP
NSC FOR DPNSA BRENNAN
HQ USCENTCOM/CCCC-CIG FOR JSEATON
EO 12958 DECL: 01/04/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, PINS, MOPS, MASS, MCAP, SA,
AE, UK, ER, DJ, QA, YM
SUBJECT: GENERAL PETRAEUS' MEETING WITH SALEH ON SECURITY
ASSISTANCE, AQAP STRIKES
REF: 2009 SANAA 1430
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Commander of the U.S. Central Command General David Petraeus congratulated President Saleh on recent successful operations against AQAP, and informed him that U.S. security assistance to the ROYG would increase to USD 150 million in 2010, including USD 45 million to equip and train a CT-focused aviation regiment under the Yemeni Special Operations Forces. Saleh requested that the U.S. provide 12 armed helicopters and train and equip three new Republican Guard brigades. Saleh rejected the General's proposal to have USG personnel armed with direct-feed intelligence present inside the area of CT operations, but agreed to a have U.S. fixed-wing bombers circle outside Yemeni territory ready to engage AQAP targets should actionable intelligence become available. END SUMMARY.
SALEH: HELICOPTERS, HELICOPTERS, HELICOPTERS
--------------------------------------------
2. (S/NF) CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus, accompanied by the Ambassador, CENTCOM aides, the Embassy DATT, and EconOff note taker, congratulated President Saleh on successful operations against AQAP during a January 2 meeting. The General told Saleh that he had requested USD 150 million in security assistance for 2010, a substantial increase over the 2009 amount of USD 67 million. Also present were Minister of Defense MG Muhammed Nasser Ahmad Ali and Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Affairs Rashad al-Alimi. Raising a topic that he would manage to insert into almost every item of discussion during the hour and half-long meeting, Saleh requested that the U.S. provide the ROYG with 12 armed helicopters. Possessing such helicopters would allow the ROYG to take the lead in future CT operations, "ease" the use of fighter jets and cruise missiles against terrorist targets, and allow Yemeni Special Operations Forces to capture terrorist suspects and identify victims following strikes, according to Saleh. The U.S. could convince Saudi Arabia and the UAE to supply six helicopters each if the American "bureaucracy" prevented quick approval, Saleh suggested. The General responded that he had already considered the ROYG's request for helicopters and was in discussions with Saudi Arabia on the matter. "We won't use the helicopters in Sa'ada, I promise. Only against al-Qaeda," Saleh told General Petraeus.
3. (S/NF) Saleh agreed to General Patraeus' proposal to dedicate USD 45 million of 2010 security assistance funds to help establish and train a YSOF aviation regiment, allowing YSOF to focus on al-Qaeda targets and leaving Sa'ada air operations to the Yemeni Air Force. Without giving much detail, Saleh also requested that the U.S. equip and train three new Republican Guard brigades, totaling 9,000 soldiers. "Equipping these brigades would reflect upon our true partnership," Saleh said. The General urged Saleh to focus first on the YSOF aviation regiment.
AQAP STRIKES: CONCERN FOR CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
---------------------------------------------
4. (S/NF) Saleh praised the December 17 and 24 strikes against AQAP but said that "mistakes were made" in the killing of civilians in Abyan. The General responded that the only civilians killed were the wife and two children of an AQAP operative at the site, prompting Saleh to plunge into a lengthy and confusing aside with Deputy Prime Minister Alimi and Minister of Defense Ali regarding the number of terrorists versus civilians killed in the strike. (Comment: Saleh's conversation on the civilian casualties suggests he has not been well briefed by his advisors on the strike in Abyan, a site that the ROYG has been unable to access to determine with any certainty the level of collateral damage. End Comment.) AQAP leader Nassr al-Wahishi and extremist cleric Anwar al-Awlaki may still be alive, Saleh said, but the December strikes had already caused al-Qaeda operatives to turn themselves in to authorities and residents in affected areas to deny refuge to al-Qaeda. Saleh raised the issue of the Saudi Government and Jawf governorate tribal sheikh Amin al-Okimi, a subject that is being reported through other channels.
SHIFTING AIRSTRIKE STRATEGIES
-----------------------------
5. (S/NF) President Obama has approved providing U.S. intelligence in support of ROYG ground operations against AQAP targets, General Petraeus informed Saleh. Saleh reacted coolly, however, to the General's proposal to place USG personnel inside the area of operations armed with real-time, direct feed intelligence from U.S. ISR platforms overhead. "You cannot enter the operations area and you must stay in the joint operations center," Saleh responded. Any U.S. casualties in strikes against AQAP would harm future efforts, Saleh asserted. Saleh did not have any objection, however, to General Petraeus' proposal to move away from the use of cruise missiles and instead have U.S. fixed-wing bombers circle outside Yemeni territory, "out of sight," and engage AQAP targets when actionable intelligence became available. Saleh lamented the use of cruise missiles that are "not very accurate" and welcomed the use of aircraft-deployed precision-guided bombs instead. "We'll continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours," Saleh said, prompting Deputy Prime Minister Alimi to joke that he had just "lied" by telling Parliament that the bombs in Arhab, Abyan, and Shebwa were American-made but deployed by the ROYG.
ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT IN MIL-MIL RELATIONS
-----------------------------------------
6. (S/NF) General Petraeus praised cooperation between the Embassy and the NSB, YSOF, Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG), and Counterterrorism Unit (CTU), but singled out relations with the Yemeni Air Force as problematic. Only four out of 50 planned U.S. Special Operations Forces Command training missions with the Yemeni Air Force had actually been executed in the past year, he said. Saleh said he would personally instruct Minister of Defense to improve the situation. The General also urged Saleh to stop Yemeni Customs' habit of holding up Embassy cargo at the airport, including shipments destined for the ROYG itself, such as equipment for the CTU. Saleh laughed and made a vague pledge to have the customs issue "taken care of." Saleh complained that the ROYG had not yet received the necessary training to operate 17 Iraqi Light Armored Vehicle (ILAVs) provided by the USG in 2008, saying that YSOF needed the training in order to use the ILAVs for CT operations. The General said he would look into having U.S. Special Operations Forces personnel conduct the training.
7. (S/NF) Pointing to the ROYG's problems in combating rampant drug and arms smuggling, Saleh told General Petraeus that U.S. maritime security assistance was insufficient to cover Yemen's nearly 2,000 km of coastline. "Why not have Italy, Germany, Holland, Japan, Saudi, and the UAE each provide two patrol boats?" Saleh suggested. The General told Saleh that two fully-equipped 87-foot patrol boats destined for the Yemeni Coast Guard were under construction and would arrive in Yemen within a year. Saleh singled out smuggling from Djibouti as particularly troublesome, claiming that the ROYG had recently intercepted four containers of Djibouti-origin TNT. "Tell (Djiboutian President) Ismail Guelleh that I don't care if he smuggles whiskey into Yemen -- provided it's good whiskey ) but not drugs or weapons," Saleh joked. Saleh said that smugglers of all stripes are bribing both Saudi and Yemeni border officials.
SALEH WELCOMES LONDON CONFERENCE
--------------------------------
8. (S/NF) Saleh told the General that he welcomed PM Gordon Brown's announcement of the London conference and said that the cooperation on Yemen between the U.S., EU, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE would be benefitial. Qatar should not be involved, however, because "they work with Iran." In this regard, Saleh also identified Qatar as one of those nations working "against Yemen," along with Iran, Libya, and Eritrea.
9. (U) General Petraeus did not have an opportunity to clear on this cable.
SECHE
Sunday, 31 May 2009, 12:17
S E C R E T SANAA 001015
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP:MBLONG
RIYADH FOR ASTEINFELD
BAGHDAD FOR LGURIAN
EO 12958 DECL: 05/30/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, YM
SUBJECT: SALEH SEES FOREIGN HAND BEHIND YEMEN,S INTERNAL
WOES
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary. During a 40-minute meeting at his residence in Taiz, President Saleh confirmed to D/D CIA Kappes his intention to permit Yemenis to enter the Saudi rehab program upon their release from Guantanamo, an issue that he said he will discuss King Abdullah during a visit to Riyadh on May 31. Saleh also ranked the threats to Yemen's security in the following order: AQAP, the Houthi rebellion, and the Southern Movement, all of which he suggested were being driven by external forces. End Summary.
2. (S) D/D Kappes and his traveling party, accompanied by the Ambassador and PolMil chief, flew on May 28 to Taiz, some 200 km south of Sana'a, in a Yemeni Air Force M-171 helicopter, to meet with President Saleh at his quarters there. Saleh appeared relaxed, greeting his visitors in an open-collar white shirt and dark trousers. (Note: over Saleh's left eye were visible the traces of a cut he suffered mid-May in a fall on the deck of the swimming pool at the Presidential Palace in Sana'a. End note.) After opening pleasantries, Saleh referred to the ongoing debate in the U.S. regarding the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, especially criticism of the plan to transfer some detainees into U.S. prisons, noting that "we have agreed to send Yemenis to Saudi Arabia." Kappes said he understood POTUS was very grateful for Saleh's support in this matter, and added that details of the prisoner transfer to Saudi Arabia were being worked out. Saleh said that he would discuss the issue with King Abdullah when he travelled to Riyadh on May 31. (Note: We understand that GCC foreign ministers also will meet in Riyadh next week and that, on the margins of that meeting, they will convene a separate session on Yemen, to which Foreign Minister Qirbi has been invited. End Note.)
3. (S) Saleh then noted what he characterized as an "agreement" by the Bush Administration to finance construction of an extremist rehabilitation facility in Yemen, the estimated cost of which is $11M. Saleh expressed his understanding that the Yemeni detainees would be placed first in the Saudi rehab program and then transferred home once the facility here was built and ready to receive them. Saleh also mentioned his "appointment with President Obama," which he said the two had discussed during their recent phone call. As to the timing of this visit, Kappes suggested it was most likely that the invitation would be extended once the transfer of Yemeni detainees to KSA was underway. Saleh replied: "Send them all to Saudi Arabia now. They already have a facility."
4. (S) Turning to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Kappes praised cooperation between U.S. and Yemeni intelligence agencies. He noted that the USG remains as determined as ever to destroy AQ worldwide, to which Saleh replied, "I hope this campaign continues and succeeds. We're doing the same here. Our position is unshakable." Kappes expressed concern that AQAP was targeting Saleh himself, a point Saleh agreed with, asserting that ROYG security services had recently arrested an individual they believe was going to fire a surface-to-air missile at the Presidential plane during a recent trip to Aden. (Comment. We hadn't heard of this incident previously, although there were reports of plans to attack Saleh's plane in a similar manner earlier this year as he prepared to depart Sana'a for Kuwait. End Comment.)
5. (S) On current unrest in the south, Saleh asserted that "we are not that worried. This is not new. These are the same people who tried to break away in 1994. Then, even with an army and an air force, they failed. They will fail again without external assistance." He noted that one difference now is that the secessionists are exploiting international media such as Arabic-language satellite channels Al Jazeera and Al Hurra. (Note: Saleh was referring to an interview with Haidar al-Attas, a former southern leader, that Al-Hurra aired earlier this month. End Note.) Kappes noted that U.S. policy in support of Yemen's unity remains unchanged, and Saleh said that such support was "most important." He asked that the U.S. pressure other countries to do the same, referring to the U.K. which, he said, is housing the movement's leaders and providing them media access. "Leave the internal situation to us," Saleh said. "We'll handle it." Asserting that the military option was a last resort, he said that the ROYG strategy will rally the voices of
southerners in support of unity, which he described as the majority of the population, as a counterweight to the minority in favor of independence. He also sought USG support for ROYG efforts to persuade GCC countries to permit Yemenis to enter their labor markets. "Our young people need jobs," he said, especially if they are to be immunized against the lure of extremist ideology. (Comment. At a dinner for Kappes on Wednesday night, the Saudi Ambassador said that his embassy has issued 36,000 visas to Yemenis seeking work in KSA in the last two and one-half months. End Comment.)
6. (S) Kappes said that the latest economic figures from Yemen must be a cause for concern, a point Saleh didn't dispute, characterizing the current economic situation as "very bad." Kappes then asked Saleh to rank-order the threats to Yemen's security, noting a conversation last fall when discussion focused on Al-Qaeda, the Houthi rebellion and southern unrest. Saleh initially said that all three were "on the same level," then corrected himself to prioritize AQAP as the most severe threat, followed by the Houthis and then the situation in the south. "Even if we told the south tomorrow, 'You are free to separate,' they would turn around the next day and start to fight with each other," he said, adding that such a lack of internal cohesion greatly diminished the risk to Yemen's security. On the other hand, he said, AQAP terrorists prepared to detonate explosive vests pose a much greater risk to internal security, as does the Houthi rebellion, given the external support the ROYG insists it receives from Iran and Hizballah.
7. (S) Comment. Saleh's decision to reverse himself and characterize AQAP as the most serious threat facing Yemen was almost certainly taken with his USG interlocutors in mind, as was, one suspects, his dismissal of the risk posed to his regime by the increasingly militant southern-independence movement. Nor was it coincidental that Saleh was quick to blame foreign powers for the nation's woes. From the U.K., Qatar and Libya aiding the southerners, to Iran and Hizballah engineering the Houthi rebellion in the north, to an international terrorist conspiracy fueling AQAP's growth, the implication is that Yemen is beset by forces that it will be hard-pressed to repel without substantial external support. This argument is, of course, also tailored to Saleh's USG audience, and meant to elicit the necessary level of political, economic and military assistance to forestall Yemen's collapse, and the negative effects it would have on regional stability and security. End Comment. SECHE
Monday, 04 January 2010, 13:50
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000004
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR EUR/FO, EUR/ERA AND EUR/WE FROM AMBASSADOR GUTMAN
EO 12958 DECL: 01/04/2029
TAGS PREL, PGOV, EU, SENV, PINR, BE
SUBJECT: EU PRESIDENT VAN ROMPUY'S PLANS FOLLOWING
COPENHAGEN AND FOR AFGHANISTAN
REF: 2009 STATE 122247
Classified By: Charge D' Affaires Richard M. Eason for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (C//NF) Summary: The Ambassador discussed the Conference of Parties (COP) Conference in Copenhagen and Afghanistan with EU Council Permanent President Herman Van Rompuy over coffee December 23 after delivering the congratulatory letter (reftel) from President Obama. Van Rompuy called the Copenhagen Conference a disaster in which Europe was excluded and mistreated. He predicted Mexico COP 16 would be a disaster as well, and added that multilateral conferences would not resolve the climate problem. He proposed coming to an agreement between the EU and the United States during the possible upcoming U.S. - EU Summit in Madrid, and then approaching China to achieve a workable solution. On Afghanistan, Van Rompuy opined that no one in Europe believed in Afghanistan anymore. He said Europe was going along in deference to the United States; there must be results in 2010, or Afghanistan is over for Europe. End Summary.
Coffee with EU President Van Rompuy
-----------------------------------
2. (U) As instructed (reftel), I delivered the letter of congratulations from President Obama to new EU Council Permanent President Herman Van Rompuy on December 23. The meeting was arranged by his new Chief of Staff Frans Van Daele. I did not mean to engage in any substantive discussions nor enter into a domain better left to Ambassador Kennard. However, both Van Daele and Van Rompuy are friends of mine, and they invited me to have some coffee for about an hour. Given the holiday period, the EU Building was virtually empty and both men seemed to have time to spare. We first discussed many social pleasantries: moving to new office space, the holidays, and family.
Copenhagen was a disaster for Europe
------------------------------------
3. (C//NF) Van Rompuy raised the recent COP 15 conference in Copenhagen, calling it an "incredible disaster." He was not angry, in the sense that he never seems angry, but he was as animated and as frustrated as I have seen him. He thought that Europe had been "totally excluded" and was "mistreated." He thought the only saving grace was that he was not there. Van Rompuy said, "had I been there, my Presidency would have been over before it began." He said he was criticized for not being present in Copenhagen, and added that he did not need to be there because he does not start in his new position until January 1. He thought it was a wise decision not to attend the conference despite the pressure.
4. (C//NF) I responded by saying that I had no idea what actually happened since I was not there, but offered that from the reports I was seeing, it looked more like a chaotic meeting had occurred rather than any decision to exclude Europe. But Van Rompuy did not give that explanation much credence, responding, "they could certainly have called Europe and told us to come."
5. (C//NF) Van Rompuy did seem to ascribe some blame to Europe. He said, "no one knows who to call: Merkel, Barroso, who knows who." He said he planned to take control of getting Europe on the same page. He mentioned that he had scheduled an informal EU meeting in February to discuss the economy, but he was now going to use the meeting to discuss Copenhagen in addition to the economy. He intends to get the EU lined up.
U.S. and EU Need to Talk Climate at Madrid
------------------------------------------
6. (C//NF) Van Rompuy said he has, "given up on Mexico City," with Van Daele calling the planned U.N. COP 16 meeting to be held there November to December 2010 "Nightmare on Elm Street 2," and stating, "who wants to see that horror movie again." Van Rompuy said, "multilateral meetings will not work." He indicated that Europe first had to get on the same page; then Europe had to meet with the U.S.; and finally they (I think he meant Europe and the U.S.) had to meet as well with China. Rather than waiting for a failure at Mexico City, he intends to address Copenhagen issues with the United States at Madrid; he envisioned engaging China thereafter. In his mind, talks with the U.S. would have to focus on Madrid and
BRUSSELS 00000004 002 OF 002
not Mexico City.
Afghanistan
-----------
7. (C//NF) We talked briefly about my having opened the residence to the press to watch President Obama,s Afghanistan speech live at 2:00 am Belgian time on December 1. That led Van Rompuy briefly to address Afghanistan. He said it was, "the last chance. Europe is doing it and will go along out of deference to the United States but not out of deference to Afghanistan. No one believes in Afghanistan any more. But we will give it 2010 to see results. If it doesn,t work, that will be it because it is the last chance. And if a Belgian gets killed, it would be over for Belgium right then."
8. (U) We parted with holiday wishes and talked about seeing an Anderlecht football (soccer) game soon. I told him I was leaving him in the good hands of U.S. Ambassador to the EU Bill Kennard but would continue to see him socially.
9. (C//NF) Comment: Van Rompuy's Chief of Staff Frans Van Daele is Belgium's premier diplomat. He is a former Ambassador to the United States, Permanent Representative to NATO, to the EU, and most recently, Chief of Staff to outgoing Belgian Foreign Minister, and now Prime Minister Yves Leterme. Much of what Van Rompuy said might be attributed to the pro-American Van Daele, who could have recommended that this appointment be used to deliver the messages on Copenhagen and Afghanistan. End Comment.
EASON .
Wednesday, 03 February 2010, 10:37
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000128
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/01/2020
TAGS PREL, PTER, EUN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KENNARD'S MEETING WITH SPANISH
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE EU
Classified By: Ambassador William Kennard, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: On February 1, Ambassador Kennard made a courtesy call on the Spanish Permanent Representative to the European Union, Carlos Bastarreche Segues. They discussed the state of play for the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), the nature of the European Parliament after the Lisbon Treaty, and prospects for a U.S.-EU Summit in Madrid in May. On TFTP, Spain intends to continue its strong efforts in support of a long-term agreement. On the Summit, Bastarreche presented both Spain's and the EU's position, which differed. Ambassador Kennard underscored the importance the Obama administration puts on needing deliverables from the President's foreign travel. END SUMMARY
Terrorist Financing Tracking Program Interim Agreement
2. (C) Bastarreche's first priority was to discuss the state of play with the TFTP agreement. He was very concerned that the interim agreement on TFTP was reached on the last possible day before the Lisbon Treaty came into force, which meant that Spain needed to be serious about damage control in the wake of suspicions that the United States and the EU Council colluded to pre-empt Parliamentary action on the agreement. Regrettably, there had also been inefficiencies and inadequate follow-up to the interim TFTP agreement, Bastarreche said. As an example, Bastarreche cited a call he received on January 17 from the Cabinet of European Parliament President Jerzy Buzek, asking why the Spanish Presidency had not responded to Buzek's letter - a letter no one had seen. Bastarreche said the Spanish Presidency was determined to be diligent about follow-up and keeping the Parliament informed. He cited the involvement of Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero, who had since responded to Buzek with detailed legal arguments, as an indication of the high level of support for this issue. Regarding Information (and incoming Justice and Fundamental Rights) Commissioner Viviane Reding's recent public comments against TFTP, Bastarreche called the remarks irresponsible, saying, "She is not entitled to speak against the position of the Commission." He characterized such anti-TFTP views as in keeping with her populist politics, i.e., done for public favor.
3. (C) For next steps on TFTP, Bastarreche said Spain will continue to try to convince the Germans to support TFTP. Spain also planned to discuss on February 2, at the Council level, a letter to Parliament which provides encouragement and justification for members of the European Parliament to wait for the interim mandate to expire in October 2010 and thus delay a definitive vote. By waiting, they can be assured that the duratnt while the U.Sessions that l the current Parliament instead feels they need to show their strength. As a result, work on many issues is parayzed.
U.S. - EU Summit
5. (C) Regarding Qhe proposed U.S.-EU Summit, Bastarreche preseted both the Spanish and the EU views. Madrid sees a visit by President Obama as extremely had become a strained bilateral relationship under President Bush. However, if Washington chose not to pursue the Summit during the Spanish Presidency, but could commit itself now to a bilateral meeting in Madrid later this year, then Spain would be satisfied. The EU thinks it would be a mistake for the United State to opt out of the Summit, given the substantive issues that will need to be addressed this semester, including Afghanistan, Iran, and China. Bastarreche stated PM Zapatero has more latitude on those key issues than Commission President Barroso or EU Council President Van Rompuy. Bastarreche said climate change is another reason not to delay a summit until the second semester, as that would put the conversation near the Mexico climate change conference. The proximity to the Mexico conference could influence the agenda at a time when the issue needs to be "de-dramatized."
6. (C) Ambassador Kennard assured Bastarreche the Summit was under consideration in Washington at present, but stressed the importance the Obama administration places on results. He said the White House understands the important symbolism of the Summit, but is very focused on the domestic agenda and overseas travel would have to lead to tangible outcomes. Ambassador Kennard assured Bastarreche that he would pass his concerns on to Washington and would let him know directly when a decision was made. (NOTE: Ambassador Kennard placed a phone call to Bastarreche later that evening and eventually informed Bastarreche of the White House decision on the morning of February 2. END NOTE)
KENNARD .
Wednesday, 03 February 2010, 14:51
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000133
SIPDIS
FOR P - U/S BURNS, ALSO FOR EUR - A/S GORDON
EO 12958 DECL: 02/04/2020
TAGS PREL, SP
SUBJECT: SPANISH REACTION TO ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING U.S.-EU
SUMMIT
MADRID 00000133 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Alan D. Solomont, Reasons 1.4(b),(d).
1. (C) Summary. In the last 48 hours the Ambassador has spoken with Spanish National Security Advisor Leon, FM Moratinos, and President Zapatero regarding the announcement that President Obama will not attend a U.S.-EU Summit in Spain. Spanish disappointment -- both among senior government officials and in the media -- is profound. Nevertheless, the GOS is taking the high road, stressing the health of the U.S.-EU and U.S.-Spanish relationships. We are taking a similar approach privately and publicly, aggressively reaching out to media to urge that they not read into this decision some hidden and inaccurate message about U.S. policy. The Spanish still hope for a Presidential visit, and will probably raise that with Washington at every opportunity. End summary.
2. (C) It is important we all continue to reiterate a consistent message about what has and has not happened. There was never U.S. agreement to a summit. The GOS was told that on many occasions. The decision made this week has everything to do with the President's very busy agenda and nothing to do with the importance the U.S. attaches to Europe and Spain. The U.S. has no more important relationship than the one its enjoys with Europe, and Spain is an important and valued ally. The President traveled to Europe six times last year. He met twice with President Zapatero in recent months, will see him again at the National Prayer Breakfast this week, and will receive King Juan Carlos at the White House February 17. The Spanish press is covering the story heavily. Our message is being repeated in the media, although commentary is running heavily towards characterizing the decision as a slight to Europe and Spain.
3. (C) The Spanish reaction is colored by the hopes they had pinned on this summit. The domestic economic news has been uniformly bad for Zapatero for a long time. That is not likely to change in the near future. Zapatero looked to the EU presidency as a chance to burnish Spain's international standing, especially as a leader within the EU. The summit with the U.S. -- the first visit of a U.S. President in eight years -- was to be the climax of Spain's presidency. Early on Spain proposed late May as the date and began working to convince U.S. officials of the value of a summit. Regrettably, and despite being told repeatedly that no dates were agreed, the GOS treated the summit as a fait accompli when talking to the media.
4. (C) The Spanish did take seriously U.S. injunctions that a summit needed concrete and worthwhile deliverables and began working on an agenda that would be meaningful to the U.S. In discussions with the Department of State and the NSC, the Spanish stressed some worthwhile topics such as data protection/information sharing, removing trade and regulatory barriers, climate change, and -- most recently as described to the Ambassador -- having Zapatero personally lead an effort to persuade other EU countries to accept more Guantanamo detainees. The Spanish did appear to have taken seriously their role as a transitional EU presidency, trying to find a balance with EU President Van Rompuy and High Representative Ashton, dividing up meetings, and agreeing on appropriate roles for both Van Rompuy and Zapatero in a proposed U.S.-EU Summit in Spain.
5. (C) By the time the new U.S. Ambassador arrived January 9, the GOS was clearly becoming nervous about the summit. In his first days, senior GOS officials raised the issue with the Ambassador, including Moratinos, Leon, Zapatero, and the King. In each instance, the Ambassador made clear that the USG had not yet agreed to a summit. His Spanish interlocutors made it equally clear that they placed great importance on having a summit.
6. (C) At this point, the Spanish do not feel betrayed, but they are deeply disappointed. Naturally they regret, as does everyone, that the bad news first appeared in the press. Despite that, the GOS is trying to put the best face on this situation. The Ambassador has explained personally to Leon, Moratinos and Zapatero that Spain remains an important and valued ally. In a February 2 conversation, Zapatero told the Ambassador he understands President Obama has a complicated agenda and that he traveled several times to Europe in the past year. Zapatero assured the Ambassador he understands the decision has nothing to do with U.S. feelings towards Spain or Europe. He said he hopes President Obama will find a convenient moment to visit Spain and suggested he would tell the President that when he sees him at the National Prayer Breakfast.
MADRID 00000133 002.2 OF 002
7. (C) Comment: Zapatero has taken a serious political blow at a time when he can ill afford it. Nevertheless, bilateral relations will survive intact. We expect Spain to follow through on its commitments to send more troops to Afghanistan, accept five Guantanamo detainees, and be helpful on Iran sanctions. The Spanish are still hopeful for a Presidential visit this year, perhaps in conjunction with the President's visit to Lisbon in November. In that regard, we have advised the Spanish not to create false expectations. We do believe such a visit would be useful in terms of strengthening relations with an important ally who has demonstrated an increasing willingness to support U.S. priorities. The use of Spanish military bases by our Navy and Air Force has long been of great value to us as is Spain's commitment in Afghanistan and its cooperation on CT, law enforcement, etc. Although Spanish leaders may voice their desire for a visit to senior USG officials, they should avoid making the same mistake twice of speaking publicly about a visit that has not been committed to. End comment. SOLOMONT
Friday, 26 February 2010, 22:41
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 018437
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/24/2020
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PHUM, EAID, ECON, EFIN, ELAB, MARR, MASS,
OEXC, OFDP, PINS, SCUL, SENV, SNAR, IMF, UN, KGHG, KDRG, MV
SUBJECT: MALDIVES AMBASSADOR'S WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS
Classified By: SCA A/S Robert O. Blake, Jr. reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (S) SUMMARY. Maldives Ambassador-designate (resident in New York) Abdul Ghafoor Mohamed held his first consultations in Washington February 23, ahead of his presentation of credentials to POTUS February 24. Meeting with SCA, S/SECC, S/GC, and OSD, Ghafoor said he would prioritize developing education and parliamentary exchanges during his ambassadorship; expressed confidence that Maldives would win a seat on the UN Human Rights Council; confirmed his government's willingness to take a Guantanamo detainee; underscored the importance of tangible assistance being provided by the larger economies to small countries at the forefront of the climate change debate; and expressed appreciation for U.S. training of Maldives security personnel. He also noted his government's interest in additional training and assistance with customs and border security and prison management. END SUMMARY.
Confident on UNHRC; Keen on Educational Partnerships
--------------------------------
2. (C) Pre-viewing Ambassador Ghafoor's meetings with Deputy S/SECC Pershing and S/GC Ambassador Fried, SCA A/S Robert Blake expressed appreciation to Ghafoor for Maldives's willingness to accept a Guantanamo detainee, and President Nasheed's strong personal effort in Copenhagen to reach an Accord. Blake also pulsed Ghafoor on Maldives's candidacy for the Human Rights Council. Ghafoor said he was confident Maldives could get one of the four Asia Group seats; he did not think Iran, lacking Arab support, had the votes. His only concern was that Thailand and Maldives could split their votes and that Iran is working African capitals. As such, Maldives is not only lobbying Asian missions, but also African missions. Blake offered quiet U.S. assistance if it would be helpful; Ghafoor appreciated it and said Maldives might take us up on it. But Maldives needed to be seen as earning the seat in its own right. As a small country, he said, Maldives can't play other countries against each other; it needs to take principled positions (e.g. Kosovo recognition).
3. (SBU) Ghafoor appreciated U.S. efforts to help push the IMF and Maldives toward agreement, but that the conditionality was "harsh." Wage cuts have been politically difficult. Referring to the March 28-29 Maldives donors conference, Ghafoor said international assistance would help the government win over the public and implement its development program. Ghafoor said that promoting educational exchanges and partnerships between the U.S. and Maldives would offer an alternative to students who currently go to Islamic schools in Pakistan and Egypt, where they could become radicalized. A/S Blake suggested Ghafoor reach out to U.S. schools and offered assistance to help build public-private partnerships, such as, for example, a college in the hotel and restaurant management field. Ghafoor was also keen to pursue parliamentary exchanges and to receive CODELs in Maldives, as well as to promote a U.S.-Maldives caucus or friendship association in Congress. We suggested he reach out to National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute, and that we would help arrange meetings for him with Congressional staff.
Ready to Assist with Detainee
-----------------------------
4. (S) S/GC Ambassador Daniel Fried conveyed U.S. appreciation for Maldives's willingness to resettle a
STATE 00018437 002 OF 003
Guantanamo detainee. Ghafoor said Maldives is ready to act quickly on the resettlement. Logistics remain to be worked out between the Home Ministry and the Embassy. Fried detailed those logistics, including finalizing transfer arrangements, concluding an exchange of diplomatic notes (that would include security measures), and requiring GORM permission to notify the candidate. Fried said we would keep the information close hold until we transferred the detainee; noted the offer of $85,000 to assist his resettlement expenses; and offered to make himself available for interviews should the GORM want help shaping any press messaging. Fried stressed the importance of working out more detailed security arrangements for the detainee, along the lines of those applied in other countries that have accepted Guantanamo detainees for resettlement; Embassy Colombo could work directly with the Maldivian government on those arrangements.
Climate Change: Maldives Seeks Concrete Action
--------------------------------------------- -
5. (SBU) Meeting with Deputy S/SECC Jonathan Pershing, Ghafoor referred to Copenhagen as a stepping stone toward a legally binding agreement; Maldives is prepared to accept any form of treaty/accord that would lead to concrete action. He said he saw a reluctance within the United States Congress to take action. He would like Maldivian President Nasheed to have the opportunity to speak before Congress in order to provide a sincere voice for the urgency of climate change. Pershing asked if Ghafoor had a sense of why only 105 of 192 countries had associated themselves with the Accord. Ghafoor replied that, following the commitments of the U.S., China and India at Copenhagen, and despite opposition from a small, vocal minority of countries, there had been a political shift; many countries from CARICOM, the African Union (led by Ethiopia), and AOSIS will come to associate with Copenhagen and engage on subsequent agreements. These coalitions must be coaxed and not pushed into making decisions and meeting deadlines. Pershing noted that chairmanship of organizational meetings was vital.
6. (SBU) Ghafoor added that Maldives would like to see that small countries, like Maldives, that are at the forefront of the climate debate, receive tangible assistance from the larger economies. Other nations would then come to realize that there are advantages to be gained by compliance. Pershing noted that Copenhagen provides a generic framework for assistance, but that the next steps are procedural. He asked about Maldivian adaptation programs. Ghafoor referred to several projects, including harbor deepening and strengthening sea walls, that are in the development stage. These projects would cost approximately $50 million. Pershing encouraged Ghafoor to provide concrete examples and specific costs in order to increase the likelihood of bilateral assistance and congressional appropriations. Ghafoor proposed that President Obama deliver a speech on climate change from Maldives when he next visits the region. He said Maldives would provide a dramatic backdrop and draw further attention to environmental challenges the islands face.
Strengthening Security Cooperation
----------------------------------
7. (SBU) Meeting with Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for South and Southeast Asia Robert Scher, Ghafoor expressed appreciation for the warm reception he had been receiving in Washington. He said that Maldivian soldiers and police (many now senior staff officials) that were trained by the U.S. have earned the respect of both the government and the citizens of Maldives. (NOTE: Ghafoor's brother is a retired director of the Maldivian National Defense Force. END NOTE.) He said he looked forward to continued cooperation in this field. Scher asked how U.S. training
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compared with that of India in terms of quantity and quality. Ghafoor said that both were substantive and substantial. He acknowledged that Maldives also interacts with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, as one might expect of a 100 percent Muslim country situated in the region. Scher indicated that the U.S. did not want to get in the way of Maldivian relationships with its neighbors. Ghafoor assessed that New Delhi's perception of the U.S. has evolved and that Male would be able to address any concerns. He stated that his government would not let relations with India impact relations with the United States, reflecting Maldives's attempt to "show balance" in the past. Ghafoor replied that, if necessary, Maldives would explain that neither India nor Pakistan need suspect anything "untoward." Ghafoor also noted that young people can receive free education (in Islamic Studies) in Egypt and Pakistan. Scher asked if all of the students return to Maldives after their studies. Ghafoor said that some had been apprehended in round ups in Pakistan, where they had been recruited by extremists. He said he believed that such exposure led to a rise in fundamentalist views within Maldives's peaceful and tolerant culture. "It used to be simply a question of faith; now you must show that you are more Muslim than others," he said. Increased access to liberal western education would help to combat growing fundamentalist trends, he suggested. Scher pointed out that that some groups would hope to exploit this lack of education, and that it was good to hear that Maldivian authorities were actively monitoring the situation. Ghafoor acknowledged that human rights must allow for freedom of expression and said Maldives is looking for guidance on how to peaceably marry two often conflicting agendas, freedom and internal security. Scher replied that hatred is better faced head-on by a benevolent government rather than pushed underground. 8. (SBU) Ghafoor noted that drug use in Maldives has led to a rise in crime that President Nasheed has pledged to combat with prevention and rehabilitation. In the past, criminals were simply "banished" to a different island. He inquired about training assistance with management of prison facilities and the training of correctional officers. Scher pointed out that this would be a matter better addressed by State/INL, DOJ and USAID. Ghafoor noted that 99 percent of Maldives is extremely vulnerable to attack from the sea. More specifically, he said that an attack (such as by Somali pirates) on an island resort would cripple the country's economy. Maldives is seeking additional equipment and training from the U.S. on customs and border security. Scher expressed DOD's interest in expanding bilateral defense and security engagement, continuing training, and helping build the Maldives's maritime security capabilities to counteract the threat from terrorism, piracy, and trafficking. CLINTON
Tuesday, 02 February 2010, 05:38
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000163
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/01/2020
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KDEM, MOPS, ECON, KE, ET
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY OTERO'S MEETING WITH ETHIOPIAN
PRIME MINISTER MELES ZENAWI - JANUARY 31, 2010
Classified By: Under Secretary Maria Otero for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (SBU) January 31, 2010; 4:15 p.m.; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
2. (SBU) Participants:
U.S. Under Secretary Otero Assistant Secretary Carson NSC Senior Director for African Affairs Michelle Gavin PolOff Skye Justice (notetaker)
Ethiopia Prime Minister Meles Zenawi Special Assistant Gebretensae Gebremichael
Summary
-------
3. (C) Prime Minister Meles Zenawi told Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs Maria Otero his government placed no restrictions on its citizens' democratic and civil rights, only the right of foreign entities to fund them. Foreign funding of civil society organizations (CSOs) is antithetical to democratization, he said, as it makes civil society leaders accountable to foreign entities rather than their own members, turning the concept of democratic accountability on its head. Democracy in Ethiopia must develop organically, and Ethiopians must organize and fund themselves and defend their own rights. Meles assured U/S Otero that Ethiopia's upcoming elections will be free, fair, transparent, and peaceful, and elaborated steps his government has taken to ensure this. While opposition groups may resort to violence in an attempt to discredit the election, the GoE will enforce the recently enacted Electoral Code of Conduct and its existing election laws without regard to party affiliation. Meles said he has warned opposition leaders that the international community will not be able to save them should they violate Ethiopian law, but rather if they do so they will face the same fate as opposition leader Birtukan Midekssa, who will "vegetate in jail forever." The U.S. delegation noted that Ethiopia's forthcoming elections would be closely watched in the U.S., and urged Meles to exercise wise judgment and leadership, give the opposition more political space, and consider the release of Birtukan Midekssa.
4. (C) Meles said the GoE is not enthusiastic about Kenya's Jubaland initiative, but is sharing intelligence with Kenya and hoping for success. In the event the initiative is not successful, the GoE has plans in place to limit the destabilizing impacts on Ethiopia. On climate change, Meles said the GoE fully supports the Copenhagen accord, but is disappointed with signs the U.S. may not support his proposed panel to monitor international financial contributions under the accord. Meles made no substantive comment on inquiries regarding the liberalization of banking and telecommunications in Ethiopia. End summary.
Foreign Funding of CSOs Antithetical to Democratization
--------------------------------------------- ----------
5. (C) Prime Minister Meles Zenawi told U/S Otero the development of a strong democracy and civil society is the only way Ethiopia can ensure peace and unity among an ethnically and religiously divided population. He noted that the Government of Ethiopia's (GoE) commitment to democracy is directly related to stability, adding that for Ethiopia, "democratization is a matter of survival." Responding to U/S Otero's concern that Ethiopia's recently-enacted CSO law threatened the role of civil society, Meles said while the GoE welcomes foreign funding of charities, those Ethiopians who want to engage in political activity should organize and fund themselves. The leaders of CSOs that receive foreign funding are not accountable to their organizations, he said, but rather to the sources of their funding, turning the concept of democratic accountability on its head. Meles asserted that Ethiopians were not too poor to organize themselves and establish their own democratic traditions, recalling that within his lifetime illiterate peasants and poor students had overthrown an ancient imperial dynasty.
6. (C) Meles said his country's inability to develop a strong democracy was not due to insufficient understanding of democratic principles, but rather because Ethiopians had not
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internalized those principles. Ethiopia should follow the example of the U.S. and European countries, he said, where democracy developed organically and citizens had a stake in its establishment. When people are committed to democracy and forced to make sacrifices for it, Meles said, "they won't let any leader take it away from them." But "when they are spoon-fed democracy, they will give it up when their source of funding and encouragement is removed." Referencing his own struggle against the Derg regime, Meles said he and his compatriots received no foreign funding, but were willing to sacrifice and die for their cause, and Ethiopians today must take ownership of their democratic development, be willing to sacrifice for it, and defend their own rights.
7. (C) Meles drew a clear distinction between Ethiopians' democratic and civil rights on the one hand, and the right of foreign entities to fund those rights on the other. There is no restriction on Ethiopians' rights, he asserted, merely on foreign funding, adding that the U.S. has similar laws. U/S Otero countered that while the U.S. does not allow foreign funding of political campaigns, there is no restriction on foreign funding of NGOs. Ms. Gavin noted the examples of foreign support for the abolitionist movement in the U.S. and for the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa as positive examples of foreign engagement of civil society, and expressed that aside from the issue of foreign funding, the ability of local organizations to legally register, operate, and contribute to democratic discourse was of tantamount importance.
GoE Will Hold Free and Fair Elections, Despite Opposition
--------------------------------------------- ------------
8. (C) Meles assured U/S Otero that Ethiopia's upcoming electoral process will be free, fair, transparent, and peaceful. The GoE has learned from the violence that followed the 2005 elections, he said, and taken action to ensure that violence is not repeated. Meles said the recently signed Electoral Code of Conduct (CoC) was not done for the benefit of political parties, but for the Ethiopian people. The people will ultimately judge political actors, he said, and they must have parameters agreed to by the parties by which they will judge those actors. After the CoC was passed, Meles noted, the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) gathered over 1,300 of its senior leaders to discuss party strategy and train all leaders on the CoC. The EPRDF knows violations of the CoC by its members will hurt the party and provide a rallying cry for the opposition. This message will flow down to all EPRDF members, he said, so that they know what is expected of them, and know both the courts and the party will hold them accountable to the CoC.
9. (C) Meles told U/S Otero he feared a repeat of the 2005 violence, and that many opposition members were not interested in peaceful elections, but would rather discredit the electoral process. As such, the EPRDF cannot give them any excuse to resort to violence. Meles noted that in addition to opposition political parties, the GoE had intelligence that the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki were all directly or indirectly involved in plots to discredit the elections. The EPRDF, he said, would "let them be" to show the population that even though their opponents' goal is not peace, the EPRDF will abide by the law.
10. (C) Meles recalled that in 2005, he had told opposition leaders in the presence of the diplomatic corps that they should not believe foreign allies would protect them if they violated the laws of Ethiopia. Opposition leaders were right to believe the diplomatic corps would try to protect them, he said, as evidenced by the statement they issued demanding the release of opposition politicians upon their arrest in 2005. Today, Meles said, foreign embassies are inadvertently conveying the same message, that they will protest the jailing of opposition leaders and potentially take action against Ethiopia to secure their release. However, the GoE has made clear to both opposition and EPRDF leaders that nothing can protect them except the laws and constitution of Ethiopia, and the GoE will clamp down on anyone who violates those laws. "We will crush them with our full force," Meles said, and "they will vegetate like Birtukan (Midekssa) in jail forever."
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11. (C) In an extended discussion in response to Meles' comments, U/S Otero, A/S Carson, and Ms. Gavin noted that Ethiopia's forthcoming elections would be closely watched in the U.S. and that the GoE's treatment of the opposition would be subject to public criticism by the Ethiopian diaspora and U.S. political figures. The U.S. delegation urged Meles to exercise wise judgment and leadership, give the opposition more political space, and consider the release of Birtukan Midekssa. A/S Carson stressed the importance of putting Ethiopia's democracy on an upward and positive trajectory, and not letting it atrophy or slide backward, using the suffrage and civil rights movements in the U.S. as an illustration of challenges the U.S. has faced as it improved its own democratic system. (Note: Three quarters of the nearly two-hour meeting focused on democracy. End note.)
Ethiopia Not Enthusiastic About Jubaland Initiative
--------------------------------------------- ------
12. (C) Meles said he had been briefed extensively regarding Kenya's Jubaland initiative. Because Ethiopia had previously intervened in Somalia without seeking Kenyan approval, he said, the GoE would not presume to analyze the Kenyans' chances for success in their own intervention. The GoE is sharing intelligence with Kenya, but Meles expressed a lack of confidence in Kenya's capacity to pull off a tactical success, which he feared could have negative regional impacts. The GoE is therefore working to minimize the likelihood of a spillover effect in Ethiopia's Somali Regional State. Noting that Ethiopia might have underestimated Kenya, Meles said, "We are not enthusiastic, but we are hoping for success."
GoE Prepared to Move Forward from Copenhagen
--------------------------------------------
13. (C) U/S Otero urged Meles to sign the Copenhagen accord on climate change and explained that it is a point of departure for further discussion and movement forward on the topic. She noted that while the agreement has its limitations, it has the international community moving in the right direction. Meles responded that the GoE supported the accord in Copenhagen and would support it at the AU Summit. However, he expressed his disappointment that despite President Obama's personal assurance to him that finances committed in Copenhagen would be made available, he had received word from contacts at the UN that the U.S. was not supportive of Ethiopia's proposal for a panel to monitor financial pledges regarding climate change. Ms. Gavin assured the Prime Minister that she would look into his concerns.
No Promises on Liberalizing Telecoms, Banking
---------------------------------------------
14. (C) U/S Otero and A/S Carson encouraged Meles to hasten steps to liberalize the telecommunications and banking industries in Ethiopia, and highlighted both the micro- and macroeconomic benefits of liberalization. Meles offered no substantive response to A/S Carson's query whether any progress had been made toward liberalizing or otherwise improving telecommunications, joking that Americans' concept of time was much faster than Ethiopians'. In response to U/S Otero's recognition of the important role of private banks in microfinance projects that directly benefit the poor, and assurance that private and state-owned banks could thrive side-by-side, Meles said he would be happy to discuss the issue in the future. YATES
Thursday, 11 February 2010, 15:54
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000115
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG; NSC FOR AGUIRRE
EO 12958 DECL: 2/11/2020
TAGS MTCRE, PARM, PREL, MNUC, ETTC, KSCA, LY
SUBJECT: LIBYA INSISTS BALL IN U.S. COURT ON SCUD B ALTERNATIVE
REF: A) State 11501; B) 09 Tripoli 753; C) 09 Tripoli 960
TRIPOLI 00000115 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (U) This is an action request; see para 8.
2. (S) Summary: In a February 9 meeting with the Ambassador, the head of Libya's Scud B destruction program, General Ahmed Azwai, insisted that the USG was mostly responsible for Libya's delayed fulfillment of Scud B destruction commitments. Azwai blamed the USG for hampering Libyan efforts to find a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)-compliant alternative weapons system to replace its Scud B stock and refused to discuss a destruction timeline until Libya acquires a replacement system. The Libyans passionately believe that the U.S. committed to assisting in the search for an alternative weapons system, and they want the U.S. to fulfill that commitment. Azwai indicated that Libya still wants to purchase the Russian Iskander missile that Libya originally proposed (ideally at the originally stipulated purchase price), but said that it is up to the U.S. to decide whether that is acceptable -- if not, then he believes the U.S. should find an acceptable alternative. Azwai made no mention of the French Scalp missile or any other proposed alternatives during the meeting, suggesting that the Scalp proposal may have been an independent move by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi. Azwai requested U.S. support for Libya's bid for MTCR membership. End Summary.
AZWAI: THE U.S. COMMITED TO FIND AN ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM FOR LIBYA
3. (S) General Ahmed Azwai, head of Libya's Scud B destruction program, met with the Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, on February 9 to reiterate Libya's expectations that the USG identify a suitable alternative to the Scud B system. (Note: The meeting was scheduled in response to a September 2009 Embassy request for a status update on Libya's MTCR-related commitments. End note.) Azwai, joined by Tajuri al-Shiradi of the MFA's International Organizations office, as well as Libya's "Rocket Committee," reviewed the history of U.S.-Libya negotiations on the elimination of Libya's Scud Bs and insisted that the 2004 trilateral agreement included "promises by the U.S. and UK to find a replacement for the Scud B system." Referencing an English language version of the agreement that Azwai provided, the Ambassador explained that the wording did not commit the U.S. or UK to find a replacement system, but noted that we had in fact suggested alternative missile systems in the past, which Libya refused.
4. (S) Azwai insisted that the language of the agreement obligates the U.S. and UK to help Libya find a suitable replacement system. Azwai argued that instead of helping Libya fulfill its commitments, the U.S. had thrown obstacles in Libya's way, first by initially rejecting Libya's request to purchase Iskander missiles from Russia and then by delaying the sale by stalling the approval process. Azwai noted that Libya had already signed a contract with Russia to purchase the Iskander missiles when the U.S. objected (he asserted that the UK had assented to the sale). "The process dragged on for two years, and we could not wait that long~and now, we still do not have an acceptable alternative," he said. According to Azwai, the two other systems the U.S. suggested -- one from Ukraine and another from Russia -- were both "unacceptable alternatives" due to the technical and range specifications needed to guarantee Libya's national security. "We must have a replacement system," he stated. "I will not allow 12,000 Libyan soldiers to remain unarmed and vulnerable. If I give up their weapons before I have a replacement, they will turn on me." He argued that Libya had already given up some of its rocket systems and codes and did not intend to give up any more until it could replace its current stock.
ISKANDER STILL BEST ALTERNATIVE TO LIBYAN SCUD B
5. (S) While Azwai told the Ambassador that Libya was "actively looking" for an alternative system, he believes that the Iskander system originally proposed by the Libyan side is still the best alternative to Libya's Scud Bs. However, according to the Rockets Committee, the price of that system has increased by one hundred percent. Azwai expressed Libya's continued desire to purchase the Iskander missile at a lower price than that which the Russians were currently offering, and he sought U.S. approval for such a purchase. "In the beginning," he commented, "we were hoping for a U.S. system, but you said there was none." He continued that "the only friend for Libya is Russia on
TRIPOLI 00000115 002.2 OF 002
weapons sales." (Azwai did not mention the French Scalp system that Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's staff raised with Emboffs in November 2009, suggesting that the proposal may have been an independent move by Saif.) Azwai emphasized that he expected the U.S. to suggest viable alternatives, and for those suggestions to be offered either in writing or in the context of another meeting with him.
6. (S) The Ambassador asked whether Libya had begun to develop a timeline for the destruction of its Scud B missiles and suggested that a U.S. technical team come to Tripoli to discuss destruction plans. Per reftel guidance, the Ambassador offered that the USG could support Libya's Scud B destruction with technical and financial assistance. Initially Azwai refused to discuss destruction plans until an alternative system has been identified, but as the Ambassador reiterated his points, Azwai asked that the Rocket Committee make note of the U.S. offer. He asked whether the U.S. would fund destruction "one hundred percent," or partially, snidely remarking that "we Libyans need to be careful about what the American offers really mean." He underscored that Libya "will not think about destruction until you [the U.S.] fulfill your commitment." Azwai said that he would not be willing to discuss destruction until after a contract for a replacement system was signed. Furthermore, since the Libyans perceive the delays in meeting Libya's MTCR commitments as rooted in U.S. inaction on the issue, Azwai demanded that Libya receive an extension on its MTCR-commitment deadline.
LIBYA'S BID FOR MTCR MEMBERSHIP
7. (S) Azwai further complained that the United States had not supported Libya's recent bids to become a full MTCR member. Members of the Rocket Committee specified that they had requested support from several embassies in Libya, with the exception of the United States, but had also requested support in Paris, at the most recent MTCR meetings. Azwai said that Libya had fulfilled the stipulations the MTCR committee required for membership, including adopting new legislation, but still could not obtain full membership. He inferred that the U.S. was part of the reason Libya's membership was blocked. The Ambassador highlighted that the USG could not act on a request that was not directly raised with us and advised the Rocket Committee to send an official request for U.S. support of Libya's membership in order for it to be considered in Washington. Azwai agreed to do so.
COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST
8. (S/NF) This meeting revealed what appears to be a fundamental misunderstanding regarding the terms and obligations of the involved parties of the 2004 trilateral Scud B disposition agreement. Azwai was adamant that the U.S. was obliged to help Libya identify a Scud B replacement system and made it clear that, unless we do, he has no intention of moving forward on destruction. It is unclear whether Azwai's position is based on a concrete Libyan legal interpretation of the 2004 agreement or a purely political assessment that Libya has gotten less than it was promised during the 2003-2004 negotiations regarding its WMD programs. We have been hearing the latter with increasing frequency from the highest levels of the Libyan government, including Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi. It is clear that further discussions -- either at the expert or political level -- will be required in order to make progress on the replacement and destruction issues. The Department's guidance on next steps on these issues, as well as Libya's MTCR membership bid, is requested. CRETZ
Monday, 21 December 2009, 16:26
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 001025
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. STATE PLEASE PASS TO ENERGY
(ANDREW BIENIAWSKI, KELLY CUMMINS, AND SARAH DICKERSON).
EO 12958 DECL: 12/21/2019
TAGS PREL, PINS, MNUC, PARM, PINR, RS, KGIC, KNNP, KRAD, ENRG,
LY
SUBJECT: FINAL HEU SHIPMENT DEPARTS LIBYA
REF: A) TRIPOLI 938 B) TRIPOLI 966; C) TRIPOLI 941
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (S/NF) On December 21 at 0515, a Russian-chartered plane took off from Tripoli with the seven casks containing Libya's final Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) spent fuel stocks. Department of Energy (DOE) staff in Tripoli confirmed that the flight arrived in Russia at 11:15 local time. Today's flight marked the successful completion of Libya's commitments to dismantle its nuclear weapons programs.
2. (S/NF) Visiting DOE staff reported that the loading of the casks the overnight on December 20-21 went smoothly. They said that Libyan officials at Tajoura Nuclear Center provided no insights into the reasons behind the GOL's last-minute decision to cancel the planned November 25 shipment (ref a) or to put it back on track via a letter to Russian authorities on December 15 (ref b). DOE staff said the month-long impasse had taken a visible toll on Dr. Ali Gashut, the head of the Libyan Atomic Energy Establishment. Gashut seemed "embarrassed" and "different," and commented that he had spent a lot of time "waiting in ministry halls," presumably as the GOL debated policy options. The director of the Tajura Nuclear Center, Engineer Ahmed al-Habrush, was personally present for the loading of the casks and signed all the required documents for handing over the HEU.
3. (S/NF) In reference to queries made by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi regarding the disposition of Libya's centrifuges that were handed over to the U.S. (Ref C), the DOE visitors noted that any centrifuges that were sent to the U.S. were destroyed and could not be could be returned to Libya in their original form. If the Libyans were referring to other materiel, such as high efficient machinery, some equipment was moved to the U.S. and some was left in Libya to be used for peaceful purposes such for medical uses.
4. (SNF) The Ambassador would like to thank the DOE team - Kelly Cummins, Igor Bolshinsky, and Stan Moses - for their efforts to resolve this issue. Their on-the-ground, expert analysis ensured that the Embassy was fully apprised of all of the technical details, and their clear explanation of the complex timelines and constraints helped ensure a timely resolution. We are very grateful for their work.
CRETZ
Monday, 07 December 2009, 16:14
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000950
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG.
EO 12958 DECL: 12/7/2019
TAGS PREL, MNUC, PARM, PINR, RS, KGIC, KNNP, KRAD, ENRG, LY
SUBJECT: LIBYAN HEU SHIPMENT SECURE; NO DECISION YET REGARDING NEXT
STEPS
REF: A) TRIPOLI 938; B) TRIPOLI 941
CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (S/NF) Summary: Visiting DOE experts confirmed December 6 that the Libyan Government had taken the requisite steps to increase the security of the seven casks of HEU, and that the contents -- and IAEA seals -- remained unchanged since the shipment was halted November 25. The Libyan Government has not yet provided guidance to its nuclear scientists regarding next steps on the shipment, but Libyan scientists are developing contingency plans to remove the HEU from the casks in Libya in the event the casks must be returned empty to Russia. DOE experts estimate that Libyan approval must be received by December 10 in order for the shipment to be completed by the end of December. Separately, a close aide to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi indicated that the Secretary's message to Libyan FM Musa Kusa had been positively received and passed to the "highest levels" of the Libyan Government. The aide also indicated that Kusa would call the Secretary in the "coming days" to assure her that the Libyan Government had approved the shipment. We continue to underscore with Libyan officials the need to resolve this issue. End summary.
HEU CASKS SECURE, UNCHANGED
2. (S/NF) Visiting DOE experts confirmed December 6 that the Libyan Government had taken the requisite steps to increase security at the Tajura Nuclear Facility, and that the seven casks of highly enriched uranium (HEU) appeared to have remained unchanged since the planned shipment to Russia was halted on November 25 (ref a). The DOE experts reported a visible increase in the number of armed guards surrounding the facility. They also confirmed that Tajura staff had disengaged the crane within the facility and had assured the team that a new, unassembled crane would not be built until after the shipment had taken place. DOE's measurements of the spent fuel within the casks determined that the content had remained unchanged. Likewise, the IAEA seals on each cask remained in place and uncompromised.
NO DECISIONS
3. (S/NF) The DOE team also reported that Libyan technical specialists at Tajura had not yet received guidance from the Libyan Government on next steps regarding the shipment. Dr. Ali Gashut, Head of Libya's Atomic Energy Establishment, confirmed this information in a December 7 telcon with the DOE team. The team also reported that although the Libyan Government had sent the Russian Government a diplomatic note confirming that the GOL would complete its contract to return the casks to Russia by the end of the calendar year, the note did not specify whether the casks would be returned empty or with the HEU spent fuel shipment. The DOE team assessed the diplomatic note as an attempt to mollify Russian demands that the casks be returned.
POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS
4. (S/NF) The DOE team estimated that the GOL must give its approval to move forward on the shipment by December 10 in order for the shipment to take place by the end of December. The DOE experts emphasized that significant lead time is required in order set up the necessary logistical arrangements, permits and overflight clearances for the specialized Russian plane to return to Tripoli and transport the HEU to Russia.
5. (S/NF) The DOE team reported that Russian engineers had begun to design a remote-controlled grapple to be used in the event that the HEU spent fuel must be off-loaded from the casks in Libya. Tajura staff told the DOE experts that, if GOL approval for the shipment was not forthcoming by December 10, the Tajura staff planned to start training on how to use the grapple to off-load the casks. (According to DOE experts, spent nuclear fuel has never been removed from casks for restorage; the removal of the spent fuel in Libya would be an unprecedented initiative.) DOE experts also commented that the return of the empty casks to Russia, if necessary, would be best done by boat and said they are developing contingency plans for that scenario.
POSITIVE FEEDBACK FROM THE SECRETARY'S CALL
6. (S/NF) Separately, emboffs have attempted to seek clarification of the Libyan Government's next steps regarding the HEU shipment. Mohamed Ismail Ahmed, Chief of Staff of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, told Pol/Econ Chief that the Secretary's December 3 call to Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa had expressed the statement of commitment requested by Saif during his recent meeting with the Ambassador (ref b), and that Kusa had passed the message to the "highest levels" of the Libyan Government. Ahmed emphasized that Saif had made a "commitment" to the Ambassador to ensure that the HEU shipment would be approved by the Libyan Government, and "Saif will follow-through on that commitment." Ahmed said Kusa intended to call the Secretary within the "coming days" in order to personally assure her that the GOL had approved the shipment. Emboffs also briefed Ahmed and MFA officials on the requisite timeline and lengthy logistical preparations needed to ensure the spent fuel's transfer to Russia by the end of the year.
COMMENT
7. (S/NF) Ahmed's comments indicate that the Secretary's message to Kusa was positively received. A flurry of phone calls between DOE and Libyan experts today also indicated that working-level Libyan officials are seeking more time to resolve the issue, as the Libyans successfully convinced the DOE experts to extend the deadline for a Libyan decision by two days, to December 10 (the initial deadline proposed by DOE was December 8). At this point, we are interpreting the Libyan experts' technical preparations for a possible unloading of the casks in Libya as the contingency planning required to address the very real safety and security concerns raised by the halted shipment. We will reassess that view on December 10, and will continue to underscore with Libyan officials the need for a resolution of the issue this week. POLASCHIK
Tuesday, 01 December 2009, 17:28
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000943
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. STATE PLEASE PASS TO ENERGY
(KELLY CUMMINS AND SARAH DICKERSON).
EO 12958 DECL: 12/1/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MNUC, PARM, PINR, RS, KGIC, KNNP, KRAD, ENRG,
LY
SUBJECT: LIBYAN MFA BRIEFED ON HEU SECURITY CONCERNS
REF: A) TRIPOLI 938, B) TRIPOLI 941
CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (S/NF) Pol/Econ Chief met MFA Americas Acting A/S-equivalent Mohamed Matari December 1 to convey our serious concerns about the security of the seven HEU-filled casks at the Tajoura Nuclear Facility. Matari dismissed U.S. concerns, stating there was "no one sophisticated enough" in Libya to be able to do anything with the casks and that the chances of anything happening were very low. He mentioned the IAEA seals as evidence that the fuel was protected (Ref A). Pol/Econ Chief underscored that the GOL should be concerned about the situation, as the casks were easily transportable and Tajoura was a poorly protected facility. U.S. DOE specialists had recommended an increased security guard presence -- armed if possible -- around Tajoura and the disengagement of the crane inside the facility. Pol/Econ Chief emphasized that the casks were easily transportable, and advised him not to be too dismissive of the security risks involved in keeping the casks unprotected. Matari said that he would meet with Foreign Minister Musa Kusa today to relay our concerns.
2. (S/NF) Pol/Econ Chief also described the environmental disaster that could take place if we did not ship the casks to Russia for disposal within a month. The U.S. needed a decision from the Libyan side as soon as possible on the shipment, as it would take time to reschedule the travel of the specialized Russian plane, including overflight permits, landing permits, and negotiating with the Russian MFA to cancel other scheduled stops. Matari was not aware of how complicated it would be to schedule a return visit of the plane, although he understood that only a few such planes exist in the world. He said he agreed that a decision needed to be passed to us within a few weeks.
3. (S/NF) Matari was not aware that Dr. Gashut claimed to have prepared a document for senior regime officials listing all of the environmental dangers associated with holding the shipment back. Matari said that Gashut probably gave the paper to Prime Mininster-equivalent al-Baghdad al-Mahmoudi (Gashut's boss) but did not think it had been passed to the MFA. (Matari may well have been unaware of any communications between Gashut and Kusa on this issue.) Matari promised to call us after he had briefed Kusa.
4. (S/NF) We also are seeking a meeting with Saif al-Islam al-Qadhaif's aide Mohamed Ismail Ahmed to relay the same information, in hopes of ensuring that senior Libyan officials understand the grave security and safety risks posed by the halted shipment.
POLASCHIK
Monday, 30 November 2009, 17:19
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000941
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. STATE PLEASE PASS TO ENERGY (KELLY
CUMMINS AND SARAH DICKERSON).
EO 12958 DECL: 11/30/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MNUC, PARM, PINR, RS, KGIC, KNNP, KRAD, ENRG,
LY
SUBJECT: LIBYANS SEEK RENEWED COMMITMENT FROM U.S. IN RETURN FOR
PROGRESS ON HEU SHIPMENT
REF: TRIPOLI 938
CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. This is an action request; see para 13.
2. (S/NF) Summary: Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi told the Ambassador November 27 that Libya had halted the shipment of its final HEU stockpiles because it was "fed up" with the slow pace of bilateral engagement. Saif claimed that Libya had not received the "compensation" it was promised in exchange for an end to its WMD programs, including cooperation in the military, security, nonproliferation, civilian-nuclear, and economic spheres. Libya sought a high-level reaffirmation of the United States' commitment to the bilateral relationship, in the form of a message to Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi, in order to move forward on the HEU shipment. Saif al-Islam, who claimed that he was "back" on the U.S. portfolio, said his father did not want to move back to "square one" and wanted to develop a positive relationship with the new U.S. Administration. The Ambassador underscored the gravity of the situation and noted that the Libyan Government had chosen a very dangerous venue to express its pique. He also noted that many of the holdups in the bilateral relationship had been due to Libyan political missteps and bureaucratic bungling. The Ambassador told Saif he would try to get some kind of statement along the lines requested, but the HEU shipment should in no way be held hostage to any specific actions beyond that. Saif assured the Ambassador that once that message was conveyed to Tripoli, he would immediately "fix" the problem. End Summary.
3. (S/NF) Once again exhibiting their flair for the dramatic, and after almost one week of stonewalling regarding the decision to not allow the departure of the HEU shipment to Russia, the Libyan leadership authorized a meeting between Saif al-Islam (accompanied by an assistant) and the Ambassador (accompanied by Pol-Econ Counselor) as the Ambassador was departing for the airport to travel to Washington. During the November 27 meeting, the Ambassador expressed his deep concern about Libya's decision to halt shipment of its remaining Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) stockpile to Russia for treatment and disposal. The Ambassador said that Libya's WMD commitments were the cornerstone of the relationship, and the last-minute, unexplained disapproval of the shipment seemed to renege on those commitments. He emphasized that the Libyans must move forward with the shipment as soon as possible, for security reasons and to preserve the bilateral relationship. The Ambassador pressed Saif to explain why the shipment was held up and insisted that the Libyans must improve communication in times of crisis, stating that Libyan officials cannot simply ignore calls from high-level USG officials and refuse to explain their decisions that negatively affect bilateral interests. This was no way to conduct a relationship. The decision to halt the shipment and create this crisis was intensified by the timing and the international context, given the President's focus on non-proliferation and the problems engendered by Iran. By its actions, Libya was jeopardizing its relationship with the whole international community.
4. (S/NF) Saif al-Islam explicitly linked Libya's decision to halt the HEU shipment to its dissatisfaction with the U.S. relationship. Saif said the shipment was halted because the regime was "fed up" with the pace of the relationship and what it perceived as a backing-out of commitments to bilateral cooperation. The areas of specific concern were Libya's purchase of military equipment (non-lethal and lethal weapons), an update on what was being done with Libya's centrifuges, movement on the Regional Nuclear Medicine Center, and financial assistance for the chemical weapons destruction program, including construction of the destruction facility. Saif pledged to solve the HEU crisis and to allow the shipment to move forward as early as next week if the USG expressed a renewed commitment to the relationship and to deeper engagement. Saif noted that the message needed to be conveyed to (or addressed to) Libyan Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi.
5. (S/NF) Saif continued that prevailing domestic opinion and conservative forces were critical of Libya's decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Noting that he personally had played an important role in Libya's re-engagement with the West, Saif asserted that "If something goes wrong, people will blame me, whether I am in a certain official position or not." Saif stated that Libya's decision to give up its WMD programs was contingent upon "compensation" from the U.S., including the purchase of conventional weapons and non-conventional military equipment; security cooperation; military cooperation; civil-nuclear cooperation and assistance, to include the building of a Regional Nuclear Medicine Facility; and the end of "double taxation" and economic cooperation, such as the signing of a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA).
6. (S/NF) Saif noted that Libya was a small, rich country, surrounded by large, powerful, poorer neighbors. Yet Libya, the only Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) signatory in the region, had given up all of its conventional weapons and could not purchase replacement systems or military equipment from the United States. He highlighted Egypt, a non-MTCR signatory, as an example of a neighboring country that receives millions of dollars in U.S. aid and military assistance but did not have to share Libya's nonproliferation commitments. Relative to such neighbors, Libya's decision to dismantle its nuclear programs had weakened its ability to defend itself. He stated, "We share rich natural resources -- oil and gas -- along the borders, yet we have no capacity to defend that wealth." Saif complained that Libya could not purchase conventional weapons from the United States or even from Sweden or Germany due to U.S. holds on the sale of those weapons to Libya -- "even until now, seven years later, there is an embargo on Libya's purchase of lethal equipment." He specifically mentioned a problem purchasing "Tiger" vehicles outfitted with American-manufactured engines from Jordan, due to a U.S. legal restriction on Libya's purchase of American-equipment.
7. (S/NF) Inquiring about the status of the centrifuges Libya gave up as part of its WMD commitments, Saif argued that the U.S. had used the "deal" as a public relations coup for the previous administration. He said that the fact that the centrifuges were sent to the United States and are still there, rather than under IAEA surveillance and control was a "big insult to the Leader." The fact that Libya was never "compensated" for the centrifuges added to the insult. In addition to the centrifuge problem, he complained that Libya had to pay for the destruction of its chemical weapons. Saif insisted that Libya was not able to pay to destroy its chemical weapons stock, noting that the construction of the destruction facility alone was estimated to cost US $25 million. For these and other reasons relating to "non-compensation" for WMD decisions, he stated that certain voices in Libya were pressuring the Leader to withdraw from the MTCR agreement. He lamented that "slowly, slowly, we are moving backward rather than forward." He told the Ambassador that in order for the relationship to progress, the U.S. needed to make a move. "The ball is in your court," Saif urged.
8. (S/NF) Continuing his lament, Saif said the U.S.-Libya relationship was "not going well." Since his last visit to the United States in 2008, Saif said that both sides had deviated from the roadmap that had been agreed upon at that time, which specified cooperation in the military, security, nonproliferation, civilian-nuclear, and economic spheres. He asserted that the roadmap had gotten "lost" due to his own "disappearance" from the political scene and "preoccupation with other issues overseas." He acknowledged that he was disconnected for a long time but that he was back on the political scene -- although he was careful to caveat that he had not yet accepted an official role in the regime.
9. (S/NF) Saif raised a few recent incidents that he argued illustrated how things were going wrong. First, he pointed to Muammar al-Qadhafi's recent trip to New York, which in Saif's opinion had not gone well, because of the "tent and residence issues and his [pere Qadhafi's] inability to visit ground zero." He said that all three issues had been complicated by local U.S. authorities and had humiliated the Libyan leader -- "even tourists can see ground zero without permission, but a Head of State cannot?" Secondly, Saif believed that his father's UNGA speech had been misinterpreted by U.S. audiences; he specifically focused on statements involving moving the UN Headquarters outside of the United States and various assassination investigations (JFK, Rafik al-Hariri, etc.). Saif stated that the elder Qadhafi meant no offense by his statements, but was merely trying to "pave the way" for any future decisions that POTUS might make related to those issues. Lastly, Saif noted that the Libyan leader was worried about U.S. intervention in Africa. The elder Qadhafi was also against the linguistic and political division of Africa into "North" and "Sub-Saharan" Africa and wanted countries such as the United States to treat Africa as a single entity rather than two blocs.
10. (S/NF) Saif said that Muammar al-Qadhafi was serious about deepening engagement with the United States and establishing a relationship with the Obama Administration. Saif said that his father did not want to "go back to square one," but wanted to move the bilateral relationship forward. Saif emphasized the Libyan leader's interest in meeting POTUS in a third country if a meeting in the United States was not possible. Such a meeting would help overcome the negative history that our nations shared, would support the rebuilding of trust, and might even help with U.S. Embassy operations and activities in Libya, according to Saif.
11. (S/NF) The Ambassador noted that the relationship had seen several advancements and several serious setbacks since Saif's last visit to the United States, including the August 20 hero's welcome accorded to Lockerbie bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi by Saif himself. Megrahi's return had severely offended American sensitivities and renewed tensions that set the relationship back. Until that point, there had been significant progress, with a military-to-military agreement signed in January and the positive April visit of National Security Advisor Mutassim al-Qadhafi and his meeting with the Secretary. Although the death of Fathi el-Jahmi had been a setback to the relationship, the U.S. and Libya had found a productive way forward through the establishment of a bilateral Human Rights Dialogue. Regarding concerns about U.S. intervention in Africa, the Ambassador reminded Saif that Colonel Qadhafi and General Ward had had what we believed to be a very productive meeting several months ago, which we had hoped would have dispelled any concerns the Libyans had about U.S. intentions in Africa. The Ambassador explained that Americans were hoping for a more forward-leaning statement by Muammar al-Qadhafi in New York but instead heard a series of remarks that were not agreeable to the American public. As a result, the relationship has been placed on a "low-burner" since August.
12. (S/NF) In spite of these issues, the Ambassador said the U.S. had managed to keep moving ahead in the areas of security, military, political, civilian-nuclear, and economic cooperation. However, many of the delays in implementation were due to Libya's opaque bureaucracy. The Section 505 end user agreement, for example, had languished in the GOL for months, as had Libya's response on TIFA. Libya's slow-rolling on visa approvals for official American travelers had delayed movement in areas such as civilian-nuclear cooperation and on the Regional Nuclear Medicine Facility.
13. (S/NF) Saif acknowledged that he was disconnected for a long time from the bilateral relationship and recognized that the hero's welcome for Megrahi had set engagement back. He reiterated that he was "back" on the scene and could serve as the "trouble-shooter" for any future problems. He urged the Ambassador to contact his office directly in times of crisis. He also promised to resolve the visa issue, stating that he understood the importance of a transparent and reliable system of issuance. In their one-on-one discussion afterwards, the Ambassador asked Saif to explain his actions when he accompanied Megrahi back to Tripoli. Saif said he knew what the reaction in the West would be, but that it did not constitute an "official" welcome. He had worked on the release for a long time, he was not a public official, and there were no international media like Al Jazeera present. In addition, Saif claimed that the Libyans would someday find a way to show that Megrahi was innocent. The Ambassador reiterated the damage the welcome had done and said no amount of justification could undo that. Saif nodded his understanding. Saif also replied that if he is confirmed in his new position, he was as yet not sure whether he would retain his current position as head of the Qadhafi Development Foundation.
COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST
14. (S/NF) The Libyan Government has chosen a very dangerous issue on which to express its apparent pique about perceived problems in the bilateral relationship, a point the Ambassador underscored with Saif al-Islam. If Saif is to be believed, it appears we might have a way forward. If the Department is willing, we would urge a phone call from the Secretary to Musa Kusa with a message for Colonel Qadhafi comprising a general statement of commitment to the relationship, a commitment to work with the Libyans to move the relationship ahead, and a strong point insisting that the HEU shipment be allowed to go forward immediately and not be held hostage to any further actions.
BIO NOTE
15. (S/NF) Saif met the Ambassdor in an office on the Bab Al-Aziziya compound. The office was filled with books, including a high stack of art and interior design books and several brochures distributed by the Embassy's Public Affairs Section. Saif conducted the meeting in English. He was accompanied by his personal assistant, Mohamed Ismail Ahmed (DOB 07/06/1968), who said that he was born in Alexandria, Egypt, and spent his childhood years traveling abroad with his diplomat father, including in Afghanistan in the late 1970s, where he attended the American School. Ahmed was soft-spoken and spoke fluent English. He asked Pol/Econ chief to provide him with additional information on the status of Libya's military procurement requests and Letters of Offer and Assistance (LOA's). POLASCHIK
Wednesday, 25 November 2009, 13:59
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000938
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. STATE PLEASE PASS TO ENERGY (ANDREW BIENIAWSKI AND KELLY CUMMINS).
EO 12958 DECL: 11/25/2019
TAGS PREL, PINS, MNUC, PARM, PINR, RS, KGIC, KNNP, KRAD, ENRG,
LY
SUBJECT: LIBYA HALTS HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM FUEL TRANSFER
REF: Tripoli 870
TRIPOLI 00000938 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (S/NF) Summary: Following a four-day standoff, the Russian plane scheduled to remove Libya's last remaining HEU spent fuel stores departed Libya without its cargo. Despite bilateral agreements with the U.S. and Russia -- and intensive outreach efforts by the U.S. and Russian Ambassadors -- Libyan officials unexpectedly refused to allow the HEU to leave the country. DOE experts are deeply concerned by the safety and security risks posed by the Libyans' decision. The seven five-ton casks, each closed with two IAEA seals, remain at the lightly-guarded Tajoura Nuclear Facility. DOE experts requested that the GOL disengage the loading crane and provide extra armed guards, but are not confident that the GOL will take the requisite security measures. The DOE experts will brief the IAEA of their concerns, and said the IAEA could provide additional seals appropriate for long-term storage and cameras.
2. (S/NF) Summary continued: According to the DOE experts, we have one month to resolve the situation before the safety and security concerns become a crisis. They believe Russia could provide another plane to remove the HEU in late December, at which point the casks must be moved to their next location. If the HEU is not removed from the casks within three months, its rising temperature could cause the casks to crack and to release radioactive nuclear material. If the HEU is not sent to Russia, the Russians would be required to develop entirely new technology to remove the spent fuel from the casks in Libya. Security concerns alone dictate that we must employ all of our resources to find a timely solution to this problem, and to keep any mention of it out of the press. End summary.
GOL UNEXPECTEDLY HALTS HEU FUEL SHIPMENT
3. (S/NF) On November 20 the GOL unexpectedly ordered a team of visiting Department of Energy and Russian (from Rostom Kirienko) officials to halt preparations of Libya's 5.2 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to ship to Russia for treatment and disposal, in spite of the government-to-government agreement signed by Libya and the United States on October 28 and a parallel agreement with the Russian government (reftel). Dr. Ali Gashut, Director of the Libyan Atomic Energy Establishment, sent the instruction by phone through the Director of the Tajoura Nuclear Facility, specifying that Gashut had been "instructed" to delay the arrival of the plane that would transport the fuel to Russia. [Note: At that time, the Libyan engineers at Tajoura indicated to DOE experts that the instruction was coming from PM al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi's office. End note.] The plane, a Russian Antonov 124-100, was scheduled to arrive on November 21, with loading to take place during the night of November 21, for shipment on November 22. Although the Russian crew already had official Libyan permission to land on November 21, Gashut told the DOE and Russian teams, via his staff, that the Libyan government did not approve the landing and asked that the plane be delayed. The teams delayed arrival of the plane until November 23. After several days on the ground without a change in the GOL's position, the Russian plane and team from Rostom Kirienko departed early in the morning of November 25 without the shipment.
4. (S/NF) Since November 20, the Ambassador and emboffs have engaged Foreign Ministry officials, the National Security Advisor's (NSA) office, the PM's office, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's staff, and Muammar al-Qadhafi's staff, seeking an explanation and reversal of the GOL's last-minute decision to halt the shipment. Foreign Ministry and NSA officials pledged to communicate the problems to Foreign Minister Musa Kusa and National Security Advisor, Mutassim al-Qadhafi, respectively. The Ambassador has also maintained close communication with the Russian Ambassador on the situation. One official insisted to the Ambassador that the Foreign Ministry had done everything "by the book" to prepare for the fuel transfer to move forward on November 21 and could not imagine what could have gone wrong. He claimed that Musa Kusa was briefed on the situation but that "Gashut reports directly to the PM's office." Salem Hamza, Special Advisor to National Security Advisor Mutassim al-Qadhafi, also claimed to have briefed his boss on the issue and that he did not know what was holding up the program.
SECURITY CONCERNS
5. (S/NF) On November 25, the DOE team briefed the Ambassador and emboffs on their concerns about the security of the HEU in its present state and next steps. The 5.2 kilograms of HEU are stored in seven five-ton casks, which the DOE experts said are "highly transportable." The casks currently are at the lightly-guarded Tajoura Nuclear Facility, closed with two IAEA seals that are adequate only for transportation, not storage. The team asked the Director of the Tajoura facility to disengage the site's loading crane, in order to prevent an intruder from using it to move the casks. They also asked that extra human security be added onsite, stating that the last time they were at Tajoura, on November 24, they only saw one security guard with a gun (although they did not know if it was loaded). The team plans to brief the IAEA about the situation and to express concern about the security of the fuel. They said it was possible that the IAEA would provide additional seals and/or cameras to increase the casks' security.
6. (S/NF) According to the DOE experts, we have approximately one month to resolve the situation, before the safety and security concerns posed by the delayed shipment reach the level of a crisis. The casks in which the Libyan HEU is stored must be moved to their next location at the end of December. The DOE experts believe that the Russians could provide another plane to transport that shipment during that timeframe. However, if the Libyans refuse to allow the shipment to go forward, the Russian experts would be required to design new technology to remove the spent fuel from the casks and put it back into the ponds at Tajoura. DOE experts stressed that this would be an unprecedented operation. They also stated that the spent fuel must be either shipped to Russia or removed from the casks in the next three months. At that point, the temperature of the HEU fuel, which is radioactive, could reach such a level to cause cracking on the casks and release of radioactive nuclear material. The team stated that their Russian counterparts are deeply concerned about liability if the radioactive material leaks from the transportation casks.
NEXT STEPS
7. (S/NF) If the Libyans can be persuaded to allow the transfer to proceed, the DOE team will work with Russian counterparts to schedule another visit by the Russian plane for transportation of the fuel, which the team estimated could take up to a month (that will require the reissuance of overflight and entry permits for Turkey, Greece, and Libya, as well as cancellation of other transport contracts that the plane already has scheduled). Absent Libya's agreement to allow the shipment to move forward, the DOE and Russian team will resort to designing and manufacturing the technology that would be necessary to unload the fuel casks remotely at the Tajoura facility.
COMMENT
8. (S/NF) Security concerns dictate that we must deploy all of our resources to find a solution to this problem. The Ambassador continues to seek an urgent meeting with the Libyan Foreign Minister and other senior officials to press for a resolution and to obtain information about what instigated the Libyan decision to halt progress on the fuel shipment. The Russian Ambassador has also been trying to meet with any of several high-level officials, but has been ignored. The situation has been complicated by a state visit by the Turkish PM as well as other visits, and the onset of the Eid al-Adha holiday, which began here today and extends for four days. The Russians did manage to convey a letter from Vice FM Sultanov on November 24, urging the GOL to let the shipment take place. If further efforts fail over the next few days, it may be necessary to consider a senior-level official call to Muammar al-Qadhafi to stress the urgency of the situation and the high degree of concern about the possibility of Libya's backtracking on its nuclear nonproliferation commitments. Lacking any other information, we have to assume that the Libyan leader is the source of the problem at this point
9. (S/NF) Security concerns also dictate that we handle this issue with the utmost discretion. Given the highly transportable nature of the HEU and the shoddy security at Tajoura, any mention of this issue in the press could pose serious security concerns. We strongly urge that any press inquiries be addressed with a no comment -- or a more general reply along the lines of: The U.S. and the international community continue to work with the Government of Libya to address its WMD commitments. End comment. CRETZ
Wednesday, 17 February 2010, 13:31
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BRUSSELS 000183
SIPDIS
NSC FOR DNSA FROMAN, KVIEN, BELL
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR FOR SAPIRO AND WILSON
EO 12958 DECL: 02/16/2020
TAGS EAID, ECON, ECPS, EFIN, ENRG, EINV, ETRD, EUN, KGHG,
PREL, SENV, BR, CH, HA, IN, SF
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: DEPUTY NSA MICHAEL FROMAN VISIT TO
BRUSSELS, JANUARY 27, 2010
SUMMARY
-------
1. (C) Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economic Affairs Michael Froman held wide-ranging discussions with over 25 senior EU officials in Brussels January 27. Froman and the Ambassador met with Commission President Barroso, the incoming European Commissioners for Climate (Hedegaard), Internal Markets (Barnier) and Trade (De Gucht), and with new European Council President Van Rompuy,s Chief of Staff. Froman and the Ambassador also lunched with a dozen Directors General and Commissioner cabinet chiefs, and led a roundtable with Member State Ambassadors. The EU officials welcomed Froman,s call for stronger bilateral cooperation to boost our economies, improve coordination on climate, Doha and financial regulation, and push back against coordinated opposition of BASIC countries (China, India, Brazil, South Africa) to our international positions. They also appreciated the Ambassador,s message that they must capitalize on the Obama Administration commitment to multilateralism to secure with the U.S. concrete achievements to strengthen growth and create jobs.
2. (C) DNSA Froman and Hedegaard committed to work closely to define the right Post-Copenhagen climate negotiating group and process, and agreed to hold a DVC prior to the February 11 European Council. Froman and De Gucht committed to share ideas to improve the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), with De Gucht planning a February-March DC visit to discuss TEC and trade issues. Froman, Barnier, and lunch attendees agreed on the importance of bilateral coordination to improve G20 and other work on financial reform. De Gucht and other officials noted the urgency of building U.S.-EU crisis response and development cooperation in the wake of the Haiti earthquake. Finally, Froman expressed U.S. support for the new EU Lisbon Treaty structure; the officials explained that the EU will need time to adjust to the new format but should emerge with better, more streamlined decisionmaking. END SUMMARY.
A PACKED AGENDA WITH SENIOR EU OFFICIALS
----------------------------------------
3. (C) Deputy National Security Advisor for International Affairs Michael Froman held intense, broad-ranging discussions with EU and Member State officials on January 27 enroute to the Davos World Economic Forum. Ambassador Kennard accompanied Froman throughout the day. Froman met with European Commissioners-designate for Climate Connie Hedegaard and for Internal Markets Michel Barnier, current Development Commissioner and Commissioner-designate for Trade Karel de Gucht (plus staff for all), and new European Council President Herman Von Rompuy,s chief of staff Frans Van Daele. Froman also met briefly with Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and with Director General for External Relations Joao Vale de Almeida. Froman attended a lunch hosted by Vale de Almeida featuring:
- Marco Buti, Director General for Economic and Financial Affairs Jonathan Faull, Director General for Justice, Freedom and Security - Antonio Cabral, President Barroso Senior Economic Policy Adviser - Fernando Andresen Guimaraes, President Barroso Diplomatic Adviser - James Morrison, Head of Cabinet for High Representative and Commission Vice President Catherine Ashton - Olivier Guersent, Head of Cabinet for Commissioner-designate for Internal Market and Services Michel Barnier - Timo Pesonen, Head of Cabinet for Commissioner-designate for Economic and Financial Affairs Ollie Rehn - Mark Vanheukelen, Head of Cabinet of Commissioner-designate for Trade Karel de Gucht - Alan Seatter, Director for North America in Directorate General for External Relations - Jean Claude Thebault, new Commission Deputy Secretary General
BRUSSELS 00000183 002 OF 007
4. (C) Froman and the Ambassador ended with a roundtable including Member State Permanent Representation (COREPER II) Ambassadors from: Austria (Hans Dietmar Schwiesgut); Belgium (Jean De Ruyt); Denmark (Poul Skytte Christoffersen); France (Philippe Etienne); Italy (Fernando Nelli Feroci); Poland (Jan Tombinski); Sweden (Christian Danielsson); and the UK (Kim Darroch).
5. (C) Discussions centered around six themes: the need to improve U.S.-EU bilateral coordination on a range of transnational issues (including climate, Doha and financial reform), to avoid repeating what Froman termed &disappointments8 of 2009 and to meet the rising challenge of surprisingly united BASIC countries (China, India, Brazil and South Africa); close coordination on climate to build upon the fledgling Copenhagen Accord; better coordination on G20 and financial supervisory and regulatory reform issues; our joint commitment to reach a Doha Development Agenda Agreement; the need to improve the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) and use it to secure concrete achievements that boost growth and create jobs; and improving U.S.-EU crisis response and development cooperation in the wake of the Haiti earthquake.
IMPROVING U.S.-EU COOPERATION TO MEET THE &BASIC8 CHALLENGE
--------------------------------------------- --------------
6. (C) DNSA Froman made two major points to his interlocutors on bilateral relations. First, he stressed, 2009 was a transition year for both the U.S. Administration and EU institutions, with both facing enormous challenges. Despite our mutual good intentions in relaunching U.S.-EU relations, Froman said, and great improvement in tone, we continued to talk past each other on some issues. He cited Copenhagen as an example, where both sides misread each other,s negotiating bottom lines, and stressed that EU leaders, &one-upsmanship8 model of outdoing each other to push EU-wide policy did not/not work in dealing with the U.S. Administration.
7. (C) Second, Froman told the EU officials, it is remarkable how closely coordinated the &BASIC8 group of countries (China, India, Brazil and South Africa) have become in international fora, taking turns to impede U.S./EU initiatives and playing the U.S. and EU off against each other. BASIC countries have widely differing interests, he said, but have subordinated these to their common short-term goals to block some Western initiatives. The U.S. and EU need to learn from this coordination, Froman said, and work much more closely and effectively together ourselves, to better handle third country obstructionism and avoid future trainwrecks on climate, Doha or financial regulatory reform.
8. (C) Ambassador Kennard underscored that this is a significant moment for U.S.-EU relations. There is important alignment between our interests, he said, with President Obama as a committed multilateralist in the White House. We must feel urgency to work together to deliver real benefits that will boost growth and create jobs, the Ambassador stressed, given that we have a limited window of opportunity before a political referendum occurs on these efforts.
9. (C) The EU officials welcomed Froman,s and the Ambassador,s calls for closer cooperation. Director General for External Relations Vale de Almeida emphasized that the Commission transition and Lisbon Treaty implementation, while seeming to add to the complexity of EU institutions (for example, with greater power for European Parliament) will produce a streamlined EU that is an indispensible U.S. partner. Commission President Barroso is committed to closer relations, Vale de Almeida said, highlighting his shift of TEC leadership to the Trade Commissioner as a positive step. Vale de Almeida asked for U.S. understanding in the EU attaching political importance to annual U.S.-EU Summits and other &processes8; these processes are the way the EU produces results, he declared. He acknowledged the U.S. desire for concrete outcomes but stressed that symbolism is important to EU institutions.
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10. (C) Council President Van Rompuy Chief of Staff Van Daele elaborated on the theme that the Lisbon changes, in adding a permanent EU Council President and Foreign Policy High Representative, will strengthen the EU,s capacity to be an effective U.S. partner. Froman responded that the U.S. welcomes the Lisbon changes and wants to help Van Rompuy in his new position. Van Daele welcomed this, saying he understood U.S. policy constraints on climate and financial regulation, given Capitol Hill dynamics. We must work together on economic reform and must look forward together, he added; there is &no good from wagging fingers.8 The U.S. and EU must focus more on getting China more invested in global cooperation, he concluded, to make the Chinese realize they &can,t have their cake and eat it too.8
11. (C) Member State Permanent Representation Ambassadors appreciated the good will of Froman and the Administration to work for better relations with Europe. UK Ambassador Darroch stressed that President Obama,s engagement with Europe (the President has made six trips to Europe since his inauguration, Froman noted) is welcome, and that European leaders &haven,t sufficiently responded yet.8 The Ambassadors were skeptical that Lisbon would bring rapid benefits. They noted that EU institutions will require an adjustment period to the new structure, implying delay in a fully effective EU under the new treaty. Polish Ambassador Tombinski expected &a big institutional fight,8 but thought eventually Lisbon may speed up EU operations. French Ambassador Etienne said the challenge will be to use these new capabilities effectively so the EU can act coherently with its major partners. Ambassadors Danielsson of Sweden and Christofferson of Denmark agreed that the lesson of our mutual misunderstanding in Copenhagen should be ensuring better communication to avoid a recurrence in other fora.
CLIMATE CHANGE: BUILDING UPON THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD
--------------------------------------------- ------
12. (C) Climate Commissioner-designate Hedegaard thanked Froman for President Obama,s efforts in Copenhagen. She asked about U.S. legislative efforts on climate and U.S. political dynamics around mid-term Congressional elections and how they might impact U.S. international cooperation moving toward COP-16 in Cancun, Mexico. Froman responded that the U.S., overriding international goal, to work on implementing the Copenhagen Accord as well as on the other UN tracks, will not change. We will still work toward domestic legislation as well, Froman said. He thought midterm dynamics would not strongly impact our work going into Cancun.
13. (C) Froman and Hedegaard reviewed Copenhagen outcomes. Froman said that while nobody considered the agreement complete, it is a good step forward. Hedegaard said Copenhagen left some disappointed in the UN process, but stressed that we can,t give up. The Accord contains a lot of good points, she said, that should not be wasted. She hoped that the U.S. noted the EU was muting its criticism of the U.S., to be constructive.
14. (C) Both officials agreed we must focus now on operational steps to implement the Copenhagen Accord. Froman said the U.S. will work in the next few weeks on getting countries to sign up for (&associate themselves with8) the Accord, and to inscribe their targets. The U.S. would be happy, he suggested, with the seven emerging market countries in the Major Economies Forum (MEF), saying others would then follow. We also need to work on financing, he added.
15. (C) Froman emphasized that we need to determine the right process and grouping of countries to go forward. This could be the Greenland group of 28 countries from Copenhagen, MEF members, or countries signing the Accord, he speculated. The U.S. is not wedded to a particular grouping, he said, but there seems to be broad consensus that relying on the two UNFCCC working groups is insufficient. Hedegaard agreed, suggesting that an informal MEF grouping might be effective. It would be critical that this have legitimacy, she said.
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The Greenland group is an option, she said, but others might resent this designation.
16. (C) It is vital to get G-77 agreement to whatever grouping we use, Hedegaard continued. Both agreed it will be important to talk to incoming G-77 chair Yemen, with Froman adding it will also be important to be in close touch with Mexico as COP-16 chair. In fact, Froman added, we need all major groups ) the EU, MEF, BASIC, G-77, the island countries ) to agree to a negotiating mechanism. Hedegaard responded that we will need to work around unhelpful countries such as Venezuela or Bolivia. Froman agreed that we will need to neutralize, co-opt or marginalize these and others such as Nicaragua, Cuba, Ecuador. Hedegaard noted the irony that the EU is a big donor to these countries, while Cuba, for example, is actively discouraging others from signing on to the Accord.
17. (C) Both agreed that we need processes for coordination and avoiding recriminations. Hedegaard said the EU will use the February 11 informal European Council meeting to reflect on how to be more focused and effective on climate. Froman noted he will do likewise for the U.S. in meetings with Climate Special Envoy Todd Stern and other Administration officials. He suggested that he and Hedegaard speak before the Council meeting to coordinate; she agreed to a videoconference February 10, the day after the new Commission is expected to be formally approved by the European Parliament.
18. (C) Froman and Hedegaard then discussed specific goals for the Bonn and Cancun meetings. Hedegaard said we must have universal acknowledgment that &the world cannot afford8 failure to reach a binding agreement. Froman thought that we should try for progress by Cancun on MRV (monitoring, reporting and verification), the adaptation framework, technologies, and some resolution of process. Both agreed that we should also get countries to inscribe 2020 targets.
19. (C) Froman and Hedegaard also discussed their respective domestic policy developments, noting the complex issue of carbon border taxes. This is an issue of great concern to China, Froman noted. Hedegaard noted the EU,s struggle with how to manage inclusion of aviation and maritime sectors in the EU,s Emissions Trading Scheme. Both agreed it is vital to show economic benefits and potential job creation from bilateral cooperation on climate and clean energy technologies, to build public support for our efforts; Hedegaard committed to provide to Froman EU studies showing such impacts.
20. (C) Froman summarized his climate points for the Member State Ambassadors; while some Post-Copenhagen soul searching is warranted, he said, we need to focus on avoiding a damaging replay of our division there in the runup to Cancun. We need to work to make the Copenhagen Accord real, getting all countries that matter to associate themselves with the agreement and inscribing their targets. We need early U.S.-EU agreement on the right group and process to take discussions forward, and need progress on financing, technical points and transparency and verification; all are important, he concluded.
G20/REFORM OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION
--------------------------------------------- -----
21. (C) Froman heard at length from Internal Markets Commissioner-designate Barnier and several lunch participants on the importance of coordination in the G20 and elsewhere on reform of financial supervision and regulation. Froman stressed with all that the U.S. wants to work closely with the EU on all G20 issues, particularly on agreeing to common principles. The G20 is an important framework for this cooperation, he said, and it is vital that we deliver results on G20 commitments not just for their own sake but to build the credibility of the G20 framework. Froman said he wants to ensure the G20 is effective.
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22. (C) Director General for Economic and Financial Affairs Buti agreed that the ascendency of the G20 has raised our need for bilateral coordination. He lauded the new macroeconomic and financial dialogue with Treasury launched just days ago, noting we have agreed to hold this to coordinate views before major events. Buti said 2009 was a &fantastic year8 for the G20, and noted we are delivering on many of the major commitments, including IFI reform, resources and quotas, the framework for balanced growth agreed in Pittsburgh, and sharing plans for withdrawal of stimulus when appropriate. Froman responded that a major medium-term challenge should then be more structural reform; Buti agreed. Vale de Almeida said the G20 is improving and streamlining as it develops, which is positive. He pointed to Buti and others at the lunch as those who can deliver on EU commitments and cooperation in the G20.
23. (C) Barnier told Froman he wants to work closely and in confidence with the U.S. He wants to move as much as possible in step with the U.S., he stressed. Barnier,s first non-EU trip will be to the U.S., he added, possibly for the April G20/IMF Spring Meetings. Froman responded that Treasury had the primary role on financial services issues, but that he looked forward to staying in touch. Before President Obama,s recent announcements on banking reform, Barnier noted, there had been doubts in the EU on U.S. willingness to fulfill G20 commitments. There have been doubts about U.S. willingness to implement Basel II bank capital rules, but said this is important to ensure a level playing field. Froman again emphasized U.S. willingness to work with Europe on these issues.
24. (C) Barnier said he was impressed by President Obama,s announcements on bank size and scope. He noted EU reaction has varied, with the UK against, the Dutch in favor and the French &supportive of the direction.8 David Wright, Director for DG Internal Market, said the announcements were a significant and structural change from what had been under discussion in the international community. He emphasized that the EU normally does not regulate via caps on particular business lines but through competition policy. Vale de Almeida in the lunch also questioned whether the announcements were &off-mark8 from the G20. Froman responded that these proposals were consistent with what had been raised previously, noted that we were not alone in showing leadership on these issues, but returned to the U.S. commitment to cooperate toward agreement on basic principles and avoid damaging regulatory arbitrage.
25. (C) Barnier said &his roadmap is the G20 roadmap,8 and he seeks relevant, proportionate regulation in Europe that leaves no market or player unregulated. He said his immediate priorities include resolving Council-Parliament differences over EU financial supervisory architecture, OTC derivatives (and cooperation here with the U.S.), corporate governance, and improving crisis prevention and management tools.
WORKING TOWARD A DOHA DEAL
--------------------------
26. (C) Froman emphasized to Commissioner De Gucht and other EU officials the U.S. commitment to try to complete an ambitious Doha Development Agenda agreement, but said that public spats over negotiations were damaging; we should work to prevent this going forward. Froman described our Doha position, and our bilateral engagement with India, Brazil, China and others to produce market access. He emphasized the vital importance of this market access to our stakeholders and the Congress. Froman said that the current offer is not acceptable to U.S. agriculture, NAMA or services stakeholders. De Gucht responded that it is important to close the Doha Round, and that blaming others does not get us there; the question is how to manage the process with appropriate ambition. He said that the EU can live with the result on the table, but if other things come onto the table, we will need a &new equilibrium.8 De Gucht said he hoped that the U.S. bilateral efforts would not interfere with the ability to nail down existing tariffs (Comment: this probably
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refers to proposed bound tariff reductions in recent DDA texts, which reduce maximum permitted ) bound ) tariffs but do not reduce currently applied tariffs significantly. End comment).
27. (C) De Gucht added that he faces a similar challenge, because the Spanish Presidency is pushing for bilateral FTAs with Latin America, and he wants to ensure such efforts do not interfere with the DDA. Froman responded that eliminating &water8 between bound and actual tariffs is insufficient, that there has to be additional market access. Froman emphasized the importance of the U.S. and EU sending a consistent message on this issue to third countries, even though he recognized that our positions, though similar, are not identical. He encouraged open dialogue and transparency with the EU. Froman said he did not want there to be misunderstanding among our trading partners (similar to what happened in Copenhagen) that the U.S. would ultimately agree to what is on the table.
MAKING THE TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC COUNCIL DELIVER
--------------------------------------------- ----
28. (C) Froman emphasized to all of his interlocutors the Administration,s interest in making the TEC deliver real results. We are open to all ideas, he said; we can reform, restructure or even eliminate the TEC, based on what we identify together as the best way to secure concrete achievements. The Ambassador added that the bottom line should be generating growth and creating jobs, which could help us prioritize issues for the TEC agenda.
29. (C) De Gucht welcomed Froman,s interest in the TEC. He viewed the TEC as very important, particularly in the context of the rising Chinese economy and significant trade deficits of both the U.S. and EU with China. De Gucht noted that as U.S.-EU tariffs have fallen, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are the logical next challenge. De Gucht Chief of Staff VanHeukelen stressed that U.S.-EU economic links are &hard to overestimate,8 with &colossal8 bilateral FDI. De Gucht highlighted a recent study showing that if we could remove one half of existing bilateral NTBs, the EU and U.S. would get many billions of dollars in welfare gains (GDP increases) by 2016, or greater than Doha. Seatter of DG External Relations pointed to the 12-14 million jobs dependent on transatlantic trade, stressing that steps to expand these jobs could be an important near-term TEC achievement. VanHeukelen said that to date the TEC has not been seen as extremely effective, but it is important that it do better.
30. (C) Both the EU and U.S. need more growth, De Gucht said, in the face of such challenges as rising social security and health care costs. De Gucht recognized, however, that there are political problems with addressing some NTBs. He agreed it is important that the next TEC meeting produces concrete results, and should not be a simple get-acquainted session. Therefore, he added, we must prepare carefully, out of the spotlight. He said Spain is pushing for a TEC before its Presidency ends June 30, but noted it is unclear if this would provide adequate preparation time. He said a low-profile planning meeting might be more appropriate in the near term. He added he is preparing a paper on TEC goals to send to the U.S. in the next few weeks and hoped the U.S. could do the same. De Gucht said he hopes to visit Washington in late February to discuss key TEC and trade issues with Froman and others. (Note: his staff clarified that the trip will likely be in early March. End note).
31. (C) Both agreed that possible TEC topics could include Doha, climate, China/third country issues, and financial regulation. Froman agreed that there should be no &artificial deadlines8 for the TEC, and that the important thing is to ensure the next meeting produces significant results, to justify the presence of high-ranking officials and respond to stakeholders. We are flexible on timing, and can take five to nine months to achieve concrete results, he underscored. Froman committed to producing a U.S. paper to discuss with the EU.
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IMPROVING CRISIS RESPONSE AND DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION AFTER HAITI
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32. (SBU) Commissioner De Gucht offered Froman his views on the situation in Haiti, where De Gucht visited the previous week in his capacity as current Development Commissioner. He said that what had happened was a disaster, guessing that &at least 250,0008 were killed, with &20 percent8 of Port-au-Prince destroyed. He thought the Haiti situation manageable, however, with time and money needed for recovery. The Southeast Asian tsunami had been much worse, he noted. A lot of assistance food stocks were already in Haiti when the earthquake hit, he said, and water and food distribution was OK. Roads were mostly unaffected, he added. The biggest near-term problem, De Gucht explained, will be for 250,000 homeless when the rainy season begins in six weeks. The GOH and donors need to rapidly build camps, he said, to avoid pandemics once rains start. Overall, in De Gucht,s view, life in Haiti is &picking up8 again, and despite media reports, security problems are not serious.
33. (SBU) Morrison of Ashton,s cabinet noted our &great8 bilateral cooperation on Haiti, and stressed that the EU is committed long-term to rebuilding the Haitian economy and state. High Representative Ashton seeks greater development cooperation with the U.S., he said. Seatter of DG External Relations said that the challenges we have faced and met in Haiti coordination underscore our need to work on our crisis response and overall development coordination. This is an area where we can achieve strong results this year, Seatter added.
34. (U) This cable has been cleared by Deputy National Security Advisor Michael Froman.
MURRAY
End Cable Text
Zenaida X Toledo 07/30/2008 04:04:14 PM From DB/Inbox: TRANS
.
Wednesday, 17 February 2010, 13:55
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000186
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS SENV, KGHG, PREL, EU
SUBJECT: CLIMATE: PERSHING AND HEDEGAARD COMMIT TO CLOSE
COOPERATION
This cable is sensitive, but unclassified. Please protect accordingly.
1. (SBU) Summary: Deputy Special Envoy for Climate Change Jonathan Pershing met with EU Climate Action Commissioner Connie Hedegaard on February 11. Also present was Ambassador William Kennard. Pershing and Hedegaard agreed that the U.S- EU cooperation remains important, particularly in light of the statement issued by the BASICs following their January 25 meeting. They agreed on the need to operationalize the Copenhagen Accord and ensure it is incorporated into the UNFCCC process. Pershing said it would be important to convene the ministers prior to the May meetings in Bonn and suggested a meeting of the MEF, to include relevant non-members. Hedegaard questioned whether guaranteed loans should be included in the $30 billion Fast Start financing package, and Pershing suggested a meeting among the key donor states be held in the near term to discuss, and if possible, agree on a common approach to what financing would be listed in each country's contribution. End summary.
2. (SBU) Pershing told Hedegaard that the prospects for climate and energy legislation this year increased following the State of the Union address. He said the President is very focused on this issue and committed to a legislative package - not just an energy bill. Hedegaard said that she would be traveling to Washington in mid-March as part of an EU delegation and asked if it would be useful for the delegation to meet with Senators. Ambassador Kennard cautioned the Commissioner, noting that any messages to the Hill must be constructive.
3. (SBU) Pershing said the focus for the U.S. team in January had been to encourage as many countries as possible to associate with the Copenhagen Accord. He expects the final number to be about 120 countries, which is in the range of the 100-150 that the USG had hoped for, although still less than would be desirable. He said that submissions by some major economies were "opaque"; Hedegaard said China's submission was open to interpretation. Pershing said Brazil's and India's submissions were as well and were probably the result of their January 25 agreement. Citing Special Envoy for Climate Change Todd Stern's February 9 speech, Pershing stressed two points: (1) the heads of states made commitments at Copenhagen and the United States does not take these commitments lightly and (2) the Accord is the result of a long and arduous process - there is no plan B for negotiation of a different agreement.
4. (SBU) Hedegaard asked about China's perceptions on the Accord. Pershing said the letter from Premier Wen to UN Secretary general Ban Ki Moon and Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen was positive, but he was more concerned about communications from Su Wei, China's Climate Negotiator. He noted that there had been no formal bilateral climate discussions between the US and China since Copenhagen, but indicated that these would likely resume in February. Pershing said the U.S. and EU must deal with China, specifically on the subject of transparency. Hedegaard then asked "did you agree with China on MRV or not? I was presented with a paper that China, India and the U.S. could agree upon." Pershing replied: "the question is whether they will honor that language." Hedegaard said she does not have high expectations for COP 16 in Mexico and that we must avoid the expectations that it will resolve all of the unanswered problems from Copenhagen. She asked whether the Copenhagen Accord could be moved into the LCA (Long-term Cooperative Action) or KP (Kyoto Protocol) working groups for future discussions. Pershing said the two tracks have not yielded much progress but the LCA would be easier, particularly since the United States is not a member of Kyoto. He said in theory, the Accord should guide the work of the COP, but he's not sure if the BASICs will allow this. He said the BASICs, led by India, are resisting any changes to the UNFCCC guidelines (under which developing countries report on their GHG emissions and actions). He said African and Latin American states are looking to turn Copenhagen into a binding agreement, but the BASICs are opposed to this. Hedegaard suggested the AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States) countries "could be our best allies" given their need for financing.
5. (SBU) Hedegaard said that in light of the BASIC announcement, the U.S. and EU must coordinate more closely. She asked whether the MEF process should be continued and suggested a meeting of Annex I countries. Pershing said the forum for further discussions has not been resolved, but he suggested that non-members could be invited to participate in MEF discussions. He said a meeting of the MEF ministers prior to the May/June meeting in Bonn could help frame expectations for Mexico. Hedegaard said she supports the MEF process but said a constructive signal from the COP at Bonn will be important.
BRUSSELS 00000186 002 OF 002
6. (SBU) Hedegaard asked if the U.S. was prepared to move forward on Fast Start funding. She said some countries like Japan and the UK will press the inclusion of loan guarantees as part of the package and asked whether the U.S. will need to do any "creative accounting. " She added: "$30 billion had been promised - - it cannot be lent." She asked for Pershing's thought on the Soros proposal, which she said was "tempting in the long-term," but she is not sure it will work for Fast Start funding. [Note: In December 2010 George Soros proposed that developed countries return their IMF special drawing rights (SDRs) to the IMF, which could in turn lend the funds to developing countries for mitigation and adaptation. Soros estimated the amount from SDRs could provide about $150 billion. End note.] Pershing replied that this proposal is just another form of loan guarantee, and we were skeptical of its utility; he also said he would share our analysis on it. On Fast Track financing, Pershing said the administration anticipated the need and budgeted funds in 2010 and 2011. He said some U.S. funding would be directly applied for mitigation and adaptation and other sources would be indirect, citing for example program funds from various agencies and funds for food security. He concurred that it would be valuable to agree on what funds would be included in each country's reporting, and said donors have to balance the political need to provide real financing with the practical constraints of tight budgets. He suggested that the small group of key donors - those that provide about 90% of the financing - convene quickly to discuss this issue.
7. (U) The Deputy Special Envoy for Climate Change has cleared this cable.
Thursday, 28 January 2010, 15:10
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000054
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/27/2020
TAGS SENV, KGHG, ENRG, NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: SUPPORT FOR COPENHAGEN ACCORD
REF: STATE 3080
Classified By: DCM Edwin Nolan for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Netherlands will join the EU in inscribing a conditional emissions reduction target of 30 percent if others commit to comparable efforts. The Dutch had pushed to make the 30 percent offer unconditionally. Dutch climate officials are recalibrating their negotiating strategy after COP15 and putting greater emphasis on pragmatism. They have praised several facets of the Copenhagen Accord and are eager to make it operational. The Dutch are concerned that failure by donors to get fast-track financing flowing quickly will lead to more friction with developing countries later this year. END SUMMARY.
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AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES CLIMATE WITH ENVIRONMENT MINISTER
--------------------------------------------- ---------
2. (SBU) Ambassador delivered reftel points January 13 during her initial call on Environment Minister Jacqueline Cramer. Cramer said the EU should inscribe its target as a single entity. She also emphasized the need for developed country pledges, taken as a whole, to add up to a convincing number for the developing world. She expressed concern that the January 31 annex would be insufficient because this bottom-up approach will not get to a 25 percent developed country commitment. She advocated a specific negotiating track led by the U.S. and others to determine how the developed world can come up with a convincing target. Cramer acknowledged this is a delicate process and offered Dutch help. Regarding the Dutch national goal, Cramer reiterated the Dutch government's long-standing target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions 30 percent from 1990 levels by 2020. (Note: Most domestic environmental and energy analysts consider this unachievable. End note.) Given this ambitious domestic goal, Cramer cautioned that Dutch government and industry were looking for comparable efforts and a level playing field with other EU member states and major global emitters.
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NETHERLANDS JOINS UK IN PUSH FOR 30 PERCENT EU COMMITMENT
--------------------------------------------- ------------
3. (C) EmbOffs reinforced reftel points January 25 with the Dutch Foreign Ministry climate negotiator Sanne Kaasjager. He said the Netherlands would join the EU in inscribing a conditional, collective target of 30 percent (the so-called "20/30" commitment, either/or). He described a "vicious" January 20 COREPER meeting where the UK's and the Netherlands' push for an unconditional 30 percent target (or at least "20-30" percent, leaving the option for a figure in between) met stiff resistance from Italy and Poland. The Netherlands will not inscribe its own national target -- 30 percent by 2020 -- for fear of distracting attention from the EU target and because its national commitment is a political rather than legal one.
--------------------------------
ENTHUSIASM FOR COPENHAGEN ACCORD
--------------------------------
4. (C) Kaasjager said the Netherlands considered the Copenhagen Accord a significant accomplishment. Specifically, he called the Accord a "breakthrough" for setting out political consensus around the 6 to 8 most contentious issues in climate negotiations. The Dutch were pleased the Accord reiterated the 2 degree Celsius objective. Kaasjager praised President Obama's hands-on role in securing the Accord while sharply criticizing the "inept" Qsecuring the Accord while sharply criticizing the "inept" Danish performance as chair of COP15.
5. (SBU) The Dutch government is taking steps to convince developing countries to "associate with" the Accord. Kaasjager has drafted messages for embassies in capitals receiving Dutch development assistance to solicit support. This is an unprecedented move for the Dutch government, which traditionally recoils at any suggestion to use aid money as political leverage. But at the annual Dutch chiefs of mission conference in mid-January, ambassadors were clamoring for guidance on how to engage and persuade developing countries on climate negotiations. However, Kaasjager said the Netherlands would find it difficult to make association with the Accord a condition to receive climate financing.
----------------------------
EU INTROSPECTION AFTER COP15
----------------------------
6. (C) According to Kaasjager, the Copenhagen endgame has
THE HAGUE 00000054 002 OF 002
caused the EU to take a hard look at its role in climate talks. He was taken aback by the sight of European leaders (e.g., PM Brown and Chancellor Merkel) hovering around the VIP room sofas where the Chinese, Indian, South African, and Brazilian representatives were consulting, trying in vain to get pull asides with the BASIC leaders. Kaasjager took exception with the media's portrayal of the EU's exclusion from the final stages of the Copenhagen talks, but delivered a harsh verdict on the EU's performance at COP15. He lamented the lack of Member State discipline and the failure to bring a "tactical plan" -- meaning the EU was unprepared to adjust quickly to changing dynamics as the talks unfolded. He said his EU counterparts are coming around to the notion that Europe's strategy must shift from "How to involve the U.S.?" to "How to involve China?"
------------------------------
PATH FORWARD FOR CLIMATE TALKS
------------------------------
7. (SBU) In a word, Kaasjager said what emerged from Copenhagen was "pragmatism." More than ever, Dutch climate officials appreciate that climate negotiations will be an incremental "process of small steps." They are still deliberating on what the right long-term negotiating track is going forward: bilateral cooperation between major emitters; coalitions of the willing (such as the Major Economies Forum, G20, or Greenland Dialogue); or the legalistic UN process. The Dutch think a bottom-up bilateral approach will not achieve enough emissions reductions. They worry about exclusion from MEF and G20 fora. And they are currently disenchanted with the top-down UN process vulnerable to spoiler countries. Kaasjager said the Netherlands will work to forge a middle road that is achievable and inclusive. In the near-term the Dutch are eager to use the next several months to make the Copenhagen Accord operational and bring its elements to the formal negotiating table in Bonn in June.
----------------------------
FAST-TRACK FINANCING PIVOTAL
----------------------------
8. (SBU) Kaasjager was particularly concerned about bottlenecks in the flow of fast-track financing envisioned in the Copenhagen Accord. Without serious effort by donor countries, he predicted a worst case scenario in which G77 members use the late 2010 Cancun meeting to accuse the developed world of failing to follow through on its fast-track financing promises. He identified three potential areas of friction with developing countries on financing: most of the pledged funding is not "additional"; it is skewed towards mitigation programs rather than adaptation; and much of it is already committed without much say from recipients. Kaasjager has circulated a proposal for donor country counterparts to meet informally at working levels with recipients countries to address these issues head-on rather than wait for them to surface as a PR disaster later.
LEVIN
Friday, 12 February 2010, 14:16
S E C R E T RIYADH 000184
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, EEB/ESC/IEC (MONOSSON), S/CIEA
(GOLDWYN, SULLIVAN), S/SECC (STERN, PERSHING, ROCHBERG)
DEPT PASS TO DOE FOR JONATHAN ELKIND, JAMES HART
EO 12958 DECL: 02/09/2020
TAGS KGHG, SENV, EPET, ENRG, PREL, SA
SUBJECT: TWO FACES OF SAUDI ARABIA'S CLIMATE NEGOTIATING
POSITION
REF: A. 09DHAHRAN 201 B. 09RIYADH 1302 C. 09RIYADH 1397 D. 09RIYADH 1492 E. 09RIYADH 1557 F. 09RIYADH 1642 G. RIYADH 103 H. SECSTATE 3080 I. SECSTATE 11182
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
-------
1. (S) Saudi Arabia is officially still studying the issue of whether to associate with the Copenhagen Accord on Climate Change. Behind the scenes, we understand serious discussions are taking place about which road will best serve the Kingdom's long term interests. On one hand, Saudi Arabia's lead climate change negotiator has criticized the Copenhagen process in private and in public, arguing that the UNFCCC process is the only acceptable legal framework. On the other hand, Saudi officials are very eager to obtain investment credits for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and other technology transfer projects that will only become available once an agreement has been reached. Saudi officials express concern about the impact a transition to a low-carbon energy mix will have on the country's revenue stream at a time when it faces enormous financing needs to transform its economy to create jobs for its young, growing population. It also fears imposed economic costs associated with "demonizing" oil. Part of the explanation for this schizophrenic position is that the Saudi Government has not yet thought through all the implications of a climate change agreement, in part because it may not fully understand the various demand scenarios. There appears to be a growing sense within the SAG that it may be in danger of becoming isolated on climate change, which may prompt a re-examination of its position. Saudi officials have suggested that they need to find a way to climb down gracefully from the country's tough negotiating position. More sustained engagement in coordination with other governments, particularly if pitched as an effort to develop partnership, may help them do so. End Summary.
Saudi Arabia not yet Decided on Copenhagen Accord
--------------------------------------------- -----
2. (C) Saudi Arabia's lead climate change negotiator Dr. Mohammad Al-Sabban told Econoffs February 3 the United States should adopt a more inclusive, transparent approach to United Nations Forum for Climate Change Cooperation (UNFCCC) negotiations. Although he was encouraged by President Obama's attitude towards developing country partners in the negotiations, Al-Sabban said the parties needed to "learn from the mistakes" of Copenhagen in thinking about preparing for the next Conference of Parties (CoP) in Mexico. Al-Sabban said developing countries felt their Danish hosts forced them to decide on the Copenhagen Accord with practically no notice. Heads of state were also called into the negotiations too early and they applied too much pressure "when the deal was not there," he said. In specific response to the U.S. request for support for the Copenhagen Accord (ref H), Al-Sabban said Saudi Arabia was still studying the accord to determine its position. The SAG cares about the environment, but it also must care for its citizens, he said.
Addressing Saudi Economic Concerns Key to Progress
--------------------------------------------- -----
3. (C) Asked how to move forward on a global climate change commitment, Al-Sabban agreed negotiations need a "speedy outcome," and said countries need to rebuild trust and confidence through more transparent negotiations. He reminisced fondly about the inclusive nature of the initial Kyoto Protocol negotiations, which he said should be replicated in Cancun. Al-Sabban said climate change negotiations should remain under the UNFCCC and not be pursued under alternative frameworks.
4. (C) Asked about tangible actions to reach national climate change goals, Al-Sabban said Saudi Arabia's nationally appropriate actions would include carbon capture and storage (CCS) credits. He emphasized Saudi Arabia's need for technology transfer and foreign direct investment to mitigate
the adverse impact that emissions-reducing policies may have on the Kingdom. Al-Sabban said the SAG had closely studied climate change policies' potential negative impacts. The Kingdom will need time to diversify its economy away from petroleum, he said, noting that a U.S. commitment to help Saudi Arabia with its economic diversification efforts would "take the pressure off climate change negotiations."
5. (C) Al-Sabban said the development of renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies was key to addressing Saudi Arabia's domestic energy demand, and he acknowledged the need for increased energy efficiency awareness. The deployment of CCS technology, he said, was "crucial" for Saudi Arabia. He said the U.S. Administration's rhetoric to end dependence on foreign oil, reiterated by President Obama in Copenhagen, is antagonistic and causes genuine fear in Saudi Arabia. The SAG is concerned about the outlook for oil demand and global production, and fears it will not be able to diversify in time to reach its development goals.
Shadow Negotiator Suggests Partnership
--------------------------------------
6. (C) Senior Advisor to the President of Meteorology and Environment (PME) Fawaz Al-Alamy told Econoffs January 27 the U.S. and Saudi Arabia share the same values on climate change, but have different negotiation tactics. Al-Alamy, who joined PME in late 2009 and led Saudi Arabia's World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, said Saudi Petroleum Minister Ali Al-Naimi wants to move forward in UNFCCC negotiations. (Note: PME sends three representatives with Al-Sabban to climate change negotiations. End note.) Al-Sabban's negative approach to negotiations "disheartens" him, as does the ongoing "blame game" on climate change. Saudi Arabia, like China and India, needs to behave like an emerging economy rather than a developing country, he said. Al-Alamy noted he had met the previous day with both the Chinese and the Indian Ambassadors to the Kingdom to discuss climate change.
7. (C) Al-Alamy recommended several steps for U.S. engagement with Saudi Arabia on climate change, including active outreach to all the key players including Al-Sabban, Petroleum Minister Al-Naimi, and PME President Prince Turki bin Nasser. Al-Alamy recommended the U.S. reach out to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretary General, who has the power to tone down the alarm in the rest of the Arab world, such as in Egypt. Al-Alamy recommended the U.S. continue to coordinate its approach with other Embassies, which he said has been very effective. Asked how to get beyond the Kyoto Protocol lens through which Al-Sabban views climate negotiations, Al-Alamy quickly replied "he only has two more years to talk about Kyoto" before it expires.
8. (C) Al-Alamy said that Minister of Petroleum Al-Naimi strongly supports solar energy as he believes it will displace oil currently used in the power sector and ultimately increase oil exports. Saudi Arabia currently uses 1.5 million barrels per day to produce electricity and water, he said. The Kingdom is considering beginning a civilian nuclear program, and top leadership including Minister of Foreign Affairs Saud Al-Faisal supports the increased use of renewable energy sources. Some, however, view Copenhagen as a serious threat to Saudi Arabia's economic stability. "Ask any Saudi," Al-Alamy said, "they all think Saudi Arabia will be asked to foot the bill for climate change." Al-Alamy outlined Saudi Arabia's top concerns, including its strong aversion to mixing trade and environmental priorities. If duties are placed on oil and gas, Saudi Arabia will not be able to move ahead with its economic diversification plans, and this creates a "phobia" of climate change talks, he said. The Saudis also resent the U.S. when it makes decisions "without consulting its friends." Al-Alamy said Saudi Arabia, and Al-Sabban in particular, needs to feel like a partner of U.S. decision making.
Is Al-Naimi the Problem?
------------------------
9. (S) Minister Al-Naimi has consistently been rational and practical in talking with western delegations about climate change, noting that Saudi Arabia had to address its development concerns, but conceding that the world needs to work together to address climate change. These reassuring statements stand in sharp contrast to Al-Sabban's public comments, such as questioning the science behind climate
change just before Copenhagen, and his often obstructionist behavior, as reported by a number of Embassies in Riyadh, during working-level negotiations. Senior Ministry of Petroleum officials have reassured us after each of Al-Sabban's public outbursts over the last six months that he has been "tamed" and brought back onto the reservation. The frequency and number of times that Al-Sabban steps out of line, and the apparent lack of any sanction, raises questions about the real Saudi position on climate change.
10. (S) A recent conversation with UK Embassy officers suggests that indeed Al-Naimi may have some questions about climate change. They report that Al-Naimi was sharply critical of the Copenhagen meetings and the climate change effort in general, in marked contrast to earlier meetings. He complained that heads of state were brought in to negotiate the final stages, which prevented Saudi Arabia from voicing its true opposition to several elements. He also questioned the legality of the Copenhagen process and its future direction.
11. (S) A senior Ministry of Petroleum official explained that, leaving Copenhagen, the Saudi delegation was convinced that the Copenhagen accord would not attract significant support, apparently largely based on Al-Sabban's analysis. The Minister's office was unpleasantly surprised by mid-January, when it was clear that a number of countries had already associated themselves with the accord. Assistant Petroleum Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman told EconCouns that he had spent two days walking Minister Al-Naimi through each of the 90 plus submissions on the UNFCCC web site. Prince Abdulaziz told the Minister that Saudi Arabia had missed a real opportunity to submit "something clever," like India or China, that was not legally binding but indicated some goodwill towards the process without compromising key economic interests. The Prince intimated to EconCouns that Al-Sabban would not long retain his position, and said the challenge for Saudi Arabia was to find a way to "climb down" from its negotiating position.
Comment
-------
12. (C) All indications are that Saudi officials are intensely discussing what position the country should take. We believe that the message is getting through, that there is a broad consensus among countries that tangible action needs to be taken now to address climate change. We also think that Saudi leaders are beginning to understand that they are in increasing danger of being left behind. They do have significant, legitimate concerns about how this process will affect their long-term livelihood. Our conversations, however, with officials in Finance, Petroleum and the other economic ministries suggests that they have not done sufficient economic analysis of the various scenarios to understand what the real impact of a climate change agreement might be. Such a discussion might help provide the kind of dispassionate basis to address legitimate Saudi concerns, while also making a better case for the need to take action to mitigate increasing emissions. We take as an encouraging sign the fact that several Saudi officials have noted to us that the Kyoto agreement only runs for two more years, suggesting that some at least understand the need to chart a more assured future course. We take the suggestion seriously that we help the Saudis find a way to climb down from their current position, ideally by offering the hand of partnership, which may help persuade the rest of OPEC to follow suit. For now, we believe that success will require a sustained, broad engagement with Saudi leadership, as we think the problem is more than just a rogue negotiator, but some broadly shared fears about the future, and uncertainty about the way forward.
SMITH
Wednesday, 25 March 2009, 08:11
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 000301
SIPDIS
FOR S, S/SRAP HOLBROOKE, AND S/SECC TODD STERN
ALSO FOR NEA/ARP AND EEB/ESC/IEC/ENR (MONOSSON, SECOR, THOMPSON) AND
SCA
AMMAN FOR ESTH HUB OFFICER (BHALLA)
EO 12958 03/24/2019
TAGS SENV, ECON, PREL, PARM, AF, PK, AE
SUBJECT: FM PRESSES SRAP HOLBROOKE FOR IRENA SUPPORT
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RICHARD G. OLSON FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D
REFS: A) ABU DHABI 199 B) ABU DHABI 170 C) 2/5/09 MONOSSON-COOPER EMAIL D) ABU DHABI 6 E) 08 STATE 134385
1. (C) During a March 24 meeting with Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, UAE Foreign Minister Shaykh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (AbZ) asked if the United States had changed its (Ref E) policy on joining the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). AbZ recalled his March discussion of the issue with the Secretary in Sharm al Sheikh and told Holbrooke the UAE is trying to convince its friends to join IRENA and support the UAE's candidacy to host the agency's headquarters in Abu Dhabi (refs A, B, and D). AbZ said the UAE was in a "tough fight" with Germany, the only other viable candidate, and explained the UAEG argument was based on the symbolic importance of having an international organization (other than UNRWA) headquartered in the region. Further, having an oil-producing country host the headquarters of an international renewable energy organization sent an important message about international commitment to renewable energy.
2. (C) Ambassador's Comment: Shaykh Abdullah's request for support came in the context of a discussion (reported septel) on Afghanistan and Pakistan in which the Abdullah and the Crown Prince (Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayid) indicated their desire (based on proven ability) to be very helpful to the United States on political issues. While there was no direct linkage between IRENA and AF/PAK, the former is very clearly something that is important to the UAEG, and the UAE expects the USG to be helpful on IRENA, given the considerable effort the UAE is putting in to supporting us on our critical issue. End Comment.
3. (SBU) Ambassador Holbrooke did not clear this message. OLSON
Wednesday, 01 April 2009, 12:35
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000329
SIPDIS
FOR S/SECC TODD STERN AND DSECC JONATHAN PERSHING
ALSO FOR NEA/ARP AND EEB/ESC/IEC/ENR (MONOSSON, SECOR, THOMPSON), AND
S/SRAP HOLBROOKE
AMMAN FOR ESTH HUB OFFICER (BHALLA)
EO 12958 03/24/2019
TAGS SENV, ECON, PREL, PGOV, AE
SUBJECT: (U) WHY THE UAE IS PRESSING FOR IRENA HQ
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RICHARD G. OLSON FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D
REFS: A) ABU DHABI 301 B) ABU DHABI 199 C) ABU DHABI 170 D) STATE 27497
1. (C) Summary. The UAE's push (refs A-C) to host the headquarters of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) complements its political and financial commitment to encouraging renewable energy production and consumption. Although the fourth largest oil producer in the world, the UAE is expanding its commitment to environmental protection, and more importantly, positioning itself for what it sees as a post-hydrocarbon based future. The UAE has launched a major effort to promote renewables by encouraging research, development and innovation in the UAE and abroad. This includes an ambitious effort to build the first zero-carbon, zero-waste city, Masdar City. The UAE has serious resources to put into the international search for alternative energy sources, and as such, UAE interest in these issues should be seen as an opportunity for the USG. Moreover, the UAE is clearly signaling that it wants United States to support its IRENA bid, given UAE support for many of our political, security and financial priorities and the Administration's focus on environmental issues. End Summary.
2. (SBU) Since the creation of IRENA in January, the UAE has actively campaigned to host the headquarters in Abu Dhabi. Though the argument that an oil producer should host a renewable energy agency may seem counter-intuitive, Emiratis view IRENA as a natural complement to their efforts to protect the environment and reduce UAE dependence on fossil fuels. The founder of the UAE Sheikh Zayed is widely known in the UAE as one of the Arab world's first environmentalists, and the new generation of leaders is advancing his efforts through the application of modern environmental technology, policies and practices.
3. (SBU) The most prominent example of UAE commitment is Masdar (www.masdar.ae), the Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company, which was launched in 2006 as part of Abu Dhabi's efforts to diversify its economy away from petroleum, while leveraging its historic expertise in global energy markets. Masdar has established the Masdar Institute for Science and Technology (MIST), in collaboration with MIT, to support graduate level research on advanced energy and sustainability, begun construction on the world's first zero-carbon, zero-waste city (Masdar City), and launched the World Future Energy Summit and the Zayed Future Energy Prize. Putting UAE money where its mouth is, Masdar has also invested over USD 1 billion in foreign wind and solar technology projects, including Torresol Energy (Spain), WinWinD (Finland) and the London Array offshore wind farm (UK), among others. Domestically, Masdar is developing solar production capacity and working with the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) on carbon capture and reinjection into oil fields. Masdar's efforts will help the Emirate of Abu Dhabi reach a target of 7 percent power generation from renewables by 2020.
4. (SBU) The UAEG wants Masdar City to be the host of IRENA, but its argument is based on more than just Masdar's credentials. Officials note the important symbolism of putting an international renewable agency in an oil-producing country. They also highlight that no other international organizations are headquartered in the Arab World, with the exception of UNRWA, which they view as an aid organization more than a policy body (and one that they hope can eventually disappear as a two-state solution materializes). Further, the UAE is centrally located between developed and developing nations and bridges north-south, east-west divides.
5. (C) COMMENT: Whether the USG can support the IRENA candidacy of the UAE ultimately depends on USG policy toward IRENA itself, and we do not have the overall context for a policy recommendation on that issue. However, several points about the UAE position need to be factored into such a policy decision:
-- First: The UAE, unlike many supporters of renewables, has serious resources to put into the development of technology. This is a point that has not been lost on the US and other countries private sectors who have worn a deep path to Masdar's door seeking participation in its projects.
-- Second: The UAE has been one of our most helpful security partners in the Middle East. UAE troops are in the fight in Afghanistan (in greater numbers and more dangerous places than many NATO Allies); the UAE has cancelled Saddam era debt in Iraq and opened an Embassy; it is perhaps the only Arab country to have fully paid up its dues to the Palestinian Authority; and it has taken a leading role in the Friends of Pakistan initiative. While the UAE
ABU DHABI 00000329 002 OF 002
has not expressed any direct linkage between any of these initiatives and IRENA, it has clearly signaled that, having been helpful to the USG on a number of issues important to us, it expects the USG to be helpful on an issue of importance to the UAE.
6. (C) UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayid Al-Nahyan (AbZ) will raise this issue with Secretary Clinton during their 7 April meeting. OLSON
Thursday, 10 December 2009, 16:48
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 002768
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, MOPS, MARR, AF, UK, PK, IR, IN, CH, RS,
SA, NATO
SUBJECT: SHADOW DEFENSE MINISTER FOX PLEDGES CLOSE U.S.-UK
COOPERATION IF TORIES GAIN POWER
Classified By: Ambassador Louis Susman for reasons 1.4 b and d
1. (C/NF) Summary. During a December 9 meeting with the Ambassador, Shadow Secretary of State for Defense Liam Fox affirmed his desire to work closely with the U.S. if the Conservative Party wins power in next year's general election. He highlighted the importance of the U.S.-UK Defense Trade and Cooperation Treaty insofar as it advances the goal of U.S.-UK interoperability. The Treaty "means a lot to us," Fox emphasized, adding that "we (Conservatives) intend to follow a much more pro-American profile in procurement." Fox, who accompanied Conservative Party leader David Cameron on a December 4-6 visit to Afghanistan, (septel) expressed confidence regarding U.S. leadership in Afghanistan and optimism about the way forward. (Note: In a December 8 Chatham House speech, Fox affirmed the importance of the Afghanistan mission and analyzed challenges facing NATO.) Fox predicted that negotiations with Iran would fail; he stated that the U.S. and UK should work together to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. He faulted the Labour government for policies which reinforce the Indian government's long-held view that HMG's foreign relations on the subcontinent are "skewed to Pakistan." End Summary.
U.S.-UK Interoperability
------------------------
2. (C/NF) Ambassador Susman met December 9 with Liam Fox, Shadow Secretary of State for Defense. (Mike Threadgold, Head of Fox's Private Office, and U.S. Embassy Political Officer Chris Palmer attended the meeting as notetakers.) Fox, a committed Atlanticist, underscored his desire to work closely with the U.S. if the Conservative Party wins power in next year's general election. He affirmed that when Winston Churchill first raised the notion of the "special relationship" it was as a wartime leader. The special relationship will remain strategically central to UK foreign policy regardless of which party is in power in the UK, Fox underlined. However, the relationship will be especially close in the defense sphere under Tory leadership, Fox stated. He affirmed his desire to increase joint defense procurement with the United States. Increasing U.S.-UK "interoperability is the key" since the U.S. and UK will continue to fight together in the future.
3. (C/NF) Fox stressed that the U.S.-UK Defense Trade and Cooperation Treaty (Note: SFRL hearings on the Treaty were to be held December 10) is extremely important insofar as it advances the goal of interoperability. Fox expressed appreciation for the Ambassador's update regarding the likelihood of Senate approval of the Treaty soon. The Treaty "means a lot to us," Fox emphasized, adding that "we (Conservatives) intend to follow a much more pro-American profile in procurement. The key is interoperability." Fox asserted that some within the Conservative Party are less enthusiastic, asserting that "we're supposed to be partners with, not supplicants to, the United States." Fox said he rebuffed these assertions, and he welcomed the Ambassador's reassurance that senior U.S. leaders value the UK as an equal partner.
Afghanistan
-----------
4. (C/NF) Fox, who accompanied Conservative Party leader David Cameron on a December 4-6 visit to Afghanistan (septel), expressed confidence regarding U.S. leadership in Afghanistan and optimism about the way forward. He noted that he hoped to meet with NSA Jones, Ambassador Eikenberry, and General Petraeus during the December 11-13 Regional Security Summit in Bahrain. Fox also stated that he planned to meet DASD Flournoy in Washington December 18; Fox will visit Washington and New York December 17-20. (Note: In a December 8 Chatham House speech (see paragraph 9), Fox affirmed the importance of the Afghanistan mission to the NATO Alliance and the importance of explaining to the British people with "clarity, conviction, and consistency" "what the national security threats are that compel us to be in Afghanistan." End Note.)
Iran
----
5. (C/NF) Turning to Iran, Fox observed that there are three possible outcomes in Iran: regime change, behavioral change for the regime's leaders, and "a change of leadership within
the regime." The first two options "won't happen" soon, although we could be "in the beginning of the end game." When regime change comes it will likely be a "bloody end," Fox stated. The regime's strong hold on power, its implacable hatred of the U.S. and Israel, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps stranglehold on the economy make it extremely unlikely that the regime will change from within, he said. He predicted that international negotiations with Iran would fail. He said that Iran's Independence Day in February would provide the next opportunity for the international community to evaluate the strength of Iran's internal opposition, based on the size of demonstrations. Fox stated that he had recently met with a group of wealthy, Iranian expatriates, most of whom expressed support for Iran's obtaining a nuclear bomb. "Persian nationalism" more than Islamic fundamentalism is the basis of Iranian popular support for a nuclear weapons program.
6. (C/NF) The U.S. and UK need to work together to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, Fox said. He expressed support for the establishment of a U.S. nuclear umbrella in the Middle East. Russia would play a more constructive role in regard to Iran if it began to fear "encirclement" by China and Iran. China could be more helpful under the right circumstances, Fox said. (Note: Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague told the Ambassador in a subsequent meeting (septel) that in his view China would probably not be more helpful in regard to Iran in the foreseeable future, although Russia would likely play a more constructive role. End Note.)
India-Pakistan
--------------
7. (C/NF) Turning to India, Fox criticized the Labour government for policies which reinforce the Indian government's long-held view that HMG's foreign relations on the subcontinent are "skewed to Pakistan." Fox predicted this would not be a factor under a Conservative government, since the Conservatives are "less dependent" than the Labour Party on votes from the British-Pakistani community.
NATO
----
8. (SBU/NF) During his meeting with the Ambassador, Fox touched on the future of the NATO Alliance, affirming the importance of the ongoing strategic transformation debate and the future of NATO. Fox focused on NATO in a December 8 Chatham House speech on "The Way Forward for NATO." In those remarks, Fox asserted that "NATO's mission in Afghanistan has created further debate on NATO's role and even of NATO's survival as a defense alliance." The speech highlights that "neither the financial burden nor the fighting burden is properly shared between NATO allies" and that the pending Strategic Concept should address collective responsibilities. Fox's speech affirms the importance of strategic nuclear forces to the Alliance, as stated in the 1999 Strategic Concept; the speech commits a future Conservative government to "maintaining Britain's round-the-clock, independent, submarine-based, and strategic nuclear deterrent." The speech concludes that, despite its shortcomings, NATO is a "necessity" and "in order to successfully face the threats of the 21st century, NATO is the only way forward." (Note: The full text of the speech is available at www.chathamhouse.org.uk End Note.)
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
Susman
Monday, 09 February 2009, 15:08
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 000348
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/06/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, MCAP, EUN, PINS, UK
SUBJECT: THE BRITISH ASK, IS OUR SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP STILL
SPECIAL IN WASHINGTON?
REF: LONDON 266
Classified By: Charge Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4(b/d).
1. (C/NF) Summary. Secretary Clinton's public praise for the U.S.-UK special relationship following her February 3 meeting with Foreign Secretary Miliband, coming on the heels of the President's January 26 phone call with Prime Minister Brown, has gone a long way to calm what has been a stronger than usual outbreak of British political and media anxiety about the future of U.S.-UK relations. The atmospherics surrounding the relationship with the United States are always under intense scrutiny in Britain, but UK media, pundits, and parliamentarians have openly worried over the last several months that the Obama administration might downplay relations with the Brown Government because of a "perfect storm" of factors -- the Brown Government's support for Bush administration foreign policies; a UK economy suffering the most severe financial downturn in Europe; a politically weak Prime Minister who must face voters in the next 15 months; and growing U.S. frustration with UK military failings in Afghanistan and Iraq. Fears about the end of the special relationship were further fueled by British over-reading of the new Administration's initial statements. More than one HMG senior official asked embassy officers whether President Obama meant to send a signal in his inaugural address about U.S.-UK relations by quoting Washington during the Revolutionary War, while the removal of the Churchill bust from the Oval Office consumed much UK newsprint, typified by a London Times story this week entitled, "Churchill Bust Casts a Shadow Over the Special Relationship."
2. (C/NF) Summary and comment con't. Downing Street and the most senior levels at Whitehall never shared the level of anxiety over the future of the relationship that gripped the British punditocracy, and now that high-level contacts across the Atlantic are resuming, such as the visit of Special Envoy Holbrooke and Miliband's meetings with Special Envoy Mitchell, any Whitehall concerns about the relationship with Washington will further dissipate. The issue still has traction as a subject for the UK media and chattering class, however. Recent UK media posturing over the Binyam Mohamed case (a UK resident in Guatanamo Bay) as a test of the Obama Administration's commitment to a "new approach" to fighting terrorism, as well as British irritation about the original "buy American" language in the U.S. stimulus legislation, demonstrates that the British public will be pressing to test the Administration's commitments and looking for signs of distance between London and Washington. Although this period of excessive UK speculation about the relationship is more paranoid than usual, we agree with a senior MP who told us that ultimately, "the people who really matter in all this, those who do the serious business, know that where it matters - over defense, security issues, intelligence-sharing - the relationship is deep, ongoing and abiding." End summary.
More Speculation than Usual
---------------------------
3. (C/NF) Every U.S. Presidential inauguration sets off debate at British think tank seminars and on UK editorial pages about the sustainability of the special relationship under a new U.S. President. The debate this year, however, is louder than at any time since the fallout from the "passport-gate" affair sent shivers through the UK chattering class about the relationship between newly-elected President Clinton and Prime Minister John Major in 1992. Over the last several months much of the British press predicted a weakening, if not the outright demise, of the "special relationship." Simon Tisdall in the left-leaning Guardian fretted that the "worrying question is whether President Obama believes there's anything special about Britain -- and it may all be a little less special than before." The right-leaning Times editorialized that "Gordon Brown's phone is unlikely to be the one that rings (when Washington calls)... the new best friend in Washington will be President Sarkozy..who has advertised his fondness of America from his first day in office (and is close to Philip Gordon, the new fluent French-speaking U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Europe)."
"He's Just Not That Into Us"
---------------------------
4. (C/NF) For many UK pundits, a break in the special relationship will come because of the new U.S. President's personal history. Several commentators have explored President Obama's life story to see what it might mean for
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his approach to the UK. His relative youth (which gives him no historical experience of the WWII and Cold War alliance with London), his formative years in the Pacific rather than in Europe, and his Kenyan grandfather's treatment at the hands of British colonial forces in Kenya (where he was imprisoned) have led many UK commentators to conclude the new President has no "natural" link to the UK, perhaps even an antipathy to the UK, and this will weaken U.S.-UK ties. The Times correspondent in Washington, summed up this view: "Mr. Obama...has no personal experience of our shared World War II experiences and little of our Cold War alliance. In his memoir, 'Dreams from My Father,' he described his trips to drink 'tea on the Thames' before flying away from a Europe that 'just wasn't mine' to discuss his Kenyan roots with British passengers who displayed arrogant attitudes to the 'Godforsaken countries of Africa.'
A Fearful UK Wonders What It Brings to the Table
--------------------------------------------- ---
5. (C/NF) For more serious observers, however, and quite a few of the Embassy's official and parliamentary interlocutors, the reasons to worry about the future of the relationship are based on the UK political and economic landscape that the new Administration encounters as it takes office. As The Spectator commented in an editorial this week, "a glimpse into the national psyche of Britain in the winter of 2009...would find a British public and leadership shaken by the extraordinarily difficult times, economic uncertainty and widespread hardship ahead." That has clearly translated into British fear that the UK at this point in time has little to offer a new Administration in Washington. UK politicians and foreign policy commentators point to a "perfect storm" of factors now in play that may make the special relationship less special -- from the weakness of Prime Minister Brown's own political standing and the crisis in the UK economy, to fears that the U.S. is frustrated with the UK military's perceived failures in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is also widespread suspicion that Washington has become infatuated with French President Sarkozy and his pro-American views.
6. (C/NF) Michael Fabricant, a Tory MP and strong supporter of a close U.S. alliance, summed up these fears when he told Poloff that the UK's economic situation reminds the British that "Britain needs the U.S. more than ever to work with us to get out of this, but I fear we seem more like Iceland to (the new administration) right now than any other European capital because our downturn is so bad and the Brown Government so weak." The economic downturn also means that the UK may not be able to provide the financial resources -- be it for development or new peacekeeping operations (ref) -- that Washington has often looked to London to provide. This has sparked concern that the UK will be viewed as less valuable an ally than it was when overflowing government coffers and a strong British Pound allowed the Blair and Brown Governments to lead the way in pledges of international aid and other support to global hot spots. And the economic weakness of the British economy is matched by the domestic political weakness of the Brown Government, which trails in the polls and must hold an election no later than May 2010. The Chatham House Director posed a question at a recent seminar that several interlocutors have also raised with embassy staff -- "do the political realities in Paris and London argue for the new Administration building bridges to Sarkozy rather than relying on a weak British government that may be out the door soon?"
U.S. Criticisms of UK Military Sting As Well
--------------------------------------------
7. (C/NF) Also sparking concern on this side of the Atlantic are perceived U.S. criticisms of the value of the UK military contributions in Afghanistan and Iraq, especially at a time when the new Administration will be looking for allies to contribute more in Afghanistan. Brooks Newmark, a Tory MP who follows defense issues, told Poloff he fears an erosion in UK public support for continued engagement in Afghanistan because of the "criticism of our troops from U.S. military commanders and others in Washington," which Newmark believes will also drive a wedge between the Administration and Downing Street. This sensitivity over perceived U.S. criticism of the value of the UK military's contributions reverberates in the UK media, which frequently quotes unnamed U.S. military officers' dismissals of the UK military's performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. A leading Daily Telegraph columnist wrote that President Obama will want the UK to provide more troops to Afghanistan but that, "following Brown's abandonment of his American allies in Basra, there is
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a growing feeling (in the U.S.), especially in the Pentagon, that Britain can't be relied on" no matter how many additional troops it may offer.
Looking for Signals and Reading Tea Leaves
------------------------------------------
8. (C/NF) British media and contacts are busy over-reading perceived signals for evidence of tensions in the relationship. This over-reading would often be humorous, if it were not so corrosive. Much was made in the British press -- and even by serious HMG officials -- of the "fact" that the new President's inauguration speech mentioned the UK only in the context of the British "enemy" harrying George Washington's troops -- although some noted that was one more mention than the UK got in candidate Obama's 7000-word essay setting out his foreign policy intentions, which did not mention the UK at all. And Secretary Clinton's statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was similarly parsed and much was made of the fact that the UK was fourth in a recitation of U.S. allies (and it was particularly painful to those British tea readers that Germany and France were named first). Similarly, the fate of a bust of Churchill in the Oval Office during President Bush's tenure has been closely monitored in the UK media and by our HMG contacts, very few of whom failed to a sinister meaning into the decision to remove the bust (which was on loan to the White House and removed for that reason). Even the press coverage of Foreign Secretary Miliband's meeting with Secretary Clinton, though positive, reflected the British paranoia -- and close reading of any supposed tea leaves -- on the special relationship. The Guardian, for example, told its readers that when a UK leader visits Washington, he or she must mention the special relationship "but American leaders, anxious to avoid upsetting other allies, steer away from referring to 'the' special relationship and speak instead of 'a' special relationship, at least until... (Secretary Clinton) showed her inexperience and in her final remarks, uttered the words 'the special relationship' at her press event with David Miliband."
Does Downing Street Share These Concerns?
-----------------------------------------
9. (C/NF) Downing Street and senior levels in Whitehall never shared this level of anxiety about the future of the relationship under an Obama Administration. The President's January 26 phone call to Prime Minister Brown - in which the President told the Prime Minister he looked "forward to continuing and strengthening the special relationship" -- helped quell any concerns about London's place in the hierarchy of U.S. allies. The Prime Minister's office made sure it was released to the UK press that Brown was the first European leader to speak with the new President following his inauguration. The U.S. officer at the Cabinet Office told us that both the fact of the call and the "tone of the conversation" was reassuring and he downplayed any concern about the relationship, at least inside the Cabinet Office. Similarly, Foreign Secretary Miliband's February 3 meeting with Secretary Clinton, which UK media and Foreign Office contacts all carefully noted was the Secretary's first meeting with a Foreign Minister, sparked positive coverage and appeared to reassure many British observers --"Clinton Praises Special Relationship; Miliband First to Meet New U.S. Secretary of State" was typical of the headlines that followed the meeting.
10. (C/NF) Despite these clear signals from the new Administration, the strength of the special relationship still has traction for the UK media and political class. Some in the UK used the Binyam Mohamed case this past week -- in which a UK high court ruled against making U.S. classified information available to UK lawyers representing a Guantanamo Bay detainee -- as a test of the Obama Administration's commitment to a "new approach" to fighting terrorism and to the special relationship, with a leading Tory politician charging, for example, that "denying evidence to a UK court of law (in this case) raises doubts about the existence of the so-called special relationship with Washington." British irritation with the original "buy American" language in the U.S. stimulus legislation -- which the UK media spun as a test of the Obama Administration's commitment to free trade agreements with its European allies -- is also an example of how elements in Britain still look for signs of distance between London and Washington. There is also still a palpable concern among our parliamentary and FCO contacts that, although there are many areas where the Brown Government's priorities track U.S. policies under the new Administration, the high expectations in Britain about a new
LONDON 00000348 004 OF 004
golden age of bilateral cooperation are themselves a potential threat to the relationship. John Spellar, a senior Labour MP and government whip, summed this up: "At the moment, there's unrealistic euphoria towards the new President...MPs are forgetting that, ultimately, Presidents have to behave in a certain way. Some of us are destined to be disappointed by him, policy-wise...On the other hand, the people who really matter in all this, those who do the serious business, know that where it matters - over defense, security issues, intelligence-sharing - the relationship is deep, ongoing and abiding."
Comment: Those Who Know the Relationship Know Its Strength
--------------------------------------------- --------------
11. (C/NF) Though tempting to argue that keeping HMG off balance about its current standing with us might make London more willing to respond favorably when pressed for assistance, in the long run it is not in U.S. interests to have the UK public concluding the relationship is weakening, on either side. The UK's commitment of resources -- financial, military, diplomatic -- in support of U.S global priorities remains unparalleled; a UK public confident that the USG values those contributions and our relationship matters to U.S. national security. This is a theme Embassy London stresses privately and publicly to reassure the public and HMG. As new Administration officials begin their working relationships with UK counterparts, and introduce themselves to the UK public through media and conference events, it is a theme we recommend they highlight as well.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
LEBARON
Tuesday, 01 April 2008, 10:06
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 000930
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/31/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINR, AF, UK
SUBJECT: WILLIAM HAGUE SAYS "NEAR DEATH EXPERIENCE" HAS
IMPROVED TORY CHANCES
Classified By: DCM Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C/NF) Summary. Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague told the DCM the Tories are "more likely to win than lose" the next general election. High approval ratings in the polls allow the Conservative Leader David Cameron a "latitude to maneuver" that he does not possess when the polls are running against him. Referring to Afghanistan, Hague said the party "would be hard pressed to part with HMG policy where British troops are concerned." Hague asserted that he, Cameron, and Shadow Chancellor George Osborne are all "children of Thatcher" and staunch Atlanticists but acknowledged that the network of ties once binding the British public to America may not be as thick for all citizens of Britain. End summary.
Saved by "Near Death" Experience
--------------------------------
2. (C/NF) William Hague and DCM, accompanied by Hague's Senior Advisor Arminka Helic and Poloff Kirsten Schulz, met in Hague's House of Commons office March 19. Hague was upbeat about the Conservatives' prospects, arguing that the "near death experience" of actively contemplating a snap general election last August when Cameron was down in the polls had forced party members and leaders to unite. Prime Minister Gordon Brown having "bottled it (lost his nerve)," after a strong Conservative Conference and a well-regarded performance by David Cameron, had left the Tories with an "internal confidence" previously lacking, said Hague.
3. (C/NF) When the Conservatives are leading in the polls as they are now, Cameron has more latitude to attack the Government, said Hague, and their proposals are taken as genuine possibilities for the future, rather than carping against the majority. He said the Conservatives are "more likely to win than lose" the next general election which he suspects will be called in fall 2009 or spring 2010. From the Conservatives' point of view, added Hague, later was better. The longer Brown stayed in office, the more the public would tend to the view that it was time for a change and a 2010 election date would mean the Labour government will have been in power for thirteen years. Hague said the state of the economy would play a role and he suspected Brown's strategy would be to cast an economic downturn as international in nature and not the product of any of his actions. Hague said the polls showed the British public is "less hostile" to the Conservative Party and, while he is optimistic about Cameron's chances, said it is also likely the Conservatives will come to power as a minority government.
Afghanistan
-----------
4. (C/NF) The DCM asked Hague how the Conservatives viewed Afghanistan, recognizing that Cameron believes policy toward that country will be at the top of his agenda. Hague said there was no great difference between the Conservatives and HMG when it came to foreign policy. There were skirmishes about the EU but otherwise there was agreement. The Conservatives, said Hague, "would be hard pressed to part with HMG policy where British troops are concerned." Thus any criticism of current Afghanistan policy would be muted. Hague said there was concern about marrying NATO and political goals. He mused that some expert on the country suggested that, at some future date, administrative control of Kabul and the North would be separated from the less plausible goal of administering the South, but he was not advocating such a shift at this, or any near, date.
National Security
-----------------
5. (C/NF) The DCM asked Hague what he thought of Brown's national security strategy, which had been released the day before. Hague said it was "more a worthy list of goals than a strategy." Without having studied it in detail, there was little in it with which the Tories would disagree, said Hague. He thought Brown had not gone far enough. The Conservatives themselves are in the process of conceiving a national security strategy. They will call for an American-style National Security Council, not just the creation of a panel of senior advisors to inform the Prime Minister. Hague added that other domestic security initiatives launched by Brown, like the creation of a Border Service, were also thin. He said the Conservatives wanted to stop spending money on the creation of a national identity card, for example, and use that money to build a "real border and customs police where we actually track who leaves the
LONDON 00000930 002 OF 002
country."
Is the Relationship Still Special?
----------------------------------
6. (C/NF) The DCM asked Hague whether the relationship between the UK and the U.S. was "still special." Hague said he, David Cameron and George Osborne were "children of Thatcher" and staunch Atlanticists. Speaking more broadly, Hague acknowledged that this was a hard question to answer. Politicians, in his view, "sit at the top of the pyramid" of the general public and it is unclear whether the British people will maintain the network of ties to America that has sustained the special relationship. For his part, said Hague, he has a sister who is American, spends his own vacations in America, and, like many similar to him, considers America the "other country to turn to." Asking his Senior Advisor her views, Helic (who is Bosnian), said, "America is the essential country." Hague said whoever enters 10 Downing Street as Prime Minister soon learns of the essential nature of the relationship with America. He added, "we want a pro-American regime. We need it. The world needs it."
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm Tuttle
Tuesday, 19 January 2010, 09:17
S E C R E T RIYADH 000090
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NSC FOR AJOST
EO 12958 DECL: 01/12/2020
TAGS IR, MARR, MASS, MOPS, SA, YM
SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIA: GENERAL JONES' JANUARY 12, 2010
MEETING WITH PRINCE MOHAMMED BIN NAIF, ASSISTANT MINISTER OF INTERIOR
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b, d)
SUMMARY
-------
1. (S) Summary: During a 30-minute meeting with Prince Mohammed, General Jones reviewed U.S. and Saudi efforts to combat Al-Qaida extremists in the region and discussed Afghanistan/Pakistan, Yemen, and Iran. Prince Mohammed highlighted Saudi Arabia's continued and growing concerns about Al-Qaida operations originating from Yemen and praised the Yemeni government's successful December attacks against Al-Qaida operatives. The meeting was followed by a lunch and a briefing on the situation on the Saudi-Yemeni border.
WE MUST KEEP AL-QAIDA ON THE RUN
--------------------------------
2. (S) General Jones noted that the attempted bombing of a U.S. aircraft on December 25 is another reminder that we are passing through difficult times. He assured Prince Mohammed that while the U.S. recognizes that screening procedures can be improved, the U.S. has confidence that the systems in place are basically sound. The General also noted that terrorism concerns seem to be spreading beyond Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, and now are being heard from governments in north Africa, particularly Niger, Mali, Morocco and Algeria.
3. (S) Prince Mohammed responded that we are likely to see many more attempts like the December 25 incident. He also noted that the Saudi experience against Al-Qaida demonstrates that the best response is to "keep them on the run." Right after the 9/11 attacks, he noted, nearly eighty percent of the mosques in Saudi Arabia voiced support for Bin Laden. That is when the Saudi leadership realized how dire the problem they faced was. Over the last 6 years of combating Al-Qaida inside Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom has foiled many Al-Qaida plots and in the process learned that we must not only to fight Al-Qaida "in the field," but also to counter their ideology in order to curtail recruitment.
4. (S/NF) In this light, the recent attack against Al-Qaida in Yemen "was very positive." Prince Mohammed noted that the Saudis have been monitoring conversations of Al-Qaida operatives in Yemen very closely, and whereas before the attack they were hearing relaxed 20-minute phone conversations over cell phones, after the attack the phones went virtually silent. This suggests that at least for now these operatives are more focused on their own security rather than on planning operations.
SAUDI CONCERNS ON YEMEN
-----------------------
5. (S) Prince Mohammed said that the Saudi government has been watching with great concern Al-Qaida's growth in Yemen over the last five years. Yemen's geography makes it a much more convenient place for Al-Qaida operations. Not only does the mountainous terrain help them hide, but the shoreline also gives them an ability to move over the water - extending their potential reach much further abroad.
6. (C) One of Al-Qaida's objectives in its confrontation with Saudi Arabia, Prince Mohammed explained is "to control Mecca and Medina." He said that they want to be able to control who makes the Hajj, and if they were able to do so, they would limit the visits of those coming to the Hajj to one week, something that could cause chaos. (Embassy note: Among Al-Qaida's basic objectives is its call to "liberate" the Islamic holy sites from the corrupt hands of the Al Saud, but this is the first time we have heard a Saudi official point out the more specific goal of limiting how long Muslims can visit the holy places as part of their Hajj. End note.)
7. (C) Prince Mohammed also noted that Saudi Arabia has been making an effort to seal the Saudi-Yemen border, noting that "we have been arresting between one to two thousand people each day." He also admitted that the Saudis have maintained a common practice of feeding those caught crossing before transporting them back across the border. "We need to change
that," he went on, since many may be crossing the border only to get a meal. Prince Mohammed pointed out that a key feature of the Saudi approach to undermine Al-Qaida's growth in Yemen is to bolster the central government, in particular with substantial financial assistance. A Saudi-Yemeni Council meets twice a year to review development projects in Yemen funded by Saudi Arabia. However, up to now, he reported, the Saudis have not been satisfied with the distribution of these development and infrastructure projects because the Yemeni government has been concentrating them in Sanaa and other urban areas. The Saudis now insist on having a say in distributing these infrastructure investments with remote areas receiving priority "to give the tribes in those areas something to lose if they cooperate with terrorists."
Afghanistan/Pakistan
--------------------
8. (C) General Jones noted that the Obama administration's approach in Pakistan and Afghanistan reflects many of the same lessons that the Saudis have learned. That is why the U.S. is working with a new emphasis on national reunification in Afghanistan. The approach includes reducing the emphasis on military operations while exerting new efforts to encourage reconciliation. In order for this strategy to succeed, Gen. Jones cautioned, it will be essential that Pakistani territory no longer be available as a safehaven to terrorists.
9. (C) Prince Mohammed commented that "Pakistan must let people know that it is fighting a war to keep Pakistan united and its people safe." But if we want one hundred percent from them, he cautioned, we should make them feel more secure on their border with India. He also noted that King Abdullah "has concerns about the Pakistani government; the biggest problem is the army." General Kayani (Army Chief of Staff) is a good man; I asked him, Prince Mohammed recounted, whether or not his soldiers, when they visit their villages, wear their uniforms, or if they changed into civilian clothes. He told me that they change to civilian clothes.
10. (C) General Jones assured Prince Mohammed that the U.S. is working to reduce Pakistani-Indian tensions, and emphasized that what is most needed at this moment is for Pakistan to choose which path it wants to take. The first step is to dislodge the terrorists; if Pakistan resolves to do this, they will find that the U.S. will help them for some time to come. The Pakistani ISI also needs to act with greater consistency. Noting Saudi Arabia's influence with Pakistan, General Jones emphasized that the U.S. is looking for Saudi Arabia's support.
Next Phase with Iran
--------------------
10. (C) General Jones described the administration's current thinking on Iran, noting that Iran has failed to enter into a serious dialogue with the international community about its nuclear program. With the deadline of the end of the year now passed, it is time to start looking at sanctions. Prince Mohammed said Saudi Arabia remains greatly concerned about Iran's nuclear program and noted that there is now a big crack in the Iranian government, particularly following the recent attack on Karroubi. (Embassy note: Opposition leader Mehdi Karroubi's car was fired upon on January 9, an attack that oppositionist attribute to Iran's Revolutionary Guard. End note.)
High Marks for U.S.-Saudi Counterterrorism Cooperation
----------------------------
11. (C) General Jones asked Prince Mohammed if there was anything needed from the U.S. to improve our counterterrorism coordination. Prince Mohammed responded that King Abdullah has made very clear that U.S.-Saudi security cooperation must remain independent of political buffeting. He said that our cooperation is very good, and has developed to the point that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are in "simultaneous mode" regarding the sharing of raw data and threat information. Gen. Jones remarked that Prince Mohammed has played an
important role in bringing about this strong security relationship, and conveyed President Obama's appreciation for this strong partnership.
Comment
-------
12. (S) We note that Prince Mohammed did not raise the matter of recently introduced heightened screening procedures on Saudi citizens. While we have heard that these new measures provoked strong reactions from some in the Saudi leadership, the absence of any expressions of concern or upset on Prince Mohammed part is fully in keeping with his reputation as one who fully understands the difficulty of maneuvering against extremist elements to prevent attacks. The Embassy views this meeting as accomplishing the important objective of reinforcing our strong counterterrorism cooperation. As is evident from his brief responses to Gen. Jones' briefs on Iran and Afghanistan/Pakistan, these issues are ones on which Prince Mohammed carefully defers to the King. SMITH
Monday, 21 December 2009, 13:34
S E C R E T SANAA 002251
SIPDIS
NOFORN
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE
EO 12958 DECL: 12/21/2019
TAGS PTER, MOPS, MASS, PGOV, PREL, YE
SUBJECT: ROYG LOOKS AHEAD FOLLOWING CT OPERATIONS, BUT
PERHAPS NOT FAR ENOUGH
REF: SANAA 02230
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. The ROYG views the December 17 CT operations as a success and a benefit to Yemeni national interests, and appears not overly concerned about unauthorized leaks regarding the U.S. role and negative media attention to civilian deaths. ROYG officials continue to publicly maintain that the operation was conducted entirely by its forces, acknowledging U.S. support strictly in terms of intelligence sharing. Deputy Prime Minister Rashad al-Alimi told the Ambassador on December 20 that any evidence of greater U.S. involvement ) such as fragments of U.S. munitions found at the sites - could be explained away as equipment purchased from the U.S. While the ROYG has touted the operation as a victory in terms of the number of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) members killed or captured, it hasn't yet decided how, or even if, it should begin to modify its public messaging to address criticism over collateral damage, or the likelihood that the extent of U.S. involvement may become impossible to deny. END SUMMARY.
2. (S/NF) In a December 20 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy Prime Minister for Security and Defense Rashad al-Alimi said that the ROYG, including President Saleh himself, views the December 17 CT operations in Abyan and Arhab as a success, despite negative press reports (septel) and leaks to the U.S. press regarding a U.S. role in the operation. Alimi said he was joined by other ROYG officials in their positive view of the operation against al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and a desire for continued collaboration on CT operations. Referring to an internal ROYG meeting chaired by President Saleh on December 19, Alimi assured the Ambassador that Saleh wants these operations against AQAP to continue "non-stop until we eradicate this disease."
3. (S/NF) Alimi told the Ambassador that Saleh was undisturbed by press reports citing U.S. officials asserting American involvement in the operations, saying that the ROYG "must maintain the status quo" with regard to the official denial of U.S. involvement in order to ensure additional "positive operations" against AQAP. Alimi seemed more concerned with the political opposition and Southern Movement's use of the Abyan operation as an example of the government's heavy-handed response to groups the ROYG deems a threat. The Ambassador cautioned Alimi that the ROYG may need to nuance its position regarding U.S. involvement in the event more evidence surfaces, complicating its ability to adhere to the official line that ROYG forces conducted the operations independently. Alimi appeared confident that any evidence of greater U.S. involvement ) such as U.S. munitions found at the sites - could be explained away as equipment purchased from the U.S. However, Alimi informed the Ambassador that senior ROYG officials continue to the discuss media strategy and the public posture of the ROYG.
NOT SO INNOCENT
---------------
4. (S/NF) According to Alimi, the ROYG has recruited a number of local political and religious leaders to visit the ares affected by the air strikes in Abyan to explain o the people the need for the operation and the dnger that AQAP poses to all Yemenis. The Governr of Abyan was given YR 20 million (approximatel USD 100,000) to disburse to the families of those killed or wounded in the strikes in Maajala, where the AQAP training camp was located. Alimi said that the civilians who died were largely nomadic, Bedouin families who lived in tents near the AQAP training camp and were assisting AQAP with logistical support. Alimi said they were poor people selling food and supplies to the terrorists, but were nonetheless acting in collusion with the terrorists and benefitting financially from AQAP's presence in the area. He assured the Ambassador that the Governor of Abyan visited the site after the operation and confirmed that there were no villages, houses, or civilian institutions that were damaged, only the training camp, and the encampments of the non-combatant Bedouin population.
COMMENT
-------
5. (S/NF) Given that local and international media will continue to look for evidence of a U.S. role in the December
17 strikes against AQAP, the ROYG must think seriously about its public posture and whether its strict adherence to assertions that the strikes were unilateral will undermine public support for legitimate and urgently needed CT operations, should evidence to the contrary surface. Thus far, the ROYG has deployed influential local leaders to the affected area in Abyan to explain the need for the strikes in an effort to quell potential unrest; however, it has not attempted to provide any context for the civilian casualties, which might help to counter overblown claims of ROYG disregard for the local population ) in this particular case, southerners. END COMMENT. SECHE
XXXXXXXXXXXX
SUBJECT: GOOGLE UPDATE: PRC ROLE IN ATTACKS AND RESPONSE
STRATEGY
XXXXXXXXXXXX
BEIJING XXXXXXXXXXXX 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DCM Robert Goldberg. Reasons 1.4 (b), (d).
1. (S) Summary: A well-placed contact claims that the Chinese government coordinated the recent intrusions of Google systems. According to our contact, the closely held operations were directed at the Politburo Standing Committee level.
-- Another contact claimed a top PRC leader was actively working with Google competitor Baidu against Google.
-- Chinese concerns over the recent Google threat to take down the company's Chinese-language search engine google.cn over censorship and hacking allegations were focused on the service's growing popularity among Chinese Internet users and a perception that the USG and Google were working in concert.
-- An appeal to nationalism seems to be the Chinese government's chosen option to counter Google's demand to provide unfiltered web content.
-- Contacts in the technology industry tell us that Chinese interference in the operations of foreign businesses is widespread and often underreported to U.S. parent companies. End Summary.
Attacks Directed at High Level
------------------------------
2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff that the closely held Chinese government operations against Google had been coordinated out of the State Council Information Office XXXXXXXXXXXX It was not until Google's public announcement of the intrusions into its systems that the issue had been discussed more widely within the Party. (Note: It is unclear whether President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao were aware of these actions before Google's going public.) As a result of Google's announcement, the PBSC had taken up the issue of Internet controls and the Google case in a series of meetings (reftel). XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that PRC operations against Google were "one hundred percent" political in nature and had nothing to do with removing Google, with its minority market share, as a competitor to Chinese search engines. Separately, XXXXXXXXXXXX told ECON MinCouns that he believed PBSC member XXXXXXXXXXXX was working actively with Chinese Internet search giant Baidu against Google's interests in China.
PRC Sees USG and Google Working Together
----------------------------------------
3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff XXXXXXXXXXXX that Google's recent move presented a major dilemma (maodun) for the Chinese government, not because of the cyber-security aspect but because of Google's direct challenge to China's legal restrictions on Internet content. The immediate strategy, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, seemed to be to appeal to Chinese nationalism by accusing Google and the U.S. government of working together to force China to accept "Western values" and undermine China's rule of law. The problem the censors were facing, however, was that Google's demand to deliver uncensored search results was very difficult to spin as an attack on China, and the entire episode had made Google more interesting and attractive to Chinese Internet users. All of a sudden, XXXXXXXXXXXX continued, Baidu looked like a boring state-owned enterprise while Google "seems very attractive, like the forbidden fruit." He said it "seems clear" to the Chinese people that Google and the U.S. government were working together on Internet freedom and to undermine Chinese government controls on the Internet. That made some intellectuals happy, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, but "some others" regarded it as interference in China's internal affairs.
Industry: Interference Common, Paranoia Driving PRC Policy
--------------------------------------------- -------------
BEIJING XXXXXXXXXXXX OF 002
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted the pronounced disconnect between views of U.S. parent companies and local subsidiaries. PRC-based company officials often downplayed the extent of PRC government interference in their operations for fear of consequences for their local markets. Our contact emphasized that Google and other U.S. companies in China were struggling with the stated Chinese goal of technology transfer for the purpose of excluding foreign competition. This consultant noted the Chinese were exploiting the global economic downturn to enact increasingly draconian product certification and government procurement regulations to force foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) to transfer intellectual property and to carve away the market share of foreign companies.
Chinese Media: American Hypocrisy and Cultural Hegemony
--------------------------------------------- -----------
5. (U) The Secretary's speech continued to dominate headlines January 25-26, with the official People's Daily (circ 2.2 million) alleging collusion between U.S. officials and the business community as evidenced by the propinquity of Google's rethink of its China business and the Secretary's speech. Chinese media again accused the U.S. of "cultural hegemony" for setting the standards for "so-called Internet freedom8 and of hypocrisy for calling for the free flow of information while using the Internet as a political and military tool. People's Daily-affiliated Global Times English (circ 150,000) called the speech a "milestone" showing that U.S. and Western political interests were "taking over every dimension" of cyberspace.
6. (U) The Party-affiliated Beijing News (circ 530,000) opined that the speech showed "a huge gap between Chinese and American information industries, which may lead to a trade war strategy." In an article headlined "China Intensifies Counterattack on Internet Accusation," Global Times Chinese (circ 1.3 million) quoted Chinese scholar Niu Xinchun as rejecting the theory that U.S.-China conflict would replace the "G2" cooperation model, noting that U.S. attacks usually ended "poorly" when the U.S. considered its practical interests. Many papers quoted statements from the State Council Information Office and Ministry of Industry and Information Technology calling Chinese Internet controls "legitimate" and saying they should not be subject to "unjustifiable interference." Papers continued to conflate Google's China business strategy with the Secretary's speech.
Blogging Circumscribed
----------------------
7. XXXXXXXXXXXX Anecdotally, censors appear to have cracked down on blogging about the Secretary's speech. Several bloggers who attended our XXXXXXXXXXXX told us subsequently they had been instructed to take down their entries about the event XXXXXXXXXXXX. Secretary Clinton's speech is currently blocked in Chinese on state.gov but remains accessible on the U.S. Embassy website in both English and Chinese. HUNTSMAN
Monday, 18 May 2009, 23:26
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 001336
SIPDIS
State for EAP/CM - SFlatt, PPark, AGoodman
State for EEB/CIP - FSaeed, SFlynn
USTR for AWinter, JMcHale, AMain, TWineland
Commerce for MAC
Commerce for ITA - IKasoff, JWu
EO 12958 DECL: 5/19/2029
TAGS ETRD, PGOV, SOCI, SCUL, ECON, CH
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXXX
Ref: Beijing XXXXXXXXXXXXX
Classified By: Economic Minister Counselor Robert Luke. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
-------
1. (C) CDA spoke by phone with on May 14 to discuss recent pressure by the Chinese government to censor the company's Chinese website, accelerated perhaps by the approach of significant political anniversaries.XXXXXXXXXXXXX averred that the root of the problem was China's Politburo Standing Committee member XXXXXXXXXXXXX who wants the company to remove a link to the uncensored google.com site from its sanitized Chinese version, google.cn. XXXXXXXXXXXXX said Google China has resisted that step as against company principles, though it has taken other smaller measures to try and placate the government. Thus far that tactic has been unsuccessful, and the government has already taken commercial steps against Google, including telling the three dominant SOE telecoms to stop doing business with the company. CDA and XXXXXXXXXXXXX discussed possible USG advocacy, including having imminent visiting Codels and possible Cabinet-level officials raise this directly. For the moment, Google does not wish to go public, preferring to see if current efforts produce results. End Summary.
2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXXX, CDA Dan Piccuta and XXXXXXXXXXXX talked XXXXXXXXXX about the increasing censorship pressure Google is facing.XXXXXXXXXXXX said Politburo Standing Committee member XXXXXXXXXXXX recently discovered that Google's worldwide site is uncensored, and is capable of Chinese language searches and search results. XXXXXXXXXXXX allegedly entered his own name and found results critical of him. He also noticed the link from google.cn's homepage to google.com, whichXXXXXXXXXXXX reportedly believes is an "illegal site." XXXXXXXXXXXX asked three ministries (note: most likely the Ministry of Industry and Information Industry, State Council Information Office, and Public Security Bureau.) to write a report about Google and demand that the company cease its "illegal activities," which include linking to google.com.
Commercial Consequences Already Visible
---------------------------------------
3. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that removing the link to google.com is against the company's principles, and its leadership has definitively refused to make such a change, despite the importance of the Chinese market. Google recently has officially but "politely" told the government this, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted, and their Chinese interlocutors at the time were visibly unhappy and said they would report the news to XXXXXXXXXXXX . XXXXXXXXXXXX reported that Google had, however, already made some changes to its Chinese site and will continue to make others. Nonetheless, he said China has already asked its three state-owned telecom companies to stop working with China, a hard blow because mobile Internet is Google's "big bet in China."XXXXXXXXXXXX said one telecom company is seeking to back out of an existing contract with Google, while the two others have stopped moving ahead with negotiations. Other SOEs have also been asked to stop working with Google in China,XXXXXXXXXXXX said.
4. (SBU) The best case scenario XXXXXXXXXXXX foresees is that China responds to Google's official refusal to take down the link by issuing an order warning against further non-compliance. More likely is
BEIJING 00001336 002 OF 003
that google.com will be blocked in China, either sporadically or permanently. This would be similar to China's current blocking of YouTube, but with greater implications for users including business travelers and tourists, advertisers, and for Google's network and technology platforms, possibly affecting other services like Gmail.thought it also possible that the government might revoke Google's license to operate in China. He acknowledged that sensitive anniversaries in 2009 present special challenges to the Chinese government, especially the XXXXXXXXXXXX June 4 Tiananmen anniversary. (Note: Possibly in preparation for this anniversary year, Chinese censors have engaged in a months-long "anti- vulgar" campaign to shut down hundreds of "illegal" websites; see reftel.)
Google Deems its Legal Basis Sound
----------------------------------
5. (SBU) Google lawyers have found no legal basis for China's demands, XXXXXXXXXXXX reported. While the government has called google.com an illegal website to justify its request for removal of the link, Chinese law does not explicitly identify the site as illegal, the site is not blocked by China, and thousands of other Chinese websites include links to google.com.
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said Google faces the dilemma of losing the Chinese market in retaliation for maintaining Google's integrity and brand. The CDA and XXXXXXXXXXXX discussed the difficulty of engaging China on this matter, since no trade obligations cover China's censorship regime, but considered what U.S. Government actions might be possible nonetheless.
USG High-Level Advocacy Requested
---------------------------------
7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that high-level USG officials phone or write to XXXXXXXXXXXX to indicate support for Google's operations in China, in accordance with Chinese law. He suggested the letter could urge further dialogue toward a mutually acceptable resolution and suggest diplomatic or commercial consequences in the event of rash or disruptive action. After some discussion, XXXXXXXXXXXX concluded that intervention by Secretary Locke might be the most effective step.
8. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX He noted that Google has also raised the issue with Representatives Kirk and Larson. However, he stressed, he would like USG support in making contact.
9. (C) The CDA said senior Embassy officials will meet with relevant Chinese ministries to make it clear the USG is aware of the issue, and to urge them to work constructively with Google.XXXXXXXXXX stressed that, before the USG engages on their behalf, Google would prefer to wait a few days to see what other steps the Chinese government might take.
Google History in China
-----------------------
10. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that Google entered the Chinese market in 2006 under scrutiny from Congress and shareholders, both concerned with the company's agreement to be subject to censorship. To enter the China market legally, but remain faithful to its values, the company took a path of
BEIJING 00001336 003 OF 003
"responsible engagement" that included three commitments: Google will never disclose to the Chinese government any personal information about its users or their search habits; Google will always include a disclosure notice to identify when search results had been removed due to censorship; and Google will always provide an uncensored, U.S.-hosted site, subject to U.S. law.
11. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Chinese government's granting of the licenses necessary for Google to operate in China implied passive approval or at least tolerance of the above principles. Since 2006, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, the company has operated responsibly and legally, following censorship orders just as other companies do. The vast majority of Chinese government requests for censorship have been related to pornographic material and illegal activities, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. In total, only about one percent of search results are blocked in China, according to the company.
12. (SBU)XXXXXXXXXXXX observed that, before Google China was formed, google.com was blocked in China in 2002 for approximately two months. At the time, he said, scholarly users were the company's largest constituency, and their complaints about limited access to academic materials through Google ultimately caused the government to re-open the site. This time,XXXXXXXXXXXX observed,XXXXXXXXXX seems unconcerned with such repercussions, and will likely not yield to pressure from China's Internet community. XXXXXXXXXXXX he said, believes Google is a "tool" of the USG being used to "foment peaceful revolution in China."
Comment
-------
13. (C) While we can neither confirm nor deny the provocative language and views attributed to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the claims of government-forced retribution by the major SOE telecoms companies are cause for serious concern. The potential for continuing escalation by the Chinese, assuming Google sticks to its guns -- and the likelihood of loud U.S. Congressional and public outcry if it caves -- suggest a high-level USG response may be in order. While we cannot verify XXXXXXXXXXXX's claims of commercial retaliation, such a move seems quite possible. End Comment.
XXXXXXXXXXXXX
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 001957
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/CM - SFLATT, JHABJAN
STATE EEB/CIP - SFLYNN, FSAEED
USTR FOR AWINTER, JMCHALE, TWINELAND
COMMERCE FOR MAC
COMMERCE FOR ITA - NMELCHER
NSC FOR JLOI
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS ETRD, PHUM, PGOV, ECON, CH
SUBJECT: GOOGLE CLAIMS HARRASSMENT BY CHINESE GOVERNMENT
1. (SBU) Summary. XXXXXXXXXXXXX claim the company's services have been blocked by the Chinese government periodically over the past three years. After users reported on June 18 that Google.cm search engine was not filtering returns for pornographic sites, the government on June 24 again blocked the company's services for 24 hours resulting in the loss of 20 percent of its traffic that day.XXXXXXXXXXXXX believe the real reason for the government's wrath is the company's refusal to remove a link to google.com from the google.cn website. They argue doing so would be in violation of a commitment the company made with Congress. End Summary.
2. (SBU) In conversations XXXXXXXXXXXXX told ADCM and EconOff that the Chinese government has been blocking several of Google's Internet sites periodically for the past three years. They said the blocking and other harassment had intensified in June 2009, purportedly because of the search engine's failure to filter some inappropriate or illicit content found on the web.
3. (SBU)XXXXXXXXXXXXX said that XXXXXXXXXXXXX a group of Chinese Internet users reported that Google.cn was not effectively filtering pornographic sites. XXXXXXXXXXXXX said Google China representatives were called to a meeting co-hosted by the State Council Information Office (SCIO, responsible for controlling Internet content), the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT, responsible for Internet technology and policy), and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS, responsible for Internet crime). The Ministries demanded Google provide better filtering on its Google.cn search engine and temporarily stop indexing sites outside of China. XXXXXXXXXXXXX The company refused this request.
4. (SBU) Google then experienced a wave of "attacks" in the media reporting that pornographic material could be found through the Google search engine. (Note: In the nine days following the June 18 incident, an incomplete list of reporting in the Chinese press contains 57 separate articles attacking Google. End Note). On June 24 servers in China were virally infected, causing them to redirect computers attempting to reach Google pages to an unknown web site. These attacks made Google services unavailable to many Chinese users for approximately 24 hours, and caused the company to lose 20% of its traffic on that day.
Lose the Google.com
-------------------
5. (SBU) BothXXXXXXXXXXXXX believe the real reason for the government's wrath is Google's refusal to remove the link to Google.com from the Google.cn website.XXXXXXXXXXXXX explained that, when the company decided to enter the Chinese market, it testified before Congress that it would agree to censor its search results in China as required by Chinese law based on three principles. First, the company would not store private user information so as to avoid persecution of individuals based on their use of Google's services. Second, the company would disclose to users when a search result had been censored. Third, Google would maintain a link from the Google.cn homepage to Google.com.
6. (SBU) According to XXXXXXXXXXXXX, from 2007 through 2009 Google received numerous informal inquiries from the Chinese government as to the possibility of removing the Google.com link. The company repeatedly explained that it could not, based on its promise to Congress. XXXXXXXXXXXXX said the government, for the first time, verbally requested the company remove the link. Google China explained removing the link was not required under Chinese law and reiterated that doing so would violate the company's commitment. This was the first time the company had explicitly denied a government request, XXXXXXXXXXXXX stated.
Pulling Out an Option
---------------------
7. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXXX said the June 24 blocking of Google's services is only the most recent of a three year history of blockings. He noted the company's You Tube service has been entirely blocked since March 24. He believes the company is being harassed. XXXXXXXXXXXXX said the negative press coverage and service outages have caused the company to lose market share. XXXXXXXXXXXXXsays the company is regularly audited by tax authorities, and XXXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXXX said that, faced with the continual
BEIJING 00001957 002 OF 002
difficulties of doing business in China, the company may even consider pulling out of the market.
8. (SBU) Comment. Google is the only international search engine still doing business in China. It is an important symbol. If Google were forced to withdraw from the market, the move could attract heavy international attention. End Comment.
Friday, 13 November 2009, 12:46
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002992
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO LIMBERT, NEA/IR AND NEA/I. NSC FOR
TALWAR, MAGSAMEN, PHEE AND VROOMAN
EO 12958 DECL: 11/13/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, TU, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAN'S EFFORTS IN IRAQI ELECTORAL POLITICS
REF: BAGHDAD 2288
Classified By: Political M/C Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) SUMMARY: Iran is a dominant player in Iraq's electoral politics, and is using its close ties to Shia, Kurdish, and select Sunni figures to shape the political landscape in favor of a united Shia victory in the January election. A pro-Iran, Shia-dominated, and preferably Islamist government, led by a united Shia alliance remains Iran's top priority. Toward that end, Iran is seeking to increase pressure on Maliki to join forces with the other prominent Shia coalition (Iraqi National Alliance) led by the Sadrists and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). END SUMMARY
2. (S) Iran is arguably the most influential regional power seeking to shape and influence the outcome of Iraq's election. This message offers an assessment of Iran's efforts to shape Iraq's electoral politics in anticipation of the national election in January.
Iran's Policy Goals and Tools
-----------------------------
3. (S) Iran's over-arching political objective for Iraq's January election is the re-election of a Shia-dominated, preferably Islamist, coalition led by Tehran's closest allies, notably ISCI and the Sadrist Trend under the rubric of the Iraqi National Alliance coalition (INA) (reftel). Iraq, given its proximity to Iran and its shared Shia heritage, represents a vital foreign policy priority for the Iranian government's (IRIG) efforts to project its ideology and influence in the region. An economically dependent and politically subservient Iraq would foster greater strategic depth for Tehran. Iranian president Ahmadinejad has referred to Iraq in recent press statements as "a Shia base" confronting the broader menace perpetrated by those opposed to Iraq's identity and stability (i.e., Sunni states, the West).
4. (S) Iran's approach to its bilateral relationship with Iraq ranges from political micro-management to broad strategic guidance emanating directly from Supreme Leader Khamenei in Tehran. The IRIG recognizes that influence in Iraq requires operational (and at times ideological) flexibility. As a result, it is not uncommon for the IRIG to finance and support competing Shia, Kurdish, and to some extent, Sunni entities, with the aim of developing the Iraqi body politic's dependency on Tehran's largesse. While exact figures are unknown, Tehran's financial assistance to Iraqi surrogates is estimated at USD 100-200 million annually, with USD 70 million going to ISCI/Badr coffers.
5. (S) Since at least 2003, Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), has been the point main directing the formulation and implementation of the IRIG's Iraq policy, with authority second only to Supreme Leader Khamenei. Through his IRGC-QF officers and Iraqi proxies in Iraq, notably Iranian Ambassador and IRGC-QF associate Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, Soleimani employs the full range of diplomatic, security, intelligence, and economic tools to influence Iraqi allies and detractors in order to shape a more pro-Iran regime in Baghdad and the provinces.
6. (S) Soleimani enjoys long-standing close ties with several prominent GOI officials, including President Talabani, Vice-President Adel Abdal-Mahdi (ISCI), Prime Minister Maliki (Da'wa), former PM Jaafari, and more recently, Speaker Samarra'i (Septel reports Iranian Speaker Qrecently, Speaker Samarra'i (Septel reports Iranian Speaker Larijani's November 4-7 visit to Iraq at Samarra'i's invitation.). Khamenei, President Ahmadinejad, Speaker Larijani, and former president Rafsanjani consult regularly with visiting GOI officials as part of the IRIG's broader "strategic" council of advisers seeking to influence the GOI.
7. (S) Iran's tools of influence include financial support to (and pressure on) a cross-spectrum of Iraqi parties and officials; economic development assistance, notably to religious organizations; lethal aid to select militant Shia proxies; and sanctuary to Iraqi figures fearful of USG targeting or those seeking to revitalize their political/religious credentials, most notably Moqtada al-Sadr. This leverage also extends, to a lesser extent, to select Sunni actors, including such public figures as Iraqi Speaker Samarra'i, whose September visit to Tehran included
BAGHDAD 00002992 002 OF 003
meetings with several senior IRIG officials.
Pre-Election Jockeying
----------------------
8. (S) Predictably, Iran is actively lobbying and recruiting Iraqis of various political stripes and affiliations, including Sunnis, in the run-up to the election to ensure a united Shia-led coalition government. Given the likelihood of a Shia-led victory in the election, Iran appears more concerned about the strength of a united Shia bloc in the post-election phase of government formation. For Iran, a "rebellious" Maliki pursuing a more nationalist vs. sectarian agenda risks splitting the Shia vote, which in turn weakens the Shia political bloc's negotiating strength during the government formation period post-election. Iran's greatest fear for the upcoming election is a fractured Shia coalition that is unable to coalesce and thereby dominate the next government. Iran's worst-case election scenario (increasingly unrealistic) is a coup d'etat of former regime elements hostile to Tehran.
9. (S) A weak Shia coalition before or after the election would further undermine the INA and their pro-Iranian entities, notably ISCI and the Sadrist Trend. The Kurds, historically closer to ISCI, remain the important swing vote and are unlikely to reveal their true coalition intentions until after the election. As seasoned masters of the Iraqi political chessboard, Kurdish leaders such as Talabani and Barzani will likely exploit their political strength among Shia/Sunni counterparts to protect and expand Kurdish influence in a future government. Iran's historic ties to the PUK, and to a lesser extent KDP officials, make the Kurds an important element in ensuring a pro-Iranian Shia victory in the election. INA officials are confident that the Kurds will join their coalition, all but guaranteeing an election victory. An unknown factor in national elections is the Kurdish opposition party, Goran List, under the leadership of former PUK Secretary General Nawshirwan Mustafa. Goran is committed to unseating the PUK (and Talabani) in Suleymaniyah province but needs financial backing to ensure its long-term viability in the KRG and national politics. Iran could conceivably alleviate Goran's financial woes, particularly through its close ties with the Kurdish Jaff tribe, some of whom are Goran members. However, doing so would undermine the IRIG's valued relationship with Talabani, while also proving exceedingly duplicitous, even by IRIG and KRG standards.
10. (S) It is important to note that Iran's power in Iraq, although extensive, is not without limitations. The IRIG's greatest political roadblock remains the domineering authority and religious credibility embodied in Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Despite his Iranian heritage, Sistani is Iraq's most revered Shia religious (and political) authority. A critic of Iran's "Velayet-e-Faqih" (rule of the jurisprudent) system of theocratic governance, Sistani's abstemious (aka Quietest school) approach to Shia politics has kept him well above the political fray while at the same time ensuring him significant impact on those rare occasions when he pronounces on politics. For example, Sistani's public support for an open list ballot was instrumental in prompting ISCI, Sadrist Trend, Maliki's State of Law, and other Shia parties to follow suit, despite Tehran's preference for a closed list. Domestic political realities will continue to force Shia political parties like ISCI, Dawa Qwill continue to force Shia political parties like ISCI, Dawa and Sadr Trend, with close historic ties to Iran, to balance between support for a broader Iraqi-Shia agenda, as championed by Sistani, and the alternative, championed by Iran, that would subordinate Iraqi interests to Iran's broader objectives (septel).
Soft vs. Hard Power
-------------------
11. (S) Following the GOI's crackdown on Iranian-supported Sadrist militias in Basrah during the "Charge of the Knights" operation in March 2008, Iran has calibrated its operations in Iraq to encompass more "soft power" (economic, religious, educational) support and investment as part of a broader "hearts and minds" campaign. (NOTE: Iranian lethal aid to militant proxies continues; however, on a less visible scale. END NOTE). With annual bilateral trade estimated at USD 4 billion (up 30 percent since 2008) and comprised mostly of Iranian imports (approximately 48 percent of Iraq's imports are Iranian goods), the IRIG continues to jockey for economic domination in Iraq through targeted development assistance, focused largely on refurbishment of Shia religious shrines,
BAGHDAD 00002992 003 OF 003
and trade deals and bilateral agreements aimed at fostering greater Iraqi economic dependency on Iran. This measure has been successful, largely because of Iran's geographic proximity and access to Iraqi markets that are otherwise financially or politically less appealing to other states, notably the United States, Europe, and other industrialized nations. Turkey, on the other hand, remains Iran's biggest economic competitor, particularly in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
Implications for U.S. Policy
----------------------------
12. (S) COMMENT: Concerns about long-term U.S. influence, albeit tempered by the withdrawal deadline, continue to inform IRIG decision-making to ensure its strategic foothold in Iraq. Iran views Iraq as a natural (and more junior) strategic partner. As a result, Iran will continue to flex its muscles to ensure it's strategic outcomes are met. This should not lead to alarmist tendencies or reactions on our part. The next Iraqi government will continue to cultivate close ties with Iran given long-standing historical realities that precede Iraq's ties with the United States. On the other hand, Iran's influence in Iraq should not be overestimated. As the GOI continues to gain its footing, points of divergence between Tehran and Baghdad become increasingly evident on such sensitive bilateral issues as water, hydrocarbons, maritime borders, and political parity. Some prominent Iraqi leaders, including those with close ties to Iran (i.e., Maliki, Ammar al-Hakim) are increasingly sensitive to being labeled Iranian lackeys.
13. (S) COMMENT CONT'D: Our objective in Iraq should be less about countering all-things Iranian, and more about developing viable alternatives and approaches that gradually alter the GOI's political, economic, and social worldview. Development of viable international alternatives in Iraq is one of the most effective measures of countering Iranian ambitions and, ultimately, integrating Iraq as a constructive member of the international community. Specifically, our ongoing efforts to bolster the GOI through capacity-building and assistance within the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) and to remove Iraq from Chapter VII remain our most valuable tools in this regard. Given the value placed on the SFA by the GOI and the Iraqi public, our ability to recognize, enhance, and exploit the value of the partnership will constitute an essential element of any effort to counter "malign" Iranian influence.
HILL
Tuesday, 04 August 2009, 11:58
S E C R E T SANAA 001402
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND PM/WRA SPICO AND
SCOSTNER
EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2019
TAGS PARM, PREL, PTER, MASS, YM
SUBJECT: (S/NF) PROGRESS ON US-ROYG COOPERATION TO REDUCE
MANPADS THREAT
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. On June 20-22, a PM/WRA delegation visited Yemen to discuss MANPADS threat reduction efforts with ROYG officials. Since 2004, US-ROYG cooperation has dramatically reduced the availability of MANPADS on the black market in Yemen. Although the program has likely recovered the bulk of the illicit MANPADS available on the black market, several more will likely be collected in the coming years. MOD insists that there are no official MANPADS stocks, and that they have already implemented necessary stockpile security and inventory controls, but the intelligence community and the National Security Bureau (NSB) believe that is not the case. The USG will offer the MOD, through NSB interlocutors, payment for destruction of MOD MANPADS and stockpile security upgrades. ROYG officials seem more receptive to a TSA-sponsored MANPADS Assist Visit. END SUMMARY.
BACKGROUND
----------
2. (S/NF) After years of uncontrolled weapons imports and the chaos of the 1994 civil war, MANPADS were widely available on the illicit arms market in Yemen, making these systems a critical proliferation threat. MANPADS that leaked from official Yemeni stocks were used in al-Qaeda (AQ) operations in Kenya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen in 2001 and 2002. In 2003, the ROYG began collecting MANPADS from weapons souks throughout the country, and in 2004 the USG agreed to compensate the ROYG for the acquisition and destruction of these and other black market MANPADS. In February 2005, US-ROYG cooperation resulted in the destruction of 1,161 MANPADS.
MEETINGS READOUT
----------------
3. (S/NF) On June 20-22, a PM/WRA delegation consisting of XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX; and XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX, visited Yemen to discuss US-ROYG cooperation to reduce the threat of MANPADS. The delegation began with a June 20 meeting at the NSB with XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX briefed XXXXXXXXXXXX on the MANPADS threat to civilian aviation. He also offered a MANPADS Assist Visit (MAV), in which experts from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) identify airport vulnerabilities to MANPADS attacks and recommend ways to mitigate them. Following the meeting, the delegation toured the current airport and the site of the new airport. During the tour, several lapses in airport security practices were observed regarding passenger screening, cargo security, and Secure Identification Display Area (SIDA) badge and access procedures. XXXXXXXXXXXX recommended that the TSA Representative (TSAR) in Amman, Jordan be contacted for follow-on discussions with airport officials. NSB officials seemed receptive to the MAV offer.
4. (S/NF) On June 21, the delegation met with NSB Deputy Director Ammar Saleh to discuss ongoing efforts to acquire MANPADS from the black market in Yemen. Since the program's inception in August 2004, this program had resulted in the destruction of 1,161 black market MANPADS in 2005. XXXXXXXXXXXX thanked the ROYG for its efforts, expressed the USG's continued interest in supporting the program, and pressed the ROYG to destroy an additional 102 MANPADS they had collected since 2005.
5. (S/NF) Ammar Saleh agreed with USG assessments that the majority of black market MANPADS had been collected in Yemen, and said that a few more might trickle in with the increase in price. (Note: In July 2008, the price for first generation systems was increased from $7,700 to $15,000. End Note.) The small quantity of illicit MANPADS that still exist outside of state control in Yemen are in the hands of tribal leaders or AQAP, neither of which is likely to part with them at any price. He could not estimate how many MANPADS Yemeni tribal leaders possess, but he believes that AQAP has six MANPADS (NFI). Finally, he expressed skepticism that the MOD would accept U.S. assistance to destroy its
official MANPADS stocks (an offer on the table since 2005). He believes MOD would want a more modern air defense system in return, not cash payment or stockpile security upgrades. He offered to attempt to broker a cash-for-destruction deal.
6. (S/NF) Accompanied by NSB official Akram al-Qassmi, the delegation visited a warehouse to view 96 MANPADS collected between 2005 and May 2009 that were awaiting destruction. (Note: These systems had already been verified by U.S. personnel and disabled. End Note.) The delegation verified an additional six SA-7s, four SA-7 gripstocks, and six batteries collected by the NSB since May 2009. The delegation disabled the six MANPADS and expended the six batteries.
7. (S/NF) On their last day, June 22, the delegation accompanied the Ambassador to a meeting with Minister of Defense Mohammed Nasser Ahmed. Ahmed denied that the MOD has any MANPADS in its official stocks, saying that they had already been handed over to NSB and destroyed. (Note: This is in direct contradiction to NSB,s June 21 assertion that the MOD had excess stocks of MANPADS, but would part with them only in exchange for a more modern air defense system. End Note.) The Minister described the MOD's progress on SA/LW issues since S/E Bloomfield's July 2008 visit. He noted that more than 250 weapons souks had been closed and more than 140 weapons dealers prosecuted. Furthermore, he remarked that the MOD has established an inventory system for all Armed Forces and MOD weapons, all of which are now marked. He invited U.S. officials to visit the warehouses to see how the system works. Finally, the Minister shared the delegation,s concerns about the airport,s MANPADS vulnerability, and said that as a member of the Supreme Security Committee, he would support a MAV.
NEXT STEPS
----------
8. (S/NF) Post worked with NSB to ensure that all 102 collected MANPADS were destroyed on July 27 (septel). Post has requested a meeting with the MOD Chief of Staff to observe the stockpile security and inventory control system reportedly in place. Post will follow up with NSB to find out whether it will accept a MAV and, if so, identify possible dates for the assessment. (Note: Despite ministerial-level support, the final decision on the MAV will be made by President Saleh. End Note.) Finally, Post will work with the Department to present a specific offer to the Yemeni government for assistance with physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) and destruction and marking of Yemeni SA/LW.
COMMENT
-------
9. (S/NF) It is hard to know what to believe regarding the presence or absence of MOD MANPADS. In a subsequent meeting on June 27, Qassmi told PolOffs that the MOD does indeed have MANPADS, but would never speak of them because they are considered a state secret. While MOD realizes their MANPADS are of little military value, they consider them better than nothing and would turn them over for destruction only if they were able to get a modern air defense system in return, according to Qassmi. PolOffs agreed to continue negotiating the destruction of MOD MANPADS through NSB interlocutors, since the MOD appears unwilling to discuss the issue with USG officials directly. END COMMENT. SECHE
Wednesday, 03 February 2010, 13:41
S E C R E T SANAA 000221
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP ANDREW MACDONALD, S/CT AMBASSADOR DANIEL
BENJAMIN, DS/ATA JOHN NASON, AND OBO ADAM NAMM
NSC FOR DPNSA BRENNAN
HQ USCENTCOM/CCCC-CIG FOR JSEATON
DHS/TSA FOR TOM WARRICK
EO 12958 DECL: 01/02/2020
TAGS PTER, PREL, PGOV, PINR, PINS, MOPS, MASS, MCAP, ASEC,
EAIR, ABLD, SA, UK, YM
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BENJAMIN DISCUSSES CT ASSISTANCE,
AIRPORT SECURITY WITH SALEH
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) Summary. During a 35-minute meeting on January 31, the Department's Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, congratulated President Saleh on the success of the London meeting and counter-terrorism (CT) operations the ROYG has undertaken in recent weeks against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) elements, and described USG interest in increasing airport security and sharing information on travelers in and out of Yemen. Saleh agreed to the upcoming Transportation Security Administration/Anti-Terrorism Assistance (TSA/ATA) visit, requesting at the same time additional CT support. When pressed by Ambassador Benjamin about Sa'ada, he indicated that the ROYG had no intention of agreeing to a ceasefire at this time. In a separate meeting, Foreign Minister Dr. Abubakr al-Qirbi agreed on the success of the London meeting, and suggested that the follow-up meeting in Riyadh would be important for determining concrete steps. Senior ROYG security officials expressed support for the Embassy's struggle to acquire land and a willingness to act on the Embassy's behalf. End Summary.
SALEH ON CT ASSISTANCE, AIRPORT SECURITY, AND SA'ADA
--------------------------------------------- -------
2. (S/NF) In a January 31 meeting with President Saleh, the Department's Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, congratulated Saleh on the success of the London meeting and suggested that stability in Yemen can be achieved only through a dual focus on security and development. He commended Saleh on actions the ROYG has taken in recent weeks against AQAP elements in Yemen and assured Saleh that he could count on continued operational support and intelligence sharing from the U.S. President Saleh said he was satisfied with counter-terrorism (CT) assistance to date and with Secretary Clinton's speech at the London Conference, but said he "would like to be more satisfied in the future" and appealed for the acceleration of additional support, specifically citing helicopters and vehicles with IED-jamming devices. Describing Americans as "hot-blooded and hasty when you need us," but "cold-blooded and British when we need you," he asked for a "moderate blood temperature" and measured approach. (Note: Also present were Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Rashad al-Alimi, National Security Bureau Director Ali al-'Anisi, and Political Security Organization (PSO) Director Ghalib Mutahir al-Gamish, with whom Benjamin met separately after the conversation with the President. End Note.)
3. (S/NF) Ambassador Benjamin reiterated the USG desire to ensure that no international terrorist attack originates again from Yemen. He said the USG wants to help the ROYG strengthen screening procedures at all of Yemen's international airports, and establish a mechanism for sharing information on passengers traveling via air to and from Yemen as well as foreign nationals who have come to Yemen to study at language or religious institutions. When approached with the upcoming Transportation Security Administration/Anti-Terrorism Assistance (TSA/ATA) visit, Saleh agreed to the idea but deferred to his Supreme Security Committee (Alimi, et al) on the details. In the follow-on meeting, Alimi and 'Anisi both concurred with the upcoming ATA/TSA visit and expressed support for increasing airport security. 'Anisi, however, had reservations about sharing information on foreign students in Yemen, and complained that the USG request was too broad. (Comment: According to GRPO reporting, the ROYG is willing to share information with the USG on American students in Yemen and would likewise share information with other embassies about their nationals. While Western governments would presumably share information among themselves, this system would still leave intelligence gaps about non-Western countries such as Nigeria. End Comment.)
4. (S/NF) Citing Saudi Arabia's decision to suspend its military operations in Sa'ada and Abdul Malik al-Houthi's public acceptance of the ROYG's conditions for a ceasefire, Ambassador Benjamin asked Saleh if he saw an end to the fighting. Saleh dismissed these points, arguing that the Saudis gave a ceasefire ultimatum to the Houthis, and will resume fighting in two weeks if the ceasefire is unfulfilled. He called the Houthis "liars" and declared that they would violate the six conditions of the ceasefire. He indicated that the ROYG had no intention of agreeing to a ceasefire at this time.
5. (S/NF) In a visit to Yemen Special Operation Forces (YSOF) Headquarters, Ambassador Benjamin was treated to a display of military equipment and briefed by YSOF Chief of Staff Brigadier General Ahmad Dahan on YSOF activities. Ambassador Benjamin emphasized common security interests and congratulated Yemeni forces for their role in recent operations. Dahan reiterated the request for helicopters and asked for communications systems and additional training courses. He lauded Yemeni operations as having a great effect on AQAP elements, and indicated that the operations were possible only due to the exchange of intelligence.
FM QIRBI LOOKING FORWARD TO RIYADH
----------------------------------
6. (S/NF) In a separate meeting, Foreign Minister Dr. Abu Bakr al-Qirbi agreed the London Conference was a success and expressed hope that the February follow-up meeting in Riyadh would help determine concrete steps to move forward. Qirbi agreed that a smaller group, focusing on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member countries, rather than a broader donor group, would be more constructive. Qirbi said that the ROYG wanted to focus on the Top Ten Economic Reform Priorities over the course of the next year, but would need donor assistance to accomplish these goals. He expressed support for discussion at the GCC-hosted meeting of funding for an extremist rehabilitation center, indicating that an educational institute with a long-term plan would do much to counter radicalization and address issues of poverty and unemployment, particularly in areas where AQAP has a hold. Qirbi and other ROYG officials expressed support for US intervention with GCC member countries in an attempt to gain financial support for a rehabilitation center as an expression of regional support for Yemen's stability.
EMBASSY LAND DISPUTE
--------------------
7. (C) The Supreme Security Committee was familiar with the Embassy's struggle to acquire land, and said they were willing to act on the Embassy's behalf. Foreign Minister Qirbi said that he had been in communication with Minister of Religious Endowments Judge Hamoud Hitar, who indicated the ROYG's readiness for the purchase and resolution of a dispute over ownership. Alimi said that Deputy Foreign Minister Mohyadeen al-Dhabi was following up and had secured the full cooperation of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. Alimi encouraged Ambassador Seche to sign the contract for the land, professing that he would personally guarantee the investment. (Comment: In a follow-on conversation on February 3, Alimi repeated his assurance to the Ambassador that the ROYG is prepared to provide for the security of the proposed housing site both during and after construction. He suggested that the Ambassador meet with 'Anisi, who President Saleh has charged with overseeing the process, to discuss final details of the deal, including our timeframe for beginning construction. The Ambassador will try to see 'Anisi next week for this purpose. End Comment.) SECHE
Monday, 19 March 2007, 10:39
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BEIJING 001840
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE ALSO FOR INR/B
TREASURY FOR OASIA/INA HAARSAGER, WINSHIP, CUSHMAN
USDOC FOR ITA DAS KASOFF
USDOC FOR 4420 ITA/MAC/OCEA MCQUEEN
EO 12958 DECL: 03/19/2032
TAGS PGOV, ECON, EFIN, SCUL, ELAB, SOCI, CH
SUBJECT: ZHEJIANG PARTY SECRETARY TOUTS ECONOMIC SUCCESSES
AND WORK TOWARDS RULE OF LAW AT AMBASSADOR'S DINNER
REF: A. BEIJING 1672
B. BEIJING 1760
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLARK T. RANDT, JR., REASONS 1.4 B AND D.
1. (C) Summary. Zhejiang Province Communist Party Secretary Xi Jinping, a contender to succeed President Hu Jintao in 2012/2013, describes Zhejiang as a driving force behind national economic growth. Zhejiang ranks high for income, low for income disparities, and makes substantial contributions to migrant worker employment and transfer payments of fiscal revenue to the Central Government. Xi dismissed concerns about overheating, noting that the faster his province grows, the greater the amount of revenues that the province will transfer to the Central Government. Those revenues also support economic development in comparatively poor regions in Central and Western China. Provincial party and government officials are regularly informed of citizens' complaints and plan to address recurring concerns about education, affordable housing and healthcare. The provincial Communist Party is committed to building the legal underpinnings of China's socialist market economy. National People's Congress passage of the Property Law will be beneficial to building China's market economy and to Zhejiang. Unification of corporate tax rates will be a great benefit to Zhejiang companies while not deterring new foreign investment. Xi expressed satisfaction with his May 2006 visit to the United States. He is a fan of Hollywood World War II movies and criticizes Chinese moviemakers for neglecting values they should promote. His frank and friendly dinner discussion with the Ambassador included several comparisons that Xi made to other provinces where other leading contenders now hold leadership roles, comparisons in which Zhejiang looks better. End Summary.
Booming Zhejiang Is a National Economic Leader
--------------------------------------------- -
2. (C) At a March 11 dinner hosted by the Ambassador at his residence, Zhejiang Party Secretary Xi Jinping responded to a series of questions about Zhejiang Provincial economic performance with an impressive array of data and interesting observations. Zhejiang Province's exports surpassed USD 100 billion in 2006, an increase of 31 percent over 2005, Xi said. Sixty percent of those 2006 exports were from private enterprises, and the 2006 rate of increase of exports for those private enterprises amounted to 40 percent. While unable to provide an immediate savings rate figure for Zhejiang residents, Xi asserted that most Zhejiang residents have more than enough money to cover expenses for basic needs. Prudential savings nonetheless remain high in recognition of the incomplete nature of China's social security system and to prepare for possible future consumption items such as health care. While a small proportion of the province's population remains near poverty and requires assistance from government, perhaps 20 percent of Zhejiang's approximately 50 million residents are high income earners within the Chinese context. They don't know how to spend all their money, Xi said. China's stock markets are not mature and thus hold risks unattractive to many Chinese, and the investment fund industry is likewise immature and unattractive. The Ambassador interjected that Treasury Secretary Paulson had discussed China's capital markets and financial sector reform in a speech in Shanghai just three days earlier and presented a Chinese text of Secretary Paulson's speech to Secretary Xi.
SIPDIS
3. (C) In their search for money-making opportunities and wealth preservation strategies, Xi continued, many rich Chinese cannot find proper outlets for their cash. This helps feed illegal financial activities, such as deceptive claims on the Internet and private but illegal banks and investment funds that claim to pay higher interest rates than are generally available in China. The Chinese Government and the Chinese people place high hopes that the bilateral dialogue mechanism established through the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) can help solve some practical problems in China's financial sectors. Secretary Xi said he hopes that Secretary Paulson and the Ambassador will play important
SIPDIS roles in the SED as it moves forward. Xi added that he hopes the United States Congress will show enough patience to allow Secretary Paulson sufficient time to solve some of these
SIPDIS problems.
4. (C) Secretary Xi proudly and easily rolled off numerous
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Zhejiang provincial economic data. Provincial GDP increased 13.6 percent in 2006, with per capita GDP now USD 4,000 -- well, USD 3,975 to be exact, he clarified. Only Guangdong, Jiangsu and Shandong have greater provincial GDPs, and on a per capita GDP basis, Zhejiang ranks first among all provinces and only lags the centrally administered cities of Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin in this regard. Per capita GDP in the provincial capital of Hangzhou is now about USD 6000 and in the port city of Ningbo now about USD 6500. Zhejiang ranks first in the nation in fiscal revenue and per capita disposable income, too.
5. (C) Zhejiang gets to keep about half of the fiscal revenue collected in the province, with about half sent to the Central Government. In 2006, Zhejiang collected 256 billion renminbi in fiscal revenue (90 percent in taxes, 10 percent in items not clearly identified in Xi's comments), of which 130 billion RMB was retained for local uses. Furthermore, fiscal revenue data do not include other funds available to the government, such as government investment funds, social security funds, or tariffs collected by Customs officials at Zhejiang ports of entry (the latter funds go directly to the Central Government, Xi added). Xi said that income for all levels of government generated from all sources in Zhejiang in 2006 was probably near 500 billion RMB.
Dismissive of Overheating Concerns
----------------------------------
6. (C) The Ambassador asked whether Central Government officials are concerned about possible economic overheating in Zhejiang. Secretary Xi replied that the faster Zhejiang grows, the more revenue the Central Government receives. It is Zhejiang's hope that the Central Government will keep the share of provincial fiscal revenue that Zhejiang must send to the Central Government stable. The Ministry of Finance is considering raising that share, a possibility which Xi opposes. Making the cake bigger (i.e., growing Zhejiang's economy) will make their piece bigger, too (i.e., a fixed percentage of a larger whole will bring an increase in absolute value of funds transferred to the Central Government). Many cities in Eastern China are concerned about this issue. Xi hopes that Finance Minister Jin Renqing will not think about or act upon this possible increase in revenue sharing burden.
Shouldering Burdens of Central and Western China
--------------------------------------------- ---
7. (C) Another issue about which Zhejiang officials are very concerned is the gap in income and economic development levels between the wealthier East Coast regions and China's Central and Western regions. Some of the fiscal revenue generated in Zhejiang is allocated to assigned counties and communities elsewhere in China, including some of the highest altitude administrative units in Xizang (Tibet) and Xinjiang, the Fuling area of Chongqing Municipality, two impoverished areas in Sichuan Province (one of which is Nanchong) and certain Miao ethnic minority areas of Guizhou. Some of these destinations in Western China can themselves only raise 10 - 30 percent of their annual local government expenditures, while in assigned areas in Central China that proportion may increase to 50 percent. Transfer payments to local governments in Central and Western China actually come in part from provincial contributions, Xi underscored, lessening the burden of the Central Government. While Zhejiang sends about 50 percent of its fiscal revenue to the Center, Shanghai must contribute an even higher share, about 65 percent.
An Important Destination for Migrant Workers
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8. (C) Zhejiang makes two other important contributions to the national economy. First, Zhejiang hosts China's second largest population of migrant workers, 14 .5 million. Only Guangdong hosts more. The ratio of Zhejiang's permanent residents (about 50 million) to migrants is a little over 3:1. Zhejiang thus makes an important contribution to addressing China's employment challenges. There is a cost with having so many migrant workers, since 65 percent of issues requiring Public Security attention (i.e., crimes) are caused by migrant workers. Xi clarified that migrant workers are defined as those who stay for work purposes for less than four months. Those who stay for more than four months in a
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locale are counted as residents. Furthermore, in the large number of migrant workers seeking work in Zhejiang are a great many who come to this comparatively rich province from less affluent other provinces and cities. Xi contrasted his large number of provincial outsiders with the situation in Jiangsu Province, where, he said, many of the migrants are persons from north of the Yangtze who are seeking employment in locations south of the Yangtze, still in their own home province.
An Important Contributor to Economic Development Elsewhere
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9. (C) The other important economic contribution by Zhejiang is the role of 4.4 million businesspersons from Zhejiang are working outside the province elsewhere in China. Xi said Central Government data does not report the economic impact of these businesspersons. While there is little foreign direct investment in Central and Western China, including little from the United States, there is considerable investment and business activity in those regions by Zhejiang businesspersons. Those 4.4 million extra-provincial Zhejiang businesspersons generate another nearly one trillion RMB more in GDP nationwide - nearly as much as the province. Another 1 million Zhejiang businesspersons live overseas, often building international business links. So one must recognize that Zhejiang has been a driver of the whole nation's economic growth.
10. (C) Nearly all other provinces have sent delegations to Zhejiang to study the province's experience and success. In recent days, delegations from Xinjiang, Sichuan and Jiangxi had scheduled upcoming appointments to visit and study Zhejiang, bringing large delegations that will include county-level Communist Party secretaries. Secretary Xi quoted Jiangxi Provincial Party Secretary Meng Jianzhu as saying he and others have much to learn from Zhejiang's development path. The experiences of coastal cities such as Shenzhen and Shanghai that are destinations for high levels of foreign investment are not suitable development models.
Income Gap and Urbanization Rate
--------------------------------
11. (C) The Ambassador inquired about income disparities within Zhejiang Province. Zhejiang has the second lowest provincial urban/rural income ratio in the nation, at 2.45:1. Jiangsu is first, at 2.1:1, while the national average is 3.3:1. However, Zhejiang's ratio may increase slightly, due to faster income growth for urban residents (10.9 percent in 2006) than for rural residents (9.3 percent in 2006). While the ratio may worsen slightly, Xi said, the important fact to recognize is that income levels are rising significantly in Zhejiang regardless of being a city dweller or rural resident. Zhejiang's population is now about 56 percent urbanized. With respect to income of urban residents, Zhejiang has ranked first in China for the last six years. With respect to income of rural residents, Zhejiang has ranked first for the last 22 years. Xi again volunteered a comparison between Zhejiang and Jiangsu. Jiangsu's total average income is less than that of Zhejiang, and the highest income level in Jiangsu, in the city of Suzhou, is only at the level of the average income level for the whole of Zhejiang Province. The average income level in Zhejiang's capital of Hangzhou, however, is about the same as the average income level in Shanghai.
12. (C) Zhejiang has maintained these remarkable results because it is an economy of the grassroots -- the common people choose their own development paths, Xi continued. Zhejiang is an economy of counties and towns (implying not being a province with a heavy hand of central economic decision making). Of the top 100 most affluent counties in China (criteria for ranking not clearly explained by Xi), 30 of Zhejiang's total 60 counties are among them. At the township level, 268 Zhejiang towns rank in the top 1000 towns in China. Of Zhejiang's total nine provincial-level municipalities, seven rank in China's top 100, and the other two are ranked between 101 and 110.
Hearing from the Grassroots Level
---------------------------------
13. (C) The Ambassador asked how provincial party and government officials hear from the citizenry and what are the
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most frequent concerns or complaints directed to Zhejiang officials. Secretary Xi said provincial officials have many sources of information, many of them designed by Provincial Party Secretary General Li Qiang, to whom Xi turned for comment. Mr. Li explained that the major source of news on the views of the citizenry remains letters. About 150,000 letters were delivered to Zhejiang offices last year. The provincial government website provides a link for submission of e-mails from the public. Party Secretary Xi and provincial government leaders from the Governor on down often lead delegations to the counties to listen to the voices of the citizens. Provincial officials spend more than 100 days per year conducting research with specific industries or in different areas of the province to gather firsthand information. Government officials can also submit information to Xi at any time. Media reports on provincial developments are an additional source of news. The provincial Communist Party itself also gathers information from the public. So, the Provincial Party Secretary has uninterrupted access to the views of the general public, Li concluded.
Concerns about Education, Housing and Health Care Common
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14. (C) Zhejiang residents are most concerned about three basic issues: education, affordable housing, and health care, Secretary Xi said. The government must take a realistic attitude in addressing these concerns. While not all concerns can or should be addressed fully - for instance, not every child in the cities and in the countryside will matriculate to the highest ranked universities -- the government should act to ensure that all children receive an education, people have basic affordable housing, and all residents have access to at least basic medical care. Zhejiang is doing a good job in all these respects, Xi asserted, even leading the whole country. While China has a per capita GDP level of about USD 1000, Zhejiang is already at about USD 4000. This leads to higher expectations for the work of provincial officials and party leaders. So new proposals will be forthcoming on how to improve the lives of Zhejiang residents.
Officials' Work Styles Another Common Concern
---------------------------------------------
15. (C) Another area in which dissatisfaction has been expressed regards the working style of government and party officials, Xi added. We will make energetic efforts to improve on this score. Surely the situation will improve in the long term but there is a long way to go. With 70 million persons holding membership in the Communist Party of China, it should not be surprising that several thousand may be problem cases. However, the complaint letters from the people show the people still have faith in the Party and hope the Party will solve such problems within the Party. For the present, the people will not take to the streets to complain about officials' work styles. While there are many problem makers in the Party, the Party also counts among its members the elite of society.
Crime and Wastefulness, Too
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16. (C) Secretary Xi briefly mentioned crime and government waste as other topics of public complaint. He did not elaborate any further on crime, but noted that once basic needs for food and clothing have been met, some officials have become wasteful in their use of administrative resources, seeking extravagance in their lifestyles. More guidance from the government is needed in such cases, in Xi's view. He closed his comments on this topic by recalling that China is a big country, with a population exceeding one billion persons. When you multiply something by more than one billion, you get a big number; but if you divide something, like GDP, by more than one billion, you get a small result. Deng Xiaoping was right in observing that China is still at a primary stage of development.
Expectations for This National People's Congress Session
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17. (C) Shanghai Consul General Jarrett, noting the important role of the private sector in the Zhejiang economy, asked Secretary Xi about the current meeting of the National
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People's Congress and expected passage of a Property Law. Is there any dissent against the proposed law in Zhejiang? What will the law mean for Zhejiang? Xi expects that the NPC will enact the Property Law during the current session. Discussion of a Property Law began in the sixth NPC, about twenty years ago. Now is the right time to enact the law, passage is needed to support the legal regime of China's socialist market economy. The Property Law will equally protect state-owned, collectively-owned assets and private properties. The law should also protect against stripping of assets from state-owned enterprises and protect the general public's growing holdings of private property. In the past, China gave lip service to property protection, with the destruction of property in the Cultural Revolution being an example. Private property plays a leading role in Zhejiang's economic development, so nearly everyone in Zhejiang agrees with passage of the Property Law. With property protection in place, Chinese can gain even more wealth.
18. (C) Another measure to be passed in this NPC session will unify corporate taxation rates for foreign-invested enterprises and domestic enterprises. Chinese companies will see their tax rates decline from 33 percent to 25 percent, while FIEs will have a five-year transitional period as their tax holidays are phased out and their tax rates climb to 25 percent. Tax unification is very good news for Zhejiang companies, Secretary Xi said. For example, the Ningbo manufacturer (heard as Ningbo Ya Ge Er) of the suit he wore to dinner has told Xi that the reduction of his corporate tax rate will save his company 40 million RMB per year. Because foreign investors who are newcomers to China consider more than just the corporate tax rate in selecting overseas investment destinations, the increased tax rate should not significantly hurt them, Xi asserted.
Rule of Law in Zhejiang Province
--------------------------------
19. (C) The Ambassador asked for Secretary Xi's views on the development and implementation of rule of law in Zhejiang. Xi replied that the Party Provincial Committee has proposed in 2006 to build Zhejiang into a province ruled by law. Laws are a basis for the socialist market economy. Provincial officials will promote public awareness of laws and do their best to enhance enforcement of laws. The Provincial People's Congress will cobine laws as passed at the national level by the NPC with Zhejiang's local conditions. The government and the Party will promote rule of law. A provincial working group on rule of law has been established, and Li Qiang is Director General of that working group. Local laws should accord with central laws. Zhejiang can provide some pioneering efforts in rule of law for the whole country.
Xi's 2006 Visit to the United States
------------------------------------
20. (C) The Ambassador asked Secretary Xi for details of his May 2006 visit to the United States and whether he had had opportunity to exchange views with members of Congress while in Washington. Xi indeed had met with members of Congress, and found those he met with quite friendly towards China. One member described himself or herself as formerly quite anti-China but his/her views had begun to shift. Xi and his delegation had been worried that Falun Gong practitioners might pose a threat during their visit, and accordingly had some security assistants accompany them on their visit. All had proceeded smoothly with no encounters with the Falun Gong. Xi said he and other Chinese officials are not worried or annoyed by noise or protests during visits but are worried about the legal consequences and burdens if served papers as part of stateside legal actions.
21. (C) The May 2006 trip had proven fruitful for Zhejiang, Secretary Xi continued, with several important contracts
SIPDIS signed that only more recently or even in the near future will be implemented. Among those agreements is one involving Federal Express, which will have ceremonies at the Hangzhou (Zhejiang Province's capital) airport for the construction or opening of a new distribution center. Citibank decided to accelerate plans to establish a branch in Hangzhou. Xi has written to China Banking Regulatory Chairman Liu Mingkang to urge accelerated processing of that application and, while expressing confidence the application will be approved soon, Xi commented to his colleagues that additional lobbying may
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be in order. The Ambassador thanked Xi for his support to Motorola for that company's production plans in Hangzhou. Motorola is doing well in Hangzhou, with Hangzhou's sales revenue nearing 45 billion renminbi (over USD 5 billion) in 2006, just slightly less than Motorola sales revenue generated at its Tianjin facilities. Hangzhou sales revenue will surely eclipse Tianjin sales revenue in 2007. Finally, the 2006 visit to the United States had included commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of sister state relations between Zhejiang and New Jersey. A New Jersey university decided to set up a branch campus in Wenzhou in Zhejiang, a plan already approved by all relevant provincial authorities but still awaiting approval by the central Ministry of Education.
A WWII Hollywood Movie Aficionado
---------------------------------
22. (C) The Ambassador also asked Secretary Xi about his recent movie viewing, recalling that Xi had told him in their meeting one year ago that he had recently seen and tremendously enjoyed "Saving Private Ryan." Had Secretary Xi seen other recent American movies that he had enjoyed? Xi replied that he already owns the "Flags of Our Fathers" DVD, but hopes to view it during the Lunar New Year holidays had gone unfulfilled. He had seen and enjoyed "The Departed." Xi said he particularly likes Hollywood movies about World War II and hopes Hollywood will continue to make them. Hollywood makes those movies well, and such Hollywood movies are grand and truthful. Americans have a clear outlook on values and clearly demarcate between good and evil. In American movies, good usually prevails. In contrast, "Curse of the Golden Flower," a recently popular Chinese movie directed by Zhang Yimou and starring Gong Li (she of "Miami Vice" movie stardom) had been confusing to Xi. Some Chinese moviemakers neglect values they should promote.
23. (C) America is a powerful nation in terms of culture because Americans say what they should say, Xi elaborated. Too many Chinese moviemakers cater to foreigners' interests or preconceptions, sometimes vulgarly so. He criticized Zhang Yimou by name as well as the kungfu action movie genre. "Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon" and "Wu Ji" and imperial palace intrigues -- all are the same, talking about bad things in imperial palaces. Most are not nominated for Oscars or other awards, so to some extent it can be said that such movies are not worth very much. The Ambassador noted that a Chinese film about HIV/AIDS orphans had just garnered the Oscar for best short documentary. Xi expressed awareness of the movie, noting that the director is a female overseas Chinese (but Xi never said whether he had seen that documentary). Xi recalled that a low cost, very good Chinese movie by the director Jia Zhangke had recently won a Golden Lion award at the Venice Film Festival. Returning to "Flags of Our Fathers," Xi said he had come to understand that the flag raising on Iwo Jima did not mark the end of the battle. The Japanese were still in holes and caves and the battle continued. He expressed particular admiration for WWII movies set in the Pacific theater of operations and expressed a strong desire to visit Guadalcanal.
24. (C) Many Chinese had died in the Anti-Japanese War (as WWII is most often referred to in Mainland China). The last one to two decades have been a period of historical importance, with peace and rapid economic development. China should use this opportunity to focus on improving the living conditions of the people. Xi noted some earlier but brief periods of peace and economic development in China, referring to two emperors' reigns in the Han Dynasty, the reign of the first emperor in the Tang Dynasty, and the consecutive reigns of Emperors Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong in the Ming Dynasty. It was a crime that such periods did not last longer. The current period of peace and rapid economic development should be extended as long as possible.
Comment
-------
25. (C) Secretary Xi, regarded by many Embassy contacts to be one of the three leading contenders to succeed President Hu Jintao in 2012/2013 as Communist Party Chairman and President of China, certainly exhibited an easy and proficient familiarity with his relatively prosperous province's economic data and development strengths. Comparisons to Jiangsu Province and reference to Henan were
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perhaps inevitable for an official with the strong ambitions he reportedly holds. The other two leading contenders to succeed President Hu are Li Yuanchao (Ambassador's March 8 dinner reported ref A), current Party Secretary in Jiangsu, and Li Keqiang, past Party Secretary in Henan (Ambassador's March 12 dinner reported ref B). End comment. RANDT
Monday, 29 June 2009, 16:59
S E C R E T STATE 067105
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: MR
TAGS ASEC
SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DAILY
Classified By: Derived from Multiple Sources
SECRET//FGI//NOFORN
Declassify on: Source marked 25X1-human, Date of source: June 27, 2009
1. (U) Diplomatic Security Daily, June 27-29, 2009
2. (U) Iraq - Paragraphs 7-11
3. (U) Significant Events - Paragraphs 12-23
4. (U) Key Concerns - Paragraphs 24-43
5. (U) Cyber Threats - Paragraphs 44-57
6. (U) Suspicious Activity Incidents - Paragraphs 58-64
7. (U) Iraq
8. (S//NF) Alleged plans by various insurgent groups to conduct attacks during anticipated U.S. military withdrawal from urban areas: According to recent multiple source reports, various insurgent groups and militias intend on attacking multiple venues throughout Iraq in anticipation of U.S. military forces withdrawal from urban areas. Specific targets mentioned included the International Zone (IZ), Victory Base Complex, joint security stations, and various forward operating bases in Baghdad and in Maysan Province (southern Iraq). Allegedly, insurgent groups also are prepared to target key infrastructure, such as bridges and major supply routes used by Coalition forces (CF) and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) convoys. According to one source, an unidentified group had access to a large tank of chlorine, 16 V-8 rockets, and three torpedoes which were supposedly recovered by the CF and ISF. The reports mentioned the attacks would commence on or about July 1. The Government of Iraq is anticipating the offensive and has placed ISF units on alert and cancelled all leave effective June 28.
9. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA would like to note the series of reports are consistent with other recent threat reporting indicating the possibility of insurgent groups and militias preparing to increase attacks in anticipation of troop withdrawal from urban areas. It is possible that extremist-affiliated groups would seek to target the IZ and the Victory Base Complex, as the venues are symbolic of the U.S. diplomatic and military presence in Iraq. It is also plausible the groups may surmise that a large attack against CF troops in these areas would be ideal, as it would serve as propaganda for them, allowing them to take credit for driving out "occupying forces."
10. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA would also highlight the allegation of the existence of the weapons cache, as the materials could possibly be used as components for improvised rocket-assisted munitions or an improvised explosive device (IED). According to the Multi-National Forces in Iraq Combined Intelligence Operations Cell, the first documented chlorine attack occurred in al-Anbar Province (western Iraq) on October 21, 2006, and the first documented chlorine vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) in the Baghdad area occurred in Taji on February 20, 2007. Despite the claims by insurgent groups and militias of chlorine-related attacks, their incident rates remain low and inconsistent. While DS/TIA/ITA cannot corroborate the veracity of the recent threat reporting, overall, there is nothing to suggest that the intention to attack the U.S. presence in Iraq will subside once a military troop withdrawal is completed. (Appendix sources 1-7)
11. (SBU) Indirect fire (IDF) of unknown size was launched against the IZ in Baghdad at 9:22 p.m. on June 24. The IDF impacted in the river approximately 250 meters south of the U.S. Embassy compound. No injuries or damages were reported. (RSO TOC Baghdad Spot Report)
12. (U) Significant Events
13. (C) WHA Honduras - Honduran military forces arrested President Manuel Zelaya June 28 according to orders issued by the National Congress and the Supreme Court of Honduras. Zelaya was taken to a local air force base and flown to Costa Rica. Emergency Action Committee (EAC) Tegucigalpa subsequently met to discuss the ramifications of the seizure of the president by host-cost country military forces. The RSO noted the general climate in the capital was calm; however, a standfast order was issued, and additional security measures were implemented. The Embassy released a Warden Message regarding the actions against Zelaya and urged AmCits to remain in the residences or hotels for the day.
14. (C) Later in the day, Congress officially named Roberto Micheletti interim president. The U.S. Ambassador gave a press conference outside the Embassy; he insisted that President Zelaya was the only democratically elected president of the country and urged that freedom of expression and circulation be restored. He also demanded the release of those government officials said to be in military custody. The EAC reconvened to assess the situation. Protest activity has centered around the presidential palace, some roads in the capital were blocked, and there were some troops on the street. However, traffic flow was reported normal in most of the city. Authorized Departure for family members was discussed, but not warranted at this time. Embassy personnel were advised to remain in their homes for the rest of the day and to limit their movements today, June 29. All Peace Corps volunteers have been accounted for and are on standfast. Post will be open today for emergency services only. The EAC will continue monitoring events in-country and provide updated information as available. (Tegucigalpa Spot Report; telcon; Warden Message; Appendix sources 8-10)
15. (SBU) EUR Germany - A Local Guard Force (LGF) member of U.S. Consulate General Frankfurt discovered two suspicious cases with protruding wires June 26 while on foot patrol in the clustered housing area. The guard notified his supervisor, and the area and two nearby apartment buildings were evacuated. Responding police requested canine and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) support. After the EOD team arrived, a local telecom technician, who had been working nearby, arrived at the scene and claimed the unattended cases; the technician had inadvertently left the cases. After further investigation and corroboration with the technician, police declare the area safe. (RSO Frankfurt Spot Report)
16. (SBU) AF Liberia - Two acts of vandalism were reported to U.S. Embassy Monrovia on the night of June 27. One took place at the residence of the chief of the DoD Office of Security Cooperation, approximately 2.5 miles from Post, where graffiti was spray painted on the perimeter wall stating, "COL THE WAR HAS JUST BEGAN." The second incident occurred at the facility of a USAID-funded project, approximately 1.5 miles from the Embassy, where the messages "INTERCON MUST LEAVE NOW, TAKE INT" and "DANGER" were spray painted on the compound wall. The RSO assesses these incidents are consistent with the pattern of threats and intimidation used by dismissed Embassy guards to obtain a favorable settlement with their former employer through the Liberian Ministry of Labor. (RSO Monrovia Spot Report)
17. (SBU) Mauritania - U.S. Embassy Nouakchott received a credible threat June 27 regarding a kidnapping against an American in the capital sometime during the night (NFI). The RSO considers the information credible and made notifications to staff to assure that all official Americans were accounted for. All residential LGF posts were manned, and radio checks were increased. Post also issued a Warden Message advising AmCits in-country of the threat. Please see the Key Concerns section for further information. (RSO Nouakchott Spot Report)
18. (C//NF) Mauritania - EAC Nouakchott met June 26 to discuss developments surrounding the murder of an unofficial American on June 23. Members were updated on the investigative progress of local authorities. The EAC reviewed the U.S. Embassy's tripwires for consideration of Authorized Departure and/or drawdown and determined there was insufficient information at this time to recommend either action. EAC members were reminded of the importance of random arrival arrivals at Post (effective June 25) along with other augmented security measures.
19. (S//NF) The EAC reconvened June 28, and members were introduced to FBI assets assigned to investigate the AmCit's murder with host-country law enforcement personnel. Members welcomed the team and support their efforts on the investigation while in-country. Members also discussed the credible kidnapping threat against an AmCit in-country and reviewed the enhanced security measures already in place. Post issued a Consular short message system alert to the American community advising of the threat. The EAC will continue to review all threat information as it becomes available, while supporting the ongoing murder investigation, and the EAC will reconvene as needed. (Appendix sources 11-12)
20. (SBU) Sudan Update - On June 24, verdicts were issued in the trial of the five Sudanese men charged with the January 1, 2008, murder of U.S. Embassy Khartoum employees John Granville and Abdelrahman Abbas. Four of the defendants were found of guilty of intentional killing and sentenced to death by hanging. The fifth defendant was found guilty on weapons charges and sentenced to two years in prison, including credit for time served since his January 2008 arrest. (Khartoum 0790)
21. (SBU) The Gambia - EAC Banjul met June 23 for its monthly meeting. It was determined that the recent activity in Tehran, Iran, should not present any additional danger for U.S. personnel or citizens in-country; however, the EAC agreed U.S. Embassy staff must be more diligent in practicing common-sense security measures. EAC members deemed Post's current security posture is sufficient. (Banjul 0190)
22. (S//NF) NEA Yemen - EAC Sana'a met June 28 to discuss a write-in threat concerning a VBIED attack against the U.S. Embassy planned for today, June 29. The threat was traced to Algeria, and, although such threats are considered relatively common, Post officials are taking the threat seriously. Members agreed that Post's current security upgrades were sufficient to deter and, if need be, withstand an attack; however, members deemed it would be prudent to request additional security from the Republic of Yemen Government at Post's perimeter, in light of the approaching July 4 holiday. Please see the Key Concerns section for further details. (Appendix source 13)
23. (C) SCA Bangladesh - U.S. Embassy Dhaka officials met with the secretary of Home Affairs to discuss concerns over an uptick in crimes directed against foreigners in Dhaka's Diplomatic Enclave. The secretary stated the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) had increased the police presence in the enclave May 7, when threat letters were sent to several diplomatic missions. Post officials will continue to monitor the situation and keep pressure on the GoB to provide adequate security to the U.S. Mission. (Appendix source 14)
24. (U) Key Concerns
25. (S//NF) AF Mauritania - AQIM threat to kidnap American citizen: According to the Spanish National Intelligence Service (CNI), an unidentified source for the CNI service center stated al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) planned to kidnap an unidentified AmCit in Nouakchott during the evening of June 27. According to the report's context statement, a CNI official provided the information during the course of a routine liaison meeting. There are no additional details on this information, and the report's originators are unable to assess the reliability of the ultimate source(s) of the information. In addition, it is not known what, if any, vetting or validation procedures the Spanish service may use to evaluate its sources. In separate reporting, AQIM, as of late June, had sent three unidentified members to Mauritania from northern Mali to conduct operations against government interests in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou, according to the Mauritanian External Intelligence Service. It was unknown, according to the Mauritanian service, whether AQIM intended to attack Mauritanian and/or foreign government facilities in those cities. Separately, AQIM Tariq Ibn Ziyad battalion leader 'Abd al-Hamid (Abu Zaid), as of late June, had delayed an order for four men to travel to Nouakchott to conduct unspecified operations, according to the Mauritanian service. DS/TIA/ITA notes the latest threat information follows last week's killing of an American in Nouakchott and the possible involvement of AQIM. (Appendix sources 15-16)
26. (S//NF) Nigeria - Extremists believed to be planning a massive terrorist attack: (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Tearline states, "Unspecified extremist groups, suspected to be operating in concert with Nigerian Shi'ites, Salafiya, or Muhammad Yusuf's Nigerian Taliban are reportedly planning to launch a massive surprise attack on some piece of critical infrastructure or against high-profile targets within Nigeria. Probable targets of this attack include top Nigerian Government officials or security agents. Members of the general public, who might be opposed to the attackers' doctrines, were also believed to be possible targets. This planned attack is reportedly aimed at sparking sectarian clashes across Nigeria."
27. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA cannot immediately corroborate the current threat with additional intelligence. While no connection can be made between this threat and previous reports, DS/TIA/ITA is concerned about recent activity surrounding extremists associated with the Nigerian Taliban.
28. (S//NF) A well-trained veteran Chadian extremist, Abu-Mahjin (Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) number 24350378), who has limited ties to al-Qa'ida associates, recently traveled to Nigeria. He may be planning to conduct or facilitate a terrorist operation. Indeed, tearline from May 1 claimed, "An Islamic extremist named Abu-Muhjin has recently been in northeast Nigeria. It is likely that he will be joined by other Islamic extremists in the coming weeks." More recent tearline stated, "Nigerian-based probable Chadian extremist Abu-Mahjin is keen to obtain more funds in connection with some sort of nefarious activity (possibly terrorism related) he is engaged in. However, it is not clear when he will receive this additional finance." Little more is known about Abu-Mahjin's apparent efforts to organize a near-term operation.
29. (S//NF) Though neither the Nigerian Taliban nor its more militant subset -- Tanzim al-Qa'ida group -- has ever attacked Western interests, they have discussed targeting foreign embassies in the past. In 2007, they reportedly plotted to attack the U.S., British, and Israeli embassies in Abuja, according to a single source that remains unsubstantiated. (Appendix sources 17-19)
30. (C//NF) NEA Algeria/Yemen - Unsubstantiated threat claiming suicide bombing against U.S. embassies: On June 26, a write-in to a USG website provided a message involving an unsubstantiated threat to U.S. embassies in Algiers, Algeria, and Sana'a, Yemen. The message was posted in Arabic and appeared to originate in Algeria. The writer warned of a "big attack against your embassies in Algeria and Yaman by suicide car on 29/06/2009" and claimed to be an agent of the Algerian Intelligence Service. The writer provided an apparent telephone number for confirming his information and warned, "The second attack what you will see it is in Hassi Messaud in Sahara by a big number of terrorists." The report's originators note that they have no further information to corroborate the information, and the source may have intended to annoy, mislead, or disrupt rather than to provide legitimate information. The originators further note that the vast majority of such information is not true, but, since volunteers have provided authentic leads on occasion, the information is provided for evaluation purely due to its threat content. (Appendix source 20)
31. (S//NF) Yemen - Al-Qa'ida possibly planning Embassy attacks: (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) According to tearline information, "Saudi authorities learned in late June that al-Qa'ida may be planning an attack on Western and Middle Eastern embassies in Yemen. There was no additional information on the timing or exact location of the planned attack."
32. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA notes this report is likely related to recent information provided by a Yemeni security official in late June regarding possible unspecified al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) attacks against the embassies of the U.S, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and unnamed European nations in Sana'a. No further information was provided on this general threat report.
33. (S//NF) DS/TIA/ITA also notes the continuing AQAP threat to Western and host-nation interests both in Sana'a and throughout Yemen. Previous AQAP attacks illustrate a willingness and capability to target Western citizens and diplomatic facilities, highlighted by the brazen attack against U.S. Embassy Sana'a in mid-September 2008. The lack of host-nation political will to combat AQAP contributes to an extremely permissive operating environment for extremist elements, suggesting threat reporting against U.S. and other foreign interests in Yemen will continue in both the near and medium term. (Appendix sources 21-22)
34. (S//NF) SCA Afghanistan - Threat to unspecified American in Kandahar: As of late June, Kandahar Taliban members Sadiq, Mullah Hamdullah, and Qari Yousef intended to kidnap an unspecified American who travels from Kandahar Airfield to work in Kandahar city to hold for ransom. The kidnappers planned to use a local Afghan who the American trusted to place a substance in his food to render him unconscious. Hamdullah, a.k.a. Bari Alai, worked under the command of Mullah Faizel who was currently in detention at Guantanamo Bay.
35. (S//NF) While the Taliban operatives named in this report are indeed active in and around Kandahar city to include involvement in kidnapping plots, DS/TIA/ITA questions the source's access to operational plans by the Taliban. In past reporting, the source has reported primarily on Taliban member atmospherics and movements in southern Afghanistan and only occasionally on threats. DS/TIA/ITA assesses information provided by the source regarding the January 2008 kidnapping of an American non-governmental organization (NGO) worker to be inaccurate.
36. (S//NF) That said, periodic reporting indicates extremists remain keen to abduct another Westerner in Kandahar city, possibly while traveling to/from Kandahar Airfield. Tearline states, "Taliban insurgents reportedly planned in late January to kidnap a U.S. national as he traveled between Kandahar Airfield and Shur Andam Pass, Kandahar Province." Reporting from November 2008 alleged the Taliban planned to kidnap two foreign women possibly from their residence in northeast Kandahar city or at the Rang Rezano market they frequented.
37. (S//NF) Mullah Faizel (variants: Faisal, Fazilfazul; TIDE number 72569) was being held at Guantanamo Bay as of early April 2008. Mullah Hamdullah (possible TIDE number 75483) is characterized in late-2008 sensitive reporting as a group commander of a large number of Taliban in Helmand Province. The same report noted Sadiq, the brother of the Taliban's second-in-command Mullah Berader (TIDE number 76541), worked at an unnamed U.S. NGO and was involved in planning an unspecified kidnapping. (Appendix sources 23-30)
38. (S//FGI//NF) Pakistan - Militants may be planning to abduct U.S. and UK citizens from NGOs and consulates; dual-citizens in Peshawar: Tearline intelligence reports, "Militants attached to Pakistan's Mumtaz Group may be planning to kidnap U.S. and UK citizens working in NGOs and consulates, as well as dual-citizen Pakistanis who are either visiting or residing in Peshawar, as of June 26. Peshawar's University Town could be the likely venue for such an operation. Further, the following individuals who probably reside in (the) Peshawar area could be supporters of the Mumtaz Group: Fahim, son of Ihsanullah; Ayaz; Abdul Rehman Khan (Awami National Party) and his son, Yunas Khan, residents of Kafir Dheri, Peshawar; Garib Shah Badshah; and Muazzam Badshah, son of Shah Badshah."
39. (S//FGI//NF) DS/TIA/ITA assesses the Mumtaz Group may be a reference to operations linked to al-Qa'ida leader Hamza al-Jawfi (a.k.a. Mumtaz; TIDE number 70390) who died in a late-February explosion in North Waziristan. Mumtaz is an oft-used alias by senior al-Qa'ida leaders that is arguably inauspicious. The now-deceased Hamzah Rabi and Abu Khabab al-Masri both used this alias as well. Worryingly, the other operatives DS/TIA/ITA suspects belong to this group are linked to ongoing, credible planning against Peshawar cantonment as well as American personnel and convoys belonging to U.S. Consulate Peshawar.
40. (S//FGI//NF) Although al-Jawfi is dead, it is possible the operations referenced can be linked to al-Jawfi's former courier and Imran (TIDE number 14399906), who collaborates closely with Mohmand Agency-based Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commander Hakimullah Mahsud. Early-April reporting from Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) links Imran -- described as an Uzbeki militant responsible for the November 12, 2008, murder of a USAID contractor and the August 26, 2008, ambush of the principal officer's (PO's) vehicle in Peshawar -- to TTP operative Faruq's ongoing planning for an attack on Peshawar's cantonment using multiple suicide operatives. Faruq is also likely involved in conducting al-Qa'ida-linked operational surveillance against the PO of U.S. Consulate Peshawar, a four-vehicle SUV protective convoy, and a vehicle workshop also affiliated with Post. Of note, however, ISI reported the capture of an individual named Imran in mid-June; although, it cannot be confirmed if this is the same Uzbeki Imran mentioned in earlier reporting. (Appendix sources 31-38)
41. (S//FGI//NF) Pakistan - Threats against Punjab and Islamabad: Reporting continues to circulate detailing ongoing plans by Pakistani extremists to launch suicide operations in Punjab Province and Islamabad. In Islamabad, threats specify the targeting of embassies located in the F-6/2 sector, police post Aabpara in Islamabad, the Imam Bargah in G-6/2, Senator Tariq Azim, and Barri Imam Shrine. In Lahore and greater Punjab Province, suicide operatives may seek to strike against foreigners in crowded areas or the Barbar Data Sahib Shrine. Although it remains unclear if these named targets are an accurate reflection of extremists' operational plans, it is of note late-June reporting also mentions the cultivation and use of sympathetic madrassas and extremists located in targeted cities to carry out future attacks.
42. (S//NF) As of late June, TTP reportedly tasked Abdul Malik Mujahid to launch suicide attacks against unspecified foreigners in crowded places in Punjab, with Mujahid considering the use of sympathetic madrassas as shelter prior to conducting an attack. Madrassas under consideration included the Jami Ashrafia and Jamiat ul-Manzur ul-Islami in Lahore. Separately, tearline from late June reports, "Militant commander Khan Bahadur, son of Sher Bahadur, is the local militant commander in the Watkai area. Bahadur currently may be residing in Islamabad, while reorganizing his group to operate in difference parts of Pakistan, as of June 25." Although there is limited information regarding the identity of Khan Bahadur (possible TIDE number 238258), earlier sensitive intelligence suggests he has served as an interlocutor in urban areas for Waziristan-based militants since 2007. According to late-January 2008 tearline, "... A Khan Bahadur (or Bhadur) in Lahore was involved in efforts to arrange talks and perhaps a government announcement for a cease-fire and helping coordinate a separate announcement from the Mujahidin, hopefully by October 13...."
43. (S//FGI//NF) As underscored by the events during and following the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) confrontation in Islamabad in July 2007, the continued existence of networks in Islamabad that can organize and facilitate protests and terrorist activity in the vicinity of the capital is indeed troubling. Notably, a body of intelligence reporting preceding the Lal Masjid confrontation suggests Pakistan-based extremists viewed the brewing tension between the madrassas and Islamabad one part of a larger comprehensive effort to re-energize and expand their jihadi operations from their strongholds in the tribal areas and Northwest Frontier Province. Interestingly, reporting from May 2007 citing a commander 10 corps lieutenant also noted 70 mosques in and around Islamabad would likely support extremist activity associated with the now-infamous Lal Masjid, which was also an unauthorized mosque. Of concern, since 2008 attacks in Pakistan have repeatedly targeted Westerners, coinciding with an unprecedented number of attacks in both Lahore and Islamabad. (Appendix sources 39-47)
44. (U) Cyber Threats
45. (U) EUR CTAD comment: The latest version of the National Security Strategy released by the UK Government includes a public cyber security strategy. The report calls for the establishment of two new offices with cyber security responsibilities and approves the use of offensive operations as a countermeasure to attacks against British systems. The Office of Cyber Security, falling under the Cabinet Office, will be the central body charged with coordinating with industry and developing strategy. The Cyber Security Operations Centre based at Government Communications Headquarters, the UK's primary signals intelligence agency, will be responsible for conducting offensive operations. According to press reports, the UK Government has hired several former hackers to staff the centre.
46. (S//NF) NEA CTAD comment: DoD reporting indicates as of mid-May, several Persian-language hacker forums are sharing information pertaining to a variety of hacking codes, tools, and video tutorials. One of the more notable findings was XXXXXXXXXXXX a backdoor Trojan horse program that allows for remote exploitation of an affected system and can provide denial-of-service capabilities. This particular malicious code is reportedly similar to a tool used against Georgian systems in 2008 (NFI).
47. (SBU) EAP CTAD comment: According to South Korean press reporting, the Republic of Korea's (RoK's) Defense Security Command (DSC) has declared intrusion attempts against the RoK's military computer networks have increased 20 percent in 2009, compared to those detected in 2008. The DSC further stated that 89 percent of the attempts are unsophisticated efforts to hack into servers and Internet homepages, whereas the remaining 11 percent appear to be more advanced attempts to obtain intelligence information. Of note, in an effort to deal with the increasing cyber threat, the RoK's National Intelligence Service has recommended President Lee Myung-bak appoint an aide to assist with the country's cyber security issues.
48. (S//NF) SCA CTAD comment: According to Defense Intelligence Agency reporting, the Government of India (GoI) continues efforts to advance its computer security programs -- particularly in light of increased concerns over Chinese computer network exploitation efforts -- but progress is hampered by significant disagreements within its departments. The key GoI organizations involved in developing and implementing security policies are identified as the Ministry of Telecommunications and the Research and Analysis Wing. Although the Indian Army is primarily responsible for the security of military networks, Indian officials acknowledge Army representatives have been largely left out of discussions. Additionally, some other key groups, such as the National Technical Reconnaissance Organization and the Indian Defense Intelligence Agency, have reportedly failed to offer significant contributions. Private security companies are also concerned that the lack of input from the private sector may lead to unfair regulations regarding telecommunications monitoring.
49. (SBU) Domestic CTAD comment: On June 22, Websense Security Labs issued an alert after discovering the official website of the Embassy of Ethiopia in Washington, DC, had been subverted with obfuscated JavaScript code hidden in an inline frame (IFrame) with the goal of infecting visitors to the site with malicious software (malware). The code redirected users to sites where malware, including Trojan downloaders, were installed without explicit user action. According to the alert, the site that hosted the malicious JavaScript is currently down. On March 20, security company Sophos discovered a similar IFrame infection on the same website. At the time, researchers at Sophos noted it resembled the attack on the Washington, DC, Embassy of Azerbaijan website that occurred in early March. The researchers also indicated the redirected sites had been used by Russian cyber criminals in previous malware infections. (Appendix sources 48-50)
50. (C) EAP China - Beijing TOPSEC founder indicates PRC investment:
51. (S//NF) Key highlights: o Founder of TOPSEC and iTrusChina notes PRC funding and directive in media interview. o TOPSEC is China's largest provider of information security products and services. o TOPSEC provides services and training for the PLA and has recruited hackers in the past. o Potential linkages of China's top companies with the PRC illustrate the government's use of its "private sector" in support of information warfare objectives.
52. (SBU) Source paragraph: "During an interview with journalists from China News Network, chairman of both Beijing TOPSEC and iTrusChina, He Weidong, spoke about the two companies, to include investment and contract from the Chinese Government (People's Republic of China (PRC)) .... Tianrongxin's capital came from two parts. The Chinese Government share one part of the investment, and the management department (of Tianrongxin) share the other part. He further stated that Tianrongxin was not really a company but a research institute; in 1995, the company took contracts from the government's research and development tasks."
53. (S//NF) CTAD comment: In November 1995, He Weidong founded the security company Tianrongxin, a.k.a. Beijing TOPSEC Network Security Technology Company, Ltd. TOPSEC is a China Information Technology Security Center (CNITSEC) enterprise and has grown to become China's largest provider of information security products and services. TOPSEC is credited with launching China's first indigenous firewall in 1996, as well as other information technology (IT) security products to China's market, to include virtual private networks, intrusion detection systems, filtering gateways, and security auditing and management systems. Additionally, in September 2000, Weidong founded the company Tianweichengxin, a.k.a. iTrusChina, which became the first experimental enterprise to develop business Public Key Infrastructure/Certification Authority services approved by China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.
54. (SBU) CTAD comment: During an interview with China News Network, Weidong stated that half of TOPSEC's start-up capital came from the PRC, with the other half coming from the company's management department. Additionally, he pointed out that TOPSEC began not as a company, but as a small research institute that took contracts from the government's research and development tasks (NFI). The turning point for TOPSEC came in 1996 when the company won a significant contract bid from the Chinese State Statistics Bureau. Since winning the bid, TOPSEC maintained a 100-percent sales growth in the following years. Weidong noted the company started out with 30,000 RMB (approximately $4,400) in 1995, and by 2002, had earnings of 3 billion RMB (approximately $440,000,000). Interestingly, shareholders did not receive bonuses, as all earnings went for future investment. Weidong also stated a bank loan was never used.
55. (S//NF) CTAD comment: Of note, the CNITSEC is responsible for overseeing the PRC's Information Technology (IT) security certification program. It operates and maintains the National Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT security and performs tests for information security products. In 2003, the CNITSEC signed a Government Security Program (GSP) international agreement with Microsoft that allowed select companies such as TOPSEC access to Microsoft source code in order to secure the Windows platform. Shortly thereafter, in 2004, People's Liberation Army (PLA) officer Yang Hua (GSP Communications Department's 3rd Communication Regiment, PLA 61416 Unit) was sent to TOPSEC to receive network-security training.
56. (S//NF) CTAD comment: Additionally, CNITSEC enterprises has recruited Chinese hackers in support of nationally-funded "network attack scientific research projects." From June 2002 to March 2003, TOPSEC employed a known Chinese hacker, Lin Yong (a.k.a. Lion and owner of the Honker Union of China), as senior security service engineer to manage security service and training. Venus Tech, another CNITSEC enterprise privy to the GSP, is also known to affiliate with XFocus, one of the few Chinese hacker groups known to develop exploits to new vulnerabilities in a short period of time, as evidenced in the 2003 release of Blaster Worm (See CTAD Daily Read File (DRF) April 4, 2008). 57. (S//NF) CTAD comment: While links between top Chinese companies and the PRC are not uncommon, it illustrates the PRC's use of its "private sector" in support of governmental information warfare objectives, especially in its ability to gather, process, and exploit information. As evidenced with TOPSEC, there is a strong possibility the PRC is harvesting the talents of its private sector in order to bolster offensive and defensive computer network operations capabilities. (Appendix sources 51-52)
58. (U) Suspicious Activity Incidents
59. (SBU) EUR Iceland - A man and a woman photographed in the area north of U.S. Embassy Reykjavik June 25. They then walked toward the backside of the Post, where they took additional photographs before departing on foot. The man was seen photographing in the neighborhood for an additional 3 hours. The Surveillance Detection Team found it unusual the subjects photographed sites other than tourist attractions. (SIMAS Event: Reykjavik-00257-2009)
60. (SBU) AF Guinea - Two young men were photographed U.S. Embassy Conakry June 25. A gendarme stopped the pair and took them to a nearby security booth where they were interviewed by Post's foreign security national investigator. Their photos of the Embassy were deleted, and the subjects were released with a warning.
61. (SBU) Record Check/Investigation: Subject 1: Mamdou Mouminatou Diallo. DPOB: 1982; Labe, Guinea. Cell phone number: 64 381 559. Subject 2: Mamadou Diallo. DPOB: 1984; Koundara, Guinea. Cell phone number: 64 184 665. (SIMAS Event: Conakry-01492-2009)
62. (SBU) NEA Tunisia - A man sat at Marsaoul Caf in Tunis focusing on the road leading to the U.S. Ambassador's residence June 4. After 30 minutes, the subject got into his car and departed the area. The man was previously seen at the caf on May 15 for approximately 1 hour.
63. (SBU) RSO Action/Assessment: The caf is located at the foot of the hill near the Ambassador's residence (the residence is located at the end of the road, approximately one-quarter to one-half mile away). This is the second time the individual and vehicle were spotted. However, Tunisian police do not share information concerning routine traffic stops or suspicious persons questioned/seen near the Embassy or Ambassador's residence. If the vehicle is seen again, the RSO will attempt to retrieve information on the owner.
64. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX
SECRET//FGI//NOFORN
Full Appendix with sourcing available upon request. CLINTON
Tuesday, 06 January 2009, 08:41
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SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY, DEPUTY SECRETARY, EAP A/S
HILL, S/P, EAP/CM
NSC FOR DWILDER
EO 12958 DECL: 01/05/2034
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ECON, EFIN, MARR, MASS, CH
SUBJECT: LOOKING AT THE NEXT 30 YEARS OF THE U.S.-CHINA
RELATIONSHIP
Classified By: Ambassador Clark T. Randt. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
1. (C) January 1, 2009, marked the 30th Anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. This anniversary followed the PRC commemoration of roughly 30 years of China's "reform and opening" policy under Deng Xiaoping, which led to China's staggering economic growth.
2. (C) Thirty years ago, China was just emerging from the nightmare of the Cultural Revolution and 30 years of fratricidal misrule. China's economy was crippled by years of disastrous policies like the Great Leap Forward. The population was coming to terms with the world's most draconian population controls enacted in 1976 after decades of Maoist state-subsidies encouraging large families. Chinese foreign relations tended to be more influenced by ideological yardsticks than economic links since China had very few commercial links with the outside world. In 1979, Chinese urbanites on average made the equivalent of five dollars per month.
3. (C) Just as no one in 1979 would have predicted that China would become the United States' most important relationship in thirty years, no one today can predict with certainty where our relations with Beijing will be thirty years hence. However, given the current significance of the bilateral relationship and the risk of missing opportunities to jointly address ongoing and predictable future challenges, below we look at trends currently affecting China with an eye to how those trends might affect relations. Several issues leap out, including China' insatiable resource needs, our growing economic interdependence, China's rapid military modernization, a surge in Chinese nationalism, China's demographic challenges, and the PRC's increasing influence and confidence on the world stage.
4. (C) China has been plagued over the millennia by unforeseen events that devastated formerly prosperous regimes. Mongol invasion, the Black Death, uncountable peasant uprisings, warlords, tax revolts, communist dictatorship, colonialism, famine, earthquakes and other plagues were largely unforeseen by the China watchers of the past. This report focuses generally on more optimistic projections. Given China's history, however, the United States should also gird itself for the possibility that China will fall short of today's mostly sanguine forecasts.
Resource Consumption
--------------------
5. (C) Popular and scholarly works in recent years highlight China's growing demand for natural resources and the possible impact that China's pursuit of resources will have on its foreign policy. Since economic reforms began in the late 1970s, industrial and exchange rate policies have fueled investment in resource-intensive heavy industries in China's coastal region, which currently account for approximately 55 percent of the country's total energy consumption today. A construction boom over the past decade has also stimulated growth in heavy industries. China is now a leading steel producer and currently accounts for 50 percent of the world's annual cement production. Reflecting China's emphasis on resource-intensive industries, China's energy utilization rate grew faster than its GDP between 2002 and 2006. In 1990, China consumed 27 quadrillion British Thermal Units (BTUs) of energy, accounting for 7.8 percent of global consumption. In 2006, it consumed 68.6 quadrillion BTUs or 15.6 percent of the global total. According to U.S. Department of Energy statistics, by 2030 China will account for 145.5 quadrillion BTUs or 20.7 percent of global energy consumption.
6. (C) China's oil demand has grown substantially over the last 30 years. In 1980, China consumed 1.7 million barrels of oil per day, almost all of which was produced domestically. In 2006, China consumed 7.4 million barrels per day, second only to the United States. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China's oil consumption will reach 16.5 million barrels per day in 2030. More than two thirds of the increased demand will come from the
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transport sector as vehicle ownership rates rise. China became a net importer of oil in 1993, and it now relies on imports to meet a growing portion of its fossil fuel needs. The IEA forecasts that China's oil import dependence will rise from 50 percent this year to 80 percent by 2030, as domestic oil production peaks early in the next decade. To strengthen the country's future energy security, the Chinese Government has adopted a "go out" policy that encourages national oil companies (NOCs) to acquire equity stakes in foreign oil and gas production. Today, state-owned Chinese oil giants CNPC/PetroChina, CNOOC, and Sinopec can be found in Sudan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Angola, and the Caspian Basin.
7. (C) China has also increased its reliance on imported minerals, and many analysts have attributed the global commodities boom of recent years in part to China's growing demand. Between 1980 and 2006, China became the world's largest consumer of iron, copper and aluminum. Chinese conglomerates are ubiquitous in sub-Saharan Africa exploiting mineral wealth there, and Chinese multinationals have significant investments in Australian mineral and uranium production.
8. (C) China's reliance on coal has come at an appalling environmental cost. This year, China surpassed the United States in carbon emissions, and it will soon become the world's biggest energy consumer. Between now and 2030, the IEA estimates, China will need to add 1,312 gigawatts of power generating capacity, more than the total current installed capacity in the United States. Coal-fired power generation, a major source of air pollution, accounts for approximately 78 percent of China's total electricity supply, and it will likely remain the predominant fuel in electricity generation for at least the next 20 years. Analysts predict that domestic coal production will peak in the next 15 to 25 years. China already became a net importer of coal in 2007, and coal imports are expected to grow in the coming decades to meet growing demand in China's coastal provinces.
9. (C) The Chinese Government recognizes the need to reduce dependence on coal, and it is pursuing policies to diversify its energy mix. China is already the largest producer of renewable energy in the world, with major investments in large-scale hydro and wind power projects. Nuclear and natural gas power will also account for a greater proportion of energy production, but under current projections, efforts to diversify China's energy mix will not have a large enough impact to curb greenhouse gas emissions growth.
10. (C) China's energy intensive growth has also had tragic consequences for public health. By most measurements, at least half of the world's most polluted major cities are in China. Rural residents, in particular farmers, have been affected by water pollution and dwindling water supplies, which are frequently redirected for industrial use. Respiratory disease, water-borne illness and tainted food scares are facts of modern life in the country. According to a recent WHO study, diseases caused by indoor and outdoor air pollution kill 656,000 Chinese citizens every year. Another 95,600 deaths are attributed annually to polluted drinking water.
11. (C) China's increasing reliance on imported natural resources has foreign policy ramifications and provides opportunities for the United States. A China that is increasingly dependent on Middle Eastern oil might be more likely to support policies that do not destabilize the Middle East. Take Iran, for instance. We have long been frustrated that China has resisted (with Russia) tough sanctions aimed at curbing Iran's nuclear program. In the future, a China increasingly dependent on foreign energy supplies may recalculate the risk a nuclear Iran would pose to the greater Persian Gulf region's capacity to export oil.
12. (C) Another opportunity presented by China's increasing resource consumption is in the joint development of technological responses to reduce carbon emissions and to diminish the public health impact of industrial growth. Scientific publications around the world conclude that the projected rate of global energy and natural resource
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consumption is unsustainable. Experts warn that we must find alternative forms of energy in order to avert calamities posed by global climate change. International efforts to develop and significantly utilize renewable energy, clean up our shared global environment, and conserve our remaining raw materials will not be effective without meaningful Chinese participation. As the world's preeminent technological power and as a leader in multilateral energy and scientific organizations, the United States is in a unique position to work with China to overcome these challenges.
Economic Interdependence and Chinese Demographics
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13. (C) In the next fifteen years, while China's overall population is predicted to stabilize, its urban population will likely grow to almost 1 billion, an increase (of 300 million people) equal to the entire current population of the United States. China plans to build 20,000 to 50,000 new skyscrapers over the next two decades -- as many as ten New York cities. More than 170 Chinese cities will need mass transit systems by 2025, more than twice the number now present in all of Europe. China is now surpassing Germany as the world's third largest economy and is projected to overtake Japan within the next five years. By the end of the next thirty years, China's economy could rival the United States in overall scale (although its per capita income will likely only be one quarter of the United States').
14. (C) Behind these outward symbols of success will be an increasingly complicated economic picture. Since 1979, by reversing the misguided economic policies of the Mao era, liberalizing labor markets and prices, opening to foreign investment, and taking advantage of the West's consumer-driven policies, China has maintained fast growth. However, the set of circumstances that allowed such impressive growth rates will no longer exist in the future.
15. (C) Many speculate that China has reached the limit to easy productivity gains by rationalizing the state-planned economy. The Economist Intelligence Unit expects China's annual growth to slow from around 10 percent in the last 30 years to 4.5 percent by 2020. After 2015 when the labor force peaks as a share of the population, labor costs will rise faster. This will increasingly make other countries like India and Vietnam more attractive for labor-intensive investment. In addition, workers will have to support a growing number of retirees. Early retirement ages combined with the urban one-child limits creates the so-called "4-2-1" social dilemma: each worker will have to support four grandparents, two parents and one child. Savings rates will start falling as the elderly draw down their retirement funds.
16. (C) China will have to manage an economy increasingly dependent on domestic consumption and service industries for growth. Already, urbanites are buying 1,000 new cars per day, making China the world's largest Internet and luxury goods market, and traveling abroad in growing numbers. By 2025, China will have the world's largest middle class, and China will likely have completed the transition from the majority rural population of today to a majority urban population. These consumers of tomorrow will likely flock to products from around the world as their North American, European and Japanese counterparts do today, providing new opportunities for American business. If incomes continue to grow, it is likely that the Chinese middle class will react like educated urbanites in other countries by exerting pressure on the Government to improve its dismal performance on environmental protection, food and product safety. We are already seeing increased public activism over such issues today.
17. (C) China will face a challenge in the next thirty years encouraging this urban consumption while dealing with the social equality issues inherent in a rural population where over 200 million people still live on less than a dollar a day. China will also have to find a way to improve the lot of between 150 and 230 million migrant workers who today must leave their children and aging parents behind in their home villages to travel to the industrial centers of the
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relatively developed coastal regions to work in factories or on construction projects.
18. (C) With China's phenomenal growth has come increased economic interdependence. This will likely increase, although some of the less-balanced elements of China's economic interactions should be mitigated. Rising consumption rates should work to lower China's trade surplus as well as its overabundance of foreign exchange reserves. More assets controlled by corporations and individuals, as opposed to the government, will diversify outward investment, reducing political control by Beijing, but also the utility of political suasion for U.S. policymakers interested in effecting the flow of capital to international hotspots.
Chinese Nationalism and Confidence on the International Stage
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19. (C) As one of two main pillars of post-Mao Chinese Communist Party rule (the other being sustained economic growth), Chinese nationalism is growing and should be monitored closely. As witnessed during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Chinese are increasingly proud of the tremendous strides their country has made in recent years. More and more young people see China as having "arrived" and might possess the confidence and willingness to assume the responsibilities of a major power. However, as was evident during protests over the 1999 mistaken bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the 2004 protests over Japanese textbooks, and more recently the anti-France diatribes that followed the roughing-up of a disabled Olympic torch bearer in Paris by Free Tibet supporters, this nationalism can also lead to jingoism. Chinese leaders of a system with few outlets to express political sentiments are faced with trying to give vent to the occasional uprising of nationalistic anger without letting it get out of hand or allowing it to focus on the failings of the central leadership.
20. (C) With notable exceptions like Zhou Enlai, Chinese foreign policy practitioners thirty years ago had little practical experience dealing with the West. Since then, Chinese diplomats and subject matter experts are increasingly well-educated, well-traveled and well-respected. Chinese diplomats at international fora such as the UN and the WTO have become adept at using procedural rules to attain diplomatic or commercial ends. This trend will likely continue in the coming decades, increasing the likelihood of American decision makers finding more able adversaries when we disagree on issues, but also more able partners where we can agree to jointly tackle a problem of mutual concern such as nonproliferation, alternative energy or pandemic influenza.
21. (C) While still reluctant to claim China is a global leader, Chinese officials are gradually gaining confidence as a regional power. By the end of the next 30 years, China should no longer be able to portray itself as the representative of lesser developed countries. This does not mean that it will necessarily identify with the more developed, mainly Western countries; it well might choose to pursue some uniquely Chinese path. In the coming 30 years, a U.S. President might be involved in negotiations with a Chinese leader seeking to reshape global financial institutions like the IMF or the WTO or establish rival institutions for non-Western countries in order to mitigate domestic Chinese concerns. Even so, China's growing position as a nation increasingly distinct from the less-developed world may expand our common interests and make it easier for the United States to convince China to act like a responsible global stakeholder.
22. (C) Foreign assistance coordination is another area of opportunity. China is rapidly ramping up its global economic presence, not only via resource extraction ventures and cheap exports, but increasingly via direct investment and assistance. This investment and assistance are welcome in most less-developed countries, whether in Africa or Southeast Asia, and particularly in countries where China's longstanding policy of "no strings attached no political interference" appeals to democratically-challenged dictators
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and kleptocrats. However, China is already facing blowback as a result of its more cavalier approach to issues that more scrupulous donors have wrestled with for decades. Scant attention paid to worker safety, job opportunities for local people, environmental protection, and political legitimacy has had negative consequences for China on multiple occasions, from a tarnished international image and being used as a political whipping boy by opposition groups in democratic countries to unpaid loans, expropriated investments, and even the deaths of Chinese expatriates. As a result, China is beginning to understand the merits of international assistance standards not for altruistic reasons, but for achieving China's own bottom-line imperatives of a more secure international position and better-protected economic interests in third countries. This realization, coupled with China's growing economic clout on the world stage, make it quite possible that, in the next 30 years, China will come to be identified by the average citizen in less developed countries not as "one of us" but as "one of them."
23. (C) In all likelihood, a new-found (if still somewhat grudging) PRC interest in internationally accepted donor principles such as transparency, good governance, environmental and labor protections, and corporate social responsibility will have matured in 30 years' time, making China a reliable partner for the United States, other donor countries, and international organizations in alleviating poverty, developing infrastructure, improving education and fighting infectious disease. And as one of the world's premier economic powers, China can be expected to have all but discarded its over-worn and outdated "non-interference" rhetoric in the face of massive Chinese investment assets and other economic interests abroad.
24. (C) As evidenced by Chinese policies toward pariah states like Sudan, Zimbabwe, Burma and Iran, China is still willing to put its need for markets and raw materials above the need to promote internationally accepted norms of behavior. However, the possible secession of southern Sudan (where much of the country's oil is found) from the repressive Khartoum-based Bashir regime, the erratic treatment of foreign economic interests in Zimbabwe by Robert Mugabe, the dangers to regional safety and stability posed by Burma's dysfunctional military junta, and the threat to China's energy security that a nuclear-armed Iran would represent have given Beijing cause to re-calibrate its previously uncritical stance toward these international outlaws. If China's integration into global economic and security structures continues apace, we would expect its tolerance for these sorts of disruptive players to decrease proportionately.
25. (C) China's work in the Six-Party Talks and the Shanghai Cooperative Organization may provide guidance as to how to accelerate this trend. China plays a leading and often responsible and constructive role in both of these multilateral groups. Future U.S. policy-makers might usefully consider additional international mechanisms that include both U.S. and Chinese membership such as the proposed Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism that may grow out of the Six-Party Talks. The Chinese themselves have suggested a Six-Party Talks-like grouping to address the Iran nuclear issue, perhaps a P5-plus-1-plus-Iran. In the future, we may wish to consider the United States joining the East Asia Summit (EAS).
26. (C) Likewise, as the Chinese economy takes up a larger portion of the global economy, it inevitably will become increasingly affected by the decisions of international economic and financial institutions. Similarly, China's economic decisions will have global implications, and its cooperation will become essential to solving global-scale problems. Drawing China constructively into regional and global economic and environmental dialogues and institutions will be essential. More and more experts see the utility of establishing an Asia-Pacific G-8, to include China, Japan, and the United States plus India, Australia, Indonesia, South Korea and Russia; others say the time is ripe to include China as a member of a G-9. Giving China a greater voice is seen as a way to encourage China to assume a larger burden in
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supporting the international economic and financial system.
Role of the Military
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27. (C) The disparate possibilities exist that in the coming decades the PLA will evolve into a major competitor, maintain only a regional presence or become a partner capable of joining us and others to address peacekeeping, peace-enforcing, humanitarian relief and disaster mitigation roles around the world. China may be content to remain only a regional power, but Deng Xiaoping's maxim urging China to hide its capabilities while biding its time should caution us against predicting that the PLA's long-term objectives are modest. In the years to come, our defense experts will need to closely monitor China's contingency plans and we will need to use every diplomatic and strategic tool we have to prevent intimidating moves toward Taiwan. In the coming years, Chinese defense capabilities will continue to improve. The PLA thirty years from today will likely have sophisticated anti-satellite weapons, state-of-the-art aircraft, aircraft carriers and an ability to project force into strategic sea lanes.
28. (C) Thirty years ago the PLA was a bloated political organization with antiquated equipment and tactics. Today, the PLA is leaner and is becoming a modern force. Chinese military and paramilitary units have participated in UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions in East Timor, Kosovo, Haiti and Africa. In December 2008, for the first time, the PLA Navy deployed beyond the immediate waters surrounding the country to participate in anything beyond a goodwill tour to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa. It is likely that China will continue to support UN-sponsored PKOs, and if the piracy expedition is successful, China might follow up with expeditions to future piracy hotspots such as the Strait of Malacca or elsewhere.
29. (C) Over the past thirty years, Chinese officials have come to begrudgingly acknowledge the benefits to East Asia resulting from the U.S. military presence in the Pacific, especially the extent that a U.S. presence in the Pacific is an alternative to a more robust Japanese military presence. A peaceful resolution of the threat posed by North Korea might cause China to call for an end to the U.S. base presence on the Korean Peninsula. Perceived threats to China's security posed by Japan's participation in missile defense or by future high-tech U.S. military technologies might cause tomorrow's Chinese leaders to change their assessment and to exert economic pressures on U.S. allies like Thailand or the Philippines to choose between Beijing and Washington.
30. (C) Whatever the state of our future relations with China, we will need to understand more about the Chinese military. Multilateral training and exercises are constructive ways to promote understanding and develop joint capabilities that could be used in real-life situations. In the coming years, the Chinese may be called upon to participate in regional peacekeeping and humanitarian relief exercises. Some of these could be handled under UN auspices, but others could be bilateral or multilateral. For instance, Cobra Gold, which is held every year in Thailand, is America's foremost military exercise in Asia. It has a peacekeeping component and since the December 2004 tsunami in Indian Ocean has included a humanitarian relief element. With proper buy-in by the Pentagon and PACOM, we could create a program to engage the PLA more directly both with our military and with friendly militaries in the region. Modest efforts at expanding search and rescue capabilities on the high seas, developing common forensic techniques for use in mass casualty events, conducting exercises with PLA units tasked with responding to civil nuclear emergencies, or table-top exercises for U.S. and Chinese junior officers could be steps that promote trust with little risk. At the same time, more frequent, regularly scheduled high-level reciprocal visits between Chinese and U.S. security officials might eventually lead to a constructive strategic security policy dialogue on nonproliferation, counterterrorism and other issues.
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Taiwan and Human Rights
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31. (C) Taiwan was the most vexing issue holding up the establishment of relations 30 years ago and remains the toughest issue for U.S.-China relations despite significant improvement in cross-Strait relations since the election of Taiwan President Ma. It will remain a delicate topic for the foreseeable future. We should continue to support Taiwan and Mainland efforts to reduce tension by increasing Taiwan's "international space" and reducing the Mainland's military build-up across from Taiwan.
32. (C) Thirty years ago, the Chinese state interfered in virtually every aspect of its citizens' lives. An individual's work unit provided housing, education, medical care and a burial plot. Reeducation sessions and thought reform were common, churches and temples were closed, and average citizens had little access to the outside world. Today, Chinese have far greater ability to travel, read foreign media and worship. Nonetheless, the overall human rights situation falls well short of international norms. Today, China's growing cadre of well-educated urbanites generally avoids politics and seems more interested in fashion and consumerism than in ideology; after all, outside-the-box political thinking, much less activism, remains dangerous. However, any number of factors in the future ranging from rising unemployment among recent college graduates, or growing discontent over the income divide separating rich urbanites from poor peasants, to discontent among the mass of migrant workers could lead to unrest and increased political activism. The Chinese Government still responds with brutal force to any social, religious, political or ideological movement it perceives as a potential threat. Chinese political leaders' occasional nods toward the need for political reform and increased democracy suggest a realization that the current one-party authoritarianism has its weak points, but do not promise sufficient relaxation of party control to create a more dynamically stable polity in the long term.
33. (C) While the U.S. model of democracy is not the only example of a tolerant open society, we should continue to push for the expansion of individual freedoms, respect for the rule of law and the establishment of a truly free and independent judiciary and press as being necessities for a thriving, modern society and, as such, in China's own interests. Someday, China will realize political reform. When that day comes, we will want to be remembered by Chinese for having helped China to advance. Randt
Thursday, 11 February 2010, 09:20
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 000367
SIPDIS
STATE PASS USAID
EO 12958 DECL: 02/11/2020
TAGS PREL, ECON, EAID, EINV, CH, XA
SUBJECT: AFRICAN EMBASSIES SUSPICIOUS OF US-CHINA
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN AFRICA
REF: (A) 09 BEIJING 955 (B) 09 BEIJING 1311 (C) 09 BEIJING 2836
Classified By: Economic Minister Counselor William Weinstein. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
Summary
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1. (C) African Embassy officials told EmbOffs that many in the African community were uncomfortable with the concept of US-China development cooperation in Africa. China's fast, efficient, "no strings attached" bilateral approach is popular in the region, as is the PRC preference for infrastructure over governance projects. African officials fear that U.S. or European interference will slow down the assistance process and tie conditions to Chinese aid. In the past, the EU angered many African countries when it proposed trilateral cooperation. The Chinese subsequently backed out of discussions citing lack of African support. In addition, African officials believe that competition between donors has had positive consequences for African development, giving the African countries options after several decades of a largely "Western" development model. Despite apprehensions, one official believed that U.S.-China cooperation could be positive if carried out with active African participation. The UK's Department for International Development (DFID) was offered as an example of an organization that has managed to collaborate well with China in Africa. End summary.
Threatening the Chinese way
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2. (C) During a February 8 lunch, Kenyan Ambassador to China Julius Ole Sunkuli said he and other Africans were wary of the U.S.-China dialogue on Africa and felt Africa had nothing to gain from China cooperating with the international donor community. Sunkuli claimed that Africa was better off thanks to China's practical, bilateral approach to development assistance and was concerned that this would be changed by "Western" interference. He said he saw no concrete benefit for Africa in even minimal cooperation. Sunkuli said Africans were frustrated by Western insistence on capacity building, which translated, in his eyes, into conferences and seminars (REF C). They instead preferred China's focus on infrastructure and tangible projects. He also worried that Africa would lose the benefit of having some leverage to negotiate with their donors if their development partners joined forces.
Lessons from the EU experience
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3. (C) South African Minister Plenipotentiary Dave Malcolmson echoed the same reservations in a February 9 meeting. According to him, lessons could be learned from the EU experience in 2008. When the EU put together a policy paper on trilateral development cooperation in Africa, many African countries were annoyed because they were not consulted on the issue. They argued that the third party in these nominally trilateral discussions was conspicuously absent. They perceived this as a Western attempt to reign in China's Africa assistance. Malcolmson said the African resistance prevented any concrete progress coming out of this initiative as the Chinese then subsequently backed out of the discussion, citing African opposition.
Africans don't want conditions, they want options
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4. (C) African countries principally fear that the U.S. and other Western countries will use trilateral cooperation to try to attach governance conditions to Chinese development. Malcolmson, who previously worked at the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) secretariat, recalled that governance projects received a lot more support from
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Western donor countries than infrastructure projects. He opined that although governance, peace and security are crucial to African growth, they must be accompanied by measures to reduce poverty and build infrastructure.
5. (C) Malcolmson echoed Sunkuli's comment that African countries also fear losing their bargaining power. China's emergence in Africa as a counterbalance to U.S. and European donors has been very positive for Africa by creating "competition" and giving African countries options. He recalled that after the 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit, when China announced its commitments to Africa to much international media fanfare, traditional donors changed their attitude. They recognized that they had to measure up to China and "came calling." The EU proposed infrastructure projects (after having defacto given up supporting these types of projects) and the World Bank began to support more agriculture projects.
The DFID example and recommendations for the future
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6. (C) Malcolmson clarified that if U.S.-China cooperation leads to a real escalation of resources then it could be a positive step, but many Africans expect that it would slow down development. He cited the DFID's relationship with China as an example of healthy cooperation. DFID's success has come from focusing on small projects and working largely outside formal channels (REF A). Malcolmson recommended working through regional African organizations like the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) as a way to alleviate African concerns. If both China and the United States contribute resources to promising African development projects, then Africans will welcome trilateral cooperation. He said this would have the added benefit of encouraging the Chinese to venture beyond bilateral development assistance and support regional projects.
Comment
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7. (C) Sunkuli and Malcolmson's comments are a potential warning sign as the USG prepares for the upcoming U.S.-China Sub-Dialogue on Africa. As the PRC continues to stress a policy of "non- interference" in the internal affairs of other countries, China could well use any voiced African opposition as an excuse to stop or slow progress on further discussions or collaboration. We should be careful to pick projects that would have broad support within the African community, preferably African-initiated and led, to get the development cooperation dialogue started on the right foot. In addition, we should clearly articulate the benefits of our cooperation to our African counterparts and include African voices in the debate on the U.S.- China-Africa relationship.
HUNTSMAN
Thursday, 15 March 2007, 10:24
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 001760
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/15/2032
TAGS PGOV, PREL, ECON, SOCI, CH
SUBJECT: FIFTH GENERATION STAR LI KEQIANG DISCUSSES
DOMESTIC CHALLENGES, TRADE RELATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR
REF: SHENYANG 26
Classified By: Ambassador Clark T. Randt, Jr. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
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1. (C) Liaoning Party Secretary Li Keqiang, a front runner for elevation to the Politburo this fall and potential successor to President Hu Jintao in 2012, described the challenges he faces as a provincial leader to the Ambassador over dinner on March 12. Engaging and well-informed, Li related that despite brisk economic growth, Liaoning's income gaps remain severe. To create a "harmonious society," he has tried to guarantee minimum living standards by providing new housing to the destitute and a job to every household. The public is dissatisfied with education, health care and housing, but it is corruption that truly incenses them. On foreign policy, Li said United States-China relations are developing smoothly, welcoming bilateral cooperation on North Korea. Turning to trade relations, Li claimed that China is boosting imports, domestic consumption and social safety nets both to balance trade and further its own development. Concerned by protectionist sentiment in the United States and what he described as a lack of understanding about China in Congress, Li passionately argued in defense of free trade and said more Members of Congress should visit the PRC. Regarding China's ongoing National People's Congress session, Li judged that passage of the draft property law and promoting programs to address social issues are most important. End Summary.
NPC: Focus on Property Law, Social Issues
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2. (C) Liaoning Party Secretary Li Keqiang, identified as a potential "fifth generation" leader and possible successor to President Hu Jintao, joined the Ambassador for dinner at his residence on March 12. In town for the ongoing National People's Congress (NPC) session, Li judged the draft property law and social issues to be the most important subjects for the Liaoning delegation. The property law, which will impact the foundation of China's economic system, demonstrates just how far China has come in 30 years of reform. Most Deputies believe the bill's passage is "assured," given the nearly unanimous support it received from the NPC Standing Committee just prior to the opening of this year's legislative session. Liaoning is also focused on Premier Wen Jiabao's commitment to deal with social issues, particularly those designed to raise living standards and better the people's livelihood.
The Economy: Not By the Numbers
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3. (C) Describing some of the challenges he faces as Party Secretary, Li related that despite brisk economic growth of
SIPDIS 12.8 percent in 2006, Liaoning's income gaps remain severe. Liaoning ranks among the top 10 Chinese provinces in terms of per capita GDP, yet the number of its urban residents on welfare is among the highest in the country and average urban disposable income is below the national average. By contrast, rural disposable incomes are above the national average. Even so, incomes for Liaoning farmers are only half that of urban residents.
4. (C) GDP figures are "man-made" and therefore unreliable, Li said. When evaluating Liaoning's economy, he focuses on three figures: 1) electricity consumption, which was up 10 percent in Liaoning last year; 2) volume of rail cargo, which is fairly accurate because fees are charged for each unit of weight; and 3) amount of loans disbursed, which also tends to be accurate given the interest fees charged. By looking at these three figures, Li said he can measure with relative accuracy the speed of economic growth. All other figures, especially GDP statistics, are "for reference only," he said smiling.
Harmonious Society Means Jobs
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5. (C) In an attempt to create a "harmonious society" in Liaoning, Li said he has tried to guarantee a minimum standard of living for all residents. For example, the province moved over 1.2 million urban slum dwellers into new, heavily government-subsidized apartments over the past two years. Premier Wen visited Liaoning during this past Chinese New Year Holiday to inspect this program. Although the new apartments provide only 40 to 50 square meters to each family, they are far superior to the slums in which residents previously lived. The Central Government provided a great
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deal of support for this program, with local governments and government-backed loans providing the most of the funding. In exchange for a modest amount of money, residents receive the deed to their new homes at a small fraction of the market rate. Li said he also guaranteed that every Liaoning household would have at least one member with a job. In 2005, there were 240,000 provincial households in which not a single family member had work. Today there are none, he proudly declared. Li's standing promise is that his government will find a job for every "unemployed household" within 20 days of notification.
Governance: Corruption, Public Feedback
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6. (C) Although Liaoning residents are dissatisfied with education, health care and housing issues, it is corruption that makes them most angry, Li told the Ambassador. The most effective way to combat official graft is to create a transparent system of rules and adequate supervision that leaves corrupt officials no room to act. This is the method Liaoning employed to manage the vast sums spent on its massive slum relocation project. Once a corrupt official is discovered, he is promptly punished, which provides a good lesson to bureaucrats taking up new posts. The province has also increased efforts to "strictly educate" public officials, Li said. Part of this education involves prison tours that force bureaucrats to visit incarcerated officials convicted of graft in order to witness first hand the consequences of malfeasance.
7. (C) To learn what is on the minds of the public, Li said he uses a variety of channels, official and unofficial. These include investigative reports, Li's own inspection tours of grassroots areas, media reporting and letters addressed directly to him. Sometimes, Li uses friends who are not from Liaoning to gather information about the province that he cannot obtain himself. Finally, there are the "official" channels of the Provincial People's Congress and Political Consultative Conference. Arguing that these official channels are "highly consultative," Li warned against assuming that People's Congress deliberations are rigged. Although every bill is usually passed with an incredibly high number of "yes" votes, he asserted that people don't see the behind-the-scenes reviews and feedback sessions that result in the original drafts of bills being altered substantially before passage.
Rule of Law
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8. (C) China has made great progress in improving its legal system and implementing the rule of law, said Li, who has a degree in law. On the other hand, given that the rule of law has a short history in China, the country still has a long way to go in "perfecting" its legal system. The concept of ruling the country according to law is increasingly becoming rooted in the minds of the people, and there is a recognition that relying on the law allows the government to do its work better and more efficiently. At the same time, the government must cope with the challenges of implementing and following the laws passed by the people's congresses.
Education
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9. (C) Education is crucial for China's continued development, Li said. The most important task is to increase access to compulsory education. Although all Chinese children are supposed to receive at least nine years of schooling, many do not. Even nine years of education is insufficient, Li said, hoping that in the long term this could be extended to 10 or 12 years. This year's NPC Government Work Report contains two key measures on education. The first provides government subsidies covering tuition for poor students, especially in rural areas. The second gives totally free schooling to those students majoring in education. Referring to Deng Xiaoping's appeal to make Chinese education open to the world, to modernization and to the future, Li said he believes China has already succeeded in doing so.
Bilateral Relations, Six-Party Talks
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10. (C) United States-China relations are "developing smoothly," Li said, which benefits both of our countries and the entire world. He agreed with the Ambassador's assessment that our common interests have led to increased cooperation in a number of areas, including on North Korea. Li welcomed the progress achieved in the last round of Six-Party Talks,
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noting that, above all, Liaoning residents hope to see a stable and peaceful Korean Peninsula. Li alleged that he had witnessed no changes in flows of North Koreans into Liaoning. He believed, however, that the DPRK has been "strictly controlling" the border.
Trade Relations: Boosting Domestic Spending
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11. (C) The Ambassador raised the large trade imbalance between the United States and China, explaining that one of our priorities in the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) is to encourage Chinese consumers to spend more by addressing deficiencies in China's social safety net and healthcare systems that result in large precautionary savings. In reply, Li said China is committed to boosting domestic consumption and imports, as well as further developing its pension, welfare and healthcare systems. China is doing this, in part, because of its international commitments, including under the WTO. But doing so also clearly promotes China's further development in a globalized economy.
12. (C) China's low consumption rates are due, in part, to the Chinese people's tradition of frugality and China's overall low level of development, Li claimed. As China continues to develop and incomes rise, consumption rates will naturally increase. In the past few years, increases in domestic consumption have outstripped GDP growth, a trend that will continue. As Chinese companies continue to grow, they will become strong enough to buy expensive high-end products from overseas, something that is already happening, which was "unthinkable" only 10 years ago. China is also making progress in improving its social safety nets. In Liaoning, all residents are covered under pension and social security systems. The problem is that these systems' standards remain low and must continue to be raised, Li said.
Free Trade vs. Protectionism
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13. (C) Referring to perceived increased protectionist sentiment on Capitol Hill, Li said one problem is that Members of Congress who have never visited China do not understand the great changes that have taken place here over the past 30 years. The best solution is to invite more Members to visit. The Ambassador, while emphasizing American support for free trade, told Li that concern in the United States over the trade deficit and jobs is real. There is a widespread perception in the United States that China is not playing fair, especially with respect to the RMB exchange rate, IPR protection and market access, particularly for services.
14. (C) Changing tack, Li launched into a spirited defense of free trade. If we resort to protectionism, we will all lose, he averred. Both China and the United States can make protectionist arguments in virtually every sector. Even in the financial sector, China could use the excuse of protecting jobs, not financial security, to lobby against market opening, given the millions of workers in state-owned banks. The same holds true for the service, distribution and retail sectors. But we cannot resort to protectionism, he emphasized. If China does not open its financial sector, its financial industry will lose competitiveness and the public will be dissatisfied. Moreover, China must play by WTO rules, which requires market opening. Similarly, if Chinese products are barred from the United States, the standard of living for most Americans will be compromised and they will be dissatisfied. "We are in the process of opening up," Li said. Congress should keep this in mind when looking at China, he asserted, reiterating that the PRC is boosting both domestic consumption and imports.
Intel Investment in Dalian
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15. (C) Regarding export licenses for Intel's possible investment in Dalian (see reftel), the Ambassador told Li that Intel is working closely with the appropriate government agencies to ensure full compliance with United States export-control requirements. Li was grateful for the information, stressing how important major multinational corporations like Intel are to Liaoning's future development. More than just the capital invested and the chips produced, Liaoning hopes to learn from Intel's advanced management techniques. There will be absolutely no obstacles to the investment on the Chinese side, as the Central Government has already approved the investment. Intel's president will visit China later this month, and if all goes well, there may be a signing ceremony to finalize the deal, Li said.
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Bio Info
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16. (C) Li Keqiang remains one of the front runners to ascend to the Politburo this fall, perhaps even to the Politburo Standing Committee, and to succeed Hu Jintao in 2012. With the Ambassador, Li was engaging and well-informed on a wide range of issues. He displayed a good sense of humor and appeared relaxed and confident throughout. Though coy about his hobbies and interests, Li said he likes to "walk," noting that he builds walking into his work schedule and implying that he has little time for other exercise. Although he spoke almost entirely in Chinese, Li clearly understood some English, correcting his interpreter on several occasions. Li expressed an interest in visiting the United States, noting that his last trip was six years ago, prior to the September 11 attacks. On several previous occasions, he traveled widely in the United States, visiting both coasts and the Midwest. Li said he particularly liked Oklahoma. RANDT
Tuesday, 02 February 2010, 08:36
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 000263
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - (ADDED SECSTATE ADDRESS)
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/CM-BRAUNOHLER
STATE FOR EAP/CM
STATE FOR ISN/NESS
USDOE FOR NNSA/SCHEIMAN, GOOREVICH, WHITNEY
USDOE FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY-MCGINNIS
STATE PASS TO NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (DOANE)
USDOE FOR INTERNATIONAL/YOSHIDA, BISCONTI, HUANGFU
NSC FOR HOLGATE
EO 12958 DECL: 01/20/2035
TAGS CH, ENRG, KPWR, MNUC, OSCI, PINR, PINS, SENV, TPHY,
TSPL
SUBJECT: PRC: NUCLEAR RESEARCH AT CHINESE ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES
BEIJING 00000263 001.4 OF 002
Classified By: BRENT CHRISTENSEN, ESTH COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.4(b,d,e)
1.(SBU) Summary: In response to an invitation by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), ESTH officer traveled to Hefei, Anhui Province, in December 2009 to visit several Chinese government-sponsored scientific institutions. During this time, ESTH officer learned of the below information through official presentations, personal observation, and informal/discreet conversations with CAS staff members. Most significantly, the Institute of Plasma Physics continues to conduct research on how to use nuclear fusion as a sustainable means to produce energy. At the same time, China is expanding its use of nuclear fission as an energy source and plans to open at least 70 nuclear fission power Qnts within the next 10 years. In 2009, CAS's Institute of Plasma Physics budget was USD$20 million. Additionally, other CAS institutes are conducting research in biometrics, computational physics and material science, nanoscience and nanomaterials, soft-matter physics, environmental spectrometry, fiber optic wave-length division multiplexing, quantum communications, superconductors and spintroncis, and cognitive sciences. End Summary.
Institute of Plasma Physics - Nuclear Research
------------------------------------
2. (C) In mid-December 2009, the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) Institute of Plasma Physics (IPP) in Hefei, Anhui Province was preparing for another cycle of experiments with its Experimental Advanced Superconducting Tokamak (EAST). EAST was designed to be a controlled nuclear fusion tokamark reactor with superconductive toroidal and poloidal field magnets and a D-shaped cross-section. One of the experimental goals of this device was to prove that a nuclear fusion reaction can be sustained indefinitely, at high enough temperatures, to produce energy in a cost-effective way. In 2009, IIP successfully maintained a 10 million degree Celsius plasma nuclear fusion reaction for 400 seconds. IIP also successfully maintained a 100 million degree Celsius plasma nuclear fusion reaction for 60 seconds. One of IIP's immediate goals is now to maintain a 100 million degree Celsius plasma nuclear fusion reaction for over 400 seconds. Currently, IIP is also conducting research into hybrid fusion-fission nuclear reactors that may be able to sustain nuclear reactions indefinitely, and at sufficient temperatures, to cost-effectively produce energy. IIP officials stated that China has the explicit goal of building at least 70 nuclear fission power plants within the next 10 years. IIP scientists claimed current Chinese nuclear energy production efforts use Uranium 235, but research is being done to make Uranium 238 a feasible alternative. IIP's 2009 budget was USD$20 million - a two-fold increase over the previous year - and IIP leadership expects their budget to increase again in 2010. Roughly one-third of IIP's budget comes from China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC); another one-third of the budget comes directly from CAS, and the final one-third comes from China's Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). According to IIP leadership, NDRC has been very laissez-faire in its oversight, but MOST tends to micromanage projects and the expenditure of money. (COMMENT: Based on personal/discreet conversations with IIP staff members, the relationship between CAS and MOST is strained due to officious and annoying oversight insisted upon by MOST. IIP scientists much prefer the NDRC management style and wish more of their funding could come from this body rather than MOST. END COMMENT) IIP has roughly 450 full-time staff members, over 400 graduate students, and approximately 100 contractors under its purview.
Institute of Intelligent Machines - Biometrics Research
------------------------------------
3. (C) The Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) Institute of Intelligent Machines (IIM) in Hefei has developed a biometrics device that uses a person's pace to identify them. The device measure weight and two-dimensional sheer forces applied by a person's foot during walking to create a uniquely identifiable biometrics profile. The device can be covertly installed in a floor and is able to collect
BEIJING 00000263 002.4 OF 002
biometrics data on individuals covertly without their knowledge. When questioned about the device's potential applications, IIM officials stated the device was being used by "secret" customers and was not available on the commercial market. IIM also said they were involved with China's "Program 863." (COMMENT: Program 863 is China's national high-technology development plan that includes both military and civilian technology development programs; therefore, it is likely the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is one of the customers for whom this biometrics device was developed. END COMMENT)
Institute of Solid State Physics - Nanotechnology Research
------------------------------------
4. (C) In mid-December 2009, the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) Institute of Solid State Physics (ISSP) in Hefei was conducting research in the fields of computational physics and material science, nanomaterials, and soft-matter physics. ISSP's 2009 budget was roughly $6 million (USD). ISSP's top priority projects are: one-dimensional nanomaterials, spin and charge research using perovskite manganese oxides, and the design and preparation of high-dampening materials. ISSP also conducts research on nanomaterials and nanostructures for China's "Program 973." (NOTE: Program 973 is China's national plan for improving basic scientific research and development. END NOTE)
Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics - Spectrometry & Fiber Optic Research
------------------------------------
5. (C) In mid-December 2009, the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics (IOFM) in Hefei was modifying environmental spectrometry technology to detect TATP explosives for use in counter-terrorism efforts. IOFM was also conducting fiber optic research on wave-length division multiplexing (WDM) technologies using pulsed and continuous laser sources at both single-mode and multi-mode wavelengths. A cursory walk through one of their labs revealed that IOFM was specifically conducting experiments in the 980-1150 nanometer range, and that they were conducting experiments using hydrogen-filled fiber optic communication lines. (COMMENT: Hydrogen-filled fiber optic lines are technologically challenging to manufacture, but provide many advantages; one of which is increased security and protection from tampering. END COMMENT)
University of Science and Technology of China - Organization & Research
------------------------------------
6. (C) In mid-December 2009, the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) in Hefei had academic programs focusing on Math, Physics, Chemistry, Life Sciences, Nuclear Science, Engineering, Computer Science, Information Technology, Management, Humanities, and a department dedicated to the development of gifted young people. USTC has 37,000 staff and 40,000 graduate students. USTC oversees two national laboratories: the National Synchrotron Radiation Laboratory and the Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Science at the Microscale (HFNL). HFNL has 95 faculty members and roughly 400 graduate students. HFNL research focuses on quantum communication, nanoscience, superconductors, spintronics, and cognitive sciences. In the area of quantum communication, HFNL was conducting research in quantum teleportation and free space quantum cryptography that scientists hope will result in "totally secure" communications. USTC also oversees China's "Program 178," although they did not describe the nature of this program. (COMMENT: A cursory walk through their labs seemed to indicate they had already succeeded in single-particle quantum teleportation and are now trying to conduct dual-particle quantum teleportation. END COMMENT) HUNTSMAN
Friday, 12 June 2009, 02:23
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 001582
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/CM - THOMAS, FLATT, THORNTON, SHEAR
STATE FOR S/P - CHOLLET, GREEN
STATE FOR E - YON
STATE FOR D - PARK
STATE PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD
NSC FOR LOI
TREASURY FOR EUGENE HUANG, CHRIS WINSHIP, JASON PAU
PARIS PASS OECD
EO 12958 DECL: 06/12/2019
TAGS PREL, ECON, EFIN, EAID, EINV, ETRD, PHUM, AU-1, CH
SUBJECT: UK-CHINA ECON DIALOGUE: NO LONGER A "BLOODY
DISASTER"
Classified By: Acting Economic Minister Counselor Robert W. Forden. Rea sons 1.4 (b/d).
SUMMARY
-------
1. (C) While the 2008 first round of the UK-China Economic and Financial Dialogue (EFD) was a "bloody disaster," the second meeting, held in London May 11, 2009, produced "decent results," according to UK Embassy Econoff Tamsin Rees, who coordinated the UK Embassy's contributions to the event. Rees said that while EFD1 was marred by a protocol-driven, scripted exchange, EFD2 featured more dialogue, and benefited from substantive working-level exchanges in advance of the ministerial meeting on touchy topics like market access. Rees said key deliverables from EFD2 include a fast track patent program for green technologies, a bank assurance pilot project permitting Standard Life to establish an insurance business in China, and commitment to another round of the successful China-Africa Dialogue. (The full outcomes list is in paragraph nine.) Still, protocol snafus dogged EFD2, such as when various British Ministers came and left throughout the day. Rees added that the UK also earlier assembled its Ambassadors to the United States, France, Moscow, the United Nations, and the European Union for a Strategic Dialogue meeting with State Councilor Dai Bingguo, which featured a good off-the-record discussion on Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and some trade topics. End Summary.
What Worked Well at the Second EFD -- Lessons for SnED
--------------------------------------------- ---------
2. (SBU) Rees attributed the greater success of EFD2 to more open discussion, better preparation, a good atmosphere, and senior buy-in on the UK side. She said more free discussion had made a "massive difference." The format limited the length of interventions to three minutes each. She said the UK had initially pushed for a two minute limit. There were 45-minute "free discussion blocks" on three key topics, which resulted in a 30-40 minute talk on trade and investment, a topic that China had initially resisted even including on the agenda, she said. In the end, Rees described Chinese delegation head Vice Premier Wang Qishan as "very vocal" and willing to talk off the cuff. She added that China was very interested in comments by the Chairman of the UK Financial Services Authority on financial regulation.
3. (SBU) Rees added that an earlier series of working-level meetings contributed to the dialogue at the ministerial. Despite China's initial unwillingness to negotiate -- or even discuss -- some matters, the British were able to overcome this resistance by really pressing the Chinese. For example, the UK kept pushing for a "joint statement" to the press rather than the pre-prepared one preferred by the Chinese. Ultimately, British persistence meant the parties agreed on a statement which was much closer to the one the UK had envisioned. China also initially refused to discuss market access, but in the plenary lead-up the UK told China that they felt China was not taking the issue seriously. As a result, MOFCOM assembled 12 Chinese agencies for a half-day meeting with the UK Ambassador to discuss market access. At first, China agreed on six market access-related deliverables, but backed out the next day, likely over concern about making the concessions public, Rees assessed.
4. (SBU) Rees added that the setting of the meeting also facilitated an open conversation. The parties met in London's elegant Lancaster House, which is adjacent to Buckingham Palace. The UK offered China its own secretariat room. Chinese participants were free to enter and leave the facility as they pleased. Vice Premier Wang even had a room with a terrace and garden, allowing him to smoke between sessions.
BEIJING 00001582 002 OF 005
5. (C) In contrast, Rees said EFD1 was a "disaster" and a "protocol-driven waste of time." She lamented that a certain Chancellor, who came to Beijing from the World Bank-IMF Spring meetings in Washington "was not engaged, was not sure why he was doing the event or what the goal was, and did not understand why the meeting had been upgraded from the existing financial dialogue." She added that he arrived in Beijing and "decided he hated the press statement" and wanted it re-written overnight.
Charm Offensive, or Just Plain Offensive?
-----------------------------------------
6. (C) Nonetheless, EFD2 had a couple hiccups. Most notably, UK Ministers who were scheduled to participate decided at the last minute that they could not commit for the whole day, and instead came and left at various sessions, while the Chinese delegation stayed for the whole event. Rees admitted that it may have been a mistake to wait until the night before the event to inform the Chinese delegation of this change in format.
7. (C) She added that the Dalai Lama had transited the UK days before the event, that the UK had refused a visa to a Chinese violinist who was scheduled to perform at the Bank of China 80th anniversary dinner, which Vice Premier Wang attended, and that Wang claimed he is allergic to alcohol while the UK had planned a whiskey dinner. She added that the latter issue confused the UK side because the former head of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority had said he used to go drinking together with Wang.
Dialogue Deliverables: Tiptoeing Forward...
--------------------------------------------
8. (SBU) The UK and China left EFD2 with a list of policy outcomes -- some substantive, some vague and nominal. Rees complained about the "unwillingness on the part of the Chinese MFA to negotiate on anything." The parties split the plenary into four sessions within which they developed policy outcomes: Supporting Economic Growth and Welfare; Financial Stability and Capital Market Development; Supporting Green Growth through Bilateral Energy and Environment Cooperation; and Trade and Investment. Rees highlighted the following (the complete list is attached in para nine):
- Climate: China insisted on couching everything climate-related in vague language, like "the two sides will share expertise." China called the topic "very sensitive" and deleted all references to "carbon markets," saying this was "inconvenient to discuss." Rees speculated that China may want to refrain from making concessions to the UK as it prepares for multilateral climate talks in Copenhagen.
- IPR: In addition to fast track patent licenses for green technology, Rees said there were additional IPR-related outcomes which were not included in the public announcement.
- Africa: China agreed to propose a date for another round of the UK-China Africa Dialogue. In the last meeting, which Rees called a success, the UK delivered an assessment on the wider impact of Chinese investment in Africa.
- Bank assurance pilot: China agreed to allow the UK's Standard Life to establish an insurance subsidiary and the UK agreed to permit Hainan Bank to do the same. Rees added that Wang Qishan's support on this was invaluable because coordination between the China Insurance Regulatory Commission and China Bank Regulatory Commission on this issue, which cut across their portfolios, had been a "nightmare."
- Financial sector: The parties agreed to allow UK firms to list in Shanghai and Chinese firms to list in London, which
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Rees noted China had already previously agreed to do at the EFD1, but had failed to implement.
Separate UK-China Foreign Policy Dialogue
-----------------------------------------
8. (SBU) Rees added that the UK also conducts a Strategic Dialogue with Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo. The UK lead is Simon McDonald, Prime Minister Brown's lead foreign policy advisor. At the most recent meeting in Beijing, McDonald assembled UK ambassadors to the United States, France, Moscow, the United Nations, and the European Union for an off-the-record, open walk-through with Chinese officials on key third country issues, like Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, as well as some trade concerns.
Text of EFD2 Outcomes Document
------------------------------
9. (SBU) UK-China Economic and Financial Dialogue II Policy Outcomes
Session I: Supporting economic growth and welfare
1. We agreed the importance of safeguarding development in low income countries during the economic slowdown. We reaffirmed our commitment to meeting the Millennium Development Goals. China appreciates UK,s commitment to achieve the 0.7 percent ODA/GNI target at an earlier date. China and UK will make every effort to contribute to achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals through their respective channels. We also confirmed our support for a substantial increase in lending of at least $l00bn by the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), including to low-income countries, and will work to ensure that all MDBs have the appropriate capital.
2. We agreed that a crucial element of the global response is the role played by the international financial institutions. Following agreements reached at the London Summit, we reaffirmed our commitment to providing additional resources to the IMF. We also reiterated our commitment to reform the IMF. We agreed that the IMF,s governance structure must reflect changing weights in the world economy. We urge IMF and the World Bank to expedite governance structure reform, work out explicit timetable and roadmap, so as to complete the next review of quotas of IMF by January 2011 and agree on voice and representation reform of the World Bank by the 2010 Spring Meetings.
3. UK will consult and exchange views with China on the Department for International Development,s policies on development.
4. As part of the UK,s G20 Chair year, China and the South Africans will co-host the Financing for Development workshop under the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting.
5. UK and China agree to jointly draft a new M0U between the UK Department for Work and Pensions and the Chinese Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security;
Session II: Financial Stability and Capital Market Development
6. UK and China re-iterate their commitment to continue to take actions to reform the regulation of the financial sector as agreed in the London Summit communiqu, in line with the principles of strengthening transparency and accountability, enhancing sound regulation, promoting integrity in financial markets and reinforcing international cooperation.
7. UK and China agree to build on current regulatory exchange
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and cooperation between their respective financial regulatory authorities (FSA, CBRC, CSRC and CIRC), including discussions between relevant parties on steps following China,s accession to the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
8. FSA and CIRC have exchanged letters on mutual cooperation;
9. Both sides will continue to support qualified Chinese companies to list on the London Stock Exchange through various listing routes, and work together swiftly to progress this.
10. China and UK agree to expand financial sector technical collaboration and exchange programme agreed by Vice-Premier Wang and Chancellor at the First EFD, specifically to focus on:
-- Financial stability issues, including international financial sector standards; -- Capital market development covering equities and bond markets, product innovation and risk management; -- SME financing; -- Investor education; -- Insurance and private pensions; -- Asset management; -- Collaboration opportunities between the relevant parties of China and the UK-based International Centre for Financial Regulation.
11. China agrees to allow qualified foreign companies, including UK companies to list on its stock exchange through issuing shares or depository receipts in accordance with relevant prudential regulations;
Session III: Supporting Green Growth through Bilateral Energy and Environment Cooperation
12. China and the UK commit to deepen cooperation on sustainable cities, as agreed under the Sustainable Cities Initiative MOU, through the pilots in Wuhan and Chongqing;
13. China and UK agree to conduct exchanges and cooperation on nuclear energy and offshore wind power development and construction, on implementing a quota system on renewable energy, and on improving industrial policies and management mechanism of renewable energy.
14. UK and China agree to share experiences on the role of economic ministries and other agencies in promoting green growth.
15.UK and China agree to discuss the possibility of fast-tracking green patents as a way to promote faster development of green technology.
Session IV: Trade and Investment
16. We agree to follow up our commitment to support trade finance at the London Summit, and strongly support the IFC to establish the Global Trade Liquidity Pool, The UK has agreed to commit contributions up to 300m towards phase 1 of the initiative. China has purchased US$1.5 billion placement bonds to support the trade finance programme of the IFC.
17. We agree to work together to expand our bilateral trade in particular in aerospace, environmental protection, biological technology, pharmaceuticals electronics and advanced engineering.
18. UK reaffirms its support for China,s market economy status at as early a date as possible and will continue to play a constructive role to encourage EU recognition;
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19. We are in full agreement on the advantages of maintaining free trade and the multi-lateral trading system. We must remain committed to the principles set out at the London Summit to reject all forms of protectionism, underpin prosperity and refrain from erecting new barriers to investment or trade. Both sides commit to continuing close cooperation, locking in of the consensus and outcomes achieved so far in the Doha round negotiations, to achieve a comprehensive and balanced conclusion of the negotiation at an early date. This would send a good signal of how the international community can work together to boost global prosperity and meet our development goals.
20. Both sides recognize the constructive role that sovereign wealth funds can play in stabilizing the world economy, and boosting global demand. The UK and China remain committed to open markets for investments, including those from Sovereign Wealth Funds.
21.China and the UK agree to take advantage of the Joint Economic and Trade Commission to explore effective ways to achieve the bilateral trade target and to enrich EFD Outcomes.
22. China and UK will actively implement the MOU on strengthening trade and investment cooperation in Chinese regional cities between the Ministry of Commerce of China and the Department of Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and the China-Britain Business Council of the UK, including in the mid-west of and the north east of China, so as to enhance the trade and investment cooperation between the two countries.
23. UK and China agree to discuss emerging ideas for how to create international model framework agreements for collaborative R&D projects promoting further co-operation on innovation and technology projects and addressing technology transfer obstacles.
PICCUTA
PICCUTA
Saturday, 28 March 2009, 02:24
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 030049
EO 12958 DECL: 3/24/2019
TAGS OVIP (CLINTON, HILLARY), PREL, AS, PK, AF, CH,
RS,JA, KS, ASEAN
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's March 24, 2009
Conversation with Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd
1. Classified by Acting EAP A/S Alexander A. Arvizu. Reason: 1.4 (d)
2. (U) March 24; 1:00 p.m.; Washington, DC.
3. (U) Participants:
U.S. The Secretary Charge d'Affaires Dan Clune Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter, S/P Glyn Davies, EAP PDAS Robert Wood, Acting Spokesman Joseph Macmanus, Executive Assistant to the Secretary Aleisha Woodward, EAP/ANP notetaker
AUSTRALIA Prime Minister Kevin Rudd Ambassador Dennis Richardson Duncan Lewis, National Security Advisor Alister Jordan, Chief of Staff Philip Green, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Andrew Charlton, Senior Economic Policy Advisor David Stuart, Deputy Chief of Mission Patrick Suckling, Assistant Secretary Mark Pierce, Political Minister Counsellor Scott Dewar, Senior Advisor
4. (C/Rel Aus) SUMMARY. In a 75-minute lunch following Rudd's White House meeting, the Secretary and PM Rudd discussed Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, Russia, and Rudd's Asia Pacific community initiative. Rudd complimented the United States' recent "creative play" on Iran. The Secretary noted the President's video message and said inviting Iran to participate in the March 31 Hague Conference on Afghanistan had caused confusion in Tehran. END SUMMARY.
------------------------
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
------------------------
5. (C/Rel Aus) The Secretary and PM Rudd agreed on the importance of making progress in building up the Afghan National Army. Rudd confirmed FM Stephen Smith would represent Australia at the March 31 Hague Conference on Afghanistan, where the Secretary indicated the United States would lay out specific goals.
6. (C/Rel Aus) The Secretary and PM Rudd discussed the need to turn Pakistan away from its "obsessive focus" on India, towards the problems in the west of the country, noting even total success in Afghanistan would be unraveled if Pakistan were to fall apart. Rudd indicated Australia was willing and able to help, especially in special operations and counterinsurgency areas, as soon as Pakistan was willing to accept help, but argued the necessary economic development assistance and capacity-building in Pakistan's security forces could only happen once the elites came to recognize the problem. The best way to cause such a realization would be to hold up a mirror showing what Pakistan would look like in five years if no action is taken. While China would undoubtedly be reluctant to do more, Rudd continued, a similar China-Pakistan mirror-holding exercise would be beneficial as well. The Secretary agreed China needed to be more engaged in Afghanistan and Pakistan, opining Chinese leaders were growing concerned that extremists' success in Pakistan could be a harbinger of similar success in China's west. She noted that Chinese FM Yang would attend the March 31 Hague Conference.
-----
CHINA
-----
7. (C/Rel Aus) PM Rudd said Chinese Politburo member Li Changchun had indicated Chinese leaders viewed the Secretary's recent visit to Beijing as a success and felt they could deal with the Obama Administration. The Secretary affirmed the U.S. desire for a successful China, with a rising standard of living and improving democracy at a pace Chinese leaders could tolerate, noting the impressive achievements in Chinese democracy at the village level. We wanted China to take more responsibility in the global economic sphere, create more of a social safety net for its people, and construct a better regulatory framework for the goods China manufactures. The Secretary also noted the challenges posed by China's economic rise, asking, "How do you deal toughly with your banker?"
8. (C/Rel Aus) Calling himself "a brutal realist on China," Rudd argued for "multilateral engagement with bilateral vigor" -- integrating China effectively into the international community and allowing it to demonstrate greater responsibility, all while also preparing to deploy force if everything goes wrong. Rudd said the Australian intelligence community keeps a close watch on China's military modernization, and indicated the forthcoming Australian Defence White Paper's focus on naval capability is a response to China's growing ability to project force. Rudd would send the Secretary a copy of his April 2008 speech at Peking University in which he had argued that China's idea of a harmonious world, based on the philosophy of Kang Youwei, and the West's concept of a responsible stakeholder were not incompatible.
9. (C/Rel Aus) Reviewing recent Chinese leaders, Rudd assessed that Hu Jintao "is no Jiang Zemin." No one person dominated Chinese leadership currently, although Hu's likely replacement, Xi Jinping, had family ties to the military and might be able to rise above his colleagues. Rudd explained that the Standing Committee of the Politburo was the real decision-making body, which then passed decisions for implementation by the State Council.
10. (C/Rel Aus) Rudd noted Chinese leaders were paranoid about both Taiwan and Tibet, but with subtle differences; leaders' reactions on Taiwan were sub- rational and deeply emotional, whereas hard-line policies on Tibet were crafted to send clear messages to other ethnic minorities. Rudd indicated that he had suggested to Chinese leaders that they consider a "small 'a' autonomy deal with the Dalai Lama." While giving little prospect of success, Rudd contended the best chance would be if someone of the Secretary's stature had "a quiet conversation" with the Politburo Standing Committee member responsible for Tibet sometime after the furor over the 50th anniversary of the Dalai Lama's exile subsides, and suggested a "third track discussion" of the long-term modalities for how such an autonomy deal could work.
------
RUSSIA
------
11. (C/Rel Aus) In light of his upcoming meeting with Russian President Medvedev, Rudd asked for insights into Russian political dynamics. The Secretary said Medvedev was looking for legitimacy and positioning vis--vis PM Putin even as Putin was dissatisfied with the role he has carved out for himself - behind the scenes puppeteer and lead on energy policy - but somewhat bound through 2012 since he had ceded other issues to Medvedev. Asked whether the United States viewed Medvedev as more liberal than Putin, the Secretary indicated Medvedev's desire for status and respect could cause him to be. Rudd agreed, opining Russians'awareness of how their leaders were viewed internationally could help improve Medvedev's domestic standing. The Secretary also explained U.S. efforts to reset the layered and complex relationship and briefly outlined a list of issues we wanted to work together on, including counterterrorism, arms reduction, Afghanistan, and human rights.
-----------------------
Asia Pacific Community
-----------------------
12. (C/Rel Aus) Noting Russia's interest in being included in Asian regional architecture, Rudd explained the thinking behind his Asia Pacific community (APC) initiative mostly as an effort to ensure Chinese dominance of the East Asia Summit (EAS) did not result in a "Chinese Monroe Doctrine" and an Asia without the United States. Expressing appreciation for U.S. reengagement in the region, Rudd said China could succeed only if the United States ceded the field. He recognized the lack of appetite for a new organization and said the APC could be created by expanding APEC's mandate or the EAS' membership. Rudd emphasized the long-term horizon of his initiative (his vision is for an APC established by 2020) and hoped his APC could fulfill a role similar to the Helsinki Commission in Europe, focusing at least initially on low-level common security policy and coordination, perhaps starting with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Rudd promised to send a draft-stage journal article outlining his APC initiative in more detail.
CLINTON
Thursday, 28 January 2010, 10:17
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BEIJING 000231
SIPDIS
STATE FOR E, EAP, EAP/CM
STATE FOR EEB/TPP WCRAFT, CLAYTON HAYS, HHELM
STATE FOR H/BETSY FITZGERALD, EAP/CM SHAWN FLATT,SCA/RA
JOHN SIPLSBURY
STATE PASS USTR FOR DMARANTIS, TREIF, TIM STRATFORD, ANN
MAIN, JEAN GRIER
DOC FOR IRA KASOFF, NICOLE MELCHER (5130), MAC (4420), IA
CSHOWERS (5120)
TREASURY FOR OASIA/DOHNER/WINSHIP
GENEVA PASS USTR
NSC FOR MFROMAN, DBELL
WHITE HOUSE FOR DAXELROD,
NSC PLEASE PASS TO NEC LSUMMERS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/28/2019
TAGS ETRD, EFIN, ECON, PREL, WTRO, CH
SUBJECT: BUILDING U.S. JOBS BY LEVERAGING CHINA,S GROWTH
Classified By: Ambassador Jon M. Huntsman for reasons 1.4 (b), (d) and (e).
1.(C) SUMMARY. We face a challenging year ahead in U.S.-China relations. Ten percent U.S. unemployment coupled with our huge trade deficit with China, China,s increasing use of industrial policies to restrict market access, and an undervalued RMB, will bring greater tension to bilateral ties. The Google case adds fuel to the fire. In this context, it is critical that we find ways to better advance our bilateral economic policy. This will require sustained, focused interaction on a daily basis with the Chinese, but also serious thinking about what can best be accomplished in the run-up to and at key meetings like the S&ED and JCCT. We need to find ways to keep the relationship positive, but even more important to ensure the American worker, in particular, reaps the benefits of our bilateral economic engagement.
2.(C) We offer below some ideas on how we can move ahead on a concerted, targeted U.S. effort to boost U.S. job-creating exports of goods and services to China as well as increased job-creating Chinese investment and tourism to the United States. While we will continue to aggressively negotiate removal of Chinese barriers, we will need as well to get Chinese buy-in to several job-boosting initiatives. There are even things we can do ourselves unilaterally. Taken together, measures would include:
- expanding sector-specific public private partnerships,
- offering SMEs China-specific support,
- building or retooling existing export promotion mechanisms,
- making educational offerings in the U.S. more attractive (and in the process giving new generations of Chinese a reason for wanting to be in the U.S. market),
- increasing pull factors for Chinese tourism to and investment in the U.S., and
- enhancing the use of the Internet and other electronic means of communication in Chinese.
3.(C) We are aware that in a resource constrained environment, some of these will cost money, but we judge that the benefits will outweigh the costs and have a significant job-creating component. Some suggestions may be more palatable than others, and costs will vary widely, but we emphasize again that the potential benefits of each are substantial. Of course we need to do a better job in helping Americans understand that the China trade relationship can actually be a good story for U.S. jobs and pay dividends far beyond the trade sector. One final note: we accent the positive here in terms of what we can do but we certainly do not neglect that the continuing need to use available trade remedies and WTO consistent retaliatory action to ensure fairness and transparency. END SUMMARY.
A ROUGH YEAR AHEAD, BUT OPPORTUNITIES ARE ENORMOUS
--------------------------------------------- -----
4.(C) Whereas 2009 was a year to build the U.S.-China relationship, 2010 will be a year that tests it. Strong Chinese economic and export growth coupled with an artificially undervalued RMB will further heighten focus on our huge trade deficit with China. Widespread perceptions that China,s industrial policies are rolling back market access add to the overall sense that China plays unfairly in the global marketplace. Other emerging issues, like Google,s problems and new rules on indigenous innovation, create a drumbeat of bad news stories for firms seeking to do
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business in China. And as backdrop, the Chinese continue to signal intense displeasure with U.S. positions on issues from the Dalai Lama to Taiwan arms sales and Internet freedom, which they then cite as reasons why they may not cooperate with the U.S. on other issues.
5.(C) Yet, with ten percent U.S. unemployment, more than ever before we must ensure that our relations with China continue to pay real dividends -- especially in creating jobs for Americans. China is the world,s fastest growing major economy and should be providing opportunities for U.S. goods and services exports. Chinese companies, thanks to government-backed loans, monopolies and preferential treatment, are awash in cash and should be a source for investment in the U.S. economy -- investment that would help maintain and create jobs in the U.S. And, China,s rapidly growing middle and upper classes, while still only representing a fraction of its population, measure many tens of millions. They should provide an enormous pool of potential consumers of U.S. goods and services as well as tourism and education in the U.S.
6.(C) Virtually every major U.S. company has a presence in China. They recognize the potential and are trying hard to work around the obstacles to market access that China erects. For many of them, China was their sole profit-center during last year,s global economic downturn. However, for the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that are the engine of job creation in the United States, exporting to or doing business in China is still a daunting prospect. Overt market access barriers and regulatory constraints at the national and sub-national level increasingly and blatantly tilt the playing field to Chinese companies' advantage. Chinese policies make it difficult to succeed in its market unless you establish a local presence, including production, something for which SMEs generally have neither the capital nor expertise. The opacity of China,s legal and regulatory systems and widespread official corruption also serve as barriers to U.S. businesses -- especially SMEs -- seeking to export to, or invest in, China. The lack of effective IPR protection, import-substitution policies, standards discriminate against foreign products and create obstacles to licensing of technology, and central and provincial/local government incentives to "buy local," additionally skew the playing field against foreign firms.
THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN: PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. DISINCENTIVES TO TRAVEL, INVESTMENT
--------------------------------------------- -
7.(C) Many in China perceive the U.S. as "closed" to Chinese and Chinese companies. Chinese businesspersons looking at investment opportunities around the globe are confused and intimidated by the different investment regulations and promotional activities in the fifty U.S. states. Businesspersons, potential tourists and students remain confused by U.S. visa regulations and, particularly in contrasting them with those of our competitors in Japan and Europe, perceive them as more restrictive than they actually are, even seeing them as "hostile" to Chinese travelers. Many Chinese and some U.S. firms complain that U.S. export controls are out-dated and costing us business as Chinese buyers travel to Europe to buy the same goods or services they cannot buy from American suppliers.
JOB-BOOSTING APPROACHES: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
-------------------------------------------
8.(C) There are no easy solutions to many of these challenges. However, we offer a range of possible initiatives and policy measures for interagency consideration that could help advance our efforts to maximize job-creating benefits from our relations with China. The proposals we
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offer below include ones that would require Chinese buy in as well as some that the U.S. could initiate unilaterally. They are not exhaustive nor are they intended to substitute for continued aggressive negotiation of market access, but instead are meant to provide additional complementary actions to enhance our economic relations and achieve greater benefits for the American people.
WIELDING STICKS
---------------
9.(C) Recent issues related to indigenous innovation, express delivery and on-line music content, for example, underscore that USG complaints about discriminatory policies - absent a credible threat of retaliatory action or other leverage -- are falling on increasingly deaf Chinese ears. China,s relatively strong economic position in the wake of the global financial crisis has intensified that trend. As has Chinese hubris that it can call the shots and determine the playbook under which it operates without disclosing the same to foreign firms. While WTO dispute settlement has worked well when applied, many of the problems we face in China,s market do not fall within WTO disciplines. We may want to consider ways to toughen up our talking points and enhance the use -- or perception of likely use -- of other real "sticks" in order to achieve market opening, job-creating objectives. This will require some consideration of just how much disruption in our economic relations we are willing to countenance if we must carry through on threats.
-- HIGHLIGHT TO CHINESE POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION on hot-button issues like Renminbi valuation and carbon tariffs on Chinese imports.
-- EMPHASIZE THAT CHINA,S INDUSTRIAL AND EXPORT-PROMOTION POLICIES WILL PROVOKE 421 CASES to be filed and positively considered.
-- COORDINATE CHINA-DIRECTED TRADE AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL SETTINGS with the EU and other trading partners, especially in Southeast Asia, that face similar challenges with China.
-- CONTINUE TO PURSUE AS APPROPRIATE WTO CASES, with emphasis on sectors most closely tied to U.S. jobs. Consider possibility of using lower "probable victory" standard in deciding whether to initiate such cases.
FOCUS OUR ENGAGEMENT ON JOBS
-----------------------------
10.(C) Given current U.S. unemployment levels we suggest the interagency prioritize our objectives over the next year on those areas most likely to create jobs in the U.S. In particular, we suggest:
-- AN OVERARCHING FOCUS ON OPENING CHINESE MARKETS TO EXPORTS OF U.S. SERVICES in all of the key U.S.-China bilateral economic fora in 2010, including the S&ED and JCCT. For example, a strong push to eliminate joint venture requirements in select services sectors could be negotiated in exchange for a Chinese-sought concession.
-- PRIORITIZE OUR "ASKS" OF CHINA ON GOODS SECTORS THAT HAVE HIGHEST JOB-CREATION POTENTIAL AND STRONG CHINESE GROWTH POTENTIAL, and intensify our advocacy in these areas through the methods outlined below.
BANG FOR THE BUCK: INCREASE AND DIVERSIFY EXPORT PROMOTION
---------------------------------------------
11.(C) Since 2005, very conservative estimates show that
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U.S. exports of goods to China created 285,000 jobs in the United States. In that same period, every dollar of funding for export promotion activities facilitated an average of USD 617 in exports to China. While many of the programs listed below would require either a shift in or new funding, those investments would quickly payoff. To increase U.S. exports to China in the near and medium term, it is essential that we expand and enhance existing export promotion programs, including:
-- EXPAND SECTOR-SPECIFIC PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS. For example, the highly successful Aviation Cooperation Program, or ACP, was founded with support from the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA). It now has over 40 corporate members, sponsored training for over 100 Chinese aviation professionals, and has introduced U.S. firms and technology throughout China,s aviation industry and regulatory structure. USG participation has helped U.S. firms build relationships with local officials that are crucial to doing business here. Likewise, an Energy Cooperation Program was established in 2009 along these same lines and healthcare is a strong candidate for immediate consideration for a similar new partnership.
-- OFFER SMEs INCENTIVES TO TEST NEW MARKETS HERE. Japan, Korea, and Germany offer SMEs loans or subsidies to offset costs of travel, trade show participation, market entry, and business matchmaking. They help companies develop procurement strategies to be more price competitive. Such measures are currently proscribed under the U.S. system.
-- TELL THE STATES WE ARE READY TO HELP: Present at Annual Governor's Association meeting and other state venues on Mission services to help their states connect to counterparts in China.
-- ESTABLISH FEDERAL AND/OR STATE-LEVEL INCUBATOR PROGRAMS, which help companies during market entry by Leveraging public-private partnerships to support new exporters. The German government partners with the German Chamber of Commerce in supporting the German Center Beijing. For start-up companies, the Center offers office space, conference facilities, in-depth counseling and practical advice from lawyers, accountants and market and sales professionals. In-house service providers assist German companies with a full range of services helping them compete. By developing public-private partnerships that join business expertise and government assistance, the USG could offer comparable one-stop service to U.S. companies to help level the playing field with competitors.
-- DUPLICATE THE "COOPERATOR" PROGRAMS of the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) in other sectors. FAS spends $25 million annually on cooperator programs in China to help companies create, expand and maintain long-term export markets for U.S. agricultural products. Those funds are matched by industry. TDA funds might help.
-- FURTHER EXPAND FCS ACTIVITY IN CHINA, one of the most effective ways to spur export promotion. This will have a big bang for the buck in terms of across-the-board commercial outreach.
-- FUND THE HIRING OF FCS EXPORT-PROMOTION CONTRACTORS IN THE 14 CHINESE SECOND-TIER CITIES that have been identified by Commerce as having the best U.S. export opportunities (these 14 cities, each of which has a population in excess of one million, currently receive 53% of all U.S. exports to China).
-- CAPITALIZE ON CHINESE OUTWARD DIRECT INVESTMENT TO THIRD COUNTRIES. For example, the Embassy could organize match-making events to introduce U.S. upstream design and managerial services firms to Chinese design/build firms that
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have contracts for infrastructure projects using PRC concessional loans in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
-- SEEK TO REDUCE U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS ON SALES OF JOB-CREATING TECHNOLOGIES that are readily available from our allied competitors (semiconductors manufacturing equipment, microwave chambers, composite prepregs). We know that there is an ongoing discuss about export controls in the U.S. and well recognize the national security implications of how we view export controls.
ENCOURAGE CHINESE INVESTMENT IN THE U.S.
----------------------------------------
12.(C) Apart from misperceptions of an unwelcoming political Environment and periodic complaints that key high tech investments are denied routinely due to CFIUS concerns, Chinese companies view the U.S. economy as an attractive investment destination. Dispelling harmful myths and actively promoting direct Chinese investment would help us capture a larger share of China,s rapidly growing ODI levels (PRC ODI to the world roughly doubled from $27 billion in 2007 to $56 billion in 2008), which in turn would create more U.S. jobs. In this regard, the following steps should be considered:
-- THE INTERNET. We should create many more Chinese language websites that are directed at key secondary and tertiary cities in China. The more we facilitate access to information about American business opportunities -- whether through a national database or enhanced state and local databases -- the better. We believe thinking local, start-ups and grassroots first is the preferable way to go in using the Internet
-- ENHANCE THE ADMINISTRATION'S INVEST IN AMERICA PROGRAM. Other countries have national promotion programs that work with Chinese companies to help them identify industry clusters or target locations based on their criteria.
-- DIRECT FEDERAL FUNDS TO SUPPORT STATE INVESTMENT-SPONSORED BUYING OR INVESTMENT MISSIONS originating in China.
-- ADD INVESTMENT PROMOTION TO THE AGENDA OF VISITING CABINET AND OTHER HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS (conduct roundtables with influential Chinese business leaders who could move substantial investment to the United States).
-- CONDUCT A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CAMPAIGN to erase misperceptions about the scope of CFIUS restraints, including use of existing bilateral fora like the S&ED, Investment Forum, and JCCT and "investment missions" to provincial capitals and second-tier cities.
-- EXTEND THE VALIDITY OF U.S. B-1/B-2 visas for Chinese travelers.
EXPANDING TOURISM AND EDUCATIONAL TRAVEL
----------------------------------------
13.(C) A fundamental Chinese misperception that our doors are closed constrains growth in Chinese travel to the U.S. across a wide range of categories, as does the confusing diversity of state-level programs on tourism and education. A rich and sustained effort to overcome these factors could pay rapid and substantial job-creating dividends. We need to create a buzz in the street that travel to America for business for other reasons is actually pretty easy. And that traveling in America is generally easy and without restrictions. We propose the U.S. consider:
-- ESTABLISH A CHINA-SPECIFIC TRAVEL AND TOURISM AUTHORITY.
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A national body to encourage the rapidly growing pool of Chinese tourists to spend leisure time in the U.S. could accelerate growth in individual travel and boost group travel. Local U.S. tourism offices need help understanding what attracts Chinese visitors.
-- DUPLICATE IN OTHER FIRST-TIER CHINESE CITIES THE NATIONAL TOURISM ASSOCIATION (NTA) program office that was created in DOC,s Shanghai Commercial Center (NTA received a supporting Market Cooperator Grant).
-- INCREASE THE FREQUENCY OF OUTREACH PROGRAMS to educate Chinese public on the visa process, including intense public diplomacy through media channels. The more visitors, the more money they will spend and we enhanced "see America" program will create good service sector related jobs in the travel and tourism industry.
-- SEEK TO EXTEND VISA RECIPROCITY FROM ONE TO FIVE YEARS IN ALL VISA CATEGORIES. The Embassy has just negotiated the extension of visa reciprocity for select categories to five years. Expanding this to all visa categories would dramatically help promote U.S. openness to legitimate travel. (By contrast, U.S. visa reciprocity with Thailand is ten years.)
-- EXPAND STATE,S EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS INITIATIVES to provide student advising and enhance student mobility between the U.S. and China as well as to support American universities, professional and technical training efforts to bring more Chinese adult students to the United States for training. It is notable that the number of Chinese in the United States for non-university education has nearly doubled in the last few years, demonstrating that U.S. education services are sought by Chinese and are an industry in which jobs could be created.
-- EXPAND FEDERAL DIRECTION AND SUPPORT TO PROMOTE community and state college recruitment of Chinese graduate and undergraduate students.
-- WORK TO CHANGE CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF UNIVERSITY RANKINGS and promote enrollment in a broader range of U.S. institutions.
DANGLING CARROTS
----------------
14.(C) Where China is already seeking assistance from us or encouraging investment, we should capitalize on that interest for job promotion. For example:
-- ADVERTISE MORE EFFECTIVELY FOREIGN-FRIENDLY INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN CHINA, especially those that are already with PRC encouragement and which are tied to follow-on U.S. goods exports (current examples include mining and logistics management).
-- IDENTIFY AND REDUCE USG-CREATED BARRIERS TO GROWTH IN THOSE SECTORS WITH THE MOST POTENTIAL IN CHINA. Green technologies is the most potent example. U.S. subsidies to R&D in green technologies, specifically solar panels, expire biannually. That unpredictability stymies long-term R&D by U.S. companies in the field, a detriment to their competitiveness in the industry. Establishing a long-term program for R&D would increase U.S. competitiveness.
-- LEVERAGE CHINESE INTEREST IN TECHNICAL EXCHANGES WITH EPA, FDA AND OTHER REGULATORY AGENCIES to extract specific commitments on expanded market opportunities for U.S.-based services in related fields, consistent with U.S. health and safety interests.
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-- RE-EXAMINE EXPORT CONTROLS ON COMMERCIALLY-IMPORTANT TECHNOLOGY being made available to China by allied competitors (i.e. semiconductor manufacturing equipment; aviation; EMC and microwave chambers). HUNTSMAN
Monday, 16 November 2009, 09:53
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 003122
SIPDIS
STATE FOR E, EAP, EAP/CM
TREASURY FOR OASIA/DOHNER, WINSHIP AND LOEVINGER
NSC FOR LOI
EO 12958 DECL: 11/16/2034
TAGS OVIP, ECON, ETRD, EFIN, PREL, PGOV, CH
SUBJECT: U/S HORMATS' MEETINGS WITH BEIJING ECONOMISTS:
REBALANCING, TRADE FRICTIONS, AND EXCHANGE RATES
REF: A. BEIJING 3090 B. BEIJING 3102
Classified By: Economic Minister Counselor William Weinstein; Reasons 1 .4 (b, d)
1. (C) Summary. Vice Minister Liu He of the Central Leading Group on Financial and Economic Affairs (CLGFEA) told Under Secretary for Economic, Energy, and Agricultural Affairs Hormats on November 9 that the small number of bilateral trade conflicts generates disproportionate political and social impact in both countries. The Chinese Government understands the need to resolve these conflicts and to build mutual trust. On rebalancing, Liu agreed that U.S. savings and Chinese consumption both need to rise, with both sides having "a long way to go." Liu is involved in preparation of China's next Five-Year Plan (covering 2011-15), two core elements of which will be boosting domestic demand, especially consumption, and promoting urbanization. Other policies, including those related to education, social safety net, low-income housing, and infrastructure would flow from these rebalancing themes.
2. (C) Summary, continued. Both Liu and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Institute of World Economics and Politics Director Zhang Yuyan voiced concerns about possible future inflation in the United States, which could erode the value of China's USD-denominated investments, and about USG and Federal Reserve exit strategies from stimulus programs. On exchange rates, Zhang acknowledged the need for China to alter its system and said several options are under consideration, including return to the July 2005-August 2008 peg system, using either the SDR or a trade-weighted basket of currencies rather than the USD as the peg. He said two arguments in favor of RMB appreciation were that an undervalued currency caused China effectively to subsidize foreign consumers, and that pressure on China from the rest of the world was rising. On the other hand, China feared currency appreciation would cause more bankruptcies in China's exporting coastal regions. End Summary.
3. (C) In his separate meetings with Liu and Zhang, U/S Hormats emphasized that his goal was not to use this visit to negotiate, but to get a sense of what was on the minds of Chinese policy makers as they considered future plans and strategies. The conversations were remarkably candid. U/S Hormats' other meetings are reported in reftels.
Trade Frictions: Small Numbers, Large Impact
--------------------------------------------
4. (C) Noting the need for a strategic approach to bilateral relations, U/S Hormats told Vice Minister Liu the most complicated current issues are trade and rebalancing. On trade, the areas of friction actually are very small as a percentage of overall trade, but the disputes sometimes get blown out of proportion. Liu described the trade conflicts as "terrible," with the small number of disputes having huge political and social impact in both countries. He believed U.S. labor unions and upcoming mid-term (2010) U.S. elections both increase pressure for trade protectionism in the U.S. In China, Liu said local governments want to protect their own tax bases and industries. The two sides need to work together to resolve these problems for the good of both countries and the rest of the world.
5. (C) U/S Hormats observed that the upcoming visit of President Obama to China presents an opportunity to conclude agreements on clean energy and/or climate change. These are very high priorities for the United States and would benefit our overall relationship. He also stressed the need to have further talks led by USTR Ambassador Kirk and Secretary of Commerce Locke. The U.S. aims to resolve trade issues if possible through discussion and negotiation, Hormats emphasized. Liu said the Chinese Government understands the need to resolve the trade disputes. He also agreed on the need to maintain dialogue on major strategic issues for the medium and long terms, observing that "we need each other" but at the same time distrust each other in many ways.
Rebalancing
-----------
6. (C) Vice Minister Liu concurred with U/S Hormats that U.S. savings and Chinese consumption need to rise, and said both sides have "a long way to go." For the first nine months of 2009, China's GDP growth reached 7.7 percent, including
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increases of seven percent in domestic investment and four percent in consumption, with negative 3.6 percent growth in net exports; Liu said this demonstrates China's efforts to boost consumption in the short term.
7. (C) Liu said he had met that morning with senior leaders to discuss preparations for the 12th Five-Year Plan (covering 2011-15). Two core elements of the plan will be boosting domestic demand, especially consumption, and promoting urbanization. Other policies, including those related to education, social safety net, low-income housing, and infrastructure would flow from these rebalancing themes. Liu believes the U.S. economy will require 2-3 years to recover from the global crisis, during which time China's external markets will remain shrunken. He claimed China's leaders had formulated a new development strategy in 2007, before onset of the global crisis, to promote rebalancing away from exports and industrial investment in favor of technological progress and domestic consumption. (Comment: Liu did not expand upon the urbanization topic, but the next plan presumably will address many of the social needs and consequences generated by China's relatively rapid and continuing urbanization trend. Expansion of programs to address needs for housing, health care, education, and other social services for recent urban migrants and their families would correlate closely with overall rebalancing initiatives. End Comment.)
U.S. Economy: Watching and Worrying
-----------------------------------
8. (C) Vice Minister Liu said he was "a little worried" about the path of the U.S. economy, fearing it might be reverting to the past model: the Fed was "printing lots of money" and the stock market, which "has no memory," was rising too fast. After hearing assurances from U/S Hormats about the U.S. desire to assure that a strong recovery took hold and ongoing Federal Reserve and USG vigilance to avoid repetition of the financial excesses of the past, Liu appeared reassured about the soundness of the U.S. approach but said both countries needed to pay attention to any future "bubbles." A return by China to its old ways and traditional growth path would not be good for China or the world, he said. CASS Director Zhang also was concerned about possible future inflation in the United States that could erode the value of China's USD-denominated investments. He inquired about USG and Fed exit strategies from stimulus programs and progress on health care reform and climate change legislation. (Comment: The concerns of Liu and Zhang about the U.S. economy parallel those expressed by various other economic policy officials in recent meetings. End Comment.)
Exchange Rates
--------------
9. (C) CASS Director Zhang said the renminbi (RMB) exchange rate is a current discussion and research topic at CASS and within the government, and there might be "some surprise" in the coming months. As China moved toward more domestic demand-based economic growth, it would need to alter its exchange rate system. One possibility would be return to a system similar to the July 2005-August 2008 peg, using either the SDR or a trade-weighted basket of currencies rather than just the USD as the peg. Zhang observed that his predecessor as CASS Director, Professor Yu Yongding, had been a strong proponent of a sharp appreciation (ten or more percent) of the RMB against the USD. Zhang said two arguments in favor of RMB appreciation were that an undervalued currency caused China effectively to subsidize foreign consumers, and that pressure on China from the rest of the world was rising. On the other hand, the Chinese Government feared currency appreciation would cause more bankruptcies in the exporting coastal regions.
10. (C) Zhang said he recently visited Japan for discussion of exchange rates, among other issues. In his opinion, China now is "at a crossroads" and faces two main options: first, moving with other countries in the region to some form of common Asian currency; or second (and more likely), keeping the RMB independent with a view toward playing a greater international role in the future. CASS senior fellow Jie Sun added that two possible currency baskets were under consideration: a more traditional basket of major currencies including the USD, or a regional currency basket, although the latter option would be difficult due to lack of any regional surveillance system. Zhang added that a paper published in March 2009 by People's Bank of China Governor
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Zhou Xiaochuan advocating development of another world currency, possibly based on the SDR, represented Zhou's "personal view" but also reflected dissatisfaction with the existing system among some Chinese officials and economists.
11. (SBU) U/S Hormats has cleared this cable. HUNTSMAN
Sunday, 10 August 2008, 07:09
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 003067
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT, FOR, DS/IP/EAP, DS/DSS/DO, DS/TIA/OSAC, DS/P/MECU,
DS/TIA/ITA, DS/DO/P, DS/ICI/CI, DS/T/ATA, DS/TIA,
DS/TIA/PII, DS/CC, EAP/CM, S/CT, CA/OCS/ACS/EAP, PASS TO
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA) OPERATIONS
CENTER, HONG KONG FOR RSO AND LEGAT AND USSS, SHANGHAI FOR
RSO, SHENYANG FOR RSO,CHENGDU FOR RSO, GUANGZHOU FOR RSO,
USSS HQS FOR INV, OPO, HNL
EO 12958 DECL: 08/10/2038
TAGS ASEC, CASC, CH, CMGT, ECON, KOLY, OVIP, PREL, PTER
SUBJECT: BEIJING 2008 SUMMER OLYMPICS: USG SITUATION REPORT
10, 08/10/2008
REF: A. BEIJING 3065 B. BEIJING 3049
Classified By: DCM Dan Piccuta for reason 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (SBU) The following cable provides information on security, public diplomacy, political, and consular activities related to the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympic Games as of 08/10/2008.
2. (U) The interagency USG Joint Operations Center (JOC) can be contacted on a 24-hour basis at the following numbers:
- JOC Direct Line: 011-86-010-6532-6966. - U.S. Embassy Beijing: 011-86-010-6532-3431, JOC extension 6200. - JOC fax: 011-86-010-6532-4763. - STE and fax: 011-86-010-6532-5163.
KEY ISSUES
----------
3. (SBU) In what appears to be a random act of violence, the U.S. Embassy has confirmed that three U.S. citizens and their Chinese guide were attacked at Beijing,s Drum Tower by a knife-wielding assailant on 08/09/2008 (ref. a). One of the Americans, Todd Bachman, was killed and his wife, Barbara Bachman, was taken to Peking Union Hospital where she currently remains in "serious but stable" condition. The third American, Elisabeth Bachman McCutcheon--the daughter of the two victims and the wife of the U.S. Men,s Indoor Volleyball team coach Hugh McCutcheon--was not injured but spent the night in the hospital. The Bachmans, two other daughters are scheduled to arrive in Beijing on 08/10/2008 at 2135 hours on a Northwest flight. They will be met by U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC) representatives and an Embassy officer. White House and Embassy doctors continue to provide assistance to the family at the hospital. On 08/09/2008, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei visited the hospital to express deep sympathy to the U.S. Government and the relatives of the victims. The U.S. Ambassador to China also visited the hospital and conveyed President Bush's heartfelt condolences. President Bush has praised China's leadership for its quick response to the deadly attack.
4. (SBU) The perpetrator, identified as Chinese citizen Tang Yongming, appears to have acted alone and leaped to his death after the attack; he was reportedly 47 years old and from Zhejiang Province. At this time there is no known motive, nor is there any indication that the attack was related to the victims, nationality or Olympic affiliation. According to China,s official state media, Tang was unemployed but had no criminal record. Chinese law enforcement officials are investigating the incident in
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cooperation with their U.S. counterparts and the U.S. Embassy will provide updates to the USOC security office as they are received from the Chinese.
SECURITY ISSUES
-----------------
5. (S/REL to USA, FVEY) Threats: Olympics Possible Target for East Turkestan Groups: Tearline information indicates that, "According to a Chinese intelligence officer in early July 2008, al-Qa'ida second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri has tasked former East Turkestan terrorists to travel to China to conduct terrorist attacks at the Olympics. Potential targets include: the U.S. President and Secretary of State; the UK Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary; the Olympics opening and closing ceremonies; the cities of Shanghai and Hong Kong; Olympic programs; and VIP tourists. The terrorists are apparently bomb-making experts and may carry micro bomb-making material in plastic products, jewelry, and crystal ornaments across the border with them. According to the Chinese intelligence officer, al-Qa'ida and East Turkestan terrorist groups would have different targets, with East Turkestan groups primarily targeting Olympic facilities and landmarks and not targeting U.S. VIPs or the U.S. Embassy." The same source previously cited information from July indicating a threat to the U.S. and Afghan Presidents during the Olympics Opening Ceremony (ref. b). [Source removed]
6. (S/NF) Europe-Based Uighur on Possible Attacks in China: The Albanian State Intelligence Service on 08/06/2008 provided information indicating that the two people arrested in connection with the 08/04/2008 attack against police in Kashgar, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, were not connected to the East Turkestan Islamic Party (ETIP), although ETIP supported the action. This information was reportedly obtained from an ethnic Uighur claiming first-hand access, who also stated that such incidents would continue to occur in China, especially before and during the 2008 Olympic Games. [Source removed]
7. (SBU) Incidents: Violence in Kuqa, Xinjiang: According to Xinhua, China's state media agency, several explosions occurred on 08/10/2008 in the town of Kuqa in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region; witnesses report seeing flashes of fire and hearing sporadic gunshots after the explosions. Chinese Internet press (sohu.com) has reported that two people threw explosives at a police station and another site, injuring three, and that five "lawless persons" were shot
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dead on the spot. Police and military have reportedly sealed off the area. An individual who answered a U.S. Embassy Officer's phone call to Kuqa County People's Hospital declined to comment on whether the attacks had taken place but said no foreigners were injured. The local Public Security Bureau (PSB) also told the Embassy that no foreigners were involved in any way. Kuqa is located 427 kilometers from the Xinjiang capital of Urumqi and is approximately 2600 kilometers from Beijing. An attack against police in the Xinjiang city of Kashgar left 16 dead and 16 injured on 08/04/2008; Chinese authorities have claimed that incident was an act of terrorism.
8. (SBU) False Fire Alarm: On the evening of 08/09/2008, the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) representative in the JOC was notified that guests at the J.W. Marriott hotel in Beijing were evacuated afte a technician working on an electrical panel accidentally set off the fire alarm. Guests were allowed to return to their rooms after it was determined that the alarm had been sounded in error.
9. (SBU) Olympic Protests: Pro-Tibetan Protesters Removed from China: Advocates for Tibetan independence continue to be detained and deported on the same day by Chinese officials in response to their ongoing campaign of well-organized protests in Beijing. These protesters, along with those detained in earlier Tibet-related demonstrations, all appear to be part of "Team Tibet," in which "Students for a Free Tibet" (SFT) and other Tibetan advocacy groups have orchestrated a series of actions to unfurl banners and fly Tibetan flags in public areas in Beijing and elsewhere. In cases involving U.S. citizens, the U.S. Embassy has first learned of all three incidents from XXXXXXXXXXXX. To date, the following pro-Tibet incidents--reported by the same caller--have occurred in Beijing:
08/09/2008--Five persons, including three Americans, detained at Tiananmen Square; American citizens deported to Los Angeles and Hong Kong.
08/08/2008--Three Americans detained at the National Stadium ("Bird's Nest") before the Olympic opening ceremony; deported to Los Angeles.
08/06/2008--Four persons, including two Americans, detained near the National Stadium ("Bird,s Nest"); American citizens deported to Los Angeles.
10. (SBU) Hong Kong Protests: According to various media reports, at least six protesters were removed from the Sha Tin Olympic Equestrian venue in Hong Kong in reaction to separate incidents during the dressage competition on
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08/09/2008. Among the six were reportedly two American citizens belonging to the "Students for a Free Tibet" organization. All protesters attempted to display either Tibetan flags or banners calling for an end to human rights abuses in China and were escorted from the arena by venue security. In one incident, the demonstrator refused to leave and was forcibly removed from the area.
SECURITY OPERATIONS
-------------------
11. (SBU) Olympic Venues Protected by Infrared Wall: According to a report in Beijing Zhongguo Xinwen She, more than 400 infrared poles have been installed around the central zone of the Olympic Games, forming an "infrared protective wall" at the "Bird's Nest" National Stadium, the Water Cube Aquatic Center, and other important Olympic competition venues. The devices alert security when a human body breaks the infrared barrier. The Olympic Village, Main Media Center, and other facilities are protected by a wider infrared screen formed by a total of 2,002 infrared poles.
12. (SBU) Shenyang Security Update: According to the Regional Security Officer (RSO) in Shenyang, as of 08/10/2008 security is at the highest levels seen to date in the general vicinity of the Olympic stadium, the Marvelot and Sheraton hotels, and the Riverside Garden residential complex. Chinese SWAT team members have been observed patrolling on every block and Peoples Armed Police (PAP) squads are present at two block intervals along main streets. In addition, groups of Public Security Bureau (PSB) officers wearing their Olympic sweat suits have congregated at major intersections, where traffic police officers have augmented or replaced regular crossing guards. Police officers are also located in the lobbies of buildings at Riverside Garden, which is home to U.S., Korean, and Japanese diplomats, as well as to a wide variety of other foreign nationals. PSB vans with several occupants have been stationed at each entrance to the community.
VIPS
----
13. (SBU) The USG Delegation to the Opening Ceremony--headed by the President of the United States--remains in Beijing; the Delegation is expected to depart the city as scheduled on 08/11/2008.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS/PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
-------------------------------
14. (U) Please refer to the "Key Issues" section for information on Public Affairs activities as of 08/10/2008.
BEIJING 00003067 005 OF 005
CONSULAR AFFAIRS
----------------
15. (SBU) Please refer to the "Key Issues" and "Security Issues" sections for information on Consular activities as of 08/10/2008.
POLITICAL AFFAIRS
-----------------
16. (SBU) Air Quality: The UK Telegraph reports that the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology ordered its European partners in a Beijing air-quality monitoring effort to close down a website (already restricted to password holders) that on 08/08/2008 reported an air pollution index (API) of 101-150 in the area of Beijing in which the Olympic Green is located. The Chinese Government reported an API of 95 that day, which is under the 100 API which the government deems as acceptable air quality. Subscribers to the website received an email on 08/08/2008 saying the site would no longer be accessible, even by password. The e-mail reportedly stated the sponsors were "very sorry to have to let you know that at the request of our Chinese partners in this project we are unable to provide public access to the Beijing Air Quality forecasts during the Olympic Games period." Christine McHugh, a researcher with the company, was quoted as saying its partner, the Ministry of Science and Technology, had given no reason for the order to close the website.
17. (U) Georgian Athletes Will Remain: Despite rumors that Georgian Olympic athletes were going to withdraw from the Games to protest Russia's military actions in Georgia, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili has announced that they will remain in Beijing until the completion of the Olympics. According to Tbilisi's Kavkas Press, the Georgian athletes reversed their decision on departure only after President Saakashvili asked them to stay to show their strength on the Olympic stage. RANDT
Thursday, 30 August 2007, 08:58
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 005705
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/30/2032
TAGS PGOV, KOLY, ECON, SENV, ABLD, ELTN, PINR, CH
SUBJECT: BEIJING MAYOR WANG QISHAN DISCUSSES OLYMPICS, CITY
PLANNING
REF: BEIJING 5621
Classified By: Ambassador Clark T. Randt, Jr. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
-------
1. (C) As Beijing prepares to host the Olympic Games in August 2008, the city is taking a number of measures to lessen air pollution, Beijing Mayor Wang Qishan told the Ambassador over dinner on August 29, calling this month's four-day experiment in which half the city's cars were taken off the road "a success." The city will complete two new subway lines and an airport monorail in time for the Games and will embark on an ambitious plan to dramatically expand the city's subway system by 2015. Security and meeting exacting International Olympic Committee (IOC) specifications for venues are other challenges Beijing faces in getting ready for the Games. The Mayor was sanguine about the city's real estate market, dismissing concerns over a bubble. Wang lamented that his job as mayor has been grueling, commenting that in his four-and-a-half-year tenure, he has not taken a single vacation. Wang denied rumors reported in the Western press that he is in store for a promotion at this fall's 17th Party Congress, claiming that he plans to remain as Mayor through at least early 2009. End Summary.
A Friendly Dinner
-----------------
2. (C) Ambassador and Mrs. Randt hosted Beijing Mayor Wang Qishan and his wife for dinner on August 29 to thank the Mayor for his assistance in the city's making road improvements and supplying permanent power to the New Embassy Compound. The Mayor discussed at length the challenges he faces in governing Beijing, particularly as it prepares to host the Summer 2008 Olympic Games, and dismissed rumors that he might be transferred out of Beijing this fall.
Mayor Wang's Future: No Plans to Move
-------------------------------------
3. (C) Responding to gossip reported by Reuters in April that he might be appointed Guangdong Province Party Secretary and promoted to the Politburo at this fall's 17th Party Congress, Mayor Wang said he "had not heard" any such rumor and planned to be Mayor through the August 2008 Olympic Games. In fact, Wang said, his intention is to "pass the Olympic torch" to Mayor Ken Livingstone of London, which will host the next summer Olympic Games after Beijing, in January 2009.
Olympics Challenges: Pollution, Transport, Security, Specs
--------------------------------------------- -------------
4. (C) Mayor Wang described a number of challenges Beijing faces in hosting the Olympic Games. First and foremost is dealing with air pollution. This month's four-day experiment in which half of Beijing's cars were kept off the roads based on odd and even license plate numbers was a success, Wang asserted. The experiment brought traffic volume down to 2002 levels, resulting in much smoother traffic patterns. Given that traffic in the city in 2002 was heavily congested, the experiment's success demonstrates that the city has constructed a large number of new roads in the last five years. Moreover, although he was hesitant to say that Beijing enjoyed blue skies during the four-day period, taking cars off the road did in fact result in much improved air quality. (Note: Per reftel, while the test improved traffic congestion, published pollution data was less conclusive on the amount of reduced pollution attributable to the car-ban. Emissions experts doubted the usefulness of such a short-term test to produce accurate conclusions.) The city will also bring online five new, clean gas-fired power plants in time for the Games, Wang continued. By that point, Capital Iron and Steel Works, a significant polluter, will have gone to a "minimal" production schedule, the Mayor explained.
5. (C) Turning to Beijing's public transportation system, Mayor Wang said the city has 140 kilometers of subway, but by May 2008 two new subway lines will be completed, including a line that runs north from city hall to the main Olympic Games site. The capital's new airport monorail will also be finished in time for the Games. Looking beyond the Olympics, the Mayor described a long-term plan to expand the city's subway lines to 5,000 kilometers by 2015, to include satellite parking lots near subway stations around the city perimeter designed to increase dramatically residents' use of public transportation.
6. (C) Security is another challenge, Wang said, commenting
BEIJING 00005705 002 OF 002
that he greatly appreciates international cooperation on security for the Games. Meeting the "very strict" IOC specifications for Olympics venues was another significant issue. An example, the Mayor related, is the sand used for the beach volleyball site in the city's Chaoyang district, which has to meet exacting requirements for purity and softness. In the end, Beijing had to bring in sand all the way from Hainan Island in order to meet IOC specifications. (Note: Independently we understand the amount necessary is 17,000 tons.)
Real Estate Demand Booming
--------------------------
7. (C) Mayor Wang was sanguine about the health of the city's real estate market and dismissed concerns over a bubble, claiming that demand for real estate in China's capital is growing. Although he expressed concern about the global impact of the subprime mortgage problem, he said he is not worried about the value of the city's real estate, since very little is purchased for the purpose of speculation. For example, the city's financial district is already completely booked up. Newcomer financial institutions like Deutsche Bank have had to locate their headquarters elsewhere, such as in the Chaoyang district in Deutsche Bank's case, as there is no room remaining for them to build in the financial district. Every major successful company in China, both domestic and international, must have a headquarters in Beijing. For example, Bao Gang steel company of Shanghai, China's largest, is building a new headquarters on Chang'an Avenue in the center of Beijing. The city has 140 million square meters of internal building space and is adding an additional 30 million square meters per year. Beijing has a "long way to go" to meet the high demand for real estate and office space, Mayor Wang confidently declared.
It's Hard Being Mayor
---------------------
8. (C) Though optimistic about his city's future, Wang lamented that his job as mayor has been grueling. As the city's leader, he has to understand and be able to respond to every issue the city faces, day and night. Consequently, he confided, in his four and one-half years as mayor, he has not taken a single vacation. Randt
XXXXXXXXXXXX S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 MADRID 000071
SIPDIS
PASS TO ELAINE SAMSON AND STACIE ZERDECKI AT EUR/WE,
JANICE BELL AT INR
TOBY BRADLEY AT NSC
EO 12958 DECL: 01/20/2034
TAGS OVIP, PINS, PREL, PTER, OFDP, SP, PGOV
SUBJECT: SPAIN: DEPARTING AMBASSADOR'S INSIGHTS ON ENGAGING
GOS LEADERSHIP
REF: A. 08 MADRID 1359 B. 08 MADRID 518
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Arnold A. Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d)
XXXXXXXXXXXX
9. XXXXXXXXXXXX For example, at one point the Ambassador informed Zapatero that U.S. CEO's might decide to stop bidding in Spain due to a growing perception that the GOS was not welcoming US bidders on procurement contracts. Zapatero had told the Ambassador to let him know if there was something important to the USG and he would take care of it. Later - when the USG had agreed to advocate on behalf of GE in a bid against Rolls Royce for a Spanish MOD contract to provide helicopter motors - GE informed the Ambassador that failure to win the contract would cause that branch of GE to cease operations in Spain, which the Ambassador duly informed Zapatero's economic adviser. Although there was considerable all-source evidence to suggest that the MOD decided to award the contract to Rolls Royce, Moncloa - the office of the President - overturned the decision and it was announced that GE had won the bid. The Ambassador is convinced that Zapatero personally intervened in the case in favor of GE.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
CHACON
Monday, 10 August 2009, 23:56
S E C R E T STATE 083026
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
RELEASABLE TO PAKISTAN
EO 12958 DECL: 08/07/2019
TAGS EFIN, KTFN, PREL, PTER, UNSC
SUBJECT: UN 1267 (AL-QAIDA/TALIBAN) SANCTIONS: USG
OPPOSITION TO FOCAL POINT DE-LISTING REQUEST FOR JUD AND HAFIZ SAEED
REF: STATE 65044
Classified By: IO Assistant Secretary Esther Brimmer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraphs 4-6.
----------------------
SUMMARY AND OBJECTIVES
----------------------
2. (SBU) In May 2009, legal representatives for 1267-listed entity Jamaat-ud-Dawah (identified by the UN 1267 Committee as an alias for Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, permanent reference number QE.L.118.05) and its leader, Muhammad Saeed (permanent reference number QI.S.263.08) petitioned on their clients behalf for delisting via the UN focal point. The focal point, which was established in the UN Secretariat pursuant to UNSCR 1730 to allow listed individuals/entities (or their representatives) to petition directly for de-listing, forwarded the de-listing request on behalf of JUD and Saeed for review to the USG (designating state) and to the Government of Pakistan (state of citizenship/residence/incorporation). The USG and GOP have had three months to review the de-listing petition. We have completed our review and plan to notify the UN focal point on August 25 of our opposition to de-listing. Before doing so, we would like to take this opportunity to: -- share the results of our review of the de-listing petition for JUD and Muhammad Saeed with Pakistani officials; -- seek GOP views on the request; -- underscore our ongoing concern over the threat posed by LeT/JUD and Saeed; -- ask Pakistani officials to update us on actions taken to impose UN 1267 sanctions on LeT/JUD and Saeed.
----------
BACKGROUND
----------
3. (S) On December 10, 2008, the UN 1267 Committee took several actions related to the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Tayibba (LeT), including its listing of Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JUD) as an alias for LeT, as well as the listing of JUD's leader, Muhammad Saeed. The Committee in 2005 added LeT to its Consolidated List citing its affiliation with al-Qaida. The addition of the JUD alias, as well as the listing of Saeed, followed closely on the heels of the LeT-perpetrated attacks in Mumbai, India, in November 2008. Prior to the attacks, our request to list JUD and Saeed were placed on hold by China at the behest of Pakistan. In spite of Pakistani acquiescence to the listings in December 2008, we continue to see reporting indicating that JUD is still operating in multiple locations in Pakistan, and that the group continues to openly raise funds. It is unclear what, if any, steps the GOP has taken to freeze JUD's assets or otherwise implement UN 1267 sanctions, which include an asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo.
--------------
ACTION REQUEST
--------------
4. (SBU) USUN is requested to inform the focal point on August 25, after both USUN and Islamabad have had a chance to inform Pakistani officials of our views, of our opposition to the de-listing request on behalf of JUD and Muhammad Saeed. In its communication to the focal point, USUN should refute the assertion in Saeed's and his legal representatives claim in the focal point de-listing petition that "there are no grounds for placing Saeed and JUD on the Consolidated List and the material relied upon is incorrect and baseless" and note that we stand by the information included in the statements of case we submitted (co-sponsored by the UK and France) to the UN 1267 Committee to add JUD and Saeed to the Consolidated List. USUN should further state that we have seen no evidence of a change in circumstance warranting de-listing of JUD or Saeed.
5. (SBU) USUN and Embassy Islamabad should inform Pakistani officials in New York and Islamabad, respectively, of our opposition to the de-listing petition for JUD and Saeed. Action addressees may wish to draw upon the following points:
-- We have reviewed the de-listing petition from attorneys on behalf of Jamaat-ud Dawa (JUD) and its leader Hafiz Saeed and will soon inform the UN 1267 Committee, via the UN focal point, of our opposition to de-listing.
-- We first wanted to share our views with Pakistani officials, and to seek Pakistan's view on the de-listing petition.
-- As you are no doubt aware, we are deeply concerned about the threat posed by LeT/JUD, and reject Saeed's and his legal representatives claim in the focal point de-listing petition that "there are no grounds for placing Saeed and JUD on the Consolidated List and the material relied upon is incorrect and baseless."
-- In fact, LeT and JUD stem from the same original organization, Markaz-ud-Dawawal-Irshad (MDI). When LeT was declared a terrorist organization in Pakistan in 2002, MDI publicly divested itself of LeT at that time and renamed itself JUD. LeT transferred most of its assets and personnel to the newly formed JUD, ensuring its survival.
-- We believe that LeT uses JUD facilities as a public front for its activities and shares offices, phone numbers, personnel and bank accounts. LeT's old offices merely changed the name on the door.
-- JUD's budget, using funds from both witting and unwitting donors, is dedicated to social services and/or humanitarian relief but some is used to finance LeT operations.
-- We are also aware that LeT and JUD share many senior leaders, including Hafiz Saeed, who according to information available to the USG, as of 2009 continued to control LeT and issue guidance to LeT members.
-- We would like here your views on the status of LeT/JUD and Saeed, and would particularly appreciate an update on steps Pakistan has taken or will take to implement UN 1267 sanctions on them.
6. (S/REL to Pakistan) Embassy Islamabad is also requested to share a non-paper, included below in paragraph 7, prepared by our intelligence community in February 2009 assessing JUD's links to LeT. This non-paper, which was previously passed by former S/CT Coordinator Dell Daily to Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani, provides more detailed information on our concerns about LeT/JUD and Saeed that underpin our view that their listing by the UN 1267 Committee was and remains appropriate.
7. (S/REL to Pakistan) BEGIN TEXT OF NON-PAPER
(U//FOUO) Assessing Jamaat-ud-Dawa's Links to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba
SUMMARY
(S//REL) The Community assesses that LT, a Pakistan-based terrorist group, uses the JUD name as an alias. JUD is a religious, educational, and humanitarian organization that the Community assesses provides cover and protection for LT's militant activities in Pakistan. LT and JUD share many senior leaders; LT falls under the authority of JUD leader Hafiz Muhammad Saeed; and JUD supports and facilitates LT's violent activities. - LT and JUD stem from the same original organization*Markaz-ud-Dawawal-Irshad (MDI)*that was founded around 1986 and for which LT served as its armed, militant wing. MDI was renamed JUD in December 2001. - LT was declared a terrorist organization in January 2002, and MDI publicly divested itself of the LT at that time. LT transferred most of its assets and personnel under the newly formed JUD.
(S//REL) The Community assesses that JUD relies heavily on private donations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), madrassas, and businesses spread throughout South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Some of the money to finance LT operations is obtained by fraudulently redirecting donations intended for humanitarian work.
(S//REL) JUD and LT have branch offices with different names and have adopted a number of aliases as a denial and deception tactic.
END SUMMARY
(C//REL) Various Names and Aliases
(S//REL) The Intelligence Community assesses that Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) are part of the same organization, originally called Markaz-ud-Dawawal-Irshad (MDI), that was founded by Hafiz Muhammed Saeed and other faculty at the University of Engineering and Technology in Lahore in 1986. MDI was established with funding from donors in the Middle East and set up camps to prepare its personnel to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan.
MDI reorganized after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, creating LT as its paramilitary wing to fight in the Indian-controlled districts of Jammu and Kashmir while MDI focused on religious and humanitarian activity. Saeed led both MDI and LT during the 1990s.
When the US declared LT a terrorist organization in December 2001, MDI reorganized*changing its name to JUD to draw a distinction between its charitable and educational work and LT's militant activities*in an effort by MDI leaders to shield their fundraising and other activities from sanctions. Saeed publicly resigned from LT, telling the media that he had assumed the leadership of JUD. In mid-January 2002, LT was banned.
Islamabad "watchlisted" JUD in 2003, but the government has resisted pressure to take action against the group, particularly after JUD,s popular earthquake relief efforts in 2005 and 2006 in response to the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan.
LT has used JUD facilities as a public front for its activities and, shared offices, phone numbers, leaders, and bank accounts. LT members identified themselves as JUD when in Pakistan and as LT when in Kashmir.
LT/JUD purportedly raises funds for the Palestinian people in response to Israel's attacks on Gaza. The Community judges that as of January, JUD also may be operating under the alias Tehreek-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool. LT's political affairs coordinator Khalid Waleed identified himself in late December as the chief organizer for a conference for Tehreek-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool, according to intelligence reporting. - On 6 February, the JUD held a Kashmir Solidarity Conference at which JUD renamed itself Tehreek-e-Azadi-e-Kashmir (TAK). At JUD,s first public protest since December, supporters used old JUD banners and chanted JUD slogans, but rallied under the name TAK to avoid arrest.
BEGIN TEXT BOX
(U//FOUO) UN Links Jamaat-ud-Dawa to Terrorism
(S//REL) The United Nations (UN) banned Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), and on 10 December, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee (the 1267 Committee) approved the addition of JUD as a new LT alias for targeted sanctions. This UN designation required all UN member states to freeze any assets this entity may have under the member states' jurisdiction, impose a travel ban, and implement an arms embargo against them as set out in paragraph 1 of UNSC Resolution 1822 of 2008.
(S//REL) The Community assesses that LT/JUD, in an attempt to evade restrictions, has established branch offices with different names and adopted a number of aliases. One branch, Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq, is a publicly acknowledged charitable arm of JUD and has its own web page with photos of hospitals and ambulances. Other aliases include Paasbaan-e-Ahle-Hadith, Paasban-e-Kashmir, Al-Mansoorian, and Al-Nasaryeen. We assess that LT and LT-associated militants will continue to use aliases in order to circumvent restrictions on their movement and operations.
END TEXT BOX
(U//FOUO) Financial Support
(S//REL) The Community assesses that JUD fundraising has relied heavily on private donations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), madrassas, and businesses spread throughout South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Some of JUD's budget, using funds raised both from witting donors and by fraud, is dedicated to social services or humanitarian relief projects, while some is used to finance LT operations. - In December 2005, an official of Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq forwarded JUD donation receipts to a probable LT front company in Saudi Arabia where an LT finance official may have been closely associated with the general manager*possibly acting as a front for moving LT funds, according to intelligence reporting. - Makki in 2002 frequently visited the Middle East and viewed it as a main source of funding. To demonstrate results to donors, JUD would finance the cost of building a new school or upgrading facilities at a madrassa, but would inflate the cost to siphon money to LT.
(S//REL) The Community lacks sufficient intelligence to determine if or how the November Mumbai attacks have affected donations to JUD. Some donors may be dissuaded from supporting JUD if they become aware that their funds may be used for additional terrorist attacks, whereas other donors may support LT's attacks. As public and government scrutiny increases in the wake of the attacks and subsequent designation of JUD as an alias of LT by the UN, we assess that JUD will rely more on covert fundraising efforts.
(U//FOUO) Leadership
(S//REL) The Community assesses that Saeed is the leader of LT and Lakvi is LT's operations commander*and they continue to run the organization despite being detained for their role in the November Mumbai attacks. We also judge that they have planned, directed, and executed LT attacks throughout South Asia and likely have used some funds collected in the name of JUD's charitable activities to support multiple LT terrorist operations, including the November Mumbai attacks. The Community assesses that Saeed continues to lead both organizations. However, the Community is unable to assess to what extent senior JUD leaders such as Saeed are involved in specific terrorist operations or the level of detail to which they are knowledgeable about specific past and pending attacks. - As of mid-July Lakvi was responsible for the LT's military operations budget of PKR 365 million (approximately US $5.2 million) per year. He reportedly used the money to purchase all materials required for LT operations other than weapons and ammunition, according to a source claiming direct and ongoing access to LT leaders.
END TEXT OF NON-PAPER
---------------------------------------
REPORTING DEADLINE AND POINT OF CONTACT
---------------------------------------
8. (U) Action addressees should report as soon as possible but no later than August 19 results of their demarche to Pakistani officials .
9. (U) Questions may be directed to IO/PSC (Erin Crowe, 202-736-7847). CLINTON
Wednesday, 29 October 2008, 10:12
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 001619
SIPDIS
WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP, CENTCOM FOR POLAD, NAVCENT AND J5, DOE
FOR KKOLEVAR AND WBRYAN, DEPARTMENT FOR P SMULL, NEA
GCRETZ, S/CT AND NEA/ARP
EO 12958 DECL: 10/28/2018
TAGS ECON, ENRG, EPET, MARR, MCAP, MOPS, OVP, PGOV, PREL,
PTER, SA
SUBJECT: SAG AGREES TO USG STEPS TO PROTECT OIL FACILITIES
REF: A. RIYADH 1579 B. RIYADH 1408 C. RIYADH 1298
RIYADH 00001619 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires David Rundell for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (U) This is an Action Request, see paragraph 11.
2. (S) SUMMARY. The Joint Commssion on Critical Infrastructure Protection and Border Security (JCCIP) initiative in Saudi Arabia made significant progress this week. On October 27, a Department of Energy delegation led by DOE DAS Wm. Bryan, with AmEmbassy Riyadh Charge' d'Affaires in attendance, presented a three-hour Vulnerability Assessment (VA) of the Abqaiq oil facility (Reftel A) to Saudi Ministry of Interior senior-level and working staff, which included a 40-minute briefing/discussion with Assistant Minister for National Security Affairs Prince Mohammed bin Naif (MBN). DOE's recommendations were enthusiastically accepted by MBN, with further JCCIP work agreed to. Concurrent with the VA presentation, the deployed CENTCOM representative in Riyadh presented the draft Letter of Request (LOR) to MBN to establish the Office of the Program Manager - Facilities Security Force (OPM-FSF), which will be responsible to train and equip the Saudi security forces being formed to protect Saudi energy production facilities, desalination plants and future civil nuclear reactors. The Saudis remain highly concerned about the vulnerability of their energy production facilities and reaffirmed their strong desire for a long-term USG commitment to implement the JCCIP agreement. END SUMMARY.
-------------------------------
FULL SPEED AHEAD ON ASSESSMENTS
-------------------------------
3. (S) DOE presented a two-day, thorough, highly-technical evaluation of Abqaiq's security capability to MOI, FSF and ARAMCO officials on Oct. 27 and 28, with the introductory briefing consisting of a three-hour presentation. The conclusion is that the Abqaiq facility's safety standards are world-class and its current security measures would counter a repeat of the Feb. 2006 failed Al Qaeda VBIED attack, but Abqaiq remains highly vulnerable to other types of sophisticated terrorist attacks. DOE provided concrete steps for the Saudis to enhance and harden Abqaiq's security architecture.
4. (S) MBN was impressed with DOE's Abqaiq VA and expressed his appreciation for DOE's work. He ordered his staff to immediately implement DOE's recommendations to improve Abqaiq's security and requested DOE to perform further VAs. The Ras Tannurah oil facility was named as the next site to be assessed, with its VA to be conducted as soon as possible. It was agreed DOE would establish three VA teams dedicated solely to evaluating Saudi Arabia's critical infrastructure sites, which number approximately 100. These DOE teams would be joined by MOI members who would learn the necessary skill sets from DOE to then perform their own individual VAs of sites. The goal would be MOI to eventually take the lead in VAs of all remaining sites, with DOE supporting the MOI VA teams. This would maximize the number of sites able to be assessed in the shortest time period. DOE also invited MOI, ARAMCO and CENTCOM to join them at Sandia Labs to wrap up the Abqaiq assessment and demonstrate the models used in formulating their recommendations. This visit is expected to
RIYADH 00001619 002.2 OF 003
be conducted by the end of 2008.
5. (S) It was noted during the presentation that the ARAMCO officials were uneasy with MOI encroaching onto their territory. ARAMCO expressed concern that "Too much security will make it too hard for us (ARAMCO) to do our jobs in producing oil." While it was telling to see firsthand some the interagency disputes within the SAG, an MOI official in a sidebar confided in us that ARAMCO's concerns would be addressed, but that MBN, who reportedly has the final say in the protection of Saudi critical infrastructure, would not allow Saudi oil facilities to be left vulnerable, regardless of ARAMCO's complaints.
6. (S) This same MOI official mentioned that the protection of Saudi critical infrastructure is expected to eventually be 25% of MOI's budget. MOI's current annual budget is approx. USD 1 billion. The protection of Saudi critical infrastructure will likely lead to a significant increase in MOI's budget as the FSF alone will be 35,000 strong, minimum, with an additional 20 per cent more forces for port and border security. DOE's security projects and future to-be-determined JCCIP programs with other USG agencies will add even more to MOI's budget requirements.
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OPM-FSF STARTS
--------------
7. (S) The draft LOR for OPM-FSF prepared by CENTCOM was presented to MBN. This draft explicitly lays out on one page the exact wording for the SAG's formal request to the USG to establish OPM-FSF. MBN directed his staff to prepare such a letter for his signature. Once we receive this letter, CENTCOM will then respond with a Letter of Acceptance (LOA) which will allow CENTCOM to begin building up OPM-FSF's personnel and equipment structure. MOI indicated they plan to present the formal Saudi LOR to GEN Petraeus when he visits the Kingdom, currently scheduled for Nov. 8.
--------------------
JOINT WORKING GROUPS
--------------------
8. (S) A related discussion item was the role of the Joint Working Groups (JWG). It was previously established there would be three JWG: FSF, Industrial Security and Internal Security (Reftel B). During our recent meetings, it was clarified and agreed to that "Joint" will refer to USG-SAG only, not inter-agency. When these working groups meet, it will be a single USG voice in dialogue with a single SAG voice. Inter-agency USG discussions will take place at the JCCIP Cell in Riyadh or in Washington.
9. (S) DAS Bryan, in discussions with MOI officials, requested clarification on MOI's view and scope of the Industrial Security Joint Working Group. The "Industry" of focus is the oil industry and all other industries that support the oil sector. This also includes interdependencies on other utilities, in particular electricity and water. This will enable DOE to better perform the system level analysis as opposed to individual site assessments. Additionally, this insight enables DOE to staff the Industrial Security JWG with appropriate USG representation.
-----------------------------
RIYADH 00001619 003.2 OF 003
"WE MUST PROTECT IT TOGETHER"
-----------------------------
10. (S) In a private meeting between MBN and the Charge', MBN conveyed the SAG's, and his personal, sense of urgency to move forward as quickly as possible to enhance the protection of Saudi Arabia's critical infrastructure with the priority being its energy production sites. MBN related how his grandfather, King Abdulaziz, had the vision of forming a lasting strategic partnership with the United States. MBN stressed he shared this vision, and wants the USG's help to protect Saudi critical infrastructure. He commented that neither the Kingdom nor the U.S. would be comfortable with the "French or Russians" involved in protecting Saudi oil facilities. "We built ARAMCO together, we must protect it together." MBN also confirmed his travel dates to Washington will be Nov. 5 to 7.
11. (S) MOI officials queried us on the exact date U/S Wm. Burns, P, would travel to the Kingdom for the meeting of the Joint Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection and Border Security. The SAG expects it to be in mid-December after the Eid al-Adha (set to end Dec. 12), and request confirmation as soon as possible of P's exact travel date so they can prepare the appropriate agenda. Post requests the Department's confirmation of P's exact travel dates to Saudi Arabia for the next JCCIP.
-------
COMMENT
-------
12. (S) The Saudis now feel energized by DOE's VA, DOE's subsequent proposals and CENTCOM's assistance in establishing OPM-FSF. Likewise, they recognize many of their energy facilities remain at risk from Al Qaeda and other terrorists who seek to disrupt the global economy, and vigorously urge we continue assisting them to counter this threat. RUNDELL
Thursday, 07 January 2010, 13:10
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000009
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/07 TAGS: ECON, PTER, KTFN, AE, AF, EFIN SUBJECT: (S) US-UAE Further Cooperation to Disrupt Taliban Finance
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Olson, Ambassador, State Department, U.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
(S//NF) Summary
1. (S//NF) SUMMARY. On December 15-16, 2009, Treasury Department Acting Assistant Secretary of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis Howard Mendelsohn, along with GRPO officers and Treasury analysts, met with senior officials from the UAE's State Security Department (SSD) and Dubai's General Department of State Security (GDSS) to discuss suspected Taliban-related financial activity in the UAE. Prior to these meetings, GRPO and Treasury passed to SSD and GDSS detailed information on the financing of the Taliban and other terrorist and extremist groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mendelsohn praised the UAE for its contribution to building a stable and moderate Afghanistan. He thanked the SSD and GDSS for its commitment, per the directive of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, to disrupt any Taliban-related financial activity that can be identified in the UAE. The UAE services pledged full cooperation toward the shared goal and asked for additional detailed and actionable lead information. In particular, they asked for additional passport information, telephone numbers, full names and aliases, and travel itineraries for Taliban figures suspected of traveling to the UAE. END SUMMARY.
2. (S//NF) During the course of the two multi-hour intelligence exchange sessions, GRPO and Treasury analysts walked through the previously shared information suggesting that Taliban-related finance officials have visited the UAE in order to raise or move funds. The UAE security officials believe that the Taliban may draw support from the sizeable Pashtun population resident in the UAE. They asked for lead information the U.S. could gather with names of individuals or entities in the UAE that may be supporting the Taliban.
3. (S//NF) Officials from SSD and GDSS pledged that their respective organizations would follow up on the information provided, and work through intelligence channels to share information and results and submit additional requests for information.
Taliban/Haqqani Network
4. (S//NF) Mendelsohn acknowledged the important steps the UAE has taken to combat al-Qaida and the Taliban-to include sending troops to Afghanistan-and highlighted the importance the USG places on combating Taliban financing. He stated that the Taliban receives significant money from narcotics trafficking and extortion, but noted that the U.S. believes that the group also receives significant funds from the Gulf, particularly from donors in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. He further stated that the Taliban and Haqqani Network are believed to earn money from UAE-based business interests. Security officials from both SSD and GDSS agreed that the Taliban and Haqqani Network are serious threats. Officials from SSD added that Iran supports the Taliban with money and weapons, helps the Taliban smuggle drugs, and facilitates the movement of Taliban and al-Qaida members. SSD officials stated that Iran's IRGC and navy are involved with these activities. GDSS officials noted Iran's support to Taliban in Pakistan, adding that GDSS believes that India also has supported Pakistani Taliban and Pashtun separatists.
5. (S//NF) Treasury analysts provided information on XXXXXXXXXXXX two senior Taliban officials who have made multiple fundraising visits to the UAE, according to U.S. intelligence. The UAE security services were not familiar with either individual and asked for additional identifying information, including current passport information used by the individuals to enter the UAE in order to track down their movements. (NOTE: Information available to the USG and shared for this exchange included telephone numbers, an e-mail address, and expired passport information for crosschecking against Emirati immigration databases on both individuals. END NOTE.) SSD confirmed it checked UAE immigration systems based on the passport information provided and found no matching records. GRPO and Treasury analysts also shared names and phone numbers of multiple Taliban and Haqqani associates known either to reside in or travel to the UAE. SSD officials stated that Taliban fundraisers may use fabricated travel documents, and that Pakistanis/Afghanis often carry multiple passports, but noted that individuals from Pakistan and Afghanistan who apply for a travel visa now require an eye scan. The officials said this system should help prevent a single individual from using different aliases or passports. The services pledged to continue their investigations and share further results.
6. (S//NF) GDSS officials noted its ongoing monitoring of the large Afghan and Pakistani immigrant communities in Dubai and they commented that the Taliban extorts money from UAE-based Afghan businessmen. The same officials said the Taliban is also involved in kidnapping for ransom, whereby Afghanistan and Pakistan-based family members of the UAE-based businessmen are kidnapped for Taliban profit. Some Afghan businessmen in the UAE have resorted to purchasing tickets on the day of travel to limit the chance of being kidnapped themselves upon arrival in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.
7. (S//NF) The GDSS officials stated that hawaladars are usually unwitting when they transfer money that ends up with the Taliban. They further noted that Taliban financial supporters are likely to transfer smaller amounts across multiple hawalas to minimize suspicion.
8. (S//NF) SSD officials discussed the Taliban and Haqqani Network's suspected use of front companies to raise and move money. They were familiar with Haji Khalil Zadran, a Kabul-based Haqqani Network financial facilitator who has visited the UAE, but were not able to provide any details on him.
9. (S//NF) GDSS officials were familiar with XXXXXXXXXXXX who reportedly provides funding to the Taliban/Haqqani Network, according to U.S. intelligence. The GDSS officials stated that they do not believe XXXXXXXXXXXX is loyal to the Taliban, and noted that he has cooperated with Pakistani authorities, as well as with Afghan President Karzai. They pointed out XXXXXXXXXXXX's past visits from former Guantanamo Bay detainee Mullah Zaif, but noted that such visits-which may have resulted in financial support-have ceased. GDSS continues to monitor XXXXXXXXXXXX although at present they do not believe that he is a Taliban financial manager. Mendelsohn suggested that he may be a pragmatist who maintains relationships with legitimate authorities, but the USG has current information that suggests he is still involved with the Taliban.
10. (S//NF) GDSS discussed at length the history of the Haqqanis. They specifically highlighted Jalaluddin Haqqani's success in exploiting images of civilian casualties in Afghanistan for fundraising purposes.
(S//NF) Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna
11. (S//NF) Mendelsohn also raised Afghanistan and Pakistan-based extremist and terrorist groups, to include Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna (JDQ). UAE security services were not familiar with the names of specific UAE-based LT members shared by GRPO and Treasury, but promised to follow up on the information. Mendelsohn raised the UAE-based NGO Dar al-Birr as an organization suspected of supporting JDQ. GDSS was familiar with the organization and pledged to investigate the matter.
OLSON
Wednesday, 02 September 2009, 11:56
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000874
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, NEA/ARP (MCGOVERN) AND INR
EO 12958 DECL: 08/19/2019
TAGS EFIN, ECON, EINV, PGOV, AE
SUBJECT: C-SA9-01527: PAKISTANI AND AFGHAN EXPATRIATE TIES TO
EXTREMISTS
REF: STATE 71311
ABU DHABI 00000874 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RICHARD OLSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND D).
1. (S) The responses in para 3 are keyed to reftel request. Post notes that reftel was not addressed to Embassy Abu Dhabi, resulting in delayed response. Post requests that all cables requiring action/information on UAE issues be sent to Embassy Abu Dhabi.
OVERVIEW
--------
2. (S) Structurally, the UAE is a relatively open economy with the most vibrant financial sector in the Gulf; its federal structure also gives much economic autonomy to the various emirates, which impose varying levels of regulation and due diligence on economic activity. Characteristic of the region, the use of cash is common for legitimate financial transactions. High volumes of cash and electronic funds flow both to and from Afghanistan and Pakistan, the vast majority of which is derived from legitimate trade and remittances. The lack of effective border controls on cash is no doubt exploited by Taliban couriers and Afghan drug lords, camouflaged among traders, businessmen and migrant workers. Systemically approaching this issue both in the UAE and in the broader Gulf region to disrupt Taliban finances, while protecting commerce and economic activity, is an important, though challenging task. At the suggestion of the UAEG, we have established joint US/UAE task force (composed of interagency elements on both sides) to combat illicit financial flows to and from Afghanistan, specifically bulk cash smuggling.
3. (SBU) Begin reftel responses:
A. (C) HOW MUCH MONEY DO EXPATS SEND BACK TO THEIR HOME COUNTRY IN ANNUAL REMITTANCES?
As the UAEG does not break down remittance statistics by country, it is difficult to ascertain the total value of funds transferred. Anecdotal information suggests some expatriates transfer as much as 50 percent of their salary, although there is significant variance.
1) (C) BY WHAT CHANNELS? HOW OFTEN?
Most expatriate residents -- of all nationalities -- who remit funds to their home country do so through formal exchange houses (like Western Union and its local competitors) or informal hawala mechanisms. As most employees are paid monthly, workers generally transfer funds on a monthly basis.
2) (S) DOES THE HOST GOVERNMENT MONITOR THE MONEY FLOWS? IF SO, HOW?
The UAE Central Bank maintains records of all financial transactions facilitated by banks, exchange houses and registered hawalas. This information includes names, addresses, phone numbers, and visa details of the sending party as well as information on the receiving party abroad. Similar information is required by Police and Customs officials for physical cash imports exceeded 40,000 AED (approximately USD 10,900).
B. (C) WHAT ARE THE METHODS WHEREBY SOUTH ASIANS ARE RECRUITED AND/OR RADICALIZED BY GULF-BASED EXTREMISTS?
Post has limited evidence South Asian expatriates are being recruited or radicalized in the UAE. There are anecdotal reports that one Pashtun Afghan community in the UAE may have tribal or religious ties to the Taliban. UAE authorities are known to observe this group's activities and occasionally disrupt gatherings.
C. (U) DESCRIBE AFGHAN AND PAKISTANI EXPATS AND LOCAL NATIONAL DONATIONS TO CHARITIES THAT MAY SEND MONEY TO AFGHANISTAN OR PAKISTAN.
Charitable giving ("zakat") is one of the five pillars of Islam, and, as such, is pervasive in Muslim communities. Donation jars, boxes, ATMs and pledge cards for the major UAE charities (see 1C) are found throughout the country. The UAEG does not directly regulate donations, but rather oversees the establishment and registration of charitable organizations, disbursal of collected funds and goods donations. UAE charities primarily make donations abroad in the form of goods and development projects, not cash.
1) (C) WHICH CHARITIES MIGHT BE ASSOCIATED WITH EXTREMIST GROUPS, TERRORISTS, OR THE AFGHAN OR PAKISTANI GOVERNMENTS?
All legal charitable organizations in the UAE are associated with UAE government officials and entities. The largest of these groups, the
ABU DHABI 00000874 002.2 OF 003
Red Crescent Authority, the Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Charitable Foundation, and the Mohammed bin Rashid Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation, have ongoing charitable activities (including donations of clothing and food, as well as project developments) in Afghanistan and Pakistan in coordination with the UAEG and host governments. There is no evidence any of these groups have ties to extremist groups. In fact, the UAEG actively works to channel zakat from nationals and expatriates to the Red Crescent Authority, whose activities and employees it monitors closely.
2) (C) DESCRIBE EXPAT AND LOCAL NATIONAL DONATION LEVELS TO THOSE CHARITIES. WHICH ONES ARE MOST POPULAR? WHICH ONES ARE MOST SUSPECTED OF HAVING EXTREMIST, TERRORIST, OR GOVERNMENT TIES?
The major UAE charities receive significant cash and in-kind donations from senior ruling family members, wealthy Emirati nationals and small donations from other citizens and expatriates. Post does not have comprehensive statistics that reveal which charities are most popular, although the three largest are the only ones authorized to disburse funds overseas.
Ajman-based Human Appeal is suspected of ties to Hamas.
3) (U) PLEASE PROVIDE INFORMATION ON ANY CHARITIES RUN BY AFGHAN AND PAKISTANI EXPATS.
Not applicable. In order to be registered, charitable groups must be founded by 20 Emirati nationals.
D. (U) HOW LARGE IS THE POPULATION OF PAKISTANI AND AFGHAN EXPATRIATE WORKERS IN EACH GULF STATE?
There are approximately 1 million Pakistani expatriates and 150,000 Afghan nationals living in the UAE.
1) (U) HOW MANY IN THE SOUTH ASIAN COMMUNITY ARE PERMANENT RESIDENTS?
UAE immigration policies do not allow for permanent residence status.
2) (U) HOW MANY ARE GUEST WORKERS?
All expatriates are resident in the UAE on work visas or their dependents.
3) (SBU) WHAT IS THEIR ETHNIC AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE, TRIBAL/CLAN MAKE-UP?
Many Pakistanis are low-wage guest workers, predominantly Pashtun/Pathan. Baluchis have intermarried with Emiratis for generations, and many Punjabi and Sindhi elites (including President Zardari) maintain pieds-a-terres in Dubai.
Most Afghan residents are believed to be Pashtun.
E. (C) WHAT LINKS DO THEY HAVE WITH POLITICAL PARTIES, INSURGENTS, OR OTHER EXTREMISTS IN AFGHANISTAN OR PAKISTAN?
While it can be assumed that the Pakistani and Afghani populations in the UAE represent a wide range of political views, political activism among expatriates is discouraged by UAE authorities.
F. (SBU) WHO ARE THE KEY LEADERS WITHIN THESE COMMUNITIES?
Key leaders are prominent and successful businessmen. Given instability at home, many Afghan and Pakistani business leaders and political figures and their families use the UAE, and Dubai in particular, as a part-time residence and are active in their respective expatriate communities. Among uneducated and unskilled workers, leaders likely emerge along tribal and societal lines.
1) (SBU) WHAT PROMINENT MOSQUES OR COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS DO THESE EXPATRIATES BELONG TO? DESCRIBE THE MOSQUES' ACTIVITIES AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOVERNMENT, PEOPLE, OR EXTREMIST GROUPS IN AFGHANISTAN OR PAKISTAN.
All mosques operate under the direct supervision of the UAEG. None have ties to Afghanistan or Pakistan, aside from the nationalities of congregants. All sermons and announcements in UAE mosques are tightly controlled by the UAE Government.
2) (U) DO EXPATS FOLLOW PROMINENT PAKISTANI, AFGHAN, OR GULF CLERICS? IF SO, WHICH ONES, AND WHY? WHICH PAKISTANI AND AFGHAN CLERICS HAVE THE LARGEST FOLLOWING AMONG EXPATRIATES IN GULF STATES?
Unknown.
ABU DHABI 00000874 003.2 OF 003
A) (SBU) WHERE DID PROMINENT CLERICAL LEADERS RECEIVE THEIR RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND WHAT SCHOOL OF THOUGHT DO THEY LOOK TO FOR RELIGIOUS GUIDANCE (DEOBANDI, BARELVI, AHL-E HADITH, SALAFI, ETC.)?
There are no known Pakistani or Afghani clerics in the UAE. The Imam who delivers the English language Friday sermon in Abu Dhabi (i.e., the language of many South Asians, is American).
B) (C) DESCRIBE CLERICS' POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN GULF STATES, PAKISTAN, OR AFGHANISTAN.
All clerics/imams are supervised by the UAEG and are not involved in political activities.
3) (U) WHO ARE THE MOST INFLUENTIAL OR WEALTHY BUSINESSMEN IN THESE COMMUNITIES? WHAT TYPES OF BUSINESSES ARE THEY INVOLVED IN?
There are a number of successful Pakistani and Afghan businessmen resident in the UAE who are involved in a wide range of trading and services.
4) (C) WHAT LINKS DO THE BUSINESS LEADERS HAVE WITH CLERICS OR EXTREMISTS AT HOME? DESCRIBE ANY ROLE THEY MAY PLAY IN RAISING, HOLDING, OR DISPERSING FUNDS FROM THE EXPAT COMMUNITY?
Post has no evidence that business leaders are engaged in fundraising or other ties to extremists, although we would not be surprised if it is happening.
G. (U) HOW DO EXPATS VIEW THE TALIBAN AND OTHER EXTREMISTS IN THEIR HOME COUNTRY? WHAT ASPECTS OF THESE GROUPS' PLATFORMS AND ACTIVITIES DO PAKISTANI AND AFGHAN EXPATRIATES ADMIRE OR REJECT?
Unknown.
H. (U) HOW DO EXPATS VIEW THEIR GOVERNMENTS IN KABUL OR ISLAMABAD?
Many wealthy Afghans and Pakistanis tell EmbOffs that they choose to live in the UAE rather than their corrupt and/or failing countries. Others, particularly those with political ties, are committed to eventually returning home to help re-build their countries, but choose to temporarily live in Dubai out of concern for their families' safety.
I. (S) PLEASE DESCRIBE ANY STEPS THE HOST GOVERNMENTS HAVE TAKEN OR PLANS THEY MIGHT HAVE TO MONITOR OR INFLUENCE THESE EXPAT POPULATIONS.
For national security reasons, the UAEG closely monitors all expatriates, particularly those from Pakistan (the largest expat community in the UAE) and Afghanistan (given concerns about extremism/terrorism). The specific plans are not known.
J. (S) TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE U.S. EMBASSIES WORKING WITH OTHER THIRD-COUNTRY OFFICIAL PERSONNEL TO GATHER INFORMATION ON AND ATTEMPT TO ADDRESS THIS SUBJECT AREA (I.E. THE TRACKING AND STEMMING OF TERRORIST FINANCING FLOWS TO INSURGENT GROUPS IN AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN)?
Emboffs have regular exchanges with like-minded countries on financial crimes matters, although historically these efforts have focused on al-Qaida and Iran. There has been ongoing cooperation with like-minded embassies regarding efforts to disrupt drug trafficking and related money laundering through the UAE.
K. (SBU) PLEASE REPORT ON THE TYPES OF MEDIA FOLLOWED AND/OR PARTICIPATED IN BY AFGHAN AND PAKISTANI EXPATRIATES IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES.
Pakistani nationals are employed at some of the major English language newspapers and satellite television stations based in the UAE. OLSON
Monday, 05 November 2007, 10:25
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001838
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, S/CT, EEB/ESC/TFS
TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY, A/A O'BRIEN
DHS FOR DHS/ICE, FINANCIAL AND TRADE INVESTIGATIONS,
KDELLACOLI, JGALLION
EO 12958 DECL: 11/05/2017
TAGS EFIN, ETTC, KTFN, PTER, KCRM, PREL, AE
SUBJECT: UAE: FOLLOW-UP ACTION REQUEST ON ILLICIT CASH
COURIERS
REF: A. SECSTATE 152088 B. 06 ABU DHABI 3872 C. 06 ABU DHABI 2281 D. 05 ABU DHABI 4592 E. ABU DHABI 1293
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b and d).
1. (C) Summary: Post has worked with the UAEG to have it focus on the issue of bulk cash smuggling. DHS/ICE has twice provided training to customs officials and DOJ/OPDAT will be providing money laundering prosecutorial training this December (which will have a bulk cash smuggling component). The USG proposed conducting a joint DHS/ICE - Dubai Customs cash courier operation in April 2006. This October, the UAE Central Bank Governor, who serves as the UAE's Chairman for the Joint Terror Finance Coordinating Committee, informed us that the UAEG did not wish to participate. (Note: Post still understands that the Central Bank Governor will be replaced and will raise this with his successor. End Note.) The UAE has regulations requiring declarations for cash imports of over USD 10,800, but no regulations covering cash exports. End Summary
2. (C) Post appreciates the opportunity to provide an update on our efforts to focus the UAEG on addressing the issue of bulk cash smuggling. DHS/ICE provided training to Dubai police and customs officials on detecting and investigating bulk cash smuggling cases in September 2005, and the issue has been raised at each of the U.S. - UAE Joint Terror Finance Coordinating Committee (JTFCC) meetings since their inception in January 2006. In the April 2006 JTFCC meeting, the U.S. side proposed holding a joint DHS/ICE - Dubai Customs cash courier operation. UAE Central Bank Governor Sultan Nasser Al-Suwaidi requested training before moving forward with any operation. That training was provided in June 2006 (ref c).
3. (SBU) Al-Suwaidi then requested that post work with the UAE Central Bank and Customs to provide a "gap analysis" of the relevant U.S. and UAE regulations. In post's initial draft of a gap analysis, we determined that the UAE has no regulations on declaring cash exports, only on cash imports (ref b). We continued working with the Central Bank and with other members of the UAEG to address the UAE's stated and unstated concerns about a joint cash courier operation. Based on concerns the UAEG stated about having non-UAE nationals publicly involved in the operation, DHS/ICE revised the proposal and Ambassador passed it to Al-Suwaidi on August 1, 2007. Al-Suwaidi promised to have the UAE's JTFCC review it. In October, during his visit to the U.S., Al-Suwaidi told Treasury U/S for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey that the UAE did not wish to pursue the proposed DHS/ICE - Dubai Customs cash courier operation with the USG, arguing that having U.S. DHS/ICE officials visible in UAE airports would not be acceptable. He did agree to continue a two-way discussion about certain at-risk flights and suggested the December meeting of the UAE's National Anti-Money Laundering Committee. Post still understands that the UAEG plans to change the Governor of the Central Bank. We will raise this issue again with the new governor, whenever that person comes on board.
4. (C) Specific responses to questions follow (see 05 Abu Dhabi 4592 and 06 Abu Dhabi 3872 for more details).
(U) Status of Host Nation Laws:
---------------------------
-- UAE Federal Law 4 of 2002 is the relevant law
(SBU) Key Elements of UAE Federal Law 4 (2002) with regard to bulk cash smuggling):
--------------------------------------------- ----------
-- The law permits the import and export of any amount of currency. It requires, however, that cash and travelers checks worth 40,000 dirhams (USD 10,800) be declared. There are no requirements to declare exports of cash or to declare other bearer negotiable instruments such as bearer bonds, 3rd party endorsed checks, etc.
-- Although there is a requirement to declare cash imports, the UAE does not provide customs declaration forms to airlines, etc (as does the U.S.). While there may be signs
ABU DHABI 00001838 002 OF 002
at some ports of entry laying out these requirements, it is not clear that they are at all points of entry.
-- Although UAEG officials have the authority to seize undeclared cash, they do not have an administrative procedure for asset forfeiture. All cases must be brought to the courts. UAE officials have requested assistance in training prosecutors and judges in the understanding the importance of these cases and in how to make the case.
-- The UAE Central Bank Governor has stated that the UAE would need to revise its regulations to deal with declarations on cash exports. As far as we are aware, these regulations have not yet been amended.
(C) Status of investigations into bulk cash smuggling:
--------------------------------------------- ---------
-- The UAE is still largely a cash based society and Emiratis are used to carrying large amounts of cash. It is not clear that customs officials always initiate action against undeclared cash, nor is it clear how aggressively these cases are investigated or prosecuted. UAE officials have told us that they have investigated these cases and brought them to prosecution, but post has no independent access to records to determine the number of these cases, nor the success rate.
(SBU) Mission Efforts
---------------------
-- In addition to the efforts briefly described in paras 1-2 above, DOJ/OPDAT will be delivering training on December 10-11 on prosecuting money laundering and financial crimes cases to prosecutors from the UAE. DHS/ICE will be delivering a presentation on bulk cash smuggling.
-- Embassy will continue to engage the UAEG and Emirate level governments on the problem of cash couriers and the need to develop a plan to address the issue. SISON
Wednesday, 30 December 2009, 13:28
S E C R E T STATE 131801
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR TFCO
EO 12958 DECL: 12/28/2019
TAGS EFIN, KTFN, PTER, PINR, PREL, PK, KU, AE, QA, SA
SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCE: ACTION REQUEST FOR SENIOR
LEVEL ENGAGEMENT ON TERRORISM FINANCE
REF: A. (A) STATE 112368 B. (B) RIYADH 1499 C. (C) KUWAIT 1061 D. (D) KUWAIT 1021 E. (E) ABU DHABI 1057 F. (F) DOHA 650 G. (G) ISLAMABAD 2799
Classified By: EEB/ESC Deputy Assistant Secretary Douglas C. Hengel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
-------
Summary
-------
1. (U) This is an action request cable. Please see para 3.
2. (S/NF) Summary: In August 2009, Special Representative to the President for Afghanistan and Pakistan (S/SRAP) Ambassador Richard Holbrooke in coordination with the Department of Treasury established the interagency Illicit Finance Task Force (IFTF). The IFTF is chaired by Treasury A/S David Cohen. It focuses on disrupting illicit finance activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the external financial/logistical support networks of terrorist groups that operate there, such as al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, and Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT). The IFTF's activities are a vital component of the USG's Afghanistan and Pakistan (Af/Pak) strategy dedicated to disrupting illicit finance flows between the Gulf countries and Afghanistan and Pakistan. The IFTF has created a diplomatic engagement strategy to assist in the accomplishment of this objective. The strategy focuses on senior-level USG engagement with Gulf countries and Pakistan to communicate USG counterterrorism priorities and to generate the political will necessary to address the problem. The IFTF has drafted talking points for use by all USG officials in their interactions with Gulf and Pakistani interlocutors. These points focus on funding for terrorist groups threatening stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan and targeting coalition soldiers. These points have been cleared through the relevant Washington agencies.
3. (SBU) Action request: Drawing on the background materials for respective countries, and in preparation for the upcoming visits by Ambassador Holbrooke and Treasury U/S Levey in January, the Department requests all action posts deliver the general talking points in paras 5-6 and country specific talking points contained in the following paras: (1) Saudi Arabia ) para 8, (2) Kuwait ) para 10, (3) UAE ) para 12, and (4) Pakistan ) para 13. The talking points should be delivered by Ambassadors/Charge D'Affaires.
4. (C) In response to State 112368, the Department has received responses from Embassies Riyadh, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Islamabad regarding the resource capabilities devoted towards these efforts. The Department also received each Mission's evaluation of the effectiveness of host country institutions working on combating terrorism financing along with post's recommendations on ways forward.
----------------------------------------
General talking points for all Embassies
----------------------------------------
5. (SBU) Threat financing:
Cutting off the flow of funds to terrorist organizations and achieving stability in Af/Pak are top U.S. priorities.
These objectives require effective actions against terrorist fundraising in the Gulf by al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, LeT, and other Af/Pak-based violent extremist groups, all of which undermine the security of the entire international community. We will not succeed without your cooperation.
Long term success in combating terrorist financing requires a comprehensive, strategic approach that includes the following elements:
(1) aggressive action to identify, disrupt and deter terrorist donors, fundraisers and facilitators;
(2) appropriate legal measures, including effective prosecution, to hold terrorist financiers and facilitators publicly accountable and to send a strong message of deterrence to current and would-be donors that their actions face significant legal and social repercussions.
(3) strong oversight of charities, including their overseas branches, to ensure that these organizations are not supporting terrorist and extremist elements;
(4) strict enforcement of UN 1267 sanctions; and
(5) full compliance with international anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards, including vigorous enforcement.
6. (SBU) Charities:
The United States strongly supports legitimate charitable activities and is a strong proponent of private charitable giving.
We recognize and admire the emphasis placed on charity within Islam and we seek to work cooperatively with governments and organizations in the Islamic world to ensure that legitimate charitable activities thrive.
At the same time, we want to increase our cooperative efforts to ensure that extremists and terrorists do not exploit charitable giving.
--------------------------------------------- ----------
Country-specific background material and talking points
--------------------------------------------- ----------
7. (U) Saudi Arabia background
(S/NF) While the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) takes seriously the threat of terrorism within Saudi Arabia, it has been an ongoing challenge to persuade Saudi officials to treat terrorist financing emanating from Saudi Arabia as a strategic priority. Due in part to intense focus by the USG over the last several years, Saudi Arabia has begun to make important progress on this front and has responded to terrorist financing concerns raised by the United States through proactively investigating and detaining financial facilitators of concern. Still, donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide. Continued senior-level USG engagement is needed to build on initial efforts and encourage the Saudi government to take more steps to stem the flow of funds from Saudi Arabia-based sources to terrorists and extremists worldwide.
(S/NF) The USG engages regularly with the Saudi Government on terrorist financing. The establishment in 2008 of a Treasury attache office presence in Riyadh contributes to robust interaction and information sharing on the issue. Despite this presence, however, more needs to be done since Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial support base for al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, LeT, and other terrorist groups, including Hamas, which probably raise millions of dollars annually from Saudi sources, often during Hajj and Ramadan. In contrast to its increasingly aggressive efforts to disrupt al-Qa'ida's access to funding from Saudi sources, Riyadh has taken only limited action to disrupt fundraising for the UN 1267-listed Taliban and LeT-groups that are also aligned with al-Qa'ida and focused on undermining stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
(S/NF) Saudi Arabia has enacted important reforms to criminalize terrorist financing and restrict the overseas flow of funds from Saudi-based charities. However, these restrictions fail to include &multilateral organizations8 such as XXXXXXXXXXXX Intelligence suggests that these groups continue to send money overseas and, at times, fund extremism overseas. In 2002, the Saudi government promised to set up a &Charities Committee8 that would address this issue, but has yet to do so. The establishment of such a mechanism, however, is secondary to the primary U.S. goal of obtaining Saudi acknowledgement of the scope of this problem and a commitment to take decisive action.
(S/NF) Department note: The Department received post's comments regarding embassy staffing at Riyadh and recommendations for enhancing bilateral cooperation (ref B). The Department agrees with post's recommendation that the U.S. must reinforce, on a political level, the Saudi Arabia Government's recent acknowledgement that terrorist groups other than al-Qa'ida are a threat both to it and to regional stability. The Department also supports post's assessment that consistent engagement, including the exchange of actionable intelligence, by senior USG officials is paramount. We plan to discuss these issues with the SAG during upcoming senior-level USG visits.
8. (U) Saudi Arabia talking points
(S/REL USA, SAU) We recognize your government's efforts to disrupt al-Qa'ida networks in the Kingdom and we reaffirm our commitment to support the Saudi government in its actions on terror finance. We encourage your government to continue efforts against al-Qa'ida and stress the importance of sharing and acting on information related to terrorist financing.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We note your concerns with fundraising in the Kingdom by al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups and urge decisive action to enforce the UN 1267-mandated asset freeze against Taliban and LeT fundraising similar to Saudi efforts to enforce UN 1267 sanctions and take other appropriate action to target al-Qa'ida.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We underscore that the Taliban and LeT are aligned with al-Qa'ida and that your government's support for disrupting the financing of these groups is critical to the stability of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the broader Central and South Asian region. We emphasize the need to prevent the Taliban from using the cover of reconciliation talks to raise funds.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We urge your government to assume responsibility for the overseas operations of charities and NGOs headquartered in the Kingdom. We encourage you to prevent terrorists and their supporters from exploiting religious events (Hajj, Umrah, Ramadan) to raise funds. We acknowledge the recent adoption of stricter financial controls on charities, but urge greater regulation and oversight of the Saudi charitable sector.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We would like to stress our interest in broadening and deepening this dialogue and information exchange as we still lack detailed information on the ultimate sources of terrorist financing emanating from the Kingdom. We commend your government for recent efforts to put terrorists and terrorist financiers on trial, and we encourage you to publicize details of prosecutions to maximize the deterrent effects.
(S/REL USA, SAU) You have had success in detaining and deterring financial facilitators. However, we encourage your government also to focus on the long-term and more fundamental goal of dissuading donors from funding violent extremism.
(S/REL USA, SAU) We commend your government's effort over the past several years to use the media, internet, and other forms of public outreach to discourage extremism. We emphasize that a critical component in this campaign is cutting off the flow of funds from Saudi Arabia to foreign religious, charitable, and educational organizations that propagate violent extremist ideologies to vulnerable populations.
9. (U) Kuwait background
(S/NF) The USG has consistently engaged the Government of Kuwait (GOK) about the specific activities of terrorist financiers in country, Kuwaiti charities financing terrorism abroad, and Kuwait's lack of a comprehensive anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regime. While the GOK has demonstrated a willingness to take action when attacks target Kuwait, it has been less inclined to take action against Kuwait-based financiers and facilitators plotting attacks outside of Kuwait. Al-Qa'ida and other groups continue to exploit Kuwait both as a source of funds and as a key transit point.
(S/NF) The GOK has undertaken a number of initiatives to curb terrorist financing in the charitable sector (ending direct cash donations, increasing monitoring and supervising mosques and charitable organizations, and enhancing enforcement of regulations by a Ministry of Social Affairs task force). It also recently arrested some Kuwait-based al-Qa'ida facilitators, but it is too early to assess whether this marks a change in Kuwaiti policy of co-opting terrorists as a means of deflecting potential attacks against Kuwaiti interests.
(S/NF) Kuwait's law prohibits efforts to undermine or attack Arab neighbors, a basis for the prosecution of al-Qa'ida facilitators, Kuwait remains the sole Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) country that has not criminalized terrorist financing. The GOK faces an uphill battle to implement comprehensive terror finance legislation due to a lack of parliamentary support. However the government is also not currently prepared to push hard on this issue. The GOK at times has obstructed or been slow to enforce UN-mandated asset freezes of Kuwait-based entities.
(S/NF) A particular point of difference between the U.S. and Kuwait concerns Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS). In June 2008 the USG domestically designated all RIHS offices RIHS under Executive Order 13224 for providing financial and material support to al-Qa'ida and UN 1267-listed al-Qa'ida affiliates, including Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Jemaah Islamiyah, and Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya. The United States nominated RIHS for listing under UNSCR 1267 but Indonesia placed a technical hold on the RIHS listing due concerns regarding RIHS's presence in Indonesia. Libya also placed a hold - probably at Kuwait's behest - citing insufficient information on RIHS's activities. Indonesia has rotated off the United Nation's Security Council so only Libya's hold on RIHS remains. (Department note: Libya's hold will drop in 2010 unless one of the newly elected UNSC Members places a hold on our request to list RIHS.) In Kuwait, RIHS enjoys broad public support as a charitable entity. The GOK to date has not taken significant action to address or shut down RIHS's headquarters or its branches, which is consistent with GOK tolerance of similar behavior by Kuwaiti citizens and organizations as long as the behavior occurs or is directed outside of Kuwait.
(S/NF) Department note: The Department appreciates postVs thorough description of the staffing situation at Mission Kuwait (ref B). The Department commends U.S. Embassy Kuwait for taking an active approach in proposing a strategy to build GOK capacity in combating financial crimes through training and seminars focused on legislation and law enforcement (ref C). The opportunity to engage the GOK on improving its capabilities to deal with financial crimes is enthusiastically welcomed by agencies in Washington. Washington agencies appreciate post's assessment and identification of several focal areas that deal with financial crimes. These goals closely track the work of the IFTF Capacity Building Working Group. The Department commends Embassy Kuwait's recent support of Kuwait's National Anti Money Laundering Committee's AML conference in early December 2009. In response to post's request, the Department will work with relevant members of the Washington inter-agency to provide comments and feedback to the draft of Kuwait's amended AML law.
10. (U) Kuwait talking points
(S/REL USA, KWT) We appreciate the breadth and depth of our strong bilateral relationship. We would like to see our cooperation on counter-terrorist financing improve to a level that matches our excellent cooperation in many other areas. In this respect, the recent Kuwait anti-money laundering conference held in Kuwait is a positive step forward.
(S/REL USA, KWT) Our information indicates that Kuwaiti donors serve as an important source of funds and other support for al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups. The arrest in August of six Kuwaiti men who were plotting terrorist attacks on U.S. and Kuwait interests marks an important step in enhanced counterterrorism cooperation. We encourage you to keep up the positive momentum.
(S//REL USA, KWT) We underscore that the Taliban and LeT are aligned with al-Qaida and that your government's support for disrupting the financing of these groups is critical to the stability of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the broader Central and South Asian region. We emphasize the need to prevent the Taliban from using the cover of reconciliation talks to raise funds.
(S/REL USA, KWT) We appreciate your government's generosity for a wide range of important causes and for the positive contributions made by Kuwaiti charities. We commend Kuwait for some of the initiatives taken to enhance oversight of charitable donations, but we need you to do more to prevent the financing of terrorism abroad from Kuwaiti soil.
(S/REL USA, KWT) Our goal is to work more closely with your government to separate and protect legitimate charitable activity from those that fund terror. We have particular concerns about their foreign activities.
(S/REL USA, KWT) We remain concerned that the continued absence of counterterrorism legislation criminalizing terrorist financing will continue to prevent effective counterterrorist efforts.
(S/REL USA, KWT) We urge your government to prioritize the passage of counterterror finance legislation. Robust and comprehensive anti-money laundering and counterterror financing laws will enhance your government's ability to prosecute those seeking to undermine Kuwait's security, but will also enhance the reputation of Kuwait's financial sector as a whole.
(S/REL USA, KWT) If raised, Kuwait RIHS: We have shared our concerns with your government regarding RIHS on numerous occasions. We designated the organization in the United States as a specially designated terrorist entity based on information that RIHS funds have supported terrorist groups in various regions of the world. The USG is not alone in its concern; six other governments (Albania, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Russia) have taken enforcement action against RIHS branches in their countries.
(S//REL USA, KWT) We would welcome the opportunity to work more closely with you to ensure that RIHS and other charities cannot be used to support terrorists.
11. (U) United Arab Emirates background
(S/NF) UAE-based donors have provided financial support to a variety of terrorist groups, including al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, LeT and other terrorist groups, including Hamas. Washington agencies note, however, that they have limited information on the identity of Taliban and LeT donors and facilitators in the UAE. Hence there is limited information to be shared with local interlocutors. Nonetheless, the point can be emphasized that the UAE's role as a growing global financial center, coupled with weak regulatory oversight, makes it vulnerable to abuse by terrorist financiers and facilitation networks.
(S/NF) Department Note: The Department has received post's comments regarding personnel staffing at Mission UAE and the challenges post faces. The Department is supportive of the action plan laid out on engaging with the UAE on Taliban finance issues (ref E). The Department assesses that a bilateral commitment by the United States and the UAE to focus on weaknesses within its financial regulatory measures is an important step in making progress on strengthening UAE efforts to disrupt potential terrorist financing.
12. (U) United Arab Emirates talking points
(S/REL USA, ARE) We appreciate the depth and breadth of our bilateral relationship. Since 2001, we have developed a strong partnership with your government in countering financial support for al-Qa'ida, and more recently, in constricting Iran's ability to use UAE financial institutions to support its nuclear program.
(S/REL USA, ARE) We would like to extend our cooperation and partnership to efforts to deal with the threat represented by Taliban and LeT fundraising in the UAE. We believe that the United States and UAE, which both have troops in the field in Afghanistan, share a common interest in curtailing any Taliban or LeT fundraising activities and fully implementing UN 1267 sanctions on such activities on behalf of these groups in the UAE.
(S/REL USA, ARE) However, we are pleased that concerns have been raised in the UAE regarding the Taliban and LeT fundraising. We also commend the calls for increased vigilance, information sharing, and enforcement actions to disrupt and deter this activity.
(S/REL USA, ARE) In our view, the alignment of the Taliban and LeT with al-Qa'ida means that our mutual efforts to disrupt the financing of these groups also is critical to the stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
(S/REL USA, ARE) We emphasize the need to prevent the Taliban from using the cover of reconciliation talks to travel and raise funds.
(S/REL USA, ARE) We appreciate your government's willingness to work with the USG on cash courier interdiction and note that such efforts are crucial to undermine al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, and other groups' ability to exploit the UAE as a fundraising and facilitation hub. We urge your government to strengthen its regulatory and enforcement regime to interdict cash couriers transiting major airports.
13. (U) Pakistan background
(S/NF) Pakistan's intermittent support to terrorist groups and militant organizations threatens to undermine regional security and endanger U.S. national security objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although Pakistani senior officials have publicly disavowed support for these groups, some officials from the Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) continue to maintain ties with a wide array of extremist organizations, in particular the Taliban, LeT and other extremist organizations. These extremist organizations continue to find refuge in Pakistan and exploit Pakistan's extensive network of charities, NGOs, and madrassas. This network of social service institutions readily provides extremist organizations with recruits, funding and infrastructure for planning new attacks. On the international stage, Pakistan has sought to block the UNSCR 1267 listings of Pakistan-based or affiliated terrorists by requesting that China place holds on the nominations. China recently placed a technical hold on the designation of three Pakistan-based or affiliated terrorists nominated by India, although China did not prevent the most recent Pakistan-related U.S. designation nomination in June.
(S/NF) The Department has received post's comments regarding personnel staffing and the detailed description of the challenges faced by Embassy Islamabad in the area of terrorism finance (ref D). Department leaves it to post discretion to determine which departments within the host government should receive the points provided in para 16 so that Pakistan fully understands the priority the USG places on this issue.
14. (U) Pakistan talking points
(S/REL USA, PAK) Emphasize that Pakistan's support for disrupting financing to the Taliban and LeT obligatory pursuant to their obligations under UNSCR 1267 and successor resolutions, and is critical to achieving stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We are deeply concerned that Pakistan has failed to enact an AML/CTF law that meets APG/FATF standards. As you may realize the FATF is currently engaged in a &International Co-Operation Review Group8 exercise, that is likely to have very negative multilateral repercussions if the Parliament does not pass an adequate AML/CTF law.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We stress your government's obligation, under UNSCR 1267, and successor resolutions to strictly enforce existing sanctions against the 142 Taliban, LeT leader Hafiz Saeed, LeT/JUD, al Rashid Trust, al Akhtar Trust and other individuals and entities on the UN 1267 Consolidated List.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We urge your government to support the international community's efforts to combat terrorist financing. Your government's views of UNSCR 1267 listing requests for LeT and other Pakistan-based terrorist groups should be made on the merits of the requests and not linked to politics, including what country made the nomination or which countries are referenced in the public statements of the cases.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We urge your government to comply with UN and domestic legal obligations to enforce sanctions on the Pakistan-based, UN-proscribed NGOs al Rashid Trust and al Akhtar Trust, and all successor organizations that continue to funnel money and provide other forms of support to the Taliban and LeT.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We emphasize that social services provided by NGO extremist organizations, such as Jamaat-ud Dawa (JUD) challenge the legitimacy of your government to provide for its people. This includes relief efforts in the Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps of the Northwest Frontier Provinces by the new LeT/JUD charity Falah-e Insaniyat Foundation.
(S/REL USA, PAK) We stress that our governments must work together to ensure that there are moderate alternatives to terrorist-controlled social welfare networks upon which IDPs and other vulnerable populations currently rely. We must work together to develop and support NGOs not affiliated with terrorist groups, and establish a comprehensive oversight and enforcement mechanism for NGOs that is consistent with the Financial Action Task Force's international standard.
(S//REL USA, PAK) We urge your Government in the strongest possible terms to take action against the Haqqani network, which is funneling weapons and fighters across the border to fight U.S. and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. This network, led by Sirajuddin Haqqani who was listed by the UN under UNSCR 1267, funds its activities through illicit activities, including kidnapping, extortion, bank robbery, narcotics, smuggling, and fraud.
(S//REL USA, PAK) We urge your Government to replace the anti-money laundering decree recently promulgated by your Executive Branch with legislation fully consistent with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations and to ensure that the current decree can stand in court. The FATF Forty Plus Nine Recommendations are international standards, which Pakistan, by virtue of its membership in the Asia-Pacific Group, committed to.
15. (U) Qatar background
(S//NF) Department Note: Qatar is one of the four Gulf countries included in the IFTF, and accordingly, the IFTF developed the background information included in para 16 for inclusion in the diplomatic engagement strategy. However, given the current focus of U.S. engagement with the GOQ on terror finance related to Hamas, it would be counter-productive for Embassy Doha to engage the GOQ at this time on disrupting financial support of terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
(S/NF) Qatar has adopted a largely passive approach to cooperating with the U.S. against terrorist financing. Qatar's overall level of CT cooperation with the U.S. is considered the worst in the region. Al-Qaida, the Taliban, UN-1267 listed LeT, and other terrorist groups exploit Qatar as a fundraising locale. Although Qatar's security services have the capability to deal with direct threats and occasionally have put that capability to use, they have been hesitant to act against known terrorists out of concern for appearing to be aligned with the U.S. and provoking reprisals.
(S//NF) Department Note: The Department has received post's comments regarding personnel staffing and the thorough description of the coordination process on terrorist finance issues at Embassy Doha (ref F). Department appreciates post's assessment that GOQ definitions of what constitutes terrorism differs occasionally from those of the USG. Department agrees with post's suggested approach on this issue of engaging with direct discussions with host government officials.
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Points of contact and reporting deadline
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16. (U) Please direct any questions or comments on this request to EEB/ESC/TFS (Jay J. Jallorina or Linda Recht). Posts are requested to report back on responses from other governments by January 19, 2010. CLINTON
Monday, 11 January 2010, 05:47
S E C R E T RIYADH 000061
NOFORN SIPDIS
TREASURY FOR U/S STUART LEVEY AND AA/S HOWARD MENDELSOHN STATE FOR S/SRAP RICHARD HOLBROOKE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2020 TAGS: ECON, PREL, EFIN, KTFN, SA SUBJECT: POSITIVE TREASURY ENGAGEMENT WITH MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
Classified By: Acting DCM Lisa Carle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. On December 13, 2009, Treasury Department Acting Assistant Secretary of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis Howard Mendelsohn, along with GRPO officers and Treasury analysts, met with senior Saudi Mabahith officials to discuss suspected Taliban-related financial activity in Saudi Arabia. Prior to this meeting, Treasury and GRPO officials shared with Mabahith detailed information on the financing of the Taliban and other terrorist and extremist groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mabahith pointed to the General Intelligence Presidency (GIP), Saudi Arabia's overseas intelligence agency, as having the lead on Taliban matters for the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG). Mabahith pledged to disrupt any Taliban-related financial activity in the Kingdom, including fundraising carried out by Taliban leaders participating in reconciliation efforts. Mabahith asked GRPO and Treasury to provide additional detailed and actionable information to assist in its investigations.
2. (S/NF) During the course of the multi-hour intelligence exchange session, GRPO and Treasury analysts walked through the previously shared intelligence, which suggested that Taliban-related finance officials have visited Saudi Arabia in order to raise funds. Mabahith pledged to follow up on the information provided, to work through intelligence channels to share information and results, and submit additional requests for information. END SUMMARY.
(U) Taliban/Haqqani Network
3. (S/NF) Mendelsohn acknowledged the important steps the Saudi government has taken to combat al-Qaida financing, and highlighted the importance the USG places on combating Taliban financing. He stated that the Taliban receives significant money from narcotics trafficking and extortion, but noted that the U.S. believes that the group also receives significant funds from the Gulf, particularly from donors in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
4. (S/NF) Mabahith agreed that the Taliban is a serious threat and stated that Saudi authorities can more easily target al-Qaida financing since the group's members are frequently Saudi nationals, often with Saudi addresses and phone numbers. Taliban/Haqqani network fundraisers, however, usually enter the Kingdom from Afghanistan or Pakistan, and may use fabricated travel documents, according to Mabahith. Mabahith also acknowledged that the Hajj represents an opportunity for terrorist fundraisers. The same officials further acknowledged the historical ties that existed between Saudi Arabia and the Taliban, suggesting that lingering sympathies may create a potential donor base in the Kingdom.
5. (S/NF) Mendelsohn stated that senior Taliban officials travel to Saudi Arabia to discuss reconciliation issues, but said they also conduct fundraising activities while in the Kingdom. Mabahith initially responded that Taliban reconciliation issues were handled by the GIP and stated that the Mabahith has very little insight or coordination with the GIP in this area. After further discussion, Issa said that even if Taliban fundraisers travel to Saudi Arabia under the auspices of reconciliation, Mabahith officials would arrest anyone who breaks Saudi law while in the Kingdom.
6. (S/NF) Treasury analysts provided information on XXXXXXXXXXXX three senior Taliban officials who have made multiple fundraising visits to Saudi Arabia, according to U.S. intelligence. (NOTE: Information available to the USG and shared for this exchange included telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, and passport information for crosschecking against Saudi customs databases. END NOTE.) Mabahith was not familiar with the individuals and pledged to follow up on the identifying information provided by GRPO and Treasury. GRPO and Treasury analysts also shared names and phone numbers of multiple Taliban and Haqqani associates known either to reside in or travel to the Saudi Arabia.
7. (S/NF) Reviewing a list of several full or partial names of suspected Taliban donors in the Kingdom, Mabahith recognized XXXXXXXXXXXX, a prominent Saudi who reportedly gave XXXXXXXXXXXX $30,000 in September 2008. Mabahith had no information regarding XXXXXXXXXXXX's financial contributions to the Taliban, but speculated that the money could have come from a trust or a charity that was associated with XXXXXXXXXXXX, rather than from XXXXXXXXXXXX himself. Mabahith pledged to investigate XXXXXXXXXXXX and stated that it would not hesitate to "press him" regardless of his social status. Mendelsohn emphasized the importance of taking actions to delegitimize Taliban fundraising, just as the Saudi government has worked hard to delegitimize al-Qaida and deter donors from giving money to the group.
8. (S/NF) Mabahith also detailed the SAG's new fingerprinting system. Mabahith suggested that the system will likely be more effective against Taliban fundraisers, who travel through official points of entry, than it will be against al-Qaida-affiliated foreign fighters, who enter the country illegally. Mabahith also stated that this system should reduce the effectiveness of forged travel documents used at official points of entry. They pointed out the country's large borders, highlighting the continuing challenges they expect to encounter.
(S/NF) Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna
9. (S/NF) Mendelsohn also raised USG concerns about Pakistan-based extremist group Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna (JDQ) and its involvement in attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan. GRPO and Treasury passed names and other identifying information of suspected Saudi Arabia-based JDQ donors and affiliates. Mabahith pledged to investigate the names and follow up through intelligence channels.
(U) Al-Haramain Foundation
10. (S/NF) Mendelsohn commended Mabahith for its successful operations exposing and disrupting the terrorist support activities of the Saudi-based NGO al-Haramain Foundation (AHF), and pledged USG support for their investigation. Mabahith confirmed that more than 40 AHF-affiliated individuals had been arrested as a result and that Mabahith had a strong case against former AHF Director Aqil al-Aqil. Mabahith candidly noted that Saudi authorities were embarrassed about the way they had handled Aqil al-Aqil, since they had previously arrested and released him based on an earlier lack of evidence. SMITH
Friday, 29 May 2009, 11:46
C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 000716
EO 12958 DECL: 05/22/2019
TAGS PREL, PTER, EFIN, AF, PK, SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI INTERIOR MINISTRY BRIEFS SPECIAL ADVISOR
HOLBROOKE AND TREASURY DAS GLASER ON TERRORISM FINANCE
REF: RIYADH 702
Classified By: CDA DAVID RUNDELL, 1.4 (b),(d)
1. KEY POINTS:
-- (SBU) Special Advisor Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and Treasury DAS Glaser were briefed on Saudi terror finance efforts at a May 16 meeting with Interior Ministry (MOI) officials at the Security Forces Officers Club in Riyadh. Holbrooke also received a briefing on Saudi counterterrorism strategies (reftel). -- (SBU) Saudi Arabia will join the Egmont Group by the end of May 2009. -- (C) Holbrooke pushed for stronger cooperation in pursuing sources of funding for the Taliban, particularly in the Gulf States. -- (C) The Hajj is still a major security loophole for the Saudis, since pilgrims often travel with large amounts of cash and the Saudis cannot refuse them entry into Saudi Arabia. A new Saudi law requires arriving travelers to declare cash over certain amounts. -- (C) The MOI is concerned about funds flowing to Hizballah from the Saudi Shi'a community. -- (C) The political situation in Pakistan affects MOI's intelligence cooperation with Pakistan's ISI.
NEW SAUDI FIU PROMISES BETTER COOPERATION
2. (C) The briefing was delivered by officials from the MOI's new Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). They said the Saudi FIU's mission is to cooperate with all other authorities to combat money laundering and terrorism finance, and outlined the divisions of FIU and their responsibilities to receive, analyze, investigate, and act upon reports of terrorist finance activities in concert with other Saudi financial and law enforcement agencies. The FIU had a budget of $31 million in 2008.
3. (C) Holbrooke asked how the U.S. was working with the new FIU. DAS Glaser said FIU cooperation will enable Saudi Arabia to plug into the global terror finance context. The U.S. has tested the Saudi system with three requests and has received a good response. Glaser added that Saudi success in rolling up domestic terror cells has had a positive impact but the need now was to target financial donors and networks that channel the funds to AQ and the Taliban. The daily work of exchanging information with Saudi Arabia was going well.
4. (C) Holbrooke asked whether the relationship could be further improved. The Saudis replied that Saudi Arabia would join the Egmont Group by the end of May 2009. Holbrooke said terrorists exploit the seams between countries such as borders, free trade zones, and international networks such as Hawala systems, and that in this respect drug proceeds were not the primary source of funds for the Taliban; rather private donations from the Gulf were the chief source of Taliban financing. This indicated the need for a new level of cooperation, he said, to address funds flowing from the Gulf to the Taliban, AQ, and South Asian terrorist groups. In particular, the UAE, Pakistan, and the UK must be on board.
5. (C) MOI counterterrorism advisor Major General Khalid al-Humaydan said Saudi Arabia was working to create a "coherent plan" on terrorist finance that included establishing a legal basis for taking action against financiers. The MOI had no problem targeting organizations, he said, but preferred to go after financiers on an individual basis: "the bad apples, not the whole barrel," he said. With the FIU in place, he said, the MOI would be better able to "turn leads into tangible evidence" and follow up with counterpart authorities in other countries. "We used to call Dubai the 'Black Hole'," of terrorist finance, he said. Glaser agreed with the need for a comprehensive strategy. He said he understood the Saudi approach to focus on individuals rather than organizations, but there was another more common model that focused on organizations as part of a broader terrorist network.
HAJJ, HIZBALLAH, AND PAKISTAN
6. (C) MOI Senior Advisor Major General Dr. Sa'ad al-Jabri said the Saudi approach was based on the fact that Saudi Arabia had been in a war and had to act. Saudi authorities had detained over 4,000 individuals, some of whom were suspected of terrorist financing offenses and would act if supplied with information. Hajj was still a big problem for the Saudis, since they could not refuse to let pilgrims enter the country. Some of the non-Saudi terrorism detainees in Saudi Arabia had entered as pilgrims. The Saudi government recently passed a law requiring arriving travelers to declare cash above a certain amount, but Hajj was still "a vacuum in our security," he admitted. Another problem was money going to Hizballah from Saudi Shiites. The Saudis' focus had been on funds from Sunni sources, but they needed to focus on the Shi'a too, Dr. Sa'ad said.
7. (C) Holbrooke noted that Pakistan was also a center for terrorist financing through Islamic charities and asked whether the Saudis were monitoring the large Pakistani community in Saudi Arabia, and whether the Saudis were consulting with the governments of Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh about the issue. Al-Humaydan said the Saudis had detained numerous individuals from these countries and were seeking cooperation to investigate their activities. He added that "we talk to ISI (Pakistan's intelligence agency) and get a good response, but we think ten times before approaching them; things are changing there and we are advised to be careful." Political unrest and new ISI leadership were the principal changes, he said. As a result, he concluded, "We only trust face-to-face transmission of information." The MOI had shared information with ISI on Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia suspected of terror finance, but ISI had not responded.
DON'T FORGET IRAN
8. (C) Holbrooke asked whether the Taliban still found support in Saudi Arabia. Dr. Sa'ad answered that support from Saudi Arabia was less than it had been in earlier years, such as the 1980s, but was still present. Holbrooke asked about Iran, and Dr. Sa'ad replied that in the Saudi view, Iran was a "serious contributor" to terrorism activities in many places, including Yemen, North Africa, and Latin America.
9. (C) Holbrooke concluded by assuring his hosts of the U.S. commitment to cooperation on fighting terrorism and for better relations with the Muslim world.
10. (U) Meeting participants
U.S.
Special Advisor Ambassador Richard Holbrooke Barnett Rubin, Senior Advisor Dan Glaser, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury David Rundell, Charge d'Affaires Andrew Roth, Embassy Riyadh Edwin Brown, Embassy Riyadh (notetaker) Jeff Smith, Embassy Riyadh
Saudi Arabia
Major General Sa'ad al-Jabri, Senior Advisor, Ministry of the Interior
Major General Khalid al-Humaydan ("Abu Ali"), Counterterrorism Advisor, Ministry of the Interior
Brigadier General Ahmed al-Issa, U.S. Liaison, Ministry of the Interior
Captain Bandar al-Subaie, Assistant to MG Sa'ad al-Jabri
FIU briefers
11. (U) Amb. Holbrooke cleared this telegram.
RUNDELL
Thursday, 24 September 2009, 03:22
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002562
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, IZ
SUBJECT: THE GREAT GAME, IN MESOPOTAMIA: IRAQ AND ITS
NEIGHBORS, PART I
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, for reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (U) This is the first of two cables reviewing Iraq's relations with key neighboring states, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Turkey, in the wake of the August 19 bombings. Part II reviews Iraq's relations with Syria, in the wake of the August 19 bombings.
2. (C) Summary: Iraq's relations with its neighbors represent a critical element in its efforts to maintain security and stability and normalize its position in the Gulf and the broader region. While Iraq made substantial progress in 2008-09 on these fronts, there remained unfinished business, especially in terms of relations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Syria. The August 19 bombings -- targeting the MFA, and by extension Iraq's improving relations with its neighbors -- represent a serious setback to that progress and have alarmed senior Iraqi officials that Iraqi Sunni Arab neighbors in particular now view those earlier gains as "reversible." Iraq views relations with Saudi Arabia as among its most challenging, given Riyadh's money, deeply ingrained anti-Shia attitudes, and suspicions that a Shia-led Iraq will inevitably further Iranian regional influence. Iraqi contacts assess that the Saudi goal (and that of most other Sunni Arab states, to vary degrees) is to enhance Sunni influence, dilute Shia dominance and promote the formation of a weak and fractured Iraqi government. Coincidentally, Iranian efforts are driven by a clear determination to see a sectarian, Shia-dominated government that is weak, disenfranchised from its Arab neighbors, detached from the U.S. security apparatus and strategically dependent on Iran. Neither of these objectives is in the U.S. interest. In the longer term, we will need to flesh out ideas for a post-GCC security architecture that includes Iraq more fully, develops ways to contain Iranian regional influence, and shapes the special position Iraq will likely occupy in the Gulf in ways that further our interests and those of our Gulf partners. End Summary.
SAUDI ARABIA -- ANTI-SHIISM AS FOREIGN POLICY?
--------------------------------------------- -
3. (C) Iraqi officials view relations with Saudi Arabia as among their most problematic, although they are usually careful with U.S. officials to avoid overly harsh criticism, given our close relations with the Saudis. Iraqi officials note that periodic anti-Shia outbursts from Saudi religious figures are often allowed to circulate without sanction or disavowal from the Saudi leadership. This reality reinforces the Iraqi view that the Saudi state religion of Wahabbi Sunni Islam condones religious incitement against Shia. The suspicion is that these anti-Shia attitudes color Saudi views of a Shia-led Iraq. The Saudis have traditionally viewed Iraq as a Sunni-dominated bulwark against the spread of Shiism and Iranian political influence. In the wake of bombings in predominantly Shia areas across the country in June 2009 that killed dozens, PM Maliki pointed publicly to one such statement, made by a Saudi imam in May, and noted, "We have observed that many governments have been suspiciously silent on the fatwa provoking the killing of Shiites."
4. (C) For now the Saudis are using their money and media power XXXXXXXXXXXX to support Sunni political aspirations, exert influence over Sunni tribal groups, and undercut the Shia-led Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Iraqi National Alliance (INA). NSC advisor QIraq (ISCI) and Iraqi National Alliance (INA). NSC advisor Safa al-Sheikh told us recently that Saudi influence in Iraq was significant, perhaps more significant than Iran's at the moment, given the financial and media assets at its disposal, and given Iran's recent internal distractions. He described the Saudi "media message" as having shifted a few years ago from one that was hostile to the GOI and sympathetic to the insurgency, to one that focused now more on an anti-ISCI message. According to PM Advisor Sadiq al-Rikabi, the Saudis are opposed to a strong Shia-led INA. Al-Sheikh also assessed that the Saudis would try to curb ISCI and INA and throw support to Sunni groups to counter Iranian influence, steps that could end up indirectly supporting Maliki, if he continues to pursue a cross-sectarian coalition in the elections. These contacts assess that the Saudi goal (and to varying degrees most other Sunni states) is to enhance Sunni influence, dilute Shia dominance, and promote the formation of a weak and more fractured Iraqi government. (COMMENT: Coincidentally, Iran also sees as in its interest a weak Iraqi government, albeit one with Shia firmly in control.)
5. (C) Some observers see a more malign Saudi influence. A recent Iraqi press article quoted anonymous Iraqi intelligence sources assessing that Saudi Arabia was leading a Gulf effort to destabilize the Maliki government and was
BAGHDAD 00002562 002 OF 003
financing "the current al Qaida offensive in Iraq." The article also quoted MP Haidar al-Abadi, a Maliki political ally, insisting that Gulf Arab neighbors wanted to destabilize Iraq. A few of our more senior contacts hint at similar malign intentions "by some neighbors," making clear without being explicit that they are referring to Saudi Arabia.
KUWAIT: RELATIONS HOSTAGE TO CHAPTER VII CONCERNS
--------------------------------------------- ----
6. (C) Although Kuwait re-opened its Embassy and sent an ambassador in 2008, bilateral relations remain hostage to Chapter VII concerns. While the Kuwaitis have indicated some willingness to reduce significantly the amount of compensation Iraq is paying under UNSCR 687, they have insisted in return on GOI re-affirmation in its entirety of UNSCR 833, entailing acceptance of the land borders and maritime boundary between the two countries. The latter in particular is highly problematic for the Iraqi leadership, especially in an election year, according to senior contacts. At present, Iraq has unimpeded navigational access from the Gulf to the port of Um Qasr, but some two-thirds of the deep water channel of the Khor Abdullah now lies -- as a result of the 833 demarcation -- in Kuwaiti territorial waters. Some observers, such as Da'wa Party MP Sami al-Askari, have expressed concern to us that after U.S. forces withdraw fully, Kuwait will try to control Iraq's access to the sea, "and that border demarcation will allow it." In his view, "No Iraqi leader could ever formally recognize the maritime border." Even PM Maliki believes this. Despite these difficulties, the Iraqi and Kuwaiti sides have made significant progress cooperating in the past six months on Kuwaiti missing persons and property. NSC advisor al-Sheikh believes that the Chapter VII issues with Kuwait will eventually be resolved and that "we do not consider Kuwait a problem country" like some of the other neighbors. Nevertheless, the border issue is an acute friction point and could, in the view of Maliki, become grounds for confrontation between the two.
IRAN'S LOOMING PRESENCE
-----------------------
7. (C) Iranian influence in Iraq remains pervasive, as Tehran manipulates a range of levers to mold Iraq's political, religious, social, and economic landscape. Overall, however, the GOI views its relations with Iran in a special category, posing risks that are manageable and not viewed as existential threats to the state. Obviously many Sunni contacts -- and many of our allies in the region -- see the situation in far starker terms and fear that Iraq could fall into Iran's political orbit and rendered unable to speak or act independently, once U.S. troops draw down. Iranian efforts are driven by a clear determination to see a sectarian, Shia-dominated government that is weak, disenfranchised from its Arab neighbors, detached from the U.S. security apparatus and strategically dependent on Iran.
8. (C) While significantly weaker than the Saudis and others on media, the Iranians fund political parties and key individuals (as other neighboring countries do), according to a range of well-informed Iraqi contacts. Shia contacts like PM advisor Rikabi and NSC advisor al-Sheikh, as well as others such as (Kurdish) FM Zebari, do not dismiss the significant Iranian influence but instead argue that it:
-- is best countered by Iraqi Shia political actors, who know how to deal with Iran;
-- is not aimed, unlike that of some Sunni Arab neighbors, at fomenting terrorism that would destabilize the government; Qfomenting terrorism that would destabilize the government;
-- will naturally create nationalistic Iraqi resistance to it (both Shia and more broadly), if other outsiders do not intervene to stoke Sunni-Shia sectarian tension; and
-- has been frozen in place to some extent in the past few months by the political turmoil inside Iran.
9. (C) According to al-Sheikh, Iraq and Iran have "very special, very frank talks" in which Iraq's Shia-led government is able to push back effectively against Iranian influence on some fronts. Observers generally credit the Iranians with playing a more sophisticated game than the Syrians, as they try to shape the political process to their liking. These contacts acknowledge that Iran is providing some form of covert support to armed groups like the Promise Day Brigades and other small groups, but maintain they have stopped support for the big militias. It should be noted that some contacts demonstrate discomfort when asked about Iranian influence and show an alacrity for moving on to other
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neighbors in the region. TURKEY: BETTER THAN THE REST
----------------------------
10. (C) Relations with Turkey are relatively positive. Turkey intervened diplomatically to attempt to mediate the post-August 19 crisis with the Syrians, and unlike the Iranian effort, seems to have gotten some traction with the parties. The effort has been well-received here, even if concrete progress has been limited. The Iraqis and Turks have established a Strategic Commission that meets periodically at the ministerial level, paving the way for head of state visits marking significant economic cooperation. PM Erdogan is expected in Baghdad in October, following up on the ministerial in mid-September in Ankara. Bilateral trade is currently at $7 billion annually, and the two countries hope it will expand significantly in the coming decade. Moreover, Turkey has worked to improve its relations with the KRG, and they have significantly increased their diplomatic and commercial presence in the Kurdish areas. However, the Turks also have been active on the Iraqi political front, funding groups like the Mosul-based Sunni Al-Hudba movement, in an effort to offset Kurd influence in areas outside Kurdistan.
11. (C) It is the water issue that threatens to complicate an improving Iraq-Turkey relationship. According to DFM Labid Abbawi, Iraq needs a flow of 700 cubic meters of water for its needs but could get back with a minimum of 500. However, Turkey was only allowing a flow of about 230 cubic meters (with an uptick in August and September beyond that level). A recent visit to Turkey by the Iraqi Minister of Water was not very productive, he noted.
THE WAY FORWARD
---------------
12. (C) It will help Iraq's efforts to maintain stability and security, and to continue moving forward in normalization with neighbors, if we and the P-5 can provide the requisite support for the appointment by the UN of a senior official (someone other than SRSG head Melkert, who already has a full plate with UNAMI) to look into the August 19 bombings. We should also weigh in with key neighbors to urge a redoubling of efforts in normalizing relations with Iraq, keeping up the pressure on Egypt and Saudi Arabia in particular to return their Ambassadors. We should also caution Iraq's Arab neighbors against efforts to inflame Shia-Sunni anxieties through their support for Sunni parties and by Shia-critical media attacks. Regarding Kuwait, we will need to work for steady progress on Chapter VII where possible, focusing on Oil-for-Food and WMD resolutions 1546 and 707, initially, with a push after elections to make progress on the Kuwait-related resolutions.
13. (C) In the longer term, we will need to flesh out ideas for a post-GCC security architecture that includes Iraq more fully, develops ways to contain Iranian regional influence, and shapes the special position Iraq will likely occupy in the Gulf in ways that further our interests and those of our Gulf partners. The challenge for us is to convince Iraq neighbors, particularly the Sunni Arab governments, that relations with a new Iraq are not a zero-sum game, where if Iraq wins, they lose. We still have work to do to convince them that a strong, stable, democratic (and inevitably Shia-led) Iraq is the best guarantee that Iraq will be able to shake Iranian manipulation and see its future bound up with that of the West and its moderate Arab neighbors.
HILL
Thursday, 19 November 2009, 12:06
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 DOHA 000677
EO 12958 DECL: 10/05/2019
TAGS PREL, AMGT, KSPR, QA
SUBJECT: THE MOVE TOWARD AN INTERAGENCY SYNCHRONIZATION
PLAN: THE RESULTS OF EMBASSY DOHA'S THIRD FIELD ASSESSMENT
REF: DOHA 140
Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b and d).
----------
KEY POINTS
----------
-- (C) Embassy Doha's third interagency off-site was held September 30, 2009. The third in a series of semi-annual off-site sessions (reftels report on the first, held September 2008 and the second, held March 2009), the off-site's objective was to review and update our field interagency assessment of key trends in Qatar over the coming 36 months.
-- (C) The off-site identified three new trends with important implications for U.S. policy: the emergence of the GOQ's internal security apparatus as a security force that eclipses in importance the Qatari military (para 4); the emergence of food security as a Qatari national security imperative (para 16) and the emergence of Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection as an area of increasing GOQ focus (paras 4, 8, 11 and 17).
-- (C) The off-site concluded with a look at mechanisms for interagency synchronization to most effectively pursue the policy imperatives identified during the off-site discussions. Embassy Doha's synchronization process has materially developed since the last off-site. We now have five active synchronization groups that bring together interagency players to achieve shared interagency goals identified through the multi-step synchronization process.
End key points.
1. (C) At our third inter-agency off-site, the interagency team focused on trends in the following areas:
-- Political and Foreign Policy -- Military -- Intelligence and Counterterrorism -- Crime -- Economic and Environmental -- Food Security -- Trade -- Society, Education and Media -- Demographic and Consular
2. (C) The remaining sections of this cable, keyed to these topic areas, provide a short synopsis of our interagency conclusions, followed by a description of the interagency synchronization process. We have also looked back upon the conclusions reached in our two previous off-site exercises and assessed the overall state and movement of several key trends identified across the three off-sites.
-----------------------------------
POLITICAL AND FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS
-----------------------------------
3. (C) AL THANI RULE IS SECURE; CROWN PRINCE EMERGES
-- (C) We expect the Al Thani family's rule to remain uncontested over the next 36 months. Given the history of intra-family coups in this country and known rivalries between key members of the ruling family, however, we expect that some friction between powerful players will continue. The Amir's health is reportedly poor but stable and we expect a smooth transition in power to his son after his eventual passing. To ensure that smooth transition, we expect to see the continued emergence of Crown Prince Shaykh Tamim as more than a figurehead, as his father continues to groom him for the highest office in Qatar. We predict that he will increasingly issue more Amiri decrees under his own authority and take on more symbolic leadership duties normally reserved for the Amir, such as greeting Eid well-wishers (something he did in September for the first time in lieu of his father).
-- (C) The Amir and Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim will continue to dominate Qatar's highly personalized foreign policy, although somewhat more attention will be paid to foreign humanitarian assistance and regional social and educational initiatives led by the Amir's consort, Shaykha Mozah, than was previously the case. The new Minister of State for International Cooperation, Khalid al-Attiyah; the Amir's Office Director (and daughter), Shaykha Hind; and the PM's new Foreign Policy Advisor, Shaykh Mohammed (the Amir's son), are part of a new generation of capable, Western-educated and energetic Qataris whose role in influencing and shaping foreign policy we expect to increase slightly over the coming 36 months.
-- (C) Over all three off-sites we assessed little or no movement in the trend toward personality-based, authoritarian rule in Qatar. Seminal and wide-ranging education reforms may have planted the seeds that will move this trend towards rationalized, decentralized government, but these effects are still several years away.
-- (C) Over the next 36 months, Qatar will continue to pragmatically pursue relations with Iran, with whom it shares the world's largest non-associated natural gas field. Qatar will also continue to pursue its classic vulnerable small-state policies aimed either at pleasing as many players as possible or - where competing demands make this impossible - at containing and counter-balancing irritation caused by these policies. We expect Qatar therefore to persist in supporting problematic players such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria, even as it attempts to strengthen its relationship with the United States and its GCC neighbors. We expect the trend in favor of using Al Jazeera as an informal tool of GOQ foreign policy to continue undiminished.
-- (C) Over the past three off-sites Qatar has maintained this trend toward small-state policies and an orientation towards the middle, with the exception of a sudden swing towards the radical camp (since subsided) that reflected high-profile pro-Hamas actions taken by the GOQ in the wake of the Israeli incursion into Gaza in January 2009.
----------------------------
MILITARY AND SECURITY TRENDS
----------------------------
4. (C) A NEW TREND: THE RISE OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE
-- (C) The creation of a professional military force will remain a second-order priority for Qatar. The Qatar Armed Forces (QAF) is not a powerful force in Qatari society, which lacks a martial tradition. The QAF could put up little defense against Qatar's primary perceived threats - Saudi Arabia and Iran - and the U.S. military's presence here is larger and far more capable than Qatar's force of approximately 8,000 men at arms. Nurturing this force over the next 36 months will therefore remain something of an afterthought for the Qatari Government.
-- (C) The Internal Security Force (ISF), on the other hand, is quickly emerging as Qatar's premier security force. While threats by terrorists or outside military forces will remain relatively low over the next 36 months, the Qatari Government recognizes that its economic and political survival depends on its critical energy infrastructure and is increasingly alarmed by vulnerabilities to that infrastructure. As Qatar focuses on its internal security, the ISF will continue to command a larger role in the three years.
-- (C) In that connection, we expect to see ISF's budgets for training and procurement increase; its requests for bilateral training programs to increase; and its role in the U.S.-Qatari bilateral relationship to grow.
-- (C) Despite ISF's increasing importance, the QAF will remain the steward of the U.S.-Qatari military relationship for the foreseeable future. Developments in that relationship on the Qatari side will continue to be personality-driven and flow from the top down. For that reason, we expect to see more frequent visits by QAF senior officers to the United States, and more senior engagement by U.S. component commanders over the coming 36 months.
5. (C) IMPROVEMENT IN U.S.-QATAR MILITARY RELATIONS
-- (C) Tactical irritants involving customs and immigration for U.S. deployed forces will reduce over the next 36 months as senior U.S.-Qatari military engagement increases, and as deployed forces demonstrate their willingness to be "good guests" by developing and enforcing procedures - including disciplinary measures - designed to respect Qatari law.
-- (C) Qatar's annoyance at a relatively small percentage of infractions of Qatari immigration and customs laws by U.S. forces will reduce as deployed forces demonstrate that they take these infractions seriously, are transparent about the number and nature of them with Qatari authorities, and implement measures to address them. In addition, we expect the activities of the Embassy's Joint Pol-Mil Issues synchronization group (see para 26) to boost the trend towards reduced friction in this key area.
-- (C) The overall mil-mil relationship declined in warmth between the first and second off-sites - partly due to customs/immigration issues and partly due to diminished U.S. military engagement with Qatar at the senior strategic level. At the third off-site, the mil-mil relationship was trending upward, as improvements occurred in these two areas. 6. (C) REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: APPROACH INFORMED BY COUNTRY TEAM
-- (C) The off-site team received a U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) brief on the concept of a Regional Security Architecture that will attempt - based on shared US-GCC interests and objectives - to create intra-GCC networks in the areas of leadership, equipping, operations, training, information-sharing and posture.
-- (C) In shaping its approach to each country in the RSA, the briefer said CENTCOM will rely on Chiefs of Mission, who can deploy the situational awareness and interagency platforms of the country teams that they lead to find the best fit for the RSA as a mechanism to advance U.S. national security goals in each country in a synchronized, effective way.
-- (C) The group assessed GOQ willingness to engage in military multilateralism as currently very weak, and predicted this weakness will impact negatively on the success of the RSA concept, unless primarily bilateral channels are activated to support it.
-------------------
INTELLIGENCE TRENDS
-------------------
7. (S/NF) POOR CT COOPERATION TO CONTINUE
-- Over the next 36 months, Qatar's intelligence services will remain focused in priority order on:
a) regime protection; b) the existential threat from Iran; c) threats of increased criminal and/or collective labor activity by third-country workers; and d) counter-terrorism.
-- As a result, to the extent the USG remains focused on counter-terrorism, cooperation between our intelligence services will remain poor, because Qatar's State Security (QSS) simply does not see a credible terrorist threat here.
8. (S/NF) A BRIGHT SPOT: CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
-- We assess that the Qataris will be more amenable to cooperating on areas that they perceive to be of greatest threat, such as Iran and the threat it poses to Qatar's critical energy infrastructure protection. We expect the Qataris to respond positively to any discussion of Iran and critical energy infrastructure protection (CEIP). The activities of our Critical Infrastructure Protection synchronization group (see para 26) in the coming months will be aimed at exploiting current dynamics in this area.
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CRIME TRENDS
-----------
9. (SBU) Qatar's crime index is among the lowest in the world, but has increased by more than 300 percent since 2005, due primarily to a doubling of the expatriate population, rapid economic growth, and the widespread use of the Internet.
10. (C) Qatar's continued construction boom, overall economic growth, and rapidly expanding airline can be expected to attract criminal activity over the coming 36 months, but we do not expect a radical overall increase. 11. (C) Given these trends, over the next 36 months, we expect the GOQ to:
a) increase requests for training by the USG; b) increase its use of information technology to make up for a lack of manpower in order to monitor activity and conduct operations; c) increase cooperation with GCC and others on fugitive tracking and recovery; d) increase its critical infrastructure protection capabilities.
-- (C) Over the past three off-sites, petty crime has remained low, with a slight increase assessed at the third off-site. Organized crime has remained low and steady over the three-offsite period, while terrorist financing remained moderate and steady over the same period. Cyber crime remained low, with a slight increase assessed at the third off-site.
---------------------------------
ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS
---------------------------------
12. (C) Qatar will continue to diversify its liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets, particularly in Europe, where it shows signs of positioning itself as a swing supplier. This enhances Qatar's economic security and, by making more countries reliant upon a Qatari supply of LNG, this move will also contribute to Qatar's physical security.
13. (C) Qatar's reliance upon expatriate labor will continue unabated over the next three years, although we do not expect it to grow. While many of its major highway projects will be completed within that period, the need for expatriate labor will shift toward projects such as the expanded Doha International Airport, the seaport construction project, and the Qatar-Bahrain causeway.
14. (C) Qatar will continue its interest in environmental protection, and will seek U.S. assistance and expertise in increasing the capacity of its environmental bureaucracy. Such assistance, beginning with a GOQ study group expected to travel to the U.S. in December to engage with the USEPA (with a view toward the eventual placement of an EPA Fellow in the Ministry of Environment) will deepen over the next three years.
15. (C) Qatar will continue to show an interest in acquiring nuclear technology. Following a GOQ move away from acquiring such technology for energy needs, we expect the current trend in favor of acquiring it for medical applications to grow over the next three years.
--------------------------------------------
A NEW TREND: THE IMPORTANCE OF FOOD SECURITY
--------------------------------------------
16. (SBU) FOOD SECURITY EQUALS NATIONAL SECURITY
-- (SBU) Gulf countries can produce no more than 10-15 percent of their own food needs, and therefore regard food security as a national security issue. To that end, Qatar has established a National Food Security Program (NFSP) under the direction of the Crown Prince.
-- (SBU) The NFSP is tasked with developing a food security strategy for Qatar, and a strategy for leading the rest of the Arab world in developing new structures and partnerships for achieving food security for the entire region.
-- (C) We expect the NFSP and others seized with food security over the coming 36 months to diminish their interest in highly complicated and risky land purchases in developing countries and to shift toward establishing partnerships with producers in developed countries, such as the U.S. We expect to see growing interest in learning about sophisticated financial instruments that can be employed to smooth out prices and supply gaps, such as commodity futures and virtual stocking. We also expect Qatar to improve its stocking capabilities, both onshore and off.
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TRADE TRENDS
------------
17. (SBU) STEADY GDP GROWTH = STEADY GROWTH IN U.S. EXPORTS -- (SBU) U.S. exports to Qatar surged by more than 340% from 2003 to 2008, to a total of USD 3.2 billion, producing a trade surplus for the United States. As a result, Qatar has become our fourth-largest export market in the Middle East, overtaking Iraq, Morocco and Kuwait in recent years. We expect export growth to continue by 20-30 percent annually over the coming 36 months. High-tech imports will claim an increasing share of U.S. exports, and these will primarily be focused on the oil and gas sector.
-- (SBU) Opportunities for greater U.S. exports will develop over the coming 36 months to the extent that port-of-entry difficulties are reduced for visiting businesspeople and U.S. businesses focus on newly-identified internal security requirements by the MOI, to include training and equipment for critical energy infrastructure protection. Our Critical Infrastructure Protection synchronization group (see para 26) will focus on shaping, influencing and exploiting opportunities in this key area.
-----------------------------------
SOCIETY, EDUCATION AND MEDIA TRENDS
-----------------------------------
18. (SBU) SOCIETAL ATTITUDES TOWARD U.S. WILL REMAIN CONFLICTED
-- (SBU) Qataris' views of the United States in general, and the advantages their country accrues through its relations with us, continued to decline through 2009. Qataris' confidence in the USG to deal responsibly with regional problems has, however, continued to increase, marking a 15 point jump to about 50 percent from December 2008 to July 2009. We expect these conflicted views of the United States to continue over the coming 36 months, with the percentage of Qataris feeling confident in the USG's ability to address regional problems steadily increasing as we responsibly end the war in Iraq and engage carefully with Iran.
19. (SBU) EDUCATION: SOCIAL CALAMITY OR BEGINNING OF A SOLUTION?
-- (SBU) Qatari divorces tripled between 1986 and 2007, and anecdotal evidence suggests that larger numbers of Qatari women have decided to remain unwed. We expect these trends, which some Qatari observers refer to as a "social calamity waiting to happen," to continue as long as the percentage of Qatari women achieving secondary and tertiary degrees far outstrips men.
-- (SBU) The Qatari Government's implementation of a remedy - an educational reform plan designed by RAND and considered one of the most ambitious in the world - will reach completion over the next 36 months, but will not produce measurable results that quickly. The reform, which is converting all Qatari public schools to something resembling U.S. charter schools, aims to make education more interesting and meaningful for students while preparing them to compete in today's globalizing job market.
20. (C) AL JAZEERA WILL REMAIN A TOOL OF FOREIGN POLICY
-- (C) Over the coming 36 months - in a trend that has held steady over the past three off-sites - the regional Al Jazeera Arabic news channel will continue to be an instrument of Qatari influence, and continue to be an expression, however uncoordinated, of the nation's foreign policy. Qatar will continue to use Al Jazeera as a bargaining tool to repair relationships with other countries, particularly those soured by Al Jazeera's broadcasts, including the United States.
-- (C) Anecdotal evidence suggests, and former Al Jazeera board members have affirmed, that the United States has been portrayed more positively since the advent of the Obama administration. We expect that trend to continue and to further develop as U.S.-Qatari relations improve, particularly to the extent that Al Jazeera coverage is made part of our bilateral discussions - as it has been to favorable effect between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and other countries.
-- (C) Over the past three off-sites we have assessed as steady the lack of overall media freedom in Qatar. Although overt and official censorship is not present, self- and discreet official censorship continue to render Qatari domestic media tame and ineffective.
-------------------------------
DEMOGRAPHIC AND CONSULAR TRENDS
-------------------------------
21. (C) Qatar's actual population, which roughly doubled from 2004 to 2008, is around two million, according to the Minister of State for Internal Affairs. As many as 1.8 million of this population is of foreign origin. These numbers are expected to grow among every nationality and region of origin, checked only by Qatar's economic prospects and Qatari security concerns about certain nationalities such as Pakistanis and Iranians. Indians account for the largest national group in Qatar with more than 467,000 people - about twice the number of Qataris.
-- (C) As Qataris become an increasingly smaller minority in their own country despite a relatively high birth rate, we expect to detect an increasingly embattled feeling among Qataris that will result in:
a) tighter restrictions on unskilled laborers and an increased focus on recruiting more western, white-collar workers; b) diversification away from India as a primary source of labor; and c) policy decisions increasingly driven by the imperative of reducing the number of foreigners that were brought in on a temporary basis to build up the nation's infrastructure.
-- (C) The number of American citizens who registered with the Embassy grew by roughly five times from 2000 to 2008. The American community is expected to plateau at what we estimate to be the current number of Americans present in Qatar -- about 15,000 (not including deployed military forces). Most of those Americans work primarily in the energy, educational and security sectors.
---------------------------------------
THE INTERAGENCY SYNCHRONIZATION PROCESS
---------------------------------------
22. (C) The DCM briefed the group on the status of "synchronization" - Embassy Doha's whole of government approach to USG policy implementation in Qatar. The goal of synchronization is to arrange in space, time and purpose, for maximum effect, the plans and programs of the various elements of the U.S. Executive Branch.
23. (C) The beginning of the process is a Front Office review of the national, agency and department-level and Qatar-specific strategic planning documents relevant to Qatar's operating environment (including those of agencies represented not in Doha, but regionally). Reviewing the objectives of these plans through the prism of the nine over-arching U.S. National Security Strategy objectives establishes that the two principle shared interagency strategic issues in Qatar are counter-terrorism and economic development.
24. (C) The six-monthly off-sites - which also embrace non-resident members of the Virtual Country Team - are the next step in the process, during which the Country Team analyzes key trends in Qatar and assesses the implications of trend directions for U.S. policy. The discussions, analysis and priorities thus generated, along with the Ambassador's guidance, drive the establishment of goal-oriented synchronization groups - which are formed and disbanded as goals are defined and achieved - aimed at shaping and influencing the operating environment for the USG interagency in Qatar.
25. (C) Centered on interagency groups organized around achieving a shared interagency goal, the synchronization process brings together all elements of the interagency engaged in achieving that common goal in Qatar. Each group is lead directly by the Front Office, ensuring regular communication among group members and providing a sustained interagency perspective to guide the group's activities. Our Virtual Country Team concept uses technology to enable participation in synchronization groups by non-resident agencies and departments that cover Qatar on a regional basis.
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POST-OFFSITE SYNCHRONIZATION ACTIVITY
-------------------------------------
26. (C) As of November 2009, Embassy Doha had five active interagency synchronization groups, as follows:
-- Security and Counter-Terrorism, which brings together the mission's intelligence and law enforcement communities and relevant elements of the Country Team to achieve shared intelligence, security and counter-terrorism objectives.
-- POTUS Initiative on Muslim Community Engagement, which aims at using the Embassy's power to convene and make connections to operationalize the principles laid out in President Obama's June 2009 Cairo speech, with a Qatar-specific emphasis on economic development (including food security) and science and technology.
-- Interagency Engagement with Qatar on Joint Pol-Mil Issues, which tackles deep-seated and wide-ranging shared civilian and military problems related to GOQ Customs and Immigrations policies and processes.
-- Interagency Initiatives on Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection, which studies the complex state of play in the area of critical infrastructure protection, makes recommendation for interagency action, and acts a filter for the many USG interagency initiatives and interests that converge on this area.
-- ILiAD Support to Diplomatic Operations, which exploits the monitoring, translation and analysis capabilities of ILiAD to support regional diplomatic operations. (Note: ILiAD is a three-agency Doha-based partnership consisting of the DNI's Open Source Center, the FBI's National Virtual Translation Center and DIA's Combined Media Processing Center (CMPC) End note.) LeBaron
Wednesday, 01 July 2009, 13:34
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DOHA 000432
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/30/2019
TAGS PREL, KPAO, QA, EG, IS, SA, IR, SU
SUBJECT: EMBASSY DOHA'S ANALYSIS OF QATARI PRIME MINISTER'S
AL JAZEERA INTERVIEW
REF: A. DOHA 421 B. DOHA 362 C. DOHA 225 D. DOHA 96 E. DOHA 422
Classified By: Amb Joseph LeBaron, reason 1.4 (B) (D)
------------------------------------
(C) KEY ANALYTIC POINTS AND COMMENTS
------------------------------------
-- In a rare, 50-minute interview on June 24 on Al Jazeera's Arabic news service, Qatar's Prime Minister, Hamad Bin Jassim Al Thani, repeatedly described the United States as a "friend." He called U.S.-Qatari relations "strategic."
-- For a small state normally cautious about aligning too closely with any other country, such a public statement designed to reach throughout the Arab world is bold. It is another indication of Qatar's strong interest in upgrading the bilateral political relationship with the United States.
-- That said, the Prime Minister's repeated emphasis in the interview on Qatar's right to its own opinion is not only a reaffirmation of Qatar's foreign policy approach to the region. It is also a signal that Qatar intends to maintain and pursue state and non-state relationships that others such as the United States oppose, such as with Hamas, Hizballah, and Iran.
-- Qatar's mediation efforts throughout the Middle East and North Africa featured prominently in the Prime Minister's remarks. These efforts reflect a small and vulnerable country's acute dependence on regional stability as much as they do an ideological stance or religious impulse.
-- But the Prime Minister spent the most time on Egypt. He strongly criticized (unnamed) elements in the Egyptian government. But, significantly, he did not criticize its President. He set ambiguous terms for re-opening the Israeli trade office.
-- Despite GOQ protestations to the contrary, Al Jazeera remains one of Qatar's most valuable political and diplomatic tools.
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COMMENT
-------
-- Prime Minister Al Thani's outreach to the United States is a response to President Obama's energetic efforts to repair the U.S. relationship with the Arab and Muslim worlds. The U.S. Administration's newfound credibility in the Middle East, bolstered by a tough stand with the Israelis over settlements, has made the U.S. a more attractive partner for Qatar and other Arab countries.
-- Beyond the President's historic speech in Cairo, other reasons exist for the Prime Minister's remarks about the United States in the interview. These include Acting NEA Assistant Secretary Feltman's recent successful visit to Qatar and the also recent and successful visits to Washington by Qatar's head of state security and Attorney General. U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan Scott Gration's close working relationship with the GOQ on Qatar's initiative on Darfur has likewise contributed. As also did the reclassification of Qatar to the Tier 2 Watch List for Trafficking in Persons.
End Key Points and Comment.
1. (U) Further to Ref A, Embassy Doha offers the following analysis and reporting on the Prime Minister's rare and important interview on Al Jazeera about Qatar's foreign policy in the region. The subjects covered in the interview, if not the questions themselves, almost certainly were worked out in advance. Thus the interview should be interpreted as a carefully-considered move by Qatar to explain to the Arab world and key members of the international community Qatar's regional political and diplomatic policies.
---------------------
U.S.-QATAR RELATIONS
---------------------
2. (C) Qatari Prime Minister (and Foreign Minister) Hamad Bin Jassim Al Thani's June 24 interview on Al Jazeera Arabic television network broached many of the country's most controversial and active regional foreign policies. The interview took place on "Bila Hodood" (Without Borders), one
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of Al Jazeera's flagship programs, which covers political and social issues in the confrontational style of its Egyptian host, Ahmed Mansour.
3. (C) The Prime Minister discussed Qatar's "strategic" relationship with the U.S. with surprising candor and explicitness, although his comments about the U.S. - Qatari bilateral relationship occupied a relatively small part of the program, and they occurred towards the middle of the interview. Repeatedly referring to the U.S. as a "friend" of Qatar, he expressed satisfaction with President Obama's concerted effort to reach out to the Muslim world.
4. (C) Pointing to the U.S. administration's campaign to halt Israeli settlement construction and resume Middle East peace negotiations, the PM remarked that he has "great hope" in the new administration. Notably, he asserted that Qatar will help the United States to the greatest extent possible if it is serious about resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Prime Minister also expressed satisfaction that the political dialogue and climate between his country and the United States have recently improved.
5. (C) These remarks by the Prime Minister about the United States represent fulsome praise for Qatar, a country that historically has publicly downplayed its relations with the United States and the American presence in Qatar. While it hosts Al Udaid Air Base, one of the largest and most important military facilities in the Middle East, Qatar's desire to avoid the appearance of being a western outpost has led the GOQ to minimize the visibility of its security dependence on the U.S. In this context, the Prime Minister's frank admission of a "strategic" relationship with the United States is significant.
6. (C) After several years of strained relations, the Prime Minister's comments are encouraging public sign that Qatar is eager to mend political fences with the United States -- although not without an important caveat (see para. 7, immediately below.) An upgraded political relationship with Qatar could manifest itself in increased cooperation on several fronts, from counter-terrorism and Middle East peace to Iraq and Afghanistan, as highlighted in Ref B.
-------------------------
Relations with Extremists
-------------------------
7. (C) However, the Prime Minister remarked several times in the interview that Qatar remains entitled to its own opinion on regional and international issues, saying "(we) have our own viewpoints, which no one can confiscate (read: dictate)." The Prime Minister was adamant: Qatar has the right to speak out and the right to pursue an independent policy line. The subtext of this is that Qatar, despite its stated strategic alliance with the United States, despite its membership in the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League, will not abandon its independence of thought and action. To Embassy Doha, the Prime Minister was signaling here Qatar's -- the Amir's -- firm intention to maintain its engagement with, and active support for, non-state actors such as Hamas and Hizbollah regardless of international pressure.
8. (C) That said, there was a complete absence of any explicit mention of Hamas, Syria, or Hizbollah Avoiding these fault lines is consistent with the apparent intention of the Prime Minister to reach out to the United States in the interview, and to telegraph that intent quite publicly to the Arab world and others. Because Qatar is unlikely to abandon ties with these parties, mentioning these relationships in the interview would only emphasize obstacles in the way of improved U.S.-Qatari relations. Hamad bin Jassim probably deliberately chose instead to speak in very general terms about regional peace and stability.
9. (C) In a similar vein, Prime Minister Al Thani's brief mention of Iran was characteristically muted and probably calculated to avoid any appearance of Qatari bias vis--vis the current protests.
-- (U) The Premier reiterated the Amir's position, stated publicly on a state visit to Paris on June 23, that Iran's stability is important for the Gulf region and expressed confidence that Iran will "bypass" the crisis.
----------------------------
QATAR'S MEDIATION PHILOSOPHY
----------------------------
10. (C) Taken as a whole, the Prime Minister's comments reaffirm Qatar that has strategically chosen to present itself as a valuable regional mediator, a role in which small
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size is not necessarily a disadvantage. Such a role is also in Qatar's acute self-interest. Tiny Qatar is acutely vulnerable to disruptions in the region; instability and chaos greatly increase the possibility that its sovereignty could be violated or its economic security undermined by its two neighbors with hegemonic aspirations, Iran and Saudi Arabia.
11. (C) The major exception to this regional approach is Qatar's policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During the Gaza war, Qatar acted in a way that inflamed, rather than tempered, regional tensions. Recognizing the damage that this approach caused at the start of the Obama Administration, and in Qatar's relations with other Arab states, Qatar's leaders set out to rehabilitate their moderate image during the Arab League summit in Doha in March 2009 (Ref C).
12. (C) The Prime Minister's interview continued this effort. The Prime Minister framed Qatar's Gaza involvement in terms of Palestinian suffering. He chose not to justify Qatar's actions in Gaza as promoting regional stability, a justification he used when discussing other regional disputes.
-----------------------------
DIPLOMATIC FREEZE WITH ISRAEL
-----------------------------
13. (C) On Israel, the Prime Minister said Qatar would re-open the Israeli trade office once the conditions that led to this action were undone and Israel made efforts to improve the plight of the Palestinians. (The office has been closed since January, in the aftermath of the Gaza War.) With such an ambiguous threshold for upgrading relations, Qatar appears in no rush to restore ties with Israel, although contacts between the two continue.
-- (U) The Prime Minister denied that Qatar sought to play on the emotions of the Arab world when it closed the Israeli trade office. Exasperated, he remarked that Qatar's Arab brothers wanted the office closed when it was open, but they want it open now that it is closed. He did not elaborate.
--------------------
RELATIONS WITH EGYPT
--------------------
14. (C) Knowing the clamor Qatar has caused in the region, the Prime Minister addressed head-on Qatar's diplomatic tensions with Egypt, which began with differences over Israel's actions in Gaza earlier this year and quickly degenerated into a media war between the two sides.
-- (U) Egyptian charges have recently included accusations that Qatar helped plan Hamas' takeover of Gaza in the summer of 2007 and Qatari complicity in Hizbollah's alleged plot to stage attacks in Egypt.
-- (U) Qatari efforts to mediate conflicts in Sudan have come under attack by the Egyptians, who argue that Qatar is interfering in Egypt's sphere of influence.
-- (U) Responding to Egyptian allegations of interference, the Prime Minister denied in the interview that Qatar worked (unsuccessfully) with the French to buy the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit from his captors. He asserted that Qatar was just responding to a request for assistance from a friendly, non-Arab state. He maintained that Qatar entered the negotiations only on the condition that the terms of Egypt's mediation were upheld.
15. (C) The Prime Minister suggested that Egyptian accusations were attempts by unspecified elements in Egypt to distract the public from that government's domestic failures. Dismissing Egyptian accusations as "ridiculous," he made no visible attempt to reconcile with the Egyptians, beyond an obligatory commitment to Arab Unity. The Prime Minister continud with the practice of blaming unspecified element within the Egyptian regime for the rift, while expressing admiration fo Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak -- no doubt toshow an Arab leader respect and avoid the appearanc of a personality-driven feud. Contrary to all vidence, Hamad bin Jassim denied that Qatar had ried to host a Gaza reconstruction conference inDoha after the Gaza war began to compete with one being held in Egypt (see Ref D). Knowing that Egypt's role in advancing peace is important to the United States, the Prime Minister was likely also addressing his comments to an audience broader than officials in Cairo.
16. (U) Demonstrating Qatar's indifference to current tensions, the Premier said the dispute would be resolved, but
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he did not know whether it would take one day or ten years.
-- (U) The Prime Minister said that he had a meeting with Umar Sulayman, head of Egypt's General Intelligence Directorate, which was mediated by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al Faysal. While they "spoke on everything," they did not agree on everything, he said.
--------------------------------
RECONCILIATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA
--------------------------------
17. (C) The lengths to which Prime Minister Al Thani praised Saudi Arabia in the interview merit further attention. They reflect Qatar's calculation that it took tensions with other Arab countries too far during the Gaza war, endangering its strategy of maximizing its influence by preserving good relations with all countries. At a time when Qatar does not appear eager (and possibly able) to reconcile with Egypt, Qatar probably believes it cannot afford to alienate the other Arab powerhouse.
-- (C) The Prime Minister recognized that Saudi Arabia had played a role in getting some Arab states to skip Qatar's emergency summit on the Gaza war. But he argued forcefully that differences with Saudi Arabia were confined to discrete points of view, a reference, we think, to Iran, Hamas, and the appropriate role of Al Jazeera in the region.
-- (U) The Prime Minister pointed to the two country's resolution of the Khor Al Udaid maritime border dispute as evidence of improving ties. He also used conspicuously warm words to describe Saudi Arabia's contributions, calling Saudi Arabia an important country and "the backbone of the GCC."
-----------------------------
THE DOHA AGREEMENT ON LEBANON
-----------------------------
18. (C) In a positive sign for U.S. interests in Lebanon, the Prime Minister indicated that Qatar would not insist that the 2007 Doha Agreement remain operative, echoing comments he made in private to A/S Feltman (see Ref E).
-- (U) Commenting on Lebanese Prime-Minister designate Saad Hariri's statement that the Doha Agreement is at an end with the completion of the recent elections in Lebanon, the Prime Minister remarked that the agreement was just for a "certain phase."
-----
YEMEN
-----
19. (C) The Prime Minister, when discussing Qatar's role in trying to mediate the Al-Huthi rebellion in Yemen, dismissed Yemeni government accusations that Qatar funded the rebellion. The Prime Minister maintained that his country was a "fair broker" that helped forge an agreement that was not honored for no fault of its own. In response to calls from some in Yemen and the region for Qatar to reprise its mediation role, the Prime Minister indicated Qatar's reluctance by noting that he would advise the Amir not to continue Qatar's involvement in Yemen. The Prime Minister likely also calculated that bringing the issue into the open would increase pressure on the Yemeni Government to return to Qatar-led mediation.
------------------------------------------
AL JAZEERA'S ROLE IN QATARI FOREIGN POLICY
------------------------------------------
20. (U) The Prime Minister broached the subject of Al Jazeera and the "headaches" its has caused for the Government of Qatar, from tensions with Saudi Arabia to contributing to the current rift with Egypt.
-- (U) Asked about Al Jazeera, he joked that Qatar should sell it, indicating Qatar was offered $5 billion for it at one time. He added that the money might be worth more than the headaches Al Jazeera has caused for the regime.
21. (C) Such statements must not be taken at face value as Al Jazeera, the most watched satellite television station in the Middle East, is heavily subsidized by the Qatari government and has proved itself a useful tool for the station's political masters. The station's coverage of events in the Middle East is relatively free and open, though it refrains from criticizing Qatar and its government. Al Jazeera's ability to influence public opinion throughout the region is a substantial source of leverage for Qatar, one which it is unlikely to relinquish. Moreover, the network can also be
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used as a chip to improve relations. For example, Al Jazeera's more favorable coverage of Saudi Arabia's royal family has facilitated Qatari-Saudi reconciliation over the past year.
LeBaron
Wednesday, 24 June 2009, 09:48
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000414
SIPDIS
FOR NEA/ARP
EO 12958 DECL: 06/24/2019
TAGS PREL, KPAO, SOCI, QA
SUBJECT: FRENCH ACTIVIST LEAVES MEDIA FREEDOM CENTER
REF: A. A) DOHA 313 (NOTAL) B. B) DOHA 287 (NOTAL)
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH LEBARON, FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
----------
KEY POINTS
----------
-- (U) Robert Menard, a well-known French activist, left the Doha Center for Media Freedom on June 23, citing increasing restrictions on the center,s ability to operate. See paragraph seven for the full text of Menard,s resignation statement.
-- (U) Menard,s departure follows several weeks of public attacks against his criticism of Qatar, as well as inaccurate accusations that he had invited a controversial Dutch journalist to Doha and had referred to Qatar publicly as &the worst place in the world.8
-- (C) Contacts tell us that Menard did not work well with Qatari colleagues and did not make any efforts to mollify key Qatari media professionals, so had no allies when criticisms began to be leveled against him.
--------
COMMENTS
--------
-- (C) Menard, who made a reputation for himself as the outspoken director of France,s Reporters Without Borders for 23 years, never seemed like a good fit for Qatar. The Qatari Government officially champions media freedom elsewhere, but generally does not tolerate it at home.
-- (C) Menard,s biggest mistake may not have been in criticizing press freedom in Qatar, but in assuming that Shaykha Mozah,s patronage of his project isolated him from all criticism and absolved him from the need to foster allies and friends within Qatar,s media and political establishment.
END KEY POINTS
1. (SBU) On June 23, Robert Menard posted a resignation statement to the website of the Doha Center for Media Freedom, citing increasing restrictions on the center,s operation as the reasons for his departure. He cites in particular Shaykh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani, Chairman of the Center,s Board, as setting obstacles to bringing threatened journalists to Qatar.
2. (SBU) Menard told PAO that he never had a good rapport with Shaykh Hamad, who is also the Chairman of the Board of Al Jazeera, and the Qatar Radio and Television Corporation. Their last discussion, according to Menard, ended in a &shouting match,8 with Menard ripping up a document Shaykh Hamad had handed him, ordering that Menard, as Director of the Center, answer to a new group of Qatari senior directors.
3. (SBU) Menard,s resignation follows several weeks of public attacks, particularly by the Editor in Chief of Arabic daily &Al Sharq,8 who published a number of editorials against Menard,s criticism of Qatar,s media freedom (reftels). These attacks escalated to include false accusations that Menard had invited controversial Dutch journalist Flemming Rose to Doha, and that Menard had referred to Qatar as &the worst place in the world8 during an episode of the talk show &On en parle a Paris8 on a French television station.
4. (C) Embassy contacts say that these criticisms were secondary to Menard,s failure to create allies and friends within the close-knit Qatari media and political establishments. For example, he attempted to fire his Qatari deputy, Maryam al-Khater, who simply opened another office of the Center in another location in Doha, leaving Menard to work out of his hotel and several villas that had been rented for the purpose of temporarily housing foreign journalists.
5. (C) Other contacts criticized Menard for importing his own team of people from Reporters Without Borders, and not relying on any local talent, or even trying to build any. According to Menard, his Qatari colleagues were &unwilling to do anything8 and &wanted to block me at every turn,8 so he kept his distance.
6. (C) This distance, according to contacts, left Menard
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vulnerable when Qataris began to level criticisms against him for his leadership of the Center and his outspokenness about the state of media freedom in Qatar and the region.
7. (U) Full Text of Robert Menard,s Resignation Statement: Robert Menard and his team have left the Doha Centre for Media Freedom. "The Centre has been suffocated. We no longer have either the freedom or the resources to do our work", he explained. "For several months we have made an independent voice heard, one that has exposed violence with concern for nothing but the truth. We have helped more than 250 endangered journalists and media all over the world, and I think we can be proud of that. "But some Qatari officials never wanted an independent Centre, free to speak out without concern for politics or diplomacy, free to criticise even Qatar. How can we have any credibility if we keep quiet about problems in the country that is our host? Now the Centre has been suffocated. We no longer have either the freedom or the resources to do our work. This cannot go on. I was willing to make any necessary compromises as long as the foundations of our work ) assistance grants, statements of opinion - were safeguarded. But that is no longer the case."Menard went on: "This is a pity, especially as media freedom is particularly threatened in this part of the world. More than 30 journalists are currently imprisoned in the Middle East and North Africa. Since the start of the year, several journalists have been killed in the region: in Iraq, Iran and the Palestinian Territories. The Centre was always there to give assistance to families, pay lawyers, fees and help those who wanted to travel to less dangerous areas. "It was the first time that an international organisation for the defence of media freedom had been set up in a country outside the West. It was made possible by the Emir and his wife Sheikha Mozah. Thanks to them, we have completed projects such as starting an independent news agency for Somali journalists, providing bulletproof jackets in Somalia, Iraq and Pakistan, opening a press centre in Gaza, supplying newsprint to newspapers in Guinea-Bissau. Our work has not been in vain, and we can only hope it will be continued in some way."Menard spoke about the obstacles encountered by the Centre and pointed to those responsible, particularly Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al Thani, who is also President of the Board of Al Jazeera: "Those who have caused us problems do not accept the idea of our independence and freedom of speech. They constantly put obstacles in our way, thereby going against the commitments we have made. "For example, Centre staff were prevented from leaving the country temporarily and had to apply for a permit whenever they needed to travel. Sheikh Hamad refused to sign administrative documents that would have enabled the Centre to take in journalists under threat in their own countries, as originally planned. His office told us recently that giving shelter to journalists from countries such as Iran might go against Qatar,s diplomatic interests. This confirmed that the Centre,s independence was, in his eyes, a myth. "Sheikh Hamad also tried to enforce new internal regulations, in violation of the Centre,s statutes and with a view to keeping tighter control over how the Centre was run. He would have had the power to censor the Centre,s statements. Finally, payment of the Centre,s budget, scheduled for 1 April, has been continually delayed and we are now unable to answer appeals from journalists in danger, in Pakistan, Somalia and elsewhere. "Returning to more basic matters, Qatar has still not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, despite frequent promises. And the committee that was supposed to discuss a new law on the media - and on which we had been invited to sit - has still not held any meetings." Menard concluded: "I do not doubt the sincerity of Her Highness Sheikha Mozah and her determination to advance the cause of freedom, especially media freedom. But she is not alone. And those who prefer to retain the status quo are many, powerful and obstinate. "No-one but her would have dared imagine a Centre like the one we have built here. Maybe Sheikha Mozah is too far ahead of her fellow citizens, too ,modern, for political figures attached to the status quo, too aware of the challenges in this world for dignitaries concerned only with their own interests." The heads of the assistance, research and communications departments have also left the Centre. The Doha Centre for Media Freedom was set up on the initiative of Sheikha Mozah and Reporters Without Borders in December 2007. Menard, who became director-general on 1 April 2008, was the founder of Reporters Without Borders, which he headed for 23 years until 1 October 2008. End text of Robert Menard's Resignation Statement
DOHA 00000414 003 OF 003
LeBaron
Friday, 02 October 2009, 21:25
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 001216
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT SHARI VILLAROSA AND WHA.
EO 12958 DECL: 10/02/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: SCENESETTER FOR OCTOBER 5-7 VISIT OF S/CT
DEPUTY COORDINATOR OF REGIONAL AFFAIRS SHARI VILLAROSA
REF: A. A. BRASILIA 01206 B. B. BRASILIA 00156 C. C. BRASILIA 01095
Classified By: Political Counselor Steve Liston, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d )
-------------
Introduction
-------------
1. (C) The relationship between the United States and Brazil is as productive and broad-based as it has ever been in recent decades, the result of the cordial personal connection already established between President Obama and President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, which is building on Lula,s excellent relationship with former President Bush. New cooperation mechanisms on biofuels, business issues, and economic matters, and our shared goals of fostering hemispheric stability, promoting democracy, developing a consensus on next steps for climate change, and achieving a mutually satisfactory conclusion to the Doha round of WTO negotiations have fostered the view in Brazil that relations between our two countries are closer than ever. Brazil appears to be headed for a rapid recovery from the effects of the global financial crisis, and Lula remains as popular as ever as the country turns its focus on the race to succeed him in January 2011.
2. (C) Internationally, U.S.-Brazil cooperation is often limited by the GOB,s unwillingness to speak out against anti-democratic actions in the hemisphere (Venezuela and Cuba), take proactive steps to address key issues such as nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism concerns, and expand its international leadership in meaningful ways. However, military-to-military relations are good and growing, and most of the Brazilian military understands the potential benefits of partnership with the United States. At the operational level, cooperation on law enforcement issues, such as counternarcotics, container security, and intelligence sharing, is excellent and improving. As the most senior official in S/CT to visit Brazil in several years, your visit provides an opportunity to highlight the importance of a regional approach to counterterrorism efforts and to explore new avenues for cooperation in that field.
--------------------
Counterterrorism: Operational Partnership, Policy Intransigence, Legal Weakness
--------------------
3. (S) The primary counterterrorism concern for both Brazilian officials and the U.S. Mission in Brazil is the presence and activities of individuals with links to terrorism-particularly several suspected Sunni extremists and some individuals linked to Hizballah-in Sao Paulo and other areas of southern Brazil. Despite publicly expressed sentiments of high-level officials denying the existence of proven terrorist activity on Brazilian soil, Brazil,s intelligence and law enforcement services are rightly concerned that terrorists could exploit Brazilian territory to support and facilitate terrorist attacks, whether domestically or abroad, and have focused their efforts in the areas of Sao Paulo, where the vast majority of Brazil,s estimated 1.2-1.5 million Muslims live; Brazil,s tri-border areas with Argentina and Paraguay and with Peru and Colombia; and its borders with Colombia and Venezuela. Brazil,s recognition of the potential threat from terrorism prompted a reform of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) that raised the profile of the issue by upgrading the counterterrorism division to the department level and establishing the Brazilian Intelligence System (SISBIN)-an NCTC-like entity within ABIN to coordinate intelligence gathering and sharing across the GOB.
4. (C) During an early July 2009 hearing before a Congressional committee (ref A), the Brazilian Federal Police,s head of intelligence publicly admitted that XXXXXXXXXXXX had performed duties for the terrorist group, ranging from propaganda, to logistics, recruitment, and other activities. Because Brazil lacks counterterrorism legislation, the DPF arrested him on charges of hate crimes, which carry a much lighter sentence.
5. (SBU) The Brazilian government continues to be a cooperative partner in countering terrorism and related activities that could contribute to the facilitation of attacks in the region or elsewhere-to include investigating potential terrorism financing, document forgery networks, and other illicit activity. Operationally, elements of the GOB responsible for combating terrorism -- the Federal Police, Customs, and to a lesser extent ABIN -- effectively work with their U.S. counterparts and diligently pursue investigative leads provided by U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, and financial agencies regarding terrorist suspects. The senior levels of the Brazilian government, however, publicly deny the possibility that terrorist groups or individuals connected to such groups operate or transit through Brazilian soil and vigorously protest any claims made by U.S. authorities to that effect.
6. (C) The Brazilian government and non-government elite shows particular sensitivity when USG officials raise a key issues, including the re-establishment of the Fourth Fleet, sovereignty over their recent off-shore sub-salt oil discoveries and the Amazon, and the status of indigenous people and lands. Terrorism and the Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay Tri-Border Area (TBA) are also sensitive in government circles.
-- Terrorism. Officially, Brazil does not have terrorism inside its borders. In reality, several Islamic groups with known or suspected ties to extremist organizations have branches in Brazil and are suspected of carrying out financing activities. Although there is good working-level law enforcement cooperation between the U.S. and Brazil on terrorism related activities, the official position of the government is to deny that Brazil has any terrorist activity.
-- Tri-Border Area (TBA). Related to the above, Brazilian officials rebuff any suggestion by U.S. officials that there is terrorist activity in the TBA. A frequent Brazilian retort to comments about the TBA is, "Which one? We have nine tri-border areas." As we are generally unable to share intelligence regarding terrorism-related activities, the USG is regularly accused of making unsupported assertions that malign TBA residents and have a negative impact on tourism in the region. The GOB insists there is no proven terrorist activity in the TBA and, in its defense, points to statements to that effect in the repeated joint communiques out of the annual 3 Plus 1 meetings.
7. (SBU) Brazil,s overall commitment to combating terrorism and the illicit activities that could be exploited to facilitate terrorism is undermined by the GOB,s failure to significantly strengthen its legal counterterrorism framework. Two key counterterrorism-related legislative initiatives continued to languish in 2009. An anti-terrorism bill that would have established the crime of terrorism and other associated crimes was drafted but shelved before its introduction in Congress and a long-delayed anti-money laundering bill has not been approved by Congress. If passed, the latter bill would facilitate greater law enforcement access to financial and banking records during investigations, criminalize illicit enrichment, allow administrative freezing of assets, and facilitate prosecutions of money laundering cases by amending the legal definition of money laundering and making it an autonomous offense.
--------------------
Counterterrorism: Making the 3 Plus 1 Work
--------------------
8. (C) The 3 Plus 1 Mechanism (ref b) on Security in the TBA of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay remains, six years after its initial plenary session, the only instrument available to discuss CT with regional partners at the policy level. Given
BRASILIA 00001216 003 OF 004
the likelihood that the Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) will reject new policy-level proposals for regional security cooperation as the GOB focuses on building up a regional security architecture in South America that does not include the United States (i.e., Mercosul working groups on security, UNASUL, South American Defense Council), re-invigorating the 3 Plus 1 becomes all the more necessary, both as a means of achieving meaningful policy-level commitments from Brazil on this important issue and as a way of maintaining a foothold in regional security discussions. The United States, turn to host the upcoming 3 Plus 1 offers the best opportunity since the initial plenary to shift the dynamics of the mechanism in a way that ensures its effectiveness and our broader security interest in the region. Taking advantage of greater GOB openness to the new U.S. Administration, a concerted USG strategy to implement this new approach that includes careful inter-agency preparation and high-level participation could lay the groundwork for the GOB to accept expanding the scope of the 3 Plus 1-substantively, geographically, or both-to make it a more effective regional security dialogue.
9. (C) The history of the 3 Plus 1 suggests that it will require careful planning and execution to make it a truly effective forum for cooperation. The Brazilians have been consistent in limiting discussions on topics that are not within the established and narrow confines of the 3 Plus 1 (only counterterrorism, only TBA), and have made it nearly impossible for the USG to propose projects for the four partners to undertake jointly.
10. (C) During SouthCom Commander General Douglas Fraser,s visit to Brazil July 29-31 (ref c) Foreign Ministry Under Secretary for Political Affairs I Amb. Vera Machado said Brazil,s "great concern" was the control of transnational illicit activities, nothing that this area is very sensitive, as it is seen by some as having this potential to lead to external interference in domestic affairs. Foreign Ministry Transnational Crimes Director Minister Virginia Toniatti raised the 3 Plus 1 security forum for the TBA, noting that WHA DAS Chris McMullen had struck the right tone in their January 2008 meeting by not speaking about terrorism in the border but rather talking about broader illicit activities. (Comment: This is the same person who in the past has often insisted that 3 Plus 1 could discuss nothing but counterterrorism, and who has effectively derailed productive dialogue at the 3 Plus 1 meetings. End comment.) Stressing how much she disliked the term "tri-border area," as it suggested an uncontrolled area when in fact each country exercised control up to its own borders, Toniatti nonetheless said that Brazil is ready to work with its neighbors and the United States in a concrete way to address confirmed illicit activities. She rejected unsupported assertions made by USG officials of support for terrorist activity in the region, which only serve to stigmatize it. She noted that there had so far been no evidence of terrorist activity or finance in the region and that all of the 3 Plus 1 declarations had explicitly states as much.
11. (C) Despite these difficulties, the 3 Plus 1 mechanism serves several important purposes. Policy-level dialogue: Although law enforcement cooperation with Brazil has always been excellent and fluid at the operational level, 3 Plus 1 is the only sub-regional discussion on these issues in which we participate at a policy level. Networking: Members of the Mission,s Law Enforcement Working Group (LEWG) -- which includes DEA, DHS (ICE, CBP, and USSS), DOj (FBI, RLA), DOD (DAO, MLO), and State -- who have attended the 3 Plus 1 sessions see value in the networking possibilities created through the mechanism. Accountability: The 3 Plus 1 allows us the opportunity to question Brazil and other partners as to what progress they have made to comply with basic international norms, and to remind them of their international obligations. Information sharing: Mission believes much of this information is valuable for understanding what the GOB is doing independently and jointly with its neighbors, not all of which is information we receive through other contacts or in the vetted and open way in which it is reported at 3 Plus 1. Moral suasion: Brazilian government officials repeatedly cite their participation in the 3 Plus 1 as a measure of their commitment to combat terrorist activity in the region. To the extent that GOB puts value on the 3 Plus 1, it provides some leverage to encourage
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Brazil to be a positive partner.
12. (C) As a result of these benefits, Mission Brazil believes 3 Plus 1 mechanism should be maintained. But we also need to look for ways to make it more effective. We see two main options for improving the mechanism: a somewhat simpler but less satisfactory evolution to a broader TBA agenda, or a more difficult and ambitious effort at restructuring the 3 Plus 1 into a country-wide counter-crime forum. (See ref C for more detail on Mission proposals.)
--------------------
Moving Forward on CT Cooperation
--------------------
13. (C) High-level, long-term USG commitment to engaging Brazil on counterterrorism, including in the 3 Plus 1, will be necessary to build a productive CT relationship above the operational level. Although we expect limited results until a new GOB Administration takes office in 2011, your visit provides an excellent opportunity to reiterate the high priority that the Obama Administration gives to this issue, frame the discussion toward a more productive relationship, and explore possibilities for policy-level cooperation.. Your visit also serves as an opportunity to push U.S. goals and regain momentum in advance of the upcoming 3 Plus 1 meeting. KUBISKE
Wednesday, 16 April 2008, 16:42
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000523
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER, STATE FOR NEA/ELA,
EO 12958 DECL: 04/16/2018
TAGS PTER, ECPS, PINR, LE, IR, SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HIZBALLAH GOES FIBER OPTIC
REF: BEIRUT 490
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michele Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
SUMMARY
1. (S) Requesting a special meeting with Charge, Telecommunications Minister Marwan Hamadeh decried the establishment of a complete fiber optics network by Hizballah throughout Lebanon. The GOL has been sharing this information widely among friends of Lebanon, to include the governments of France, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE. Hamadeh sees only two choices for the GOL: approach the UN Security Council, or use the "cover" of March 14-friendly municipalities to cut the lines. However, he questioned whether the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) have the "guts" to do so, given that Hizballah already stated to Lebanese security officials that it would view this as equal to an Israeli act of aggression, and would then take action against the GOL. Hamadeh hopes that Saad Hariri, now in Geneva, will return soon to Lebanon so that March 14 can meet to formulate a strategy. End summary.
GOL HAS BEEN SHARING HIZBALLAH FIBER OPTIC MAP, REPORT WIDELY
-------------
2. (S) &Iran Telecom is taking over the country!8 were the first words out of the mouth of Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh when he met with Charge and Econoff on April 16. He was referring to the discovery of a complete fiber optic system (FiOS) installed by Hizballah throughout Lebanon - reftel. In addition, Hizballah has introduced Wi-Max in Beirut's southern suburbs. Hamadeh pointed out that although Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) television had run a story the previous night about the Hizballah FiOS network, it was already widely known. The LBC story was not planted by the GOL, nor planned, but in Hamadeh's opinion it was no bad thing to get the story out there. Hamadeh himself has been sharing the news both within the GOL and outside, with &friends,8 which includes the Arab countries, the U.S., France (Sarkozy was &stunned") and Terje Roed-Larsen of the UN. He briefed Bernard Kouchner, Jean-David Levitte, Boris Bouillon and Michel Barnier while in Paris. In Beirut he spoke to Charge Andre Parent of France and Ambassador Abdul Aziz Khoja of Saudi Arabia. Saad Hariri, when he heard, sent a private plane from Saudi Arabia to pick up a copy of the map, which traces in detail the route of the system, to share with Saudi King Abdullah and Intelligence Chief Prince Mukrin bin Abdul-Aziz. PM Siniora briefed the Jordanians and Emiratis, as well as Arab League SYG Amr Musa on the network during his recent trip around the region, Hamadeh confirmed. Within Lebanon Hamadeh says that the first person he told, after the Prime Minister and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt was Maronite Patriarch Sfeir. Hamadeh described the strategic implications of the Hizballah plan, which he says is targeting the Christian areas, despite a denial of that by Hizballah. In addition to Hamadeh and PM Siniora, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Defense Minister Michel Murr have been active in the GL information campaign on the network.
INTERFERENCE IN TELECOMS LINKED TO NETWORK
-----------------
3. (S) While the confrontation over the FiOS system was taking place with Hizballah, mobile telecommunications were being subject to interference by Syria in the north, Israel in the south and possibly by the UN at sea, according to Hamadeh. The information about Israeli interference was passed &unofficially8 by UNIFIL, since, in a recurring complaint by Hamadeh during the conversation, the LAF has not reported any problems officially. The Syrian interference is similar to that occurring during the Nahr al-Barid fighting, and highlights the ability of the Syrians to communicate within Lebanon through non-Lebanese mobile systems. Because the system in the part of Syria bordering on northern Lebanon is a private company, MTM, Hamadeh believes that they offer political cover to the Syrian government, who he nevertheless believes is behind the problem. Hamadeh views these events as part of the same strategic interference in Lebanon, both internally and externally. Hamadeh has a map that delineates
BEIRUT 00000523 002 OF 004
the interference, in an arc that runs from the north to the south of Lebanon.
MARCH 14 NEEDS TO MEET, BUT SAAD SHOULD BE THERE
------------------------
4. (S) Hamadeh said that he, the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Elias Murr are all danger, but he and Murr will take the biggest risk in exposing the Hizballah FiOS network. Hamadeh told the PM that he could not assume the risk alone for a showdown with Hizballah. He also used the risk of physical harm as a deterrent with Jumblatt, who wanted to hold a press conference to expose the Hizballah system. Hamadeh believes that this is a March 14 issue, and cannot be resolved without the participation of Saad Hariri. Hamadeh complained that there has not yet been either a March 14 meeting or a cabinet meeting to discuss this matter. He says he asked for such discussions in a meeting with PM Siniora April 15, and will raise it again when they meet April 16. Hamadeh also discussed the issue with Larsen, whom he met with recently in Paris, although he did not give Larsen the map. If the GOL decides to raise the issue with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) he will then provide the map, said Hamadeh.
HIZBALLAH RESPONSE - DON'T TOUCH!
--------------
5. (S) Hamadeh reported that LAF G-2 Brigadier General Georges Khoury and ISF Major General Ashraf Rifi saw Wafiq Safa, the Hizballah liaison to the Lebanese intelligence services, together. Khoury asked Safa to take down two parts of the network as a first step; Safa refused. Safa stated that the network is part of Hizballah's ability to defend Lebanon, and that Hizballah would regard any attack on the network as an act of aggression. However, PM Siniora only got a written report from Khoury ten days after the meeting, Hamadeh complained. Even then, the report was unsigned and thus returned to Khoury for signature. According to their report, Hizballah argued that the PM, Hamadeh and Murr are only raising the issue of the FiOS system in order to bring up the issue of Hizballah weapons. Safa stated categorically that the FiOS system is not up for discussion because it is a key part of the Hizballah arsenal. Safa freely acknowledged to Rifi and Khoury that the network exists. It could only be discussed as part of a defense strategy, he said, adding that the network has no commercial or trade implications. He maintained that it does not penetrate the Christian areas.
HIZBALLAH ASSERTIONS UNTRUE
-----------------
6. (S) Hamadeh believes both Hizballah assertions to be untrue. He refutes the Hizballah claim that the system exists solely to give them defensive communications throughout the country, saying that there are ¢rales8 or hubs in many villages along the route, and no doubt these have lines running off to other villages and residences. He also believes that Hizballah crews are only waiting for the snows in the Christian regions of Metn and Kswaran to melt before completing penetration of these regions from the east.
WORK DONE UNDER VARIOUS FORMS OF COVER
-----------------
7. (S) To complete the installations and at the same time stay below the radar, Hamadeh says that Hizballah has used the municipalities to issue local permits. For example, in Sidon they are working under the cover provided by Abdel Rahman Bizri, the mayor. In another case the Ministry of Energy issued a permit for work that was &to reinforce energy lines,8 although Hamadeh says that was clearly not true. Hamadeh says that the whole of the Bekaa valley was done with local permits, and installations were done by different groups, each unaware of what the others were doing. However, he also says that some of the work was done with the knowledge of resigned Minister of Energy Fneish, a Hizballah member.
DISCOVERY AND REPORT
--------------------
8. (S) The first official report was from the region of
BEIRUT 00000523 003 OF 004
Chouifat, which reported installation of an unknown fiber optic system, and asked the Minister of the Interior to stop it. No one did anything because, in Hamadeh's opinion, they &had no guts.8 At the time of the earlier exposure of the Hizballah telephone lines running through Beirut, and even along the wall of the French embassy, the GOL asked Hizballah to remove those lines, which Hizballah did, and Hamadeh said that he believed at the time that would be the end of the network in the south. The full Ministry of Telecommunications report on the system was compiled by engineers in the ministry and othersXXXXXXXXXXXX who Hamadeh believes could be in great danger because of the report. Once again Hamadeh pointed out that there were no official reports yet from ISF Major General Rifi or LAF G-2 Brigadier General Khoury.
FUNDING FROM IRAN
-----------------
9. (S) The current installations, as per the map Hamadeh has given us, shows lines running from Beirut, around both sides of the airport, into the south below the Litani and back up through the Bekaa valley to the far north. It covers the Palestinian camps, and the Hizballah training camps in the Bekaa, and is penetrating deep into the Christian Metn and Ksarwan areas. Although Hamadeh says he has &a few names,8 he did not list the companies who are responsible for the installation, but said that information would be made available shortly. He cited the Iranian Fund for the Reconstruction of Lebanon as the source of the funding. This same group has been rebuilding roads and bridges since the July 2006 war with Israel, and has been accused before of installing telecommunications lines in parallel with new roads. Hamadeh said that he wants to get the list of companies involved and black list them with the GOL.
STRATEGIC VICTORY
-----------------
10. (S) Hamadeh highlights the system as a strategic victory for Iran, since it creates an important Iranian outpost in Lebanon, bypassing Syria. He sees the value for the Iranians as strategic, rather than technical or economic. The value for Hizballah is the final step in creating a nation state. Hizballah now has an army and weapons; a television station; an education system; hospitals; social services; a financial system; and a telecommunications system. As a sign of its confidence Hizballah official Safa told Khoury and Rifi that any move against the FiOS system would be taken as &an Israeli attack8 and dealt with accordingly. When Khoury and Rifi pointed out that the people in the area might not accept this and might show hostility to Hizballah in this case, Safa replied, &We don't care; we will accept hostile reactions.8 At that point, according to Hamadeh, the GOL decided it needed to inform its friends and make a decision on the next steps to be taken.
HAMADEH PREPARES INTERNAL CAMPAIGN
-----------------
11. (S) Meanwhile, Hamadeh is preparing a &very strong8 internal campaign. This campaign, he said, has the potential to &destroy8 Aoun and mobilize Christians, as well as influence those Shia who are already beginning to worry about Hizballah. He is waiting for a March 14 meeting to discuss this campaign. Saad has apparently traveled to London and Geneva this week, and is expected to be back in Riyadh by 4/20. Saad has been out of Lebanon for some several weeks and it is not known when he will return. Hamadeh sees only two choices for the GOL: approach the UN Security Council directly, or take on Hizballah by cutting lines. But do the Lebanese security forces have the "guts" for that, or are they frightened by Safa's statement that those actions would be considered an act of aggression, he wonders.
12. (S) Comment: Last year, when Hamadeh's telecommunications ministry "discovered" the well-known Hizballah telephone system, including the line strung along the wall of the French embassy, he maintained that the GOL would not tolerate the erosion of its "last monopoly" by Hizballah, However, aside from the ceremonial cutting of the French embassy line, there was no further action. This time around, it appears that by sharing as widely as possible the details of the plan, the GOL may hope that someone else will take on the challenge. End cmment.
BEIRUT 00000523 004 OF 004
SISON
Thursday, 01 May 2008, 12:17
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000586
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO
USUN FOR WOLFF/PHEE/KUMAR
EO 12958 DECL: 04/30/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, KJUS, UNGA, SY, LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: JUMBLATT ON POSSIBLE NEW UNSCR, NATIONAL
DIALOGUE; RIZK ON UNIIIC EXTENSION
REF: A. BEIRUT 584
B. BEIRUT 573
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
--------
1. (C) March 14 leader Walid Jumblatt questioned the utility of a new UN Security Council resolution on Lebanon if it does not address the border issue with Syria and if it does not contain strong language. He noted that the GOL had not yet agreed on whether an open session on the latest UNSCR 1559 report would be preferable to a closed session. Expressing his disappointment that Speaker Nabih Berri is refusing to meet majority leader Saad Hariri to discuss the National Dialogue, Jumblatt said he remains supportive of holding the Dialogue. He is hesitant about electing a president with a simple majority on May 13. Jumblatt was joined mid-meeting my Justice Minister Charles Rizk, who confirmed that the GOL is preparing to request the UN to extend UNIIIC's mandate next week. Rizk added that he is extremely concerned about the safety of XXXXXXXXXXXX. End summary.
2. (C) The Charge, accompanied by PolOff, met with Druze leader Walid Jumblatt at his residence in Clemenceau on April 30. Justice Minister Charles Rizk, XXXXXXXXXXXX, Chief Justice Antoine Kheir, and Minister of Displaced Nehme Tohme joined the meeting.
HESITATION OVER A NEW UNSCR, OPEN DISCUSSION ON 1559
----------------------------
3. (C) Jumblatt questioned whether a new UN Security Council resolution focused on putting the Lebanon-Syria relationship on track (Ref A) would benefit Lebanon. He said that it would need to mention borders, an inclusion which might not have unanimous support. He expressed his fear that any new resolution would have "watered-down" language, and would quickly lose momentum, thereby becoming "obsolete, like past resolutions." He also was noncommittal about whether the next UN session to discuss the latest UNSCR 1559 report should be open or closed, saying that the GOL had not yet agreed whether it was ready to discuss the border issue with Syria.
MARCH 14 MARCHING AHEAD
-----------------------
4. (C) "It is an injustice that Berri won't see Saad," complained Jumblatt. Noting that Sheikh Qabalan, head of the Higher Islamic Shia Council, had urged Berri in a telephone call to meet Saad, Jumblatt said even if Berri agrees, it won't have the same impact. "They should have met yesterday," he stated. Nevertheless, Jumblatt continued, you can't say no to dialogue. Jumblatt said he believes a 13-7-10 cabinet division is "swallowable," but that he suspects Berri won't be able to deliver on this because Syria is waiting for the next U.S. administration and for parliamentary elections in Lebanon in hopes that it will be able to secure a more favorable division.
5. (C) Jumblatt stressed that a president must first be elected prior to discussing cabinet formation. Unsure about whether Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Michel Sleiman will accept an election by a simple majority, Jumblatt was silent when asked about March 14's backup strategy. (Note: Saad's plan is to go to parliament on May 13 and elect a president, with a simple majority if necessary, Ref B. March 14 members seem to be counting on General Sleiman's acceptance, though he has not yet indicated his willingness. Jumblatt himself did not appear eager to pursue a simple majority election. End note.)
6. (C) Jumblatt reported that he will not see Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa when Moussa arrives in Beirut
SIPDIS May 1 because he is going to Jordan to see King Abdullah, and then hopes to meet Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abu Gheit. Nonchalant about the value of Moussa's visit, he said he was hopeful that the Qataris now appear to be siding with March
BEIRUT 00000586 002 OF 003
14, "slowly but surely." However, he wondered where French policy stands today.
HOW THE U.S. CAN HELP
---------------------
7. (C) When asked how the USG could best support Lebanon at this juncture, Jumblatt said he was pleased to see the USG's recent public statements on Syria's efforts to build nuclear weapons. Jumblatt half-jokingly said that the U.S. should now send the USS Nimitz to intimidate Syria. Jumblatt also suggested U.S. assistance for Lebanese prisons (in response to recent prison riots in Roumieh). Rizk added that a roadmap would be helpful to lay out how the U.S. can best support the Ministry of Justice (in addition to the ongoing $7 million USAID judicial training program).
8. (C) Jumblatt noted that the GOL had yet to receive the $1 billion central bank deposit promised by the Saudis. Minister Tohme opined that the holdup is due to "Saudi culture," and the best way to get the money would be for Prime Minister Foaud Siniora to send his advisor, Mohammed Chatah, to spend four or five days sitting in Riyadh "to move things along."
CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF UNIIIC
------------------------------
9. (C) Jumblatt said the Special Tribunal was "not enough" to intimidate Syria. Rizk chimed in to acknowledge that work on the Special Tribunal was "frightening to Syria until recently." Both agreed that Syrian President Bashar Assad won't care about the Tribunal in a year's time. Rizk repeated his concerns that UNIIIC Commissioner Daniel Bellemare had stated to some that he "has no case." Rizk said the U.S. can help by directing Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad to ask the UN SYG to impress upon Bellemare the importance of his role as prosecutor for the Tribunal.
10. (C) Rizk pointed out that Bellemare should not be disassociating UNIIIC from the detention of the four generals suspected of involvement in Rafiq Hariri's assassination because the blame then falls squarely on XXXXXXXXXXXX
11. (C) The GOL had not yet formally agreed to send a letter to the UNSC requesting a six-month extension of UNIIIC's mandate, Rizk reported, because the cabinet lacked the necessary quorum at its April 29 meeting. He said he had no doubt that the letter would be approved by the GOL, adding that Siniora had only made one edit to the letter (changing "as soon as possible" to "soon"). Rizk expressed his optimism about the letter's success at the UNSC because he changed the language to state that the GOL "welcomes" Bellemare as prosecutor, instead of making a request; it's a letter you can't say no to, Rizk affirmed.
GOL STILL PONDERING HOW TO REACT TO HIZBALLAH FIBER OPTIC NETWORK
--------------------------------
12. (S) Meanwhile, in a separate conversation on Hizballah's progress in establishing a fiber optic network, Siniora's senior advisor Mohammed Chatah told Charge that the network was yet another example of Hizballah's many infringements against the state. The network could thus not be separated from Hizballah's military activities. A GOL public accusation against Hizballah would beg the same question as to why the GOL did not remove Hizballah's tanks, and entailed military risks for the GOL. The UNSC could not remain neutral to reports of increasing illegitimate Hizballah activities, he noted, but the GOL would have to be the one to initiate the accusation. Chatah also said there was no clear strategy within the GOL on how to approach the problem, cited some disagreement between Defense Minister Murr and Telecom Minister Hamadeh.
BEIRUT 00000586 003 OF 003
SISON
Thursday, 04 February 2010, 13:03
S E C R E T LONDON 000257
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR BRIANNE MARWAHA, NEA/IR AND STEVEN LETT, EEB
EO 12958 DECL: 02/02/2020
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ETTC, ECPS, TSPA, IR, UK, FR
SUBJECT: IRAN: HMG BRIEFS ON IRIG JAMMING OF BBC, VOA
BROADCASTS; REQUESTS LOBBYING ASSISTANCE
REF: MURRAY/MARWAHA E-MAILS 02/02/2010
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Greg Berry, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) SUMMARY: Embassy London Iran Watcher (poloff) met February 3 with Jaime Turner, Deputy Head of Multi-lateral Affairs at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Iran Group to discuss ways to condemn publicly the Iranian regime's blocking of western satellite channels and how to circumvent it. Turner informed poloff that the European Parliament (EP) would soon be debating a resolution condemning the IRIG's actions against BBC Persian, Voice of America and Deutsche Welle broadcasts. HMG requested that the USG join with the UK and France (home of Eutelsat, owner of the Hotbird satellite) at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to lodge an official complaint against the IRIG for jamming commercial broadcasts. HMG also hopes the U.S. will join it in lobbying the French government to convince Eutelsat to drop IRIG broadcasts from the Hotbird satellite. END SUMMARY.
2. (S) Jaime Turner, Deputy Head of Multi-lateral affairs at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Iran Group, briefed poloff on the IRIG's jamming of western satellite broadcasts, particularly BBC Persian and Voice of America. Turner said Eutelsat, the owner of the Hotbird satellite (the most popular satellite covering the Midde East region) had, after several months of enduring Iranian jamming of its signals, decided to drop BBC Persian from the satellite because of complaints from other commercial broadcasters that their programs were being affected as well. Although Eutelsat has given BBC Persian a slot on another satellite, that satellite does not carry many of the most popular channels and therefore has limited reach.
3. (S) In an informal survey conducted by the British Embassy in Tehran, the UK found that less than 15 percent of people in Tehran have access to either BBC Persian or Voice of America (VOA) television broadcasts. In a few cases, individuals were able to hear the broadcasts, but the pictures were scrambled. In an effort to reach more people inside Iran, BBC Persian has begun streaming all of its magazine programs on the web, but those are only accessible to people who are arguably the best informed because of their ability to circumvent IRIG internet filtering. BBC also has started producing one-minute news summaries that can be distributed via Bluetooth. Radio has been far less affected, with regular access to BBC World Service and VOA still readily available. Eutelsat has lodged a complaint at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) against the Iranian government. The French government (Eutelsat is a French company) also plans to engage on the issue at ITU. According to Turner, the UK has not been particularly active at ITU in the past, and therefore has little influence, but will join the French protest. HMG would appreciate USG engagement as well.
4. (S) While lodging complaints at the ITU has symbolic value, Turner said her government recognizes the body has no enforcement authority. Therefore, HMG is looking at other ways to address the issue. HMG is exploring ways to limit the operations of the IRIB's Press TV service, which operates a large bureau (over 80 staff) in London. However, UK law sets a very high standard for denying licenses to broadcasters. Licenses can only be denied in cases where national security is threatened, or if granting a license would be contrary to Britain's obligations under international law. Currently, neither of these standards can be met with respect to Press TV, but if further sanctions are imposed on Iran in the coming months, a case may be able to be made on the second criterion.
5. (S) In the immediate term, HMG plans to lobby the French government to approach Eutelsat and press it to drop IRIB broadcasts from the Hotbird satellite. The IRIB broadcasts several channels from the satellite, both domestically (even most terrestrial TV channels in Iran are dependent on a satellite and repeaters) and internationally, so it is an important source of income for Eutelsat. While it would be unlikely for the company to agree to drop the IRIB broadcasts spontaneously, Turner believes it would be susceptible to an approach by the French government because of the cover it would gain from complying with an official government request. HMG would appreciate USG engagement with the government of France on this issue.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN
Friday, 12 June 2009, 04:47
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000355
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, INR/EAP, EEB/TFS
PACOM FOR FPA
TREASURY FOR OASIA, OFAC
EO 12958 DECL: 06/12/2019
TAGS ECON, EFIN, ETRD, PREL, PINR, BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: CRONIES LAUNCH NEW SOCCER LEAGUE
REF: RANGOON 330
RANGOON 00000355 001.6 OF 003
Classified By: Economic Officer Samantha A. Carl-Yoder for Reasons 1.4 (b and d).
Summary
-------
1. (C) On the alleged order of Senior General Than Shwe, regime cronies and businessmen launched the new Myanmar National Football League (MNL) on May 16, 2009. To date, the MNL has been a huge success, with high attendance and wide national TV and radio coverage. It is unclear if there is any political motivation behind the MNL, although many Burmese businessmen speculate the regime is using it as a way to distract the populace from ongoing political and economic problems. End Summary.
Let the Games Begin
-------------------
2. (C) The Myanmar Football Federation (MFF), chaired by regime crony Zaw Zaw, launched the Myanmar National Football League on May 16, 2009. The league, the first of its kind, has eight professional teams representing different states and divisions. During the May-July season, teams compete for the National Cup and title of Myanmar National League Champion. The teams are sponsored by regime cronies and businessmen (listed below). According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Zaw Zaw and Than Shwe's grandson created the idea of a professional soccer league more than a year ago but had to obtain the Senior General's support first. One well-connected source reports that the grandson wanted Than Shwe to offer USD 1 billion for Manchester United. The Senior General thought that sort of expenditure could look bad, so he opted to create for Burma a league of its own. In January, Secretary-1 reportedly told select Burmese businessmen that Than Shwe had "chosen" them to be the owners of the new professional soccer teams. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the owners are responsible for paying all costs, including team salaries, housing and transportation, uniform costs, and advertising for the new league. In addition, owners must build new stadiums in their respective regions by 2011, at an estimated cost of USD one million per stadium.
--------------------------------------------- ------
Myanmar National League 2009 Teams
--------------------------------------------- ------
Team Owner and Company Sanctions Subject
--------------------------------------------- ------
Kanbawza Aung Ko Win/Kanbawza Bank No
Delta United Zaw Win Shaine/Ayeyar Hintha No (financially backed by Zaw Zaw, owner of Max Myanmar Yes
Magway Steven Law/Asia World Co. Yes
Okkthar United Aung Kyaw Moe/Intl Brewery No Trading Co.
RANGOON 00000355 002.2 OF 003
Zayar Shwe Myay Win Myint/Chair, Myanmar No Chamber Of Commerce
Yangon United Tay Za/Htoo Trading Yes
Southern Myanmar Htay Myint/Yuzana Co. Yes
Yadanarbon Sai Sam Htun/Loi Hein Co. No (sole distributor of soft drinks produced by SOEs)
--------------------------------------------- ------
3. (C) The eight teams currently practice and play in Rangoon; by 2011, the MNL should have a nationwide presence, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated. The teams have an average of 40 players and salaries range from between USD 500-2000 a month, depending on the caliber of the players. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Steven Law's Magway team pays the highest salaries, spending USD 155,000 a month, while Win Myint's Zayar Shwe Myay team only spends USD 52,200 a month on salaries. Tay Za, Aung Ko Win, and Steven Law also pay their players high signing bonuses, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX , Aung Ko Win, owner of the Kanbawza team, has budgeted USD 2 million for the 2009 season. Other owners will spend approximately the same amount, he noted.
4. (C) Several of the team owners have taken their obligations seriously, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated. For example, Tay Za has hired five players from Africa; and Zaw Zaw, who financially backs the Delta United team despite being Chair of the MFF, recruited several Argentinean players. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Aung Kyaw Moe, owner of Okkthar United Team and the International Brewery Trade Co. (which produces Myanmar Beer and Grand Royal Whiskey), is currently sponsoring the July 2009 National Cup. Tay Za's Air Bagan allegedly plans to host the next cup, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated.
So What's In it for The Owners?
-------------------------------
5. (C) When asked why the owners would participate in such an expensive endeavor, XXXXXXXXXXXX observed that they had little choice. "When the Senior General asks someone to do something, you do it with no complaints," he stated. He then added that several of the businessmen will receive incentives from the regime, such as construction contracts, new gem and jade mines, and import permits, which will more than offset their costs. Sponsorship may also bring its own benefits. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that due to advertising associated with the MNL, several owners, including Sai Sam Htun who owns Alpine Water, have seen an immediate increase in business revenue. Several owners have plans to sell team merchandise. As the league expands, business should boom, although it will take a few years, he concluded.
Early Success
-------------
6. (C) The MNL to date has been quite successful. Tickets are relatively expensive by Burmese standards, ranging from USD .50 to USD 1, which can be as much as half a day's salary for the average Burmese. Nevertheless, there has been heavy attendance at most of the games, with several games sold out. Reportedly though, owners paid up to USD 3 per head to entice fans to the first games, when it looked like ticket
RANGOON 00000355 003.2 OF 003
sales were lagging. Proceeds from the MNL are used to support the MFF. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that for the more popular teams, such as Yadanarbon and Magway, scalpers are able to sell tickets for up to USD 1.50. XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that given the continued political and economic repression of the people, he understands why they want to spend their money on something enjoyable. For those who cannot afford to attend the games, MRTV (the GOB's television network) shows the games live. During Saturdays and Sundays at 4pm, local teashops are filled with Burmese watching the games. Additionally, the matches are broadcast on the radio.
MNL: A Distraction or Just Good Fun?
-------------------------------------
7. (C) While admitting that the MNL is "just good fun," a number of our contacts question the regime's motivation behind creating the league. Several have commented that it may be a way for the regime to distract the people from ongoing political and economic problems, or to divert their attention from criticism of the upcoming 2010 elections. Many speculate that the regime will suspend the 2010 MNL cup, should it fall close to the election date, as the government may not want large crowds of people to gather. That remains to be seen. Whatever the reason, the MNL is proving an early success, and something for the Burmese to talk about without threatening the regime.
DINGER
Friday, 19 June 2009, 05:24
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000378
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, INR/EAP, EEB/TFS
PACOM FOR FPA
TREASURY FOR OASIA, OFAC
EO 12958 DECL: 06/19/2019
TAGS ECON, EFIN, ETRD, PREL, PINR, BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: UPDATE ON CRONY ZAW ZAW'S ACTIVITIES
REF: A. 07 RANGOON 1107 B. RANGOON 298 C. RANGOON 355 D. RANGOON 330
RANGOON 00000378 001.4 OF 004
Classified By: Economic Officer Samantha A. Carl-Yoder for Reasons 1.4 (b and d).
Summary
-------
1. (C) Regime crony Zaw Zaw continues to expand his businesses in Burma. In addition to Max Myanmar Group of Companies, Zaw Zaw owns a beverage bottling company, a cement plant, a trading company, a jade mine in Phakhant, a rubber plantation in Mon State, and a professional soccer team. Embassy Rangoon recommends OFAC add Zaw Zaw's additional companies and key management personnel (listed in paragraph 5) to the targeted sanctions list. End Summary.
Additional Business Ventures
----------------------------
2. (C) Zaw Zaw, one of Burma's up-and-coming cronies, continues to expand his businesses. His Max Myanmar Group of Companies, which overseas his construction and tourism operations, is already designated on the Department of the Treasury's sanctions list (Ref A). We have confirmed Zaw Zaw also owns Pinya Manufacturing Co. Ltd., which produces beverages including Max Cola for the local market. Pinya Manufacturing began operating in 1998 with an initial investment of 12.5 million kyat (approximately USD 41,000 in 1998) and currently employs more than 70 workers. Pinya Manufacturing Co. Ltd. has 13 distribution branches throughout Burma.
3. (C) Embassy business contact XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed that Zaw Zaw is expanding his business ventures under the Max Myanmar umbrella, including construction of a cement factory in Nay Pyi Taw, which allegedly will provide cement to Steven Law for Asia World's airport project (Ref B), a concrete block factory in Nay Pyi Taw, a jade mine in Phakhant, and a rubber plantation in Mon State. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX , Zaw Zaw operates the Lone Khin jade mine in conjunction with the Ministry of Mines and recently received an additional 50 acres of land in Phakhant for jade mine development. Zaw Zaw allegedly sold several lots of jade at the March 2009 government jade and gem auction, [name removed] noted.
4. (C) Zaw Zaw is currently Chairman of the Myanmar Football Federation, and he owns Delta United, one of the professional soccer teams in the new Myanmar Football National League (Ref C). Contacts confirm that Zaw Zaw hired Senior General Than Shwe's grandson to play on the team (Ref D). Zaw Zaw has also begun to develop plans for the construction of a new soccer stadium in Pathein, Irrawaddy Division, the future home of the Delta United team,XXXXXXXXXXXX . XXXXXXXXXXXX estimated the stadium construction cost will be more than USD 1 million, and should be completed by 2011.
5. (SBU) Below is information on additional companies owned by Zaw Zaw.
RANGOON 00000378 002.8 OF 004
-- Delta United Football Club; Pathein, Irrawaddy Division. Listed owner and partner: U Zaw Win Shaine, owner of Ayeyar Hinta Co., Ltd.
-- Lone Khin Jade Mine; Phakhant, Kachin State.
-- Max Myanmar Cement Factory; near Taung Phila Limestone Deposit, Leiway Township, Nay Pyi Taw.
-- Max Myanmar Concrete Block Factory; Nay Pyi Taw.
-- Max Myanmar Rubber Plantation, Belin, Mon State.
-- Pinya Manufacturing Co. Ltd.; 37/38 Baw Maw An Twin Wun Street, Industrial Zone 3, Hlainthaya, Rangoon; phone: 95-1-681-745, 95-1-685-75, 95-1-685-15; fax: 95-1-680-669. Managing Director: U Kyi Lwin, a.k.a. U Kyan Khinn.
Embassy Recommendation
----------------------
6. (C) Zaw Zaw is one of several mid-level cronies actively attempting to curry favor with the regime and to use his government ties to expand his commercial enterprises. He, his family, and many of his companies are already listed on OFAC's targeted sanctions list. Embassy Rangoon recommends OFAC also designate the above-mentioned companies and senior management under the JADE Act.
DINGER
RANGOON 00000378 003.2 OF 004
6. (SBU) The Burmese government usually releases a supplementary budget later in the fiscal year reflecting higher expenditures; its total annual deficits are thus greater than in the initial official budgets. For example, the FY08-09 supplementary appropriation added an additional 743.9 billion kyat (approximately USD 743 billion at current rates) to that year's budget, raising expenditures by more than 15 percent over projected totals.
7. (SBU) As in previous years, "Government" received the largest allocation of additional funding (USD 282 million), approximately half of FY08-09's supplemental appropriation. Businessmen explained that money likely funded ongoing construction costs in Nay Pyi Taw, as well as other government infrastructure projects. SOEs received the second largest amount - 185 billion kyat (USD 185 million), a 65 percent budget increase. The Ministry of Defense received an additional 9 billion kyat (USD 9 million) and the Ministry of Finance received 53 billion kyat (US 53 million). In response to Cyclone Nargis, the GOB allocated an additional 77 billion kyat (USD 77 million) to the Ministry of Agriculture while the Ministry of Social Welfare received 44 billion kyat (USD 44 million).
Weak Revenue Generation
-----------------------
8. (SBU) During last year's IMF Article IV consultations, IMF representatives highlighted the need for the Burmese Government to improve its tax administration and modify its widespread discretionary tax exemptions. According to IMF officials, the GOB replied that one of its goals is to reduce the budget deficit by addressing the main causes: weak revenue collection, losses from inefficient SOEs and SEEs, unrestrained government spending, and budget expenditures for non-productive uses, such as defense and construction. However, business contacts reported that the GOB did little to modify its tax structure in 2008, leading them to question the government's prediction of a 27 percent increase in tax revenues in FY09-10.
9. (SBU) Over the past few years, authorities have attempted to increase revenues through stricter enforcement of income taxation and through an informal 2007 Customs valuation rate hike from 450 kyat/$1 to between 800 and 1200 kyat/$1, depending on the product and its origin. While GOB officials privately argue that this rate hike indicates an effort to reconcile the various exchange rates, it instead complicates Burma's already complex informal exchange rate system.
10. (SBU) According to the FY09-10 budget data, most SOEs will operate at a loss. Even with extractive industries presumably posting sizable profits, the net SOE loss is predicted to be roughly 484 billion kyat (USD 484 million) -- though this estimate could be too low. State-Owned Enterprises registered a loss of 601 million kyat in FY08-09, substantially more than GOB initial estimates of 450 billion kyat. According to budget publications, SOEs lost 800 billion kyat in FY07-08, 436 billion kyat in FY06-07, and 549 billion kyat in FY05-06.
11. (SBU) Corruption at all levels remains a problem in Burma, which affects the GOB's ability to collect revenue.
RANGOON 00000378 004.2 OF 004
While the government cracked down on crooked Customs officials in 2006, the payment of bribes on the borders continues, according to business contacts. Corruption is also rife in other GOB agencies, including the Internal Revenue Department, Immigration, and the Yangon Central Development Committee.
Comment
-------
12. (SBU) While the published budget provides a general guideline of how the GOB will allocate its funds, the lack of details in the document -- and the general unreliability of GOB statistics -- make it impossible to obtain an accurate picture of Burma's fiscal situation. This problem is compounded by the lack of spending discipline by senior leaders, who will likely continue allocating money for pet projects with little oversight or regard for planned appropriations. Despite the GOB's stated intention to reduce the budget deficit, another increase is far more likely due to uncontrolled spending, SOE losses, and the lack of tax reform. Burma's economic future remains troubled.
DINGER
Tuesday, 28 July 2009, 14:27
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001689
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/23/2019
TAGS PGOV, KDEM, SOCI, JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN SOCCER GAME HALTED AMIDST ANTI-REGIME
CHANTS, HOOLIGANISM TOWARD PALESTINIANS
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lawrence Mandel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary: Anti-Palestinian hooliganism and slogans denigrating the Palestinian origins of both the Queen and the Crown Prince led to the cancellation of a July 17 soccer game between the rival Faisali and Wahdat clubs, who traditionally represent the East Banker and Palestinian communities, respectively. Matches between the two teams have a long history of violence, but the specific digs at the royal family marked a new low. The clubs have been fined and their fans publicly chastised, yet official media reporting and commentary has been noticeably thin. The game exposed the growing rift between East Bankers and Palestinians in Jordan. The King's silence on the event is noteworthy, as is a reluctance among our contacts to discuss the issue. End Summary.
Faisali 0, Wahdat 0, PPD (Riot)
-------------------------------
2. (C) Jordanian police intervened to stop fan violence and the chanting of anti-regime slogans during a July 17 match between Amman soccer clubs Faisali and Wahdat in the industrial town of Zarqa. The unrest began when Faisali fans started to chant slogans against Palestinian-origin Jordanians, including Queen Rania. Some Faisali fans threw bottles at Wahdat players and their fans. The coaches of both teams ordered their players off of the field in the middle of the game for their own safety, and the remainder of the match was canceled. (Note: It ended in a scoreless draw. End Note.)
A Storied Rivalry
-----------------
3. (U) Faisali and Wahdat serve as the proxy champions of the East Banker and Palestinian communities, respectively. Faisali, whose name refers to the Hashemite King Faisal, is controlled by a prominent tribe (the 'Udwan) which hails from the East Banker stronghold of Salt. It is known as the favored team of tribal East Bankers, even though many of its players are of Palestinian origin. Since the formation of the Jordanian Football Union (JFU) in 1944, Faisali has won thirty national championships.
4. (C) Wahdat, which takes its name from the large Palestinian refugee camp on the southern side of Amman, is seen as the favored team of Palestinian-origin Jordanians. Wahdat has won eleven national soccer championships since 1944, including the last three. The club's current president is Tareq Khoury, a successful businessman who allegedly bought his seat on the Wahdat board. He has since leveraged that position into a political career, and was elected to the Lower House of Parliament in 2007.
Game Over
---------
5. (S) Faisali-Wahdat games have a long history of hooliganism and politically motivated violence. Past matches have been shut down by the police following riots spurred by offensive slogans shouted by both sides. Those slogans have over time become a popular barometer of tensions between East Bankers and Palestinians. The slogans and cheers on the Faisali side during the July 17 match were particularly divisive and controversial, as they were directed at members of the royal family for the first time. Faisali supporters chanted about the Palestinian origins of Queen Rania with the cheer, "divorce her you father of Hussein, and we'll marry you to two of ours." The newly appointed Crown Prince did not escape comment either, as he is half Palestinian (and one quarter British) himself.
Official Fallout
----------------
6. (SBU) Official reaction to the match was surprisingly pro-forma. Prince Ali, half-brother to the King and chairman of the Jordanian Football Union (JFU), issued a statement calling the behavior of Faisali fans "unacceptable" and "a red line." In addition to a relatively meager 5000 JD (USD 7000) fine on Faisali, the JFU indicated that larger security restrictions would be placed on future games. Members of parliament also sent a missive to the press denouncing the chants of Faisali supporters as "contrary to Jordanian values." The statement was read by MP and Wahdat president Tareq Khoury on the floor of parliament. The Faisali club issued a press release of its own, promising to identify the "outcasts" among its fans and deal with them accordingly.
Media Silence, Internet Cacophony
AMMAN 00001689 002 OF 002
---------------------------------
7. (C) Despite all of the official condemnations of Faisali and its supporters, none of Jordan's self-censoring media featured descriptive news stories about the game and why it was called off. Columnists and commentators, even those who are usually used to advance pro-government views, were noticeably silent. The heads of the Faisali and Wahdat fan clubs were allegedly invited to appear on Al-Jazeera, but refused in recognition of the sensitivities surrounding criticism of the royal family.
8. (SBU) Internet news sites, however, were full of commentary on the game and its implications. Many defended the Faisali supporters as "real" Jordanians fighting against undue Palestinian influence. Some commentators believe that Prince Ali failed to remain neutral in the conflict by only chastising Faisali supporters, and called for Wahdat to receive similar opprobrium.
Comment
-------
9. (S) There is broad recognition throughout Jordan that the Faisali-Wahdat incident exposed the uncomfortable gap between East Bankers and Palestinian-origin Jordanians -- one that most would rather keep well-hidden for the sake of political stability. The connection between this rift and the Hashemite monarchy, including the newly-appointed Crown Prince, makes the incident even more unsettling. Even our most forthcoming contacts are reluctant to talk with us about the issue, recognizing that it strikes at the core of Jordanian identity politics. One contact reluctantly admitted that the game brought out the "ugly side of Jordanian ultranationalism" and said that it would be difficult to contain now that it was publicly expressed. Another pointed to the "increasingly explicit and provocative" Faisali slogans as proof that status quo-oriented East Bankers are uncomfortable with the increasing pressures for reform that will inevitably lessen their near-monopoly on political and social power.
10. (S) The King's silence on the game and its political implications is deafening. High level government contacts and members of the diplomatic community are puzzled by the King's failure to respond to a verbal attack on his family that also dips in to Jordanian identity politics. While he is on "internal vacation" in the southern part of Jordan, the King's public exposure has been limited to meetings with scattered foreign officials. While perhaps unintentional, the King's silence has effectively empowered the pro-status quo establishment. Mandel
Thursday, 25 February 2010, 05:18
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000127
SIPDIS
COMMERCE FOR D.STARKS
EEB/CBA FOR T.GILMAN
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USTR FOR C. MORROW AND P. BURKHEAD
EO 12958 DECL: 02/24/2020
TAGS ECON, EINV, EIND, ETRD, KCOR, PINR, PGOV, RS, KS, IR,
TU, AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: WHO OWNS WHAT VOL. 2 - THE MINISTER OF
EMERGENCY SITUATIONS, BELUGA CAVIAR, AND FRUIT JUICE (C-RE9-02494; C-RE9-02493; C-RE9-02492)
REF: BAKU 54
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Don Lu, a.i., for reasons 1.4(b) and ( d).
1. (S) SUMMARY: This cable is the second in a series that profiles the most powerful families in Azerbaijan, both in terms of economic and political power. This issue features Minister of Emergency Situations Kamaladdin Heydarov and his family. Heydarov was previously Chairman of the State Customs Committee, and his hand-picked successor now operates that agency, one of the most corrupt operations in Azerbaijan. The Heydarov family, which controls a business empire in Azerbaijan ranging from fruit juice production to real estate development, is the second most powerful commercial family in Azerbaijan, after the Pashayev family (into which President Aliyev married). End Summary.
The Man Behind the Power
------------------------
2. (S) Kamaladdin Heydarov is the most powerful member of this family, and some observers have said he might be even more powerful than the President himself. (COMMENT: Post does not believe this is true, although Heydarov controls more visible assets and wealth within the country than the President. End Comment.) His father, Fattah Heydarov, is a Member of Parliament from the mountainous Qabala district, which serves as a home base for the family outside Baku. Fattah was Secretary of the Ordubad (and later Julfa) District Party Committee during Soviet times, and served as Minister of the Welfare Service of Nakhchivan from 1976 to 1978 and later as Nakhchivan's Minister of Culture from 1983 to 1995.
3. (S) Kamaladdin Heydarov was Chairman of the State Customs Committee for nine years, and since 2006 has been head of the para-military Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), which acts as a super-Federal Emergency Management Agency, Fire Marshall, health and safety inspector, and overall regulator of many aspects of the economy. Born in 1961, he holds a degree in Geology and International Law from the Azerbaijan State University. He held executive positions in a number of private and public enterprises prior to his appointment at the ripe old age of 35 as Chairman of the State Customs Committee (SCC), an agency that is notoriously corrupt, even by Azerbaijani standards. Heydarov's rise to power was partly a result of the strong relationship between his father Fattah and former President Heydar Aliyev (also from Nakhchivan), but also partly a result of Heydarov's strong management skills. As he gained wealth for the ruling party, Heydar Aliyev's respect for him grew, until finally he was entrusted with the valuable role of Chairman of the SCC.
4. (S) The State Customs position allowed him to gain his massive wealth, as significant illicit payments were paid "up the food chain" in an elaborate and well-orchestrated system of payoff and patronage. Heydarov likely still enjoys a sizeable income from the SCC, as it is controlled by his loyal successor. When President Ilham Aliyev appointed Heydarov as Minister of Emergency Situations in 2006, he was replaced at the SCC by his Deputy Aydin Aliyev. Aydin Aliyev is not related to President Aliyev, and Heydarov is Aydin Aliyev's sole benefactor, a symbiotic relationship in which Aliyev presumably gives undying loyalty (and a hefty cut) to the powerful Heydarov in order to retain his position. When Charge first met Heydarov in 2007, the Minister had been in office for less than a year but had a chest full of military ribbons that would rival the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Presumably he transferred them directly from his old State Customs uniform.
The Ministry of Everything Significant (MES)
--------------------------------------------
BAKU 00000127 002 OF 004
5. (SBU) The Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) has consistently proven itself to be one of the most powerful ministries in Azerbaijan. It is suspected to have the largest revenue of any Ministry. It even has its own para-military unit, consistent with other such ministries in the CIS. Heydarov mentioned to a visiting Washington VIP in 2008 that his ministry had recently taken control of an anti-aircraft battery near Baku in which he had served as a young conscript during Soviet times. The Ministry now controls the fire departments and other emergency services, fire code inspections, state grain reserves, and construction licensing. This last area of responsibility (perhaps the most important for foreign entities operating in Azerbaijan) also covers building inspectors who can interfere with, delay, or stop any construction project they declare to be "unsafe." In fact, MES staff have previously warned American and other foreign businessmen that their purview covers anything that is associated with temperature, pressure, or isotopes -- categories broadly interpreted to include just about everything under the sun.
6. (SBU) It is often said mockingly that in Azerbaijan's judicial system, one can only win a case if one is friends with the judge - or if introduced by Benjamin Franklin (read: significant cash). Of course being known to the judge as politically powerful is another path to courtroom victory. The path to certifying a building's safety is likely similar, and the true structural integrity of Baku's recent construction boom is suspect. In 2007, a multi-story high-rise under construction crashed to the ground, killing several workers. In January 2010, three workers were killed when they fell from a building under construction on high-rent Neftchiler Prospect (reftel). Suspect construction is widespread in Baku, as new, speculative real estate ventures in central Baku (including high-rise buildings) are largely vacant, while practical buyers bid up the prices of flats in "Stalin-ka" buildings that pre-date independence. These older buildings, which tend to be low-rise, are thought to have had higher construction standards and generally be safer and more dependable.
7. (S) These types of market developments do not bode well for the reputation of MES, which is widely viewed as a cash cow for Baku's elite, and the Heydarov family in particular. If an event such as an earthquake led to widespread destruction of property, it is assumed that outrage would be private, rather than public, and would not boil over into attacks on contractors or corrupt bureaucrats, as was the case after the 1999 earthquake in Istanbul. Some less powerful contractors would become easy targets, but the true architects of disaster such as Heydarov's MES would find a way to use its resources and the tools of the state to escape any reprisal.
His Boys and Their Toys
-----------------------
8. (S) Kamaladdin's two sons, Nijat Heydarov and Tale Heydarov, have recently expressed a desire to purchase two Gulfstream jets, valued at $20 million each. The family also owns an Airbus A319 corporate jet that is presently undergoing cabin completion in Basel, Switzerland. According to initial reports, ownership of the Gulfstreams would be shared between "Shams al Sahra FZCO" (registered in Dubai to Tale and Nijat) and Mr. Manouchehr Ahadpur Khangah, with Shams al Sahra and Kangah each holding 50 percent of each jet. Khangah was not previously known to the Embassy, but according to information from Gulfstream appears to be a citizen of both Iran and Azerbaijan (unclear if he also holds other passports). Purportedly as part of Patriot Act compliance, Gulfstream asked the Heydarovs for information that would confirm the lawful sources of their wealth. The
BAKU 00000127 003 OF 004
Heydarovs provided Gulfstream an overview of their family holdings, and it appears they own more businesses than any other Azerbaijani family, including companies in food canning, construction materials, concrete, asphalt, chemicals, bricks, textiles, CD and DVD production (since licensed CDs or DVDs are generally unavailable on the local market, these are certainly all pirated), milk processing, tourism, gypsum materials, leather, agriculture, pianos, alcohol and spirits, juices, banking, insurance, and construction.
9. (C) One Embassy contact, XXXXXXXXXXXX referred to Khangah as the Chief Executive Officer or "front man" of a substantial portion of the Heydarov family conglomerate. This contact noted that while Khangah is listed as the official owner of various businesses, they are very much Heydarov-owned operations in which Khangah functions more as a manager. This source added that Khangah's role was mirrored by an unnamed Turkish citizen who controls another segment of the family businesses.
10. (C) Many of the family,s operations are part of the "Gilan," "Qabala," "Jala," or "United Enterprises International (UEI)" family of companies. Gilan Holdings is omnipresent in Baku, as the company is one of several major real estate developers and has been in the forefront of Baku's highly speculative real estate market. Observers compare Gilan to Dubai World or Nakheel, although admittedly on a smaller scale. The Heydarovs have largely cornered the fruit juice market in Azerbaijan, maintaining extremely high prices for locally produced juices and watered-down juice drinks, while making life difficult -- with the help of State Customs -- for cheaper competitors from Turkey, Ukraine and Russia. When USAID tried to support the production and distribution of pomegranate products in Azerbaijan, they quickly learned that no one sells pomegranate juice, concentrate, or derivatives from Azerbaijan without Heydarov's permission. Azerbaijan's economy is largely dominated by monopolistic interests, and observers suggest that the Heydarovs are at the top of this mountain of non-competition. It is rumored that the Heydarovs also have interests in the local Pepsi bottler, the local license for Red Bull, British American Tobacco, Japan Tobacco, and Imperial Tobacco. Heydarov has readily admitted to visiting U.S. delegations that he owns and operates the Caspian Fish Company which controls the lucrative (and previously Russian Mafia-controlled) Beluga Caviar production in Azerbaijan.
11. (S) The Heydarovs are also active in cultural endeavors. Kamaladdin Heydarov is a composer and has written a song about former President Heydar Aliyev that was sung by Azeri singer Aghadadash Aghayev. His wife is ethnic Korean, and he himself is quite the Koreaphile; he is President of the Azerbaijan Taekwondo Federation and owner of the recently opened high-end Korean restaurant "Shilla." Korean diplomats have confirmed that Heydarov was the protector for several major business deals, but have complained that many of these deals have gone awry after the Korean firms refused to pay adequate patronage to Heydarov.
12. (C) Heydarov's son Tale is the President of The European Azerbaijan Society (TEAS), and has made rounds to U.S. embassies in European capitals from his London base. The "society" purports to be an independent advocacy group, but its talking points very much reflect the goals and objectives of the GOAJ. In recent meetings, Tale and his cohorts have raised "Armenian aggression" in Nagorno-Karabakh and "double standards" of U.S. human rights and democracy reporting in the region, and complained about efforts of the U.S. Congress to provide humanitarian assistance within the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. Tale and/or Nijat also own the Qabala Football Club -- perhaps as a small-scale effort to replicate the Chelsea antics of Russia's Roman Abramovich. The Qabala squad is a virtual United Nations team, with
BAKU 00000127 004 OF 004
players from across Europe, Latin America and Africa -- the best team money can buy, at least for central Azerbaijan. Both sons were educated in London and presently live there. Tale holds a B.A. in International Relations and History from the London School of Economics and an M.A. in Security and Global Governance from Birkbeck College, while Nijat holds a B.A. in Politics and East European Studies from University College London and an M.A. in Management, Organizations, and Governance from the London School of Economics. Some newspapers have reported that Tale might return to Baku to become a Member of Parliament later this year.
It's Good to Be King
--------------------
13. (C) The family's influence is strongest in the regions of Qabala, Masalli, and Lenkeran. Postsuspects that Heydarov continues to control the tate Customs Committee and wield influence over the Ministry of Taxes, the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, and Ministry of Economic Development, which is now led by a former Ministry of Taxes official. Additionally, of course, Heydarov profits significantly from widespread activities of the Ministry of Emergency Situations. That ministry, according to observers, may be the most sought after employer in official Baku, as Heydarov has made a reputation for paying salaries on time and in full. Employees benefit from perks of MES employment, such as the ability to enroll children in one of Baku's best-looking and best-financed public schools. Measures like these, contacts report, create a loyal following for the minister among his minions.
Turf Wars: Don't Cross Kamaladdin
---------------------------------
14. (S) Embassy contacts note that Kamaladdin Heydarov is currently in a "fight over grain" with Minister of Agriculture Ismat Abbasov, and wants Abbasov replaced by Member of Parliament Eldar Ibrahimov. Historically, those who have fought with Heydarov have always fared poorly: Farhad Aliyev and Heydar Babayev were (in succession) driven out as Minister of Economic Development in part after falling on Heydarov's bad side. Both were billed as reformers, and the economic reforms they were seen to propose stood to hurt Heydarov's interests at the State Customs Committee and the Ministry of Emergency Situations. In addition, some opposition newspapers had begun to call them potential candidates for the position of Prime Minister. Feeling threatened by their reform activity and growing power, Heydarov allegedly put his foot down. Both were removed from government and their business interests were seriously damaged. Rumors circulated in 2009 that Heydarov may have even been behind the assassination of Air Force Chief and Deputy Defense Minister General Rail Rzayev. The rumors point to the widely-reported forced landing of Heydarov's helicopter after it took off without obtaining flight clearance.
15. (U) The next issue of "Who Owns What" will profile the family of Ziya Mammadov, the Minister of Transportation. With so much of the nation's oil wealth being poured into road construction, the Mammadovs also control a significant source of rent-seeking. His holdings extend to the buses that run throughout Baku. A recent television report asked if the Mammadovs controlled mysterious construction company ZQAN Holding; the reporter pointed out the letters of ZQAN matched the initials of father Ziya, mother Qanira, son Anar, and daughter Nigar. A ZQAN representative brushed this aside as innuendo. LU
Wednesday, 06 August 2008, 16:49
S E C R E T FREETOWN 000389
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W (JHUNTER), INL/AAE (SSNYDER)
EO 12958 DECL: 08/06/2018
TAGS SNAR, PREL, PGOV, PINR, SL
SUBJECT: COCAINE BUST: MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION SACKED,
DEA PARTICIPATION ACCEPTED
REF: A. FREETOWN 336 B. FREETOWN
Classified By: CDA Glenn Fedzer for reasons 1.4(b/d)
1. (S) Summary: Transportation and Aviation Minister Ibrahim Kemoh Sesay was relieved of his duties August 4, pending the conclusion of the cocaine trafficking investigation. Sesay has vehemently proclaimed his innocence since the bust, despite a close family connection to one of the accused. XXXXXXXXXXXX Sesay was questioned by the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) August 5, but the SLP had orders from the President to neither charge nor detain him. This runs counter to Koroma's public and private statements which have said he will hold anyone connected to the cocaine bust accountable, regardless of their connections. Also, following an Embassy offer August 1, the GoSL has accepted and offer for DEA to assistance in the investigation, and possible help with the deportation of the accused. End Summary.
Minister Fired
--------------
2. (SBU) The repercussions of the July 13 cocaine bust at Lungi Airport (reftel A) continue to be felt, with Minister of Transportation and Aviation Ibrahim Kemoh Sesay relieved of his duties August 4. According to a State House press statement, this action was taken to facilitate the investigation and provide "unfettered access to everyone and everywhere the investigations demand." Sesay stated in a radio interview August 5 that he "expects to land on his feet" following the conclusion of the investigation, inferring that he will resume his ministerial duties at that time.
3. (SBU) Sesay's removal from power is not a surprise. Media reports have called for his resignation since the bust, in large part due to the arrest of his cousin (Note: Media reports refer to them as brothers, but this reflects the African tradition of brotherhood that extends beyond immediate family. End note), Mohamed Sesay. The media have reflected the public sentiment that, at the very least, the close familial relationship between the two makes it hard for the Minister to be impartial during the investigation. Kemoh Sesay has frequently declared his innocence and willingness to allow the investigation to occur without influence or interference.
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX the President directly ordered SLP senior officers to refrain from arresting Kemoh Sesay. Instead, he was brought in for questioning and released on August 5, with subsequent questioning expected August 6. The SLP intend to convince the President to sanction his arrest, and in the meantime have Kemoh Sesay under constant surveillance. Since he is considered a flight risk, warnings were sent out to all exit points, including the airport. Despite these measures, known corruption at the borders makes it nearly impossible to prevent escape.
5. (C) The Sesay "brothers" are APC stalwarts with close ties to the President. Kemoh Sesay was originally elected as a Member of Parliament in 1996 as an SLPP party member, but switched allegiances to the APC during the 2002 elections. He was elected MP in the Port Loko District in 2007 and resigned this position to become Minister. Mohamed Sesay, not considered competent or educated enough to be a politician, was one of the key financial backers of the 2007 Presidential campaign. His contributions during the election, according to rumor, earned the ministerial position for Kemoh Sesay and the Manager position of the national football team for himself. If the allegations are true, these positions were strategically selected and likely used to facilitate narcotics trafficking beyond this particular case.
DEA Help Accepted
-----------------
6. (S) Following an official USG offer made by diplomatic note on 1 August, the GoSL accepted DEA assistance and held a joint DEA-GoSL meeting August 6, chaired by Office of National Security General Kellie Conte. Conte and GoSL officials made clear their fear that the traffickers could
corrupt lover-level judiciary and police officials, and hoped that the DEA could indict and remove the traffickers from Sierra Leone as quickly as possible. The attendees at the meeting also agreed that an additional DEA agent fluent in Spanish should be sent to Sierra Leone immediately. Post will report further developments regarding DEA participation septel.
7. (S) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX His stance on Kemoh Sesay's possible arrest contradicts previously reported information that he intends to see any guilty party brought to justice, regardless of their personal or professional connections. This is an unwelcome development, particularly given the importance of Koroma's personal integrity and commitment to rule of law in encouraging greater investor and donor confidence. On the other hand, DEA involvement, particularly if it results in the removal of traffickers from Sierra Leone quickly, helps the President retain his government's reputation and commitment to the rule of law--before the traffickers use their resources to bribe their way past prison and police officials who make only few dollars a day. End comment. FEDZER
Tuesday, 02 September 2008, 23:30
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 093970
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/02/2018
TAGS SENV, PREL, UNEP, WMO, KGHG, IR, ML, AR, MA, MO
SUBJECT: LIFELINES FOR IPCC WORKING GROUP ELECTION
Classified By: Classified by IO/DAS Gerald Anderson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (U) This is an action message. Please see paragraph 3.
2. (C) Summary. Missions should be prepared to assist the U.S. Delegation to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its efforts to secure a positive outcome to elections for working group co-chair positions at the IPCC Plenary being held in Geneva, August 31-September 4. USDEL is working actively to prevent the election of an Iranian scientist to the developing-nation co-chairmanship of Working Group Two, a position which would pair him with a U.S. scientist running unopposed for developed-nation co-chair of the same group. The focus of USG efforts is to support an alternate candidacy for the position, although the full slate of active candidates and their potential for election will not be known until the later stages of the plenary sessions. Curricula vitae of some of the leading candidates are at paras 6-10. End Summary.
3. (C) Action Request. Missions should assign a Point-of-Contact for this issue and provide phone and e-mail information to the US Mission to the UN in Geneva. USUN should appoint its own POC and relay contact information for all POCs to USDEL IPCC. In the event that USDEL requires assistance in working with counterpart delegations (e.g., coming to a consensus on a single strong alternate candidate to support), USDEL may contact Mission POCs directly, or via US Mission Geneva, to ask that Missions apprise host governments of the situation, with a view to arranging for instructions from capitals. Missions should do everything possible to assist USDEL if they receive such a request. Until such a call is received, however, Missions should take no action on this issue; USDEL will be interacting directly with host-country expert delegations in Geneva, and premature contacts/demarches with host country government officials in capitals, even to preview the background of the situation, could be highly counter-productive. Point of Contact for USDEL is OES/EGC,s Donna Lee XXXXXXXXXXXX.
4. (C) Background. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (http://www.ipcc.ch) is a highly influential body established by the World Meteological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to assess scientific issues related to climate change. This year, the U.S. has nominated Stanford Professor Christopher Field to the developed-country chair of IPCC Working Group Two, which assesses the vulnerability of socio-economic and natural systems to climate change and the options for adaptation. His nomination is unopposed. Iran, however, has nominated Dr. Mostafa Jafari to be the developing-country co-chair of the same working group. Jafari is a highly-qualified scientist with research ties to the UK and Japan, but he is also a senior Iranian government employee who has represented Iran in international negotiations. Co-chair appointments are for a minimum of four years, and require close collaboration and often travel to or extended residencies in each others, countries. Having U.S. and Iranian co-chairs would be problematic and potentially at odds with overall U.S. policy towards Iran, and would significantly complicate the U.S. commitment to funding the Working Group Two secretariat. U.S. withdrawal of its nominee, however, would effectively give Iran a veto over future U.S. nominees in UN bodies. Moreover, having a U.S. co-chair at the IPCC significantly bolsters U.S. interests on climate change, a key foreign policy issue.
5. (C) Background continued. Prior to arrival in Geneva, USDEL contacted IPCC Chairman Dr. Rajendra Pachauri (please protect), who agreed to work on this issue to avoid the potential for disruption to one the organization,s three core working groupsXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX. Next, USDEL contacted the Austrian delegate serving as EU representative on the nominating committee that manages the election process, who showed an understanding of U.S. equities. USDEL contacted the Malian and Argentinean delegations, who have nominated highly-qualified co-chair candidates (see below), and the German delegation, who have been interested in advancing the Malian for co-chair of Working Group Three, for which Germany has nominated an unopposed candidate as developed-country co-chair. The Malians subsequently told USDEL that their candidate, Dr. Yauba Sokona, prefers Working Group Two to Working Group Three. Also prior to arrival in Geneva, USDEL contacted the UK and Netherlands delegations, both of which we have worked closely with in the past. Based on experience at prior IPCC plenaries, events related to the Working Group elections will likely unfold unpredictably and rapidly, necessitating a rapid and flexible USG response.
6. (SBU) CV of Iranian candidate:
Mostafa Jafari
Personal Information: DPoB: 1956, Tehran
Education: -- Post doctorate research in Plant Ecophysiology Methodology in 1997 (Japan). -- Ph.D. in Plant Science (Ecology) in 1990 (UK). -- Short course in Agricultural Economy in 1983 (Tehran). -- B.Sc. in Forest and Range graduated in 1978 (Iran). -- Diploma in 1974 (Tehran).
Membership in Professional Organizations: -- Japanese Forestry Society -- The British Grassland Society -- The British Ecological Society -- International Union of Forestry research Organization -- Asia-Pacific Association of Forestry Research Institutions -- New York Academy of Science -- The International Association for Ecology
Professional Responsibilities: -- Starting to work as chief of Agricultural committee in 1979 (Tehran). -- Member of Scientific Staff since 1990. -- Lecturer in Universities (Ecophysiology, Ecology, Range Rehabilitation, Plant Geography) and advisor of several postgraduate students in different universities. -- Head of High Council for Forest, Range and Soil in Forest and Range Organization (highest technical body in FRO) 1990-1993 (consideration and approval of more than 200 silviculture projects with cooperation of council members). -- Director General of Studies and Coordinating Office in Forest and Range Organization 1991-1994. -- Head of Coordinating Council for Forest, Range and Watershed Management, 1992 (nominated by Minister). -- Member of Agricultural Commission of National Research Council of I.R. Iran, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998 (nominated by First Deputy of President). -- Director (President) of Research Institute of Forest and Rangelands, I.R. Iran, from 1992 to Nov. 1997. (with 600 staff including 250 scientific researcher and 900 research projects, publishing 200 books in this period) -- Full authority representative of Minister and Member of Iranian National Sustainable Development Committee, 1993-1998. -- Chief, Sustainable Development Committee of Ministry, 1995-1998. -- Member of Expert and Academic Advisory Commission and Chief of Environmental Committee in Planning and Budget Organization, 1997-1998. -- Chief, Expert Committee of Forests and Rangelands (Agricultural Commission of National Research Council of I.R. Iran), 1997-1998. -- Advisor to the Minister, 1997-1998. -- Permanent Representative of I.R. Iran to FAO office, Rome, June 1998- March 2003. -- Advisor to the Deputy Minister and Head of FRWO, and National Forest Focal Point, from March 2003.to Oct. 2005 -- Head of TP Secretariat of Low Forest Cover Countries (LFCCs, International Intergovernmental Organization), Since, March 2003. -- International Affair Advisor to the Deputy Minister and Head of IRIMO, and Director of First Vice President Office of WMO, Since August 2004. http://www.weather.ir/farsi/about/IPCC/irani. asp -- Head of High Council for Forest, Range and Soil in Forest, Range and Watershed management Organization (highest technical body in FRWO) from Oct. 2005 to July 2006, (considering and approve of main Silvicultural project in FRWO with cooperation of council members). -- Scientific member of Research Institute of Forest and Rangelands,
Major Publications: Publication of 63 articles including five books and two university textbooks, including: -- Jafari, M. (1997a), The Present Status of Forestry Research in I.R. Iran, in Four Articles on Forests, Technical Publication No. 176-1997, Research Institute of Forests and Rangelands, pp 121. -- Jafari, M. (1997b), Present Status of Afforestation Research in I.R. Iran, in Four Articles on Forests, Technical Publication No. 176-1997, Research Institute of Forests and Rangelands, pp 121. -- Jafari, M. (2006), An Overview On Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) with An Introduction to Monitoring and Evaluation, ISBN: 964-6931-80-4, Pouneh Publisher, Tehran, Iran, pp 170. -- Jafari M. (2007a), Review on needfulness for plant ecophysiological study and investigation on climate change,s effects on forest, rangeland and desert ecosystems, presented in Workshop: Climate Change in South-Eastern European Countries: Causes, Impacts, Solutions, 26- 27 March 2007, Orangerie, Burggarten, Graz, Austria. -- Jafari M. (2007b), Climate Change and IPCC Assessments (Abstract of Keynote Lecture of the Symposium), in The Final Report of ICCAP, The Research Project on the Impact of Climate Changes on Agricultural Production System in Arid Areas, March 2007, ICCAP Publication 10-Japan, ISBN 4902325-09-8, pp 315-317. -- Cruz, R.V., M. Jafari, et al, 2007: Asia. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 469-506. -- Falkenmark M., C. M. Finlayson and L. J. Gordon (Coordinating lead authors), 2007, Agriculture, water, and ecosystems: avoiding the costs of going too far" Chapter 6, in book entitled "Water for Food, Water for Life" published by the International Water Management Institute (IWMI), UK. (M. Jafari, Reviewer of chapter six).
Research projects: Managing director of research project in RIFR entitled: &Investigation on Climate Change Effects on Forest Ecosystems in Gilan and Mazandaran Provinces with Emphasize of Wood Dendrology Studies8
Language knowledge: Persian, English (fluent); Italian, Arabic, French.
International negotiations: -- UNCED (Rio de Janeiro) Conference on Climate Change http://unfccc.int/cop4/resource/docs/1998/sbi /inf02.pdf http://unfccc.int/cop4/resource/docs/1998/sbi /inf02.htm -- Kyoto Protocol, Leading Author (LA) of Fourth Assessment Report of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (AR4 of IPCC WG II / Chapter 10 Asia ) 2004-2007) http://www.gtp89.dial.pipex.com/10.pdf -- Biological Diversity, Combat Desertification, Forestry negotiations, IPF, IFF, UNFF, http://www.iisd.ca/forestry/unff/unff3/2june. html http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/sd/sdvol101nu m1e.pdf http://www.iisd.ca/forestry/unff/unff5/may17. html http://www.iisd.ca/forestry/unff/unff5/may25. html -- 10th World Forestry Congress, Paris (vice president of WFC X, chairman of two technical working groups); -- 12th World Forestry Congress, Quebec (vice president of WFC XII, chairman of two technical working groups and one open forum), http://www.iisd.ca/sd/wfc12/sdvol10num8e.html -- Head of Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) of Tehran Process Secretariat for Low Forest Cover Countries (TPS for LFCCs, International IGO) since 2003 (ftp:// ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/007/j2042E/j20 42E00.pdf)
7. (SBU) Biographic Summary of Malian candidate:
Youba Sokona Executive Secretary, Sahara and Sahel Observatory (OSS) PROFESSIONAL INFORMATION:
Dr. Youba Sokona has been Executive Secretary of the Sahara and Sahel Observatory (OSS) since June 2004. OSS is an independent international organization based in Tunisia, comprised of 22 African and European countries, regional and international organizations, and representatives of civil society organizations. The Executive Secretary directs program operations and implements the decisions taken by the Executive Board and General Assembly.
Throughout his career, Dr Sokona has served in various advisory capacities to African governments and organisations. He has published several books and articles on the issues of energy, environment and development with a focus on Africa. Prior to his appointment to OSS he was:
Coordinator, Energy Programme, and Executive Secretary for International Relations, Environement and Developpement du Tiers Monde (ENDA-TM), based in Dakar, Senegal (1982)2003); and
Professor, &Ecole Nationale d,Ingenieurs de Bamako8 (National Engineering School, Bamako, Mali).
Dr. Sokona has participated in many international events on climate change, desertification, and biodiversity. He is often invited by African governments and international organisations, such as the World Bank, UNDP, UNEP, UNCCD, etc., to be a member of steering committees, to conduct programme evaluations, to chair high-level sessions in international conferences, and to contribute scientific and policy papers.
He took part in the international negotiations and follow-up events to the Rio process and the three UN environmental conventions on Climate Change, Desertification, and Biodiversity.
AWARDS, BOARD MEMBERSHIPS AND AFFILIATIONS:
Member, Technical Advisory Group of the joint UNDP/World Bank Energy Sector Management Assistant Program (present);
Board Member, International Institute for Environment and Development (present); and
Board Member, Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (present).
EDUCATION:
University of Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris (PhD, Engineering and Earth Sciences)
Ecole Nationale Superieure des Mines de Paris
Ecole Nationale d,Ingenieurs de Bamako (Mali)
8. (SBU) CV of Argentinean candidate:
Vicente Ricardo Barros
A PhD in Meteorological Science, Dr. Barros is a Chief Researcher at the Conicet and Climatology Professor at the University of Buenos Aires, School of Natural Sciences, where he heads the Masters program in Environmental Science. He has written more than one hundred papers on climatic problems, half of which have been published in international scientific magazines. He took part in drafting a chapter of the Third Report of the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climatic Change in 2001.
Education:
1961-65 University of Buenos Aires (UBA): Licenciado in Meteorological Sciences
1969-71 The University of Michigan: Master of Science in Meteorology:
1972-73 UBA: Doctor in Meteorological Sciences
Management Position:
Faculty of Sciences (UBA) Director of the Masters program in Environmental Sciences (since 1999)
Scientific position:
National Council for Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET) Senior scientist; and Department of Atmosphere and Ocean Sciences (DAOS) of the UBAx
Teaching position:
University of Buenos Aires; Full Professor in Climatology (since 1987)
Past management positions:
1989-92 Member of the Directory of the National Commission of Environmental Policies
1991-92 National Report to the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development and Environment, Rio de Janeiro 1992, 579 pp. 1991. Coordinator
1993-97 Director of the Department of Atmosphere and Ocean Sciences (UBA)
1994-02 Member of the Directive Council of the Faculty of Sciences (UBA)
1996-97 National Director of the Project: Greenhouse gasses emissions inventory and Climate Change Studies on Vulnerability and Mitigation. GEF-UNDP- SECYT
1997-98 President of the Commission of the Exact and non Biological Natural Sciences segment of the National plan on Science and Technology 1999-2001
1999 Technical Director of the Emission target study of greenhouse gases. EPA- UNDP
1999 Revision of the First National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Books:
El Cambio Climtico Global 2004. Ed, Libros del Zorzal, Buenos Aires 172 pp. Segunda edicion en 2006. Traducido al Checo y Publicado en 2006 por Mlada Fronta con el titulo Globalni zmena klimatu
El Cambio Climtico en el Ro de la Plata. 2005. Eds. V. Barros, A. Menendez and G, Nagy. CIMA. Buenos Aires
El Cambio Climtico en la Cuenca del Plata. 2006. Eds. V. Barros, R. Clarke and P. Silva Dias. CIMA. Buenos Aires.
Climate Change and Adaptation, Eds, Neil Leary, James Adejuwon, Vicente Barros, Ian Burton and Rodel Lasco, Earthscan Publishers, London 2007 Coordinator
Activities as an international expert:
1983 Project on basic information to develop wind energy in Uruguay. UNDP/WMO
1987 Planning of the wind energy use in Cuba. UNDP/WMO
1987-91 Project on wind energy in the Energy Department of Uruguay. UNDP/UNIDO
Activities in international organizations
1997-00 Member of the Atmospheric Observation Panel for Climate del Global Climate Observing System. WMO-UNEP
1999-00 Contributing author to the chapter on Detection and attribution of climate change of the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
2001-03 Member of the panel on the Plata basin of VAMOS (CLIVAR)
Journal reviewer activities:
Acta Oceanografica (Argentina), Atmosfera (Mexico), Climate Research (Germany), Geoacta (Argentina), Geofisica Internacional (Mexico),Geophysical Research Letters (USA), Int. Journal of Climatology (United Kingdom), J. Climate (USA), J. Geophysical Research (USA), Meteorologica (Argentina), Magazine of the Academy of Sciences (Brazil), Revista Geofisica (IPGH), Journal of Hydrometeotology (USA), Journal of Arid Environments (Holanda), REGA (Brasil-Argentina)
Publications In Refereed Journals:
Climate variability over subtropical South America and the South American Monsoon: A Review 2003: V. Barros, M. Doyle, M. Gonzalez, I. Camilloni, R. Bejaran and R. Caffera. Meteorologica, 27, 34-58
Extreme discharge events in the Paran River and their climate forcing 2003:. I. Camilloni and V. Barros J. of Hydrology, 278, 94-106
Implications of a Dynamic Target of Greenhouse Gases Emission Reduction: the Case of Argentina 2002. Environmental and Development Economics, July 2002. Barros, V. and M. Conte Grand
Differences in the El Nio response over the Southern Hemisphere 2003. J. Climate.17, 1741-1753. Vera C., Silvestri, V. Barros and A. Carril.
Impact of Global Change on the Coastal Areas of the Rio de la Plata. AIACC Notes. Junio 2003.Vo 2, .9-12. Barros, V., Camilloni, I. and A. Menendez
La temperatura del Atlntico Sur y la diferencia de caudales del Rio Parana durante los eventos El Nio 1982-83 y 1997-98. 2004. Revista Brasileira de Meteorologia I. Camilloni y V. Barros.
The major discharge events in the Paraguay River; Magnitudes, source regions and climate forcings. J Hydrometeorology 2004 Vol 5, 1061-1070.. V. Barros, L Chamorro, G. Coronel and J. Baez
An Observed Trend in Central South American Precipitation 2004. J. Climate. 17: 4357-4367 B. Liebmann, Vera, C. Carvalho, L., Camilloni, I., Barros, V., Hoerling, M y Allured, D. A.
Observed trends in indices of daily temperature extremes in South America 1960-2000 2005. J. Climate, 18, 5011-5023. Vincent, L.A., T.C. Peterson, V.R. Barros, et al
Trends in total and extreme South American precipitation 1960-2000 and links with sea surface temperature 2006. J. Climate, 19, 1490-1512. Haylock M. R., Barros V. R., et al
Seasonal-to-decadal predictability and prediction of South American climate 2006. J. Climate, 19, 5988)6004. P. Nobre, J. Marengo, I. F. A. Cavalcanti, G. Obregon, V. Barros, I. Camilloni, N. Campos and A. G. Ferreira
How does Soil Moisture Influence the Early Stages of the South American Monsoon? 2008 J. Climate. 21. 185-213. E. Collini, E. Berbery, V. Barros and, M. Pyle.
Precipitation trends in southeastern South America: relationship with ENSO phases and the low-level circulation. 2008. Theoretical and Appl. Climatology. In press. V. Barros, M. Doyle and I. Camilloni.
Land use impact on the Uruguay River discharge 2008 Geophysical Research Letters, Vol. 35, LXXXXX, Doi:10.1029/2008GL033707. Aceptado. R. Saurral, V. Barros, and D. Lettenmaier
Proceedings of congresses, workshops and other scientific meetings:
Interanual variability of the South Atlantic High and rainfall in southeastern South America during summer months. I. Camilloni, M. Doyle y V. Barros. CLIVAR. 2004
Climate change in the environmental agenda for Argentina V. Barros, H. Carlino, and Daniel Perczyk. Second AIACC Regional Workshop for Latin America and the Caribbean. Buenos Aires, 24-27 Agosto 2004.
Climate scenarios for the 21st century: influence on the discharges of the Plata basin I. Camilloni, R. Saurral, R. Mezhe and V. Barros. Fourth international workshop on development and management of dams in the Plata basin; Salto Grande, Noviembre 2005
Extreme Precipitations in Argentina, Trends and Climate Change. M. Re, R. Saurral and V. Barros. Fourth International Workshop on Development and Management of Dams in the Plata Basin; Salto Grande, November 2005.
Seasonal dependence of surface-atmosphere interactions for subtropical South America. Collini, E. A.; Berbery, E. H.; Barros, V. . 8th International Conference on Southern Hemisphere Meteorology and Oceanography. Abril 2006, Foz de Iguazu. Proceedings pag. 999.
Sea-level pressure patterns in South America and the adjacent oceans in the IPCC AR4 models. Di Luca, A.; Camilloni, I.; Barros, V. 8th International Conference on Southern Hemisphere Meteorology and Oceanography. Abril 2006, Foz de Iguazu. Proceedings pag. 235.
Precipitation trends in southeastern South America: relationship with ENSO phases. Doyle, M.; Barros, V. 8th International Conference on Southern Hemisphere Meteorology and Oceanography. Abril 2006, Foz de Iguazu. Proceedings pag. 1513
Assessing long-term discharges of the Plata River Saurral, R.; Mezher, R.; Barros, V. 8th International Conference on Southern Hemisphere Meteorology and Oceanography. Abril 2006, Foz de Iguazu. Proceedings pag. 821.
Extreme precipitations in Argentina Re, M.; Saurral, R.; Barros, V. 8th International Conference on Southern Hemisphere Meteorology and Oceanography. Abril 2006, Foz de Iguazu. Proceedings pag. 1575.
Other reports:
Planning:
- Implementacion de modelos matematicos para el pronostico del tiempo. 1972. SMN. Lichtenstein, E, C.Martinez, V. Barros, W. Vargas, H. Hordij y H. Ciapessoni. - Coordinacion de la presentacion del proyecto de desarrollo del CENPAT al Banco interamericano de Desarrollo. CONICET 1978. Barros, V. y J. Vercino
National policies:
- National Report to the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development and Environment, Rio de Janeiro, 1992. 579 pp. 1991 (in Spanish). - Background Report for the First National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1997 (in Spanish).
- Greenhouse gasses emissions inventory and Climate Change Studies on Vulnerability and Mitigation. In Argentina, SECYT 1998, 5 volumes (in Spanish). - Background report for the Revision of the First National Communication to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Secretary of Sustainable Development and Environment, 1999, 104 pp (in Spanish). - Inventory of Greenhouse gasses of the Argentine Republic, year 1997. Secretary of Sustainable Development and Environment, 1999, 150 pp (in Spanish).
Conferences:
Since 1969, more than 100 conferences to scientific, diplomatic and business communities and for the public. In 1991 and 1992, numerous conferences about the Argentine Report to the Conference of United Nations on Environment and Sustainable Development of 1992. Similarly in 1997 and 1998 on climate change and the First Argentine Communication to the Framework Convention on Climate Change and on its revision in 1999.
9. (SBU) CV of Moroccan candidate:
Abdalah Mokssit
Head of the National Center on Climate and Meteorological Research (Direction Meteorologie Nationale), Casablanca.
Civil Engineer in Meteorology Specialization in Global Circulation Modelling
Areas of expertise: -- Numerical weather Prediction -- Climate variability -- Climate Rediction -- Climate Change dtection and attribution
Major Research Projects: -- Climatology: Dryness studies in Morocco and the world. -- Climate Change: Co-Chair of the Expert Team on Climate Change Detection CLL/WMO. -- Climate application impact studies: Climate change and water resource management in Morocco -- Climate change and agriculture in the Tadla region of Morocco
Speaks and writes Arabic, French and English fluently
Major Publications: -- H C Upadhayaya and A. Mokssit: Adiabatic on linear normal mode initialization for a grid point Global model; Processings of Indian Academy of Sciences, volume 100 Number 1, Mars 1991; model. Proceedings of Indian Academy of Sciences volume 100 Number 1 Mars 1991; -- Mokssit et R. Gnaoui: realisation d'un outil d'anlyse de Protocole Atlas 400; Mmoire de trvaux de fin d'etudes realise chez Transpac, juin 1987; -- Mokssit: Outil pour la reussi te du Management par Projets; Memoire realise dans le cadre du cycle superieur de management du ministre de l'equipement , juin 1997; -- Mokssit et al: Le point sur la secheresse au Maroc; dition du Ministere des travaux publics; 1996; -- Mokssit et al: La prevision a longue echeance au Maroc; Workshop on Long Range Forecasting; Nairobi 1998; -- Mokssit et al: Les changements Climatiques et Ressources en eau; etude realisee dans le cadre du projet Maghrebin (RAB/ G94 finance par le PNUD) sur les changements climatiques;
-- Mokssit et al: Changements climatiques et ressources en eau dans le bassin versant de l'OURGHA; -- Mokssit: la secheresse dans le climat Marocain; Atelier sur la prevention et la gestion des situations de scheresse dans les pays du Maghreb, Juin 1996; -- Mokssit: Numerical Simulation of Devastating Meteorological Situations; INM/WMO Symposium on Cycllones and Hasardous weather in Mediterranean, Avril 1997; -- Mokssit; Development of priority Climate Indices for Africa; paru dans regional Climate Studies/ Mediterranean Climate, February 2001; -- A. Dave Easterling, A. Mokssit et AL: Workshop Report on Climate Change Indices; BAMS (Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society); -- Mokssit: Chapter 4 on Drought ( au niveau mondial), 7 eme revue de l'OMM sur le Climat Mondial; -- Mokssit: On climate change Extreme Indices; 7eme revue de l'OMM sur le Climat Mondial; -- F.Zwiers, H. Cattle, T.C. Peterson and A. Mokssit: Detecting climate: WMO bulletin Volume 52, No 3, July 2003
10. (SBU) Biographic Summary of Maldivan candidate:
Amjad Abdulla
Amjad Abdulla is the Director General at the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Water of Maldives and has been working in the Ministry since 1990 in various positions. He is the national focal point for the National Adaptation Programme of Action for Climate Change. He is the lead negotiator from the Maldives to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
Mr. Abdulla was a member of National Commission for the Protection of the Environment (NCPE) from 2003 to 2006 and is also a member of a number of task forces and committees appointed by the President to develop the strategic plans and policies on environment and development. He has worked nationally and internationally as a freelance consultant on various environmental projects. He has also coordinated and managed several donor assisted projects at the Ministry.
Mr. Abdulla is also author and contributing author to several reports of high national significance: Maldives National Adaptation Programme of Action on Climate Change; First National Communication of Maldives to UNFCCC; Third Environment Action Plan; National Sustainable Development Strategy. He has also written and published several reports and research papers relating to environmental planning and the economic vulnerability of Small Island States. He is also has experience in planning and designing of several coastal developments, including, harbours, jetties, breakwater and other shore protection measures for several islands in the Maldives.
Mr. Abdulla has the distinction of having represented the Maldives at a number of international conferences including the negotiation to review the implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the Mauritius International meeting in 2005. He has also represented Maldives at the UNFCCC negotiations. Mr. Abdulla was the Vice-Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) under UNFCCC from December 2004 to December 2006 and chaired the 22nd and 23rd Session of the SBSTA. He is also a member of the Enforcement Branch of the Kyoto compliance committee and an alternate member of the Adaptation Fund Board under UNFCC. He is also the current chair of the LDC group for climate negotiations under UNFCCC.
Mr. Abdulla possesses an honours degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Brighton, UK and a MSc, in Environmental Science, Policy and Planning from the University of Bath, UK. His professional areas of interest include environmental economics, environmental planning, sustainable development and climate change. RICE
Friday, 15 August 2008, 21:37
UNCLAS BRASILIA 001112
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR OES/EGC FOR DONNA LEE
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS KGHG, KSCA, SENV, AORC, BR
SUBJECT: CLIMATE CHANGE: BRAZIL WILL CONSIDER USG NOMINATION FOR
CO-CHAIR OF IPCC WORKING GROUP II
REF: STATE 82703
1. (U) THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AND NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION.
2. (SBU) Environment, Science and Technology Counselor met on August 15 with the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations (MRE) Director of the Division of Environmental Policy and Sustainable Development, Counselor Andre Odenbreit Carvalho, and with MRE's Special Ambassador for Climate Change Sergio Barbosa Serra to urge Brazil's support for Dr. Christopher Field to be Co-Chair of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Working Group II. Odenbreit and Serra appreciated receiving the information and they stated that the Brazilian government would give the nomination full and careful consideration.
3. (SBU) Odenbreit then pointed out that Brazil was nominating Dr. Susana Kahn, the Environment Ministry's Secretary for Climate Change and Environmental Quality, for the position of Vice-Chair of IPCC Working Group III on Mitigation. Further, he noted that Brazil is supporting the re-election of Dr. Thelma Krug as a Co-Chair of an IPCC regional Working Group. He requested that the USG give these nominations due consideration. EST Counselor assured them that the USG would give the nominations careful consideration.
SOBEL
Friday, 15 August 2008, 13:46
UNCLAS OSLO 000461
SIPDIS
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS KSCA, SENV, AORC, NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY IN FAVOR OF USG IPCC WG II NOMINEE AND ASKS
FOR US SUPPORT IN RETURN
REF: SECSTATE 82698
1. (SBU) In response to reftel, Poloff spoke with Oyvind Christophersen and Marit Viktoria Pettersen, lead members of the Norwegian delegation to the next IPCC Plenary. GON affirmed that the US had contributed a lot to the IPCC and that its continued involvement would be a good idea. GON said it was "very much in favor" of Christopher Field, although it could make no guarantees.
2. (SBU) GON asked for the US to support its nominee for vice-chair of WG III, Oyvind Christophersen. He has been involved with the IPCC since 1993 and was a lead author on the IPCC Special Report on Carbon dioxide Capture and Storage. GON also mentioned that it was important to have non-EU countries like Norway participating in the bureau.
3. (SBU) GON introduced its "Proposal for an IPCC Special Report on Managing the Risk of Extreme Events to Advance Climate Change Adaptation," which it is proposing in conjunction with the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. GON asked for US support for the report, which would be carried out by WG II. GON added that it is willing to host the scoping meeting for the report. WHITNEY
Tuesday, 09 June 2009, 14:24
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000235
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 6/9/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINR, KDEM, IR
SUBJECT: IRAN'S FIRST FAN: DISSATISFACTION WITH AHMADINEJAD MAY
EXTEND FROM THE SOCCER PITCH TO THE BALLOT BOX
DUBAI 00000235 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy Richardson, Acting Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: As emotions run high following a week of adversarial debates between Iran's four presidential candidates, the outcome of the national soccer team's World Cup qualifying match against the UAE could add to voters' dissatisfaction with Ahmadinejad just 36 hours before they head to the polls. President Ahmadinejad has worked hard to associate himself with Iran's beloved national team - "Team Melli" - a tactic that backfired in March when he was accused of "jinxing" the team, which suffered a last-minute defeat to Saudi Arabia just after Ahmadinejad entered the stadium. That event, coupled with an unexpected loss by the national wrestling team with Ahmadinejad in attendance earlier in the year, set off a firestorm of SMS messages and internet jokes holding the President personally responsible for the teams' defeats, and has led numerous IRPO contacts to predict - only partially in jest - that a loss to the UAE team in Tehran on June 10 could further weaken Ahmadinejad's standing among soccer-crazed Iranians. End summary.
MIXING SPORTS AND POLITICS
--------------------------
2. (SBU) Since British oil workers first introduced the sport to Iranians in the early 20th century, soccer has developed into one of Iran's most popular past times, rivaled only by wrestling. Although the Islamic Revolution and Iran-Iraq War hindered the development of professional soccer in Iran until the early 1990's, Team Melli came into international prominence in 1998 when it made its World Cup debut in France. Although Iran failed to advance beyond the first round, Team Melli's memorable 2-1 victory over the U.S., in what was considered to be a particularly friendly and sportsmanlike match, cemented the national team's standing in the eyes of many Iranians.
3. (C) As a result of its enormous domestic fan base, soccer has become highly politicized in Iran. According to an IRPO contact closely involved with Iranian professional soccer, the Iranian government is well aware of the potential domestic unrest that can result from a Team Melli loss - or even win. Iran's successful World Cup qualifiers in 1997 and 2005 resulted in massive celebrations in the streets of Tehran, marked by public intoxication, dancing, and women removing their hijabs, while Team Melli's elimination from the 2001 World Cup qualifiers led to rioting. Contacts tell IRPO that the Iranian government worries that public unrest over a Team Melli loss could add fire to the increasingly volatile political demonstrations that have paralyzed Tehran in recent nights.
4. (C) President Ahmadinejad, in particular, has staked a great deal of political capital in Iranian soccer. A personal fan and former player, Ahmadinejad has made several press appearances practicing with Team Melli. In an effort to capitalize on soccer's popularity with constituents, Ahmadinejad, a political conservative, went so far as to call for the inclusion of women at men's games in 2006, although he was overruled by Supreme Leader Khamenei in a rare, but significant, open disagreement between the two men. As a direct result of Ahmadinejad's close ties to Iran's national soccer team, several European politicians and Jewish groups unsuccessfully lobbied for Iran's disqualification from the 2006 World Cup. After the team's poor performance in the World Cup qualifiers, Ahmadinejad fired Team Melli's coach in June 2006, reportedly for "damaging national pride," and launched an investigation into corruption in the Football Federation of the Islamic Republic of Iran (FFIRI). In November 2006, the Fidiration Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) temporarily disqualified Team Melli from international tournaments for Ahmadinejad's repeated violations of FIFA's political interference rules.
THE GEORGE STEINBRENNER OF IRAN
-------------------------------
DUBAI 00000235 002.2 OF 003
5. (SBU) Despite the 2006 FIFA suspension, Ahmadinejad's personal involvement in Team Melli has only grown in significance. In June 2008, Ahmadinejad, with the assistance of Seyyed Hasan Khomeini, Ayatollah Khomeini's grandson, successfully pressured the FFIRI to lift its suspension of star Ali Karimi in order for him to play in the 2010 World Cup qualifiers. According to press reports, Ahmadinejad was personally involved in the firing of coach Ali Daei after Iran's loss to Saudi Arabia in March 2009. Team Melli's next coach, Mohammad Mayeli-Kohan, only lasted two weeks in the politically-charged environment. With Ahmadinejad's support, Team Melli eventually settled on American citizen and former 1998 World Cup U.S. team assistant coach Afshin Ghotbi, who was greeted with a hero's welcome by Iranian fans at Tehran's Imam Khomeini Airport. Ahmadinejad personally loaned Team Melli his presidential plane to travel to Pyongyang for Ghotbi's debut match against North Korea on June 6.
6. (C) Because of the government's strong influence - IRPO's contact claims that Iranian intelligence services have files on most prominent soccer figures - Team Melli's players, most of whom were born after the Revolution, XXXXXXXXXXXX. However, the heightened intensity of this year's campaign season has inspired a number of prominent soccer officials, including the managing board of Zob Ahan Football Club and the former coach of Persepolis Football Club, to endorse Mir-Hossein Mousavi. Soccer fans, too, have publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with the Ahmadinejad administration. The same contact told IRPO that the crowd turned on Ahmadinejad's deputies, Vice President for Executive Affairs Ali Saeedlou and Vice President for Physical Education Mohammad Ali Abadi, after Persepolis, the most popular and successful of Iran's government-owned clubs, lost to Uzbekistan's Bunyodkor Football Club in last week's AFC Champions League match. Iranian fans reportedly cheered "we don't want political soccer" and began to pelt the two administration officials, before security arrived to escort them out of the stadium.
7. (C) Despite Ahmadinejad's support, Iran's chances of qualifying for the 2010 World Cup are slim. Following last week's disappointing 0-0 draw against North Korea, Team Melli will play the UAE in Tehran on June 10, two days before the presidential election. Although the UAE is widely recognized as the worst team in Iran's qualifying group, Team Melli tied UAE 1-1 when they last met in November 2008. A loss to the UAE, Iran's political and economic rival across the Strait of Hormuz, would be deeply embarrassing to Iranian national pride and could very well damage Ahmadinejad's image in the mind of the Iranian electorate. According to contacts, Ahmadinejad "cannot afford" a loss on the eve of the election in such a tight race. Some in Iran doubt that Ahmadinejad will even make an appearance at the UAE match after he was deemed a "jinx" by superstitious fans, who linked his arrival at Azadi Stadium for Iran's last home match against Saudi Arabia with the downturn in the game. However, Ahmadinejad has given no indication that he plans to disassociate himself from Team Melli on the verge of elimination. "Unfortunately, this sport has been afflicted with some very bad issues," he told Iranian media on June 7. "I must intervene personally to push aside these destructive issues."
COMMENT
-------
8. (C) Through his decidedly public involvement with Team Melli, Ahmadinejad has inextricably linked himself to the outcome of Iran's bid to qualify for the 2010 World Cup. The presidential election, which has become hotly contested over recent days as Ahmadinejad has cast aspersions on his rivals and drawn other powerful elites into the fray by making sweeping allegations of corruption, is increasingly turning into a referendum on Ahmadinejad himself. Though many serious issues will draw Iranians to the polls on June 12, one cannot overlook the effect that the result of the June 10 Iran-UAE match, especially an embarrassing loss, could have on Ahmadinejad's electoral fortunes. To many, the state of soccer in Iran today
DUBAI 00000235 003.2 OF 003
reflects the problems that Ahmadinejad's challengers claim the country has suffered under his administration. Whereas Iran achieved international prominence in the 1998 World Cup under Khatami, Ahmadinejad's politicization of the sport has compromised Team Melli's standing on the world stage, and in many Iranians' eyes, further jeopardized the country's national pride. RICHARDSON
Thursday, 24 April 2008, 11:06
C O N F I D E N T I A L CASABLANCA 000081
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND NEA/PI
EO 12958 DECL: 04/23/2018
TAGS ECON, EFIN, KDEM, MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCAN ROYAL FAMILY HOLDING ONA FIRES CEO
Classified By: Principal Officer Douglas Greene for reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D)
REF: (A) 05 CASA 1220 (B) 07 CASA 169
1. (SBU) Summary: Morocco's largest conglomerate, the palace-controlled ONA, dismissed its CEO on April 11, charging that he mismanaged Wana, the company's telecommunications subsidiary. The abrupt nature of the dismissal has been the talk of Casablanca business circles for the past week, and has refocused attention on the king's business activities. While the timing and manner of Bendidi's dismissal were unexpected, business contacts in Casablanca did not find it unusual, noting historically high turnover in ONA's executive suite. End Summary.
-------------
ONA FIRES CEO
-------------
2. (U) Omnium nord-africain (ONA), Morocco's largest conglomerate, announced on April 11 that it had dismissed CEO Saad Bendidi for mismanaging Wana, the company's telecommunications subsidiary. Bendidi had been the CEO of palace-controlled ONA since February 2005. Mouatassim Belghazi, an ex-civil servant and head of the Morocco-Emirates Development Company (SOMED), an ONA affiliate, was named to replace him within hours, prompting speculation that the dismissal was premeditated, despite ONA's protestations to the contrary.
------------------------------
WHY DID BENDIDI GET THE BOOT?
------------------------------
3. (U) According to the unusually frank statement released by ONA's Board of Directors, the company decided to fire Bendidi after 2007 results suggested that he had failed to develop Wana adequately. Board members took issue with the ex-CEO's plan to infuse the telecommunications venture with an additional five billion dirham (USD 688 million) investment, and blamed him for "serious management failings in planning and strategic direction of the enterprise." ONA reported that operating profits fell 29 percent as a result of Wana's steep start-up costs. While Wana is only the third largest telecommunications provider in Morocco, behind French Vivendi-controlled Maroc Telecom and the Spanish-Portuguese company Meditel, ONA feels that the market has plenty of room for a successful third player.
4. (U) Reports in Morocco's leading business paper, "La Vie Eco" on April 18, suggest that Bendidi's fate was sealed not so much by Wana's poor results, as by the view of ONA's powerful board of directors that he had failed to adapt the company's strategy in the face of the shortfall. In background interviews, company officials noted that slippage from Wana's business plan was evident as early as October 2007, but that Bendidi failed to react, even after the ONA board engaged four separate sets of consultants to propose possible alternatives. Bendidi's critics have alleged similar passivity in addressing poor performance in other divisions, including the Acima supermarket chain. A number of our contacts thus see little reason to doubt that Wana was at the root of Bendidi's dismissal.
5. (SBU) Other contacts caution against taking ONA's harsh public statements at face value, however. They note that the company's fixed and mobile phone services have been on offer just over a year, barely enough time to evaluate its potential, and that additional investment is frequently required when companies seek to break into new fields. They add that ONA posted strong earnings in 2007, due in part to strong banking results and the sale of a stake in an insurance company. At the end of March, net income had risen from 959 million dirham a year earlier to 1.7 billion. ONA stock has risen 19 percent in 2008.
6. (SBU) Given such results, many believe there must be more to the story of Bendidi's dismissal. Some viewed the fact that he was not given the chance to politely bow out, but was publicly fired, as further evidence that something more than poor performance was at play. One individual, for example, ascribed the shift to a desire to give a chance to the much-touted Belghazi, suggesting that poor Wana results offered a convenient pretext for change. Others speculated that a personality clash between Bendidi and Mounir Mahjidi, the King's special secretary, may have played a role.
7. (SBU) Despite the intrigue surrounding Bendidi's firing, members of the business community in Casablanca did not find it particularly unusual. A long-time franchise-holder pointed out that Bendidi's predecessor, Bassim Jai Hokaimi, also did not last more than a few years at ONA's helm. A piece in the French-language weekly Maroc Hebdo called Belghazi the newest initiate to the "ejector seat," reinforcing the perception that the top job at ONA is a risky proposition. As one businessperson put it, the palace can be very demanding. When the palace calls, "if you don't pick up the phone on the first ring, you're in trouble," she said.
8. (C) Comment: Whatever the true story, the manner in which Bendidi's departure was handled has not shown ONA in the best light. As more than one commentator has noted, the flood of recriminations that have accompanied the firing offers a rich vein for Wana's competitors to mine in months to come. The contretemps has led some to raise broader issues as well, however. "Le Journal's" lead editorial seized on the dispute to renew the publication's longstanding call on the king to exit the business world, citing the inherent conflict between his role as ultimate arbiter of the Moroccan system and leading businessman and banker within it. ONA's "incredible communiqu," the journal wrote, not only "shattered" the credibility of the group, but also "cast doubt on the transparency of the king's business affairs," an "explosive situation" at a time when Moroccans face rising prices for goods whose production and distribution is often assured by the king's own companies. These issues too have long sparked hushed debate in Moroccan business circles, but few expect the royal role in ONA to change anytime soon. End Comment.
GREENE
Monday, 14 December 2009, 05:39
S E C R E T SANAA 002208
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD
DEPT FOR PM/WRA LFREEMAN
EO 12958 DECL: 12/14/2019
TAGS ETTC, ECON, MARR, MASS, MCAP, PREL, PGOV, YI, BU, CY,
UK, LI, UNSC, YM
SUBJECT: ALLEGED ILLICIT SERBIAN ARMS SALE TO YEMENI
MILITARY, POSSIBLE UNSCR 1521 VIOLATION
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (S/NF) A front company for Serbian illicit arms dealer Slobodan Tesic (alt. Tezic), XXXXXXXXXXXX, signed a USD 78 million arms contract with the Yemeni Ministry of Defense in early October 2009, to be delivered by early January 2010, according to the Bulgarian Embassy in Sana'a. The 34-page contract, an alleged copy of which was provided to EconOff by XXXXXXXXXXXX on December 7 and subsequently forwarded to State NEA/ARP and Washington analysts, details a package of small arms ammunition, heavy artillery ammunition, sniper rifles, demolition equipment, antiaircraft guns, and howitzers. The Bulgarian Embassy claims that XXXXXXXXXXXX, both named in the contract, are linked to Slobodan Tesic, a Serbian national listed in the travel ban annex to UNSC Resolution 1521. Tesic has made frequent trips to Yemen in the past year in connection to this contract, according to the Bulgarian Embassy. (Note: Sensitive USG reporting corroborates the claim that XXXXXXXXXXXX is a Tesic front company. End Note.) The XXXXXXXXXXXX told EconOff he was passing on information of the upcoming arms transfer, obtained through a Yemeni source in the ROYG Ministry of Defense, in the hopes of having the U.S. Government stop the sale and thus provide opportunities for Bulgarian arms manufacturers to supply similar equipment to the ROYG. The Cyprus address of record for XXXXXXXXXXXX
2. (S/NF) Below is the text of a one-page document on Slobodan Tesic and XXXXXXXXXXXX that the Bulgarian Embassy claims was produced by the Bulgarian national intelligence service. (Note: Post has no information on the alleged local agent mentioned in the document, XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Note.)
Begin text:
XXXXXXXXXXXX ) Cyprus
Serbian Off Shore Co. ) Registered in Cyprus and owned by the person SLOBODAN TESIC/TEZIC/ - Serbian national.
XXXXXXXXXXXX There is large list of crimes connecting with this man, supplying weapons for Iraq, Liberia etc., terrorist regimes.
XXXXXXXXXXXX has a power of attorney for the A/M company. He signed the contracts as XXXXXXXXXXXX
He has also British passport but he has no any official authorization or license issues by UK for trade with military items.
Mr. SLOBODAN TESIC tried to enter Bulgaria during 2005 but he was returned back to Serbia as he is in the ban list of UN.
Local agent in Yemen: XXXXXXXXXXXX
End text. SECHE
Thursday, 22 January 2009, 01:05
S E C R E T STATE 005567
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 01/24/2034
TAGS PARM, PREL, ETTC, MASS, AE, MU, SA, YM, IR, SU
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP TO INFORMATION
REF: A. STATE 4162 B. STATE 3948 C. STATE 3521 D. STATE 2617 (NOTAL) E. STATE 2072 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ann Ganzer, ISN/CATR Office Director, Reason 1.4 (b), (c), (d).
1. (U) This is an action request to Embassies Abu Dhabi, Khartoum, Muscat, Riyadh, and Sanaa. Please deliver immediately. Please see paragraph 4.
----------
Background
----------
2. (S/NF) Ref A asked Sudan to stop flights from Sudan which we believed are carrying lethal military equipment. Earlier Washington advised Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Yemen in Ref B with updated information that additional flights may be planned for , which we are concerned could also be used to transfer arms from Iran to Sudan. Ref C advised that Washington had received information that the UAE firm requested overflight permission from the Civil Aviation Authority in Yemen for to conduct flights on between Iran and Sudan. Ref D advised Egyptian authorities that may be involved in the transfer of arms to Hamas. Ref E informed that Iran intended to conduct arms shipments to Hamas via Sudan and that the arms were expected to be transferred via aerial routes using cargo planes.
----------
Objectives
----------
3. (S/NF) Posts should seek to:
-- Inform host governments of this new information regarding flights and that we have reason to believe the flight will be transporting lethal military equipment.
-- Inform the host government additional flights may be planned for .
-- Ask host nation to stop the flights.
-- Ask to be provided information that is regularly required for overflight requests.
-- Emphasize that UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, paragraph 5, states Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly any arms of related materiel, whether or not originating in Iran.
-- Stress to Sudan the United States considers this activity exceptionally concerning, particularly as our two countries are working together towards critical issues of UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) deployment, resolution of the situation in Darfur, and implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
--------------
Action Request
--------------
4. (S) Posts are requested to immediately approach host governments to inform them of the flights and request their assistance to stop the flights, in Sudan's case, or deny overflight or require the planes to land for inspection.
Begin Talking Points:
SECRET/REL SUDAN
-- We have information that, as of cargo flights were operating between Iran and Sudan.
-- FM Alor stated that he strongly supported stopping these flights. We appreciate FM Alor's concern regarding these flights and would like to follow-up with additional information.
--
-- We have additional information that a Sudanese official, having failed to receive overflight permission for has approached a second company to attempt the transfer.
-- Additional flights may be planned for .
-- We continue to believe these flights are transporting lethal military equipment.
-- As you are aware, there is information that is regularly required for overflight requests. We would like to know what information was provided to you. The regularly required info is: Flight purpose, aircraft operator, type, registration, nationality, type and amount of cargo, origin, destination, date/time, entry/departure points.
-- We continue to urge you to maintain vigilance to these flights.
-- UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, para. 5 states that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly any arms or related materiel, whether or not originating in Iran.
-- Any supply or transfer outside Iran of arms and related materiel violates Iran's obligations under UNSCR 1747.
-- The United States considers this activity exceptionally concerning, particularly as our two countries are working together towards critical issues of UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) deployment, resolution of the situation in Darfur, and implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
-- In the spirit of this resolution, we request you deny overflight permission for these flights or request that the aircraft land for inspection as a condition for overflight permission.
SECRET/REL UAE, YEMEN, OMAN, AND SAUDI ARABIA
-- We appreciate any assistance you can provide regarding the military-related flights between Iran and Sudan that operated on and request that you remain vigilant on denying additional flights.
-- We have information that a Sudanese official, having failed to receive overflight permission for flights, has approached a Sudanese company to attempt th transfer.
-- Additional flight may be planned for .
-- As you are aware, there is information that is regularly required for overflight requests. We would like to know what information was provided to you. The regularly required info is: Flight purpose, aircraft operator, type, registration, nationality, type and amount of cargo, origin, destination, date/time, entry/departure points.
-- Additionally, all overflights require fees to be paid. Countries can deny overflight permissions because overflight- or other flight-related fees by the parties involved with operating th flights are in arrears. We request that you look into this avenue as an additional means to refuse future overflights.
-- UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, para. 5 states that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly any arms or related materiel, whether or not originating in Iran.
-- Any supply or transfer outside Iran of arms and related materiel violates Iran's obligations under UNSCR 1747.
-- In the spirit of this resolution, we request you deny overflight permission for these flights or request that the aircraft land for inspection as a condition for overflight permission.
SECRET/REL UAE ONLY
-- According to the
End Talking Points
CLINTON
Tuesday, 24 February 2009, 10:54
S E C R E T KHARTOUM 000249
NOFORN
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, NEA/IPA, ISN/CATR,
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON
EO 12958 DECL: 02/24/2019
TAGS ETTC, MASS, PARM, PGOV, PREL, SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN COMPLAINS OF "PROBABLY AMERICAN" BOMBING
ATTACKS IN EASTERN SUDAN
REF: A. KHARTOUM 120 B. KHARTOUM 107 C. KHARTOUM 82 D. KHARTOUM 59
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) CDA Fernandez was summoned to the Foreign Ministry on the morning of February 24 by Americas Department head Ambassador Nasreddin Wali. Wali said that he had sensitive and worrisome information to relate to the Charge. Reading from hand-written notes in Arabic and referring to a large dog-eared map brought in for the occasion, Wali said that there had been two air attacks on Eastern Sudan in January and February. In the January attack, 43 people were killed and 17 vehicles destroyed. This occurred near Magd, in the Gebeit region of Red Sea state, "the Northern part of an area known as Oku" (phonetic). It is roughly at the latitude of 17 degrees and longitude of 33.5, according to Wali.
2. (S) The second attack occurred on February 20 at Bir al-Mansurab (latitude of 17 degrees and longitude of 34, according to Wali). The second attack was 15 kilometers from the site of the January attack. In the February attack, 45 Sudanese were kalled and 14 vehicles destroyed. Both attacks occurred 150 kilometers deep inside Sudan, not near any international border.
3. (S) Wali said that "we assume that the planes that attacked us are your planes." He said that Sudan has had "tight cooperation" with the United States on security matters and any concerns that the USG has about security related issues can be raised within the context of bilateral diplomatic and intelligence relations between the two countries. He added that "Sudan would like to have clarification about this matter. We protest this act and we condemn it. Sudan reserves the right to respond appropriately, at the right time, in a legal manner consistent with protecting its sovereignty."
4. (S) Comment: This complaint by Sudan comes on the heels of the Embassy being tasked by Washington to demarche Khartoum on weapons smuggling issues possibly involving Iran and Hamas (reftels a-c). So it is easy for the regime to assume that the demarches and these kinetic incidents are somehow connected. The initial attack is already the object of gossip by elements of Sudan's political elite, even outside the tight confines of the regime's inner circle (reftel d). CDA had already scheduled an Emergency Action Committee meeting on February 24 to discuss the Embassy's security posture in the runup to the March 4 ICC announcement and this latest news is an additional concern in a very volatile political environment. Embassy requests Washington guidance on what - if any - formal response should be given to the Sudanese. And should this potentially explosive story somehow leak to the sensationalistic Sudanese press, it could very well turn our security situation here from bad to worse. End comment.
FERNANDEZ
Tuesday, 17 March 2009, 00:29
S E C R E T STATE 024945
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/13/2034
TAGS PARM, PREL, ETTC, MASS, AE, MU, SA, YM, IR, SU
SUBJECT: (S) NEW INFORMATION ON IRANIAN ARMS TRANFERS TO
SYRIA AND HAMAS.
REF: A. STATE 5567 B. STATE 4162 C. STATE 3948 D. STATE 3521 E. STATE 2617 (NOTAL) F. STATE 2072 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ann Ganzer, ISN Acting DAS, Reasons: 1.4 (b), (c), and (d).
1. (U) This is an urgent action request to Embassies Amman and Cairo. Please deliver as soon as possible. Please see paragraphs 4 and 5.
----------
Background
----------
2. (S/NF) We have received information that Iran intends to ship a cargo of lethal military equipment to Syria with onward transfer to Sudan. Our information indicates the equipment may then be transferred to Hamas. Per REFTELS, Iran has been attempting to transfer military equipment via Sudan for the past two months. We believe these current flights may begin in the very near future. Any arms export by Iran would be a violation of UNSCR 1747, regardless of the recipient.
----------
Objectives
----------
3. (S/NF) Posts should seek to:
-- Inform host governments that Iran intends to continue delivering lethal military equipment to
-- Inform the host government that additional flights are expected to depart in the very near future.
-- Ask host nation to require the flights to land for inspection or deny overflight.
-- Emphasize that UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, paragraph 5, states Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly any arms of related materiel, whether or not originating in Iran.
--------------
Action Request
--------------
4. (S) Posts are requested to approach appropriate host government officials as soon as possible, using the points in para 5 to approach host governments to inform them of the flights and request their assistance to deny overflight or require the planes to land for inspection.
5. (SECRET/REL JORDAN and EGYPT) Begin Talking Points:
--We have recently received information that Iran intends to transship military equipment from Syria to Sudan, to be transferred to Hamas. We believe the flights will be conducted using cargo aircraft and will begin in the very near future.
--These flights will likely be conducted by . However, we cannot rule out that Iran may use other cargo planes and/or airlines.
-- UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, para. 5 states that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly any arms or related materiel, whether or not originating in Iran.
-- Any supply or transfer outside Iran of arms and related materiel violates Iran's obligations under UNSCR 1747.
--We are passing this information to you in an effort to highlight a transfer of proliferation concern and to ensure that Iran does not make use of your territory to transfer items proscribed by UN Security Council resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803.
--We request that your government look into these flights and either consider denying overflight permission or require the flights to land for inspection.
End Talking Points
Thursday, 30 April 2009, 15:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000746
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/26/2019
TAGS PREL, MASS, MOPS, PARM, KPAL, IS, IR, SO, EG, SU
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL MULLEN'S MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. Key Points:
- (S/NF) During an April 21 meeting with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, Egyptian General Intelligence Service Chief Omar Soliman explained that his overarching regional goal was combating radicalism, especially in Gaza, Iran, and Sudan.
- (S/NF) On Gaza, Soliman said Egypt must "confront" Iranian attempts to smuggle arms to Gaza and "stop" arms smuggling through Egyptian territory.
- (S/NF) Soliman shared his vision on Palestinian reconciliation and bringing the Palestinian Authority back to Gaza, saying "a Gaza in the hands of radicals will never be calm."
- (S/NF) On Iran, Soliman said Egypt was "succeeding" in preventing Iran from funneling financial support to Hamas through Egypt. Soliman hoped that the U.S. could encourage Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions and stop interfering in regional affairs, but cautioned that Iran "must pay a price" for its actions.
- (S/NF) Egypt is "very concerned" with stability in Sudan, Soliman said, and was focusing efforts on convincing the Chadean and Sudanese presidents to stop supporting each others' insurgencies, supporting negotiations between factions in Darfur, and implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). "Egypt does not want a divided Sudan," Soliman stressed.
----
Gaza
----
2. (S/NF) Soliman said radicalism was the "backbone" of regional security threats, adding that radicalism in Gaza posed a particularly serious threat to Egyptian national security. Soliman said Egypt must "confront" Iranian attempts to smuggle arms to Gaza and stop arms smuggling through Egyptian territory. "Egypt is circled by radicalism," he continued, expressing concern over instability in Sudan and Somalia as well. Egypt's own successful campaign against radicalism in the 1990s provided a useful lesson in how to counteract extremist groups by reducing their ability to operate and raise funds, in additional to educating people on the dangers of extremism. Soliman noted that only the Muslim Brotherhood remained and the Egyptian government continued to "make it difficult" for them to operate.
3. (S/NF) "We do not want incidents like Gaza to inflame public anger," Soliman said, adding that the Gaza conflict put "moderate (Arab) regimes" in a corner. To prevent another outbreak of violence, Egypt is focusing on Palestinian reconciliation and a durable cease-fire between Hamas and Israel. On reconciliation, Soliman explained, the ultimate goal was to return the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, as "Gaza in the hands of radicals will never be calm." The problem, however, is that the PA cannot return to Gaza without Hamas' acquiescence. Soliman said the PA must return before the January 2010 Palestinian elections, or else Gazans would be afraid to vote for moderates.
4. (S/NF) Stability in Gaza also depends on giving people a more "normal" life, Soliman continued, saying Israel must be convinced to regularly open the border crossings for legitimate commercial activity. The current system - where Egypt informs Israel of a humanitarian shipment and Israel waits two days before accepting or rejecting the shipment for transfer to Gaza - does not adequately meet people's needs.
5. (S/NF) On Palestinian reconciliation, Soliman said he expected the factions to return to Egypt on April 26 to discuss his proposal on establishing a high committee comprised of the various factions. The committee would be responsible for preparing for the January 2010 elections, monitoring reconstruction, and reforming the security services in Gaza. On reconstruction, the committee would issue licenses for companies eligible to participate on projects, but the PA would decide who receives the money for private and government contracts. Arab governments would assist with reforming the security services and could base security assistance out of Egypt. Soliman doubted that Hamas would agree to the high committee, but said it was important
CAIRO 00000746 002 OF 002
to keep Hamas and Fatah talking, so they would not resort to violence.
-----------------------
Iran, Counter Smuggling
-----------------------
6. (S/NF) Iran is "very active in Egypt," Soliman said. Iranian financial support to Hamas amounted to $25 million a month, but he said Egypt was "succeeding" in preventing financial support from entering Gaza through Egypt. Iran has tried several times to pay the salaries for the al-Qassam Battalions, but Egypt had succeeded in preventing the money from reaching Gaza. Soliman said the Egyptian government had arrested a "big Hezbollah cell," which was Hezbollah's first attempt to stand up a cell within Egypt. Iran was also trying to recruit support from the Sinai Bedouins, he claimed, in order to facilitate arms smuggling to Gaza. So far, he continued, Egypt had successfully stopped Hamas from rearming. Soliman noted that in six months, MOD will have completed the construction of a subterranean steel wall along the Egypt-Gaza border to prevent smuggling. He warned, however, that people will find an alternative to the tunnels to smuggle arms, goods, people, and money. Admiral Mullen expressed appreciation for Egypt's efforts to combat smuggling, adding that he hoped Egypt felt comfortable enough to ask for additional border security assistance at any time.
7. (S/NF) Egypt has "started a confrontation with Hezbollah and Iran," Soliman stressed, and "we will not allow Iran to operate in Egypt." Soliman said Egypt had sent a clear message to Iran that if they interfere in Egypt, Egypt will interfere in Iran, adding that EGIS had already begun recruiting agents in Iraq and Syria. Soliman hoped the U.S. would "not walk the same track as the Europeans" in regards to negotiating with Iran and warned against only focusing on one issue at time, like Iran's nuclear weapons program. Iran must "pay the price" for its actions and not be allowed to interfere in regional affairs. "If you want Egypt to cooperate with you on Iran, we will," Soliman added, "it would take a big burden off our shoulders."
-----
Sudan
-----
8. (S/NF) Egypt is very concerned with stability in Sudan, Soliman said, but asked for the U.S. to be "patient" with the Sudanese government and give Egypt time to help the Sudanese government deal with its problems. He applauded the appointment of Special Envoy Gration and recent U.S. statements on Sudan. Soliman said Egypt was focused on three areas for promoting stability in Sudan: 1) repairing the relationship between Chadean President Deby and Sudanese President Bashir and stopping their support for each others' insurgencies 2) supporting negotiations between the various factions in Darfur, and 3) implementing the CPA. Soliman encouraged a larger role for French President Sarkozy in mediating between Chad and Sudan. He said that Southern Sudan "feels no benefits from unity," and Egypt is trying to bridge the "physiological gap" between north and south itself by providing humanitarian assistance. "Egypt does not want a divided Sudan," he stressed. Admiral Mullen replied that Egypt's leadership on Sudan was critical and looked forward to increased cooperation between Egypt and Special Envoy Gration.
------------------
Piracy and Somalia
------------------
9. (S/NF) Admiral Mullen stressed that piracy was an international crime that needed an international solution, especially on support for trying captured pirates. The U.S. did not want Somalia to become the next safe haven for al-Qaeda after Pakistan, he stressed. Soliman replied that there were not enough ships in the region to provide adequate security against pirate attacks and recommended that the international community, through the UN Security Council, focus counter piracy efforts on the Somali shore.
10. (U) Admiral Mullen did not have the opportunity to clear before his departure. SCOBEY
Monday, 22 February 2010, 14:45
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 000414
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2025
TAGS PREL, PTER, MASS, SY, LE, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI OFFICIALS REQUEST USG DEMARCHE SYRIA ON
POSSIBLE MISSILE TRANSFER TO HIZBALLAH
REF: IIR 6-849-9075-10
Classified By: Luis G. Moreno for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (S/NF) On February 22, 2010, BG Yossi Baidatz, Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI) Chief of Production and Analysis, advised Embassy Tel Aviv officers that IDI had information suggesting Syria intended to imminently transfer SCUD-D missiles to Hizballah in Lebanon. Baidatz explained that IDI viewed completion of such a transfer as creating a "new level of concern" along Israel's northern border, and he requested that the USG demarche the Syrian government in an attempt to dissuade them from transferring the missiles. Baidatz requested that any demarche be delivered prior to the February 25 arrival in Washington of Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak. Baidatz was concerned that a demarche following Barak's meeting in Washington would lead the Syrians to believe that the U.S. and Israel collaborated to uncover and thwart the transfer.
2. (S/NF) Embassy Tel Aviv's Office of Regional Analysis is sending additional details separately. Cunningham
Thursday, 25 February 2010, 13:43
S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000168
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
LONDON FOR LORD
PARIS FOR NOBLES
EO 12958 DECL: 02/25/2019
TAGS PTER, PREF, PREL, IS, LE, SY
SUBJECT: V/FM MIQDAD DENIES SUPPLYING BALLISTIC MISSILES TO
HIZBALLAH, DIRECTS U.S. DEMARCHE TO ISRAEL
REF: A. STATE 17307 B. TEL AVIV 404
Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter, for reasons 1.4 b,d.
1. (S) Summary: Responding to Ref A demarche, Syrian Vice Foreign Minister (V/FM) Miqdad expressed surprise the U.S. was sharing such a strong message in the wake of Under Secretary (U/S) William Burns' positive February 17 visit. He argued Israel represented the major threat to stability in the region and that the U.S. should be directing its message toward Israeli officials. Syria, he claimed, wanted peace and was working with Turkey and the U.S. toward that end. Flatly denying any Syrian role in the supply of weapons to Hizballah, The most sophisticated weapons Damascus supported Lebanese independence while Israel violated Lebanese sovereignty on a daily basis. Miqdad argued Syria wanted to preserve the positive results of U/S Burns' recent visit and promised to convey the message. He also pledged to review our request for assisting the Center for Victims of Torture and agreed to follow up Charge's request for official written notification of the government's decision to allow the Damascus Community School (DCS) to reopen. End Summary
--------------------------------------
Miqdad: Direct Your Message to Israel
--------------------------------------
2. (S) Charge and Pol/Econ Chief delivered Ref A demarche to Syrian Vice Foreign Minister (V/FM) Faisal al-Miqdad on February 25. A clearly surprised Miqdad listened attentively and took detailed notes, interrupting twice to confirm whether the demarche concerned the transfer of ballistic missiles and to clarify whether the message represented a U.S. or an Israeli "warning." Charge explained the message reflected Washington concerns that SEMEP Mitchell and U/S Burns had shared previously with President Asad. Addressing the substance of the demarche, Miqdad argued that Israel itself could not have sent a stronger warning. The message, he continued, "shows the U.S. has not come to a mature position (that would enable it) to differentiate between its own interests and Israel's." Syria was "of course" not in the mood to increase tensions or escalate, "because we believe in peace." Toward that end, Syria was doing its best with Turkey and the U.S. to achieve peace. Syria was not taking steps to escalate. Unless Israel had plans to escalate against Syria or Lebanon, "there's no need to worry," said Miqdad.
3. (S) Referring to Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's February 16 speech, Miqdad emphasized that Hizballah was responding to Israeli threats and clearly conveyed Hizballah's intent to respond only if Israel attacked first. Syria believed in and supported the role of UNIFIL, and was using its contacts with the Lebanese Government to "insist" on Lebanon's full cooperation with UNIFIL. Miqdad insisted Israel, not Syria or Lebanon, was issuing provocative threats and using Hizballah as a pretext. The Syrian government had been pleased to hear Lebanese PM Hariri's remarks expressing concerns about Israeli provocation, including the violation of Lebanese airspace and assassinations. The U.S. message, summed up Miqdad, "should be directed to Israel not to escalate."
----------------------------------------
Denial of Supply of Weapons to Hizballah
----------------------------------------
4. (S) Charge replied that the U.S. message had come in the context of improving bilateral relations, which depended on a frank and candid exchange of assessments of regional developments. The U.S. was issuing neither threats nor
ultimatums, but rather it sought to convey what it believed to be a shared interest in avoiding conflict. Miqdad commented that it was "strange" the U.S. had chosen to deliver "harsh words while we're trying to build better relations." He promised to convey the message to his superiors but reiterated Syria's desire to avoid escalation. "You may hear about weapons going to Hizballah," he claimed, "but they are absolutely not coming through Syria." The real threat to stability was coming from Israeli officials who had threatened recently to attack Damascus and to change the Syrian regime. "Please convey to Washington, while we take note of your demarche, this message should be directed at Israel," he said.
5. (S) Charge replied that, as U/S Burns had conveyed to President Asad, the U.S. was urging all parties in the region, including Israel, to exercise restraint and support Lebanese independence. "This is our commitment," Miqdad responded, "we shall not interfere (in Lebanon)." The Lebanese should be allowed to decide for themselves on how to resolve their own issues; those who would interfere want to disturb the peace after Lebanon successfully conducted national elections and formed a consensus government. "We're confident the Lebanese can deal with their own situation," he said. Charge rejoined that the military capabilities of a non-state actor like Hizballah represented a major concern because Hizballah responded only to its own leadership and not to government authorities.
6. (S) Miqdad said this issue should be discussed in the overall framework of the situation. He then contended the provision of U.S. weapons to the region represented a destabilizing factor. "The most sophisticated weapons are coming to Israel, to be used against whom?" he asked. When the U.S. pressed Israel to stop threatening its neighbors, the situation would stabilize. "We want peace. It's the only solution. We are the ones who are threatened," he declared. Charge replied the whole region was threatened. Miqdad said the U.S. and Syria needed to worked toward peace. "You should address your message to the people who don't want peace," he added, noting the results of U/S Burns' visit should be preserved and continued to improve relations. Syria had responded positively to U/S Burns' message because it felt more confident of Washington's desire to move forward.
---------------------
CVT and DCS Follow-Up
---------------------
7. (C) Charge affirmed the U.S. shared this intent and wanted to maximize the opportunity by staying in close contact. In that context, he raised PRM's pending request to Miqdad to assist the Center for the Victims of Torture to receive approval to begin a proposed project in Syria; Miqdad agreed to look at the matter and requested Embassy follow-up. Likewise, on the issue of visas for the next group of DHS circuit riders, Miqdad asked that the circuit riders not apply for visas until he had had a chance to intervene. (Note: Embassy will provide Miqdad with a list of the circuit riders.)
8. (C) Charge also asked Miqdad for advice on how to proceed regarding Damascus Community School (DCS). FM Muallim had instructed the Embassy to "start hiring teachers," but the MFA had not yet provided any written notification of President Asad's decision to allow the school to re-open. There also remained the issue of whether Syrian students would be allowed to enroll. Miqdad agreed that this matter required a response and advised the Charge to follow up with him in the coming week. (Note: Miqdad reported he would be traveling to Libya for two days to discuss bilateral
relations.)
-------
Comment
-------
9. (S) In the midst of hosting a quick-notice visit by Iranian President Ahmedinejad (who openly criticized the Secretary's Congressional testimony expressing concern about Syria and Hizballah), the SARG might interpret our demarche as an attempt to divert the spotlight from the show of mutual support between Tehran and Damascus. Miqdad's surprise that we would raise this issue so forcefully on the heels of U/S Burns' visit may have been genuine, but the abject denial of any Syrian role in supplying arms to Hizballah and the verbal counter-attack against Israeli provocation were standard (if disingenuous) responses. Yet even a seasoned diplomat like Miqdad could not restrain a raised eyebrow at our mention of the transfer of ballistic missiles to Hizballah. We expect the specificity of this concern could well prompt further discussions among Syrian officials, Hizballah, and the visiting Iranian delegation.
10. (S) Miqdad notably did not respond to our concern about a possible Hizballah revenge operation for the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh. While Miqdad and Syrian officials might take some comfort in UNIFIL's role in preventing the spillover of recent tensions in south Lebanon, a Hizballah operation against Israeli targets could easily result in a situation in which UNIFIL found itself unable to contain rising escalation. One point we might stress in the future: Syria's desire for a deterrent against Israeli military action -- presumably a motivation for the transfer of ballistic missiles to Hizballah -- will not increase stability because there are no mechanisms or rules of the road to prevent and/or manage unanticipated escalation. Not having control over Hizballah's missiles or influence over Hizballah's military plans to avenge Mughniyeh increases this danger. Our demarche might resonate more fully here if we can persuade other key countries, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, France, and others, to underscore their concerns about regional instability, to which Syria's supply of ballistic missiles to Hizballah is directly contributing.
11. (S) Leaving aside the substance of Miqdad's response to the demarche, his agreement to meet us on two hours' notice on a Syrian holiday (the Prophet's birthday) and during the Ahmedinejad visit is worth noting. Miqdad's Chief of Staff is typically the recipient of Embassy demarches; CDA's only other meeting with Miqdad apart from appointments involving Washington visitors was to discuss the Vice Minister's trip to the U.S. last September. His future willingness to meet directly with us -- which FM Muallim instructed him to do to follow up on DCS issues -- will serve as one more barometer of the SARG commitment to engagement in the weeks and months ahead. HUNTER
Friday, 26 February 2010, 00:36
S E C R E T STATE 017894
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/25/2020
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, MASS, IS, LE, SY
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: CONTINUED CONCERN OVER SYRIAN SUPPORT
TO HIZBALLAH
REF: A) 2009 STATE 129636
Classified By: NEA A/S Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph four.
Summary
-------
2. (S) We previously demarched Britain, France, and Turkey on our increasing concerns over Syria's continued provision of advanced weapons to Hizballah (Ref A). In London, Paris and Ankara the demarches were taken seriously and all governments pledged to raise their concern with Syrian officials. French diplomats noted that they routinely deliver the same message to the Syrians, but that Damascus denies involvement. This issue now needs to be reinforced with these governments and brought to the attention of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar. Under Secretary Burns visited Damascus on February 17 and stressed U.S. concerns about weapons transfers to Hizballah directly with Syrian President Bashar Asad, who bluntly stated that he knew of no new weapons systems going to Hizballah. In light of disturbing and weighty evidence to the contrary -- that Syria currently provides Hizballah with advanced ballistic missiles and other weaponry -- we want France, Britain, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar to make a renewed push to echo our concerns with Syria, given that Syria continues to ignore warnings that its transfers of advanced surface-to-surface and surface-to-air weapons to Hizballah could jeopardize prospects for an agreement with Israel or spark a conflict significantly more destructive than the 2006 Israel-Hizballah war. Syria's actions clearly jeopardize regional stability and could risk drawing Damascus into any future war between Israel and Hizballah.
3. (S) The Syrian leadership views military support to Hizballah as integral to Syria's security and as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with Israel over the return of the Golan Heights, as well as a possible stick to bring the Israelis back to the table. While our commitment to principled engagement with Syria -- as demonstrated by Under Secretary Burns' recent visit -- remains strong, we must enlist additional French, British, Turkish, Saudi, Jordanian, and Qatari support to help dissuade Syria from expanding its ties to Hizballah any further, especially via the transfer of additional sophisticated weaponry.
Objectives
----------
4. (S/REL FRANCE, BRITAIN, TURKEY, SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN, AND QATAR) Drawing on paragraphs 2 and 3 for context, we request that Embassies in Paris, London, Ankara, Riyadh, Amman, and Doha pursue the following objectives with senior French, British, Turkish, Saudi, Jordanian, and Qatari officials at the highest appropriate levels.
-- Highlight that Under Secretary Burns visited Damascus on February 17 as part of our ongoing engagement with Syria. Reiterate our commitment to sustained, principled engagement with Syria. We plan to continue our dialogue with Syria and look forward to the arrival of our new ambassador in Damascus once the confirmation process is complete.
-- Stress that in addition to discussing bilateral issues of mutual interest, Under Secretary Burns conveyed to President Asad a number of our priority concerns with Syria, specifically cross-border weapons smuggling into Lebanon destined for Hizballah.
-- Note that in response, Asad claimed that Syria could not be Israel's policeman and that he knew of no new weapons systems being smuggled from Syria to Hizballah.
-- Underscore that, contrary to President Asad's statements, we are aware of current Syrian efforts to supply ballistic missiles to Hizballah.
-- We also note President Asad's recent comments -- during a February 25 joint press conference with his Iranian counterpart -- that support for Hizballah was a "moral and legal duty."
-- Express deep concern that Syria's expanding military ties to Hizballah, including the supply of ballistic missiles to Hizballah, jeopardize regional prospects for peace and stability. Specifically, Syrian transfers of increasingly sophisticated weaponry risk renewed conflict between Israel and Hizballah that may expand, unlike in 2006, into Syria.
-- Convey that arms shipments to Hizballah -- especially ballistic missiles -- increasingly undermine Israel's confidence in Syria's willingness and ability to deliver peace and diminish the value of an eventual Syrian-Israeli accord, as Hizballah will not return the weapons it has already received.
-- Underscore that the next report on Security Council resolution 1701 will be discussed on March 12. Full implementation of Security Council resolution 1701, including the arms embargo and weapons-free zone, remains a priority for the United States. In light of the upcoming report, it is especially important to stress that Syria's actions constitute serious violations of Security Council resolution 1701 -- which will be taken seriously by the international community -- and belie its claims to respect Lebanon's sovereignty.
-- Express our appreciation for your host government's support on the critical issue of Syrian weapons transfers to Hizballah and note that we hope to continue our cooperation to prevent serious miscalculations by the Syrian government.
-- Share the following S/REL FRANCE, BRITAIN, TURKEY, SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN, QATAR text verbatim:
(Begin releasable text.)
We would like to convey to you that we have information indicating that Syria is providing increasingly sophisticated weapons to Hizballah, including from its own military stocks.
For example, we assess that Syria has provided or will provided guided short range ballistic missiles to Hizballah that could target two-thirds of Israel, including Tel Aviv, from launch sites north of the Litani.
Our information also indicates that Syria has made advanced surface to air missile systems available to Hizballah and has probably provided training on these systems to Hizballah personnel.
(End releasable text.)
-- Urge France, Britain, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar to raise these concerns once again in their dialogue with senior Syrian officials. We do not want to undermine our collective outreach to Syria. However, we are increasingly concerned that the Syrian government is making a strategic miscalculation by incorrectly assuming that increasing Hizballah's military capability concomitantly bolsters Syria's security and strength at the negotiating table with Israel, when the opposite is more likely to be true.
-- Syria's desire for a deterrent against Israeli military action -- presumably a motivation for the transfer of ballistic missiles to Hizballah -- is not producing a stable deterrent because there are no mechanisms to prevent unanticipated escalation. Not having control over Hizballah's missiles increases the risk of this danger.
-- Emphasize that Syria's actions risk derailing our common efforts to bring peace to the region.
-- Note that we are raising our concerns with Syrian officials in Damascus and with the Syrian Ambassador here in Washington.
-- Also note our continuing strong commitment and support to the full implementation of resolutions 1747 and 1701, encouraging France, Britain, and Turkey to stress their continuing support for the full implementation of resolution 1701 -- in its entirety (including the arms embargo and weapons free zone) -- with senior Syrian officials.
-- These are U.S. concerns. We are not carrying somebody else's "water" on this issue.
-- (For Turkey) Express that we greatly appreciate Turkey's continued efforts to combat weapons smuggling. As conveyed by Under Secretary Burns when he was in Ankara on February 18, we urge Turkey to use its close ties with Damascus to underscore the repercussions that Syria's continued provision of weapons to Hizballah has for regional stability and the broader goal of Middle East peace. We hope that Turkey will leverage its influence with Syria on this crucial issue.
Reporting Deadline
------------------
5. (SBU) Embassies are requested to report the results of this demarche to Syria desk officer Andrew Abell and Lebanon desk officer John Duchak by March 3, 2010. CLINTON
Friday, 22 January 2010, 15:17
S E C R E T USNATO 000035
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/22/2030
TAGS MCAP, MARR, PREL, NATO, PINS, EN, LG, LH, PL, RS
SUBJECT: NATO AGREES TO DO CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR THE
BALTIC STATES
REF: IMSWM-0028-2010
Classified By: D/Political Advisor A. "Hoot" Baez. Reasons: 1.4 (b) an d (d).
1. (S/REL NATO) On January 22, NATO's Military Committee agreed to expand EAGLE GUARDIAN, the Alliance's contingency plan for the reinforcement and defense of Poland, to also include the defense and reinforcement of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
2. (S/REL NATO) The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), ADM Stavridis, had proposed the EAGLE GUARDIAN expansion at the January 20 meeting of the Military Committee, after which the expansion was formally submitted to Allies for decision under a silence procedure. HEFFERN
Friday, 13 February 2009, 15:14
S E C R E T WARSAW 000170
SIPDIS
EUR FOR FRIED/GARBER, T FOR A/U/S MULL
OSD FOR DASD WARLICK
EO 12958 DECL: 01/11/2019
TAGS PREL, MAPP, PL
SUBJECT: POLAND WANTS LIVE PATRIOTS, "NOT POTTED PLANTS"
REF: 10 AUGUST 2008 U.S. NON PAPER ON DEPLOYMENT OF A U.S. PATRIOT BATTERY IN POLAND
Classified By: Ambassador Victor H. Ashe for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) SUMMARY. GOP officials are not privy to the full range of U.S. planning and thinking with regard to the prospective Patriot battery rotation here, but they do have expectations -- some naive, some tactical -- that they are making increasingly clear. For example, when told last autumn that the Patriots would not be integrated -- at least initially -- into the Polish air defense system, Deputy Defense Minister Komorowski angrily responded that Poland expected to have operational missiles, not "potted plants." Merited or no, our Polish interlocutors believe: 1) (assuming successful SoFA talks) Patriots will start rotating to Poland this year regardless of the outcome of Washington's review of the Missile Defense program; 2) the battery will have some undefined "operational capability;" 3) the garrison remaining in Poland after 2012 will have the same size and composition as the uniformed elements that will staff the rotations; and 4) access to Patriot equipment for training will not be substantially impeded by provisions of the Export Control Act. To help us manage these issues, this cable lays out what we understand about Polish expectations and the backstory of how they got there. END SUMMARY.
PATRIOTS AND MD - CONNECTED OR NO?
2. (S) The proposed Patriot rotation was a condition of Polish agreement to sign the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement (BMDA), and the U.S. would likely not have offered it outside of that context. A (very) simplified recounting of the story of how we got here seems in order.
3. (S) The question of Patriots in Poland hung (largely silently) over the BMDA negotiations for much of last spring. The final breakthrough in the BMDA negotiations in fact came with a July 7 Polish non-paper, which indicated a GOP willingness to contribute to the deployment of a Patriot battery in Poland. The U.S. non-paper response of 10 August said that "in the context of a broader and deeper bilateral security relationship, including the deployment of missile defense interceptors in Poland, the United States is prepared to deploy a U.S. Army Patriot battery in Poland (emphasis added)." The Patriot deployment plans were made public in the Declaration of Strategic Cooperation, signed at the time of the BMDA, where we agreed to intensify our security and defense cooperation, including through "the deployment of a U.S. Army Patriot air and missile defense system in Poland" starting in 2009.
4. (S) Since then both sides have used this connection to urge greater negotiating energy on the part of the other: the U.S. saying clearly that it will not move forward on Patriots without ratification of the BMDA and SOFA (a condition outlined in the 10 August non-paper), and the Poles moving cautiously at times on SOFA talks out of concern that the U.S. is not on schedule for a 2009 commencement of the Patriot rotation. Correctly or not, the Poles believe that ratification of SoFA and the BMDA gets them Patriots in 2009, independent of a USG decision on BMD, and that the Strategic Declaration signed at the time of the BMDA stands on its own. They have even turned our language on us in making the point, asking that the U.S. not be so "transactional" in tying its obligations to Poland's defense to new thinking about interceptors.
WHEN IS A PATRIOT A PATRIOT?
5. (S) The Declaration of Strategic Cooperation outlines some parameters for the proposed Patriot "deployment," allowing that a Patriot battery rotation "will include joint training opportunities that will enhance Polish air defense capabilities." The Poles interpret "will include" to mean "not limited to" and they expect that Polish air defenses will be enhanced in some operational capacity by the Patriot rotation. Repeated U.S. statements since August 2008 that the battery will not be operational are interpreted by the Poles to be part of a larger discussion of C4ISR and the inter-operability of Patriot in their overall air defense architecture. After months of back and forth, we think the Poles now understand that the rotation battery will not be fully operational and cannot be integrated immediately into the Polish system and that the battery will focus on training and exercises.
6. (S) However, this is a good juncture to point out the most glaring gap in understanding between us and the Poles. The Poles have not been told that the battery will rotate without actual missiles -- i.e., not only will the rotation not be operational in the initial phase (due to C4ISR and other issues) but it will also not be operational, and certainly interoperable, at any point in our current plans. This will be a question of basic definitions for the Poles: is it a Patriot battery if it doesn't have live missiles? The Poles think the Patriots will become not only operable, but interoperable, over time - thus enhancing Poland's air defense. When told last Fall that the Patriots would not be operational, at least at first, Deputy Defense Minister Komorowski angrily responded that Poland expected to receive operational Patriot missiles, "not potted plants."
WHAT IS A GARRISON? WHAT IS JOINT TRAINING?
7. (S) The GOP also has a different concept of the footprint involved when the U.S. agreed (also in the Declaration) to establish a "garrison to support the U.S. Army Patriot battery" by 2012. The Poles believe the permanent battery arrangement will have around 110 personnel -- about the same number required to staff planned temporary rotations between 2009 and 2012 -- which is to say that the Poles expect the "garrison" to convert the rotation itself into a permanent presence. Current U.S. planning appears to call for only 20-30 permanent personnel to maintain forward deployed equipment. In addition, the Poles understand that technology transfer regulations would normally restrict their access to Patriot equipment for purposes of training and exercises, but have interpreted the clause in the Declaration allowing for "joint training opportunities" to mean that they will have greater access to technology than is generally granted by the Export Control Act.
COMMENT
8. (S) We need to navigate the way forward carefully. We may be able to close some of the gaps between our plans and the Poles expectations with time and focus and patience on both sides. However, the "potted plant" problem, is much more tricky. Prime Minister Tusk, neither a fan of MD nor as wed to the U.S.-Polish strategic relationship as his predecessors, sold the BMDA to the Polish public as enhancing Polish security because of the Patriot agreement. Assuming the European missile site plans don't completely wither on the vine, the Poles will expect the Patriot rotation to not only go forward, but to have some operational, if not eventual interoperational capability. As we move forward, we will want to be careful not to stumble into this chasm. We need a strategy for how we will consult with the Poles to close the gap before it undoes much good work to date. ASHE
Wednesday, 16 December 2009, 15:00
S E C R E T USNATO 000588
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/16/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, MARR, NATO
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON NATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING
FOR OUR BALTIC ALLIES
REF: STATE 127892
Classified By: Charge John Heffern for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (S) The Polish, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian PermReps, and Secretary General Rasmussen, welcomed the U.S. decision to support expanding the NATO contingency plan for Poland, EAGLE GUARDIAN, to include the Baltic countries. Ambassador Daalder, accompanied by German Ambassador Ulrich Brandenburg, delivered reftel points in separate December 15 meetings with the SecGen, the Polish PermRep, and a joint meeting with all three Baltic PermReps. The Ambassador stressed that this initiative was a routine adjustment to ongoing contingency planning, that military and geographic logic dictated that the defense of Poland include the defense of the Baltic states, and that this initiative, as with other NATO planning, should remain in restricted NATO circles and was not for public consumption. He explained that work on this initiative should start immediately in January following NATO's winter break.
2. (S) The SecGen was extremely pleased by the U.S. support for an approach that would meet a legitimate demand by three NATO Allies. Poland more cautiously agreed with the approach so long as it did not delay completion of the Poland-related portion of EAGLE GUARDIAN. The Baltic PermRemps were grateful for this initiative, and stressed the need to ensure this would be a real plan to defend their countries rather than a simple appendage to the Poland contingency plan. They understood the need to keep this issue within NATO, and asked for guidance in responding to public inquiries. Ambassador Daalder shared with the Baltic PermReps reftel points on press inquiries. They agreed to adopt a uniform press response.
3. (S) Ambassador Daalder acknowledged in these meetings that Germany had initiated the proposal for expanding EAGLE GUARDIAN to include the Baltic states. The German PermRep noted that the German Chancellery and Ministry of Defense had signed off on this approach, and MFA approval should come after FM Westerwelle's full briefing on this issue. HEFFERN
Wednesday, 16 December 2009, 13:02
S E C R E T TALLINN 000373
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 2019/12/16
TAGS NATO, MARR, MCAP, PREL, EN
SUBJECT: Estonia Pleased with NATO Contingency Planning Plan
REF: STATE 127892
CLASSIFIED BY: Marc Nordberg, Political/Economic Chief; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
Classified by DCM Karen Decker for Reasons 1.4 B & D.
1. (U) Pol Chief and DATT delivered reftel points on December 15 to Paul Teesalu, Director of the MFA's Security Policy Division, and to Sven Sakkov, MOD Undersecretary for Defense Policy, and Eerik Marmei, MOD Director of the NATO and ESDP Department.
2. (S) Teesalu welcomed the information and called it an "early Christmas present." Teesalu was pleased to see a clear plan to add the Baltic States to Eagle Guardian, and thought this the best option for easily including the Baltic region in contingency planning. Teesalu also fully agreed that all such discussion should be conducted out of the public eye, stating that Estonia is looking for, "solidarity, not visibility." The GOE has asked the Lithuanians to keep contingency planning discussions private as well.
3. (S) Sakkov likewise stated this information is good news, and is a major event for Estonia 5 B= years after joining NATO. He thanked the USG for its support on contingency planning. Sakkov however wondered about the Polish reaction. On the margins of the November 2008 NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting the Polish delegation told Sakkov that they were against including the Baltic states into Eagle Guardian as they did not want the Polish plan to be diluted or held hostage in case other allies opposed adding the Baltic states. Sakkov added he recently heard from Lithuanian counterparts that Poland has not softened its position.
4. (S) Sakkov was also concerned about the process of getting the Baltic region added to EAGLE GUARDIAN, asking on several occasions whether the Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC) would have to inform the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or just the Secretary General (SECGEN), and how the addition would be approved in the MC and tasked to SACEUR. Although not expressly stated, he seemed concerned about opportunities for other members to put a stop to the process.
5. (S) Sakkov further stated he would immediately inform President Ilves, prior to Ilves' departure for a December 16 meeting with the Baltic, and possibly Polish, presidents. Sakkov said Estonian J3 and J5 planners were ready to assist in developing the contingency plan, but asked if the USG had any further information on a reassurance package for the Baltic states - something that can be used publicly, such as increased exercises, to show the Baltic peoples they will be covered by Article 5. POLT
Tuesday, 15 December 2009, 15:17
S E C R E T RIGA 000594
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/16/2019
TAGS MARR, MCAP, PREL, NATO, LG
SUBJECT: LATVIA SILENTLY CELEBRATES CONTINGENCY PLANNING
DECISION
REF: SECSTATE 127892
Classified By: PolCouns Brian H. Phipps, Reason(s) 1.5 (B) and (D).
(S/NF) On December 15, Latvian MFA Security Policy Director Kaspars Ozolins expressed his government's profound happiness upon receipt of reftel demarche. He shared our desire to keep all discussion of contingency planning out of the public eye, and, unprompted, said he would stress this imperative with his Lithuanian colleagues. Ozolins said that German contacts had been favorably disposed toward the extension option, but had told him that they were awaiting the results of USG interagency review before coming forward. He expressed some anxiety that the Government of Poland might be concerned that EAGLE GUARDIAN could be diluted or lose focus as a result of including the Baltic states. PolCouns replied that the USG would seek to assure Poland that, on the contrary, its own security would be enhanced by a geographic expansion of EAGLE GUARDIAN. The Government of Latvia also favored an expansion of other country-specific contingency plans into regional plans, Ozolins said. GARBER
Friday, 18 December 2009, 14:36
S E C R E T WARSAW 001228
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/CE (GLANTZ) AND EUR/RPM
EO 12958 DECL: 12/18/2019
TAGS NATO, MCAP, MARR, PREL, PL
SUBJECT: POLAND COULD ACCEPT "COMPLEMENTARY" CONTINGENCY
PLANNING FOR POLAND AND BALTIC STATES
REF: STATE 127892
Classified By: DCM William Heidt for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) SUMMARY: Deputy DefMin Stanislaw Komorowski and MFA Security Policy Director Adam Kobieracki reacted similarly when DCM raised reftel points -- Poland strongly agrees with the necessity of contingency planning for the Baltic States but would like to avoid delays in the completion of the EAGLE GUARDIAN plan for Poland. However, both Komorowski and Kobieracki suggested that Poland might be able to accept a "creatively packaged" plan that included separate but complementary components ("chapters") for Poland and the Baltic States. They agreed that discussions should not be made public. END SUMMARY.
2. (S) In a meeting with DCM on December 17, Komorowski expressed satisfaction with the level of cooperation with other NATO contingency planners on EAGLE GUARDIAN. Poles were active participants in the process and looked forward to its completion by the end of February or early March. Komorowski was skeptical that a regional approach to contingency planning was the best way ahead. Komorowski said Warsaw would prefer a unique plan for Poland, although he allowed that Warsaw could accept the notion of two complementary chapters for Poland and the Baltic States within EAGLE GUARDIAN. More important for Poland was the need to avoid any delay in completing the plan or to rehash already-agreed components, such as the threat assessment. He added that he "agreed entirely" that the issue should remain as secret as possible, and that it was in the "common interest" to avoid public discussion of NATO contingency planning.
3. (S) Kobieracki made similar points to DCM on December 15, and suggested the USG engage in detailed consultations with Polish officials in Brussels and with the General Staff in Warsaw. He said Poland had hoped that a revised EAGLE GUARDIAN plan could be used as a starting point for developing contingency plans for the Baltic States rather than become intertwined with them. He hinted that a creatively packaged regional plan that met Polish needs in terms of conditionality and automaticity might be acceptable, but cautioned that Warsaw would need assurances that NATO's defense of Poland was an "issue in its own right" and not dependent on the security or defense of other NATO members. Kobieracki insisted that Poland would also need assurances that regional planning would not negatively impact on NATO's response to prospective crises, particularly with respect to pre-planned deployments. He urged that completion of EAGLE GUARDIAN not be delayed to accommodate incorporation of the Baltic States into a regional contingency plan. Kobieracki agreed that contingency planning discussions should not be made public. FEINSTEIN
Tuesday, 26 January 2010, 20:29
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 007810
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/22/2020
TAGS MARR, MCAP, NATO, PREL, EN, LG, LH, PL
SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF EAGLE GUARDIAN TO INCLUDE BALTIC
ALLIES
REF: A. USNATO 35 B. 09 STATE 127892
Classified By: EUR PDAS Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (U) This is an action cable. Please see paragraphs 3-4.
2. (S) Summary and Action Request. On January 22 NATO Allies agreed in the Military Committee to expand the NATO Contingency Plan for Poland, EAGLE GUARDIAN, to include the defense and reinforcement of the Baltic States. Posts in Allied capitals should be prepared to explain, as necessary, U.S. support for this approach and how it fits within our broader vision for NATO contingency planning, as well as how to respond to media inquiries on the matter. Posts are asked to draw on the points below, as necessary, in discussions on this issue. End Summary and Action Request.
3. (C) Posts need not engage host government officials proactively on NATO contingency planning at this time, but are encouraged to use the points below as the basis for discussions on the matter as needed.
(S/REL NATO) CONTINGENCY POINTS (FOR USE AT POST,S DISCRETION)
-- The United States believes that NATO - as a matter of course - should conduct appropriate contingency planning for the possible defense of Allied territory and populations.
-- As President Obama said in Prague: "We must work together as NATO members so that we have contingency plans in place to deal with new threats, wherever they may come from."
-- The U.S. welcomes the decision to expand EAGLE GUARDIAN to include the defense of the Baltic states, and sees it as a logical military extension of the existing contingency plan that fits well within the existing scenario.
-- We see the expansion of EAGLE GUARDIAN as a step toward the possible expansion of NATO's other existing country-specific contingency plans into regional plans. This is the first step in a multi-stage process to develop a complete set of appropriate contingency plans for the full range of possible threats - both regional and functional - as soon as possible. At the same time, we believe contingency planning is only one element of NATO's Article 5 preparedness.
(S/REL NATO) POINTS ABOUT PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF PLANS (FOR USE AT POST'S DISCRETION)
-- The United States believes strongly that such planning should not be discussed publicly. These military plans are classified at the NATO SECRET level.
-- The Alliance has many public diplomacy tools at its disposal. Contingency planning is not one of them. What we should do is explore other public steps for demonstrating the vitality of Article 5, such as exercises, defense investment, and partnerships.
-- Public discussion of contingency plans undermines their military value, giving insight into NATO's planning processes. This weakens the security of all Allies.
-- A public discussion of contingency planning would also likely lead to an unnecessary increase in NATO-Russia tensions, something we should try to avoid as we work to improve practical cooperation in areas of common NATO-Russia interest.
-- We hope that we can count on your support in keeping discussions on NATO contingency planning out of the public domain.
-- We should work together to develop strategies - to include activities such as exercises, defense investment, and partnerships - for demonstrating to our publics that Article 5's value ultimately lies in NATO's capabilities and deterrence, rather than specific planning.
4. (C) Washington strongly believes that the details of NATO,s contingency plans should remain in confidential channels. However, recent press coverage of NATO decisions regarding possible contingency planning options for the Baltic region may lead to additional media inquiries. If necessary, posts may use the points below in responding to
STATE 00007810 002 OF 002
public queries.
(U) PUBLIC/PRESS INQUIRIES -- IF ASKED:
-- NATO does not discuss specific plans.
-- As a matter of course, however, NATO engages in planning in order to be as prepared as possible for whatever situations might arise, particularly as relates to its ability to carrying out its Article 5 commitments.
-- Plans are not static. NATO is constantly reviewing and revising its plans.
-- NATO planning is an internal process designed to make the Alliance as prepared as possible for future contingencies. It is not "aimed" at any other country.
-- President Obama acknowledged this when he said at Prague that "We must work together as NATO members so that we have contingency plans in place to deal with new threats, wherever they may come from." CLINTON
Thursday, 12 November 2009, 07:06
S E C R E T WARSAW 001139
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/CE (GLANTZ), OSD FOR MITCHELL
EO 12958 DECL: 10/15/2019
TAGS PREL, MARR, PL
SUBJECT: HLDG: CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRESS ON U.S. BMD AND
PATRIOT PROPOSALS
REF: WARSAW 972
Classified By: Ambassador Lee Feinstein for reasons 1.4 b and d
1. This corrected cable replaces WARSAW 01071.
2. (S) SUMMARY. Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, led a U.S. delegation to Warsaw for the first-ever U.S.-Poland High Level Defense Group (HLDG). Polish Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Stanislaw Komorowski led the Polish delegation. The discussion on the first day of the HLDG focused on providing more details for U.S. Missile Defense plans and a prospective Polish role in the new concept as well as additional aspects for the deployment of a U.S. Patriot battery to Poland for training and exercises. Additionally, the U.S. delegation laid out three potential alternative presence options which, if Poland chose, could replace a Patriot garrison as a post-2012 permanent presence of U.S. Armed Forces. Day 2 of the HLDG focused on strategic discussions, including U.S.-Poland bilateral defense cooperation, Afghanistan, and NATO's new strategic concept. In addition, the Polish side provided reaction to the possible alternative presence options the U.S. outlined the previous day. Polish reaction to the BMD proposal was positive, though they were disappointed that the SM-3 site would not become operational until 2018, and they sought more information about how early preparations for the deployment could begin. The response to alternative presence options was very positive, both in plenary session and in a small two-on-two dinner meeting the night before. The questions about the Patriot presentation focused on timing and interoperability. END SUMMARY.
3. (U) The U.S. delegation included USAF MG Paul Schafer, EUCOM Director, Strategy, Policy, and Assessment; USAF BG John Hesterman, Joint Staff Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs; Ambassador Lee Feinstein, U.S. Embassy Warsaw; DAS Pamela Quanrud, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs; DAS Frank Rose, Verification, Compliance, and Implementation; and Ms. Nancy Morgan, MDA Director for International Affairs. The Polish side included Deputy Foreign Minister Jacek Najder; MG Mieczyslaw Gocul, Chief of Strategic Planning Directorate, General Staff of the Armed Forces; and Piotr Pacholski, MOD Director of the Missile Defense Office.
NEW BMD ARCHITECTURE IN EUROPE
4. (S) Undersecretary Komorowski began by explaining that Poland understood the reasoning for the U.S. decision to change direction on a European Ballistic Missile Defense program, but that more detail on the threat and the potential SM-3 deployment in Poland would be welcome. Komorowski underscored that Poland wanted to take its responsibility for the decision on whether to take part in the new system seriously and was looking for further details on the system to inform that decision.
5. (S) Ambassador Vershbow opened by stating that we know the September 17 briefing on the new U.S. approach had raised many questions. We welcomed this opportunity to explain this approach in greater detail, and why we felt it was a better approach for U.S.-Polish relations and for NATO. Nancy Morgan of the Missile Defense Agency briefed the Polish side on the U.S. Missile Defense Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) plan. The brief laid out the objectives for each of the four phases, described the potential role that Poland could play, and illustrated the differences between the Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) and the Standard Missile (SM)-3 program. Following the brief, the Polish delegation asked many questions about the importance of Poland's location for the program, other ways Poland might be able to participate in the system beyond hosting a land-based SM-3 system, and the timing necessary for Poland's decision. The Poles also asked how the SM-3 system, if deployed in Poland, could become a NATO system, and finally, a series of hypothetical questions on the adaptive nature of the system vis-a-vis the changing threat.
6. (S) ASD Vershbow said that with regard to location, Poland was given "right of first refusal" because of its previous commitments and because Poland was a very good site for defending all of Northern Europe. That said, Poland was not the only possibility for a northern European interceptor site. ASD Vershbow said that the timing of activating the
Polish site in 2018 rather than 2015 was driven by analysis of the threat, but also by the development timeline of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, which was key to providing wide-area protection to allies in Northern Europe. Ambassador Vershbow stressed, however, that preparation of the site could begin well in advance of activation, possibly in 2013, but that we would need to work with Congress to get funding for early site preparation. With regard to how NATO might defend itself from missiles coming from elsewhere than Iran or Syria, BG John Hesterman of the Joint Staff said that sea-borne platforms could provide surge capability against threats from an unforeseen direction, land-based sites could be upgraded with more interceptors if the scale of the threat were increased, and radars could be reoriented. The Poles asked whether proceeding with Phase III when SM-3 Block IIA would be deployed to Poland was firm or would die if perception of the threat receded. ASD Vershbow reassured the Poles of U.S. commitment on this point.
PATRIOT PHASE 1 WILL NOT BE OPERATIONAL
7. (S) Following delivery of the Non-Paper providing further definition to the US policy regarding Patriot rotations, LTC Sean Gainey from U.S. Army Europe briefed the concept for the Phase 1 rotations of a U.S. Patriot battery to Poland. In response to a direct question from Komorowski following the brief, ASD Vershbow emphasized that the rotations will be solely for training and exercises and would not add to Polish air defense capabilities, and Maj Gen Schafer reinforced the point made by the interagency cleared Patriot non-paper that the Patriot battery would not be operational at any time. The U.S. delegation asserted that the U.S. is committed to doing quarterly rotations in Poland through 2012. However, it was made clear that training opportunities would be limited to basic familiarization training due to current disclosure restrictions unless Poland decided to buy Patriot systems. ASD Vershbow also reiterated that a deployment of a Patriot battery would not take place without a ratified Supplemental Status of Forces Agreement (SSA). However, the U.S. would, on the basis of continued progress on SOFA negotiations, move forward with bilateral planning for a March 2010 deployment in good faith that the SSA would soon be brought into force.
ALTERNATIVE PRESENCE OPTIONS IN PLACE OF PATRIOT GARRISON
8. (S) Near the end of Day 1 discussions, ASD Vershbow presented new options for potential cooperation which the U.S. believed may be more useful to Poland than Patriot rotations. He explained that we looked at other alternative programs that would be affordable for both countries, would assist in the modernization of the Polish Armed Forces, would help Poland better meet its NATO force goals, and would be sustainable by the U.S. military. The three options presented were: 1) a quarterly rotation of F-16s, and the establishment of a small permanent support detachment, which would focus on enhancing Polish fighter capabilities, increasing sortie readiness and meeting NATO commitments; 2) quarterly C-130 rotations from Ramstein AFB, also with a small permanent support detachment in Poland with the goal of increasing Polish readiness and ability to support own and NATO operations; 3) the relocation of a U.S. Naval Special Warfare unit from Stuttgart to Gdansk or Gdynia. The Polish delegation accepted U.S. unwillingness to discuss Patriot Phase 2 and the garrison until after consideration of the alternate presence options, and the atmosphere in the room was positive and constructive. Komorowski also said both in a small meeting preceding the HLDG and in plenary that the Patriot's contribution to Polish air defense is minimal, though important symbolically.
9. (S) At the start of Day 2, the Polish delegation presented its initial reactions to the alternative presence proposals. Undersecretary Komorowski said he believed the proposal for F-16 rotations was his favorite. The reactions from the Polish experts included many questions of detail: when could the rotations arrive, how many planes would each rotation have, how many people would be in the permanent support unit, would the U.S. be able to provide tanker and AWACS support, and would the rotation only operate in Poland, or would it be allowed to train Polish ground and air crews? EUCOM pledged to follow up with more detailed discussions on these proposals at a later date. To the three proposals, Undersecretary Komorowski added a fourth for the U.S. to consider - as an additional rather than a replacement for any of the U.S. proposals. Noting that Polish Minister of
Defense Bogdan Klich planned to sign an agreement with his Ukrainian counterpart that very day establishing the framework for a combined Polish-Ukrainian-Lithuanian Brigade that would be stood up for international deployments by 2013, Komorowski asked if it would be possible for U.S. involvement in this brigade, either assigning some forces or stationing officers at the permanent headquarters to be located in Lublin.
DEFENSE COOPERATION
10. (S) Undersecretary Komorowski defined the Polish approach to defense cooperation by dividing proposals for new programs into two categories: Afghanistan deployment assistance and programs funded through Foreign Military Financing (FMF). On Afghanistan, Komorowski detailed a "wishlist" for U.S. cooperation including better help on UAVs and other sensors, giving Poland access to "Four Eyes"-level intelligence by making it a Fifth Eye, increased U.S. provision of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, and the building of a runway in Ghazni to support C-130 flights. On FMF, Komorowski stated that Poland wishes to focus mainly on C4ISR purchases to increase the interoperability of Polish military equipment. BG Hesterman of the Joint Staff related that the Chairman has a lot of empathy for Poland's MRAP issues based on our own experiences with IEDs and that the Chairman remains fully engaged in assisting Poland in this critical area. On the runway question, Hesterman reiterated what the Chairman told the Polish CHOD in June that the U.S. is willing to assist with contracting support coordination to build the extension. He added that with the Afghanistan strategy and resourcing under review and decisions pending in our capital and others, that there could be more developments in this area.
AFGHANISTAN POLITICAL CHALLENGES
11. (S) Deputy Foreign Minister Jacek Najder, the Polish Plenipotentiary for Afghanistan, provided a Polish strategic overview for Afghanistan. He concurred with COMISAF's assessment that the Alliance had lost the strategic initiative and that NATO was not keeping pace with the insurgents. In Ghazni province, where Poland is focusing most of its attention, voting irregularities were high. While Poland is also disappointed with the way the election played out, Najder asserted that regardless of whether there is a run-off, the challenge will be in incorporating the lessons learned from the August election so that the 2010 Parliamentary elections in Afghanistan function better. Najder also called for a greater regional focus to expand to both India and Iran. Finally, Najder stressed that Poland remained in Afghanistan because of NATO and the importance that NATO has to Poland's national security. However, he believed that NATO should delink success in Afghanistan with evaluations of NATO's overall success. Komorowski emphasized that Poland was committed to the pledge of "in together, out together" on Afghanistan. However, he noted the difficulty for Polish politicians in reconciling the high public support for Polish membership in NATO with public support for consequences and responsibilities such as operation in Afghanistan, which come with NATO membership.
12. (S) ASD Vershbow noted that President Obama was still reviewing the recommendations of COMISAF and his resource requests, but emphasized that the U.S. would not turn away from Afghanistan, which was a test of NATO's credibility. He agreed that it would be better to expand the discussion with Iran to encourage better behavior, but said that this was unlikely to succeed in the short term. In response to questions on the role of Russia in Afghanistan, ASD Vershbow recalled that Russia also wants to contain many of the threats to Russia, including terrorism and narcotics trafficking, but was also sensitive about the U.S. presence in Central Asia. Recalling the July agreement for air transit of lethal goods through Russia, ASD Vershbow stated his belief that NATO and the U.S. could find additional ways to partner with Russia on Afghanistan.
NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT: DEFENSE OVER SECURITY
13. (C) Komorowski declared that it was time for a new document, not just the alteration of the 1999 Strategic Concept. He said that the most important aspect of the new strategic concept for Poland will be the reaffirmation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty as the most important agreement between the Allies, and that Article 5 shall take
precedence over expeditionary operations. Noting that the strategic environment had changed, he stated his belief that a new doctrine was needed that would expand NATO's capabilities to deal with its members' obligations under Article 5. Komorowski explained that while out-of-area operations were valid NATO missions, that the new Strategic Concept must clearly state that NATO's door remained open as well as introduce clarity into how NATO deals with its international partners, especially Russia. Komorowski related that Poland's member of the "wise persons" group, Adam Rotfeld, was consulting with other central European countries to give them the sense that their input was taken in the process. Minister Najder concluded by simply stating that NATO remained a defense alliance, not a security organization.
14. (C) ASD Vershbow remarked that both countries came at the issue from a similar perspective. NATO, in his opinion, needed a shorter, crisper document which would be more accessible to both parliaments and public and better made the case for an increase in resources to meet NATO's full mission set. There was a need to find the proper balance between Article 5 and expeditionary missions. Observing that Article 5 may need to be viewed more broadly to encompass non-military threats like cyber-attacks. ASD Vershbow cautioned that we would need to have a strategy with real meaning, backed up by planning, exercises, and capabilities. He said it was clear that zero growth of the NATO budget was unsustainable with the expansion of NATO missions and we needed to look at common funding and other reforms and get more value for money.
15. (S) COMMENT. In marked contrast to September 17, the mood of the two days of HLDG discussions was positive and constructive. The Polish delegation listened to U.S. proposals on BMD and Patriot, and both sides conveyed a sense that real progress was made. Concerns exist on the Polish side at having to wait until 2018 for SM-3 site activation, but the possibility raised by ASD Vershbow of early site preparation helped mitigate the concern. The Poles asked specific questions in an effort to determine whether Phase 1 Patriot rotations would have any operational capacity, but seemed to accept the fact that they would not and that this was the established U.S. position (despite the public comments of Komorowski following the meeting). The Polish side was prepared to defer discussion of the Phase 2 Patriot garrison, and the alternative presence options generated favorable interest. The question moving forward is the extent to which this constructive progress will be felt higher in the Polish government, particularly by Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski. END COMMENT
16. (U) ASD Vershbow has reviewed and cleared this cable. FEINSTEIN
Thursday, 07 May 2009, 05:17
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000467
SIPDIS
EUR, PM, H
EO 12958 DECL: 04/20/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, OREP, RS, PL
SUBJECT: POLAND - CODEL LEVIN DISCUSSES MISSILE DEFENSE,
PATRIOTS
REF: WARSAW 375
Classified By: Ambassador Ashe for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: In meetings with CODEL Levin, the Polish Prime Minister's chief of staff, the President's deputy national security advisor, and the speaker of the Polish parliament expressed unanimous support for a large U.S. military footprint in Poland to bolster Article 5 guarantees. PM chief of staff Slawomir Nowak told CODEL that, regardless of the U.S. decision on Missile Defense, Poland expects the U.S. to "honor its commitments" to bring a Patriot battery to Poland. All three Polish officials requested that the U.S. keep Poland updated on the status of dialogue with Russia, suggesting that Russia, not Iran, poses the greater threat to Poland. CODEL's meeting with FM Sikorski is reported septel. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL), and Senator Susan Collins (R-ME), visited Warsaw April 15-16 to discuss Missile Defense and Polish interest in a U.S. Patriot battery rotation with Polish officials, including Prime Minister Tusk's chief of staff Slawomir Nowak, Deputy Chief of President Kaczynski's National Security Bureau Witold Waszczykowski, and Parliamentary Speaker Bronislaw Komorowski (Civic Platform, PO). The Senators' meetings with Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski and Deputy Defense Minister Stanislaw Komorowski are reported septel.
U.S. "ROCK SOLID" ON ARTICLE FIVE
3. (C) Senator Levin began all three meetings by conveying the President's message that the U.S. commitment to the NATO Article 5 guarantee is "rock solid." While U.S. support for Poland may differ in form under the Obama administration, U.S. support for Poland will be strong. When asked whether Warsaw felt assured that NATO would honor its Article 5 commitments to Poland, Waszczykowski said "we still have our doubts," adding that some European members -- particularly France -- prefer talk to action, he wryly added "that's why we bought F-16s and not French Mirages, and why we went through with the Missile Defense deal."
PATRIOTS AND AMERICAN BOOTS
4. (C) Senator Levin warned all three interlocutors that if the Czechs reject the proposed MD radar site, the Polish component of MD would be put in jeopardy under current U.S. legislation. Nowak expressed confidence that the Czechs would ratify the agreement with the U.S., suggesting they are simply waiting for a U.S. decision on MD. Speaker Komorowski acknowledged the provisions of U.S. law, but stated Poland does not want to be responsible for Czech problems. Senator Collins acknowledged the political cost to Poland of supporting MD, and asked for Komorowski,s views on how to maintain support for the United States if it pursues a different course.
5. (C) Asked whether Poland would be reassured by the presence of Patriot batteries in lieu of MD, Nowak told CODEL Levin that, regardless of MD's fate, the GOP expects the USG to "honor its commitments" on Patriots. Poland intends to build a comprehensive air-defense system and has identified Patriots as "the most important element" of its defense modernization efforts. Nowak said Poland "will not suffer" if the U.S. withdraws from MD, but repeatedly asserted that the GOP is "counting on Patriots." (NB: At one point, Nowak even intervened when his interpreter mistakenly said the Poles "would like Patriots." "No, we are counting on them," Nowak emphasized in English.)
6. (C) Waszczykowski was less adamant about Patriots, stating that Poland and the U.S. had a binding political agreement on security matters, which he hoped the United States would respect. He added that Poland "wants U.S. boots on the ground" -- not necessarily as a tripwire, but as a deterrent. Nowak similarly stressed Poland's strong interest in "deepening" military cooperation, ideally to include a large U.S. footprint in Poland. He mused that one Patriot battery and ten MD interceptors do not constitute the "impressive presence" that Poland is hoping for.
7. (C) Speaker Komorowski and Nowak both pointed out that, by agreeing to host the MD site, Poland had paid a "high price" -- especially in its relations with other EU members and with Russia. Komorowski expressed concern that Poland had again become a Russian target after a dozen years of improving relations -- senior Russian officials have threatened to target Poland with nuclear missiles, are stirring up
WARSAW 00000467 002 OF 002
anti-Polish sentiment among Russians, and are acting against Poland's interests in Ukraine.
8. (C) Komorowski argued that the U.S. needs to fulfill its symbolic agreement to show involvement in defense of Polish territory. If the new administration is changing U.S. political priorities, it also needs to engage in dialogue with Poland, not just Russia. Most important for Poland is U.S. involvement in Polish security, through physical presence of American forces in Poland, NATO facilities in Poland, fulfilling the commitment to provide Patriot missiles, and greater U.S.-Polish cooperation.
DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA
9. (C) Komorowski, Nowak, and Waszczykowski stressed the importance of keeping Poland updated on the status of U.S.-Russia talks. Nowak stressed the GOP's strong interest in a positive outcome, but reminded the CODEL that U.S. negotiators had promised the USG would overcome Russian objections to MD. "The MD site is an American base. The burden of achieving Russian agreement is on the U.S. side," he said. Even so, Nowak said, Poland had agreed to accept confidence-building measures with the Russians and was also working to convince Moscow that MD is not a threat to Russia's nuclear arsenal. Regardless, Russia will find it difficult to accept any "tangible manifestation" of a NATO presence in Poland or the Czech Republic.
10. (C) Nowak said Poland had not discussed Patriots with the Russians. Russia should not have a say in Poland's defense modernization planning. Noting that Poland's armed forces are "defensive in nature," Nowak reiterated that Poland's primary goal is to increase interoperability with allies.
11. (C) Presidential Advisor Waszczykowski reacted more emotionally. While Washington is entitled to talk to Russia, to work toward a solution to the Iranian threat, and to make its own decision about the MD initiative, the U.S. should take care not to undermine Poland's security. He then wondered aloud, "How long will it take you to realize that nothing will change with Iran and Russia?" Waszczykowski asserted that Moscow is trying to regain its sphere of influence and stressed the critical importance of an increased U.S. or NATO presence for Poland's security. He added that Russia continues to deny its historical wrong-doings against Poland, imposes economic sanctions against Poland at will, and frequently disrupts the flow of oil and gas.
THREAT FROM IRAN?
12. (C) In all three meetings, Senator Nelson expressed doubt that Iran would abandon its nuclear weapons or missile programs, but noted that the Iranian threat to Europe could be met for the foreseeable future with the AEGIS and THAAD systems. Waszczykowski, who served as Poland's Ambassador to Tehran (1999-2002), agreed that Iran poses an increasing threat to the United States and Europe. He said that the Iranian regime has no incentive to warm relations with Washington because the regime has built its own legitimacy on the cornerstone of anti-Americanism.
13. (C) Nowak and Komorowski told the CODEL that Poland does not perceive a direct threat from Iran. Nowak stated that, as an active and loyal ally, Poland had agreed to host the MD site because of the threat Iran poses to the U.S. and others in NATO. He noted that Poland's desire to be a strong ally was also the basis for its activity in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nowak said Poland perceives a greater threat from non-state actors, but conceded that Iran's support for terrorist organizations was troubling. He added that Poland's decision to host MD had moved it "closer to the top of Iran's list," and, as a result, made Patriots more important to Poland's security.
14. (U) CODEL Levin has cleared this message.
ASHE
Monday, 22 February 2010, 16:12
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000110
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/CE (GLANTZ, KARAGIANNIS)
OSD FOR MITCHELL, AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW, ADMIRAL MULLEN
EUCOM FOR ADMIRAL STAVRIDIS
USAREUR FOR GENERAL HAM
EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2020
TAGS PREL, MARR, MOPS, PGOV, PL
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS DEFENSE MINISTER KLICH
Classified By: Classified BY Political Counselor Dan Sainz, reason 1.4 (b, d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Defense Minister Bogdan Klich told the Ambassador on February 18 that Poland is eager to see the fruits of bilateral defense cooperation, which he described as based on a solid political foundation. He emphasized the importance to Poland of an April arrival of the first Patriot battery rotation. Klich did not repeat recent Polish government points about the configuration of future rotations of the Patriot battery. End Summary.
2. (C) During a February 18 meeting with the Ambassador, Polish Defense Minister Bogdan Klich said there is a good political framework for continued U.S.-Polish defense cooperation, and noted Under Secretary Tauscher's February 8 visit had been a very successful one. Klich said he does not expect anything will happen to undermine that solid foundation. He added that the bilateral supplemental SoFA, signed December 11, provides a strong legal framework for defense ties. The SoFA ratification vote in the Sejm (the lower house of Parliament) was overwhelmingly in favor, and Senate approval would also come quickly. (Note: The Senate voted 88-1 in favor of SOFA ratification later on February 18.) Klich said President Kaczynski would sign the SoFA ratification bill quickly.
HOPING FOR PATRIOTS IN APRIL
----------------------------
3. (C) Klich said Poland has a strong desire to see the fruits of bilateral defense cooperation, and he highlighted the political importance of an early first rotation in Poland of the U.S. Patriot battery. He said Poland hopes the first rotation will occur in April. The Ambassador said the United States wants the rotation to be viewed as a bilateral success. In answer to Klich's questions about timing, the Ambassader said the United States has said the first rotation would take place within 90 days of SOFA ratification. He said a more precise time frame will be determined at the last bilateral planning meeting for the Patriot rotation, which will take place in the first week in March.
MILITARY FACILITIES FOR ALTERNATIVE U.S. PRESENCES
--------------------------------------------- -----
4. (C) Klich called for talks on other forms of an enhanced U.S. security presence in Poland. He said he had authorized Deputy Defense Minister Stanislaw Komorowski and ChoD Franciszek Gagor to take part in such talks. Klich highlighted Polish interest in all of the options presented by DOD A/S Vershbow at the October High Level Defense Group discussions: F-16s, C-130's, as well as "stable, not temporary" special operations forces. When asked, Klich confirmed that the GoP is particularly interested in U.S. F-16 rotations. Speaking personally, he said he also had a strong interest in a special operations force presence, since he had signed a bilateral special operations cooperation agreement with Secretary Gates a year ago. ChoD Gagor added that the biggest multilateral exercise Poland is hosting this year, "Jackal Stone 10," will feature special operations forces. Klich added that as part of the first in-depth infrastructure review in postwar Poland, the Defense Ministry had decided to close 20% of defense facilities, but would be &saving8 three complexes for U.S. forces.
GETTING THE WORD OUT ON DEFENSE COOPERATION
-------------------------------------------
5. (C) The Ambassador noted that the bilateral agenda for defense cooperation is a full one, and both governments should work together to inform public opinion about the many useful exchanges under way. Klich strongly agreed that Defense Ministry and Embassy staff should follow up in this area. Deputy Defense Minister Komorowski added that if A/S Vershbow visits Warsaw in the coming months, it might be a good occasion to do some joint public diplomacy work about planning for other forms of an enhanced U.S. security presence in Poland. (Note: Amb. Vershbow's planned mid-March trip has been postponed.)
6. (C) COMMENT: Klich's emphasis on a hoped-for April arrival
WARSAW 00000110 002 OF 002
of the first Patriot battery is consistent with other government statements and press leaks that signal a decision to focus on the timing of the first deployment, as opposed to other aspects of it. In that regard, Klich did not repeat government appeals that Patriot rotations be integrated into the Polish air defense system and include "live" missiles, as he did in a meeting the previous week with Under Secretary Tauscher. The emphasis on the timing of the first deployment corresponds with developments in the presidential race, and Foreign Minister Sikorsky,s active candidacy for the Civic Platform nomination. FEINSTEIN
Wednesday, 10 February 2010, 14:13
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000094
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CE, ISN/CTR; NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL
EO 12958 DECL: 02/10/2020
TAGS AF, CH, IR, IZ, MARR, NATO, PARM, PL, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: U/S TAUSCHER MEETS FM SIKORSKI, MOD KLICH
REF: STATE 12108
Classified By: Ambassador Lee Feinstein; Reason 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY. During February 8 meetings with Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher and Ambassador Lee Feinstein, Foreign Minister Sikorski and Defense Minister Klich said they were pleased with the successful completion of the protocol amending the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement. Sikorski said he wanted to move forward on discussions regarding U.S. alternative presence options in Poland after the Patriot rotation begins. He said he would support increased pressure on Iran. He expressed skepticism about Russia's approach toward Tehran, especially in light of China's recent assertiveness. Klich said the second planned Patriot rotation would likely take place in the heat of the fall Polish Presidential election season and asked Washington's help in managing public expectations. Klich also requested more armored vehicles and road-clearing equipment to support Polish operations in Afghanistan. END SUMMARY.
SIKORSKI ON U.S. PRESENCE, RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
2. (C) U/S Tauscher and Ambassador Feinstein met Foreign Minister Sikorski for a courtesy call following the conclusion of the Strategic Cooperation Consultative Group (SCCG) on February 8. Sikorski told U/S Tauscher and Ambassador Feinstein that he was gratified that the United States and Poland had reached ad ref agreement on the protocol amending the BMDA. Sikorski said Poland wanted more information about proposed U.S. alternative presence options in Poland, and asked for more details. He expressed interest in an F-16 presence, but also asked about C-130s, and Special Forces.
3. (C) Sikorski asked how the United States assesses its efforts to engage Russia. He expressed concern that the United States would feel pressured to make concessions, at Poland's expense, to gain Russia's support in the Security Council in the face of an increasingly "hostile" China. He proposed an intelligence exchange regarding whether Russia has tactical nuclear weapons in the Kaliningrad oblast, and complained about the planned French sale of Mistral amphibious assault ships to Russia. U/S Tauscher said that the United States was realistic about Russia. Moscow was increasingly frustrated with Tehran, she said, adding that Washington had made some progress on this and other issues with the Russian Government. Ambassador Feinstein said that trans-Atlantic solidarity would be more important -- not less -- in the circumstances of a more assertive China.
4. (C) The Ambassador delivered reftel demarche to Sikorski on the human rights situation in Iran and pressed Sikorski to issue a public statement on the issue. Sikorski affirmed Poland's support for increased pressure on Iran. He also suggested a special focus on Iranian civil society during the Community of Democracies conference to be held in Poland in June.
5. (C) Sikorski said that the London Conference on Afghanistan was useful because it finally convinced Karzai that it was his last chance to make necessary reforms and take more responsibility for Afghanistan's security situation. DFM Najder raised Ukraine's transfer of T-72 tanks to Iraq, offering that Poland could sell the same type of tanks if Ukraine could not meet its obligations.
6. (C) Sikorski reiterated that PM Tusk is eager to hold a bilateral meeting with President Obama on the margins of the April 12-13 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. The Prime Minister's Chancellery is exploring ways to extend Tusk's U.S. trip by including stops in additional cities, with the aim of creating a larger window within which to schedule an Oval Office meeting.
KLICH: PATRIOTS, POLITICS, AND EQUIPMENT REQUESTS
--------------------------------------------- -----
7. (C) U/S Tauscher and the Ambassador met with Defense Minister Bodgan Klich on February 8 before the opening of the
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SCCG. Klich said he expected the Polish Sejm and Senate to ratify the supplemental SOFA agreement by the end of February or early March, and hoped President Kaczynski would quickly sign. Klich said he understood the configuration of the first Patriot rotation, but noted that the second rotation would occur in the heat of the presidential election. For that second rotation, he argued, it was important to manage public expectations during a sensitive political period. U/S Tauscher and the Ambassador made it clear that the Patriots would not be integrated into Poland's air defense system. Such a move would require a U.S. Presidential decision, and the President has made no such decision. It would be important for Poland to work with the United States to cultivate realistic public expectations for future Patriot rotations.
8. (C) Klich expressed satisfaction with the results of the NATO defense minister's meeting in Istanbul Klich and Gagor said that Poland would like to extend the loan term of its existing Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAPs) vehicles. There are currently 30 on loan until November 2010 and Poland needs an additional 50 MRAPs if possible by April/May when it plans to increase its troop contributions to Afghanistan. He also requested one Road Clearing Package (RCP).
9. (C) Turning to defense cooperation with third countries, Klich said that the Baltic states were very pleased with the U.S. proposal for NATO contingency planning, which is crucial for reassuring NATO's eastern members. He also noted that Poland wants the United States to have the status of "associative party" in the newly established Polish/Ukrainian/Lithuanian brigade. Klich emphasized that Poland is thinking outside of Europe and wants to have a deeper dialogue with the United States. on China. He added that he recently had a good visit to China, during which Poland signed a bilateral defense cooperation agreement.
PARTICIPANTS
------------
10. (U) Participants in the meeting with FM Sikorski:
U.S. Participants: -U/S Ellen Tauscher -Ambassador Lee Feinstein
Polish Participants: -FM Radoslaw Sikorski -DFM Jacek Najder -DFM Andrzej Kremer -Director of the Minister's Secretariat, Michal Miarka
11. (U) Participants in the meeting with MOD Klich:
U.S. Participants: -U/S Ellen Tauscher -Ambassador Lee Feinstein -Frank Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Inspection -John Plumb, Principal Director, OSD Missile Defense Policy
Polish Participants: -DefMin Bogdan Klich -Franciszek Gagor, Chief of the General Staff -Lt. General Mieczyslaw Cieniuch -Piotr Pacholski, Director of Missile Defense Office
12. (U) U/S Tauscher has reviewed this message. FEINSTEIN
Wednesday, 24 February 2010, 14:08
S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000159
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR P, NEA, S/CT
EO 12958 DECL: 02/24/2020
TAGS PTER, PREL, PGOV, SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF ATTENDS CT DIALOGUE WITH
S/CT BENJAMIN
Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: In a surprise appearance, Syrian General Intelligence Director (GID) General Ali Mamlouk attended a February 18 meeting between Vice Foreign Minister Faisal al-Miqdad and a U.S. delegation led by S/CT Coordinator Daniel Benjamin. Miqdad explained Mamlouk had joined the meeting at the request of President Bashar al-Asad as a gesture following a positive meeting between U/S William Burns and the Syrian president the previous day. Stressing the meeting did not signal the commencement of security and intelligence cooperation between Syria and the United States, the Syrian side said the discussion could be a starting point for a blueprint regarding possible cooperation in the future. Calling Coordinator Benjamin's description of terrorist groups operating in the region "valid," Mamlouk emphasized the linkage between progress on political issues in U.S.-Syrian relations and possible security and intelligence cooperation. He identified Syrian-Iraqi border security as an area where Syria could cooperate with the U.S., but only after Iraqi legislative elections in March. Mamlouk added cooperation on Syrian-Iraqi border security could lead to security cooperation in other areas.
2. (S/NF) Mamlouk, Miqdad, and Syrian Ambassador to the U.S. Imad Mustapha were attentive during Benjamin's presentation on al-Qaeda, foreign fighters, and other common threats, and reacted positively to his warnings that these issues presented challenges to both the U.S. and Syria. Mamlouk and Miqdad emphasized three points regarding possible security and intelligence cooperation with the U.S.: (1) Syria must be able to take the lead in any regional actions; (2) politics are an integral part of combating terrorism, and a "political umbrella" of improved U.S.-Syrian bilateral relations should facilitate cooperation against terrorism; and (3) in order to convince the Syrian people that cooperation with the U.S. was benefiting them, progress must be made on issues related to economic sanctions against Syria including spare parts for airplanes and a plane for President Asad. "In summary, President Asad wants cooperation, we should take the lead on that cooperation, and don't put us on your lists," Miqdad declared. END SUMMARY.
SURPRISE GUEST AT MIQDAD MEETING
3. (S/NF) GID Director General Ali Mamlouk was the surprise guest at a February 18 meeting at the MFA hosted by Vice Foreign Minister Faisal al-Miqdad with S/CT Coordinator Daniel Benjamin, DHS A/S David Heyman, and NEA DAS Maura Connelly. Miqdad said Mamlouk's participation in the meeting had come at the direction of President Asad following what Miqdad termed a positive meeting between Asad and U/S Burns on February 17. Syrian Ambassador to the U.S. Imad Mustapha, who translated for Mamlouk during the meeting, stated that Mamlouk's attendance at meetings with foreign delegations was extraordinary and did not occur "even with friendly countries like Britain and France." Mustapha explained President Asad instructed Mamlouk to attend the meeting as a personal gesture.
4. (S/NF) Benjamin, stressing that cooperation on counter-terrorism efforts was an essential part of the roadmap for improved bilateral relations, noted that there were issues on which we had clear differences, such as Syrian support for Hamas and Hizballah. The U.S., he continued, still viewed these groups as undermining stability and the prospects for peace in the region. Nonetheless, the two countries should still work to cooperate on immediate threats facing both the U.S. and Syria, including the proliferation of takfiri groups in the region, such as al-Qaeda, and stopping the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq. The Coordinator provided Mamlouk an overview of the threats posed by terrorist groups operating in the region from North Africa to Iraq to Yemen. Benjamin noted the challenge that these
groups posed to Syria as well, illustrated by the September 2008 attack on a Syrian intelligence building. He explained the U.S. is concerned about the long-term implications of arms smuggling to Lebanon and Iraq through Syria, and observed that the disarray among the Palestinians could ultimately create an opening for groups with an al-Qaeda orientation, citing the case of Junjalat, a radical faction in Gaza.
5. (S/NF) Mamlouk pointed to Syria's 30 years of experience in battling radical groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood as evidence of Syria's commitment to the fight against terrorism. Mamlouk termed Benjamin's description of the challenges posed by terrorist groups in the region as "valid, despite the reasons that gave rise to them." Mamlouk repeatedly stressed his attendance at the meeting did not signal the commencement of security and intelligence cooperation between Syria and the U.S., but could be a starting point for "a blueprint for that which is not yet started." Echoing Miqdad, Mamlouk said progress on political issues in the Syrian-U.S. bilateral relationship was "closely connected" to progress on possible cooperation on security and intelligence.
MAMLOUK DESCRIBES GID'S METHODS
6. (S/NF) The GID Director said Syria had been more successful than the U.S. and other countries in the region in fighting terrorist groups because "we are practical and not theoretical." He stated Syria's success is due to its penetration of terrorist groups. "In principle, we don't attack or kill them immediately. Instead, we embed ourselves in them and only at the opportune moment do we move." Describing the process of planting embeds in terrorist organizations as "complex," Mamlouk said the result had yielded been the detention of scores of terrorists, stamping out terror cells, and stopping hundreds of terrorists from entering Iraq. Mamlouk acknowledged some terrorists were still slipping into Iraq from Syria. "By all means we will continue to do all this, but if we start cooperation with you it will lead to better results and we can better protect our interests," he concluded.
7. (S/NF) According to Mamlouk, Syria's previous experience in cooperating with the U.S. on intelligence "was not a happy one." He stated Syria hoped any future cooperation would be "on an equal basis." Mamlouk specified this meant Syria should be allowed to "take the lead" on anti-terrorism efforts. Alluding to the "wealth of information" Syria has obtained while penetrating terrorist groups, Mamlouk declared "we have a lot of experience and know these groups. This is our area, and we know it. We are on the ground, and so we should take the lead."
POSSIBLE COOPERATION ON IRAQ
8. (S/NF) Mamlouk identified Iraqi border security as an area where Syria and the U.S. could cooperate. He described Syria as ready to move forward on tripartite border security talks, but added "we are at a freezing point until after the Iraqi elections" scheduled for March. Mamlouk added that cooperation on Iraqi border security could lead to cooperation in other areas.
9. (S/NF) Benjamin, noting the importance of achieving a secure and stable Iraq, stated an important measure of progress on this subject is further success on reducing the flow of foreign fighters and cracking down on their facilitators. Mamlouk said the foreign fighters come from a large number of Arab and Muslim countries and that the Syrians detain "large numbers plus their local facilitators." As an example, Mamlouk said he handed over 23 Saudis detained in Syria to Saudi Prince Muqrin last year. Benjamin commended Mamlouk on reducing the flow of foreign fighters,
while encouraging further progress. Miqdad interjected that the issue of foreign fighters using Syrian soil is a matter of national security for Syria. "We have zero tolerance," he said. Miqdad said Syria needs the cooperation of other countries, namely those from which the terrorists are coming. "If we can close this circle - with us, you, and other countries - we will succeed," he concluded.
10. (S/NF) Miqdad added that Syrian/Lebanese border security is also a subject on which the SARG is making progress. Stating "the past is behind us," Miqdad said Syria is attempting to assist the Lebanese on security at ports and at the border without interfering in internal Lebanese affairs.
UPDATE ON TERRORIST NAMES PROVIDED BY USG
11. (S/NF) Alluding to previous USG requests for assistance on tracking down terrorists thought to be in Syria, the Syrian side stressed that intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and Syria should not be solely based on receiving names of terrorist suspects from the USG and checking up on those individuals. However, Mamlouk confirmed that Syria could verify the specific whereabouts of several individuals who had been discussed in previous meetings with SARG officials.
MIQDAD WANTS POLITICAL UMBRELLA TO GUIDE SECURITY COOPERATION
12. (S/NF) Following Mamlouk's statements regarding possible security and intelligence cooperation, Miqdad stated he wanted to emphasize three points. First, Miqdad said that because of Syria's "wealth of information" on following 30 years of facing security threats from takfiri groups, Syria must be able to take the lead in any joint efforts. Second, the Vice Foreign Minister said politics are an integral part of combating terrorism and warned that listing Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism and including Syria on the list of 14 countries for enhanced screening by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) created a "contradiction" when the U.S. subsequently requested cooperation with Syria against terrorism. Miqdad stressed a "political umbrella" of improved U.S.-Syrian bilateral relations should facilitate counterterrorism cooperation.
13. (S/NF) Third, Miqdad stated convincing the Syrian people to support cooperation with the U.S. would hinge on progress on economic sanctions against Syria, including spare parts for airplanes and a plane for President Asad. The Vice Foreign Minister said the Syrians wanted these efforts "accelerated." Miqdad specifically requested the USG reach out to Lufthansa Technik and "assure them of no negative consequences" if they cooperate with Syrian requests to have the purchase of spare aircraft parts approved. In response, Benjamin said the Obama administration viewed counterterrorism as a vital concern but, unlike its predecessor, it did not see counterterrorism as something that was separate from the rest of U.S. foreign policy or the sole driver of U.S. foreign policy. Rather, it was part of the fabric of policy, and the administration recognized that progress in bilateral relations would involve coordinated moves in a number of areas. Benjamin added the U.S. expected that the Syrian people would see the benefits of closer relations.
14. (S/NF) Miqdad also encouraged the U.S. to reconsider including Syria on the TSA's list for enhanced screening, and praised U/S Burns for informing the SARG that the U.S. was prepared to lift its block on Syrian accession to the World Trade Organization. "In summary, President Asad wants cooperation, we should take the lead on that cooperation, and don't put us on your lists," Miqdad declared.
DHS BRIEFING
15. (S/NF) Benjamin and Heyman underscored that the TSA's enhanced screening requirements protected travelers of all nationalities, and that the TSA does not target Syrians but applies to all travelers, including American citizens, coming to the U.S. from or through the listed countries.
16. (S/NF) A/S Heyman provided the Syrians with a brief overview of DHS's mission and activities, focusing in particular on its expertise in the management of ports, airports, and land borders. He noted DHS could explore with the SARG ways to meet international security standards at ports. This, in turn, could lead to enhanced trade and travel between the two countries, and reduce obstacles to shipping between the U.S. and Syria. Heyman said the Coast Guard was prepared to send a team to Syria to work on port security with their Syrian counterparts. This type of activity could lead to measures that reduced costs and lowered barriers to shipping. General Mamlouk said the SARG would study the proposed Coast Guard visit.
UPCOMING VISITS
17. (S/NF) Highlighting the importance of continued U.S.-Syrian dialogue on bilateral issues, Benjamin proposed a mid-March visit to Damascus by NEA A/S Feltman and NSC Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa Daniel Shapiro. Benjamin invited Miqdad to a subsequent visit to Washington in April. Miqdad spoke at length about his fondness for A/S Feltman, and thanked Benjamin for the invitation to visit Washington. Benjamin added he was ready to return to Damascus at the appropriate time. Mamlouk asked Benjamin what the agenda of his next visit would be, and Benjamin explained that it would depend on the outcome of the upcoming visits.
18. (C) U.S. participants: S/CT Coordinator Daniel Benjamin CDA Charles Hunter DHS A/S David Heyman NEA DAS Maura Connelly NSC Director for Lebanon and Syria Meaghen McDermott S/CT Staff Patrick Worman POL/ECON Jay Munir, notetaker
19. (C) Syrian participants: Vice Foreign Minister Faisal al-Miqdad GID Director General Ali Mamlouk Syrian Ambassador to the U.S. Imad Mustapha MFA Americas' Director Muhammad Khafif Miqdad Chief of Staff Husam Al'aa
20. (U) S/CT Benjamin cleared this message.
HUNTER
Friday, 11 December 2009, 17:42
S E C R E T CASABLANCA 000226
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA AND NEA/MAG
EO 12958 DECL: 12/10/2019
TAGS ECON, EINV, EFIN, MO, PGOV
SUBJECT: PALACE COERCION PLAGUES MOROCCO'S REAL ESTATE
SECTOR
Classified By: Consul General Millard for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: At a XXXXXXXXXXXX meeting, XXXXXXXXXXXX told EconOff that major institutions and processes of the Moroccan state are being used by the Palace to coerce and solicit bribes in the country's real estate sector. XXXXXXXXXXXX recounted his recent experience in the context of his XXXXXXXXXXXX real estate project, and specifically cited difficulties with Omnium Nord Africaine (ONA), the king's holding company, which involved an imposed trip to Doha to meet with wealthy Qatari investors and Al-Jazeera officials. XXXXXXXXXXXX made clear to his Qatari interlocutors that Morocco's major investment decisions were in reality made by three individuals in the Kingdom: XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX, and the King himself. "To have discussions with anyone else would be a waste of time", XXXXXXXXXXXX reportedly told his Qatari interlocutors. XXXXXXXXXXXX argues that, contrary to popular belief, corruption in the real estate sector during the reign of King Mohammed VI is becoming more, not less, pervasive. END SUMMARY.
---------------------------
A TALE OF ROYAL PROPORTIONS
---------------------------
2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said major institutions and processes of the Moroccan state are used by the Palace to coerce and solicit bribes in the real estate sector. While corrupt practices existed during the reign of King Hassan II, XXXXXXXXXXXX explained, they have become much more institutionalized with King Mohammed VI. Institutions such as the royal family's holding company, Omnium Nord Africaine (ONA), which now clears most large development projects, regularly coerce developers into granting beneficial rights to ONA, he claimed.
3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Palace, through ONA, strongly "encouraged" him to enter into a joint venture with them. Having refused the proposition and enduring months of standstill on the project, XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed to facilitate an ONA-led investment prospection trip to Qatar in exchange for sole proprietary rights in his own project. ONA officials acquiesced, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX andXXXXXXXXXXXX traveled to Qatar XXXXXXXXXXXX to meet with wealthy Qatari investors and Al-Jazeera at the request of XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX reportedly told his interlocutors that Morocco's major investment decisions were effectively made by three individuals: the King, XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX. At the Qatar meeting, XXXXXXXXXXXX bluntly stated that "to have discussions with anyone else would be a waste of time," XXXXXXXXXXXX told us. XXXXXXXXXXXX ONA, at the request of the Palace, partially agreed to honor its commitment, asking for only a five percent share in XXXXXXXXXXXX project.
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Comment
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5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX's experience demonstrates a reality, of which most Moroccans dare only whisper -- the influence and commercial interest of the King and some of his advisors in virtually every major real estate project here. A former U.S. Ambassador to the Morocco, who remains closely connected to the Palace, separately lamented to us what he termed the appalling greed of those close to King Mohammed VI. This phenomenon seriously undermines the good governance that the Moroccan government is working hard to promote.
MILLARD
Tuesday, 12 January 2010, 17:50
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000039
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 01/11/2020
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, PINR, MOPS, AG, US
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN FM: TSA LISTING "INTOLERABLE,
INAPPROPRIATE, INOPPORTUNE"
REF: A. ALGIERS 20 (NOTAL) B. STATE 001187
ALGIERS 00000039 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Ambassador David D Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
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1. (S/NF) Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci January 11 summoned the Ambassador and forcefully objected to Algeria's placement on the TSA enhanced screening list. He termed the decision intolerable, inappropriate, and inopportune. It reflected neither the reality of Algeria's security situation, its counterterrorism efforts nor our close bilateral cooperation. Further, the U.S. had not communicated the TSA decision to Algeria prior to releasing it to the press, which was how the GOA had learned of the measure. The GOA now had to contend with not only the collective humiliation felt by domestic opinion but also incomplete and inaccurate information regarding Algeria's CT efforts circulating in the international press as a result of the story. Medelci reinforced the earlier MFA demarche (ref A) formally requesting removal from the list and a high-level U.S. statement to help correct the record regarding Algerian cooperation on counterterrorism. He pointedly asked the Ambassador to communicate this message to the Secretary and said the GOA would be monitoring the U.S. reaction closely. End Summary.
TSA Decision Ignores Reality of CT Cooperation
--------------------------------------------- -
2. (S/NF) Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mourad Medelci summoned the Ambassador to the MFA January 11 to underscore Algeria's dissatisfaction with its placement on TSA's enhanced screening list. Medelci began by noting he had had a productive visit to Washington in early December. He had been favorably impressed with both the quality and level of his meetings and had appreciated their focus on bilateral security and counterterrorism cooperation. The visit had underscored the strategic importance of our countries' counterterrorism partnership on this sensitive issue. "We are confident in the direction this cooperation is leading," he remarked. "After my visit, I was eager to report my discussions in Washington to President Bouteflika, meetings which demonstrated that our relations have reached a new level."
3. (S/NF) The discussions in Washington, he asserted, reflected the reality of the relationship. Algeria's own struggle against terrorism and its contribution to defeat terrorists were well understood. It remained determined to continue that cooperation and reinforce the relationship with the U.S. "We are aware of the risks this threat poses. We must remain vigilant and preserve the progress that has been made," Medelci said. The progress that both sides have made on the ground underscores the confidence and openness of the strategic partnership.
4. (S/NF) Therefore, the minister said, the GOA had been extremely disappointed with Algeria's inclusion in the TSA list, as well as the press coverage the decision had generated. The decision was intolerable, inappropriate, and inopportune. It was a contradiction not only to Algeria's
ALGIERS 00000039 002.2 OF 004
own progress on security and efforts to fight terrorism, but also to our countries' counterterrorism cooperation. No attacks against the U.S. had been "signed" by an Algerian. Algeria had made major progress in recent years on its internal security. The domestic security environment had been stabilized, airports were secure, and Algeria was now an international partner in the fight against terrorism. TSA's announcement had made no mention of any of this.
Measures Viewed as Discriminatory
---------------------------------
5. (S/NF) This was not just a matter of Algeria's inclusion on the list, Medelci said. The GOA protested the discriminatory nature of the whole list. Thirteen of the 14 countries listed were Muslim. This sent a message that was inconsistent with President Obama's Cairo speech, and the administration's stated policy of outreach to Muslim communities. The decision will likely give further impetus to those who already question the sincerity of the administration's approach.
6. (S/NF) The GOA was also disappointed, Medelci continued, that the decision had not been communicated prior to its release and that the Algerian leadership had to learn of it via the media. The minister said the GOA had initially refrained from making a public statement out of concern for U.S. relations, but now, due to the extensive press play and sense of collective humiliation among the public, it felt it needed to respond.
U.S. Focus on Air Travel Safety
-------------------------------
7. (S/NF) The Ambassador said the intention behind the TSA measures was not to harm or discriminate against any group or country, least of all our friends and partners. The intention was to make air travel as safe as possible for all. The problem was that, on Christmas day, a terrorist had gotten through the system. President Obama had reacted immediately, ordering reviews of both our watch list system and our air passenger screening measures. He had also made clear that our approach would not be static but would evolve as our evaluation of the risk evolved. Algeria's concerns would be reported in full; Washington had already heard the message from Ambassador Baali. The Ambassador added that the U.S. understood well Algeria's difficult history with terrorism and appreciated its leadership in the international fight against extremist violence. The U.S. wanted to continue, and build on, our very important counterterrorism cooperation as well as our new partnerships in other areas, including military relations, law enforcement, and economic and trade cooperation.
Going Forward
-------------
8. (S/NF) Medelci said the GOA shared the desire to continue building our bilateral relationship. He reconfirmed GOA approval for a recent U.S. request to allow overflights of EP-3E surveillance aircraft. He also welcomed the visit of U.S. Attorney General Holder to conclude work on a mutual legal assistance treaty. The minister underscored as well the GOA's readiness to assist with the upcoming Department of
ALGIERS 00000039 003.2 OF 004
Commerce trade mission to Algeria in February and offered to meet with the head of the U.S. delegation, schedule permitting. At the same time, he asked that the Ambassador convey his message on Algeria's concerns about the TSA measures to Secretary Clinton. The GOA shared the U.S. desire to continue building the bilateral relationship. But it would also be watching closely to see how the U.S. responds to its stated concerns and looking forward to an "equitable solution".
GOA Statement
-------------
10. (U) Below is Embassy's informal translation of the statement issued January 11 by the Algerian MFA:
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mourad Medelci, summoned Monday the Ambassador of the United States of America in Algiers to express the Algerian government's strong protest over the decision taken by U.S. authorities to include Algerian nationals on a list of countries whose nationals are subjected to specific control measures when arriving and departing U.S. airports:
"In the wake of the decision taken by the U.S. authorities to include Algerian nationals on a list of countries whose nationals will be subjected to specific control measures when arriving and departing U.S. airports, Foreign Affairs Minister Mourad Medelci summoned the Ambassador of the United States of America in Algiers to express the Algerian government's strong protests over the unfortunate, unjustified, and discriminatory measure.
"This comes after several previous efforts that were deployed, once the TSA measures were known, by the central government and by our Ambassador in Washington with the relevant U.S. authorities."
END INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF GOA STATEMENT.
COMMENT
-------
11. (S/NF) The past year has seen developments in important new areas of government-to-government cooperation. These include:
-- Approval for visits by senior Department of Defense visitors, including Deputy Assistant Secretary Huddleston and the first by AFRICOM Commander General Ward. These have significantly improved the substance of our mil-mil engagement.
-- Prompt agreement to allow U.S. military overflights for surveillance aircraft against AQIM targets in the Sahel.
-- Repatriation of eight Algerian Guantanamo detainees since 2008 and agreement to cooperate on the return of the remaining Algerian detainees.
-- Bilateral cooperation on judicial matters; a mutual legal assistance treaty and a customs agreement are both ready for signature.
ALGIERS 00000039 004.2 OF 004
-- Cooperation with our new legatt office, including on a cybercrime investigation that will protect American citizens from hackers and identity thieves.
-- Improved police contacts and access for RSO, which plans to launch an anti-terrorism assistance program this year.
12. (S/NF) On the commercial side, the U.S. exported about USD 400 million in oil field equipment and services to Algeria in 2008 and imported USD 19 billion worth of Algerian oil and natural gas. And our commercial interests are rapidly expanding beyond the hydrocarbons sector. Algeria signed two contracts, totaling USD 847 million, in December 2009, to purchase 11 Boeing aircraft. These were presidential decisions, made in the face of heavy French pressure for Airbus. A U.S. firm, Solar Turbines, concluded a USD 320-million contract in October 2009 with Algeria's state electricity company to supply gas-fired turbines. U.S. companies are also competing for politically sensitive security contracts. Cogent, a U.S. biometrics company, is close to signing a USD 45-million deal to supply the Ministry of Interior with an automated fingerprint identification system but faces heavy competition from France. Harris Radio is bidding on a contract with a potential value of USD 500 million to manufacture and supply radios for Algeria's defense ministry and signals corps. The Harris and Cogent contracts have significant implications for U.S. commercial and security interests.
13. (S/NF) It is noteworthy that Medelci began and ended this conversation by stressing the importance the Algerian leadership attaches to continuing bilateral cooperation, especially on counterterrorism. But in-between, however, he delivered an unmistakable message that the GOA feels the TSA moves are inconsistent with that relationship and that they will be watching closely to see how we respond to this demarche. Over the past year, we have had a green light to develop important new ties across the board, from military to law enforcement. That light has now turned yellow. PEARCE
Wednesday, 06 January 2010, 17:38
S E C R E T ALGIERS 000020
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 01/05/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, MOPS, PINR, AG, US
SUBJECT: ALGERIA STRONGLY PROTESTS TSA LISTING
REF: ALGIERS 15 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
-------
1. (S/NF) MFA Americas Director General Sabri Boukadoum expressed to the Ambassador January 6 the GOA's "profound dismay" regarding Algeria's inclusion on the TSA list for enhanced screening. He said this message came directly from President Bouteflika. The TSA decision, Boukadoum stressed, did not accurately reflect the level and quality of our bilateral relations, especially in regard to counterterrorism cooperation. Algeria's placement on the list had created the impression that Algeria was part of the problem, a misunderstanding that is now circulating in the international press. Boukadoum told the Ambassador that Algeria's leadership would like an official U.S. statement to correct this impression. Ambassador replied that the intent of the new measures was to ensure air travel safety and not to discriminate or embarrass our friends and partners. Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. valued its counterterrorism cooperation with Algeria and hoped the bilateral relationship would continue to grow and develop. END SUMMARY.
GOA Not Pleased, Seeks Removal from List
----------------------------------------
2. (C) MFA Americas Director General Sabri Boukadoum called the Ambassador to the MFA on January 6 to deliver instructions expressing the "profound dismay" of Algeria's highest authorities at Algeria's inclusion in the TSA list of countries subject to new air passenger screening measures. MFA Director for the Protection of Algerian Citizens Overseas Hocine Sahraoui, a representative of the presidency, Houria Khiari, and U.S. desk officer Abdulmutalib Bouacha also attended. Boukadoum stressed several times at the outset of the meeting that his demarche instructions came directly from the "highest authority" -- i.e., President Bouteflika.
3. (C) Boukadoum told the Ambassador that he had been asked to convey two main points. The first concerned Algeria's inclusion on the TSA list. Algeria respected and understood the U.S. need to secure the safety of its citizens and interests. But Algeria's inclusion on this list did not accurately reflect either the level or the quality of our bilateral relations, and especially the nature of those relations with regard to the fight against terrorism. The placement of Algeria on a list that includes state sponsors of terrorism and countries of interest creates the impression that Algeria is part of the problem and less than a full partner in the fight against terrorism.
GOA Seeks U.S. Statement on Algeria as Key CT Partner
--------------------------------------------- --------
4. (C) The second point, he said, besides the GOA's desire to be removed from the list, was that the country's leadership hoped to see an official U.S. statement that would underscore Algeria's important counterterrorism partnership with the U.S. -- in order to help correct the erroneous image of Algeria that had been created by coverage of the TSA story in the international media and on the Internet. "We are partners," he said. "The highest levels did not appreciate this."
5. (C) Boukadoum said Algeria's Ambassador to the U.S. Abdullah Baali would deliver the same message in Washington. Baali also had instructions to see Secretary of Homeland Security Napolitano.
U.S. Focus is on Air Travel Safety
----------------------------------
6. (C) The Ambassador said GOA views would be reported fully and immediately to Washington. He told Boukadoum that President Obama had addressed the issue squarely in a statement the previous day. The problem was that on Christmas Day a terrorist had gotten through. This had been a systemic failure, and as a result the President had ordered two reviews -- one of our watch list system, and another of aviation screening procedures. The intent of the new measures was not to discriminate against or embarrass any persons, groups, or countries, and most especially not our friends and partners. The intent was to do the necessary to ensure air travel safety, for everyone. President Obama had thus made clear on January 5 that he had personally ordered, and approved, the new measures. And he had promised that more steps could be on the way in coming days, whether with regard to information integration or passenger screening.
U.S. Values Counterterrorism Cooperation with Algeria
--------------------------------------------- --------
7. (C) At the same time, the Ambassador continued, the President also had made clear that an important part of our approach would be to deepen cooperation with our international partners. This was where Algeria, and US-Algerian cooperation, came in. The Ambassador noted that we have worked together to improve both the quality and level of our bilateral exchanges in recent years, and he hoped that trend would continue. It was unnecessary to say how much the United States valued its counterterrorism cooperation with Algeria, as well as our overall relationship with Algeria. We hoped to continue to develop and build on the progress that has been made.
8. (C) Boukadoum reiterated that Algeria's disagreement was not with the measures themselves. Rather Algeria protested its inclusion on TSA's list because it gives the impression that Algeria is not cooperating. "We are cooperating on counterterrorism, and we will continue to do so," he stated. Meanwhile, Boukadoum asserted that other countries with nationals who have committed terrorist acts have not been placed on the list. Boukadoum argued that to suggest that Algeria is part of the problem is simply unfair. He regretted that international press coverage of the TSA screening measures had cast Algeria in this light and not as country that is a victim of terrorism.
Comment
-------
9. (S/NF) A key line in this demarche was the point that Algeria's inclusion on the TSA list "does not reflect the level and quality of our relations, or the nature of our relations in the fight against terrorism". With this, the GOA implicitly brought the quality of the entire relationship into play. What grates is that, instead of being seen as a nation that has suffered from terrorism and as an active leader in combating it, they feel instead cast as part of the problem and associated with state sponsors. This sense of damage to Algeria's international reputation, and especially by the way the story has pinged around in the press and on the Internet, is what undoubtedly fueled President Bouteflika's "profound dismay". That said, it is encouraging that Algeria carefully separated the meeting yesterday -- to inform us of their approval of EP-3 overflights by Africa Command against AQIM in the Sahel -- and the meeting today on the TSA issue. This suggests they are trying to separate issues and limit damage. But domestic and regional public opinion does count, so the leadership will want to redress somehow what they perceive as a blow to their national dignity and international prestige. Hence the request that a senior U.S. official make a statement that will help turn around the negative image in the international media.
10. (S/NF) It is worth remembering that no country is more important than Algeria in the fight against al-Qa'ida in the Sahel and Maghreb. So it is probably worth looking for a good chance to make that point publicly, and at as high a level as possible. If we do not, it is doubtful that we would see any dramatic gestures or sudden moves by Algeria. On the contrary, counterterrorism cooperation would probably continue, to the extent it is in the interest of both sides. It would more likely be a matter of what we don't see - mil-mil relations frozen instead of advancing, efforts to expand law enforcement cooperation slowed, large commercial contracts going to non-U.S. bidders, reduced Embassy access to senior officials, and generally less receptivity to coordination on regional issues and in multilateral fora. PEARCE
Wednesday, 30 December 2009, 16:33
S E C R E T ALGIERS 001162
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/30/2024
TAGS PREL, PINR, MOPS, KCOM, AG, US
SUBJECT: OVER-FLIGHT CLEARANCE FOR AFRICOM EP-3 MISSIONS:
PRELIMINARY ALGERIAN RESPONSE
REF: SECSTATE 130969
Classified By: DCM William Jordan for reasons 1.4. (b), (d).
1. (S/NF) OSC Chief delivered reftel request for EP-3 overflight permission to the Algerian Defense Ministry's Office of External Relations and Cooperation (DREC) on December 29. There was no immediate response, but the DREC summoned OSC Chief for a follow-up meeting December 30 to state that (1) no decision was possible before next week and (2) overflight requests generally require two-weeks advance notice before they can be approved.
2. (S/NF) DCM, on December 30, double-tracked the request with Algerian MFA DG for the Americas Sabri Boukadoum. In presenting the message, DCM stressed (1) that the request was intended to survey the SIGINT environment in areas of Mauritania and Mali where AQIM operates, (2) that, without knowing what that survey would yield, the USG could not make any commitments ahead of time as to what data it might share with the GOA, and (3) that the request should be regarded in large measure as a follow-up to the recent visit by AFRICOM Commander General Ward and a demonstration of the enhanced security cooperation we want to support in the face of the AQIM threat in the trans-Sahara region. He further explained that we had made the same request to other governments in the region and were awaiting their responses.
3. (S/NF) Boukadoum asked for information on the expected flight path of the EP-3 over Algerian airspace (DCM confirmed that, departing from Rota, the flights would likely overfly the southwestern corner near Tindouf), whether the aircraft would seek to overfly Mauritania and Mali on each mission (DCM responded that the missions would be divided between those principally flying over Mali or Mauritania but not both), and whether collection would occur inside Algerian airspace (DCM reiterated the notation in reftel that the aircraft would not collect on AQIM in Algeria unless the GOA specifically requested it).
4. (S/NF) As with the DREC, Boukadoum indicated that we should not expect a definitive answer before next week. He agreed, however, to forward our request up his hierarchy immediately. Boukadoum expected that the highest levels of the GOA would consider the request.
5. (S/NF) Comment: Although post will be closed for the New Year holiday from COB December 30, our interlocutors know how to reach key Embassy POCs if and as necessary before we reopen on Sunday, January 3. In the meantime, and given the DREC's stress on the longstanding requirement for two-weeksQ, notice prior to any overflight, operational planners for this mission should be prepared to provide at least a notional schedule for flights should we get indications that the GOA and neighboring countries are prepared to provide clearance. We stressed the number of sorties and timeframe envisaged under this concept of operations, but we should not expect to receive blanket clearance for all overflights. Having as much advance information on the flights as possible to share with the GOA would minimize the potential need to have to clear each and every mission with 14-days advance notice.
PEARCE
Sunday, 25 October 2009, 09:28
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000948
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 10/20/2029
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, MCAP, MOPS, SNAR, AG, ML, MR, NG,
UV, US
SUBJECT: ALGERIA SAYS BAMAKO SUMMIT KEY TO REGIONAL
CAMPAIGN AGAINST AQIM
ALGIERS 00000948 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Ambassador David D Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Algerian Minister Delegate for Defense Guenaizia told visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) Ambassador Vicki Huddleston October 19 that the Algerian, Mauritanian, Nigerien and Malian chiefs of staff had agreed to set up a regional command for joint counter terrorism operations at Tamanrasset in southern Algeria. He indicated the command could eventually be expanded to include Libya, Burkina Faso and Chad. For its part, Algeria was determined that terrorists not be allowed to set up logistics, training and supply bases along its frontiers, i.e., in neighboring countries, with the intent of delivering weapons and explosives to Algeria. Algeria has taken the lead in sensitizing its southern neighbors to the nature of the threat and the need for combined action. Huddleston asked how the U.S. and others could support this effort. Guenaizia replied that intelligence-sharing was fundamental. So was provision of certain technical means, like IED jammers. A delegation from Northrop Grumman was coming to Algeria this week to discuss the capabilities of a Boeing 737 aircraft with a modified AWACS array. But the U.S. could perhaps assist most before the impending Bamako summit by helping secure the requisite top-level political will among Sahel countries that would make the summit a success and facilitate effective military cooperation. Here, he contended, the biggest problem was the Malian political leadership. The U.S. could help by talking to Mali and others with influence in Mali to ensure the necessary level of political will was there. Huddleston said she expected the U.S. would indeed be engaging Mali and its neighbors to help make the summit a success. Guenaizia welcomed the expected visit of General Ward of Africa Command in late November. END SUMMARY.
U.S. RECOGNIZES ALGERIA'S LEADING ROLE
--------------------------------------
2. (C/NF) Visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) Ambassador Vicki Huddleston met October 19 with Algerian Minister Delegate for Defense Abdelmalik Guenaizia and other senior generals, including Defense Ministry (MND) SG Major General Ahmed Senhadji, MND Director of External Relations and Cooperation General Mekri, MND Director of the Directorate of Documentation and External Security (DDSE) Major General Lallali and Colonel Mohamed Benmousset, Project Manager for Major General Senhadji. She told Guenaizia that the United States recognized Algeria's leadership in Africa, including Algeria's history of support to Africa's independence movements, promotion of economic and social development, and on security matters. Huddleston acknowledged Algeria's own experience in combating terrorism and underscored USG appreciation for Algeria's lead on efforts to secure the Sahel region and prevent terrorism from taking root in neighboring countries. She recalled her cooperation with Algeria when she was ambassador in Mali to confront the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), forerunner of al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), after the GSPC captured European tourists and brought them to northern Mali from Algeria in 2003. Algeria's commitment to combat GSPC in the region was clear, she said, and its engagement with Mali was impressive. The U.S. played its part through training to increase Mali's military planning capacity. In the end, Huddleston concluded, we were successful. GSPC fled Mali to Niger and then to Chad, where GSPC leader "al-Para" was captured and returned to Algeria. Huddleston noted the regional military chiefs of staff meeting held in Tamanrasset in July and the planned regional heads of state summit in Bamako demonstrated that Algeria understood once more the importance of a coordinated regional response to combat terrorism in the Sahel. The U.S. recognized Algeria's commitment to working with the countries of the region, she stressed, and Algeria's leading role in that effort. She explained the goal of her visit was to learn how the U.S. can support Algeria's effort.
3. (C) Guenaizia thanked Huddleston for focusing her discussion on counterterrorism. Terrorism, he emphasized, was not a local phenomenon in the region. It was brought from outside with all its horrors, he said, and it is a phenomenon the people of the region reject. When the threat
ALGIERS 00000948 002.2 OF 004
first emerged in Algeria, the international community misunderstood the scope of the problem and left Algeria alone to fight in the 1990s. Algeria faced an international embargo in its time of need, he said. Despite this embargo and the challenge of protecting an area of 2.3 million square kilometers and a population of 34 million, he said, Algeria became self-reliant and prevailed with the overwhelming support of the Algerian people the security services and the army.
MUST MAINTAIN PRESSURE
----------------------
4. (C/NF) Guenaizia said today the situation had improved considerably, but terrorism remains a serious threat, and Algeria will maintain the same level of pressure and dedication to its counterterrorism efforts. He stressed, however, that terrorism was not only a threat to Algeria, it threatened the entire region and beyond. AQIM, he argued, wants to embed itself in the region and, therefore, Algeria intended to take the fight beyond Algeria's borders. Like a skilled boxer, he said, the key is to keep pressure on your opponent and increase your room for maneuver. Guenaizia made it clear that Algeria will not tolerate a situation in which AQIM or other armed groups are able to establish camps for logistics and training along Algeria's frontier in neighboring countries with the intent of facilitating the entry of trained insurgents, weapons and explosives into Algeria.
5. (C/NF) Guenaizia said the situation in northern Mali presented the greatest obstacle to combating terrorism. The nexus of arms, drug and contraband smuggling in northern Mali created an enabling environment, Guenaizia argued, and provided a source of logistical and financial support. Guenaizia added that terrorists will use any means available to finance their activities, including corruption and hostage-taking. Thus, he underlined, fighting terrorism requires "implacable" political will to neutralize all avenues of support terrorists can exploit. Guenaizia asserted that increased drug trafficking represented a critical problem in this regard. Thousands of tons of drugs now cross through the region, he said. Based on clashes with Algerian security forces, Guenaizia assessed that those involved in drug trafficking were well organized and had military training. Guenaizia said that Morocco was a major smuggling route for cannabis and hashish and was not doing enough to interdict traffickers. Huddleston told Guenaizia the U.S. was equally concerned with drug trafficking in northwest Africa, particularly Colombian drugs transiting west Africa and the Sahel en route to Europe. The drug trade added another source of finance for terrorists, and its destabilizing effect on local populations could expand the geographic scope of terrorist recruitment efforts, she said, citing the example of the Boko Haram in Nigeria.
6. (C) Guenaizia cautioned that the terrorist network in the Sahel is a sophisticated organization. "These are not simple warlords we are facing," he emphasized. They use the best explosives, have honed their bomb-making expertise and use sophisticated means to deploy explosives against their targets, Guenaizia underscored. He added that information to build highly sophisticated IEDs is easily obtainable from the Internet. No country is safe, he went on; "We need to remain vigilant."
TAMANRASSET REGIONAL COMMAND
----------------------------
7. (C/NF) Guenaizia noted that regional chiefs of staff met in the southern Algerian city of Tamanrasset in July to create a mechanism to allow militaries in the region to coordinate efforts against terrorist threats while at the same time respecting each country's sovereignty. Military leaders of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, he said, agreed to establish a regional command in Tamanrasset that will host military representatives from each country and coordinate joint operations against AQIM targets. Joint military efforts, Guenaizia elaborated, are necessary to prevent AQIM from implanting itself in the region. He called this the fundamental challenge. Regional military leaders are
ALGIERS 00000948 003.2 OF 004
now sensitized to the problem, he asserted, and are willing to wage a common CT campaign. He indicated that the command could eventually be expanded to include Libya, Burkina Faso and Chad. For its part, Algeria will provide resources to optimize the command center's capacity. "What we can't obtain among ourselves," he added, "we will seek from our friends."
8. (C/NF) Guenaizia cautioned that, although the regional command in Tamanrasset was an important first step, he didn't expect immediate results. The meeting in Tamanrasset, he noted, concerned military coordination, but successful action hinged on two operational aspects: military readiness and political will. Guenaizia said regional military leaders had done their job, now it was up to the civilian leaders of the region to demonstrate the political will to act. "We are waiting for the Bamako summit," Guenaizia stressed.
HOW THE U.S. CAN HELP
---------------------
9. (S/NF) As to how the U.S. and others could support the regional effort, Guenaizia emphasized (repeating himself three times to make the point) that sharing intelligence was fundamental. Guenaizia reminded Huddleston that Algeria once agreed to U.S. surveillance overflights years ago, but the experience yielded few positive results for Algeria even though the intelligence collected related directly to Algeria's national security and used Algeria's sovereign airspace. Huddleston replied that the U.S. and Algeria were already sharing a lot of intelligence. There would be a willingness to conduct overflights, but she underlined that any overflight mission would have to be linked to direct action on the ground. The cost of one mission, she emphasized, was around USD 50,000, so we had to be sure of the result. Huddleston suggested Guenaizia could raise this matter during AFRICOM Commander General Ward's expected visit in November.
10. (S/NF) The provision of technical means was also key. Guenaizia complained that in many ways Algeria still faced an embargo in regards to the provision of technical equipment, including counter-IED measures and sensors for intelligence gathering. He informed Huddleston that a Northrop Grumman delegation will arrive in Algeria this week to discuss the capabilities of an AWACS-type platform based on a Boeing 737 airframe. Algeria also needed sophisticated IED jammers, he said. Insurgents use cell phones to detonate IEDs remotely, he stressed, resulting in huge casualties for Algerian forces. Guenaizia lamented that despite this critical need, Algeria's partners had been slow in responding to Algeria's request to purchase jammers. He did not refer directly to U.S. end-use-monitoring rules, but he shared an anecdote about Algeria's difficulties purchasing jamming technology from Portugal, a request, he continued, that has been pending for more than a year with no response.
11. (S/NF) He said the U.S. and others could perhaps assist most before the Bamako heads of state summit by helping secure the requisite top-level political will among Sahel governments needed to make the summit a success and facilitate effective military action. DDSE Major General Lallali said the key to securing commitment for effective cooperation rested with top-level leaders in Bamako. Lallali said Mali's political leadership was the biggest problem. "We need a signal from Bamako that shows their commitment," Lallali stated. Malians are suffering from terrorism, he said, yet when local populations try to fight back, the authorities crack down on those populations.
12. (S/NF) Lallali complained that Malian officials have alerted insurgents that their cell phone calls were being monitored and leaked sensitive intelligence. Lallali also accused Mali of facilitating ransom payments for hostages. He called Mali a favorable business environment for terrorists and believed many wealthy and powerful families in Mali benefited from illegal trafficking. He termed the XXXXXXXXXXXX the "Terrorist Bank" and said, "we need to suppress that bank," noting the connection between drug trafficking and support for terrorist finance and logistics. Lallali commented that Algeria's effort in the UN to criminalize
ALGIERS 00000948 004.2 OF 004
ransom payments aimed to curb corruption's role in facilitating terrorism. He implored DASD Huddleston to "please do something with them."
13. (S/NF) Guenaizia agreed that trust was an issue with Mali. Although Algeria has provided materiel and training support to Mali to help resolve the Tuareg issue, it was not inclined to give Mali weapons and communications gear because of concerns that such equipment might be trafficked to Ivory Coast or Guinea. Guenaizia said there was a "double language" in Mali-- its political leadership did not share the commitment Mali's military leaders demonstrated. In order to succeed in the fight, Guenaizia affirmed, Mali had to cooperate fully. The Bamako summit has to deliver a clear political commitment. The U.S. could help by talking to Mali and others with influence in Mali to ensure the necessary level of political will was there. Huddleston agreed that complicity in Mali regarding the desire to share in the spoils of illegal trafficking seemed to have become worse since her tenure as ambassador. She concurred that Mali's cooperation was essential but said that engaging Mali was a task for the entire region, not only Algeria. Huddleston cited the potential role of other partners in the region with influence in Mali, like Libya and Burkina Faso. She also suggested involving the AU to press for a general statement on fighting terrorism in the Sahel that would not single out Mali but rather deliver a broad message that countries in the region should act in concert and not allow terrorists to operate with impunity. The U.S., she said, will engage Mali and others in the region to play a constructive role in the region's fight against terrorism.
BETTER COMMUNICATION
--------------------
14. (S/NF) Huddleston told Guenaizia that U.S. military assistance in the region aimed to improve the capacity of militaries in Mali, Mauritania and Chad through training and equipment. President Tandja's bid for a third term in office, she regretted, probably meant the U.S. will not be able to assist Niger, but we will extend our assistance to Burkina Faso soon. It was important, she stressed, that U.S. efforts were in step with regional efforts already underway. In this regard, Huddleston emphasized that communication among regional governments and other partners, like the U.S., was essential. Huddleston referred to recent talks between the U.S. and European allies on security in the Sahel, during which the European Commission and France mentioned plans for assistance. Guenaizia noted Europe's interest in getting involved and said that some European governments had tried to insert themselves into the Tamanrasset meeting. He bluntly stated that Africa had already endured a period of colonialism. Lallali interjected that European participation could complicate matters.
15. (S/NF) Huddleston clarified that outside partners did not have to be involved directly but needed to be apprised of future steps and planning in order to provide support. Huddleston suggested regular meetings by the MOD with the Ambassador and DATT in Algiers. Guenaizia said he had no objection, both with the U.S. and others. The threat concerns all. But cooperation had to advance gradually. We should review progress in stages, he added. Immediate efforts, he reiterated, should focus on pressuring Mali and achieving a successful summit in Bamako. The next step was to allow time for standing up the regional command in Tamanrasset and determining equipment needs. He suggested in two to three months we might be able meet and take stock of that effort. In this regard, Guenaizia welcomed the expected visit of General Ward of Africa Command in November.
16. (U) DASD Huddleston did not clear this cable.
17. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. PEARCE
Friday, 22 February 2008, 11:28
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000198
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D COPY --CHANGE OF CLASSIFICATION
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NEA FOR K.HARRINGTON AND M.POPAL
EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2023
TAGS PREL, PGOV, AG
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR A/S WELCH VISIT TO ALGERIA
REF: A. ALGIERS 111 B. ALGIERS 110 AND ALGIERS 140 C. 07 ALGIERS 1806 D. 07 ALGIERS 1807 AND 08 ALGIERS 0075 E. ALGIERS 141
Classified By: Ambassador Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) We and the Algerians are looking forward to your visit next week. There was a prominent article about your visit, generated with help from our PAO, in best-selling el-Khabar newspaper on February 21. You will be visiting just as the government machine is gearing up to amend the Algerian constitution to enable President Bouteflika to run for a third term in 2009. There is no strong, influential voice criticizing this effort; only small parties and a few notable individuals have spoken against the building momentum (ref A). The only issue that appears unresolved inside the top civilian and military leadership is whether or not there should be a change to the constitution that establishes a vice president as well. This vice president would be the obvious successor to Bouteflika, especially if his health prevents him from serving out a third term that would expire in 2014. We are arranging for you to meet with former Prime Minister Ouyahia, the man most frequently thought to be tapped for vice president.
AN UNHAPPY COUNTRY
------------------
2. (C) There is much discussion among political circles about the constitution, the third term and the succession issue, but precious little discussion about how to address long-standing political alienation and social discontent throughout the country. Housing is woefully short, while unemployment and underemployment are endemic (at least 50 percent among young people). In a relatively new phenomenon, many young people are trying to flee the country, by small boat if necessary. The average age at which Algerians marry is now into the mid 30s - a vivid indicator of how unhappy the twenty-somethings are. Meanwhile, most world food price hikes are being passed to consumers, resulting in strikes by different labor groups almost weekly (see ref B for example. Notably, while you are here we expect school teachers nationwide to strike; on the positive side, school closures may ease traffic during your visit, inshallah.) Almost daily there are isolated demonstrations with the occasional government office in some distant town attacked. Meanwhile, voter turnout for the 2007 legislative and local elections was lower than ever before because Algeria's young people do not see the political system as having any relevance to addressing their problems. This is not the quaking state of the early 1990s. The government is firmly entrenched. However, much of political and social elite sense that Algeria is drifting (see also ref C).
THE VISION THING
----------------
3. (C) These political, economic and social problems notwithstanding, Algeria is richer than ever. The oil and gas sector is running up record export revenues - USD 70 billion likely in 2007, while imports will only be about USD 45 billion, according to the IMF. As a result, the GoA is piling up record foreign exchange reserves, now around USD 110 billion. The public knows about the riches and the GoA's inability to relieve problems like housing and unemployment hits at the GoA's credibility. Bouteflika and his team have only one approach to energize the economy: spend tens of billions of dollars on infrastructure as well as some grandiose projects to generate jobs and also create a Bouteflika legacy. The construction industry is growing but not as fast as in other oil-boom states. Red tape, burdensome regulations and centralization slow project implementation and impede new private investment. The GoA seems incapable of addressing these systemic problems. This inability stems from a lack of vision at the top. Bouteflika and his team have yet to make a choice on whether Algeria will be a market-driven economy where Algerians must integrate into the world economy or an economy whose government still provides the old social contract of the 1960s and 1970s. We have small technical assistance projects to help the GoA reform its financial and education sectors, but bureaucratic ineptitude and a lack of Algerian urgency slow progress. We therefore extract small, new reforms where we can get them. (Treasury DAS McDonald will be here at the same time as you to look at Treasury-funded assistance
ALGIERS 00000198 002 OF 004
programming.)
TERRORISM PROBLEM NOT A THREAT TO STABILITY
-------------------------------------------
4. (S/NF) The social discontent enables al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to find a steady supply of recruits but not enough to threaten stability. There are terror-related attacks almost daily now, usually in the mountains east of Algiers. (There are occasional attacks in southern and western Algeria now too.) AQIM and other Islamist extremists usually hit Algerian security forces, but there are regular threats against Western interests, especially French and American. The terrorists' tactics have not much changed except in one important manner: nine suicide car bomb attacks since April 2007. AQIM can't threaten the government's stability but it has hurt the credibility of Bouteflika's national amnesty program; it likely weakened him in internal debates with the Algerian hard-liners inside the security force leadership. It has hurt the credibility of the Algerian security forces among the Algerian public and the Western community here. In particular, the December 2007 attack that destroyed the UN headquarters here deeply embarrassed the Algerian government. When the UN said it would conduct its own investigation into the security shortcomings before the attack, the hypersensitive Algerian authorities reacted vehemently and forced the UN to back down. Watching this brittle response, Western companies and embassies now are jittery. Many say that they are watching us for signals on when to send out expatriates. Algiers has seen no incidents since December 11 but there are constant threat reports in sensitive channels.
COUNTER-TERROR COOPERATION VERY GOOD
------------------------------------
5. (S/NF) As the AQIM threat has ratcheted up, we have increased our collaboration with Algerian military intelligence. They are prickly, paranoid group to work with, but with them we have rolled up several networks that sent Algerian jihadis to Iraq. According to information from an al-Qaida in Iraq cell, 64 Algerian fighters reached Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007. Thus, our collective work is not perfect, but the number of Algerians fighting in Iraq likely would have been far higher were we not working closely together. We have also helped the GoA roll up AQIM networks that were planning attacks inside Algeria. Notably, the Algerian authorities do not like to discuss our cooperation against AQIM publicly. Instead, they limit themselves to saying that they cooperate with the U.S. and other nations against international terror networks. We have a new FBI office at the embassy that we hope will establish collaborative programs with the Interior Ministry, but the Algerians are not rushing to cooperate.
MILITARY TO MILITARY: WE MUST BE PATIENT
-----------------------------------------
6. (S/NF) While the Algerians are not rushing to expand our mil-mil relationship. it is slowly growing. For the first time in early 2007 the Algerians themselves proposed some joint activities, and we undertook training exercises here involving the navy and air force. AFRICOM has offered much more, but the Algerians purposely keep a foot on the brake. They want to avoid dependence in their military relations, so they spread out activities among foreign partners. They have limited administrative capacity, and the officers who work on bilateral activities with France or Germany or Russia are the same ones who work with us. They are not good at multi-tasking. Part of the Algerian caution also results from bureaucratic gamesmanship and paranoia. In contrast to programming with some other countries, Algerian military intelligence clears all our bilateral military activities. (They likely seek to enhance their own position within the Algerian power structure by controlling the security relationship with the U.S.) In addition, GoA security personnel are exceptionally careful in their contacts with foreigners due to their CI concerns. Probably because Algerian military intelligence was not ready, the Algerians lost their chance to have a high-level bilateral military committee meeting at the Pentagon in April 2008 that would have drawn up plans for expanded activities into 2009. Their failure to reserve the April dates probably will push that meeting into the autumn or even to the next administration. We warned them clearly but their own system was too sclerotic to respond.
ALGIERS 00000198 003 OF 004
REGIONAL POLICIES: FAR APART FROM US
-------------------------------------
7. (C) Bouteflika is very much his own foreign minister and his thinking about regional politics has evolved little from the 1970s. He loyally attends all the NAM and African Union summits, and he places huge weight on the United Nations, liberation ideology and negotiation over use of force (especially Western armed forces). The Algerians are surprisingly ill informed when events are moving in the region; they also lack a good grounding in underlying trends in areas like the Middle East. Arab satellite TV seems to be a big source of their information. Hence, you will find that the Algerians take nettlesome positions on the regional questions of import to us:
-- Peace Process: They line up behind the Arab League consensus, arguing in private that it is hopeless to try to exclude Syria and Hamas from the efforts to reach a settlement (ref D). They appreciate our pledge to work for a viable Palestinian state and to achieve short-term, concrete improvements for the Palestinians. So far, we have seen little enthusiasm in response to our demarches for more aid to the Palestinian Authority, but they likely would respond to a strong request from the Arab League. The Algerian public, particularly the Islamists, is now less preoccupied with violence in Algeria and vehemently anti-Israeli. The GoA, therefore, is unlikely to make any unilateral gestures to Israel.
-- Lebanon: The Algerians back Arab League efforts and hope for consensus to develop among the Lebanese factions. Their senior MFA official working Middle East issues has repeatedly cautioned us against trying to isolate Syria on Lebanese issues (ref E). Underlining how our efforts complement Arab League efforts will make the most headway with the Algerians.
-- Iraq: President Bouteflika told Senator Nelson last summer that the U.S. should not withdraw too quickly from Iraq lest security deteriorate further. The MFA and Algerian military intelligence have made the same point to us more recently, although publicly the GoA says little. There is an Iraqi embassy in Algiers, but relations with the Iraqi Government are cool. The Algerians have no intention of reopening an embassy in Baghdad. In part, they are still angry about the murder of two of their diplomats in Baghdad in 2005. Despite their repeated inquiries, they have received no information on who was responsible. In addition, public and government distrust of the Iraqi Shia makes the GoA unwilling to take any risks on Iraq policy. Their military intelligence likely would work discretely with Iraqi intelligence to disrupt al-Qaida activities, but we doubt Algerian officers would actually go to Iraq.
-- Iran: Algerian officials remember Iranian support for Algerian Islamists in the early 1990s and are suspicious of Iran's regional intent. President Bouteflika in private has told the Iranian President to cooperate with the UN on the nuclear issue. The GoA is also adamant that we should continue on the diplomatic track and recognize even small Iranian steps when we see them; they were reluctant to endorse more pressure on Iran during Ambassador Schulte's visit here in late November. The Algerian leadership has a bit of sympathy for Hizballah and Hamas as liberation fighters, but their heads tell them to be wary. Thus, you will hear understanding from them when we warn them of the dangers of these terror groups, but the Algerians will immediately insist that Israel and the U.S. have to resolve the Palestinian and Lebanese problems. Underlining how Hizballah and Hamas threaten the very progress on the Lebanese and Palestinian issues that the GoA wants will be the most effective arguments.
-- Western Sahara: This is the issue that the GoA cares the most about and you will likely receive an earful. The GoA still lingers over the hope that the Baker Plan will come back despite our telling them repeatedly that it is finished. The top Algerian leadership stress that they view a Saharan referendum on independence as a matter of national liberation as a matter of principle. They don't want to destabilize Morocco, and they doubt the Western Sahara is so important to the throne's hold on power. They do not want to start armed hostilities, although we are less sure they would - or could - stop every possible Polisario provocation. The Algerians likely will try to wait for the end of this American administration hoping that the next one will be less supportive of the Moroccan autonomy proposal. Explaining the
ALGIERS 00000198 004 OF 004
exhaustion of broad American patience with the long-standing dispute will be the best way of shaking loose the Algerian fixation on Baker.
AND THE GUANTANAMO PROBLEM
--------------------------
8. (S) For the past two years we have sought GoA approval for the repatriation of some of the two dozen Algerians held at the facility. During the April 2007 visit of S/WCI Williamson we all agreed on principles to govern the return of Algerians, but since then the GoA has refused to agree to accept even a single detainee back despite our repeated attempts. We think that President Bouteflika and military intelligence chief LTG Medienne agree that it would be harmful to Algeria to take any detainees back, and that consensus at the very top makes any movement by lower officials impossible. The GoA has told us we can send detainees back to the countries where we detained them, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan. This is a non-starter. We need you to explain firmly that the Guantanamo detainee issue will not go away and probably will become more important in the next year as we move closer to shutting down the detention center at Guantanamo.
FORD
Thursday, 20 December 2007, 10:12
S E C R E T ALGIERS 001809
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/19/2027
TAGS PTER, PINS, ASEC, AG
SUBJECT: AFTER THE LATEST ALGIERS BOMBINGS: THIS WILL BE A
LONG HAUL
Classified By: Ambassador Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) SUMMARY: The December 11 bombings in Algiers demonstrate that Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) can adapt its tactics to discredit the Algerian government even if it cannot destabilize the state. Its tactics have evolved and it is more frequently targeting foreigners. AQIM seeks to copy tactics used by Al-Qaida in Iraq and we expect in the future to see AQIM resort to operations such as kidnapping, attacks by women suicide bombers and more suicide vests, for example. The Algerian security forces appeared to enjoy some success dampening AQIM operations in October and November, but there is no sign that they can completely secure the capital. Indeed, they are warning in public and private that they cannot. Their public line is, therefore, that the country must soldier on even with the occasional terrorist atrocity. Behind closed doors, however, the December 11 bombings have opened a debate about whether President Bouteflika's amnesty program is appropriate or not; some in the security services want to cast it aside and use an iron fist. According to the Portuguese ambassador, who joined his prime minister in a meeting with Bouteflika on December 16, the Algerian president appeared shaken and unsure of how to respond to the bombings. His advisors appear glum, and Bouteflika himself has yet to say anything to the nation in the wake of the bombings. Looking forward, we see a terror organization able to adapt and shift tactics and targets facing a government that easily holds military superiority but is not exactly sure what more it can or should do. None of our contacts think the security services will be able to prevent new attacks. They do not know when those attacks might occur or what form they will take. Thus, the security situation could stay roughly as it is now, or it might deteriorate further; we do not expect it to improve. Our contacts all expect more terror attacks, although none knows when or what form they will take. Al-Qaida tactics in Iraq are probably the best guide. The Embassy has already adopted stricter security measures for staff and dependents and is urging the non-official American community in forums like the OSAC to do the same. In the weeks and months ahead, we will have to reevaluate our posture more frequently in response to the greater AQIM threat. END SUMMARY.
----------------------------
AQIM IS AN ADAPTIVE ORGANISM
----------------------------
2. (SBU) AQIM is using a variety of tactics to keep the Algerian government guessing and that are slowly raising concerns among the foreign community and the broader public in Algiers. The following list shows the evolution of AQIM tactics:
-- Summer 2006: ambushes with roadside bombs and gunfire against Algerian army patrols in the mountains east of Algiers;
-- October 2006: first car bombs in years in the Algiers region, hitting two police stations;
-- December 2006: first attack on foreigners in years, using a roadside bomb to hit a U.S.-Algerian company bus in Algiers suburb, killing two (no Amcits);
-- February 2007: multiple, coordinated, powerful car bombs in towns scattered in the mountains outside Algiers;
-- March 2007: another roadside bomb against a bus full of foreigners, this time a Russian company bus west of Algiers;
-- April 2007: suicide van and truck bombs simultaneously hit Prime Minister's offices in downtown Algiers and destroy a police station east of the city center near the airport; there were two suicide vehicles against the police station in a tactic very similar to that seen in Iraq;
-- July 2007: suicide truck bomb hits Algerian army base at Lakhdaria, east of Algiers, killing dozens of soldiers;
-- September 2007: another suicide truck bomb, this one driven by a 15 year old, hits Algerian coast guard base at Dellys, east of Algiers, again killing dozens; -- September 2007: first suicide vest attack, this one directly targeting President Bouteflika in Batna, 200 miles east of Algiers;
-- September 2007: drive-by suicide car bomb attack on a French/Italian company convoy in the mountains east of Algiers
-- September 2007: suspected planning of a kidnapping of two French nationals working at the Algiers airport leads to the sudden departure of the two men;
-- December 2007: roadside bomb attack again targets a Russian company bus west of Algiers;
-- December 2007: simultaneous suicide truck bombs destroy UN offices and damage Supreme Court building in central Algiers; one of the truck drivers was 64 years old, something heretofore unseen here.
---------------------------------------------
EXPECT MORE ATTACK METHOD VARIATION A LA IRAQ
---------------------------------------------
3. (S) The Al-Qaida in Iraq network, which already has ties to jihadi groups in Algeria, has strong influence on AQIM elements. The suicide bomber in July 2007 was nicknamed "Abu Musaab" because he was so enamored with Zarqawi in Iraq. The AQIM videos strongly resemble videos from Iraq in terms of the music, Quranic citations and filming of hits on enemy targets they show. They strongly pitch the alleged American wrongdoings in Iraq and Palestine to recruit men to join AQIM. AQIM is also copying tactics we have seen in Iraq, including use of suicide vehicle bombs and vests. (Comment: Notably, during the 1990s violence in Algeria, there was only one suicide attack. We have now seen nine since April 2007. End Comment.) Water Resources Minister Abdelmalek Sellal, who previously held top jobs in the Interior Ministry, warned Ambassador on December 16 that it would be easy to imagine AQIM resorting to SVBIEDs driven by women or women attacking a target wearing a suicide bomb vest. Security officers at other embassies have pointed to the use of kidnappings in Iraq and worry that AQIM could actively start such a campaign in Algeria. Historically, AQIM has paused between vehicle bomb attacks, although we do not know if that is due to resource constraints or tactical decisions. History suggests we may have a pause lasting as long as months before the next car bomb attack, although it could be much sooner. In any case, our intelligence is incomplete and we may not see the next attack, in whatever form it takes, coming.
-----------------------------------
IRAQ AND PALESTINE HELP RECRUITMENT
-----------------------------------
4. (C) A prominent conservative Islamist political leader, Abdallah Djaballah, told the Ambassador on December 17 that the suicide attacks demonstrated the influence of the Iraqi jihadis whose appeal to religious sensitivities finds a ready audience here. In addition, he noted, Islamist extremists released under the government's amnesty program are hugely frustrated because they can find no jobs and lack any means to support themselves. They are easy to recruit, he claimed. AQIM's choice to put a video of Ayman Zawahari ranting about Palestine last week is likely to further boost recruitment. The website has had over 35,000 hits in a week. Djaballah warned that many young Algerians react strongly to any suggestion that foreign forces are attacking Islam itself, and Palestine, along with Iraq, is the perfect symbol. Jaghloul Abdelghafar, a counselor at the Presidency working on extremism issues, echoed the point about Algeria suffering because of Palestine and Iraq to the Ambassador December 18. He stated that there is a "hard-core five percent" that will always plague Algeria. Political scientist Lyes Boukraa, who has written two books about the terrorism phenomenon in Algeria, told DCM December 18 that he thought the terror groups have more potential recruits than they need.
-------------------------------------
ALGERIAN SECURITY FORCES: FRUSTRATED
-------------------------------------
5. (S) The Algerian government is trying to figure out how best to contain and eliminate the extremist problem.
Algerian military forces conducted major sweeping operations in the troublesome mountains east of Algiers as well as along the eastern border region near Tebessa in November. They also continued to try wrapping up AQIM support networks and, until the December 11 bombings, they appeared to be having some successes. The number of security force casualties reported in the press dropped steadily in October and November 2007 from the spike seen in September 2007 due to the AQIM suicide attack in Dellys. In contrast to 1994-1996, the Algerian army and gendarmerie can deploy to any location in the country and immediately establish control. AQIM in its December 12 communique felt obliged to tell the government very directly that it had not disappeared.
6. (C) The government now is warning the public that it cannot completely contain the terrorist threat. Interior Minister Zerhouni told the press after the December 11 bombings that there was no such thing as perfect security posture since bomb attacks were so easy. Other terror attacks are possible even though the terror groups are weakening, Zerhouni told the press December 12. He also commented that the security forces had relaxed somewhat after their successful security measures for the November 29 local elections, and the suicide bombers had exploited that opening. Head of the Defense Ministry's External Relations Director General Sefendji told DATT on December 17 that the Algerian military had enjoyed successes in combined air-ground operations against terrorist groups in mountainous areas, but they could not stop suicide attacks in Algiers. National police chief (DGSN director) Ali Tounsi told the press on December 15 that the security services had put in place special measures to protect the Constitutional Council in view of the threat information the GOA had. However, he commented, there was no way to protect against such an "exceptional" attack. Tounsi pledged that the GOA would stand up new, stronger security measures in Algiers in the wake of the December 11 bombings. Pressed by Ambassador for details about the measures on December 18, Tounsi would only say that police reinforcements would surge into the capital in the coming days. He declined to give more details but said he would consider the Ambassador's strong suggestion that the DGSN brief the key ambassadors about the new security plan. (Comment: Tounsi appeared not entirely on top of the brief and probably couldn't have provided many details even if he had wanted to. The Interior Ministry is avoiding repeated requests from embassies for information on Interior Ministry plans and operations. End Comment.)
-----------------------
HARD LINE OR SOFT TOUCH ?
-----------------------
7. (S) Water Resources Minister Sellal, who is often rumored to be on a short list to be the next prime minister, told Ambassador December 16 that the GOA ought to strike much harder against the terrorists than it is doing. He was entirely in favor of the iron fist, he stated flatly. However, he noted, current political reality ("la conjuncture politique") does not allow for such a tough policy. Indeed, Prime Minister Belkhadem had reiterated on December 12 that Bouteflika's signature national reconciliation program would continue. Ahmed Fattani, publisher of L'Expression newspaper who has good contacts in the security services, told Ambassador December 17 that many in the security forces want to launch a broad campaign of arrests. For this reason, he said, they leaked to him information that some 250 of the Islamist extremists previously released under President Bouteflika's amnesty program had rejoined the AQIM fight against the government. Fattani claimed that some in the security services said the number was even higher, but L'Expression used the 250 number so as not to anger Bouteflika further.
8. (S) Bouteflika himself has made no public remarks in the wake of the December 11 bombings. The Portuguese ambassador, who accompanied his prime minister in a meeting with Bouteflika on December 16, told the Ambassador on December 18 that Bouteflika appeared very distressed by the Algiers bombings and unsure of what to do. According to the Portuguese, Bouteflika urged Portuguese Prime Minister Socrates to convince European states to help the Algerian security services. Bouteflika reportedly asked for advice on how to secure fixed sites and sought help from the Europeans to tap cell phones whose SIM cards are changed. One of Bouteflika's aides, Rachid Aissat, who was the Algerian DATT in Damascus and Moscow in the 1960s, earnestly asked the Ambassador on December 16 for help in countering car bombs. The GOA, he conceded, had no good sense of how to respond. (Comment: Many of our contacts interpret Bouteflika's silence since December 11 to his embarrassment that both suicide bombers were previously known to the security services and had benefited from the provisions of the national reconciliation program. End Comment.)
-------
COMMENT
-------
9. (S) AQIM is very far from being able to bring down the Algerian government but it can certainly make it look weak and foolish. From a narrow security perspective, the December 11 attacks represent not so much the result of diminished Algerian security capabilities as a successful change in AQIM targeting to hit the UN and the Constitutional Council. Security and military contacts have been asking us for a technological fix for the car bomb threat for months. They do not seem to fully appreciate the fact that they are now fight an al-Qaida group, and not just the old Algerian terrorist group GSPC of the late 1990s. AQIM subscribes to international jihadist goals as well as attacking the Algerian government. The more success the GOA has killing the senior terrorist leaders from the GSPC, the more quickly the newer amirs recruited under the al-Qaida banner will rise to the forefront.
10. (S) Looking forward, we can imagine that the security situation could stay roughly as it is now or deteriorate; we do not expect it to improve. None of our contacts think the security services will be able to prevent more terrorist attacks. They do not know when those attacks might occur or what form they will take. AQIZ tactics in Iraq are probably the best guide. Meanwhile, the GOA is slow at best to share information with us. As a result, the Embassy has taken stricter security measures for staff and dependents, and upgraded security of our chancellery and main staff residence. We are telling the non-official community in forums like the OSAC to do the same. In the weeks and months ahead, we will need to reevaluate our posture more frequently in response to the greater AQIM threat. FORD
Tuesday, 22 December 2009, 22:24
S E C R E T STATE 130330
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/22/2019
TAGS MARR, MCAP, MOPS, PARM, PINR, PREL, PTER, MASS
SUBJECT: USG POLICY TOWARD YEMENI ARMS ACQUISITIONS
REF: SANAA 002208
Classified By: NEA/ARP Director Andrew W. Steinfeld for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraphs 6-8.
2. (S/NF) SUMMARY: We have received reports of an arms deal between the Yemeni Ministry of Defense and what is believed to be a front company for Serbian arms dealer Slobodan Tesic. This individual is designated under the travel ban under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1521 (2003) and its subsequent extensions for his assistance in providing arms to Liberia in violation of the UN arms embargo. Washington seeks to verify this reporting with the government of Yemen, and strongly urges Yemen not to deal with individuals designated by United Nations Security Council Resolutions. End Summary.
----------
BACKGROUND
----------
3. (S/NF) Intelligence reporting indicates that in early October the Yemeni Ministry of Defense signed a weapons deal with
, for $95 million in early October 2009, to be delivered by early January 2010. The scheduled delivery will include small arms ammunition, heavy artillery ammunition, sniper rifles, demolition equipment, anti-aircraft guns, and howitzers. Reporting indicates that
, both named in the contract, are linked to Serbian arms broker Slobodan Tesic, and that Tesic has made frequent trips to Yemen in the past year in connection with this contract. Tesic is designated in the travel ban annex of UNSCR 1521 for his assistance in providing arms to Liberia in violation of the UN arms embargo.
(S/NF) We have learned through sensitive reporting that Yemen may be pursuing sizable arms deals with several other Eastern European countries for $30 million to $55 million each. It is currently unclear if the Yemeni government is merely shopping around, or if the country is actually attempting to purchase several hundred million dollars in small arms for use against Houthi rebels. If the latter is true, we have concerns about stockpile security and the potential for these weapons to be diverted to Yemen,s robust black market.
----------
OBJECTIVES
----------
4. (S) Posts should seek to:
--Ascertain whether the Yemen Government is dealing with Slobodan Tesic.
--Discourage Yemen from working with individuals designated by United Nations travel bans.
--Note USG concerns about a possible small arms buildup in Yemen.
-------------------------------
ACTION REQUEST / TALKING POINTS
-------------------------------
5. (S) Post is requested to demarche host governments at the highest appropriate level to convey the following points to all action addressees:
BEGIN TALKING POINTS
SECRET/REL YEMEN
-- The United States understands that you might be using a Serbian arms broker connected to Slobodan Tesic to procure arms.
-- If this is true, you should know that Tesic is designated under a travel ban under UNSCR 1521 for his assistance in providing arms to Liberia in violation of the UN arms embargo.
-- We would discourage your government from working with this individual, due to his UN designation and history of disreputable arms deals.
-- In addition, it has been our understanding that, since 2005, your government was no longer using arms brokers to procure weapons for your military.
--While we recognize your right to acquire arms for your legitimate defense needs, we have concerns that any arms in excess of your requirements may fall into the black market. We encourage your government to be vigilant in securing your weapons stockpiles and reiterate our offer for a visit by the Defense Department's Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to provide a technical assessment to assist you in this effort.
------------------
END TALKING POINTS
------------------
---------------------
REPORTING REQUIREMENT
---------------------
6. (U) Post is asked to report results of its efforts.
-----------------
POINTS OF CONTACT
-----------------
7. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up are XXXXXXXXXXXX , ISN/CATR and XXXXXXXXXXXX , NEA/ARP.
8. (U) Department thanks post for its assistance. Please slug all responses for ISN, NEA, and T. CLINTON
Monday, 09 November 2009, 12:05
S E C R E T KYIV 001942
SIPDIS
NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY
DOE FOR ANDREW BIENIAWSKI
EO 12958 DECL: 11/05/2019
TAGS PARM, PREL, KNUC, UP
SUBJECT: U.S.-UKRAINE NONPROLIFERATION MEETINGS SEPTEMBER
23-24, 2009
Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary, Reason 1.4 (b, d)
1. (S) Summary: Highlights of this semi-annual U.S.-Ukraine nonproliferation dialogue include:
--Ukraine gave an inconsistent answer on the question of transferring HEU spent fuel to Russia. --Ukraine asked for additional security assurances beyond those provided in Budapest in 1994, and was interested in continued missile defense cooperation with the U.S. -- Ukraine noted that the SCUD missile elimination Memorandum of Understanding had been approved by all the Ministries, was submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers for final approval, and will soon be ready. -- Ukraine requested U.S. support for additional elimination of melange liquid rocket propellant, but the U.S. said it would concentrate first on eliminating the SCUDs and associated melange before discussing any further elimination of melange. -- Ukraine requested additional U.S. funding for SS-24 elimination, which the U.S. undertook to consider and respond to. -- The U.S. made a formal request for more information on Ukraine's planned transfer of MTCR Category I items to Saudi Arabia to allow for robust bilateral consultations on the margins of the MTCR Rio de Janeiro Plenary in November on the Saudi issue as well as the broader issue of Category I transfers. -- Ukraine said it is no longer exporting weapons to Burma, and claimed not to have exported T-72 tanks to South Sudan despite U.S. satellite photos to the contrary. The U.S. noted it would have to consider whether to impose sanctions for the tank transfer, and that a factor in U.S. deliberations would be whether the GOU was being truthful. -- Ukraine again undertook to look into specialty steel exports to Iran's missile program, while the U.S. warned that if Ukraine could not solve this problem on its own, the U.S. may take action of its own against the entities involved. -- After two years of negotiations, the U.S. and Ukraine signed a contract September 24 on the removal and storage of radioactive sources. -- The U.S. also pressed Ukraine to agree to destroy more small arms under the NATO Partnership for Peace Small Arms/Light Weapons destruction project. End Summary
2. (S) In a one-on-one meeting prior to the formal meeting, Nykonenko welcomed Van Diepen to Kyiv. Nykonenko said that Ukraine was very familiar with Van Diepen's strong nonproliferation bona fides and took this as more proof that the United States had confidence Ukraine could be a strong nonproliferation partner. The sides previewed the agenda and discussed security assurances, HEU spent fuel repatriation and downblending, NATO Partnership for Peace issues related to small arms and light weapons elimination, SCUD missile elimination, missile defense, Ukrainian specialty steel exports to Iran, and Ukrainian T-72 tank exports to South Sudan. Relevant portions of the one-on-one discussion are included in the following readout of the regular meeting agenda.
HEU
---
3. (C) During the one-on-one meeting, Van Diepen said that it was particularly urgent for Ukraine to approve the shipment of the HEU spent fuel from the Kyiv Institute to Russia by the end of September. He explained that if the shipment is not approved by then, it could not take place until 2011 at the earliest, and Ukraine would continue to bear the costs and security risks of storing the material until then; that the spent fuel had no commercial value, but would be valuable to terrorists; and that, since Ukraine had been invited to the Nuclear Security Summit next year, it would be important for Ukraine to report progress in securing its nuclear materials. Nykonenko replied that Ukraine's position of February 2008 had not changed, and thus we had to wait for the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences report in early 2010.
4. (C) In meetings the next day, Vladimir Ryabtsev from Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) explained that all of the technical issues had been resolved, and Ukraine had made the decision to ship the spent fuel. They had not shipped it because it had not been worked out who would pay Russia $800,000 for addressing the waste associated with reprocessing the spent fuel. There was not enough money in Ukraine's budget to pay this expense. Wayne Leach, the DOE officer assigned to Embassy Kyiv, said that
the U.S. would send this new information back to Washington and provide an answer to Ukraine soon. (Comment: Other sources have indicated to DOE separately that the decision to repatriate this spent fuel still rests with the President and the NSDC and is still being addressed as a package along with the other Russian-origin HEU in Ukraine; in effect, that Ryabtsev may have been characterizing the debate somewhat inaccurately. The GOU has long been aware that DOE's Global Threat Reduction Initiative program does not have authority to pay for waste issues associated with such repatriation.)
Missile Defense
---------------
5. (U) In the one-on-one meeting before the plenary, Nykonenko told Van Diepen that Ukraine had read with interest the new U.S. plan for missile defense in Europe. Nykonenko pointed out that Ukraine had missile defense expertise and was interested in continued missile defense cooperation, which could help reconfirm Ukraine's role in the new European security architecture. It was 'very important' for Ukraine to receive positive signals from the U.S., he said. Van Diepen replied that the U.S. would be looking forward to discussing missile defense with Ukraine the following week during the meetings in Kyiv led by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Vershbow.
Security Assurances
-------------------
6. (S) The first item Nykonenko raised during the one-on-meeting was an appeal for additional security assurances for Ukraine, beyond those the U.S. had provided in the 1994 Budapest Declaration. He explained that Ukraine felt threatened, particularly after the Russian invasion of Georgia. Ukraine needed a security anchor to fill the vacuum until it could join NATO. Ukraine had received the August 2009 note from the U.S. reaffirming Budapest, but it wanted to discuss the issue in more detail. Ukraine was hoping that, with U.S. leadership, a new multilateral security assurance could be worked out. The GOU would be grateful to begin expert-level talks on this; the fact of such talks would send a good signal to Ukraine's public*and neighbors. He passed a non-paper that proposed a new security assurance. Legally binding assurances were best, he concluded, but he said he understood this was very difficult.
7. (U) Van Diepen explained that the United States' Budapest commitment endured and was not tied to the expiration of the START Treaty in December. See paragraphs 53-54 below for additional discussions on this topic and issues related to the START Follow-on Treaty.
SCUD Missile Elimination
------------------------
8. (S) Nykonenko introduced the SCUD agenda item by noting that this project is a priority for Ukraine. Ukraine's Ministry of Defense Economic Department Deputy Director Sergiy Novosyolov reiterated that point and stated that we successfully completed the first stage -- the U.S. team inventory of the SCUDs and associated equipment in June-July 2009, the various documents and annexes from each of the sites, and U.S. agreement to eliminate a portion of the melange (liquid propellant for SCUD and other missiles). Novosyolov further explained that the SCUD Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) had been approved by all the Ministries and was submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers for final approval and will soon be ready. He also noted that a list of possible Ukrainian contractors had been sent to the U.S. Embassy and stated GOU readiness to discuss costs, timetables, volume of work, transporting the missiles to elimination sites, and other technical and logistical factors associated with implementation of the project.
9. (S) Alexander Dotsenko, from the National Security and Defense Council, added that there are several legal issues for the Cabinet of Ministers to consider before authorizing the MOD to sign the MOU. He stated that we should schedule an experts meeting to discuss the details of the elimination work, including the specific process for selecting the contractor, tax exemption issues, and a system to monitor the work of the contractor to ensure that all of the work is completed on time and in accordance with the other terms of the contract.
10. (S) Van Diepen expressed appreciation for the excellent cooperation received from the Ukraine Ministry of Defense in the conduct of the June-July 2009 site inventories. He noted U.S. interest in moving forward to the elimination
phase of the project and hoped that the MOU would be approved soon. Paul Van-Son, from ISN's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) office, expressed agreement in principle to the Ukraine-proposed technical discussions, but emphasized that the MOU must be signed first. He also explained that the U.S. understood the importance of additional melange elimination to Ukraine, but noted that we would concentrate first on eliminating the SCUDs and associated equipment and melange in accordance with the MOU before discussing any further U.S. role in the elimination of additional stocks of melange.
Melange Elimination
-------------------
11. (S) Nykonenko noted that Ukraine had a dramatic melange problem, with over 16,000 tons of the rocket fuel and the steady deterioration of the storage containers. While the U.S. had committed to eliminating 1440 tons as part of the SCUD elimination project and the OSCE agreed on September 16 to eliminate 3000 tons, Ukraine was interested in additional bilateral U.S. assistance to dispose of the remaining fuel. Alexander Nilov, a rocket fuel expert from the MOD, explained that the 3000 tons would be transported by rail to Russia, where a Russian contractor hired by the OSCE would eliminate the fuel. The first shipment of melange would leave Ukraine on November 1, and the work would be completed in a year. This export of a military product to Russia was in compliance with Ukraine's export control laws, he added.
12. (S) Van-Son explained that NDF contractors are evaluating the technical capability/costs of using the Polish mobile plant that is on site at Radekhiv to eliminate the 1440 tons of SCUD oxidizer. He again emphasized that the MOU on SCUD elimination must be concluded before further discussions can take place on elimination of SCUD-associated melange. He concluded that the U.S. would like to evaluate the progress on the OSCE melange elimination project once it commences, as well as progress on the NDF SCUD project, before considering any further funding for any separate melange project in Ukraine.
13. (S) Dotsenko reminded the U.S. of his request to consider eliminating additional melange as part of the SCUD project and stated that Ukraine had met its obligation to eliminate half of its missiles and associated equipment by 2005 as it agreed to do in 1998. (NOTE: While Ukraine currently has 54 SCUD TELs, Dotsenko maintains that Ukraine possessed 117 SCUD TELs when the 1998 U.S.-Ukraine Memorandum of Understanding was signed. According to Dotsenko, Ukraine eliminated half of its SCUD force prior to 2005 using its own funds, and the U.S. should therefore consider eliminating more melange based on the 1998 numbers.) Dotsenko asked the U.S. to consider additional melange elimination projects, pointing out that Ukraine would have 13,000 tons remaining even after the OSCE project is completed. He also requested that melange elimination be included on the agenda for the next meeting.
Removal of SS-24 Solid Rocket Fuel and Elimination of Motor Cases
--------------------------------------------- ---
14. (S) Nykonenko explained that, because of Ukraine's budget crisis, the water wash-out removal of SS-24 rocket fuel from the motor cases had been significantly delayed. Ukraine was continuing to adhere to the "black box" elimination method, under which the USG paid Ukraine a given amount of money for each eliminated motor case, regardless of how Ukraine removed the propellant. As in previous meetings, Ukraine requested additional U.S. funding for SS-24 elimination ($250,000 per rocket motor to remove the fuel in an environmentally safe manner and an additional $15,000 per empty rocket case). Nykonenko highlighted a letter sent to the U.S. Congress from the Ukrainian Rada requesting additional U.S. assistance under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to perform this work.
15. (S) Neil Couch, from the VCI Bureau's START Treaty office, said that the U.S. remains committed to economically feasible, technologically sound propellant removal and motor case elimination as part of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. He continued that the Department of Defense is committed to the SS-24 elimination program regardless of the end of START in December 2009, but will not pay Ukraine more than it pays Russia for the elimination of the exact same missile system.
16. (S) Sergei Birin, from the National Space Agency of Ukraine, explained that Ukraine had begun this work with 10
rocket motors. It needed $250,000 to remove the fuel from each case plus an additional $15,000 per empty rocket case for expenses related to the operation of the facility where the motors were located. Birin said that Ukraine needed an additional $6 million to complete this work, and Ukraine was waiting for the U.S. answer to its request. Ukraine had allocated $50 million to speed up the implementation of rocket fuel wash-out, but this sum was not sufficient to continue the work*operations at the Pavlohrad missile facility had been suspended. Nykonenko noted that Russia's costs were lower because it used a method that Ukraine did not regard as environmentally safe*burning the fuel out of the motors. Ukraine cannot use this method because it is located in the center of Europe and the rocket facilities where this work is done are near large population centers. He added the U.S.-Ukraine 1993 CTR Agreement stated that elimination would be completed in an environmentally safe manner.
17. (S) Couch recalled that Ukraine had agreed after four years of intensive negotiations in the START Treaty Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) to cut four 80-millimeter holes in the motor cases so they could not be used again as rockets, but could be used for other commercial purposes after the fuel was eliminated. Ukraine also could have crushed the motor cases or cut them in two. Birin said that Ukraine had already eliminated the fuel from four of the ten rocket motor cases in the test batch it was using to refine its wash-out technique. In the first motor case there was some residual fuel remaining that Ukraine burned out. This burn-out left big holes in the motor case such that there was no need to cut the smaller holes as agreed in the JCIC. With each successive wash-out, the amount of residual fuel remaining had been less, so Ukraine was confident it would come up with an effective technique to wash out the fuel.
18. (S) Van Diepen noted that Ukraine was having detailed technical discussions on these SS-24 elimination issues with DTRA this week. He said he would get a detailed debriefing from DTRA and forward Ukraine's remarks to the political level, which would consider Ukraine's new requests for assistance. He promised to provide Ukraine a response.
Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC)
------------------------------------
19. (C) Couch said that for several weeks the NRRC link between the U.S. and Ukraine had been out of service. The U.S. had determined that the link between Washington and Kyiv was ok, and that the problem was between the MOD and the Ukraine ground station. Nykonenko replied that Ukraine appreciated U.S. assistance to upgrade the link, and that Ukraine had completed this work. He said that Ukrainian engineers were working on the current problem and hoped to have the link back in service soon.
Wassenaar Arrangement
---------------------
20. (C) Nykonenko said that Ukraine had amended its list of military items subject to export control restrictions. In addition, it had revised the list of dual use items; that list is awaiting interagency approval. Finally, Ukraine is working to enhance the control of lathes and other items, including training, that are not on the Wassenaar or MTCR lists, but are on the EU list. Ukraine is using best practices guides for approval of exports. Van Diepen emphasized it is very important to pass national legislation to implement the export control regimes effectively.
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
----------------------------------------
21. (S) Tetyana Vidzigovska, State Service of Export Control of Ukraine, stated that Ukraine had implemented the changes to the MTCR Annex agreed to at the 2008 Canberra Plenary, noting that the GOU approved these changes on September 19, 2009. She also explained that the GOU is paying close attention to items not controlled by the MTCR and is considering enhancing controls over training and intangible technologies, and adopting additional controls on items going to Iran in accordance with the European Union list. Van Diepen thanked Ukraine for the update and noted that the U.S. undergoes a similar interagency process in implementing changes to the MTCR Annex.
22. (S) Boris Atamanenko, National Space Agency of Ukraine, stated that Ukraine had transferred MTCR Category I items to the U.S., Russia, Germany, and Saudi Arabia, and Category II
items to the U.S., Russia, Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Korea, China, and India during the past year. In accordance with its MTCR commitments, he noted that Ukraine had informed MTCR Partners in April 2009 (POC Document 86) of the intended Category I transfer to Saudi Arabia, and none of the Partners had objected or made an official request for further information. Van Diepen attempted to confirm that Ukraine had actually transferred Category I items to Saudi Arabia., not just notified its intention to transfer, but Atamanenko's response created confusion on this point.
23. (S) Van Diepen then said that the United States was extremely disappointed by this unwelcome news of an MTCR Category I transfer to Saudi Arabia. By definition, MTCR Category I systems are inherently capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and the MTCR Guidelines clearly state that such transfers should only be made on rare occasions. A principal purpose of the MTCR is to prevent the transfer of MTCR Category I items to non-MTCR countries. Van Diepen further noted that he understood that Ukraine had previously notified MTCR Partners of an MTCR Category I transfer to India, to which the U.S. objected but Ukraine transferred the items anyway. He stated that the India case was the first time that an MTCR Partner had gone ahead with a transfer when objections were made by another Partner. If Ukraine were to transfer Category I items to Saudi Arabia, that would be yet another unfortunate precedent. Van Diepen added that the U.S. would object to such a transfer, as it is our right to do as an MTCR Partner, but he said he would reserve further commentary until we get more information on what is actually being contemplated for transfer or has been transferred to Saudi Arabia.
24. (S) Van Diepen said that Ukraine should consider this discussion a formal request for more information on the Category I transfer to Saudi Arabia. He also asked that this information be provided to the U.S. well in advance of the MTCR Rio de Janeiro Plenary in November. This would allow for bilateral consultations on the margins of the MTCR Plenary on the Saudi issue as well as the broader philosophy on MTCR Category I transfers. Given the confusion over whether or not a transfer had already taken place, Van Diepen requested further clarification from Ukraine on Day 2 of the talks.
25. (C) On Day 2, Atamanenko clarified that no MTCR Category I items had yet been transferred to Saudi Arabia, but a project had been started that will result in a Category I transfer. Ukraine will not transfer any technology that would create any missile systems. Atamanenko also noted that the U.S. (ISN Director Durham) and UK had approached the GOU at the MTCR RPOC meeting in Paris in April, that they had requested further information about the sale, and had not raised concerns about the potential transfer. However, Ukraine had not received a formal written request from the U.S. or the UK for this information. Van Diepen then reiterated his 'formal' request for further information on the equipment/technology to be transferred in preparation for a robust discussion of this issue on the margins of the upcoming MTCR Plenary. (Embassy Kyiv subsequently followed up with a written request and raised the request in further meetings with MFA.)
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
-----------------------
26. (S) Nykonenko said that Ukraine had participated in the ATT's Open-Ended Working Group meetings in 2009 and was looking forward to the February 2010 meetings. Ukraine supported the development of the ATT as long as it did not restrict self-defense and the legitimate production of military items. Ukraine was optimistic that an ATT could capture countries outside of the export control regimes. He said that Russia did not agree with Ukraine's position, so we needed a common strategy to deal with Russia. Nykonenko added that any Treaty negotiated without the participation of the U.S., Russia, and China would be of limited utility.
27. (S) Van Diepen said that the United States supports greater responsibility in arms transfers, reducing the destabilizing trade in illicit arms, and ensuring that all states have national systems and internal controls that meet the highest standards. In working towards these goals, we will continue to oppose lowering of international standards on the transfer of conventional arms and ensure that there is no infringement on domestic ownership of firearms. He continued that work on the ATT must be done on a consensus basis in order to ensure these objectives are met. The UK
needs to get back tQconsensus decision-making; the UK planned to introduce a resolution during the UN First Committee*the U.S. needed Ukraine's help to ensure that consensus decision-making is part of any resolution passed. Nykonenko supported the U.S. position on the feasibility of an ATT and that the two countries (along with Russia and China) needed to develop a common strategy.
Transfer Cases
--------------
28. (S) Van Diepen said that there are two types of cases the U.S. wanted to discuss on the second day of the consultations: 1) transfers to Burma and South Sudan in which there were deliberate Ukrainian government actions that are contrary to U.S. philosophy on exports; and 2) other transfers by Ukrainian entities, presumably not authorized by the Ukrainian government. The U.S. wants to work cooperatively with Ukraine to stop this second category of illicit transfers.
Burma
-----
29. (S) Nykonenko said that Ukraine had received the U.S. demarche and was no longer exporting weapons to Burma. Ukraine was just wrapping up existing contracts, and had been reducing its exports to Burma since 2005. In 2008 Ukrainian exports to Burma were 'as good as zero' in part due to previous U.S. warnings, and Ukraine had not signed any new contracts with Burma in the last two and one half years. Current exports were just spare parts. The remaining business was so small that the company involved had recalled all of its workers from Burma.
30. (S) ISN/CATR Deputy Director Brian Bachman thanked Nykonenko for the information. He said that the U.S. was still concerned about the exports to Burma, but was pleased to hear that Ukraine was now only exporting a small number of spare parts and was no longer exported completed weapons, as reports had indicated.
South Sudan
-----------
31. (S) Van Diepen recalled that when the U.S. had raised with Ukraine in July 2008 that an additional shipment of T-72 tanks, BM-1 GRAD armored vehicles, small arms, and other military equipment planned for a late June or early July shipment to Kenya was being purchased by the Kenyan Ministry of State Defense for South Sudan, Ukraine had assured us the arms were for the Government of Kenya. Ukraine had informed the U.S. that it had received an end-user certificate from the Kenyan government and receipts acknowledging the arrival of the earlier tank shipment in Kenya. Subsequent to our discussions, the M/V Faina, which was carrying another weapons shipment from Ukraine, was hijacked, and it became clear that cargo was also intended for South Sudan. Van Diepen asked if the GOU had investigated.
32. (S) Valeriy Lysenko, from Ukraine's Export Control Service, said that the T-72 tank shipment was intended for Kenya. He said Ukraine had not transferred any military equipment to South Sudan. All of Ukraine's contracts were checked.
33. (S) Van Diepen gave the Ukrainian side a copy of the contract that clearly lists the GOSS, and asked if the GOU side maintained that the export was for Kenya. Lysenko held to this line, questioned the authenticity of the contract, and asked if the U.S. had any better evidence. Van Diepen, regretting that the GOU had forced him to do so, showed the Ukrainians cleared satellite imagery of T-72 tanks unloaded in Kenya, transferred to railyards for onward shipment, and finally in South Sudan. This led to a commotion on the Ukrainian side.
34. (S) Van Diepen continued that he appreciated the sides could have different export control policies, as was their sovereign right. But not being told the truth was something the United States did not expect from a strategic partner. There was nothing for Ukraine to gain from lying and a lot to lose, he cautioned. Since South Sudan is on the U.S. terrorism list, the U.S. would have to consider whether to impose sanctions over the transfer; a factor in U.S. deliberations would be whether the GOU the truth.
35. (S) Lysenko said that Ukraine would study the U.S. information and he asserted that Ukraine only had a relationship with Kenya, and did not have a relationship with
South Sudan. Ukraine could not be held responsible for the actions of a third country. This matter was a common problem for the U.S. and Ukraine to resolve. He said Ukraine's special agencies might need to get involved to find out what had happened. Nykonenko said that Ukraine would study this situation in the light of a partner relationship so hat the U.S. would know that Ukraine is a reliable partner.
Ukraine's Exports of Specialty Metals for Iran's Ballistic Missiles
---------------------------------------
36. (S) Van Diepen said that, contrary to Ukraine's export control policy, Ukrainian entities, including XXXXXXXXXXXX, were engaged in providing the Iranian ballistic missile program with specialty metals and other sensitive items such as ball bearings used in liquid propellant missile systems. It is possible that these activities were taking place without the knowledge of the Ukrainian government. The U.S. remains deeply concerned that, given the high quality of steel that can be purchased from Ukrainian manufacturers, Iran's ballistic missile program continues to seek items from Ukrainian entities, including XXXXXXXXXXXX. Van Diepen continued that such steels have long been difficult for Iran to produce indigenously. Van Diepen provided the following points/non-paper:
-- The United States and Ukraine have discussed in the past the supply by Ukrainian firms of sensitive materials to Iran's ballistic missile program.
-- Specifically, between 2002 and 2007, we repeatedly raised concerns that Ukraine's XXXXXXXXXXXX was engaged in providing the Iranian ballistic missile program with specialty metals and other sensitive items such as ball bearings used in liquid propellant missile systems.
-- In September 2004, the United States imposed sanctions against XXXXXXXXXXXX for transferring items controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to Iran.
-- Subsequently, in May 2006, we advised you of XXXXXXXXXXXX's continued efforts to supply Iran's ballistic missile program with additional materials, including MTCR-controlled 08X22HGT titanium stabilized duplex stainless steel, which is used in the production of Scud and NoDong propellant tanks, as well as CR18NI10TI, a type of stainless steel that is not MTCR-controlled, but is used in the production of a variety of Scud engine parts.
-- We remain deeply concerned that, given the high-quality of steel that can be purchased from Ukrainian manufacturers, Iran's ballistic missile program continues to seek items from Ukrainian entities, including XXXXXXXXXXXX.
-- Such steels have long been difficult for Iran to produce indigenously. As you will recall, in late 2006 we shared with all MTCR Partners information indicating that a key choke point for Iran's missile programs is the ability to acquire advanced materials such as AISI 4340 and AISI 4130 steels.
-- Both of these steels are used by Iran's solid-fueled ballistic missile program in the production of motor cases.
-- We therefore urge you to exercise vigilance in your export control processes, and to take all appropriate measures to ensure that Ukrainian firms are not acting as sources of specialty metals to Iranian ballistic missile entities.
37. (S) Nykonenko said that Ukraine would look into the matter and provide detailed information to the U.S. Van Diepen said that if Ukraine could not solve this problem on its own, the U.S. would consider taking action by sanctioning the entities involved, including the steel companies, and by taking other measures. Iran's missiles threatened U.S. and allied troops stationed in the Middle East, so for self-defense reasons, the U.S. had to act to stop these exports. Ukraine's steel companies have benefited from trade with the West, but they could not have it both ways-- it was not in their interest to risk large profits from the West for small illicit profits from rogue states like Iran.
Ukrainian Training to Iran's Malek-Ashtar University of Technology
--------------------------------
38. (S) Van Diepen said that we recently shared with the GOU information indicating that as of early 2009, Iran's Malek-Ashtar University of Technology (MUT), as in years past, was continuing to sponsor international scientists, including from Ukraine, to provide training in Iran. Malek-Ashtar University of Technology is subordinate to Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), and provides instruction to representatives of Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO) as well as the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). The U.S. urged Ukraine to ensure that Ukrainian individuals and institutions are not providing sensitive technology, training, and/or other support to Malek-Ashtar University of Technology or other Iranian entities affiliated with Iran's missile program, and asked for the status of Ukraine's actions. Nykonenko said that Ukraine had recently received the U.S. information and was reviewing it.
Prohres-Pakistan
----------------
39. (S) Van Diepen noted that we recently provided information to Ukraine noting the interest in Pakistan's National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) in procuring gyrotheodolites from Ukraine's Prohres. He urged Ukraine to investigate this activity and take actions to prevent any transfer of this missile-related equipment. Nykonenko said that Ukraine had recently received the U.S. information and was reviewing it.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
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40. (S) Van Diepen said that there is a long history to this case and requested an update from Ukraine. He also provided additional information on this case:
-- We now have new information indicating that in August 2009, XXXXXXXXXXXX was working with representatives of China's Changda Corporation to establish a partnership related to the production of gyrotheodolites with China's Shaanxi Cangsong Machinery Plant.
-- The Shannxi Cangsong Machinery Plant is subordinate to the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation Tenth Academy and manufactures inertial guidance systems for Chinese ballistic missiles.
-- Given the possible missile-related end-use of these items, as well as the identity of XXXXXXXXXXXX's potential Chinese partner, we are concerned that this cooperation could be used to support China's MTCR Category I missile programs.
-- We therefore strongly urge you to conduct further inquiries into XXXXXXXXXXXX's dealings with Chinese missile-related entities, and take all appropriate measures to ensure that XXXXXXXXXXXX is not serving as a source of goods or technologies for China's MTCR Category I programs.
41. Nykonenko said that Ukraine is still reviewing the U.S. information on these matters. (NOTE: Ukraine provide a written update on this case at the end of the talks: "XXXXXXXXXXXX did negotiate with China Great Wall and received licensing approval to repair a previously provided UGT-S gyrotheodolite. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX did not negotiate with the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology to transfer MTCR-controlled DOZ stellar sensors." END NOTE.)
G8 Global Partnership/Combating Nuclear Smuggling
--------------------------------------------- ----
42. (U) Viktor Ryazantsev of the State Committee for Nuclear Regulation, Mykola Proskura of the Ministry for Emergency Situations, and Oleksandr Panchenko of the State Border Guard Service provided detailed reports on the progress made on the range of anti-nuclear smuggling assistance projects developed with the GOU by the U.S. Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI) in January 2006. Each reported extensive progress on these projects and expressed deep appreciation for U.S. assistance in facilitating both project implementation and participation by other donors.
43. (U) NSOI Coordinator Mike Stafford agreed with them that the two sides had made remarkable progress on these projects and added that their degree of cooperation provided a model for NSOI's engagement with other governments. Stafford also noted that, in addition to progress on the assistance projects, it was important to monitor progress in implementing the agreed steps in the joint action plan that the sides had also agreed upon in January 2006 and whose
implementation the assistance projects were designed to facilitate. Stafford noted that the USG had just received from the Ukrainian Embassy earlier in the week an updated matrix indicating that 27 of the 30 steps in the joint action plan were either complete or in progress. He congratulated the GOU on this progress and secured Nykonenko's agreement to keep the U.S. side updated as implementation proceeds. Stafford also announced that NSOI had allocated $935,000 from its FY09 budget to assist monitoring on Ukraine's green border with Russia, proposed on behalf of the Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program a workshop to strengthen Ukraine's ability to respond to nuclear smuggling incidents, and agreed to a Ukrainian request to query the Government of Finland on when a proposed mobile radiation monitoring van might be provided. (The Finnish regulatory authority subsequently reported that they hoped to provide it in December.)
44. (U) On behalf of ISN/CTR, Stafford expressed U.S. appreciation for the provision of a temporary location for the Science and Technology Center Ukraine (STCU) and requested periodic updates on construction of the permanent headquarters. Nykonenko emphasized three additional assistance projects that had been suggested by Ukraine at the most recent Global Partnership (GP) Working Group meeting, and reiterated a request that contributions by GP members to the Chernobyl Shelter Fund not be credited against their commitments to the GP. Stafford said he had investigated the latter matter after the original Ukrainian request and had learned the USG and several other GP members were counting these contributions within their GP commitments. The USG was not inclined to change this practice and thus would not ask others to change, either, especially since how to account for assistance was a sovereign decision.
Electron
--------
45. (U) Proskura said that, after two years of negotiations, the U.S. and Ukraine had signed a contract September 24 on the removal and storage of radioactive sources from the Electron Gaz Plant.and the Kavetskiy Institute. Ukraine had selected the contractor, and he saw no reason why Ukraine's nuclear regulatory body would intervene to stop the work.
46. (C) Leach said that this contract demonstrated Ukraine's strong commitment to nonproliferation. The sides would begin be securing the sources at the two facilities and then would work on removing the material beginning with one-of-a-kind sources at the Institute of Physics in Kyiv. The sides would work out a way to deal with the different sources and more difficult conditions at Electron Gaz. The sides would need to work closely and cooperatively to resolve all of the problems as the project moved forward, he concluded.
NATO Partnership for Peace Destruction Project
--------------------------------------------- -
47. (U) PM/WRA Deputy Director Steven Costner noted that the sides would have detailed technical discussions the next day on this topic, but he wanted to summarize the state of play in front of the larger group. While the original Phase I of the project planned for the destruction of 15,000 tons of munitions and 400,000 small arms/light weapons (SA/LW), revised plans by NATO and the USG (as Lead Nation) was for the project to terminate when current funding ran out (around the end of March 2010), due to the GOU deciding not to destroy all of the SA/LW. This revised plan would cover 6000 tons of munitions. The good news was that munitions destruction finally had commenced, with approximately 600 tons destroyed to date, and that the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency had determined that an extra 2000 tons of munitions could be destroyed (i.e., 8000 tons total) due to interest accrued in the account. The other donors would need to approve the use of the interest for this purpose, but that was expected to be a formality. Additionally, construction on the explosive waste incinerator would begin in October. As for SA/LW destruction, over 134,000 had been destroyed to date, with the GOU recently committing to destroy another 54,000 after over a year and a half suspension of such destruction. This would bring the total destroyed to approximately 190,000 SA/LW, but would leave the project approximately 210,000 weapons short of the original goal.
48. (U) Costner emphasized that the USG had committed to engage the GOU on its proposal to convert the balance of the SA/LW into replicas for sale to see if this could be done in a way that would satisfy USG requirements that the weapons no longer function as such. If agreement was reached, the USG and NATO would commit to continuing the destruction project
and destroying the balance of the 15,000 tons of munitions as originally envisioned. However, he emphasized that U.S. laws were stringent in this regard and that experts may not reach agreement the next day. In this case, the sides would be faced with two options: 1) Ukraine would need to destroy the weapons as originally agreed; or 2) the project would be shut down, as noted above.
49. (U) Nykonenko expressed appreciation for the good news that the munitions total would be increased to 8000 tons, and expressed confidence that the experts would find a solution the following day that would allow destruction assistance to continue. (Note: The following day Ukrainian experts stated that they have recommended to the Cabinet of Ministers that the GOU agree to destroy the balance of weapons consistent with their original commitment, instead of converting them to replicas. If Cabinet of Ministers approval is attained, this will allow the project to continue. See septel for details. End Note.)
Biological Threat Reduction Initiative
--------------------------------------
50. (U) Ludmilla Muherska from the Ministry of Health gave a detailed presentation on Ukraine's efforts to upgrade 18 regional medical laboratories. The Ministry of Health is also working with the MOD and the other security services to upgrade security at the laboratories. Ukraine would require additional assistance to reduce the biological threat and to complete all of this work
51. (U) Van Diepen urged Ukraine to identify expeditiously a new location for a Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) that meets DoD/CTR's conditions and he emphasized that Ukraine needs to consolidate all especially dangerous pathogens in the CRL, once completed.
52. (U) Muherska said that Ukraine is working on this complex issue and was considering several sites for the CRL. Some of the sites were located on MOD-owned property, so if selected, the site would need to be transferred to the Ministry of Health. Ukraine is hoping that it would be able to select a site soon.
Side Conversation -- Security Assurances and START Follow-On
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
53. (S) On the margins of the Nonproliferation talks, Nykonenko had three conversations with VCI/SI Deputy Director Neil Couch to clarify Ukraine's desire to participate in the START Follow-on Treaty and Kiev's security concerns. Nykonenko stated that he has been appointed as the Ukrainian Representative to the START Follow-on negotiations and, in that capacity, he wants to consult with the U.S. negotiator. He added that, despite a rocky relationship with Russia, he has met with Ambassador Antonov on four occasions and he doesn't understand why the United States has not offered similar consultations. He is willing to meet with A/S Gottemoeller at any time or place. Nykonenko reiterated his offer for Ukraine to play a mediating role between the United States and Russia in START Follow-on, citing past examples in which Ukraine had played such a role in START. Finally, Nykonenko asked that the START Follow-on Treaty contain a preambular statement that singled-out Ukraine's contribution to START implementation specifically and to nuclear non-proliferation in general. He added that it was unfair to include Ukraine in the same category as Belarus and Kazakhstan since they are members of the CIS and only do what Russia tells them to do.
54. (S) Couch asked Nykonenko to explain why Ukraine needed additional, legally binding security assurances, recalling that the 1994 Budapest security assurances provided by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation did not expire with the START Treaty in December of 2009; that the 2008 United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership was still in force; and that Vice President Biden''s recent speech in Kyiv had confirmed the United States' commitment to Ukrainian security. With all of these assurances, what else did Ukraine need? Nykonenko responded that Ukraine had no doubts about the commitment of the United States; however, Ukraine had serious concerns about Russia's commitment. Citing the Russian-Georgian conflict and the large ethnic Russian population in Ukraine, Nykonenko explained that if the United States would agree to new security assurances with Ukraine, then Russia would likely agree to join in the document. That is Ukraine's real desire; it views an agreement with the United States as a vehicle to bring Russia along. Nykonenko added that such an
agreement would also satisfy the two halves of Ukraine society, the westward-leaning half and the Russian-leaning half, and help quell internal tension. He also raised the issue of the Russian Black Sea Navy Base at Sevastopol, stating that Ukraine has no way of knowing how many soldiers Russia had on the base and that he believed Russia has exceeded its number of personnel allowed under the Navy Base lease. This was especially urgent for Ukraine given Russia's suspension of its CFE commitments. Nykonenko was clearly concerned that the Russians could use the Black Sea Base as jumping-off point for military action in Ukraine. (Note: A subsequent initial check with analysts at the Defense Intelligence Agency indicates no visible build-up of Russian forces at the Black Sea Navy Base. DIA is currently conducting a more thorough review of available information. End note.)
55. (U) Participants:
United States:
ISN Acting Assistant Secretary Vann Van Diepen XXXXXXXXXXXX
56. ISN Acting Assistant Secretary Van Diepen cleared this cable. PETTIT
Friday, 15 January 2010, 12:43
C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 000031
SIPDIS
ISN/CATR FOR MARGARET MITCHELL
EO 12958 DECL: 01/11/2020
TAGS ETTC, MCAP, MOPS, PARM, PINR, PREL, PTER, MASS, YM
SUBJECT: BULGARIA ENHANCES END-USE MONITORING MECHANISMS
FOR YEMEN ARMS DEAL
Classified By: CDA Susan Sutton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Bulgaria has decided to approve the sale of arms from a private Bulgarian firm to the Government of Yemen. The deal, funded by the UAE and worth approximately USD 55 million, will send small arms, explosives, ammunition, and other weaponry to Yemen in the first half of 2010. In light of the increasingly unstable situation in Yemen, and in response to our proposal for greater end-use monitoring, the Bulgarian Export Commission agreed to take extra steps to ensure proper delivery, storage, and accountability for the shipments, which began on January 5. The Export Commission passed on identification numbers for all items and stated that Bulgaria will comply with a USG proposal for additional monitoring, as well as coordinated efforts with their embassy in Yemen to heighten safeguards for proper delivery. Although not mandatory, Bulgaria continues to consult with us on an informal basis on arms deals involving potentially controversial destinations. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Bulgaria's Export Commission notified us on November 7 that it was considering approval of a deal, financed by the UAE that would send over 30,000 assault rifles, 100,000 high-explosive charges, RPGs, and ammunition to Yemen from the Bulgarian consignee XXXXXXXXXXXX in the first part of 2010. At that time, we expressed our reservations about the deal, given the unstable situation in Yemen and the potential for proliferation of small arms. Although it accepted our concerns, the Export Commission decided to go ahead with the deal, noting that the difficult economic situation made the offer extremely attractive to domestic arms producers. Anticipating this, we proposed a set of measures to enhance end-use monitoring. The MOEE agreed to reduce the quantity of assualt rifles by 25 per cent and provide serial numbers, lot numbers, and production years for nearly all of the items. The Ministry of Energy and Economy also received a statement of compliance from the GoY regarding delivery, description of goods, and storage requirements. XXXXXXXXXXXX provided us with delivery schedule documents, including flight information for the XXXXXXXXXXXX scheduled air shipments between XXXXXXXXXXXX . This information was passed through intel channels. XXXXXXXXXXXX also gave us a CD containing lot numbers and serial numbers. Noting their good contacts on the ground in Yemen, XXXXXXXXXXXX informed us that Bulgaria's Commercial Attache is expected to be present for all deliveries.
3. (C) COMMENT: The Bulgarian government continues to work closely with us to prevent arms proliferation. As a rule, they seek our advice on potentially controversial cases, even when our consultation is not mandatory. In the past, the GoB has denied arms deals to countries of concern, such as Eritrea, based on our objections. In this instance, the financial incentive was too great for them to refuse. But, they are committed to working with us on all possible end-use monitoring steps. Copies of the E.U.C. and the lot and serial numbers have been sent by SIPRnet to ISN/CATR Margaret Mitchell. SUTTON
Tuesday, 13 May 2008, 15:28
S E C R E T STATE 050524
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 05/05/2018
TAGS PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CHINA CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO IRAN
REF: A. STATE 162318 B. STATE 109649 C. BEIJING 5237 D. STATE 071143 E. STATE 073601 F. BEIJING 5754 G. STATE 72896 H. BEIJING 5361 I. STATE 148514 J. BEIJING 6848 K. STATE 159388 L. BEIJING 7212 M. BEIJING 7387
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY ISN ACTING DAS ELIOT KANG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Beijing, please see paragraph 2.
--------------
ACTION REQUEST
--------------
2. (S/NF) Post is requested to draw on the points in para 4 below and to provide photographs in a demarche to the Government of China (GOC) on the issue of transfers of advanced conventional weapons such as MANPADS to Iran. NOTE THAT THE POINTS FLAGGED AS PROVIDED BY THE IC MUST BE USED VERBATIM.
----------
BACKGROUND
----------
3. (S/NF) In April 2008, Coalition forces recovered from a cache in Basra, Iraq at least two Chinese-produced Iranian-supplied QW-1 MANPADS that we assess were provided by Iran to Iraqi Shia militants. The date of production for the recovered QW-1 systems is 2003, but it is not known when these particular launchers were transferred by China to Iran or when the launchers entered Iraq. We have demarched China repeatedly on its conventional arms transfers to Iran, urging Beijing to stop these transfers due to unacceptably high risk that such weapons would be diverted to militants and terrorists in Iraq and elsewhere. Beijing has typically responded by asserting that its sales are in accordance with international law, that it requires end-users to sign agreements pledging not to retransfer the weapons, or -- disingenuously in the judgment of USG technical experts -- that it cannot confirm that the weapons recovered by Coalition forces in Iraq are actually Chinese in origin. This latest recovery of Chinese-origin weapons in Iraq gives us yet another opportunity to present the Chinese government with concrete evidence that Iran is illicitly diverting Chinese-origin weapons and to urge Beijing to take concrete steps to halt future diversions and investigate past transfers to Tehran.
--------------
TALKING POINTS
--------------
4. (S/REL CHINA) BEGIN TALKING POINTS:
TRANSFERS OF MANPADS TO IRAN
-----------------------------
-- We have repeatedly raised with you our concerns regarding Iran,s retransfer of Chinese-produced weapons to extremists and terrorists in Iraq and elsewhere.
-- We understand that you have provided Iran with QW-1 MANPADS in the past, and Iran has publicly asserted that it produces the Misagh-1, which is based on the Chinese QW-1.
-- We previously raised with you the recovery in Iraq in 2004 of an Iranian-origin Misagh-1 MANPAD that had been fired at a civilian airliner.
-- We have recently acquired additional information about Iranian diversions of Chinese-origin MANPADS that we would like to share with you.
BEGIN IC POINTS THAT MUST BE USED VERBATIM:
-- Coalition forces recovered at least two Chinese QW-1 MANPADS missiles from a militant cache in Basra, Iraq in April 2008. The missiles had 2003 production markings, had not been fired, and were still intact in their launch tubes.
-- We assess that these missiles were provided to Iraqi Shia militants by Iran.
END IC POINTS THAT MUST BE USED VERBATIM.
MANPADS TRANSFERS TO STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM
--------------------------------------------- ---
-- Iran is the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism. We know that Iran has provided Chinese weapons to extremist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan that are using these weapons to kill Americans and Iraqis, something we take very seriously.
-- Iran is not a responsible purchaser of military equipment. There is an unacceptably high risk that any military equipment sold to Iran, especially weapons like MANPADS, that are highly sought-after by terrorists, will be diverted to non-state actors who threaten U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as civilians across the region.
-- It is for that reason UNSCR 1747 calls on states to exercise vigilance and restraint in the transfer of systems contained in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, such as MANPADS. Likewise, the United Nations General Assembly passed resolution A/62/391 encouraging state members to ban the transfer of MANPADS to non-state actors.
-- We strongly urge you to:
terminate all weapons-related, including further MANPADS-related transfers and technical assistance to Iran, in accordance with UNSCR 1747;
insist that Iran cease any weapons-production related activities based on or including Chinese technology, to include MANPADS technology;
insist that Iran stop illicit retransfers of Chinese-origin weapons, or Iranian-produced weapons based on Chinese designs, to non-state actors;
insist that Iran provide an accounting of all Chinese-origin weapons; and institute thorough, regular inspections of Chinese-origin weapons already in Iranian stocks to determine how many may have been diverted and to prevent future diversions.
-- We ask that you share with us the results of your investigations into this matter.
SERIAL NUMBERS OF WEAPONS SOLD TO IRAQ:
------------------------------------------
-- We have provided you with information on specific Chinese weapons systems that we have recovered in Iraq.
-- Further information you can provide to us on your sales of these systems to Iran would help our investigators on the ground distinguish between weapons newly transferred to Shia militants and those transferred prior to the commencement of armed conflict in 2003. Serial numbers of equipment sold to Iran would be most helpful in this regard.
END TALKING POINTS. RICE
NNNN
End Cable Text
Friday, 10 July 2009, 23:27
S E C R E T STATE 072112
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/09/2024
TAGS PARM, MTCRE, PREL, TW, YM
SUBJECT: (S) ELICITING YEMENI COOPERATION FOR ARMS
SMUGGLING INTERDICTION EFFORTS
Classified By: Classified By: Senior Adviser Stephen Mull for REASONS 1.4 (B), (C) and (D).
1. (U) This cable is an action request. Please see paragraph five. Ambassador Seche is authorized to orally convey information in paragraphs 7-9 in delivering this demarche (but asked not to leave points in written form). Post may not/not provide these points in the form of a non-paper.
2. (S) OBJECTIVE:
(a) To obtain ROYG cooperation with CENTCOM efforts to interdict the smuggling of weapons into Gaza, including through authorization of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and helicopter flights over Yemeni territorial waters.
(b) To elicit Yemeni agreement to receive an interagency delegation to discuss additional means of cooperation including on enhancement of Yemen's own anti-smuggling capability.
3. (S) Background: On January 16, 2009, the USG signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Israel on the prevention of supply of arms and related materiel to terrorist groups. We are working on many fronts to implement this MOU, including through interdiction efforts by U.S. military assets in the region. CENTCOM has been tasked with responsibilities pertaining to military implementation of the MOU within its AOR.
4. (S//NF) We understand a significant volume of arms shipments to Hamas make the short 24-hour transit across the Red Sea from Yemen to Sudan. These shipments usually transit in small groups of flagged and unflagged dhows that use territorial waters, busy harbors, and mangroves to mask their routes and increase their likelihood of evading interception by U.S. or other forces. These intentional tactics, combined with the number of and similarity among vessels, make interdiction difficult once the vessels reach international waters. In a recent case, sparse intelligence and a dhow's use of Yemeni territorial waters allowed a known shipment of arms probably bound for Gaza to transit undetected in international waters past a searching U.S. warship.
5. (S) Obtaining Yemeni permission to fly Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and helicopters over Yemeni territorial waters would greatly enhance CENTCOM's ability to gain the intelligence required to identify and track the dhows as they enter international waters and increase the probability of successful interdiction. Accomplishing this would not/not require sending UAVs or helicopters into the airspace over Yemen's land territory.
6. (S/REL ROYG) Action Request: To fully support DoD's intent to disrupt and deter illicit arms smuggling, Embassy Sanaa is requested to approach ROYG at the highest appropriate level to request authorization for CENTCOM to fly Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and helicopters over Yemeni territorial waters in an effort to better track dhows and make successful intercepts once they reach international waters.
7. (S/REL ROYG) Post is also requested to emphasize the importance of the broader interdiction effort to the USG and propose that the ROYG receive an interagency delegation to discuss means to maximize bilateral cooperation in this regard, including on enhancement of Yemen's own anti-smuggling capability.
8. (S//NF) Our arms interdiction efforts are focused on preventing shipments intended for Gaza. Nonetheless, Gaza-bound shipments represent only one aspect of the broader regional problem of arms smuggling from and through Yemen. The following points discuss several recipient groups and possible destinations (Gaza, Somalia) of arms smuggled from and through Yemen. Post may use its discretion in framing the scope of this conversation in order to maximize the prospects of a positive response. Post may not/not provide these points in the form of a non-paper.
9. (S/REL ROYG) Points for Oral Presentation: Arms Smuggling in Yemeni Coastal Waters
In the past, we have had extensive discussions with your government about the ability of terrorists and other sub-state actors to acquire small arms/light weapons (SALW) sourced from Yemeni black markets and use them to conduct attacks elsewhere. For example, the Strela-2 (SA-7 GRAIL) manportable air defense systems (MANPADS) used in the 2002 attacks on a civilian airliner in Kenya were sourced in Yemen, as were small arms used to attack the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 2004.
We welcome the steps your government has taken over the last several years to stem the influx of weapons to the Yemeni black market from external sources, to take illicit weapons off the streets, and to prevent terrorist access to lethal arms. However, we remain extremely concerned that arms smuggling activities originating in and/or transiting Yemen are still providing a destabilizing source of weapons for the region. The large quantities of black market weapons still available in Yemen are being exploited by regional smuggling networks to provide arms to various non-state actors, possibly including al-Qa'ida associated terrorist groups.
(S//REL TO USA, YEM) We have specific information that a weapons smuggling network originating in Yemen is supplying weapons to individuals in Africa who are delivering them to various entities there, potentially including al-Qa'ida associated terrorist groups.
(S//REL TO USA, YEM) According to recent information, an extremist associated with the al-Rashaydah tribe, Abu-Fu'ad al-Dindari, agreed to negotiate a weapons purchase between representatives of al-Rashaydah tribe in Sudan which is receiving weapons from Yemen through this network and Somalia-based al-Shabaab.
(S//REL TO USA, YEM) This network also provides arms that are smuggled into the Gaza Strip. The weapons are transported by boat across the Red Sea to landing points in Sudan. The vessels are met either on shore or a short distance off the coast. Once landed, we assess that the goods are transported north by car through Sudan.
(S//REL TO USA, YEM) We have been able to identify a number of the Yemeni members of this network, including several who are affiliated with XXXXXXXXXXXX owns at least one boat and may operate a fleet of small fishing vessels that are used to run money and weapons across the Red Sea between Yemen and Sudan.
(U) This particular network has smuggled a wide variety of weaponry out of Yemen, including rockets, handguns, anti-armor rocket-propelled grenades, and anti-aircraft guns.
(S) We have identified this network and some specific information on its activities. We believe, however, that other arms smuggling networks operating from and through Yemen may exist.
(U) Yemen's geographical location and large black market weapons stocks, not to mention, the many armed groups active in the region that are seeking additional arms supplies, make it an inviting target for arms brokers and smugglers to exploit.
(U) In Yemen and elsewhere in the region, small, privately-owned boats that can be diverted from legitimate commercial trade for smuggling purposes are widely available. The availability of these means of transport makes maritime counter-smuggling operations a potentially key element of any effort to stem this flow of weapons.
(U) Such boats can easily transit the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf using the territorial waters of coastal states, including Yemen, in order to minimize the risks of interception in international waters. The large numbers of such boats that sail these waters adds to the challenges in identifying specific vessels engaged in illicit smuggling activities.
(S//REL TO USA, YEM) We have, for example, identified Shaqra, Balhar, Al-Mukalla, Ras al-Sharmah, and Al-Ghayda on Yemen's south coast as possibly key smuggling havens or transit areas for weapons intended for Somalia and possibly elsewhere.
End Text. CLINTON
Wednesday, 14 January 2009, 15:56
S E C R E T YEREVAN 000020
NOFORN
SIPDIS
PASS TO EUR/PRA, ISN/CATR, INR/SPM
EO 12958 DECL: 01/13/2019
TAGS ETTC, PARM, PINR, AM
SUBJECT: (S/NF) CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS ON EXPORT CONTROL ISSUE
REF: A. 08 YEREVAN 1040 B. 08 YEREVAN 1051
Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------------
1. (S/NF) The separate meetings on January 14 with NSS Chairman Hakobian and President Sargsian regarding the Iran export control issue were both positive and constructive. Sargsian acknowledged the weapons purchase from Bulgaria, and neither he nor the NSS Chairman challenged our information that these weapons were then transferred to Iran/Iraq. Both men indicated that there would be an investigation into how the weapons went from Armenia to Iran/Iraq. Hakobian seemed to indicate that the blame most probably lay with the Bulgarians and perhaps unauthorized Armenians acting on their own. Probably in an attempt to minimize U.S. demands, they also noted that there have been significant reforms and personnel changes since the incident. The President reiterated that cooperation with the U.S., including on security and export control, was an Armenian priority, and that the GOAM, with the NSS as the lead, would discuss the proposed Memorandum of Understanding with the expert team on January 15.
2. (S/NF) Somewhat surprisingly, the President has reversed the mantra he has repeated for the last four months that the weapons transfer "did not happen and could not have happened." It,s not clear what has prompted this abrupt climb down, but it is probably some combination of solid evidence, a compelling presentation, an understanding of the consequences non- cooperation could bring, a desire to get off on the right foot with the new administration -- and a Soviet-style calculation that they can sign the MOU, but probably won,t really have to implement it. While there will no doubt be hard questions during the meeting on the MOU and actual implementation will pose even greater challenges, we are -- unexpectedly -- in the best place we could be going into discussions on the MOU. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
MEETING WITH NSS CHAIRMAN HAKOBIAN: BETTER THAN EXPECTED
--------------------------------------------- -----------
3. (S/NF) Ambassador Mahley and his delegation met with NSS Chairman Hakobian on January 14 to discuss Armenia,s role in an arms transfer to Iran, from which point they were later transferred onward to insurgents in Iraq. NSS Chairman Hakobian indicated that Armenia was ready to cooperate on this case and to have a dialogue with the U.S. Hakobian emphasized throughout the meeting that Armenia has undergone significant changes over the last several years and there are new people in the government since 2003, when this transfer occurred. Hakobian also highlighted that two Deputy Defense Ministers had been fired since the transfer happened. Mahley thanked Hakobian for his remarks and said he was here to discuss a tough issue, which reflected the good relationship between the U.S. and Armenia and that this type of discussion that friends have. Hakobian reiterated that Armenia values that relationship.
4. (S) Mahley, drawing from the points in paragraph 18, laid out the U.S. evidence for our assertion that Armenia facilitated Iran,s acquisition of RPG-22s and PKM machine guns, which have been recovered in arms caches of Iranian- sponsored insurgent groups in Iraq. This exchange, which was promised by Sectary Rice, included reviewing the documentary evidence. During the course of our investigation the markings on the weapons indicated that they originated in Bulgaria, and we were able to subsequently determine the lot numbers on the RPG-22s corresponded with the production of 1000 items, all of which were shipped to Armenia along with the PKM machine guns. In addition, we shared with Hakobian that in early January 2003, the Bulgarian firm XXXXXXXXXXXX and the Armenian Ministry of Defense concluded a deal to purchase the RPG-22s and the PKM machine guns; the Armenian XXXXXXXXXXXX served as an intermediary in the transaction. INR analyst Stewart Eales then reviewed the documentary evidence that we had to support this conclusion. First, as part of this deal an end-user certificate from Armenia was signed by then- Defense Minister Sargsian. Hakobian acknowledged that the signature was that of Sargsian. In response to the presentation of the invoice for the transfer, Hakobian asked who from Armenia signed the document. Mahley said that we did not have that information. Eales then explained that the
financial document showed that the money for the deal came from an Iranian front company through an Armenian bank to Bulgaria.
POINTING THE FINGER AT BULGARIA
-------------------------------
5. (S/NF) Hakobian made clear that the information was "clear" and "without doubt." He assured Mahley that he would launch an investigation and that the GOAM needed as much information as possible so that it could find the individuals responsible for the transfer. In response to the financial documents, Hakobian responded "so Bulgaria sold these items to Armenia knowing they were going to Iran?" Mahley and Eales explained that the Bulgarians were not aware of the involvement of an Iranian in the transaction.
6. (S/NF) Hakobian was also very concerned with how the goods were transferred to Armenia. In reviewing the invoice, he noted that the goods were to be flown to Yerevan airport and therefore there must be some documentation about this flight. Hakobian asked if the U.S. knew whether all of the goods were provided to Iran. He stated outright that he thought it was possible that the weapons were delivered to Armenia, but some of them were subsequently diverted in a scheme to make money. Hakobian said he needed to understand what was reported to the Ministry of Defense. He was particularly interested in raising an issue about whether the entire shipment went to Iran, or whether officials skimmed off part of the cargo. He noted that Armenia has done a lot of work since 1991 to prevent Iran from turning Armenia into a conduit for Russian arms transfers to Iran.
7. (S/NF) Mahley responded that it was the U.S. assessment that the documents clearly show a deal between the Armenian entity XXXXXXXXXXXX and Iran. There is no indication that the Bulgarian entities were aware of Iranian involvement; it is our assessment that this deal was done to hide the Iranian involvement from Bulgarian and any other non-Armenian sources. With regard to the issue of whether any of the goods were kept in Armenia, it was the U.S. assessment that the payment process showed the Iranian entity paid for the entire amount being acquired and that it knew the quantities it was paying to acquire. We have no shipping documentation from Armenia to Iran.
U.S. LAWS AND GOALS
-------------------
8. (S/NF) Leaving aside Armenia,s intention to investigate, Mahley reviewed with Hakobian what the goals of the U.S. were for this situation. First, the transfer is impossible to reverse. Therefore, it is critical for the U.S. to have full confidence that GOAM cannot let this happen again. Second, this incident triggered two U.S. laws that could result in sanctions. Mahley emphasized that Armenian cooperation in this matter would be an important factor in our decision whether to waive sanctions.
9. (S/NF) After the presentation of the additional information on this case, Hakobian appeared to understand the consequences of this activity and there is potential for significant damage to Armenia. He said Armenia has a lot of problems and there is no desire to create more problems. Hakobian committed to use all available resources of the GOAM to fully investigate this transfer and share an official report with the USG.
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SARGSIAN
-------------------------------
10. (S/NF) Later in the afternoon, President Sargsian received Ambassador Mahley. Sargsian opened the meeting by noting that building relations with the United States is of vital interest to Armenia and that security is an important component in the overall bilateral relationship. He said that he, personally, was proud of his contributions in this respect and recalled that he had signed the Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement with DOD. Sargsian indicated that he had been briefed by the NSS on Mahley's earlier meeting and invited Ambassador Mahley to begin. 11. (S/NF) Mahley noted the earlier constructive meeting with the NSS and said that he would like to brief the President directly on the export control case and how it came about. Following Mahley's abbreviated presentation, the President stated there was such a contract with the Bulgarians and that he had signed the end user certificate in his capacity as Minister of Defense. He listened intently as Ambassador Mahley passed the three documents (invoice, end user document, and financial transaction statement) and nodded as he reviewed the documents.
12. (S/NF) Ambassador Mahley clarified that the information we were sharing was obtained by the USG using its own sources and methods. Earlier Chairman Hakobian had asked whether he could approach the Bulgarians; if he did so, it was possible that the Bulgarians would be unaware of the case, Mahley indicated.
13. (S/NF) Ambassador Mahley stated that the reason the team of experts is in Armenia is that the Administration wants to move forward to find a constructive resolution to the issue, and he was sure that the next Administration would be interested in doing so as well. Ambassador Mahley reviewed why the transaction was of such concern to the U.S. and stated that U.S. law requires us to sanction the entities of a country that facilitated such a transfer. While sanctions are mandatory, the President has the ability to waive sanctions on national security grounds. If Armenia makes the necessary changes to strengthen its export control system, there might no longer be a need to impose sanctions.
This was what Deputy Secretary Negroponte conveyed in his letter to Sargsian.
GOAM READY TO DISCUSS MOU
-------------------------
14. (S/NF) Mahley indicated that he was ready to discuss with the GOAM a proposed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with GOAM experts, which the U.S. believes would allow a constructive way forward for the two countries. Many of the items Armenia has already accomplished, he stated. There are
additional items that the MOU covers, including process and transparency, that still need to be implemented in the export control regime and that the MOU would cover. The USG sees the signing of an MOU "even without the particular export control case that triggered this discussion" to be a constructive step in the bilateral relationship, Mahley concluded.
15. (S/NF) Mahley shared that he had briefed Congress and that there was considerable interest in the case since the weapons had led to the death and injury of U.S. servicemembers in Iraq. Mahley added that the USG understands the sensitivity of this case and so worked hard to ensure that all the facts provided the GOAM were correct and in order; this took some time which delayed the briefing for the President.
16. (S/NF) President Sargsian responded that he had understood two things from previous conversations on this subject: 1) information-sharing would precede any prescriptive measures that the U.S. would suggest, but perhaps he had misunderstood this; and 2) the weapons in question were missiles or rockets -- not RPGs. He stated that the information about the contract with Bulgaria is correct and the GOAM needs to explore further how the weapons got to Iran or Iraq. "We know that we got the weapons. We will figure out how they were transferred and we will let you know," the President assured Mahley.
17. (S/NF) President Sargsian said the GOAM wants to cooperate with the U.S. on export control and will examine the MOU. He said he had certain questions, and the NSS would take the lead in working with Ambassador Mahley and the experts group the following day. The President concluded that the GOAM did not have and had no interest in cooperating with Iran on weapons sales.
I.C.-CLEARED TALKING POINTS DELIVERED TO GOAM
-------------------------------------------
18. (S/REL ARMENIA) -- Between April 2006 and June 2008, Coalition forces in Iraq
recovered multiple RPG-22 antitank weapons and PKM machine guns.
-- These weapons bore Bulgarian factory markings and were tracked through a sales arrangement that took the weapons through Armenia to Iran.
-- We have information that in early January 2003 the Bulgarian firm XXXXXXXXXXXX and the Armenian Ministry of Defense (MOD) completed a weapons sale that included these weapons recovered by Coalition forces in Iraq. The Armenian company XXXXXXXXXXXX served as intermediary for the deal. XXXXXXXXXXXX-- According to the end-user certificate and sales invoice, the deal included 1000 RPG-22s produced by the Bulgarian firm XXXXXXXXXXXX and 260 PKM machine guns produced by the Bulgarian firm XXXXXXXXXXXX. We have
obtained documentation that includes production lot numbers for the RPG-22Ms and the serial numbers for the PKM machine guns sold to Armenia. The XXXXXXXXXXXX invoice was signed by XXXXXXXXXXXX. The end-user certificate was signed by former Armenian Minister of Defense (now President) Serzh Sargsian, which offered the Government of Armenia,s assurance that the weapons would remain within the possession of the Armenian Government.
-- Financial records for the RPG-22 and PKM sale identify the
ordering customer as XXXXXXXXXXXX, someone known by the U.S. to be associated with Iranian arms acquisitions.
-- An RPG-22 attack on a US armored vehicle in Iraq on January 31, 2008 killed one US soldier and wounded three. Factory markings on the recovered RPG-22 rocket debris indicate it was originally part of the shipment to Armenia by the Bulgarian firm XXXXXXXXXXXX.
-- US military personnel discovered an arms cache in Baghdad on February 15, 2008 that belonged to Hizballah Brigades -- an Iranian-backed Iraqi militant group. Among the weapons recovered, most of which were Iranian in origin, were six Bulgarian RPG-22 anti-tank weapons. The production lot and serial numbers on all six indicated they were produced by the
Bulgarian firm XXXXXXXXXXXX and part of the sale to Armenia in January
2003.
-- Two RPG-22 launch tubes were recovered following an attack
that wounded three US military personnel in Baghdad in mid- March 2008. The lot and serial numbers on the recovered tubes matched those originally sold to Armenia in January. Handwritten on both launchers was the Arabic message "Rejoice
- Islamic Resistance of Iraq - Hizballah Brigades" -- the name of the same Iranian-backed Iraqi militant group. (SECRET//REL Armenia) YOVANOVITCH
Monday, 23 March 2009, 07:00
S E C R E T SANAA 000495
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NSC FOR APDNSA JOHN BRENNAN AND JOHN DUNCAN
DEPT FOR S/WCI AMBASSADOR CLINT WILLIAMSON
AND SHAUN COUGHLIN, NEA/ARP ANDREW MACDONALD
EO 12958 DECL: 03/23/2019
TAGS KDRG, PGOV, PINR, PTER, PINS, IZ, SA, YM
SUBJECT: SALEH SHOWS NO FLEXIBILITY ON GTMO DETAINEES
Classified By: CDA Angie Bryan for reasons 1.4(b), (c), and (d)
SUMMARY
-------
1. (S/NF) President Saleh on March 16 rejected a proposal by visiting Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor (APDNSA) John Brennan that Yemeni Guantanamo detainees be sent to a Saudi rehabilitation center jointly run by Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Saleh instead insisted that the Yemeni detainees be returned to Yemen as soon as a proposed rehabilitation center in Aden, funded by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, is ready to accept them. End Summary.
SALEH INTRANSIGENT ON DETAINEES
-------------------------------
2. (S/NF) President Saleh on March 16 repeatedly rebuffed suggestions by visiting APDNSA John Brennan that Yemeni Guantanamo detainees be sent to Saudi Arabia, insisting on a Saudi-style rehabilitation center inside Yemen, funded by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Brennan, accompanied by the Ambassador, NSC Director John Duncan, S/WCI Ambassador Clint Williamson, and Pol/Mil Chief, told Saleh that the U.S. wanted detainees to return to Yemen eventually. In the absence of a Yemeni program, however, the best near-term solution was for Saudi Arabia and Yemen to jointly run a program, at a Saudi-built rehabilitation facility at Abha in KSA with an immediate capability of receiving up to 120 detainees and open to Arabs from across the region. Saleh refused to address this suggestion directly, saying Yemen would build its own rehabilitation center in Aden. "We will offer the land in Aden, and you and the Saudis will provide the funding." It will be ready 90 days after receipt of the USD 11 million required for construction, Saleh said.
3. (S/NF) Growing increasingly impatient, Saleh said that the U.S. could duplicate the Saudi program in Yemen. Brennan responded that such a program takes time to develop and that Saleh had his hands full dealing with al-Qaeda in Yemen. Saleh said that while he personally had no problem with detainees being sent to KSA, Yemeni opposition parties are the real obstacle because they will not allow him to give KSA control over Yemeni citizens. Brennan told Saleh that a leader of his depth of experience could surely figure out a way to deal with the opposition,s concerns. Saleh asked why the U.S. didn,t simply keep the detainees at Guantanamo or send them to the "Moayad prison" while Yemen builds its own facility. XXXXXXXXXXXX Signaling his bottom line, Saleh told Brennan that Yemen already had plans for a rehabilitation center and repeated his demand that the U.S. and KSA fund it. At this point, Brennan asked to speak with Saleh and the Ambassador privately.
4. (S/NF) In the pull-aside with Brennan and the Ambassador, Saleh said that he wouldn,t object if the U.S. and Saudi Arabia entered into a bilateral agreement regarding disposition of the Guantanamo detainees. (Comment: Saleh said this knowing full well that the Saudis are unwilling at this point to take in the Yemeni detainees without his concurrence. End Comment.) In a brief meeting outside Saleh's gazebo, Ambassador Williamson described to Saleh's nephew, Deputy Director of the National Security Bureau (NSB) Ammar Saleh, the USG's review process for evaluating possible destinations for detainees and praised the Saudi program. Ambassador Williamson said that Saudi Arabia was closer to Yemen than Guantanamo and that if the Saudi solution didn't work, then the Yemenis would be transfered to other countries, but not to Yemen. Ammar proposed sending the Yemenis to the ROYG facility for a brief (e.g. 3 month) period at which time Saleh could announce that they had asked to be transferred to KSA, and it would be done. He cautioned that he had not yet proposed the idea to Saleh and that any such transfers would have to be approved by both the family and the tribes involved. Ambassador Williamson thanked Ammar Saleh for his suggestion and said he would take it up with Mr. Brennan, but noted that he did not think it was a viable alternative given the caveats imposed.
RETURN OF THE BAATH IN IRAQ??
-----------------------------
5. (S/NF) In a bizarre postscript to the morning meeting with Saleh, the Palace protocol office called an hour later to request that Brennan meet with Ammar Saleh. Expecting a continuation of the Guantanamo detainee discussion, the Brennan delegation and the Ambassador met with Saleh, who said that he had been instructed by the President to share "very important" intelligence information with Brennan. Ammar said the NSB had what it considered reliable information that the Iraqi Baath party was reconstituting itself and would reclaim power in Baghdad once the U.S. pulled out. Upon hearing this, Brennan ended the meeting, telling Ammar that he had come expecting to discuss detainee issues, and that he would report to President Obama his disappointment that the ROYG was being inflexible in dealing with the issue. In a final twist, the protocol office called to say that Ammar Saleh would meet Mr. Brennan at the airport as he departed Yemen (raising again the possibility that there could be further discussion of the detainee issue) only to call back to say Ammar Saleh had been called away to another meeting.
ROYG SPIN AND EMBASSY PRESS STATEMENT
-------------------------------------
6. (C) Official news agency Saba released a statement after the meeting saying that Saleh had called on the U.S. to "extradite" Yemeni citizens at Guantanamo to Yemen so they could be rehabilitated and integrated into society. The Saba statement also noted that Brennan had delivered a letter from President Obama praising Yemen's efforts in counterterrorism and that Saleh had given Brennan a response letter for President Obama. (Note: Brennan did deliver a letter from President Obama, but the letter focused on the danger of transfering detainees directly to Yemen. Contrary to the Saba statement, Saleh did not give Brennan a letter for President Obama. End Note.)
7. (U) The Embassy issued the following press release, cleared by Brennan, the afternoon of March 16.
Begin Embassy press release text:
John Brennan, Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor, visited Yemen on March 16, 2009 as part of a visit to the region to discuss continued cooperation between the United States and Yemen in combating terrorism. As part of the ongoing dialogue between Yemen and the United States regarding the remaining Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo, Mr. Brennan raised with President Ali Abdullah Saleh the U.S. Government's concerns about the direct return of detainees to Yemen.
End Embassy press release text.
COMMENT
-------
8. (S/NF) To say Saleh missed a good chance to engage the new Administration on one of its key foreign policy priorities would be a severe understatement. He appeared alternately dismissive, bored, and impatient during the 40-minute meeting. Saleh's knowledge that Saudi Arabia will not accept Yemeni detainees without at least tacit support from Saleh has likely emboldened the ROYG to press publicly and privately for an all-or-nothing push for the direct transfer of detainees to Yemen. Saleh clearly feels that he has the better hand in any negotiations on the issue. He may have concluded that, if he holds out long enough, the USG will eventually acquiesce to his demands because of the Administration's timeline for closing Guantanamo in spite of Mr. Brennan's clear message that the USG is actively seeking alternatives. End Comment.
9. (U) APDNSA Brennan cleared this cable. S/WCI Ambassador Williamson did not have the opportunity to clear this cable. BRYAN
Friday, 29 January 2010, 16:02
C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 000096
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/29/2020
TAGS PREL, PGOV, UNSC, MARR, MOPS, PTER, PINR, IS, SY, LE
SUBJECT: UNSCOL WILLIAMS ON UNIFIL INCIDENT, GHAJAR
REF: A. BEIRUT 53 B. 09 BEIRUT 974 C. 09 BEIRUT 1334
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) Michael Williams shared with the Ambassador on January 27 a disturbing report of a January 23 act of aggression against a UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) foot patrol in the southern Lebanese town of Bint Jbeil involving an angry crowd and denial of the UNIFIL patrol's freedom of movement. Williams called the incident "clearly worrying" because of its quick escalation and its occurrence during a routine patrol. Following his January 24-26 consultations in Israel, Williams also questioned the GOI's commitment to withdrawal from the occupied Lebanese village of Ghajar. While Williams concluded that the GOI did not expect an immediate conflict with Hizballah, he reported it still harbored deep concern about potentially destabilizing factors in south Lebanon. Even so, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) praised its relationship with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) via the Tripartite mechanism. On UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1559, Williams argued against the insistence of some Lebanese that the resolution be "canceled," noting "the big elephant in the room is Hizballah End Summary.
ROUTINE PATROL OBSTRUCTED, INCIDENT ESCALATED
---------------------------------------------
2. (C) The "temporary obstruction" of UNIFIL's movement January 23 in the southern town of Bint Jbeil was a violation of UNSCR 1701, UNSCOL Michael Williams told the Ambassador on January 27, since any denial of UNIFIL's movement was considered a violation. At approximately 1100 on January 23, members of an eight-man French UNIFIL foot patrol noticed that they were being photographed by individuals following them in a civilian vehicle. Soon after a UNIFIL soldier wrote down the car's license plate number, a crowd of approximately 50 people -- some armed with baseball bats, metal bars, and one individual with a knife -- formed around the UNIFIL soldiers. The soldier's notebook was seized by a member of the crowd and set ablaze with kerosene. After the crowd tried to isolate one of the UNIFIL soldiers in a threatening manner, the patrol fired warning shots. While the members of the LAF were present, it is not clear what role they played. Reportedly, one of the LAF soldiers told his UNIFIL counterpart that UNIFIL needed to "respect the (local residents') rights as civilians."
3. (C) Williams characterized the incident as "clearly worrying." It was "very unusual," he emphasized, for local residents to exhibit such behavior during the course of routine patrols, especially because the UNIFIL unit was not headed to search someone's home. When asked for his assessment of the LAF's and UNIFIL's renewed commitment to work together more closely after several incidents in the second half of 2009, Williams replied it was not yet clear what specific steps had been taken to improve the relationship.
DEALBREAKERS ON GHAJAR REMAIN UNRESOLVED
----------------------------------------
4. (C) UNIFIL's January 25 meeting with the GOI Ghajar team was positive, UNIFIL polchief Milos Strugar told polchief separately on January 26. The Israeli team had visited the village, spoken with residents and local leaders, and inspected infrastructure since their last meeting, so they had a more comprehensive picture of the issues involved, he underscored. On January 25, the Israelis made a presentation on humanitarian issues to be addressed, Strugar said, but they did not return to discuss the key security and legal jurisdictional concerns they had raised previously (ref A). Strugar, who had been downcast after the Israelis presented a maximalist position on January 7, was more upbeat, although he assessed that the talks would progress slowly despite what he described as "an effort" on the Israeli side.
5. (C) The next meeting between UNIFIL and the GOI on Ghajar would be held in approximately two weeks due to the disruption caused by the handover of UNIFIL,s command from Italian General Claudio Graziano to Spanish General Alberto Asarta Cuevas, Strugar noted. In his final Tripartite meeting on January 25, which Cuevas attended, Graziano laid out the history of the Ghajar issue and described the current status of negotiations, Strugar said. His comments, in memorandum form, would be the basis for Asarta going forward, Strugar explained. Williams believed Asarta shared Graziano's understanding of the importance of resolving Ghajar, although Graziano had invested a great deal of his personal capital on the issue.
6. (C) In his meeting in Jerusalem, Strugar reported, Graziano conveyed his concerns regarding the Israeli presentation made on January 7 and urged the Israelis to return to the UNIFIL plan as a basis for progress. Strugar described the Israelis as "open" and said that MFA DG Yossi Gal emphasized that the previous Israeli presentation was "just a starting point." The Israelis will return to the UNIFIL plan as a basis, Strugar predicted, although he believed that the legal and jurisdictional questions at stake -- not the security ones -- would be difficult to resolve. Before the next meeting, UNIFIL would brief the Lebanese on the negotiations, as well, Strugar confirmed. UNSCOL Williams told the Ambassador that it was his impression that no progress had been made on the legal or security questions raised with respect to Ghajar, terming the remaining concerns "dealbreakers."
7. (C) After Williams' January 24-26 consultations in Israel, he believed that Israel was "looking for something" from Lebanon before withdrawing from Ghajar. Williams relayed that the Israelis did not specify what that "something" could be, but in any case, he was not convinced that the GOL had the political cover -- or inclination -- to negotiate seriously over Ghajar. He noted that the Israeli Ministry of Defense seemed more "flexible" on the issue, while he questioned whether the MFA (the lead agency) was really committed. MOD General Yossi Heymann, whom Williams called "impressive," believed that the issue of Ghajar was suffering from "over legislation" and that sometimes it was better to "have some gray." When Israel pulled out of Ghajar in 2000, there were no detailed arrangements and it "kind of" worked, Heymann pointed out. Williams said he assured his Israeli interlocutors that after an Israeli withdrawal from Ghajar, he would "do (his) damnedest" to push the Lebanese to take reciprocal positive steps in accordance with their UNSCR 1701 obligations.
ISRAELI CONCERNS IN LEBANON
---------------------------
8. (C) Williams reported that while in Israel, he had met with not only Gal and Heymann, but also with representatives of Prime Minister Netanyahu's office, as well as MOD Chief of Staff General Gabi Ashkenazi for the first time. Williams reported the GOI did not expect a conflict with Hizballah in the near future along the Blue Line. He heard repeated worries, however, about the potential for Hizballah to acquire anti-aircraft missiles or act on its standing threat to retaliate for the death of Imad Mughniyeh. Ashkenazi assessed that the early January attack on the convoy of the Israeli ambassador in Jordan could have had some limited Hizballah involvement, but it was uncharacteristically unsophisticated for the group, Williams said. Israeli interlocutors also expressed concerns about extremist Palestinian groups in Lebanon, particularly in the Ain el-Hilweh refugee camp near Saida.
9. (C) For his part, Williams expressed concern to the Ambassador that if another rocket attack were to occur -- whether by Palestinian militants or Hizballah -- Israel would respond forcefully. In such an event, UNIFIL would likely be unable to contain any escalation, he worried, adding, "Everything we've worked for could go away in as little 12 hours."
IDF PRAISE FOR THE LAF
----------------------
10. (C) The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) praised the LAF's participation in the Tripartite talks, especially the leadership of Brigadier General Abdulruhman Shehaitly, Williams said. General Heymann had mentioned to Williams, in particular, the late August incident when an (possibly mentally ill) Israeli citizen walked across the Blue Line and was picked up and returned to Israel by the LAF after questioning (ref B). In that instance, Heymann asserted to Williams, the credit for the man's return to Israeli authorities goes to the LAF and former UNIFIL Commander General Graziano.
UNSCOL ON 1559
--------------
11. (C) When asked about the December efforts by some to target UNSCR 1559, Williams explained that Security Council resolutions never die or "get canceled," as some Lebanese politicians had advocated. Williams noted that many Lebanese were naive about why UNSCR 1559 still existed, even though the resolution had not yet been fully implemented. While key parts of UNSCR 1559, such as Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, had been implemented, Williams said, "the big elephant in the room is Hizballah." Williams noted that Lebanese FM Ali Chami had not raised the issue of UNSCR 1559 recently, despite Chami's involvement in lighting December's media firestorm on the issue (ref C). During his latest consultations in Israel, Williams recalled, no one had raised the issue of UNSCR 1559 either.
12. (C) Williams confirmed that the next UNSCR 1701 report was due at the end of February, with consultations to follow in March, but the next UNSCR 1559 report was not due until April. Williams characterized this timeline as "a better sequence." He noted that previously, when the UNSCR 1559 report had come first, it added tensions to the UNSCR 1701 report and consultations.
13. (C) COMMENT: The January 23 incident in Bint Jbeil is disturbing because of its rapid escalation and the unanswered questions about the role the LAF played. We will underscore the need for strong UNIFIL-LAF cooperation with new UNIFIL Commander Asarta in a scheduled February 4 meeting and with our LAF interlocutors at the first opportunity. End Comment. SISON
Monday, 27 July 2009, 16:09
S E C R E T TUNIS 000516
SIPDIS
NEA/MAG; INR/B
EO 12958 DECL: 02/28/2017
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, PINR, ENRG, EAID, TS
SUBJECT: TUNISIA: DINNER WITH SAKHER EL MATERI
REF: TUNIS 338
Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
Summary
-------
1. (S) The Ambassador and his wife had dinner with Mohammad Sakher El Materi and his wife, Nesrine Ben Ali El Materi, at their Hammamet home July 17. During the lavish dinner Al Materi raised the question of the American Cooperative School of Tunis and said he would seek to "fix the problem prior to the Ambassador's departure" as a gesture to a "friend." He praised President Obama's policies and advocated a two-state solution for Israel and the Palestinians. He also expressed interest in opening a McDonald's franchise and complained about the government's delay in passing a franchise law. He expressed pride in his Islamic Zaitouna radio and in the interviews with opposition party leaders published in his newly purchased newspaper publishing group. During the evening, El Materi was alternately difficult and kind. He seemed, on occasion, to be seeking approval. He was living, however, in the midst of great wealth and excess, illustrating one reason resentment of President Ben Ali's in-laws is increasing. End Summary.
------------------
The ACST Situation
------------------
2. (S) Presidential son-in-law and wealthy businessman Mohamed Sakher El Materi, and his wife, Nesrine Ben Ali El Materi hosted the Ambassador and his wife for dinner at their Hammamet beach residence July 17. El Materi raised the American Cooperative School of Tunis (ACST), asking what was happening. The Ambassador explained the situation and emphasized that there is anger and concern in Washington and the English-speaking American/international community in Tunis. He said if the school is closed, there would be serious consequences in our relations. El Materi said he could help and would seek to resolve the situation immediately, i.e., prior to the Ambassador's departure. He wished, he said, to do so for a "friend." He noted that he had helped the UK Ambassador secure several appointments (including a lunch with the Prime Minister) for UK Prince Andrew during his recent visit. Before his intervention, El Materi said, the Prince had only one appointment with a single Minister.
---------------------
Freedom of Expression
---------------------
3. (S) Ambassador raised the need for more freedom of expression and association in Tunisia. El Materi agreed. He complained that, as the new owner of Dar Assaba, the largest private newspaper group in the country, he has been getting calls from the Minister of Communications complaining about articles he has been running (Comment: This is doubtful). He laughed and suggested that sometimes he wants to "give Dar Assaba back." El Materi noted the interviews his newspapers have been running with opposition leaders (he mentioned FDTL Secretary General Mustapha Ben Jaafar). He was clearly proud of the interviews.
4. (S) El Materi said it was important to help others, noting that was one reason he had adopted a son. The Ambassador mentioned the Embassy's humanitarian assistance projects, noting they could not get media coverage. El Materi said forcefully they should be covered, that it was important the Embassy seek such coverage. He said it would counteract some of the negative US image. The Ambassador asked if El Materi would send reporters to do stories on the US assistance projects. El Materi said yes, absolutely.
5. (S) El Materi complained at length about Tunisian bureaucracy, saying it is difficult to get things done. He said communication inside the bureaucracy is terrible. He said people often "bring wrong information" to the President implying he had to get involved sometimes to get things corrected.
----------------------------------
On Exterior Politics and Economics
----------------------------------
6. (S) El Materi praised President Barack Obama's new policies. He said the invasion of Iraq was a very serious US mistake that had strengthened Iran and bred hatred of the United States in the Arab world. He pressed for a two state solution to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and indicated Tunisia needs to accelerate convertibility of the dinar. In general, however, El Materi's knowledge of and interest in international political and economic issues seemed limited.
7. (S) The Ambassador raised economic liberalization, noting the importance of opening up to franchising. El Materi agreed, noting that he would be pleased to assist McDonald's to enter Tunisia, suggesting they begin at the new cruise port in La Goulette. He complained about the unhealthy food served by McDonald's, however, adding it is making Americans fat. He also complained about the GOT's delay in passing a franchising law.
8. (S) The Ambassador noted he has been asking Tunisians what ideas they have for the new US President and Administration. El Materi commented that Nesrine would like more done on the environment. The Ambassador responded by explaining some of the Administration's policies on the environment. El Materi said Nesrine is focused on organic products and wants everything (even the paint and varnish) in their new house in Sidi Bou Said (next to the Ambassador's residence) to be organic.
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Islam
-----
9. (S) El Materi said he had begun to practice Islam seriously at 17. He repeatedly said he was practicing, and had a strong faith. (NB. He went off to pray at the sunset call to prayer.) He suggested that if you have faith and pray to God, he will help. He emphasized that his religion is personal, and he does not believe it is appropriate to impose his views on others. (Comment. During the evening, El Materi seemed at his most passionate when describing the Koran, his belief in one God, and the importance of Mohamed as the final prophet of God.)
10. (S) El Materi said he was proud of Zeitouna radio, the first and only Tunisian Koranic radio station, and discussed how Zeitouna bank would be opening. He hopes to create a regional version of Zeitouna radio to spread the Malakite school of Islam. He expressed the view that Islamists and extremists pose a great threat to Islam and modernity. He said he follows Islam, but modern Islam.
---------------------------------------
El-Materi Unplugged: Home/Personal Life
---------------------------------------
11. (S) El-Materi's house is spacious, and directly above and along the Hammamet public beach. The compound is large and well guarded by government security. It is close to the center of Hammamet, with a view of the fort and the southern part of the town. The house was recently renovated and includes an infinity pool and a terrace of perhaps 50 meters. While the house is done in a modern style (and largely white), there are ancient artifacts everywhere: Roman columns, frescoes and even a lion's head from which water pours into the pool. El Materi insisted the pieces are real. He hopes to move into his new (and palatial) house in Sidi Bou Said in eight to ten months.
12. (S) The dinner included perhaps a dozen dishes, including fish, steak, turkey, octopus, fish couscous and much more. The quantity was sufficient for a very large number of guests. Before dinner a wide array of small dishes were served, along with three different juices (including Kiwi juice, not normally available here). After dinner, he served ice cream and frozen yoghurt he brought in by plane from Saint Tropez, along with blueberries and raspberries and fresh fruit and chocolate cake. (NB. El Materi and Nesrine had just returned from Saint Tropez on their private jet after two weeks vacation. El Materi was concerned about his American pilot finding a community here. The Ambassador said he would be pleased to invite the pilot to appropriate American community events.)
13. (S) El Materi has a large tiger ("Pasha") on his compound, living in a cage. He acquired it when it was a few weeks old. The tiger consumes four chickens a day. (Comment: The situation reminded the Ambassador of Uday Hussein's lion cage in Baghdad.) El Materi had staff everywhere. There were at least a dozen people, including a butler from Bangladesh and a nanny from South Africa. (NB. This is extraordinarily rare in Tunisia, and very expensive.)
14. (S) They have three children, two girls and a boy. Leila is four and another daughter that is about 10 months. Their boy is adopted and is two years old. The youngest daughter is a Canadian citizen, by virtue of birth in Canada. The family's favorite vacation destination spot is the Maldives Islands.
15. (S) El Materi said he has begun an exercise and diet regime. He has, he said, recently lost weight (it was visibly true). El Materi said he eats in a "balanced" way. He had just spent an hour on a bike, he claimed. Nesrine said she gets no exercise.
16. (S) Both El Materi and Nesrine speak English, although their vocabulary and grammar are limited. They are clearly eager to strengthen their English. Nesrine said she loves Disney World, but had put off a trip this year because of H1N1 flu. Nesrine has, for sometime, had Tamiflu nearby (even taking it on trips). Originally it was out of fear of bird flu. She packs it for El Materi too when he travels. Nesrine said she has visited several US cities. El Materi had only been to Illinois recently in connection with the purchase of a plane.
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Comment
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17. (S) Throughout the evening, El Materi often struck the Ambassador as demanding, vain and difficult. He is clearly aware of his wealth and power, and his actions reflected little finesse. He repeatedly pointed out the lovely view from his home and frequently corrected his staff, issued orders and barked reprimands. Despite this, El Materi was aware of his affect on the people around him and he showed periodic kindness. He was unusually solicitous and helpful to the Ambassador's wife, who is disabled. Occasionally, he seemed to be seeking approval. One western Ambassador in Tunis, who knows El Materi, has commented that he has western-style political skills in his willingness to engage with ordinary citizens. It is an uncommon trait here.
18. (S) El Materi, in recent months, has been ever more visible in the local diplomatic community. He has clearly decided (or been told) to serve as a point of contact between the regime and key ambassadors. Nesrine, at age 23, appeared friendly and interested, but nave and clueless. She reflected the very sheltered, privileged and wealthy life she has led. As for the dinner itself, it was similar to what one might experience in a Gulf country, and out of the ordinary for Tunisia.
19. (S) Most striking of all, however, was the opulence with which El Materi and Nesrine live. Their home in Hammamet was impressive, with the tiger adding to the impression of "over the top." Even more extravagant is their home still under construction in Sidi Bou Said. That residence, from its outward appearance, will be closer to a palace. It dominates the Sidi Bou Said skyline from some vantage points and has been the occasion of many private, critical comments. The opulence with which El Materi and Nesrine live and their behavior make clear why they and other members of Ben Ali's family are disliked and even hated by some Tunisians. The excesses of the Ben Ali family are growing.
Please visit Embassy Tunis' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/tunis/index.c fm Godec
Tuesday, 28 April 2009, 06:43
S E C R E T MBABANE 000107
STATE FOR AF/E (MBEYZEROV); AF/S (MJWILLS, MHARRIS,
EPELLETREAU); AF/RSA; EEB/IFD
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
GENEVA PASS TO UNOHCHR (MKLECHESKI)
EO 12958 DECL: 04/27/2018
TAGS AU, EFIN, IO, MA, PGOV, PREL, WZ, SADC, ZI, KV
SUBJECT: SWAZI PS ON USG IN UNHRC; KOSOVO; MADAGASCAR;
ZIMBABWE; AND QADHAFI
REF: A. STATE 33709 B. STATE 31175 C. MBABANE 103
Classified By: Ambassador Maurice Parker. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (S) SUMMARY: On April 27, DCM Morrison discussed several pending demarches with Clifford Mamba, Principal Secretary (PS) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. PS Mamba was positive about support for the U.S.'s candidacy for the UN Human Rights Council, promised to consult the Minister of Finance regarding Kosovo's admission into the IMF and World Bank, and confirmed that Swaziland has not made a financial commitment to the Zimbabwe short term emergency relief package. PS Mamba said Swaziland's non-recognition of Kosovo is not a matter of hostility, but waiting for direction from the African Union (AU). XXXXXXXXXXXX END SUMMARY
KOSOVO AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT
2. (C) On April 27, PS Mamba confirmed that Swaziland has not recognized Kosovo and said Swaziland was looking for an international consensus, whether from the AU or the UN Security Council. He promised to speak to Minister of Finance Majozi Sithole and FM Dlamini about the issue of Kosovo's IMF and World Bank membership before Minister Sithole travelled to the U.S. for upcoming meetings, perhaps in the next week. When questioned by the DCM on the role of the non-aligned movement (NAM) in Swaziland's decision-making process, he said regional concerns outweigh NAM decisions. He conceded the NAM has been trying to find its purpose since the end of the cold war, but gave no indication that Swaziland would be voting differently if regional concerns were not involved.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
4. (SBU) The PS was pleased to hear of the U.S. re-engagement on the UN Human Rights Council and complimented the Obama administration on its new policy towards Cuba. He informally pledged positive support for U.S. candidacy to the council.
QADHAFI'S AU LEADERSHIP
5. (C) On the subject of the AU under Qadhafi's leadershiop, PS Mamba mentioned his amusement at receiving a diplomatic note with Kaddafi's new title as King of Culture. He alleged that Qadhafi has put the AU secretariat into chaos, by-passing all protocol and the institutional frameworkXXXXXXXXXXXX He dismissed Qadhafi's call for a United States of Africa, saying SADC has been explicit in their rebuttal of this idea, and moving one country in one direction is hard enough, much less moving 48 countries.
6. (S) COMMENT. XXXXXXXXXXXX
PARKER
Tuesday, 06 January 2009, 14:12
S E C R E T CONAKRY 000837
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/06/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ASEC, GV
SUBJECT: LIBYAN LEADER MEETS WITH GUINEAN PRESIDENT
Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF SHANNON CAZEAU FOR REASON 1.4 B AND D
1. (U) On a trip that included several stops in neighboring West African countries, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi spent approximately three hours in the VIP lounge of the Conakry airport on January 3 where he met with President Moussa Dadis Camara and Prime Minister Kabine Komara. Press reports indicate that Qadhafi chose not to leave the airport because the Guinean Government could not offer adequate security. In anticipation of his arrival, some 250 Libyan paratroopers reportedly arrived in two aircrafts the evening of January 2.
2. (S) Specific details as to what was discussed in the meeting between the leaders are murky. Sensitive sources indicate that Qadhafi may have offered to provide the new Guinean Government with weapons. XXXXXXXXXXXX local press speculated that the Libyan leader may have been looking to reinstate a controversial hotel contract that had been negotiated by former Prime Minister Kouyate in late 2007, and then cancelled a few months later by the late President Conte. The Spanish Ambassador mentioned to DCM on January 5 that he had heard that Qadhafi had negotiated some kind of arms deal.
3. (S) Both press and independent sources reported that Qadhafi gave a bullet-proof Nissan vehicle to President Camara. A sensitive source told Embassy that Qadhafi also gave the president a large sum of cash.
4. (U) Libyan press (Tripoli Great Jamahiriyah TV) reported that Qadhafi congratulated his "companions in the military council" for having the "situation in Guinea under control after the death of President Lansana Conte" and for having "managed to save Guinea from internal problems." Qadhafi reportedly said that the Guinean people "are backing the revolutionaries."
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COMMENT
-------
5. (S) Civilian contacts have claimed that Libya provided financial support for the December 23 coup, and that opposition political leader Alpha Conde (Rally for the Guinean People - RPG) may have personally solicited Qadhafi's support. During his administration, former Prime Minister Lansana Kouyate's frequent trips to Libya generated rampant speculation as to what the Guinean leader may have been trying to negotiate with Qadhafi. In the absence of any clarification from either government as to what was discussed, speculation continues. Relations with Libya are viewed with suspicion by some Guineans due to Qadhafi's alleged support of controversial leaders in neighboring countries (i.e. Charles Taylor in Liberia and RUF rebels in Sierra Leone). END COMMENT. RASPOLIC
Friday, 24 October 2008, 06:45
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 002673
NOFORN
STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND L/LEI
EO 12958 DECL: 10/23/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, LY, UK
SUBJECT: PAN AM 103 BOMBER HAS INCURABLE CANCER; LIBYANS
SEEK HIS RELEASE
REF: A. TSOU-NEA EMAILS/TELCONS B. TSOU-L EMAILS/TELCONS
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Richard LeBaron, reasons 1.4 b, d
1. (C/NF) Summary. Convicted Pam Am 103 bomber Abdelbasset al-Megrahi has inoperable, incurable cancer, but it is not clear how long he has to live, according to two separate medical opinions obtained by officials at Greenock prison near Glasgow, where Megrahi is currently serving a life sentence. Preparatory hearings for the second appeal of Megrahi's conviction, meanwhile, are continuing, but the appeal itself will probably not begin until late 2009, according to the Scottish Crown. The Libyan government is therefore pursuing Megrahi's early release through two other channels, the FCO reports: compassionate release under Scottish law, and the as-yet unsigned UK-Libya Prisoner Transfer Agreement (PTA). HMG has made clear to the Libyans, to Embassy London and to the media that it will take no official position on Megrahi's early release, but will leave the decision - whether through compassionate release or the PTA - to the devolved Scottish government. At the same time, FCO contacts tell us that HMG is adamant that, despite devolution, London controls foreign policy for the UK, not the Scottish. Embassy London is working with the FCO and the Cabinet Office to find a way to represent USG views on the matter to the Scottish government, should we wish to, without making any implicit statement about UK national foreign policy prerogatives.
2. (C/NF) Summary cont. The Libyans have not yet made a formal application for compassionate release for Megrahi, but HMG believes that the Scottish may be inclined to grant the request, when it comes, based on conversations between Scottish First Minister (PM-equivalent) Alex Salmond and UK Justice Secretary Jack Straw. Although the general practice is to grant compassionate release within three months of end of life, this is not codified in the law, so the release, if granted, could occur sooner rather than later. End summary.
Megrahi's Diagnosis
-------------------
3. (C/NF) Megrahi was first diagnosed on September 23 at Inverclyde Royal Hospital, both the FCO and the Scottish Crown office have told us; the second diagnosis was on October 10. The two diagnoses match: he has prostate cancer that has spread to his bones, the cancer has advanced rapidly, and it is inoperable and incurable. Megrahi could have as long as five years to live, but the average life expectancy of someone of his age with his condition is eighteen months to two years. Doctors are not sure where he is on the time scale, and therefore, how much longer he has to live. He has visibly deteriorated in recent weeks, according to those who have visited him. His visitors have included a Libyan oncologist, who expressed satisfaction with the medical treatment Megrahi has been receiving. FCO North Africa Group Head Rob Dixon told us October 22 that Qadhafi apparently complained about the Scots' treatment of Megrahi, but that complaint was unspecific and hasn't been repeated. Megrahi has told his family he is dying, and is receiving regular visits from a imam.
Compassionate Release
---------------------
4. (C/NF) The Libyans are pursuing two tracks to obtain Megrahi's release, apart from the appeal, Dixon told us. The first is the possibility of early release on compassionate grounds. FCO Minister for the Middle East Bill Rammell sent Libyan Deputy FM Abdulati al-Obeidi a letter, which was cleared both by HMG and by the Scottish Executive, on October 17 outlining the procedure for obtaining compassionate release (text of letter sent to NEA and L). It cites Section 3 of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act of 1993 as the basis for release of prisoners, on license, on compassionate grounds. Although the Scottish Crown informed the families of the Pan Am 103 victims in an email October 21 that the time frame for compassionate release is normally three months from time of death, Dixon stressed to us that the three month time frame is not codified in the law. Although Scottish Justice Minister Kenny MacAskill would normally make the final decision, Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond told Jack Straw that he will make the final decision in this case. Salmond told Straw that he would make the decision based on humanitarian grounds, not foreign policy grounds; Dixon told us HMG has interpreted this to mean that Salmond is inclined to grant the request.
Publicly, Salmond has refused to speculate on what decision he might make.
5. (C/NF) The Libyans have not yet requested compassionate release, but have indicated to the FCO that they will. Libyan officials are currently seeking a meeting with the Scottish Executive to discuss the situation. If Megrahi were to be released on compassionate grounds, he would be released into Scotland, but could be transferred back to Libya. According to Dixon, Megrahi does not have to drop his appeal in order to be granted compassionate leave.
Prisoner Transfer Agreement
---------------------------
6. (C/NF) The second track that the Libyans are pursuing to obtain Megrahi's early release is the UK-Libya Prisoner Transfer Agreement. The text of the PTA is not yet concluded between HMG and Libya, although the Libyans are now pushing for this process to be expedited, Dixon tells us. Once the two governments reach agreement on the text, HMG will proceed to clear it with the devolved governments of Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland. Salmond publicly expressed his ire to then-PM Tony Blair for not consulting with Scotland beforehand when HMG announced its intention to pursue a PTA with Libya in 2007; nonetheless, Dixon says the current draft PTA contains standard language that the Scottish have cleared for other countries. Once the three devolved governments agree to the text, Libyan and British officials will sign it. Dixon says the signing will probably take place before Christmas. Once it is signed, under British law the PTA needs to sit for 21 days before the House of Commons and in the Lords before it is enacted, meaning that late January 2009 is the earliest the PTA could come into effect. Megrahi cannot be transferred under the PTA while he has an appeal pending. Dixon says that Megrahi is not specifically mentioned in the text; however, there are no other prisoners currently in the UK prison system to which the PTA would apply.
Status of Megrahi's Appeal
--------------------------
7. (C/NF) The Scottish High Court's October 15 decision to allow all grounds for appeal to be considered, including grounds that had been previously rejected by the Scottish Criminal Case Review commission (text sent to NEA/MAG and L/LEI), slows the whole appeal process down, according to Scottish Court Head of Policy John Logue. Logue and Dixon both estimate that the appeal itself probably won't begin until late 2009, and probably won't conclude until 2010, Dixon said. Under Scottish law, even if Megrahi dies before the appeal is completed, a third party "with a legitimate interest" can continue the appeal on his behalf. The Scottish Crown is therefore proceeding with the case, Logue said.
UK: Between a Rock and A Hard Place
------------------------------------
8. (C/NF) HMG is in an awkward position, Dixon and Cabinet Office North Africa officer Ben Lyons confided to us. The Libyans have told HMG flat out that there will be "enormous repercussions" for the UK-Libya bilateral relationship if Megrahi's early release is not handled properly. At the same time, in keeping with the practice of devolution, HMG has made clear to the Libyans, to the media, and to us that it will take no official position on Megrahi's early release, but will leave the decision on early release - whether through compassionate release or the PTA - to the Scottish government, and the decision on the appeal to the Scottish courts. But HMG is also adamant that, despite devolution, London controls foreign policy for the UK, not Edinburgh. Added to the mix are Alex Salmond and his Scottish National Party, whose stated goal is an independent Scotland, with a referendum on the issue to be held in 2010; Salmond and the SNP will look for opportunities to exploit the Megrahi case for their own advantage. This is the first time HMG has had to deal with a foreign policy issue under devolution, Dixon said, and HMG is feeling its way forward, as are the Scottish; Logue told us that Scotland, for example, has never before granted compassionate release to a foreign national. We noted that while we understand the complexities of the issue for HMG, we need to find a channel for consultation and representation of USG views on the matter to the Scottish government, should we wish to, while taking HMG equities into account. Our HMG interlocutors agreed to explore options with us.
Comment: Devolution and Foreign Policy
---------------------------------------
9. (C/NF) This is the first time that HMG - and the USG - will face a foreign policy decision made under the constraints of devolution, and the channels that we establish now will set a precedent for future cases. In creating these channels, we will need to take into account sensitivities on the sides of both HMG and the Scottish Executive, while ensuring that whatever position we may want to convey in the Megrahi case gets to the right officials in a timely manner.
10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
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LEBARON
Monday, 24 August 2009, 14:05
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 001946
NOFORN
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE AND NEA/MAG
EO 12958 DECL: 08/24/2019
TAGS PREF, PTER, UK, LY
SUBJECT: SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT HOLDS EMERGENCY SESSION AS
DEBATE OVER MEGRAHI DECISION REACHES FEVER PITCH
REF: A. LONDON 1925 AND PREVIOUS B. STATE 80743
Classified By: Ambassador Louis B. Susman, reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C/NF) Summary. The Scottish Government severely underestimated the both USG and UK public reaction to its decision to grant compassionate release to convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi on August 20. Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond has privately indicated that he was "shocked" by FBI Director Mueller's public letter. The media continue to report U.S. anger over the decision, and concern Scotland will be targeted economically, through reduced U.S. tourism and whiskey boycotts. The media speculate that the UK Government had a hand in the deal to maintain good diplomatic relations with Libya and secure oil and gas deals, which the UK Government has denied as "completely wrong" and "offensive." Today (August 24), the Scottish Parliament meets to hear Scottish Justice Minister Kenny MacAskill's explanation of his decision. The media speculates that Scottish opposition parties, all of which are on record condemning the decision, may move against the Scottish National Party's (SNP) minority government in a vote of no confidence, though the two-thirds majority required to secure such a move would be very difficult to obtain. Prime Minister Gordon Brown has not yet made a statement on Megrahi's release, with other Cabinet members maintaining that it was a decision for the devolved Scottish Government. Given growing discontent and speculation about a UK Government hand in the deal, Brown may have to make a statement soon. Meanwhile, local Scottish opposition politicians are using the issue to call into question the SNP government's credibility and competence. End summary.
Reaction to USG Statements
--------------------------
2. (C/NF) The UK media have widely reported on FBI Director Mueller's letter to MacAskill and Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Mullen's comments on the Scottish Government's decision to grant compassionate release to convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi. Washington-based Scottish Government Representative Robin Naysmith told CG Edinburgh Sunday, August 24 that Scottish First Minister Salmond was "shocked" by Mueller's comments, which were "over the top" given that President Obama had already commented on the decision. Naysmith underscored that Scotland received "nothing" for releasing Megrahi (as has been widely suggested in the UK and U.S. media), while the UK Government has gotten everything - a chance to stick it to Salmond's Scottish National Party (SNP) and good relations with Libya. (NOTE: We expect Naysmith to be engaging heavily in Washington on these issues. END NOTE.)
3. (C/NF) The media have also reported growing concerns that American anger over the decision will translate into a boycott of Scottish whiskey and reduced American tourism in Scotland, an approximately USD 416 million business annually. In a previous meeting with CG Edinburgh on Friday, August 21, Salmond reiterated that he and his government "had played straight" with both the USG and UK Government, but implied that the UK Government had not. During the meeting, which occurred before the Mueller and Mullen statements, he said he wanted to move beyond the Megrahi issue and deepen Scotland's relationship with the USG. He said the Libyan Government had offered the Scottish Government "a parade of treats," all of which were turned down. (NOTE: Roughly fifty percent of Scottish exports go to the U.S., and over 450 U.S. businesses employ over 100,000 Scots in Scotland. END NOTE.)
4. (SBU) Scottish Government statements, including those from Salmond, have acknowledged the "strongly-held views of the American families," but underscored that those views are not shared by all of the victims' families (referring primarily to the British families). Salmond defended the decision, saying it was "right in terms of (the Scottish) legal system" and "what (they) are duty-bound to do." Salmond is also reported in the media to have said that the USG had made clear that, while it opposed Megrahi's release, it regarded freeing him on compassionate grounds "far preferable" to a transfer under the Prisoner Transfer Agreement (PTA). (NOTE: While indicating the USG's preference for compassionate release over a PTA transfer, as described in reftel B, Salmond's statement does not mention the USG's strong opposition to any release, particularly one that would allow Megrahi to travel outside of Scotland. END NOTE.)
Scottish Parliament Holds Emergency Session
-------------------------------------------
5. (SBU) The Scottish Parliament holds an emergency session Monday at 1430 local time (August 24), calling on Scottish Justice Minister Kenny MacAskill to explain his decision. All three opposition parties in Scotland (Labour, Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats) have condemned the minority Scottish National Party (SNP) government's decision to release Megrahi. The media openly speculate that a vote of no confidence will occur if MacAskill does not resign, but it would be difficult for opposition parties to garner the two-thirds majority required (87 of the 129 seats), if the SNP is able to maintain control of its 47 Members of Scottish Parliament (MSPs).
6. (SBU) Scottish opposition political figures, like Scottish Labour leader Iain Gray and former Scottish First Minister Jack McConnell, have condemned the decision to release Megrahi, calling it a "grave error of judgment." Scottish Liberal Democrat leader Tavis Scott said, "The SNP's credibility at home and abroad is in tatters. Scotland's must not be allowed to follow with it."
Compassionate Release for Oil and Gas?
--------------------------------------
7. (SBU) The UK media widely speculates that the UK Government had a hand in the decision to release Megrahi in order to maintain good diplomatic relations with the Libyans and to secure oil and gas deals, citing the now infamous 2004 "deal in the desert" between former PM Blair and Libyan leader Qaddafi, recent meetings and correspondence between PM Brown and "Muammar," a recent meeting between Business Secretary Lord Mandelson and Qaddafi's son Saif al-Islam, and other high-level trade delegations. Qaddafi's personal thanks to Brown, the Queen, and the British Government after embracing Megrahi in a televised statement have fanned the flames and increased calls for Brown to explain the UK's involvement in the decision-making process. Mandelson insisted to the media that it is "completely wrong" and "offensive" to suggest that Megrahi's release was linked to trade deals. A Foreign Office contact reiterated to Poloff August 24 that such speculation is "completely absurd." He acknowledged that the Libyans had raised Megrahi at every turn in their burgeoning diplomatic relationship, but said that Megrahi's release was "never directly or implicitly" linked to any deal.
UK Government Reaction
----------------------
8. (C/NF) Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who is currently on holiday in Scotland, has refrained from comment. Acting PM Chancellor Alistair Darling has said, "you either devolve the responsibility for criminal justice or you don't," a position that Foreign Secretary Miliband supported in interviews on Friday, August 21. Miliband affirmed that "the sight of a a mass-murderer getting a hero's welcome in Tripoli is deeply upsetting, deeply distressing." Conservative leader David Cameron has sent Brown a public message condemning the decision and calling on Brown to "make clear his own views" on the decision.
UK-Libya
--------
9. (C/NF) Foreign Office North Africa team leader Rob Dixon told Poloff August 24 that the UK has been telling the Libyan Government, through Saif al-Islam and the Foreign Ministry, that the Libyan Government's handling of its September 1 national day festivities will determine the future of the UK-Libya bilateral relationship. Dixon explained that the UK has explicitly told the Libyans that Megrahi should not be featured in any high-profile way. He said that the UK has also told the Libyans that Qaddafi's personal thanks to PM Brown and the Queen were "unhelpful" and the UK Government's "unhappiness" had been communicated "in clear terms." Dixon said the Foreign Office will take stock after the September 1 festivities.
UK-Scotland
-----------
10. (C/NF) Dixon termed "absurd" MacAskill's comment (in his original August 20 statement about Megrahi's release) that the UK Government's refusal to make representations was "highly regrettable." Referring to MacAskill's welcoming of a public inquiry into the case, Dixon said such an undertaking would be "nearly impossible" given the way devolution works. Dixon implied that the comments were designed to blame the UK Government for putting the Scots in a position to have to make a decision. Dixon told Poloff on August 24 that the Foreign Office had had no contact with the Scottish Government since the decision was announced.
Comment
-------
11. (C/NF) It is clear that the Scottish Government underestimated the blow-back it would receive in response to Megrahi's release and is now trying to paint itself as the victim. It seems likely, especially given the increasing speculation that the UK Government had a hand in the decision, that Prime Minister Brown will have to address the issue publicly. Meanwhile, local Scottish opposition politicians are trying to undercut the SNP minority government's credibility as much as possible.
12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
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SUSMAN
Wednesday, 28 October 2009, 13:58
C O N F I D E N T I A L DOHA 000644
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/28/2019
TAGS PREL, PTER, LY, UK, QA
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIAL: QATAR'S INVOLVEMENT IN AL-MEGRAHI
RELEASE STEMMED FROM ARAB LEAGUE REQUEST TO QATAR AS ARAB LEAGUE PRESIDENT
Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b and d).
--------------
(C) KEY POINTS
--------------
-- At an October 28 meeting with MFA Minister of State for International Cooperation Khalid Al-Attiyah, Ambassador raised strong USG concerns about Qatar's role in the release of convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdelbasit Al-Magrahi.
-- Al-Attiyah said that Qatar became involved because Qatar, as 2009 President of the Arab League, had been asked by the Arab League to do so. Al-Magrahi had also petitioned the Amir for help, but Al-Maghrahi's request was only a secondary factor, Al-Attiyah indicated.
-- Al-Attiyah, who was directly involved in the issue, stressed that Qatar had been very careful to abide by Scottish law.
-- When pressed by Ambassador over whether financial incentives were involved, Al-Attiyah replied "That is ridiculous. It was not necessary to offer money, and we did not."
------------
(C) COMMENTS
------------
-- The Amir does have a history of responding to personal appeals from abroad for mercy, whether from prisoners seeking amnesty or political exiles seeking a home. Doha has several notable exiles. Al-Attiyah's explanation of the appeal from Al-Megrahi as a motivating factor rings truthful, even if it was of secondary importance.
End Key Points and Comments.
1.(C) During an October 28 meeting with MFA Minister of State for International Cooperation Khalid Al-Attiyah, Ambassador raised the USG's strong objections to the August 20 release of convicted Lockerbie bomber Adbulbasit Al-Megrahi.
2. (C) Al-Attiyah, who played a direct role in the release, explained that Qatar became involved in the issue for two reasons: first and foremost, the Arab League had asked Qatar, in its capacity as the current chair of the Arab League, to seek Al-Megrahi's release on humanitarian grounds; second, Al-Megrahi had sent a personal letter to Amir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani pleading for humanitarian intervention.
3. (C) On the basis of these two factors, Al-Attiyah said he was dispatched to Scotland to meet with the Minister of Justice there. He made clear to the Minister that Qatar's efforts would be conducted entirely within the framework of the Scottish law on humanitarian release of prisoners judged to have just a short time to live. On the basis of that provision, he said, the Minister of Justice rejected Al-Megrahi's release under the Prisoner Transfer Agreement between the UK and Libya, but authorized it on humanitarian grounds.
4. (C) Ambassador pressed the issue of whether Qatar had offered any financial or trade incentives to induce Al-Megrahi's release. Al-Attiyah strongly dismissed such speculation, saying "That is ridiculous." It was not necessary to offer money. It was all done within Scottish law. We offered no money, investment, or payment of any kind. LeBaron
Thursday, 25 February 2010, 17:51
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 000450
SIPDIS
NEA/MAG FOR NARDI AND KALMBACH
EO 12958 DECL: 02/23/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, LY
SUBJECT: UK -LIBYA RELATIONS - IN LIMBO
REF: TRIPOLI 137
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Greg Berry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Poloff met with incoming Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) North Africa Director Philippa Saunders on February 23. During a conversation that focused almost entirely on Libya, Saunders explained that fear over how Tripoli will handle Megrahi's eventual funeral remains a major concern and one that HMG continues to raise regularly. Under the direction of FCO MENA Director Christian Turner the UK Embassy in Tripoli is currently engaged in an effort to identify all possible UK &levers of influence8 with Tripoli. Unfortunately, &there aren,t too many,8 although she mentioned Tony Blair and a private doctor who has a personal relationship with the Gaddafi family. The effort partially originated from the assumption that there will be &maybe a 48-hour window if we,re lucky8 between Megrahi,s eventual death and a funeral and the FCO wants to ensure HMG is in a position to act quickly.
2. (C) Saunders noted that there is "very little political appetite" for engaging with Libya at the moment, further contributing to the sense of being in a holding pattern. She noted that she and the new UK Ambassador designate, along with UK Embassy Tripoli, would be working on developing a new Libya strategy which she predicted would be ready to share with a possible new government following the upcoming UK General elections (expected May 6). Saunders predicted the strategy would likely present a spectrum of engagement possibilities and the various threats associated with each.
3. (C) Saunders, who has only been in her position for a few weeks, said that Libya has taken, and she believes will continue to take, the majority of her time. Summing up the relationship, she described it as being "in limbo" and "lacking clarity" on several fronts. She lamented that the Swiss visa crisis (reftel) was taking most their embassy's time, quickly adding her belief that the UK Embassy in Tripoli was closely engaged with our Embassy on the issue.
4. MINIMIZED CONSIDERED
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SUSMAN
Sunday, 23 August 2009, 13:34
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000686
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/PPD, AND EUR/WE
EO 12958 DECL: 8/23/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ASEC, CASC, KMDR, KPAO, UK, LY
SUBJECT: QADHAFI PERSONALLY WELCOMES LOCKERBIE BOMBER
REF: Tripoli 685
TRIPOLI 00000686 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi personally met and welcomed convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi in the latter's home in Sebha August 21. In press statements, Qadhafi thanked the Scottish government for its "courage and independence" despite "unnecessary and unacceptable pressure," and criticized the reaction of the "other side" as "double standard politics," "encroachment," and "arrogance and contempt." Qadhafi's public, personal involvement will make it extremely difficult for more pragmatic Libyan officials to try to manage the fallout from the mishandling of Megrahi's return. Separately, the UK Ambassador categorically denied Saif al-Islam's claims that the UK agreed to Megrahi's return in exchange for business deals, and said the UK was reconsidering its representation at the 40th anniversary of Qadhafi's coup September 1. End Summary.
MEGRAHI WELCOMED WITH A WARM EMBRACE
2. (SBU) Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi met convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Bassett al-Megrahi on August 21, in Megrahi's hometown of Sebha. [Note: Qadhafi had traveled to Sebha on August 19 to review some economic projects, and apparently stayed there until the August 21 meeting. End note.] The widely televised meeting, preceded by a warm embrace between Qadhafi and Megrahi, also included several poems expressing congratulations to Qadhafi on the 40th anniversary of the "Great al-Fatah Revolution," on the start of Ramadan, and for "the return home of brother, Abdel Basset al-Megrahi." Qadhafi delivered remarks to local and international press after his tete-a-tete with Megrahi, which he addressed to "friends" and "those who objected to these friends." Qadhafi thanked the Scottish Government, including the PM and FM, for their "courage," stating that they "have proven to be independent in spite of all unnecessary and unacceptable pressure they faced." He went on to thank his "friend Brown," the British Prime Minister, his government, Queen Elizabeth, and Prince Andrew, who "against all odds encouraged this brave decision." Qadhafi noted that the UK efforts would positively affect "exchange" between the two countries.
3. (SBU) Addressing "the other side," Qadhafi derided comments that the USG had made concerning the sensitivity of Megrahi's release to the families of Lockerbie victims, stating "Are we without feelings, and they have feelings? Are we donkeys and they are humans?" Qadhafi referred to the U.S. opposition to Megrahi's release as "double standard politics," calling it "encroachment" and "arrogance" and "contempt for other nations, their public opinion, and humanity." Qadhafi further stated that the U.S. position was responsible for injustice and terrorism. He said, "Terrorism has its justifications, which is double standard politics."
MEGRAHI'S RELEASE AND UK BUSINESS DEALS
4. (C/NF) On August 20 Qadhafi's son and potential successor to the throne, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi issued a statement through his quasi-governmental organization, the Qadhafi International and Charity Foundation, praising his own efforts and success in achieving Megrahi's release from prison. He thanked the Scottish and British governments and stated that the friendship between Libya and both nations would be "forever consolidated." Saif al-Islam went on to address the families of Lockerbie victims, saying that although Megrahi withdrew his appeal, his innocence would one day be proved. During Saif al-Islam's remarks to his new television station "Al Mutawassit" August 20, which were reprinted August 21 in state-owned newspaper "Oya," he linked Megrahi's release to UK business contracts, asserting that Megrahi's case was raised during all negotiations of UK-Libya commercial, oil, and gas deals. Saif al-Islam implied that former UK PM Tony Blair had raised Megrahi with the Libyan leader in connection with lucrative business deals during Blair's 2007 visit to Libya. [Note: Rumors that Blair made linkages between Megrahi's release and trade deals have been longstanding among Embassy contacts. End note.] The UK Ambassador in Tripoli categorically denied the claims during a conversation with the Charge August 21. He also stated that the British government was reconsidering its decision to send Prince Andrew to September 1 events in Libya.
PREPARING FOR A GRANDER AFFAIR?
5. (C) While the Qadhafi family and government officials have not had any public interaction with or comment on Megrahi since the September 21 meeting, banners are being unfurled in Tripoli's Green Square - the site of the upcoming 40th anniversary celebrations - hailing Megrahi's homecoming and the Libyan leader's support of his release. Rumors among Embassy contacts suggest that Megrahi will be honored officially by Qadhafi during the 40th anniversary events. The state-run "Al Watan" website claimed that the Libyan People's Congress would award Megrahi a medal of honor for his "bravery and patience" in turning himself over to the "states of international arrogance" for the sake of his nation.
6. (C) Comment: Qadhafi's personal, warm welcome of Megrahi and strongly worded statement critical of U.S. opposition to Megrahi's release are a powerful indication of the importance that Qadhafi attaches to the issue. Qadhafi likely viewed Megrahi's return as vital to his own domestic politics: a boon to the influential Megrahi tribe and, more importantly, a major victory for the hardliners who have been critical of his engagement with the West. Qadhafi's very public, personal involvement in this issue will complicate the efforts of pragmatic Libyan officials seeking to manage the fallout from Megrahi's return, as they now have very little political cover to make the case for a muted response. We continue to monitor the situation. End Comment. POLASCHIK
Sunday, 16 August 2009, 15:40
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000663
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG, EUR/WE, H, AND L
EO 12958 DECL: 8/16/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, UK, LY
SUBJECT: CONFLICTING MESSAGES ON PENDING RELEASE OF ABDEL BASSETT
AL-MEGRAHI
REF: TRIPOLI 662
TRIPOLI 00000663 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa told the British Ambassador August 15 that convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Bassett al Megrahi is a very ill man, too ill for anything but a quiet return to his family. While the British Ambassador, who had raised the Megrahi case on instructions from London, was encouraged by Kusa's comments, he also noted that only one man -- Muammar al-Qadhafi -- would decide Megrahi's true reception in Libya. Building on Qadhafi's comments to CODEL McCain (ref), the Executive Director of the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) told us August 16 that the Libyan Government "as a democracy" could not control any spontaneous demonstrations by the people in support of Megrahi's return. The Libyan Government may be gearing up for a two-pronged approach on Megrahi's return: an official policy of no celebrations, coupled with a disingenuous denial of any involvement in "spontaneous" celebrations that could erupt upon Megrahi's return. It may be useful to engage Foreign Minister Musa Kusa on this issue. End summary.
UK AMBASSADOR: MUSA KUSA INDICATES A QUIET RETURN
2. (C) UK Ambassador Sir Vincent Fean told the Charge August 15 that he had met Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa earlier on the same day, on instructions from London, to discuss the potential release from a Scottish prison of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Bassett al Megrahi. Stressing that he had addressed the issue as a hypothetical scenario, Fean said that he had urged the Libyan Government to handle Megrahi's possible release in a very low-profile manner. According to Fean, Kusa responded that Megrahi is a very sick man, and is too ill for anything but a quiet return to his family. While the British Ambassador interpreted Kusa's response as positive, he also noted that only one man -- Muammar al-Qadhafi -- would determine Megrahi's true reception in Libya. He expects to receive a personal letter from Prime Minister Gordon Brown to Qadhafi on this issue, for delivery this week.
3. (C) The British Ambassador expressed relief that Megrahi likely would be returned to Libya under the compassionate release program. He noted that a refusal of Megrahi's request could have had disastrous implications for British interests in Libya. "They could have cut us off at the knees, just like the Swiss," Fean bluntly said. He also expressed hope that the Megrahi issue would not have a negative impact on U.S.-UK relations, commenting that "we have lots of other issues on the agenda right now." The Ambassador stressed that he had no further information on timing for Megrahi's possible release but said that he expected a decision "soon."
QADHAFI FOUNDATION: THE PEOPLE WILL DECIDE HOW MEGRAHI IS RECEIVED
4. (C) During an August 16 meeting, QDF Executive Director Yusuf Sawani passionately argued on behalf of Megrahi's right to receive compassionate release from the Scottish judicial system. Stating that "everyone in Libya was more than surprised by the official USG reaction on the issue," he argued that the United States, as a civilized, democratic nation, should not stand in the way of an official decision made by the Scottish judicial system. He described the U.S. justice system as infamous for making mistakes and jailing innocent people but emphasized that even convicted criminals were entitled to certain rights within the U.S. legal system. Referring to CODEL McCain's recent press statements, he said that he understood that U.S. congressmen must respond to the positions of their constituencies, but he did not understand why members of the U.S. Administration would object to Megrahi's release on compassionate grounds. He accused the U.S. Administration of attempting to interfere politically with the Scottish judicial system, in an effort to exact "revenge" on Megrahi for his crimes.
5. (C) The Charge reminded Sawani that the U.S. position remained unchanged: while we will not interfere in the Scottish procedures, we continue to believe that Megrahi should serve out the remainder of his life sentence in a Scottish prison. Noting that the repatriation of Megrahi was recently unveiled by the QDF as one of its three priority objectives, the Charge strongly urged Sawani and the QDF to treat Megrahi's potential return in a low-key manner. Sawani expressed agreement that the official Libyan Government response to a Megrahi release should be quiet, but he insisted that the Libyan people would ultimately decide how to react to Megrahi's return. Although he denied that the QDF would play any role in organizing any demonstrations in support of Megrahi, Sawani asked heatedly whether the U.S. would demand that the Libyan Government set up barricades and send police to quell demonstrations in honor of Megrahi's return. "No one can object to Libyans expressing their feelings if Megrahi comes back," he said, "this is democracy." Sawani warned that U.S. objections to Megrahi's release would resurrect Libyans' former views of the U.S. as a "tyrant nation," to which the Charge responded that a hero's welcome for Megrahi undoubtedly would elicit a similarly strong reaction among the American people. Sawani conceded that it would be important for both sides to carefully manage this extremely sensitive issue.
6. (C) Comment: Based on comments from Kusa and Sawani, the Libyan Government may be gearing up for a two-pronged approach on Megrahi's return: an official policy of no celebrations, coupled with a disingenuous denial of any involvement in "spontaneous" celebrations that could erupt upon Megrahi's return. The latter scenario makes sense in the context of Muammar and Muatassim al-Qadhafi's comments to CODEL McCain that the GOL could not prevent the Libyan people from giving Megrahi a hero's welcome (ref). Given Foreign Minister Musa Kusa's pragmatic understanding of the broader strategic interests at stake, it may be useful to engage him on this issue. End comment POLASCHIK
Wednesday, 28 January 2009, 17:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000065
NOFORN
SIPDIS
LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR WALLER
EO 12958 DECL: 1/28/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, LY, UK
SUBJECT: PAN AM BOMBER AL-MEGRAHI: THE VIEW FROM TRIPOLI
REF: A) LONDON 209, B) 06 TRIPOLI 0055, C) 08 TRIPOLI 994
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C/NF) Summary: While Libya has a number of other pressing foreign policy issues on its plate, the case of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdelbasset al-Megrahi is arguably the regime's most sensitive political subject, in part because it involves a firm timeline in the form of the ailing el-Megrahi's approaching death. Through remarks by senior officials suggesting that al-Megrahi is innocent and a steady diet of publicity about his case, the regime has limited its room for political maneuver. U.K. Embassy interlocutors here are planning for a scenario in which the U.K.-Libya Prisoner Transfer Agreement is ratified in early March and the GOL makes application shortly thereafter for al-Megrahi's transfer to Libya. The U.K. Embassy expects a sharply negative GOL reaction if al-Megrahi dies in prison or if the Scottish Executive and/or FCO oppose his transfer. The U.K. Embassy has recommended dramatic pre-emptive measures, to include drawing down their mission in Tripoli, if either of those possibilities occurs. If the USG publicly opposes al-Megrahi's release - or is perceived to be complicit in a decision that results in al-Megrahi remaining in prison - the U.S. Embassy and private Americans in Libya could face similar consequences. End summary.
AL-MEGRAHI'S CASE IS THE GOL'S MOST SENSITIVE AT PRESENT
2. (C/NF) Consistent with information reported reftel, U.K. Emboffs here have interpreted the lengthy and repeated visits to the U.K. by MFA A/S-equivalent for European Affairs Abdulati Obeidi and External Security Organization Director Musa Kusa in connection with the matter of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdelbasset al-Megrahi as reflecting the great political importance the GOL attaches to successfully resolving (from the GOL's perspective) the case. Contacts here have told us that Ahmed el-Msellati, a senior regime legal adviser/fixer who played a pivotal role in finalizing and implementing the U.S.-Libya claims compensation agreement, has also visited the U.K. to consult with al-Megrahi's defense team and FCO officials. While the GOL has a number of other pressing foreign policy issues on its plate - moving forward with re-established U.S.-Libya ties, reacting to the Gaza crisis, managing its role as the only current Arab member of the UNSC, mediating between Chad and Sudan, resolving its contretemps with the Swiss, and initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa - al-Megrahi's case is arguably the most critical and sensitive political subject at present. That is so because the regime has widely publicized developments in his case and because, unlike other foreign policy priorities, al-Megrahi's situation involves an immutable timeline in the form of his approaching death from cancer. In media interviews last August, senior regime figure Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi said al-Megrahi was innocent and that Libya had accepted responsibility for Pan Am 103 and allowed al-Megrahi and co-defendant al-Amin Khalifah Fhima to be tried in order to facilitate Libya's re-assimilation into the international community after years of isolation under international sanctions. Those comments, together with a steady diet of articles in Libyan state-owned newspapers about al-Megrahi's case and the travails of his family in Glasgow, have raised expectations among ordinary Libyans that the regime will secure his release, and have limited the GOL's room for political maneuver.
U.K. EMBASSY FOCUSED ON TRANSFER UNDER PTA AND SECURITY POSTURE
3. (C/NF) U.K. Embassy interlocutors here tell us they are planning for a scenario in which the U.K.-Libya Prisoner Transfer Agreement (PTA) is ratified in early March and the GOL makes application shortly thereafter for al-Megrahi's transfer to Libya. They do not anticipate that GOL officials will pursue another application for bail, and said they had no information from the FCO to suggest that al-Megrahi's application for compassionate release, which was denied in November, would be re-submitted in light of his deteriorating medical condition. U.K. Emboffs began consulting with us in December about deliberations concerning their security posture and tripwires for action should al-Megrahi die in Scottish prison. Consistent with information reported reftel, GOL officials have warned U.K. Emboffs in demarches here that the consequences for the U.K.-Libya bilateral relationship would be "dire" were al-Megrahi to die in Scottish prison. Specific threats have included the immediate cessation of all U.K. commercial activity in Libya, a diminishment or severing of political ties and demonstrations against official U.K. facilities. GOL officials also implied, but did not directly state, that the welfare of U.K. diplomats and citizens in Libya would be at risk.
4. (C/NF) Citing demonstrations in Benghazi against the Italian consulate in 2006 that rapidly turned violent (ref B) and the quick curtailment of direct air links in the ongoing Swiss-Libyan dispute (ref C), the U.K. Embassy has reportedly recommended to London that the following pre-emptive measures be taken immediately if al-Megrahi were to die in prison or if the transfer under the PTA were to be denied: 1) close the British School; 2) close the British Council; 3) issue a travel advisory/warden message-equivalent advising British nationals to exercise extreme caution and/or leave Libya; and 4) draw the U.K. mission down to only essential personnel. The failure of Switzerland and Libya to resolve the dispute prompted by the arrest of Muammar al-Qadhafi's son, Hannibal, last July has convinced U.K. Emboffs that the consequences if al-Megrahi were to die in prison or if the transfer under the PTA were denied would be harsh, immediate and not easily remedied.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS
5. (C/NF) If the USG publicly opposes al-Megrahi's release (or is perceived to be complicit in a decision to keep al-Megrahi in prison), Post judges that U.S. interests could face similar consequences, including regime-orchestrated demonstrations against the Embassy, retaliation against U.S. business interests and possible obstruction of the travel of official and private Americans, as occurred in the case of the Swiss. (Note: Unlike recent demonstrations against the Swiss (Swiss-Libyan dispute) and Egyptian embassies (in connection with Gaza), in which the regime mustered crowds that dutifully went through the paces, al-Megrahi's case is a genuinely emotive one for ordinary Libyans; demonstrations would likely be more energetic and harder for the GOL to control. End note.) Some variation of that scenario is possible, though not as likely, if al-Megrahi were to die in prison without the USG having declared a position. The fact that the GOL did not orchestrate and apparently did not sanction protests against U.S. facilities in connection with events in Gaza gives cause for cautious optimism that the GOL might distinguish between U.S. and U.K. interests in such a case, although the GOL essentially views the Pan Am 103 case as a joint U.S.-U.K. issue.
6. (C/NF) Comment: Despite the GOL's strategic decision in 2003 to take steps to facilitate its acceptance back into the community of nations, the regime remains essentially thuggish in its approach, particularly on issues it perceives to involve domestic political equities. The over-reaction of Muammar al-Qadhafi to what amounted to a matter of pride involving a verbal spat with then-Crown Prince Abdullah at the 2003 Arab League Summit, together with the more recent deterioration of Swiss-Libyan ties, are illustrative of what may happen should al-Megrahi die in prison. The regime understands that we have equities in this case: on the margins of the former Secretary's visit to Tripoli in September, senior regime figure Abdullah Sanussi asked former NEA A/S David Welch to influence Pan Am 103 families not to oppose al-Megrahi's transfer (Welch demurred). The issue of al-Megrahi is sensitive enough for the regime that there may be repercussions for our interests here even if we remain neutral; there will almost certainly be consequences if we publicly take a position opposing his transfer. By contrast with the Swiss problem, which is seen as an issue over the reprehensible behavior of Hannibal al-Qadhafi, al-Megrahi is effectively viewed as something of a folks hero in the eyes of the regime and many ordinary Libyans. End comment. CRETZ
Monday, 11 May 2009, 10:50
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RIYADH 000651
SIPDIS
NOFORN
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP (JHARRIS), R (MARK DAVIDSON), NEA/PPD (WALTER
DOUGLAS)
EO 12958 DECL: 10/20/2050
TAGS PGOV, PHUM, PTER, ECON KISL, SA
SUBJECT: IDEOLOGICAL AND OWNERSHIP TRENDS IN THE SAUDI MEDIA
Classified By: CDA David Rundell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary: The Saudi regulatory system offers the al-Saud regime a means to manipulate the nation's print media to promote its own agenda without exercising day-to-day oversight over journalists, and Saudi journalists are free to write what they wish provided they do not criticize the ruling family or expose government corruption. In addition, most media in Saudi Arabia--print and electronic--are owned by royal family members, and accordingly self-censorship is the order of the day. In comparison to a few years ago, however, the media business in Saudi Arabia is dynamic, fueled by increased demand by Saudi and pan-Arab audiences, new licensing agreements with US and other international media, and an unprecedented level of openness to outside ideas.
2.In interviews with Embassy and Consulate Jeddah officers before the early December Eid holiday, XXXXXXXXXXXX editors and XXXXXXXXXXXX TV managers outlined key elements of these trends and adumbrated how the long hand of the al-Saud--motivated by profit and politics--retains a strong hold over media in this sophisticated new environment, through means ranging from refined Interior Ministry procedures for recalcitrant journalists, to directives by King Abdallah himself to adopt progressive perspectives as an antidote to extremist thinking. End summary.
//Family Business?//
3. (S) Embassy press officers met recently XXXXXXXXXXXX. According to Shuaa Capital, a Gulf-based financial services firm, SRMG is the largest publisher in the country, with a global readership well in excess of 180 million and an aggregate market share of 46.1%.
4. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Prince Waleed bin Talal, he told us, now owns 35% of SMRG, with "private investors" controlling the rest. Financial reports we acquired list Saudi businessman Mohammed Hussein Ali al-Amoudi as owning 57.70% of SRMG at the beginning of 2008, which on paper would give him (and others he may represent) control of this powerful media concern.
5. (S/NF) It is worth noting, however, that other Saudi editors we've spoken to always refer to the Saudi Research and Marketing Group as being "owned" by Prince Salman, despite the fact that XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that he is not a shareholder and the official holdings of XXXXXXXXXXXX amount to only ten percent of the company. When this was noted by emboff to one of our press contacts, he told us that it was well-known that Prince Salman owns SRMG and controls its direction through his son Faisal.
//New Direction//
6. (S)XXXXXXXXXXXX is representative of a trend we have noted in all media here: the increase of well-educated, relatively pro-US Saudis in editorial positions. Technocratically-minded with a journalism degree from a US university, XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that the entire SRMG organization has been directed to adopt a "professional, western-style approach" to the media that would both increase revenue and reinforce "modern ideas" that the SAG leadership wishes to purvey as an antidote to extremist ideology.
7. (SBU) Although originally founded as an economic daily, "Al Eqtisadiah" has long been equally known for its political content, often printing editorials and opinion harshly critical of the US on a number of fronts. XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that XXXXXXXXXXXX recently had a three-hour discussion with one of Rupert Murdoch's sons on a deal to publish an Arabic-language version of the Wall Street Journal, and that SRMG is trying to win a contract to publish the International Herald Tribune (uncensored, he emphasized) in Saudi Arabia. XXXXXXXXXXXX
RIYADH 00000651 002 OF 004
//The MBC Group//
8. (S) A similar ideological and ownership pattern characterizes the hugely-successful Middle East Broadcasting (MBC) group, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX.
9. (S/NF) During a visit to the US Embassy in November for a visa in preparation for the King's UNGA and White House summit meetings, XXXXXXXXXXXX told press officer that while MBC is owned by King Fahd's brother-in-law (the non-royal Waleed bin Ibrahim al-Ibrahim), fifty percent of the profits of the MBC empire go to King Fahd's youngest son (and al-Ibrahim's maternal nephew) Abdulaziz bin Fahd. XXXXXXXXXXXX on issues relating to al-Arabiya and other MBC channels. When asked if the thirty-something prince was interested only in the profits of the station, or if he also took an active role in the ideological direction of al-Arabiya, XXXXXXXXXXXX whispered with a grimace, "Both."
10. (S/NF) In a meeting at his XXXXXXXXXXXX office XXXXXXXXXXXX with Consulate and Embassy press officers, XXXXXXXXXXXX because of the SAG's concern that young Saudis were particularly vulnerable to the calls of extremists, and that the station now targets its moderate news broadcasts to the 14-18 year old demographic in short presentations of three minutes or less. He also said that the stations website, Arabiya Net, appeals to a pan-Arab audience and gets about 100,000 visitors per day. Al Arabiya and other MBC channels, he said, present programming that they hope counters the influence of al-Jazeera and fosters "moderate" perspectives among the country's youth.
//David Letterman, Agent of Influence//
11. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said the American programming on channels 4 and 5 were proving the most popular among Saudis. A look at the December 17 programming menu for MBC channel 4 reveals a 24-hour solid block of such programs as CBS and ABC Evening News, David Letterman, Desperate Housewives, Friends and similar fare, all uncensored and with Arabic subtitles. Channel 5 features US films of all categories, also with Arabic subtitles. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that this programming is also very popular in remote, conservative corners of the country, where he said "you no longer see Bedouins, but kids in western dress" who are now interested in the outside world.
12. (S) Over coffee in a Jeddah Starbucks, XXXXXXXXXXXX, and XXXXXXXXXXXX elaborated on the changes in the Saudi media environment. "The government is pushing this new openness as a means of countering the extremists," XXXXXXXXXXXX told Riyadh press officer. "It's still all about the War of Ideas here, and the American programming on MBC and Rotana is winning over ordinary Saudis in a way that 'Al Hurra' and other US propaganda never could. Saudis are now very interested in the outside world, and everybody wants to study in the US if they can. They are fascinated by US culture in a way they never were before."
13. (S) So effective has US programming been, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, that it is widely assumed that the USG must be behind it. Some believe, he said, that Prince Talal's relationship with Rupert Murdoch's News Corp and its sister company Twentieth Century Fox has a clear ideological motive behind it, noting that the Fox Movie Channel on "Rotana" is available for free to anyone with a satellite dish. Both XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX, liberal-minded supporters of US democracy and society with little use for conspiracy theory, clearly believed this was the case.
14. (S) While revenue from commercials on Rotana's Fox Movie Channel probably matter more to Prince Waleed than the dissemination of western ideas (MBC and Rotana are in a bitter battle for market share) it is easy to understand why XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX believe that this programming is having a profound effect on the values and worldviews of Saudi audiences. During the recent Eid holiday, Rotana's "Fox Movies" channel repeatedly aired two mawkish US dramas (again with Arabic subtitles) featuring respectful, supportive American husbands dealing with spouses suffering from addiction problems--in one case gambling (lost the kids' college funds and then told her college professor husband it was because he was boring) and the other alcohol (smashing cars and china when she
RIYADH 00000651 003 OF 004
wasn't assaulting the husband and child.) These films and others broadcast over the Eid offer models of supportive behavior in relationships, as well as exemplary illustrations of heroic honesty in the face of corruption ("Michael Clayton") and respect for the law over self-interest ("Insomnia.")
15. (C) Saudi-produced religious programming on ART and Rotana also departs from past models. Rotana's popular religious channel "Al Risala" features a hip, clean-shaven Saudi in western clothes offering practical religious advice in a calm and friendly manner. Jeddah-based Arab Radio and Television company (ART) (owned by Saleh al-Kamel and according to our contacts being edged aside by MBC and Rotana) recently featured an MTV-style music video clip on its "Iqraa" religious channel depicting a group of dissolute young Saudi men who give up their carousing and return to observance. They are then shown succeeding in sales presentations and other interactions at work, gaining the admiration of their colleagues and supervisors. The young men continue to dress in standard attire, remain clean-shaven and are fully integrated into normal, workaday Saudi society. The message of moderation in the religious realm could not be clearer.
//The Idol//
16. (S) The Kingdom's chattering classes aren't the only ones noticing the movement towards moderation and rapprochement with the outside world that is reflected in print and television media. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that religious conservatives call the Saudi newspaper "Al-Watan" (owned by Prince Khaled al-Faisal) "Al-Wathan"--the idol. XXXXXXXXXXXX said his network is referred to as XXXXXXXXXXXX, and that pan-Arab daily "Al Sharq al Awsat," with its distinctive green-colored pages, is known as "Khadraa al Domon"--"green plant from the dung heap," a metaphor from one of Prophet's hadiths warning young men of feminine corruption wrapped in meretricious allure.
17. (S) Extremist elements, said all of these contacts, have been largely deprived of their public voice in the media and on television, but remain a diminished but still potent force in Saudi Arabia. When reporting officer noted the enormous security progress that allowed him to sit outside a crowded Starbucks less than two blocks away from the Jeddah Consulate--something that would have been unthinkable two years earlier--XXXXXXXXXXXX shook his head. "You (Americans) still have to be careful. They're still out there," he said, referring to violent extremists.
//Okaz//
18. (S) In a meeting with Jeddah CG and XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX was blunt when asked about SAG efforts in countering extremist thinking. "King Abdallah was here," he said, pointing around his well-appointed office XXXXXXXXXXXX in Jeddah. "He told us that conservative elements in Saudi society do not understand true Islam, and that people needed to be educated" on the subject. King Abdallah, he said, used a metaphor of a donkey to explain how the religious police use the wrong approach. "They take a stick and hit you with it, saying 'Come donkey, it's time to pray.' How does that help people behave like good Muslims?" XXXXXXXXXXXX quoted the king as saying.
19. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX also told us that he had taken over the XXXXXXXXXXXX establishment only two months ago at the direction of the Minister of Information, and that one of his first orders of business was to enact dramatic cuts in the sprawling editorial division. It was clear by the direction of the conversation that XXXXXXXXXXXX, intends to make sure that the paper falls in line with the SAG's message.
//The Stick//
20. (S/NF) Although all chief editor positions in Saudi Arabia must
RIYADH 00000651 004 OF 004
be approved by the Minister of Information, it is the job of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to take action against editors and writers who refuse to follow government directives and policies. In the past, the MOI played a largely reactive role in this regard through its Supreme Information Council, which would discuss questionable material and order editors to be scolded or fired, or at times ban publication of the paper for a certain period of time.
21. (S/NF) According to our contacts, however, a more effective system is in place. Instead of being fired or seeing their publications shut down, editors now are fined SR 40,000 ($10,600) out of their own salaries for each objectionable piece that appears in their newspaper. Journalists, too, are held to account. Instead of the Supreme Information Council in Riyadh taking the lead in tracking what journalists write, there are now MOI committees in each Saudi city that know their community well and have a keen ear for who is talking about what. If these MOI operatives detect a problematic pattern in a journalist's writing (or even hear through channels that he or she is heading down a certain line of inquiry), they will invite the journalist for a chat, during which they will discuss the origin of these perspectives, suggest alternative approaches, ask after the family, etc.,.. These mechanisms, our contacts say, have been very effective in reining in media opinion that the SAG doesn't like.
//Al-Hayat and Khaled bin Sultan//
22. (S/NF) One of the exceptions to the talking-point consistency of most Saudi media is pan-Arab daily "Al-Hayat," which is owned by Deputy Defense Minister Khaled bin Sultan. XXXXXXXXXXXX.
23. (S/NF) When this rather more dynamic editorial environment at "Al-Hayat" was noted to XXXXXXXXXXXX he told us that Khaled bin-Sultan actually does not involve himself in the workings of the paper, provided it never criticizes the royal family or SAG policy. Al-Hayat, he explained, has more credibility in the Arab world than rival Al-Sharq al-Awsat, and had to be more daring than other Saudi print media. "Besides," said XXXXXXXXXXXX, "information is power for the al-Saud, and owning Al-Hayat gives Khaled bin Sultan more influence in the family."
24. (S) Comment: In keeping with other initiatives such as the Interfaith Dialogue and plans for educational reform, the SAG has clearly made a strategic decision to open the country to outside opinion, perspectives and culture to root out the vestiges of the extremist ideology and vision that threatened their rule. At the same time, they have refined their methods of control over editors and journalists in an effort to control the spread of these and other dissident ideas. End comment.
Rundell
Wednesday, 18 November 2009, 16:58
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JEDDAH 000443
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/PPD
EO 12958 DECL: 10/31/2014
TAGS SA, SCUL, SOCI, ZR, KISL
SUBJECT: UNDERGROUND PARTY SCENE IN JEDDAH: SAUDI YOUTH
FROLIC UNDER "PRINCELY PROTECTION"
REF: A. JEDDAH 0292 B. JEDDAH 0079
JEDDAH 00000443 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Consul General Martin R. Quinn for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d)
1. (C) Summary: Behind the facade of Wahabi conservatism in the streets, the underground nightlife for Jeddah's elite youth is thriving and throbbing. The full range of worldly temptations and vices are available -- alcohol, drugs, sex -- but strictly behind closed doors. This freedom to indulge carnal pursuits is possible merely because the religious police keep their distance when parties include the presence or patronage of a Saudi royal and his circle of loyal attendants, such as a Halloween event attended by ConGenOffs on October 29. Over the past few years, the increased conservatism of Saudi Arabia's external society has pushed the nightlife and party scene in Jeddah even further underground. End summary.
Elite party like the rest of the world,
---------------------------------------
just underground
-----------------
2. (C) Along with over 150 young Saudis (men and women mostly in their 20's and early 30's), ConGenOffs accepted invitations to an underground Halloween party at XXXXXXXXXXXX residence in Jeddah on XXXXXXXXXXXX. Inside the gates, past the XXXXXXXXXXXX security guards and after the abaya coat-check, the scene resembled a nightclub anywhere outside the Kingdom: plentiful alcohol, young couples dancing, a DJ at the turntables, and everyone in costume. Funding for the party came from a corporate sponsor, XXXXXXXXXXXX as well as from the XXXXXXXXXXXX host himself.
Royalty, attended by "khawi," keep religious police at bay
--------------------------------------------- -------------
3. (C) Religious police/CPVPV (Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice) were nowhere to be seen and while admission was controlled through a strictly-enforced guest list, the partygoers were otherwise not shy about publicizing the affair. According to a young Saudi from a prominent Jeddah merchant family, the Saudis try to throw parties at princes' houses or with princes in attendance, which serves as sufficient deterrent to interference by the CPVPV. There are over 10,000 princes in the Kingdom, albeit at various levels and gradations -- "Royal Highnesses" ("Saheb Al Sumou Al Maliki") signified by direct descent from King Abdulaziz, and mere "Highnesses" ("Saheb Al Sumou") from less direct branches of the Al Saud ruling family. XXXXXXXXXXXX. Although XXXXXXXXXXXX is XXXXXXXXXXXX not in line for the throne, he still enjoys the perks of a mansion, luxury car, lifetime stipend, and security entourage. (Note: Most of XXXXXXXXXXXX's security forces were XXXXXXXXXXXX. It is common practice for Saudi princes to grow up with hired bodyguards from Nigeria or other African nations who are of similar age and who remain with the prince well into adulthood. They are called "khawi," derived from the Arabic word "akh," meaning "brother." The lifetime spent together creates an intense bond of loyalty. End note.)
Availability of black market alcohol, prostitutes, and drugs
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
4. (C) Alcohol, though strictly prohibited by Saudi law and custom, was plentiful at the party's well-stocked bar, well-patronized by Halloween revellers. The hired Filipino bartenders served a cocktail punch using "sadiqi," a locally-made "moonshine." While top-shelf liquor bottles were on display throughout the bar area, the original contents were reportedly already consumed and replaced by sadiqi. On the black market, a bottle of Smirnoff can cost 1,500 riyals when available, compared to 100 riyals for the locally-made vodka. It was also learned through word-of-mouth that a number of the guests were in fact "working girls," not uncommon for such parties.
JEDDAH 00000443 002.2 OF 002
Additionally, though not witnessed directly at this event, cocaine and hashish use is common in these social circles and has been seen on other occasions.
5. (C) Comment: Saudi youth get to enjoy relative social freedom and indulge fleshly pursuits, but only behind closed doors -- and only the rich. Parties of this nature and scale are believed to be a relatively recent phenomenon in Jeddah. One contact, a young Saudi male, explained that up to a few years ago, the only weekend activity was "dating" inside the homes of the affluent in small groups. It is not uncommon in Jeddah for the more lavish private residences to include elaborate basement bars, discos, entertainment centers and clubs. As one high society Saudi remarked, "The increased conservatism of our society over these past years has only moved social interaction to the inside of people's homes." End comment. QUINN
Thursday, 28 February 2008, 13:07
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000146
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, EEB/TFS; TREASURY FOR LEVEY/GLASER; NSC
FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO
EO 12958 DECL: 02/28/2028
TAGS ECON, EFIN, EINV, KCOR, PGOV, SY, LE
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: REACTIONS TO MAKHLUF DESIGNATION
REF: A. DAMASCUS 126 B. DAMASCUS 70 C. DAMASCUS 54
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4(b,d)
This is a corrected copy of DAMASCUS 142 -- deleted extra word in the comment.
1. (S) Summary: The February 21 designation of Rami Makhluf pursuant to E.O. 13460 generated considerable discussion, but Syrian media coverage has been minimal. Makhluf's defiant announcement on BBC Arabic radio that the designation was tantamount to a medal of honor was as close to an official reaction as we have seen. Human rights contacts overwhelmingly supported the action. A few Syrian websites reporting the designation generated comments that generally denounced corruption and favored the action, but roughly 30 percent of the postings had positive things to say about Makhluf. Business and other reactions were mixed, with some saying the timing of the designation could not have been better, while others suggested the USG action was a desperate political act that failed to achieve anything significant. We nonetheless detected uncertainty about what the designation could mean for Rami's partners and his foreign-based assets. End Summary
----------------------------------------
MAKHLUF REACTS WITH BRAVADO ON BBC RADIO
----------------------------------------
2. (SBU) The February 21 designation of Rami Makhluf hit Damascus on the eve of the Syrian weekend and thus generated little initial media reaction. Two days after Washington's announcement, Rami took to the airwaves of BBC Arabic Radio to respond, calling the designation "a medal we hang on our chest" as part of a "political ploy aimed at undermining important (Syrian) individuals." He added, "They accuse us of corruption, while we are among the group that is working to invest the most in Syria." Discounting the impact of the designation, Makhluf claimed that he had no assets in the U.S. "Only a fool would invest in America," he said. "We were expecting such a decision to be issued over a year ago, but they were late." Although FM Muallem responded publicly when the E.O. was first announced on February 13, there thus far has been no official SARG reaction to the Makhluf designation.
--------------------------------------------- --
SERENDIPITOUS TIMING AMPLIFIES IMPACT ON REGIME
--------------------------------------------- --
3. (S) Coming just a week after the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, and during a period of rising tensions with Saudi Arabia and the West, the timing of the Makhluf designation amplified its impact on the regime. Contacts report that Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) and General Intelligence Directorate (GID) officials are currently engaged in an internecine struggle to blame each other for the breach of security that resulted in Mughniyeh's death. In recent days, the Saudi-sponsored Sharq al-Awsat published scathing articles suggesting that Syria is not worthy of hosting the upcoming Arab summit. Additionally, President Mubarak has publicly linked Syrian policy in Lebanon to Egypt's
DAMASCUS 00000146 002 OF 004
participation in the Arab League summit, and Syrians are increasingly concerned about the direction Lebanon is heading. Thus, in the conspiracy-fueled streets of Damascus, our sources indicated that the Makhluf designation seemed to be a well-timed ratcheting-up of pressure on the regime.
--------------------------------------------
EDUCATED SYRIANS AND CIVIL SOCIETY CELEBRATE
--------------------------------------------
4. (S) The designation resonated on the Syrian "street" among middle class followers of international media, many of whom quietly celebrated Makhluf's public humiliation as a long-overdue comeuppance. The website "Syrianews" covered Makhluf's response on BBC, and approximately 70 percent of readers' comments to the article were anti-Makhluf. "As for Santa Claus Makhluf who is showering us with his deeds," wrote one, "could he explain to us where did he bring his first millions from?" Another commented, "Did Rami invest in any project which would support scientific research, develop the country, or do such projects that do not yield profits in the billions?" Still another opined, "Does anybody dare criticize the economic genius Professor Rami?" The human rights community was also very supportive, but expressed to Poloff their desire to see additional designations in the near future. Upon hearing the news at a meeting with Post's TDY Press Attache, a XXXXXXXXXXXX dissident shouted and kissed the officer's cheek.
-------------------------------------
SOME BUSINESSMEN EXPRESS APPREHENSION
-------------------------------------
5. (S) Reaction from Embassy business contacts tended to fall into one of two categories, depending on the contact's relationship with the regime. Apolitical businessmen reported that the designation had sent shockwaves through Rami's business partners who were now waiting nervously for any additional shoes to drop. Most were concerned about their potential liability due to their business relationship with Makhluf, especially those with assets in the U.S. and Europe. One contact predicted that if this designation was quickly followed by others, or even rumors of additional ones, Rami's foreign and local partners would completely divest out of self-preservation and absorb whatever regime criticism resulted.
6. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX, a businessman XXXXXXXXXXXX argued any corruption sanctions that did not include Rami would be meaningless. He predicted before the designation that most Syrians were fully aware of Rami's corruption and would secretly applaud it. Some regime insiders would attempt to portray the designation as a personal matter between the Bush administration and the Asad family. While Rami had been expecting the sanction for some time, it was nonetheless important for the U.S. to send a strong signal. XXXXXXXXXXXX did not think that sanctioning Rami alone would have much of an effect on Syria's regional or domestic policies. More designations and tough implementation would be needed to convince the regime the U.S. was serious.
7. (S) A reporter for XXXXXXXXXXXX said he
DAMASCUS 00000146 003 OF 004
wasn't sure the details of the designation were well understood by Syrian businessman and the average Syrian in the street. How would the designation affect foreign investment prospects, for example? Most Syrian elites assumed that the absence of Rami's assets in the U.S. would make this a moot case. If there were ripple effects on Rami's business partners, then that might cause people to pay closer attention.
8. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX a XXXXXXXXXXXX correspondent working on his own piece regarding Makhluf, passed along that he and other journalists had interviewed a former XXXXXXXXXXXX employee of Rami's empire who had XXXXXXXXXXXX knowledge of Rami's holdings. That source said the designation created many questions that had to be answered before one could assess the impact. Would all of Rami's partners be sanctionable? Did Rami have to own a majority share in a company before Americans and others were liable? How would the designation affect ongoing negotiations regarding the sale of Rami's share of Syriatel's cell concession? XXXXXXXXXXXX supported the designation and reported that his contacts said that it was overdue. He believed more designations were desirable, arguing, "One a week for the next three months would pressure the Syrians and force them to capitulate."
---------------------------------
WHILE OTHER ELITES ARE DISMISSIVE
---------------------------------
9. (S) Elites with a pro-regime bias characterized the designation as a purely symbolic gesture with no tangible economic repercussions. They viewed the designation as a feckless personal attack on the Asad family from a U.S. Administration with little remaining political leverage over Syria. Regarding Makhluf's many prominent business partners in Cham Holding, this group's opinion was that no Syrian would dare try to divest from Rami -- even if he wanted to -- for fear of being perceived as a coward in the face of US pressure. Consequently, this line of thinking concluded, Makhluf's designation will result in a "circling of the wagons" around the regime.
10. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX admitted to Econoff that, after hearing about the designation on Al Jazeera, he had run his own name through Google to see what public information might connect him to Rami. Claiming to have no affection for the Makhlufs or the regime, he said he still could not imagine divesting XXXXXXXXXXXX and remaining in Syria. "I love the U.S.," he explained, "but my entire life is in Syria. What am I supposed to do, take my family to the U.S. and get a job making 5000 dollars a month, or be my own boss and XXXXXXXXXXXX a better life in Syria?" XXXXXXXXXXXX would not put him in legal jeopardy, he finally shrugged his shoulders and said, "Whatever happens to Rami...happens to all of us."
11. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX assessed Rami's designation as an empty, desperate attempt by the outgoing Bush administration to punish a member of Bashar's inner circle. A marketing expert XXXXXXXXXXXX asked, "What was the intended message (of the designation)? I looked and looked, but could find very
DAMASCUS 00000146 004 OF 004
little. The time for such an action was two years ago." Unless the U.S. could sanction Rami's Byblos Bank (five percent share) or convince the Emiratis to freeze Rami's UAE-based assets, he concluded that the designation would have very little teeth and would be regarded by most Syrians as yet another "wayward arrow from the warped bow of George Bush."
12. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX characterized Rami's designation as a "mostly symbolic gesture" that would have little impact on the regime's policies. XXXXXXXXXXXX said Bashar had already put some distance between himself and his cousin and Makhluf had moved a great deal of his personal assets to Dubai. XXXXXXXXXXXX conceded that most Syrians viewed Rami in a negative light and that his strong-arm business tactics had earned him many enemies. He nonetheless believed that a majority of Syrians, at least the few who had heard about it on BBC or read about it on the internet, would see the act as a last-ditch effort by the Bush administration to punish Bashar.
13. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he had had several run-ins with Makhluf XXXXXXXXXXXX during his tenure, but that Rami had learned "the hard way" from Bashar that there was a limit to how much he could get away with on the basis of his family ties. He predicted that Bashar would secretly welcome any U.S. sanctions against corruption, because corruption was rife in Syrian government and society and had undermined the President's credibility with the Syrian people. Designating Rami, however, would have very little practical impact because Rami had diversified his many investments and it would be hard to identify majority share interests that he owned.
-------
COMMENT
-------
14. (S) Rami Makhluf's designation has generated the most reaction among Embassy contacts of any USG action vis-a-vis Syria in the past three years. With increased murmurings casting a pall over the Arab League summit, uncertainty about what will happen in Lebanon, and never-ending conspiracy theories about the Mughniyeh assassination, Rami's designation occurred at a time when the SARG is facing pressure from multiple sources. Early indications are that the "business community," regardless of political affiliation, is definitely nervous about the potential implications of doing business with Rami. CORBIN
Tuesday, 29 September 2009, 17:21
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000771
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND INR.
EO 12958 DECL: 9/29/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, LY, PINR
SUBJECT: A GLIMPSE INTO LIBYAN LEADER QADHAFI'S ECCENTRICITIES
CLASSIFIED BY: XXXXXXXXXXXX, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S/NF) Summary: Recent first-hand experiences with Libyan Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi XXXXXXXXXXXX primarily in preparation for his UNGA trip, provided rare insights into Qadhafi's inner circle and personal proclivities. Qadhafi appears to rely heavily on XXXXXXXXXXXX and reportedly cannot travel with his senior Ukrainian nurse, Galyna XXXXXXXXXXXX. He also appears to have an intense dislike or fear of staying on upper floors, reportedly prefers not to fly over water, and seems to enjoy horse racing and flamenco dancing. His recent travel may also suggest a diminished dependence on his legendary female guard force, as only one woman bodyguard accompanied him to New York. End Summary.
QADHAFI'S PERSONALITY REFLECTED IN HIS PHOBIAS
2. (S/NF) Muammar al-Qadhafi has been described as both mercurial and eccentric, and our recent first-hand experiences with him and his office, primarily in preparation for his UNGA trip, demonstrated the truth of both characterizations. From the moment Qadhafi's staff began to prepare for his travel to the United States, XXXXXXXXXXXX various proclivities and phobias began to reveal themselves in every logistical detail. When applying for Qadhafi's visa, protocol staff asked whether it was necessary for the Leader to submit a portrait of himself that fit consular application regulations, noting that his photo was displayed throughout the city and that anyone of hundreds of billboards could be photographed and shrunken to fit the application's criteria. When the rule was enforced, protocol staff reluctantly conceded to take a portrait of the Leader specifically for the visa application.
3. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX informed us that the Leader must stay on the first floor of any facility that was rented for him. (XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX that Qadhafi could not climb more than 35 steps.) XXXXXXXXXXXX cited this requirement as the primary reason that the Libyan residence in New Jersey was selected as the preferred accommodation site rather than the Libyan PermRep's residence in New York City.XXXXXXXXXXXX also sought to find accommodations with room to pitch Qadhafi's Bedouin tent, Qadhafi's traditional site for receiving visitors and conducting meetings, as it offers him a non-verbal way of communicating that he is a man close to his cultural roots.
4. (S/NF) Qadhafi's dislike of long flights and apparent fear of flying over water also caused logistical headaches XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that the Libyan delegation would arrive from Portugal, as Qadhafi "cannot fly more than eight hours" and would need to overnight in Europe prior to continuing his journey to New York. XXXXXXXXXXXX also revealed in the same conversation that Qadhafi does not like to fly over water. Presumably for similar reasons, Qadhafi's staff also requested a stop in Newfoundland to break his travel from Venezuela to Libya on September 29. [Note: The Government of Canada recently confirmed that the Libyan delegation canceled plans to stop in Newfoundland. End Note.]
DEPENDENCIES: RELIANCE ON A SELECTIVE GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS
5. (S/NF) Qadhafi appears to be almost obsessively dependent on a small core of trusted personnel. XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX appears to play an equally important role in Qadhafi's personal retinueXXXXXXXXXXXX We constantly hear that XXXXXXXXXXXX also plays a key role XXXXXXXXXXXX also seems to have been tasked with insuring that the Leader's image is well-preserved through the full array of carefully-planned media events.
6. (S/NF) Finally, Qadhafi relies heavily on his long-time Ukrainian nurse, Galyna XXXXXXXXXXXX, who has been described as a "voluptuous blonde." Of the rumored staff of four Ukrainian nurses that cater to the Leader's health and well-being, XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized to multiple Emboffs that Qadhafi cannot travel without XXXXXXXXXXXX, as she alone "knows his routine." When XXXXXXXXXXXX's late visa application resulted in her Security Advisory Opinion being received on the day Qadhafi's party planned to travel to the U.S., the Libyan Government sent a private jet to ferry her from Libya to Portugal to meet up with the Leader during his rest-stop. Some embassy contacts have claimed that Qadhafi and the 38 year-old XXXXXXXXXXXX have a romantic relationship. While he did not comment on such rumors, a XXXXXXXXXXXX recently confirmed that the Ukrainian nurses "travel everywhere with the Leader."
PREFERENCES - FROM DANCING TO HORSEMAN
7. (S/NF) In addition to the personality quirks revealed through Qadhafi's travel to New York, the Qadhafi's preferences for dancing and cultural performances were displayed over the last month. The three-day spectacle of his 40th anniversary in power included performances by dance troupes from Ukraine, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco, as well as musical performances by bands from Mexico, Russia, New Zealand, and a number of other nations. Qadhafi appeared particularly enthralled by Tuareg horse racing during two of the events, clapping and smiling throughout the races. The flamenco dancers that participated in his celebratory events appeared to spark a similar interest, as Qadhafi decided to stop in Seville (for a "personal trip" according to the Spanish Ambassador here) on his way back to Libya from Venezuela specifically to attend a flamenco dance performance. [Note: That stop has reportedly been scrapped for unknown reasons. End note.]
NO NEW YORK PHOTO OPS - QADHAFI LEAVES FEMALE GUARDS AT HOME
8. (S/NF) While Qadhafi's reported female guard force has become legendary, it played no role in his travels to New York. Only one female guard was included among the approximately 350-person strong Libyan delegation to New York. This is the same female bodyguard who sticks close to Qadhafi in his domestic and international public appearances and may, in fact, play some sort of formal security role. Observers in Tripoli speculate that the female guard force is beginning to play a diminished role among the Leader's personal security staff.
9. (S/NF) Comment: Qadhafi's state visits and appearances at various conferences and summits, both at home and abroad, have revealed greater details about his personality and character. While it is tempting to dismiss his many eccentricities as signs of instability, Qadhafi is a complicated individual who has managed to stay in power for forty years through a skillful balancing of interests and realpolitik methods. Continued engagement with Qadhafi and his inner circle is important not only to learn the motives and interests that drive the world's longest serving dictator, but also to help overcome the misperceptions that inevitably accumulated during Qadhafi's decades of isolation. As XXXXXXXXXXXX told us, pointing to a larger-than-life portrait of Qadhafi, "When you have been isolated for so long, it is important to communicate." End comment.
CRETZ
Friday, 17 July 2009, 16:19
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TUNIS 000492
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA AA/S FELTMAN, DAS HUDSON, AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE
GRAY, AND NEA/MAG FROM AMBASSADOR
EO 12958 DECL: 07/13/2029
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ECON, KPAO, MASS, PHUM, TS
SUBJECT: TROUBLED TUNISIA: WHAT SHOULD WE DO?
Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for E.O. 12958 reasons 1.4 (b ) and (d).
-------
Summary
-------
1. (S/NF) By many measures, Tunisia should be a close US ally. But it is not. While we share some key values and the country has a strong record on development, Tunisia has big problems. President Ben Ali is aging, his regime is sclerotic and there is no clear successor. Many Tunisians are frustrated by the lack of political freedom and angered by First Family corruption, high unemployment and regional inequities. Extremism poses a continuing threat. Compounding the problems, the GOT brooks no advice or criticism, whether domestic or international. Instead, it seeks to impose ever greater control, often using the police. The result: Tunisia is troubled and our relations are too.
2. (S/NF) In the past three years, US Mission Tunis has responded by offering greater cooperation where the Tunisians say they want it, but not shied from making plain the need for change. We have had some successes, notably in the commercial and military assistance areas. But we have also had failures. We have been blocked, in part, by a Foreign Ministry that seeks to control all our contacts in the government and many other organizations. Too often, the GOT prefers the illusion of engagement to the hard work of real cooperation. Major change in Tunisia will have to wait for Ben Ali's departure, but President Obama and his policies create opportunities now. What should we do to take advantage of them? We recommend:
-- keep a strong focus on democratic reform and respect for human rights, but shift the way we promote these goals; -- seek to engage the GOT in a dialogue on issues of mutual interest, including trade and investment, Middle East peace, and greater Maghreb integration; -- offer Tunisians (with an emphasis on youth) more English-language training, educational exchanges, and cultural programs; -- move our military assistance away from FMF, but look for new ways to build security and intelligence cooperation; and, -- increase high-level contacts but stress that deeper US cooperation depends on real Tunisian engagement. End Summary.
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The Backdrop: Historic Relations and Shared Values
--------------------------------------------- -----
3. (SBU) The United States and Tunisia have 200 years of close ties and common interests, including advancing regional peace, combating terrorism, and building prosperity. Since independence, Tunisia deserves credit for its economic and social progress. Without the natural resources of its neighbors, Tunisia focused on people and diversified its economy. In a success all too rare, the GOT is effective in delivering services (education, health care, infrastructure and security) to its people. The GOT has sought to build a &knowledge economy8 to attract FDI that will create high value-added jobs. As a result, the country has enjoyed five percent real GDP growth for the past decade. On women's rights, Tunisia is a model. And, Tunisia has a long history of religious tolerance, as demonstrated by its treatment of its Jewish community. While significant challenges remain (above all the country's 14 percent unemployment rate) on balance Tunisia has done better than most in the region.
4. (SBU) On foreign policy, Tunisia has long played a moderate role (although recently its goal has been to &get along with everyone8). The GOT rejects the Arab League boycott of Israeli goods. Although it broke ties with Israel in 2000, the GOT has from time to time taken part in quiet discussions with Israeli officials. The GOT also supports Mahmoud Abbas' leadership of the Palestinian Authority. Tunisia participated in the Annapolis conference and has supported our efforts to promote Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The GOT is like-minded on Iran, is an ally in the fight against terrorism, and has maintained an Embassy in Iraq at the Charge level. Moreover, Tunisia recently signed a debt forgiveness agreement with the GOI on Paris Club terms; it is the first Arab country to do so.
5. (SBU) Finally, although Tunisians have been deeply angry over the war in Iraq and perceived US bias towards Israel, most still admire the &the American dream.8 Despite the anger at US foreign policy, we see a growing desire for English-language instruction, a wish for more educational and
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scientific exchanges, and a belief in the American culture of innovation. Tunisians see these as important for their future.
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The Problem: A Sclerotic Regime and Growing Corruption
--------------------------------------------- ---------
6. (C) Despite Tunisia's economic and social progress, its record on political freedoms is poor. Tunisia is a police state, with little freedom of expression or association, and serious human rights problems. The GOT can point to some political progress in the last decade, including an end to prior review of books and ICRC access to many prisons. But for every step forward there has been another back, for example the recent takeover of important private media outlets by individuals close to President Ben Ali.
7. (C) The problem is clear: Tunisia has been ruled by the same president for 22 years. He has no successor. And, while President Ben Ali deserves credit for continuing many of the progressive policies of President Bourguiba, he and his regime have lost touch with the Tunisian people. They tolerate no advice or criticism, whether domestic or international. Increasingly, they rely on the police for control and focus on preserving power. And, corruption in the inner circle is growing. Even average Tunisians are now keenly aware of it, and the chorus of complaints is rising. Tunisians intensely dislike, even hate, First Lady Leila Trabelsi and her family. In private, regime opponents mock her; even those close to the government express dismay at her reported behavior. Meanwhile, anger is growing at Tunisia's high unemployment and regional inequities. As a consequence, the risks to the regime's long-term stability are increasing.
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US-Tunisian Relations: If Only We Would Say This Is Paradise
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
8. (S/NF) US-Tunisian relations reflect the realities of the Ben Ali regime. On the positive side, we have accomplished several goals in recent years, including:
-- increasing substantially US assistance to the military to combat terrorism; -- improving (albeit still with challenges) some important counterterrorism programs; -- strengthening commercial ties, including holding a TIFA Council meeting, hosting several trade and economic delegations and growing business activity; -- building ties to young people and the cultural community through expanded English-language programs, a new film festival, and new media outreach efforts; and -- encouraging congressional interest in Tunisia.
9. (C) But we have also had too many failures. The GOT frequently declines to engage, and there have been too many lost opportunities. The GOT has:
-- declined to engage on the Millennium Challenge Account; -- declined USAID regional programs to assist young people; -- reduced the number of Fulbright scholarship students; and, -- declined to engage in Open Skies negotiations.
Most troubling has been the GOT's unilateral and clumsy effort to impose new and retroactive taxes on the American Cooperative School of Tunis. There is little doubt that this action was at the behest of powerful friends (probably including Leila Trabelsi) of the International School of Carthage. It raises important questions about Tunisian governance and our friendship. If, in the end, the GOT's actions force the school to close we will need to downsize the Mission, limit our programs, and dial down our relations.
10. (C) At the same time, the GOT has also increasingly tightened controls that make it exceptionally difficult for the US Mission to conduct business. The controls, put in place by Foreign Minister Abdallah, require the Mission to obtain written MFA permission for contact with all official and semi-official Tunisian organizations. Mid-level GOT officials are no longer allowed to communicate with embassy personnel without express authorization and MFA-cleared instructions. All meeting requests and demarches must be conveyed by diplomatic note. Most go unanswered. All Embassies in Tunis are affected by these controls, but they are no less frustrating for that.
11. (C) Beyond the stifling bureaucratic controls, the GOT makes it difficult for the Mission to maintain contact with a
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wide swath of Tunisian society. GOT-controlled newspapers often attack Tunisian civil society activists who participate in Embassy activities, portraying them as traitors. Plain-clothes police sometimes lurk outside events hosted by EmbOffs, intimidating participants. XXXXXXXXXXXX
12. (C) Some of the GOT's actions may be related to its intense dislike of the former Administration's &freedom agenda.8 The GOT considered this policy dangerous and believed it opened the door for Islamic extremists to seize power. GOT leaders have made no secret of their disapproval of the Ambassador's and other EmbOffs' contacts with opposition XXXXXXXXXXXX leaders as well as civil society activists who criticize the regime. They were intensely critical, as well, of the previous Administration's use of public statements (such as on World Press Freedom Day 2008), which they believed unfairly targeted Tunisia.
----------------------
So, What Should We Do?
----------------------
13. (C) Notwithstanding the frustrations of doing business here, we cannot write off Tunisia. We have too much at stake. We have an interest in preventing al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other extremist groups from establishing a foothold here. We have an interest in keeping the Tunisian military professional and neutral. We also have an interest in fostering greater political openness and respect for human rights. It is in our interest, too, to build prosperity and Tunisia's middle class, the underpinning for the country's long-term stability. Moreover, we need to increase mutual understanding to help repair the image of the United States and secure greater cooperation on our many regional challenges. The United States needs help in this region to promote our values and policies. Tunisia is one place where, in time, we might find it.
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The Extended Hand
-----------------
14. (C) Since President Obama's inauguration, Tunisians have been more receptive to the United States. Senior GOT officials have warmly welcomed President Obama's statements and speeches. His address in Cairo drew particular praise, with the Foreign Minister calling it &courageous.8 Meanwhile, some civil society contacts who had been boycotting Embassy functions in opposition to the war in Iraq have started coming around again. Generally, the metaphor of the &extended hand8 in President Obama's inaugural address has resonated powerfully with Tunisians. Concretely, the Tunisians have welcomed many of the Obama Administration's actions, including the decision to close the Guantanamo Bay detention center and the plans for troop withdrawals from Iraq. Above all, Tunisians have been pleased by the President's tone, statements and actions (so far) on Middle East peace.
-----------------------------------------
How To Advance Democracy and Human Rights
-----------------------------------------
15. (S) The Obama Administration creates an important opportunity, then, to explore whether and how to pursue a more productive bilateral relationship. GOT officials say the United States tends to focus on issues where we do not see eye-to-eye. They bristle at our calls for greater democratic reform and respect for human rights, and protest they are making progress. For years, the Embassy's top goal has been to promote progress in these areas. We need to keep the focus, especially with 2009 an election year in Tunisia. Ben Ali is certain to be reelected by a wide margin in a process that will be neither free nor fair. In this context, we should continue to underscore the importance of these issues, and to maintain contacts with the few opposition parties and civil society groups critical of the regime.
16. (C) We should consider how this policy objective is publicly manifested, however. For several years, the United States has been out in front -- publicly and privately -- criticizing the GOT for the absence of democracy and the lack of respect for human rights. There is a place for such
TUNIS 00000492 004 OF 005
criticism, and we do not advocate abandoning it. We do recommend a more pragmatic approach, however, whereby we would speak to the Tunisians very clearly and at a very high level about our concerns regarding Tunisia's democracy and human rights practices, but dial back the public criticism. The key element is more and frequent high-level private candor. We recommend being explicit with GOT leaders that we are changing our approach, while also making clear that we will continue to engage privately with opposition parties and civil society.
17. (C) In addition, we should increase our efforts to persuade our European partners, and other like-minded countries, to step up their efforts to persuade the GOT to accelerate political reform. While some in the EU (e.g., Germany, the UK) agree with us, key countries such as France and Italy have shied from putting pressure on the GOT. We should work to get them to do so, and to condition further assistance and advanced EU associate status on it.
----------------------------
Advancing Other US Interests
----------------------------
18. (C) Whether we succeed on democracy and human rights, the United States has an interest in building relations with a wide spectrum of Tunisians, particularly the young. To do so, and to build good will with the GOT, we should offer the government a dialogue on a range of issues of mutual interest, backed up by increased assistance. Of greatest interest to the GOT would be increased engagement on economic issues, i.e., on increasing bilateral trade and investment, as well as the provision of technical assistance, especially involving technology transfer. The Tunisians would welcome a revival of the US-North African Economic Partnership, as well as other efforts that would promote North African economic integration.
19. (C) In addition, we should offer serious engagement in high-priority areas for Tunisians that will also benefit the United States, including:
-- more, and more comprehensive, English-language programs; -- Ph.D. scholarships for Tunisian students to study in the United States, such as those that USAID used to make available in the 1970's and 1980's; -- more support for University linkages; -- more science and technology exchanges -- to give substance to a bilateral S&T agreement that, with no money behind it, has had little impact; and -- more cultural programming.
20. (C) In addition to talking to the GOT, we need to engage directly with the Tunisian people, especially youth. The Embassy is already using Facebook as a communication tool. In addition, we have the Ambassador's blog, a relatively new undertaking that is attracting attention. Over the past couple of years, the Embassy has substantially increased its outreach to Tunisian youth through concerts, film festivals, and other events. Our information resource center and America's Corners are popular ways for Tunisians to access unfiltered news and information. We should continue and increase such programs.
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Advancing Broader Foreign Policy Objectives And Security Cooperation
-------------------------------------------
21. (C) We should also seek new ways to engage Tunisia in pursuit of our broader foreign policy agenda. We believe that the GOT would welcome this kind of engagement, and that it would pay dividends, not only in our bilateral relationship but also on transnational issues. For example, we continue to count on GOT support for our efforts to promote Israel-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab peace. Although Tunisia has limited influence within the Arab League, it remains in the moderate camp, as demonstrated most recently by its refusal to participate in the extraordinary Doha Summit on the situation in Gaza. At appropriate moments, we would recommend doing more to brief the GOT on our efforts in the peace process and to draw them into providing additional support. Special Envoy Mitchell's stop here in April was well received and we should look for ways to continue such consultations.
22. (S/NF) There are opportunities in the area of security cooperation, too. For starters, we know that Tunisia could be doing a better job in sharing intelligence with us about
TUNIS 00000492 005 OF 005
the threat of terrorism in North Africa. This was all too clear when, yet again, the GOT failed recently to share information with us in a timely fashion on a reported plot against US military personnel. GRPO has been taking steps to increase cooperation through liaison channels; while there has been progress, more is possible.
23. (C) On military cooperation, the time has come to shift our military assistance away from FMF to more targeted programs that meet specific needs. There is increasing evidence the Tunisian military does not need FMF to the degree it claims, and in any event it has bought us too little in the way of cooperation. Rather, we should focus on working with the Tunisians to identify a small number of areas were cooperation makes sense. The recent use of the Section 1206 and PKO programs to provide the Tunisian military with ground surveillance radar and unmanned surveillance aircraft is a good example.
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Our Message: Deeper Cooperation Depends On Real Engagement
--------------------------------------------- -------------
24. (S) Tunisia is not an ally today, but we still share important history and values. It is fair to consider Tunisia a friend, albeit cautious, closed and distant. Most importantly, in a region in turmoil, Tunisia has better prospects than most even though it is troubled. In the end, serious change here will have to await Ben Ali's departure. But President Obama's new tone and policies may create a window of opportunity. We should use it to make overtures to the GOT in areas where they seek our involvement or assistance. And, we should seek to engage all Tunisians (especially the young) in ways that will improve the future for both our countries.
25. (S) To succeed, however, we need resources and commitment from Washington. New and expanded programs will require money and staff to implement them, particularly in public affairs. Senior US Government officials must also be prepared to visit more often than in recent years to engage the Tunisians. Meetings outside Tunisia are a good tool, too. The Secretary's recent meeting with North African Foreign Ministers on the margins of the Gaza Reconstruction Conference in Sharm el-Sheikh provides one model for engagement and offers the added benefit of allowing us to also promote greater Maghreb integration.
26. (S) Finally, we recommend US officials be clear in all meetings with Tunisians: more US cooperation depends on real Tunisian engagement. For too long Tunisia has skated by. A small country, in a tough region, the GOT relies on vague promises of friendship and empty slogans. More can and should be expected of Tunisia. The GOT frequently says it is a US ally and calls for greater US engagement. We should respond clearly: yes, but only if we get genuine help from Tunisia on the challenges that matter to us all. The Tunisian government loves the illusion of engagement. The US government should press for the hard work of real cooperation.
Godec
Thursday, 18 June 2009, 08:49
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001324
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR S/SEMEP
EO 12958 DECL: 06/18/2019
TAGS PREL, LE, SY, UN, IS
SUBJECT: GOI DISCUSSES LEBANON AND SYRIA WITH HOF
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Luis G. Moreno, reason 1.4 (b) a nd (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY. On June 10, Fred Hof, Special Advisor for Regional Affairs in the office of Special Envoy Mitchell, held a series of meetings with GOI officials from the MFA and MOD to discuss the situation in Lebanon and Syria and the possibilities for progress towards opening negotiations with each. The Israeli officials expressed cautious optimism over the election results in Lebanon, but did not believe they would lead to major changes in the power balance in Lebanon, or serious reduction of Hizballah influence. However, both Amos Gilad, Pol-Mil Director in the MOD and Nimrod Barkan, Director of the MFA Political Research Division (INR equivalent), told Hof that the Lebanese election results took Syria by surprise, and were a blow for Syrian President Asad. The officials were split over the prospects for Israeli peace with Syria. Alon Ushpiz, Chief of Staff for the MFA Director General, believes Syria is only interested in a process that gives it international legitimacy. However, in a separate meeting, Gilad called Syrian/Iran ties a "marriage of convenience" which could possibly be broken with a peace agreement with Israel and incentives from the United States. On Ghajar and Sheba'a, there was consensus within the GOI that Ghajar can be resolved, but doing so will not have much utility, while Israeli will only agree to discuss Sheba'a within the context of Syria. End Summary.
----------------------------
Lebanon Elections Hurt Syria
----------------------------
2. (C) The Israeli officials said that it is too soon to tell what the results of the elections in Lebanon will really mean. Nimrod Barkan told Hof that he does not see the elections as damaging for Hizballah, as their popularity among the Shia remained solid. He added that if Hizballah could maintain its blocking third within the GOL as established in the Doha Agreement, the Lebanese government would remain paralyzed. In another meeting, Amos Gilad assessed that the elections results were largely due to huge amounts of Saudi Arabian money and the Maronite Patriarch throwing his support to March 14, and not because of a fundamental shift in Lebanese society.
3. (C) On the other hand, both Gilad and Barkan agreed that the elections were a blow to Syria, which was completely caught off-guard by the results. The Syrian presidential advisors on Lebanon, they said, are now in trouble. Barkan explained that the Syrians were so convinced the pro-Syrian March 8 would win the elections that they thought they could minimize their interference and still win. They wanted to appease France and the United States, and not irritate Saudi Arabia, and thought they could do so at no cost. In this way, Barkan said, French and American actions and rhetoric in support of March 14 were productive.
--------------------------------------------- -------
Hizballah Still Planning to Avenge Mughniyah's Death
--------------------------------------------- -------
4. (S) Barkan emphasized that Hizballah still plans on avenging the death of Hizballah operations chief Imad Mughniyah, and that Israel has already thwarted two terror attacks in third countries. Barkan said Israel has very sensitive intelligence that Hizballah has completed operational planning for a third attack outside Israel, but so far Nasrallah has not decided whether to give the order to carry it out, despite Iranian pressure to launch the attack. Barkan said he had personally drafted the MFA's post-Lebanon election statement, which included a warning the GOL that Israel will hold them responsible for any attacks "emanating from Lebanon" and not just attacks from Lebanon. Gilad also told Hof that Hizballah had shown restraint in the face of Iranian pressure due to the elections, especially during the Gaza operation. Barkan and Gilad both emphasized that they did not know if Hizballah's calculus would change post-election. Gilad warned Hof that the next round of fighting with Hizballah would likely involve rockets falling on Tel Aviv, and if this happens Israel will respond harshly throughout Lebanon.
------------------------------------
Can Syria Separate Itself from Iran?
------------------------------------
5. (C) Hof also held a meeting with senior MFA staff, including Deputy Director General for Coordination (Director General Chief of Staff) Alon Ushpiz, Minister Lieberman's Chief of Staff Naor Gilon, and Deputy Minister Ayalon's Chief
TEL AVIV 00001324 002 OF 003
of Staff David Siegel. Ushpiz asked Hof if the United States really sought peace with Syria in the near term, or if it saw Israeli engagement with Syria as a way to put pressure on the Palestinian track, create space in the Arab world, and gain influence with Syria. Hof replied that all of those goals could be pursued simultaneously, including peace. During the proximity talks in Turkey conducted under the Olmert government, Ushpiz said that President Bush gave PM Olmert the approval to hold talks through Turkey, but said the United States would not get involved, so Israel went as far as it could. Israel was also unsure about proceeding because, they said, the GOI remained skeptical regarding Syria's intentions to withdraw itself from its alliance with Iran in exchange for peace.
6. (C) Amos Gilad, on the other hand, told Hof that the GOI defense establishment assesses that Syria may be serious about removing itself from Iran and withdrawing support for Hizballah in exchange for reconciliation with the West, especially the U.S., and the return of the Golan Heights. Gilad asserted that peace with Syria is critical to achieving Israel-Palestinian peace due to Syria's ability to support spoilers. Therefore, he asserted, it was worth it for Israel to make the attempt. In the talks through Turkish mediation, however, Gilad said that Israel had been too forthcoming about its security requirements, and too enthusiastic, and Syria was not ready. He also noted that Israeli security requirements with Syria had changed radically since the last talks in 2000, as Israel no longer fears a Syrian surprise armor attack across the Golan but rather is concerned about Syrian missile attacks on Israeli cities, so those issues would need to be renegotiated.
7. (S) Negotiations with Syria may succeed, Gilad said, because Iran was a marriage of convenience for Syria. He believes Syria would much rather be close to their fellow Arabs and the rest of the international community, if given the chance. Gilad stressed that both the Iranians and the Arab Sunnis despise the ruling Alawite minority in Syria - he recalled that Sadat used to call the Alawites "pagans" - and said the Iranians would like to get rid of the Asad regime at the appropriate time. Gilad noted that Syria did not inform Iran of its nuclear reactor, which was built entirely with North Korean assistance, and did not notify Iran in advance of its proximity talks with Israel. In addition, he said, the Golan Heights have remained Israel's quietest front, evidence that Syria can uphold its commitments as long its commitments are clear.
8. (C) While Syria may want peace, Gilad cautioned that it may be impossible for Syria to extricate itself from Iran and Hizballah, even if it tried. Hizballah is now an integral part of Syria's defense concept, and is a more effective fighting force than the Syrian army. But in the end, Gilad stated, Israel only has two choices with Syria: war or peace.
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Hof: Small Steps Needed Towards Talks with Lebanon
--------------------------------------------- -----
9. (C) Turning to the prospects for moving toward peace with Lebanon, Barkan and Gilad separately told Hof that the GOI had examined the question of renewing the 1949 armistice commission, at the USG's suggestion, and there were many questions, including some basic legal questions posed by MFA lawyers. Hof replied that much of the armistice agreement is obsolete, but the armistice allows for mutually agreed modifications, and recognition of its basic legitimacy among the Lebanese, and the fact that it is mentioned in the Taif Agreement, could create cover for talks.
10. (C) Hof suggested an incremental strategy for Lebanon, expanding existing, low-level mil-mil trilateral contacts with UNIFIL gradually until they eventually can encompass some political progress. Small steps were needed because the Lebanese people's attitude toward Israel had hardened over the past 30 years, Hof explained, and we need to get them back to seeing peace with Israel as a realistic prospect.
11. (C) Gilad, Barkan, and the senior MFA officials separately told Hof that Israel was ready to move forward with resolving the issue of the northern end of the village of Ghajar, but doubted that resolving the issue would lead to real progress and risked boosting Hizballah. Hof replied that Ghajar can be an important step as long as any Israeli public message is carefully calibrated to emphasize that Israel is fulfilling its 1701 obligations, and that other parties should do the same, and not as a benefit to the Lebanese moderates. It is a small step, Hof said, but the kind of small step needed in this process.
TEL AVIV 00001324 003 OF 003
12. (C) On Sheba'a Farms, all the GOI officials separately repeated the long-standing position that Sheba'a must be resolved in the context of Syria and not Lebanon. Sheba'a, they said, was simply a pretext for Hizballah's claim to represent "resistance to occupation," and if it were resolved Hizballah would simply find another pretext. Hof agreed that it was a pretext, but thought it would be useful to make Hizballah publicly shift their pretext. Issues like the seven Lebanese villages in northern Israel, Hof explained, are not taken seriously in Lebanese society, but the Lebanese claim to Sheba'a Farms is. Forcing Hizballah to shift its excuse for retaining an armed force could help expose them to Lebanese society as Iranian surrogates willing to fight to the last Lebanese.
13. (U) Fred Hof has cleared this message.
********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv ********************************************* ******************** CUNNINGHAM
Wednesday, 14 May 2008, 09:24
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000768
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/12/2018
TAGS IR, IS, IZ, LE, MASS, MCAP, MNUC, MOPS, PGOV, PINR,
PREL, SA
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAG FM SAYS UN PEACE KEEPING FORCE NEEDED
NOW
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Michael Gfoeller for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)
1. (S) SUMMARY. S/I Ambassador David Satterfield and an MNF-I/Embassy Baghdad team met with SAG Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal on May 10. While Iraq was the main topic discussed, Saud brought up events taking place in Beirut and emphasized the need for a "security response" to Hizballah,s "military challenge to the Government of Lebanon." Specifically, Saud argued for an "Arab force" to create and maintain order in and around Beirut, which would be assisted in its efforts and come under the "cover" of a deployment of UNIFIL troops from south Lebanon. The US and NATO would need to provide movement and logistic support, as well as "naval and air cover." Saud said that a Hizballah victory in Beirut would mean the end of the Siniora government and the "Iranian takeover" of Lebanon. END SUMMARY.
Lebanon: A "Military" Problem with a Military Solution
--------------------------------------------- ---------
2. (S) Opening a discussion with S/I Satterfield focused largely on Iraq, Saud first turned to Lebanon and stated that the effort by "Hizballah and Iran" to take over Beirut was the first step in a process that would lead to the overthrow of the Siniora government and an "Iranian takeover of all Lebanon." Such a victory, combined with Iranian actions in Iraq and on the Palestinian front, would be a disaster for the US and the entire region. Saud argued that the present situation in Beirut was "entirely military" and that the solution must be military as well. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were too fragile to bear more pressure; they needed urgent backing to secure Beirut from Hizballah's assault. What was needed was an "Arab force" drawn from Arab "periphery" states to deploy to Beirut under the "cover of the UN" and with a significant presence drawn from UNIFIL in south Lebanon "which is sitting doing nothing." The US and NATO would be asked to provide equipment for such a force as well as logistics, movement support, and "naval and air cover."
3. (S) Satterfield asked what support this concept had from Siniora and from other Arab states. Saud responded that "Siniora strongly supports," but that only Jordan and Egypt "as well as Arab League SYG Moussa" were aware of the proposal, lest premature surfacing result in its demise. No contacts had been made with Syria on any Beirut developments, Saud said, adding, "what would be the use?"
An "Easier Battle to Win"
-------------------------
4. (S) Saud said that of all the regional fronts on which Iran was now advancing, the battle in Lebanon to secure peace would be an "easier battle to win" (than Iraq or on the Palestinian front). Satterfield said that the "political and military" feasibility of the undertaking Saud had outlined would appear very much open to question. In particular, attempting to establish a new mandate for UNIFIL would be very problematic. Satterfield said the US would carefully
RIYADH 00000768 002 OF 002
study any Arab decision on a way forward. Saud concluded by underscoring that a UN/Arab peace-keeping force coupled with US air and naval support would "keep out Hezbollah forever" in Lebanon.
5. (U) Ambassador Satterfield has cleared this cable. FRAKER
Wednesday, 10 May 2006, 09:26
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000198
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/PI
LONDON FOR TSOU
EO 12958 DECL: 4/26/2016
TAGS ECON, ECIN, ETRD, PGOV, LY
SUBJECT: QADHAFI INCORPORATED
REF: TRIPOLI 33, 53
CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, U.S. Liaison Office, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY. Qadhafi often speaks out publicly against government corruption, but the politically-connected elite has direct access to lucrative business deals. This commercial access can easily be cut off when individuals fall out of favor. The Qadhafi family and other Jamahiriya political favorites profit from being able to manipulate the multi-layered and regularly shifting dynamics of governance mechanisms in Libya. They have strong interests in the oil and gas sector, telecommunications, infrastructure development, hotels, media distribution, and consumer goods distribution. The financial interests of Qadhafi and his key allies present both opportunites and challenges for reform efforts in Libya. Any reform is likely to be cyclical over the long-term. END SUMMARY
---------------------------------------
Saif's Call For Freedom of the Press Equals Net Profit
---------------------------------------
2. (C) As with many other regimes, politically-connected members of the Libyan elite have direct access to lucrative business contracts. Qadhafi often speaks out publicly against government corruption and sometimes dismisses officials who are caught in gross improprieties. In some cases, it appears that falling out of favor politically can trigger the discovery of improprieties in business dealings that might not otherwise come to public attention. As reported reftel, Saif al-Islam's One-Nine group will reportedly start marketing foreign publications in Libya in the near future. The Qadhafi Foundation, Saif's quasi-NGO, is hailing the move as an example of freedom and reform in the Jamahiriya. XXXXXXXXXXXX The Qadhafi family will clearly accrue significant financial gains from having exclusive rights to distribute foreign press in Libya, as well as effective censorship over any troubling articles that might appear. The One-Nine group gets it name from the September 1, 1969 anniversary of the Muammar Qadhafi-led military coup that overthrew King Idris.
----------------------------------------
Oil and Gas Revenues Channeled to Qadhafis and Political Elite
-------------------------------------------
3. (S) All of the Qadhafi children and favorites are supposed to have income streams from the National Oil Company and oil services subsidiaries. Saif is involved in oil services through One-Nine Petroleum and other Qadhafi family members and associates are believed to have large financial stakes in the Libyan Tamoil oil marketing company based in Europe and Oil Invest. AbdelMagid al-Mansuri, the former "director" of One-Nine Petroleum, was responsible for the ill-executed "U.S.-Libya Economic Forum" held at the Corinthia Hotel December 2004. The Forum was viewed as a blatant attempt to tie up lucrative percentage deals for Libyan elites looking for representative relationships with U.S. companies. During 2004, the internet-based publication Libya al-Yown distributed information tracing a large number of sweetheart deals to One-Nine's Oil and Gas division XXXXXXXXXXXX in Scotland, home to a well-connected Libyan expatriate community. It is believed that millions of dollars are distributed to politically connected Libyans and Libyan expatriates via the XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX
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Aisha Competes with Saif on Charitable Activities and Broad Commercial Interests
--------------------------------------------- ----
4. (C) Dr. Aisha Muammar Al-Qadhafi, General Secretary of the Wa'atassemo Charity Society, is patron of the December 4-7, 2006 Infrastructure Libya: The International Exhibition and Forum for Libya's Infrastructure and Economic Development implemented by the UK conference organizer Montgomery and Associates. Also listed as cooperating organizations are the General People's Committee for Planning, the General Board of Infrastructure and Urban Development, and the Inspector General of Housing and Utilities. At the same time, there will be a U.S.-Libya Oil, Gas and Energy Exhibition and Forum at the same International Fairgrounds, also under Wa'atassemo sponsorship, and coordinated by U.S. company Nathan and Associates. Until recently, Aisha has been in the public eye based on charitable activities, sponsoring human rightsseminars and the situation in Iraq (with a distinct focus on the negative effects of the presence of U.S. and foreign troops), signing up for the international advisory board for Saddam Hussein's defense strategy, and promoting social welfare for women and children. She now appears to be branching out into areas that will give her more direct connections with the energy and construction sectors, especially since the government has announced that housing development will the major focus of the 2006 budget distributions. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Aisha was actively looking to branch out into other areas, perhaps because of her recent marriage to a Qadhaf al-Dam with additional business interests. Aisha is also reported to have financial interests in the private St. James Clinic of Tripoli, one of the two most trustworthy medical facilities that supplement the unreliable health care available through public facilities. In addition to health care management and referrals to hospitals to Malta and elsewhere in Europe, the clinic has an extensive aesthetic surgery practice.
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Competition Between Siblings led to Takeover of Coca Cola Plant
--------------------------------------------- ------
5. (C) The recent controversy over the Coca Cola plant in Tripoli also highlighted Qadhafi family involvement in commercial enterprise. While three different sons Saadi, Mohammed and Mutassim, were all rumored to be fighting at different points over who had the right to the representative license, the dispute was supposedly argued before the courts and resolved through mediation. The very twisted tale of the Coke franchise, reported in Tripoli 53, continues to confound the local business and diplomatic community attempts to ascertain exactly what interests are in play. One well-connected consumer goods distributor said that Qadhafi's son Mutassim was involved in setting-up the Coca-Cola franchise held by the Egyptian Ka'Mur group during the late 1990s. XXXXXXXXXXXX Supposedly, Mutassim lost control of many of his personal Libyan business interests during the period of 2001 to 2005 when his brothers took advantage of his absence to put in place their own partnerships. Mutassim was recently spotted by Pol/Econ Chief arriving on a British Air flight at Tripoli International Airport, greeted by a small group of well wishers and protocol assistants with bouquets of flowers, then whisked off to the VIP arrivals lounge and into his vehicles without passing through customs or immigration. Qadhafi son Mohammed heads the Libyan Olympic Committee that now owns 40% of the Libyan Beverage Company, currently the Libyan joint venture Coca-Cola franchisee. The British Ambassador to Libya reported his sources attributed the resolution to a deal whereby Mohammed Al-Qadhafi was prevailed upon to relinquish his/Libyan Olympic Committee's share of the joint venture and sign it over to the Libyan Pensions Fund. Another Ambassador chimed in that he heard it was sister Aisha Al-Qadhafi who mediated the dispute between the two brothers and got Mohammed out of the soda business. If Libyan government officials are asked about the Coca Cola case, the standard response is that the government was making sure that all the proper licenses and registrations were in place.
----------------------------------------
Telecommunications Controlled by Mohammed
------------------------------------------
6. (S) Mohammed, who has plenty to keep him busy through his control of the General Post and Telecommunications Committee, has major input over any telecomm or internet service. Frequent USLO requests over the last two years to meet with the GPTC have been ignored by the Libyan government, even requests for meetings with senior U.S. officials and Congressional delegations. Several U.S. companies are actively pursuing contracts to provide a much-needed upgrade to the local telecommunications network, but the Libyan government rejects any trade promotion activities for telecom through official government channels. Based on Colonel Qadhafi's experience overthrowing King Idris and the recognized importance of controlling radio broadcasts in 1969, and the role of mobile phone networking during the 2006 Benghazi riots, the family would definitely want to preserve its strong control over the telecom sector.
------------------------------------
New City Planned by Saadi
-------------------------------------
7. (S) Saadi is also branching out into infrastructure development. His functionaries contacted USLO public affairs section for publications in Arabic language on economic and commercial issues. Saadi's staff then notified USLO that he planned to establish "a new city in the west of the country, in the area between Zwara and the Libyan-Tunisian border. The new city will be under the management and supervision of the Engineer al-Saadi al-Qadhafi." As Saadi's staffers frame the interest, "he wants information on how the U.S. can help with this matter." That general area of coastline has an island that has been slated for tourist development in the last couple years without any subsequent action, perhaps because a large oil processing facility mars the view from the island, and also because outside investors can not get liquor licenses for hotels populated by foreign tourists. The Qadhafi family is already in the tourism business through the large percentage of ownership in the XXXXXXXXXXXX
-------------------------------------------
Consumer Goods Distribution Controlled by Few Family Holding Groups
-------------------------------------------
8. (C) Food distribution is also reportedly controlled by only four or five politically-connected families. There are no large western-style food markets in Libya. There is small western-style market in Tripoli and some smaller shops in the city that carry more imported items, but most of the neighborhood shops go to the distribution warehouses controlled by the people with strong government ties. The consumer products distribution are largely controlled by three merchants, including the Husni Bey Group, a diversified holding company that runs a range of operations under the direction of Husni Bey's children. Bey does not characterize his company as politically well-connected, but has learned to expand operations through key alliances and he knows how to work the system to his benefit. More importantly, he knows how to recover when his businesses get caught up in the financial interests of the more connected political elite. The Akida Group, run by the Akak family, is rumored to have close ties to the ruling regime and it runs a virtual monopoly over air conditioning equipment, heating units, and small appliances as the local LG agent.
9. (C) The government attempts during the 80s to instigate large socialist-style department stores failed; the shells of the state enterprises sit empty around Tripoli and other Libyan cities. (At least one is rumored to soon be rehabilitated as a modern shopping mall for privately owned stores.) Starting in the mid 90s, people were once again allowed to open small businesses. During Eid holidays, Libyan families buy new clothing to wear during the celebration and treat children to toys and sweets from small stores. The men tend to wear traditional embroidered wool robes produced locally or in Egypt or Syria, while women may indulge in new fashions imported from European or Asian manufacturers. During the January 2006 Eid, local women complained that the clothing variety available in the local shops was limited. Rumors circulating in Tripoli claimed that Qadhafi's second wife, as well as his daughter Aisha, own or have financial interests in many of the new clothing stores opened in the post-sanctions era. XXXXXXXXXXXX Most of the garments in local stores are imported from China, Malaysia and India. Small boutiques have a limited supply of expensive goods imported from Europe, and these enterprises in particular seem to have the financial backing of people with strong ties to the ruling elite.
------------------------------------------
Qadhafi Incorporated Lifestyle
------------------------------------------
10. (C) Qadhafi himself keeps a low profile in Tripoli. The Bab al-Azizia compound has facilities for banquets and other public events, but it is not lavish in any way compared with the ostentation of the Gulf oil state families or Hariri clan. Qadhafi's wife travels by chartered jet in Libya, with a motorcade of Mercedes waiting to pick her up at the airport and take her to the destination, but her movements are limited and discrete. She hosted a banquet for diplomatic women in the Bab al-Azizia compound on the occasion of the al-Fatah (Revolution) holiday in September that was festive but not extravagant. Since the family keeps a tight control on the media and most of the Qadhafi children spending excesses take place outside Libya, there is not much public reaction to the coffers of Qadhafi Inc. Compared to egregious pillaging of State coffers elsewhere in Africa, or the lavish spending of Gulf Arabs, the Libyans don't see much to complain about in their leader's lifestyle, as long as he does a good job of making sure other people get a piece of the pie. And when Libyans do complain, they are removed from access to financial rewards.
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Comment
-------------
11. (S) The financial interests of Qadhafi and his key allies present opportunites and challenges for reform efforts in Libya. At a minimum, it seems safe to say that reform will have its ups and downs over the long-term, as individual, regime and national interests come into play. If and when foreign publications do become available in Libya, there will be a financial gain for Saif. At the same time, the family will still have control over monitoring what information is released to the public. Over the long term, demand for more outside information would inevitably create pressure for open access and more press freedom. Similarly, Libya has a stated commitment to moving forward with WTO accession and joining international financial organizations. But it is doing so on its own timetable, a slow timetable. Reported septel, the General People's Congress just passed in April 2006 new agency and representation rules that run counter to WTO principles. While the General General People's Committee for Economy and Trade has working groups actively revising legislation to prepare for WTO accession, it will take some time to reconcile all the different structures of the Jamahiriya government (translation: "State of the Masses"). Libyan government officials have been telling P/E Chief for 10 months that the WTO accession will be presented in Geneva "in a few weeks, that only the translation has to be finished." Institutional development is very primitive and the Libyans have a cultural and social preference for elements of distributive economy, placing great value on financial rewards that flow from affiliation with regime leadership, security services etc. There was a shipment of BMWs delivered to the government in early 2006, for example, and it seems likely that the young men driving them around town got the vehicles "distributed" through their affilation with different government entities. With regard to reform partnership efforts, there are the greatest opportunities to promote positive change by engaging in the Central Bank's efforts to establish banking controls and standards, partnering with the General People's Committee for Manpower and Training on civil service reform, and cooperating with the General People's Committee for Economy and Trade in its WTO accession efforts.
BERRY GOLDRICH
Friday, 29 August 2008, 18:11
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000680
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR S, AF/SPG, NEA/MAG
EO 12958 DECL: 8/28/2018
TAGS OVIP, PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ECON, KDEM, PTER, KISL, AU, SU,
LY, AG, TS, MO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE'S VISIT TO LIBYA
CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d) 1. (C) Embassy Tripoli and the Government of Libya are looking forward to your historic visit to Tripoli September 5. Coming on the heels of NEA A/S Welch's successful finalization of a comprehensive claims settlement agreement in Tripoli August 14, the GOL views your visit as a signature event in its decade-long effort to achieve reintegration into the international community, and as a tangible benefit of its strategic decision in 2003 to abandon its WMD programs and renounce terrorism. Key issues for your visit include:
-- Internal political issues
-- Bilateral relations
-- Human rights
-- Counter-terrorism cooperation
-- Sub-Saharan Africa
-- Regional issues, including Iraq and Iran
-- Energy sector and commercial opportunities
INTERNAL POLITICAL ISSUES
2. (C) Your visit comes days after the 39th anniversary of the September 1, 1969 military coup that brought Muammar al-Qadhafi to power. It is expected that al-Qadhafi will outline in his Revolution Day speech how the GOL will implement dramatic government restructuring and privatization he advocated in a key address in March. Al-Qadhafi's plan could represent his most radical experiment in governance since the late 1970's. Ordinary Libyans are concerned about the rising costs of food, fuel and other staples; privatization would strike a direct blow at the tacit pact - oil revenue-financed, cradle-to-grave subsidies in exchange for political quiescence - that has underpinned the regime for decades. Drawing a line between reform and greater participation by Libyans in governance, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, Muammar al-Qadhafi's son and heir apparent, called for a more robust civil society, judicial reform, greater press freedoms and respect for human rights in a major speech August 20. A new legal code, which would be the first major change to Libya's judicial system since the 1950's, is currently under review. Saif al-Islam implicitly criticized past decisions of his father's regime, claimed he had achieved much of his own reform agenda and said he would withdraw from politics to focus on civil society and development work. Expected to clarify government reform efforts and his own political future, Saif al-Islam's speech has instead confused Libyans, raising doubts about the long-term viability of the reform agenda and calling into question whether he is ready for a formal leadership role. The issue of who might succeed Muammar al-Qadhafi looms large. The conventional wisdom is that it is Saif al-Islam's job to lose; however, some observers interpreted the appointment of another son, Muatassim al-Qadhafi, to the newly-created position of National Security Adviser in early 2007 as a sign that Muammar al-Qadhafi was hedging his bet.
BILATERAL RELATIONS
3. (C) Your visit - the first by a U.S. Secretary of State since John Foster Dulles' trip in 1953 and the most recent Cabinet-level visit since then-Vice President Nixon was here in 1957 - is viewed as the key component of a "grand opening" in U.S.-Libyan bilateral relations, as compared to the "soft opening" between re-establishment of diplomatic ties and finalization of the claims agreement (i.e., 2004-2008). The GOL also wants to see a fully-accredited U.S. ambassador posted to Tripoli and full visa services at the Embassy. The fact that most Libyans must currently travel to Tunis to apply for non-immigrant visas (the Embassy's security posture/infrastructure have not permitted broader visa operations to date) is perceived as a slight. Anxious to avoid the public perception that U.S.-Libya ties are chiefly about counter-terrorism cooperation, prospective military-to-military ties and hydrocarbon resources, the GOL is keen to emphasize cooperation in education (it wants to send more students to study in the U.S.), science and technology and culture. The GOL wants to be able to purchase lethal military equipment and would like to sign a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. Despite high-level rhetoric, limited GOL capacity will significantly constrain efforts to quickly expand bilateral cooperation and engagement in all these areas.
4. (C) Libyan reaction to news of the recently finalized
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U.S.-Libya claims settlement agreement has been a mixture of relief and high expectation. Coverage in state-owned media has been positive, but muted; we're told the GOL did not publicly trumpet the agreement to avoid questions about the deal's parameters (it has not publicized the agreed amount of compensation to be distributed by the humanitarian fund) and to avoid criticism that it capitulated to U.S. demands. A recent editorial in the "Ouea" newspaper, owned by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, expressed cautious optimism that bilateral relations had turned a corner and welcomed U.S. assistance in education and technology transfers, but squarely blamed the U.S. for past contretemps and cautioned against U.S. "interference" in Libyan internal affairs. Libya has balanced re-engagement with us by actively pursuing closer ties with Russia. Then-president Putin visited in March and resolved a thorny Soviet-era debt issue that paved the way for lucrative commercial contracts; he is expected to send his deputy to attend the September 1 Revolution Day festivities. In recent remarks, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi described Russia as "a key strategic partner" and said the GOL would support Russia in its position on Georgia. Libya is conflicted about re-engagement with the U.S. Conservative regime elements are still wary that our ultimate goal is regime change, while ordinary Libyans are genuinely pleased that a key political irritant in the bilateral relationship has been resolved. Many hope that expanded political and economic engagement with the U.S. will help solidify recent Libyan economic reforms.
HUMAN RIGHTS & POLITICAL FREEDOMS
5. (S) There are high expectations in some quarters that the U.S. will pressure al-Qadhafi and the GOL more publicly and directly to urge greater respect for human rights and open further political space in what remains a closed, tightly-controlled society. A number of Libyans are disappointed that this did not occur immediately after relations were re-established in 2004. The GOL has expressed tepid interest in a high-level human rights dialogue; however, they have cautioned that they view discussion of individual cases as improper interference in their internal affairs. XXXXXXXXXXXX
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX Absent a clear message that engagement on human rights will be a necessary adjunct of an expanded U.S.-Libya relationship, meaningful progress in this area is unlikely.
COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION & EXTREMISM
7. (S) Libya has been a strong partner in the war against terrorism and cooperation in liaison channels is excellent. Muammar al-Qadhafi's criticism of Saudi Arabia for perceived support of Wahabi extremism, a source of continuing Libya-Saudi tension, reflects broader Libyan concern about the threat of extremism. Worried that fighters returning from Afghanistan and Iraq could destabilize the regime, the GOL has aggressively pursued operations to disrupt foreign fighter flows, including more stringent monitoring of air/land ports of entry, and blunt the ideological appeal of radical Islam. The Qadhafi
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Development Foundation brokered talks with imprisoned members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) that led to the release earlier this year of about 130 former LIFG members. The GOL considers the program an important means to signal willingness to reconcile with former enemies, a significant feature of Libya's tribal culture. Libya cooperates with neighboring states in the Sahara and Sahel region to stem foreign fighter flows and travel of trans-national terrorists. Muammar al-Qadhafi recently brokered a widely-publicized agreement with Tuareg tribal leaders from Libya, Chad, Niger, Mali and Algeria in which they would abandon separatist aspirations and smuggling (of weapons and trans-national extremists) in exchange for development assistance and financial support. Libya also cooperates closely with Syria, particularly on foreign fighter flows. Syria has transferred over 100 Libyan foreign fighters to the GOL's custody over the past two years, including a tranche of 27 in late 2007. Our assessment is that the flow of foreign fighters from Libya to Iraq and the reverse flow of veterans to Libya has diminished due to the GOL's cooperation with other states and new procedures. Counter-terrorism cooperation is a key pillar of the U.S.-Libya bilateral relationship and a shared strategic interest.
SUB SAHARAN AFRICA
8. (C) Having largely abandoned pan-Arab leadership aspirations, the GOL places a heavy premium on maintaining its perceived role as a leading state in Africa. Libya spearheaded establishing the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); the 10th anniversary of CEN-SAD's founding in September 1999 will occur shortly after your visit. Libya is deeply frustrated with its inability to deliver a sustainable peace between Chad and Sudan. Despite abortive UN/AU-led Darfur talks in Libya in October 2007 and the stillborn October 2007 Libya-brokered Chad cease-fire, the GOL remains actively involved in Chad-Sudan mediation efforts (it played a key role in re-establishing Chad-Sudan diplomatic relations in July 2008). But Libya recognizes it cannot broker peace unilaterally. The GOL views skeptically calls for an international observer force on the Chad-Sudan border under the March 2008 Dakar Accord and refers instead to the February 2006 Tripoli Accords (which also called for joint military observation of the Chad-Sudan border) and the October 2007 Sirte process as the platforms for a viable peace process. Hard experience - despite personal appeals by Muammar al-Qadhafi, the GOL failed to entice Darfur rebel leaders to attend the October 2007 Sirte conference - has prompted Libya to realize it is better positioned to pressure the regimes in Ndjamena and Khartoum than rebel movements. Libya believes the key to "fixing" Chad is to pressure Deby to address the deep, popular opposition to his government. The GOL has facilitated humanitarian relief through a key overland corridor running from Kufra, in southeast Libya, to Darfur. After years of failed unilateral intervention, Libya appears to appreciate UN/AU leadership of the Darfur political process and U.S. partnership in efforts to promote peace in and between Chad and Sudan. A visit by Special Envoy Williamson could help reinvigorate Libya's support for stalled international mediation efforts. On AFRICOM, the GOL has argued that any foreign military presence, regardless of mission, on the African continent would constitute unacceptable latter-day colonialism and would present an attractive target for al-Qaeda. AFRICOM's Deputy Commander visited Tripoli for low-key talks in January 2008 and General Ward plans to visit in October/November.
REGIONAL ISSUES
9. (S) Iraqi spokesman Ali Dabbagh recently met with Muammar al-Qadhafi, who expressed interest in pursuing closer relations with Iraq. It was agreed that a Libyan delegation would visit Iraq soon. Libyan-Iranian relations are complicated and increasingly contentious. Iranian First Vice President Davoudi, the highest ranking Iranian official to visit Tripoli in 25 years, signed a number of cooperation agreements during his January 2008 stop here as part of an apparent effort to garner support in the UNSC for heading off a third resolution on Iran's nuclear activity. Libya wanted Iran's help in smoothing over ties with Lebanon, which have been strained since the disappearance of Imam Musa Sadr during a 1978 visit to Tripoli. Iran's decision to demur appears to have factored into Libya's decision not to oppose a third UNSCR on Iran. Al-Qadhafi recently disparaged publicly Iran's nuclear aspirations, which prompted an angry rebuke in the Iranian press. Nonetheless, there are concerns about possible ties between state-owned Libyan banks and Iranian entities of particular concern. Ties with Syria are less contentious; Libya's new sovereign wealth fund announced last week that it had invested $200 million in a Syrian cement production venture. Claiming that it wants to
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emulate Dubai in its development approach, Libya has recently pursued closer ties with Arab Gulf states. A $500 million joint investment fund was announced during the August 2008 visit of Oman's Sultan Qaboos, his first since 1972. A number of similar investment projects have been established with the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain during a flurry of visits over the past year. Relations with Saudi Arabia remain strained.
ENERGY SECTOR & COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES
10. (C) Libya's economy is almost entirely dependent on oil and gas. Libya has the largest proven oil reserves (43.6 billion barrels) and the third largest proven natural gas reserves (1.5 billion cubic meters) on the African continent. Libya currently produces about 1.7 million barrels/day of oil; only Angola and Nigeria produce more in Africa. Oil and gas infrastructure suffered during the sanctions period. The lifting of sanctions has opened the way for new exploration and improved production. New technology and refined management techniques introduced by international oil companies (IOC's) are a key part of Libya's plan to increase oil production to 3.0 million barrels/day by 2013. Most of Libya's oil and natural gas are exported to Europe - Italy, Germany, Spain and France are key customers. Major U.S. energy companies active in Libya include Amerada Hess, ConocoPhillips, Marathon, Chevron, ExxonMobil and Occidental. Joint ventures involving U.S. companies currently account for about 510,000 barrels/day of Libya's 1.7 million barrels/day production. A large number of small to mid-sized U.S. oil and gas services companies are also working in Libya.
11. (C) After years of isolation under sanctions and limited spending by the GOL, Libya is currently in the midst of an economic boom, partly driven by a desire to complete large-scale infrastructure projects as tangible symbols of the regime's achievements in advance of the 40th anniversary of al-Qadhafi's revolution on September 1, 2009. High oil prices have helped fuel the outlays. Western companies, eager to establish a position in what is expected to be a lucrative market, are arriving in sizeable numbers. A temporary pause prompted by adoption of the Lautenberg Amendment in January 2008 and concern about asset seizure is coming to an end on news of the comprehensive claims agreement. XXXXXXXXXXXX Despite great promise, Libya remains a challenging business and investment environment. Contradictory regulations, inefficient government bureaucracy, limited human capacity and rampant corruption (in 2007, Transparency International ranked Libya 133rd out of 180 countries in terms of being most corrupt) are significant challenges that could hamper greater investment.
AL-QADHAFI & HIS FOREIGN MINISTER
12. (C) Muammar al-Qadhafi is notoriously mercurial. He often avoids making eye contact during the initial portion of meetings, and there may be long, uncomfortable periods of silence. Alternatively, he can be an engaging and charming interlocutor, as he was during NEA A/S Welch's meeting on August 14. A self-styled intellectual and philosopher, he has been eagerly anticipating for several years the opportunity to share with you his views on global affairs. We've been told that issues he might raise include Sarkozy's Union for the Mediterranean proposal (which al-Qadhafi opposes), the Georgia conflict, illegal migration (Libya is a key transit country), Iran, Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict (including his "Isratine" one-state solution), and Africa. Intellectually curious and a voracious consumer of news - trusted advisers are tasked with summarizing in Arabic important books and articles printed in other languages, including your recent article in Foreign Affairs - al-Qadhafi will be well-informed and more inclined to focus on strategic views than pragmatic measures. Foreign Minister Abdulrahman Shalgham, whom you met in Washington, is also expected to meet with you during your visit STEVENS
Wednesday, 18 June 2008, 22:26
S E C R E T STATE 065820
EO 12958 DECL: 06/20/2018
TAGS PREL, MARR, MOPS, UG, CG, LY, ZI
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER'S JUNE 13 MEETING WITH UGANDAN
PRESIDENT MUSEVENI
Classified By: Assistant Secretary Frazer for Reasons 1.4 (a) and (d)
1) (SBU) SUMMARY. On June 13, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer met with Ugandan President Museveni in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where Museveni was attending his son's graduation from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. President Museveni and A/S Frazer discussed military action against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Libyan involvement in sub-Saharan African politics, and the political stalemate in Zimbabwe. President Museveni, A/S Frazer, and the State Department Country Officer for Uganda were present. END SUMMARY.
DRC ACTION AGAINST THE LRA
---------------------------
2) (S) President Museveni said the DRC has not actively attempted to end the LRA threat to the region despite numerous diplomatic agreements and regional meetings. Museveni noted that Kabila has agreed on many occasions to remove the LRA from eastern DRC, but "nothing happens" after an agreement is reached. Museveni said regional Defense Attaches recently agreed to military action against the LRA but could not develop a joint plan of action to deploy. He also noted that "there was a lack of seriousness" among some of the regional players.
3) (S) Museveni did not believe the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) had the capacity or the will to carry out a successful mission against the LRA. A/S Frazer told Museveni that Kabila believed in FARDC,s capabilities, and Kabila's continued engagement has shown the DRC's will to conduct a successful operation. Kabila's main fear, A/S Frazer noted, is that Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF) action on DRC soil would create political problems for Kabila in Kinshasa. Museveni acknowledged Kabila's reservations, but noted that Kabila's logic "didn't make sense" since LRA, not the UPDF, is killing Congolese and destabilizing the region.
4) (C) A/S Frazer suggested the UPDF provide technical advisors to the FARDC, possibly embedding one to two UPDF soldiers in appropriate FARDC units. Museveni did not believe Kabila would accept technical or logistical assistance from the UPDF or other regional militaries. The Government of Uganda (GOU) offered the DRC a UPDF C-130 aircraft for the proposed FARDC operation but Kabila rejected it, Museveni said. Museveni did not believe technical advisors would be helpful because the FARDC needed combat personnel, not technical support.
5) (C) A/S Frazer said Kabila informed her that he plans to send two FARDC battalions to deploy against the LRA by the end of the month. Museveni indicated he is open to a joint UPDF/FARDC operation if Kabila agrees. A/S affirmed that President Bush remains very interested in ending the LRA threat and would welcome Museveni,s thoughts on the LRA threat to the region.
LIBYA
-----
6) (S) President Museveni said Libyan President Qadhafi "is a problem" for the continent and is pushing for the creation of a "United States of Africa" to be governed by one president. Museveni thought Qadhafi's plan is neither feasible nor desirable, given cultural and linguistic differences across the continent. Rather than the development of a unitary African state, Museveni said he is pushing Qadhafi and other African leaders to develop regional political federations and markets that support common objectives. Museveni indicated to A/S Frazer that Qadhafi continues to "intimidate" small African countries through bribes and other pressure. As a result of Libya's actions, small West African countries have been afraid to participate fully or speak out during international meetings at the United Nations, African Union, and other forums.
7) (S) Museveni noted that tensions with Qadhafi are growing and as a result, and he worries that Qadhafi will attack his plane while flying over international airspace. Museveni requested that the USG and GOU coordinate to provide additional air radar information when he flies over international waters.
ZIMBABWE
--------
8) (C) Museveni told A/S Frazer that he spoke to Zimbabwean President Mugabe by telephone after the first round of elections. During his call, Mugabe told Museveni he was confident he would win in the second round of elections. Mugabe told Museveni he did not want election monitors from countries that were "hostile" to Zimbabwe, but wouldn't mind observers from other countries. A/S Frazer thought thousands of monitors were necessary, especially in rural areas, to encourage people to vote. A/S Frazer advised Museveni that she would ask the U.S. Ambassador in Zimbabwe how many elections monitors he believes are needed.
9) (C) Museveni thought Zimbabwe's faltering economy and Mugabe's poor understanding of the private sector were at the root of Zimbabwe's political problems. He said a discussion of the economy would provide an entry point to tell Mugabe that he has failed and is embarrassing liberation leaders. He noted that Mugabe is unwilling to take calls from most African leaders saying they are not his age-mates.
10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
RICE
Friday, 14 September 2007, 09:01
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KAMPALA 001449
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/18/17
TAGS PGOV, PREL, UG, SU, CG, SO
SUBJECT: UGANDA: A/S FRAZER DISCUSSES LRA, CONGO, AND
SOMALIA WITH PRESIDENT MUSEVENI
Classified By: Ambassador Steven Browning for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Africa Bureau Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer met with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni on September 5 to discuss current developments in the negotiations with the Lord,s Resistance Army (LRA), developments in eastern Congo, and stabilizing Somalia. President Museveni, similarly to U.N. Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas Chissano, said that there needed to be "irreversible progress" in the peace process by the end of January 2008. Museveni said he would press Congolese President Joseph Kabila to take action against the "negative forces" in eastern Congo. On Somalia, Museveni pushed for tough action against Eritrea and pressure on Transitional Federal Government President Yusuf to be more inclusive and announce a timeline for the transition to democracy. Museveni also explained his vision of African unity in contrast to Libya,s approach as revealed at the AU Summit in Accra. End Summary.
- -
LRA
- -
2. (C) Africa Bureau Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer traveled to Uganda on September 5 and met with President Yoweri Museveni and northern Ugandan officials. She was accompanied by Ambassador Browning, Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution Tim Shortley, and the P/E Chief (notetaker). A/S Frazer opened the meeting by introducing Tim Shortley as her new Senior Advisor on Conflict Resolution who will focus on LRA and eastern Congo. She then asked President Museveni for his views on the status of the negotiations with the LRA. Museveni expressed pessimism about the peace process, describing it as a &circus8 and that the LRA was being &pampered.8 President Museveni told Frazer that he had discussed the process with U.N. Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas Joachim Chissano during Chissano's recent visit to Kampala. He agreed with Chissano to give the peace talks until the end of January unless there were signs of &irreversible progress.8 Museveni said he would raise the LRA in his meeting with Congolese President Joseph Kabila in Arusha on September 8. Museveni said he would urge Kabila to take action now against the LRA. He would advise Kabila to push the LRA out of Congo and into the assembly area in southern Sudan to stop the LRA from &gallivanting around Garamba.8 This type of action could demonstrate Kabila,s commitment to enforcing the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, other regional pacts, and international resolutions.
3. (C) Museveni complained that the LRA was using the peace talks to reorganize and described Joseph Kony as a &trickster.8 In Museveni,s view, the LRA,s complaints that the International Criminal Court (ICC) warrants should be dropped prior to his coming out of the bush were not valid if a national legal process was underway to deal with the issue of accountability. The ICC was only a problem for Kony if he did not want peace. Museveni was adamant that Kony should not be rewarded with a suspension or dropping of the ICC indictments before he agreed to peace. Guarantees could be built into the implementation of a peace agreement to address his fears.
4. (C) Senior Advisor Shortley asked Museveni for his views on how Kony would be handled if he agreed to a deal. Museveni described his provision of protection, livelihood, and homes for Kony,s mother (and now deceased father) since 1994. Museveni was flexible on Kony,s future, saying that the LRA leader could live anywhere in Uganda where he had not committed atrocities. Museveni agreed with Shortley that the resumption of the peace process could slip into October, which reaffirmed the President,s cynicism about the negotiations. Despite his misgivings about the &circus at Juba,8 Museveni was willing to allow the process to continue until the end of January.
5. (C) Museveni dismissed the demands for political power by the diaspora that backed the LRA. He argued that northern Ugandans were represented at all levels of government. In fact, Museveni pointed out that northerners elected opposition party members to represent them. The Ugandan Government would not accept &rewarding8 the disaffected diaspora and &terrorists8 through the peace process. Museveni argued that if regime critics such as former U.N. Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict Olara Otunnu wanted to return to Uganda to run for office, they could do so. If northern Uganda was &thirsty8 to have Otunnu represent it, then a member of Parliament should vacate his seat for Otunnu to compete. He elaborated with the example of former President Tito Okello,s son, Henry
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Okello Oryem, who won election to parliament in Kitgum. After he lost his parliamentary seat, Museveni appointed Oryem as Minister of State for International Relations. (Note: Oryem is the deputy leader of the GOU negotiating team. End Note.)
6. (C) The President also stated his belief that Kony was a proxy of the Khartoum Government. Museveni proudly pointed out that Uganda had defeated Khartoum through its support for the Sudan Peoples, Liberation Army (SPLA) even though, he joked, the United States took credit for finalizing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
7. (C) Shortley expressed the U.S. Government,s hope that with increasing stability in northern Uganda, the Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan (PRDP) could be formally launched in order to attract more attention from potential donors. Museveni said he wanted to correct the common misconception that peace in the north was the result of the negotiations. According to Museveni, the current stability was not the result of the peace talks but from Kony being pushed into Congo. He said that the GOU had defeated the LRA in northern Uganda and Southern Sudan. For Kony, the peace process was a &relief8 from military pressure, according to the President. He also stated that there were many prominent Ugandans who were LRA collaborators who feared exposure and now viewed the peace talks as a way to save Kony and themselves.
8. (C) A/S Frazer agreed with Museveni,s assessment of the LRA,s intentions and the need to secure Kabila,s cooperation. She said it was encouraging that Museveni was meeting with Kabila. She told Museveni that the U.S. wanted to work together on potential contingenices, and in particular, help Uganda transform the situation on the ground. Meeting the needs of the PRDP would be an extremely important way of supporting this transformation. Museveni said the cabinet had prepared a paper on the PRDP, which included a 14-point plan, with projects for industrializing northern Uganda.
9. (C) Museveni stated that &behind all of this is Sudan, Sudan, Sudan, Sudan.8 He said that even if the Khartoum Government could not supply the LRA at previous levels, he believed it was in constant touch with the LRA and smuggling supplies. Museveni said that the Uganda military was now more capable to address the LRA problem. A/S Frazer asked if Museveni had communicated his timeframe for the peace talks with the LRA. Museveni said no, but Chissano may have, although he was not sure. Museveni downplayed the role of local politicians in the process. He described his own Government,s parallel track as part of the foolery and lamented that fools have a lot of audiences. He pointed out that even international conservation groups have contacted the LRA to check on the white rhinos and other wildlife in the park. Museveni said that he himself participated in the "foolery" and has taken Vincent Otti,s telephone calls and sent the LRA cows for Christmas. The President claimed that the GOU had infiltrated the LRA and knew what its members were talking about.
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EASTERN CONGO
- - - - - - -
10. (C) A/S Frazer asked Museveni if he could confirm media reports that Kabila had used gunships in eastern Congo. Museveni did not know but would check. She also described U.S. efforts to calm both Kabila and Rwandan President Kagame, promote improved diplomatic relations, and foster inter-communal dialogue. A/S Frazer also highlighted U.S. efforts to facilitate dialogue through the Tripartite Plus process. Museveni said that Foreign Minister Kutesa had delivered several messages to Kabila. Kustesa was surprised that Kabila had taken the problem of the negative forces in eastern Congo casually. Museveni said that Uganda was begging Kabila to do something about Kony, the Allied Democratic Forces, and the FDLR. Uganda made the argument that it is a state obligation for Congo to take action, not a situation in which Kabila would be doing Museveni a favor. Museveni lamented that there was little to show on the security front since MONUC,s inception. He attributed this to lack of attention by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and MONUC,s current leadership. Kabila feels he has the protection of the &big boys8, according to Museveni. However, Museveni said that the UNSC was a better venue for addressing the problem than the U.N. General Assembly. He gave the example of Ghana, which had previously held strong positions on the LRA, Congo, and Sudan, and now had weakened its stance after becoming chair of the African Union.
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11. (C) Museveni sees two ways in which Congo could solve the LRA problem. First, allow joint operations with Uganda. Second, Congo could find a third party, such as France or Angola to help. Museveni was flexible on how it was done and wanted Congo to understand that it had a number of options. For Uganda, it would be preferable if the U.N. cleared the border areas of negative forces, which would then move deeper into Congo. Re-establishing border control would lessen the threat of the negative forces to Uganda and Rwanda. In Museveni's view, once the negative forces moved deeper into Congo, then Kabila could take as long as he wanted to deal with them.
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SOMALIA
- - - -
12. (C) On Somalia, Museveni raised concerns about Transitional Federal Government President Yusuf,s non-inclusivity and the slowness in the building of a national army. He emphasized the importance of establishing a timetable for elections. Museveni felt that the Ugandan military had a good relationship with Somali civilians. Improvement of the infrastructure and economy were also essential to stabilizing the country. Uganda had named an ambassador to Somalia with 36 years of experience and who was an economist. Museveni asked him to prepare a paper on formalizing Somalia,s informal economy.
13. (C) Another problem in Somalia was Eritrea, according to Museveni. He described his visit with President Isaias Aforkwi in March and said that although the two promised to talk, they had not communicated since. Museveni said President Isaias was preoccupied with trying to unseat Meles. That was all Isaias talked about, yet Museveni observed that Meles did not appear to be in any less control of Ethiopia despite Isaias, actions. Museveni told A/S Frazer that Isaias needed to be talked to by the members of the U.N. Security Council who carry a big stick. Museveni claimed that Eritrea continued to infiltrate weapons into Somalia and said that Isaias needed to be intimidated. Museveni argued that the UNSC should consider a blockade or sanctions if Eritrea does not listen. If Isaias was controlled and Somali groups cut off from him, the situation could stabilize. A/S Frazer told Museveni that the U.S. was considering options, ranging from designation as harboring terrorists to drying up financial support, against Eritrea. The U.S. was trying to persuade the Somali parliamentarians in Eritrea to leave before they associated with terrorist elements who sought refuge there. This would be important to establishing credentials as a legitimate opposition. She asked if Uganda would be willing to accept those parliamentarians that chose to leave Eritrea. Museveni agreed and explained that the wife of former warlord Aideed was still living in Uganda. Museveni,s only condition was that TFG President Yusuf must have no objection. A/S Frazer said that any such arrangement would be worked on in consultation with key players in the political process.
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AFRICAN UNION AND OTHER ISSUES
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
14. (C) Museveni turned to his opposition to the formation of an "African Government." He said that Libya pushed hard for support for it at the summit, but that Uganda led the charge against it. Museveni believes economic integration would be possible, but political integration would be difficult as each country has different foreign and internal policies and national identities. Uganda also has a basic disagreement with Libya over Sudan. Museveni accused Libya of pushing an Arab agenda on the continent.
15. (S) In a tte--tte with A/S Frazer, Museveni went further to express concern about Libya,s intentions and methods of influencing &weak8 West African states. Museveni said Qadhafi is trying to buy them off or intimidate them by destabilizing their countries unless they agree with union. He also expressed disappointment that President Mbeki has not effectively offered an alternative vision to Qadhafi,s approach to union government. Museveni said he and Mbeki are working together to counter Libya,s vision of unity.
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COMMENT
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16. (C) Museveni demonstrated flexibility on how LRA leader Joseph Kony might be handled. Though pessimistic about
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whether the peace talks would succeed, Museveni was willing to let the peace process move forward, but not without end. He welcomed the addition of Senior Advisor Shortley to support U.S. efforts. Press coverage of A/S Frazer's visit was extensive.
16. (U) A/S Frazer cleared this message.
BROWNING
Tuesday, 22 December 2009, 03:40
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000880
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, NEA/I
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR NOBLES
LONDON FOR LORD
EO 12958 DECL: 12/20/2029
TAGS PREL, IR, LE, IZ, TU, SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN-IRANIAN SHOW OF SOLIDARITY MASKS TENSIONS
OVER IRAQ, YEMEN, AND WAR WITH ISRAEL
DAMASCUS 00000880 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: CDA Chuck Hunter for reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (S/NF) The successive visits of three high-level Iranian officials to Damascus in early December appear at first glance to reaffirm strong Iranian-Syrian security ties and other forms of bilateral cooperation, but they may, in fact, mask deepening rifts over Iraq, Yemen, and the possibility of war with Israel. Syrian observers suggest the a shifting balance of power between Iran and Syria. The Iranian government, challenged domestically by anti-regime protests and abroad by building pressure over its nuclear program, has sought Syria's help just when Syria has begun to enjoy other strategic options, such as its relations with Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Asad's government proved willing to host the visits, sign a defense MOU, and allow Hamas Politburo Chief Khaled Meshaal to visit Tehran, all the while continuing close cooperation with Iranian security services and Hizballah operatives. But Asad reportedly resisted Iranian arguments for closer bilateral coordination in Iraq and Yemen and flatly rejected being drawn into a war between Iran and Israel. End Summary.
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Reaffirmation of Staunch Syrian-Iran Ties
-----------------------------------------
2. (C) On the surface, the early-December visits of three Iranian officials -- National Security Advisor Saeed Jalili on December 3, Vice President and head of the Environmental Department Mahammed-Javad Mahamadzideh on December 5-6, and Minister of Defense Ahmad Ali Vahidi on December 8-11 -- represented a concerted reaffirmation by both countries of their strong security ties and their commitment to expanded relations. Set against a backdrop of rising international pressure on Iran over its nuclear program and an exchange of threats between Israel and Iran, the visits signaled continuing cooperation in confronting Israeli policies. Asad publicly praised Iran's support for resistance against Israeli occupation after his December 3 meeting with Jalili. According to the Syrian press, Jalili also met with Palestinian leaders based in Syria, including Hamas Politburo Chief Khaled Meshaal, whom he invited to visit Tehran the following week. Though less focused on security issues, the visit of VP Mahammadzideh affirmed both countries' commitment to expanding economic cooperation and working together on responding to climate change. On December 11, Vahidi and his Syrian counterpart, Ali Habib, expressed a desire for a deepening of defense and military ties, formalized in a memorandum of understanding calling for "efforts aimed at the establishment of a comprehensive regional security pact," and establishing recurrent meetings of the Joint Defense Cooperation Committee.
3. (S/NF) The public showcasing of these three visits contrasted with the secrecy with which Iranian Revolutionary Guard Commander/al-Quds Force Ghassem Soleimani conducted his. Reportedly accompanying Jalili, Soleimani returned to Damascus after a long absence, perhaps a reflection of lingering tensions between Iran and Syria that erupted after the February 2008 assassination of Hizballah military strategist Imad Mugniyah in the Syrian capital. XXXXXXXXXXXX spoke very reluctantly about Soleimani's presence in Damascus, saying only that "he was here," and "when he visits, it's usually significant." XXXXXXXXXXXX reported seeing Jalili and Soleimani at a XXXXXXXXXXXX meeting with Syrian officials that included FM Muallim, as well as unspecified members of Hizballah. "Soleimani represents the
DAMASCUS 00000880 002.2 OF 004
business end of the resistance," commented XXXXXXXXXXXX, also reluctant to discuss the sensitive issue of Iranian-Syrian-Hizballah military cooperation.
4. (S/NF) Taken collectively, the Iranian visits over eight days were meant to dispel doubts that Syria would or could abandon its ties to Iran, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX The visits allowed the Syrian government to project an image of strength at a time when Israel was rejecting Syria's demand for a commitment to withdraw to the June 4 lines and a return to Turkish-facilitated proximity talks prior to moving to direct peace negotiations. In a joint press conference with Jalili, FM Muallim supported Iran's right to enrich uranium and to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Moreover, the Iranian visits coincided with the introduction of a law in the Knesset to require a national referendum on any peace treaty. "Iran provides us diplomatic cover as well as the military might to back up our demands for peace," argued XXXXXXXXXXXX. "In return, we're providing Iran support when the West is pressuring Iran on its nuclear program," he said.
----------------------------------
But Did Iran Wear Out Its Welcome?
----------------------------------
5. (S/NF) Whatever Syrian rationale there may be for showcasing military ties to Iran, many Syrian observers are emphasizing the shifting balance of power in their bilateral relationship. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX Iran, not Syria, sought the visits as a sign of Syrian reassurance. "Be assured," commented XXXXXXXXXXXX "they needed these visits far more than we did." Summing up a view heard repeatedly around Damascus, "things in our relations with Iran are starting to return to normal" after a long period of Syrian dependence, XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted. He added, "U.S. isolation and the invasion of Iraq made it necessary to adopt such extreme measures. But now, things are moving back to equilibrium."
6. (S/NF) By the time of Vahidi's visit, some Syrian officials were quietly grousing that the Iranians were "too needy." The Syrian government wanted to extend support to a loyal Iranian ally, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, but the dramatic display of multiple Iranian visits in a short period of time "was Iran's doing." The Syrian government, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, perceived a note of panic in the Iranian requests and some were saying Syria's renewed relations with Saudi Arabia, its deepening ties to Turkey, and even Washington's desire to re-engage Syria had made Iran "jealous."
7. (S/NF) While the Syrian government responded positively to Iranian requests for public statements of support on the nuclear issue and against Israel, it remained silent after the Iranian Minister of Defense's arrival statement denounced Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States. By the time Vahidi arrived on December 8, press contacts noted, the Syrian government's attitude had shifted to "let's get this over with," according to XXXXXXXXXXXX. Indeed, at the same time Vahidi was parading his 20-car motorcade around Damascus, several other visits were occurring, including one by the Turkish military commandant and President Sarkozy's Middle East advisors, Nicolas Gallet and Jean-David Levitte. Most of Presidential Media Advisor Bouthaina Shaaban's December 10 press conference was dedicated not to Syrian-Iranian relations, but to Syria's ties to other countries, according to press contactsXXXXXXXXXXXX.
DAMASCUS 00000880 003.2 OF 004
----------------
Signs of Discord
----------------
8. (S/NF) Going beyond atmospherics XXXXXXXXXXXX reported several disagreements between Jalili's delegation and their Syrian counterparts. On Iraq, Jalili reportedly proposed a "joining of Syrian and Iranian efforts" to influence the upcoming Iraqi elections. "They (the Iranians) basically asked us to focus on co-opting Shia politicians and to drop our support for the Sunnis and former Baathists," arguing that the center of gravity in Iraq lies with the Shia. On this issue XXXXXXXXXXXX reported, Syrian officials expressed great reluctance and continued to insist on the reintegration of former Iraqi Baathists into the political system. Some Syrian officials XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed that Syria needed to extend the range of its political connections in the Iraqi Shia community, said XXXXXXXXXXXX. But Iran's vision for Iraq was "a Shia-dominated state made of up of mini-states," an outcome the Syrian government opposed, he said. The SARG continues to desire a stronger centralized power base in Baghdad.
9. (S/NF) On Yemen, Vahidi's public remarks rebuking Saudi Arabia for interfering in its neighbor's affairs drew sharp criticism from Syrian officials during the Iranian Defense Minister's meetings XXXXXXXXXXXX Vahidi was clearly trying to drive a wedge between Damascus and Riyadh, but "it didn't work," he said. Asad stopped short of publicly contradicting the Iranian official during his visit, but he reassured Saudi King Abdullah's son Abdul Azziz, in Syria to pay personal condolences after the death of President Asad's brother Majd, that Syria fully supported Saudi Arabia's efforts to defeat the Huthi separatists. "There weren't any newspaper reports of Iranian ministers here (paying condolences)," noted XXXXXXXXXXXX.
10. (S/NF) More significantly, Syria reportedly resisted Iranian entreaties to commit to joining Iran if fighting broke out between Iran and Israel or Hizballah and Israel. XXXXXXXXXXXX said Iranian officials were in Syria "to round up allies" in anticipation of an Israeli military strike. "It (an Israeli strike on Iran) is not a matter of if, but when," XXXXXXXXXXXX said, reporting what Syrian officials had heard from their Iranian counterparts. The Syrian response, he continued, was to tell the Iranians not to look to Syria, Hizballah or Hamas to "fight this battle." "We told them Iran is strong enough on its own to develop a nuclear program and to fight Israel," he said, adding, "we're too weak." The Iranians know Syria has condemned Israeli threats and would denounce Israeli military operations against Iran. "But they were displeased with Asad's response. They needed to hear the truth," XXXXXXXXXXXX said.
11. (S/NF) Asked what advice Syria was giving Iran, XXXXXXXXXXXX replied that Syria, along with Turkey and Qatar, was preparing for an Israeli-Iranian military exchange in the near future. "Military officials tell me they have noticed Israeli drones snooping around our sites," he explained, noting some Syrian officials saw Israeli reconnaissance as an indication that Israel might seek to disable anti-air radar stations as part of a plan to fly bombers over Syrian territory en route to Iran. "We expect to wake up one morning soon and learn the Israeli strike took place. Then we expect an Iranian response. At that point, we, Turkey, and Qatar will spring into action to begin moderating a
DAMASCUS 00000880 004.2 OF 004
ceasefire and then a longer-term solution involving both countries' nuclear programs. That's the best scenario. All the others are bad for us and the region," summed up XXXXXXXXXXXX. "We would hope the U.S. would recognize our diplomatic efforts to resolve a regional crisis and give us some credit for playing a positive role."
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Comment: So What?
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12. (S/NF) Many Syrian and some diplomatic observers believe Syria is in the process of re-calibrating its relations with Iran and is seeking to avoid choices that would constrain the country's flexibility as it faces an uncertain regional setting. Does, however, Syria's instinct for self-survival and desire for less dependence on Iran represent anything other than a shift of emphasis as long as Damascus insists on maintaining its military relations with Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas? Some analysts here argue that Syria's improved relations with Turkey, France, and Saudi Arabia afford Damascus a greater range of choices in dealing with the West, the Arab world, Israel, and Iran. This school asserts that better ties with the U.S. would further increase Syria's range of options and its potential to move farther away from Iran. Even if Damascus and Tehran maintained some semblance of their political-military relationship, the extent of their ties would be constrained by Syria's competing equities in deepening relations with others, including the U.S. Others argue that a wider range of options would only perpetuate Syria's decision-averse orientation; if the Iranians can't pin down Syria on matters of war and peace, then what chance would the United States have? Syria could pocket openings offered by Washington and simply use our gestures to play rivals off one another.
13. (S/NF) At the end of the day, it may be impossible to assess Syria's intentions with any confidence until the regional context becomes clearer. In the meantime, the U.S. should take a modicum of quiet satisfaction that Syria is showing signs of wanting to moderate Iran's influence in its affairs, even though expecting the relationship to end altogether remains unrealistic. If Syria's improved relations with France, Saudi Arabia and Turkey can initiate cracks in the Syrian-Iranian axis, then perhaps discrete U.S.-Syrian cooperation could add further stress to these fault lines. A willingness to offer concrete deliverables as evidence of a U.S. desire for improved relations would force Syrian officials to calculate how far they would go in response, providing us with a more accurate measure of their intentions. At a minimum, increased Washington interest in Syria would increase Tehran's anxiety level and perhaps compound Syrian-Iranian tensions, at a time when Syrian officials themselves may be unsure how they will react to unfolding events.
HUNTER
Monday, 01 February 2010, 04:41
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000228
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/RUS, EEB
TREASURY FOR TORGERSON/WRIGHT
NSC FOR MCFAUL
WHITE HOUSE FOR USTR EHAFNER
EO 12958 DECL: 01/28/2020
TAGS EINV, ETRD, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DRAFT BILL WOULD REQUIRE ON-SHORE CREDIT
CARD PROCESSING
REF: MOSCOW 00079
Classified By: ECONMINCOUNS Matthias Mitman for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1.(C) SUMMARY: The latest version of the Russian draft law "On the National Payment System" contains several provisions that would disadvantage U.S. businesses. The draft law would set up a National Payment Card System (NPCS) including its own payment card that banks and payment card companies could join voluntarily. Most likely to be a consortium of state-owned banks, the NPCS operator would process the domestic payments for all members and collect processing fees estimated at $4 billion per year. The draft also forbids sending abroad any payment data for domestic transactions. Should international payment card companies such as Visa and MasterCard chose not to join the NPCS they would have to set up the infrastructure to do their Russian payment processing domestically. END SUMMARY.
2.(C) On January 27, the Russian newspaper Kommersant reported that it had received a copy of the "final" version of the draft legislation "On the National Payment System." Visa's Public Relations Head Dmitriy Vishnyakov, who along with MasterCard representatives met Ministry of Finance officials on January 22, told us that MinFin is still seeking consent from the various ministries and agencies involved in the legislation. Vishnyakov reported that Deputy Finance Minister Svyatugin leads MinFin's effort on this legislation, including shepherding the bill through the GOR interagency process. Vishnyakov passed a copy of the latest draft law to econoff.
To Join or Not To Join
-----------------------
3.(C) According to Visa's Vishnyakov, the latest version follows the "China model" of payment card systems. The law would set up a National Payment Card System (NPCS), which Vishnyakov reported would likely be run by a consortium of state banks as either a non-profit entity or a joint stock, profit-making company. Banks and credit card companies would have the option of joining the NPCS. If they joined, banks in Russia would issue cards under the NPCS brand, with its own logo. Payment processing for these cards would be done on-shore by the NPCS entity. According to the Kommersant article, the fees for these services are estimated at Rb 120 billion ($4 billion) annually. As Vishnyakov pointed out, the vast majority of Visa's business in Russia is done with cards issued and used in Russia; with earnings from processing going to NPCS, Visa would no longer profit from these transactions.
4.(C) While joining the NPCS would be optional for both banks and international payment card companies, membership has its privileges. If Visa and MasterCard choose to join the NPCS, they would not have any role in domestic transaction processing, but the bank-issued NPCS cards could be "co-branded" with Visa or MasterCard. When the cardholder used his card abroad, the transaction theoretically would go through the normal Visa or MasterCard processing that takes place outside of Russia. While Vishnyakov said such a deal is a possibility, it would require negotiations to specify this approach in the draft law.
ON-SHORE PAYMENT PROCESSING REQUIRED
------------------------------------
5.(C) In the proposed draft of the law, if international payment card companies choose not to join the NPCS, they will have to set up on-shore processing centers. But neither Visa nor MasterCard representatives, which together have 85% of the Russian payment card market, are willing to say whether they would be willing to do so. MasterCard's Head in Russia, Ilya Riaby, said MasterCard would have to "build and assess the business model of setting up on-shore processing" before it could reach a decision. The draft law stipulates that international payment card companies will have one year to establish processing centers inside of Russia. (Note: Currently no international companies have processing centers in Russia.) A ban on sending abroad payment data for purely domestic transactions will become effective two years after the law enters into force.
6.(C) According to Vishnyakov, MinFin understands that this
MOSCOW 00000228 002 OF 002
would entail so much expense and difficulty for Visa and MasterCard that the two companies might quit the Russian domestic market. Vishnyakov believes that, at least at the Deputy Minister level, MinFin's hands are tied. Implying that Russian security services were behind this decision, Vishnyakov said, "There is some se-cret (government) order that no one has seen, but everyone has to abide by it." As described reftel, credit card company and bank representatives have told us that GOR officials apparently assume that US payment systems routinely share data associated with payment transactions by Russian cardholders with intelligence services in the US and elsewhere.
STATE EMPLOYEES ALL GET NPCS CARDS
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7.(C) The current draft of the law would require all stated-owned enterprises and all state employees to be issued NPCS cards and to receive their salaries via electronic deposit into NPCS member-banks. (Note: Eighty percent of payment card holders have what are called "salary cards," a type of debit card negotiated between the employer and a bank. Historically, employees have used their salary cards almost exclusively to withdraw their salaries at the beginning of each month, though they can also use them as debit cards.) One positive aspect of the latest version of the law is that vendors are not required to accept NPCS cards, as was required in earlier versions.
COMMENT
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8.(C) This draft law continues to disadvantage U.S. payment card market leaders Visa and MasterCard, whether they join the National Payment Card System or not. If they join, the NPCS operator will collect the fees, leaving them to collect processing fees only when card-holders travel abroad -- a tiny section of the market. If they do not join but choose to compete with NPCS cards, they will have to set up payment processing centers in Russia, a very large investment in itself, and compete against a system likely backed by the largest Russian state banks. While the draft legislation has yet to be submitted to the Duma and can still be amended, post will continue to raise our concerns with senior GOR officials. We recommend that senior USG officials also take advantage of meetings with their Russian counterparts, including through the Bilateral Presidential Commission, to press the GOR to change the draft text to ensure U.S. payment companies are not adversely affected. END COMMENT.
Beyrle
Thursday, 05 March 2009, 13:21
S E C R E T ASMARA 000080
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/EX AND AF/E
EO 12958 DECL: 03/04/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, ER
SUBJECT: IS ERITREA UNRAVELING?
REF: ADDIS ABABA 567
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald K. McMullen for reason 1.4(d)
1. (S) Summary: Young Eritreans are fleeing their country in droves, the economy appears to be in a death spiral, Eritrea's prisons are overflowing, and the country's unhinged dictator remains cruel and defiant. Is the country "on the brink of disaster" as posited by Eritrea's first cousins across the border in Tigray, Ethiopia (ref)? Party leaders tell us their Leninist "war economy" will be reversed, while Asmara is abuzz with reports of multiple cabinet-level changes. However, tinkering at the margins of governance will count for naught as long as the Isaias regime remains a one-man band. Gold mining will not provide the anticipated economic panacea. Although the regime is one bullet away from implosion, Eritrea's resilience as a country is based on 1) a strong sense of nationalism forged over four decades of war, and 2) the capacity of most Eritreans to withstand suffering and deprivation with forbearance and toughness. Any sudden change in government is likely to be initiated from within the military. End Summary.
2. (S) The Regime's Political Capital is Tanking
--------------------------------------------- ---
Isaias' popularity stemmed from his leading role in Eritrea's Davidic victory in the thirty-year struggle for independence. Immediately after liberation, Isaias seemed to be providing (like Mugabe) reasonably good governance to his traumatized nation. The accelerating decline into dictatorship began in 1996 with an alleged assassination attempt against Isaias by Ethiopian PM Meles Zenawi, followed by the bloody 1998-2000 Border War, and the "treason" of the inner-circle critics called the G-15. Severe persecution of any potential opposition increased. With half of Eritrea's population being born after liberation, Isaias' Struggle credentials are less important than before; youth today face a hopeless future of open-ended National Service at survival-level wages. Hope for a better future fueled Eritrean resistance for a whole generation; the country's reservoir of hope is now largely depleted.
3. (S) The War Economy is Failing
---------------------------------
Hagos Ghebrehiwet, as the Economic Director of the Peoples Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), is the architect of the regime's failed economic policies. When previously asked by the ambassador if he was a Communist, Hagos replied, "No. Quite the opposite." He explained that from 1993-98 development of the tiny private sector was a top goal, but with the outbreak of war in 1998 "national security became the economic and political imperative." He contends that the subsequent "no peace, no war" situation with Ethiopia obligated the state to maintain the economy on a war footing, due to shortages of hard currency. Hagos told the ambassador in mid-February that the regime was reversing its war economy policies. "We are going back to the immediate post-independence approach," he claimed. NOTE: Post has seen no indication of this. END NOTE.
4. (C) Gold To the Rescue? No
------------------------------
Many Eritrean businessmen and officials hope, and opposition members fear, that come 2010, gold mining will provide the economic fillip needed to rescue the economy and the regime. Mining company executives tell us these hopes and fears are grossly misplaced. Nevsun is the Canadian company leading the development of the large Bisha gold, copper, and zinc field. Nevsun employees say Bisha is like Neapolitan ice cream, with a thin layer of gold atop thicker layers of copper and zinc. Nevsun's agreement is heavily front-loaded for cost recovery, meaning for the first two years (the life of the gold extraction) almost all revenues will accrue to Nevsun for capital and infrastructure costs. The gold will be flown from Bisha directly to Switzerland. While the government will get some revenues from taxes and royalties, it is only with the beginning of copper extraction in 2012 or 2013 and zinc five years later that the government of Eritrea will see much return on its investment. In short, there is no help on the immediate horizon for Eritrea's faltering economy.
5. (C) No American Enemy to Blame
---------------------------------
Prior to January 20 every bad thing in Eritrea was touted as proof of an American-led conspiracy against Eritrea. Daily anti-American diatribes peppered the regime-controlled airwaves and print media. The regime attempted to deflect all complaints by claiming America and its puppet, Ethiopia, were an immediate threat to Eritrea's sovereignty and/or territorial integrity. Criticism of the regime was thus tantamount not only to sedition, but also to treason. Since January 20 the regime has been on what it considers a charm offensive with the U.S. in hopes that the Obama administration will for some reason reverse USG opposition to the regime's regional meddling and domestic oppression. Without the "world's sole superpower" being constantly blamed for all of Eritrea's woes, Eritreans seem to be focusing more on their own government's manifest shortcomings. Grumblings are increasingly loud and frequent, but still only in private.
6. (C) Tough, Proud, and Suffering
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Around 80% of Eritreans live on farms or in small villages. Many are only marginally involved in the monetized economy and produce part of what their families need to survive. Governmental benign neglect would be a positive and welcome change. The regime's practice of seizing crops or forcing farmers to sell grain at below-market prices has caused families to attempt to withdraw from the monetized economy, at least in part, although the Isaias regime is very good at controlling nearly all aspects of Eritrean society. Eritrean farmers have long lived a knife-edge existence due to marginal rainfall, decades of war and brigandage, and the use of Dark Age technology. Even before last year's dreadful harvest, UNICEF reckoned that 40% of Eritrean children were malnourished. Despite this, Eritreans remain fiercely patriotic. In the face of deprivation and oppression, the time-tested best practice is to shut up, hunker down, and pray for rain.
7. (S) Where Will Change Come From?
------------------------------------
In hushed tones, Asmarinos are discussing reports of wholesale changes in the cabinet and other senior civilian positions. From what we understand, the exercise (septel) will be a grand round of musical chairs, with former fighters loyal to President Isaias mostly swapping ministerial portfolios. Meanwhile, the urban population remains largely cowed. The PFDJ's Secretary General languishes in medical exile in UAE; Isaias chairs the party's monthly meetings in his absence. Neither the government, party, nor populace seem to have the wherewithal to effect a sudden change in government. The military does. We've heard increasingly frequent and specific reports of mutinous behavior from within the military, sparked by growing numbers of troops deserting across the border into Sudan and even into Ethiopia. The mantle of Eritrean nationalism could conceivably pass from the shoulders of Isaias Afwerki to the Eritrean Defense Force. Defense Minister Sebhat Efrem probably has the standing to paper over the rivalries of the senior generals (at least temporarily), should the military or a faction of it suddenly find the need to step in to "save the revolution."
MCMULLEN
Tuesday, 15 December 2009, 11:19
S E C R E T ASMARA 000429
EO 12958 DECL: 12/10/2019
TAGS PGOV, MOPS, SOCI, PREF, ER
SUBJECT: ERITREA'S SQUABBLING COLONELS, FLEEING
FOOTBALLERS, FRIGHTENED LIBRARIANS
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald K. McMullen for reason 1.4(d)
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Things are getting worse and worse in Eritrea. The regime is facing mounting international pressure for years of malign behavior in the neighborhood. Human rights abuses are commonplace and most young Eritreans, along with the professional class, dream of fleeing the country, even to squalid refugee camps in Ethiopia or Sudan. The economy continues to sink; exports for 2008 totaled only $14m and vital hard-currency remittances have fallen to 43% of the 2005 level. "He is sick," said one leading Eritrean businessman, referring to President Isaias' mental health. "The worse things get, the more he tries to take direct control--it doesn't work." The following three vignettes highlight the current state of affairs in Eritrea. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) THE DEFENSE MINISTER AND THE COLONELS
--------------------------------------------
Defense Minister Sebhat Efrem convoked army colonels in late November for a three-day conference on professional and career issues. On the second day a serious row reportedly broke out among the conferees; the acrimony rose so high that General Sebhat cancelled the rest of the conference and sent the quarreling colonels back to their units. The bone of contention? Perceived differences in the quality of the villas (often confiscated from the original owners) given to the colonels by the regime to maintain their allegiance.
3. (SBU) SOCCER TEAM 1 - REGIME 0
----------------------------------
Eritreans are mad about soccer. Many dusty streets in Asmara are filled with urchins kicking an old sock stuffed with rags back and forth between goals made of piled stones. Senior government and party officials are avid fans of the British Premier League and sometimes leave official functions early to catch key matches. Despite tight control of the domestic media, satellite TV dishes are allowed, probably so folks can watch international soccer. Impressive numbers of senior regime officials attended the World Cup pool draw reception thrown by the South Africa embassy last week. The BBC and diaspora websites are reporting that the entire Eritrean national soccer team defected after playing in a regional tournament in Kenya. If true, this will be stunning news for the Eritrean population. Only the coach and an escorting colonel reportedly returned to Eritrea. (One wonders why, given their likely fate.) Isaias has previously claimed the CIA was luring Eritrean youth abroad; if the soccer team has in fact defected, he will undoubted try to twist logic in some way to blame the United States.
4. (C) [Content removed]
----------------------------
Eritreans are fearful of associating with foreigners, as they are often grilled afterwards by security thugs. XXXXXXXXXXXX
5. (S) COMMENT: The brittle Isaias regime is one pistol shot away from implosion. However, Isaias is clever, very good at operational security, and two decades younger than Mugabe. While many in Eritrea long for change, few are in a position to effect it. END COMMENT.
McMullen
Monday, 08 June 2009, 12:33
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 001318
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/07/2019
TAGS PGOV, PINR, PREL, KPAO, ET
SUBJECT: UNDERSTANDING THE ETHIOPIAN HARDLINERS
Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
SUMMARY
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1. (S) In a rare meeting with the elusive head of the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) and main hardliner within the powerful executive committee of the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) party, Ambassador and NISS chief Getachew Assefa discussed a wide range of regional and bilateral issues. Getachew made clear during the four hour private meeting that Ethiopia sought greater understanding from the U.S. on national security issues vital to Ethiopia, especially Ethiopia's concerns over domestic insurgent groups like the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). He spoke at length about former Addis Ababa Mayor-elect Berhanu Nega XXXXXXXXXXXX; VOA's biased reporting; the dangers of former defense minister Seeye Abraha's growing authority within the opposition; Ethiopia's views on democracy and human rights; Eritrea's role as a rogue state in the region; and regional issues including the importance of supporting the Transitional Federal Government and a rapprochement with Alhu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ) as the only option for Somalia's survival; and the need for U.S. reconciliation with Sudan. End Summary.
TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING
-----------------------------
2. (S) Through the arrangements of former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia, Irv Hicks, Ambassador met with Ethiopia's national intelligence chief, Getachew Assefa, for a four hour private meeting on June 4. Getachew, noted for his eccentric behavior and elusiveness, explained to the Ambassador that he welcomes greater dialogue with the U.S. Embassy, but underscored the importance of deeper U.S. understanding of Ethiopia's security concerns. Characterizing the U.S. relationship as sound and expressing appreciation for the cooperation with the U.S. on special projects on counterterrorism, Getachew emphasized that Ethiopia shares U.S. views on high value targets (HVT) like Robow and al-Turki as threats to regional stability. But domestic insurgent groups, like the OLF and ONLF, should also be treated as terrorists because they have safe haven camps in extremist-held areas in Somalia and receive support and assistance from the very same HVTs that the U.S. and Ethiopia are trying to neutralize. Such support makes the ONLF and OLF accomplices with international terrorist groups, Getachew argued. Just as Ethiopia would not meet with domestic U.S. insurgent groups, referring to individuals and groups who would conduct bombings of U.S. government offices, abortion clinics and advocates of racial and gender hate, Ethiopia would not want U.S. officials to meet with Ethiopia's domestic insurgents who bomb and kill Ethiopian officials and citizens.
3. (S) Getachew added that the GOE does conduct talks with the ONLF and OLF and there are groups, like the Ethiopian elders, who reach out to the membership in an effort to end the violence. Getachew stressed that this is an Ethiopian process by Ethiopians and should remain an Ethiopian-led, Ethiopian-directed and Ethiopian-coordinated process. Ambassador made clear that the U.S. Administration does not meet with the ONLF and that the U.S. is in close consultations with Ethiopian authorities on their views on the ONLF and OLF, and that the U.S. supports the work of the Ethiopian Elders to end the violence. Getachew noted the visit to European Capitals and Washington of ONLF senior leaders and said they met with staffers in the U.S. Vice President's office. The Ambassador said that we had no evidence that a meeting took place with the Vice President's staff and stressed that the State Department did not meet with the ONLF group. Further, the U.S. military no longer meets with alleged ONLF supporters in the volatile Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia because of security concerns. The Ambassador stressed that such meetings in the past was for force protection of U.S. military civil affairs team working in the dangerous Ogaden region near Somalia, but in the last few years there has been no contact. The Ambassador added that there should be closer discussion between he U.S. and Ethiopia on this issue.
U.S. GIVES EXTREMISTS A VOICE AND LEGITIMACY
--------------------------------------------
ADDIS ABAB 00001318 002 OF 004
4. (S) Getachew complained pointedly that Voice of America (VOA) is biased and gives a platform for extremist elements. XXXXXXXXXXXX
5. (S) Getachew also discussed the VOA reports covering former State Department official Greg Stanton of Genocide Watch, who charged Prime Minister Meles of crimes against humanity as a result of Ethiopia's incursion into Somalia in 2006. Getachew complained that VOA Amharic reporting was biased and not even handed. He did note that VOA English was fine. VOA Amharic service does not interview Ethiopian officials who can refute "false assertions" espoused in the VOA interviews. Getachew praised Germany's Deutsche Wella service for its balanced and yet hard hitting reporting. Getachew underscored that if the GOE is doing something wrong or does not have the support of the people, news services have an obligation to highlight such problems. Getachew said VOA, however, seeks to report only what is anti-government or lend support for the opposition. Getachew concluded that the U.S.G., because of VOA Amharic service is an official arm of the U.S.G., lacks neutrality in its support for the opposition and this undercuts relations between the two countries. The Ambassador replied that VOA is a very independent media and the U.S.G. does not have oversight and control over the content of the reporting.
6. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX
THE OPPOSITION
--------------
7. (S) Getachew commented on Ethiopia's opposition leadership underscoring that he wishes to see a vibrant opposition movement, but currently, the NGO community and foreign missions support the opposition blindly without critical analysis. XXXXXXXXXXXX
ADDIS ABAB 00001318 003 OF 004
8. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
--------------------------
9. (S) Getachew echoed common themes advocated by the ruling EPRDF party stalwarts from the Prime Minister to the party faithful. He stressed that the EPRDF supports democracy and that it is the goal for the ruling party to eventually give way to other parties of common vision in fighting poverty and a commitment to support the process of democratization. Getachew said he would support opposition parties if they have a better message to help Ethiopia overcome poverty, improve health care and education, and raise the standard of living of the Ethiopian people. He added that the U.S. and others should look at Ethiopia's democracy efforts and human rights record as a work in progress. It will take time but Ethiopia is moving in the right direction that will make Ethiopia a democratic state.
FOREIGN POLICY: ERITREA, SOMALIA, AND SUDAN
-------------------------------------------
10. (S) Getachew described Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki as "no martyr," who sought to survive and establish himself as the predominate leader in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia stands in the way of Isaias' grand design and it is his goal to divide Ethiopia and weaken it through terrorism. Getachew remarked that one of Isaias' bodyguards was in Dubai and then defected to Ethiopia. The bodyguard remarked that Isaias was a recluse who spent his days painting and tinkering with gadgets and carpentry work. Isaias appeared to make decisions in isolation with no discussion with his advisors. It was difficult to tell how Isaias would react each day and his moods changed constantly. Getachew added that Eritrea trains over 30 rebel groups at Camp Sawa near the Sudan border and graduates are infiltrated into Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia to enhance instability and target Ethiopian interests. Getachew expressed dismay with Kenya in allowing Eritrean intel officers and military trainers who support al-Shabaab in Somalia, to bribe their way out of Kenya and return to Eritrea. He explained the activities of Abraha Kassa, Eritrea's elusive intel chief who directs Eritrea's Somalia operations.
11. (S) On Somalia, Getachew said the only way to support stability was through support for the ASWJ which attracts a wide range of support from all the clans, especially those groups in conflict with each other. The ASWJ has been effective in countering al-Shabaab and is ideologically committed to Sufism and the defense of Islam against the extremist salafists which form al-Shabaab. Getachew said the U.S. can best help by supporting the ASWJ and TFG to cooperate, to pay salaries of TFG troops and support the IGAD and African Union which are seeking to sanction Eritrea, implement a no fly zone, and close ports used by extremist elements.
12. (S) On Sudan, Getachew urged the U.S. to engage Bashir and the Sudanese leadership. Sudan, more than Somalia, poses the greatest threat to regional security and stability, Getachew argued. The prospects for a civil war which destabilizes the region would be devastating. The only country that would benefit would be Eritrea.
COMMENT
-------
13. (S) It is interesting that Getachew's description of President Isaias mirrors Getachew's own character, as well.
ADDIS ABAB 00001318 004 OF 004
Getachew avoids speaking with foreigners and few foreigners really know him. He is not well liked within his own agency for decisions he makes in isolation which, at times, make little sense and are not discussed in consensus with his staff. His apparent hot temper and reclusive habits have made it difficult for his staff to gauge his moods and understand his thought process. The Prime Minister himself and other EPRDF leaders have remarked to the Ambassador that it is difficult to talk with Getachew and to meet with him, but that his loyalty to the EPRDF is never in question. Despite his poor reputation, Getachew is regarded as a strong EPRDF hardliner and commands considerable authority and influence within the powerful EPRDF executive committee which lays down the policy for the ruling party and the government. While relations with NISS officials below Getachew's rank are extremely cordial and, depending on the unit, very close, the Ambassador has met with Getachew only twice in the past three years, and other Embassy staff have also met with little success in engaging him. Even visiting senior U.S. intel officers have not been successful in meeting Getachew. Ambassador will pursue future meetings with Getachew but he will never be a close contact. End Comment. YAMAMOTO
Monday, 09 February 2009, 14:53
S E C R E T ASMARA 000047
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/EX AND AF/E
EO 12958 DECL: 02/02/2019
TAGS PREL, PTER, ECON, ER
SUBJECT: AN ERITREAN OVERTURE TO THE UNITED STATES
REF: ASMARA 35
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald K. McMullen for reason 1.4(d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Senior Eritrean officials in recent weeks have signaled their interest in re-engaging with the United States in areas of mutual interest. They have done so by loosening restrictions on Embassy Asmara (REF), by engaging in more diplomatic interaction with embassy personnel, by ending the daily anti-American diatribes in state-owned media, by sending congratulatory letters to President Obama and Secretary Clinton, and by authorizing over $100,000 to support ongoing U.S. medical volunteer programs such as Physicians for Peace. Senior officials invited the ambassador and his wife to spend a day on a family farm, the Defense Minister attended a representational event at the CMR, and Foreign Affairs officials tell us Isaias himself helped draft a white paper on re-engaging the United States. Post has bluntly told key officials that Eritrean support for Somali extremists precludes a more normal bilateral relationship and warned that an al-Shabaab attack against the United States would trigger a strong and swift American reaction. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) A PICNIC WITH THE "AMERICAN MAFIA"
-----------------------------------------
Members of Eritrea's "American Mafia," senior party and government officials who speak fluent English and have lived in the United States, have taken the lead in signaling Eritrea's interest in improved relations. On February 7, for example, the ambassador and his wife were invited to spend the day on the family farm of Hagos Ghebrehewit, the ruling party's economic director (and architect of Eritrea's imploding economy). Hagos, formerly a green card holder, was Eritrea's first ambassador to the United States. Also present were the minister of health (an American citizen), the current Eritrean ambassador to the United States, and the party's political director, Yemane Ghebreab. Lunch was served in a rocky gulch beneath a thorny acacia tree. The ambassador and his wife were treated to grilled sheep innards served with honey and chili sauce (but no silverware), washed down with a sour, semi-fermented traditional drink called, aptly, "sewa." The other guests chided Hagos, only half jokingly, for his inability to run an economy, noting that Eritrea's Coca-Cola plant and national brewery were both shuttered.
3. (C) THE DEFENSE MINISTER CELEBRATES GROUNDHOG DAY
--------------------------------------------- -------
Defense Minister Sebhat Efrem attended a reception at the ambassador's residence on February 2. This was the first Post invitation General Sebhat has accepted for almost two years. He and the ambassador discussed past military to military exchanges, training, and education. General Sebhat fondly remembers GIs from Kagnew Station who helped tutor his math and science classes as a young student; he said he hoped circumstances would permit a resumption of mil-mil relations. February 2 is also President Isaias' birthday, yet General Sebhat chose to spend the evening celebrating Groundhog Day at the CMR.
4. (C) TOUGH TALK ON SUPPORTING TERRORISM
-----------------------------------------
Despite the clear signals by party and government officials of their interest in exploring a less antagonistic bilateral relationship, the ambassador on three occasions in recent weeks has delivered a very straightforward and simple message: Eritrean support for Somali extremists obviates closer ties and Eritrea will be held accountable for any al-Shabaab attack on the United States. The ambassador shared unclassified information with key Eritrean authorities (including the detailed NPR report of January 28 on al-Shabaab's recruitment and training of Minnesotans) to reinforce the seriousness and urgency of the al-Shabaab threat. One senior official acknowledged limited Eritrean contact with al-Shabaab, but claimed the contact was "infrequent and indirect." He added, "If there was anything we could do to prevent a terrorist attack on the United States, we will do it." The ambassador warned that Eritrea was in a very perilous situation, as its support for al-Shabaab makes Eritrea at least partially responsible for al-Shabaab's actions, yet Eritrea does not control it. "Based on recent history, how do you think we would react to a major al-Shabaab terrorist attack against the United States?" the ambassador asked. This seems to have driven home the point to our Eritrean interlocutors.
5. (S) COMMENT
--------------
Eritrea's fundamental interest in re-engaging with the United States is to promote a "balanced" U.S. approach to its border dispute with Ethiopia. Isaias views everything through this lens. While we have delivered an unambiguously stark message on counterterrorism, we are uncertain how this will factor into Isaias' opaque calculations. Among Eritrean and foreign observers, there is a growing consensus that Isaias is increasingly isolating himself and marginalizing all organs of government and the party. Can he and will he make a rational cost-benefit analysis on continued support for Somali extremists? Isaias might listen to the rulers of Libya and Qatar; we leave it to others to judge whether those messages would necessarily be helpful. Unlike the party, exiled opposition, or general Eritrean populace, the military's officer corps has the wherewithal to precipitate a sudden change. We have seen no serious cracks in its loyalty, as the perceived external threat from Ethiopia trumps all else, but we will step up our efforts to cultivate cordial relations with key military leaders as circumstances permit. End Comment.
MCMULLEN
Sunday, 20 April 2008, 17:11
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 000380
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/E, AND INR/AA
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER
EO 12958 DECL: 04/20/2032
TAGS PREL, MOPS, PBTS, DJ, ER, ET
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI FM REPORTS TALKS UNDERWAY WITH ERITREA TO
DEFUSE BORDER INCIDENT
REF: A. DJIBOUTI 378 B. DJIBOUTI 377
Classified By: ERIC WONG, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I.
1. (S) SUMMARY. On April 20, senior Djiboutian officials--including Djibouti's defense minister, intelligence chief, and deputy CHOD--were involved in talks with Eritrean military officials in an attempt to defuse tensions arising from Eritrea's establishment of a military outpost on disputed territory at Ras Doumeira, along the Bab al Mandab strait. According to Djibouti's foreign minister, the GODJ sought to use "quiet diplomacy" to press Eritrea, although it believed that Eritrean President Isaias was unpredictable, as evidenced by Eritrea's 1994 attack on a Djiboutian outpost at the same area. Foreign Minister Youssouf reports that Isaias opposes Djiboutian efforts to broker discussions between Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), and that Isaias also suspects that routine U.S. military exercises in Djibouti are aimed at gathering intelligence for Ethiopia. Youssouf said Djibouti would welcome participating in the International Contact Group on Somalia, and planned to meet with visiting UN SRSG for Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah later in the week. END SUMMARY.
2. (S) On April 20, Charge and GRPO met with Djiboutian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf to discuss the GODJ's April 17 complaint that Eritrea had established a military outpost on Djiboutian territory at Doumeira (ref A). Charge and GRPO were accompanied by two representatives of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA): Embassy Djibouti Country Coordination Element (CCE) CDR James Dickie, and CJTF-HOA Director of Intelligence (CJ-2) CAPT Kevin Frank.
--------------------------------------------- -------
FRENCH IMAGERY SHOWS STRUCTURE ON DISPUTED TERRITORY
--------------------------------------------- -------
3. (S) FM Youssouf presented low-resolution color photographs of Ras Doumeira dated the afternoon of April 17, which he said had been provided by French authorities. The photos show a manned structure and several trucks at the base of a mountain; according to FM Youssouf, the structure is an Eritrean military post constructed recently on "no man's land" along the easternmost portion of the border between Djibouti and Eritrea, along the Bab al Mandab strait.
4. (S) While Eritrean forces had "pulled back" on the evening of April 19, FM Youssouf expressed concern that an estimated 3,000 Eritrean troops were along the Eritrean border with Djibouti, concentrated along three axes: from Eritrea to the Djiboutian border towns of Daddato, Sidiha Menguela, and Bissidourou. In addition to the post at Ras Doumeira, Eritrean forces had also recently built a coastal road from the port of Assab to Doumeira, and had begun to reclaim the waterfront, in an apparent attempt to construct some sort of port facility, he said.
-----------------------------------
MIL-MIL TALKS UNDERWAY WITH ERITREA
-----------------------------------
5. (S) In response to this "belligerent act," Youssouf said the GODJ had strengthened its military presence at its base at Moulhoule (15 km south of Doumeira). In addition, the GODJ had dispatched a delegation on the morning of April 20 to Moulhoule, in order to discuss the incursion with Eritrean officials. According to FM Youssouf, GODJ representatives included Deputy Chief of the Djiboutian Armed Forces Brigadier General Zakaria Cheick Ibrahim, National Security Service (NSS) Director Hassan Said Khaireh, and Defense Minister Ogoureh Kiffleh Ahmed. FM Youssouf said he had also been in direct contact personally with the Eritrean Navy Commander, Major General Karikare Ahmed Mohammed, whom he believed had some influence on Eritrean President Isaias. FM Youssouf also planned to engage the secretary-general of Eritrea's foreign ministry, who was expected to transit Djibouti airport (from Dubai) on the evening of April 20.
6. (S) To satisfy the GODJ's concerns, Eritrean forces needed to withdraw at least 1 km away from the demarcated border at
DJIBOUTI 00000380 002 OF 002
Mt. Doumeira, Youssouf said; adding that international law required pulling back to 5 km from the border.
7. (S) FM Youssouf noted that the GODJ sought to utilize "quiet diplomacy" to defuse the situation, and had not yet issued any public statements on the recent Eritrean incursion. However, he noted that the 1994 incident, which had involved an exchange of gunfire between Eritrean and Djiboutian forces at Ras Doumeira, reached a denouement only when Djibouti protested to the United Nations, the Arab League, and the African Union. Djibouti subsequently demarcated the border, while Eritrea issued a map with altered boundaries for propaganda purposes.
--------------------------------------------- ----------
ISAIAS "A LUNATIC"; SUSPICIOUS OF ETHIOPIA AND THE U.S.
--------------------------------------------- ----------
8. (S) The Eritrean government (GSE) was "very unpredictable," Youssouf said. He underscored that Eritrean troops had previously attacked a Djiboutian outpost at Ras Doumeira in 1994, at the same time that the Eritrean foreign minister was visiting the capital of Djibouti. Thus, according to Youssouf, Isaias had blindsided his own foreign minister. "This man is a lunatic," opined Youssouf, adding, "you can't pick your neighbors." Youssouf noted the scarcity of food and consumer goods in Eritrea, caused by its "monopolistic, communist" state. As "waves of refugees" already crossed Djibouti's porous borders from Somalia, Djibouti could ill afford additional refugees from conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
9. (S) Youssouf said President Isaias had complained, at the last EU-Africa summit in Lisbon, that there was "no terrorism in Djibouti." Isaias was deeply suspicious of Djiboutian cooperation with the United States, claiming even to have information on USG renditions involving Djibouti, Youssouf said. More recently, GSE officials had expressed concern about both U.S. military exercises in Djibouti and also alleged Ethiopian plans to attack Assab from Bure and to definitively remove Isaias from power. The GSE had asserted that recent U.S. military exercises in northern Djibouti (ref A) were not intended to combat terror, but rather were intended to collect information for Ethiopia, Youssouf said. Youssouf highlighted that the GODJ was "happy" with the U.S. presence in Djibouti, and would continue to support the United States.
--------------------------------------------- -------
ERITREA OPPOSED TO DJIBOUTIAN-BROKERED SOMALIA TALKS
--------------------------------------------- -------
10. (S) Recent business talks relating to the possible construction of a massive bridge linking Yemen to Djibouti had heightened GSE interest in Doumeira. The GSE opposed Djibouti's ongoing efforts to broker discussions between Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) (ref B), Youssouf said, as the GSE sought to keep Ethiopia preoccupied in Somalia, and thus to fracture the Ethiopian military into 3-4 fronts. Youssouf said Djibouti would welcome participating in the International Contact Group on Somalia, and planned to meet with visiting UN SRSG for Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah later in the week.
11. (S) COMMENT. FM Youssouf noted that no public statements from the USG were needed yet, as Djibouti sought to press Eritrea through "quiet diplomacy." Should these talks fail, however, the international community will have to weigh what actions, if any, would be effective in reversing the Eritrean incursion. The recent withdrawal of UN peacekeeping forces from the Temporary Security Zone, following more than two years of increasing restrictions on the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), highlight the GSE's intransigence in the face of international pressure. END COMMENT. WONG
Tuesday, 03 November 2009, 15:52
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRETORIA 002245
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/01/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ECON, ASEC, KHIV, SF, ZI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S COURTESY CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER
MASHABANE
REF: PRETORIA 2167
Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD GIPS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador's first official call with Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Maite Nkoana-Mashabane was warm and frank. Mashabane thanked the USG for its partnership and support through PEPFAR and acknowledged past mistakes in HIV/AIDS policies. The Ambassador thanked the SAG for support on security and the Minister promised to continue the current support. They agreed to work together on establishing a bilateral mechanism and cooperating on augmenting food security and combating violence against women. Mashabane made strong statements on distancing the SAG from Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe and supporting Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai. Although Mashabane was very positive about our bilateral agenda, the SAG's capacity to execute remains a question. End Summary.
-------------------------
Positive Bilateral Agenda
-------------------------
2. (C) Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Maite Nkoana-Mashabane was warm and receptive in the Ambassador's first official meeting with the South African Government on November 2. She said her government was excited about working with the Obama Administration, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and the Ambassador, expecting that bilateral relations would continue to improve. Mashabane expressed the hope that we could develop a bilateral mechanism early in 2010, building on her meeting with the Secretary in Pretoria in August. The Ambassador said we looked forward to hearing the SAG's ideas for the bilateral mechanism and setting a date for the Annual Bilateral Forum early in 2010. Mashabane hoped that President Obama could make a state visit to South Africa linked to attending the FIFA World Cup in June-July 2010. She envisioned President Zuma reciprocating with a state visit to the U.S. early in 2011. Mashabane also noted the positive role of the U.S. in the G-8 and the G-20, emphasizing that developing countries were excited about President Obama's leadership.
3. (C) Mashabane noted that the Ambassador's confirmation speech showed that he and the USG shared South Africa's five key priorities set forth at the ANC Conference at Polokwane in December 2007: employment, education, health, fighting crime, and rural development. She and the Ambassador agreed that there was a long agenda of shared objectives and that they should identify clear and achievable goals. The Ambassador said the U.S. would like to do more to support education, and observed that USAID had important initiatives in this area. He also said he would like the U.S. and South Africa to partner for various trilateral programs in Africa. She supported this approach, noting South Africa's interest in "prospering" its neighbors. Mashabane highlighted AGOA as a positive force for stability in Africa. The Ambassador noted that US UN Ambassador Susan Rice would like to host the Minister for an event when she next visits New York. He thanked the SAG for its recent Human Rights Council vote in favor of the U.S.-Egypt-sponsored Freedom of Expression Resolution.
4. (C) Mashabane said she was passionate about integration and de-racialization as tools to eradicate the legacies of apartheid in both rural and urban townships. She said Qapartheid in both rural and urban townships. She said advancing rural development was complicated by an excessive number of municipalities at 284. Mashabane encouraged the Ambassador to make contact with the Premier of Gauteng Province, Nomvula Mokonyane, a close childhood friend, now known as "Mama Action". She said that her staff would share a new proposal for the South Africa Development Agency, newly brought under her Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). The Minister joked that she needed to be nice to Minister of Finance Gordhan and Minister of National Planning Manuel, suggesting that they controlled the economic and finance levers in the new government. The Ambassador emphasized that the USG wants to support and contribute in all the priority areas, like education, rural development, and health. He noted his comment in his Senate confirmation statement that our job is to help South Africa succeed, observing our shared diversity and the special challenge of overcoming the legacy of apartheid. Mashabane said it was a propitious moment with a new President (Zuma)
PRETORIA 00002245 002 OF 003
who listens to and supports South Africans.
--------------------------------------------
Health and HIV/AIDS - Extolling Cooperation, Noting Past Mistakes
--------------------------------------------
5. (C) The Minister thanked the USG for its sustained support as a key partner in fighting HIV/AIDS under the PEPFAR program in South Africa, hoping for continued support. She admitted that there had been mistakes in past policy, but the SAG was now committed to catching up. Mashabane stated that President Zuma would make a strong statement on World AIDS Day on December 1, emphasizing that South Africa would now lead from the front, not from behind. The Ambassador noted that the USG had agreed to make a one-time contribution of $120 million over two years to help with the ARV stock-out gap, subject to some key conditions. Mashabane encouraged the Ambassador to communicate with Minister of Health Motsaeledi and Minister of Finance Gordhan on these issues. The Ambassador noted the need to make plans for the next five years, also encouraging South Africa to share its experience and skills with the rest of Africa. Mashabane said the SAG would like to be able to make greater use of generic ARVs and other drugs to save costs.
--------------------------------------------- -
Food Security and Agriculture - Women's Issues
--------------------------------------------- -
6. (C) Mashabane identified food security and agriculture as key areas for cooperation. She said we would shortly receive a written response on our food security initiative. The Minister spoke highly of the work and vision of the passionate and dynamic Agriculture Minister, Tina Joemat-Petterson. She encouraged the Ambassador to visit one of the Minister's rural pilot projects.
7. (C) The Ambassador raised our desire to cooperate on women's issues and to target specifically violence against women, noting its linkages to HIV/AIDS. The Minister agreed with the importance of this issue. She said South Africa has good laws and regulations, but many women - particularly in rural areas - still live in the past in terms of their culture and communities. Mashabane cited the Progressive Women's Movement of South Africa as an effective organization, chaired by Baleka Mbete, who is also the National Chair of the ANC. She cited the value of workshops aimed at preventing violence before incidents. The Ambassador mentioned visiting a U.S.-funded Tutuzela Care Center that supports rape counseling and law enforcement. Mashabane said such centers had achieved a significant increase in conviction rates from 20 to 80 percent. She said that she was the outgoing Chair of the Progressive Women's Movement of SA in Limpopo and cited a recent workshop in that Province. The Ambassador said that the USG would like to follow up on participating in such workshops.
--------
Security
--------
8. (C) The Ambassador thanked the Minister for the SAG's security support to the U.S. Mission since the mid-September threat and asked that it remain in place (also requested by separate diplomatic note.) She said she supported this request. Mashabane said South Africa would win its battle against crime, asserting that it would never have problems as great as Brazil's. The Ambassador offered technical support Qgreat as Brazil's. The Ambassador offered technical support and training for law enforcement agencies.
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Zimbabwe
--------
9. (C) The Minister expressed great frustration with President Mugabe, saying that "we cannot do quiet diplomacy forever" and calling him "the crazy old man". She said we must all support Prime Minister Tsvangirai, but she expressed disappointment that he withdrew from the government without consulting South Africa and other international partners. She said there were rumors that he was instructed to do this by a senior USG official. The Ambassador said that to his knowledge this was not the case, noting that Tsvangirai "walked" without any consultation and seemingly without a
PRETORIA 00002245 003 OF 003
plan. Mashabane said the current SADC Chair President Joseph Kabila was left cooling his heels in South Africa over the weekend when Mugabe at first refused to receive him until late Sunday. (She noted that she was stuck in Pretoria waiting to fulfill her protocol role of seeing him off at the airport, so was not able to take her children home to Limpopo Province over the weekend.) Mashabane said the SAG view was that Mugabe is getting desperate and is trying to push the country into elections. On the other hand, she said Tsvangirai wasn't realistic in calling for removal of all the security chiefs. She advocated seeking to change the electoral law to facilitate proper counting, while pragmatically leaving the security chiefs in place. Mashabane broached consideration for amnesty scenarios for the security chiefs that might induce them not to block a political transition.
10. (C) Mashabane promised to follow-up with the Ambassador on next steps following discussions she would have very soon with President Zuma and the Foreign Minister of Mozambique. She advocated helping Tsvangirai prepare for elections if they happen and exposing the dirty actions of the security chiefs. The Minister pointed out the danger to her northern province of Limpopo and the rest of South Africa with potential for more cholera outbreaks and significant refugees if the situation lingers or worsens.
11. (C) Mashabane raised concerns about Palestine, Israel, and the Goldstone Report. The Ambassador said the U.S. was committed to a two-state solution. He said President Obama was frustrated with Israel and noted that private messages are much stronger than the public ones. The Ambassador said Secretary Clinton would be aggressive in calling for greater dialogue and results. Mashabane recommended that the Ambassador meet with South African Jewish Deputies to hear their perspectives. The Ambassador welcomed the suggestion and said he was also interested in outreach to the Muslim community in South Africa.
12. (C) COMMENT: The Ambassador's first official meeting with the South African Foreign Minister was particularly friendly and open, emblematic of the positive trend in our bilateral relationship. The Foreign Minister indicated a desire to set up a dinner to welcome the Ambassador, as long as we did not tell the other Ambassadors. The Ambassador met her last August (prior to presenting his credentials) while accompanying Secretary Clinton on her visit to South Africa, when the two Ministers established a warm rapport. There is clearly enthusiasm within the SAG for developing a bilateral mechanism. We should bear in mind, however that the South African Government faces shortfalls in capacity which limit its ability to staff cooperative mechanisms and to implement programs, so we will have to carefully choose our initiatives. The Foreign Minister made strong statements on Zimbabwe and Robert Mugabe, but our sense is that her department does not have the lead within the SAG on the Zimbabwe agenda. GIPS
Tuesday, 20 October 2009, 13:34
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 001399
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/20/2019
TAGS PREL, ETRD, ZU, EU
SUBJECT: EU COMMISSIONER DE GUCHT'S TRIP TO ZIMBABWE
Classified By: USEU Charge d'Affaires Christopher Murray, for reasons 1 .4(b) and (d)
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Karel de Gucht, along with the Swedish International Development Cooperation Minister Gunilla Carlsson, traveled to Zimbabwe on 12-13 September with an EU delegation including representatives of the Council, Commission, and the current and future Presidencies. While there, they met with President Mugabe, Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, the Foreign and Justice Ministers, and civil society members. They then traveled to South Africa where they met with Deputy Prime Minister Mutambara. POLOFF, along with Canadian and Australian counterparts, met with Louis Amorim of the Council Secretariat on September 18, and then with Maud Arnould and John Clancy from Commissioner de Gucht's Cabinet on October 1 to discuss the visit, the status of the Global Peace Agreement (GPA), the Government of National Unity, sanctions and the way forward. END SUMMARY
ATMOSPHERICS:
-------------
2. (SBU) The EU delegation saw the visit as a success because it drew media attention back onto Zimbabwe. This was the first high-level EU visit since 2002, and the GOZ made a real effort. But Mugabe's anti-Western rhetoric continued in the press, including public statements about "Bloody Whites" coming to interfere with their internal affairs. The Foreign Minister told the delegation not to worry as the remarks were simply playing to the domestic constituency. The meetings were very political and not at all technical. There were huge differences of opinion, but open discussions, even with President Mugabe.
MEETING WITH MUGABE
-------------------
3. (C) President Robert Mugabe was willing to engage, which the delegation took as a positive, but not willing to give an inch. Mugabe acknowledged the important role the British Labor Party (plus the Swedish, German and Danish) had in helping Zimbabwe achieve independence. He clearly wanted to be conciliatory here, particularly toward the Swedes. Then he returned to the theme of a U.S. and U.K. conspiracy to overthrow him.
4. (C) The delegation expressed concern about slow reforms, the status of the GPA, and continuing political violence. Mugabe resisted it all claiming, for example, that the only violence today consists of small incidents involving youths. The Movement for Democratic Change party (MDC), he added, is also full of violent youths. In response, the Swedish Minister was polite but very straightforward saying, "We don't share those views, even if it could be a question of perception." When pressed, Mugabe would say, "I will do the right things and I will avoid the wrong things."
5. (C) Throughout, Mugabe was a superb debater, always looking for proof and asking his underlings regarding details. (NOTE: Clancy advised it is better to stay out of the weeds when trying to make points to Mugabe because "he will turn details against you." END NOTE) Mugabe stated the GPA has been completely implemented and the Unity Government was working well, so sanctions should be lifted. He claimed there was an independent judiciary in Zimbabwe, so the fate of imprisoned MDC Minister Roy Bennett was not in his hands. He claimed no knowledge of other arrested parliamentarians and turned to his Chief of Intelligence for details, who also claimed to know nothing. Ignoring the view of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) that certain appointments, such as the Central Bank Governor and Attorney General, must be made by the Unity Government, Mugabe claims those appointments could not be deemed unilateral because he was not required to consult. He admonished the delegation not to let themselves be manipulated by the opposition on these topics.
6. (C) Mugabe stated that land reform was an irreversible decision. He said he was not completely against some kind of land ownership system, and a leasing idea, "does not shock him." He argued that resolving the land issues would require a comprehensive land survey, for which Zimbabwe would need
BRUSSELS 00001399 002 OF 004
financial and human resources. The direct implication was that unless donors provide the resources, the GOZ is not going to do it. (NOTE: In a later meeting, the Foreign and Justice Ministers repeated these points, adding the threatening comment, "This is the one issue about which people take up arms." END NOTE)
IMPRESSIONS OF MUGABE
---------------------
7. (C) Our EU interlocutors said Mugabe appeared physically fit, mentally sharp, and "charming." When asked if his position had either weakened or been consolidated, Amorim answered that it was very strong. He remains powerful but is clearly surrounded by hardliners who are "dodgy," "cold," and lack Mugabe's intelligence. (NOTE: Mutambara cautioned the delegation not to be fooled into thinking that Mugabe was being lead by hard-liners, saying, "He is the worst hardliner there is." END NOTE)
8. (C) In both meetings with our EU interlocutors, they told the same illustrative anecdote: during the delegation's meeting with Mugabe, a strong, young man entered with a bowl and pitcher of water on a silver tray. He knelt in front of Mugabe, who made a show of washing his hands with this subservient man at his feet. The delegation thought Mugabe intended it as a show of his strength and power, but instead, as Clancy put it, "it showed that Mugabe has lost the plot of normal human interaction and the responsibility of leaders toward their people."
MEETING WITH TSVANGIRAI: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES
--------------------------------------------- -----
9. (C) The delegation then went to Bulawayo and met with Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and separately with Minister of Education David Coltart. Tsvangirai was much more positive in Brussels in June about the GPA than he was in this meeting. He gave a structured, concise description of challenges and priorities. The challenges included the disputed appointments of the Attorney General and Central Bank Governor. He blamed the latter for the complete economic meltdown and said, "We cannot have him there." XXXXXXXXXXXX END NOTE)
10. (C) Tsvangirai discussed political harassment, particularly the serious accusations against Roy Bennett. The fact that he is "white" matters, Tsvangirai said, since ZANU-PF is concerned that Bennett will defend the white farmers. Tsvangirai said the spirit of the Unity Government is threatened by ZANU-PF. He insisted there is no alternative to the Unity Government, but added that he did not know "how much longer we can take this." He is very disappointed that the SADC extraordinary session on Zimbabwe did not happen, and that there has been little progress since June. Minister Carlsson asked if there was a risk of the Unity Government collapsing, and he said "no."
11. (C) As for priorities, he highlighted that the MDC heads all the ministries that promote the population's well-being, such as education, health, and housing, among others. MDC was originally unhappy with the distribution, especially with ZANU-PF's control of all the "hard" sectors, but then saw that the only resources coming from outside supporters were for service provision. If MDC can make its sectors work (through aid or other means), they can make the Unity Government work, and people will see a difference in their lives. Amorim noted that Tsvangirai's analysis seems accurate. Everyone he spoke with who was not a government official confirmed that things are better - schools are open and stores have food. Tsvangirai remains concerned about food security, however. He explained the goal of providing one million homes with seeds and fertilizer, saying they had already done half and asked the EU to fund the rest.
MEETING WITH MUTAMBARA
----------------------
12. (C) Deputy Prime Minister Mutambara impressed Amorim as being "very sharp, young, engaging, and very, very dangerous." Arnould said Mutambara was a "strong personality" who was talking for the camera - he made a long
BRUSSELS 00001399 003 OF 004
speech to the press about the importance of his faction in the government, and the imperative to lift sanctions. Mutambara was livid that the United States met with Mugabe and Tsvangirai but did not meet with him. Amorim summarized Mutambara's main message to the delegation as, "You have to count me in. If you do not include me, I can wreck this." He claimed he was "the only one who can shut up Mugabe," and that everyone else is afraid of him. When asked if others in the government shared Mutambara's assessment of his importance, Amorim replied that while Mutambara only has three seats, they tipped the balance and allowed the MDC to claim a majority. Mutambara knows that he could pull out and destroy the whole thing. Mutambara stated that he considers the SADC communique of January to be part of the GPA and implementation will not be complete without it. He sees the GPA as irreversible, "there is no Plan B."
MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN AND JUSTICE MINISTERS, CIVIL SOCIETY
--------------------------------------------- -------------
13. (C) Back in Harare on Sunday morning, the delegation also met with Foreign Minister Samuel Mumbengegwi and Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa who were described as playing good cop and bad cop, respectively. The Foreign Minister was conciliatory, describing the visit as a crucial step to normalization. The Justice Minister was confrontational, asking, "Who are you to tell us how to run our business?" and saying, "listening to you and listening to Tsvangirai is the same thing." The delegation had the impression it was hard for them not to have all the control and to have Europeans "telling them what to do."
14. (C) In meetings with Civil Society leaders, they talked of continued violence in the rural areas by ZANU-PF, but also by MDC. In urban areas, there have been fragile gains on human rights, including press freedom, but it depends on Ministerial tolerance. It could all vanish tomorrow because the laws remain unchanged. (Note: Tsvangirai and Biti said that they want to see the Property Rights Act, the Freedom of Media Act, and the Public Order Act all passed in the next six months. END NOTE) But on constitutional reform, there is deadlock. The July meeting started ominously, with participants nearly coming to blows, and ZANU-PF members saying they would not participate because MDC members were getting paid and they were not.
SANCTIONS
---------
15 (C) Sanctions were discussed in all meetings with government officials. Mugabe portrayed the West as unfairly targeting people in the Unity Government for no reason. "What do you expect but hostility when you expel the children of my collaborators from universities in your countries? This hurts us." He uses the sanctions in the media, saying, "You are making the people of Zimbabwe suffer, trying to force regime change from the outside." Clancy noted, "One would think that sanctions would be a gadfly to him - nothing more than annoying. But they bother him enormously because they do not apply to the MDC." The officials with Mugabe stated that the targeted travel measures do not matter, but indicated the measures against parastatals do. Unsurprisingly, Tsvangirai does not want sanctions lifted. He says the process needs to be a two-way street, so there is no reason to lift them when there has been no progress.
16. (C) Out of the three, Mutambara spoke the most about sanctions and claimed they only help Mugabe. Without sanctions, he said, the GPA could move ahead, as Mugabe would have no excuse. (NOTE: Considering that Mugabe claims the GPA is finished, the delegation did not share this assessment. END NOTE) Mutambara asserted that the West must follow the advice of Africa leaders. "If Zuma says so, then you should not bat an eye." He seemed surprised to hear from the delegation that Tsvangirai did not agree. Mutambara said that any progress would require considerable engagement with Zuma. "You must get African leaders to put pressure on Mugabe. He will not listen to you."
17. (C) The Zimbabwean Ministers said the African Union and SADC have asked that the sanctions be lifted, so "why don't you listen to them?" Minister Carlsson asked how they reconcile asking for respect for SADC's views on sanctions when the GOZ had pulled out of the SADC Tribunal because of its views (a reference to the case brought by Mike Campbell, a white farmer). Displaying a capacity to "create reality"
BRUSSELS 00001399 004 OF 004
(Amorim's words), the Ministers gave a very legalistic response ending with, "the Tribunal does not exist."
WHAT'S NEXT?
------------
18. (C) Arnould stated that ZANU-PF is rebuilding and needs money, but time is on their side. (She mentioned ZANU-PF has an arrangement with the Iranians to supply oil.) Asked about the way forward, Amorim said the EU is committed to the plan for the dual roadmaps (in which the GOZ prepares a roadmap for GPA implementation, and EU Heads of Mission prepare one for normalizing relations; then they would link the two). He stressed that the GOZ must accept the need to deal with the Member States' Heads of Mission in Harare on this, not always with Ministers from capitals. The delegation's message was that they support the people of Zimbabwe and will continue to do so, just not necessarily by going through the government. The current visit should not be taken to imply that things are fine now. It's a long-term process. They sent the very strong message that the reluctance of the GOZ to engage in the roadmap is matched by European reluctance. Nothing has moved in Harare, so the EU sees no reason to move from their current position.
19. (C) In response to Prime Minister Tsvangirai's 16 October remarks on the lack of political progress in Zimbabwe, Commissioner de Gucht issued a statement outlining again the absolute necessity for all parties to implement the GPA without further delay. De Gucht encouraged key regional bodies, particularly SADC, to do all they can to assist the parties to the GPA to resolve their differences for the benefit of the Zimbabwean people.
MURRAY .
Wednesday, 02 December 2009, 14:01
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000930
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR BRIAN WALCH
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR MICHELLE GAVIN
EO 12958 DECL: 12/02/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ZI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RAY'S VISIT WITH GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO
ZIM
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES A. RAY FOR REASONS 1.4 B,D
1. (C) SUMMARY: There is a strong need in Zimbabwe for security sector reform, as without it, none of the efforts at political reform can be assured. After Robert Mugabe leaves the scene (either through death or retirement) ZANU-PF as a political force in Zimbabwe will be irrelevant, although some of the party members are likely to continue to be involved in the country's politics. We need to start now to identify the next generation of the country's leadership and begin the process of influencing them. According to an MDC member of Parliament, there are three ZANU-PF factions in government and Parliament; a few mostly younger people who want to work with MDC and move the country forward, a large percentage (including Mugabe) who want to hang on to power for as long as they can, and a small number of extreme hardliners (Emmerson Mnangagwa among them) who for ideological or personal reasons want the coalition government to fail regardless of the consequences to the nation. South Africa, at the end of the day, is not likely to be as helpful as we would like in improving the situation here, and we need to look at how to involve the PRC as the Chinese have Mugabe's ear. China is likely to be agreeable to efforts to improve economic stability and just might be helpful in achieving success in security sector reform. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) I met Dr. Albrecht Conze, German Ambassador to Zimbabwe, at his embassy on December 1, 2009. Unlike most of the other EU ambassadors who waited for me to ask them questions, Conze immediately began probing for the U.S. position on a number of issues, most notably how to engage with the government in the medium term, and our views on security sector reform. He stressed that the need for success in dealing with the security chiefs cannot be underestimated. Without reform in this sector, our efforts at political and economic reform risk failure. Conze agreed with me that we need to do more to identify the next generation of leadership in Zimbabwe and start influencing them now. He is concerned about the obsessive focus on Mugabe, who is admittedly part of the problem, but is also essential to its solution. Should he suddenly die, or otherwise be moved from office, it could lead to chaos and violence as competing groups vied for control. Conze believes that ZANU-PF in a post-Mugabe world will be irrelevant and will not exist in its current form, although some ZANU-PF members are likely to continue to be involved in Zimbabwe's politics.
3. (C) Conze said that in conversations with MDC-M politician David Coltart, he was told that in Parliament and government there are three ZANU-PF factions. A small number of mostly younger ZANU-PF members want to cooperate with the MDC to move the country out of the rut it is in. The vast majority (including Mugabe himself) are in a second group that is willing to make only grudging concessions but is primarily interested in hanging on to their positions as long as they can. A smaller, third faction (which includes Defense Minister Mnangagwa) of extreme hardliners work hard to cause the coalition government to fail without any regard to the impact this would have on the country. Some of them are motivated by revolutionary (Marxist) fervor, some by personal grudges and animosities, and some are, in Conze's words, just evil and greedy. Despite his advanced age, Mugabe is the spider sitting at the center of this web and has full control over all the factions. Without him, many of them would be nothing and would have nothing. Even most in the MDC recognize that he is key to the future of politics here.
4. (C) The Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) plays a significant role in Zimbabwe and the Western nations need to involve them more in cooperative activities wherever possible. Conze agreed with me that while they are not likely to want to participate in pro-democracy programs, economic stability is clearly in their interests. He considered an invitation to the PRC ambassador here to periodically attend the Fishmongers Head of Mission meeting (a group of US-Canada-Australia-EU ambassadors who meet weekly) to explore potential areas of cooperation. Conze believes that the PRC might even be useful in moving security sector reform forward as it has a potential impact on economic stability, and he does not believe South Africa will be really useful in this regard.
5. (C) COMMENT: While Conze, like many of the European ambassadors here, often puts too much faith in utterances by
HARARE 00000930 002 OF 002
MDC officials, the characterization of the ZANU-PF factions seems right on the money. It also indicates that change here will come slowly, and that Mugabe, who has without a doubt been a large part of the problem, is essential to maintaining control long enough to allow reform to take hold. He will continue to make meaningless concessions here and there, but is not likely to cede any power or control for the foreseeable future. MDC for its part seems to understand and accept this. Conze's views on involving China are intriguing, given the general attitude of most EU personnel here. Most don't know much about PRC activities, and view those they are aware of with suspicion. Conze is the first to acknowledge that China too is part of the problem and could possibly be part of the solution. His idea of involving them in security sector reform, however, is likely to cause strong pushback from some of the more conservative EU members; and in fact, his idea of inviting the Chinese ambassador to the Fishmonger's meeting is also likely to meet some resistance. This promises to be an interesting food fight. END COMMENT.
RAY
Wednesday, 09 December 2009, 13:04
C O N F I D E N T I A L HARARE 000955
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B.WALCH
DRL FOR N. WILETT
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
NSC FOR M. GAVIN
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR J. HARMON AND L. DOBBINS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ZI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESENTS CREDENTIALS TO MUGABE
Classified By: Ambassador Charles A. Ray for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).
1. (SBU) Ambassador Ray presented his credentials to President Robert Mugabe today. The Ambassador was the fourth of four ambassadors to do so (after Cuba, Sudan, and Ghana) and we were told there would be a 10-15 minute sit down after the presentation of credentials and photos. Instead, Mugabe, who was accompanied by Foreign Minister Mumbengegwi and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Bimha, engaged the Ambassador in a 45-minute discussion (mostly monologue) at which tea and snacks were served.
2. (SBU) As customary, Mugabe immediately launched into his "history lesson," beginning with the revolutionary struggle for one man, one vote, continuing to the Lancaster House agreement, proceeding to the betrayal of the British in failing to fund land reform compensation, and ending with sanctions. He blamed British policy on land reform on British desires to keep their farmers on the land; British refusal to support land reform forced Zimbabwe to proceed with land reform on its own, which then resulted in targeted sanctions. President George W. Bush, according to Mugabe, then imposed even harsher sanctions (he mischaracterized ZDERA as preventing U.S. companies from doing business in Zimbabwe) than Britain to reward Prime Minister Tony Blair for supporting him on Iraq.
3. (SBU) Mugabe averred that Zimbabwe was democratic. Like anywhere, there may have been incidents of police misconduct, but there was no policy that resulted in human rights abuses. He added that, despite the (necessary) land reform program, not all land had been seized. Commercial tea and sugar estates still existed, as well as wild life conservancies. No business investments had been indigenized or nationalized.
4. (SBU) During a pause in the monologue, Ambassador Ray broke in. He noted the spirit of friendship which had been extended to him by Zimbabweans (to which Mugabe quipped that Zimbabweans remained friendly despite the imposition of sanctions). The Ambassador said he sought cooperation rather than confrontation and that he was committed to helping Zimbabwe regain its status as the "jewel of Africa." He wished to listen, not lecture. But to move forward, it was necessary for everyone to play by the rules. The Ambassador concluded that the future of Zimbabwe was up to the Zimbabwean people.
5. (SBU) Mugabe responded that he would not visit "the sins" of the Ambassador's predecessors on the Ambassador. He hoped the Ambassador was extending an olive branch; he expected better relations with the U.S. Without referring to him by name, he accused Ambassador McGee, the previous U.S. ambassador, and the U.S. government, of having sought regime change; and charged that McGee had supported the opposition and become the right-hand man of the opposition.
-------
COMMENT
-------
6. (C) Mugabe appears unchanged from several conversations we have had with him over the last couple of years. He is fixated on land reform and sanctions, and is almost trance-like (monologue, soft voice) in discussing these subjects. But he is generally alert and can keep up with a conversation. Physically, Mugabe is frail He appears uncomfortable when seated -- he slouches and frequently turns his body as if to find a better position, and then sits straight up and speaks in a louder voice for a few seconds before lapsing back into the barely audible soft voice. END COMMENT.
RAY
Thursday, 24 December 2009, 08:26
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001004
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON, DAS PAGE, AND AF/S
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR MICHELLE GAVIN
EO 12958 DECL: 12/24/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ASEC, ZI
SUBJECT: TSVANGIRAI ASKS THE WEST FOR HELP ON CHANGING THE
STATUS QUO
REF: HARARE 987
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHARLES A. RAY FOR REASONS 1.4 B,D
1. (SBU) This cable includes an ACTION REQUEST, please see paragraph 8.
2. (C) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai said that while there was tremendous progress in 2009 as compared to 2008, Zimbabwe and its coalition government still faces challenges. Reforms must be implemented quickly, and there has been some progress, though none that affects the ZANU-PF power structure. Implementation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) has been slow and Mugabe has been using delay to maintain control. In 2010 there must be some progress to show the people, but it will require actions by all parties, including the Western powers, to change the status quo. He expects the recently announced commissions to be installed in early 2010, and is satisfied with their makeup. ZANU-PF has implemented a strategy of reciprocity in the negotiations, using Western sanctions as a cudgel against MDC. He would like to see some quiet moves, provided there are acceptable benchmarks, to 'give' some modest reward for modest progress.
3. (C) Ambassadors of the U.S., UK, French, and the Netherlands, and a representative of the EU were called to PM Tsvangirai's residence at 0730 on December 24 for an update briefing on the current discussions among the principals in the coalition government and a request from him for some flexibility on the part of the West on the issue of sanctions. He said that there has been tremendous progress in restoring confidence of the people in government in 2009 as compared to 2008. The people generally endorse the government, but the future holds both opportunities and challenges. The principal challenge is how to quickly embark on reforms. There has been a little progress on that front, but not what was expected. Implementation of the GPA has been too slow, and he is not satisfied with it. ZANU-PF has been using delay on the GPA to maintain control. The negotiators have held 11 meetings up until the end of the year. On the issues of media, land, and corruption, there has been some progress, but none of it touches on the power structure. On the three stickiest issues, Gono, Tomana, and Bennett, there has been no progress. He is hopeful, however, that if some progress can be made on other issues, these too will be settled.
4. (C) ZANU-PF seems to have introduced a new tactic in its agenda - reciprocity. What this means, he said, is that Mugabe is asking, "What's in this for us?" If MDC gets governorships, Mugabe asks, why can't the sanctions against ZANU-PF be lifted? Tsvangirai said that it seems that Mugabe plans to use the governors as a trade-off against sanctions. He said he has repeatedly told Mugabe that MDC has no control over sanctions. But, he added, lack of any flexibility on the issue of sanctions poses a problem for him and his party. In this he assured us that Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Q In this he assured us that Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara is in full agreement with him. He also acknowledged that his public statements calling for easing of sanctions versus his private conversations saying they must be kept in place have caused problems.
5. (C) Tsvangirai said the challenges for 2010 are:
- Get the reforms moving on the constitutional process. - Open media space, national healing, and anti-corruption. - Prepare for elections in 2011. - Move from economic stability to growth. - Deal with human rights violations.
He said the coalition government must expedite action in all these areas because, not only are Western governments watching, but the people of Zimbabwe will expect improvement. He said Security Sector Reform will take center stage in
HARARE 00001004 002 OF 002
2010, using a multilateral approach involving all parties here and SADC. In early 2010, Tsvangirai and Mutambara will take the diplomatic lead on the sanctions issue. The question before us, Tsvangirai said, is how to start moving on rewarding progress without giving the impression we are rewarding lack of progress or bad behavior. We need to establish acceptable benchmarks of progress, and determine what each involved party needs to do to change the status quo. If necessary, he said, he and Mutambara can quietly meet with Western leadership to develop a plan on the issue of sanctions. He said that he and Mutambara have decided to take this issue out of the hands of the negotiators and handle it personally. What is needed is some kind of concrete roadmap that all can agree on, linking easing of sanctions with identifiable and quantifiable progress.
6. (C) Tsvangirai wants to go to Mugabe after the negotiators deliver their final report on January 15, 2010, with some idea of what the Western position is on sanctions. He said that in order to change the status quo, all parties might have to take some risks, because maintaining the status quo only guarantees continued stalemate in the reform process. Economic recovery and democratic reform are the essential requirements in Zimbabwe right now. The 2011 elections are a critical goal as well. Winning the election, he said, is not the problem, but a peaceful transfer of power is. The recently announced commissions will be installed early in 2010, he said, and he is satisfied with their makeup. The heads of the Media and Electoral Commissions are honest men who he believes will put the interests of the country first. His goal is to have the Electoral Commission hire its own staff and be independent. The key is to wrest control from the Securocrats.
7. (C) On the subject of Mugabe himself, Tsvangirai said that in his recent meetings, though Mugabe seems mentally acute, he appears old and very tired. He comes to many meetings unbriefed and unaware of the content. It appears that he is being managed by hardliners. Tsvangirai said his goal now is to find a way to 'manage' Mugabe himself. One way, perhaps, would be to give him something to give his hardliners. Precisely what that something is, he said, is something he is still wrestling with.
8. (C) COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST. We are skeptical of Mugabe's motives, and worried a bit at what appears to be naivete on Tsvangirai's part. However, we believe that in one area he is correct: changing the status quo here will require some risk taking on everyone's part. As we've previously discussed (reftel), we think it might be in USG interests to consider some form of incremental easing of non-personal sanctions, provided we see actual implementation of some of these reforms. Post would appreciate Washington's view on what would be acceptable benchmarks, and possible moves on our part. We also request guidance on what to tell Qmoves on our part. We also request guidance on what to tell Tsvangirai at our next meeting, which is expected early in the New Year. END COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST.
RAY
Friday, 19 September 2008, 16:13
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 000368
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DOE FOR GPERSON, CHAYLOCK
EO 12958 DECL: 09/18/2018
TAGS EPET, ENRG, PGOV, RS, NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: SHELL CLAIMS PRODUCTION UNAFFECTED BY
RECENT ATTACKS; COMMENTS ON GROWING VIOLENCE IN THE DELTA
REF: A. LAGOS 365 B. LAGOS 366
Classified By: Consul General Donna M. Blair for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D )
1. (S/NF) Summary: Shell's Vice President for Africa, Ann Pickard (strictly protect), said a September 13 attack on a Shell natural gas node in Rivers State may impact the supply of gas to Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) plant, but she downplayed the impact of recent attacks on Shell's current oil production. She claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX were behind the militant unrest in Rivers State and that XXXXXXXXXXXX Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi's lack of political connections forced him to fight rather than "co-opt" the militants as the Delta and Bayelsa State governors have done. Pickard asked what the USG knew about GAZPROM interest in Nigeria; and if we had any information on shipments of one to three surface to air missiles to militant groups in the Niger Delta. She alleged that a conversation with a Nigerian government official had been secretly recorded by the Russians. Post believes that the spate of recent attacks may have impacted Shell's oil production more than Pickard is letting on. End Summary.
Shell Says Attacks Caused Little Impact to Production
--------------------------------------------- --------
2. (S/NF) In a September 18 meeting with Econoffs to discuss the attacks that occurred September 13-16 in Rivers State, Shell's Vice President for Africa, Ann Pickard, downplayed the impact of attacks on Shell's oil production. According to Pickard, most of the fields in the area were already shut-in due to pipeline breaks from attacks earlier this summer. She was concerned however, that the September 13 attack on Shell's Soku gas facility would hamper the delivery of natural gas to NLNG (Ref A). During the attack Soku was hit by two rocket propelled grenades and Shell is still assessing the extent of the damage. (Note: Pickard remarked that Shell had received two days advanced warning of an attack from another USG agency, but the information provided was too vague for Shell to act upon. End Note)
3. (C/NF) Pickard also thought she detected a troubling new development in least one of the recent attacks in Rivers State. In previous attacks in the western Niger Delta, militants had approached facilities via creeks and swamps using boats. In one of the attacks on September 14, militants crossed a significant amount of dry land to reach their target. Pickard was unsure if this was a one-off occurrence or a new militant tactic. She expressed concern that if the militants were willing to move over long stretches of dry land, oil facilities thought to be secure would be vulnerable to attack. On the JTF's performance, she noted the JTF was taking a more proactive approach to confronting the militants and increasing the use of helicopters to attack militant formations.
Amaechi Lacks Capacity to Co-Opt the Militants
--------------------------------------------- -
4. (C/NF) Discussing the politics behind the recent events in Rivers State, Pickard said Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi lacked the connections among Rivers State militant leaders to successfully co-opt them as the governors in Delta and Bayelsa states have done with militants in their states. Amaechi has more groups of militants to deal with than does Delta State, where Governor Uduaghn has reached an agreement with Tom Polo, or Bayelsa State, where Governor Silva has reached an agreement with three of five groups. (Note: She did remark that Bayelsa State militant leader, "Boyloaf" was not one of the Bayelsa militant leaders that had been "settled". End Note.). In her view the clash between the JTF and militants was a proxy war for ongoing disputes between Amaechi and XXXXXXXXXXXX (Ref B)
GAZPROM Making a Play for Shell's Concessions in Nigeria?
--------------------------------------------- ------------
5. (S/NF) Pickard asked for USG information on GAZPROM's interest in Nigeria. She had heard from contacts in the British government that the GON has promised GAZPROM access to 17 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Pickard said that that amount of gas was only available if the GON were to take concessions currently assigned to other oil companies and give them to GAZPROM. She assumed Shell would be the GON's prime target. She discussed recent press reports of a memorandum of understanding between GAZPROM and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and agreed it was likely more flash than substance. In an interesting aside, Pickard told Econoffs that she had recently held a meeting with an unnamed Nigerian minister in the minister's office. Shortly thereafter she said she received a verbatim transcript of the meeting "from Russia." (Comment: Pickard was a little coy on this subject. She did not name the minister and it wasn't clear who gave her the transcript. The implication was that the Russian government was actively collecting on Shell in Nigeria as well as one of Nigeria's ministries. Pickard routinely meets with the oil, gas, and defense ministers as well as top military leaders and senior advisors to the President. End Comment.)
Shell Concerned About MANPADS in Niger Delta
--------------------------------------------
6. (S/NF) In another request for information, Pickard asked if we had any information about possible shipments of "surface to air missiles (SAMs)" to militants in the Niger Delta (Note: Presumably she is referring to man portable air defense systems (manpads) and not larger surface to air missile systems. End Note.) She claimed Shell has "intelligence" that one to three SAMs may have been shipped to Nigerian militant groups, although she seemed somewhat skeptical of that information and wondered if such sensitive systems would last long in the harsh environment of the Niger Delta in the care of groups not known for their preventive maintenance practices. When asked what aviation security steps Shell was taking, Pickard said Shell helicopters generally fly above the effective range of the small and medium caliber weapons used by militants.
7. (S/NF) Comment: In earlier conversations, Pickard has not always been forthcoming on oil production levels. Government spokesmen and other oil executives tell us Nigeria lost between 150-200,000 barrels per day of oil production because of the recent attacks in Rivers State. Chevron admits it lost 30,000 barrels of production. Which company then lost the other 120-170,000 barrels? The European oil companies have fields in Rivers and share pipelines with Shell, so it is possible that damaged Shell pipelines have cut off those fields. However, Chevron contacts have told us they believe eight Shell fields were taken off-line as a result of the attacks. Pickard has repeatedly told us she does not like to talk to USG officials because the USG is "leaky." She may be concerned that by telling us the true impact of the attack, more bad news about Shell's Nigerian operations will leak out. But in any case, her comments about the causes and methods of growing violence in certain areas of the Delta, particularly Rivers State, bear concern. End Comment. BLAIR
Tuesday, 30 January 2007, 16:07
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 000356
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/S
EO 12958 DECL: 01/29/2017
TAGS PREL, ZI, SF
SUBJECT: (C) EXILED ZIMBABWEAN BUSINESSMEN FLOAT ZIMBABWE
POWERSHARING IDEA
Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Elizabeth Hinson. Reason s 1.4(b) and (d).
(U) This message has been coordinated with AmEmbassy Harare.
1. (C) SUMMARY: Exiled Zimbabwean businessmanXXXXXXXXXXXX is quietly floating an idea to shift executive power from President Mugabe to a "technocratic" Prime Minister. To get Mugabe to accept the deal, Mugabe would remain President until 2010 with some power over the security apparatus, but the Prime Minister would run the economy and get the country back on its feet. All parties would work together to draft a new constitution. XXXXXXXXXXXX was open to ideas on who best to sell the plan, but suggested new UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, working through an envoy like former Malaysian PM Mahathir, as possible mediators. We cannot comment on the merits of the plan, but find it encouraging that senior Zimbabwean exile businessmen are discussing solutions to their country's political and economic crisis. Embassy Harare notes that the concept is increasingly in circulation in Harare and may not require outside intervention. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) A group of prominent Zimbabwean businessmen living in South Africa, led by XXXXXXXXXXXX, discussed with visiting NIO for Africa, PolCounselor and PolOff January 27 a possible strategy for transferring executive power from President Robert Mugabe to a "technocratic" prime minister. XXXXXXXXXXXX was joined by XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX, and XXXXXXXXXXXX. The four businessmen agreed that there is a "window of opportunity" to bring positive change to Zimbabwe, opened by the deteriorating economic situation and Mugabe's advancing age and declining health.
3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX's strategy builds on the assumption that Mugabe will never voluntarily give up power. He fears for his future if he steps down -- citing the Charles Taylor example XXXXXXXXXXXX.
4. (C) Under XXXXXXXXXXXX's (somewhat convoluted) plan:
-- Mugabe gets the extension of his presidential term to 2010, but would share power with a "technocratic" Prime Minister during the 2007-10 period.
-- The PM would have to be acceptable to 85 percent of the parliament, thus requiring opposition MDC support, and could only be removed by an 85 percent vote in parliament.
-- The President would still appoint the key security ministers of Defense, Home Affairs, and National Security. The PM would appoint the other cabinet members, particularly in the economic area. However, deployment of troops would require the approval of both the PM and President.
-- The PM would not be eligible to run for President in 2010, thus ensuring his or her political independence.
-- Between 2007-10, the Constitution and electoral system would be reviewed, and a new constitution put in place.
-- In return for these "reforms," the international community would agree to the phased lifting of sanctions, the "acceptance" of the extension of Mugabe,s term to 2010, and perhaps most importantly to provide economic assistance to help rehabilitate the Zimbabwean economy.
5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that a number of Zimbabweans could play the role of technocratic Prime Minister. XXXXXXXXXXXX.
6. (C) On the question of who sells this plan to Mugabe, XXXXXXXXXXXX was open to ideas. He said that Moeletsi Mbeki, a
PRETORIA 00000356 002 OF 002
South African businessman and (estranged) brother to the President, recommended against South Africa playing the mediation role, arguing that ForMin Dlamini-Zuma is too close to Mugabe. Moeletsi Mbeki recommended involving the new UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, working through an envoy like
SIPDIS former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir.
7. (C) COMMENT: We cannot comment on whether Mugabe might accept a power-sharing plan like XXXXXXXXXXXX proposes or who is best to convince Mugabe, but it is encouraging that four senior Zimbabwean businessmen are actively discussing ideas to resolve their country's political and economic crisis. For the last seven years, most exiled Zimbabwean businessmen in South Africa have avoided any political involvement in their home country. We are not as quick as Moeletsi Mbeki to dismiss a possible South African role in any proposed transition deal, even if they are not the ones to sell it directly to Mugabe. The South African Government is increasingly frustrated with Mugabe's intransigence and Zimbabwe's economic decline, which impedes regional integration and growth; President Thabo Mbeki wants to see Zimbabwe "resolved" before he leaves power in 2009; and the last thing South Africa wants while hosting the 2010 World Cup is a messy and violent election in Zimbabwe. END COMMENT.
8. (C) EMBASSY HARARE COMMENT: The concept described by XXXXXXXXXXXX is increasingly in circulation in Harare. Morgan Tsvangirai told Emboffs on 30 January that this is Mugabe,s
SIPDIS Plan B as he runs into growing resistance to 2010 and that the candidate for PM would be Simba Makoni. Significant outside intervention, therefore, may not be necessary; however, gentle encouragement from Pretoria is unlikely to be amiss. UN SYG Ban may not wish to engage on this issue at the beginning of his tenure, especially in view of the way Mugabe treated former UN SYG Annan. END EMBASSY HARARE COMMENT.
BOST
Wednesday, 29 November 2000, 13:59
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 006677
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH
LONDON FOR CHARLES GURNEY
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/29/10
TAGS PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, ZI, SA
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY MEETS WITH ZIMBABWE
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HARARE 06677 01 OF 03 291400Z OPPOSITION LEADER
REFTEL: HARARE 6584
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR TOM MCDONALD FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SUSAN E. RICE MET MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE (MDC) PRESIDENT MORGAN TSVANGIRAI ON NOVEMBER 16. TSVANGIRAI OFFERED FOUR
SIPDIS SCENARIOS UNDER WHICH THE CURRENT POLITICAL CRISIS COULD UNFOLD. HE BELIEVES A TRANSITIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT IS THE BEST WAY OUT OF THE CRISIS PITTING THE PEOPLE AGAINST THEIR UNPOPULAR LEADER. MASS ACTION WILL BE CONSIDERED INITIALLY AT THE MDC'S NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING NOVEMBER 24. MASS ACTION WOULD BE INTENDED TO PRESSURE PRESIDENT MUGABE TO RESIGN. THE MDC UNDERSTANDS THE SERIOUS RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH MASS ACTION, TSVANGIRAI PROFESSED, AND RECOGNIZES THAT IT IS IN THE COUNTRY'S BEST INTEREST TO AVOID BLOODSHED. EVERYONE IS FOCUSED ON SEEING MUGABE GO, BUT IT WILL PROBABLY TAKE A CONVERGENCE OF OPPOSITION FROM ZANU-PF, THE MILITARY, AND REGIONAL LEADERS TO FORCE HIM OUT. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) ON NOVEMBER 16, ASSISTANT SECRETARY SUSAN E. RICE, HER DELEGATION, AMBASSADOR MCDONALD, DCM, AND POLOFF (NOTETAKER) HAD A BREAKFAST MEETING WITH MDC PRESIDENT MORGAN TSVANGIRAI. TSVANGIRAI WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MDC NATIONAL CHAIRMAN ISAAC MATONGO.
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 HARARE 06677 01 OF 03 291400Z
--------------------------------------
TSVANGIRAI LOOKS INTO THE CRYSTAL BALL
SIPDIS
--------------------------------------
3. (C) TSVANGIRAI BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE SEES THREE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS IN ZIMBABWE: LAWLESSNESS, THE LAND QUESTION, AND THE ECONOMY, AND EMPHASIZED THAT THE ECONOMY IS THE MOST DIRE PROBLEM. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE (GOZ) IS TRYING TO POLARIZE THE POLITICAL PLAYERS IN THE COUNTRY. THE MDC LEADER SEES FOUR POTENTIAL SCENARIOS EMERGING FROM THE CURRENT POLITICAL CRISIS: 1) THE PEOPLE WAIT 18 MONTHS TO VOTE MUGABE OUT--THIS IS THE MOST CONSTITUTIONAL, BUT LEAST LIKELY SCENARIO. 2) THERE IS AN ACCELERATED, BUT STILL CONSTITUTIONAL, PROCESS WHEREBY MUGABE RESIGNS OR IS EASED OUT AT THE DECEMBER ZANU-PF CONGRESS. THIS IS NOT VERY LIKELY EITHER SINCE MUGABE HAS OUSTED THE PROVINCIAL PARTY EXECUTIVES THAT MIGHT CHALLENGE HIS INTENTION TO RUN AGAIN IN 2002. 3) MASS ACTION IS UNDERTAKEN, FORCING MUGABE TO LEAVE THE SCENE EARLY. TSVANGIRAI STATED THAT THIS OPTION MUST BE CAREFULLY
SIPDIS CONSIDERED, AND HE ASKED RHETORICALLY: DO WE WANT TO PUSH OUT AN ELECTED PRESIDENT BEFORE HIS TERM IS UP? 4) AN ARMY COUP THAT REMOVES MUGABE, POSSIBLY WITH A GREAT DEAL OF BLOODSHED, FROM WHICH IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR ZIMBABWE TO RECOVER.
4. (C) IDEALLY, TSVANGIRAI CONTINUED, THE MDC WOULD LIKE TO SEE A TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS WHERE ZANU-PF REMAINED IN CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT BUT BROUGHT IN MDC MINISTERS--ESSENTIALLY, A CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 HARARE 06677 01 OF 03 291400Z COALITION GOVERNMENT. THE GOAL OF A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WOULD BE TO ARREST THE ECONOMIC DECLINE, RESTORE INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE IN ZIMBABWE, AND ESTABLISH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. WHEN ASKED ABOUT AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION FIRST TO MAKE A COALITION GOVERNMENT MORE FEASIBLE, TSVANGIRAI STATED THAT A CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM PROCESS
SIPDIS SHOULD BE BROAD-BASED AND WELL-CONSIDERED. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS NOT ENOUGH TIME TO GO THROUGH THAT PROCESS NOW. HE SAID THE ECONOMY IS THE PRIORITY ISSUE BECAUSE CONFIDENCE MUST BE RESTORED IN IT BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN 2002. IT DOESN'T MAKE SENSE TO TALK ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION WHILE THE PEOPLE ARE SUFFERING.
---------------------------
MASS ACTION IS ON THE TABLE
---------------------------
5. (C) THE OPPOSITION LEADER WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE COUNTRY CANNOT CONTINUE AS IT HAS FOR ANOTHER SIX MONTHS. WE KNOW THAT ZIMBABWE IS NOT LIKE YUGOSLAVIA, BUT THE PEOPLE ARE DEMANDING CHANGE BEFORE THE SITUATION GETS WORSE, HE PROFESSED. UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES, THE MDC WOULD WAIT UNTIL 2002 FOR CHANGE, BUT THE ECONOMIC DECLINE IS SO STEEP THAT IF IT WAITS THAT LONG,
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1865
PAGE 01 HARARE 06677 02 OF 03 291401Z ACTION AF-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 ACQ-00 CEA-01 CIAE-00 COME-00 CTME-00 DINT-00 DODE-00 DOTE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00 EUR-00 EXIM-01 E-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 FRB-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 ITC-01 LAB-01 L-00 VCE-00 AC-01 NSAE-00 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-02 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /012W ------------------A54E56 291401Z /38 O 291359Z NOV 00 FM AMEMBASSY HARARE TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7739 INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 HARARE 006677
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH
LONDON FOR CHARLES GURNEY
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/10 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, ZI, SA SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY MEETS WITH ZIMBABWE CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HARARE 06677 02 OF 03 291401Z OPPOSITION LEADER
THERE WILL BE "NOTHING TO VOTE FOR" BY THE TIME THE ELECTION ARRIVES. THE MDC'S NATIONAL COUNCIL , AT LEAST INITIALLY, WILL MEET NOVEMBER 24 TO CONSIDER MASS ACTION. IF THE EXECUTIVE DECIDES TO CONDUCT A MASS ACTION, IT WILL MOST LIKELY BE IN THE FORM OF GENERAL STRIKE TO BEGIN IN MID-DECEMBER WHEN CHILDREN ARE HOME FROM SCHOOL AND BUSINESSES BEGIN TO CLOSE ANYWAY FOR THE CHRISTMAS HOLIDAY. THIS WOULD MINIMIZE THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE POPULATION, TSVANGIRAI BELIEVES. (NOTE: THE MDC'S NATIONAL COUNCIL CANCELLED PLANS FOR MASS ACTION AT ITS NOVEMBER 24 MEETING. SEE REFTEL. END NOTE.) HE SAID THE MDC UNDERSTANDS THE MAGNITUDE AND SERIOUSNESS OF MASS ACTION, AND IT HAS TRIED TO POSTPONE IT FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, BUT THE POPULAR SENTIMENT IS TO DO IT. A GENERAL STAY-AWAY IS PREFERABLE TO CONFRONTATION SINCE IT IS NOT IN THE COUNTRY'S BEST INTEREST TO HAVE VIOLENCE OR BLOODSHED.
6. (C) ON THE GOZ'S REACTION TO A MASS DEMONSTRATION IN HARARE, TSVANGIRAI BELIEVED THE ARMY WOULDN'T HESITATE TO SHOOT A LOT OF PEOPLE. HE THOUGHT ITS REACTION WOULD BE LESS SEVERE IN OTHER CITIES LIKE BULAWAYO AND MUTARE, WHERE THE NUMBER OF TROOPS IS MUCH FEWER AND THEIR LOYALTY TO MUGABE MORE QUESTIONABLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SEES THE MILITARY AS DIVIDED. MUGABE HAS APPROPRIATED THE TOP BRASS FOR HIS OWN ENDS, AND THEY ARE LOYAL TO HIM. HOWEVER, THE BULK OF THE MILITARY'S LOWER RANKS DO NOT SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT, TSVANGIRAI CLAIMED. CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 HARARE 06677 02 OF 03 291401Z
---------------------
HOW TO GET MUGABE OUT
---------------------
7. (C) THE MILITARY IS ONE OF THE THREE MAJOR INFLUENCES ON MUGABE, TSVANGIRAI CONTINUED. THE OTHER TWO ARE ZANU-PF AND REGIONAL LEADERS. IF MUGABE IS TO BE PRESSURED TO LEAVE THE SCENE, ALL THREE MUST TURN AGAINST HIM, THE OPPOSITION LEADER DECLARED. WHEN ASKED WHAT ELSE MIGHT INDUCE MUGABE TO STEP DOWN, TSVANGIRAI SAID THE PRESIDENT WILL DO SO ONLY AFTER HE HAS HAD HIS REVENGE AGAINST THE WHITES AND ONLY AFTER HE HAS REIGNED IN ZANU-PF DISSIDENTS AND UNIFIED HIS PARTY. MUGABE IS A VINDICTIVE PERSON, TSVANGIRAI PROFESSED. FOR ITS PART, THE MDC RECOGNIZES MUGABE AS THE NATION'S FIRST LEADER AND A VERY IMPORTANT ONE IN ITS HISTORY. THE MDC WON'T ENGAGE IN RETRIBUTION AGAINST MUGABE AND HIS SUPPORTERS, TSVANGIRAI HINTED, BECAUSE "WE CAN'T FOCUS ON THE PAST IF WE ARE TO MOVE FORWARD." WHILE MUGABE IS PRESIDENT, THE MDC LEADERSHIP WON'T MAKE PERSONAL COMMENTS ABOUT HIM, AS THAT WOULD JUST INFLAME THE SITUATION.
------------------------
ROLE OF REGIONAL LEADERS
------------------------
8. (C) THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY ASKED THE MDC LEADER ABOUT THE ROLE REGIONAL LEADERS COULD PLAY IN RESOLVING THE SITUATION. TSVANGIRAI STATED THAT AFTER INITIALLY CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 HARARE 06677 02 OF 03 291401Z SHOWING AMBIVALENCE TOWARD ZIMBABWE, SOUTH AFRICAN PRESIDENT MBEKI HAS RECENTLY STARTED TO TALK MORE FIRMLY AND IS SHOWING SIGNS HE WILL NO LONGER TOLERATE THE SITUATION IN ZIMBABWE. TSVANGIRAI MENTIONED THAT ON HIS LAST VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA, HE MET WITH FORMER PRESIDENT MANDELA--WHO STILL EXERTS GREAT INFLUENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA, HE STATED--AND URGED THE LEADER TO INTERVENE IN ZIMBABWE. HE DID NOT RECEIVE A FIRM COMMITMENT FROM MANDELA, HOWEVER, AND DID NOT SEE MBEKI. ZAMBIAN PRESIDENT CHILUBA HAS BEEN DISTANT WITH THE MDC..
------------------------
MDC'S VIEW ON LAND ISSUE
------------------------
9. (C) ON THE LAND ISSUE, TSVANGIRAI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT LAND REFORM WAS "UNFINISHED" BUSINESS AND MUST BE ADDRESSED SERIOUSLY BY ANY GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE. HOWEVER, EQUITY, LEGALITY AND ECONOMIC VIABILITY MUST BE KEYSTONES TO ANY SUCCESSFUL LAND REFORM PROGRAM. THE MDC SUPPORTS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LAND COMMISSION TO OVERSEE THE REDISTRIBUTION OF LAND. THE MDC ALSO SEES THE 1998 DONORS CONFERENCE AS THE STARTING POINT FOR LAND REFORM, AND IT WOULD SUPPORT THE UNDP LAND INITIATIVE, THE OPPOSITION LEADER STATED. TSVANGIRAI SAID THAT WHEN HE WAS IN THE UK RECENTLY, HE TOLD THE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ1866
PAGE 01 HARARE 06677 03 OF 03 291401Z ACTION AF-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 ACQ-00 CEA-01 CIAE-00 COME-00 CTME-00 DINT-00 DODE-00 DOTE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EB-00 EUR-00 EXIM-01 E-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 FRB-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 ITC-01 LAB-01 L-00 VCE-00 AC-01 NSAE-00 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 SSO-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-02 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 SWCI-00 /012W ------------------A54E5D 291401Z /38 O 291359Z NOV 00 FM AMEMBASSY HARARE TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7740 INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 HARARE 006677
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH
LONDON FOR CHARLES GURNEY
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/10 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, ZI, SA SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY MEETS WITH ZIMBABWE CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HARARE 06677 03 OF 03 291401Z OPPOSITION LEADER
BRITISH TO REFRAIN FROM MAKING PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON LAND REFORM IN ZIMBABWE AND TO USE ITS INFLUENCE BEHIND THE SCENES TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM.
------------------------------------
ZIMBABWE NEEDS A PEACEFUL TRANSITION
------------------------------------
10. (C) THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A PEACEFUL POLITICAL TRANSITION TO THE OPPOSITION LEADER. THE USG SEES HUGE RISKS--WITH FEW, IF ANY, UPSIDES--TO MASS ACTION, AND URGED THE MDC TO MANAGE THE POLITICAL TRANSITION CAREFULLY. WE HAVE URGED THE GOZ NOT TO USE LETHAL FORCE ON DEMONSTRATORS, AND WE URGE THE OPPOSITION NOT TO GET IN A SITUATION WHERE LETHAL FORCE MIGHT BE USED, THE SECRETARY SAID. THE USG ALSO WANTS TO ENCOURAGE THE MDC TO ENGAGE IN A DIALOGUE WITH MODERATES IN ZANU-PF, EVEN IF PRIVATELY. A/S RICE AFFIRMED THE USG'S WILLINGNESS TO FACILITATE SUCH CONTACTS, IF DESIRED. SHE ALSO PUSHED THE MDC TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GOVERNANCE OF THE COUNTRY THROUGH ITS SUBSTANTIAL PRESENCE IN PARLIAMENT, AND LAMENTED THE MDC FAILURE TO ENGAGE IN THE PREPARATION OF THE BUDGET, DESPITE THE FINANCE MINISTER'S SOLICITATION OF MDC INPUT. SUCH ENGAGEMENT, RICE ARGUED, WOULD SHOW THAT THE MDC IS A SERIOUS AND CREDIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO ZANU- PF. TSVANGIRAI, WHEN PRESSED, RELUCTANTLY TOOK THIS POINT ON BOARD.
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 HARARE 06677 03 OF 03 291401Z 11. (C) COMMENT: TSVANGIRAI WAS FRANK, CONFIDENT AND RELAXED. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT CONVINCE US THAT THE MDC HAS A CLEAR OR WELL-THOUGHT-OUT PLAN FOR MASS ACTION OR WHAT IT WOULD ACCOMPLISH. HIS COMMENTS SUGGESTED THE MDC IS PINNING HOPE ON INTERNAL ZANU-PF MACHINATIONS TO FORCE MUGABE FROM POWER. HIS PUBLIC APPROVAL OF FINANCE MINISTER MAKONI'S BUDGET, AS REPORTED IN THE NOVEMBER 17 "THE DAILY NEWS," MAY BE AN INDICATION OF HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE CREDIBLE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. TSVANGIRAI IS CLEARLY UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE PUBLIC TO LEAD A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT. OTHER INTERLOCUTORS HAVE TOLD US THAT IF HE DOES NOT DO SO SOON, HE HIMSELF MAY BE FORCED FROM THE PARTY LEADERSHIP. NOW THAT THE QUESTION OF MASS ACTION IS MOOT FOR THE TIME-BEING, IT WILL BE UP TO TSVANGIRAI TO CHANNEL THE PEOPLE'S, AND HIS OWN PARTY MEMBERS', FRUSTRATION INTO CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE. IF TSVANGIRAI CAN DO THAT, HIS POSITION WILL BE STRENGTHENED IMMEASURABLY, BOTH HERE AND ABROAD. END COMMENT.
12. (U) A/S RICE HAS CLEARED THIS MESSAGE.
MCDONALD
CONFIDENTIAL
>
Wednesday, 17 February 2010, 07:01
S E C R E T NAIROBI 000181
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/02/17
TAGS PREL, EAID, KE, XW, ECON, EINV, ENRG, EFIN, PGOV, CH, PINR
SUBJECT: Chinese Engagement in Kenya
REF: 10 STATE 10152
CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Walton, Economics Officer, State, Econ; REASON: 1.4(B), (C), (D)
1. (S/NF) Summary: China's engagement in Kenya continues to grow exponentially. China enjoys a large trade surplus with Kenya; exports increased by more than 25 percent a year from 2004 to 2008. The China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) is drilling for oil in the Isiolo region. China may be a potential partner in the development of the new mega-port at Lamu. In addition, China is heavily involved in various infrastructure projects across Kenya primarily with roads. China is also providing weapons to the GOK in support of its Somalia policies and increasing their involvement with the Kenyan National Security and Intelligence Service (NSIS) by providing telecommunications and computer equipment. Recently, China signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement with the GOK providing new development grants. To date, China and the U.S. do not collaborate on development projects in Kenya. End summary.
2. (U) China enjoys a large trade surplus with Kenya, exporting more than 30 times its imports. For 2008, China exported $917 million of goods to Kenya while China imported $29 million worth of Kenyan goods. China's exports in 2008 grew by 39 percent over 2007 capping the fourth straight year of at least 25 percent export growth, including a 54 percent increase in 2007 and a 79 percent increase in 2005. China is now the third largest exporter to Kenya after the United Arab Emirates, which principally exports oil to Kenya, and India. In comparison, the U.S. exported $440 million worth of goods to Kenya in 2008 while importing $343 million worth of Kenyan goods.
3. (U) The CNOOC is drilling for oil in the Isiolo region of Kenya (see ref A). The exploratory well will cost $26 million dollars and drilling will be complete in April 2010. Numerous oil companies have drilled 31 exploratory wells in Kenya over the last 50 years without success. However, CNOOC is making a credible effort to find oil in an area geologically similar to Southern Sudan, with its substantial oil finds. As reported ref A, we had heard that CNOOC would announce results from the exploratory well by January 2010; we are now hearing an announcement may come in April.
4. (U) The GOK is highly interested in developing a major port complex in Lamu, which has much greater potential as a deep water port than Mombasa. The GOK originally held discussions with Qatar over the development of the Lamu port in return for a substantial allocation of farm land. Negotiations involving development of the Lamu port reportedly occur inside the "black box" of President Kibaki's inner circle at State House. We understand, however, that talks with Qatar are off, and that the Chinese are in play as a potential partner for the port development project and associated regional infrastructure (road and rail infrastructure to Southern Sudan and Ethiopia, and pipeline infrastructure to Southern Sudan and Uganda). China's interest in the Lamu project is reportedly linked to the presence of oil in Southern Sudan and Uganda which could be exported via Lamu as well as the greater export potential to Ethiopia, Southern Sudan and Uganda. The addition of oil from Isiolo would add additional impetus to China's interest in the port development which is estimated to cost more than $5 billion.
5. (SBU) China is currently developing a number of infrastructure projects in Kenya. Currently, China Wuyi, Syno Hydro, and China Overseas Engineering Corporation are working on the Thika Road project, a major eight lane highway from Nairobi to Thika town. Another Chinese firm, Shengli Engineering & Consulting Company was the prime contractor for the Mombasa-City Centre-Gigiri road upgrade project. In addition, the second phase of a project to upgrade the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) is being worked by China National Aero-Technology International Engineering Company (CATIC). The first phase of the project was completed by the Chinese company, China Wu Yi. TBEA International, another Chinese firm, is developing a 120 MW thermal plant in Longonot and 600 MW coal-fired power station in Mombasa as an independent power producer. TBEA is also undertaking projects that involve construction of 132 kV lines and sub-stations in the Rift Valley, Central, Western and Coast provinces. During a recent visit to the Olkaria geothermal development site in the Rift Valley Province, Econoff observed that Great Wall Drilling, another Chinese company, was exploring for geothermal energy. The KenGen Olkaria Geothermal Development Manager told Econoff that while he would prefer to buy quality American drills, pipes, and other geothermal-related products, American companies could not compete with China on price and price won every time in Kenya.
6. (S/NF) In January 2010, the GOK received from the GOC via CATIC weapons, ammunition, supplies, and textiles for making uniforms in support of the GOK's Jubaland initiative.
7. (S/NF) As of late August 2009, XXXXXXXXXXXX awarded XXXXXXXXXXXX a contract to provide landline telephone monitoring equipment to XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX awarded the contract to XXXXXXXXXXXX after being pressured to do so by XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX . XXXXXXXXXXXX 's preference for is based on kickbacks he received XXXXXXXXXXXX while on a visit to China. XXXXXXXXXXXX received monthly payments of over $5000 from XXXXXXXXXXXX which were used to pay medical bills.
8. (S/NF) As of September 2008, XXXXXXXXXXXX As of early March 2009, Chinese technicians were working on a project in the basement of the NSIS headquarters. The presence of the technicians was well known throughout the NSIS and was causing some concern over the level of cooperation between the NSIS and its Chinese counterparts.
9. (U) The GOK and GOC recently signed an Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement. The agreement provides a $7.3 million grant from China to Kenya. Of the grant, $150,000 will finance a computer program for the Ministry of Finance while the remaining funds can be used by the GOK to fund development projects of their choice. The agreement also covered Chinese funding of feasibility studies for the potential development of Lamu port. In addition, China committed to funding portions of the Northern Corridor road project, which links Mombasa and Nairobi to Ethiopia and Southern Sudan, as well as parts of the new Mombasa-Kampala standard gauge railway. Currently, China's Shengli Engineering Construction is refurbishing The Moi International Sports Complex at Kasarani with $12.8 million of grant-in-aid money from China. In Early 2009, China provided a $1 million grant to the GOK for the construction of a 100 bed hospital in Nairobi. In 2008, the GOK received approximately $381 million in interest-free and preferential loans, with $145 million intended for the planned ring roads aimed at decongesting Nairobi. Since 2008, the GOK has implemented campaigns to attract investment from the $1 billion China-Africa Development Fund.
10. (U) China's companies working in Kenya tend to import a substantial number of Chinese workers. This importation of labor from China tends to limit the number of Kenyans who directly benefit with wages and knowledge transfer from the projects. The low Chinese bids on major projects also push local firms out of the process, especially in infrastructure areas where capacity building of local firms would be useful. In addition, the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) noticed a marked increase in poaching wherever Chinese labor camps were located and in fact set up specific interdiction efforts aimed to reduce poaching (see ref B). KWS also reports that 90% of the ivory smugglers detained at JKIA are Chinese nationals.
11. (U) The U.S. mission in Kenya has no current or pending development partnership arrangements with the GOC or any informal collaboration at the program or project level. The GOC does not participate in donor coordination in Kenya. Donors have encouraged the GOK to bring China into the donor coordination process, but no progress has been made to date. While we do not recommend it, a potential area for collaboration could include agricultural development, a USG strength and an area of Chinese interest in Africa. However, the GOC does not participate in the multilateral agricultural donors group in Kenya. The GOC could be invited to join this donors group, predicated on their willingness to sign a Memorandum of Understanding ensuring their support of Kenya's long term agriculture strategy. The World Bank recently announced a new initiative to work in cooperation with Chinese infrastructure development in Africa. This new effort seems to be aimed at working with China and African countries to maximize the benefits of Chinese development aid to the African people.
12. (SBU) Comment: Collaboration between the USG and China in Kenya should be approached cautiously as there appears to be little dovetailing of our interests to date. The GOC has been silent on the implementation of the reform agenda, which we consider essential to Kenya's future stability and prosperity; the GOC turns a blind eye to the flooding of the Kenyan market with Chinese counterfeit goods, such as batteries, which directly damage U.S. market share here; and the GOC has not demonstrated any commitment to curb ivory poaching. We expect China's engagement in Kenya to continue to grow given Kenya's strategic location. If oil or gas is found in Kenya, this engagement will likely grow even faster. Kenya's leadership may be tempted to move ever closer to China in an effort to shield itself from Western, and principally U.S., pressure to reform. Given the possibility of a backlash by the Kenyan people against China, perhaps over the issue of imported Chinese labor or mishandling of natural resources, there may be benefits to keeping our distance, at least publicly, from China. RANNEBERGER
Tuesday, 23 February 2010, 08:20
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 LAGOS 000075
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/W, AF/RSA, AND INR/AA
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MALABO
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/02/23
TAGS EPET, ENRG, ECON, PGOV, PREL, NI
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON MEETS OIL COMPANIES IN LAGOS
CLASSIFIED BY: Donna M. Blair, CG, State, ConGen Lagos; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Assistant Secretary (A/S) Carson met with members of the International Oil Companies (IOCs) on February 7. The A/S stressed the fact that Nigeria is the most important country in Africa for the United States. The IOC members noted that the A/S spoke mainly of issues in Northern Nigeria and did not dwell on Southern issues. The Petroleum Industry Bill is discouraging future investment mostly in deep-water fields where most of the remaining oil in Nigeria lies. If Nigeria raised the price of gas to two-thirds of the world price, the IOC's would be at each others throats trying to cut the price by a penny or two. Nigeria has the possibility of becoming the next Pakistan within 25 years. A/S Carson allayed the IOCs concerns of the United States' relationship with China. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Assistant Secretary Carson met with members of the international oil community in Lagos on February 7. In attendance were the following: Shell Senior Vice President's Ann Pickard and Ian Craig; Shell Vice President Peter Robinson; Chevron Managing Director Andrew Fawthrop; Chevron Public Affairs Manager Femi Odumabo; Exxon Mobil Managing Director Mark Ward; Hercules Manager Coleman McDonough; Schlumberger Manager Supply Chain Service Demi Adenusi; American Business Council (ABC) President Dick Kramer; Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary; Economic Officer; Maritime Affairs Officer; Marine AttachC) and, Consul General Lagos.
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NIGERIA: MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRY IN AFRICA
-----------------------------------------
3. (C) Fawthrop asked the A/S whether he was in Nigeria to deliver a message or was it more of a fact-finding trip? A/S Carson stated that he was in Nigeria for both reasons in that he wanted to listen and engage with Nigeria. Nigeria is the most important country in Africa for the United States due to: the size of its population; presence of hydro-carbons; peace keeping role in ECOWAS, especially in Sierra Leone and Liberia; its seat on the United Nations Security Council; along with the strength and size of its financial markets the A/S continued. Nigeria has enormous potential and is the seventh largest Muslim country in the world with an Islamic population that will eclipse Egypt by 2015 according to A/S Carson. Having no United States presence in Northern Nigeria is akin to having no presence in Egypt and is why the United States is considering opening a Consulate in Kano.
4. (C) The United States is concerned about the power vacuum in Nigeria and the state of health of President Yar A'dua, per A/S Carson. The president is "very, very, very, very ill" and Nigerians are under illusions regarding the state of their president. "Nigeria cannot afford to implode or run aground." 30 years of military government was not good. The United States expects a stable, legal, democratic, constitutionally-based government with no "military involvement, full stop" A/S Carson stated. It is important for the GON to do a better job this time around in regards to elections. Only ten percent of Nigerians saw a ballot ticket in the 2007 elections. If Nigeria brings credibility to its democratic processes, its economic processes will improve.
LAGOS 00000075 002 OF 005
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UNITED STATES PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN NIGERIA NEEDS ATTENTION
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5. (C) Some places are more important than others within the Federal system of Nigeria and Lagos is one of the more important places, according to A/S Carson. Consulate General Lagos is bigger and more important than Embassies Benin and Togo together. Lagos is significantly more important than Cape Town even though the latter is 100 times better in terms of livability. The United States must be in Lagos in a significant way, A/S Carson declared.
6. (C) The statements of the A/S sounded wonderful from a Hausa viewpoint, but nothing was mentioned about Southern and Eastern Nigeria, Fawthrop pointed out. The A/S agreed that Fawthrop was correct. The United States is underrepresented diplomatically, economically, commercially, militarily and from a security standpoint. When the A/S served in Nigeria from 1969-1971, the United States had the Embassy in Lagos with Consulates in Ibadan, Kaduna, and briefly in Port Harcourt, before the Civil war, and also a USIS post in Kano. With the Nigerian population at 50 million the United States was better and more broadly represented in a Nigeria that produced almost no oil. With an Embassy in Abuja and a Consulate in Lagos, the United States has experienced a "huge loss" in Nigeria today, per A/S Carson. The United States must get back into Enugu and Port Harcourt. "No presence means no access, which leads to no influence. Without influence you have nothing."
7. (C) Akwa Ibom governor Godswill Akpabio was singled out as an impressive governor by Mark Ward. Akpabio has built up infrastructure and industrial development. He is "one to watch" per Ward. Other Southern governors that were highlighted included were Rivers State governor Chibulke Amaechi and Edo State governor Oshiomhole. Fawthrop suggested that USAID has a lot to offer in the South in that if USAID makes a mistake it is OK. If a private company engages in a similar project and makes a mistake you have a FCPA investigation. The Consul General (CG) added that it might be possible to team up with security assets of the IOCs to arrange diplomatic trips to the Niger Delta. This arrangement would not happen "100 percent of the time," but more often than not, per the CG.
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STATUS OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY BILL
-------------------------------------
8. (C) The PIB is more about taking control and not a real solution, per Mark Ward. XXXXXXXXXXXX There are currently three versions between the Senate, House, and Interagency committee and it is unclear when and what will materialize, according to Ward. Fawthrop added that the PIB amounts to resource nationalization and stated that it costs more than 40 percent to develop the oil as opposed to leaving it in the ground. The current fiscals of the PIB estimate that is costs 25 percent to develop the oil, thereby creating a disincentive. If the oil stays in the ground then billions of development money will go away and the resulting slowdown will be a massive problem. The IOCs received a lecture from a team made up of various GON agencies (the interagency team) in Abuja In a recent meeting in an example of the current level of communication per Fawthrop. The whole group then went to the office of the Vice President where the interagency team stated that there was very good communication between them and the IOCs.
9. (C) The large fields, elephants, have all been developed in
LAGOS 00000075 003 OF 005
Nigeria per Fawthrop. What remains are fields one-quarter to one-third the size. The same costs are involved in producing the oil but the revenue will be less because there is less oil. The IOCs need more incentive, not less, in order to develop these fields profitably. What the PIB accomplishes is a disincentive. The downstream sector is very simple in Nigeria in that the refined gas is moved from one tanker to another, to a smaller tanker and then sold. The refining sector, exploration and production sectors are very complex. It is unrealistic for the PIB to try to change all of these areas in one tome of legislation, asserted Fawthrop.
10. (C) The gas side of the PIB tries to legislate the delivery of gas rather than incentivize it. "The donkey is tired and beaten. It will not go no matter what you tell it" stated Fawthrop. If the gas price went to two thirds of the world price the IOCs would "cut each others throat" to cut the price by one or two cents. The rest of the IOC members nodded in agreement to this statement by Fawthrop. European gas competition has gas developed on a cost plus basis adding about eight percent to the cost. The model should be based on rate of return and not forced upon operators by legislative decree.
11. (C) Whenever gas doubles the cost of electricity goes up by one quarter. Stable electricity will allow industry to flourish in Nigeria but this will not happen 15 months before the elections. Amateur technocrats run the oil and gas sector according to Shell's Peter Robinson. They believe that they can control the industry via spreadsheets and pushing through the PIB. There are many emotional issues in the PIB with Nigerian politicians believing that they make no money on deep-water projects. Potential banker and businessmen partners do not understand the industry. The GON has made USD 2.5 billion with no investment in the past two years according to Robinson.
12. (C) A large problem will be the ten percent of equity that is to go to the communities argued Fawthrop. Equity going into the communities will make them explode. The recipients of the monies will be highly disappointed when they see the amount they will receive, a much larger sum will be expected. Kramer referred to the community equity as the "lawyer relief act" and wondered how one defines an actual community.
13. (C) Peter Robinson stated after the meeting that Pedro Van Meurs, the oil consultant hired by the GON to help negotiate with the IOCs, is considering leaving. Van Meurs has been trying to show the GON officials that their fiscal math does not work with the PIB. Van Meurs does not agree with the IOC position completely but sees areas for improvement. One example given to Lagos Econoff by Exxon Mobil Project Manager Anh Tran concerned the levels of cost involved with deep-water projects. Exxon, and other IOCs, maintain that their capital costs are at least 40 percent of deep-water projects while the GON allows for 25 percent capital costs under the PIB. Van Meurs agreed that 25 percent was not adequate.
--------------------------------
WHERE DOES NIGERIA GO FROM HERE?
--------------------------------
14. (C) It is possible that Nigeria could be a future Pakistan according to A/S Carson. In 25 years, there could be impoverished masses, a wealthy elite and radicalism in the North. The question is whether the oil wells will be dry as well and could Nigeria be on "sustainable and irreversible glide path to a new economic base" per the A/S. When you look at the 2020/20 plan by the GON you see that Nigeria needs to grow by 14 percent a year to
LAGOS 00000075 004 OF 005
be at the current level of Indonesia Fawthrop asserted. That is using today's figures, which does not take into account Indonesia's growth Kramer added. Nigeria is growing at five percent now and would need 20 percent growth per annum in energy and USD 22 billion investment in power plants Fawthrop stated. What would happen if Nigeria fell just short of their goals, would there be an alternative plan in place Fawthrop wondered? He cited the example of the 2009 6,000 Megawatt goal. It was apparent early on that the goal was not feasible and an alternative plan could have been devised. The GON insisted that they would reach their goal and did not develop alternatives. The same would hold true for 2020/20 Fawthrop assumed.
15. (C) The A/S offered that a forum could be organized in Nigeria with World Bank President Robert Zoellick speaking to a wide audience. Under Secretary for Economic, Energy, and Agricultural Affairs Bob Hormats would be invited as well to lend his knowledge of Africa. The forum would be shaped with the broader picture in mind, not just oil. This would not be sponsored by the IOCs. Members of the business community and individuals that were committed to making oil meaningful to Nigeria's future would be asked to participate. Talk would center on "over the horizon" issues, where Nigeria has gone right and where it has gone wrong. Two or three fora would be defined with key people to spark debate. Religious tensions, North-South issues, the lack of capacity in the GON, narco-trafficking, the growing irrelevance of Nigeria, as Princeton Lyman has suggested, could be potential subjects. Nigeria is at a critical financial and political threshold and the entire nation could possibly tip backwards permanently, per A/S Carson.
---------------------------------------
CHINESE - AMERICAN RELATIONS IN AFRICA
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16. (C) What is the status of America's influence in Africa and how does it compare to China, Fawthrop queried? The influence of the United States has increased in Africa, the A/S countered. The United States' reputation is stable and its popularity is the highest in Africa compared to anywhere else in the world. Obama has helped to increase that influence. "We must manage the expectations of the Obama administration" offered the A/S. The United States does not consider China a military, security or intelligence threat. China is a very aggressive and pernicious economic competitor with no morals. China is not in Africa for altruistic reasons. China is in Africa for China primarily. A secondary reason for China's presence is to secure votes in the United Nations from African countries. A third reason is to prove that Taiwan is not an issue. There are trip wires for the United States when it comes to China. Is China developing a blue water navy? Have they signed military base agreements? Are they training armies? Have they developed intelligence operations? Once these areas start developing then the United States will start worrying. The United States will continue to push democracy and capitalism while Chinese authoritarian capitalism is politically challenging. The Chinese are dealing with the Mugabe's and Bashir's of the world, which is a contrarian political model, A/S Carson stated.
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COMMENT
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17. (C) A/S Carson effectively provided the IOCs with a rationale for the United States' interest in Nigeria and its commitment to the country. This commitment seems more substantial than the IOCs given the prospect of the PIB and the current state of play in Nigeria. Providing the IOCs with statements of support through continuing if not increasing the USG presence in Nigeria will be important in determining the increasing, decreasing or non-existent role of the IOCs in the future in Nigeria. As the A/S stated, if we can have a substantial presence in Pakistan, why not Nigeria? END COMMENT.
LAGOS 00000075 005 OF 005
18. (U) A/S Carson did not have an opportunity to clear this cable before departing post. BLAIR
Friday, 26 February 2010, 16:37
S E C R E T ABUJA 000215
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/W, AF/RSA, INR/AA
NSC FOR GAVIN
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON
LONDON FOR POL (PLORD)
PARIS FOR POL (BAIN AND KANEDA)
ROME FOR AF WATCHER
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/02/26
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINS, PINR, PTER, MARR, NI
SUBJECT: GOODLUCK JONATHAN REMAINS ACTING PRESIDENT OF NIGERIA
REF: ABUJA 207; FEB 24 A/S CARSON-AMB SANDERS TELCON
CLASSIFIED BY: Robin R. Sanders, Ambassador, STATE, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(A), (B), (D)
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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Ambassador met February 26 with Acting President (AgP) Dr. Goodluck Jonathan at the Vice President's official residence, Aguda House, in Abuja to review the current political situation following the return earlier this week of ailing President Yar'Adua. Moves are afoot, between Jonathan and key northerners in the lead such as former Head of State Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar, to encourage the Yar'Adua family to let go and let the President resign with dignity. This will allow Jonathan to serve as interim President until elections and also allow him to designate a vice president. Given the dysfunctional level of the current Cabinet, Jonathan said that once this happens, he will dissolve the cabinet, after consulting with the Council of State. Both moves, he believes, will appease Northern politicians, as he suspects that more northerners will support the resignation idea. Jonathan claims he wants to do a good job over the next 12 months, and leave a legacy of credible elections, electoral reform, including replacing the Independent National Electoral Commission's (INEC) chairman and all of the commissioners. He promised the Ambassador that he would look at her suggestion of using terminal leave for the INEC chairman, which could have him out earlier than June. The Acting President also agreed to allow U.S.-UK technical assistance to help improve the voter registry and provide for a parallel vote tabulation. He expects things to calm down in the next 10-14 days, will not leave the country until things are resolved, and has opened channels with the military. Chief of Army Staff (COAS) was leaving Jonathan's private office when Ambassador was entering. End Summary.
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WHO'S IN CHARGE?
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2. (C) Jonathan told the Ambassador "everyone's confused" about who is in charge of Nigeria. There has been an increase in the level of uncertainty in the internal political situation following ailing President Yar'Adua's return, which was shrouded in secrecy, during the early hours February 24. The AgP said he was "unhappy" that the first statement issued following Yar'Adua's return referred to Jonathan as "Vice President." The GON issued a second statement February 25 that reversed course and refers to Jonathan as the Acting President. Jonathan said that the Villa received a lot of pressure to correct this error so that the lines of leadership and executive direction were clear.
3. (C) The AgP lamented, "This terrible situation in the country today has been created by four people: Turai Yar'Adua [the ailing President's wife], his Chief Security Officer (CSO) [Yusuf Mohammed Tilde], his Aide-de-Camp (ADC)[Col. Mustapha Onoedieva] and Professor Tanimu Yakubu [Yar'Adua's Chief Economic Advisor]." The AgP said he does not know their motives, but expected it was likely for nefarious purposes. He added Minister of Agriculture Abba Ruma and Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Minister Adamu Aliero had provided a second-tier of layering to the bubble surrounding Yar'Adua. The AgP noted that "people are angry," and did not want to allow those surrounding Yar'Adua to replicate the control and access similar to what they had done in Jeddah for the past three months.
4. (C) Jonathan said the CSO and ADC saw him separately to let him know that they did not intend to mistreat the AgP and expressed their willingness to work with him (which the AgP doubts). The AgP said he told them both "then the best thing is to stop the charade." The AgP told the Ambassador he believes Yar'Adua is in a semi-comatose state without an understanding of what is going on around him.
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ENCOURAGE PRESIDENT TO RESIGN
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5. (C) The AgP said that Former Head of State Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar, who according to Jonathan has become one of his closest advisors, worked out a strategy where he would reach out to other former Nigerian Heads of State, including former Head of State Gen. Yakubu Gowon, to approach those closest to Yar'Adua, especially his wife Turai, to try to convince them that the best, and most dignified step to take for the country and for Yar'Adua as a human being would be for the President to resign. This action would constitutionally make Jonathan Nigeria's President. Doing such would also be easier than convincing two-thirds of the 42-member Federal Executive Committee (FEC) to declare the ailing President "physically incapacitated and medically unfit" to continue in the office of the Presidency. Jonathan said he and his wife, Patience, visited Turai as a humanistic gesture to express their best wishes for the recovery of Yar'Adua and out of respect for his ailing boss. The AgP said under no circumstances did he want Turai to come to his official residence.
6. (C) Once Yar'Adua resigns and Jonathan becomes interim President, he said he would choose a Vice President that could appease the Northerners by working with them to identify a
candidate. AgP Jonathan also shared that until Yar'Adua resigns, and things come down he would not leave the country. (N.B. This is in reference to the POTUS invitation to attend the April 12-13 Nuclear Security Summit). The issue of identifying a northerner as a vice presidential candidate, Jonathan underscored this appears to be the thing most on the minds of the northerners as they feel cheated out of the Presidency with Yar'Adua's illness.
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FEARS ABOUT MILITARY
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7. (C) Jonathan said "everyone, including the Army Chief of Staff (COAS) [LTG Abdulrahman Bello Dambazau] and Chief of the President Guards Brigade [BG Abdul Mustapha]" are concerned about the confusion over who is the executive of the nation. The AgP said the military chiefs are making sure no politicians are reaching out to the rank-and-file, and encouraging the military to stay in the barracks so that the uncertain political situation does not generate coup-like behavior emanating from the mid-ranks because of the confusion. As the Ambassador began her meeting with the Acting President, he had just concluded a meeting with COAS LTG Dambazau (see reftel A for Ambassador's conversation with the COAS February 24).
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USG ADVICE: BECOME A NATIONAL FIGURE
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8. (C) Based on points developed telephonically with Assistant Secretary Carson (ref B), Ambassador encouraged Jonathan to change the perception that he is a regional figure, and be seen, rather, as a national figure who has the best interest of the nation at heart. Ambassador expressed that given that the U.S. and Nigeria are very best friends, we feel the need to share our concerns, as any good friend would do, and that we are counting on him to steer Nigeria through this troubled and uncertain period. At the moment, Jonathan's detractors believe he is a surrogate for former President Obasanjo. Ambassador advised the AgP that he needs to publicly demonstrate that he is the sole executor of national issues, not being directed or serving a political purpose for Obasanjo or others, so that his leadership would not be in question and the polity would accept that he had the best interest of nation at hand. The AgP said he appreciated our advice, including publicly holding Obasanjo at arms length. He said he would consider taking steps, including possibly convoking the entire diplomatic corps to brief them on the current political climate, using this and other events to demonstrate that he is his own man,
and diminish the appearance he is a regional leader.
9. (C) Jonathan noted that the Northern politicians would always be uncomfortable with him as president, and he understood the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) picked him as Yar'Adua's running mate in 2007 because he represented the Niger Delta. Jonathan said he was handling Niger Delta issues until the Ministry for Niger Delta Affairs was created in September 2008, allowing him to distance himself from being viewed as someone who could only work on that issue. "I was not chosen to be Vice President because I had good political experience," he said. "I did not. There were a lot more qualified people around to be Vice President, but that does not mean I am not my own man." However, he said, with the changed circumstances, the AgP said that his sole focus is to leave a legacy of both electoral reform and credible elections, including changing the entire Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). The AgP said he was appreciative of the Ambassador's remarks made during the National Day reception February 25 and Assistant Secretary Carson's February 24 statement because both provided him with the courage to press forward.
10. (C) Jonathan shared initially, he had the intention to dissolve the Cabinet early the week of February 22, and had planned to make that announcement at the February 24 FEC meeting, but found out that Yar'Adua was returning, and thus dissuaded him from acting. He said the last Cabinet meeting was disastrous and included yelling and screaming, and it is totally dysfunctional. He said he is "not a politician" and had very limited experience as an administrator, but concluded, "I will not tolerate a brawl." Jonathan said he will dissolve the Cabinet once he knows people are more comfortable with him being the Acting President or if the current strategy to convince Yar'Adua surrogates and family members to allow the ailing president to resign.
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ELECTORAL REFORM AND INEC
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11. (C) Jonathan agreed to the USG offer of technical assistance to review and update Nigeria's national voter registry and funding for a Parallel Voter Tabulation (PVT). The AgP asked us for a letter formally offering this assistance (NB: we are providing to him today). The Ambassador noted the technical assistance could begin as early as the end of March with his approval (which he gave) with software installed that can assist with cleaning up the voter registry.
12. (C) On the INEC Chairman, Ambassador told the AgP that the USG
would not continue any election assistance if Iwu remains on seat after June 2010. She described the meeting between A/S Carson and Iwu, noting the latter showed no signs of respect for good governance. The AgP said he understood the USG would not be able to continue providing technical assistance if the current INEC chairman remains beyond his five-year mandate that ends in June 2010. Ambassador raised the issue of using Iwu's terminal leave to get him out sooner. The AgP said he would ask the Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF) to inquire if the current chair could take terminal leave, which could have him out as soon as next month. Jonathan again said that once he solidifies his position as Acting President or President, and that once the political environment is less uncertain, he would begin taking steps to replace all thirteen of INEC's commissioners, and work toward replacing Iwu earlier than June provided he can confirm the amount of terminal leave Iwu has. However, the AgP noted this would not be easy, but he is committed to seeing this through.
13. (C) Jonathan said he does not anticipate standing for elections in 2011 and that he is not working towards being a presidential candidacy. He wants to put into place an electoral structure that will be ready for national elections. He did, however, note that, "if they want me to run, that will be something to consider at that time." However, he stressed that his focus now and for the next 12 months will be on "doing a good job and witnessing respectable and credible elections in 2011."
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FIRM UP THE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM
----------------------------------------
14. (S) Ambassador raised with the AgP the case of Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed (aka "Talha"). Talha was indicted earlier this week in New York on terrorism charges. Nigeria's State Security Service (SSS) was about to release Talha onto an international flight before Nigerian police intervened and took him into custody. Ambassador underscored that the SSS' close call in violating an Interpol Red Notice would not be helpful in making the case for Nigeria's removal from the U.S. Transportation Safety Administration List of "Countries of Concern." Ambassador also asked that SSS appear as witnesses when requested to demonstrate Nigeria remains a partner to the U.S. in the international fight against terrorism. She added that at least at the Director level, SSS not only knew about the Interpol notice, but simply said they did not want to hold him any longer. Ambassador added that the GON police forces did the right thing and stepped in to block the suspect from boarding the plane. He is now in police custody. Ambassador officially requested that he be turned over to the FBI agents here to escort him to the U.S. to stand trial.
15. (S) The AgP said he would call in SSS Director General Gadzama to clarify the security agency's role in Talha's near-release and that if the three SSS officers implicated had taken such action without authorization, they would face serious implications, including termination. Ambassador also took the opportunity to request Jonathan stop repeating that the December 25 attempting bombing case involving Nigerian Abdulmutallab was an "one-off aberration" and that Nigeria indeed does have foreign terrorist links and elements operating in country, as exemplified by Talha.
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COMMENT
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16. (C) After two days of uncertainty, that included signals of competing heads of state emanating from the dueling titular references within a Villa press release, it appears that Jonathan has plans to firmly take the reigns of the presidency, with the support from key northerners and the senior leadership of the military. As the Ambassador stepped out of her meeting, at least two Ministers and a Governor were waiting to consult with the Acting President. The Acting President's bottom line is that he would do his best in the job in the next twelve months. He also wanted to ensure we understood he would "not be manipulated by anyone." We believe the USG is firmly placed to advance our bilateral agenda, including the creation of an environment conducive to free, fair, and credible elections with the approval and assistance of Nigeria's de facto head of state. Even if he decides to contest for the presidency, Jonathan seems sincere in wanting to leave a lasting legacy of electoral reform for Africa's most populous nation. It is always hard to judge how some will behave (or surprise you) when leadership is unexpectedly thrown in their lap. The verdict is out on Jonathan and his previously underwhelming personality and performance needs to keep us in the cautious lane, but so far, so good. Things are quiet. The COAS is doing the right things. Jonathan is reaching out to key respected northerners, like Abdulsalami, which we see as a good thing. Our next steps should be to continue to encourage the AgP on the right path; help on the push back on Obasanjo through former and current USG officials; and, if the drum beat calling for the ailing President to resign picks up speed, we should ensure that we indicate our support for this given that it probably the best thing for the country. End Comment. SANDERS
Thursday, 06 December 2007, 12:56
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 001848
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR PM/WRA - STEPHANIE PICO
EO 12958 DECL: 06/18/17
TAGS MARR, MASS, PARM, PGOV, PREL, UG
SUBJECT: UGANDA MAY BE OPEN TO MANPADS STRATEGY
REF: STATE 156001
Classified By: PolOff Jarahn Hillsman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) Summary: Post has considered reftel Horn of Africa MANPADS Acquisition Engagement and Plan of Action Strategy for Uganda. Mechanisms proposed to help the GOU address counter-proliferation and destruction are feasible and timely. Post is confident that the GOU would welcome greater USG involvement. We have also determined that a Yemen-like acquisition plan could support GOU efforts to control MANPADS proliferation, but do not believe it to be necessary at this point. There are no political impediments to immediate engagement with GOU officials on the proposed MANPADS strategy. A sucessful strategy would incorporate a larger weapons accountability and destruction program to enlist wider GOU support for MANPADS destruction. End Summary.
-----------------------------------------
GOU Shares Counter-Proliferation Concerns
-----------------------------------------
2. (S/NF) The GOU has demonstrated its willingness to work with the USG to combat terrorism and further East African security initiatives, particularly in the area of weapons proliferation. Military and civilian authorities, starting with the establishment of the National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons in 2001, have deepened collaboration to tighten arms control regulations and have actively sought international partners to advance objectives. We therefore believe that the GOU would be receptive to U.S. assistance in drafting export control legislation and determining priorities. Given that the majority of the MANPADS currently in Uganda were purchased by the government, U.S. intervention with the "supply country" might not be welcomed by the GOU. Such action would be considered by some as meddling in internal security matters.
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GOU Committed to SA/LW DESTRUCTION; Open to U.S. Engagement
--------------------------------------------- --------------
3. (S/NF) The GOU in 2007 worked with SaferAfrica, UNDP, the U.S., and other international partners to identify and destroy small arms and light weapons stockpiles, including MANPADS. Minister of Defense Crispus Kiyonga reaffirmed this commitment publicly, and expressed Uganda's desire to work with the U.S. and other international partners to meet the country's obligations under the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Nairobi Protocol, and the National Action Plan on Small Arms and Light Weapons. We believe that the GOU would welcome greater U.S. engagement in the area of stockpile management and destruction. However, a more broadly focused assistance package that helps with overall weapons accountability and destruction would likely garner wider GOU support.
--------------------------
Yemen Acquisition Possible
--------------------------
4. (S/NF) A Yemen-like acquisition plan could be reached with the GOU. The primary Ugandan counterpart would be the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF). Currently, we do not believe there is black market activity to warrant such a program.
-----------------------
Timing And GOU Partners
-----------------------
5. (S/NF) The GOU has demonstrated political will to tighten arms proliferation, combat global terrorism, and push forward on East Africa peace and security initiatives. This commitment suggests that Uganda would be open to immediate engagement.
6. (S/NF) The primary GOU interlocutors would likely be the following:
--Ministry of Defense;
--Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF);
--National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons;
--Parliament's Committee on Military and Internal Affairs; and
KAMPALA 00001848 002 OF 002
--Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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Pitfalls OR Challenges to Strategy Implementation
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7. (S/NF) The GOU's military sales relationship with North Korea might hinder engagement. For three years, the GOU has refused to allow us access to its classified budget, which could potentially include the sale of MANPADS by the GOU. CHRITTON
Tuesday, 12 January 2010, 15:13
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 000059
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
FOR A/S CARSON AND NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR GAVIN FROM THE AMBASSADOR
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/01/12
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KCOR, KE
SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY TO ADVANCE THE REFORM AGENDA
REF: 09 NAIROBI 1811; 10 NAIROBI 31; 10 NAIROBI 50; 10 NAIROBI 11 09 NAIROBI 2485; 09 NAIROBI 2483; 09 NAIROBI 2475; 09 NAIROBI 2401
CLASSIFIED BY: Michael E. Ranneberger, Ambassador, DOS, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) Summary: Our highest priority efforts are focused on advancing implementation of the reform agenda, which is key to the future democratic stability and prosperity of Kenya. While some positive reform steps have been taken, the old guard associated with the culture of impunity continues to resist fundamental change. Most key reforms are yet to be carried out, and the future of the constitutional review process is uncertain. We are employing public and private pressure, engaging broadly with the senior-most levels of the government and other political actors, and reaching out extensively to the Kenyan people, youth, civil society, the media, the private sector, and religious groups. We also laying out incentives for positive action on reforms and supporting significant steps when they are taken. Continued intensive U.S. efforts - using our unique influence in Kenya - is essential to propel implementation of the reform agenda. U.S. efforts are viewed very favorably by the Kenyan people and are helping generate increased domestic-driven pressure for reforms. This message discusses the current state of play, the dynamics affecting the reform agenda, and U.S. policy and actions. End summary.
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U.S. Policy and Central Importance of Reform Agenda
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2. (C) Advancing implementation of the reform agenda is the central objective of U.S. policy in Kenya. Achieving this is key to ensure the future democratic stability and prosperity of Kenya, a strategically important partner of the United States. Failure to implement significant reforms will greatly enhance prospects for a violent crisis in 2012 or before - which might well prove much worse than the last post-election crisis. Bringing about implementation of the reform agenda poses a large challenge because doing so threatens the culture of impunity and the entrenched political class that has existed in Kenya since independence. Most of the political and economic elite (to greater and lesser extents) compose the vested interests that benefit from and support impunity and the lack of accountability with respect to governance, state resources, and the rule of law. This includes President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga, who signed the coalition agreement, as well as most of the members of the Cabinet and leaders of the political parties.
3. (C) That said, there are dynamics at play which create an historic opportunity to achieve progress. First, the unprecedented post-election crisis jolted the Kenyan people and led to a broad appreciation, domestically and internationally, that some changes must be made to avoid such a crisis - or worse - in the future. Second, demographic pressures and generational change are having a marked impact, with youth increasingly assertive about the need for reforms. Third, and very importantly, the United States has enormous, unique leverage with the Kenyan people and government. Fourth, Kofi Annan on behalf of the African Union and group of eminent personalities remains intensively engaged. Fifth, there is more democratic space in Kenya than ever before, with a very active civil society, a vibrant media, a savvy private sector, and active religious groups. Sixth, Kenya's leaders are ultimately practical politicians whose desire for self-preservation means they are responsive to some degree to intense international and domestic pressure.
------------------------
Some Positive Steps
------------------------
4. (C) As we have reported, the coalition government has demonstrated some progress on reforms in the past two years due to all of the dynamics delineated above - but particularly as a result of the continuing role being played by Annan and especially U.S. pressure. At a time when most observers were cynically saying that Police Commissioner Ali would never be removed, he was. Following the imposition of our travel ban on Attorney General Wako, he started talking about "retirement" (before the middle of this year, he says). The government has launched police reform. A new Interim
NAIROBI 00000059 002 OF 004
Independent Electoral Commission is up and running, and the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission will soon begin its work. XXXXXXXXXXXX An anti-money laundering bill (which we have been heavily lobbying for) was recently passed and signed into law. The constitutional review process is underway.
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Culture of Impunity Works to Forestall Fundamental Reform
--------------------------------------------- ----------------
5. (C) These are positive achievements, but most are only first steps. Those associated with the culture of impunity are working hard to limit the impact of steps taken so that they do not lead to truly fundamental reform that would threaten vested interests. Removals of key individuals, while in themselves significant, must be followed by real institutional reform. Several examples demonstrate the substantial challenges in bringing about institutional reform. Example 1: XXXXXXXXXXXX who blocks progress on high-level investigations and has ties directly to State House XXXXXXXXXXXX. The committee which considered replacements for XXXXXXXXXXXX picked someone who is a lightning rod to the vested interests and who is unlikely to be approved by Parliament, XXXXXXXXXXXX. Example 2: the process of police reform has been launched with great fanfare, but oversight of the process is questionable. The governmentXXXXXXXXXXXX is allegedly closely associated with the "kwe kwe" death squad responsible for extrajudicial killings. These examples are simply a few of many which demonstrate how the "culture of impunity" is, in effect, an informal system of governance that co-opts and/or forces others to participate or perish. To put it another way, the political elite are planning several chess moves ahead. While we are no mean chess players ourselves, it is very difficult to anticipate their next move or the motives behind "reform" steps.
------------------------------------
Key Reforms Not Yet Undertaken
------------------------------------
6. (C) Thus, while some initial progress has been made, the reforms needed to bring about fundamental change have not yet been achieved. No significant steps have been taken against high-level corruption, which remains rampant. No significant reform of the judicial or Attorney General's office has been undertaken. No steps have been taken to hold accountable perpetrators of post-election violence. Police reform remains an open question. Little has been done by the coalition government to foster national reconciliation and cohesion. The most important issue on the reform agenda is constitutional review (see ref B and previous reporting), but prospects for success of this are problematic. While constitutional revision must be accompanied by the other reforms, without constitutional revision the other reforms will not be sufficient to ensure future stability.
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Positive Impact of U.S. Policy and Actions
--------------------------------------------- -----
7. (C) Though daunting, key elements of the reform agenda are achievable. Consistent and intense U.S. pressure and support - privately and publicly - stands a reasonable chance to achieve substantial progress on implementation. Part of this effort involves helping to empower a new generation of leaders and leveraging the old guard to implement at least some key elements of the reform agenda. We are thus engaged in a well-coordinated intensive effort along the following lines: First, we are engaged in intensive private contacts with the full array of key actors, from Kibaki and Odinga on down. Second, we are engaged in
NAIROBI 00000059 003 OF 004
extensive outreach to civil society, religious groups, the media, and the private sector to urge more concerted efforts to press for implementation of the reform agenda. Third, we are reaching out vigorously to the Kenyan people to encourage dialogue, reconciliation, and peaceful advocacy for implementation of reforms. Fourth, we are engaged in targeted outreach and support for youth to empower them to participate more effectively to press for implementation of reforms and to help escape the cycle of poverty which facilitates their manipulation by the political elite. Fifth, we are supporting reform-minded parliamentarians. Finally, as part of our overall approach, we are laying out incentives, providing concrete support for implementation of reforms, and deploying specific pressure publicly and privately.
8. (C) We are coordinating this intensive push on the reform agenda through an inter-agency Mission Task Force. The Task Force, which I chair twice weekly, ensures that U.S. efforts are coordinated, complementary, and sustained. We are, for example, providing expertise to the constitution revision Committee of Experts, and are working with the Interim Electoral Commission on parameters for providing $1.5 million in technical assistance. We are working closely with the Minister of Security on ways to support real police reform, particularly the establishment of internal and external oversight mechanisms. We are providing technical and expert assistance to the Parliamentary Reform Caucus, which was established with our encouragement. We have just dispatched a delegation of civil society and youth leaders to Washington, and we are coordinating dates for the visit of a Parliamentary Reform Caucus delegation in February. Support from AID's Office of Transition Initiatives, coupled with public outreach, are having a dramatic impact in expanding the role of grassroots youth organizations to promote inter-ethnic dialogue and peaceful pressure for implementation of reforms. We recently launched a $45 million youth empowerment initiative. Actual travel bans and the threat to impose more are key elements of pressure that provide tangible evidence to corrupt anti-reform elites and to the Kenyan people that the USG will not do business as usual absent real change.
9. (C) This multi-faceted approach is having a marked impact among the Kenyan people and politicians. The U.S. push for reform is clearly viewed positively by the Kenyan people. The coalition leadership and Kenyan elite recognize the central importance of the U.S., know that the U.S. stance is viewed positively by the Kenyan people, and realize that they cannot ignore U.S. pressure. The quick impact which the Secretary's recent calls had (see ref B) is one indication of this. Another is that the parliamentary reform caucus, which started with just 20 members, has grown to over 60. Another smaller but very telling indication is that senior politicians have recently starting consulting leaders of the grassroots youth organizations which we are supporting. Members of Parliament have started talking with them and Prime Minister Odinga called one of the youth leaders before he departed with the civil society delegation to Washington.
10. (C) While the culture of impunity and the grip of the old guard political elite on the levers of state power and resources remain largely intact, hairline fractures are developing in their edifice which - if we continue to work them intensively - will develop into broader fractures and open up the potential for a peaceful process of implementation of fundamental reforms. Although being realistic about what is achievable, we should not set our sights too low. With a strong, consistent, and concerted effort, much can be accomplished. By burrowing into the process and using concrete support as leverage, significant police reform can be carried out. Providing support for witness protection will significantly improve the odds that the International Criminal Court will be able to indict several key suspects of post-election violence. Such indictments, particularly if they are public, would be a major blow to the culture of impunity and likely help alter political dynamics in a positive way. Most importantly, intensive U.S. engagement can improve prospects for successful conclusion of the constitutional revision process (the sine qua non of the reform agenda). Much else can be accomplished as well, but taken together these steps would constitute major progress and would greatly enhance prospects for future democratic stability and prosperity.
11. (C) U.S. efforts are also contributing to something less tangible but equally important: a dynamic of change percolating throughout Kenya. We are hearing from many, many sources that our outreach efforts are encouraging and emboldening ordinary Kenyans to speak out in favor of change. The old guard of vested interests knows that we and others within Kenya are fanning the winds of change - always stressing the need to work peacefully within the democratic process -- and feels threatened by that, but they also realize that they must somehow come to grips with it. The old
NAIROBI 00000059 004 OF 004
guard's strategy is to do just enough to placate the people, Annan, and us, while trying to avoid fundamental change in the system. However, there is a real possibility that, as they seek to walk this fine line, the flood gates of change will open, or that at least the change will end up being more far-reaching than they envisaged. The sharp reaction of the old guard to our efforts and growing domestic pressure indicates that the culture of impunity system is not as strong as it may seem on the surface.
12. (C) In essence, we are on the right track. Obtaining further, decisive progress will require sustained, intensive high-level U.S. engagement and, as we have requested, additional resources in some areas as well. We are proceeding with a realistic appreciation of the challenge of bringing about fundamental change, but also with a cautiously optimistic appreciation that much is possible, and that positive engagement can make it happen. RANNEBERGER
Tuesday, 20 October 2009, 06:17
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 001907
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT PASS USAID/AFR/SD FOR CURTIS, ATWOOD AND SCHLAGENHAUF
DEPT PASS TO USTDA-PAUL MARIN, EXIM-JRICHTER
DEPT PASS TO OPIC FOR BARBARA GIBIAN AND STEVEN SMITH
DEPT PASS USTR FOR AGAMA
JOHANNESBURG FOR NAGY
USDOE FOR GEORGE PERSON
TREASURY FOR TONY IERONIMO, ADAM BARCAN, SOLOMAN AND RITTERHOFF
EO 12958 DECL: 02/04/2029
TAGS EPET, ENRG, EINV, ECON, ETRD, PGOV, NI
SUBJECT: (C) SHELL MD DISCUSSES THE STATUS OF THE PROPOSED PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY BILL
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Dundas McCullough for reasons 1.4. (b & d).
Ref: Abuja 1836
-------
SUMMARY
-------
1. (C) Shell EVP for Shell Companies in Africa met with the Ambassador on October 13 to discuss the status of the proposed Petroleum Industry Bill. She said the GON wanted the National Assembly to pass the bill by November 17 and that the international oil companies would have to move quickly if the House passed the bill in the coming weeks. She said there was "total alignment" among the IOCs and with the Nigerian oil companies. She said it would be helpful if the Embassy would continue to deliver low-level messages of concern and call on the Speaker of the House to see where he stood on the bill. She expected the situation in the Niger Delta to be "quiet" until the end of the year but would get "out-of-hand" when the election cycle starts up at the end of the year. Shell's views of the PIB track closely with ExxonMobil's views as reported in reftel. END SUMMARY.
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CURRENT STATUS OF THE PIB
-------------------------
2. (C) Shell EVP for Shell Companies in Africa Ann Pickard met with the Ambassador at the Embassy on October 13. The DCM and Economic Counselor joined the Ambassador, and XXXXXXXXXXXX accompanied Pickard. The Ambassador asked Pickard for her views about the status of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB). Pickard said the GON wanted the National Assembly to pass the bill by November 17 in order for the GON to be able to announce it at the upcoming CWC Gulf of Guinea Conference in London November 17-19. She said that if the House passes the PIB in the coming weeks, "we need to move quickly" to obtain any necessary changes before it becomes law. Fortunately, she added, "We are working with the House and the House appears to want to work with us." She continued that if the Senate passes the PIB, "We aren't worried." Unfortunately, she explained, "We think the Senate will pass a bad bill" but it won't really matter. She added that she would be at the Nigerian House and Senate later that day and would let the Embassy know if there were any unexpected developments.
3. (C) The Ambassador asked if Shell had had engagements with the GON outside the National Assembly, such as with the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Nigeria. Pickard said, "We are meeting with them at all levels." She noted that an IMF team headed by Charles McPherson was in Abuja to look at the PIB and that Shell would be meeting with them as well. In contrast, she said, "We are worried about the World Bank's political agenda and it is not clear what their agenda is." She said the World Bank was working on how to make the IJVs "bankable" so that they would be able to go to international and domestic banks for financing.
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GAS FLARING AND CLIMATE CHANGE
------------------------------
4. (C) Pickard said the PIB requires an end to gas flaring by 2010. She said the industry won't be able to do that due to the lack of QShe said the industry won't be able to do that due to the lack of investment and security. Shell is ahead of the other IOCs and could be ready by 2011. Shell would have to spend $4 billion to do this, but the GON would also have to fund its part and that is a risk. Shell would shut in oil production in fields where it is uneconomic to end gas flaring, and it would let others have the gas for free where it is economic to do so.
5. (C) Pickard continued that NNPC General Managing Director Dr. Mohammed Barkindo was interested in doing something on climate change in preparation for the climate change summit in Copenhagen December 6-18. Barkindo was spread pretty thin so Shell will ask him how they can help him prepare for the summit. She added that Shell had recently told the oil producing countries that coal will squeeze out oil as a result of the CO2 footprint issue if the oil producing
ABUJA 00001907 002 OF 004
countries and IOCs do not do more to address the issue.
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POTENTIAL BENEFITS
------------------
6. (C) Pickard summarized the PIB's potential benefits. The creation of fully integrated and independently functioning international joint ventures (IJVs) would solve the oil and gas industry's longstanding funding problems if the proposed IJVs are done right. The Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) was previously forced to reduce its ownership of some existing joint ventures to 49 percent to make them profitable enough to obtain financing. The proposed division of responsibilities between the NNPC and the Directorate of Petroleum Resources also would be good. The IOCs currently do not know if the NNPC is their partner or regulator.
----------------------------
COHESION WITHIN THE INDUSTRY
----------------------------
7. (C) The Ambassador asked if the industry was united in its approach to the PIB. Pickard replied that there was "total alignment with the international oil companies at every level." She acknowledged that Shell had more exposure to the loss of acreage than any other company. "We could lose 80 percent of our acreage," she said. The problem comes from the fact that the PIB will redefine how a company can hold on to its exploration and production blocks, limiting what can be kept to two kilometers around each well. "Everyone offshore loses a lot," she continued. "We will have to bring satellites on fast or we will lose the blocks." However, the problem with that is that the companies have to be able to pass things through to the blocks quickly and it takes years to get a rig in due to delays in the Nigerian approval process. (NOTE: Pickard told Econoff in Lagos that Shell "sent away" three platforms in late September. END NOTE.)
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ALIGNMENT WITH NIGERIAN OIL COMPANIES
-------------------------------------
8. (C) The Ambassador asked about the IOCs' alignment with the Nigerian oil companies. Pickard replied that "the Nigerian companies are with us" because they will be taxed at the same rate in the current version of the PIB. The IOCs are starting to see what the Nigerian companies want to do.
--------------
THE USG'S ROLE
--------------
9. (C) The Ambassador asked what the Embassy could do to help with the Joint House Committee on Petroleum Upstream and Downstream and Justice that is working on the PIB. Pickard said she hoped the current level of dialogue between the GON and the IOCs continues. Unfortunately, "We have not been able to meet with President Yar'Adua for nine months," she said. "They have him protected." She said it would be helpful if the Embassy would continue to deliver low-level messages of concern. In particular, she thought it would be helpful for the Embassy to call on Speaker of the House Dimeji Bankoke to see where he stood on the bill. Beyond that, she would like to keep the Embassy in reserve and use it as a "silver bullet" if the PIB passes the House. The Ambassador noted that the U.S., U.K., Dutch and Qthe House. The Ambassador noted that the U.S., U.K., Dutch and French Embassies had already made a joint call on NNPC General Managing Director Dr. Mohammed Barkindo.
----------------------------------------
CHINA'S INTEREST IN NIGERIA'S OIL BLOCKS
----------------------------------------
10. (C) Pickard mentioned China's recently reported interest in Nigeria's oil blocks. She said Shell had received a copy of the letter that Special Advisor to the President on Petroleum Matters Dr. Emmanuel Egbogah had sent to the Chinese which said that their offer for oil exploration blocks was not good enough. Minister of State for Petroleum Resources Odein Ajumogobia had denied that the letter
ABUJA 00001907 003 OF 004
had been sent, but later conceded that the GON was only "benchmarking" to see what the IOCs should pay for shallow-water licenses. Pickard said Shell had good sources to show that their data had been sent to both China and Russia. She said the GON had forgotten that Shell had seconded people to all the relevant ministries and that Shell consequently had access to everything that was being done in those ministries.
--------------------------------------------- --
CHANGING RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE GON'S TEAM
--------------------------------------------- --
11. (C) Pickard observed that there might be changes with how the GON management of the petroleum sector is organized. Minister of Petroleum Resources Rilwanu Lukman may be given the responsibility for implementing the PIB, while Minister of State for Petroleum Resources Ajumogobia may get the Directorate of Petroleum Resources and ongoing business. The problem with these changes is that the GON could still get "unempowered people" who are not able to address the issues. The question is whether Ajumogobia would be able to step up. (NOTE: Press reports on October 17 reported that Lukman will be given overall responsibility for the formulation of policy, and oversee the implementation of the PIB, the Integrated Joint Venture negotiation and rollout, the fiscal terms transition and implementation, the new organization implementation, and stakeholder management. We will also supervise the NNPC and its subsidiaries, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the African Petroleum Producers Association, and the University of Petroleum. Ajumogobia will be in charge of the Gas Master Plan Transition Implementation, the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas, the alternative fuels, and the Petroleum Equalization Fund. He will also oversee the Directorate of Petroleum Resources, the Petroleum Training Institute and the Pricing Regulatory Agency. END NOTE.)
--------------------------
SHELL'S CURRENT PRODUCTION
--------------------------
12. (C) The Ambassador asked about the level of Shell's current operations. Pickard said Shell was producing 663,000 barrels per day as of October 13, including the Bonga field. Approximately 80,000 barrels per day had been brought back from the Forcados field on the previous day. Some 900,000 barrels per day of capacity was still shut in. Of that, Shell could bring back 600,000 barrels per day, while the remaining 300,000 barrels per day is "too unreachable."
--------------------------
AMNESTY IN THE NIGER DELTA
--------------------------
13. (C) The Ambassador asked Pickard what she thought about the future of the GON's amnesty offer to militants in the Niger Delta. She responded that Shell expected the situation in the Niger Delta to be "quiet" until the end of the year. It will then get "out-of-hand" when the election cycle starts up in December, January and February. She expressed particular concern about Bayelsa State, home to Shell's 500,000 barrel-per-day capacity Bonny field. Pickard also noted that Q500,000 barrel-per-day capacity Bonny field. Pickard also noted that Shell saw Israeli security experts in Bayelsa, but not in the Delta, and that there had been "a big drop in kidnapping" as a result.
-------------
Looking Ahead
-------------
14. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
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COMMENT
ABUJA 00001907 004 OF 004
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15. (C) Shell's views of the PIB and the alignment among the IOCs and with the Nigerian oil companies track closely with the views of ExxonMobil, as reported in reftel. The main difference is that Shell tends to minimize the different tax concerns and financial vulnerabilities of the individual IOCs. Shell is much more vulnerable than the other IOCs because its operations are concentrated in less favorable JV concessions that are located in the violence-prone Niger Delta. ExxonMobil and Chevron's operations are concentrated in more favorable production sharing contracts (PSC) in the relatively violence-free offshore areas. In the event that the PIB retains negative terms or violence returns to the Delta, Shell can be expected to hurt the most and cry the loudest.
16. (U) Embassy Abuja coordinated this telegram with ConGen Lagos.
SANDERS
Monday, 09 November 2009, 07:32
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000888
AF/S FOR B. WALCH
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR L.DOBBINS AND J. HARMON
COMMERCE FOR ROBERT TELCHIN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS PGOV, PREL, ASEC, PHUM, ECON, ZI
SUBJECT: ZIM NOTES 11-09-2009
-----------
1. SUMMARY
-----------
Topics of the week:
SADC Summit-MDC to Reengage... Warthogs Delay Ambassador's Arrival... .XXXXXXXXXXXX The Organ directed the parties to resolve outstanding issues, as contained in the Global Political Agreement and SADC Communiqu of January 27, within 30 days. The Organ also called for the lifting of all international sanctions. South Africa, represented by President Jacob Zuma who will travel to Harare next week, will facilitate the inter-party dialogue between ZANU-PF, MDC-T, and MDC-M. See Harare 885
3. Warthogs Delay Ambassador's Arrival... This week we are thrilled to welcome Ambassador Charles A. Ray to Post. He arrived on November 4 after his November 3 arrival was delayed because of a bizarre accident hours earlier. On takeoff to Bulawayo on the afternoon of November 3, an Air Zimbabwe flight struck a group of about five warthogs and veered off the runway, destroying some of the runway lights. Passengers on the Air Zim flight were stuck in the plane for about two hours; security authorities forced passengers to surrender any photographic evidence of the crash before they were allowed to leave. All night flights on November 3, including Ambassador Ray's South African Airways flight from Johannesburg, were cancelled. The government did not comment on the warthogs' fate.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
8. Prisons Conditions Remain Dire... Despite some dramatic improvements in food availability in prisons, conditions remain dire, particularly for women and juveniles. A Red Cross feeding program has reduced malnutrition in prisons, but some local NGOs continue to contend that prison conditions are far from acceptable. Although the government has allowed greater access to prisons than in years past, the prison system remains cloaked in secrecy. See Harare 879
XXXXXXXXXXXX
On the Economic and Business Front
HARARE 00000888 003 OF 003
----------------------------------
11. All Quiet on the Banking Front... A week has gone by since the press reported that the central bank had been spending the reserve deposits of the commercial banks. But so far, there have been no bank runs, and the bankers themselves seem not to be bothered by the news. Either they know something we don't, or they've become accustomed to life down the rabbit hole.
12. Time for Another Indigenization Scare... A ZANU-PF minister has been promoting a plan to give the GOZ authority to seize majority ownership of foreign-owned firms. Saviour Kasukuwere, Minister of Indigenization and Empowerment, recently met with bU[k]isxQQtation rules would only apply to new companies. As long as the MDC is in the government, Kasukuwere's proposed regulations will not be introduced. But even talk of implementing the Act is enough to make businesspeople nervous, and the inevitable headlines in the foreign press will be another reminder to the world that it is too early to invest in Zimbabwe.
13. Salary and Wage Negotiations Deadlocked... According to the Employers' Confederation of Zimbabwe (EMCOZ), most companies have failed to agree on salary and wage increases with their employees. EMCOZ told us that at a recent meeting held two weeks ago, employee representatives from the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions proposed a minimum wage equivalent to 60 percent of the USD 500/month poverty line. EMCOZ says employers are unable to meet such high wage demands. Instead, they propose to negotiate annual adjustments rather than the current quarterly adjustments in exchange for monthly salary increases based on productivity gains.
14. Sweet Deal for Sable Chemicals... Having closed their electrolysis factory a month ago due to high electricity tariffs, Zimbabwe's sole fertilizer manufacturer, Sable Chemicals, has re-opened its plant. According to the general manager, Sable Chemicals eventually managed to strike a deal with the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority for a lower tariff of US 3 cents per kilowatt hour instead of the normal US 7 cents paid by the other consumers. The development is set to improve the availability of fertilizers on the market.
-----------------
Quote of the Week
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"The countries of Europe and America want to dictate which way our politics should go and they talk about regime change. They want us to go down on our knees and beg. One day we should think about fighting them in the international courts." -- President Robert Mugabe, speaking at a funeral at Heroes Acre on Q-- President Robert Mugabe, speaking at a funeral at Heroes Acre on October 31.
RAY
Thursday, 05 November 2009, 15:18
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRETORIA 002263
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/04/2019
TAGS PGOV, PINR, SF
SUBJECT: CONTROVERSIAL YOUTH LEAGUE PRESIDENT RETAINS
LIMELIGHT
REF: 08 PRETORIA 002715
PRETORIA 00002263 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Political Counselor Walter N.S. Pflaumer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (SBU) Summary: African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) President Julius Malema probably has received more publicity from the news media in recent months than any other ruling party figure. (Note: "Mail and Guardian" political writer Mandy Rossouw has even recently published a book about Malema. End Note.) He was the most vocal member of the ruling party during the ANC's 2009 national election campaign, and his public presence does not seem to be waning now that the new government is in place. It has never been adequately answered whether Malema speaks on his own or with backing from senior leaders of the party. Regardless of whether his views are sanctioned, however, it is becoming clearer that President Jacob Zuma respects Malema and his place within the movement. End Summary.
2. (C) There has hardly been a day in South Africa since the national election in April that ANC Youth League President Julius Malema has not been in the news. In recent months, he has been featured in a front page profile article from the "Mail and Guardian," a front page article in the "Sunday Independent," and on numerous radio interviews -- including Talk Radio 702 and Five FM. He has been in the news for doing commendable things such as meeting with and supporting University of the Free State Chancellor Jonathan Jansen last month following the university administrator's decision to allow students to return to campus following a racist incident. He has also been in the news for doing questionable things such as hosting wild parties in northern Johannesburg that reportedly rage late into the evening and are fueled by alcohol and sex. Moreover, Malema has been involved in several court cases in front of the Equality Court. Most recently, a judge on November 2 delayed a case in the Court in which Malema is accused of hate speech. Malema earlier this year told an election rally that the woman who accused Zuma of rape in 2006 "had a nice time." (Note: The Sonke Gender Justice Network said the comment was damaging to rape victims and women who were afraid to lodge rape complaints. End Note.) Clearly, Malema is a force in South African politics. Here are some of the reasons Malema has been in the news:
-- On October 29, Malema met with University of the Free State Chancellor Jonathan Jansen about his recent decision to pardon the racist behavior of four white students for a 2007 video in which they made black university employees eat contaminated food. The decision was controversial because many saw it as one that was made without wide consultation and without acknowledgment that the video was harmful to a non-racial, non-sexist South Africa. The Youth League initially said that Jansen should be fired and alluded to the government's new crime strategy of "Shoot to Kill" in saying that those who excuse racism are criminals who deserve to be shot. After meeting with Jansen, however, Malema told protesting students at the university that they should support the chancellor because he "is one of our own." The ANC Youth League President noted that the ANC would not agree with any calls that the professor should step down because he is a "symbol of transformation." Malema also encouraged Qis a "symbol of transformation." Malema also encouraged Jansen to follow through on a pledge to establish a reconciliation program that would be monitored by the Human Rights Commission.
-- On October 25, Malema said the ANCYL would work to ensure that Caster Semenya can run as a girl in the future (FYI: Semenya's gender is a medical question being investigated by the IAAF). Malema in recent months has been one of Semenya's strongest supporters. He greeted her at the airport after she returned from Europe as a disputed champion in track and field and told reporters that if she were white there would be no question of support from South Africans. At the October 25 session with reporters, Malema blasted the media for "trying to divert the country from celebrating her victory." He said that when the Youth League speaks on her behalf, it is doing so because of the poor treatment young women receive in rural areas.
-- On October 21, he visited Standerton in Mpumalanga Province to investigate ongoing service delivery protests. The protests have been some of the most violent in the
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country this year. Following Malema's meetings with residents and provincial and municipal officials, the ANC fired the mayor of Lekwa municipality, the mayoral committee, the speaker of the council and the chief whip.
-- On October 20, the ANCYL President told reporters that South Africa would nationalize the country's mines for extra revenue. He said, "The nationalization of the mines will happen, the Freedom Charter says that." He then added, "We want the ANC in conference in 2012 to pronounce what is the stand of the ANC on the nationalization of mines ... we need decisive leadership, we don't want cowards." (Comment: ANC Treasurer Mathews Phosa, who is often the voice of reason countering Malema's statements, told British businesses in early November that the South African Government would not nationalize the mines. End Comment.)
-- On October 14, Malema was reportedly stopped for speeding on the road between Polokwane and Seshego. When his vehicle was pulled over, the ANC Youth League President is said to have berated traffic officials and asked, "Do you know who I am?" Malema then called numerous senior ANC and government officials and instructed them to discipline the traffic officers. A general manager for traffic was ultimately called to the scene and the following day he asked traffic officials to write letters describing how "they mistreated the youth leader." Roads Department spokesperson Wisani Ngobeni told reporters that the allegations surrounding the incident were all "a hoax" and "hearsay." Deputy Transport Minister Jeremy Cronin, however, told the "Sowetan" on November 4 that his ministry is investigating the incident because "nobody is above the law."
-- In late September, Malema was in the news for hosting a wild party at his Sandton home that included a live band and alcohol. When neighbors went to complain about the noise, Malema reportedly asked them "Do you know who I am? Do you know what I can do?" He then reportedly slapped a police reservist.
3. (C) Admittedly, part of the reason Malema is so prominent in the news is because the public is fascinated by him and his outlandish statements, which sell newspapers and draw listeners. Rossouw, who published the most definitive account of Malema so far, has told Poloff in past meetings that Malema speaks for many working class and poor South Africans and that the Zuma government has effectively used Malema to address difficult issues which would be difficult to tackle without alienating core supporters.
4. (C) Yet, another part of the reason Malema features in the news is that he is extremely ambitious and wants to advance in ANC structures. There are rumors that Malema currently has the final say over ANC and government officials in Limpopo regarding what companies get tenders and what individuals get jobs. There is speculation that Malema wants to take over from Joe Maswanganyi as Limpopo's ANC provincial secretary at the ANC's congress in 2012. There also are rumors that he sees this as a stepping stone toward succeeding Cassel Mathale as provincial chair in 2016, which could lead to the provincial premiership.
5. (C) Comment: Malema's continued media prominence begs the question: Where is President Zuma on some of these issues? (See reftel.) After all, it was Malema who went to Mpumalanga and Limpopo to quell violent service delivery QMpumalanga and Limpopo to quell violent service delivery protests. It was Malema who argued recently -- and extensively -- that South Africa intends to nationalize the mines. It was Malema who visited with Jansen after the decision to pardon university students. On none of these issues did Zuma make a statement. In fact, Zuma's only comment regarding these issues may have been when he declared publicly on October 26 that Malema is a "good leader worthy of inheriting the ANC." (Note: There were reports that Zuma told Malema before going to Standerton that he needed to be careful of his statements. End Note.)
6. (C) A long string of ANC Youth League Presidents have won notoriety for making outrageous statements; viz mid-'90s League President Peter Mokaba's frequent use of the slogan "kill the Boer/kill the farmer," at the very time when Nelson Mandela was campaigning for reconciliation and peace. One respected political analyst commented to us recently that he would be worried if a Youth League President did not go around sounding off like this, and that having someone saying
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such things might even serve as something of a safety valve by making disgruntled youth feel that their anger was being heard by the ANC's senior leaders. We are nonetheless concerned that, as a generation which does not remember the struggle against apartheid comes to adulthood, they may be less content to accept mere rhetoric to express their anger at what they may see as continuing inequality. End comment. GIPS
Friday, 23 February 2001, 15:53
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 001173
FOR AF AND S/S FROM AMBASSADOR
EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2011
TAGS PREL, PGOV, SF
SUBJECT: THIN-SKINNED MBEKI WILL REQUIRE DEFT HANDLING
REF: A. 99 PRETORIA 12315 B. 99 PRETORIA 12316 C. 00 PRETORIA 9150 D. 00 CAPE TOWN 2150 E. PRETORIA 425 F. PRETORIA 533 G. CAPE TOWN 179 H. PRETORIA 619
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR DELANO E. LEWIS. REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: RECENT ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT MBEKI HAVE RAISED CAUTION FLAGS ABOUT HIS ABILITY TO ACCEPT CRITICISM AND MANAGE COLLEGIALLY. THE CHALLENGE FOR U.S. OFFICIALS WILL BE TO ACCEPT THIS IMPORTANT, BUT HYPERSENSITIVE, AFRICAN FIGURE AS HE IS, AND BUILD A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE. POST STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT HE BE INVITED TO WASHINGTON EARLY ON TO BEGIN BUILDING THAT DIALOGUE. END SUMMARY
2. (C) THE CONTROVERSIAL INVESTIGATION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S 1999 $4 BILLION ARMS PURCHASE AGREEMENT HAS SO FAR REVEALED LITTLE ABOUT THE ARMS TRADE, BUT A GREAT DEAL ABOUT PRESIDENT MBEKI AND THE MINDSET OF HIS KEY ADVISORY TEAM. AS DETAILED IN REFS A-G, PRESIDENT MBEKI AND OTHERS AROUND HIM HAVE VIGOROUSLY, SOMETIMES ANGRILY AND SHRILLY, RESISTED CALLS FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF THE TRANSACTION THAT WOULD INCLUDE THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE UNIT OF JUSTICE WILLIAM HEATH, ESTABLISHED BY MBEKI'S BELOVED PREDECESSOR NELSON MANDELA. THEY ARGUE THAT SUITABLE AND COMPETENT INVESTIGATORY INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT ALREADY EXIST, OBVIATING THE NEED FOR ANOTHER INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATOR. WE ARE INCLINED TO AGREE WITH THE SAG ON THE CORE QUESTION THAT THE SANDF NEEDED TO PURCHASE SOME NEW EQUIPMENT, AND THE PRICE THEY WILL PAY IS REASONABLE. WE CAN ONLY OBSERVE FROM THE SIDELINES THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES, AS WELL AS THE FOURTH ESTATE, ON THE ARMS DEAL INVESTIGATION AND HOPE THAT SOUTH AFRICA'S COMMITMENT TO RULE OF LAW IS ULTIMATELY VINDICATED. BUT THE LARGER ISSUE REMAINS FOR US OF HOW TO JUDGE, AND BUILD A DIALOGUE WITH, THE MAN AT THE CENTER OF THIS DEBATE.
3. (C) THIS LATEST EPISODE IS ONE OF SEVERAL WORRISOME SIGNALS FROM MBEKI AND HIS CAMP THAT RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS JUDGMENT. MBEKI'S RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT OVERWHELMING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ON HIV/AIDS HAS BEEN MUCH NOTED AND DISCUSSED IN INTERNATIONAL CIRCLES AND WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA. HIS FAILURE TO SPEAK OUT ON CLEAR HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW VIOLATIONS TAKING PLACE IN MUGABE'S ZIMBABWE HAS ALSO BROUGHT HIM MUCH CRITICISM AND HAVE CLEARLY HURT INVESTOR CONFIDENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S ECONOMY IN THE PROCESS. MBEKI'S RELIANCE ON A CORE OF ADVISORS THAT LACK THE EXPERIENCE AND DIPLOMATIC SEASONING ALSO UNDERCUTS MBEKI'S IMAGE EARLY-ON OF THE COOLLY RATIONAL MANAGER. THE MINISTER IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY ESSOP PAHAD HAS LAUNCHED BLISTERING ATTACKS ON THE PRESS WHEN HIS BOSS IS CRITICIZED. XXXXXXXXXXXX. HIS FORMER SPOKESPERSON, THE LATE PARKS MANKAHLANA HAD LOST ALMOST ALL CREDIBILITY WITH HIS KEY AUDIENCE, THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS IN THE MONTHS BEFORE HE DIED OF A DISEASE THAT MOST WERE CONVINCED WAS AIDS, BUT HE WOULD NEVER ADMIT. MBEKI REMAINS UNBLINKINGLY LOYAL TO CABINET MINISTERS, SUCH AS THE OFTEN INSULTING AND THOUGHTLESS MINISTER OF SAFETY AND SECURITY STEVE TSHWETE, WHO OUTRAGED THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNITY HERE BY QUESTIONING THEIR PATRIOTISM WHEN THEY CRITICIZED MBEKI'S HANDLING OF CRIME ISSUES, OR THE TRUCULENT AND PETULANT FOREIGN MINISTER NKOSAZANA DLAMINI-ZUMA (REF H), OR HIS HEALTH MINISTER WHO CIRCULATED TO THE ENTIRE CABINET LARGE SECTIONS OF A BOOK BY AN TOTALLY DISCREDITED AIDS DENIER.
4. (C) SOUTH AFRICA'S REPORTERS AND EDITORS HAVE BROUGHT THESE INADEQUACIES TO THE PUBLIC'S ATTENTION WITH UNRELENTING ZEAL. EVEN PAPERS HISTORICALLY SYMPATHETIC TO MBEKI AND THE ANC, SUCH AS THE SOWETAN HAVE JOINED A CHORUS OF CRITICS QUESTIONING MBEKI'S LEADERSHIP. SIPHO SEEPE, FOR EXAMPLE, A POLITICAL ANALYST SYMPATHETIC TO THE ANC, WRITING IN THE SOWETAN ASKED IF MBEKI IS FIT TO GOVERN. IN RESPONSE, MBEKI AND HIS TEAM OF ADVISORS HAVE TAKEN EXACTLY THE WRONG TACK. THEY ACCUSE THE PRESS OF RACISM (ATTACKING THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE IT IS PREDOMINANTLY BLACK), OR OF BEING A MOUTHPIECE OF OPPOSITIO N PARTIES, OR OF HAVING A PERSONAL VENDETTA AGAINST MBEKI. MBEKI'S AND THE ANC'S SOLUTION TO THIS "PROBLEM" IS NOT TO ENGAGE THE MEDIA ON AN INTELLECTUAL BASIS BUT RATHER TO SET UP ITS OWN "NEWS" WEBSITE TO "INFORM" SOUTH AFRICA'S PEOPLE (PRESUMABLY THOSE WITH COMPUTERS) WHO HAVE BEEN "MISINFORMED" ON THE ISSUES.
5. (C) WHY MBEKI, WHOSE INTELLIGENCE IS WIDELY ACKNOWLEDGED AND WHO IS WELL RESPECTED PERSONALLY, SHOULD EXHIBIT A TENDENCY TOWARD SHRILLNESS AND DEFENSIVENESS IS HOTLY DEBATED. SOME SPECULATE THAT MBEKI AND THE MAJORITY OF ANC LEADERS AND OFFICE HOLDERS ARE STILL HANDICAPPED BY THE EXPERIENCE OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID. THEN, ENEMIES WERE EVERYWHERE AND THE WORLD FIT VERY NEATLY INTO SHADES OF BLACK AND WHITE. OTHERS SEE MBEKI AS AN INDIVIDUAL WHO MUST ALWAYS BE RIGHT. WHEN THE FORCE OF MEDICAL AND PUBLIC OPINION ON THE CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN HIV AND AIDS GREW TOO GREAT, MBEKI ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS "WITHDRAWING" FROM THE DEBATE RATHER THAN ADMIT THAT HE POSSIBLY HAD ERRED. MBEKI HAS POSITED THE VIEW THAT NONE OF THE CRITICISMS HE HAS RECEIVED WORRIES HIM BECAUSE HE KNOWS THEY AREN'T TRUE, AS HE TOLD THE EDITOR OF DRUM MAGAZINE RECENTLY. IN THAT SAME INTERVIEW, MBEKI SAID THE OPPOSITION WANTS SOMETHING BAD TO HAPPEN IN SOUTH AFRICA "SO THEY CAN THEN SAY 'LOOK HOW BAD THIS GOVERNMENT IS.'"
6. (C) ULTIMATELY, NO ONE KNOWS WHY MBEKI SOMETIMES DISPLAYS THIS IRRATIONAL SIDE, OR WHEN IT WILL MANIFEST NEXT. CERTAINLY, HE IS MORE FREQUENTLY REASONABLE, INTELLIGENT, AND CAPABLE, AS HE DEMONSTRATED AGAIN IN THE FEBRUARY 9 STATE OF THE NATION ADDRESS. MBEKI IS AN AVID READER AND IS ACUTELY AWARE OF THE CRITICISMS BEING LEVIED AGAINST HIM. HE MUST ALSO BE AWARE OF THE STREAM OF RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE MEDIA THAT HE SHOULD SURROUND HIMSELF WITH AN ADVISORY TEAM THAT IS INTELLIGENT, WELL VERSED IN CURRENT AFFAIRS, AND ABLE TO MAKE RATIONAL DECISIONS.
7. (C) USG OFFICIALS MEETING WITH MBEKI SHOULD BE PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE HIS DEFENSIVENESS AND HIGH SENSITIVITY TO CRITICISM. GIVEN HIS CURRENT GRIP ON THE REINS OF THE ANC, WE ANTICIPATE THAT HE WILL BE A PROMINENT FEATURE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE FOR SOME TIME TO COME. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HIS CONTROL OF THE ANC COULD WEAKEN OVER THE LONGER TERM, AS LACK OF DELIVERY ON SOCIAL ISSUES BEGINS TO JEOPARDIZE HIS AND HIS PARTY'S PREDOMINANCE. HIS PERCEIVED FAILURE TO EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS THE HIV EPIDEMIC, IN PARTICULAR, COULD MAKE HIM VULNERABLE TO GRASSROOTS OPPOSITION, POSSIBLY FROM WOMEN'S GROUPS.THE NEXT NATIONAL ELECTIONS ARE NOT UNTIL 2004, HOWEVER, AND THE TWO-TERM LIMIT IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION COULD ALLOW HIM TO SERVE UNTIL 2009.
8. (C) DIALOGUE WITH THIS ESSENTIAL AFRICAN LEADER SHOULD BE COUCHED IN POSITIVE, SUPPORTIVE LANGUAGE, IN THE HOPE OF BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP THAT WILL ALLOW US TO CROSS SWORDS WITH HIM AT A LATER DATE IF WE HAVE TO. AMBASSADOR LEWIS HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO ESTABLISH A RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESIDENT MBEKI THAT ENCOURAGES MBEKI TO ADOPT A MORE MODERATE TONE WITH HIS ADVERSARIES AND A LESS CONTROVERSIAL STANCE ON CRITICAL ISSUES (SUCH AS HIV/AIDS) THAT AFFECT THE WELL-BEING OF SOUTH AFRICA.
9. (C) WE RECOMMEND INITIATING AN EARLY AND HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND MBEKI. HE HAS MADE IT KNOWN TO US THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BE INVITED TO WASHINGTON BEFORE NELSON MANDELA, WHOSE GLOBAL STATURE HAS SOMETHING TO DO WITH MBEKI'S OCCASIONAL MANIFESTATIONS OF A FRAGILE EGO. aWE SUPPORT HIS REQUEST AND HOPE WASHINGTON WILL BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE THIS BRILLIANT, PRICKLY LEADER OF AFRICA'S MOST IMPORTANT STATE.
LEWIS
Friday, 08 May 2009, 15:04
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PRETORIA 000939
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
SIPDIS
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS KDEM, PGOV, PREL, SF
SUBJECT: PART 1 OF 3: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SOUTH AFRICA'S
NEXT PRESIDENT
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-------
Summary
-------
1. (SBU) Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma, President of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party, is a controversial but not well understood personage who emerged from obscurity to where he now occupies the apex of South Africa's political pyramid. He is deeply loved and revered by his closest constituencies; he is mistrusted by opposition parties; and is hated by those here who believe he is "wrong for South Africa." Zuma's nearly five decades of involvement with the ANC, has brought him to this moment. Zuma is now poised to become the fourth post-apartheid President of South Africa, following Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, and Kgalema Motlanthe.
2. (SBU) The National and Provincial elections held on April 22, 2009 resulted in the ANC winning its fourth consecutive governing majority (65.9%). Under the South African constitution, the Parliament elects the state president; thus the ANC majority in Parliament elected Jacob Zuma to be inaugurated in Pretoria on May 9, 2009. This message weaves together various sources to provide a comprehensive look at the life and times of Jacob Zuma. Our goal is to dispel the caricatures that dominate the media and present a more realistic picture of the man who will soon lead the most dynamic emerging democracy in Africa. This is the first in a series of three related cables. End Summary.
-----------------
The Boyhood Years
-----------------
3. (SBU) Zuma was born on April 12, 1942 in the rural village of Inkandla in the heart of Zululand (now, Kwa-Zulu Natal). One hundred or so years before Zuma's birth, the Zulu War leader Shaka led a bloody expansion of the Zulu kingdom against other African tribes, and fifty or so years before, the last Zulu War was won by the British Empire. Two centuries of colonial incursions into the heart of South Africa and the advent of the Afrikaner Boers into central and eastern territories reduced the Zulus to dependency status in a racist system that placed all blacks at the bottom of a segregated system of governance. Jacob Zuma was born the first-born son of the second wife of a provincial policeman and had two full brothers and two full sisters. The first wife of his father had three boys and four girls. His father, whom he says he never saw, died while Zuma was very young.
4. (SBU) The death of his father left his mother destitute and displaced her from her home in Inkandla. She returned to her own village of Maphumulo where she worked for low pay as a domestic. As the war ended, she relocated to a Durban township and worked as a domestic to feed her children. Zuma's childhood was spent between Durban and the rural interior of Zululand. In 1947, the National Party won the election and instituted apartheid and racial categories as the policy of the state. The Group Areas Act, pass laws, Bantustans, separate facilities and amenities were in place. The racial segregation of the colonial period became the law, and the authoritarian police state was prepared to enforce wit with violence. In reaction, the violent, chaotic relations between the state and the oppressed Africans led to an atmosphere of periodic bloody riots, political suppression, torture, murder, strikes, townships in flames, Qsuppression, torture, murder, strikes, townships in flames, and widespread suffering.
5. (SBU) Zuma was forced to work odd jobs from a young age to supplement his mother's meager income -- as a herd boy, a gardener, a domestic, in tea houses, and small shops. He faced the same problems of life of all Africans in the apartheid state. In the rural, pastoralist cattle culture of the Zulu, Zuma's first job as a herd boy linked him to an ancient traditional occupation of African boys throughout the continent. He once wrote, "I used to look after them (the cows) very well. That was the first time I was praised for a job well done."
6. (SBU) Not unusual for the times, as an unregistered African, Zuma only achieved schooling to Form III, or Fifth
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Grade equivalent. However, friends and relatives recognized his hunger for learning and helped him with what they had learned. He claims to be self-taught and that he taught himself to read and write. In his teens, in 1955, a cousin encouraged him to attend night school in Durban. In this era, African churches, trade unions, and civic organizations offered educational opportunities to their members that were otherwise lacking from the state. Throughout South Africa and beyond, Zuma's life exemplified the distinction between education and intelligence -- the former he lacked, the latter he had in abundance. In 1985, in a biography penned for the Communist Party, he said he was self-educated up to the Junior Certificate level. Later in his life he said, "Education is education whether it is formal or not." He continued, "I have done everything that the educated have done."
--------------------------
To Political Consciousness
--------------------------
7. (SBU) The ANC was established in 1912 as one of several civil agencies seeking to end racism and segregation and to protecting the human and civil rights of the African majority. By mid-century, it had attracted the support of African intellectuals and traditional leaders as well as the average neglected African who was denied the rights of citizenship in the land of their birth. Zuma's elder half brother from his father's first wife was a secret member of the ANC. A maternal uncle was a trade union activist. They talked to him about the struggle for equality and freedom, setting the spark for his developing political consciousness.
8. (SBU) Zuma actively took to politics, resistance, and activism as a young man of 17 years. He attended public and underground meetings where the goals of groups like the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) were discussed. In 1958, he hovered around the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) -- an organ made famous a decade earlier by the young revolutionary Nelson Mandela -- and in 1958, Zuma joined the ANC and its Youth League. He said he was not an active participant, but he attended meetings and rallies. In 1959, he joined the South African Council of Trade Unions (SACTU) with his brother and soon was involved in an anti-pass campaign in the Noxamana district as well as in demonstrations opposing the Bantustan policy. In these activities, he found a fraternity among like-minded groups that defined his life's work.
9. (SBU) In 1961, the year Nelson Mandela was arrested and jailed, Zuma was 19 years old and committed to fighting apartheid. That year, in Durban, he began courses with SACTU on Marxism-Leninism, the labor theory of value, and political discussions about colonialism, imperialism, the anti-colonial movement, and the nature of the struggle inside South Africa. While a member of a political study group in 1962, the year Mandela was sentenced to life in prison, Zuma was recruited into the militant armed wing of the ANC -- Umkonto wa Sizwe (the Spear of the Nation, aka "MK"). The following year, he was recruited into the SACP, though in his words, he did "little party work." It was Zuma's associations with these organizations at this critical tipping point in South Africa's history that became the guiding commitment of his QAfrica's history that became the guiding commitment of his life up until today.
--------------------
Life in the Struggle
--------------------
10. (SBU) As an underground member of the banned ANC and the SACP, young Jacob Zuma was urged to go into exile, gain military training, and join the fight against apartheid. In June 1963, the 21 year old Zuma was arrested with 45 other young comrades in Zeerust, in the Transvaal (now North West Province), as they were walking to Botswana into self-imposed exile. He was detained for ninety days, then tried and sentenced to ten years in prison for "conspiracy to overthrow the government." Zuma spent the next ten years incarcerated with many other political prisoners, including the senior ANC leadership in prison such as Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, among other political prisoners at the infamous Robben Island. While in Robben Island, in what had become
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the ANC's graduate school, they discussed the U.S. civil rights movement, the anti-Vietnam War movement, the African independence movement, and the global ideological contest of the Cold War.
11. (SBU) Zuma rarely discusses this period of his life in public, nor did his biography speak frankly about that experience, his relationships, and what he learned. He does say that many important people there engaged in serious political debates and disagreements, but he failed to say who they were or what they argued about. The only insight he provided says he held many responsible positions within ANC structures at Robben Island, he was a mentor for students, and at the end was Chairman of the Political Committee. In the culture of the revolutionary anti-apartheid movements, his presence at Robben Island during Mandela's first decade there is the best possible "struggle credential" he could possibly have acquired to rise in the movement. Released from prison at the age of 32 in 1974, Zuma immediately re-engaged the struggle with the ANC Natal underground.
End of Part One LA LIME
Tuesday, 12 May 2009, 08:51
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 PRETORIA 000954
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
SIPDIS
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS KDEM, PGOV, PREL, SF
SUBJECT: PART 3 OF 3: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SOUTH AFRICA'S
NEW PRESIDENT
PRETORIA 00000954 001.2 OF 004
-------
Summary
-------
1. (SBU) This is the third of three messages that aim to reveal a comprehensive background picture of Jacob Zuma, the President of the ruling African National Congress party (ANC), who was inaugurated as the fourth post-apartheid president of South Africa. The first message was released before Zuma was inaugurated, and the last two will be released following his ascendancy. End Summary.
---------------------------
Zuma Destined for Greatness
---------------------------
2. (SBU) The global emergence of the anti-apartheid and disinvestment movements gained momentum in the 1970s and the 1980's, such that even the USG adopted a sanctions policy against the apartheid regime. Under international diplomatic, political, military, and economic pressure, the SAG decided that apartheid was no longer sustainable. Negotiations with Nelson Mandela, who was serving a life sentence in Robben Island, opened the door for his release from prison and the un-banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and other opposition and anti-apartheid political parties. When SAG President F.W. de Klerk un-banned the ANC in 1990, Jacob Zuma, the ANC's Intelligence and Security chief in exile, was one of the first high level ANC operatives to return to South Africa. Zuma immediately became involved in negotiations concerned with dismantling apartheid laws and governance, facilitating the repatriation of those in exile, as well as the release of all political prisoners. It was between 1990 and 1994 that Zuma achieved his most important success: negotiating an end to the spiral of violence between the ANC and the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) -- that believed in Zulu tradition and primacy -- and resulted in thousands of politically-related deaths. Zuma is likely the most prominent ANC Zulu politician -- even eclipsing Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Moreover, his own Zulu ethnicity and identity was a major asset, convincing the Zulus of KwaZulu Natal to support the ANC's leadership, the new ANC constitution, and reconciliation as he urged a non-violent way for the opposing political movements to communicate. Though sporadic outbreaks of Zulu-ANC violence occurred up until 2009, the intensity, frequency, and number of deaths have reduced to a very small fraction compared to the early 1990s. This achievement remains one of the most important bases for Zuma's stature, popularity and support among the ANC rank and file.
3. (SBU) For the decades of his imprisonment, Mandela was the most recognized icon of the ANC as well as a global symbol of freedom, perseverance, and resistance to apartheid. Upon his release, he led the ANC's efforts to create a majority-based, multi-racial democratic system founded on a progressive constitution based on democratic best practices around the world. In the period before the end of apartheid following the 1994 election which made Mandela the first democratically-elected president of South Africa, Zuma was appointed to key roles in the ANC and participated in their political decisions and negotiations. In 1994, his supporters say, he stepped aside so that Thabo Mbeki could stand unopposed as Mandela's Deputy President. He had one unsuccessful campaign to become the premier of KwaZulu Natal Qunsuccessful campaign to become the premier of KwaZulu Natal and in 1994 was appointed the Deputy Premier of that province by his old comrade and sometimes adversary Thabo Mbeki. Between 1994 and 1996, Zuma was KwaZulu Natal's provincial chairman of the ANC as well as MEC for Economic Development and Tourism. In 1996, he was re-elected as Chair of the ANC in KwaZulu Natal and the same year became the ANC's National Chairperson -- one of the top six jobs in the party.
4. (SBU) His highest office -- prior to his current status as President-elect of South Africa following a vote in Parliament on May 6, 2009 -- was ANC Deputy President and Member of Parliament, as he served as Deputy State President in the Mbeki Administration from 1999 to 2005. Upon attaining the party Deputy Presidency, by tradition of succession in the ANC, Zuma was believed to be Mbeki's heir apparent, destined to succeed to the presidency in his time. But there were bumps in the road. He served as an unofficial
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peace mediator and diplomatic troubleshooter in the region (Zimbabwe, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and helped the ANC build a rapport with trade unions, traditional leaders, and other political parties. Zuma developed the reputation of being humble, charismatic, loyal, hard-working, and committed to improving the lives of South Africans. In 1999, based on this profile, he was appointed Deputy President of the ANC and became the Deputy President of South Africa in the first Mbeki administration. He was dismissed by Mbeki as SAG Deputy President in 2005 as a result of being implicated in the corruption trial of his friend and financial advisor Schabir Shaik. In 2006, he was charged with rape of a family friend, but was acquitted. Following Shaik's conviction of bribing Zuma for personal gain, Zuma was indicted and charged with multiple counts of corruption, accepting bribes, tax evasion, and money laundering.
5. (SBU) Zuma's rise to the pinnacle of South African politics at the same time that serious questions about his character were headline news is an astonishing political achievement in itself. Zuma is known as a populist whose rise occurred in partnership with leftist constituencies in the ANC. Despite criminal allegations against him, he remained popular in the party, unlike Mbeki who came to be hated. Zuma is particularly popular among Zulu ethnic and Youth Leagues; their defense of him claims he has served the people well, there are others worse than him, and he is much better than Mbeki. Some of his most ardent supporters promised to kill and die for him while others threatened that if Zuma were to be convicted, "blood would flow" and they would make the country "ungovernable." To them, Zuma had a "right" to be president. Mbeki believed that a Zuma presidency would be a disaster for South Africa and would split the ANC. Zuma's supporters counter-claimed that Mbeki was a disaster for the poor and he was the one splitting the party, creating a strong presidency that acted without reference to party instruction. In 2007, well after the conviction of his friend Shaik for bribery and corruption, Zuma was also indicted for having a corrupt relationship with Shaik. The charges were set aside in September 2008 due to lack of preparedness by the prosecutors to proceed with the case.
6. (SBU) Despite Mbeki's intellect and experience as well as his apparent success as a leader, politician, and diplomat, Zuma out-maneuvered him by manipulating the party base through the district offices and portraying himself as the victim via the image-making machinery of the ANC. Pundits thought Mbeki was the smartest and most effective political leader of his generation, but on December 17, 2007 in Polokwane, Limpopo, the ANC declared Zuma the clear favorite, beginning Mbeki's surprising slide into political obscurity. Days following his election, corruption charges were re-filed against Zuma, causing a leadership crisis in the ANC that was only resolved in September 2008 when the Zuma-led NEC forced Mbeki to resign as President of South Africa -- a deliberate act of triumphant revenge just eight months short of the end of his second five year term. Kgalema Motlanthe (septel), Qof his second five year term. Kgalema Motlanthe (septel), the ANC Deputy President, was sworn in as South Africa's third post-apartheid president, but his seven month tenure was purposefully that of a care-taker, marking time until the president in waiting took office.
7. (SBU) Following a year-and-a-half of controversial high profile court challenges, appeals, and counter-suits, all charges against Zuma were dropped only weeks before the election in April 2009. His supporters' adoration only grew as his detractors characterized him as an unlettered and corrupt buffoon surrounded by crass and intimidating socialist sycophants. Zuma loyalists ignored critiques that he is a charismatic populist and political chameleon who tells each audience exactly what they want to hear, that he is a man without his own vision or policy center. His supporters understand that Zuma has one over-riding policy -- loyalty to the ANC and improving the lives of the rural poor above all else.
--------------------------
Keys To Zuma's Personality
--------------------------
PRETORIA 00000954 003.2 OF 004
8. (SBU) Zuma has clearly weathered numerous storms during recent years and he used several tactics of political survival that give clues to his personality and leadership style. First, he used the power of persuasion to build strong alliances. Faced with enormous challenges to his political career, Zuma built a strong support team and pulled his family close to him. He also relied heavily on his contacts in KwaZulu Natal Second, he leveraged on the infrastructure and networks of his friends. The perceived political conspiracy against Zuma became a reality in the minds of many South Africans -- including Pietermaritzburg High Court Judge Chris Nicholson -- and this triggered a groundswell of sympathy for him. The ANC Youth League, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and the South African Communist Party (SACP) gave him a political platform to express his views. He also worked closely with business people who had local and international networks. They extended their influence so he could counter the negative images that his adversaries had built of him. Third, he remained focused on key tasks. Throughout the political crisis he faced after Mbeki fired him, Zuma focused on his oft-repeated assertion that he was innocent and that he was the victim of a systematic abuse of power. Fourth, Zuma understood that the main thrust of the political conspiracy would have been to remove him from the ANC, and the ANC from him. His best response would be to live the values of the ANC throughout the crisis period, and become the epitome of an ANC cadre -- which he did. He built extensive relationships in Parliament and with ANC branches across the country. As he began to live the values of the ANC, the ruling party found it more difficult to distance itself from him.
9. (SBU) Fifth, Zuma delegated effectively while never abandoning his responsibilities. Zuma is outstanding at delegating jobs to those around him. According to those closest to Zuma, "his demeanor in the face of adversity helped to create a positive atmosphere inside his war-rooms." Sixth, he always maintained the moral high ground and remained authentic throughout. No matter how hard detractors tried to break his spirit by name-calling and leaking information, Zuma never lost his composure. In the midst of his toughest times, Zuma visited his working-class supporters and the unemployed. Seventh, he improvised his communication methods -- and found success doing so. When he realized that much of the media in South Africa was against him becoming the next leader, he resorted to positive imagery. He became the dignified underdog, and he painted those against him as shameless bullies and cowards. Last, Zuma used smart aggression as a tool to wear down his opponents. Throughout the most difficult times of the past few years, Zuma came across as reluctant to draw first blood, only displaying subtle determination to take the fight to his aggressors. This is consistent with a leader that is aware of his own strengths -- smart power.
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Comment
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10. (SBU) As Zuma's presidency begins, many outstanding questions remain about his government and his policies. His close association with the ideological left of the ANC Qclose association with the ideological left of the ANC alliance has raised some worries about the impact on economic policy by close Zuma allies in the SACP and COSATU. He has reassured investors their assets will be secure under his administration, but has also called for the redistribution of wealth in the interests of the poor. The ANC has led the world to expect a more intimate intertwining of the ruling party and the state as well as a deployment of public officials whose standard of conduct and effectiveness will be their loyalty to Zuma and the ANC and their willingness to carry out ANC policies. With a relatively weak opposition but respected courts and activist civil society, there is optimism that a Zuma administration will, at worst, muddle through. There are many top performers in the ANC, and the ANC tradition of collective decision-making will define the policy context of the Zuma administration. One can only guess how South Africa will evolve under a Zuma presidency -- which he promises will only be for one term. South Africans have suffered many more and greater tragedies than an elected government with a near two-thirds majority. It is trite to
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say, but "time will tell." In this case, such a statement rings true for South Africa in 2009. LA LIME
Tuesday, 15 September 2009, 16:39
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CAPE TOWN 000204
SIPDIS
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS PGOV, KDEM, SF
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT SPENDS EXCESIVELY ON LUXURY CARS
1. (U) In recent months government Ministers and senior officials have spent roughly 4 million USD on luxury vehicles. Although the spending is in accordance with the Ministerial Handbook and no
regulations have been broken, the public outcry has been enormous. (Note: Ministers are entitled to a state-purchased car equivalent to the value of 70 percent of their annual salary End Note.) In light of the global economic crisis, and the fact that many South Africans lack access to basic services such as water, sewage, electricity and garbage removal, there is a renewed public awareness and discontent over excessive government spending. 2. (U) In August, President Jacob Zuma stated that newly sworn-in Ministers were thinking about the recession and no longer spending large amounts of public money on luxury cars. However the spending spree continued throughout August and September leading to opposition parties raising the issue in Parliament and trade unions weighing in on the matter. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) went so far as to urge those Ministers who bought extravagantly expensive cars to give them back, leading to a war of words between the trade union and Communications Minister Siphiwe Nyanda. Nyanda, who himself purchased vehicles totaling several thousand dollars, the most spent by anyone in the Cabinet, said it was absurd for Cosatu to suggest that the Ministers should return the official vehicles because vehicles are needed to deliver on their mandate and meet the expectations of the public. It is, however, the expenditure incurred by Blade Nzimande, Minister of Higher Education and Training and leader of the South African Communist Party (SACP) that has caused the most strident public backlash. Nzimande's vehicle purchase has evoked the most criticism as it highlights the double standards at play in government. In June this year while endorsing the principles and values behind Nelson Mandela Day, Nzimande stated it was necessary to reaffirm the values Mandela represents and "roll back the greed, corruption and selfishness of capitalism." However, two months later he spent thousands on a new car. In response to the public outcry Nzimande stated that "I have not abandoned my values. I don't think I've abandoned my moral leadership. I am still a communist, I am still committed to the working class, and I am still committed to taking up the issues relating to the poor." 3. (U) In a study commissioned by the Democratic Alliance (DA) it was found that if every Minister, Deputy Minister, Premier and Minister in the Executive Committee (MEC) were to spend the full amount allowed by the Ministerial Handbook on vehicles, the total cost would come to approximately 32 million USD for 220 motor vehicles. That is enough to have built 5500 houses, 25 schools, or to pay the salaries of 1500 nurses for a year. The DA has submitted a letter to the Director-General in the President's Office requesting that the Ministerial Handbook be amended to reflect a more sympathetic appreciation for the financial hardships faced by most South Africans. In addition, the DA has launched an "austerity" drive as well as a wasteful expenditure monitor and Western Cape MECs have been told to use vehicles in the government garage car pool rather than purchase new ones. Western Cape Premier Zille is using an old vehicle and the official car she used as mayor of Cape Town, a hybrid Prius, is now being used by her successor. Zille has also said that the Western Cape executives would no longer QZille has also said that the Western Cape executives would no longer use blue light escorts for travelling and would cancel their corporate credit cards, stop using VIP lounges for domestic air travel, and give up their state subsidies for domestic employees. Recognizing the need to address the situation Minister in the Presidency Collins Chabane, issued a statement saying that Cabinet has established a ministerial task team to look at government spending in the context of the economic meltdown.
4. (U) Comment: The global economic recession has unleashed a reappraisal of the role of state spending in the South African economy and the Zuma administration should be on the cutting edge of defining this role for South Africa. Zuma's government has failed to do this and, despite winning an overwhelming majority in the April general election, is currently faced with a credibility problem as on the one hand it advocates serving the needs of the poor and encourages all South Africans to tighten their belts during the current economic crisis, while on the other it is allowing excessive spending of public money on personal luxuries. In order to restore public confidence in the government, there needs to be a marked improvement in service delivery and an eradication of entitlement and inefficiency. Effective management of government is a priority. This also applies to the curtailment of corruption and overspending which is sapping state coffers and inhibiting the delivery of basic services. However, there needs to be a political will to combat corruption and self enrichment, as any failures to do so weaken the government's authority to combat corruption and excessive spending at lower levels in government. Local municipal elections are due to be held in 2010 with many constituencies expected to be closely contested. Opposition parties have already expressed the possibility of an alliance to contest the local elections and the ANC could find itself in a precarious position should its legitimacy be weakened. South Africa is believed to have one of the highest per capita rates of protest action in the world, and South Africans are openly critical of a government most of them vote for at the polls. Politically, the "cargate" scandal has the ability to weaken the Zuma government and increase protests, as a loss of credibility has the potential to create a climate for instability, unrest and
CAPE TOWN 00000204 002 OF 002
1. (U) In recent months government Ministers and senior officials have spent roughly 4 million USD on luxury vehicles. Although the spending is in accordance with the Ministerial Handbook and no regulations have been broken, the public outcry has been enormous. (Note: Ministers are entitled to a state-purchased car equivalent to the value of 70 percent of their annual salary End Note.) In light of the global economic crisis, and the fact that many South Africans lack access to basic services such as water, sewage, electricity and garbage removal, there is a renewed public awareness and discontent over excessive government spending. 2. (U) In August, President Jacob Zuma stated that newly sworn-in Ministers were thinking about the recession and no longer spending large amounts of public money on luxury cars. However the spending spree continued throughout August and September leading to opposition parties raising the issue in Parliament and trade unions weighing in on the matter. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) went so far as to urge those Ministers who bought extravagantly expensive cars to give them back, leading to a war of words between the trade union and Communications Minister Siphiwe Nyanda. Nyanda, who himself purchased vehicles totaling several thousand dollars, the most spent by anyone in the Cabinet, said it was absurd for Cosatu to suggest that the Ministers should return the official vehicles because vehicles are needed to deliver on their mandate and meet the expectations of the public. It is, however, the expenditure incurred by Blade Nzimande, Minister of Higher Education and Training and leader of the South African Communist Party (SACP) that has caused the most strident public backlash. Nzimande's vehicle purchase has evoked the most criticism as it highlights the double standards at play in government. In June this year while endorsing the principles and values behind Nelson Mandela Day, Nzimande stated it was necessary to reaffirm the values Mandela represents and "roll back the greed, corruption and selfishness of capitalism." However, two months later he spent thousands on a new car. In response to the public outcry Nzimande stated that "I have not abandoned my values. I don't think I've abandoned my moral leadership. I am still a communist, I am still committed to the working class, and I am still committed to taking up the issues relating to the poor." 3. (U) In a study commissioned by the Democratic Alliance (DA) it was found that if every Minister, Deputy Minister, Premier and Minister in the Executive Committee (MEC) were to spend the full amount allowed by the Ministerial Handbook on vehicles, the total cost would come to approximately 32 million USD for 220 motor vehicles. That is enough to have built 5500 houses, 25 schools, or to pay the salaries of 1500 nurses for a year. The DA has submitted a letter to the Director-General in the President's Office requesting that the Ministerial Handbook be amended to reflect a more sympathetic appreciation for the financial hardships faced by most South Africans. In addition, the DA has launched an "austerity" drive as well as a wasteful expenditure monitor and Western Cape MECs have been told to use vehicles in the government garage car pool rather than purchase new ones. Western Cape Premier Zille is using an old vehicle and the official car she used as mayor of Cape Town, a hybrid Prius, is now being used by her successor. Zille has also said that the Western Cape executives would no longer QZille has also said that the Western Cape executives would no longer use blue light escorts for travelling and would cancel their corporate credit cards, stop using VIP lounges for domestic air travel, and give up their state subsidies for domestic employees. Recognizing the need to address the situation Minister in the Presidency Collins Chabane, issued a statement saying that Cabinet has established a ministerial task team to look at government spending in the context of the economic meltdown.
general lawlessness. End Comment
Thursday, 17 December 2009, 07:09
C O N F I D E N T I A L KAMPALA 001399
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 2019/12/17
TAGS PHUM, PGOV, UG
SUBJECT: UGANDA: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON 2002 GULU PRISON INCIDENT
REF: STATE 112641
CLASSIFIED BY: Aaron Sampson, Pol/Econ Chief, State, Pol/Econ; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) Summary: The following information responds to reftel questions regarding the 2002 death of Peter Oloya at Gulu Central Prison. In 2003, the Ugandan High Court described Mr. Oloya's death as "a blatant case of extra judicial killing." Relying on the testimony of one eyewitness, and the Ugandan government's failure to produce any eyewitnesses or signed affidavits to the contrary, the High Court concluded Oloya was shot on the orders of Lt. Col. Otema. Our efforts to investigate the 2002 killing produced no additional information. End Summary.
2. (C) Who was in command of the UPDF forces that went to Gulu prison?
- Lt. Col. Charles Anway Otema was in charge of UPDF forces that went to Gulu prison and accompanied these forces to the prison.
3. (C) What was the relationship of the commanding officer of the forces entering the prison in the chain of command to then-Lt. Col. Otema?
- Lt. Col. Charles Anway Otema was the commanding officer of the forces that entered the prison, and entered the prison along with forces under his command.
4. (C) What were the orders of the detachment that went to Gulu Prison? Were these given by then-Lt. Col. Otema? Did these specifically address safeguarding prisoners?
- On November 3, 2009, Gulu District Chairman Walter Ochora told PolOff that he, Lt. Col. Otema, and President Museveni discussed an intercepted message on September 16, 2002, revealing plans by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to liberate prisoners from Gulu central prison. Ochora said President Museveni ordered Lt. Col. Otema to go to the prison, secure the prisoners, and bring them back to the military barracks. Ochora said the Director General of Prisons authorized Lt. Col. Otema's unit entrance to the prison. We have no further information on the content of the orders given to Lt. Col. Otema.
5. (C) What measures as commander did then-Lt. Col. Otema take after the incident? Did he order an investigation?
- The UPDF has not provided information about the nature or extent of any internal UPDF investigation. Member of Parliament (MP) David Penytoo Ocheng, who was incarcerated with Oloya in Gulu prison at the time of the incident, told PolOff that he rode from the prison in the back of the military truck carrying Oloya's body. Ocheng recalls Lt. Col Otema saying, "Is he dead? Is he dead? If he is dead just bury him." Ocheng said Oloya was clearly dead, with gunshot exit wounds in the front of his chest. Upon arrival at the military barracks, Lt. Col. Otema approached the back of the truck, asked again if Oloya was dead, and ordered the soldiers to carry Oloya to the military barracks hospital. Ocheng said that three days later some soldiers at the military barracks told him they had buried a decapitated civilian matching Oloya's description with a chest bullet wound.
6. (C) If there was an investigation, who conducted the investigation?
- The UPDF provided no information regarding any internal UPDF investigations of Oloya's killing.
- On February 14, 2003, the Ugandan High Court heard an application seeking compensation for the 21 Gulu prisoners, including Oloya,
for violation of human rights. The hearing determined whether the claimants were deprived of basic rights, and did not indentify any parties or individuals responsible for depriving the claimants of these rights.
- In regard to the shooting death of Oloya, the Uganda's Attorney General did not dispute that Oloya was fatally shot by UPDF personnel, but claimed that Oloya was "shot dead accidentally as he attacked one of the soldiers and attempted to disarm him." Stephan Otim, a fellow prisoner and eyewitness, testified that "as the late Peter Oloya was moving towards the prison gate, Lt. Col. Oteng Awany ordered the soldiers to shoot him...the soldiers then shot Peter Oloya in the back and his body was loaded into a lorry".
- The High Court said it was "inclined to believe" the version articulated by Oloya's fellow prisoners. The court specifically cited Otim's eyewitness affidavit, and the Ugandan government's failure to produce any affidavits from Lt. Col. Otema or other eyewitness in response. The Court described the Attorney General's claim of an accidental shooting as "pure fiction", and found it "inconceivable that a prisoner namely the late Peter Oloya could have attacked and then attempted to disarm one of the soldiers...it is unimaginable that a poor unarmed prisoner would attack a soldier amidst many other heavily armed soldiers." The Court ruled that "Peter Oloya was intentionally deprived of his right to life when he was shot in cold blood at the orders of Lt. Col Otema Awany. His killing was not in execution of a sentence passed in a fair
trial by a court of competent jurisdiction in respect of a criminal offence under the laws of Uganda where such sentence had been confirmed with the highest appellate court. This was a blatant case of extra judicial killing by which the right to life of the late Peter Oloya as protected by Article 22(1) of the Constitution was violated." The Court found it "surprising" that Lt. Col. Otema "swore no affidavit in reply leading to an irresistible inference that the averments that Peter Oloya was deliberately shot in cold blood at the orders of Lt. Col. Otema Awany are true." The government appealed this ruling in 2006 but the Attorney General failed to appear and the appeal was subsequently dismissed.
7. (C) Was it an official investigation?
- The UPDF did not provide evidence of any internal UPDF investigation. The High Court case was an official legal hearing into human rights violations. The hearing was not a criminal trial, nor did it lead to criminal charges against Lt. Col. Otema or any other party.
8. (C) Will the GOU release the investigation results or a summary to us (with the understanding that the USG will respect confidentiality?
- We have already emailed scanned copy of the 2003 High Court ruling to the Uganda Desk Officer.
9. (C) Why did the UPDF decline to release Peter Oloya's body?
- The UPDF provided no information on why it failed to comply with the court order to release the Oloya's body.
- Ochora told PolOff that he and Gulu District Chairman Norbert Mao recently discussed this case with President Museveni (the 2003 High Court ruling notes a petition by Mao for the release of Oloya's body). Ochora said the President saw no reason not to return Oloya's body to relatives and that the Paramount Chief (the Acholi King) should be informed to handle the rituals involved in moving the body.
- MP David Penytoo Ocheng said that three days after he and other prisoners were transferred to the military barracks in 2002,
soldiers on burial detail for UPDF soldiers killed by the LRA told him they had also buried a decapitated civilian matching Oloya's description. The soldiers told Ocheng that the body bore a large exit wound on the front of the chest.
10. (C) If possible, can the Embassy interview one or more eyewitnesses (preferably from different points of view, e.g. prison official, prisoner, soldier) from the Gulu prison incident?
- Post has been unable to identify any eyewitnesses. Ochora was not an eyewitness and was not at the prison at the time the incident occurred. Penytoo said he was in an adjacent prison yard when shots were fired. Nor are we convinced that locating eyewitnesses seven years after the incident would provide any greater clarity as political and personal sentiments continue to color descriptions of the incident. The 2003 High Court ruling contains a sworn affidavit by one eyewitness, Stephen Otim. Neither the Ugandan government nor the UPDF produced sworn statements by other eyewitnesses challenging Otim's version of events.
11. (C) We would appreciate post's opinion with regard to the credibility of NGO accounts vs. government accounts of this incident. We also would appreciate post's opinion on whether Otema was involved in the incident or not.
- There is no dispute that Lt. Col. Otema was present the night Peter Oloya was shot. The question is whether Oloya was deliberately shot, and if so was this at Lt. Col. Otema's orders, or was Oloya shot accidently while trying to wrestle a weapon from one of Lt. Col. Otema's men. We do not feel that we are in a position to go beyond the findings of the High Court in concluding what actually happened the night of Oloya's death. LANIER
Monday, 19 October 2009, 11:29
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KAMPALA 001197
SIPDIS
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON FROM AMBASSADOR LANIER
EO 12958 DECL: 10/18/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINS, PHUM, EAID, KDEM, UG
SUBJECT: UGANDA: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF ASSISTANT
SECRETARY CARSON
Classified By: Ambassador Jerry Lanier for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1.(C) Summary: Under President Museveni's leadership, Uganda has become a confident and outspoken regional leader through its military role in Somalia (which up to now has preserved the TFG as a moderate alternative to Islamic extremism), its effective campaign against the LRA and its related commitment to rebuild northern Uganda. Yet the President's autocratic tendencies, as well as Uganda's pervasive corruption, sharpening ethnic divisions, and explosive population growth have eroding Uganda's status as an African success story. Holding a credible and peaceful presidential election in February 2011 could restore Uganda's image, while failing in that task could lead to domestic political violence and regional instability. It is too early to tell whether the deadly September 10-12 riots in Kampala are the beginning of a massive and open-ended effort for political change in Uganda, or will lead to a more productive internal dialogue and a stronger democracy. The path of Ugandan politics over the next eighteen months depends largely on the President's vision and leadership. Your visit will be crucial in conveying US views and policy on Uganda and East Africa, and in raising the President's awareness about how seriously Western governments will be following the course of democracy in Uganda in the coming months. End Summary.
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Elections and Uganda's Fading Democracy
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2. (C) Uganda under President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) has made remarkable progress over the past 23 years. The country has gone from total economic collapse in the aftermath of Idi Amin's despotism to being an African success story, building unprecedented domestic peace, economic growth, and making substantial progress towards democracy. Yet Museveni and the NRM have not fully embraced multiparty politics or allowed meaningful political alternatives. They are now more entrenched in government and state institutions than during the days of his "no-party" system. The NRM's near total accumulation of power has led to poor governance, corruption, and rising ethnic tensions, a combination that threatens Ugandan "democracy" and stability.
3. (C) Opposition political parties, however, are fractured, politically immature, and greatly outnumbered in Parliament. They control no government ministries, and are not skillful using either press or protest, their primary political tools. Nor can the opposition provide a coherent and attractive platform of proposals to counter the NRM. And it is by no means clear the opposition would improve governance in Uganda in any way. Currently, a coalition of all but one of Uganda's main opposition parties looks likely to nominate a joint opposition candidate for 2011, probably the leader of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) Kizza Besigye, who lost to Museveni in 2001 and 2006. This coalition is demanding the dissolution of the partisan Electoral Commission constituted by Museveni, and the acceptance of specific electoral reforms. Since Museveni now appears unlikely to yield on either count, opposition parties and the government seem destined for another turbulent showdown as elections approach in early 2011.
4. (C) Although the press and civil society have enjoyed relative freedom under the NRM, harassment and intimidation of those critical of the Museveni regime has risen in recent years. Up to a dozen journalists and media outlets were charged with sedition and/or shut down by authorities for allegedly inciting recent riots that left up to 27 dead and more than 100 injured.
5. (C) Ethnic tensions, always present in Uganda in varying degrees, have also sharpened as Museveni and politicians on all sides have cultivated ethnic-based support. Tensions among groups residing along the oil-rich shores of Lake Albert flared in August after Museveni suggested restricting elective offices there to one specific ethnic group. The September riots were sparked in part by Museveni's decision to support a small ethnic group's bid for autonomy within the Buganda Kingdom. The underlying conflict derives from Buganda's persistent attempt for a greater political role, with the ultimate goal of establishing a Bugandan monarchy within the Ugandan state, which Museveni has repeatedly stated he will not allow. The President's view is that
KAMPALA 00001197 002 OF 004
"Kings" are unelected and would lack political accountability. Indeed a semi-autonomous internal state would not only be a political threat to him but could also ultimately threaten Uganda as a unified nation-state. The stalemate over this issue continues, with no resolution in sight.
6. (C) Museveni's heavy-handedness and the corruption of senior leaders have sparked dissent within the NRM. A group of NRM "rebels" consisting of about 15 younger, mostly back-bencher MPs supports opposition demands for an impartial Electoral Commission and is critical of Museveni's unwillingness to hold senior NRM leaders - such as Security Minister Mbabazi, Foreign Minister Kutesa, and Trade Minister Otafiire among others - accountable for corruption allegations. Museveni also faces a challenge from some older party stalwarts - generally the same senior NRM leaders accused of corruption - who fought with him in the "bush war" and want to succeed him as President. Press reports and anecdotal evidence suggest the President is increasingly isolated and unaware of the depth of resentment both within the NRM and among society as a whole.
7. (SBU) Our message: Conducting free, fair and peaceful elections in February 2011 would reinforce Uganda's image as an African success story. Failure in this area could relegate Uganda to the list of unstable African nations, seriously jeopardize its future stability, and make it more difficult for the U.S. to continue as a strong security partner. To hold credible elections, Museveni must address the perceived partisanship of the Electoral Commission and make meaningful electoral reform within the next four months.
8. (C) Even if the President begins now to make good faith efforts to hold free and fair elections, he still may be unable to prevent serious, even stability threatening violence around the 2011 elections. The opposition is privately threatening violence and it is difficult to discern what the President could do now that would satisfy the political desires of so many who have been excluded from politics for so long.
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Other Challenges: Human Rights and Corruption
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9. (SBU) Uganda has made great strides in protecting human rights since the disasters of the 1970s and 1980s, yet the government's recent record is poor, particularly with respect to arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, and lengthy pre-trial detention. One encouraging sign is the eagerness of the Ugandan Human Rights Commission and senior leaders of the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF) and police to divulge, investigate, and prosecute human rights abuses. The UPDF and police have clearly improved their efforts to hold personnel accountable for abuses. However, there remains numerous, credible allegations of unlawful detention and torture by the Joint Ant-Terrorism Taskforce (JATT), the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI), the police's Rapid Response Unit (RRU), and other para-military outfits. These allegations severely undermine progress in other areas. Overall it is clear that neither the law enforcement institutions nor the judiciary are capable of restraining government excesses in either corruption or abuse of human rights.
10. (SBU) Uganda's anti-corruption record is not impressive. In 2007, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) initiated a threshold program to combat corruption. Implemented by USAID, the program worked with the Auditor General, the Inspectorate General of Government, the Public Procurement and Disposal Authority, the Department of Public Prosecutions (DPP), the Department of Criminal Investigations, and the newly created Anti-Corruption Court to improve oversight and increase the number of corruption related prosecutions. Although the program dramatically increased the capacity of Uganda's corruption fighting agencies, MCC canceled it for 2010 due to lack of political will at the highest levels of the government. Impunity at high levels of government continues, diminishing trust in the regime and the public's faith in democracy.
11. (SBU) Our message: While the UPDF and the Police have made progress in professionalizing their forces and in establishing systems to prevent, investigate, and prosecute human rights abuses, the GOU needs to extend this effort to paramilitary organizations that are accused of abuses.
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Continued abuses by these agencies severely damage the credibility and reputation of Uganda's political leadership. On corruption: The President must lead from the top and hold senior leaders accountable when there is credible evidence of corruption. Despite Uganda's economic success, GDP growth could be much higher by reducing corruption.
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Peace and Security Part I: Somalia
----------------------------------
12. (SBU) President Museveni believes a stable Somalia is necessary for peace and stability in East Africa. As head of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 2005-2006, Museveni oversaw the birth of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its institutions, and lived up to his commitment to support it with the initial deployment to Mogadishu of a 1,700-man UPDF Battle Group in March 2007. As the vanguard of an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Battle Group deployed alone, albeit with USG assistance. The UPDF deployed an additional "augmentation" battalion in early 2009 to bring its total peacekeepers on the ground to 2,750, with plans to add a fourth battalion in late 2009.
13. (SBU) According to the UPDF, 45 Ugandan soldiers have died due to roadside bombs, suicide attacks, and non-combat related illness while serving in Somalia. The most recent deaths occurred on September 17 when Al Qaeda-affiliated Al Shabaab extremists successfully attacked the AMISOM HQ building, killing five Ugandans among others. However, the UPDF's and Government of Uganda's commitment to the mission remains unshaken.
14. (SBU) Our message: Uganda's commitment to AMISOM and the professionalism of the UPDF has made Uganda one of our primary partners in the fight against terrorism. We stand shoulder-to-shoulder with AMISOM and will continue to support the UPDF's deployment in Mogadishu. We encourage the GOU to deploy its augmentation battalion shortly and wish to discuss specifically how we can support and equip this and future deployments.
--------------------------------------------
Peace and Security Part II: LRA and Karamoja
--------------------------------------------
15. (SBU) Uganda's long-term stability is linked to the resolution of the 22-year-old LRA insurgency, finding viable solutions to other regional conflicts, and preventing the spread of extremism. In December 2008, a joint military operation code named Operation Lightning Thunder destroyed the LRA base camp in Garamba Park in the DRC and scattered the LRA across the DRC, Sudan, and CAR. It failed in capturing or killing LRA leaders, including Joseph Kony, although UPDF follow-up has eliminated most of the LRA's fighting capacity. While LRA elements still attack civilian populations and raid supplies in the tri-border area between DRC, CAR, and Sudan, the LRA and Kony are under severe pressure and greatly weakened.
16. (SBU) Northern Uganda has been at peace for three years and continues to recover and rebuild from the LRA's abduction of over 40,000 children and displacement of an estimated 1.8 million people in the Acholi, Lango, Teso, and West-Nile sub-regions. Improved security in the north, the GOU's pursuit of a formal peace agreement, and government's national Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) have led to an estimated 80 percent of internally-displaced persons (IDPs) to return or move closer to their homes. The return of IDPs highlights the need to support programs that provide for reconciliation, social and economic development, and security.
17. (SBU) Karamoja is Uganda's most insecure region due to conflicts between local nomadic groups with a history of cattle-rustling. Conflict is also fueled by an influx of small arms, largely from southern Sudan and Kenya. At its peak, conflict in the region displaced an estimated 125,000 Karamojong people. The Government increased its military presence in Karamoja, engaged local leaders, and in 2008 launched the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Plan (KIDDP) to promote security and recovery. These actions have improved security. Nonetheless, large areas of Karamoja are under-policed and violence resulting for cattle raids persists.
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18. (SBU) Our message: We commend the GOU's efforts to bring about a resolution to the 22-year old conflict with the LRA, and will continue to support GOU efforts to defeat the LRA and rebuild northern Uganda. The U.S. supports the PRDP and in 2008 provided $163 million in assistance to the north. We are providing a similar amount this year. We strongly encourage the GOU to make good on its pledge to fund the PRDP and to take the lead in developing northern Uganda. We encourage Uganda to continue talking with its neighbors, particularly the DRC and southern Sudan, to resolve regional security problems.
------------------------------
HIV/AIDS and Population Growth
------------------------------
19. (U) The long war against the HIV/AIDS epidemic is at a crossroads. Under Museveni's leadership, Uganda was a pioneer in recognizing and taking action against HIV/AIDS in the 1990s. Prevalence rates plunged from nearly 20 percent then to under seven percent today. But incidence is rising again in the context of a rapidly expanding population and complacency from both the GOU and the population at large. Much of Uganda's success since 2004 is the success of PEPFAR, which began to ramp up that year. But Ugandan complacency is also partly a legacy of PEPFAR, which, by scaling up so rapidly and often bypassing GOU entities, created donor dependence and diminished incentives for GOU leadership, which had existed pre-PEPFAR.
20. (SBU) Population trends in Uganda are a demographic time bomb that will destroy the country's economic and social gains. Few countries in the world are growing as fast as Uganda. At current trends, Uganda's population will double (from 30 to 60 million) in 20 years and reach 130 million by 2050. If unabated, this surge in population will stress the natural environment and exceed the government's ability to provide basic health and education services, resulting in chronic and extreme political instability and social unrest As PEPFAR policy transitions from care and use of anti-retrovirals to focusing on prevention, government leadership will be even more important.
21. (SBU) Our message: We recognize and commend President Museveni's previous commitment to combating the spread of HIV/AIDS. However, infection rates are once again rising. Uganda urgently needs to renew its effort to fight HIV/AIDS and simultaneously address the nation's runaway population growth.
------------------------------
Economic Opportunities and Oil
------------------------------
22. (SBU) President Museveni is dedicated to an enlarged East African Community, to liberalizing the Ugandan economy, to containing inflation, and to promoting economic growth and foreign investment. Foreign debt has dropped from over $6 billion in 2004 to less than $1 billion through debt relief programs and prudent borrowing habits. The pace of economic growth has remained consistent over the last 21 years with annual GDP growth rates between five and eight percent. Museveni's commitment to the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) is unwavering. Unreliable power, inadequate transport infrastructure, and corruption, however, need immediate attention, as they seriously limit economic development and investor confidence in Uganda.
23. (SBU) In October 2006, Canadian firm Heritage Oil announced the first oil discovery on the shores of Lake Albert. The British firm Tullow Oil, has made major discoveries both around and under Lake Albert, and has plans to begin producing and exporting crude oil by mid-2010. Libya's TamOil is the primary investor in a proposed pipeline from Uganda to Kenya to import fuel, and possibly export crude. Chinese firms are also interested in expanding investments in Uganda's oil. The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) is funding a feasibility study for a refinery in Uganda. Exxon/Mobile is considering a visit to Uganda later this year.
24. (SBU) Our message: Uganda's oil resources could and should be a boon for economic development and make the country less dependent on foreign assistance. We wish to support transparent management and prudent investment of oil wealth in the years ahead. LANIER
Friday, 11 May 2007, 13:32
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 001712
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/S
EO 12958 DECL: 05/09/2017
TAGS PGOV, PINR, SF
SUBJECT: LIMPOPO PROVINCE SPLIT OVER ZUMA AND MBEKI
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Donald Teitelbaum. Reasons 1.4( b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY. PolOff and PolAsst's trip to Limpopo Province on 24 April confirmed press reports that Zuma's camp has made inroads in gaining provincial support for Zuma as ANC President, but the province remains split and difficult to call. As expected, Zuma's supporters were fervent but short on substance, never making a case for what Zuma would bring to the party as ANC President. Instead, they emphasized that the ANC as an institution is greater than the sum of its members, dismissing the importance of leadership in the process. END SUMMARY.
----------------------------------
A LITTLE TASTE OF WHAT WAS TO COME
----------------------------------
2. (C) PolOff and PolAsst traveled to Limpopo Province on 24 April to gauge support for the upcoming ANC presidential election. Though several officials agreed to meet, some refused. Joshua Matlou, ANC Youth League (ANCYL) Provincial Chairperson, told PolAsst that "it would be useless for both of us since I would only talk about things that are in the newspaper." Matlou added that ANC members do not trust American diplomats because "they have seen what the U.S. government does to elections in other countries when they do not like the locally preferred candidate." Matlou believes this attitude cuts across the spectrum of ANC members. (NOTE: With almost 53,000 ANC members, Limpopo is the ANC,s fourth-largest province after Eastern Cape, Gauteng, and KwaZulu-Natal. At the 2002 national conference, it fielded 324 candidates, almost twice those of the smallest province, the Northern Cape, but half that of the largest, Eastern Cape. Limpopo will host the December 2007 ANC conference where the next ANC President will be chosen. END NOTE)
-------------------------------
ANC LARGER THAN LIFE, LITERALLY
-------------------------------
3. (C) ANC Provincial Secretary Cassel Mathale refused to be drawn into a conversation about who he supports for ANC President, even though he is widely reported to be pro-Zuma. Instead, Mathale, who was polite, persistent, and yet unpersuasive, argued that the ANC as a party is so strong that it does not matter who becomes President. He added that the ANC would soon be finishing what it started in 1994 -- building strong institutions so that no one person would have too much power. (COMMENT: This is likely a reference to next month's ANC policy conference which will debate transferring some powers from the ANC President to the ANC Secretary General (septel). END COMMENT)
4. (C) Rosina Semenya, Provincial Minister for Public Works and the ANC Women's League's (ANCWL) Provincial Chairperson, echoed Mathale's comments that the ANC as a party, institution, and culture is more important than any individual leader. When asked how the ANCWL and ANCYL work together at the provincial level given the ANCYL's outspoken support of Zuma, Semenya surprisingly asked what was wrong with Zuma. She added that "people should be willing to overlook certain qualities if someone was brought up in ANC culture and tradition. That is what is most important." To maintain and enrich this tradition, she told us the ANC is creating a policy institute to inculcate its members in ANC policies and that former controversial Limpopo Premier Ngoako Ramathlodi, who fell out of favor with Mbeki last year, is in charge of the project. XXXXXXXXXXXX END NOTE)
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YOUTH LEAGUE: YOUR WORST BEST FRIEND
------------------------------------
5. (C) ANCYL Provincial Secretary Julius Malema, who was frank and friendly, started the conversation with stories of his "young pioneer" days when the ANC taught him how to use a gun 17 years ago, at the tender age of 9. He then boasted that Limpopo's ANCYL has more members than any other province and is "100 percent united" in its support of Zuma. Malema never explained why he or the league supports Zuma, but did
PRETORIA 00001712 002 OF 002
admit that Zuma would likely not have been picked up by the ANCYL "if Mbeki hadn't gone after him." Malema stated matter of factly that Zuma is "a victim of a conspiracy similar to what would happen in American politics." When PolOff politely challenged him about his analogy, he backed off and said, "Well, that's how it's portrayed in movies." When asked what triggered the loss of Mbeki's support from the ANCYL, he replied that "Mbeki thinks he's too clever for all of us and he won't engage with us." In a subsequent aside, Malema admitted that ANCYL President Fikile Mbalula did not want to support Zuma during the rape trial but that the regional leadership insisted, arguing that if the YL defended Zuma on corruption charges, they could defend him on rape charges since both acts are immoral. He also hinted that Fikile was told his position depended on his support of Zuma.
6. (C) PolOff was shut down every time she tried to turn the discussion to other potential candidates. When asked about the possibility of a female successor, Malema dismissed the idea, saying South Africa needs a "man who is ahead on issues, but who can walk with the masses." He also dismissed Tokyo Sexwale saying he had his chance. When asked if Tokyo's involvement in big business soured the ANCYL, he said that he is not against the rich, just capitalists, but that Sexwale is not a capitalist "because he only owns shares of companies, not actual means of production." (COMMENT: Malema wore a sweatshirt with NIKE emblazoned on it and also complained about the bank's right to repossess his Audi if he does not make payments. END COMMENT) When asked what the league plans on doing if Zuma goes to jail, he said they would accept the decision and throw their support behind ANC Secretary General Kgalema Motlanthe. However, he added that
SIPDIS though "Motlanthe is brilliant, you can't understand anything he says."
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LIMPOPO UNLIKELY TO LAY CARDS DOWN SOON
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7. (C) Mathale told us that Limpopo will hold its provincial conference to declare its candidate for ANC President in late November or early December, but admitted that the province will know long before the conference where the regions stand. In fact, soon after the June policy conference, the ANC will send out a communiqu urging regions to start sending in their preferred names and delegates. Semenya also said that Limpopo's ANCWL has not yet set a date for its provincial conference, but will wait until after June's policy conference as to not "distract from ANC policymaking."
8. (C) Malema could not say when Limpopo would hold its regional conference, but did mention that the national ANCYL would not be holding a conference at all this year (in violation of its constitutional requirement to do so every three years), having already decided to support Zuma. Malema justified the position by echoing Fikile's statements that the league "already has leaders in place who can influence the outcome and that they want to keep it that way." When asked how this strategy differs from the ANC's Eastern Cape youth league, which was "officially" disbanded in part because they had not held their regional conference in time, Malema said with a straight face that Eastern Cape postponed for a year, while the national level is only postponing six months. (COMMENT: Eastern Cape's ANCYL branch was disbanded unofficially because of its support of Eastern Cape's call for a third term for Mbeki. END COMMENT)
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COMMENT
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9. (C) Despite the fact that most of those free (or willing) to talk with us were pro-Zuma, we should not overestimate his supporters' bark nor discount the pro-Mbeki camp within the province. The ANCWL and ANCYL will have approximately 53 votes each for the entire country in December, likely a third to a quarter of Limpopo's vote as a province. Moreover, heavyweights like Limpopo's Premier Sello Moloto, ANC Regional Secretary David Magabe, and ANC Regional Chairperson Dickson Masemola are pro-Mbeki, having publicly declared their continuing support to the current elected leadership. Bost
Friday, 24 July 2009, 16:08
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 001707
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/23/2019
TAGS KNNP, PGOV, PREL, MARR, MOPS, UK, PARM, MNUC, MCAP
SUBJECT: (SBU) DOUBTS -- AND REASSURANCES -- ABOUT
REPLACING BRITAIN'S TRIDENT NUCLEAR DETERRENT
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b and d)
1. (C) Summary. The Prime Minister's office released a statement July 17 affirming that "there has been no change in the Government's position on Trident. The policy remains as set out in the 2006 White Paper, and there has been no change to the timetable." This statement was a reaction to media reports that HMG planned to defer the decision, scheduled for September 2009, to commission design plans for four new submarines to replace Britain's existing Vanguard fleet, the submarine platform for Britain's Trident nuclear deterrent. Recent polling indicates that a majority of British voters oppose replacing the Trident system. Although HMG and Conservative Party leaders support replacing Britain's Trident nuclear deterrent, the challenge for the next government will not be whether or not to replace the UK's Trident nuclear weapons system -- but how to do so in light of severe fiscal constraints. End Summary.
To Replace or Not to Replace
----------------------------
2. (SBU/NF) British media reported July 17 that HMG had decided to defer the decision scheduled for September 2009 to commission design plans for four new submarines to replace Britain's existing Vanguard fleet, the submarine platform for Britain's Trident nuclear deterrent. Media cited an unnamed British official as stating July 16 that no new money would be spent, nor would decisions be made regarding Trident renewal, until after the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, which will conclude in May 2010. Press reports quoted the official as stating that "because of the review conference...we will delay decisions that involve spending significant sums of money until 2010." Media analysts noted that this timeline effectively meant that no decision would be made on Trident renewal until after the next British general election, which must occur no later than June 3, 2010. The official reportedly said that "all our deterrent is now up for grabs but in the context of a multilateral negotiation," since the goals of a nuclear free world should be seen as an "aspiration." (Note: The UK Trident system consists of 160 operational nuclear warheads carried by Trident II (D5) ballistic missiles aboard four Vanguard-class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines. The warheads and submarines are British built, but with substantial American design assistance. End Note.)
3. (SBU) Shortly after the press reports surfaced, the Prime Minister's Office issued a clarification as follows: "There has been no change in the Government's position on Trident. The policy remains as set out in the 2006 White Paper, and there has been no change to the timetable." A Ministry of Defence spokesperson also insisted that Britain's policy was unchanged. Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg attacked government "chaos and confusion" over renewing Trident. Clegg called on PM Brown to "climb down" and admit that the missile system was not justified given equipment shortages for British troops serving in Afghanistan.
4. (C/NF) Judith Gough (protect), Deputy Head of the Security Policy Group at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) told Poloff July 21 that the unnamed official who had briefed the press was Simon McDonald, the Cabinet Office Head of Foreign and Defence Policy. She said that press reports about HMG plans to defer Trident replacement design work "came as news" to FCO and MOD officers charged with following Trident. She noted the PM's office's clarification and stressed that HMG remained committed to Trident and "there has been no change to the timetable." Notwithstanding the clarification, Gough added that there might still be a decision to "push aside" tough fiscal decisions, such as Trident, until next year -- and even after the general election. (Note: The estimated cost of Trident over the next decade is 20 billion pounds. End Note.) Diana Venn (protect), an officer in the Cabinet Office's Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat, told Poloff July 23 that there had been a "slight misunderstanding" when McDonald briefed the press. She stressed that "Trident is not on the table...we won't disarm unilaterally."
Weak Public Support
-------------------
5. (SBU) According to an ICM poll published in the center-left "The Guardian" newspaper July 13, 54 percent of British voters would "prefer to abandon nuclear weapons rather than put money into a new generation of Trident warheads." The poll found that 42 percent back renewal. However, another recent ICM poll showed that a majority of respondents wanted to extend the life of the existing system rather than spend money to replace it. In a July 2006 poll, 51 percent of respondents backed renewal, while 39 percent opposed it.
Comment
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6. (C/NF) Senior MOD officials have privately reassured us that HMG remains committed to the Trident program -- and we deem it highly improbable that PM Brown will want to be remembered as the Prime Minister who abandoned Britain's independent nuclear deterrent. Indeed, it was a Labour government (under Tony Blair) that in December 2006 issued a White Paper formally opening the process to replace the UK's Trident nuclear weapons system and thereby enable the UK to retain nuclear weapons well into the middle of the century. The Conservative Party's leadership is committed to Trident, a point that Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague made in an April interview when he pledged his party to upgrading the Trident deterrent. The challenge for the next government will not be whether to renew Trident -- but how to do so in the context of severe fiscal constraints. Indeed, in a major foreign policy speech earlier this month, Hague acknowledged that "extreme pressures on our own defence budget obviously necessitate a strategic defence review, which an incoming Conservative government will certainly undertake." End Comment.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
LeBaron
Friday, 31 July 2009, 06:59
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001039
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/30/2019
TAGS PARM, PREL, MNUC, IR, CH, UK, FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE'S POSITION ON NUCLEAR ISSUES IN THE RUN-UP
TO THE NPT REVCON
REF: A. PARIS POINTS JULY 15 B. PARIS POINTS JULY 6 C. PARIS POINTS APRIL 10 D. PARIS 1025
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathy Allegrone for Reasons 1.4(b), (d).
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: French officials have made clear that nuclear issues enjoy the sustained attention of President Sarkozy and have become a major foreign policy priority, especially in the run-up to the spring 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). France's concerns go beyond the conference, however, to include larger issues of the link between disarmament and deterrence, as well as non-proliferation. In various meetings, French officials have noted repeatedly what they see as worrying trends in both U.S. and UK disarmament policy pronouncements. Based on the calculation that they cannot fight a winning battle against or without us, and alongside a public strategy of positioning themselves as leaders on disarmament, the French are at great pains to coordinate with the United States to assuage their own concerns and present a united front to others on these issues. The seriousness with which the GOF takes these issues means that France can be a valuable partner to the United States on nuclear issues if we can calm their fears over our position on disarmament while making clear our policy goals and redlines. END SUMMARY.
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PUBLICLY PROCLAIMING LEADERSHIP ON DISARMAMENT
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2. (S/NF) France kicked off its reaction to President Obama's nuclear policies immediately following his April 5 remarks in Prague with a public campaign to highlight France's efforts toward disarmament, comparing their achievements favorably to the objectives outlined by the U.S. President. On April 9, centrist daily Le Figaro - which tends to reflect official positions - published an anonymous report from the Elysee saying President Obama's statement largely recalled positions long-held by France (ref C). To further highlight French leadership, the same paper reported just prior to President Obama's visit to Moscow that France had opened up the dismantled Pierrelatte fissile material production site to a group of journalists (ref B) as proof of France's commitment to stopping the production of fissile materials ahead of FMCT negotiations.
3. (C/NF) The French MFA also produced statements on July 7 and 10 - immediately following President Obama's Moscow trip - trumpeting France's steps towards disarmament and claiming a unique leadership role among nuclear powers. The statements cited France's reduction of its nuclear warheads to 300, dismantling of fissile material production sites, and a moratorium on fissile material production, while welcoming U.S.-Russian negotiations to reduce nuclear arsenals "which represent 95% of the global stockpiles."
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EAGER FOR ENERGETIC ENGAGEMENT
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4. (S/NF) This flurry of publicity was followed up in July by a series of high-level, interagency engagements by the GOF on nuclear issues with the Embassy and with key officials from Washington. Political Director Gerard Araud has vowed that France is ready to coordinate with the United States on these issues "every day if necessary" (Note: Araud is headed to New York in late August to take up his new position as PermRep. End Note.). Jacques Audibert, currently A/S-equivalent for Strategic Affairs and Araud's replacement as Political Director, has told us he expects to spend "most of his time" in 2009 on non-proliferation and disarmament issues. He called for continued engagement and early coordination, hoping to meet again on the sidelines of an expected P5 confidence-building meeting in London in September. Elysee Military Advisor Edouard Guillaud added France was eager to support U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, for example by sending French experts to the U.S. and by providing briefings to Codels in Paris.
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FRENCH WORRIES
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5. (S/NF) In large part, France's desire to work ever more closely with the United States on nuclear issues reflects new concerns with U.S. policy, based on analysis of recent statements by President Obama, specifically his comments that: "The notion that prestige comes from holding these weapons, or that we can protect ourselves by picking and choosing which nations can have these weapons, is an illusion," (Moscow) and "No single nation should pick and chose which nations hold nuclear weapons. That is why I strongly reaffirmed America's commitment to seek a world in which no nations hold nuclear weapons" (Cairo). The French read this as counter to the spirit of the NPT, in which this discrimination is inherent. Although U.S. interlocutors have pointed out that these speeches were intended to strengthen NPT principles, Araud and Ministry of Defense U/S-equivalent for Strategic Affairs Michel Miraillet said they fear non-aligned nations and NPT violators can easily interpret these remarks to their advantage. Miraillet even asked for advance warning of any speeches about nuclear issues that might contain "surprises." Several of our French interlocutors have expressed concerns that these statements focus more on disarmament than on non-proliferation. Araud, Audibert, and MFA DAS-equivalent for Disarmament and Nonproliferation Martin Briens said that in touting U.S.-Russian negotiations and elaborating a long-term vision of total disarmament in the President's speeches, the U.S. will make it easier for non-aligned nations to focus at the 2010 RevCon on actual progress on disarmament and avoid discussions of non-proliferation.
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IRAN
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6. (S/NF) The GOF has expressed its dismay at the U.S. decision to not mention Iran by name and make reference to its need to adhere to the Additional Protocol at the PrepCon. The French have indicated that the NPT's most urgent mission is to curb the Iranian potential to develop nuclear weapons. In order to address Iran head-on, Briens has emphasized that partners will have to abandon fears that they might disturb an atmosphere conducive to larger engagement of Iran. France has also welcomed U.S. assurances that we do not support nuclear capabilities for Saudi Arabia or Egypt, which they said would be tantamount to accepting a nuclear armed Iran. The French focus on Iran at the NPT comes in the context of a general French preference for strong rhetoric and strong action on Iran, based on the apparently broad GOF consensus that a nuclear Iran presents an unacceptable danger to French interests. While numerous French officials have highlighted their efforts to encourage strengthening sanctions against Iran with EU and UN partners, they have little optimism that these efforts will bear fruit. They are now concentrating on close cooperation with the United States and individual bilateral measures by individual partners to help increase pressure on the Iranian regime.
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FMCT
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7. (S/NF) France is currently reviewing its policy on an FMCT, a process the GOF expects to complete by the end of September. France has stopped its own production of fissile materials, and is in favor of a multilateral FMCT, which they view as a key measure to cap stockpiles in China, India, Israel, and Brazil by addressing the issue of future production in a legal regime. However, Briens has made clear that any effort to address the issue of existing stocks within the agreement is a French redline. Noting France's transparency in admitting its total number of weapons, Briens said limiting its small stocks of fissile materials would undercut the credibility of France's long-term deterrent. While France is willing to discuss transparency on stockpiles within the P5, French officials have repeatedly said they will not accept tabling this issue in Geneva. As France proceeds with its policy review, French officials have expressed interest in U.S. views on verification and sanctions for non-compliance.
8. (S/NF) In the context of an FMCT, French officials have repeatedly mentioned China's expected opposition to real progress, regretting that, unlike France or the United States, the Chinese are not publicly challenged on their lack of action. As part of an effort to encourage movement by the Chinese, the MFA Disarmament and Non-proliferation section's Celine Jurgensen told us that France intends to call for a
PARIS 00001039 003 OF 004
universal moratorium on fissile material production as FMCT negotiations proceed (ref D). Noting potential progress in Geneva on starting these negotiations, Jurgensen said France intends to move as soon as possible, potentially making its plea for a moratorium at UN First Committee discussions this autumn.
------------------------------------------
AN OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE U.S. RHETORIC?
------------------------------------------
9. (S/NF) As the GOF's focus on President Obama's speeches shows, French concerns currently focus on U.S. rhetoric and they hope to shape our views in their favor during the current U.S. policy reviews underway. As Briens told us, France is worried that non-aligned countries will try and use the RevCon as a referendum on P5 progress on disarmament to forestall calls to fulfill non-proliferation obligations or take on new ones, such as the Additional Protocol. Even if the U.S. is fully committed to disarmament, the results will be long term, allowing non-aligned countries to cite a lack of progress by the time of the RevCon as a sign of P5 hypocrisy.
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FRANCE'S UNTOUCHABLE REDLINE: DELEGITIMIZING DETERRENCE
--------------------------------------------- ----------
10. (S/NF) However, France's concerns about U.S. rhetoric go beyond RevCon tactics and to the heart of French nuclear theology. Araud said that any statements that are seen to delegitimize the idea of a nuclear deterrent capacity directly threaten French strategic interests, which are fundamentally and "psychologically" bound to France's deterrent. France's policy of nuclear deterrence is supported by parties across the political spectrum and has become an essential part of French strategic identity. In the negotiations preceding France's return to NATO's integrated military command, President Sarkozy made clear that an independent French nuclear policy was an "untouchable" redline. And in a notable departure from the official refrain that France looks forward to cooperating with the United States, Araud explicitly threatened that France would "stonewall" if it felt its sensitivities were being ignored. In this context, French officials are especially keen for details on how the United States plans to "hedge" by maintaining a deterrent in addition to our disarmament efforts and how U.S. disarmament goals can accommodate build ups by China and possibly Iran.
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FRANCE WORRIED ABOUT THE UK
---------------------------
11. (S/NF) France's concerns over evolving U.S. nuclear policy come in the context of similar, but even greater, concerns with the UK. Audibert told us July 10 that the July 6 France-UK defense summit was difficult across a range of issues, but specifically cited British support for eliminating nuclear arsenals (ref A) as a major area of divergence. Araud and the Elysee's Guillaud fear British nuclear policy is being guided for the moment by Labour Party "demagogues" for domestic political consumption. Briens added that Gordon Brown seems to have decided disarmament will be his legacy, and the UK has moved from talking about disarmament as a political sop to gain parliamentary support for renewing its Trident force, to embracing disarmament as an end in itself. According to Briens, in some fora, the UK has shown willingness to accept clauses calling for a "ban on nuclear weapons." Critically, UK rhetoric suggests that nuclear weapons are inherently bad, thus implying that maintaining a deterrent force is immoral. For France "nuclear weapons are not bad or good, they just are." Thus, France continues to oppose the phrase "a world free of nuclear weapons," which in Araud's view implies a moral judgment. However, France can accept "a world without nuclear weapons," which the GOF thinks is more neutral.
12. (S/NF) UK Political Officer Ben Fender told us on July 21 that the French have been very vocal in their concern about UK disarmament policy, particularly following a March 17 speech by PM Gordon Brown suggesting the UK was ready for further reductions to its nuclear arsenal. While admitting that Brown cut his political teeth in a 1980s Labour Party supportive of unilateral disarmament, Fender has been at pains to convince the GOF that in the context of the RevCon,
PARIS 00001039 004 OF 004
the UK and France actually have very little to argue about. Britain also wants a balanced focus on all three pillars, and agrees on the need to work with the P3 to reach out to non-aligned countries and discourage spoilers. According to Fender, the short term France/UK disagreement is essentially one of rhetoric: France feels talk of disarmament ultimately weakens the P3 diplomatically, while the UK feels that a publicly pro-disarmament stance gives the P3 diplomatic leverage to shift the discussion to non-proliferation by arguing that the nuclear states are doing their part.
13. (S/NF) Fender added that, in the UK's view, while any moves seen to threaten the legitimacy of France's deterrent will remain a redline, there are other issues that "France will make noise on, but ultimately come along." In the latter category, Fender mentioned specifically transparency measures in an FMCT. The danger, in his view, is that France will feel that its deterrence redline is not being respected by allies and retreat to its box, blocking progress on other issues. Serious engagement by both the United States and the UK will be necessary to reassure the French and prevent this scenario.
14. (S/NF) COMMENT: The GOF is anxious for P3 unity and close cooperation with the United States in rolling out disarmament and non-proliferation goals in the coming year. Therefore, France is nervous that the U.S. position on disarmament is moving further away from their own and that we are more accommodating to the concerns of non-aligned nations over existing stockpiles. The GOF's proactive engagement of U.S. officials suggests a strategy of attempting to influence U.S. policy as it is being elaborated in order to protect, in their view, the diplomatic viability of their own deterrent capacity. The potential pitfalls with these concerns will be if the GOF continues to feel the United States is "delegitimizing" their nuclear deterrent, thus precipitating classic French obstructionism (as threatened by Araud and feared by the British) that could turn a valuable partner on non-proliferation into an institutional "non." Continued communication between Washington officials and their French counterparts will help tamp down misunderstandings of our position before they escalate, while displaying at the same time a commitment to cooperating with the GOF on this policy priority. In this context, the recent visits by Ambassador Susan Burk, Special Advisor Robert Einhorn, and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Dr. James Miller were greatly appreciated by our French interlocutors.
As next steps, post suggests the following for the Department's consideration:
- Maintaining regular senior-level engagement with the GOF on nuclear issues in Paris, Washington, Geneva, New York, and elsewhere, ensuring direct and clear lines of communication and clarifying our position and our redlines;
- Reiterating to the French that our positions regarding the RevCon are largely in synch;
- Continuing active discussions at both technical and political levels of those topics where disagreements may remain but where we might find common ground, such as the nature of an FMCT or how to deal with Iran at the RevCon;
- Using this engagement as an opportunity to look for early warning signs that French suspicions regarding our position on disarmament may be leading to obstructionist behavior that could halt progress on areas where agreement would otherwise be possible. END COMMENT. PEKALA
Thursday, 06 August 2009, 18:19
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 082013
SIPDIS
USUN FOR POL
GENEVA FOR CD DEL
EO 12958 DECL: 08/05/2019
TAGS AORC, CDG, ENRG, FR, KNNP, MNUC, PARM, PGOV, PREL, UK, UNGA,
IAEA, NPT, GM
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) BILATERALS
WITH UK, FRANCE, AND GERMANY
Classified By: Amb. Marguerita Ragsdale. 1.5 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Susan Burk, Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation met with key Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) interlocutors in London, Paris, and Berlin from July 14 ) 17. The meetings demonstrated that we have very few differences with these governments on the main objectives for the Treaty and the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon). The UK and France are quite eager to take strong leadership roles and work closely with us, including on disarmament issues, and to engage with a wide range of NPT Parties to ensure a successful RevCon. Burk agreed with UK and French officials on the importance of coordination among the P-5 on NPT issues. The UK and France agreed that we should be ambitious in pursuing our objectives for the RevCon. They differ in one key area, however, with the UK eager to promote its aggressive disarmament posture and France defensive about disarmament and concerned that US/Russian initiatives and UK unilateral measures will lead to increasing pressures on France to engage on nuclear disarmament. This different perspective is causing considerable unease between the two. 2. (C) German officials were more cautious about goals for the RevCon, possibly because their evident sensitivity to the views of Non-Aligned Movement states leads them to focus on the gulf between those states and the West. All three governments with whom we met see Iran as perhaps the biggest problem for the NPT, and believe that high-level intervention with Egypt will be necessary to resolve the Middle East issue at the RevCon. Burk was asked at every stop about the relationship of the U.S.-proposed nuclear security summit to the RevCon; she described the events as related and complementary, rather than linked. 3. (U) In London and Paris, Burk was joined by ISN/MNSA Deputy Director Scott Davis, OSD's Amy Prible, and Adam Scheinman, Director of Nonproliferation, National Security Council. Davis and Prible also attended the Berlin meetings. End Summary UNITED KINGDOM
4. (C) Amb. Burk said the U.S. wanted to see the RevCon reaffirm Parties' support for the Treaty and indicated that specific U.S. objectives for the Conference include enforcing Treaty compliance, strengthening IAEA safeguards, dissuading NPT Parties from abusing the Treaty's withdrawal provision, ensuring that the growth in nuclear energy does not increase proliferation risks, and endorsing President Obama's disarmament agenda while being realistic about the pace of disarmament. She indicated that the United States stands by the agreements reached at the 1995 and 2000 RevCons but ten years will have elapsed since the last positive RevCon and the parties needed to look forward. She pointed out that the upcoming Conference is an important international event, but is not an end in itself. The U.S. sought a constructive review of the Treaty that would impart valuable momentum to other efforts to strengthen the regime.
5. (C) UK Director of Defence and Strategic Threats Simon Manley replied that the UK agrees that the RevCon is only a step in a process but that the NPT has become a major political issue in his country. He said that the third PrepCom was better than expected - "almost Nirvana" - but that there was a lack of coherence among the P-5 that "did us no favors." Manley and his UK colleagues frequently praised President Obama's leadership on nonproliferation and disarmament. Manley noted the "positive vibes" resulting from U.S. initiatives on FMCT and CTBT, but added that China and France are uncomfortable about recent developments on disarmament. He and Burk agreed that our governments need to continue to work hard to explain how much we have done to reduce our numbers of and reliance on nuclear weapons.
6. (C) Manley suggested that recent developments have put the NAM "off balance" on disarmament but that the nuclear-weapon states need to discuss how to handle the "13 practical steps" to disarmament from the 2000 RevCon Final Document. He added that Mariot Leslie (FCO Director General for Defence and Intelligence) is keen on P-5 cooperation and the need for a positive message on NPT matters. Both sides agreed that intensive P-3 and P-5 engagement is needed to prepare for the RevCon, noting the value of P-5 consensus and the desire not to let Russia and China keep us from taking
STATE 00082013 002 OF 005
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) BILATERALS WITH UK, FRANCE, AND GERMA credit for our disarmament initiatives. As Burk put it, we should not "pull our punches" for the sake of P-5 consensus. Manley expressed UK concerns about French attitudes, suggesting Paris has not "come through the thought process" on eliminating nuclear weapons and worries about proposals for multilateral disarmament.
7. (C) Manley and Nick Lowe (Head, Nuclear Issues Section, FCO Counter-Proliferation Department) agreed with the U.S. focus on addressing non-compliance and withdrawal. Lowe said that we should not allow the Iran and North Korea issues to damage the RevCon but also should not "let them off the hook." Burk pointed out that third PrepCom Chairman Boniface Chidyausiku had praised the United States for handling Iran and North Korea in a "generic" fashion at the PrepCom, rather than frequently criticizing these countries by name. When Burk mentioned concerns about Syrian nuclear activities, Liane Saunders (Head, Counter-Proliferation Department, FCO) pointed out that the recent G-8 summit statement on nonproliferation omitted reference to the subject because Russia insisted that any such reference also mention Israel's strike on a Syrian facility in 2007.
8. (C) Burk expressed concern about the NAM argument that Western states are trying to change the Treaty by arguing for universal adherence to the Additional Protocol and said we needed to make clear we are seeking to strengthen the regime, not amend the Treaty. She took the opportunity to suggest that IAEA member states need to provide the Agency the resources it needs to carry out its mission and noted USG support for a meaningful increase in the Agency's regular budget. Peter Carter (Head, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Department of Energy, and Judith Gough (Deputy Head, Security Policy Group, FCO) replied that the IAEA needs to make the "business case" for how it will use such resources.
9. (C) Carter said that efforts on multilateral fuel cycle arrangements need to get beyond have/have not tensions. Manley added that mistrust is high and that the March conference on nuclear energy, held in London, reflected that this problem has gotten worse. Lowe pointed out that none of the relevant proposals ask consumer states to give up their rights to peaceful uses. Burk suggested that we should be able to make this a positive debate by explaining how the NPT and a strong and reliable nonproliferation regime facilitate the sharing of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including for power.
10. (C) Both sides acknowledged how difficult the Middle East aspect of the NPT is, with Burk saying that it needs to be considered in the context of the broader matter of regional security. Manley expressed concern about Egypt's efforts to create momentum for major demands on the issue. Saunders noted Russian proposals for handling the Middle East, including a major conference and an NPT "envoy" to the region, suggesting that Russia is seeking to "flush Egypt out" on the issue.
11. (C) Turning to NPT diplomacy and process, Jon Noble (Head, Counter-Proliferation and Security Cooperation, MOD) suggested that modifying the RevCon rules to allow decisions by majority instead of the current practice requiring consensus would allow Parties to adopt more meaningful statements. Burk replied that a majority rule is a "two-edged sword," since votes on important matters could be passed in spite of our disagreement. She added that other approaches that could be used at the RevCon included those used in 1985, when a final document was adopted that summed up some opposing views (i.e., "some believe/others believe"), and the issuing of IAEA information circulars reflecting agreed RevCon Main Committee language. Discussion then turned to coordinating on respective efforts to influence NAM Parties, which Manley termed "mapping." Part of the challenge is to demonstrate to such Parties how the Treaty has benefited them.
12. (C) Later Burk met with FCO Minister of State Ivan Lewis, who reiterated UK NPT priorities, alluded to UK-French differences on disarmament, and asked about the connection between the U.S.-proposed summit on nuclear security and the NPT RevCon. On the latter Burk replied that they two are complementary but separate events.
FRANCE
13. (C) Gerard Araud (MFA Political Director) opened the session and stayed for 45 minutes of the nearly half-day of meetings. He began by noting that he was "nervous" about the
STATE 00082013 003 OF 005
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) BILATERALS WITH UK, FRANCE, AND GERMA evolution of U.S. nuclear policy and offered what he called a "psychological analysis" of France's perspective on its nuclear capability. He asserted that nuclear deterrence is part of his country's "international identity" and that France does not want nuclear weapons to be de-legitimized, as some NPT Parties would like to do. He said that President Obama has set out the prospect of elimination of such weapons but that we need to control the unreasonable expectations of other countries, including Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the European Union in general. And China hides behind the efforts of the other P-5 states to avoid pressure for limits on its own nuclear arsenal.
14. (C) For France's part, Araud said that President Sarkozy's March 2008 nuclear policy speech contained concrete proposals on disarmament. Citing a statement in the President's Cairo speech - "no nation should pick and choose which nation holds nuclear weapons" - Araud asked the United States to warn France if we intend to change our rhetoric further. He also argued that the nonproliferation and peaceful uses pillars of the NPT are more important than disarmament.
15. (C) Burk replied that the United States has no illusions that disarmament will be easy or rapid, particularly if other states are building up nuclear arsenals. She said that President Obama is seeking to reinvigorate the NPT and the regime in general. It is the U.S. hope that progress on disarmament will serve as leverage for a stronger commitment to nonproliferation by non-nuclear-weapon states, but U.S. flexibility in this area obviously has its limits. Burk also said the U.S. wants to pursue a bold set of objectives at the RevCon, which she described in terms similar to those she used in London.
16. (C) Jacques Audibert (MFA Director for Strategic Affairs, Security, and Disarmament) assured Burk that he is "not nervous" but, referring to UK policy changes, believes the P-5 is imbalanced regarding views on disarmament and that the United States and France need to stick together. Martin Briens (DAS for Disarmament and Nuclear Nonproliferation) added that the UK is starting to seem really convinced that disarmament is possible, since it may abandon its Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile program. At the PrepCom, the UK delegation even seemed to be acting as a "mediator" between France and the NAM and was mainly motivated by seeking to avoid disagreements.
17. (C) Briens argued that Iran is the most serious problem for the NPT, and France was the only Party that mentioned it explicitly in its general statement to the recent PrepCom. To ensure a serious treatment of this problem, we bridges must be built with the NAM and we must work with more reasonable Parties like Jordan. Iran's non-compliance should be mentioned in any RevCon consensus document, but it would not be "the end of the world" if such a document was not adopted, adding that we should not "seek success at all costs."
18. (C) The French were particularly harsh about Egypt's NPT behavior. Araud called its attitude "unacceptable," and Briens called the Egyptians "ideologues" on the Middle East and disarmament. Briens averred that Egypt is campaigning among Arab states against the Additional Protocol and expressed annoyance that Egypt had rejected the EU suggestion of a seminar on Middle East security until after the RevCon. He concluded: "The nastier they are, the more they get out of the process." Michel Miraillet (Under Secretary of Defence for Policy) noted Egyptian enrichment efforts, stated with suspicion that Egypt had known a lot about the Libyan nuclear program and the A.Q. Khan network, and suggested that Egypt has been reacting to "humiliation" it believes it suffered at the 1995 RevCon. Burk acknowledged that Egypt could prevent any RevCon agreement over the Middle East issue but said we should try to forestall that by fostering progress of some sort on the objectives of the 1995 NPT resolution on the region that is acceptable to all in the region (e.g., including Israel). Briens said that France will raise some of these issues "at a high level."
19. (C) Regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Briens suggested that we should try to get agreement at the RevCon at least on the concept that enrichment and reprocessing are not "normal technologies." In response to Burk's appeal to France to support the proposed increase for the IAEA's budget so the Agency has sufficient resources to accomplish the tasks that Member States give it, Briens argued that the Agency has funds that it has not even spent.
STATE 00082013 004 OF 005
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) BILATERALS WITH UK, FRANCE, AND GERMA He mentioned France's paper on "Elements for a Declaration of Principles" on nuclear energy, proposed for adoption by both nuclear supplier and consumer states (originally provided to USG in 2008), and asked for U.S. comments. Another draft will be circulated at the end of July.
20. (C) Discussion then turned to NPT diplomacy. Both sides agreed on the essential need for close P-5 cooperation and for working to persuade other NPT Parties on the need for progress on both nonproliferation and disarmament. Briens said that the P-3 should discuss respective red-lines on disarmament, and Burk agreed that we need to work out how to deal with points on which the P-3 diverge. Burk suggested that we engage NAM Parties that are the beneficiaries of peaceful nuclear cooperation. Briens expressed particular frustration with France's EU partners, pointing out that all others had accepted the PrepCom recommendations draft without a reference to Iran. He said the EU consists of activists (presumably including the Netherlands and Sweden) and fence sitters (central European states), and that the latter category might be helpful on disarmament and the Middle East.
GERMANY
21. (C) Peter Gottwald (Commissioner of the Federal Government for Arms Control and Disarmament) said that Germany agrees with the U.S. RevCon objectives described by Burk but admitted that he has "no illusions" about how hard it will be to achieve them and that we cannot be too ambitious. A year ago, he suggested, many thought the nonproliferation regime would collapse, mainly because of perceptions that it is unfair, but recent U.S. initiatives have changed that atmosphere. Since we have committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons, the regime's inequality is now seen as likely to end some day. Burk replied that the United States wants to be ambitious regarding the RevCon and believes we have an opportunity to do so.
22. (C) Gottwald continued that NAM states also suspect that proposals for multilateral fuel-cycle arrangements may not be fair, though many of them do afford equal treatment, not conditioning access to recipients' giving up the right to sensitive facilities. Burk agreed that this matter is important to the NPT and that we should frame the proposals as collective efforts to strengthen the regime and to facilitate access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including nuclear power.
23. (C) In response to his question, Burk assured Gottwald that the U.S.-proposed Nuclear Security Summit is not in competition with the NPT RevCon. Gottwald replied that nuclear security and countering nuclear terrorism are matters that should bring NPT Parties together, thereby helping to strengthen the Treaty; Burk agreed. This led him to suggest that nuclear security be placed in the wider context of nonproliferation and that the summit be linked to the NPT. Burk said that the subject of nuclear security was one that we believed could be taken up usefully at the RevCon but said the U.S. wanted to be careful not to create the perception that a subset of NPT Parties is somehow "pre-cooking" an outcome for the RevCon via the Nuclear Security Summit. That is not the case.
24. (C) Burk stated that it is important that the RevCon take a positive approach to the Additional Protocol, but Gottwald said that it would be hard to reach agreement on the subject even among like-minded Parties. He opined that, on the issue of dissuading Treaty violators from withdrawing, the Conference could at least "raise awareness" by "developing a common sense that this is a problem."
25. (C) Stefan Kordasch (Deputy Head of Division, Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation) expressed concern that Egypt will be aggressive and could instigate a "deal breaker" at the RevCon. Amb. Andreas Michaelis (Director-General for Near and Middle Eastern Affairs) explained Egyptian behavior as over-compensation for having lost much of its leadership role in the Middle East, particularly within the Arab League. Egypt's status is now such that it leads only on matters that are not "core interests," of Arab states (which he appeared to believe is the case for the Middle East/NPT issue). He suggested that Egypt might be satisfied with "status quo" language at the RevCon plus some kind of "Israeli statement": "Can you extract something from the Israelis? Something they have already said?" Michaelis stressed the need to engage the Egyptians at the highest level, i.e., Mubarak, but also identified Umar Suleiman, the
STATE 00082013 005 OF 005
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) BILATERALS WITH UK, FRANCE, AND GERMA head of Egyptian intelligence, as very influential and a potential useful interlocutor. He pointed out that Germany has set up a ministerial-level steering committee arrangement with Egypt that could be used to surface the problem of the Middle East in the NPT. Its first meeting is scheduled for February 2010; NPT could be raised then.
26. (C) Burk also met with Deputy Foreign Policy Advisor Rolf Nikel (Chancellery), who said he could endorse nearly everything in President Obama's Prague speech. The only question was how to go about achieving its goals. He asked detailed questions about U.S. NPT priorities, asking which issues the U.S. considered "most urgent" and which should be addressed first to prepare the way for progress in other areas. Burk replied that we are still developing our policies but that part of the challenge is convincing governments to exercise the political will to strengthen the nonproliferation norm.
27. (C) In response to Nikel's question about proposals for multilateral fuel-cycle arrangements, Burk pointed out that we need to do a better job of explaining the proposals to counter the NAM argument that supplier states are seeking to deny them their right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which is not true. Nikel suggested that we would reach a "crunch point" if Iran does not respond meaningfully to the EU 3 3 proposals by the end of the year, after which stronger sanctions could be imposed. He pointed out that this scenario would affect the atmosphere for the RevCon, to which Burk replied that we would need to build unity among Parties to rebuff any obstructionism by Iran at the Conference.
28. (C) The last meeting was with Christian Democratic Bundestag member Eckart von Klaeden and staffers from all the major German political parties. Von Klaeden asked whether the United States seeks to enforce compliance by amending the NPT, something Burk assured him is not an option we will pursue. Other questions concerned P-5/NAM disputes, Iran, CTBT, the IAEA fuel bank, the U.S.-proposed nuclear security summit, and concerns about Myanmar's nuclear intentions. CLINTON
Thursday, 24 September 2009, 15:46
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 002222
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/22/2024
TAGS POGOV, PREL, MARR, MOPS, MCAP, KNNP, PARM, UK
SUBJECT: PM BROWN'S DECISION TO CONSIDER REDUCING THE UK'S
TRIDENT NUCLEAR DETERRENT
REF: A. LONDON 2186 (NOTAL) B. LONDON 1707 (NOTAL) C. EMBASSY LONDON DAILY REPORT 9/16/2009 (NOTAL) D. EMBASSY LONDON DAILY REPORT 9/21/2009 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Political Counselor Robin Quinville for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S/NF) Summary. Prime Minister Brown's September 23 announcement at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) that the UK is prepared to consider reducing from four to three the number of its nuclear submarines caught many in HMG by surprise. That said, there has been increased discussion in recent months within HMG and Conservative Party circles about the most effective way to cut defense costs, in the face of a surging budget deficit, and maintain an effective defense, even if HMG sources downplay the fiscal basis for a possible fleet reduction. HMG sources stress that the UK remains committed to maintaining an independent nuclear deterrent -- as did Brown himself during his UNGA speech. HMG sources also note that reducing the number of submarines from four to three would not necessarily reduce the total number of missiles or operational nuclear warheads in the British arsenal. They strongly emphasize that any reduction must be consistent with maintaining a "continuous at sea deterrent." Julian Miller, the Deputy Head of the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat at the Cabinet Office, assured the Political Minister Counselor September 24 that HMG would consult with the U.S. regarding future developments concerning the Trident deterrent to assure there would be "no daylight" between the U.S. and UK. End Summary.
2. (SBU/NF) Cabinet Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) officials confirmed to Poloff September 23 Prime Minister Brown's plans to announce at UNGA that Great Britain would be prepared to reduce from four to three the number of nuclear submarines that carry nuclear weapons. Foreign Minister Miliband publicly explained the decision by observing that "President Obama has injected new drive into the effort to meet the goals of the (Nuclear) Nonproliferation Treaty, which is a world free of nuclear weapons, and our Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, is determined that Britain plays its full part in those discussions." (Note: The UK Trident system consists of 160 operational nuclear warheads carried by Trident II (D5) ballistic missiles aboard four Vanguard-class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines. The warheads and submarines are British built, but with substantial American design assistance. End Note.)
3. (SBU) According to the transcript of PM Brown's wide-ranging September 23 speech to UNGA (a transcript is available at www.number10.gov.uk ), Brown stated that "all nuclear weapons states must play their part in reducing nuclear weapons as part of an agreement by non nuclear states to renounce them...In line with maintaining our nuclear deterrent, I have asked our national security committee to report to me on the potential future reduction of our nuclear weapons submarines from four to three." He described his overall proposal regarding nuclear weapons reduction as a "grand global bargain between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapons states." HMG officials confirmed to Poloff that Brown would elaborate on his proposal at the September 24 UNSC Heads of State meeting.
Timing is Everything
--------------------
4. (S/NF) The announcement of a proposed fleet reduction caught many in the MOD, FCO and Cabinet Office by surprise. Dr. Richard Freer (strictly protect) Head of Defence and Security Policy in the Cabinet Office's Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat, told Poloff September 23 that "in an ideal world, we'd have done a bit more pre-vetting." One of Freer's Cabinet Office deputies was blunter, separately telling Poloff that the announcement was "unexpected" by Cabinet Office staff. MOD officials separately told DAO Embassy London that the announcement was unexpected.
5. (S/NF) Both Freer and Judith Gough (strictly protect), Deputy Head of the Security Policy Group at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stressed to Poloff that HMG has not formally decided to scale back the deterrent but would only do so if a government defense review determines, in Freer's words, that it would be "technically feasible" to maintain "continuous deterrence patrols" with three submarines instead of four. All sources stressed that HMG remains committed to an independent nuclear deterrent. The PM's spokesman publicly affirmed that HMG is committed to maintaining "an
LONDON 00002222 002 OF 003
effective nuclear deterrent." Freer criticized media for exaggerating the significance of Brown's announcement, opining that it was "not really a major disarmament announcement," but rather a reaffirmation of HMG's commitment to nuclear disarmament, albeit not unilaterally.
P5 Reassurances
---------------
6. (C/NF) Mariot Leslie, the Director General for Defence and Intelligence at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), told representatives of P5 embassies at a September 23 briefing that HMG remains committed to a nuclear deterrent "at a minimum level consistent with (the UK's) deterrence doctrine." She underscored that HMG had not made a commitment to reduce its fleet from four to three submarines, but would only do so if three submarines could maintain "continuous at sea deterrence." She stated that HMG's eventual decision would not depend upon the actions of other nuclear weapons states, but would be based entirely on Britain's defense needs. She referenced the UK's 2006 White Paper, that mentioned the possibility of reducing the submarine fleet from four to three vessels, if consistent with defense requirements. She also noted that the review of the number of submarines was unrelated to the issue of how many missiles and warheads the UK would retain, a point that other HMG officials also made to Poloff.
7. (C/NF). Leslie explained to the P5 embassy representatives that she had requested a meeting with them in order to respond to "speculation" in the British press about what PM Brown would announce at the UN. She underscored the importance of close coordination among the P5, especially in the lead up next year's Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon), and she urged P5 delegations "to keep in touch in New York." She stressed HMG's commitment to a successful RevCon, and underscored that P5 cooperation was essential for a successful outcome.
"No Daylight"
-------------
8. (S/NF) Julian Miller, the Deputy Head of the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat at the Cabinet Office, assured the Political Minister Counselor September 24 that HMG would consult with the U.S. regarding future developments concerning the Trident deterrent to assure there would be "no daylight" between the U.S. and UK. He noted that it is "still an open question" as to whether three new submarines would be able to provide continuous deterrence. Like Leslie, Miller referenced the 2006 White Paper, stressing that a possible reduction from four to three submarines was not a "fundamentally new position."
Money Matters
-------------
9. (C/NF) In recent months there has been increased discussion within HMG and Conservative Party circles and among defense analysts about the most effective way to cut costs while getting value for money, in the face of a surging budget deficit. Many estimates indicate that it would cost 20 billion pounds, spread over two decades, to replace all four of the aging Vanguard fleet. It is debatable how much cost savings would be generated by cutting the replacement program by one quarter; one estimate places total savings as low as three billion pounds. Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth declared in a September 15 speech that operations in Afghanistan illustrate that the world has rapidly and significantly changed in the decade since Britain last conducted a Strategic Defense Review (SDR). He noted that "some assumptions of the SDR have now been overtaken by events." Ainsworth stressed that "there will be tough choices ahead" and that "major shifts" in defense spending could not be ruled out. He outlined the process for an updated SDR, starting with a Defence Green Paper to be published in early 2010. In an interview following the speech, Ainsworth indicated, in regard to the UK's independent Trident nuclear deterrent, that "if we can provide that at-sea deterrent with three submarines and not four submarines we will look at that."
10. (C/NF) Conservative Party defense sources have privately affirmed to Embassy officers their commitment to the Trident deterrent. They have also acknowledged that reducing to three submarines would be one effective cost-saving measure to consider as part of a Strategic Defense Review, which the
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Conservatives have promised to undertake if they win next year's general election. Shadow Conservative Defense Secretary Liam Fox told the BBC following Brown's speech that the PM's proposal seemed "reasonable and sensible," so long as the UK could maintain a continuous at-sea deterrent. Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg welcomed Brown's announcement to consider scaling back Trident, stating that it is "unrealistic" to believe the UK could foot the bill for renewing Trident.
11. (S/NF) Foreign Secretary Miliband publicly rejected on September 22 assertions that scaling back Trident would be a cost-cutting measure. Julian Miller also downplayed the potential fiscal impact of a reduction, telling the Political Minister Counselor that it is still unclear whether a reduction to three submarines would create significant savings. Miller stressed that a reduction in the number of submarines was one way to "show commitment to the disarmament agenda."
Comment: A Popular Decision
----------------------------
12. (S/NF) Brown's readiness to cut the size of Britain's Trident fleet will please a large segment of the British public -- both fiscal hawks and disarmament doves, although some in the latter camp would just as soon see the UK scrap its deterrent entirely. Indeed, July polling indicates that 54 percent of British voters would "prefer to abandon nuclear weapons rather than put money into a new generation of Trident warheads." (Ref B) HMG sources stress that both Brown and Miliband are personally committed to nuclear disarmament, albeit not unilaterally. Miliband most recently signaled his commitment to disarmament in an op-ed in the September 20 "Guardian" newspaper, reminding readers that the UK has reduced its nuclear arsenal 75 percent since the end of the Cold War. (Ref D) Toward the end of the op-ed, he hinted at PM Brown's readiness to scale back Trident: "As soon as it becomes useful for the UK arsenal to be included in a broader negotiation, we stand ready to participate and act."
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN
Wednesday, 02 July 2008, 09:21
UNCLAS MADRID 000724
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/OHI (JKENNEDY;JBECKER)
STATE FOR EEB/IPE (JURBAN)
STATE FOR EUR/WE, OES, L/OES
STATE PASS USTR (DWEINER)
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS ETRD, KIPR, PBTS, PHSA, SCUL, SP
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MINISTER OF CULTURE
1. (U) Summary: Ambassador met with Minister of Culture Cesar Antonio Molina on 6/30/08. The minister told the Ambassador that he was willing to meet with the claimant or his representative in a Nazi art loot case. The minister emphasized he was willing to continue to fight intellectual property rights (IPR) piracy. He was also clearly following the Odyssey case closely and made it clear that the GOS would exercise all of its legal options. The minister discussed cultural cooperation with the U.S. as well. End Summary
PARTICIPANTS
------------
2. (U) The minister was accompanied by Cultural Industries Policy Director General Guillermo Corral van Damme. The Ambassador was accompanied by EconOff.
CASSIRER CLAIM
--------------
3. (U) The Ambassador stressed the USG's interest in direct discussions between the Spanish government and Claude Cassirer, the AmCit claimant of a painting by Camille Pisarro ("Rue St. Honore") in the Thyssen Museum. The Ambassador noted also that while the Odyssey and Cassirer claim were on separate legal tracks, it was in both governments' interest to avail themselves of whatever margin for manuever they had, consistent with their legal obligations, to resolve both matters in a way that favored the bilateral relationship. The minister listened carefully to the Ambassador's message, but he put the accent on the separateness of the issues. Molina said that no Spanish government could return the painting (if this is what the claimant wants). To begin with, while the minister presides over the board that manages the Thyssen Museum's collection, the minister could not oblige the board to return the painting without a (Spanish) legal judgment. The minister added that paying compensation, as the British government has reportedly done in a number of cases, also posed legal problems. Director General van Damme said, however, that perhaps the Spanish government had "sinned" (pecado) in not meeting with the claimant or his representative. The minister said that he was willing to meet with the claimant or his representative in connection with a trip to Washington, D.C. in September or October this year.
IPR
---
4. (U) The minister emphasized that he remains committed to fighting piracy. He said that on July 10, he would preside over the Spanish government's inter-ministerial anti-piracy coordinating body. Van Damme said that this meeting would serve to "relaunch efforts" to fight piracy. The Ambassador noted that the USG had waited a number of years to place Spain on the Special 301 Watch List, but that this year, continued alarming internet piracy levels had precipitated the Watch List decision. Having said that, the Ambassador also praised recent vigorous enforcement actions, for instance the arrests of 32 suspected Chinese DVD and CD pirates. The Ambassador noted that the subsequent press conference, in which the minister said that Spaniards should not buy pirated products because such products harmed culture, was especially significant. Both the minister and director general emphasized the importance of the internet. Van Damme said it was especially important to create attractive business models for selling content on-line. The Ambassador suggested that the minister meet with IPR and internet service provider representatives when he travels to Washington this fall, and he agreed to do so.
ODYSSEY
-------
5. (U) The minister explained that one of the reasons for his September or October Washington trip was to meet with the law firm the Spanish government has retained in the Odyssey case. The minister added that he was following the court proceedings in Tampa, Florida closely. He expressed indignation at a recent CNN interview of Odyssey CEO Greg Stemm who indicated that he would be willing to keep the gold coins found at the salvage site and return items of purely archeological interest. The Ambassador explained that the USG was cognizant of its international law responsibilities in these kinds of salvage cases and that American government lawyers would study carefully the legal implications and obligations arising from the Tampa court's decisions.
CULTURAL COOPERATION
--------------------
6. (U) The minister and the director general expressed great enthusiasm for cultural cooperation with the U.S. in general and Washington, D.C. in particular. With respect to Washington, for instance, the minister talked about Spanish support for an exhibition of 1970s and 80s art. He also talked about a more ambitious project, a "museum of "Latin" art (not clear where this would be, but he did talk about a "museum", not just a one-off exhibit). This would be separate from Ambassador Westendorp's (Spain's ambassador to the U.S.) idea of using the former Spanish Ambassador's residence in the Washington for some form of cultural repository.
COMMENT
-------
7. (U) The minister's expressed willingness to meet with Claude Cassirer or his representative is a modest step forward. We will remind the minister of this commitment whem he finalizes his Washington travel plans. With respect to IPR, we think the minister is sincere in his desire to combat piracy. Our challenge as an Embassy is to find ways to convince the GOS and stakeholders (especially the ISPs) that action against internet piracy cannot be held hostage to the mantra that "new business models" are required in this area. They certainly are necessary and desirable (both for ISPs and content providers). However, action against piracy may, in some cases, be necessary to make those models feasible.
AGUIRRE
Wednesday, 02 January 2008, 11:51
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 000006
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR H - PLEASE PASS TO CODEL LIEBERMAN
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS OREP, PREL, SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN SCENESETTER FOR CODEL LIEBERMAN - CORRECTED
CABLE PARAGRAPH 13
MADRID 00000006 001.2 OF 004
1. (SBU) Summary: I warmly welcome Senator and Mrs. Lieberman to Madrid. When you arrive, Spain will be emerging from the Holidays and starting to focus on what is likely to be a very competitive March 9 general election. Although the media here prefers to focus on differences in the U.S.-Spain relationship resulting from Spain's 2004 withdrawal from Iraq, cooperation is excellent in areas of common interests - fighting terrorism and organized crime, strengthening NATO and the Transatlantic security relationship, and in promoting the spread of democracy in many areas of the world. As the Hispanic population of the United States continues to grow, and as Spanish increasingly becomes our second national language, Spain has the potential to be an even closer U.S. partner. End summary.
Counter-Terrorism and Law Enforcement
-------------------------------------
2. (SBU) U.S.-Spain relations were seriously damaged by President Zapateros's decision soon after his reelection in 2004 to precipitously withdraw Spanish forces from Iraq. However, over the last several years both countries have made a concerted and successful effort to rebuild the relationship based on strong mutual interests in counter-terrorism, fighting narcotics trafficking and organized crime, and rapidly expanding economic ties. The real bilateral story is found in novel initiatives such as the HSPD-6 agreement we signed in September to facilitate the sharing of information between our national counter-terrorism authorities. Spain is home to a large and growing Muslim population. The March 11, 2004, train bombings were a shock to Spain (21 of the suspects were convicted here in October). Spain remains a target of Islamic extremists; al-Qaeda has called for attacks to recapture the medieval "Al Andalus". The Spanish are actively pursuing Islamic extremist terrorism-related investigations and have scores of suspects in jail. Neither has the threat of ETA terror gone away: two Spanish Civil Guard officers were murdered in France in early December by the Basque terrorist group.
3. (SBU) Narcotics trafficking is another area of common concern. Andean cocaine is a serious problem here, and Colombian trafficking organizations are active in Spain. Money laundering is another serious issue. We are eager to find ways to increase bilateral cooperation and to encourage Spain to engage more aggressively with law enforcement authorities in key Latin American countries.
Security and Diplomatic Cooperation
-----------------------------------
4. (SBU) Spanish military cooperation matters. The bases of Rota and Moron are strategic hubs, midway between the U.S. and Afghanistan and Iraq. U.S. planes and ships account for around 5,000 flights and 250 port calls a year in Spain. The Spanish military is pro-U.S. and pro-NATO. The navy employs the AEGIS system in its frigates and has been working for five years to acquire the Tomahawk missile system. Spain is also interested in the Joint Strike Fighter. We need to keep this military-to-military relationship strong.
5. (SBU) Spain has 750 troops with ISAF in Afghanistan and a provincial reconstruction team in Badghis province. They have contributed some 150 million Euros in Afghan reconstruction funds. Planning is underway to allow the Spanish to train and equip an Afghan Army company, which we hope will be a prelude to the training and equipping of a full battalion. On Iraq, Spain has contributed $22 million to the Basrah Children's Hospital and a further $28 million in development funding for Iraq. Spain has nearly 1,100 troops with UNIFIL in Lebanon and about 700 in Kosovo.
6. (SBU) On the diplomatic front, Spain in recent years has more often been a follower than a leader, looking to stay within EU consensus on issues such as Kosovo, Iran, and missile defense. It is more forward-leaning on the Middle East peace process, undoubtedly driven by FM Moratinos' long personal involvement in the issue. Moratinos was an eager participant in the Annapolis Conference and helped ensure Spain made a robust pledge of support for the Palestinian Authority during the recent Paris donors' conference. Driven by the twin threats of terrorism and illegal immigration, Spain is also increasing its engagement with the countries of North and Western Africa.
7. (SBU) Spain is second only to the U.S. in terms of economic and political influence in Latin America. Spain
MADRID 00000006 002.2 OF 004
wants strong democratic and free market institutions in the region. Nevertheless, we have sharp differences over Cuba. Spain's socialist government has opted for engagement, claiming it can encourage regime elements who want change. We take every opportunity to remind the Spanish that the Cuban regime is only interested in survival and that the Cuban dissidents need and deserve the active and visible support of democracies everywhere. On Venezuela, the socialists' early efforts at constructive engagement with Chavez have gone sour. At the most recent Iberoamerican Summit, King Juan Carlos publicly interrupted a Chavez tirade about former Spanish President Aznar, telling the Venezuelan President to "shut up." The government is uncomfortably situated between Spanish companies who fear Chavez will move against their Venezuela interests and the strong public support for the King.
Economy
-------
8. (SBU) Spain has one of the fastest growing economies in Europe. In fact, the economy has grown in each of the last 15 years, and per capita GDP passed Italy's in 2006. In the last several years, a housing boom has contributed greatly to growth, but as elections approach, housing prices are stagnating, construction is slowing, and unemployment and inflation are staring to creep up. U.S. investment has long been important to the economy (more so than bilateral trade), but the tables have turned. This year, Spain has been the fourth largest foreign investor in the U.S., with particular emphasis in banking, construction, and renewable energy. In the latter sector, Spain has the world's largest and third largest wind power firms, and Spanish firms also are active in U.S. solar and biofuels projects.
Elections
---------
9. (SBU) Spain will hold a general election March 9, and the campaign will just be heating up as you arrive. The ruling Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) candidate is President Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. Despite a strong economy, a budget surplus, and a variety of social spending initiatives, the early polls indicate a close race. Nevertheless, the polls also suggest Partido Popular (PP) candidate Mariano Rajoy has had limited success getting his message out. The PSOE will run on the economy and its social programs. The PP will argue the economy is softening and that the PSOE has made too many concessions to Basque and Catalan regional governments, is weak on ETA, and soft on illegal immigration. Foreign affairs is unlikely to be a key issue, but the PSOE will remind voters it got Spain out of Iraq while the PP will say Spain's international prestige has slipped.
Jewish Community in Spain
-------------------------
10. (SBU) Full religious freedom only returned to Spain in 1978 with the establishment of a democratic constitution. In practice, Spain is still an overwhelmingly Catholic country, although Protestant and Islamic believers are increasingly important demographically. Estimates of the size of the Jewish community in Spain vary from 50,000 to 100,000 faithful, primarily concentrated in urban areas including Madrid and Barcelona. The Spanish Federation of Jewish Communities (FCJE) signed an agreement with the Spanish government in 1992 establishing Judaism as one of the "deeply rooted faiths" of Spain. Certain local and regional governments, among them Toledo, Segovia, and Sevilla, have sought to capitalize on Jewish tourism by publicizing the romantic aspects of the Sephardic community in pre-Inquisition Spain while downplaying the expulsion. Nevertheless, anti-Semitism remains an undercurrent in Spain; swastikas and other graffiti appear periodically on buildings and in neighborhoods associated with Judaism or the pre-expulsion Sephardic presence. Neo-Nazi propagandists and ultra-rightists remain present in Spain, most significantly along the Mediterranean coast in Valencia and Barcelona, but also in all major cities. In Madrid, skinheads, Falangists and Franco supporters make their presence known through infrequent demonstrations and marches, as well as by harassing the growing immigrant population.
11. (SBU) The USG is currently engaging with the GOS over the 2007 exhumation of three pre-expulsion Sephardic cemeteries in Andalucia and Catalunya. In each case the cemeteries were
MADRID 00000006 003.2 OF 004
uncovered by accident during excavation for construction or road projects, and in each instance the local authorities did not handle the graves in keeping with strict Jewish dictates, more likely out of ignorance than malice. Based on interest from concerned Americans, among them Representative Edolphus Towns, Chairman Warren Miller of the U.S. Commission for the Preservation of America's Heritage Abroad, and Rabbi David Niederman of the United Jewish Organization, I, my DCM and our Consul General in Barcelona have expressed our concern to the Spanish government that these culturally and religiously sensitive sites need to be protected and handled in a manner in keeping with the wishes of the Jewish community in Spain. Because each municipal government has jurisdiction in affairs dealing with cemeteries, the government has sought to place the responsibility on each local jurisdiction. The FCJE and local Jewish organizations have lobbied the national and local governments to enact a national protocol for addressing any future excavations and are hoping to secure funding to research the location and condition of other cemeteries that have been lost for centuries. The exhumed remains have since been re-interred in other Jewish cemeteries with religious authorities present.
12. (SBU) Critics have accused the Spanish government of taking anti-Israel stances with respect to both the Middle East Peace Process and the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, while the government has strongly refuted allegations of anti-Semitism and Israel bashing. Spain's Foreign Minister Moratinos is a frequent visitor to the region, and he made a controversial visit to Damascus and Beirut in 2007 in which he was photographed with the number two of Hizballah. Nevertheless, he claims to enjoy a good relationship with Israeli FM Livni and is planning a fence-mending trip to Israel in the coming months.
Pisarro Painting Claim
----------------------
13. (SBU) During your conversation with Ambassador Ana Salomon, you may wish to mention the claim of Claude Cassirer, an elderly American citizen, for a Camille Pissarro painting ("Rue Saint Honore") now at the Thyssen Bornemisza Museum in Madrid, Spain's appeal of a U.S. district court ruling that U.S. courts have jurisdiction is now before the 9th Circuit. The Nazis forced Mr. Cassirer's grandmother to sell the painting in 1939. Baron Hans Heinrich Thyssen-Bornemisza acquired it in 1976. In the early 1990's, the Spanish Government purchased the collection and built the current museum. In 1958, Mrs. Cassirer received a DM 120,000 restitution payment for the disappearance and provisional dispossession of the painting, but retained full right to the painting. Were Mr. Cassirer to win his claim, he would be obliged to reimburse this amount to the German authorities. Pursuant to the 1998 Washington Conference Principles on Nazi Confiscated Art, Cassirer's attorneys offered to discuss the claim with the Government of Spain in 2002 but the government refused. Spain also refused to engage in a mediation process that was part of the district court proceedings. The Washington Conference accepted the Principles by consensus, in which the Spanish representative joined. Dealers, claimants and holders of artworks generally heed the principles. Spain correctly points out that the principles provide for states to "act within the context of their own laws", and notes that claimant has not filed a claim in Spain. But the Principles also call on parties to achieve just and fair solutions on an expeditious basis and to develop and use alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. In December 2007, Ambassador Salomon told Ambassador J. Christian Kennedy, the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, that the new Spanish Minister of Culture might take a more constructive view of this claim. In June 2005, the then Special Envoy raised the issue in Madrid with museum and government officials, to no avail. Earlier correspondence between the Envoy and the Spanish Ambassador in Washington was also without result. We recommend you urge Ambassador Salomon and others as appropriate to engage with Cassirer to find a mutually acceptable solution.
Conclusion
----------
14. (SBU) Again, I am looking forward to your visit. While we want to avoid being an issue in the Spanish elections, we do need to remind Spain that the bilateral relationship is founded on strong mutual interests such as counter-terrorism and law enforcement. Regardless of who wins in March, terrorists, drug traffickers, and alien smugglers will
MADRID 00000006 004.2 OF 004
continue to see both our countries as targets. We have much work to do together. AGUIRRE
Friday, 12 February 2010, 15:25
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000174
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/OHI, EEB/TPP/IPE, L/PD
STATE ALSO FOR ECA AND EUR/PPD (L.MCMANIS)
STATE PASS USTR FOR D.WEINER AND J.GROVES
STATE ALSO PASS U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE FOR M.WOODS AND
M.PALLANTE
COMMERCE FOR 4212/DON CALVERT
COMMERCE ALSO FOR USTPO
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS ETRD, KIPR, PGOV, PREL, PHUM, SCUL, SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MINISTER OF
CULTURE ANGELES GONZALEZ-SINDE
REF: A. BARCELONA 15 B. 09 MADRID 1161
MADRID 00000174 001.3 OF 003
SUMMARY:
1. (SBU) Ambassador met February 10 with Minister of Culture Angeles Gonzalez Sinde to discuss bilateral cooperation on cultural issues, intellectual property rights and draft legislation that would enhance the government's ability to combat digital piracy, and the Holocaust-related claim by AMCIT Claude Cassirer on a State-owned painting in Madrid's Thyssen-Bornemisza Museum. The Minister reiterated the government's request that the Embassy continue to engage with the political opposition on draft legislation for shutting down pirate websites. With respect to the Cassirer claim, Ministry officials says the Spanish state is prohibited from giving away property or offering compensation, but the Ambassador asked the Minister to look at some different options to resolve the matter in a more satisfactory fashion. End Summary.
CULTURAL COOPERATION
2. (U) The Minister was accompanied by her Chief of Staff, Javier Bonilla, and Director General (DG) for Cultural Policy and Industries Guillermo Corral van Damme. Ambassador Solomont began by listing the various cultural events he has participated in since his recent arrival. The Ambassador also mentioned the partnership between the Boston-based Berklee School of Music and Spain's General Society of Authors and Publishers (SGAE) in developing a cultural center and music university in Valencia, which he characterized as an "ambitious project." The Ambassador also thanked the Minister for her work on the Fulbright grantee selection boards and her speech at the November 2009 event celebrating the 50th anniversary of the first Spanish grants awarded under the program. Finally, he mentioned that the Boston Museum of Fine Arts plans to lend a John Singer Sargent painting, which was influenced by the Velazquez masterpiece "Las Meninas," to the Prado, and he hoped the Minister could attend a reception for the Boston delegation in March.
IPR PROTECTION AND ANTI-PIRACY MEASURES
3. (SBU) Ambassador Solomont said he had heard a great deal about Spain's Internet piracy problem, from MPAA CEO Glickman and others, and asked where things stand with the government's legislative proposal (ref B) on shutting down or blocking pirate websites. Minister Gonzalez-Sinde replied that everything the government tries to do in this area is big news, since attempts to regulate Internet activity are of intense interest to young people, the media, and companies like Google. The government's proposal, she said, is quite reasonable and even modest. The government has pledged not to move aggressively against citizens and individual users as has been proposed in France and the UK, but its initiative is nonetheless controversial. Many politicians, she averred, have little information or understanding of the issue. Even those who recognize the damage that Internet piracy does to cultural industries have not been helpful.
4. (SBU) At the same time, the Minister said there has been a lot of progress and an open public debate on the issues surrounding Internet piracy since she came into office last April. There are still populist demands for "free culture" on the Internet, but these are being taken less seriously in the media. The Internet is shaking up traditional modes of cultural distribution, she said. Increased use of the e-book is sensitizing authors and influential media owners to the piracy problem.
5. (SBU) The Congressional debate over the government's draft law will be complicated, and this is where the Minister said the Ambassador can help. The Government believes it is making progress with Deputies from the ruling Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), but is concerned about the opposition Populist Party (PP). The Ambassador noted he had raised the issue in his initial meeting with PP leader Mariano Rajoy and had told him how important the issue is to the USG and private industry. Gonzalez-Sinde pointed out that if the government does not solve this problem now, it
MADRID 00000174 002.3 OF 003
could become an issue in the next presidential campaign. Should the PP come back to power, it will have to deal with this issue, because the current situation is unsustainable over time. (Comment: As reported septel, DG Corral told econoffs recently that the government faces opposition from some members of the ruling party, and he asked us to make our views known to legislators from the regional Convergencia i Unio (Cataluna) and Partido Nacional Vasco (Basque Country) blocs.)
6. (SBU) Ambassador said the USG wants to see the legislation move forward in Congress and not be weakened in the amendment process. He also noted that the music industry in particular does not believe the government's proposal will solve the problem, to which the Minister replied that the Government has committed to trying this approach first, and if it doesn't prove effective, they will come back with additional and perhaps stronger measures. The music industry is important to Spain, she said, because it helps promote the Spanish language in Latin America and also in the United States.
7. (U) On another issue, the Minister raised the draft law being considered by the Catalan regional legislature that would require that foreign films be dubbed or subtitled into the Catalan language (ref A). She placed the issue in the context of requirements that television networks finance and broadcast Spanish and European films, and said it was also related to the transition of televisions and films from analog to digital format. She said the Catalan regional government (Generalitat) is responding to public interest in promoting the language and sees these other initiatives as unnatural and unbalanced. It is trying to push back, but its attempt to require that more films be shown in Catalan is risky, as major studios and distributors oppose it. So do movie house owners, who cite low demand because, in their experience, even Catalan speakers prefer to see movies in Spanish. Gonzalez-Sinde was not certain whether the regional Parliament would pass the law in its current session.
CASSIRER CLAIM
8. (SBU) The Ambassador raised the claim of AMCIT Claude Cassirer to a Camille Pissarro painting that is currently part of the Thyssen Museum's permanent collection. The Ambassador noted that Spain had participated in the 1998 Washington Conference on Nazi Confiscated Art and in last year's Prague Conference. Spain had signed the Declarations of Principles but was in the position of possessing a painting that the Nazis had forced its original owner to sell. He cited a German government letter stating that the compensation the owner had received from Germany for the painting's original disappearance did not extinguish the family's claim to restitution or compensation. Ambassador hoped the GOS would facilitate face-to-face negotiations on compensation, as opposed to "moral recognition." Acknowledging that the claimant has a lawsuit against Spain and the Thyssen Foundation before the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, Ambassador asked what prevented the GOS from playing a stronger hand outside the legal process.
9. (SBU) Minister Gonzalez-Sinde replied that lawyers for the MFA and the Museum have advised that Spain is legally barred from returning the painting or paying compensation. She offered to speak again to FM Moratinos to see if anything can be done. DG Corral pointed out that Spain had acquired the painting legally and in good faith and had no involvement in the transaction in which a Nazi art dealer coerced the painting from its owner. The Thyssen Foundation manages the collection that includes the painting, but the State owns it. There is no legal way for the State to surrender its property absent a judicial order, he said, and the government could be sued if it tried. The State is legally bound to protect its property, even at times against its own will.
10. (SBU) Spain is sensitive to the family's claim, Corral said, but does not believe it can legally negotiate compensation. It might, however, be able to make gestures to the family and to the Los Angeles Jewish community. The government could, for example, organize and fund travel to Spain and cultural exchanges to promote mutual understanding
MADRID 00000174 003.3 OF 003
and appreciation while giving due recognition to the Cassirer family.
11. (SBU) Ambassador suggested that the GOS try to come up with creative solutions. At the same time, he undertook to convey the GOS concerns to Cassirer's attorneys and to ask them to offer a series of options for the government to consider. If there appear to be viable options, they could serve as a basis for direct negotiations. Post will follow up with EUR/OHI.
SOLOMONT
Friday, 07 September 2007, 10:49
UNCLAS MADRID 001722
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/WE, L, AND OES
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS PREL, EWWT, PBTS, PHSA, SCUL, SP, CA
SUBJECT: ODYSSEY UPDATE: DHS DELIVERS CUSTOMS INFORMATION
REF: MADRID 1670 AND PREVIOUS
1. (SBU) On September 6, DHS-ICE Attache delivered the Odyssey Customs import documents to Director of Aduanas Nicolas Bonilla, as requested by GOS via the Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement (CMAA) on July 24. The DHS-ICE Attache advised Bonilla that the information was confidential and to be used only for law enforcement purposes. Bonilla expressed appreciation for the information, and assured the DHS-ICE Attache that it would be used only for official purposes. He added that Aduanas would make a formal request through DHS channels before sharing the documents with any other GOS agency. Post advised MFA representatives of this exchange the afternoon of September 6.
2. (SBU) Separately, the MFA sent Post a diplomatic note September 4 in response to the Ambassador's August 29 meeting with Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos (ref). MFA officials advised us verbally that they will seek the Odyssey information through their Aduanas, acknowledging that Aduanas would first have to seek the necessary permission from DHS. Jorge Domecq, MFA's Deputy Director for Gibraltar Issues, noted that MFA was interested in obtaining the Odyssey customs information to provide to lawyers representing the GOS in the Tampa Admiralty Court.
3. (SBU) Meanwhile, the Odyssey Explorer remains docked in Gibraltar and has not yet unloaded its cargo. According to British Embassy representatives, Odyssey representatives have stated that the vessel will begin unloading its cargo the week of September 10.
4. (SBU) Below is an informal translation of Foreign Ministry diplomatic note 277/31 dated August 31, which was provided to the Embassy on September 4.
Begin Text:
(complimentary opening)...and has the honor to refer to Embassy Note Verbal No. 445 of 20 August 2007 on obtaining the documents for entry into the United States of the objects of archeological value brought up by the "Odyssey Marine Exploration" from a wreck code-named "Black Swan."
In this regard, the Ministry wishes to reiterate to the Embassy the request made for the above mentioned documents in Note Verbal number 79 of 22 May 2007.
Furthermore, the Ministry seeks to inform the Embassy as follows:
- On 24 July 2007, the Director of the Department of Customs and Excise Taxes of the Tax Agency of Spain sent a letter to the Director of U.S. Customs and Border Protection requesting these documents pursuant to Article X of the Mutual Assistance Agreement on Customs ("special assistance cases"). A copy of the letter is attached hereto.
-The documents are requested for the Tax Agency of Spain, which is the agency responsible for the enforcement of Spanish and Community customs legislation.
- The documents are requested to investigate the legality and validity of the transfer to the United States of the two shipments of coins and archeological material from Gibraltar referred to in the attached document, and to enforce compliance with all applicable Spanish legislation in this area, take all appropriate judicial action and assert the rights of the Government of Spain in all appropriate legal venues.
- The Spanish Government will approach this matter with the discretion and confidentiality that it applies to all its relations with the U.S. Government...
(Complimentary closing)
End Text. AGUIRRE
Wednesday, 10 February 2010, 13:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000093
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR BRIAN WALCH
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR MICHELLE GAVIN
ADDIS FOR USAU
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/02/10
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ZI
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX's observations on the political landscape and
U.S.-Zimbabwe relations
REF: HARARE 87; HARARE 36
CLASSIFIED BY: Charles A. Ray, Ambassador, STATE, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (SBU) Pol/econ chief met February 9 with XXXXXXXXXXXX offered his observations on various topics including the state of ZANU-PF, indigenization, and elections.
2. (C) ZANU-PF. XXXXXXXXXXXX described the party as badly fractured. It was like a stick of TNT, susceptible to ignition and disintegration. ZANU-PF was holding together because of the threat of MDC-T and foreign pressure. He likened ZANU-PF to a troop of baboons incessantly fighting among themselves, but coming together to face an external threat. New leadership was essential and would emerge as some of the old timers, including Robert Mugabe, left the scene. XXXXXXXXXXXX opined that Vice President Joice Mujuru or S.K. Moyo (former ambassador to South African and now party chair) were possibilities, although Mujuru's fear of Mugabe was affecting her ability to lead.
3. (C) MDC-T. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, MDC-T is alienating supporters because of corruption. He pointed to the Harare suburb of Chitungwiza where MDC-T is investigating its councilors for being on the take. Residents of Chitungwiza blame the party. XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that part of the problem was that many MDC-T local councilors and parliamentarians elected in 2008 had no independent income. Unable to survive on their US$200/month salaries, they were now turning to graft. He also noted that the national party was not enabling parliamentarians to demonstrate, e.g. by bringing home pork, that they were working for their constituents.
4. (C) Elections. XXXXXXXXXXXX believed elections would take place in 2012 or 2013. Parliamentarians from all parties, particularly those who had no income before coming into office, had no interest in running again before necessary. They would try to stall the constitutional process.
5. (C) Global Political Agreement (GPA). XXXXXXXXXXXX thought there would be slow progress. In his opinion, the most important achievement of the GPA was the sidelining of Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor Gideon Gono.
6. (C) Indigenization. Taking an opposite view to Minister of Youth and Indigenization Saviour Kasukuwere (Ref A), XXXXXXXXXXXX said the government's indigenization program benefitted nobody accept those who were already wealthy. It did nothing for his constituents, who couldn't afford to buy into companies and were living hand-to-mouth.
7. (C) Economic Recovery. XXXXXXXXXXXX said a primary focus should be communal lands where 80 percent of Zimbabweans live. Before the economy collapsed, he said the communal areas produced 80 percent of farm output consumed in the country. (NOTE: These numbers are indicative but not accurate. More than 30 percent of Zimbabweans live in urban areas, so somewhat less than 80 percent live on communal lands. But communal lands have long been the main source of Zimbabwe's domestic food supply. END NOTE.) Production dramatically decreased with the collapse of the economy as small farmers were no longer able to access inputs. Another factor was the Grain Marketing Board's requirement that crops be sold to it. It then failed to pay farmers. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that international assistance would be necessary to resuscitate the economy. But
HARARE 00000093 002 OF 002
lesser steps were important. He volunteered that the Ambassador's Self Help Program had once been present in communal areas. It was a powerful indication of U.S. interest in helping Zimbabweans, and was of tremendous assistance to those who benefitted from projects.
8. (C) Sanctions and ZDERA. XXXXXXXXXXXX said sanctions on individuals should remain if justified by the behavior of these individuals. Sanctions on parastatals that were contributing or could contribute to the economy should be lifted. With regard to ZDERA, XXXXXXXXXXXX acknowledged that the IMF and World Bank had ceased activities in Zimbabwe before ZDERA was enacted. The economy was already on a downhill trajectory because of misguided economic policies and the disastrous land reform policy. But the passage of ZDERA was like slashing an already deflating tire. Many Zimbabweans viewed ZDERA as an attempt to hurt them when they were already suffering. As such, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, ZDERA has a large symbolic value and should be repealed.
9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
-------------
COMMENT
-------------
10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX's comments on ZANU-PF are representative of a large part of the party. There is little doubt that if a secret party election were held, Mugabe and his inner circle would lose their positions. But Mugabe, aided by the securocrats and through fear, still has control. On sanctions and ZDERA, most ZANU-PF members, even moderates, tell us they believe sanctions, especially on parastatals, and ZDERA have hurt the economy (though they cannot cite evidence for this claim). XXXXXXXXXXXX's view is more nuanced than most. XXXXXXXXXXXX's view on ZDERA is what many in the MDC-T have been telling us: It is serving no real purpose other than to provide a convenient whipping boy for ZANU-PF. END COMMENT RAY
Thursday, 11 June 2009, 17:24
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000728
SIPDIS
HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
COMMERCE FOR 4332/MAC/WH/JLAO
TREASURY FOR RJARPE
NSC FOR RKING
EO 12958 DECL: 04/21/2019
TAGS ECON, PGOV, PREL, ETRD, EINV, ENRG, TRGY, EMIN, PTER,
PINR, ASEC, MOPS, PARM, VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA INCAPABLE OF SUBSTANTIVE NUCLEAR
COOPERATION WITH IRAN/RUSSIA
REF: A. CARACAS 26 B. LA PAZ 806
Classified By: Economic Counselor Darnall Steuart for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: A plain-spoken nuclear physicist told Econoff that those spreading rumors that Venezuela is helping third countries (i.e. Iran) develop atomic bombs "are full of (expletive)." He said Venezuela is currently unable to provide such assistance particularly as the Chavez administration "does not trust scientists." He added that Venezuela's nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia finalized May 4 is pure political theater as Venezuela is incapable of cooperation with Russia on the development, design, construction and operation of nuclear reactors. Also contrary to the agreement with the Russians, to the knowledge of the scientific community, there is no exploration or exploitation of uranium, ongoing or planned, in Venezuela. The scientist contended that, even if the Venezuelan government used all Cuban scientists, exploring for commercially viable uranium deposits in Venezuela would require a large taskforce and news of such an effort would leak quickly. END SUMMARY.
-------------------------------------------
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT POLITICAL THEATER
-------------------------------------------
2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told Econoff June 3 that the agreement between Venezuela and Russia on nuclear cooperation has no real substance. The agreement, signed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in November 2008, but approved and formally issued by Venezuela's National Assembly May 4, lays out cooperation between the Venezuelan Ministry of Energy and Petroleum and Russia's Rosatom in the following areas: 1. Basic Nuclear Research; 2. Controlled Thermonuclear Synthesis; 3. Development, design, construction and operation of nuclear reactors; 4. Industrial production of inputs and components for nuclear reactors; 5. Exploration and exploitation of uranium and thorium; 6. Infrastructure development for nuclear energy; and 7. the development of a legal framework in the sector.
3. (C) In a previous conversation XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the only part of the Russian agreement that had any potential might be the exploration and exploitation of thorium, as he believes Venezuela has significant deposits of that resource (Ref A). XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized that as to the rest of the agreement, meaningful cooperation is not possible. All Venezuela is currently capable of, he argued, is the purchase of finished materials and technology.
--------------------------------------------- -----
URANIUM EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION NOT HAPPENING
--------------------------------------------- -----
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX bluntly discounted the idea of cooperation with the Russians on uranium exploration and exploitation, as well as rumors that Venezuela is providing Venezuelan uranium to assist other countries (i.e. Iran) with "atomic bombs." (Note: International press reports citing an Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry document leaked May 25 alleged that Bolivia and Venezuela are supplying uranium to Iran. For a similar perspective from La Paz on the dubiousness of this claim, see Ref B.) XXXXXXXXXXXX added that former Venezuelan President of the Inter-American Commission on Atomic Energy Julio Cesar Pineda's May 8 statements to the press about Venezuela having more than 50,000 tons of uranium were "funny" and "not too clever."
5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that in the states of Merida and Trujillo, there might be uranium deposits ranging between 60 parts per million (ppm) and 2,000 ppm, with 200 ppm being the minimum for an economically viable deposit. He contended that no one could be sure, however, since the last meaningful study
CARACAS 00000728 002 OF 002
concluded in 1976. He noted that XXXXXXXXXXXX has conducted a "yellow cake" experiment with a few milligrams of Venezuelan uranium, but that it is impossible to extrapolate or even guess at the amount of uranium in Venezuela from such limited testing.
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that currently, as with all nuclear related materials, if Venezuela had a need for refined uranium, it would make much more economic sense to simply buy it rather than try to produce it itself. For political reasons, however, the government could decide to refine uranium anyway, XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested. He claimed that no Venezuelan scientists would be involved in such a decision as the Chavez administration "does not trust scientists." Nevertheless, he added, there is no indication of any interest on the part of the government to resume uranium exploration or exploitation.
7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the last uranium exploration effort involved multiple labs and more than 30 scientists. Such a major undertaking would not be easy to hide for long, he said, even if the government avoided using Venezuelan scientists and opted instead for a 100 percent foreign team consisting primarily of Cuban members. Additionally, there are only three labs in Venezuela that could measure whether or not uranium concentrations are high enough to exploit. All three labs, including the one at USB, XXXXXXXXXXXX reluctantly admitted, either have broken equipment or no nitrogen. None of the three, he said, could currently participate in such a study.
-------
COMMENT
-------
8. (C) Although rumors that Venezuela is providing Iran with Venezuelan produced uranium may help burnish the government's revolutionary credentials, there seems to be little basis in reality to the claims. Similar to the conclusions drawn by La Paz in Ref B, it is highly unlikely that Venezuela is providing Venezuelan uranium to third countries. At one point, Venezuela may have been able to make good on Chavez's claims that it would purchase multi-billion dollar nuclear power plants from the Russians, but even that type of "nuclear cooperation" is doubtful due to the Venezuelan government's current financial difficulties.
CAULFIELD
Friday, 22 January 2010, 15:14
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 000069
SIPDIS
ENERGY FOR CDAY AND ALOCKWOOD
HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
TREASURY FOR MKACZMAREK
NSC FOR DRESTREPO AND LROSSELLO
USDOC FOR 4332 MAC/ITA/WH/JLAO
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/01/22
TAGS ECON, EFIN, VE
SUBJECT: Venezuela's Economy in 2010: A Difficult and Uncertain Year
REF: 10 CARACAS 9; 09 CARACAS 1374; 10 CARACAS 27; 10 CARACAS 39 10 CARACAS 35; 10 CARACAS 5
CLASSIFIED BY: CAULFIELD, CDA, DOS, CDA; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) Summary: 2010 is shaping up to be another bad year for Venezuela economically. After oil prices fell in the second half of 2008, Venezuela's bubble burst and the economy contracted 2.9 percent in 2009. Analysts' predictions for growth in 2010 range from anemic growth of 1.4 percent to a contraction of up to 3.4 percent. This range reflects a number of key unknowns, including the extent and economic impact of the electricity crisis, how the January 11 devaluation and related changes in the foreign exchange regime play out, the efficiency and effectiveness of what is almost surely to be increased fiscal spending, the pace of President Chavez's march toward socialism, and the potential for social and political volatility. Mounting economic problems have contributed to a decline in Chavez's popularity, which is an important reason Chavez agreed to a devaluation that would substantially increase government revenues and permit massive spending prior to the September legislative elections. Chavez is betting that short term measures can delay the long term consequences of his ill-conceived policies. End summary.
2009: The Year the Bubble Burst
2. (C) Venezuela's bubble burst in 2009. From 2004 through 2008, government spending, fueled by high oil prices, triggered a boom in consumption that led to growth rates of 10.3 percent in 2005 and 2006, 8.4 percent in 2007, and 4.8 percent in 2008. This populist economic model was sustainable as long as oil prices continued to rise and even showed its underlying vulnerabilities when oil prices reached their peak in July 2008. The rapid fall in oil prices from July to December 2008 (from 129 to 32 USD per barrel for the Venezuelan basket) created a serious fiscal problem for the Venezuelan government (GBRV) in 2009, leading it to cut spending in real terms and issue a significant amount of debt. A decline in consumption followed, and Venezuela's GDP contracted 2.9 percent in 2009. With little incentive for private sector investment in tradable goods, manufacturing was particularly hard hit, falling 7.2 percent in 2009. Only the gradual but steady rise in oil prices over the course of 2009 prevented a bad situation from turning far worse.
Growth Outlook for 2010: Continued Recession or at Best Anemic Growth
3. (C) Forecasts by local and international analysts for GDP growth in Venezuela in 2010 range from 1.4 percent (Ecoanalitica, a local consulting firm) to a contraction of 3.4 percent (the Economist Intelligence Unit). Perhaps the only thing analysts can agree on is that if there is growth it will be anemic, slower than Venezuela's population growth rate of 1.6 percent. This variation in forecasts does not, as one might expect in an oil economy, come from different forecasts of oil price or production. Most analysts believe the price will be in the USD 70-80 per barrel range for the Venezuelan basket in 2010 and many predict a slight decrease in production (see Ref A for post's oil sector outlook). Instead, we believe this variation derives largely from different perspectives on unknowns relating to Venezuela's unique economic and political environment that have an important bearing on the economy. Relevant questions include the extent and economic impact of the electricity crisis (which itself could impact oil production), how the January 11 devaluation and related changes in the foreign exchange system will play out, the efficiency and effectiveness of
CARACAS 00000069 002 OF 004
what is almost surely to be increased fiscal spending, the pace of President Chavez's march toward socialism, and the potential for social and political volatility. The price of oil, of course, will continue to be a determining factor.
GBRV Economic Strategy for 2010: Devaluation and Increased Fiscal Spending
4. (C) Parliamentary elections scheduled for September are shaping up as the key political event for 2010. For this reason, local analysts have long expected increased fiscal spending to be a key part of the GBRV's economic strategy. Thanks largely to the fall in oil prices and the associated fall in GBRV revenue, fiscal spending appears to have fallen in real terms in 2009 after increasing 111 percent in real terms from 2004 to 2008. PDVSA's social spending also appears to have dropped significantly in 2009. (Note: These statements are based on GBRV budget figures [including additional credits] for 2009 and PDVSA's June 2009 financial statement. Off-budget spending from quasifiscal funds plays an important role in GBRV spending but is impossible to measure. End note.)
5. (C) The January 11 devaluation, which will provide a massive revenue boost in bolivars to PDVSA and the GBRV, indicates the importance President Chavez places on increasing spending in 2010 as a means to stimulate the economy and fund his party's election campaign. As respected local consultancy Sintesis Financiera put it, "Chavez's decision [to devalue] reflects his judgment that the benefit of making significant amounts of money immediately available to the government to fund the 2010 campaign...outweighs the political cost of being blamed for inflation and recession." Both Sintesis Financiera and Ecoanalitica estimated the devaluation will provide a net increase in fiscal revenue to the central government in 2010 of approximately Bs 80 billion (the equivalent of USD 30 or 18 billion, depending on which official exchange rate one uses). The GBRV and PDVSA have other mechanisms on which they can rely to close any remaining deficits, including domestic bond issuances for the GBRV and, thanks to a recent legal reform, Central Bank financing for both. In other words, the GBRV will have the resources to significantly ramp up spending in 2010.
6. (C) The devaluation and increased spending are not panaceas for restoring growth, however. We expect the GBRV to increase public sector salaries, to seek to revitalize existing or create new social programs targeted at Chavez's political base, and to pour money into electoral campaigns. (Note: On January 15 Chavez announced minimum wage increases of 10 percent in March and 15 percent in September. End note.) The impact these measures will have on growth is a major question. As the experience of health program Barrio Adentro indicates (ref B), many social programs are in decline; on the other hand, a pollster recently told Emboffs his company's data from November 2009 showed a slight uptick in the penetration and perceived effectiveness of social programs, which he attributed largely to a new program targeted at Caracas barrios (septel). While it provides the revenue for a fiscal stimulus, the devaluation will likely increase inflation (thereby putting downward pressure on purchasing power and real demand) and could dampen certain import-dependent economic activity. Confusion related to how the new two-tiered official exchange rate will work may also take a small toll on growth. As noted in ref C, we doubt the change in relative prices brought about by the devaluation will be sufficient to stimulate local production in any significant way.
Controlling Inflation: BCV Intervention and Coercion
CARACAS 00000069 003 OF 004
7. (C) The devaluation has caused some local analysts to raise their predictions for 2010 inflation from 30-35 percent to 35-50 percent. President Chavez and his government are clearly worried about the potential for increased inflation and seem to have three strategies for dealing with it. First, by offering a preferential rate for imports deemed essential, the GBRV is hoping to contain price increases in basic goods. Second, the Venezuelan Central Bank (BCV) has unveiled and begun to implement a long-anticipated strategy to manage the parallel foreign exchange rate (ref D), used by many importers when they cannot get access to one of the official exchange rates. Finally, President Chavez has threatened businesses that raise prices with expropriation, and the GBRV's consumer protection agency has conducted a well-publicized campaign of "inspections" of businesses suspected of raising prices. Taken together, these measures may well keep inflation at the lower end of the 35-50 percent range, but they also introduce additional distortions, may lead to shortages in some cases, and do not create a more positive climate for investment.
Other Key Unknowns: Electricity Crisis and the March Toward Socialism
8. (C) The two-pronged electricity crisis Venezuela is currently experiencing is clearly having an impact on Venezuela's economy. Problems resulting from years of underinvestment in transmission, distribution, and new generation capacity have been mounting over the past several years (ref E). On top of these problems, an El Nino-related drought in southeastern Venezuela has forced the GBRV to begin to reduce generation at the hydroelectric dams that supply Venezuela with 70 percent of its power. The GBRV has shut down production lines at energy intensive state-owned steel and aluminum producers and begun to ration electricity throughout the country. We have not seen a credible estimate of the likely impact of this crisis on real GDP, but it could be significant if rains come later or in lesser volume than normal. The electricity crisis is a symbol of the consequences of the GBRV's economic model, which values spending with direct and immediate political impact over longer-term investment and institution building. We expect mounting infrastructure and services problems in other areas, particularly as state and municipal governments, which provide many services, have seen their budgets progressively cut in real terms.
9. (C) The pace of President Chavez's march toward socialism will also have an impact on economic growth. State control over the economy is increasing, whether directly through nationalizations or indirectly through increased regulations or measures such as the devaluation (which gives public sector entities access to a preferential rate for imports and thus a further competitive advantage). Given institutional weaknesses and the priority put on political over economic results, increased state control has often translated into lower and/or more inefficient production, as the case of the basic industries in Guayana clearly shows (ref F). Over the past three years, the GBRV has nationalized important companies in the oil, oilfield services, electricity, telecommunications, cement, banking, food production and distribution, and steel sectors, among others. The mostly negative economic consequences of nationalizations across key sectors and other instances of state intervention will continue to play out in 2010, and if Chavez increases the pace of the transition toward socialism the economic impact could be even greater.
A Complex Feedback Loop: the Economy and the Social and Political Situation
CARACAS 00000069 004 OF 004
10. (C) Small-scale protests, often related to economic or infrastructure issues, are common throughout Venezuela. According to a political economist who has studied the 1989 "Caracazo", a more generalized and violent social uprising whose proximate trigger was an increase in gasoline prices, current social, political, and economic conditions are such that more generalized protests are possible today, though he cautioned that there was no way to predict whether (or when and how) they might actually take place. A deepening of the electricity crisis and further contraction of the economy could further heighten underlying social tensions. President Chavez, for his part, is acutely aware of the impact the country's general economic trajectory has had on his popularity. As evidenced by his decision to terminate an unpopular electricity rationing plan in Caracas and his appointment of Ali Rodriguez as electricity minister, he is obviously concerned about the potential political impact of the electricity crisis. If the electricity crisis deepens and increased spending does not stimulate the economy - or, specifically, reward his supporters - enough to compensate for the negative effects of the devaluation, President Chavez could face more serious political difficulties. Were the opposition more organized and united, he almost certainly would. CAULFIELD
Thursday, 15 October 2009, 21:59
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001333
SIPDIS
ENERGY FOR ALOCKWOOD AND LEINSTEIN, DOE/EIA FOR MCLINE
HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
TREASURY FOR MKACZMAREK
COMMERCE FOR 4332/MAC/WH/JLAO
NSC FOR DRESTREPO AND LROSSELLO
EO 12958 DECL: 10/15/2019
TAGS EPET, EINV, ENRG, ECON, VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA: AMBASSADOR VIEWS ECONOMIC SITUATION IN
ZULIA
REF: A. CARACAS 1130 B. CARACAS 1129 C. CARACAS 854
CARACAS 00001333 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Economic Counselor Darnall Steuart, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador traveled to the State of Zulia October 4-7 and met with a range of political, private sector, and business leaders. This cable highlights the economic messages delivered to him by the business community. It reinforces reftels that point to decreased private sector investment in Venezuela, growing difficulties in doing business, the loss of a profit/production motive on the part of PDVSA (the government,s largest source of revenue), and the on-going negative impact of oil field services company expropriations. END SUMMARY.
The Petroleum Industry
----------------------
2. (C) The Ambassador met with Chevron and visited a manufacturing facility owned by leading U.S. oil field services company Baker Hughes. Their comments on a number of issues affecting the oil industry follow.
A. (C) PROFITS AND FINANCE: XXXXXXXXXXXX , ChevronXXXXXXXXXXXX told the Ambassador XXXXXXXXXXXX that the company's two Maracaibo joint ventures (JV ) Petroboscan and Petroindependiente) with PDVSA are profitable ) especially since Chevron is not investing new funds. He confided that although the JVs owe over $100 million to various service companies, Chevron is withdrawing profits through a deal to take crude oil shipments from Petroboscan to its Pascagoula refinery in Alabama. In contrast to Chevron's perspective, Baker HughesXXXXXXXXXXXX confided to the Ambassador that PDVSA continues to owe the company $100 million, even though it paid $70 million in early September (Ref B). Of $12 million in foreign exchange requests pending with CADIVI, Venezuela,s foreign currency control board, BHI has received approvals for only $700,000.
B. (C) OPERATIONS: XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed that BHI's strategy continues to be to minimize its exposure; it is not investing in Venezuela (Ref A). XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that XXXXXXXXXXXX had, in fact, received a congratulatory message from BHI corporate headquarters for not growing the business (and increasing its risk exposure). He explained how BHI has been able to maintain Maracaibo as a regional production center, in spite of the challenges created by the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,s (GBRV) economic policies and regulatory environment. As an example, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that BHI buys all of its steel from its Houston headquarters, but is not charged for it, effectively providing local operations with a subsidy to support operations.
In Chevron,s case, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that PDVSA is pressuring the company to reduce the number of Chevron secondees assigned to the Petroboscan and PetroIndependiente JVs as each one of them costs five times the amount of a locally hired Venezuelan. He added that Petroboscan used to have five maintenance drill rigs operating, but today has only two ) effectively limiting its ability to maintain crude production levels. Additionally, Petroboscan only has one rig drilling new wells.
C. (C) OIL FIELD SERVICES: XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the situation in regards to oil services in western Venezuela has changed significantly. Equipment conditions have deteriorated drastically since the May expropriations of nearly 80 service companies. XXXXXXXXXXXX recounted that two weeks before he had taken a barge out to supervise the repair of a couple of offshore wells; he was surprised at the terrible state of safety and maintenance issues on the now PDVSA-operated vessel. In addition, some well maintenance services are no longer available. He attributed this to an internal PDVSA
CARACAS 00001333 002.2 OF 003
dynamic (i.e., PDVSA Exploration and Production has contractually locked up any available service providers before PDVSA CVP ) the entity that manages the joint ventures )is able to secure services).
Baker Hughes, XXXXXXXXXXXX shared that doing business in Venezuela is increasingly difficult, noting that where there used to be seven steps required to export a container from Venezuela, there are now over thirty steps imposed by GBRV agencies. XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed that BHI has removed higher-technology assets from Venezuela. As an example, BHI has exported seven high-technology pumps (leaving three in country), each valued at $500,000, from Venezuela. BHI also exported a coiled tubing unit from Venezuela.
D. (C) PRODUCTION: Reflecting on the January 2009 GBRV-ordered OPEC quota production cuts at Petroboscan, XXXXXXXXXXXX shared that the JV has lost upwards of 15,000 b/d of production since being ordered by PDVSA to re-activate the field to pre-cut production levels of 115,000 b/d. He stated that Chevron's internal estimate for Venezuelan crude production is between 2.1 and 2.3 million b/d, with approximately 1.3 million b/d going to the U.S., 800,000 b/d consumed in Venezuela, and 300-400,000 b/d (of crude petroleum and refined product) exported to Cuba and Petrocaribe members. Responding to a question from the Ambassador about whether PDVSA is aware of the negative impact on production that expropriations and mismanagement missteps are bound to have, XXXXXXXXXXXX offered that crude oil production is no longer the standard by which PDVSA judges performance (Ref C).
3. (C) A tour of "Fire School de Venezuela," a private academic institution (affiliated with the Texas A&M University System) that provides both municipal firefighters and oil company and oil service company personnel with firefighting and other emergency service training, provided the Ambassador with additional insight on PDVSA operations. XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Ambassador that PDVSA sends employees to the school for certification courses. However, both XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX
The Business Sector
-------------------
4. (C) Members of XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Ambassador that the private sector's inability to repatriate dividends and increasing security concerns impede efforts to attract foreign direct investment. The board members added that it is difficult to maintain current investment as the rules of the game are constantly changing. They asked the Ambassador for help in developing programs based on best practices from U.S. cities that have overcome similar problems (such as crime), and specifically programs that involve local government partnership with the private sector and civil society. The Ambassador offered that there are many examples in U.S. cities, such as Boston, Washington, DC, New York, and Atlanta and that the Embassy would pursue with XXXXXXXXXXXX.
5.(C) The Ambassador also attended a dinner hosted by the Zulia chapter of the Venezuelan-American Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber participants echoed well-known concerns regarding the difficulties with the CADIVI foreign exchange controls and voiced caution regarding the use of the parallel permuta rate because they do not want to be seen as possibly operating on the margins of Venezuelan law. A XXXXXXXXXXXX manufacturer mentioned that he is no longer able to import material from Europe using CADIVI. He fears his production
CARACAS 00001333 003.2 OF 003
costs will significantly erode his company's competitiveness if he imports the fabric using the permuta exchange market. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed to know people who had been victims of extortion or kidnapping plots by Colombian guerrillas. 8. (C) COMMENT: This was the Ambassador's first trip to Zulia since returning to Venezuela after being declared persona non grata in September 2008. The one-year gap in visits provided a dramatic snapshot of the deteriorating economic situation in Venezuela. The two perspectives on doing business in Venezuela presented by Chevron and BHI underline the private sector's difficult situation -- faced with increased risk, companies are not investing in operations but are seeking ways to maintain a market presence given the tremendous opportunities that may yet exist in Venezuela,s oil sector. END COMMENT. DUDDY
Thursday, 04 February 2010, 17:50
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000147
SIPDIS
ENERGY FOR ALOCKWOOD AND LEINSTEIN, DOE/EIA FOR MCLINE
HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
TREASURY FOR MKACZMAREK
COMMERCE FOR 4332/MAC/WH/JLAO
NSC FOR DRESTREPO AND LROSSELLO
OPIC FOR BSIMONEN-MORENO
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/02/04
TAGS EPET, EINV, ENRG, ECON, VE
SUBJECT: Venezuela: Insights into Recent PDVSA Activity from
Mitsubishi
REF: CARACAS 11; 09 CARACAS 495
CLASSIFIED BY: Darnall Steuart, Economic Counselor, DOS, Econ; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: According to a source in Mitsubishi XXXXXXXXXXXX, PDVSA is seeking to close at least $13 billion in finance deals. Senior PDVSA officials are reportedly upset over the failure to solicit bids from international companies for the Mariscal Sucre offshore natural gas project; PDVSA announced it would develop the resources on its own. Energy Minister Ramirez is traveling to Moscow, Beijing, and Japan in an attempt to move other projects forward. Shortage of natural gas is forcing PDVSA to prioritize projects and slow-down or cancel projects in the pipeline. The Vice Minister of Energy and Petroleum for Petrochemicals reportedly is not honoring any natural gas commitments made prior to his assumption of the post. Petrochemical projects in the Jose condominium are working to secure an electricity generation capacity in the face of the current crisis. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) PDVSA Finance: Petroleum AttachC) met with Mitsubishi XXXXXXXXXXXX on XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX spoke freely on a range of issues impacting the energy sector. His comments on the bids in the extra heavy crude Carabobo Round are reported in septel. With respect to PDVSA's financing needs, XXXXXXXXXXXX shared that PDVSA is seeking to close several international financing deals, including an $8 billion offer from the "Icc Consortium," a $1.5 billion loan from Deutsche Bank for a power plant, and a $1.5 billion corporate line of credit from Banco Espirito Santo (BES).
3. (C) Mariscal Sucre: On Wednesday, January 20, in a signing ceremony for the petroleum workers' new collective bargaining agreement, President Chavez announced that PDVSA would develop the Mariscal Sucre offshore natural gas fields independently. The bid round failed to attract any international interest. [NOTE: During the ceremony, Minister of Energy and Petroleum Rafael Ramirez also announced that PDVSA would develop the Junin 10 block of the Faja on its own, effectively eliminating Statoil and Total from continued participation. The range of costs involved in other Junin projects with international oil companies are between $16 billion and $25 billion. Chevron XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested to PetAtt on January 29 that neither company was willing to pay PDVSA a bonus to be awarded the block and that PDVSA "kicked" them out as a temporary negotiating measure. END NOTE] XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that privately, senior PDVSA leadership is extremely upset with the failure of international companies to register bids. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that Mitsubishi sent a letter to PDVSA explaining why the conditions offered by Venezuela were insufficient and what would need to be changed to make a bid commercially viable. XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested the obstacle to Mitsubishi's bid was the expected price for natural gas that participating companies would receive from the GBRV (GBRV wants to buy natural gas for $1.25/million cubic foot and international companies are looking for a price above $3/million cubic feet). Estimates published in local media put Mariscal Sucre development costs at over $8 billion.
4. (C) Ramirez Travel: After receiving last second permission from President Chavez to add a stop in Tokyo onto his current travel plans, Energy and Petroleum Minister Ramirez is currently in Moscow and will be in Beijing through February 3. He is scheduled to meet with private sector and Japanese government officials in Tokyo on February 4 and 5. XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated that Ramirez's goal in Moscow would be to advance the Russian petroleum consortium's Junin
CARACAS 00000147 002 OF 002
project. In Beijing, XXXXXXXXXXXX expected Ramirez to focus on "bringing CNPC" back in line and advancing the various Chinese heavy oil projects in the Faja. XXXXXXXXXXXX believed Ramirez's stop in Tokyo would be designed to seek additional financing for PDVSA, to advance the Junin 11 reserve certification study (Ref B), and to reprimand the Japanese companies for not submitting bids in the Mariscal Sucre bid round.
5. (C) Jose Petroleum and Petrochemical Condominium: XXXXXXXXXXXX mentioned that the private sector petrochemical tenants have all been given contradictory information regarding possible electricity rationing measures that Pequiven will execute. None of his interlocutors had heard of possible electricity rationing in Jose's petroleum upgraders. XXXXXXXXXXXX shared that Mitsubishi is organizing a joint lease of a 25-30 MW electricity barge that could be brought in on a 2-3 year contract. Mitsubishi believes this size generator could satisfy all of the petrochemical company electricity requirements.
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Mitsubishi is also trying to confirm the supply of natural gas from PDSVA to Pequiven and its mixed company enterprises in Jose. Mitsubishi financed a methane plant whose construction is expected to be completed within two months. The Japanese firm has a contract with Pequiven and an additional "back-to-back" contract with PDVSA to supply natural gas to Pequiven for the mixed company. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Vice Minister for Petrochemicals (and PDVSA Vice President for Refining, Trade, and Supply) Asdrubal Chavez reportedly told another Japanese firm recently that any natural gas supply deal signed before he assumed his current position at the Ministry is invalid and that it was not in PDVSA's interests. The other Japanese firm has been working for several years to finalize an olefins project in Jose.
7. (C) COMMENT: PDVSA's reported search for loans, lines of credit, and bonus payments for new production companies suggests it continues to suffer from a lack of liquidity. The failed Mariscal Sucre natural gas bid round represents a significant setback for PDVSA. That Russian and Chinese national oil companies did not submit bids in Carabobo suggests the Minister's travel is to ensure support from "like-minded" countries and to avoid new public setbacks. PDVSA's search for financing and credit, a failed natural gas bid round, a (to date) inconclusive Carabobo round signal, as well as the company's 2009 expropriations of petroleum service companies and on-going service company arrears (estimated to exceed $8 billion), signal that PDVSA has much work to do to turn its fortunes around. Unfortunately, it appears that its management may not be up to the task. END COMMENT. DUDDY
Wednesday, 10 February 2010, 22:10
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000163
SIPDIS
ENERGY FOR ALOCKWOOD AND LEINSTEIN, DOE/EIA FOR MCLINE
HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
TREASURY FOR MKACZMAREK
COMMERCE FOR 4332/MAC/WH/JLAO
NSC FOR DRESTREPO AND LROSSELLO
OPIC FOR BSIMONEN-MORENO
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/02/10
TAGS EPET, EINV, ENRG, ECON, IT, VE
SUBJECT: Venezuela: Italian Ambassador Briefs on Eni Oil Deals
CLASSIFIED BY: Darnall Steuart, Economic Counselor, DOS, Econ; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Italy's Eni stands to become possibly the second largest international oil company operating in Venezuela as a result of deals signed at the end of January, according to Italian Ambassador Luigi Maccotta. It has agreed to develop the extra heavy crude Junin 5 block, to build an upgrader and a 1,000 MW power plant, and to transfer proprietary heavy oil technology to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (GBRV). The Italian government is interested in the U.S. perspective on Venezuela's growing ties with Iran and Eni's CEO plans to brief NSA Jones on the Italian company's activities in Iran in a March visit to Washington. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) At Italian Ambassador Luigi Maccotta's (protect) request, the Ambassador met him February 4 to discuss the January 28 visit of Eni XXXXXXXXXXXX to Venezuela. Maccotta stated that the press generally covered all the points regarding the various energy deals agreed to by the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MENPET) and Eni, which included:
B7 A memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the development of the Junin 5 extra heavy oil block in the Orinoco heavy oil belt (and the creation of a mixed company (60% PDVSA/40% Eni).
o The mixed company expects to produce approximately 240,000 b/d of extra heavy crude (8.5B0 API).
B7 An MOU to create a mixed company to refine production from Junin 5 and the PetroMonagas joint venture (a 60-40 split mixed company involving PDVSA and BP) (350,000 b/d) with an investment of $9.3 billion. The basic engineering would begin this year with operational startup slated for 2016.
B7 An MOU for the development of a 1,000 MW combined cycle power plant at the CIGMA complex in Guiria.
B7 An MOU on the transfer of proprietary Eni heavy oil production technology.
B7 Maccotta disputed press reports that Eni had paid a $646 million bonus to PDVSA, saying that Eni had agreed to a $300 million bonus, which will not actually be paid given that PDVSA owes Eni nearly $1 billion.
Maccotta speculated that once these projects move forward, with the exception of Chevron, Eni will be the international oil company with the largest operations in Venezuela. Maccotta told Petroleum AttachC) following the meeting that Italy's OPIC-equivalent agency, SACE, is not involved in the financing of the Eni deals.
3. (C) Ambassador Maccotta shared that the XXXXXXXXXXXX trip was originally scheduled for XXXXXXXXXXXX, but then "Honduras happened" and Italy found itself on the "wrongside" of the GBRV. At Minister Ramirez's insistence, the signing ceremony was rescheduled for January 26, but XXXXXXXXXXXX changed it to January 28 to reinforce the GBRV's need for Eni. Maccotta shared that the GBRV had rejected Eni's proposed changes to the terms and conditions of the oil deals, but 30 minutes before the ceremony was supposed to begin, XXXXXXXXXXXX told Ramirez, "take it or leave it, I can get on my plane and move on." Ramirez apparently used that half an hour to convince President Chavez to accept all of Eni's proposed changes or risk losing the deal.
CARACAS 00000163 002 OF 002
Venezuelan-Italian Mixed Commission
4. (C) Maccotta also previewed Italy's agenda for the May Venezuela-Italian Mixed Commission meetings. Of the 76 oil services companies located in Zulia state that were expropriated on May 8, 2009, roughly 30 were owned by Italian citizens or descendents of Italian immigrants. (Note: No compensation has yet been paid for these expropriations. End Note) Additionally, Italy wants to discuss GBRV land seizures and approximately $1.2 billion in pending foreign exchange approvals for Italian-owned companies.
5. (C) The Ambassadors also shared current perspectives on the economic-political situation of Venezuela and U.S.-Venezuelan bilateral relations. Maccotta inquired as to U.S. perspectives on the growing relationship between Iran and Venezuela and noted that ENI XXXXXXXXXXXX is expected to meet with NSA Jones in Washington, DC in March to discuss Eni's activities in Iran.
6. (C) COMMENT: It is unclear what bonus Eni really paid PDVSA, but it is interesting that regardless of the figure, PDVSA likely will not see any cash flow in the immediate future due to its $1 billion debt to the Italian company. The timing of the Eni-GBRV ceremony was also curious as it fell on the same day MENPET received bids in the Carabobo bid round. Perhaps Minister Ramirez needed to close a high-profile deal following the GBRV's January 20 announcements of its failure to move the Total/Statoil oil projects in Junin 10 forward and the failed Mariscal Sucre natural gas bid round. END COMMENT. DUDDY
Tuesday, 02 June 2009, 14:42
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000641
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/29/2029
TAGS PREL, ECON, EAIR, MASS, SENV, AMGT, VZ, AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON FM TAIANA
REF: (A) BUENOS AIRES 0498 (B) BUENOS AIRES 0632 (C) STATE 48493
Classified By: Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).
1. (C) Summary and introduction: Argentine FM Jorge Taiana told the Ambassador, during the latter's May 28 farewell call, that the GOA had no intention of following Venezuela's lead on expropriations. Taiana expressed concern about the visit of a team from the FAA and the prospect (which has since receded) of a downgrade in the rating of Argentina's civil aviation regime. The Ambassador updated Taiana on MOD efforts to find new office space for the U.S. Military Group. Taiana (protect) said he knows that Argentina, in a recent submission regarding its Antarctic claim, left out the language that was agreed with the USG and other key governments in 2004 (ref C), but claimed the current electoral climate in Argentina had made it impossible to submit such specific language due to the Malvinas/Falklands issue's continued prominence here. The Ambassador complained to Taiana that an Argentine judicial investigation was inadvertently holding up the re-exportation of cars belonging to American diplomats. The Ambassador urged resolution of Paris Club and private bondholder debts. Ref B reports discussion of Cuba issue at the OAS General Assembly. End summary.
Venezuela's Hugo Chavez
-----------------------
2. (C) The Ambassador indirectly asked if the the Argentine business community's alarm regarding the latest wave of Venezuelan expropriations (including several affecting Argentina's Techint conglomerate) was giving the GOA pause about Chavez. Taiana stressed that no one senior in the GOA -- neither CFK, other ministers or Nestor Kirchner -- wanted to follow Chavez's lead on expropriations. Taiana said Peron had already gone through a nationalization phase in the 1940s, and the country had learned its lesson. Argentina may favor a larger state role in the economy than does the United States, but it still values the private sector and recognizes the primacy of private property for propelling economic growth and development. The GOA does not agree with what Chavez was doing, Taiana reiterated. (Comment: These comments tracked with Interior Minister Randazzo's public comments on the week of May 25 that Chavez's expropriations were "pre-Peronist. End comment.)
Civair
------
3. (C) Taiana said he was concerned about the visit of a team from the FAA and the possibility of a downgrade in Argentina's International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA). He noted that the transition from military to civilian control of air traffic had been wrenching, with the military trying to hold on to power. He said he hoped the FAA assessment did not blow up publicly into a divisive issue. The Ambassador noted that none of the FAA's recommendations was difficult or unfeasible. (NOTE: An FAA team was in Argentina May 27-29, completing the IASA evaluation begun in March, 2009. While official results have yet to be released, an informal readout from the team leader indicates that Argentina will maintain its IASA Category I status. The FAA provided similar information to GoA civil aviation authorities.)
Military Group
--------------
4. (C) Taiana asked if the Ministry of Defense had offered the U.S. Military Group alternate office space (per ref A discussion). The Ambassador acknowledged the MOD had made an offer, and that one Military Group component located at MOD headquarters had moved out of that building to the Embassy. The Ambassador explained that two other Military Group components currently located at Air Force and Navy facilities were hoping for a temporary reprieve pending a fuller discussion of updating the 1964 agreement at joint U.S.-Argentine talks in October. Taiana asked to be kept informed of developments.
Antarctic
---------
5. (C) Taiana (protect) said he knows that Argentina, in the data it submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regarding its Antarctic claim, left out the specific language that was agreed with the USG and other key governments in 2004 (ref C). He claimed that the current electoral climate in Argentina had made it impossible to submit such language with the GOA data. Doing so would have subjected the GOA to a storm of criticism for its "surrender" of Argentine claims, and resulted in his removal from office. "But if you read our submission carefully, you'll see our language respects all Antarctic Treaty provisions," he said, quickly adding that the prime issue for Argentina, of course, was not Antarctica, but protecting its claim to sovereignty over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.
POVs
----
6. (C) The Ambassador explained to Taiana that an Argentine judge investigating abuse by others of diplomatic importation of vehicles had seized documents, effectively holding up the export of privately owned vehicles (POVs) belonging to American diplomats who had served in Argentina and are now posted elsewhere. The Ambassador said Washington was very concerned and looking into reciprocity measures. Taiana said he was not aware of this latest development and would look into it. (The Ambassador subsequently signed a letter to the investigating judge, to be transmitted through the MFA, which explains our serious concerns and seeks positive action.)
Paris Club
----------
7. (C) The Ambassador told Taiana that he had advised President Kirchner the night before (ref B) that resolution of Paris Club and private bondholder debts is clearly in Argentina's long-term interest. Taiana agreed the GOA needed to find a way to resolve the matter, and the Ambassador noted that Planning Minister De Vido and others in the GOA seemed to be moving toward that position as well.
WAYNE
Friday, 19 February 2010, 23:28
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000061
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR P, WHA
NSC FOR RESTREPO
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/02/19
TAGS PREL, XM, BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR'S MEETINGS WITH SENIOR PRESIDENTIAL
ADVISORS
REF: BRASILIA 45
CLASSIFIED BY: Thomas A. Shannon, Ambassador, State, Embassy Brasilia; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) Summary. During separate meetings at the Presidential Palace, Foreign Policy Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia and Presidential Chief of Staff Gilberto Carvalho discussed with Ambassador Shannon their interest in working together on a range of regional and global issues, including Honduras, Venezuela, Haiti, and non-proliferation issues. Garcia and Carvalho were impressed with the wide range of high-level USG visits to Brazil over the next month, and were eager at the prospect of increased dialogue with the USG on critical issues. Garcia was interested in finding a strategy to rehabilitate former Honduran President Manuel Zelaya; he also reacted favorably to suggestions that the United States is open to discussion with the Government of Venezuela if the right interlocutors could be found. Carvalho was particularly interested in discussing long-range cooperation in Haiti. End summary.
Honduras
2. (C) Marco Aurelio Garcia, Lula's highly influential Foreign Policy Advisor, steered the conversation in his February 8 meeting toward Latin America, his primary focus. He opened with the need for a "certain rehabilitation" of former President Manuel Zelaya, which he did not define in detail but characterized as "a little more than amnesty." Garcia recognized that Zelaya is essentially conservative but argued that, as a catalyst of a popular movement in Honduras, resentment regarding his dismissal will continue and can potentially destabilize Honduras long-term if it is not addressed. In response to comments by the Ambassador that President Lobo is open to re-establishing normal diplomatic channels with Brazil, Garcia took on a conciliatory tone and acknowledged that some degree of communication with Lobo - "an exchange of notes" - has already taken place.
Venezuela
3. (C) Garcia characterized Venezuela as having deep domestic economic problems, particularly with regard to energy supply. He believed that President Chavez would be forced to step back substantially from the "foreign policy of oil" in order to attend to domestic concerns. He emphasized that Lula tells Chavez regularly that Venezuela "needs to escape from oil." Brazil is willing to help, Garcia said, by providing agricultural assistance to the GOV and support in building Venezuela's hydroelectric capacity, among other areas.
4. (C) Ambassador Shannon said that Venezuela's problems were increasingly intractable, and that the internal domestic problems they were generating were pushing Chavez toward more authoritarianism and repression. He noted that our efforts at outreach had all been rebuffed by Chavez, and that the lack of any reliable interlocutors made dialogue with Venezuela almost impossible. Garcia asked if the United States was still interested in dialogue. The Ambassador said yes. Garcia was visibly intrigued by this, indicating that Brazil could be of assistance in this area.
Bolivia, Colombia, Chile
5. (C) Garcia spoke favorably about Bolivia's economy and government, and made the case that President Morales is more moderate than his words or image indicate. He downplayed any current tension between Bolivia and Brazil on hydrocarbons or other issues and suggested that Bolivia under Morales should not be viewed as a concern for either the U.S. or Brazil. The Ambassador noted that the United States and Bolivia had negotiated a draft bilateral framework agreement, but that the Morales government was unprepared to move forward on the agreement at this time. On Chile, Garcia opined that the victory of Sebastian Pinera opens the door for the right to take power, and that he foresees serious problems between Chile and Bolivia. He conceded that Colombian President Uribe will win again if he runs for re-election and that former Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos will probably win if Uribe doesn't run.
Haiti
6. (C) Haiti featured prominently in the Ambassador's meeting February 9 with Lula's personal Chief of Staff, Gilberto Carvalho. (Note: Carvalho, who has been Lula's Chief of Staff ever since entering the Presidency in 2003, normally focuses largely on Lula's schedule and on domestic political concerns. End note.) Speaking in terms that much resembled an earlier meeting between Ambassador Shannon and MRE Secretary General Patriota (reftel), Carvalho and the Ambassador talked about Haiti as an opportunity to provide a template for future joint U.S.-Brazil assistance efforts in the region, and also as a model for future UN post-disaster efforts. Carvalho agreed with the need for the United States and Brazil to prioritize plans for sustainable reconstruction strategy in the next stage of Haiti's recovery, and on the need to use security efforts to advance the development strategy in Haiti.
Visits and Coordination
7. (C) Carvalho and Garcia both spoke briefly about President Lula's upcoming international travel, including:
- Feb 22-25 (Cuba, Mexico-for the Summit of Latin American and Caribbean nations-El Salvador, Haiti)
- Mar 13-15 (Israel, Palestine, Jordan)
- Apr 13-14 (United States-for the Global Nuclear Security Summit)
- Mid-May (tentatively Iran, Russia, Spain)
Each responded favorably to suggestions of increased communication between the U.S. and Brazil at the executive level - including communication between President Lula and President Obama - both before and after official trips. Both were also impressed at the broad range of high-level USG visitors to Brazil planned for the next month. SHANNON
Tuesday, 09 February 2010, 18:49
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HAVANA 000084
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/CCA
EO 12958 DECL: 02/08/2020
TAGS ECON, EFIN, PREL, PGOV, CU
SUBJECT: KEY TRADING PARTNERS SEE NO BIG ECONOMIC REFORMS
IN 2010, AGREE CUBA'S FATE HINGES ON VENEZUELA
REF: A. 09 HAVANA 631 (GOC TELLS CUBANS TO FEND FOR THEMSELVES) B. 09 HAVANA 322 (...ANOTHER SPECIAL PERIOD?) C. 09 HAVANA 763 (NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSION)
HAVANA 00000084 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Principal Officer Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: There is little prospect of economic reform in 2010 despite an economic crisis that is expected to get even worse for Cuba in the next few years, according to key commercial specialists, economic officers and Cuba-watchers in Havana. Promised structural reforms remain on hold while the Cuban government wrings its hands in indecision, fearful of the political consequences of these long-overdue changes. The one potentially significant reform implemented in 2009, the leasing of idle land, has not been effective. The Cuban government (GOC) could be forced to speed up reforms in the event of a significant reduction of assistance from an increasingly unstable Venezuela. Otherwise, the GOC will continue to prioritize military-led control and aim for a slow, measured pace of reform focused on agriculture and import substitution. The Cuban people have grown accustomed to tough times and will respond to future government belt tightening with similar endurance. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) Pol/Econ Counselor hosted a breakfast with commercial and economic counselors from six of Cuba's seven largest trading partners, including China, Spain, Canada, (the U.S.), Brazil and Italy, plus key creditors France and Japan. These countries also represent most of the foreign companies investing in Cuba, with the notable exception of Venezuelan state-owned enterprises.
DIPLOMATS ARE MOSTLY PESSIMISTIC
--------------------------------
3. (C) The global financial crisis and the inability to service foreign debt will make the dire situation in Cuba even worse in 2010, according to EU diplomats. Brazil was a bit more optimistic noting that Cuba can still withstand more economic hardship. All diplomats agreed that Cuba could survive this year without substantial policy changes, but the financial situation could become fatal within 2-3 years. Italy said GOC contacts had suggested Cuba would become insolvent as early as 2011.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT: NO ROOM FOR IMPORT REDUCTIONS
--------------------------------------------- -------
4. (C) The GOC has responded to the crisis with calls to further reduce imports and increase domestic production. However, Spain argued there is little more room for Cuba to reduce its imports after a 37% reduction in 2009 as the increasing majority are now basic necessities like food and animal feed. (Note: press reports February 9 that Cuba has cut rice imports from Vietnam, its largest supplier, by 11 percent for 2010. End Note.) Exports and other sources of foreign currency (tourism and remittances) are unlikely to increase substantially without a dramatic global turnaround, access to U.S. markets or an opening to U.S. tourists. Two-way trade with China alone in 2009 fell by close to $1 billion. Regarding increasing production, the only significant reform in the last five years, the leasing of idle land to improve agricultural production, has little chance of succeeding as implemented. The diplomats noted that many of the Cubans that were granted land have no farming experience, and the few farmers with experience have limited access to capital, tools and markets.
STILL DEFAULTING ON TRADE PARTNERS
----------------------------------
5. (C) Payment problems continue for all countries. Despite once again restructuring all of its official debt in 2009, Japan has yet to see any payments. Even China admitted to having problems getting paid on time and complained about
HAVANA 00000084 002.2 OF 004
Cuban requests to extend credit terms from one to four years. When France and Canada responded with "welcome to the club", China suggested Canada help secure payment from a Cuban joint venture that includes Canadian firm Sherritt International which is now reportedly receiving its share of profits.
AN UNWELCOMING ENVIRONMENT FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS
--------------------------------------------- ---
6. (C) Foreign investors have been treated poorly in Cuba and new investors will demand additional protections and guarantees, according to the French. The Chinese complained that the GOC's insistence on keeping majority control of all joint ventures makes no sense. "No matter whether a foreign business invests $10 million or $100 million, the GOC's investment will always add up to 51%," China's commercial counselor said in visible exasperation. He noted a joint venture to produce high-yield rice that produced a good first harvest but was not sustainable at the GOC-mandated prices. Brazilian investors are taking a longer term view on returns, however, noting some success in raising capital for the refurbishment of the port at Mariel.
MAJOR REFORMS ON HOLD
---------------------
7. (C) Despite the grave analysis, none of our contacts foresee meaningful economic reform in 2010. Immediate reform is neither necessary nor politically advisable since it has the potential of being too politically "destabilizing," said the Brazilian. Even reforms openly supported in the official press late last year (Ref A), such as the ending of the food ration system, are now on hold due to the initial negative public reaction. Any discussions around Chinese-style reforms, particularly regarding foreign investment, have been difficult and "a real headache" according to the Chinese. The French said the GOC will not act until its face is up against the wall and it runs out of options, which is not yet the case in spite of all the challenges. One cited example of the GOC's hesitancy is that all proposals for micro-credit programs coveted by the Ministry of Foreign Investment require the Council of State's approval. To date, only one small project by the Spanish has been approved with little success.
AS VENEZUELA GOES
-----------------
8. (C) The Spanish see future reforms determined by two factors: 1) foreign pressure that is outside of the regime's control; and 2) domestic pressure developed after a consensus is reached through internal discussions. All our colleagues agreed that Venezuela is the most important and "increasingly complicated" foreign variable. Without Venezuelan support, the GOC would have to enact significant reforms similar to those that enabled the regime to survive through the Special Period of the early 1990s (Ref B), according to the Spanish. The view from the French is that Venezuela "es en flames" and a source of serious concern for Cuba.
THE DOMESTIC DEBATE CONTINUES
-----------------------------
9. (C) If reform is driven by domestic factors it will be slow and hesitant. Unlike former president Fidel Castro, Raul Castro needs the "support of the machine" to make chnges, according to the Canadians.naul Castro's National Assembly speech in December (Ref C) made it clear that the GOC is in no hurry to reform, argued the Italians. The Spanish noted that the consensus-building process likely explains the numerous official press stories and letters to the editor in support of some sort of economic reforms, without the accompanying government measures. Even though this limited but noteworthy public debate is almost always framed in socialist and revolutionary rhetoric, many of the articles are highly critical of current policies and propose market-oriented reforms. The simple fact that space still
HAVANA 00000084 003.2 OF 004
exists (and appears to be growing) within Cuba for this form of public dissent indicates that the GOC has not completely given up on bigger reforms.
SLOW, MEASURED AND MILITARY-STYLE REFORMS
-----------------------------------------
10. (C) In lieu of structural reforms, the GOC will continue to take small steps to increase domestic production and reduce imports, focusing on lifting agricultural production from its current lamentable state. The GOC has started on a slow and steady path, according to the Canadians. "Unless (or until) the situation becomes unstable, the government is not going to walk any faster." An example of step-by-step reform is the pilot suburban agriculture project taking place in the third largest city in Cuba. A Reuters reporter told us that he witnessed the GOC clearing land and providing resources to private, collective and state farmers working around the city of Camaguey. As an incentive, the GOC will permit farmers to sell a bit more of the production directly to consumers. The goal is to encourage idle workers to return to farms close to the city and produce enough food to feed the surrounding areas. The focus on local production will also cut down on costs associated with state-run (and thoroughly corrupt and inefficient) transportation and storage. If successful, the GOC will replicate this project in other cities.
11. (C) Even limited reforms could open up private sector opportunities (e.g. permitting cooperatives to operate barber shops, restaurants or retail stores), but in general the military will continue to expand its influence in core economic activities. According to the French, the Cuban leadership believes it can transfer the successes of military state companies that control a good part of the tourism industry to the rest of the economy. Many of our contacts agreed that the military is generally better regarded in Cuba than the political institutions, and reportedly intervened directly in the operation of flour mills earlier this year after bread had disappeared from markets. The Italians noted that the Agriculture Ministry is in the hands of the general most faithful to Raul Castro in Ulises Rosales del Toro. The French argued that the military is seizing all core economic activities of the state. The Cuban economy is increasingly run by military engineers that are capable of running the day-to-day business activities, but do not have the vision to enact reforms or lead the country out of the economic mess of centralized state planning.
12. (C) As a result, several of our colleagues commented that leadership of the Cuban economy is more centralized this year. A side effect of such control is that the economic ministries are restricting access. The French complained that the running of the GOC's finances has shifted from the Central Bank to the Ministry of Economy and Planning and, with that shift, the French no longer have any access to officials or information. A Reuters reporter said that unlike in past years he was not granted any officials meetings on a recent trip to eastern Cuba despite several requests. All agreed that decision-making circles are small and increasingly isolated.
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
--------------------------------
13. (C) Many officials in the GOC have reconciled themselves to the inevitability of better relations with the United States, said the Brazilians. The Cubans involved in the Mariel Port project have said that the project is in preparation for the day when U.S. - Cuba economic relations normalize. While the French see the window for improving relations as closed after the GOC could not bring itself to take the necessary steps, the Brazilians argued that mixed signals from the Cuban regime are a reflection of dissent in the power circles about whether to move ahead. Some in the GOC objected to the U.S. role in Honduras and Haiti and decided that better relations were not worth the risk.
HAVANA 00000084 004.2 OF 004
(Comment: the "U.S. role" according to the official Cuban press was to support the coup in Honduras and a military occupation in Haiti. End Comment.)
THE CUBAN PEOPLE WILL SURVIVE
-----------------------------
14. (C) In the short term, the GOC will require even more belt tightening from the Cuban people. The Italians and French explained that Cuba cut imports before increasing production, which simply means there are fewer products available for Cubans. The GOC has been clear in its public statements that 2010 will be just as difficult as 2009 and further savings (i.e. cuts) will be necessary. Everyone agreed that the Cuban people could withstand more hardship, although the Italians questioned whether further economic tightening would end up weakening and delegitimizing the GOC further.
COMMENT
-------
15. (C) Despite how badly Cuba needs them, significant economic reforms are unlikely in 2010, especially with the continued delay of a policy-revising Communist Party Congress (Ref C). The GOC's direction and leadership remains muddled and unclear, in great measure because its leaders are paralyzed by fear that reforms will loosen the tight grip on power that they have held for over 50 years. Faced with political uncertainty regarding future Cuban leadership and relations with the United States, the Cuban people are more likely to endure a slow erosion of state-subsidies than a much-needed radical restructuring. .FARRAR
Friday, 27 August 2004, 08:08
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001100
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/26/2014
TAGS PARM, PINR, PREL, KNNP, BM, KN
SUBJECT: ALLEGED NORTH KOREAN INVOLVEMENT IN MISSILE
ASSEMBLY AND UNDERGROUND FACILITY CONSTRUCTION IN BURMA
Classified By: CDA, A.I. RON MCMULLEN FOR REASON 1.5 (A/C).
1. (S) SUMMARY: North Korean workers are reportedly assembling "SAM missiles" and constructing an underground facility at a Burmese military site in Magway Division, about 315 miles NNW of Rangoon, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX . This unsolicited account should not be taken as authoritative, but it tracks with other information garnered and reported via XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Summary.
2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX
3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX some 300 North Koreans are working at a secret construction site west of Mimbu, Magway Division, in the foothills of the Arakan Yoma mountains. (Comment: the number of North Koreans supposedly working at this site strikes us as improbably high. End comment.) The XXXXXXXXXXXX claims he has personally seen some of them, although he also reported they are forbidden from leaving the construction site and that he and other "outsiders" are prohibited from entering. The XXXXXXXXXXXX was confident that XXXXXXXXXXXX had the ability to distinguish North Koreans from others, such as Chinese, who might be working in the area. The exact coordinates of the camouflaged site are not known, but it is reportedly in the vicinity of 20,00 N, 94,25 E.
4. (S) The North Koreans are said to be assembling "SAM missiles" of unknown origin. XXXXXXXXXXXX the North Koreans, aided by Burmese workers, are constructing a concrete-reinforced underground facility that is "500 feet from the top of the cave to the top of the hill above." He added that the North Koreans are "blowing concrete" into the excavated underground facility.
5. (S) The XXXXXXXXXXXX is supposedly engaged in constructing buildings for 20 Burmese army battalions that will be posted near the site. Of these, two battalions are to be infantry; the other 18 will be "artillery," according to this account.
6. (S) [XXXXXXXXXXXX
7. (S) COMMENT: The [XXXXXXXXXXXX second-hand account of North Korean involvement with missile assembly and military construction in Magway Division generally tracks with other information Embassy Rangoon and others have reported in various channels. Again, the number 300 is much higher than our best estimates of North Koreans in Burma, and exactly how the XXXXXXXXXXXX allegedly came to see some of them personally remains unclear. Many details provided XXXXXXXXXXXX match those provided by other, seemingly unrelated, sources.
8. (S) COMMENT CONTINUED: We cannot, and readers should not, consider this report alone to be definitive proof or evidence of sizable North Korean military involvement with the Burmese regime. The XXXXXXXXXXXX description made no reference at all to nuclear weapons or technology, or to surface-to-surface missiles, ballistic or otherwise. XXXXXXXXXXXX This account is perhaps best considered alongside other information of various origins indicating the Burmese and North Koreans are up to something ) something of a covert military or military-industrial nature. Exactly what, and on what scale, remains to be determined. Post will continue to monitor these developments and report as warranted. McMullen
Tuesday, 30 January 2007, 10:23
S E C R E T RANGOON 000105
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP
EO 12958 DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS PARM, PREL, ETTC, MNUC, BM, CH
SUBJECT: BURMA XXXXXXXXXXXX REPORT SENSITIVE SHIPMENT
Classified By: Econoff TLManlowe for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary: Embassy contacts XXXXXXXXXXXX shared with us on XXXXXXXXXXXX documents for 112 metric tons of "mixed ore" shipped on January 25 from Burma to China via Singapore. XXXXXXXXXXXX noticed that authorities treated the shipment as highly sensitive, and suspect it may have included uranium. Our contact had no direct evidence to support this claim. End summary.
2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX, told emboffs that XXXXXXXXXXXX informed him they were suspicious about the behavior of authorities when handling a January 25 shipment of mixed ore from Rangoon. According XXXXXXXXXXXX, security was tighter than usual, surveillance was heavier, and officials paid closer attention to the movement of the shipment and activity at the port. XXXXXXXXXXXX also claimed that metals are usually exported in blocks, whereas the bags in this shipment were filled with loose earth and mud. The source of the mixed ore, Maw Chi, is also a source for uranium, they claimed. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the destination in China, Fang Chen, and the shipping line, Advance Container Lines, were unusual for routine ore shipments. Shipments normally go to other ports in China via Myanmar Five Star Line, the government-owned shipping line, according to them. The shipper, Myanmar Ruby Enterprise, is a joint venture, 30% owned by the Ministry of Mines. XXXXXXXXXXXX
3. (S) Key information contained in the documents we have seen includes: Carrier: Advance Container Lines Co., Ltd. Shipper: Myanmar Ruby Enterprise Address: No. 24/26 Sule Pagoda Road, Kyauktada Township, Rangoon Shipped from Rangoon: January 25, 2007 Vessel: Kota Teraju to Singapore Destination: Fang Chen, China Port of Discharge: Fang Chen, Guang Xi, China Consignee: Yunnan Minmetals Trading Co., Ltd. Address: F/8 No. (408) Beijing Road, Kuming, PR China Shipment: Six containers holding 3080 bags, 112.0049 net metric tons of Mawchi Mixed Ore: (tin, tungsten, scheelite mixed concentrate) Value: 534,263.37 euros.
4. (S) We have no further information about the shipment or the reliability of the documents. We would be pleased to forward copies of the documents received to anyone interested. VILLAROSA
Tuesday, 20 January 2004, 09:44
S E C R E T RANGOON 000088
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 01/09/2014
TAGS PGOV, PARM, PREL, BM, RS, KS, KNPP
SUBJECT: BURMA: RUMORS OF CONSTRUCTION OF A NUCLEAR REACTOR
NEAR MINBU
REF: STATE 297614 AND PREVIOUS 03 RANGOON 1427
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D)
1. (S/NF) An expatriate businessmanXXXXXXXXXXXX recently volunteered to an Embassy Officer that he had heard rumors that a nuclear reactor was being built near Minbu, in central Magway Division on the Irawaddy River. The businessman added that he personally had seen a "massive" barge containing large-sized rebar being unloaded on a trip to the area. After asking local residents about the rebar's purpose, he was told that similar size barge shipments were arriving almost weekly and that the rebar was to be used in the construction of unnamed/unidentified factories. In the opinion of the businessman, the quantities involved as well as the diameter of the rebar suggested a project larger than "factories." Along these lines, the businessman noted that there was a new airport near Minbu with a landing strip that, based on its length and thickness, seemed excessive, adding that "you could land the space shuttle on it."
2. (S/NF) Comment: Rumors of construction of a nuclear facility in/near Magway Division date back to 2002 and generally refer to alleged Goverment of Burma (GOB) and Russian cooperation on a nuclear research reactor project. Similar rumors, sans the "Russia" angle, have been circulating with greater frequency within diplomatic and expatriate circles since a November 2003 Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) article which described signs of growing military ties between North Korea and Burma. While we have no direct evidence of this alleged cooperation, rumors of ongoing construction of a nuclear reactor are surprisingly consistent and observations of activity such as that described above appear to be increasing, as are alleged sightings of North Korean "technicians" inside Burma. Martinez
Tuesday, 23 September 2008, 08:59
S E C R E T RANGOON 000749
SIPDIS
FOR STATE ISN/CTR AND PM/ISO/PMAT (24/7)
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO DEPT OF ENERGY
EO 12958 DECL: 09/23/2018
TAGS KNNP, MNUC, PARM, KCRM, PTER, ASEC, KCOR, BM
SUBJECT: BURMESE CIVILIAN OFFERS TO SELL PURPORTED URANIUM
238 TO U.S. EMBASSY RANGOON, BURMA
REF: A. 2007 STATE 162091 B. USDAO RANGOON IIR 6 812 0131 08
Classified By: CDA Larry Dinger for Reasons 1.4 (b and d)
1. (S//REL to USA, ACGU) Per Ref A, Post is alerting the Department and Washington agencies that on XXXXXXXXXXXX after USDAO Rangoon received guidance from DIA, a Burmese civilian met with members of USDAO Rangoon and offered to sell Uranium-238. The individual had initially contacted the USDAO eight days prior with the offer. The individual provided a small bottle half-filled with metallic powder and a photocopied certificate of testing from a Chinese university dated 1992 as verification of the radioactive nature of the powder. During XXXXXXXXXXXX interview, the individual claimed to be able to provide up to 2000 kg of uranium-bearing rock from a location in Kayah State XXXXXXXXXXXX , and further stated if the U.S. was not interested in purchasing the uranium, he and his associates would try to sell it to other countries, beginning with Thailand. See Ref B for further information.
2. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Details of the incident follow, keyed to questions in Ref A:
A) (S//REL to USA, ACGU) Current location of the material: Sample bottle is in transit via classified Diplomatic Pouch to Aberdeen Proving Grounds via DIA.
B) (S//REL to USA, ACGU) Transportation status of material: sample bottle in transit through diplomatic courier service. The sample was wrapped in several layers and placed inside multiple containers, including glass, lead, and wooden boxes/crates. Following instructions from DIA headquarters, USDAO has sent the package via Diplomatic Pouch to Aberdeen Proving Grounds, through DIA, 3100 Clarendon, Arlington, VA. The box is marked "Secret." Dimensions are 16 X 16 X 8 inches. Embassy Rangoon assesses that the host nation is currently unaware of USDAO receipt and shipment of the material. However, the possibility cannot be dismissed that rather than a sale for profit, the seller is attempting to assist in executing a government entrapment scheme.
C) (S//REL to USA, ACGU) As noted, Post assesses that the Burmese government is currently unaware of USDAO receipt and shipment of the sample. Burmese authorities would likely seize any additional samples or stocks of the material if aware of their existence.
D) (S//REL to USA, ACGU) Sample is in transit by commercial air via Diplomatic Pouch.
E) (S//REL to USA, ACGU) Intended destination of material: The subject indicated his first choice for a possible buyer of the alleged uranium is the United States, via the Embassy in Rangoon. Other stated options include the Thai and Chinese Embassies. His intent appears to be to sell the material in Rangoon. Subject made no mention of intent to move material across borders.
F) Unknown.
G - J) (S//NF) Subject identified himself as XXXXXXXXXXXX .
(S//REL TO USA, ACGU) The subject brought with him a small bottle weighing 1.8 ounces and measuring 70 mm long by 26 mm in diameter, which was half-filled with a grey metallic powder. He claimed the material in question was Uranium-238 in powder form. The subject claims to represent a small group that wants to sell uranium to the U.S. Embassy. According to the subject, he has 50 kilograms of uranium-containing rock or ore at an undisclosed location in Rangoon, which is stored in a barrel that prevents the radioactivity from being toxic XXXXXXXXXXXX . He estimates there are at least 2000 more kilograms that could be dug up from the
site in Kayah State. The uranium was only recently brought to Rangoon (subject would not give a specific time frame). The subject claimed the uranium was discovered in Kayah state in 1992. XXXXXXXXXXXX
(S//REL TO USA, ACGU) The subject claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX know about the uranium. XXXXXXXXXXXX
K) N/A.
L) N/A.
M) (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) Interview occurred in a consular interview room (used for walk-ins) at the U.S. Embassy Rangoon.
N) Additional details: Ref B contains all other available information related to this incident.
3. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX
DINGER
Monday, 20 April 2009, 16:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000671
SIPDIS
DEPT PASS TO USTR-AGAMA
DEPT PASS USAID AFR/SD FOR CURTIS AND ATWOOD
BAGHDAD FOR DUNDAS MCCULLOUGH
TREASURY FOR PETERS, IERONIMO AND HALL
DOC FOR 3317/ITA/OA/KBURRESS AND 3130/USFC/OIO/ANESA/CREED
EO 12958 DECL: 04/20/2034
TAGS ECON, EINV, EAID, ETRD, PGOV, NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PFIZER REACHES PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT FOR
A $75 MILLION SETTLEMENT
Classified By: Economic Counselor Robert Tansey for reasons 1.4(B&D)
1. (C) Summary. In an April 2 meeting with the Ambassador, Pfizer lawyers Joe Petrosinelli and Atiba Adams reported that Pfizer and the Kano State government had reached a preliminary settlement on lawsuits arising from medical tests conducted with Trovan (oral antibiotic) on children living in Kano during a meningitis epidemic in 1996. Petrosinelli said Pfizer has agreed to the Kano State Attorney General's (AG) settlement offer of $75 million, including a $10 million payment for legal fees, $30 million to the Kano State government, and $35 million for the participants and families. According to Adams, several final details need to be worked out on the mechanism for payment. Pfizer strongly recommends setting up a $35 million trust fund for the participants to be administered by a neutral third party and for the $30 million for the Kano State government to be used for improving health care in the state. Pfizer underscored that the Nigerian representatives wanted lump sum checks and that Pfizer is concerned with potential transparency issues. The next step is a meeting between high-level Pfizer officials and Nigerian side at a neutral location to work out the final details. End Summary.
2. (SBU) On April 2 Pfizer lawyers Joe Petrosinelli and Atiba Adams and Pfizer Nigeria Country Director Enrico Liggeri met with the Ambassador and EconDep to discuss the status of settlement negotiations. Four lawsuits were brought against Pfizer stemming from medical tests with the oral antibiotic Trovan conducted on children living in Kano during a meningitis epidemic in 1996. In Kano State Court there is one civil suit and one criminal case and in the Federal High Court there is one civil suit and one criminal case. Since 2006, Petrosinelli and Adams have been briefing the Mission on the status of the cases.
Settlement Reached
------------------
3. (C) Petrosinelli reported that Pfizer had tentatively reached "an agreement in principle" on the Kano AG's settlement offer of $75 million. Adams explained that the parties agreed that the $75 million would be broken down as follows - a $10 million payment for legal fees; $30 million to the Kano State government; and $35 million to participants and families. Petrosinelli noted, that Pfizer has worked closely with former Nigerian Head of State Yakubu Gowon and that he has played a positive mediation role with Kano State and the federal government. Petrosinelli said Gowon also spoke with Kano State Governor Mallam Ibrahim Shekarau, who directed the Kano AG to reduce the settlement demand from $150 million to $75 million. Adams reported that Gowon met with President Yar'Adua and convinced him to drop the two federal high court cases against Pfizer. (Comment: In 1966 Gowon became the head of state following a military coup that deposed Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi who had come to power via an earlier military coup. He was head of state from 1966 to 1975. He now plays an elder statesman role in Nigerian politics. End Comment.)
More Discussions Needed
-----------------------
4. (C) According to Adams, details need to be worked out on the mechanism for payments to the Kano State government and participants because Pfizer is unwilling to give a lump sum payment. Pfizer is concerned with transparency issues and is pushing for a $35 million trust fund for the participants to be administered by a neutral third party and the remaining $30 million to be used for improving health care in Kano state. Pfizer underscored that the Nigerian representatives were pushing for lump sum checks and Pfizer will not agree to that. Pfizer is considering rebuilding Kano's Infectious Disease Hospital where the trial was conducted and working with health care nongovernmental organizations. Adams suggested that the trust fund for participants be administered by a neutral third party because he expects "additional" participants to come forward after they hear about the settlement. The Ambassador suggested Pfizer work with NGOs already working in Kano State and for Pfizer to consider working with local NGO implementing partners that the USG has used because of their transparency record.
ABUJA 00000671 002 OF 002
EconDep provided Pfizer a copy of the U.S.-Nigeria Framework for Partnership document as a guide for existing projects and partners in Kano. Petrosinelli explained that the next step was a meeting at a neutral location between high-level Pfizer officials and the Nigerian side to work out final details and conclude the settlement.
Pfizer Exposes Attorney General
-------------------------------
5. (C) In follow up to the April 2 meeting, EconDep met with Pfizer Country Manager Enrico Liggeri in Lagos on April 9. (Note: Liggeri has years of experience in Nigeria because his family operated a business in Lagos from the early 1960s to the late 1980s. He spent most of his childhood in Lagos. End Note.) Liggeri said Pfizer was not happy settling the case, but had come to the conclusion that the $75 million figure was reasonable because the suits had been ongoing for many years costing Pfizer more than $15 million a year in legal and investigative fees. According to Liggeri, Pfizer had hired investigators to uncover corruption links to Federal Attorney General Michael Aondoakaa to expose him and put pressure on him to drop the federal cases. He said Pfizer's investigators were passing this information to local media, XXXXXXXXXXXX. A series of damaging articles detailing Aondoakaa's "alleged" corruption ties were published in February and March. Liggeri contended that Pfizer had much more damaging information on Aondoakaa and that Aondoakaa's cronies were pressuring him to drop the suit for fear of further negative articles.
6. (C) Liggeri commented that the lawsuits were wholly political in nature because the NGO Doctors Without Borders administered Trovan to other children during the 1996 meningitis epidemic and the Nigerian government has taken no action. He underscored that the suit has had a "chilling effect" on international pharmaceutical companies because companies are no longer willing to conduct clinical testing in Nigeria. Liggeri opined that when another outbreak occurs no company will come to Nigeria's aid.
7. (C) Comment: Pfizer's image in Nigeria has been damaged due to this ongoing case. Pfizer's management considers Nigeria a major growth market for its products and having this case behind it will help in efforts to rebuild its image here. Final discussions on the $30 million and $35 million are likely to be tricky because the Nigerian side wants to control who gets the money, not Pfizer. The U.S. Mission will continue to advocate for transparency in settling the case and also note to GON authorities that Pfizer must abide by the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and cannot simple hand over large sums of money to state and local officials. Petrosinelli and Adams will get back to the Mission on what further assistance may be needed. End Comment.
8. (U) This cable was coordinated with ConGen Lagos. SANDERS
Tuesday, 19 May 2009, 12:58
S E C R E T CAIRO 000874
NEA FOR FO; NSC FOR KUMAR AND SHAPIRO
EO 12958 DECL: 05/17/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KDEM, ECON, EG, IS, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S VISIT TO
WASHINGTON
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) Introduction: President Mubarak last visited Washington in April 2004, breaking a twenty year tradition of annual visits to the White House. Egyptians view President Mubarak's upcoming meeting with the President as a new beginning to the U.S.-Egyptian relationship that will restore a sense of mutual respect that they believe diminished in recent years. President Mubarak has been encouraged by his initial interactions with the President, the Secretary, and Special Envoy Mitchell, and understands that the Administration wants to restore the sense of warmth that has traditionally characterized the U.S.-Egyptian partnership. The Egyptians want the visit to demonstrate that Egypt remains America's "indispensible Arab ally," and that bilateral tensions have abated. President Mubarak is the proud leader of a proud nation. He draws heavily from his own long experience in regional politics and governance as he assesses new proposals and recommendations for change.
MUBARAK'S PROFILE
-----------------
2. (S/NF) Mubarak is 81 years old and in reasonably good health; his most notable problem is a hearing deficit in his left ear. He responds well to respect for Egypt and for his position, but is not swayed by personal flattery. Mubarak peppers his observations with anecdotes that demonstrate both his long experience and his sense of humor. The recent death of his grandson Mohammad has affected him deeply and undoubtedly will dampen his spirits for the visit which he very much wants to make. During his 28 year tenure, he survived at least three assassination attempts, maintained peace with Israel, weathered two wars in Iraq and post-2003 regional instability, intermittent economic downturns, and a manageable but chronic internal terrorist threat. He is a tried and true realist, innately cautious and conservative, and has little time for idealistic goals. Mubarak viewed President Bush (43) as naive, controlled by subordinates, and totally unprepared for dealing with post-Saddam Iraq, especially the rise of Iran,s regional influence.
3. (S/NF) On several occasions Mubarak has lamented the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the downfall of Saddam. He routinely notes that Egypt did not like Saddam and does not mourn him, but at least he held the country together and countered Iran. Mubarak continues to state that in his view Iraq needs a "tough, strong military officer who is fair" as leader. This telling observation, we believe, describes Mubarak's own view of himself as someone who is tough but fair, who ensures the basic needs of his people.
4. (S/NF) No issue demonstrates Mubarak,s worldview more than his reaction to demands that he open Egypt to genuine political competition and loosen the pervasive control of the security services. Certainly the public "name and shame" approach in recent years strengthened his determination not to accommodate our views. However, even though he will be more willing to consider ideas and steps he might take pursuant to a less public dialogue, his basic understanding of his country and the region predisposes him toward extreme caution. We have heard him lament the results of earlier U.S. efforts to encourage reform in the Islamic world. He can harken back to the Shah of Iran: the U.S. encouraged him to accept reforms, only to watch the country fall into the hands of revolutionary religious extremists. Wherever he has seen these U.S. efforts, he can point to the chaos and loss of stability that ensued. In addition to Iraq, he also reminds us that he warned against Palestinian elections in 2006 that brought Hamas (Iran) to his doorstep. Now, we understand he fears that Pakistan is on the brink of falling into the hands of the Taliban, and he puts some of the blame on U.S. insistence on steps that ultimately weakened Musharraf. While he knows that Bashir in Sudan has made multiple major mistakes, he cannot work to support his removal from power.
5. (S/NF) Mubarak has no single confidante or advisor who can truly speak for him, and he has prevented any of his main advisors from operating outside their strictly circumscribed spheres of power. Defense Minister Tantawi keeps the Armed Forces appearing reasonably sharp and the officers satisfied with their perks and privileges, and Mubarak does not appear concerned that these forces are not well prepared to face 21st century external threats. EGIS Chief Omar Soliman and Interior Minister al-Adly keep the domestic beasts at bay, and Mubarak is not one to lose sleep over their tactics. Gamal Mubarak and a handful of economic ministers have input on economic and trade matters, but Mubarak will likely resist further economic reform if he views it as potentially harmful to public order and stability. Dr. Zakaria Azmi and a few other senior NDP leaders manage the parliament and public politics.
6. (S/NF) Mubarak is a classic Egyptian secularist who hates religious extremism and interference in politics. The Muslim Brothers represent the worst, as they challenge not only Mubarak,s power, but his view of Egyptian interests. As with regional issues, Mubarak, seeks to avoid conflict and spare his people from the violence he predicts would emerge from unleashed personal and civil liberties. In Mubarak,s mind, it is far better to let a few individuals suffer than risk chaos for society as a whole. He has been supportive of improvements in human rights in areas that do not affect public security or stability. Mrs. Mubarak has been given a great deal of room to maneuver to advance women's and children's rights and to confront some traditional practices that have been championed by the Islamists, such as FGM, child labor, and restrictive personal status laws.
SUCCESSION
----------
7. (S/NF) The next presidential elections are scheduled for 2011, and if Mubarak is still alive it is likely he will run again, and, inevitably, win. When asked about succession, he states that the process will follow the Egyptian constitution. Despite incessant whispered discussions, no one in Egypt has any certainty about who will eventually succeed Mubarak nor under what circumstances. The most likely contender is presidential son Gamal Mubarak (whose profile is ever-increasing at the ruling party); some suggest that intelligence chief Omar Soliman might seek the office, or dark horse Arab League Secretary-General Amre Moussa might run. Mubarak's ideal of a strong but fair leader would seem to discount Gamal Mubarak to some degree, given Gamal's lack of military experience, and may explain Mubarak's hands off approach to the succession question. Indeed, he seems to be trusting to God and the ubiquitous military and civilian security services to ensure an orderly transition.
MUBARAK'S EGYPT: 1982 -- 2009
-----------------------------
8. (C) Egypt continues to be a major regional economic, political, and cultural power. However, economic problems have frustrated many Egyptians. Egypt's per capita GDP was on par with South Korea's 30 years ago; today it is comparable to Indonesia's. There were bread riots in 2008 for the first time since 1977. Political reforms have stalled and the GOE has resorted to heavy-handed tactics against individuals and groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, whose influence continues to grow.
9. (SBU) Economic reform momentum has slowed and high GDP growth rates of recent years have failed to lift Egypt's lower classes out of poverty. High inflation, coupled with the impact of the global recession, has resulted in an increase in extreme poverty, job losses, a growing budget deficit and projected 2009 GDP growth of 3.5% - half last year's rate.
10. (S/NF) Mubarak himself refuses to discuss economic assistance to Egypt, but other interlocutors may raise it. On May 7, Egypt formally and publicly accepted FY 2009 and FY 2010 assistance levels, ending a stalemate over the FY 2009 program, linked to levels, a perceived lack of consultation, and political conditionality. Based on our assessment of Egypt's most pressing assistance needs, and broad public consensus in Egypt that the educational system is seriously deficient, we would like to focus on education. We believe the Egyptians would welcome a new presidential level initiative in this area, which would also be in U.S. national interests given the critical role education will play in Egypt's political and economic development.
MUBARAK'S REGIONAL OUTLOOK
--------------------------
11. (S/NF) Israeli-Arab conflict: Mubarak has successfully shepherded Sadat,s peace with Israel into the 21st century, and benefitted greatly from the stability Camp David has given the Levant: there has not been a major land war in more than 35 years. Peace with Israel has cemented Egypt,s moderate role in Middle East peace efforts and provided a political basis for continued U.S. military and economic assistance ($1.3 billion and $250 million, respectively). However, broader elements of peace with Israel, e.g. economic and cultural exchange, remain essentially undeveloped.
12. (S/NF) Camp David also presented Mubarak with the perpetual challenge of balancing Egypt,s international image as a moderate with its domestic image as pan-Arab leader. Mubarak has managed this strategic dichotomy most effectively in times of regional stability. However, the Gulf wars, and especially post-Saddam regional crises, have taxed this equation. For example, during the 2006 Lebanon war, the Bush Administration asked Egypt to side against Hizballah; at the same time Egyptian protestors demanded the peace treaty with Israel be vacated. The Egyptians were frozen, and relegated to waiting for the situation to stabilize. More recently, with Iran bringing the battlefield closer with Hamas' actions in Gaza and discovery of the Hizballah cell in Egypt, the Egyptians appear more willing to confront the Iranian surrogates and to work closely with Israel.
13. (S/NF) Mubarak has been effective as an intermediary during various phases of the Israeli-Arab conflict. In the Arafat era, Egypt worked between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. At the outset of the Abbas era, Egypt,s role was unclear as the Israelis and Palestinians communicated directly, and Mubarak for a time was left with no deliverable either to the West or his public. He firmly believes, incorrectly, that the Bush Administration "forced" the Palestinian legislative elections of 2006 (which Hamas won). Hamas' June 2007 takeover of Gaza allowed the Egyptians back into the game as a go-between, and Mubarak,s team has made clear they will not cede the "Palestinian file" to another Arab state. In general, the Egyptian-Israeli strategic relationship is on solid ground, as they face a shared threat from Hamas.
14. (S/NF) The ongoing intra-Arab dispute, which pits Egypt and Saudi Arabia against Syria and Qatar and is primarily driven by Iran's regional influence, is the current test for Mubarak. For the moment the Egyptian-Saudi moderate camp is holding. Mubarak has maneuvered with reasonable effectiveness, brandishing Egyptian clout through a hastily prepared but effective summit in Sharm el Sheikh in February, but Iran,s Arab surrogates (especially Qatar) continue to unsettle the Egyptians. Mubarak will rail against President Bush,s decision to invade Iraq, contending that it opened the door to Iranian influence in the region. That said, the Egyptians recently told Special Envoy Ross they expect our outreach to Iran to fail, and that "we should prepare for confrontation through isolation." Mubarak and his advisors are now convinced that Tehran is working to weaken Egypt through creation of Hizballah cells, support of the Muslim Brotherhood, and destabilization of Gaza. Egypt has warned that it will retaliate if these actions continue.
15. (S/NF) Egypt views the stability and unity of Sudan as essential to its national security because of concern over its access to Nile waters and the potential for increased Sudanese refugee flows. The GOE is using development assistance in South Sudan to encourage unity. Here too, the Egyptians are jealous and sensitive to the Qatari foray into resolving Darfur, a crisis squarely in Egypt's backyard. Mubarak may ask about the potential for cooperation with the U.S. on Sudan and will probably want to hear how the Administration will approach the issue. If he agrees, Mubarak can use his stature and credibility with Bashir to make progress on Darfur and human rights issues.
16. (S/NF) MUBARAK REGIONAL TALKING POINTS
-----------------------------------------
Israeli-Arab peace: He will ask for continued U.S. leadership and highlight Egypt's role as moderate interlocutor. He will stress the primacy of the Palestinian track over efforts with Syria. He will press for concrete action on settlements and resist Arab gestures to Israel until the Arabs can see whether or not Netanyahu is credible.
Iran: He will rail against Iranian regional influence and express pessimism about U.S. outreach to Tehran. He will make clear that there should be no linkage between Israeli-Arab peace and Iran but will agree with the President's assessment that such linkage as does exist argues for progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track to undermine Hamas and Hizballah.
Sudan: He will highlight Egypt's role as provider of humanitarian and military assistance, and stress the need to maintain stability.
Intra-Arab strife: He may criticize Qatar, and perhaps Syria, as Iranian surrogates. He may ask about our plan to engage Damascus and suggest we coordinate our efforts.
Iraq: He may be circumspect, but harbors continuing doubts about Maliki and his Iranian ties. He will say Egypt is open to bilateral improvement but is awaiting Iraqi actions.
SCOBEY
Monday, 30 November 2009, 14:02
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ZAGREB 000694
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
EMBASSY SARAJEVO FOR DAS JONES
EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ICTY, EUC, HR
SUBJECT: PUSHING CROATIA FORWARD ON ICTY COOPERATION AND EU
ACCESSION
Classified By: Amb. James Foley, reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: After making difficult concessions in order to conclude an Arbitration Agreement with Slovenia, Prime Minister Kosor now confronts an ongoing UK and Netherlands blockage of Croatia's EU accession path, inspired by ICTY Prosecutor Serge Brammertz. This impasse has the potential to endure as the GOC likely cannot produce documents demanded by the prosecutor, and Brammertz seems unwilling to settle for anything besides the documents. Brammertz also refuses to assist the GOC in its investigation. Importantly, the impasse could undermine the U.S. stake both in the Kosor-led reform process in Croatia and the region's integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Accordingly, post recommends that we register our differences with Brammertz's assessment at the December 3 UNSC discussion of ICTY and consider high-level approaches to the UK and Netherlands urging that the EU make Croatia's ICTY cooperation a closing rather than an opening benchmark for Chapter 23 accession negotiations. END SUMMARY.
CROATIA'S EFFORTS TO SATISFY ICTY
2. (U) Prime Minister Kosor, Justice Minister Simonovic, Interior Minister Karamarko and Chief State Prosecutor Bajic all met with visiting Special Envoy for War Crimes Issues Ambassador Stephen Rapp and Ambassador Foley on November 27, to describe Croatia's continuing efforts to cooperate with the ICTY and Prosecutor Serge Brammertz in the search for missing artillery documents in connection with the 1995 Operation Storm and the Gotovina case. The discussions focused on the results of Croatia's recent police-led Task Force formed specifically to address objections Brammertz had raised with earlier efforts by Croatia to locate the documents. The Task Force's status report, sent to ICTY on November 9, states that Croatia provided ICTY with three of the 23 documents sought (as well as a partial draft of a fourth), four others were never created, seven were destroyed, and eight have not been located.
3. (C) All GOC officials insisted that Croatia is engaged in a good faith effort to locate whatever documents, if any, that can be found, and pledged that the investigation would continue. Prime Minister Kosor declared to Ambassador Rapp that the GOC had an "absolute political will" to find the documents or establish their chain of custody and said she had issued orders for the investigation to continue. She commented that it would be "absolutely stupid" for Croatia to jeopardize its otherwise imminent EU accession "over a few documents," noting that General Gotovina's rendition to The Hague was the work of the GOC. Karamarko predicted that if Brammertz gave a good grade to Serbia despite its failure to render Mladic and Hadzic while giving a negative grade to Croatia over missing documents "that may or may not exist," it could have "dangerous" internal repercussions. Bajic echoed this, stating that an EU decision not to open Chapter 23 would be a "major setback to Croatia in terms of the reform process and those who have been involved in it." (NOTE: Bajic was apparently alluding to his own anti-corruption efforts backed by Kosor. END NOTE)
4. (C) Ambassador Rapp told Kosor and others the Task Force's work was a "good faith" and "impressive" effort. Post shares this assessment of the Task Force's work as credible and indicative of a significant effort by the GOC to cooperate with the ICTY. The investigation is far from perfect, relying too heavily on interviews with individuals connected to the documents. In our Nov. 27 meetings, we suggested ways that the continuing investigation could be made more aggressive. However, we have no reason to believe that the GOC lacks the will to find the documents or is seeking to thwart the ICTY. The artillery documents have likely been destroyed or sequestered over the years by Gotovina and his associates.
ICTY CANNOT BE SATISFIED
5. (C) Brammertz for his part remains unwilling to acknowledge the full degree of Croatia's cooperation. In his written report to the UNSC he notes only that "results are limited". While proclaiming himself "satisfied" with Serbian efforts that have nonetheless failed to produce the fugitive indictees, Brammertz seems unwilling to accept Croatian efforts as satisfactory unless they actually produce the missing papers.
RESULT: IMPASSE
ZAGREB 00000694 002 OF 003
6. (U) The immediate problem is that several EU member states (in particular the UK and the Netherlands) have refused to allow Croatia to open accession negotiations on Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) pending a clean bill of health on ICTY cooperation. Brammertz has indicated that he will continue to demand that Croatia produce the missing documents throughout the entirety of the appeals process. Thus Croatia could be facing a prolonged and indefinite blockage of its EU accession.
7. (C) UK Ambassador Blunt (protect) told Ambassador Foley last week that some key officials in London regard Croatia as virtually unchanged since the Tudjman era and are inclined to assume GOC bad faith in its dealings with the ICTY. UK Ministers were unlikely to budge on Chapter 23 in the face of a negative assessment from Brammertz. However, Blunt personally agreed that the missing artillery documents likely could not be found by the GOC, and that Brammertz had no interest in either assisting the GOC investigation or accepting as adequate any Croatian effort that does not produce the documents. Blunt suggested that a visit by Ambassador Rapp to London to acquaint senior officials with these realities might offer the only hope for a reassessment of the entrenched UK position.
8. (C) French Ambassador Pasquier told Ambassador Foley on November 28 that Paris was deeply concerned about Brammertz's expected contrasting assessments of Serbian and Croatian cooperation. He stressed that France supports and does not wish to jeopardize Serbia's progress, but fears that a simultaneous rejection of Croatia's efforts and the continued blockage of Chapter 23 would badly damage public support for EU membership and Kosor herself. He expected that France would be prepared to back Croatia and implicitly dissent from Brammertz's assessment in the Security Council on December 3. But he stressed that hope for unblocking Chapter 23 depended on Brammertz adjusting his language and finding a way on December 3 to acknowledge progress and cooperation on the part of the GOC. That might be enough, he thought, to persuade the UK and Netherlands to allow the opening of Chapter 23.
A NEW U.S. APPROACH
9. (C) The stakes for the U.S. of an enduring impasse on this issue are high -- not only a prolonged blockage of Croatia's EU accession with implications for internal stability, but a closed EU door to the rest of Southeastern Europe. We therefore propose a U.S. effort aimed at unblocking Croatia's Chapter 23 negotiations and encouraging intensified Croatian efforts to cooperate with the ICTY. One aspect of this strategy would be to urge the EU to bring more factors into its assessment of cooperation than simply the Prosecutor's judgment. In this regard, we note that the ICTY Trial Chamber will hold a hearing on the document issue on December 16, although it is unlikely to issue a ruling until after the new year. Another aspect would be to press Brammertz to show more readiness to accept a credible investigation by the Croatians as adequate cooperation, and to provide assistance to Croatian efforts. Ultimately, we should urge the EU to allow Chapter 23 to open, with a closing benchmark being the implementation of further steps to bolster the credibility of the continuing GOC investigation or the delivery of the requested documentation.
10. (C) To set the stage for this approach, post supports Ambassador Rapp's efforts vis a vis Mr. Brammertz in advance of the December 3 UNSC session, and recommends the following points be addressed in the U.S. statement at that session if our assessment of Croatian cooperation remains at variance with his:
-- Cooperation with the ICTY remains a fundamental obligation for all states in the region, and a sine qua non of Euro-Atlantic integration; -- We note that Croatia has engaged in extensive efforts to respond to the Trial Chamber's order of September 2008 to deliver or engage in a credible investigation into the fate of the requested artillery documentation from Operation Storm; -- In our judgment those efforts have been conducted in good faith, and we believe that the Government of Croatia's latest investigation, which is continuing, is credible and represents a significant step forward in Croatia's cooperation with the ICTY; -- At the same time, we believe the Croatian efforts should be improved and would encourage the Croatian authorities to
ZAGREB 00000694 003 OF 003
explore additional measures such as using outside expertise and engaging in more aggressive investigative techniques; -- For that reason, we are concerned with the Prosecutor's apparent reluctance to engage directly with the Croatian investigators in providing advice on investigative measures, and we would encourage him to reconsider that approach.
11. (C) Post expects Minister of Justice Simonovic to represent Croatia in the December 3 Security Council session. Simonovic told us that at present Croatia anticipates statements of support in the Security Council from France, Austria, Turkey and potentially additional members. FOLEY
Thursday, 03 September 2009, 13:41
S E C R E T BELGRADE 000841
SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
EO 12958 DECL: 2019/09/03
TAGS PGOV, PREL, EINT, MASS, RS, SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA GRAPPLES WITH RUSSIA RELATIONS IN ADVANCE OF MEDVEDEV
VISIT
REF: (A) 08 BELGRADE 98, (B) 08 BELGRADE 1333
CLASSIFIED BY: Jennifer Brush, Charge D'Affaires; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
Summary
-------
1. (C) As Serbia seeks to overcome mounting economic difficulties and move forward toward its primary goal of European Union membership, the government is struggling to strike the right tone in the bilateral relationship with Russia: President Tadic and his close advisors appear intent on giving the Russians their due without irritating the Europeans, while others - including Foreign Minister Jeremic - seem to want to use close ties to Russia as a "bargaining chip" with Europe and the United States (ref A). A planned visit by Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev in October is already drawing additional attention to a bilateral relationship where warm, friendly rhetoric is often not matched by concrete, mutually-beneficial cooperation in the political, economic, or security realms. End Summary.
October Medvedev Visit
----------------------
2. (C) The recent announcement that Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev will visit Serbia in October to mark the 65th anniversary of the liberation of Belgrade during World War II by Soviet forces has focused public attention on the Serbia-Russia relationship and triggered press headlines heralding the "return to a brotherly embrace" with Russia. Presidential advisor Aleksandar Knezevic told us on August 20 that the Russians had proposed "grandiose" plans for the visit (rumored to include a military parade); Knezevic said the presidency would tailor the events to show that Russia was one of several key partners. With regard to the World War II celebrations in particular, he acknowledged the challenge of balancing the commemoration of the Soviet role in liberating Belgrade with the role of other Allies in the broader war effort. Presidential chief of staff Miki Rakic confirmed on August 25 that plans were still in flux and that the date had not been set, despite widespread press reports that it would be October 20.
3. (SBU) The primary deliverables for the Medvedev visit will reportedly be a $1.4 billion Russian loan for budget support and infrastructure projects and the creation of a joint venture between Gazpromneft and Srbijagas for the expansion of the Banatski Dvor underground natural gas storage facility. Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Konuzin has told the press that the two countries would sign a number of bilateral agreements but declined to reveal the topics. We expect that the two sides will highlight the visa-free travel arrangement that went into force on June 1, as well as the existing bilateral Free Trade Agreement.
Political Relations: Balancing the Rhetoric
-------------------------------------------
4. (C) The dilemma that Tadic and his associates in the Presidency face in calibrating the tone and lavishness of the Medvedev visit is symptomatic of Serbia's overall bilateral relationship with Russia. They perceive a continued need for Russia's UNSC veto and rhetorical support on Kosovo, particularly while the International Court of Justice case is ongoing. At the same time, this more pragmatic group of policymakers sees that Russia is not always a reliable partner - such as when the Russian government used Kosovo's declaration of independence to justify its actions in Abkhazia and Ossetia. This group also realizes that Russian assistance pales in comparison to the tangible benefits of eventual European Union membership. They argue - correctly - that the two objectives of EU membership and good relations with Russia need not be mutually exclusive, pointing to numerous statements by the Russian government that it supports Serbia's EU aspirations. Tadic and his closest foreign policy advisors therefore devote most of their energy to European integration, focusing on Russia only when necessary to maintain balance in outward appearances.
5. (C) Vuk Jeremic and his team at the Foreign Ministry take a different approach, however. They appear unwilling to fully commit themselves rhetorically or on a policy level to the EU course, and cling to Russia, China, and the Non-Alignment Movement as counterweights or alternatives to the EU. Following from that logic, they see every positive interaction with Moscow as a blow to Washington, and even attempted to leverage the Medvedev visit to lobby for a meeting for FM Jeremic with the Secretary. Political Director Borko Stefanovic's August 25 description to us of plans for an elaborate Medvedev visit was emblematic: he and possibly Jeremic would travel to Moscow in advance of the visit to coordinate messaging; Medvedev would address Parliament, becoming the first head of state to do so; and the anniversary of the liberation of Belgrade would be used to highlight Serbia's proud anti-fascist history.
Economic Relations: Skewed to Russia's Benefit
--------------------------------------------- --
6. (SBU) Russia is Serbia's second largest trading partner and eighth largest source of investment. Bilateral trade has grown significantly in recent years, reaching a high of just over $4 billion in 2008; Russian imports account for about 13% of Serbia's total imports. Numbers have fallen off in 2009 due to the global economic crisis, but the balance has remained in Russia's favor due to Serbia's heavy reliance on energy imports; in the first six months of the year, total trade was $1.1 billion, with an $830 million trade deficit for Serbia. Nearly 75% of Russian exports to Serbia are energy-related, with crude oil accounting for 49% and natural gas 25%.
7. (SBU) Since 2000, Russian firms have invested approximately $1 billion in Serbia -- $742 million in cash, and the rest in obligations for future investments. The 2009 purchase of Serbia's state petroleum industry, NIS, by Gazpromneft for $555 million (ref B) accounts for more than half of total Russian investment. Other significant deals include Lukoil's 2003 purchase of 80% of petrol distribution company Beopetrol for $187 million and auto parts producer Autodetal's troubled 2008 purchase of a 39% stake in bus manufacturer Ikarbus for $10.7 million. Russia's only greenfield investment in Serbia to date has been the Bank of Moscow, which began serving corporate and retail clients in June 2009 with $24 million in founding capital. The Bank of Moscow appears to be focusing on potential energy deals and acquisition of Serbian state-owned banks.
Security Cooperation: All Talk, (Almost) No Action
--------------------------------------------- ------
8. (SBU) As in the political realm, Serbia's security relations with Russia are more symbolic than concrete. Minister of Defense Sutanovac meets periodically with Russian counterparts and organizes photo opportunities with the handful of Serbian students who attend Russian military institutes each year. The Serbian military still relies heavily on Soviet-era equipment, including a dwindling fleet of MiGs, and therefore remains dependent on Russia for spare parts, service, and technical training; the amount Russia charges for this support is a frequent sore point. Serbia's military relationship with Russia is largely void of content; there are no joint operational or planning exercises. A recent Russian-funded demining project at the Nis Airport attracted significant media coverage, despite being modest in scope. (Comment: In contrast to these relatively limited engagements with Russia, the Serbian military's ties with the U.S. and NATO are growing dynamically. In the past year alone, over 60 members of the Serbian military attended U.S. NCO training, military academies, and war colleges; Serbia is restructuring its military on the Western/NATO model; it enjoys a dynamic relationship with the Ohio National Guard; and it is upping its involvement in Partnership for Peace, including hosting the ongoing MEDCEUR disaster response exercise with EUCOM. End Comment.)
9. (S) Russia has not been forthcoming on Serbia's requests for assistance in locating Hague indictee Ratko Mladic, presidential advisor Miki Rakic told us on August 25. Rakic said he believed based on Mladic's profile that the former Bosnian Serb military commander was likely hiding in Serbia, possibly with assistance from foreign sources. Asking that the information "remain at this table," Rakic told us that he had posed a series of questions about specific contacts between Mladic associates and Russian diplomats, as well as phone calls and trips to Russia by Mladic associates, to FSB Director Aleksandr Bortnikov in June, to Russian National Security Advisor Nikolay Patrushev in July, and most recently to Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov. If the Russians did not respond before Medvedev's visit, Rakic said, Tadic would raise the issue himself.
Comment: This Is Not a Competition
-----------------------------------
10. (C) While the European Union is and should remain Serbia's ultimate goal, the country is also inextricably linked by energy dependency, military relationships, and cultural affinity with Russia. The Serbian government's struggle to find the proper balance between these two imperatives stems from conflict between policymakers - such as Jeremic -- who see foreign policy as a zero-sum game, and those who believe in mutually beneficial relationships. We can strengthen the hand of pragmatic forces in the Serbian government by recognizing in our public statements that Serbia needs to devote effort to having a healthy, balanced relationship with Russia. We can afford to be magnanimous on this point because we have the better story to tell: the foreign direct investment statistics and the results of our programs supporting economic, political, and security reform demonstrate that Serbia benefits far more from cooperation with the United States and the West than it does from Russian rhetoric. While the Serbian public has not yet fully accepted these facts, our constant public diplomacy efforts to highlight the results of U.S. engagement are having an impact. We should continue to let our actions speak louder than our words by engaging with Serbia on issues of mutual interest, avoiding any direct comparisons with Russia, and flatly rejecting the notion that in the 21st century any country must choose between East and West. End Comment. BRUSH
Tuesday, 28 July 2009, 02:18
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 078274
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/14/2019
TAGS OVIP (CLINTON, HILLARY), PGOV, PREL, KDEV, ECON,
NL, IS, SR
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton's July 14 conversation
with Dutch Foreign Minister Verhagen
1. Classified by Bureau Assistant Secretary Philip H. Gordon. Reason: 1.4 (d)
2. (U) July 14; 2:45 p.m.; Washington, DC.
3. (SBU) Participants:
U.S. The Secretary Charge Michael Gallagher EUR A/S Philip H. Gordon PA Spokesperson Ian Kelly Executive Assistant Joe Macmanus NSC Director for Europe Toby Bradley Valerie Belon (EUR Notetaker)
The Netherlands FM Maxime Verhagen Ambassador Renee Jones-Bos Pieter De Gooijer, MFA Political Director General Jack Twiss, Embassy Political Counselor Marcel de Vink, Private Secretary Bart Rijs, MFA Spokesman
4. (C) SUMMARY. The Secretary met July 14 with Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen, following Prime Minister Balkenende's morning meeting with President Obama. They discussed strategic and operational coordination in Afghanistan, noting initiatives to improve cell phone communications and a southern airfield. Verhagen expressed satisfaction with the President's invitation to PM Balkenende to attend the upcoming G20 summit in Pittsburgh. They discussed next steps to establish an objective metric to assess Serbian cooperation with the ICTY, noting FM Verhagen's continued skepticism that Serbia was fully cooperating on investigations. EUR A/S Gordon thought feedback from teams implementing U.S. assistance should provide a better idea of any gap between Serbian promises and actions. FM Verhagen said he was closely and optimistically following progress toward a re-start of Middle East peace talks and, less optimistically, events in Iran, offering to help better align European positions to support U.S. efforts. END SUMMARY.
-------------
Afghanistan
-------------
5. (C) The Secretary said she looked forward to continuing Dutch advice about our strategic approach in Afghanistan. The U.S. strategy owed a lot to the 3-D approach (defense, diplomacy, development) that the Dutch had pioneered. On the future level of Dutch activities in Afghanistan, FM Verhagen noted PM Balkenende had made clear in his morning meeting with President Obama that although there were differences within the Dutch coalition government that were still being worked out, he was convinced the Dutch would stay in some capacity in Afghanistan and continue to build on their experience with the 3D approach. He viewed fighting corruption and supporting democratic elections as key elements of the current focus in Afghanistan.
6. (C) When the Secretary mentioned the U.S. initiative to locate new cell phone towers on outposts that we control, Verhagen agreed to look into doing the same at Dutch bases in the south. Up to then, the Taliban had been very successful at making cell communication "go dark" at night, hampering the U.S. ability to communicate. The Secretary also said that the successful cell phone tax should be applied to insurance needed to protect against damage and sabotage of cell phone towers. Verhagen highlighted a Dutch initiative to expand the U.S.-built airfield in Tarin Kowt, the capital of Uruzgan, noting that making it available for civilian use would make security investments more sustainable.
------
STATE 00078274 002 OF 003
7. (C) The Secretary welcomed Dutch participation in the G20 Pittsburgh Summit, and noted, in particular, the credibility the Dutch brought to development issues as a world leader in foreign development assistance. Verhagen said the GONL welcomed the invitation to the G20 meeting.
------
Serbia
------
8. (C) The Secretary said the United States understood Dutch concerns about Serb cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and was looking for an objective metric to measure cooperation. Verhagen welcomed the U.S. offer to share feedback from an FBI fugitive recovery team dispatched to Belgrade. Verhagen agreed the Serbs had made progress, but remained concerned that they were not cooperating "to the maximum," according to the prosecutor's recent report. He agreed that a more pro- European government was unlikely, but the EU Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) could not be unblocked without full cooperation with the ICTY, which provided for the extradition of Ratko Mladic to The Hague. Verhagen expressed concern that the Serbs might make promises and fail to deliver, and the Dutch offers of assistance had not been accepted. Further, Dutch proposals to look into other EU sweeteners that fell short of implementing the SAA had also been rejected. "Serbian leaders are only interested in an SAA; they say one thing in person, another to the international press, and another to their own publics," Verhagen said. A/S Gordon said the FBI team would provide a better idea of what gap remained between Serbian promises and actions.
----------------------
Development Assistance
----------------------
9. (SBU) The Secretary also credited the Dutch as a leading donor country. She asked Verhagen for his advice on establishing metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of international development activities. She added that as the United States embarked on the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), she would be very interested in learning from the Dutch experience.
------------------
Middle East Peace
------------------
10. (C) FM Verhagen briefly raised his visit to Israel three weeks earlier; he had been closely following events, including the cancellation of Special Envoy Mitchell's planned visit, President Obama's statement, and Netanyahu's response. Verhagen said that he was indeed convinced that we could reach a breakthrough and that all sides wanted a re-start, including Syria, which he also had visited. However, a trigger was needed, which he suggested could be a moratorium on all settlement construction. The Secretary agreed that if the Israelis agreed to any moratorium, however defined, it would be unprecedented and extraordinarily significant. The Palestinians had moved against Hamas and other militants, but the Arabs had been slow to show they were also serious, she added.
11. (C) Verhagen said he was willing to be helpful to ensure the EU moved with the United States. He asked for U.S. reaction to Solana's proposed timeline, and the Secretary responded that, although Solana's speech had been excellent, there really could be no timeline for Middle East peace until negotiations resumed. She emphasized that the Quartet had been very helpful. Verhagen said he had asked Solana to set up an action plan for the EU to help implement a peace agreement, once it had been achieved. He also noted the Dutch were a main donor to the Palestinian Authority, assisting with prisons and security in Jenin as well as a large agricultural project in Gaza, for which the Dutch had secured Israeli agreement to keep the border open for
STATE 00078274 003 OF 003
-----
Iran
-----
12. (C) FM Verhagan expressed concern about Iran and proposed discussions on what to do if the United Nations Security Council proved unwilling to act. Europe and the United States should act together, but the EU was not united. Any U.S. and EU sanctions packages should be identical, in his view. CLINTON
Tuesday, 17 October 2006, 06:20
C O N F I D E N T I A L BELGRADE 001681
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/WCI
DOJ FOR ALEXANDRE
EO 12958 DECL: CLOSURE OF ICTY
TAGS ICTY, PREL, PGOV, PHUM, KCRM, UNSC, SR
SUBJECT: ICTY ACTION PLAN SCORECARD, OCTOBER 2006
Classified By: DCM Roderick Moore, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (c) SUMMARY: In July, the USG provided the GoS with eleven recommendations designed to advance the hunt for Ratko Mladic. Due primarily to the resistance of PM Kostunica himself, the GoS has not carried out in full a single one of our recommendations (two have been, arguably, partially initiated). In fact, Kostunica has literally brushed aside our recommendations, telling A/S Fried recently that Serbia "does not need two action plans." With a constitutional referendum and follow-on elections likely to dominate the political calendar for the next several months, Action Plan coordinator Rasim Ljajic has told us frankly that we should not expect any more public activity on the issue, though he says below-the-radar operational activities will continue.
2. (c) Moreover, Carla del Ponte has sharply criticized the ineffectiveness of GoS implementation of the "Action Plan" Serbia negotiated this summer with ICTY and has told us that the PM has demonstrated no political will to take the steps necessary to bring about Mladic's arrest. By contrast, the PM declared over the weekend that Serbia has done "absolutely everything" to cooperate with ICTY and criticized the EU's "irrational" approach on Hague conditionality. Below is an assessment of the GOS' response to our eleven recommendations. END SUMMARY
Proposal 1: Kostunica publicly calls for Mladic's immediate arrest and instructs all Serbian government officials to do their utmost to accomplish this goal, stating that those that obstruct this goal will be immediately removed from their position. Kostunica asks for the public's help in this effort and ensures that the government's hotline number is widely publicized.
Status: In the three months since the Action Plan was initiated, Kostunica has said twice in prepared written statements (one delivered orally) that Mladic should be "brought in and handed over" to ICTY (i.e., he shied away from using the word "arrest," despite explicitly assuring the Ambassador that he would do so). Within those two statements, he tempered his calls by also criticizing Bosnia's "mockery of justice" in not apprehending former BiH General Dudakovic for crimes committed against Serbs. Kostunica has made no appeal for public assistance in the Mladic hunt, has not publicly called upon his security services to find and arrest Mladic, nor publicly threatened to sanction individuals assisting in Mladic's flight from justice. In our opinion, and that of Ljajic and Deputy PM Dulic-Markovic, neither the PM nor the government has made a sustained effort to address our first proposal. Ideally, we would want to see Kostunica launch a sustained effort with a nationally-televised, Oval Office-type address to the nation to make the points mentioned in our recommendation.
Proposal 2. Kostunica, along with Interior Minister Jocic, issues PUBLIC instructions to all security units throughout Serbia to dedicate full resources to arresting Mladic.
Status: This has not been done and is not currently planned.
Proposal 3. Serbian security forces initiate an effective manhunt along the lines of U.S. Marshal Service recommendations for such efforts.
Status: This has not been done and is not currently planned. The U.S. Marshals provided a detailed briefing to Minister Jocic in 2005, including specific recommendations on the structure and hierarchy of an effective task force. It is our assessment, and that of ICTY, that the gaps in cooperation among the security services (BIA, VBA, and MUP) and the lack of more results are at least in significant measure due to the loose and ineffective operational structure the GOS has put in place. Operational efforts remain largely as they were prior to the announcement of the Action Plan.
Proposal 4. Kostunica privately calls on the Serbian Orthodox Church to publicly support the arrest/transfer of Mladic. Status: This has not been done and is not currently planned.
Proposal 5. Headed by the PM and President Tadic, Serbian military intelligence (VBA) shares the classified briefing given recently at the country's Supreme Defense Council with U.S. Ambassador and selected EU ambassadors. That briefing should include a comprehensive list of people known or suspected to have supported Mladic, as well as his whereabouts up until the present day and GoS efforts to apprehend him.
Status: This has not been done and is not currently planned.
Proposal 6. Justice Minister Stojkovic announces the opening of a formal investigation into Mladic supporters based in part on the findings of the Republika Srpska Truth Commission report on Srebrenica, which includes a detailed list of people involved in or supporting the Srebrenica massacre, including Mladic and his support network. The focus of this investigation should be to identify current Mladic supporters.
Status: This has not been done and is not currently planned. In fact, Stojkovic's efforts on ICTY since July have been largely counterproductive. For instance, he opposed the War Crimes Prosecutor's effort to introduce legislation that would give him jurisdiction over aiders and abettors of ICTY fugitives.
Proposal 7. As part of the above investigation, those suspected of supporting Mladic or having information on Mladic's support network will immediately be brought in for questioning, and if appropriate, detained. This would include senior figures such as former head of military intelligence Aca Tomic, former Army Chief of Staff Krga, and Mladic son Darko Mladic. They should be held for questioning on the same basis, as appropriate, as those currently in detention (former lower level Mladic supporters wrapped up in the past several months).
Status: This has not been done. Ljajic told us eight weeks ago it was planned, but it never happened. Tomic is believed to have been close to Kostunica, including during the period that Tomic was involved in protecting Mladic in Serbia.
Proposal 8. Kostunica proposes to parliament a new law that imposes additional criminal penalties on anyone found to be assisting PIFWCs in any way, including financially.
Status: This has not been done. In fact, Kostunica's government initially opposed this legislation when proposed by the War Crimes Prosecutor. Only following high-level interventions by USG and ICTY officials has Kostunica offered to introduce such legislation - an offer del Ponte dismissed as insignificant given that the Serbian parliament is not slated to meet anytime soon.
Proposal 9. The Government of Serbia prepares and makes available to the general public a report on Mladic, containing especially information about war crimes he is accused of committing.
Status: This has not been done. Kostunica's government has done basically nothing to place Mladic's crimes in context. Indeed, before the tenth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre in 2005, Kostunica's party blocked a special parliamentary resolution that would have condemned the massacre; Kostunica argued that such a resolution would be inappropriate if it omitted an equal condemnation of crimes against Serbs. Ljajic told us he planned to "leak" information about Mladic's alleged atrocities and his massive financial gains from the Bosnia war to local press to start "demythologizing" him, but this never happened and, according to Ljajic, is no longer being planned.
Proposal 10. Kostunica forms an interagency task force within Serbia headed by the Special Prosecutor for War Crimes, which will be responsible for the location and apprehension of Mladic and other high-priority fugitive indictees. All personnel on the task force should be properly vetted to ensure that no investigations or the mission of the task force will be compromised.
Status: This recommendation has been only incompletely fulfilled. The task force, put in place at the behest of ICTY in the course of negotiations over the "Action Plan" (i.e., not in response to the USG recommendation), lacks the sort of centralized, well-resourced structure that the U.S. Marshals recommended. War Crimes Prosecutor Vukcevic is broadly coordinating operational activities, but ICTY has assessed that this has not led to a substantial change in the form or the intensity of the effort.
Proposal 11. Serbia helps establish and actively participates in a regional task force to coordinate efforts among the various law enforcement and intelligence agencies throughout the region to find and apprehend persons wanted for war crimes.
Status: An initiative in this direction has been launched, and one meeting has been held. According to Ljajic, there is some evidence that Bosnian security agencies and BIA are cooperating on some surveillance activities.
3. (c) CONCLUSION: In all, at most one or two of our eleven proposals have been partly addressed. The most critical element of the proposals - a consistent, concerted effort by Kostunica and the government to make the public aware that they are serious about tracking down and arresting Mladic - has not been initiated. Yet on October 14, Kostunica told local press that "Serbia has done absolutely everything to complete cooperation with the Hague tribunal." Based on what we have seen to date, we cannot concur with that rosy assessment.
POLT
Wednesday, 06 May 2009, 17:31
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000399
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/06/2019
TAGS PREL, KWAC, SR
SUBJECT: SERBIAN GOVERNMENT HUNTING FOR MLADIC
REF: 08 BELGRADE 1097
Classified By: Acting DCM Troy Pederson for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
1. (C) The Serbian government continues to publicly emphasize its efforts to capture war crimes indictee Ratko Mladic, and Serbian officials responsible for cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) privately tell us the current government is very supportive of their work. ICTY Belgrade,s chief, who sits in on operations discussions, agreed that Serbia was looking hard for Mladic and was also providing all document and witness assistance required, in contrast to the previous government,s efforts. Serbia also continued to prosecute domestic war crimes cases, and the war crimes court recently issued verdicts and sentences in two high-profile cases. The current government clearly wants to find Mladic, a prerequisite for moving ahead with EU accession and Serbia,s future. End Summary.
Looking for Mladic
------------------
2. (C) With the upcoming visit of ICTY Chief Prosecutor Serge Brammertz, the main question regarding Serbia,s ICTY cooperation -- and the key to the Dutch unblocking Serbia,s frozen Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU -- is whether Serbia is really doing all it can to find the remaining two ICTY indictees, particularly Bosnian Serb wartime military leader Ratko Mladic. Government officials continue to state publicly that Serbia is making every effort to find Mladic and fellow indictee Goran Hadzic. Chief of the War Crimes Investigation police Aleksandar Kostic told visiting S/WCI representative Julie Vibul-Jolles May 5 that the current government had the will to find the fugitives, but that so much time had passed that it was hard to track them down. He said there was no information to suggest Mladic was in Serbia but there was no information that he was anywhere else either. Police continued to search for leads, including surveilling known associates and family members. Regional intelligence sharing was helpful and had led to the arrests of Stojan Zupljanin and Radovan Karadzic, Kostic said.
3. (C) ICTY Belgrade Office Head Deyan Mihov told us May 5 that he believed that the search for Mladic was very active. The current government was engaged with ICTY, a "big change compared to the past." Mihov said the Security Information Agency (BIA) and Military Intelligence Agency (VBA) were now working well together and supporting each other,s efforts. Mihov said he attends weekly meetings of the Action Team as an observer and receives detailed operational information and plans concerning the search for both fugitives. Mihov told us that the meetings of the Action Team, which was officially co-headed by President of the National Council for Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal Rasim Ljajic and War Crimes Prosecutor Vladimir Vukcevic, were really led by Presidential Chief of Staff and National Security Council Secretary Miki Rakic, which he viewed as a strong indication that the search for Mladic was a personal priority of President Tadic. Mihov said Rakic had provided the same information to Brammertz each time he visited and also requested Brammertz,s help obtaining specific intelligence assistance. Mihov emphasized that the government could use any additional intelligence assistance the U.S. could provide. Mihov said he was impressed that the Action Team was trying equally hard to find Hadzic, even though the political payoff for Serbia from his capture would be much less than for Mladic.
Technical Cooperation with ICTY
-------------------------------
4. (SBU) Serbia,s technical cooperation with the ICTY, while not as high-profile, is also essential. Director of the ICTY Cooperation Council Office Dusan Ignjatovic told us May 4 his office had granted all of ICTY,s and defense lawyers, archive access requests, delivered all subpoenas to witnesses, addressed all witness protection issues ICTY had identified, and complied with more than 98% of document requests. Mihov confirmed that technical cooperation was close to 100% with no outstanding problems over documents, another improvement over the past government.
Domestic Trials
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BELGRADE 00000399 002 OF 002
5. (SBU) Domestic war crimes trials also continue, with verdicts recently in two high-profile cases. War Crimes Prosecutor Vukcevic told us May 5 the current government was much more supportive of domestic war crimes trials. On April 23, the court convicted four former policemen for murdering 50 ethnic Albanian civilians in Suva Reka, Kosovo in March 1999. Two of the defendants were sentenced to 20 years in prison, one to 15 years, and the fourth to 13 years. Three of the defendants, including the principal defendant, were acquitted. Vukcevic told us that he was pleased that the case had established that a crime had been committed but that he would appeal the acquittals. The War Crimes Court also completed on March 12 a retrial in the Ovcara (Vukovar) case, convicting 13 members of the Vukovar Territorial Defense for torturing and killing in November 1991 200 Croatian prisoners of war who had surrendered. Five individuals were acquitted, and one received a much lighter sentence in the retrial (6 years versus the original 15), and the War Crimes Prosecutor,s spokesman announced the prosecutor would appeal that sentence and the acquittals.
Comment
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6. (C) In contrast to the approach of the previous government, the current Serbian government is working hard on ICTY cooperation. The pressing domestic political need to unblock the SAA and move closer to European Union membership is clearly a major motivating factor, made all the more important by the worsening economic situation. While the term "fully cooperating" may be elusive, it is important to acknowledge the current government's efforts and not allow the dead weight of the past to hinder Serbia,s future. End Comment. MUNTER
Wednesday, 29 July 2009, 13:51
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000765
SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
EO 12958 DECL: 2019/07/29
TAGS ECON, PREL, SR, MARR, PGOV
SUBJECT: SERBIA IN THE WAKE OF VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN'S VISIT
REF: A) BELGRADE 725 B) BELGRADE743
CLASSIFIED BY: Jennifer Brush, Charge, US Department of State, US Embassy Belgrade; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
Summary
-------
1. (C) Vice President Biden's May 20 visit to Belgrade, during which he met with President Tadic, Prime Minister Cvetkovic, and Defense Minister Sutanovac, marked a "new beginning" in the bilateral relationship thanks to the core message that the United States recognized Serbia as an important regional partner and potential contributor to global prosperity and stability. Two months later, we have seen constructive engagement from the Serbian government on a certain number of issues. Our challenge now is to maintain and build on the momentum generated by the Vice President's visit to keep pushing Serbia forward on Euro-Atlantic integration, regional relations, economic development, and the bilateral relationship. During this several-month period between Ambassadors, post urges Washington policymakers to visit Belgrade and engage in international fora with their Serbian counterparts as frequently as possible on these key issues. End Summary.
Euro-Atlantic Integration
-------------------------
2. (C) The Vice President's message that the United States wanted Serbia to consider joining NATO, but would not push it to do so given the lasting impact of the 1999 NATO intervention, was well-received by the Serbian government and public. Lively public debate about the pros and cons of joining NATO was triggered by the recent 10th anniversary of the bombings, and was given additional impetus by the VPOTUS visit. In addition, the Vice President's decision to meet separately with Minister of Defense Dragan Sutanovac has given this reform-oriented advocate of cooperation with NATO additional credibility and weight in the policymaking process. Moving forward, we should continue to expand our vibrant military-to-military relationship with Serbia, work with partners to educate the public about the benefits of NATO membership, and encourage the Serbian government to cut through its interagency squabbles and open its long-awaited NATO mission in Brussels. We should also encourage Serbia to play an increasingly active role in global security issues, for example by sending police to Afghanistan within the ISAF framework.
3. (C) It is also in our interest to find new ways to support Serbia's aspirations to join the European Union, in that integration is the surest guarantee of increased prosperity and stability in the Balkans. Our existing assistance programs are already focused on the reforms needed for successful EU candidacy, from the economic sector to good governance and rule of law, and should be continued. While progress is slow and imperfect, the Serbian government is gradually working its way through the mountain of reform legislation that it must adopt and implement in these areas. Its main challenge now is to convince The Netherlands that its efforts to capture ICTY indictees Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic are sincere and effective, as the Dutch insist on Serbia's full cooperation with The Hague Tribunal as a prerequisite to unfreezing the Interim Trade Agreement and ratifying the Stabilization and Association Agreement. Pursuant to Vice President Biden's discussion of the issue with President Tadic, we are working with the FBI to bring a fugitive investigation expert to Belgrade to review the case file on Mladic and determine whether there are avenues of investigation or techniques that have not yet been applied. Continued engagement with the Dutch government to identify steps the Serbian government could take to demonstrate its best efforts to cooperate with the ICTY would enhance our leverage with the Serbian government.
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Regional Relations
------------------
4. (C) The Vice President's clear statement during his visit that the United States is not asking Serbia to recognize Kosovo helped defuse tension over this issue. Some in government, most notably Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic and officials from the Kosovo Ministry, continue to take an obstinate and non-constructive public approach to relations with Kosovo, however. Although we are still seeking a modus operandi in which Serbian and Kosovo officials can engage in regional fora on essential areas of cooperation, including trade, and organized crime, some progress is happening behind the scenes. In the two months since the Vice President's visit, the Serbian government has encouraged Kosovo Serbs to return to the Kosovo Police Service (KPS); worked with KEK to encourage Kosovo Serbs to sign electricity contracts; and fired Northern Kosovo hardliner Marko Jaksic from his GOS-paid job as head of the Mitrovica Health Center.
5. (C) We are not seeing a sufficiently constructive approach from the Serbian government on decentralization and the ICO-led plan to create five new Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo through municipal elections in November, however; rather than recognizing it as the best opportunity for Kosovo Serbs to defend their interests, President Tadic and others have made unhelpful, preemptive statements saying that the Serbian government cannot approve any elections carried out under the Ahtisaari Plan by the "false state" of Kosovo. Another stumbling block is Serbia's intent to hold elections in August in Kosovo for the Belgrade-controlled parallel structures in two municipalities. It is premature to conclude that the Serbian government's position on the November elections is immutable, however. President Tadic's statement that "the conditions do not exist for us to encourage Kosovo Serbs to participate in these elections" provides us an opening to initiate a dialogue with pragmatic elements in Belgrade -- namely Tadic and his advisors -- about the conditions under which the Serbian government could support Kosovo Serb participation. While it may not ultimately be possible to reach common ground, it is important to try.
Economic Development
--------------------
6. (C) During his meeting with Prime Minister Cvetkovic, Vice President Biden praised the Serbian government's efforts to minimize the impact of the global economic crisis on the country. He encouraged Serbia to deal with the issue of property restitution, as it was the only country in the region that had not done so, and the uncertainty surrounding land ownership was having a negative effect on the investment climate. Since the visit, a draft law on zoning and the use of construction land that has been in development for several years has moved forward from the Government to the Parliament. As currently written, the draft law will clarify the situation by granting title to land to those who currently have ownership or use rights of the buildings on it. The law will almost completely eliminate the possibility of restitution in kind to claimants, however, except in the case of vacant/undeveloped property. The draft law foresees the creation of a restitution fund that would be financed by the proceeds of the conversion of privatized public enterprise land to other uses. In order to ensure the equity of the process, which is of particular interest to the Serbian-American diaspora, we are engaging with the government and parliament to carefully consider the two issues - restitution and zoning - so as not to have the zoning law preempt legitimate claims for restitution (reftel A).
BELGRADE 00000765 003 OF 004
7. (C) Serbia continues to face a tough road toward economic development. While it continues to make progress toward WTO, accession is not expected before mid-2010 due to the need for significant amounts of additional legislation. Meanwhile, the economic crisis continues to bite into Serbia as foreign direct investment has nearly dried up and the government has become increasingly dependent on borrowing to meet budgetary demands this year. It will be important to encourage the government to continue making the necessary reforms to free the economy from the old state-centered model and to encourage greater market liberalization and entrepreneurship, so that it will be competitive once the global economy rebounds.
Bilateral Relationship
----------------------
8. (C) President Obama's election generated enormous goodwill in Serbia, and people here believe that the new Administration is taking a more even-handed approach to the Balkans than in the past. Vice President Biden's visit confirmed and cemented this impression on the part of both the Serbian government and public, by demonstrating that one of the most vocal critics of the Milosevic regime now saw the leadership of Serbia as potential partners and forces for regional stability. We still have a great deal of work to do to uproot entrenched stereotypes of the U.S. Government as imperialistic, anti-Serb, and pro-Albanian, however. A recent Medium Gallup poll showed Serbia tied with Pakistan for first place - at 61% -- on the list of countries whose citizens hold negative views of the United States. Frequent statements from the Serbian government characterizing the United States as an international bully, combined with a pronounced aversion to acknowledging U.S. partnership and assistance and a penchant for exaggerating Russian contributions and the importance of the Non-Aligned Movement, contribute to this outdated public perception. We will push our Serbian interlocutors to take a more balanced and mature approach to their public statements about the United States, while continuing our intense public diplomacy efforts to highlight our work here.
9. (C) Visas are a central issue in Serbia's relations with its Western partners, and the United States is no exception. Serbian citizens long for the days when they could travel freely with Yugoslav passports and chafe under visa requirements, seeing them as a "sanction" held over from the 1990s. While the application process for U.S. visas is light-years more customer friendly and less onerous than that of most European countries, which frequently require applicants to queue for hours three or four times, it has become the subject of debate now that the European Union is moving forward with Schengen visa liberalization for Serbia. Given the stable situation in Serbia and the relatively low refusal rate, post believes that it would be justified to consider increasing the standard validity of non-immigrant visas from the current three years to five (reftel B). This would have a beneficial impact on our workload at a time of reduced consular staffing, while also allowing us to send a signal to the Serbian people that we recognize the progress that the country has made since its democratic transition and are eager for increased engagement.
Comment
-------
10. (C) Although the current Serbian government is democratic and
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pro-European, it is also frequently unfocused and politically timid. Our challenge is to make it clear that Vice President Biden's visit wasn't merely a reward for good behavior, but rather the start of what needs to be a much more intensive dialogue on how we can work together more closely and productively on our shared objectives. End Comment.
BRUSH BRUSH
Tuesday, 26 January 2010, 13:40
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000053
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/ACE, AND INL/AAE
EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, KCOR, HR
SUBJECT: CROATIAN PROSECUTORS INVESTIGATING FORMER PM AND
OTHER "UNTOUCHABLES" FOR CORRUPTION
REF: 09 ZAGREB 644
Classified By: Political Officer Chris Zimmer for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Chief State Prosecutor Mladen Bajic has outlined to us several ongoing corruption cases targeting former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader and other top government officials. Prosecutors are developing at least one case against the former PM which could result in his indictment, and they are continuing to uncover evidence in several other cases which could also implicate Sanader. PM Kosor has strengthened anti-corruption efforts by creating interagency teams to investigate the most serious cases of corruption in state-owned enterprises, while the Ministers of Interior and Justice have warned that there are no "untouchables" in the corruption clampdown. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) In a series of meetings in early to mid-January, Croatian Chief State Prosecutor Mladen Bajic described several ongoing corruption probes to Poloff which target former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, current and former ministers, and nearly all major state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Bajic said that Sanader has possible involvement in several cases, but the one in which prosecutors have gathered the most evidence involves illegal mediation between his friends and Hypo Alpe Adria Bank Group of Austria. The Hypo Bank case indicates that Sanader allegedly arranged a DM 4 million loan for his neighbor, Miroslav Kutle, in the 1990's and received a DM 800,000 kickback from Kutle in return. XXXXXXXXXXXX is cooperating with the anti-corruption prosecutors (USKOK), and XXXXXXXXXXXX story has been corroborated by XXXXXXXXXXXX with knowledge of the transactions. The illegal mediation charge for receiving gifts and benefits while abusing an official position to secure business transactions carries a prison term of one to five years. Bajic said that Hypo Bank is cooperating with the investigation.
3. (C) Sanader is also implicated in several corruption cases involving the Transportation Ministry. Transport Minister Bozidar Kalmeta has been under fire for several months due to corruption cases XXXXXXXXXXXX Bajic said that Sanader often bypassed Kalmeta and gave instructions about how to handle certain cases directly to . Bajic did note, however, that XXXXXXXXXXXX should have at least been aware of what was happening within XXXXXXXXXXXX.
4. (C) Bajic said his office is leading interagency teams established under orders from PM Kosor to deal with five priority cases involving state-owned enterprises (SOEs): XXXXXXXXXXXX. The teams, led by the prosecutor's Office for Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime (USKOK), meet daily and include the Police, Tax Administration, Finance Police, and other experts. Bajic said he believes that all major Croatian SOEs are now under investigation. Chief of Police Oliver Grbic told reporters in mid-January that police were running twelve investigations during the past six months intoXXXXXXXXXXXX management officials of public companies.
5. (C) A sixth company under investigation, Podravka, has 26 percent government ownership, and parliament approves the supervisory board. At least seven members of the board, all affiliated with the ruling coalition, were arrested, and Deputy Prime Minister (and Minister of Economy and former Podravka executive) Damir Polancec resigned in October 2009. Dinko Cvitan, head of USKOK, confirmed to poloff on January 21 that USKOK has now opened a formal investigation of Polancec for illegal mediation. The scandal involves embezzlement and fraudulent loans by several Podravka-linked firms in an attempt by managers to buy controlling interest in the company. Bajic said he needed several documents from XXXXXXXXXXXX in Hungary to move forward with charges in the case, and initially described efforts to secure them from Hungary as "catastrophic." XXXXXXXXXXXX and several Hungarian officials were uncooperative, he said, XXXXXXXXXXXX. During a January 18 meeting between PM Kosor and Hungarian PM Bajnai, PM Bajnai told press that documents relating to Podravka's XXXXXXXXXXXX were sent on to Croatia on January 15; Bajic said he received a Hungarian prosecutor's
ZAGREB 00000053 002 OF 002
report on XXXXXXXXXXXX's dealings with Podravka on January 22.
6. (U) Minister of Interior Tomislav Karamarko and Minister of Justice Ivan Simonovic have also been spearheading a public relations campaign to publicize the "war on corruption" in Croatia. Simonovic said on Croatian Radio that "no one can be above the law -- either former or present or future presidents or prime ministers." He went on to add that "there have always been untouchables, but this is the first time in the history of Croatia that there won't be untouchables anymore."
7. (C) COMMENT: An important test of Croatia's anti-corruption efforts will be the ability to go after the biggest fish. For several years, Bajic has been extremely hesitant to open even a formal investigation, let alone seek an indictment against high-ranking officials, unless he felt he had a watertight case. The opening of the formal investigation against Polancec, and Bajic's assessment that the Hypo Bank case currently has solid evidence against Sanader, are strong signs that some "big fish" may soon face formal charges, joining former Defense and Interior Minister Berislav Roncevic, who is currently under indictment for a truck procurement scandal during his time at the MoD (reftel). While the illegal mediation charges being considered against Sanader and Polancec may seem rather minor, Bajic suggests that there is likely much more to be uncovered involving the former PM. In any case, as Bajic likes to point out, Al Capone was brought down for tax evasion rather than for his more notorious activities. FOLEY
Friday, 12 February 2010, 11:51
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000097
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/SCE AND INL/AAE, VIENNA FOR FBI/CALDWELL
EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2020
TAGS PREL;PGOV;KCOR;HU;HR
SUBJECT: PODRAVKA CORRUPTION CASE TIED TO XXXXXXXXXXXX AND
XXXXXXXXXXXX DEAL
REF: A. ZAGREB 0053 B. ZIMMER-CALDWELL E-MAILS
Classified By: Political Officer Chris Zimmer for Reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: The investigation of former Deputy Prime Minister Damir Polancec and the Podravka food company (which is 26 percent state-owned) is uncovering a growing scandal and has now tied Podravka's financing schemes to the XXXXXXXXXXXX. The majority of Podravka's board are under arrest. Prosecutors are seeking information from XXXXXXXXXXXX, who provided XXXXXXXXXXXX to the Podravka management board. Prosecutors believeXXXXXXXXXXXX was then used in the board's scheme to take over the company, which led to subsequent illegal actions to cover up their activities and financial losses. Media are beginning to speculate on the role of former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader in the affair. End Summary.
2. (C) Croatia's Chief State Prosecutor Mladen Bajic met with RSO and Poloff on February 2 to outline the prosecutor's "Operation Spice" investigation into Podravka and former Deputy Prime Minister Polancec. Bajic presented two documents. The first was an unsigned financing agreement between XXXXXXXXXXXX and Podravka from November 2006. The second was a completed financing agreement between a company called XXXXXXXXXXXX and from XXXXXXXXXXXX which was secured by Podravka shares. Bajic said that under the equity acquisition financing agreement, XXXXXXXXXXXX approximately 34 million euro (with an additional 39 million euro available in a second tranche) for purchase of nearly 600,000 ordinary shares of Podravka. XXXXXXXXXXXX Bajic said Podravka's management, under a plan spearheaded by Polancec, had arranged the deal in order to use the proceeds to purchase a controlling interest in the company. (NOTE: Four members of Podravka's former management board are currently in detention. The board, which is appointed by parliament, was composed of members supported by various parties within the ruling coalition. End Note.) XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX replaced an unnamed "Podravka Management Approved Holding Company" as the borrower of record.
3. (C) Prosecutors from the Office of Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime (USKOK) are interested in learning the details of XXXXXXXXXXXX, including who approached XXXXXXXXXXXX (NOTE: Post forwarded copies of the XXXXXXXXXXXXagreements to the FBI office in Vienna on February 8. End Note.) Bajic told EmbOffs that the XXXXXXXXXXXX agreement is legal -- his interest is in learning who was involved on the Croatian side. According to prosecutors, the criminal aspects of the deal involveXXXXXXXXXXXX and actions taken by Polancec and others in order to XXXXXXXXXXXX.
4. (C) Due to the economic crisis, the value of Podravka shares fell more than 50 percent, from approximately 600 kuna (120 USD) per share XXXXXXXXXXXX. According to prosecutors, as the value decreased, Podravka management, XXXXXXXXXXXX had to meet margin calls for the shortfall. In one scheme to increase Podravka's revenues, at least on paper, Bajic said the management engaged in money laundering by funneling Podravka money XXXXXXXXXXXX in order to pay fraudulent contracts with Podravka.
5. (C) While Polancec's scheme at Podravka was unraveling, he was simultaneously involved in negotiations with XXXXXXXXXXXX END NOTE.) Hungarian prosecutors forwarded to Bajic their report on an investigation of XXXXXXXXXXXX in the Podravka deal. According to the report, when the XXXXXXXXXXXX of the equity agreement dropped to 35 percent in December 2008, it triggered an early termination agreement. Hungarian prosecutors say that at this point, Deputy Prime Minister Polancec, who was also Minister of Economy and deeply involved in the XXXXXXXXXXXX negotiations, approached XXXXXXXXXXXX and asked XXXXXXXXXXXX to be a consultant to Podravka. As a result of these consultations, XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX for his failed schemes at Podravka.
6. (C) Press reports on the XXXXXXXXXXXX connection to the Podravka case within the past week have also speculated on the possible involvement of former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader. Sanader was closely involved in XXXXXXXXXXXX negotiations and it would have been difficult for Polancec to have taken some of the actions prosecutors are alleging he did in the XXXXXXXXXXXX talks without Sanader's knowledge. Bajic declined to tell us on February 2 whether Sanader is a target of this investigation, but he has told us on previous occasions that his office is investigating the former PM in several cases.
7. (C) Bajic has said privately that Podravka could be Croatia's Enron, a game-changing case in the GoC's efforts to tackle corruption, particularly if he can obtain sufficient evidence that Polancec intentionally undersold XXXXXXXXXXXX. Cooperation with Hungarian prosecutors continues to improve. Bajic said he was very impressed with the evidence and analysis the Hungarians provided on the XXXXXXXXXXXX connection.
8. (C) COMMENT: The Podravka case is one of the major cases that the EU is watching to determine Croatia's commitment to fighting corruption. The results to date are positive. The willingness and ability of USKOK to investigate an incumbent Deputy Prime Minister, almost immediately after suspicions were raised, shows that, as Prime Minister Kosor has contended, there may no longer be "untouchables" in Croatia. Post will continue to work with the FBI in order to facilitate USKOK's contact with XXXXXXXXXXXX. END COMMENT. FOLEY
Friday, 05 February 2010, 14:20
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BELGRADE 000025
SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/02/05
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, SR, KV
SUBJECT: SERBIA: AMBASSADOR'S FIRST MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN
POLICY ADVISOR RATKOVIC
REF: BELGRADE 19; STATE 9661
CLASSIFIED BY: Deborah Mennuti, Political Counselor, State, POL; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
Summary
-------
1. (C) In a February 3 conversation with the Ambassador, presidential foreign policy advisor Jovan Ratkovic conveyed Serbia's desire for intensified cooperation with the United States and detailed his plans to visit Washington February 10-12 to discuss possible ways forward on Kosovo, saying Serbia sought a "realistic, pragmatic, peaceful, win-win solution" for Serbs and Albanians. He expressed concern that the International Civilian Office (ICO) plan to integrate northern Kosovo could destabilize the situation and threaten political stability in Serbia, and would not engage on the issue of whether Serbia would seek an UNGA resolution calling for new status talks. Ratkovic noted the important role that KFOR played in Kosovo and said that Serbia would formally open its NATO mission by mid-2010 and increase its participation in Partnership for Peace activities. Progress toward EU membership would likely be slowed by EU enlargement fatigue and wariness of accepting new members until they were fully qualified, he predicted. Ratkovic expressed cautious optimism that a breakthrough in bilateral relations with Croatia would be possible, concern about Macedonia's long-term stability, and disappointment with the poor state of relations with Montenegro. End Summary.
2. (SBU) The Ambassador paid an introductory courtesy call on presidential foreign policy advisor Jovan Ratkovic on February 3. Ratkovic was accompanied by his deputy Aleksandar Knezevic.
Bilateral Relations
-------------------
3. (SBU) The Ambassador thanked Ratkovic for his help in arranging for her to present her credentials to President Tadic so soon after arrival (Ref B), which had allowed her to get off to a quick start in meeting Serbian government officials. She told Ratkovic that she would work to build on the already-strong momentum of the bilateral relationship by expanding our cooperation on economic and security issues, while addressing difficult issues in a constructive way. The visits of Codel Voinovich, Codel Pomeroy, and EUR DAS Jones in February would be important opportunities for dialogue, she noted. Ratkovic said that Senator Voinovich was an old friend who was always welcome in Serbia. The fact that he and Senator Shaheen would be arriving on February 17 after having visited Pristina on the anniversary of Kosovo's declaration of independence was problematic, however; Ratkovic was unable to confirm whether President Tadic would meet with the congressional delegation pending resolution of these itinerary concerns.
4. (S) Ratkovic expressed the hope that 2010 would be a "decisive" year for building bilateral relations in which the United States would treat Serbia as a true partner in all areas of cooperation, not just security. Serbia intended to continue its cooperation with the U.S. on sensitive intelligence matters and to increase defense cooperation by working on peacekeeping training with the Ohio National Guard. Multilaterally, Serbia had committed to sending up to 50 additional gendarmerie to UNMISTAH in Haiti under EU auspices and was in discussions with Spain about contributing troops to UNIFIL in Lebanon.
BELGRADE 00000025 002 OF 005
Brainstorming on Kosovo
-----------------------
5. (C) Ratkovic informed the Ambassador that he would visit Washington from February 10-12, after attending Wehrkunde in Munich and a Conservative Party event in London. He hoped to meet with A/S Gordon, as well as contacts in Congress, for "discreet brainstorming" on ways forward on Kosovo. The Ambassador conveyed U.S. concerns (Ref B) about indications that Serbia would continue to take a confrontational approach on Kosovo after the ICJ rendered its advisory opinion. Dismissing the question of whether Serbia would seek an UNGA resolution calling for new status talks as a "mere tactical issue" for the MFA to decide, Ratkovic said the Presidency was focused on the bigger question of how to achieve a "realistic, pragmatic, peaceful, win-win solution" for Serbs and Albanians. Ratkovic said that Serbia recognized and was trying to respect the "legitimate interests" of Kosovar Albanians; in return, Serbia expected the Kosovars to respect the legitimate interests of Serbia and Kosovo Serbs as well. He stressed that the Serbian government wanted the U.S. to be part of and support a solution that would lead to regional stability and reconciliation. For that reason, he hoped for high-level, free-thinking, and informal discussions in Washington; he had received explicit guidance from President Tadic on the specifics of his message, but was not at liberty to share it yet.
6. (C) Ratkovic returned to the topic of Kosovo later in the conversation, stressing the sensitivity of how the north is handled. Ratkovic argued that the northern part of Kosovo had a history distinct from the rest of the province, claiming that the three districts north of the Ibar were only annexed to the province after World War II to counter-balance the rapid growth of the ethnic Albanian population. "These people have never lived with Albanians, have never felt themselves part of Kosovo, and won't accept rule by Pristina," Ratkovic said. "Belgrade is not trying to change the reality on the ground for Kosovar Albanians, but changing the reality for Kosovo Serbs would also be destabilizing," he added. For that reason the ICO proposal to integrate the north put forward by Peter Feith and supported by the United States was "not helpful," according to Ratkovic, who claimed that military intervention was being discussed. He said that this was the primary reason that Tadic decided to address the UN Security Council on January 22: the implementation of such a strategy could result in instability and thus become a national security concern for Serbia, threatening the country's democratization and pro-Western orientation. (Comment: Serbia's historical arguments are routinely countered by Albanian historical recollections to the contrary. Ratkovic's claims of a separate historical "reality" for Northern Mitrovica, therefore, would find resistance from Kosovo Albanian historians. End Comment.)
7. (C) The Ambassador responded that the ideas put forward by Feith were not new; the integration of northern Kosovo had always been on the table. She emphasized that there was no discussion of the use of force to impose the integration of the whole territory of Kosovo. Noting that we understand the Serbian government's sensitivities, the Ambassador underscored the need to exchange views openly on the full range of unresolved issues and encouraged Ratkovic to share his thinking in detail while in Washington. Ratkovic said that Serbia had the EU's assurances that the document produced by the ICO was not an EU plan. He added that given the situation on the ground and the attitude of Kosovo Serbs toward the ICO, the only way to implement the plan would be by use of force.
BELGRADE 00000025 003 OF 005
NATO Relations
--------------
8. (SBU) Asked about the President's views on Serbia's relations with NATO, Ratkovic said that as a former Minister of Defense, President Tadic knows the issue well. Tadic believes that Serbia cannot remain outside of NATO forever, but doesn't say this often because of the political sensitivity of the issue. Ratkovic explained that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the citizens of Yugoslavia assumed that they would be among the first to enter both the European Union and NATO. It wasn't until the wars of the Milosevic era and the 1999 NATO intervention that anti-NATO sentiment developed in Serbia. Ratkovic characterized current public support for PfP participation and NATO membership as "surprisingly high" given Serbia's history.
9. (C) Serbia is taking concrete steps to increase its engagement with NATO, Ratkovic said. It has appointed an ambassador to NATO and established a mission there; once the office is fully operational, President Tadic will travel to Brussels in June or July to open it formally and hopes to address the North Atlantic Council. Tadic had instructed the MFA and the MOD to increase Serbia's participation in PfP "on the model of Austria." These steps needed to precede any decision about membership, Ratkovic said. He added that President Tadic would meet with SACEUR/EUCOM CDR ADM James Stavridis in Belgrade on February 11. Ratkovic emphasized that NATO's image in the Serbian public had a significant influence on the development of the relationship, mentioning the role of KFOR in protecting Kosovo Serbs and religious sites and concerns about its drawdown.
European Integration
---------------------
10. (C) Ratkovic predicted that the Spanish EU presidency would push for movement on Serbia's EU membership application in March but did not know whether the effort would be successful, due to member-states' enlargement fatigue and wariness of accepting any more new members that were not fully qualified. He charged that Germany's misguided belief that enlargement was economically detrimental rather than beneficial had led it to introduce new hurdles for applicants, including making the forwarding of a membership application to the Commission for an avis a political rather than a technical question. He asserted that both Serbia and Croatia had the administrative capacity and political will to fulfill all EU criteria, noting that the upcoming tenth anniversary of the October 5, 2000, overthrow of Milosevic would provide an opportunity to remind the world of the results of Serbia's "democratic revolution."
Regional Relations
------------------
11. (C) The Ambassador told Ratkovic that the United States was supportive of Serbia's efforts to improve its relations with Croatia and informed him that PRM DAS David Robinson would visit Belgrade in early March to look at how the United States could contribute to resolving protracted refugee issues, particularly
BELGRADE 00000025 004 OF 005
between Serbia and Croatia. Ratkovic said that the presidency was working discreetly with Croatia on a "roadmap" to resolve all of the outstanding bilateral issues, and that they understood the EU had sent a helpful message to Zagreb that Croatia needed to find solutions in order to close Chapter 23 of the acquis. He said he was cautiously optimistic that there would be a breakthrough with Croatia in 2010.
12. (C) Ratkovic expressed pessimism about prospects for constitutional reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina in light of upcoming elections. He said the Spanish EU presidency would make a last attempt to reach agreement before the election campaign began in earnest but would face difficult odds. Ratkovic reiterated that the Serbian government supported the territorial integrity of BiH and would not be swayed by what he claimed was the desire of the majority of Republika Srpska residents to secede and merge with Serbia. In this context, Serbia also supported BiH's entry into EU and NATO as a way to stabilize the country and cement the current borders. Ratkovic said the USG had miscalculated in making constitutional reform a pre-condition for a NATO Membership Action Plan status for BiH, as most Bosnian Serbs were not for NATO. He expressed regret that the Butmir process had not produced agreement since many of the elements of the plan were acceptable to all three constituent peoples; it would have been better to avoid taking an "all or nothing" approach to the reforms and to have granted MAP status, he judged.
13. (C) Serbia is more worried about Macedonia's future than Bosnia's, Ratkovic said. It is not clear how a country composed of two completely different ethnic groups with no common language or religion can hold together, he commented, particularly with the ethnic Albanian population growing at such as rate that it will equal the Slavic population in 20 years. Ratkovic said that President Tadic was talking to both Greece and Macedonia about the name issue in hopes of unblocking Macedonia's path to both the EU and NATO.
14. (C) Serbia's relations with Montenegro were at a historic low, Ratkovic said, noting that as he and Tadic were both of Montenegrin origin they felt the situation keenly. He explained that the Montenegrin government had had to distance itself from Belgrade in order to win the independence referendum, but as there were no longer any divisive issues the ball was in Podgorica's court. It remained to be seen if Montenegro would treat Serbia as "a strategic partner or a bogeyman," Ratkovic commented. One important criterion will be how Montenegro addresses organized crime, which Ratkovic identified as a serious problem that Serbia believed must be tackled.
Comment
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15. (C ) As Tadic's foreign policy advisor, Ratkovic's comments come closest to reflecting the President's views and vision on issues across the spectrum. His decision to visit Washington next week, under clear instruction, to outline Tadic's thinking in a low-key manner on a post-ICJ way forward is a constructive step and may provide an important opportunity to influence Belgrade's strategy. In a meeting with the UK ambassador (please protect) earlier this week, Ratkovic outlined the following ideas that likely reflect current thinking: Option A: some understanding of a bigger Serbian role in the north and over five monasteries in the south, in which case Belgrade would "accept" but not recognize
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Kosovo; Option B: Partition; Option C: Serbia chooses between Kosovo or the EU. Option A (i.e, finding a way to define Serbia's special interests in the north and with the status of some churches in the south) most likely reflects the ideas that Belgrade is most interested in exploring. While Serbia's lack of a commitment to recognize Kosovo will remain an EU stumbling in the long-term, Ratkovic's overture next week may provide an initial first step toward defining a more realistic modus vivendi, which we have been encouraging the Serbs to explore.
16. (C) Ratkovic understands that the ideas he outlines next week will only provide a basis for discussion, with the expectation, of course, of much more work to follow. Nevertheless, we are encouraged by what appears to be a growing recognition of both the strategic and tactical importance of opening channels for a post-ICJ dialogue sooner rather than later, and the need to manage next steps in a way that does not undermine other key Belgrade objectives, above all eventual EU accession. FM Jeremic's visit to Washington the week of February 22 and DAS Jones's travel to the region the same week will provide important follow-on opportunities for continued engagement on the way ahead. End Comment. WARLICK
Monday, 23 February 2009, 17:24
C O N F I D E N T I A L PRISTINA 000077
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DEPT FOR S, P, EUR (FRIED, JONES)
NSC FOR HELGERSON, OVP FOR BLINKEN
FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT FROM THE AMBASSADOR
EO 12958 DECL: 02/14/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, UNMIK, KV
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF KOSOVO PRESIDENT
SEJDIU AND PRIME MINISTER THACI TO WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 26, 2008
Classified By: AMBASSADOR TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (C) It has been a difficult but in many ways successful year since Kosovo declared its independence on February 17, 2008. Though we spent much time planning for the possibility of large-scale population flows after the declaration and took precautions lest the independence move sparked outright conflict between Kosovo and Serbia, none of this has taken place. Instead, with our strong support and encouragement, Kosovo has weathered a series of provocative and sometimes violent actions taken by Serb hardliners, demonstrating through patience and restraint that it is a responsible member of the international community and an eager aspirant for eventual inclusion in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Kosovo has a modern constitution, has passed laws to protect its minorities, and is looking to build a sustainable economic base through development of its energy sector and other private investment. Acknowledging Kosovo's achievements, 55 of the most important countries in Europe and elsewhere have recognized Kosovo, though the pace of recognitions has been slowed by Serbia's unfortunate decision to refer the question of Kosovo independence to the International Court of Justice. Kosovo is working to expand the group of recognizers, and would appreciate the assistance of the new U.S. administration in convincing friends and allies -- particularly in the Islamic world -- to come on board.
2. (C) Kosovo's temperate line is in many ways due to the leadership of President Sejdiu and Prime Minister Thaci, two men of very different backgrounds and political sentiment who chose to make common cause at a critical time for Kosovo. The two formed a coalition government just prior to independence, an arrangement that has held steady despite historical animosities and considerable mistrust between their two parties. This visit and your visible endorsement of Kosovo's moderate approach will help fend off growing domestic criticism -- from dissatisfied members of the governing coalition and from the vocal opposition -- that Kosovo leaders have not been assertive enough in establishing control over Kosovo's rebellious Serb-majority north or defending against Serbian encroachments on Kosovo sovereignty.
3. (C) And those encroachments will likely persist, even under the pro-European government of Serbian President Tadic in Belgrade. The previous Serbian government under Prime Minister Kostunica engineered a policy of full ethnic separation in Kosovo, physically intimidating local Serbs into abandoning jobs in Kosovo's once multi-ethnic police force and municipal administrations. Serbia held its own illegal municipal elections in Kosovo despite warnings from the UN that such a move violated UNSCR 1244 and moved rapidly to emplace parallel institutions in Serb-majority areas throughout Kosovo. Serbia also backed open violence by the thuggish and criminalized Serb leadership in Kosovo's north, which ordered the destruction of two northern border gates and the subsequent March 17, 2008 attack on UN and KFOR peacekeepers.
4. (C) While Tadic has made significant steps on key issues of importance to the West, including on ICTY commitments, he has pursued a policy in Kosovo not materially different from that of his predecessor. Serbia continues to assert the authority of parallel Serb municipal authorities throughout Kosovo, sowing the seeds of potential conflict in areas where Serbs and Albanians live side by side. Tadic's Serbia has refused to restore customs operations at the two northern gates, resulting in a rash of smuggling and organized crime in northern Kosovo. No local Serbs have yet been permitted by Belgrade to return to Kosovo institutions. While Tadic and his foreign minister Jeremic (the mastermind of Belgrade's Kosovo policy) finally bowed to European pressure to accept the deployment of an EU rule of law mission (EULEX) throughout Kosovo, they have resisted engaging in discussions with EULEX on the resolution of practical issues including customs and police, insisting instead that the UN impose Belgrade-crafted measures -- the so-called "six points" -- to effectively separate Kosovo's ethnic Serbs from its majority population. Should these six points be implemented in the way Belgrade foresees, Kosovars worry that partition could once again become a viable reality.
5. (C) The Kosovo government remains prepared to engage in quiet diplomacy with Serbia via EU mediation, and has held open those positions in the police and public sector that
were once occupied by local Serbs in anticipation of any signal from Belgrade to the Kosovo Serb community that they are free to resume a more collaborative approach. You can impress upon Sejdiu and Thaci once again the imperative to maintain outreach to their minority communities and implement fully those obligations they undertook to the Serb population under the plan developed by UN Special Envoy (and Nobel laureate) Ahtisaari.
6. (C) Kosovo's challenges are not limited to the political and security realm. Last year's Donors Conference saw over $1.5 billion pledged in support of Kosovo, but the momentum of Kosovo's economic development and its attractiveness to international investors -- particularly in the energy field, where Kosovo's huge lignite deposits can be transformed over the next decade into a reliable domestic supply of electricity as well as an export commodity -- will ultimately depend not on the largesse of donors but on the government's own credible pursuit of its economic objectives, something you can stress in your discussions with them. They will also need to avoid the serious pitfalls of cronyism, corruption and political patronage in public appointments; the recent selections of solid professionals to lead their intelligence agency and the ministry of the Kosovo Security Force (the small, NATO-trained civil response force) gives at least some cause for hope in this regard.
7. (C) Sejdiu and Thaci may reaffirm their conviction that U.S. troop contributions in Kosovo remain essential, particularly since U.S. forces alone are trusted enough by Serbs and Albanians to maintain peace in one of the most volatile parts of Kosovo. Kosovo leaders will also express their belief that only the United States can provide the kind of lasting leadership in Kosovo and the region that is necessary for prolonged stability. Frankly, we agree. While many in the EU and most notably the "Quint" countries were vigorous in supporting Kosovo's independence, the intensified problems we predict as a consequence of Belgrade's intransigence -- especially those surrounding Kosovo's north, where Serb extremists have shown their readiness for continued confrontation -- could easily lead some queasy Europeans to back away from their commitments over time and settle for a partition-like outcome that has been adamantly opposed by Kosovars of all political persuasions. The United Nations, as well, though "reconfiguring" and downsizing its presence here, has shown a negative tendency to retain certain important authorities, under pressure from Belgrade and Moscow. If Kosovo is to succeed as a long-term proposition -- and it most certainly can -- our sustained engagement is necessary to bolster European resolve, bring Belgrade to a more realistic sense of its equities in peace and stability, and take a firm line with the UN on further reducing its presence in Kosovo. These meetings in Washington will help reinforce the sense that Kosovo is moving forward and imbue Kosovo's leadership with a renewed sense of confidence as they prepare to face the many challenges ahead. KAIDANOW
Tuesday, 12 January 2010, 13:30
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AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/01/12
TAGS PGOV, PREL, KV, SR
SUBJECT: Post ICJ Opinion: Serbia to Continue Obstructing Kosovo
Independence
CLASSIFIED BY: Bradford J. Bell, Acting Economics Chief, US Department of State, Economics Section; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
Summary
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1. (C) We expect Serbia will continue to obstruct and undermine Kosovo's sovereignty in the lead up to and following the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion, which most believe will be ambiguous. Regardless of the position taken by the ICJ, Kosovo's independence and sovereignty are irrefutable. Serbia's government is unified in its refusal to accept that fact but is internally divided regarding how to push its claim to Kosovo after the ICJ issues its opinion in spring 2010. President Boris Tadic and his office appear willing to follow our and the EU's advice and to quietly accept any outcome while moving Serbia toward EU integration, but are lacking a coordinated plan to do so. In contrast, Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic, driven by personal interest in self promotion and a misperception of the domestic political landscape, is planning a new diplomatic offensive on Kosovo on the heels of any ICJ opinion. Absent an alternative approach by Tadic, we expect Jeremic's more confrontational plan will win out. To temper Serbia's post ICJ strategy and to limit its duration and impact, we will need to be well coordinated with our EU allies and encourage the EU to wisely use its significant remaining carrots and sticks with Serbia to elicit the cooperative resolution of this issue, while assuring Kosovo's territorial integrity. We must also be prepared to fight Serbia in the UNGA if necessary. End Summary.
Preparing for the Advisory Opinion
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2. (C) Over the next several months as the ICJ deliberates, we expect Foreign Minister Jeremic to maintain an offensive posture and continue his globe spanning travels, heralding the upcoming ICJ decision at each stop. He will try to prevent any further recognitions of Kosovo during this interim period and to shore up support from Serbia's allies, particularly Russia, the EU non-recognizers (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) and members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Previewing his intentions, Serbian media reported on December 25 that Jeremic sent a letter to foreign ministers of countries which have not recognized Kosovo, expressing gratitude for upholding the UN Charter and the hope that they would continue to respect Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In addition, Jeremic wrote that the ICJ opinion "must not be obstructed in any way," suggesting that political meddling could influence the court's opinion. Absent direct intervention from President Tadic, we expect Jeremic will continue his quixotic global campaign with vigor.
ICJ Opinion Likely to be Ambiguous
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3. (C) The Serbian government expects the ICJ to deliver its opinion to the UN General Assembly by spring 2010. Media and analysts have speculated that the most likely scenario is for the ICJ to issue multiple opinions, with some supporting Kosovo and others Serbia. Kosovo Minister Goran Bogdanovic told local media on December 25 that he expected there would be significant political pressure to make the ICJ's decision "more neutral." Serbia is thus preparing for an outcome that remains ambiguous, with both sides claiming victory. While the ruling's expected ambiguity could provide Serbia an opportunity to end its campaign against Kosovo, Foreign Minister Jeremic has already said Serbia will take no action that implies Serbia's recognition of Kosovo (reftel).
4. (C) Serbian politicians, including influential Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Rasim Ljajic, have told us that Serbia cannot merely forget Kosovo out of fear that the vocal and numerous opposition will accuse Tadic of treason. Ljajic pointed to the recent Progressive (SNS) victory in the Belgrade municipality of Vozdevac as a clear sign that the opposition has the potential to
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pose a real threat to the governing coalition. As a result, Serbian officials are now contemplating how vocal and obstructive the GoS should be after any final ICJ ruling in order to assure their political majority.
Tadic's Unclear Path
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5. (C) Over the past month several European interlocutors have stressed with President Tadic the need to move beyond Kosovo and to focus on Serbia's European integration. We believe the message is beginning to sink in with Tadic, but he still lacks a coordinated strategy to implement. Tadic's National Security Advisor, Miki Rakic, told Charge Brush on December 10that the government still had no plan for its post-ICJ policy and was only then beginning to consider alternatives. In separate meetings with Charge Brush on December 28 and 29, Defense Minister Sutanovac and informal presidential advisor Srdjan Saper both seemed confused when Charge Brush asked about Tadic's post-ICJ strategy, with neither even willing to speculate on what the President might be thinking.
6. (C) EU sources in Belgrade confirm that during his December 15 meeting with Tadic EU Director General for Foreign Affairs Robert Cooper encouraged Serbia to think carefully about how it would handle Kosovo issues after the ICJ opinion. According to our EU sources, Tadic and his foreign policy advisor Jovan Ratkovic told Cooper that Serbia was currently analyzing four possible post ICJ scenarios, but had yet to "draw any firm conclusions." Specifically Tadic mentioned consideration of the China-Taiwan model and the "two Germanies" scenario, recognizing that any outcome would need to be tailored to Kosovo's "special situation." Tadic reportedly told Cooper that after the ICJ advisory opinion Belgrade would be more than ready to talk to Pristina -even directly- as long as talks were not perceived or portrayed as Serbia directly or indirectly recognizing Kosovo.
Thoughts of Partition still in their Heads
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7. (C) Tadic reportedly told Cooper that he recognized that there needed to be a degree of clarity and finality to any outcome, cognizant that the EU would be unwilling to accept another "Cyprus-like" state as a member. Ratkovic more explicitly told Cooper that while Belgrade would need to accept that it would not govern Kosovo again, Kosovo would have to come to the realization that it would not effectively be able to extend its governance north of the Ibar river. Tadic reiterated to Cooper that ultimately Serbia's post ICJ strategy was being developed to avoid Serbia being a problem to its international partners but where its "concerns were taken care of."
8. (C) Belgrade's Quint (U.S., UK, Germany, France, Italy) have frequently discussed the seriousness of Serbia's plans. Although listening to FM Jeremic would lead one to believe that the Minister actually has a plan for new status talks, neither he nor any other GoS official has ever publicly fleshed out Serbian goals, much less the details for any such talks. In a January 6 conversation with ChargC) Brush, Ratkovic would say only that "Serbia did not send the Kosovo issue to the ICJ just to have it come back and blow everything up; we will use the ruling to increase regional stability."
Jeremic's Preferred Path
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9. (C) Despite claims from MFA Political Director Borko Stefanovic
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to Charge Brush on December 21 that the MFA was seeking "a way out of its Kosovo strategy post ICJ" we believe FM Jeremic intends to continue to beat the Kosovo drum throughout 2010. Jeremic is reportedly championing an alternative scenario under which the GoS would seek to "legalize any ICJ opinion," as MFA State Secretary Stefanovic told Cooper on December 14. Serbia's goal could be to again use the UN to bolster the political legitimacy of its stance against Kosovo's independence. We expect the MFA envisions a multi-month process during which Serbia would try to persuade the UN General Assembly to adopt a resolution welcoming the ICJ ruling (or perhaps the portions favorable to Serbia's position) and calling for new negotiations as a result. If the UN effort is unsuccessful, the GoS might energize the NAM to issue a statement calling for new talks.
10. (C) Under Jeremic's scenario we expect Serbia would aim to reopen negotiations on Kosovo's status. The MFA would likely not seek direct talks with Pristina authorities but rather would insist upon a new, "impartial" international negotiator from a non-recognizing country. While Serbia's goal would be to reopen talks, it would not be in any hurry to conclude them and instead would try to drag out any talks for years. The ruling Democratic Party (DS) would likely want to postpone any result until after parliamentary elections scheduled at the latest for May 2012.
EU's Carrots and Sticks
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11. (C) While no EU state expects Serbia to recognize Kosovo, Serbia's EU path will remain muddled without recognizable and accepted borders between Serbia and Kosovo. The EU must lead the charge in making this clear to Serbia. The EU must be willing to offer Serbia carrots and sticks until there is a clearly accepted understanding of where Serbia ends and the Republic of Kosovo begins, while maintaining Kosovo's current territorial integrity. Levers at the EU's disposal include determining when to unblock the SAA with Serbia, the disbursement of IPA funds, and the speed with which the EU will consider Serbia's recently submitted application for EU candidacy. We also must be wary of EU states offering Serbia the wrong carrots. The UK Ambassador to Belgrade recently suggested to us that we should no longer push for additional countries to recognize Kosovo, in an effort to dissuade Jeremic from his own globe-trotting efforts to dissuade recognitions.
U.S. Approach
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12. (C) The arrival of the new U.S. Ambassador, coupled with two upcoming CODELS (Voinovich and Pomeroy), may provide the USG excellent opportunities to help President Tadic orient his rhetoric to European integration and the benefits thereof. During his December 15 meeting with Secretary Clinton, Jeremic invited her to visit Serbia in 2010. A visit in advance of the ICJ decision (the first since Powell visited in 2003 for PM Djindjic's funeral) would highlight USG support for Tadic's EU path and help steer him away from any pressure to consider new status negotiations.
Comment
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13. (C) If Belgrade follows the path that President Tadic appears to favor, Serbia will be able to move forward with EU integration while still not recognizing Kosovo. If however, when the ICJ opinion is issued, Jeremic is the only one with a plan, the GOS is likely to pursue the misguided idea of continuing to battle in the UNGA. This course will at least delay and at worse threaten
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Serbia's EU aspirations. In either case, we must snuff out any further roundabout talk on partition by both President Tadic and Foreign Minister Jeremic.
14. (C) We must use the next few months before the ICJ issues its opinion to press Tadic to put the battle for Kosovo behind him once and for all and focus all of his government's energy on EU accession. The initial step is to encourage our EU Quint members to clearly state to Jeremic and Tadic that Serbia risks complicating its EU path if it continues to push for new status negotiations after an ICJ opinion. EU Quint members in Belgrade have told us they intend to meet with Jeremic soon to stress this specific point, pending guidance from their capitals. This message, however, will need to be reinforced directly by EU capitals and from Brussels. If our strategy is to be effective, we need to encourage Brussels to have a clear, coordinated policy regarding the linkage between Serbia's EU path and resolving practical issues with Kosovo. If Serbia fails to heed this message we and our like minded European partners will need to prepare to defeat any new Kosovo resolution in the UNGA next fall. This will require an aggressive strategy to counter Serbia's lobbying.
15. (C) Any strategy must include a coordinated statement from Washington and European capitals at the highest levels that Kosovo's partition is not an option and that continued defacto partition through Serbian interference will also put Serbia's EU membership on hold. This will require a coordinated effort with the European Union, which must be persuaded to use its leverage in tangible ways. A visit by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary to Belgrade before the ICJ ruling would help solidify this message both in Belgrade and in EU capitals. End Comment. PEDERSON
Wednesday, 08 April 2009, 17:27
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EO 12958 DECL: 03/14/2019
TAGS PGOV, PINR, PREL, KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO/EULEX: AT FULL OPERATING CAPABILITY, BUT
NOT WITHOUT PROBLEMS
Classified By: Ambassador Tina S. Kaidanow for Reasons 1.4 (b), (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: On April 6 the European Union's rule-of-law mission in Kosovo, EULEX, declared full operational capability (FOC). Four months after its initiation, EULEX can claim some significant successes, including a complete and violence-free roll-out of the police component; the reopening of the problematic Mitrovica courthouse and hearing of a case, the first since violence closed the court on March 17, 2008; and establishing its customs presence at border crossing points Gates 1 and 31 with Serbia. However, the EULEX police component's low profile and its limited executive authority, the absence of control over its judges, and EULEX unwillingness -- or inability -- to clarify the question of applicable law continue to dog the rule of law mission's ability to do its job effectively. All of these problems are compounded in the Serb-majority north, where EULEX has yet to reinforce its authority with the local populace. Success also requires that Serbia play a constructive role in dealing with EULEX on a technical level to solve practical problems while keeping the UN firmly outside the process -- an outcome we wish Brussels would underscore with Belgrade in a far more decisive manner. END SUMMARY
POLICE
2. (C) EULEX's Police component, with 1654 total staff (international and national), comprises by far the largest share of EULEX's 2507 person presence in Kosovo. EULEX Police enjoyed some success when the Formed Police Units (FPUs or specialized riot police) responded to tense situations in January and March in the divided flashpoint city of Mitrovica. However, the EULEX Police component has remained largely invisible in day-to-day operations. This is largely due to a different mandate that EULEX sees for its police officers compared to how UNMIK Police operated. Where UNMIK Police possessed wide-ranging executive authority and were visible to the public throughout the country, EULEX Police focus primarily on monitoring, mentoring, and advising (MMA). EULEX headquarters tells us that this MMA role necessitates that its officers work most closely with the Kosovo Police on management functions, and this work requires primary staffing at the station level.
3. (C) American officers assigned to the Police component have expressed some frustration regarding this hands-off approach and the absence of executive authority when operating in the field. Officers in the Strengthening Department operating in Mitrovica and at border gates, for example, have no executive authority to enforce laws or make arrests for visible criminal violations committed in their presence. They can only perform their MMA activities, and acting outside of this mandate could expose individual officers to disciplinary action -- for example, responding with force to an agitated and threatening individual at a border crossing -- for exerting unlawful executive authority. As a result, EULEX refuses to deploy officers from the Strengthening Department to situations where they might be compelled to act in self-defense -- the very situations where an international presence would be most beneficial.
4. (C) As an example, March protests over power cuts in the eastern Serb enclave of Silovo/Shilovo (Gjilane/Gnjilane municipality) initially saw no EULEX police officers respond due to their absence of executive authority. U.S. officers assigned to work with Kosovo Police (KP) officers in station-level management positions in the region convinced KP commanders to visit the scene, thus creating a rationale for the U.S. officers to monitor the commanders' performance in the field. At the same time, these officers exposed themselves to personal jeopardy by leaving what EULEX calls their primary workplace, the police station.
5. (C) As it stands now, there is a large gap in EULEX's police activity. The Special Police Department provides in extremis crowd control and riot suppression and currently
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deploys the bulk of its 455 FPU officers in the Mitrovica region. The Strengthening Department assigns officers to monitor, mentor, and advise at the station-level across the country. However, due to its lack of executive authority, EULEX has little role to play in emerging situations not yet requiring an FPU response -- situations that might benefit from the presence of international police officers whom local residents may regard as more objective and professional than KP officers.
6. (C) EULEX Police's Executive Police Department (EPD) does possess authority to conduct investigations into organized crime cases and incidents where political interference undermines the rule of law, but EULEX tells us that this activity is limited due to insufficient equipment. Without surveillance or wiretap equipment, EPD officers cannot conduct effective investigations.
JUSTICE
7. (C) The EULEX Justice component enjoys some success in the solid mentoring relationship it has developed with Kosovo judges and prosecutors. Feedback has been positive and cooperation with USG programs in these areas has been very good. Cooperation with EULEX Justice at the headquarters level has also been good, and weekly meetings, which include other international stakeholders including the International Civilian Office (ICO) and the European Commission (EC), have helped ensure a tighter, more unified message on the range of legal issues. Significantly, EULEX has occupied the Mitrovica court house and has begun prosecuting cases. Though Serbs in north Mitrovica initially protested EULEX's presence, seeing the organization as a tool of the Kosovo government and independence, EULEX was able to conduct a prosecution against two Serb defendants in March that resulted in acquittal on charges of felony robbery. But continued confusion within EULEX on applicable law has detracted from the success of this proceeding. The judges chose to apply UNMIK law, arguing that the offenses occurred while Kosovo was under UNMIK jurisdiction. EULEXXXXXXXXXXXXX failed to clarify the question of applicable law with both the judges and the GOK prior to beginning the case. We expect the court to issue a written judgment on or about April 10, which could prompt an unhappy response from Kosovo leaders and media (a point we have made repeatedly to EULEX top officials).
8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX It's also apparent that the rigidity of EULEX's prosecutorial structure, with international prosecutors assigned to specific courts or prosecutor's offices and case transfers among prosecutors necessary when a case moves to another court or jurisdiction, hampers quick and effective action.
CUSTOMS
10. (C) The EULEX Customs component has developed a strong mentoring, monitoring, and advising role with the Kosovo Customs Service and has gradually increased its activities since EULEX initiated operations on December 9, 2008. Coordination between Customs Head of Component Paul Acda and Kosovo Customs Director Naim Huruglica, stemming from their previous cooperation under UNMIK, is especially strong and transparent.
11. (C) Eight EULEX Customs staff are working at the Kosovo Customs Service headquarters, including the Customs Head of Component, his deputy, two media relations personnel, and four expert advisors working directly with relevant Kosovo Customs departments in revenue operations, law enforcement, legal, and finance and administration. EULEX Customs also has 18 personnel working as mobile customs units (six teams of three people), plus one team coordinator, monitoring all customs border posts. The mobile units group is based at a separate Kosovo Customs building located in Fushe Kosove/Kosovo Polje, just outside of Pristina. These units are fully staffed but are experiencing some equipment shortages, including phones, radios, cameras, GPS equipment, etc.
12. (C) The EULEX Customs Reinforcement Task Force has a staff of 22 internationals out of a planned 33, with no local staff deployed to date. This group first operated on a 9-to-5 basis in northern Kosovo in December 2008, and commenced 24/7 operations in mid-January 2009. On February 1, 2009, EULEX Customs officials began registering commercial goods entering through the two northern gates (1 and D31), data which had gone unrecorded since protesters destroyed the gates in February 2008. The registration process entails collecting basic information about shipments, such as company name, type of goods, value and quantity, to share with customs officials at the inland Mitrovica customs clearance terminal, and vehicles entering these gates receive instructions to proceed to the inland terminal. These are essentially the same procedures that were in place prior to independence (February 2008), except that EULEX officials are not yet withholding personal documents from drivers -- such as a passport or driver's license -- as a guarantee that the driver will present the goods for clearance at the Mitrovica terminal.
13. (C) Full customs procedures will not restart at Gates 1 and D31 until the gates undergo repair and receive specialized inspection equipment. Possible next steps toward
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reestablishing full customs controls will include building customs offices at the northern gates, establishing freight forwarding and bank offices, installing cameras that connect directly to the main customs operations center in Pristina, and acceptance of customs duties at the gates. Some of these steps, such as installing cameras and collecting duties, are likely to spark political sensitivities in the north, with threats emanating regularly from northern Serb hardliners about the violent response that will ensue if customs is fully restored. EULEX Customs also needs clarification on which customs law applies in the north -- UNMIK or Kosovo -- in order to begin collecting customs duties at the two northern gates. Discussions on how to rectify this legal dilemma are on-going in the context of "practical issues" consultations between EULEX and the Belgrade and Kosovo governments. EULEX Customs has recommended adding an additional 20 international and 10 local staff in the north to cover eventual revenue collection at Gates 1 and D31, which would take the Customs component to fully operational status.
EULEX BEYOND FOC
14. (C) EULEX's policy chief Dominique Orsini on April 2 told us that Full Operating Capability (FOC) is a military term in vogue and in use because of former French General Yves de Kermabon's influence and reflects only that EULEX has sufficient personnel to fulfill its mission. While EULEX declared FOC on April 6, it does not mean that EULEX's activities or its mandate have grown to meet Kosovo's requirements for EULEX's mission. Orsini told us that EULEX is actively considering how to improve its performance and told us that other participant countries and the UN have also noted the gap in policing left by the limited executive authority that EULEX police officers possess. EULEX is considering creating a very limited cadre of civilian affairs officers that might be able to respond to emerging situations, providing on-the-scene international voices working with Kosovo Police to help quell local tensions. Visiting EU CIVCOM representative Kim Friedberg told the Ambassador on April 7 that this was under active consideration for the north, though the very next day EULEX HOM de Kermabon denied to the Ambassador that this civilian or political component would do anything more than simply "coordinate" among EULEX elements and possibly other international actors operating in the north. Confusion obviously still exists on the methodologies EULEX will employ to overcome some of these "gap" issues.
15. (C) Orsini is also less confident that EULEX will resolve the applicable law question. As long as only 22 of 27 EU member states recognize Kosovo, EULEX will be unable, according to Orsini, to develop a consistent policy that identifies Kosovo law as the only legal system operating here. He added that Madrid and the other four non-recognizing capitals complain to Brussels each time a routine report even suggests that EULEX is venturing beyond the bounds of status-neutrality and straying from its mandate under UNSCR 1244, and Brussels, in turn, notifies EULEX headquarters of its offense. (At the recent EULEX ceremony marking the opening of their new headquarters and reaching FOC, no Kosovo flag was displayed, though all EU member state flags -- including that of the UK, which recently announced its withdrawal of most of its EULEX contingent -- were prominently featured. No U.S. or Turkish flag was flown, either.) We expect that this confusion will continue to plague both justice and customs operations in the North, and it will become an ever more vocal bone of contention among Kosovo Albanian political forces and the local media.
COMMENT
16. (C) EULEX has had some successes -- its deployment, de Kermabon's receptiveness to our counsel, its effective response to violent outbreaks in Mitrovica, and a growing number of concluded court cases, including a war crimes conviction against a Kosovo Albanian that carried a 17-year
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prison sentence. Its cautiousness in hewing to status neutrality and defining its mission as purely technical, however, is a serious limitation. Right now EULEX is a stabilizing influence, helping to provide law and order in the absence of international consensus on Kosovo's status, but it could quickly become immobilized by its inherent political limitations.
17. (C) EULEX must take a more active role in helping Kosovo resolve practical issues that fall within its legitimate mandate on customs, justice and police issues; this will obviously require an active dialogue with Serbia -- but without the UN presence in negotiations that convinces the Kosovars that these talks are just a continuation of the abortive "six point" discussions that almost led to a breakdown of stability in Kosovo last November. If EULEX -- the biggest and most ambitious ESDP mission to date -- is to succeed, it needs to make progress on the critical issues of the north, but that progress will only come if Brussels applies equal pressure on Belgrade and Pristina, rather than acceding to Belgrade's political demands and alienating their Kosovo counterparts. Thus far the jury is still out on whether the EU will show the necessary degree of political leadership, but we will continue to urge a balanced and vigorous approach, as well as a more robust operational posture in Kosovo's north. End Comment. KAIDANOW
Thursday, 09 July 2009, 16:15
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 STOCKHOLM 000418
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/09/2029
TAGS EUN, PREL, PGOV, IR, RS, SW
SUBJECT: EUR A/S GORDON'S JULY 3 MEETINGS WITH THE EU
POLITICAL DIRECTORS
STOCKHOLM 00000418 001.2 OF 006
Classified By: CDA LAURA J. KIRKCONNELL FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)
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SUMMARY
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1. (U) Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Phil Gordon met with the 27 EU Member State Political Directors in Stockholm July 3. He then met with the EU Political Directors "troika," comprising Swedish PolDir Bjorn Lyrvall, EU Council Secretariat DG Robert Cooper, EU External Relations Commission PolDir Karel Kovanda, Spanish PolDir Alfonso Lucini, and EU Council Secretariat Policy Coordinator Helga Schmid.
2. (C) On Iran, A/S Gordon emphasized that post-election developments have not altered the Obama Administration's fundamental approach to the nuclear question, and UK PolDir Mark Lyall-Grant urged the EU to be in position "to move rapidly" with new sanctions at the beginning of the Spanish EU Presidency in January 2010. On the Middle East peace process, the United States was focused on creating the conditions necessary for peace before proposing full-scale negotiations. This would require a stop to Israeli settlements and efforts to build up Palestinian security capacity and an end to violence and incitement. French PolDir Gerard Araud raised the possibility of an EU security force in support of a possible agreement. Regarding the U.S.-Russia relationship, Gordon said that the Russians are testing the Obama Administration to see if it will compromise on its principles; it won,t.
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IRAN
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3. (C) Swedish MFA Political Director Bjorn Lyrvall opened A/S Gordon's discussion with the EU 27 PolDirs by noting growing concern over internal developments in Iran following last month's presidential elections. Terming as "outrageous" regime statements blaming the unrest on foreign actors, Lyrvall discussed the importance of EU unity in response to the detention of local employees of the British embassy in Tehran and noted that the EU Political Directors had discussed "possible responses" to the detentions during their meetings earlier in the day. Asked to brief on the nuclear file, EU DG for External and Politico-Military Affairs Robert Cooper replied that he had little to say. The post-election unrest in Iran seemed to entail "no new cooperation, perhaps rather less," and the Iranian regime was now weaker and less legitimate. Cooper continued that "the prospects look difficult" for a meaningful Iranian response to the P5 1 offer, and that we had always seen this year as the key year for addressing this issue. Cooper concluded that, in the second half of this year, we must have "the beginning of a breakthrough."
4. (C) In his introduction, A/S Gordon expressed the importance the Obama Administration attaches to working with Europe, stressing that the U.S. realizes that it cannot handle matters alone and that Europe is our most natural foreign policy partner. Concerning Iranian election unrest, he said that the Administration's policy had denied the regime the opportunity to blame the U.S. so now it was turning to the UK. Asked about links between the post-election domestic situation and the negotiations on the nuclear file, A/S Gordon suggested that the regime might pursue one of several options. It might decide to engage the P5 1, which A/S Gordon (and other EU PolDirs) assessed as unlikely. Or it could pretend to engage, while forestalling meaningful action. Lastly, it could refuse any dialogue.
5. (C) While now is not the time for the USG to increase its engagement, it is also not the time to reduce it, Gordon continued. The President's approach would continue to highlight the path Iran would need to take to address international concerns. But the clock was ticking as long as enrichment continued, Gordon added, so he urged the PolDirs to start thinking now about actions they might need to take by the end of the year to increase pressure on Tehran. "Each day that passes sharpens the binary choice between accepting a nuclear Iran or a military strike, either by Israel or the U.S.," Gordon continued. The successful development of a nuclear capability by Iran would spell the death of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, he concluded, because the international community would not be able to maintain credibility with other would-be nuclear powers.
6. (C) UK Political Director Lyall-Grant agreed that the prospects for negotiations with Iran were not good, but
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argued that the P5 1 must persevere "because the alternatives are grim." If talks do not yield progress soon, then the EU must "discreetly" think about additional sanctions even in the absence of a UN Security Council resolution, which would be unlikely given the Russian and Chinese positions. The EU should be in position "to move rapidly" at the beginning of the Spanish EU Presidency (in January 2010) with a set of sanctions that are "very substantive" in the areas of "trade, banking and possibly the hydrocarbons sector." He also expressed gratitude for U.S. and EU solidarity with the UK concerning its local embassy employees in Tehran.
7. (C) Iran was turning into "a military dictatorship with an extremist ideology," stated German Political Director Volker Stanzel. Therefore, the international community must not "play the game the Iranian leaders want" and must not escalate in response to Iranian escalations. Rather, engagement with the Iranian opposition should continue where possible. Moreover, the international community should press Tehran for a "yes/no" answer to the P5 1 proposal by the time of the UN General Assembly in September. Efforts to keep Russia and China "in the boat" would be important, but even without them the EU and United States should "go ahead anyway" with additional autonomous sanctions.
8. (C) Spanish PolDir Alfonso Lucini noted "consensus that we need to prepare a Plan B," but asked whether enhanced sanctions would "be enough" if Russia and China were not on board. Saying he preferred further UNSC action on Iran, A/S Gordon acknowledged that PRC leaders' concerns regarding China's internal stability*which requires sufficient oil imports to maintain economic growth*was a key factor in PRC policy on Iran. And while Russia did not want to see a nuclear Iran, it might also be motivated by a desire to ensure that the United States and the EU do not enjoy a major foreign policy success in the Middle East. Indeed, some in Moscow might see advantages for Russia if Israel or the United States used force against Iran, which in their view would seriously damage U.S. standing in the region, as well as dramatically increase the price of oil. Even if Russia and China refused to support a new UNSC, joint U.S.-EU actions would have a powerful impact on trade -- and be a powerful statement with respect to regime legitimacy. And if there were no new effort on sanctions, that failure to act would send a message to the rest of the world about the low risk of pursuing a nuclear program.
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MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
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9. (C) Turning to the Middle East peace process, A/S Gordon noted that after extensive consultations in the region, Special Envoy Mitchell had concluded the time was not ripe for full-scale negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians. Rather, the conditions for successful negotiations needed to be created first. The United States had "visibly and publicly" called for Israel to halt all settlement activity, which helped create an atmosphere in which we could ask that Arabs do hard things as well. S/E Mitchell has been urging Arab governments to support the Palestinian Authority's security services in an effort to enhance security in the West Bank and Gaza. The U.S. saw no logic to engagement with Hamas until it renounces violence and recognizes all past agreements, A/S Gordon continued. While the U.S. and EU both need to remain engaged with both the Israelis and the Palestinians, there might be benefits in Washington focusing its efforts on getting a stop to settlement activity while the EU focused on efforts to build security in the PA-administered territories.
10. (C) Lyrvall said the EU very much welcomed the U.S. approach and the President's Cairo speech. The gap between the Israelis and Palestinians is very deep. Greek PolDir Tryphon Paraskevopoulos stated that "no one in the Middle East thinks Iran will actually use nuclear weapons against Israel." Rather, they think Israeli concerns over the Iranian nuclear program are motivated by a desire to not lose their strategic dominance. He noted that whenever the international community took actions against Iran, Iran responded by firing up Hamas and Hizbullah to cause trouble. A regional approach, therefore, was needed, including improved ties with Syria. The Greek PolDir concluded elliptically that Qatar and Saudi Arabia needed to "stop playing with fire." A/S Gordon noted that Syria is the conduit for Iranian arms into the region, and that U.S. diplomacy is focused on weaning Syria away from Iran.
11. (C) French PolDir Araud said that we should not get into any prolonged negotiations with the Israelis on settlements;
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the core issue is negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians. The Knesset is unable to act. We already know the parameters of the peace agreement. If there is no strong international commitment to working this, the parties will not negotiate, he said. Nothing will be possible if the U.S., the EU, and the Arab states are not united in pressing both sides. He also raised the possibility of an EU security force in support of a possible agreement. A/S Gordon agreed with Araud on settlements, but said that we need to improve the context for real negotiations by making progress on smaller issues, and that the U.S. call for stopping settlements resonates with the Arabs, and helps with asking them for funding for the PA and reaching out to Israel.
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AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN
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12. (SBU) A/S Gordon outlined the significant steps the Obama Administration was taking in Afghanistan: 21,000 additional troops, the appointments of SR Holbrooke, LTG McChrystal, Amb. Eikenberry, as well as certain changes in strategy such as on narcotics. He asked that European governments do more to explain to their publics that the EU is not helping the Americans with "an American war." Afghanistan and Pakistan are global problems with serious security and humanitarian concerns for Europe. Lyrvall agreed, pointing to ongoing discussions within the EU on doing more on the civilian side, and noting that the upcoming Afghan elections were crucial. European Commission PolDir Kovanda stated that the EU will deploy 250 observers from Member States, PRTs and local missions to monitor the elections along with 8,000 Afghan observers, and expressed gratitude for NATO,s indispensable in extremis support.
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RUSSIA
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13. (C) At Lyrvall's request, A/S Gordon offered some impressions to the group on U.S. relations with Russia. He said that we are looking to restore relations while also stressing our core principles; e.g., no spheres of influence, democracies have the right to choose alliances, and non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russians, for their part, are exploring U.S. willingness to compromise in the name of better relations, which we will not do. A/S Gordon said that with regard to the Medvedev proposals, the U.S. is not prepared to compromise on European security. Lyrvall asked about expectations for the Moscow Summit. A/S Gordon said we were not trying to overstate expectations, but we are talking seriously with the Russians on arms control and Afghanistan. Lithuanian PolDir Eitvydas Bajarunas urged a common U.S.-EU approach on Belarus and Georgia, and A/S Gordon replied that we can only interpret the Zeltser release as an expression of Belarus's interest in better relations, and that he was planning to go to Belarus himself. He said Georgia was a good example of the U.S. not compromising its principles in the name of better relations with Moscow-- in fact, Russia had been isolated on decisions regarding OSCE and UNOMIG ) and he noted the Vice President's upcoming trip to Georgia and Ukraine.
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TROIKA MEETING
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14. (U) After his meeting with EU27 PolDirs, Gordon held a smaller meeting with the EU Political Directors "troika," comprising Swedish PolDir Bjorn Lyrvall, EU Council Secretariat DG Robert Cooper, EU External Relations Commission PolDir Karel Kovanda Kovanda, Spanish PolDir Alfonso Lucini, and EU Council Secretariat Policy Coordinator Helga Schmid. This smaller discussion focused on Russia, the Eastern Partnership region, the Western Balkans, and non-proliferation.
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RUSSIA
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15. (C) A/S Gordon conveyed that the U.S. may be making some progress with Russia on START follow-on negotiations, and may also be making progress with regard to cooperation on Afghanistan. We have little to no progress to report regarding Georgia. The Russians are testing the Obama Administration to see if it will compromise; it will not. Lyrvall commented that there have been no breakthroughs in EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) negotiations, and noted that the Russians see the EU's
STOCKHOLM 00000418 004.2 OF 006
Eastern Partnership initiative through a zero-sum lens; if it encourages closer EU ties with six former-Soviet states, it must be anti-Russia. Lucini recommended engaging Russia in the Eastern Partnership through cooperation on concrete projects. Helga Schmid praised the OSCE Ministerial in Corfu for its emphasis on the indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic security.
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GEORGIA
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16. (C) Schmid commented that the Geneva process is useful because it is the only venue which includes all parties to the Georgia conflict. She encouraged the U.S. to press Georgia to work with the Abkhaz; the Abkhaz have been rebuffed in their overtures to the Georgians, and are left with no option but to seek Russia's support. Kovanda similarly urged outreach to the Abkhaz; they are looking for some daylight with the Russians, and we should help. EU negotiations on visa facilitation with Georgia are not going well. Lucini said we need to let Georgians know we support them without giving Saakashvili "a blank check."
17. (C) A/S Gordon said the Georgians have shown reasonable restraint with protesters lately, marking a departure from previous behavior. Vice President Biden's upcoming trip to Georgia will emphasize the need to strengthen democratic institutions. A/S Gordon inquired about potential U.S. participation in the EU's Georgia monitoring mission. An American contribution*either official USG or via NGOs--would showcase our commitment, and could potentially deter future Russian misbehavior. Schmid noted that U.S. participation would also mean opening the mission to Turkey and Ukraine; U.S. political support might be preferable. Cooper agreed that it would be hard for the EU to resist Turkish participation in the EU monitoring mission if the U.S. participated, as Turkey is an EU candidate country. Turkish participation would not necessarily be a bad thing, but it would "need some thinking about."
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BELARUS
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18. (C) Schmid said the Belarusians are under huge pressure from Russia to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia; the Belarusian FM told her so personally at Corfu. Belarus is bankrupt, and therefore vulnerable to Russian exploitation. The EU is looking into possible European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and IMF support, on the order of two to three billion dollars. Schmid said "I don't like Luka, but(" the Zeltser release was clearly intended as a signal.
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EASTERN PARTNERSHIP
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19. (C) A/S Gordon said the U.S. understands this; we would like to associate ourselves with the EU's Eastern Partnership initiative. Lyrvall said an EU-Ukraine FTA is looking increasingly unlikely due to Ukrainian squabbling; Moldova is likewise "a mess." It is difficult to anchor those countries into the European integration process. On Armenia, A/S Gordon said that resolving Nagorno-Karabakh is the key to unlocking Turkish-Armenian relations, and consequently regional energy supplies. The Russians have been reasonably productive on this account, but it is unclear whether they are just going through the motions or are seriously engaged, particularly as a Nagorno-Karabakh solution would facilitate a Southern Corridor gas route. Cooper asserted that if the Russians really wanted to resolve Nagorno-Karabakh, they would have done so already. On Ukraine, A/S Gordon asserted that the U.S. does not want to unconditionally bail Ukraine out of its economic troubles. We should let IFIs (particularly the IMF) help Ukraine. The U.S. and EU need to urge Ukraine's unwilling government to take difficult steps in this regard.
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WESTERN BALKANS
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20. (C) Pointing to EU High Representative Solana/Vice President Biden's and Swedish FM Bildt/Deputy Secretary Steinberg's recent joint engagement in the Balkans, A/S Gordon said the more high-level U.S.-EU cooperation we can organize in the Balkans, the better. Lyrvall said that Sweden wants to keep the EU's enlargement agenda moving
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during the Swedish Presidency. Montenegro's application is with the Commission, and Macedonia may receive a relatively positive EU progress assessment. Fairly or unfairly, Macedonia may have to compromise on the name issue in order to move forward on EU accession. In Serbia, implementation of the interim agreement is "deadlocked," and Dutch FM Verhagen's recent trip to Serbia is unlikely to assuage the Netherlands' concerns.
21. (C) On Bosnia and Herzegovina, FM Bildt and Deputy Secretary Steinberg planned to meet the following week to discuss the Prud process. It is critical that BiH takes ownership of the 5 2 process, Lyrvall said. The EU is enthusiastic about a transition in BiH as long as the conditions are met. There has to be recognition that the EUSR mission would be less "intrusive"; rather, the EU would present a "pull factor" for reform, he added. EU enlargement policy has been a successful incentive for reform elsewhere in the region. A significant shift in the Althea mission should not take place until transition is secure on the civilian side, Lyrvall concluded. Cooper said there might come a point where we need to "force the issue" of state property; if we do not resolve this before the autumn PIC, then we'll lose two years because of the Bosnian elections. Cooper added that after a "miserable" PIC, we should insist on conditionality. BiH Croats have gotten the message from Zagreb to be productive.
22. (C) A/S Gordon asked whether the Swedes might invite the parties and the U.S. to Stockholm to resolve the state property issue. The U.S. agrees that OHR is not doing well, but we are reluctant to take away the crutch and make a leap of faith. He recounted a side conversation with French PolDir Gerard Araud, who said that if we wean the Bosnians off of the "drug" of OHR, then the EU can be the "methadone." Furthermore, to conduct a military transition at the same time as the OHR/EU transition would send the wrong signal and might invite problems. Lucini said EU member states are talking to their militaries about the need to stay in BiH, but militaries are pushing back. Lyrvall conceded the need for "a comfort blanket."
23. (C) On Macedonia, A/S Gordon said the U.S. is still letting UNSR Nimetz lead, and noted that Deputy Secretary Steinberg has talked to the Greeks. While the Macedonians need to "climb down" on issues such as naming their airport, they have a reasonable case on other topics such as their language, the name of their citizenship, etc. Some "climbing down" is needed on both sides.
24. (C) On Serbia, A/S Gordon said that while we haven't spoken to ICTY prosecutor Brammertz, the U.S. is trying to provide further FBI and forensic assistance. The U.S. is trying to determine what Serbian steps are required in order to get the Dutch on board with Serbia's EU accession process. What is the gap between "full Serbian cooperation" and what the Serbs are currently doing, and how can it be filled? Cooper said we are caught in a vicious circle with Brammertz, who feels he cannot utter the words "full cooperation" but is trying to indicate as much in other terms.
25. (C) On Kosovo, Lyrvall noted the sensitivities raised by the fact that five EU member states do not recognize Kosovo's independence. However, even these recalcitrant member states would like to move forward with Kosovo's Euro-Atlantic integration. Lyrvall noted the issue of visa liberalization in the Balkans, and said the EU has leverage on the Serbs in this regard. Cooper stated that we have had some small successes in Kosovo and some failures. The Battle of Kosovo Polje anniversary passed without incident, with the Serbian royal family making some usefully anodyne speeches. But decentralization in Kosovo will not succeed. Serbian President Tadic has said that Serbia cannot call on Kosovo Serbs to vote in Kosovo,s elections. EUSR for Kosovo Pieter Feith thought we should think of 2011 as a deadline for bringing the ICO process to an end: according to Feith, once a state is up and running, the international community should step back. The "six point" agenda is largely dead. A/S Gordon relayed that Deputy Secretary Steinberg told Kosovo leaders that their comments on UNMIK were not helpful.
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NON-PROLIFERATION
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26. (C) Lyrvall said that the EU was very encouraged by the Obama Administration's approach on non-proliferation. A/S Gordon said that the Administration is serious about the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, but realistic. If the international community hopes to promote a Fissile Material
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Cut-off Treaty and create an international nuclear fuel bank, we must back the IAEA with resources. The Administration will try to get the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ratified; the prospects for ratification are uncertain, but are better now than before, in part due to improvements in scientific modeling over the past ten years. Regarding START talks with Russia, the Administration seeks a framework that permits fewer weapons than the Moscow Treaty and that also includes delivery vehicles and warheads. Both sides want an agreement, but ratification is always a question. Raising Iran, Cooper pointed out that a nuclear-armed Iran would "blow the NPT out of the water." If we allow Iran to develop the bomb, how can we credibly say "no" to the Egyptians and the Saudis?
27. (U) Assistant Secretary Gordon has cleared this cable. KIRKCONNELL
Saturday, 09 May 2009, 13:02
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000183
SIPDIS
CORRECTED COPY
DEPT FOR D, P, EUR (FRIED, JONES)
NSC FOR HELGERSON, OVP FOR BLINKEN
FOR THE VICE-PRESIDENT FROM THE AMBASSADOR
EO 12958 DECL: 05/09/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, UNMIK, KV
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN
TO KOSOVO, MAY 21, 2009
PRISTINA 00000183 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: AMBASSADOR TINA KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (C) Mr. Vice President: You last saw the President and Prime Minister of Kosovo in Washington during their first meetings with the new Administration in February, just after the one year anniversary of Kosovo's independence. That meeting proved a huge boost for a Kosovo public anxious to be reassured of the continuing support of the United States, and your visit here will further encourage Kosovo to understand that it has the strong backing it needs, but must take the initiative on its own to pursue democratic and economic development in a way that meets the demands of its citizens.
2. (C) As Kosovo's leaders told you then, they have emerged at the end of a long and arduous journey with independence achieved, but many serious challenges ahead. Their accomplishments in the last 18 months and longer -- in fact throughout the difficult status determination period -- are admirable and should be recognized. At our urging, Kosovo leaders have taken the high road and largely ignored the seemingly unendless provocations lobbed their way by successive regimes in Serbia: violence in Kosovo's north sanctioned by Belgrade, the destruction of customs operations on the border with Serbia, Serbian support for parallel governing institutions and parallel elections, the continuing refusal of Belgrade to permit Kosovo Serb participation in multi-ethnic municipal administrations or in Kosovo's police and security forces, a Serbian trade embargo on Kosovo's exports, the insistence on raising a case against Kosovo's declaration of independence in the International Court of Justice, and -- lately -- efforts by Belgrade to target prominent Kosovo figures for prosecution in Serbia and extradition from any Western country where they may travel. Though the pro-Western government of Serbian President Boris Tadic is an improvement on its predecessor in many ways, the general parameters of Serbia's Kosovo policy remain unchanged under the single-minded focus of Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic and his Foreign Ministry cohort.
3. (C) The need to deal with the flow of problems stemming from Belgrade's policy has cost us and the Kosovars. It opens the Kosovo leadership to venomous opposition accusations that the government is not doing enough to establish its own authority in response to these Serbian moves, particularly in Kosovo's north, and it distracts from the real requirements of responsible governance in Kosovo -- expanding economic growth, eliminating corruption, and enhancing the transparency and effectiveness of major social institutions. Indeed, the north has become a proxy battleground for two differing visions of the region's future: for Serbs and for Belgrade (notably for President Tadic himself, who has spoken openly in the past of his thinking), it represents that part of Kosovo most likely to be retained by Serbia in a partition scenario as a precursor to Serbia's accession into the EU, while for ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, retention of the north remains the symbolic key to proving Kosovo's legitimate sovereignty. The fragile EU rule of law presence inserted triumphantly last December in the north and elsewhere in Kosovo is no match for this political minefield, and we can expect regular ethnic confrontations -- with attendant casualties, including among international peacekeepers -- until such time as either side accepts the futility of its ultimate aims in the north.
4. (C) With close to 2000 EULEX police, justice and customs functionaries in Kosovo, the European Union should have an overriding interest in a stable relationship between Kosovo and Serbia, and indeed recent months have seen an ongoing dialogue among EU representatives and the governments in Pristina and Belgrade designed to press for practical progress on a variety of issues of importance to both sides. The talks, however, have limped along without much to show; full resumption of customs operations on the northern border is months away, assuming Belgrade ever gives the go-ahead, and Serb police remain outside the Kosovo Police structure in Kosovo's south despite ample time (and full salaries paid by the Kosovo government) for their reabsorption. EU visitors from Brussels tell us that they "lack leverage" with Serbia (more accurately, they lack leverage with the five EU states that do not recognize Kosovo) and, despite the obvious imperative of gaining Belgrade's cooperation to ensure the success and momentum of the EULEX mission, they seem to have
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abandoned any attempt at real leadership to push for concessions. We can already sense a strong degree of "Kosovo-fatigue" among our European counterparts which, coupled with the palpable sense here in the region that Europe has given up on further expansion, could prove a bad combination in providing the necessary EU-inspired incentives for further advancement in Kosovo.
5. (C) In the economic realm, Kosovo must find a way to deal with its moribund and budget-consuming energy sector if it is to attract investment and avoid popular unrest due to rolling blackouts. International organizations and donors -- the World Bank, the IMF (which Kosovo will join after a successful board vote this May), the European Commission, the U.S. and others -- must do a better job of coordination and providing effective guidance to the Kosovars, who lack the relevant experience and are often subject to mixed messages which do little to sketch out a clear way forward. The clearest example of this is in the energy arena, where the World Bank has taken a position on the development of Kosovo's vast lignite deposits at odds with most of the other donors and stakeholders.
6. (C) All this, without question, makes continuing American leadership and support to Kosovo that much more imperative, in every sense possible -- political, technical and military. The need for KFOR to remain present in Kosovo, especially in the north but in other mixed ethnic areas as well (for example in Kosovo's east and south where USKFOR has its area of responsibility and where the majority of Serbs live), cannot be overstated. Recent moves by some allies to depart Kosovo in a fashion uncoordinated through NATO bode ill for KFOR's future effectiveness; that will be especially apparent if, as we anticipate, the French downsize their presence in Mitrovica and the north later this year.
7. (C) Kosovo is, thus far, a success story. Still, any of the factors we have enumerated -- continued Serbian pressure, counter-productive reactions from volatile political elites in Kosovo, EU vacillation and weakness, mounting territorial-cum-political tensions in the north, premature NATO withdrawal, or, maybe most serious, failure to secure a strong economic foundation for Kosovo's future -- could create obstacles to Kosovo's enduring survival. Kosovo is looking to the United States -- and to you, Mr. Vice President, as a known friend and long-time champion of human rights and dignity in the Balkans -- to assert yet one more time (and, yes, the continual reassurance is necessary under circumstances like those elaborated above) that we will be here for the long run to help get Kosovo through the difficult times ahead.
8. (C) But the quid pro quo, and one we must insist on with increased frequency and volume, is an acceptance of Kosovo's own responsibilities -- in governance, in outreach to its non-majority communities, and in getting beyond the provocations from Serbia to focus on Kosovo's future. Kosovo has been steeped in Serbia-related mayhem for too long; real maturity will come with the wisdom and ability to see beyond. You will carry this message in your meetings with leaders, in your address to the Assembly, and in your very appearance in Kosovo at this critical time. KAIDANOW
Wednesday, 27 January 2010, 15:44
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000044
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR (SCE, ACE, RPM)
EO 12958 DECL: 01/27/2020
TAGS PGOV, PINR, PREL, MARR, KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SUCCESS IN THE NORTH KEY TO A SUCCESSFUL
KFOR DRAWDOWN
REF: A. 09 PRISTINA 509 B. 09 USNATO 409 C. BELGRADE 0003
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER DELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: While skirmishes and security incidents may be rare from day to day, an impending frozen conflict in Northern Kosovo remains the greatest threat to a safe and secure environment (SASE) in Kosovo in the near and medium terms. Fortunately, a constellation of factors exists that could reverse ten years of rot in Northern Kosovo and avoid letting this region become a frozen conflict. An impressive level of international consensus exists to address Northern Kosovo issues, and international actors and the GOK have agreed on a Northern Strategy to do just that. KFOR, at its current robust "Gate 1" force posture of 10,000, can play an important role, deterring extremists both north and south, as this strategy is implemented. As decisions are made on progress to "Gate 2" (5,000 troops) and beyond, the best way to operationalize the NAC's central condition for successful drawdown -- maintenance of a safe and secure environment, with a threat level assessed as low -- will be success in this Northern Strategy. Benchmarks for this success include replacement of illegal parallel structures with legitimate Kosovo bodies, the establishment of robust rule of law institutions, the re-establishment of customs controls and revenue collection, and the re-establishment of legal, normalized electrical services and billing under KEK control. END SUMMARY
NORTHERN KOSOVO REMAINS THE BIGGEST THREAT TO SASE
--------------------------------------------- -----
2. (C) We have argued (ref A) that to achieve the conditions-based drawdown of KFOR troops agreed by the North Atlantic Council (ref B), it is crucial both to build local security capacity and address existing security threats now, while KFOR's force posture remains robust. Northern Kosovo -- home base for illegal Serbian parallel structures and a region rife with smuggling and organized crime -- remains perhaps the greatest threat facing Kosovo in the short and medium terms. Kosovo institutions have exercised little control there since 1999, and practically none since riots after Kosovo's independence in 2008. The result has been a zone where customs collection is essentially on an "honor system," courts don't function, international police all but fear to tread, and the only municipal governments are those elected by the Republic of Serbia in polls held in direct contravention of UNSCR 1244. Lack of activity or even access by Kosovo authorities in Northern Kosovo is a constant irritant for Kosovo's leaders and the country's majority Albanian population, and it represents for both the very real threat of the partition of Kosovo -- a reversal of ten years of USG policy and a grave threat to stability in Kosovo and the Western Balkan region. A series of recent statements by Belgrade's leadership has established that the ultimate partition of Kosovo is, at a minimum, one of the policy options Belgrade has in view (ref C).
NORTHERN STRATEGY AN OPPORTUNITY
--------------------------------
PRISTINA 00000044 002 OF 004
3. (C) For much of the past ten years, pursuit of our strategic goal of a stable, democratic, multi- ethnic Kosovo has taken a back seat in the North to tactical concerns of avoiding demonstrations and clashes. Fortunately, there is a growing consensus in the international community that the time is now to reverse this trend. Embassies of the major European powers, the U.S., the International Civilian Office and the European Union Rule of Law Mission EULEX have agreed on a Northern Strategy to displace the illegal parallel structures, introduce legitimate, legal GOK structures, and increase the presence and improve the performance of rule of law institutions (customs, police and courts) in Northern Kosovo. The GOK has accepted this strategy as its own, and has pledged budget resources toward its implementation.
4. (C) That this international and local alliance for action in Northern Kosovo comes while KFOR remains at a robust presence of roughly 10,000 troops is fortunate. The Northern Strategy (septel) has been designed to incentivize participation in GOK structures, not to impose them by force. That said, local forces, including Serbs and Albanians who benefit from the current near lawless environment, could attempt to use violence to disrupt attempts to collect customs duties or reopen courts. KFOR at 10,000 will play an important, if ancillary, role in this strategy to ensure Kosovo's long-term stability and territorial integrity. At 10,000, KFOR remains capable to respond to multiple, simultaneous incidents. KFOR's ability to respond with overwhelming force to multiple provocations will itself serve as a valuable deterrent. As recently as January 26, Serbian State Secretary for the Ministry of Kosovo and Metohija Oliver Ivanovic raised the specter of violence, arguing it is the inevitable outcome of the Northern Strategy. Whether meant as a warning, or simply to rattle the less committed elements of the International Community, Ivanovic's statement was a useful reminder that some Serb elements consider such threats and tactics as legitimate. A strong KFOR is the best deterrent to extremists on either side of the River Ibar.
ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE NORTH ARE PRACTICAL SASE BENCHMARKS
--------------------------------------------- ----------
5. (SBU) While a robust KFOR is important to the success of the Northern Strategy, the implementation of the strategy is an opportunity for KFOR, a roadmap to a successful drawdown to deterrent presence. In our view, the central condition established by the North Atlantic Council for KFOR's eventual drawdown to deterrent presence is "maintenance of a safe and secure environment (SASE), with a threat level assessed as low." In the past, we have been all too quick to assess the durability of Kosovo's threat level based on the presence or absence of security incidents on a daily basis. Depending on a definition of SASE as the absence of security incidents risks masking a disturbing reality -- Northern Kosovo can be, at the same time, both free of security incidents and a frozen conflict in the making, at risk of partition. A Northern Kosovo like this, as it is today, is a far cry from stability, and is in fact an engine for future instability in Kosovo and the wider Western Balkan region.
PRISTINA 00000044 003 OF 004
6. (SBU) As the NAC debates the move to "Gate 2" (5,000 troops) and beyond, we would argue that the time is ripe to move from a negative operationalization of security, based on the absence of incidents, to a positive one. Such an operationalization would establish realistic, observable measures of success in reversing a decade of erosion in Northern Kosovo and establishing Kosovo's authority throughout its territory. Such benchmarks should include:
-- successful establishment of the decentralized municipality of North Mitrovica;
-- re-establishment of collection of customs revenue at Gates 1 and 31, as part of a single, Kosovo-wide customs regime;
-- the staffing of the Mitrovica District Court with ethnic Serb and Albanian judges recognized by the Kosovo justice system;
-- enhanced EULEX police presence in Northern Kosovo, and the full integration of Kosovo Serb members of the Kosovo Police (KP) in Kosovo Police structures;
-- the replacement of illegal parallel municipal authorities in Northern Kosovo with, legal, legitimately constituted Kosovo bodies;
-- the arrest and prosecution of major organized crime figures; and,
-- the normalization of electric power distribution and billing throughout Northern Kosovo by KEK, according to UNMIK law and regulation.
STATUS NEUTRAL, NOT VALUE NEUTRAL
---------------------------------
7. (C) Some may protest that the establishment of such benchmarks represents a break with KFOR's status neutral stance. This is patently untrue. In no case do the benchmarks listed above violate UNSCR 1244, the source of KFOR's mandate, and in most cases -- like electricity and local self- government -- success in these benchmarks would represent a re-establishment of the UNSCR 1244 regime, respect of UNMIK laws and UNMIK regulations. In the end, this is true status neutrality. What some would request, only taking positions and actions which are equally acceptable to Belgrade and Pristina, isn't status neutrality, but rather value neutrality. This is neither in KFOR's interest nor in Kosovo's, and was never USG policy in the region.
COMMENT
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8. (C) For ten years, stability in Northern Kosovo has been defined as merely the lack of conflict. Today's KFOR, at "Gate 1" levels of 10,000 troops, presents our best opportunity to define stability properly, as success in addressing Kosovo's most vexing security threat: Northern Kosovo as an emerging frozen conflict. Success in the Northern Strategy -- including reintroducing Kosovo structures to this region, and eliminating illegal Serbian parallel structures -- represents our best chance for a peaceful, stable Kosovo governing within the
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full extent of its recognized borders, and KFOR's surest roadmap to a successful reduction in troop strength to "Gate 2" and beyond. DELL
Friday, 29 January 2010, 12:35
C O N F I D E N T I A L PRISTINA 000048
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHIL GORDON FROM THE AMBASSADOR
EO 12958 DECL: 03/14/2019
TAGS PGOV, PINR, PREL, KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: STRATEGY FOR NORTHERN KOSOVO AN IMPORTANT
STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell for Reasons 1.4 (b), (d).
1. (C) Phil - I know that you are seeing Robert Cooper on Tuesday, February 2, among other things, to discuss Kosovo and the strategy for northern Kosovo. Integrating Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo society and preserving the country's territorial integrity is central to Kosovo's and the region's long-term stability and has been a core U.S. policy objective since 1999. In November 2009, we had a breakthrough that ended ten years of Belgrade-imposed stalemate when thousands of Serbs in southern Kosovo took part in Kosovo municipal elections. We want to replicate that success in the north and end the stalemate that has left Kosovo's future uncertain. That fundamentally is what the so-called northern strategy is about. We want to coax the population into greater cooperation with Pristina, not to impose outcomes on them.
2. (C) Currently, we have a growing, if still somewhat fragile, consensus within the international community in Pristina that the time is right to end the years of drift on the north and to alter the dynamic of a hardening partition between the north and the rest of Kosovo. In part, this is sparked by the new willingness among Kosovo Serbs to engage with Kosovo institutions. It also stems from Belgrade's increasingly aggressive actions in the north (e.g., seizure of the Valac electrical substation; unilateral appointment of Serb judges to illegal parallel courts) that have underscored to representatives of the international community on the ground the risks of continuing to do nothing. For ten years, we told the Kosovars to trust us -- "let us handle the situation, and we will protect you" -- and now the government of independent Kosovo is increasingly asking us when we are going to make good on that commitment. KFOR is drawing down (in six months NATO could take a decision to cut its forces in half). We need to take advantage of a unique opportunity that has crystallized and act now while we still have a KFOR presence capable of handling any contingency.
3. (C) Belgrade has reacted vehemently to the northern strategy. I think this intensity is rooted in the concern that any positive momentum in the north will undermine Belgrade's likely post-ICJ strategy: push to reopen status talks and formalize the emerging de facto partition of Kosovo. Furthermore, Belgrade has shrewdly judged that raising the specter of confrontation rattles our EU partners and is an effective tactic for derailing the strategy altogether. Cooper will likely reflect this anxiety with you, but I do not sense that this concern is nearly as strong within the local Quint (with the exception of Italian Ambassador Michael Giffoni, who spent ten years on Javier Solana's staff, where the Brussels bureaucrats have long been anxious about taking any difficult decision on the north). With this in mind, I recommend that you stress three points with Cooper. First, the northern strategy is not radical. Much of it restates what the international community, in general, and the EU, in particular, are already committed to doing. Second, it provides a vehicle for constructively channeling the GOK's ambitions for the north and takes advantage of Prime Minister Hashim Thaci's readiness to offer inducements to northern Serbs who engage with Kosovo institutions. Third, we now have legitimate Serb partners (elected by fellow Serbs) who are ready to help us in the north. These are the elements of a soft approach, which is the northern strategy's leading edge.
4. (C) We should expect Belgrade to challenge all elements of the strategy and to misportray the strategy as hard and confrontational. Serbian Ministry for Kosovo State Secretary Oliver Ivanovic has already declared that Pristina is promoting conflict. This is not the case. There is no interest here in conflict (not among the Quint and the ICO, nor within the GOK), but the current situation is untenable and deteriorating. The aim is to stop the rot in the north and create the positive momentum there that we need to secure our long-term policy objectives: a secure and stable Kosovo and a Serbia focused on its EU future, not old ambitions and grievances. We need to start the process now, and we should not allow Belgrade to use threats of confrontation as a veto to block progress.
5. (C) You can tell Cooper that the northern strategy offers incremental, but fundamental, steps necessary to getting the
north right. We know, however, that there will be difficult challenges that pose risks. For example, EULEX must get serious about rolling up organized crime networks in the north that feed the parallel structures and make the current situation unsustainable. The northern Serbs are the first victims of these thugs, and there is a growing body of reports that they would welcome a change if EULEX can deliver it. We must, also, deal with the blatant theft of Kosovo property that has allowed Serbia to, in effect, seize the northern power grid in Kosovo. Dealing with these issues will require hard choices and fortitude. Our message to Cooper should be that we want to coordinate and consult with Brussels every step of the way. This process, after all, only works if Brussels makes clear to Belgrade that its EU future depends on real cooperation on Kosovo. In recent meetings with Boris Tadic, both Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy reportedly emphasized that Serbia's path to Brussels runs, in part, through constructive relations with Pristina. This is the perfect message. Brussels needs to repeat it -- regularly. We, of course, are also ready to consult with Belgrade, as well, and to offer them the opportunity to engage constructively. Where we part company with some within the EU, however, is in not being willing to accept that we must have Belgrade's agreement before taking any steps.
6. (C) I need to emphasize the importance of this moment. Failure to act soon means losing northern Kosovo and will re-open the Pandora's Box of ethnic conflict that defined the 1990s. Fortunately, our European partners increasingly recognize this. My British colleague here confirms what Stu has also heard -- that there is a greater degree of commitment and resolve in member capitals than may be the case in the Commission and the Council officialdom in Brussels. Even there, though, initial anxieties over the strategy appear to be easing as they look more carefully at the content and less at the rhetoric. DELL
Friday, 30 October 2009, 15:38
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000644
SIPDIS
STATE PASS EUR/SCE
EO 12958 DECL: 10/27/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, KCOR, HR
SUBJECT: PM KOSOR STRENGTHENING POLITICAL WILL TO FIGHT
CORRUPTION; DEPUTY PM POLANCEC RESIGNS
REF: ZAGREB 633
Classified By: Political Officer Chris Zimmer for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Since Jadranka Kosor took over as Prime Minister in July following Ivo Sanader's sudden resignation, she has brought to her office what appears to be a new attitude toward allegedly corrupt party members that is strengthening the political will to fight corruption at all levels in the Croatian government and economy. While no convictions have occurred since she took office, a steady stream of investigations and indictments has been coming out of the Ministry of Interior and the State Prosecutor's Offices. Senior government officials have told us that Kosor has said she will not protect corrupt members of the party out of loyalty or to maintain influence, as Sanader did. On October 30, Deputy PM and Economics Minister Damir Polancec resigned over allegations of involvement in a scandal at a large agri-business firm. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) For the past three years, the Croatian State Prosecutor's Office for the Suppression of Organized Crime and Corruption (USKOK) has been ratcheting up its activity in corruption cases. Until this year, however, its cases had involved mid-level bureaucrats in services such as the land registry, or health and education systems. Few indictees could be described as being politically-well connected. Since this summer, however, a series of cases have been playing out in both the media and the police and prosecutors' offices. These cases have begun to reach politically-connected individuals. Cases under investigation have already led to significant changes in management, and detention of some key players, at the state-owned electric company HEP, and the 25-percent state-owned food producer Podravka. In another case, a long-awaited investigation of a military procurement from 2004 in involving former Defense (and later Interior) Minister Berislav Roncevic was launched following Sanader's July resignation, with indictments issued against Roncevic and a close aide on October 28 (reftel). State Prosecutors have confided to us that they have a number of other cases either under indictment or active investigation that could also implicate high-level political figures.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
3. (C) All of these cases have reportedly created strains within the ruling HDZ party, with senior party members arguing that the government should not rush to judgment, and that Kosor was being too quick to seek dismissal of those tainted by various allegations. The Prodravka case presents the latest challenge in this regard. Minister of Economy (and Deputy Prime Minister) Damir Polancec is a former Podravka executive and is suspected of participation in the alleged scheme by which the management board was using embezzled funds to buy a controlling interest in the company. Six managers were arrested last week for their roles in the scheme, but Polancec has not been publicly named by investigators as a suspect. Opposition parties and the media called vociferously for Polancec's resignation, and the leader of a junior partner in the ruling coalition publicly stated that his party, the Independent Serb Democratic Party (SDSS), would not support Polancec if parliament voted on a motion for his dismissal. Polancec suddenly resigned his position today (October 30).
4. (C) Many well-informed sources have commented in particular on the shift in attitudes toward corruption between Kosor and her predecessor, Ivo Sanader. MFA State Secretary Davor Bozinovic told the Ambassador on October 26 that Kosor potentially is commencing an historic shift in governance in Croatia. He and others have noted that President Mesic is quietly supporting Kosor, his erstwhile presidential opponent, against the HDZ old guard. Bozinovic regretted that the opposition is not supporting her anti-corruption efforts, which could spare them a difficult task when they return to power.
5. (C) Chamber of Commerce President Nadan Vidosevic, a long-time HDZ member and now independent candidate for president of Croatia, told the Ambassador on October 27 that he also saw a change in approach. He claimed Sanader and Kosor had recently argued over Kosor's approach to the corruption investigations. Kosor insisted that Chief State Prosecutor Bajic be allowed to pursue all leads, while Sanader saw this as a threat to him and other party cronies.
ZAGREB 00000644 002 OF 002
(NOTE: Bajic himself has told the Ambassador that he has the authority to investigate anybody as evidence dictates, and that he would pursue an investigation against Polancec in the Podravka case. END NOTE.) A media source recently alleged to us that Kosor had directly threatened Sanader with potential legal action. Vidosovic claimed Polancec told him he would finger Sanader if he were indicted.
6. (C) Luka Madjeric, Head of the Government's Office for Human Rights and a former assistant to Kosor, told Poloff that Kosor rose quietly through the ranks of the HDZ. Therefore, he said, she does not have as many political IOUs, nor is she complicit in the scandals now plaguing other party members. This allows her to address corruption issues in a more straightforward manner than her predecessor. Since she does not have to worry about being personally implicated in the scandals, she is more willing than Sanader was to allow prosecutors and police to pursue leads that may implicate top party officials.
7. (SBU) The new political will to target corruption coincides with improved procedures for investigating and prosecuting cases, many of which have been designed and advocated for under US and other donors' assistance programs. In September, the national police officially opened their own Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organized Crime (PN-USKOK), which serves as a partner to the prosecutor's USKOK division. Both the police and prosecutor USKOKs have offices in the four largest cities, Zagreb, Split, Rijeka, and Osijek, and jurisdiction for investigating organized crime and corruption cases. Courts in these four cities also have specialized USKOK courts, created in early 2009, with cleared panels of experienced judges specially trained to hear these complex criminal cases. And, as of July 1, Croatia's new Law on Criminal Procedure granted USKOK prosecutors many of the functions previously held by investigative judges. Prosecutors can now question suspects and witnesses without going through lengthy procedures in the courts. Bajic has told us that these changes have greatly increased the pace of investigations and helped minimize leaks and the potential for witness tampering.
8. (C) COMMENT: Kosor's willingness to confront corruption appears genuine. But it almost certainly includes some elements of political calculation. First, the strategy of simply denying, ignoring or stiff-arming corruption investigations was growing increasingly hard to sustain, especially given USKOK's increasing effectiveness. Trying to de-fang USKOK, as some HDZ hard-liners have reportedly suggested, would have met with strong international condemnation and damaged Croatia's EU aspirations. Second, Kosor, who rose to the top of the party without a mandate from the voters and with less long-standing ties than many of the party's barons, may well be quite happy to see intra-party rivals weakened by more aggressive and free-ranging investigations into corruption. Finally, given the HDZ's current unpopularity, Kosor may simply have calculated that she had little to lose, and that it was best to start right away in hopes of changing the HDZ's public image before the next elections, which must be held by fall 2011 but could come as early as spring 2010 if the governing coalition fractured. So, while the developments of the past few months signal progress, it is premature to declare victory in the fight against corruption in Croatia. No "big fish" convictions have yet been secured. And Kosor may yet find that the strains created by anti-corruption cases may complicate dealing with challenges such as the economic crisis and completing the requirements for EU accession. Nonetheless, this is potentially the beginning of a watershed moment in Croatia, made possible by an unexpected leader whose party cannot at the moment afford to disperse with her. END COMMENT. FOLEY
Monday, 14 July 2008, 06:56
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 000557
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, AND IO
PACOM FOR FPA
EO 12958 DECL: 07/13/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PHUM, BM
SUBJECT: CONTINUING THE PURSUIT OF DEMOCRACY IN BURMA
RANGOON 00000557 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: P/E Chief Leslie Hayden for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
1. (SBU) Embassy Rangoon pol/econ chief departs Post this week after ending a two-year tour that saw the largest political uprising in Burma in twenty years, the arrest and imprisonment of the pro-democracy opposition's most talented leaders, and the worst natural disaster in Burma's recorded history. We asked her to share her candid observations on the current political situation, and her recommendations on how best to advance our democratic goals.
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The Senior Generals
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2. (C) The Burma army remains firmly in control throughout most of the country, with Senior General Than Shwe retaining almost absolute power. He has the final word on all significant political and economic decisions. While outsiders may portray him as an uneducated, crass, and blundering man, he has successfully consolidated and held onto power for several years, while at the same time building lucrative relationships with his energy hungry neighbors that undermine Western efforts to cripple his regime.
3. (C) The generals keep their power through a vast system of economic patronage, not unlike a Western style Mafia. Military-owned enterprises control every profit-making natural resource and industry in the country. Economic prosperity can only be enjoyed by rising thorough the ranks of the Army, or having extremely close ties to the senior generals. This is why China's urging to the generals to begin reforming Burma's economy falls on deaf ears. Economic liberalization and reform would require the generals to dismantle the very system that ensures their power. Dismantling this system will be one of the biggest challenges for any future democratic leader of Burma.
4. (C) Rumors of splits at the top of the regime are the result of uninformed analysis and wishful thinking of the exiles and outside observers. While the senior generals may disagree from time-to-time amongst themselves (as witnessed after Nargis), they follow the orders of Than Shwe. The senior generals are keenly aware that if they do not stand together, they will fall together. True democratic change will not likely happen until the top two generals, Than Shwe and Maung Aye, are off the scene. Both are extremely concerned for the safety and financial security of themselves and their families. Third-ranking general Thura Shwe Mann is rumored to be Than Shwe's pick for Burma's President in 2010, but if Than Shwe and Maung Aye are still alive, they will likely pull his strings from behind the scenes. Sources close to Thura Shwe Mann tell us he is smart, sophisticated, and well-aware of Burma's problems. Some talented Burmese intellectuals and political dissidents tell us they pass him policy papers that are reportedly solicited on his behalf. However, he is intimately involved in Burma's corruption, primarily through his sons' business interests.
5. (C) Several of our sources close to high and mid-ranking military officers tell us that some of the regional commanders are reform-minded and aware of the need for political and economic reform. However, most of the military believe that working within Burma's current military system is the only way to bring about this change while maintaining stability. While some officers begrudgingly respect Aung San Suu Kyi, they do not sympathize with the pro-democracy opposition in general. We should not expect an imminent coup to save us from the hard-line senior generals.
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Aung San Suu Kyi and the Pro-Democracy Movement
--------------------------------------------- --
6. (C) Since the September protests, the most dynamic and talented leaders of Burma's pro-democracy movement have been jailed, left the country, or remain in hiding. Tellingly, the NLD remain free. While many outside Burma perpetuate the
RANGOON 00000557 002.2 OF 004
impression of Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) party as a large movement with massive support waiting to take the Parliamentary seats they won in the 1990 election, the reality is quite different. Without a doubt, Aung San Suu Kyi remains a popular and beloved figure of the Burman majority, but this status is not enjoyed by her party. Already frustrated with the sclerotic leadership of the elderly NLD "Uncles", the party lost even more credibility within the pro-democracy movement when its leaders refused to support the demonstrators last September, and even publicly criticized them.
7. (C) Many of the younger political activists are turning away from the NLD and preparing to run in the 2010 parliamentary elections, to effect political change any way they can. This includes members of 88 Generation. There is reportedly an ongoing, heated debate among the 88 Generation leaders in Insein prison on whether or not the groups' members should contest the election, with Ko Ko Gyi advocating members do so, and Min Ko Naing opting for a boycott. Those who want to run tell us they do not agree with the new constitution and despise the regime's roadmap to democracy. However, with the absence of any alternative, they see the new Parliament as a possible mechanism for dialogue between the military, the pro-democracy opposition, and the ethnic cease-fire groups.
8. (C) The way the Uncles run the NLD indicates the party is not the last great hope for democracy and Burma. The Party is strictly hierarchical, new ideas are not solicited or encouraged from younger members, and the Uncles regularly expel members they believe are "too active." NLD youth repeatedly complain to us they are frustrated with the party leaders. Repeated overtures from and "summits" with the leaders of the 88 Generation in 2007 failed to result in any significant cooperation between the factions. Indeed, lack of unity among the pro-democracy opposition remains one of the biggest obstacles to democratic change in Burma.
9. (C) The "Uncles" have repeatedly rebuffed the most dynamic and creative members of the pro-democracy opposition, who reinvigorated the pro-democracy movement throughout 2006 and 2007 by strategically working to promote change through grass-roots human rights and political awareness and highlighting the regime's economic mismanagement. Nor has the party made any effort to join forces with the technically sophisticated bloggers and young, internet-savvy activists, who have been so clever at getting out the images which repeatedly damaged the regime and undermined its international credibility. Instead, the Uncles spend endless hours discussing their entitlements from the 1990 elections and abstract policy which they are in no position to enact. XXXXXXXXXXXX Additionally, most MPs-elect show little concern for the social and economic plight of most Burmese, and therefore, most Burmese regard them as irrelevant.
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The Ethnic Cease-Fire Groups
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10. (C) The cease-fire groups remain an important component of Burma's future political stability and it is noteworthy that none have chosen to support Aung San Suu Kyi and her party. Instead, they have entered dialogue with the regime, at the same time cutting lucrative concession deals for many of groups' leaders. However, many leaders of the cease-fire groups have told us they would cast their lot with whomever best looked out for their interests. However badly the regime does this, the NLD has repeatedly missed opportunities to reach out to the cease-fire groups to demonstrate that they would. Instead, it has consistently issued statements calling for a dialogue between the NLD and regime first, before the ethnic cease-fire groups are brought into the mix. They have also continually feuded with ethnic MPs-elect on the Committee to Represent the People's Parliament (CRPP).
RANGOON 00000557 003.2 OF 004
11. (C) It is these long-held ethnic tensions that has kept the cease-fire groups from defecting from their dialogue with the regime to form an alliance with the NLD. Many of Burma's neighbors, including China, are aware of the tension between the NLD and the ethnic nationalities. The NLD's continuing alienation of the ethnic minority groups gives credence to the regime's most effective argument with its neighbors and ASEAN: that the military is the only force capable of guaranteeing stability in Burma.
12. (C) The recent statement Aung San Suu Kyi released through UN Special Envoy Gambari indicated she is aware of this problem and wants to rectify it. The overture she offered to the ethnic nationalities was welcomed by the cease-fire group leaders with whom we spoke. But her party failed to follow up on her initiative and issued only a half-hearted invitation for the ethnic leaders to visit them at NLD headquarters in Rangoon. Once again, they reduced the role of the ethnics to second-class supplicants. The timing of ASSK's statement was strategic: just before the referendum on a constitution, which many of the cease-fire groups were unhappy with because the regime had failed to include key compromises promised by former PM Khin Nyunt before his ouster. A genuine overture from the NLD offered the best chance yet to split the cease-fire groups from the regime and undermine its credibility with its regional supporters. The Uncles failed to use this opportunity, so the cease-fire groups continue their relationship with the regime.
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Where do We Go From Here?
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13. (C) Throughout the country, there is still widespread and growing frustration with the regime for its brutal and incompetent rule. Though most Burmese do not believe the NLD will be able to bring about democratic change, at least while ASSK is under house arrest, they have not given up on working for democracy. Instead, they are taking matters into their own hands and creatively working in what space is available to improve the lives of their communities.
14. (C) Like the many community-based organizations (CBOs), religious organizations, and civil society groups that responded to Cyclone Nargis while the international community was shut out, many dissidents and ordinary Burmese are creatively trying to incorporate democratic principles into their civil society programs, including private-tuition schools, environmental programs, health education, and religious organizations. Through this process, change will come about more slowly than most want, but it is a channel that functions where most other options were shut down by the regime after the September 2007 demonstrations. It is also a method that promotes change from the grass roots, teaching community responsibility at the local level, rather than a top-down movement by the urban, intellectual elite. A strong civil society is something we should seek and encourage in Burma. It will make any democratic transition in Burma more likely to succeed.
15. (C) Ending Burma's isolation will also be integral to any successful long-term change in the country. No matter how democratic transition comes about in Burma, the military will be involved given its vast control over the political and economic structures of the country. We should make an effort to seek out and speak with the more progressive military officers and to those who have access to the senior generals. Their hostility to democratic change is motivated by paranoia and distrust of the West, and a belief that we seek to punish them and obliterate a significant role for them in Burma's future. If we want to counter this, we should pursue dialogue directly with them rather than through intermediaries who can sometimes garble messages.
16. (C) If we do decide to speak with the generals again, we should do it strategically. Dialogue could be used as a tool to bring the generals into the twenty-first century.
RANGOON 00000557 004.2 OF 004
Discussions could take place on the margins of international fora, exposing them to the outside world and its diplomatic norms, juxtaposing Burma's backwardness against the modern world, which could cause greater realization among the generals about their country's lack of development. Careful preparation could be made before such events to make sure Burma's neighbors send the same messages to the generals during their bilateral meetings. Such unity of message was extremely effective in persuading the regime to open up to international assistance after Cyclone Nargis.
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Give a Little, Get a Little
---------------------------
17. (C) While our economic sanctions give us the moral high-ground, they are largely ineffective because they are not comprehensive. Burma's biggest client states refuse to participate in them. However, the generals despise the sanctions and want them removed because they challenge the regime's legitimacy. If we really want to see the generals make progress, we need to show them what they will get in return. This means being willing to gradually remove sanctions in exchange for true steps toward dialogue and political change.
18. (C) We should start small and hold them to real action (unlike the sham dialogue they purported to initiate with Aung San Suu Kyi last November). If they do make concrete progress, we should be ready to offer them something. For instance, removing them from Tier 3 on the Trafficking in Persons rankings, or taking them off the Narcotics Majors list, areas where the regime has actually made some progress. This should be a gradual process that would be based only on the condition of concrete results. Large rewards should come only with large compromises, such as lifting the visa ban if they release Aung San Suu Kyi. We may also want to consider putting security guarantees on the table for the most senior generals and their families if we are serious about removing them from the scene. As we move toward the 2010 parliamentary elections, it may be a strategic time to begin talks with them about such an agreement. Allowing international election monitors, lifting laws that restrict free and fair debate, and freeing key political prisoners could be tied to lifting specific sanctions.
19. (C) While talking to the generals may be unpalatable, their firm control over Burma and the weakness of the pro-democracy opposition are a reality we must consider when working to promote change in Burma. The prospect for democratic change in the near future is low, but despite the setbacks after the September demonstrations, there is hope change may eventually come. After many years of waiting for the outside world to help free them from the generals' despotic rule, many Burmese are finding creative ways to take control of their country through community-based organizations and building the capacity of civil society. Through these organizations, leaders may emerge who will run in the 2010 elections and work for democratic change.
20. (C) We should seek every opportunity to support and increase the capacity of Burma's nascent civil society by expanding humanitarian assistance inside the country that promotes self-reliance, conflict resolution, and respect for human rights. Such a policy will have the added benefit of expanding our influence and increasing our access throughout the country. Not only will this approach increase our knowledge of the subtle changes occurring inside Burma, but it will strengthen our position and influence inside when change does come, so we can assist the Burmese to reform their political and economic systems in a manner that best promotes U.S. economic and strategic interests. Above all, our Burma policy should be focused on helping those Burmese who are working to bring about democratic change themselves, for that is the only way it can realistically come. VILLAROSA
Tuesday, 10 November 2009, 09:35
S E C R E T RANGOON 000732
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, INR/EAP
PACOM FOR FPA
EO 12958 DECL: 11/10/2019
TAGS KNNP, PARM, PREL, NPT, PGOV, PINR, KN, BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: ANOTHER CONVERSATION ABOUT BURMA-DPRK
NUCLEAR ISSUE
REF: RANGOON 502
Classified By: CDA Larry Dinger for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
1. (S) [NAME REMOVED] , who on [DETAILS REMOVED] informed Australian Ambassador Chan in Rangoon that Burma and the DPRK were engaged in "peaceful nuclear cooperation" (reftel), has changed [DETAILS REMOVED] story. In a November 9 conversation with Ambassador Chan, [NAME REMOVED] said there had been a "misunderstanding." After Chan's "blunt" response to the August revelation (Chan had responded with incredulity to the thought that the GOB might consider nuclear cooperation of any sort with the DPRK to be acceptable), [NAME REMOVED] had checked around Nay Pyi Taw. [DETAILS REMOVED] now says GOB-DPRK conversations were merely "exploratory." [NAME REMOVED] cannot confirm any direct nuclear cooperation. [DETAILS REMOVED] added that, in any case, the Kang Nam 1 affair and Secretary Clinton's remarks in Phuket in July "put everything on hold."
2. (S)[NAME REMOVED] observed that Russia is the key GOB partner for a nuclear reactor, but [DETAILS REMOVED] said there has been no progress. Russia has proposed a commercial deal, and the GOB cannot afford it. [NAME REMOVED] added that many countries have relations with the DPRK, including Australia, "so why worry?!"
Comment
-------
3. (S) As with many issues in Burma, the truth behind and possible motivations for [NAME REMOVED] first version and the recent revision are difficult to ascertain. Ambassador Chan now believes [DETAILS REMOVED] was simply speculating in August and has corrected the record. We were not in the actual conversations, but to us [DETAILS REMOVED] revision sounds more like an effort to cover a lapse in judgment than to deny the earlier story outright. The comment about the Kang Nam 1 and the Secretary's remarks having "put everything on hold" leave room for concern. That noted, other of [NAME REMOVED] comments have caused us to question just how well plugged in [NAME REMOVED] is on the "nuclear" issue. Bottom line: GOB-DPRK cooperation remains opaque. Something is certainly happening; whether that something includes "nukes" is a very open question which remains a very high priority for Embassy reporting. DINGER
Friday, 18 January 2008, 10:34
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000044
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR P, EAP/MLS AND IO
PACOM FOR FPA
EO 12958 DECL: 01/16/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, BM
SUBJECT: CHINESE LOSING PATIENCE WITH BURMA
Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
1. (C) Summary: Charge hosted the Chinese Ambassador for lunch on January 17. We discussed the lack of political dialogue and the need for all countries to speak with one voice to persuade the generals to start talking and quit dragging their feet. The Chinese Ambassador no longer tried to defend the regime, and acknowledged that the generals had made a bad situation worse. The Chinese have used their access to the generals to push for change, without much observable result, but remain interested in working with us to promote change. The Ambassador indicated that fear of losing power and economic interests may be the key obstacles keeping the generals away from the negotiating table. End Summary.
Chinese Fed Up
--------------
2. (C) Ambassador Guan Mu no longer tries to defend the regime as making any progress on political dialogue. He admitted that he did not know why the dialogue apparently stopped last November, although he added that some in the senior leadership understand that they must open up to the outside world. He acknowledged that accurate information about the current situation does not get passed up to the senior levels. Although claiming that it was un-Buddhist for monks to become involved in politics, Guan agreed that the monks' involvement indicated how bad the situation had become in Burma. He pointed out the designated liaison officer met with Aung San Suu Kyi last week after a two-month hiatus, but quickly admitted that this gap was "too long." Charge pointed to Senior General Than Shwe as the main obstacle to moving forward. The Ambassador responded that he believed that Than Shwe would be ready to open up in a few more years. The Burmese people can't wait that long, the Charge warned, stressing that further delays would only increase the possibility of further turmoil.
3. (C) Ambassador Guan stated the various Chinese officials traveling to Burma have counseled the senior generals to speed up the political dialogue and warned them that the international community would not accept any backtracking. He agreed that the various parties just needed to start talking, and urged us to offer positive, constructive comments. Charge said "start talking now" was very constructive advice, and real dialogue would be welcomed by the whole world. If the generals were serious about a dialogue, they should be meeting everyday, not just with Aung San Suu Kyi, but with ethnic leaders, and other interested citizens as well. A one hour meeting with one person after two months was just for show, claimed the Charge, not serious. In addition, she continued, the regime has not permitted ASSK to meet with anyone else. The regime should be easing the restrictions on her, so she can get advice and counsel from a wide variety of people.
Control vs. Turmoil
-------------------
4. (C) Guan cited two concerns that might be hindering the political dialogue from getting started: losing power and economic interests. Guan suggested, if the senior leaders could be offered assurances that they would not "lose their lives" and could keep their economic interests, they might be more amenable to ceding power gradually. He implied that the economic interests were of higher priority for the generals and their families. Charge replied that this could all be negotiated, reiterating the need to get started now. If turmoil breaks out as people's frustration continues to grow, there might be nothing left to negotiate, she added.
5. (C) The generals want to stick to their roadmap, stated Guan. Charge suggested that they could still call it a roadmap while increasing participation at each of the remaining steps, including the current constitution drafting. Even though this might slow the roadmap process, she said it could produce more broadly accepted results in the end, which would be better for all. The roadmap process as it is will
RANGOON 00000044 002 OF 003
not deliver the stability that everyone wants to see, the Charge said, because it does not incorporate provisions the pro-democracy supporters and ethnic minorities want to see. Instead of taking credit for speeding up the roadmap as he has in previous meetings, Guan nodded in agreement. He repeated the Chinese interest in stability. Charge said more demonstrations were likely in the coming months if the people saw no signs a genuine dialogue was underway. She expressed confidence that many issues could be easily resolved, if the various parties just started talking and kept talking.
6. (C) Guan acknowledged that the regime has done nothing to improve the lives of the Burmese people, even though they recieved increased oil and gas revenues. He recognized that the huge increase in satellite fees will further turn the public against the military. Charge characterized the latter as an attempt to keep people from the news, but also effectively blocking them from some of their few escapes--soccer and Korean soap operas. Guan mentioned that China had learned that when the government tried to press down too hard, it increased the likelihood of an eruption; he understood the risks of more turmoil in Burma.
7. (C) Guan questioned whether democracy could work in Burma citing the experience of their first decade of independence and Ne Win's efforts to promote a democratic transition in 1988. Charge explained that many nations went through the same struggles after independence, and reminded Guan that it was the current generals who blocked a transition in 1988. The Burmese have learned from the past, according to the Charge, if they have a voice in deciding their political future then they will have an interest in maintaining stability. Guan said there were some issues that were inappropriate for outsiders to decide, like sexual problems in a family. Charge agreed saying the role of the outsiders should be in persuading the parties to talk; what they talked about and the decisions they came to was up to them. Charge urged China to join with the U.S. in urging genuine talks get started now and keep going until a more broadly acceptable way forward can be agreed upon by all the relevant parties of Burma.
Meet the USDA, not the NLD
--------------------------
8. (C) Charge noted that the most recent Chinese visitor had spent a lot of time with Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA-the regime's mass member organization) members. Guan described He Luli as a senior official from one of China's eight political parties, and of the People's Congress. Guan did not believe that her meetings meant USDA was preparing to formally become a political party. He noted that while USDA claimed 24 million members, 60% were under the age of 18, so could not vote. Charge asked if the He met with the National League of Democracy (NLD), and Guan quickly replied that the "government would not permit that," referring to the Burmese government.
9. (C) Charge mentioned that the Foreign Ministry had complained that we visited NLD "excessively" and asked if the Chinese had been called in. He smiled, shook his head no, and asked if Charge visited NLD. Yes, she replied, adding she would be pleased to introduce the Ambassador to NLD members. He said he received a letter from U Aung Shwe, the NLD Chairman, requesting a meeting, had not scheduled anything, but shook their hands when he encountered them at National Day receptions. He noted that the Foreign Ministry did not prohibit Charge from seeing NLD, just advised against too many visits. Charge said we would go on meeting with NLD regularly since they were always willing to talk with us, unlike the government. Guan stated that Chinese officials had recommended to senior leaders that they meet with Charge, and said Than Shwe had told the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister that he would.
10. (C) Comment: The Chinese clearly are fed up with the footdragging by the Than Shwe regime. While democracy, demonstrations, and politically active monks make them nervous, they recognize that the risks of further turmoil are
RANGOON 00000044 003 OF 003
increasing so long as the generals refuse to talk. This turmoil will inevitably affect Chinese business interests here, making them more amenable to our approaches regarding Burma in the interests of promoting stability. The Chinese can no longer rely on the generals to protect their interests here, and recognize the need to broker some solution that keeps the peace, including bringing in the pro-democracy supporters. Those discussions need to get started now. The generals no doubt fear for their futures, so some quiet assurances of protection might help bring them to the negotiating table. The Chinese share our desire to get them to the negotiating table. The Chinese Ambassador has made clear his continuing interest in working together with us. VILLAROSA
Tuesday, 07 October 2008, 19:48
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 107438
SIPDIS
USUN FOR JEFF DELAURENTIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/23/2018
TAGS PREL, KPAO, PHUM, BM
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST: REPLACEMENT OF SRSG GAMBARI FOR
BURMA MISSION
Classified By: IO PDAS James Warlick. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (U) This is an action request. See para. 4.
2. (C) Department views the "good offices" mission of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative (SRSG) to Burma as an important vehicle for encouraging democratic progress in Burma. Consequently, Department has viewed with growing concern the lack of progress on core political steps that the UNSC called on Burma to take such as the immediate release of political prisoners and the opening of a meaningful, time-bound political dialogue with democratic and ethnic minority leaders, in particular, with Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), over the course of SRSG Gambari's four missions to Rangoon. Indeed, it appears that Gambari's access to regime officials and ability to secure results has only contracted over the course of these missions. His access to democratic leaders has been constrained by both the regime and more recently a loss of confidence in Gambari among leaders of the democracy movement.
3. (C) Gambari appears unrealistically upbeat, pursuing and reporting progress on peripheral matters (e.g., a possible economic forum, the possible placement of a UN staff member in Rangoon) that are a distraction from what the Security Council has articulated as critical goals and identified as Gambari's mandate.
4. (C) Considering the key role of the good offices mission and Gambari's inability to secure significant progress from the Burmese regime, USUN is asked to demarche SYG Ban or Ambassador Kim to seek Gambari's dismissal as SRSG for Burma. This demarche should occur as soon as practical.
5. (C) Taking into account Gambari's usefulness in his concurrent role as UN advisor on the International Compact with Iraq, as well as SYG Ban's likely sensitivities in regard to a possible dismissal, Department provides the following talking points (not/not to be left as a non- paper) for use by USUN in this demarche:
6. (C/rel to UN) Begin points:
-- Over time, the United States has become increasingly concerned that the UN good offices mission in regard to Burma is in dire jeopardy.
-- Special Representative Gambari's fourth and latest trip to Burma continued a disturbing pattern of regime-managed itineraries; restricted access to key regime officials and activists; and complete lack of progress on the critical issues that form the core of Mr. Gambari's mandate: the opening of a meaningful and time-bound dialogue with democratic and ethnic minority leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi, toward democratization and national reconciliation, and the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners.
-- While the main responsibility for this lack of progress should be attributed to regime intransigence, Mr. Gambari has not been willing to acknowledge it. This lack of progress, Mr. Gambari's inappropriate claims of success regarding peripheral issues, and his unwillingness to press the regime more forcefully for progress have caused us to conclude that his continued involvement undermines the good offices mission and should therefore be ended.
-- We have no wish to embarrass Mr. Gambari and have no intent to link any removal with a lack of progress in Burma, but we would ask that you find a way to terminate gracefully his participation in this particular mission. In particular, we cannot support further travel to Burma for discussions with regime leadership by Mr. Gambari as part of the good offices mission.
-- We urge you not to rush to name a replacement. There have been a series of Special Representatives, none of whom have succeeded due to regime intransigence. Absent some sign that the regime is willing to engage seriously, we fear appointment of a new envoy could actually encourage the regime and some of its friends to continue to emphasize process over substance. As you requested, however, we are willing to share ideas of possible candidates as you consider next steps.
-- There is talk of your ramping up your personal involvement on Burma, or perhaps even visiting. We think you could play an important role but understand you will have to consider carefully how you would engage. Although a trip by you could be useful, we believe it's critical that the groundwork be laid so you can be confident that your visit will result in tangible progress.
-- We understand that the Burmese are unlikely to make major concessions as a condition for your visit. However, we do not believe you should go without a strong indication ahead of time that your visit would coincide with some tangible, positive steps. Steps that we recommend you insist upon are: the release of high-profile political prisoners; the release of Aung San Suu Kyi or at least the easing of her house arrest; insistence that you and any subsequent Special Representative will be able to determine your own schedules, including meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi, political prisoners, activists, and whomever else you wish; and that you will have access to the senior most leadership of the Burmese regime; agreement on specific steps to begin a dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and other democratic and ethnic leaders; and a guarantee that any Special Representative will be granted a multiple entry visa.
End points. RICE
Friday, 07 August 2009, 10:51
S E C R E T RANGOON 000502
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, INR/EAP,
PACOM FOR FPA
EO 12958 DECL: 08/07/2019
TAGS KNNP, PARM, PREL, NPT, PGOV, PINR, KN, BM
SUBJECT: (S) BURMESE OFFICIAL CONFIRMS BURMA-DPRK
"PEACEFUL" NUCLEAR COOPERATION
Classified By: CDA Larry Dinger for for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
1. (S) Australian Ambassador to Burma Michelle Chan informed CDA that XXXXXXXXXXXX told her the Burma-DPRK connection is not just about conventional weapons. There is a peaceful nuclear component intended to address Burma's chronic lack of electrical power generation. When Chan cited reports of a Burma-Russia agreement for development of a peaceful nuclear reactor, XXXXXXXXXXXX responded that the agreement with Russia is currently just for "software, training." The DPRK agreement is for "hardware." XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed reports Burma's Army Chief of Staff (third highest ranking) General Thura Shwe Mann visited the DPRK last November. Asked why Thura Shwe Mann, XXXXXXXXXXXX responded, "Because he is in charge of all military activities." XXXXXXXXXXXX reportedly seemed surprised that the West might be concerned by a Burma-DPRK "peaceful" nuclear relationship. XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that, after all, given sanctions, Burma really has "no other options" but to develop the relationship wi th North Korea.
Comment
-------
2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX DINGER
Friday, 11 January 2008, 11:28
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000125
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM, EAP/MLS, P, DRL
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER
EO 12958 DECL: 01/08/2028
TAGS PREL, PHUM, CH, BM
SUBJECT: MFA AND SCHOLARS DESCRIBE CHINA'S EFFORTS ON BURMA
REF: 07 BEIJING 7197
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C) Summary: China has made great efforts to improve the situation in Burma, stretching the boundaries of its policy of non-interference, MFA and Chinese think tank interlocutors told HFAC and SFRC staff members January 10-11. MFA says China is contemplating next steps to address the current "standstill" in Burma, but Chinese scholars said domestic events and other international issues will draw China's attention away from Burma. MFA officials and the scholars continue to encourage direct talks between the United States and the Burmese regime. End summary.
2. (SBU) MFA Asia Department Counselor Yang Jian and Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) Asia scholars Zhai Kun and Zhang Xuegang met HFAC professional staff members Eric Richardson and Dennis Halpin and SFRC professional staff member Frank Januzzi on January 10-11.
"Bold Measures" Necessary to Prevent Further Turmoil
--------------------------------------------- -------
3. (C) Counselor Yang Jian told the HFAC and SFRC staff members January 11 that China would like to see the Burmese Government take "bold measures" to improve the livelihood of the Burmese people and achieve national reconciliation through dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and democracy supporters as well as ethnic minority groups. Counselor Yang stated that the Chinese accept the Burmese regime's so-called "roadmap" to democracy as the best route to democracy and national reconciliation in Burma. CICIR scholar Zhai said the Burmese government exerts control over society only on the surface and the potential for "lots of trouble" persists. Zhai said the regime's inept handling of the economy costs it legitimacy. Even if the Burmese generals and Aung San Suu Kyi undertook a healthy dialogue, economic problems could throw the country into turmoil.
Encouraging Signs but Current Standstill
----------------------------------------
4. (C) Yang said despite the potential for further trouble, the Chinese government is encouraged by a number of developments since the disturbances in August and September, including the visits of UN Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari, the appointment of Labor Minister Aung Kyi (who Yang believes is "close to the core" of the Burmese regime) as a liaison with Aung San Suu Kyi, and the release of detainees. Yang said that during VFM Wang Yi's November 2007 visit to Burma (reftel), Wang shared with senior Burmese leaders China's analysis, again suggesting more attention to the livelihood of the Burmese people, dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi, and more interaction with ASEAN. Yang said that, based on the regime's positive language about the dialogue, China had been optimistic it would succeed. In light of the current "standstill" in Burma, however, China is thinking about what other steps now to take with the regime.
China's "Extraordinary" Efforts
-------------------------------
5. (C) Yang recounted China's efforts to improve the situation in Burma. She said that after China and Russia in January 2007 vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning Burma, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan traveled to Burma in February to hold "extraordinary" discussions with the regime's senior leaders. Tang suggested that Senior General Than Shwe and other Burmese leaders improve Burma's domestic and international situation. Yang said lower level Burmese officials, hesitant to approach senior leaders with critical advice, were pleased with China's approach to Than Shwe.
6. (C) Scholars Zhai Kun and Zhang Xuegang January 10 separately echoed the view that China is making great efforts to influence Burma positively while adhering to its policy of non-interference. Zhai said China has delivered indirect but clear signals to Asian countries and the United States on the need for greater openness in Burma. Zhai highlighted Premier Wen Jiabao's November 19 speech at the National University of Singapore. (Note: Wen's speech included the following: "Only an open and inclusive nation can be strong and
BEIJING 00000125 002 OF 003
prosperous; cutting off contacts with the outside world can make a country backward.")
Direct U.S.-Burma Dialogue
--------------------------
7. (C) During the Wang Yi visit, Burmese leaders expressed interest in more discussions with the United States. Noting that USG officials have suggested Burmese officials contact our Embassy in Rangoon, Yang said Burma preferred the format of the June 2007 talks in Beijing. China views the June meetings between the Burmese delegation and State Department officials as a "bilateral confidence building measure," Yang said.
Continued Support for Gambari
-----------------------------
8. (C) Yang said China will continue to support UN Special Advisor Gambari's mission, though she noted that the Burmese Government is unhappy with Gambari because Burmese leaders believe they followed Gambari's suggestions during his first visit but then received only further opprobrium. Yang said Burmese leaders are unhappy about the UN "Group of Friends" on Burma. While China is open to multilateral means to address the situation in Burma, China believes Burma's acceptance of these means is the key to success. For example, China would like ASEAN to play a more constructive role, Yang said, but ASEAN is divided over how to address Burma. Older ASEAN member countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, favor a hard-line approach. Newer ASEAN members, such as Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, support a more moderate stance towards Burma.
No Sanctions
------------
9. (C) MFA's Yang reiterated that China remains opposed to additional sanctions, which she said will not spur further dialogue, but instead make the regime look further inward and give it an excuse for hard-line polices. Despite China's opposition to sanctions, Yang stressed that the United States and China have similar goals for Burma, including stability, democracy and development. Therefore, China and the United States should show unity, particularly in the UN, in addressing the situation in Burma. CICIR scholar Zhai said that because China foremost values stability in Burma, China does not wish to see a sudden change in the Burmese regime. In that light, China fears the pressure of more sanctions may only bring further civil unrest.
China's attention drawn away from Burma
---------------------------------------
10. (C) CICIR's Zhai said China would like to see ASEAN play a larger role on Burma partly because domestic events in China, including the National People's Congress in March and the Olympics in August, are increasingly consuming China's attention. Zhai said recent protests in Vietnam over the South China Sea and the turmoil in Pakistan have also drawn China's and international attention away from Burma.
Including democracy supporters slows down roadmap
--------------------------------------------- ----
11. (C) Zhai said that including the democratic opposition and ethnic groups in the so-called roadmap to democracy at this stage would slow down the process, yet Zhai asserted that "if Senior General Than Shwe is rational," he will include the democratic opposition to increase the legitimacy of the current regime.
USG should assure safe future for Burmese generals
--------------------------------------------- -----
12. (C) CICIR's Zhang said that the United States should "play two hands" with the Burmese Government. Zhang said the United States has been sufficiently critical of the regime and now should send messages, via China if necessary, to reassure Burmese military leaders that their personal security would not be imperiled in a democratic transition. Zhang said that guaranteeing the safe future of the current military leadership is the key to "unlocking the deadlock."
13. (U) HFAC and SFRC staff members did not have an opportunity to clear this cable.
BEIJING 00000125 003 OF 003
RANDT
Tuesday, 23 December 2008, 13:26
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003228
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/22/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, KISL, IN
SUBJECT: CONGRESS PARTY STUNG PLAYING RELIGIOUS POLITICS
WITH TERRORISM
REF: MUMBAI 518
Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary: On the floor of parliament, Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram officially dismissed comments made by the Minority Affairs Minister A.R. Antulay that implied Hindutva elements may have been involved in the Mumbai attacks. Antulay sparked a political controversy on December 17 with comments insinuating that the killing of Maharashtra Anti-Terror Squad (ATS) Chief Hemant Karkare by the Mumbai terrorists was somehow linked to Karkare's investigation of bombings in which radical Hindus are suspected (reftel). The outlandish comments suggested that somehow Hindutva elements were in league with the Mumbai attackers, or used the attacks as cover to kill Karkare. The opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) immediately called for Antulay's resignation and protested with boisterous walkouts in parliament over the course of five days. Compounding matters, the Congress Party, after first distancing itself from the comments, two days later issued a contradictory statement which implicitly endorsed the conspiracy. During this time, Antulay's completely unsubstantiated claims gained support in the conspiracy-minded Indian-Muslim community. Hoping to foster that support for upcoming national elections, the Congress Party cynically pulled back from its original dismissal and lent credence to the conspiracy. Regardless of Chidambaram's dismissal (and Antulay's party-ordered retraction), the Indian Muslim community will continue to believe they are unfairly targeted by law enforcement and that those who investigate the truth are silenced. The entire episode demonstrates that the Congress Party will readily stoop to the old caste/religious-based politics if it feels it is in its interest. End Summary.
Killed in Mumbai Attacks, Karkare Led Investigation into "Hindu Terror"
---------------------------------------------
2. (U) Indian Minorities Affairs Minister A.R. Antulay's sparked controversy on December 17 with comments insinuating that the killing of Maharashtra Anti-Terror Squad (ATS) Chief Hemant Karkare by the Mumbai terrorists was somehow linked to Karkare's investigation of "Hindu terrorists." Two of the Mumbai terrorists gunned down Karkare, and his ATS colleagues Additional Commissioner of Police Ashok Kamte and Inspector Vijay Salaskar the first night of attacks, November 26. The three officers were killed as they reached a hospital the terrorists entered after attacking the Mumbai train station.
3. (U) As Maharashtra ATS Chief, Karkare led the investigation into the September 2008 Malegaon blasts which claimed the lives of six people. Initially the police suspected Muslim terrorists. However, authorities recently arrested eleven Hindus, including an Indian Army Lieutenant Colonel. Police identified five of those arrested as having ties to the BJP's youth wing in their earlier years. Two others had ties to a recent addition to the Sangh Parivar family of Hindu nationalist organizations.
Antulay's Comments
------------------
4. (U) On December 17, even as a solemn debate on the Mumbai attacks and counterterrorism was taking place in parliament, Antulay made a series of public comments drawing attention to a possible link between Karkare's killing and his investigation. He offered no evidence to back-up his claims.
-- "Superficially speaking they had no reason to kill Karkare. Whether he was a victim of terrorism or terrorism plus something, I do not know."
-- "Karkare found that there are non Muslims involved in the
NEW DELHI 00003228 002 OF 002
acts of terrorism during his investigations in some cases. Any person going to the roots of terrorism has always been the target."
-- "Unfortunately his end came. It may be a separate inquiry how his end came."
-- "There is more than what meets the eyes."
Congress Party Dismisses...
---------------------------
5. (U) Most Congress Party leaders quickly disassociated the Party from Atulay's comments. Congress Party spokesman Abishek Singhvi told the press, "We do not accept the innuendo and the aspersions cast. This should be the end of the matter. The Congress does not agree with Antulay's statement." Another Congress Party spokesman, Manish Tiwari, followed the next day with, "The Congress in any manner does not endorse Antulay's views." Just as quickly BJP leaders called for Antulay to resign or be sacked.
...Then Equivocates...
----------------------
6. (U) However, on December 21 senior Congress leader Digvijay Singh told the media, "I don't think Antulay made a mistake. What he asked for is a probe. What is objectionable in his statement?" Two days earlier the Congress-led government of Maharashtra rejected a demand for an inquiry into Karkare's death. The opposition BJP took exception to both the substance of Antulay's comments and the Congress Party's inconsistent response. Shouting slogans, the BJP staged a walkout in the parliament three days in a row and demanded a formal clarification from the government. Emboldened by the equivocation, Antulay refused to apologize or retract his statements and said they reflected the views of a large segment of the Muslim population.
...And Finally Dismisses
------------------------
7. (U) After taking flack for nearly a week, the Congress Party finally gave its official view when Home Minister Chidambaram stated in parliament, "There is no truth whatsoever in the suspicion that there was conspiracy." Chidambaram called Antulay's comments "regrettable." Shortly thereafter Antulay backed down and told the press, "For me the matter is settled." He ruled out his resignation.
Congress Party Plays Cynical Politics
-------------------------------------
8. (C) Comment: While the killing of three high level law enforcement officers during the Mumbai attacks is a remarkable coincidence, the Congress Party's initial reaction to Antulay's outrageous comments was correct. But as support seemed to swell among Muslims for Antulay's unsubstantiated claims, crass political opportunism swayed the thinking of some Congress Party leaders. What's more, the party made the cynical political calculation to lend credence to the conspiracy even after its recent emboldening state elections victories. The party chose to pander to Muslims' fears, providing impetus for those in the Muslim community who will continue to play up the conspiracy theory. While cooler heads eventually prevailed within the Congress leadership, the idea that the party would entertain such outlandish claims proved once again that many party leaders are still wedded to the old identity politics. The seventy-nine year old Antulay was probably bewildered to find that his remarks, similar in vein to what he would have routinely made in the past to attack the BJP, created such a furor this time. End Comment. MULFORD
Monday, 29 June 2009, 05:53
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001337
SIPDIS
NSC ANISH GOEL
EO 12958 DECL: 06/26/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PK, AG, IN
SUBJECT: NSA JONES DISCUSSES U.S.-INDIA SECURITY
RELATIONSHIP AND PAKISTAN WITH DEFENSE MINISTER ANTONY
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter Burleigh for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary. Meeting National Security Advisor James Jones on June 26, Defense Minister A.K. Antony stressed his support for moving beyond minor irritants and to a broad and expanded security relationship between India and the United States. Both Jones and Antony affirmed their commitment to building the U.S.-India mil-mil partnership as envisioned by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh. Antony stressed the importance India places on success in Afghanistan. Chief of Army Staff Deepak Kapoor told Jones about the continuing problem of infiltration from Pakistan and the need for India to be able to have confidence and trust in its western neighbor for effective dialogue to take place. End Summary.
2. (SBU) Participants:
NSA General (retired) James Jones CDA Peter Burleigh Senior Director Don Camp Senior Director John Tien Senior Advisor Sarah Farnsworth DATT Colonel Richard White Political Officer Sameer Sheth (notetaker)
Minister A.K. Antony Chief of Army Staff, General Deepak Kapoor Other Ministry of Defense Officials
Need to Move Beyond Minor Irritants
----
3. (C) After warmly welcoming Jones, Antony began by emphasizing the importance of expanding the quality and depth of the U.S.-India relationship. He stressed his desire to expand the bilateral military relationship despite minor irritants, and expressed his hope that Jones' visit to India would further the relationship. Antony mentioned joint development and production, and technology transfers as meriting focus, adding that the Indians find U.S. technology transfer conditions too restrictive. Jones and Burleigh urged completion of the End-Use Monitoring agreement. Antony said it needed to be defensible to Parliament, musing that he himself is accountable to parliament and to India's vibrant and multi-party democracy.
4. (C) Jones declared to Antony that he is very encouraged by the overall direction of the bilateral relationship, especially after having met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who had expressed his optimism for U.S.-India relations. Jones told Antony the U.S. is in complete agreement with the Prime Minister's vision, emphasizing that President Obama is also equally committed to strong ties between the two nations. "There is real intent to follow the vision of our national leaders," Jones noted. He assured Antony that the U.S. will be as flexible as possible within the confines of U.S. laws, Indian laws, and both our publics. We must do whatever we can to resolve the challenges that can potentially slow the relationship down, since these are sensitive times that require both nations to find ways to more closely cooperate.
Success in Afghanistan Critical
----
5. (C) Antony told Jones India has a stake in Afghanistan, reminding him that India's borders before partition extended to Afghanistan. The Indian military is concerned by the situation in Afghanistan, Antony admitted, and stressed that the international community's operations there must succeed because the India cannot imagine for a moment a Taliban takeover of its "extended neighbor."
Pakistan: Infiltration Continues/Trust Deficit Remains
----
6. (S) After the conversation moved to Pakistan, General Deepak Kapoor, Chief of Army Staff, interjected and told Jones the Pakistani military's statements regarding the Indian threat on its eastern border are wholly without merit. Even after the 11/26 terrorist strikes on Mumbai, he emphasized, India did not make any move of a threatening nature toward Pakistan. Kapoor alleged that there are 43 terrorist camps in Pakistan, 22 of which are located in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Although the Pakistanis raided some camps in the wake of 11/26, Kapoor averred, some camps have reinitiated operations. Kapoor further asserted infiltration across the Line of Control cannot occur unless there is some kind of assistance and/or degree of support that is institutional in nature. He described several incidents of infiltration that occurred this year, including that of 40 terrorists in March who were found possessing significant ammunition and other equipment. India is worried, Kapoor said, that some part of the huge U.S. military package to Pakistan will find its way to the hands of terrorists targeting India. Furthermore, if "we can catch them (the infiltrators), why can't the Pakistani military?" Kapoor asked. "There's a trust deficit between the U.S. and Pakistan but there's also one between India and Pakistan," he stressed.
7. (S) Jones asked Kapoor how the Pakistanis react when the Indians confront them with these incidents. Kapoor replied the Pakistanis remain in denial mode, but fortunately today India's counter-infiltration posture is stronger than in the past. Asked about the percentage of infiltrators that get through, Kapoor estimated between 15 to 20 percent but cited the challenge posed by India's open border with Nepal. He asserted that at least 16 terrorists this year entered India through Nepal and then traveled to Kashmir. Throughout his remarks, Kapoor stressed that infiltration bids were "acts of aggression."
8. (S) Jones queried Kapoor on prospects of upgrading Indo-Pak military talks to discuss these issues. Kapoor rhetorically asked whether there should not be a degree of confidence in Pakistan before such a dialogue can even begin. Antony interjected that unless there is some tangible follow-up action by Pakistan against the perpetrators of the 11/26 attacks, discussions with Pakistan will be difficult. Regarding terrorist camps in Pakistan, Jones told Antony and Kapoor that the U.S. will take up the issue with Pakistan.
Regional Problems Require Regional Solutions
-------
9. (C) Jones suggested regional problems require regional solutions, underscoring the need for all of us to move forward on a broader strategy by building confidence and trust. The U.S.-India partnership is very important in this context. The worst thing for the region would be another 11/26-type attack, Jones stressed, and that we cannot let the terrorists play us off against each other. He concluded by underscoring President Obama's desire to stimulate the bilateral relationship and the U.S. commitment to working as honestly as possible to share information with India on security matters.
10. (U) NSA Jones cleared this message. BURLEIGH
Friday, 20 August 2004, 06:19
C O N F I D E N T I A L VATICAN 003213
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/WE LEVIN; IO/UNP NARANJO; IO/T: BOOTH, COWLEY
; G/TIP: ETERNO
EO 12958 DECL: 08/19/2014
TAGS AORC, ECON, KDEM, PHUM, PREL, VT, UNGA
SUBJECT: HOLY SEE BACKS U.S. UNGA PRIORITIES
REF: A. STATE 152009 B. WILLSON - MARTIN EMAIL AUG 12 C. VATICAN 2518
Classified By: Charge d'affaires D. Brent Hardt for reasons 1.5 (b and d).
-------
Summary
-------
1. (C) Holy See Acting Foreign Minister equivalent Parolin told Charge August 18 that the Holy See was on the same page with the U.S. on most UNGA initiatives. On cloning, Charge emphasized the Holy See's potential to influence Catholic countries to support a ban on human cloning. Parolin emphasized the Holy See's agreement with the U.S. position and promised to support fully UN efforts to ban embryonic cloning. He rejected the suggestion that the Holy See's UN mission had sent mixed messages on the issue last year, insisting that their widely disseminated position paper was strongly behind a complete ban. Parolin suggested that the U.S. do more to make the scientific case for the possibilities of adult stem cell research as an alternative to embryonic stem cells as a means to build support for the ban. On human trafficking, Parolin expressed support for the U.S. initiative to increase focus on child sex tourism, and suggested that Permanent Observer Migliore might make a statement on the issue in his UNGA intervention. Turning to economic issues, Parolin agreed with Charge that developing nations had to take responsibility for their own economic and social development, but insisted that internal initiatives had to be bolstered by aid from a reformed international system. End Summary.
------------------------------------
Holy See, U.S. on Same Page for UNGA
------------------------------------
2. (SBU) Charge reviewed the U.S. UNGA priorities with the Holy See's Acting Foreign Minister equivalent Monsignor Pietro Parolin August 18, drawing on ref (a) points. Parolin offered strong support for U.S. priorities on cloning, trafficking, and democracy, and support with caveats on the global development and Middle East priorities. Embassy had shared points prior to the meeting, and Parolin offered the following comments.
---------------------
Banning Human Cloning
---------------------
3. (C) Charge began by thanking Parolin for the Holy See's recent strong statement against all forms of human cloning issued in the wake of the recent UK decision to permit expanded cloning for therapeutic purposes. Parolin responded that the Holy See's unequivocal position on the issue was well-known, and noted the close agreement between the Vatican and USG on the issue. Charge raised points from ref (b), emphasizing the opportunity the Holy See's UN mission had, particularly among predominantly Catholic countries, to expand support for the Costa Rican resolution banning all forms of embryonic human cloning. Charge stressed that an active role by Permanent Observer Archbishop Migliore could be crucial to several countries, not least of all Poland. After last year's lobbying efforts, Charge noted, some countries appear to have been left with the impression that the Holy See was willing to accept the Belgian compromise on the issue. As it happened, the closeness of the vote showed that any such misconception may have been decisive.
4. (C) (Comment: A Polish diplomat accredited to the Holy See subsequently told us that he had found the Holy See's diplomacy on the cloning issue last year "strange." He said that in 2003, the Nuncio to Poland had passed the Vatican paper on the subject not to the Polish Foreign Ministry, but to the Bishops' Conference. This approach did not ensure maximum exposure for the document. Our contact was unaware of the extent of lobbying by the Nunciature this year; in fact, before we spoke to him he had not been aware that the issue was to be taken up again. End Comment.)
5. (C) Parolin acknowledged that there had been some internal discussion within the Holy See at the outset of the UN deliberations last year on whether to support the Belgian compromise, but he insisted that the Vatican had rejected that position and gone full speed ahead for the total ban. He maintained that Archbishop Migliore at the UN had been committed to the Holy See's position, and may have simply adopted "tactics" that were misunderstood. Migliore, he added, had hoped to avoid dividing the international
community on the issue. Parolin stressed that there had been "constant communication" on the issue between Migliore and the Secretariat of State. The Permanent Observer continuously updated the Vatican on his lobbying efforts in New York, and advised which countries the Secretariat should approach at the Vatican. Parolin said he expected continuing close cooperation this year, and welcomed U.S. suggestions on countries that might be most susceptible to Vatican pressure.
6. (SBU) Parolin observed that while the Holy See would concentrate on the moral side of the argument, the U.S. might be able to sway some missions by being more aggressive in making the scientific case for alternatives to embryonic stem cell research. The Vatican continues to believe that the scientific argument will likely be the most compelling for countries on the fence, and if alternatives to embryonic research can be shown to be credible, these countries will then have an acceptable foundation for supporting a ban on embryonic research.
-----------------
Human Trafficking
-----------------
7. (SBU) Parolin, who represented the Holy See and spoke at Post's recent anti-trafficking conference (ref c), wanted to know more on how TIP would fit into the UNGA agenda and what specific initiatives we would be pursuing. He expressed support for the U.S. goal of increasing the international focus on child sex tourism, and suggested that Archbishop Migliore might make a statement on the issue. Charge encouraged this idea and went on to discuss further collaboration between the U.S. and Holy See on the issue. (Note: Post plans to increase outreach to seminarians studying in Rome to raise the profile of the "demand" aspect of TIP -- an aspect of the problem that priests might well be able to address from the pulpit or in their mentoring/pastoral roles. End Note.)
8. (SBU) Charge also suggested that pastoral guidance from the Vatican on trafficking could be a big boost for anti-TIP efforts around the world. He noted the usefulness of a 2002 anti-TIP document put out by the Nigerian Bishops' Conference, and guidance that Pontifical Councils had published on other subjects (e.g., the Council for Health Care on the pastoral response to drug addiction and abuse). Parolin seemed intrigued, and promised to speak to the Council for Migrants and Itinerants (nominal lead organization on TIP at the Vatican) to explore ways of expanding Holy See engagement against trafficking.
--------------------------
Advancing Economic Freedom
--------------------------
9. (SBU) Turning to economic issues, Parolin agreed that developing nations had to take responsibility for their own economic and social development and focus on good governance and anti-corruption initiatives. In the Vatican's view, however, there had to be a balanced approach to the issue, in which these internal initiatives were bolstered by expanded aid from a reformed international system. "The international community has a duty to help these countries," Parolin insisted. "They cannot do it alone." Charge agreed that a balanced approach was needed, but suggested that UN debates had not reflected this balance, focusing almost exclusively on the international institutions and largely ignoring the critical steps countries needed to take domestically to promote economic growth.
------------------------
Democracy, Anti-Semitism
------------------------
10. (SBU) In reference to our other UNGA priorites, Parolin said the Holy See agreed fully with U.S. efforts to promote democracy and build a greater voice for democratic countries within the UN. He also indicated that the Holy See would be supportive of a UNGA resolution on anti-Semitism, noting that the Holy See had supported the OSCE's anti-Semitism declaration and believed a similar resolution at the UN would be useful. Charge reviewed U.S. concerns about anti-Israel resolutions and committees. Parolin acknowledged U.S. concerns, but said there was an urgent need to revitalize the Road Map and restart some form of peace process in the region.
HARDT
NNNN
2004VATICA03213 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Thursday, 21 January 2010, 15:58
C O N F I D E N T I A L VATICAN 000013
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR OES DREW NELSON, RACHEL KASTENBERG, KATE LARSEN
EO 12958 DECL: 1/20/2035
TAGS KGHG, PGOV, PREL, CU, VE, VT
SUBJECT: "GREEN" POPE SUPPORTS US PATH FORWARD FROM COPENHAGEN
REF: A. A. STATE 3080 B. B. 09 VATICAN 132
CLASSIFIED BY: Julieta Valls Noyes, DCM. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: The Holy See supports USG efforts to have countries associate themselves with the Copenhagen Accord by the January 31 deadline (ref. A), and will encourage them to do so. The Pope's recent environmental messages offer Vatican officials a strong platform to leverage the moral authority of the Church to combat climate change. While the Vatican supports the inclusion of all countries in international environmental discussions and decision-making, it is not naove about the political motives behind Cuba's and Venezuela's criticism of Copenhagen. End summary.
2. (C) On January 20, P/EOff met with Dr. Paolo Conversi, the Vatican's point person on climate change at the Secretariat of State, to deliver ref. A demarche. Conversi immediately expressed the Holy See's genuine desire to see the Copenhagen process move forward. He was aware of the January 31 deadline but did not know which countries had agreed formally to join the process. Conversi agreed to encourage other countries discreetly to associate themselves with the Accord, as opportunities arise. (Note: For practical reasons, the Holy See will not formally associate itself with the Copenhagen Accord: Vatican City State's carbon footprint negligible. The Vatican decision is consistent with its practice of not becoming a formal party to agreements if they require substantial technical expertise and reporting commitments).
3. (C) Conversi was pleased overall with the process leading to Copenhagen and with the Conference itself. He said expectations were too high before the event. Regarding the group of dissenting countries, including Venezuela and Cuba, Conversi said the Vatican was sympathetic to their complaints about inclusion in decision-making but believed their criticism was largely politically motivated. Noting that Pope Benedict had firmly established his "green" reputation using his New Years' Day Peace message to highlight environmental protection (ref. B), Conversi said he looked forward to further collaboration with the U.S. prior to Bonn and Mexico City.
4. (U) In a separate meeting, Monsignior James Reinert, the environmental analyst at the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace (a Vatican think tank), confirmed to P/EOff that the profile of environmental issues in the Vatican is at an all-time high. Secretariat of State officers represented the Holy See at environmental meetings now, where in the past his own office would have had the lead. (Note: Justice and Peace will continue to produce analytical documents on environmental issues for bishops around the world, while the Secretariat will have the lead on policy, particularly in multilateral fora.)
5. (C) Comment: Conversi's offer to support the U.S., even if discreetly, is significant because the Vatican is often reluctant to appear to compromise its independence and moral authority by associating itself with particular lobbying efforts. Even more important than the Vatican's lobbying assistance, however, is the influence the Pope's guidance can have on public opinion in countries with large Catholic majorities and beyond. End Comment.
DIAZ
Tuesday, 23 May 2006, 11:53
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 VATICAN 000083
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/WE LARREA, EUR/NCE
EO 12958 DECL: 5/23/2031
TAGS PL, SOCI, PREL, VT
SUBJECT: POPE TRAVELS TO POLAND: PART ONE
REF: A) 05 VATICAN 475 ET AL.; WARSAW 799 ET AL.; MARTIN - CURTIN, VAN CLEVE TELCONS
VATICAN 00000083 001.4 OF 004
CLASSIFIED BY: Peter Martin, Pol/Econ Chief, Vatican, State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (U) This cable is the first of two messages previewing Pope Benedict's May 25-28 visit to Poland. The first details Poland's continuing importance to the Holy See and touches on several on-going issues in the Polish Church from the perspective of the Vatican. The second focuses in more detail on the specifics of the upcoming visit.
-----------
Summary
-----------
2. (C) Even without Pope John Paul II at the helm of the Catholic Church, the Holy See's attention to Poland and the influence of Poles here remains an important dynamic in the workings of the Vatican. Recent months have offered much evidence of this, and numerous opportunities to assess the Poland - Holy See relationship. Most high-ranking and mid-level Poles have stayed on in their positions in the Vatican bureaucracy since the death of John Paul, maintaining the Vatican's Polish flavor. Pope Benedict has consistently made gestures to acknowledge the importance of the Polish Catholic Church in the context of European and world Catholicism - an importance embodied most immediately by the crowds of Polish pilgrims that still flock to Rome. Pope Benedict and other Vatican officials maintain Pope John Paul's hope that Poland will serve as a counter-weight to Western European secularism, but are wary of nationalistic or divisive forces with a Catholic label, such as media outlets under the control of Polish station Radio Maryja. With Pope Benedict XVI's May 25-28 visit to Poland looming, many in and around the Vatican are addressing these subjects. End Summary.
------------------------
Poland: Still a Presence
------------------------
3. (C) The papacy of John Paul II is slowly fading into history, but Poland remains an important part of the conversation at the Vatican. Recent months have offered much evidence of this, and numerous opportunities to assess Holy See - Poland relations. Late last year, several groups of Polish bishops came to Rome for their quinquennial "ad limina" visit to the pope and Vatican officials. In December, then-President Aleksander Kwasniewski made his swan song visit to the Vatican and met with Benedict XVI. In January, his successor, President Lech Kaczynski, made his first trip abroad as president and met Pope Benedict XVI. The first anniversary of the death of the Polish pope in April saw waves of Polish pilgrims visiting Rome, but the sound of Polish on the streets of Rome hardly abated for the Easter celebrations two weeks later. Add periodic events commemorating various dates in the life of John Paul II or initiatives that he began, and there remains an inevitable Polish flavor to life at the Vatican.
4. (C) In the aftermath of the death of the Polish pope, Pole-weary Italian journalists heralded the impending exodus of Poles from Rome and the Vatican Curia (bureaucracy) (ref a). Their hope was that an Italian would regain the papacy and add to the already imposing number of Italians in the Curia. Many predicted that the papacy would inevitably turn its attention from the homeland of the deceased pontiff. In the end, Joseph Ratzinger of Germany was elected pope, and the Poles, by and large, stayed. And although it was inevitable that the death of John Paul would signal a change in the relationship between Poland and the Holy See, the bond remains strong. The Vatican has continued to play close attention to Poland and Poles continue to wield great influence in Vatican City.
-----------------------------------
Polish Personnel, Influence Remain
-----------------------------------
5. (C) Benedict moved his own German secretary, Monsignor Georg Ganswein, into the Apostolic Palace, but he kept on Pope John Paul's Polish aide, Mieczyslaw Mokrzycki (an ethnic Pole from Ukraine) in a very visible position in the papal household. Other prominent Poles at the Vatican, such as Cardinal Zenon Grocholewski (Congregation for Education), Monsignor Antoni Stankiewicz (Roman Rota - the Vatican's high court), Archbishop Edward Nowak (Congregation for the Causes of Saints), Monsignor Krzysztof Nitkiewicz (Congregation for Oriental Churches), Archbishop Stanislaw Rylko (Council for Laity), and others are continuing in high-profile positions. [Note: Rylko was passed over for an expected elevation to the College of Cardinals at the most recent consistory, but still heads an important Vatican department.]
6. (C) Benedict also named London-born Polish priest Wojciech Giertych as theologian of the Papal Household, another prestigious position. Giertych is the son of well-known Polish
VATICAN 00000083 002.2 OF 004
nationalist Jedrzej Giertych (1903-92), and brother of Maciej Giertych of the League of Polish Families party in Poland. Maciej's son, Roman, is the newly-named Education Minister (as reported by Embassy Warsaw) and a member of the Catholic organization, Opus Dei . Though Fr. Giertych was selected for his erudition and preaching rather than his nationality (we also doubt his family connections played a role in the appointment), his presence presents another opportunity for Polish visibility and influence. A host of lower-level Polish functionaries continue as well, doing a lot of the heavy lifting in and around the Vatican. The only major name to leave Rome in the wake of the death of John Paul was Archbishop Stanislaw Dziwisz, John Paul's longtime secretary, whom Benedict sent to follow in his mentor's footsteps as Cardinal Archbishop of Krakow.
7. (C) "Even after the death of the Holy Father, we have a strong presence here," Grzegorz Kaszak, rector of the Polish College (residential seminary) in Rome and a former Vatican bureaucrat, told us. Kaszak pointed out that Poles had been making inroads at the Vatican for over twenty years. Their influence was unlikely to diminish overnight. Even when Benedict XVI makes the major changes in the Curia that Vatican-watchers have been predicting for some time, most Poles here do not predict that Polish influence in the Vatican will drop precipitously. "We are now part of the culture here," and a crucial element of the Church in Europe and in the world, Kaszak insisted.
------------------------------------------
Vatican Publicizes Stats on Polish Church
------------------------------------------
8. (C) The statistics bear Kaszak out. We defer to Embassy Warsaw on the strength of the Polish Catholic Church domestically, but the Vatican was touting its numbers in advance of the pope's trip. The Holy See released statistics noting the country's 36.6 million Catholics at some 10,114 parishes and 800 pastoral centers. There are some 28 thousand priests and almost 25 thousand other religious personnel (nuns and other male religious) with 6,400 students studying to become priests. Vatican-based sources have remarked to us that Poland's Catholic muscle is felt far beyond the country's borders. In parishes in Italy, other European countries, the U.S., and elsewhere, it is not uncommon to come upon Polish clergy, either on loan, or having taken up residence in a foreign diocese. What's most important to the Holy See is the "formation of the youth," according to Dariusz Giers, a Polish priest working at the Vatican's Health Ministry. "The Vatican knows we have excellent programs to educate young people [in religious matters]" he said, emphasizing the importance of this factor for the continuing strength of the religion. What's more, many at the Vatican consider Polish Catholicism to be dependably orthodox, compared to more liberal strains of the faith found in some parts of Western Europe. "The Poles are grounded in the faith," one contact opined. "You wouldn't have to worry about the Da Vinci Code confusing people in Poland."
---------------------
Ubiquitous Presence
---------------------
9. (C) As if to emphasize the ubiquitous presence of Poles in and around the Vatican, Kaszak exchanged several greetings in Polish with passing nuns as he spoke to us not far from St. Peter's Square. In fact, whether one's in the Vatican grocery store or post office, St. Peter's Basilica, or walking any of the streets around Vatican City, it's hard to go twenty minutes without hearing some Polish. And this is not just from the Vatican functionaries from Poland and the many Polish nuns who staff several Vatican offices and residences. The flow of Polish pilgrims to Rome has waned little even a year after the death of Pope John Paul. Of course, massive crowds of Poles came to Rome to observe the first anniversary of the pope's death on April 2. A mass said by Pope Benedict and other events packed an overflowing St. Peter's Square. But it seemed to onlookers that the Polish influx was just as great - or greater - for the Easter celebrations not long afterwards. As is typical for the outdoor audiences and public masses, banners from Polish parishes and towns highlighted Polish participation. "I think there were even more Poles here for Easter," Vatican bureaucrat Giers told us. "This has been nearly constant since the death of the Holy Father. I don't see signs of it slowing down."
----------------------------
Pope Reaches Out to Poles
----------------------------
10. (C) The Holy See clearly recognizes who its audience is. At his weekly public gathering (a mixture of prayer and pep rally), Pope Benedict speaks every week to the crowd in Polish,
VATICAN 00000083 003.6 OF 004
in addition to Italian, French, English, Spanish, and German. Polish is typically one of the languages used for prayers at Vatican masses. The pope often makes special emphasis on the Polish contingent at the audiences and other events, as on May 3, when he noted the anniversary of the 1791 ratification of the Polish Constitution and heralded the anniversary a noteworthy event in Polish Catholic history. Benedict XVI has also devoted some of his rare private audiences to Polish or Polish-affiliated groups such an April visit with representatives of the Krakow-based publishing house, Znak, publisher of Pope John Paul's last book and other Church-related works. That Pope Benedict, who travels much less than his predecessor, chose Poland as his second trip abroad (his first was a visit to World Youth Day in Germany that had been scheduled before his election) is perhaps the strongest sign of this recognition (septel).
---------------------------------------
A Counter-Weight to Secular Europe?
---------------------------------------
11. (C) The Holy See's attention to Poland is not simply customer service or "taking care of the troops". As was clear under Pope John Paul II, the Vatican has high hopes that Poland will serve as a counter-weight to Western European secularism as the nation makes itself more at home in an integrated Europe. Pope Benedict's preoccupation with what he sees as Europe's increasing psychological distance from its Christian roots is clear (ref a). He has continued to focus on Poland's potential in combating this trend. This was one of the themes of the visit of several groups of Polish bishops to the Vatican at the end of last year. "It's a topic that always comes up," explained Monsignor Michael Banach, the Holy See MFA's country director for Poland. He told us that the two sides recognized that the Polish bishops needed to exert leadership in the face of Western European secularism. Certainly the Holy See hopes that Poland will hold the line at the EU on "life and family" issues that arise. But the necessity of maintaining and fortifying the faith internally in Polish society is perhaps an equally important - if not unrelated - focus. Several sources have told us that both sides are keenly aware of the danger that European secularism will dilute Polish faith and identity.
-------------
Trojan Horse
-------------
12. (C) Looking at Poland's position in Europe and the EU, several Polish interlocutors told us that Western European suspicion of Poland as a "Trojan horse" for the U.S. in the EU was not just a phenomenon among the laity - it had also infected the Vatican. "We definitely get that feeling" from a few of the French, German and other Western European prelates at the Vatican, said Giers. The war in Iraq, unpopular among many Vatican officials, has certainly played a role here. Traditional Polish affection for the U.S., on the other hand, seems as strong as ever among the Polish clergy stationed or studying in Rome. In conversations at a dinner not long ago at the Polish College, several seminarians and priests made a point of praising the U.S. and lauding USG foreign policy.
----------------
Radio Maryja
----------------
13. (C) Although the Vatican is on guard against encroaching secularism, it shares with many Polish bishops a wariness of Radio Maryja, the Catholic radio station accused of xenophobia and anti-Semitism. Banach and Piotr Samerek, DCM at the Polish Embassy to the Holy See, told us that during their ad limina visits, several of the bishops appealed to Vatican Foreign Minister Giovanni Lajolo and others to clamp down on excesses of Radio Maryja and its sister media outlets. The complaints included Radio Maryja's meddling in Polish politics. According to Banach, Lajolo was sympathetic, and expressed his reservations about the network. But Lajolo took a typical Vatican line in judging the matter to be an Polish internal affair. Banach told us that Lajolo told more than one group of bishops that they had to deal with Radio Maryja themselves as part of their "pastoral responsibilities". Though media attributed some comments critical of Radio Maryja to Pope Benedict, the Holy See clearly did not want to get involved.
14. (C) When Papal Nuncio Jozef Kowalczyk made an April statement chastising Radio Maryja, many assumed that the Vatican had finally decided to clamp down on the network. Our contacts tell us that wasn't the case, saying that while the Holy See agreed with the spirit of Kowalczyk's intervention, the nuncio had spoken out on his own. Some following the issue at the Vatican have told us that Kowalczyk went too far, given the Vatican's view of the matter as an internal Polish question. In
VATICAN 00000083 004.4 OF 004
any case, as Banach told us, things seem to be improving, as the proposed programming board set up to monitor the content of the station's broadcasts looks like a step in the right direction.
----------------
Other Influences
----------------
15. (C) As the Holy See examines the many aspects of its relationship with Poland, it seeks to maintain its focus on the pastoral rather than political. But religious subjects routinely morph into political ones. Banach wouldn't bite when asked for his view of the entry of radical elements such as Andrzej Lepper or ultra-Catholics like Roman Giertych into Poland's governing coalition and ministerial ranks (ref c). He did say that the Vatican understood the dangers that right-wing nationalists posed to Poland's future, and allowed that some saw a danger of Catholic fringe groups discrediting the mainstream Church. As far as the reputation for anti-Semitism that stuck to some nationalists, Banach commented that "no one" wanted to see the progress that had been made on such issues lost.
----------
Comment
----------
16. (C) It is only a little more than a year after the death of Pope John Paul II, and it is inevitable that with the passage of time Poland will eventually become less central to the world of the Vatican. John-Paul era Vatican bureaucrats will eventually move on. Poland may become more secular. The memory of the Polish pope will certainly recede further into the past. The growth of the Catholic Church in certain parts of the developing world could also play a role here, pushing the Poles, Italians and others to less prominent roles with the Holy See and capturing even more attention in Curial offices. For the near future, however, Poland is assured an important place at the Vatican table.ROONEY
Wednesday, 18 August 2004, 16:27
C O N F I D E N T I A L VATICAN 003196
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/WE: LEVIN; EUR/SE; EUR/ERA
EO 12958 DECL: 08/18/2014
TAGS EU, PHUM, PREL, SOCI, TU, VT
SUBJECT: VATICAN STILL OPEN TO TURKEY'S EU BID
REF: A. 03 VATICAN 1164
B. 03 VATICAN 5666 C. 03 VATICAN 5748
Classified By: Charge d'affaires D. Brent Hardt. Reasons 1.5 (b) and ( d).
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Summary
-------
1. (C) Acting Holy See Foreign Minister Parolin reaffirmed August 18 that the Holy See remained open to Turkish EU membership, notwithstanding recent critical comments by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger. Parolin emphasized that the Holy See's position on Turkish membership in the EU had not changed from the stance it has described to us in the past (ref a). If Turkey meets the EU's Copenhagen criteria, Parolin said, the Vatican sees "no obstacle" to EU membership. He clarified that Ratzinger's skeptical view of EU membership for Turkey reflected the Cardinal's "personal feeling," and did not reflect the view of the Holy See. Parolin acknowledged that some within the Holy See harbored concerns about Turkey's EU bid and its potential impact on the EU, but maintained that he believed these concerns could be addressed over time, and would not represent insurmountable obstacles. He acknowledged that Ratzinger's statement was incorrectly seen as a Vatican position, and indicated a willingness to consider clarifying its formal position pending discussions with the Turkish Ambassador -- who had yet to raise the issue -- and with FM Lajolo on his return to Rome later this month. End Summary.
--------------------------------------------
Holy See Still Open to Turkish EU Membership
--------------------------------------------
2. (C) Acting Vatican Foreign Minister equivalent Monsignor Pietro Parolin told Charge August 18 that the Holy See remained open to Turkish EU membership. He affirmed that recent negative comments about Turkey's EU bid by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger did not reflect any change in the Holy See's formal position. That position remained that, if Turkey fully meets the EU's Copenhagen criteria, the Vatican sees "no obstacle" to EU membership. Parolin made it clear that Ratzinger's take on the issue was his own, and that he was not speaking on behalf of the Holy See. "These were his personal feelings," Parolin added. "Although he is an important member of the Curia, he does not speak for the Secretariat of State."
SIPDIS
--------------------------------------------- --------
Turkey's EU Bid: Complexities, but no Great Obstacles
--------------------------------------------- --------
3. (C) While Parolin discounted Ratzinger's comments -- that Turkey had always been "in permanent contrast to Europe" and that linking it to Europe would be a mistake -- as not reflective of Vatican foreign policy, he did allow that EU membership for Turkey would present challenges. He noted the difficulty of European integration for a country with such a different cultural and religious background, citing existent problems with the integration of Muslims into European society as reason for caution when examining Turkey's EU hopes. He acknowledged that there were others, including former FM Cardinal Tauran, who share Ratzinger's concerns. Tauran had suggested the EU look first to Orthodox Christian countries Ukraine and Moldova before addressing Turkey's membership. Parolin affirmed that the Holy See's primary concern with Turkey's EU bid remained religious freedom, particularly the juridical status of churches in Turkey (ref a). In his view, the "difficulties and complexities" did not represent an insurmountable obstacle for Turkey's EU membership, but rather necessary topics of reflection that would have to be addressed before moving forward on accession.
----------------------------------
At Odds with Papal Muslim Outreach
----------------------------------
4. (C) Charge pointed out that as an EU member, Turkey could help to ease tensions between the Western and Muslim worlds, illustrating how a secular state with a Muslim population could cooperate with countries with a Judeo-Christian heritage. He noted that the Pope, in his outreach to the Muslim world, has constantly preached the doctrine of inclusion and integration, even while advocating recognition of Europe's Christian roots. Ratzinger's comments, by contrast, suggested a permanent state of conflict and division that appeared to run counter to the Pope's broader
outreach to the Muslim world, the Charge observed. Parolin acknowledged this contradiction, and indicated that he believed it was possible that Turkish EU membership could eventually help the Christian minority and others suffering from a lack of religious freedom in Turkey. "We certainly hope for that development," he concluded. Charge also pointed out that Turkey has for decades been an important member of NATO that had contributed significantly to the organization's success; there was no reason why it could not contribute equally to the EU.
----------------------
Clarification Possible
----------------------
5. (C) Charge noted the public confusion generated when a senior Vatican official as influential as Cardinal Ratzinger makes a political statement on such a sensitive issue, and emphasized the importance of clarifying its official position. In this regard, Charge passed Parolin an account of Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's sharply critical response to Ratzinger's comments, including the strong reaction by the Turkish and American media. Parolin had not yet seen Erdogan's comments, and appeared concerned by their bluntness. He also indicated his surprise that the Turkish Ambassador had not yet contacted him, though he said it was possible the Ambassador was on summer leave. Parolin indicated that he would wait to hear the Turkish reaction, and would then discuss with FM Lajolo the possibility of issuing some form of clarification of the Vatican's stance.
-------
Comment
-------
6. (C) As we saw most notably during the Iraq war when individual Cardinals offered personal criticism of USG policy (refs b, c), the media often characterizes the personal views of high-ranking prelates as "Vatican" stances. In this case, Ratzinger's lofty stature in matters of Catholic theology made the temptation to do so even greater. In fact, Ratzinger's influence in matters of faith and morals does not translate into direct influence upon Vatican foreign policy, where his expertise is much more limited. Ratzinger has been a leading voice behind the Holy See's unsuccessful drive to secure a reference to Europe's "Christian roots" in the EU constitution, and he clearly understands that allowing a Muslim country into the EU would further weaken his case for Europe's Christian foundations. In any case, the Vatican's official position remains one of cautious, skeptical openness towards Turkish integration to the EU. In fact, the Pope, in his February address to Turkish Ambassador Durak essentially acknowledged Turkey's future in Europe, telling Durak that "as Turkey prepares to establish new relations with Europe," the Church would insist on "fundamental human rights" for Turkish Catholics.
HARDT
NNNN
2004VATICA03196 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Wednesday, 22 April 2009, 16:27
C O N F I D E N T I A L VATICAN 000059
EO 12958 DECL: 4/22/2029
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KIRF, VT, CU, VE, BL
SUBJECT: (C) VATICAN HOPES FOR BETTER U.S.-CUBA TIES, IN PART TO REIN
IN CHAVEZ AND HIS ACOLYTES
REF: A. A) CARACAS 486 B. B) CARACAS 443 C. C) VATICAN 36 D. D) VATICAN 12
CLASSIFIED BY: Julieta Valls Noyes, CDA, EXEC, State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: The Holy See welcomes President Obama's new outreach to Cuba and hopes for further steps soon, perhaps to include prison visits for the wives of the Cuban Five. Better U.S.-Cuba ties would deprive Hugo Chavez of one of his favorite screeds and could help restrain him in the region, according to a Vatican official. This is highly desirable for the Vatican, which is very concerned about the deterioration of Church-state relations in Venezuela. To avoid similar downward spirals elsewhere, the Vatican said Church leaders elsewhere in Latin America are reaching out to leftist governments. The recent attack on a Cardinal's home in Bolivia may have been intended to derail such quiet rapprochement. End Summary.
Cuba: Great News. What Will You Do Next?
----------------------------------------
2. (C) CDA and Acting DCM on April 22 called on the Holy See's official in charge of relations with Caribbean and Andean countries, Msgr. Angelo Accattino, to review recent developments in the region. As he had done previously (ref c), Accattino warmly welcomed recent White House policy decisions on Cuba and reviewed with interest the White House Fact Sheet on "Reaching Out to the Cuban People" which CDA gave him. Accattino also noted favorably Raul Castro's comments that Cuba was prepared to talk to the U.S. about all topics - although "after all, he has no other options anymore." CDA said Castro would need to reciprocate the moves from Washington with more than words - he needed to take action on political prisoners or reduce the cost of receiving remittances in Cuba.
3. (C) Accattino said the Vatican considered intriguing the possibility of a swap of political prisoners in Cuba for the "Cuban Five" in jail in the U.S. ADCM protested that their circumstances were not parallel, as the Cuban Five were convicted spies and the prisoners in Cuba were dissidents. Accattino quickly agreed but said discussions that led to the release of the dissidents were worth pursuing regardless. The Holy See was also following the Supreme Court appeal by the Cuban Five, to see how that might affect relations between the U.S. and Cuba. As an interim measure, Accattino suggested that the U.S. allow a jail visit by the wives of two of the five Cuban spies. CDA again noted that the U.S. had taken the first step, now the Cuban government needed to reciprocate in a concrete way.
Venezuela: Chavez is Worried. So is the Church.
--------------------------------------------- -
4. (C) The Cuba debate, Accattino said, had cast a long shadow at the recent Summit of the Americas. Venezuela's Hugo Chavez was clearly rattled by the thought that the U.S. and Cuba could enter into a dialogue that excluded him, and this motivated his "little scene" at the Summit. "Chavez is not dumb," and he was playing to the other hemispheric leaders with his bombastic approach to President Obama. The Holy See believes that the U.S. and Cuba should pursue a dialogue both for its own sake and/and in order to reduce the influence of Chavez and break up his cabal in Latin America, Accattino said.
5. (C) The situation for civil society in Venezuela is getting worse every day, according to Accattino. The asylum request by Maracaibo Mayor Manuel Rosales in Peru was only the latest sign of the narrowing political space in Venezuela. (Asked for updates on the whereabouts or situation of the Venezuelan asylum seeker Nixon Moreno from the Nunciature in Caracas, however, Accattino answered a bit evasively.) The real concern, Accattino said, is that Venezuela is turning into Cuba, while Cuba may be ready to open up.
6. (C) Church-state relations are also deteriorating daily in Venezuela, Accattino said. The Venezuelan Catholic Conference of Bishops (CEV) did not check in with Rome before taking actions or making statements like its highly critical April 6 communique (ref A). The Holy See agreed with the CEV conclusions, and would defend them -- even when it believed "a less confrontational approach would be more effective."
Bolivia: No More Venezuelas, Let's Talk. But Who Attacked Our Cardinal?
--------------------------------------------- --------------
7. (C) Turning to the recent dynamite attack against the residence of Cardinal Terrazas on April 15 in Bolivia, Accattino said it had worried the Holy See greatly. There was property damage, but thankfully no-one was hurt. It could easily have been worse. The Vatican is reserving judgment, pending the government's investigation, on who was behind the attack. It could have been radicals inside the government who want to derail the recent rapprochement between the Church and the state. The extreme right also could have been responsible - trying to make it seem like the government did it - for the same reason. Accattino said the Holy See considers either explanation equally plausible at this point. Meanwhile, it will keep talking to the government, because it has no choice.
Comment: Looking Out for the Church First
-----------------------------------------
8. (C) The Holy See has consistently maintained that improving U.S.-Cuba ties would greatly reduce the appeal of Hugo Chavez. It is so alarmed by the continued downward spiral in its own relations with Chavez, in fact, that Accattino said Church leaders in Latin American countries with leftist governments are rethinking their approach. Many episcopal (bishops) conferences in the region had in the past been willing to criticize excesses of these governments in an effort to protect civil society. They may be pulling back from that activism and advocacy in the short term, in order to protect their longer-term ability to minister to the Catholic faithful without interference. That attitude is what is behind the Church's moves to improve relations with the Morales government in Bolivia. It may also explain Accattino's ever-so-mild tone of criticism when discussing CEV decisions in Caracas. As for Accattino's polite unwillingness to discuss the Nixon Moreno case, that may also be telling, given his considerable interest in the topic last time we spoke (ref c). End Comment.
NOYES
Monday, 09 November 2009, 12:02
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VATICAN 000113
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/9/2034
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KIRF, UK, VT
SUBJECT: THE VATICAN AND THE ANGLICANS: OPPORTUNITY OR OPPORTUNISM?
REF: VATICAN 82
VATICAN 00000113 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Rafael Foley, Polchief. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) Summary
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1. (C) The upcoming visit of the Archbishop of Canterbury to Rome November 21 will take place with the background of the Vatican's far-reaching decision to facilitate the conversion of disaffected Anglicans to Catholicism. Embassy contacts approving the measure interpret it as a bold and appropriate response to the legitimate request of conservative Anglicans. Skeptics worry that it will weaken and change the tone of dialogue between Catholics and other Christian denominations, and that it will accentuate tradition at the expense of accommodation. Critics see it as opportunistic preying on the internally divided Anglican Communion. While Archbishop Williams has said that the Vatican decision is in a sense a consequence of Anglican-Catholic dialogue, the Vatican informed but did not seek the Archbishop's approval before announcing the decision. End summary.
Go It Alone
-----------
2. (C) On October 22, POL/ECONOFF spoke with XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the Pontifical Council for Christian Unity, which is responsible for ecumenical dialogue--i.e., relations with non-Catholic Christian Churches--is concerned about the effect of the announcement on the ongoing dialogue with the Anglican Church and has resisted pressure to put out a statement in support of the decision.
3. (C) During the press conference announcing the upcoming release of the "apostolic constitution" that will set the implementing mechanism to bring in particular groups of Anglicans, Cardinal Levada--Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith-- reported that Archbishop Rowan Williams knew about the Vatican decision "a month earlier." However, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the Anglican leadership was most likely only notified on October 19, when Levada and Williams met. Another source XXXXXXXXXXXX told poloffs that when Williams expressed concern about the implications of the announcement, Levada responded that the Vatican had already made its decision and was moving forward with it.
Most appealing to conservatives
-------------------------------
4. (C) In a separate conversation, British Ambassador Francis Campbell told Ambassador Diaz that if many Anglicans decide to join the Catholic Church in response to the Vatican's--yet to be released--new rules, the Vatican could face unforeseen obstacles. Campbell cited the difference between the Anglican Stipend and Catholic Allowance as chief among them. Because of the need to provide for families, Anglican priests are paid far more than their Catholic counterparts. With many parishes already financially stretched, a large transition of Anglican converts could overwhelm the financial resources of many dioceses. Within the Anglican Church, the groups most likely to join with Rome tend to be the most conservative. This is particularly true in the U.S., because the issues dividing Anglicans--the ordination of women and acceptance of homosexuality--are more prominent in the United States than elsewhere. Other Embassy contacts and media analysis agree that it is the Anglican conservative groups that will find it most appealing to become Catholics in groups that would be allowed, according to Levada, to maintain most of their Anglican traditions--except the Anglican freedom to openly voice dissent. Anglicans who take the Vatican's offer will be expected to accept Papal rule.
5. (SBU) In a recent article, Vatican specialist and author John Allen (U.S.) concluded that "when the dust settles, the centuries-old breach between Rome and Canterbury will remain
VATICAN 00000113 002.2 OF 003
intact." In this view, the apostolic constitution will not make the Catholic Church in the U.S. or elsewhere more conservative, because the numbers of converts will not be significant. Worldwide, he writes, there are 77 million Anglicans (including 2.2 American Episcopalians), while there are 1.2 billion Catholics. An Embassy contact pointed out that it is entirely possible that conservative Anglican bishops may also decide not to join the Catholic Church and bring their parishes with them, because they will have to relinquish their positions as bishops. The apostolic constitution will allow Anglican priests to become Catholic priests, but Anglican bishops would not come in as bishops.
The harshest critic
-------------------
6. (SBU) The harshest public criticism for the decision has come from a former friend of the Pope, the Swiss theologian Hans Kung. In an article published in several major European newspapers, Kung states that "having brought back the extreme anti-reformist faction of the Pius X fraternity into the fold, Pope Benedict now hopes to fill up the dwindling ranks of the Catholic Church with Anglicans sympathetic to Rome". For all its color, Kung's criticism is not influential with mainstream Catholics, according to an Embassy contact who is himself skeptical about the wisdom of the apostolic constitution. Kung, XXXXXXXXXXXX adds, comes across as personally bitter and has used such a strong language in criticizing the Pope that moderate reformists would not want to be associated with him or his opinion pieces: "with Kung, it is all about Kung."
Views from the Pope's loyalists
-------------------------------
7. (SBU) Embassy contacts who are most loyal to the Pope and are the first to defend his decisions have explained the announcement about the apostolic constitution as the charitable response to the legitimate Catholic longings of specific Anglican groups. An Opus Dei professor of theology told poloffs that the Vatican was not so much acting, but reacting, to the petition that the Traditional Anglican Communion -an association of churches that is separate from the Anglican Communion and reportedly has hundreds of thousands of members worldwide--made in 2007 to unite with the Catholic Church, provided the Vatican allowed it to maintain its Anglican rites.
8. (SBU) The Pope's response, the professor adds, is very progressive, because it allows for greater diversity of rites within the Catholic Church, and because it permits individuals who are already forming a community to come to the Church together (what the Church calls a "corporate" conversion) as oppose to asking them to undergo the more daunting individual conversion. (Note: with respect to the diversity of rites, another Embassy contact said that some of the Anglican rites that the apostolic constitution may allow are very traditional, for example in the use of Latin for the masses. End note). For the professor, the Pope is redefining ecumenism (i.e., the process of uniting the once-upon-a-time single Christian family) by moving from the "getting to know you" ecumenical dialogue to specific ecumenical action with measures that make it easier for a greater union to materialize, even if incompletely.
9. (SBU) The professor also maintained that the apostolic constitution does not have anything to do with a relaxation of priestly celibacy. Currently, former Catholic priests who have left the Church to become married Anglican priests are already banned in Cannon (Church) law from re-entering the Catholic Church as priests. He also notes that, even if the number of married (convert) priests will increase, there will be no married bishops in the Catholic Church, just like there are married priests but no married bishops in the Oriental Catholic Churches.
Comment: winners and losers
----------------------------
VATICAN 00000113 003.2 OF 003
10. (C) As the dust settles, it is possible to see the winners and losers of the Pope's decision. On the winning side is Cardinal Levada, the American "Faith Czar" who will have a direct say on the final form of the new procedures. Also on the winning side are Vatican officials and theologians in tune with the Pope's preference for depth of conviction over broadening the appeal of the Christian message. Traditionalists groups who cherish the use of Latin and older rites also gain, as their practices get reinforcement from unexpected quarters. Anglicans wishing to convert to Catholicism also come out stronger, as their options increase. The Pope's own anti-secular agenda also wins. In uniting traditionalist Anglicans with the Catholic Church, the Pope is bringing together two groups strongly committed defending to Europe's Christian heritage--a theme he strongly champions.
11. (C) On the losing side, the Archbishop of Canterbury and Cardinal Kasper, the German prefect of the Pontifical Council for Christian Unity who has lead with increasing difficulty--since Cardinal Ratzinger became Pope--the Vatican's ecumenical dialogue. Archbishop Williams was already in a very difficult situation trying to hold together an increasingly-divided Anglican Communion. Among his critics who want nothing to do with the Vatican, recent events "confirm" him as the weak leader they always said he was. Cardinal Kasper, who might have been intentionally spared from the difficult trance of standing next to Levada when the announcement was made (he was out of the country), also loses. The ecumenical dialogue will continue, but it will be a different dialogue now. His ecumenical interlocutors will not help but to wonder if anything that Kasper says really matters. Finally, those who might have hoped that changing attitudes towards a variety of social issues (homosexuality and women's ordination among them) in non-Catholic denominations might lead the Vatican to reconsider its own position have reasons to be disappointed. End Comment. DIAZ
Tuesday, 03 July 2001, 12:03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 VATICAN 003507
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/WE, PD/ECA (SEXTON), WHITE HOUSE FOR JOSEPH
HAGIN, BRADLEY BLAKEMAN AND MARY HAINES, PLEASE PASS TO
NSC FOR AMB. FREID
EMBASSY VATICAN MESSAGE NO. 107/01
EO 12958 DECL: 07/02/11
TAGS PREL, PHUM, IS, EG, CH, ID, PHUM, IS, EG, CH, ID, PHUM, IS, EG, CH, ID, PHUM, IS, EG, CH, ID, VT, VTPREL, VTPREL, VTPREL
SUBJECT: THE VATICAN-- THE SUPRANATIONAL POWER
REF: 00 ROME 0988
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CDA JOSEPH MERANTE FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 VATICA 03507 01 OF 04 031719Z
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
---------------------------
2. (U) THIS CABLE PROVIDES ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE PLANNED PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH THE POPE. IT UPDATES REFTEL, OUTLINING ASPECTS OF THE USG- HOLY SEE RELATIONSHIP THAT WE BELIEVE WILL REQUIRE U.S. ATTENTION IN THE NEAR AND MIDTERM. THE MIDDLE EAST WILL FEATURE PROMINENTLY. IN ASIA, VATICAN PRIORITIES WILL REMAIN FOCUSED ON CHINA, TAIWAN, VIETNAM AND INDONESIA/EAST TIMOR. THE VATICAN IS INVOLVED IN MEDIATING AFRICA'S GREAT LAKES CONFLICT, WHILE CUBA LOOMS LARGE AMONG VATICAN INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA. THIS CABLE IDENTIFIES AREAS IN WHICH THE U.S. AND THE VATICAN SHARE INTERESTS, AND AREAS IN WHICH THERE ARE POLICY DIFFERENCES.
3. (U) BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION (CONT'D): THE HOLY SEE IS A SUPRANATIONAL ENTITY THAT HAS ITS CAPITAL AND TERRITORIAL MANIFESTATION IN THE STATE OF VATICAN CITY. THE UNITED STATES BASED ITS 1984 RECOGNITION OF THE HOLY SEE IN PART ON THE FACT THAT THE HOLY SEE EXERCISES SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE 109 ACRES OF THE VATICAN CITY STATE. HOWEER ALL AMBASSADORS TO THE HOLY SEE, INCLUDING THE U.S. AMBASSADOR, ARE ACCREDITED TO THE HOLY SEE AN NOT/NOT TO THE STATE OF VATICAN CITY. THE VATIAN INSISTS ON THIS POINT TO REMIND THAT ITS REAC AND INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY IS GLOBAL. FOR PRPOSES OF THIS CABLE, THE TERMS HOLY SEE AND VATICAN WILL BE USED INTERCHANGEABLY. CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 VATICA 03507 01 OF 04 031719Z
4. (U) BACKGOUND AND INTRODUCTION (CONT'D): THE HOLY SEE ISONE OF THE OLDEST CONTINUALLY EXISTING INTERNATINAL ENTITIES. IT EXERCISED TEMPORAL CONTROL OF TE ITAIAN PENINSULA DURING THE MIDDLE AGES, BUT WAS COMPLETELY BEREFT OF TERRITORY BETWEEN 1870 AND 1929. NEVERTHELESS, EVEN DURING THIS PERIOD, MOST NATIONS CONTINUED TO RECOGNIZE THE IT AS AN INTERNATIONAL ENTITY AND MAINTAINED FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
5. (U) BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION (CONT'D): THE VATICAN IS ONE OF VERY FEW SOVEREIGN ENTITIES THAT HAVE PRESENCE AND REACH IN VIRTUALLY EVERY COUNTRY OF THE WORLD. ALTHOUGH ITS SOVEREIGNTY IS OVER LIMITED TERRITORY, VATICAN TEACHING AND POLICIES CAN INFLUENCE THE OVER ONE BILLION ADHERENTS OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH. END BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION.
DEVELOPING POLICY TOWARD THE HOLY SEE
-------------------------------------
6. (C) IN DEVELOPING U.S. POLICY VIS-A-VIS THIS UNIQUE ENTITY, POLICYMAKERS SHOULD THINK OF THE HOLY SEE AS SIMILAR TO A TRADITIONAL NATION-STATE, WITH A VARIETY OF FACTORS INFORMING ITS FOREIGN POLICY. THE MOST IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING INCLUDE:
-- RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES/HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS: THE VATICAN STRIVES TO TRANSLATE ITS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND ITS HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS INTO CONCRETE POLICIES. CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 VATICA 03507 01 OF 04 031719Z FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES BASED ON THESE PRINCIPLES INCLUDE: SUPPORT FOR THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT AND DEBT RELIEF FOR POORER COUNTRIES, OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, OPPOSITION TO ABORTION AND CONTRACEPTION, AND OPPOSITION (ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS) TO EMBARGOES;
-- "NATIONAL" SELF-INTEREST: THE HOLY SEE SEEKS TO PROTECT CATHOLICS AROUND THE WORLD, ITS OWN POSITION OF INFLUENCE, AND ITS VAST WEALTH. THE VATICAN'S SUPPORT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN RESULTS FROM ITS DESIRE TO PROTECT 600,000 IRAQI CATHOLICS FROM ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM; ITS REFUSAL TO PUBLICLY CRITICIZE CROAT NATIONALIST CLERGY IN BOSNIA STEMS IN PART FROM THE CROAT CHURCH'S STAUNCH DEFENSE OF THE FAITH DURING THE COLD WAR;
-- HISTORY/TRADITION: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HOLY SEE AND SPAIN, PORTUGAL, AND OTHER LATIN COUNTRIES GO BACK OVER 500 YEARS. THE VATICAN'S HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THESE COUNTRIES FREQUENTLY DEMANDS AN ACTIVE FOREIGN POLICY ROLE;
-- PROSELYTISM: THE VATICAN KNOWS THAT IT MUST
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8384
PAGE 01 VATICA 03507 02 OF 04 031715Z ACTION ECA-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AMAD-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 DS-00 EUR-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 VCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 SAS-00 /002W ------------------00B3A7 031716Z /38 O 031203Z JUL 01 FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000 WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 VATICAN 003507
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/WE, PD/ECA (SEXTON), WHITE HOUSE FOR JOSEPH HAGIN, BRADLEY BLAKEMAN AND MARY HAINES, PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR AMB. FREID
EMBASSY VATICAN MESSAGE NO. 107/01
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/11
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, IS, EG, CH, ID, VT
SUBJECT: THE VATICAN-- THE SUPRANATIONAL POWER
CONTINUALLY REFRESH ITS MESSAGE FOR CHANGING TIMES. VATICAN II IN THE 1960S WAS AN EXAMPLE. INTERFAITH AND ECUMENICAL OUTREACH IS AN IMPORTANT FOCUS OF THE CURRENT PAPACY, AND PROSELYTISM/POPULATION GROWTH IN THE THIRD CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 VATICA 03507 02 OF 04 031715Z WORLD ACCOUNTS FOR MUCH OF THE GROWTH OF THE CHURCH IN RECENT YEARS.
7. (C) PAPAL HEALTH/SUCCESSION AND WHAT IT MIGHT MEAN FOR U.S. POLICY: POPE JOHN PAUL II IS SURELY THE MOST WIDELY RECOGNIZED WORLD LEADER. ALONG WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, HE ENJOYS THE HIGHEST STATURE AND PROFILE AMONG WORLD LEADERS. IN EARLY 2000, PRESS MISREPRESENTATION OF A GERMAN BISHOP'S REMARKS IN THE POPE JOHN PAUL II'S ABILITY TO CONTINUE IN OFFICE, SPARKED A SERIES OF SPECULATIONS AROUND THE WORLD ABOUT SUCCESSION. THE POPE AND THE VATICAN STRONGLY DENIED THAT HIS CONDITION WAS SERIOUS ENOUGH TO WARRANT ABDICATION. THERE IS LITTLE SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA THAT THE POPE WOULD IN FACT RESIGN EVEN IF HIS HEALTH WERE TO DECLINE PRECIPITOUSLY. THE LIST OF CARDINALS WIDELY PERCEIVED AS POTENTIAL SUCCESSORS DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY AMERICANS, AND ONLY ONE ANGLOPHONE. AN ELECTION OF A EUROPEAN CARDINAL (MOST LIKELY AN ITALIAN) WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN ONLY MINOR CHANGES IN VATICAN POLICY AND ITS CURRENT STANCE ON ISSUES VIS A VIS THE UNITED STATES. IF THE NEXT POPE IS FROM LATIN AMERICA, ASIA, OR AFRICA, WE SHOULD EXPECT THE VATICAN TO TAKE POSITIONS FURTHER TO THE "LEFT OF CURRENT U.S. POSITIONS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, BUT FURTHER "RIGHT" ON SOCIAL ISSUES.
MIDDLE EAST
-----------
8. (C) MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS (MEPP): THE HOLY SEE DENIES WANTING TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE POLITICAL CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 VATICA 03507 02 OF 04 031715Z ASPECTS OF THE MEPP, ALTHOUGH IT REMAINS KEENLY INTERESTED IN WHAT IT TERMS THE "CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS" ASPECTS OF THE HOLY SITES IN THE REGION (SPECIFICALLY JERUSALEM). THE VATICAN MAINTAINS THAT ITS CONCERNS HAVE BEEN LARGELY IGNORED BY THE USG AND THE ISRAELIS, AND IN 1999 WORKED WITH THE FRENCH AND SEVERAL OTHER EU COUNTRIES IN THE "JERUSALEM WORKING GROUP" (JWG -- SINCE INACTIVE).
9. (C) THE VATICAN WAS CLEARLY DISAPPOINTED WHEN THE USG AND GOI DECLINED TO ASSOCIATE WITH THE JWG INITIATIVE. THE GOI'S DECISION TO ALLOW CONSTRUCTION OF THE NAZARETH MOSQUE CREATED ALARM (AND IN SOME CASES, RESENTMENT) AT THE VATICAN. THE GOI FOR ITS PART WAS CONCERNED THAT THE POPE LEFT UNANSWERED BASHIR ASSAD'S ANTI-SEMITIC INVECTIVE DURING THE POPE'S MAY 2001 SYRIA VISIT. WE CAN EXPECT CONTINUED TENSION IN THESE AREAS. THE HOLY SEE WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE MEPP, WHILE DENYING THIS INTENTION. EMBASSY VATICAN CONTINUES TO RECOMMEND A HIGH LEVEL VISIT TO ENCOURAGE THE VATICAN TO PLAY A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE, OR AT LEAST LESS UNHELPFUL, ROLE IN THE PROCESS.
ASIA
----
10. (C) THE VATICAN AND THE U.S. SHARE INTERESTS IN MANY OF THE SAME COUNTRIES (E.G. INDONESIA, CHINA, TAIWAN, VIETNAM), BUT NOT ALWAYS FOR THE SAME REASONS. IN ADDITION TO THE FORMAL CHURCH NETWORK NUMEROUS, OFTEN SEMI-AUTONOMOUS, CATHOLIC MISSIONARY ORGANIZATIONS CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 VATICA 03507 02 OF 04 031715Z OPERATING THROUGHOUT ASIA HAVE A SOPHISTICATED UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THEIR AREA. CONTACT WITH THESE MISSIONARY ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDES UNIQUE INSIGHTS INTO CONDITIONS IN THESE COUNTRIES. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH IN ASIA IS AN EXPRESS GOAL OF THE CHURCH. THE VATICAN AND ITS CONSTITUENT EPISCOPATES ARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN DIALOGUES WITH POLITICALLY POWERFUL MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN ORTHODOX FAITHS. THE RESULTS OF THESE DIALOGUES WILL IMPACT PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, STABILITY, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES.
11. (C) CHINA: WITH ITS OWN NETWORK OF CONTACTS AMONG CHINA'S UNDERGROUND AND PATRIOTIC CHURCHES, THE HOLY SEE HAS EXCELLENT SOURCES OF INFORMATION REGARDING DISSIDENTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER THE POPULATION. THERE IS A CONSTANT CONTROVERSY AROUND THE EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THIS ISSUE INVOLVES THE VATICAN'S RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN AND CHINESE GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICE. BEIJING'S REGULATION AND OFTEN OPPRESSION OF THE CATHOLIC
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8394
PAGE 01 VATICA 03507 03 OF 04 031721Z ACTION ECA-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AMAD-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 DS-00 EUR-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 VCE-00 DCP-01 NSAE-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 SAS-00 /003W ------------------00B442 031721Z /38 O 031203Z JUL 01 FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000 WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 VATICAN 003507
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/WE, PD/ECA (SEXTON), WHITE HOUSE FOR JOSEPH HAGIN, BRADLEY BLAKEMAN AND MARY HAINES, PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR AMB. FREID
EMBASSY VATICAN MESSAGE NO. 107/01
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/11
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, IS, EG, CH, ID, VT
SUBJECT: THE VATICAN-- THE SUPRANATIONAL POWER
CHURCH IS PARALLEL TO AND THEREFORE A WINDOW ON PROBLEMS IN CHINA WITH U.S.-BASED PROTESTANT CHURCHES AS WELL AS ISLAM AND BUDDHISM. THE CENTRALIZED STRUCTURE OF THE CHURCH AND THE REPORTING SYSTEM WITH THE NUNCIOS AND CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 VATICA 03507 03 OF 04 031721Z BISHOPS, NOT TO MENTION INDEPENDENT MISSIONARY GROUPS, GIVES EMBASSY VATICAN A UNIQUE VIEW OF EVENTS INSIDE CHINA.
12. (C) VIETNAM: UNOFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS CONTINUE BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE VATICAN ON ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THE GOV'S ATTEMPT TO CONTROL RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IS ONE OF THE MAIN STUMBLING BLOCKS FROM A VATICAN PERSPECTIVE. THE VATICAN'S ATTEMPTS TO APPOINT BISHOPS WITH MINIMAL GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE AND THE REPORTING PROVIDED BY ITS NUNCIO ON THESE EFFORTS CAN BE USED AS A GAUGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ISSUES IN VIETNAM.
13. (C) INDIA: INDIA HAS SEEN SIGNIFICANT SECTARIAN VIOLENCE OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS, AS MUCH AGAINST MUSLIMS AS CHRISTIANS. RESOLUTION OF THIS VIOLENCE IS A KEY TO DEMOCRACY, STABILITY AND THE GUARANTEE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE VATICAN, LOCAL BISHOPS WHO REPORT TO THE VATICAN, AND VARIOUS MISSIONARY ORGANIZATIONS WILL ALL CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE OBSERVERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND DEVELOPMENTS.
14. (C) INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR IS POISED TO BECOME THE SECOND CATHOLIC COUNTRY IN ASIA (THE OTHER IS THE PHILIPPINES). THE VATICAN, THROUGH ITS BISHOPS, HAS BEEN DEEPLY INVOLVED IN RECONCILIATION EFFORTS FOR YEARS. THE VATICAN IS INVOLVED IN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN EAST TIMOR. IN OTHER PARTS OF INDONESIA WRACKED BY SECTARIAN VIOLENCE, THE CATHOLIC PRESENCE IS LESS PRONOUNCED, BUT CATHOLIC MISSIONARIES PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION. CATHOLIC PRELATES HAVE ALSO ACTED AS CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 VATICA 03507 03 OF 04 031721Z MEDIATORS BETWEEN OTHER CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES AND MUSLIM GROUPS. VISITS OF THE INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND PRESIDENT TO THE VATICAN UNDERSCORE THE INFLUENCE THE VATICAN HAS ON A COUNTRY OF SIGNIFICANT POLICY INTEREST TO THE USG.
15. (C) NORTH KOREA: VATICAN OFFICIALS, AND CATHOLIC RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS PERIODICALLY VISIT NORTH KOREA. WE LEARN FROM THEIR VISITS AND WE CAN GIVE SUGGESTIONS TO OUR CONTACTS FOR POINTS TO RAISE WITH NORTH KOREAN OFFICIALS.
AFRICA
------
16. (C) GREAT LAKES: VATICAN CONTACTS ADMIT PRIVATELY THAT CHURCH RELATIONS WITH LATE DROC PRESIDENT LAURENT KABILA BEGAN ON THE WRONG FOOT BECAUSE OF KABILA'S MINDSET AND THE CHURCH'S PREVIOUS ASSOCIATION WITH THE MOBUTU REGIME. REAL HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS AND RELIGIOUS (EVANGELIZATION) CONSIDERATIONS PUT AFRICA ON THE SCREEN AT THE VATICAN. THE VATICAN AFFILIATED SANT'EGIDIO COMMUNITY PLAYS AN IMPORTANT SUPPORTING ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO MEDIATE THE CRISIS, KEEPING THE VATICAN INFORMED OF THEIR EFFORTS.
LATIN AMERICA
-------------
17. (C) CUBA: THE POPE'S 1998 VISIT TO CUBA HAS NOT BROUGHT THE KIND OF PROGRESS ON CHURCH FREEDOM SOUGHT BY CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 VATICA 03507 03 OF 04 031721Z THE POPE. THAT SAID, VATICAN-GOC DIALOGUE HAS CONTINUED WITH FOLLOW-UP VISITS TO CUBA BY SENIOR VATICAN OFFICIALS -- AND TO THE VATICAN BY CUBAN COUNTERPARTS. AMONG THE TOPICS OF DISCUSSION: THE GOC'S TREATMENT OF THE CUBAN CHURCH, THE STATUS OF DISSIDENTS, AND THE EFFECTS OF THE U.S. EMBARGO, ABOUT WHICH THE HOLY SEE SHARES CASTRO'S CRITICISM. THE VATICAN IS QUIETLY LOOKING AHEAD TO THE DAY WHEN FIDEL CASTRO DEPARTS THE SCENE. IT IS CONCERNED HOWEVER, THAT HIS REPLACEMENT CAN ACTUALLY BE WORSE.
EUROPE
------
18. (C) THE VATICAN WOULD LIKE TO SEE A UNIFIED, CHRISTIAN (IE. CATHOLIC) EUROPE. AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO INTENSIFY ITS DIALOG WITH THE LEADING PROTESTANT GROUPS IN GERMANY AND SCANDINAVIA. THE VATICAN WILL ALSO CONTINUE ATTEMPTS TO ENGAGE THE RUSSIAN CHURCH AND THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCH IN ISTANBUL IN AN ATTEMPT TO HEAL THE LATIN/ORTHODOX RIFT. VATICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE BALKANS CAN BE USEFUL TO U.S. POLICY IF IT IS DIRECTED AT PROMOTING CATHOLIC/ORTHODOX
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8397
PAGE 01 VATICA 03507 04 OF 04 031723Z ACTION ECA-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AMAD-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 DS-00 EUR-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 VCE-00 DCP-01 NSAE-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 SAS-00 /003W ------------------00B486 031723Z /38 O 031203Z JUL 01 FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000 WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 VATICAN 003507
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DEPT. FOR EUR/WE, PD/ECA (SEXTON), WHITE HOUSE FOR JOSEPH HAGIN, BRADLEY BLAKEMAN AND MARY HAINES, PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR AMB. FREID
EMBASSY VATICAN MESSAGE NO. 107/01
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/11
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, IS, EG, CH, ID, VT
SUBJECT: THE VATICAN-- THE SUPRANATIONAL POWER
COEXISTENCE. CONTINUED VATICAN CRITICISM OF "U.S. MATERIALISM AND COMMERCIALISM" COULD BE USED BY MANY IN EUROPE TO SUPPORT ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF LIMITING U.S. INFLUENCE AND ACTIVITY ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 VATICA 03507 04 OF 04 031723Z
19. (C) AREAS IN WHICH WE CAN WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE VATICAN DURING THE NEXT 12 MONTHS:
-- ETHNIC RECONCILIATION AND CIVIL CULTURE - IN JUNE, PD/ECA DAS BRIAN SEXTON MET WITH VATICAN AND SANT'EGIDIO OFFICIALS DURING A PD/ECA SPONSORED INTER-RELIGIOUS CONFERENCE ON BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA. EMBASSY VATICAN, WITH DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE, IS SEEKING TO DEVELOP FOLLOW-UP PROJECTS;
-- ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS -- POST HAS DEVELOPED TWO PROJECTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH CARITAS (THE VATICAN RELIEF NGO) AND WITH THE ARCHBISHOP OF PESCARA. THESE PROJECTS WILL OFFER EDUCATION, RESCUE, REHABILITATION, AND REPATRIATION TO VICTIMS AND POTENTIAL VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKERS. WORKING WITH THE CURIA AND CARITAS THERE IS MUCH MORE GROUND TO BE COVERED IN THIS AREA IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
-- BIOTECHNOLOGY AND AGRICULTURAL TRADE -- EMBASSY VATICAN HAS SPONSORED TWO DISCUSSIONS OF THIS THEME INVOLVING SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS ATTACHED TO THE VATICAN. PROMOTING A MORE POSITIVE VATICAN APPROACH TO APPROPRIATE USE OF GMOS IN THIRD WORLD AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT COULD HELP MAKE GMOS MORE WIDELY ACCEPTED EVEN IN THE DEVELOPED WORLD.
20. (C) AREAS IN WHICH WE SHOULD EXPECT CONTINUED DIFFICULTIES DURING THE NEXT 12 MONTHS:
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 VATICA 03507 04 OF 04 031723Z -- THE MIDDLE EAST - THE VATICAN WILL CONTINUE TO OPPOSE U.S. EFFORTS TO ISOLATE SADDAM HUSSEIN. WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THE VATICAN WILL NOT SUPPORT OUR EFFORTS IN IRAQ, AND INVESTIGATE WAYS TO LIMIT VATICAN INTERFERENCE WITH OUR OBJECTIVES. IN ISRAEL, THE VATICAN WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS TO INSERT ITSELF ON THE QUESTION OF THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM;
-- DEATH PENALTY - THE VATICAN WILL CONTINUE ITS CONDEMNATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY. STATEMENTS BY THE POPE ARE LIKELY TO BE USED BY MANY AROUND THE WORLD TO CONDEMN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD CONSIDER IF IT WANTS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE, AND IF SO, WHAT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AVENUES TO USE. MMERANTE
CONFIDENTIAL
>
2001VATICA03507 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Monday, 21 December 2009, 11:24
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 001141
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/11/2019
TAGS PHUM, PREL, UNGA, US, XG, XT
SUBJECT: UNGA64: EU AND EFTA MEMBER STATES WELCOME AND
SUPPORT NEW U.S. PRIORITIES: REPORT PREPARED BY AREA ADVISOR FOR WESTERN EUROPE ROBERT SMOLIK
Classified By: Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo for reasons 1.4 (d)
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
1. (U) The EU-27 responded to new U.S. flexibility at UNGA64 by collaborating pragmatically on our top priorities, and by providing essential voting support. Ably led by Sweden's EU presidency, EU member states shared the burden on lobbying the G-77 regarding human rights resolutions. They stood firm against G-77 ideology on economic/social resolutions, notably voting No on the Right to Development, and voting No with us on the trade resolution, for only the second time at UNGA.
2. (SBU) Despite differences with us over the Freedom of Expression resolution, EU states contributed to a more positive outcome on the Defamation of Religions resolution. They also attempted to moderate the language of Palestinian resolutions. The EU split over the Goldstone report resolution,(5 Yes-7 No-15 Abstain) primarily because of Dutch insistence on clear principles.
3. (C) While enthusiastic about new U.S. flexibility on disarmament and non-proliferation, Germany complicated eventual consensus on the Arms Transfer Treaty and France continues to question total disarmament. On Cuba, the EU as a whole and Spain in particular remained critical of our policy. Overall, Spain stood out for its influence within the EU and in Latin America, and The Netherlands for its principled, helpful stance on Goldstone and the Palestine resolutions.
4. (C) EFTA country delegations played influential niche roles: Switzerland's PR ably chaired the budget committee; Liechtenstein's PR led the ICC assembly of states parties; and Norway's proposed pragmatic follow-up to U.S. initiatives on combating violence against women in conflicts. The Vatican observer was as always active and influential behind the scenes. Although budget committee business is not yet complete, the large contributors from the Eurozone have shown welcome budget discipline and have pledged not to re-open the issue of the U.S budget cap.
5. (SBU) Looking ahead to UNGA65, the WEOG quietly chose its candidate for President of that General Assembly, to be formally elected by the GA in June 2010: Joseph Deiss, former President of the Swiss Confederation. Deiss is a consensus-builder and should preside efficiently, discretely, and impartially.
6. (C) Also looking forward to UNGA65, EU delegations at the UN (and in other international organizations) are moving deliberately towards an enhanced observer status, based on the Lisbon Treaty mandate, whereby the EU would speak early and authoritatively for the 27 in all UN debates. How such a new dynamic would affect U.S. interests at the UN and beyond, and how other regional groupings (AU, Caricom) might react, are important future issues.
To encourage the EU-27 to continue as our core supporters at UNGA65, we should engage them in early and energetic consultations on our UNGA65 agenda.
END SUMMARY
STRONG SWEDISH EU PRESIDENCY
7. (U) Led by an organized and pragmatic Sweden-EU Presidency delegation, the 27 EU member states worked collaboratively and productively with us on our major UNGA64 objectives. They responded with alacrity to new U.S. flexibility, particularly on arms control and economic/social issues. Compared to UNGA62 and 63, they committed and delivered a higher level of cooperation, which led to better results for traditional "WEOG" interests, particularly on human rights resolutions and on other "rights" issues.
8. (C) The EU lobbied energetically for the three key country-specific human rights resolutions (Burma, DPRK, Iran, of which they ran the first two). The Swedish presidency helped to organize and implement a burdensharing campaign that was more comprehensive, systematic, and synergistic than in previous UNGAs. EU lobbying efforts mobilized permanent representatives and other senior diplomats, not only third committee experts. The Swedish Ambassador himself repeatedly engaged with G-77 colleagues to sway votes.
9. (C) The EU failed to achieve their desired consensus to
USUN NEW Y 00001141 002 OF 004
vote together in favor of or to abstain on the Goldstone Report resolution, primarily because The Netherlands demanded a clear position of principle against endorsement of the report. As a result, the EU split, with Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, Portugal, and Slovenia voting Yes while Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia joined the U.S. in voting No. The other 15 abstained.
10. (C) The EU's traditional negotiation with the Palestinian observer delegation over its Israel resolutions improved slightly in dynamic, but not in outcome. Although the EU succeeded in moderating some of these draft resolutions, the overall voting outcomes remained overwhelmingly against the U.S. position. The EU did help to build bridges to moderate Arab states on Israel's technical agriculture resolution, but the Arab group nonetheless called a vote on the resolution and pressured OIC and African NAM members to join in abstaining.
SPECIFIC COMMITTEE NEGOTIATIONS
11. (C) On Fourth Committee issues dealing with decolonization, France and the U.K. were strong partners. However, their influence within the EU caucus at the UN on Palestine resolutions was not as positive as we expected and hoped. Sweden-EU Presidency helped substantially with the Palestine resolutions, enforcing efficiency in EU consultations and briefing WEOG members on the outcome of the EU's negotiations. The EU's annual negotiation of these nine drafts (four UNRWA and five on the special rights of the Palestinians) improved marginally, but it was Dutch insistence of a strongly-worded EU explanation of vote against the inclusion of politicized terms like "blockade" and "collective punishment" that had the most impact on the Fourth Committee deliberation of these resolutions. The vote outcomes remained lopsided.
12. (U) On other Third Committee resolutions, particularly Right to Food, Rights of the Child, Right to Development, EU member states warmly welcomed our new flexibility (particularly on the former resolution) and stood firm against G-77 excesses (surprisingly voting No as a bloc against the latter resolution). There was spontaneous applause in committee when the U.S. joined consensus on the Right to Food for the first time ever, and on Rights of the Child for the first time in a decade.
13. (C) On Second Committee issues the EU was as frustrated as we were regarding the disconnect between positions taken by large G-77 nations at the UN and diverging commitments they had undertaken in the G-20. However, preferring to see a glass half full, several EU Ambassadors said that this "schizophrenia" would eventually improve second committee economic resolutions, but that this would take time. The EU joined us for the second time ever at UNGA by casting 27 No votes on the trade resolution. A Norwegian diplomat was key facilitator in those negotiations, which came close to bridging the gap between US/EU positions and the G-77's.
14. (C) On First Committee, the Arms Transfer Treaty (ATT) resolution ran into determined opposition from Germany (and Mexico). Germany's argument was that a consensus on the ATT would yield a "lowest common denominator" weak outcome. The U.K. sided with us as we called for language supporting a consensus-based approach to ATT negotiations. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty resolution also for the first time achieved consensus, with support and acclaim from key European players for U.S. willingness to do so. Overall, EU support for new U.S. flexibility on non-proliferation and disarmament was strong. Key Europeans helped us lobby third parties.
15. (C) During UNGA64, the EU worked closely with us on the trade resolution. Negotiators, led by a Norwegian trade expert, nearly agreed on draft language with the G-77. Unfortunately, given realities of the Doha Round, both we and the EU voted No. There was little difference in European dynamics on the MDG debate compared to previous UNGAs. In the lead-up to the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, most of the UN negotiations proceeded away from NY, despite Secretary General's Ban Ki-moon's repeated references to the issue. Nevertheless, Denmark's PR worked diligently to prepare modalities for the MDG, biodiversity and associated high-level events that will open UNGA65.
16. (U) Extra-EU support for our initiatives on preventing violence against women in armed conflicts came from Norway. The PR brought his national chief of police to the UN for a consciousness-raising session that proposed and sought
USUN NEW Y 00001141 003 OF 004
practical programs to address the issue. Belgium's PR also hosted a side-event on this issue and is looking for U.S. engagement. The Vatican observer mission lobbied actively and influentially in the corridors and in informal consultations, particularly on social issues, especially on the Defamation of Religions resolution, where they are allies. Their long-term view of this issue coincides with ours: the trend is positive.
17. (SBU) On the downside, during the Cuba debate relating to our trade embargo and other U.S. bilateral policies, the EU showed no change in its firm stand against extraterritoriality provisions of the embargo. Spain was a particularly tenacious critic of our Cuba policy.
18. (C) In Fourth (decolonization) Committee France and the UK generally were strong partners. However, their influence within the EU caucus at the UN on Palestine was not as positive what we had hoped. The Swedish EU Presidency helped substantially with the UNRWA resolutions. The EU's traditional negotiation of nine drafts on Palestine resolutions (4 on UNRWA and five on Special Rights of Palestinain People) improved marginally in tone and objectivity from previous years. Also of initial concern, EU working-level negotiators suggested unhelpful amendments to the U.S. cybersecurity resolution, adding extraneous, questionable references (e.g., to MDGs). Once the matter was raised at PR level, the EU lined up behind our resolution as drafted.
19. (SBU) The legal affairs committee's resolutions, invariably adopted by consensus, featured like-minded cooperation between EU legal experts and U.S. counterparts. However, we would have appreciated more active European support on important points of principle in the negotiations of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and on the Russian sanction paper preserving Security Council prerogatives, but they were silent. Although not formally part of the UN legal affairs committee's work, the ICC is often staffed and led by legal officers who overlap with UN business, notably the PR of Liechtenstein, Christian Wenaweser, who spent several weeks away from the UN to preside in The Hague over the ICC Assembly of States Parties.
20. (SBU) The budget committee's end game is still being played out. From the start of the intertwined debates over scales of contribution and various budget processes, the EU provided critical support (particularly since Japan was less stalwart on budget stringency than in previous years). Early on, the EU agreed to respect the inviolability of the cap on U.S. contributions. In the scales of contribution debate, they agreed from the first to seek greater contributions from the governments of the large emerging economies, in line with our approach. On December 15 Ambassador Rice urged EU PRs to accelerate their endgame on scales to reach consensus with the G-77 for both the peacekeeping and regular budgets. Our concern was that a continued EU/G-77 stand-off might jeopardize our ceiling on contributions. EU PRs acknowledged that there is little chance of agreement with the G-77, but urged continued U.S. support for their efforts. Switzerland's PR Peter Maurer served ably and honestly as chair of the budget committee.
LOOKING AHEAD TO UNGA65
21. (C) According to the UNGA tradition of rotating its Presidency among the regional groupings, WEOG (whose numbers are weighted heavily towards the EU-27) chose its UNGA65 candidate. This selection will be ratified by the entire GA membership in a June 2010 vote. The decision was taken quietly on December 14 in a WEOG secret straw poll. Joseph Deiss, former President of the Swiss Confederation outpolled the Belgian candidate, Louis Michel, former FM and EU Commissioner, who ran as current chair of the European Parliament's inter-parliamentary association with parliamentarians from the ACP (developing world). Deiss is a consensus-builder and should preside efficiently, discreetly, and impartially. His performance as President of UNGA65 will be an indicator of how WEOG can reach out to the G-77.
22. (C) Also looking ahead to UNGA65, the EU (under its new, broader Lisbon Treaty mandate) will seek to become an enhanced observer. Subject to passage of an implementing resolution, the EU delegation (not the rotating EU Presidency nation) would speak early and authoritatively on all matters before any UNGA meeting, from committees to plenary. The EU member state permanent representatives are negotiating among themselves the language of such a resolution. Although they do not expect action on enhanced
USUN NEW Y 00001141 004 OF 004
observership until the second half of 2010, they are already previewing their request to the UN membership. They have reached out to key groups and nations, from China and India to the Rio Group. Such enhanced observer status for the EU regional grouping may generate counterproposals from others such as the AU or Caricom. The U.S. will need to monitor the dynamic of such negotiations and outcomes for their effect on U.S. equities and interests in future General Assemblies.
23. (U) Another election is scheduled at UNGA65, for the two WEOG rotating seats on the 2011-2012 UNSC. Three candidates are contending for the two seats: Canada, Germany, and Portugal.
24. (C) Comment: Despite initial concerns that European delegations would soon come to view new U.S. flexibility (which generally reinforces their own positions) as a natural state of affairs, they did not during the first months of UNGA64 "pocket" our flexibility and seek more. This dynamic is not yet played out, though, and so we should be prepared to counter any EU presumption that U.S. positions are necessarily crafted to align with EU preferences. When we do so align, we should seek EU reciprocity, either in terms of shifting an EU negotiating position or in terms of EU support in persuading G-77 members to back our common transatlantic positions.
25. (SBU) Recommendation: Since the EU concerts its UNGA65 positions by summer 2010, it is in our interest to begin early, energetic, and detailed consultations. One influential interface would be with key EU Permanent Representatives. This should allow us to work together to meet almost certain G-77 opposition to key elements of our policy, and to show transatlantic leadership at the UN. Such pre-consultations should allow us to influence EU consensus-building, before their positions crystallize. The bottom line is that the EU generally provides our core support, so we should engage the EU proactively and in detail.
RICE
Friday, 26 June 2009, 16:37
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 VATICAN 000078
SIPDIS
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
EO 12958 DECL: 6/26/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, VT
SUBJECT: HOLY SEE: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S JULY 10 VISIT
REF: A. A) VATICAN 72 B. B) VATICAN 63 C. C) VATICAN 59 D. D) VATICAN 52 E. E) VATICAN 38
VATICAN 00000078 001.2 OF 005
CLASSIFIED BY: Julieta Valls Noyes, CDA, EXEC, State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) Mr. President, it's an honor to welcome you and your family to the Vatican, the world's smallest sovereign state, and one with global clout.
Summary
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1. (C/NF) Holy See officials also are pleased you are visiting. Your meeting with Pope Benedict XVI will be an opportunity to discuss our shared commitments to overarching goals such as peace, justice, development, human dignity, and inter-faith understanding. From the Vatican's perspective, it will also provide a forum to discuss sensitive bioethical issues in a mutually respectful way. In your meeting with him, or possibly with other Vatican officials on the margins, you may cover other topics of special interest, such as the Middle East, Iraq, immigration, and the environment. Your discussions at the Holy See will help deepen our mutual collaboration on issues around the world. End Summary.
Context for Your Visit
----------------------
2. (C/NF) The Vatican is second only to the United States in the number of countries with which it enjoys diplomatic relations (188 and 177 respectively), and there are Catholic priests, nuns and lay people in every country on the planet. As a result, the Holy See is interested and well informed about developments all over the globe. This year marks the 25th anniversary of formal relations between the U.S. and Holy See. The Holy See is the global government of the Catholic Church, which it operates from Vatican City State, a sovereign territory of a quarter of a square mile.
3. (C/NF) The Holy See in many ways welcomed your election, as demonstrated by the Pope's immediate letter of congratulation. Vatican officials have been impressed by many of your initiatives, especially on foreign policy. The Vatican newspaper, the "Osservatore Romano," has welcomed your positions on the Israeli-Palestinian situation, outreach to Muslims, disarmament, Cuba and the environment. The Holy See has appreciated your multilateralism and focus on human rights, including your decisions to run for the Human Rights Council and close the Guantanamo detainee facility. Nevertheless, although it does not generally express them publicly, the Vatican also has profound concerns about your Administration's positions on abortion and embryonic stem cell research. The Vatican has allowed the American Catholic Church to take the lead in enunciating these concerns. This is a tactical decision, and should not be interpreted as a divergence of views between Rome and the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB). The Vatican trusts the USCCB, is proud of the work that Catholic organizations do in the U.S., and relies on the generosity of American Catholics to support the Vatican and Catholic causes worldwide. On balance, the Vatican regards your Presidency favorably and will seek to focus more on the areas of policy convergence between us than on the issues that divide us.
Pope Benedict XVI
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4. (C/NF) The Pope has had a rocky year, having confronted controversies about Catholic-Jewish relations and his views on AIDS prevention, and breakdowns in internal Vatican communications related to the controversies. At the same time, he also took crucial, successful trips to the Middle East and Africa. He is looking forward to meeting you. The Pope genuinely likes Americans and the United States, and enjoyed his visit there last year. He admires the U.S. model of secularism, where the church and state are separate but which he says "allows for professing belief in God and respects the public role of religion and churches." The Pope has made promotion of international religious freedom a central objective of his papacy, and appreciates U.S. support for this goal. As the spiritual leader of 1.3 billion Catholics worldwide and enjoying
VATICAN 00000078 002.2 OF 005
respect as well from non-Catholics, the Pope wields an unparalleled moral megaphone. He uses it carefully, speaking publicly in generic, neutral terms about the need for peace and social justice rather than criticizing individual states. Behind closed doors, he sometimes takes on specific issues more directly. In that context, a Vatican official had told us that the Pope probably will raise abortion, embryonic stem cell research, and social justice issues -- especially immigration -- with you.
Bioethical Issues
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5. (C/NF) The Catholic Church teaches that abortion is wrong. Vatican officials grudgingly accept that abortion is legal in the U.S., but oppose making it more widely available. Internationally, the Vatican would forcefully oppose USG advocacy of legalizing abortion elsewhere, financing foreign abortions, or making abortion an international "reproductive right." The Vatican would welcome an honest, respectful dialogue with the United States on abortion. Vatican officials followed your Notre Dame speech closely. While clearly not agreeing with everything you said, they were very pleased by your calls to reduce the number of women seeking abortions, make adoption more available, and provide support for pregnant women. They appreciated your commitment to "honor the conscience of those who disagree with abortion," and especially welcomed the call for a sensible conscience clause for health care workers.
6. (C/NF) The Vatican opposes embryonic stem cell research on the grounds that it leads to the destruction of human embryos. It has no objection to non-embryonic stem cell research. As new techniques now allow research with adult stem cells, the Vatican says the use of embryonic stem cells is not justified scientifically either.
Financial Crisis, the Poor, and Immigration
-------------------------------------------
7. (C/NF) The Vatican has been very vocal about protecting the world's most vulnerable people from harm caused by the global financial crisis. In a letter to UK PM Gordon Brown, for example, the Pope wrote, "Development aid, including the commercial and financial conditions favorable to less developed countries and the cancellation of the external debt of the poorest and most indebted countries, has not been the cause of the crisis and out of fundamental justice must not be its victim." The Vatican criticizes "consumerist" societies, strongly supports the UN Millennium Development Goals, and hopes all countries will redouble efforts to meet their MDG pledges. The Vatican has long supported freer migration between nations to permit the poor to begin new lives. The USCCB has made immigration reform a priority in the U.S., and the Pope will likely mention this in his discussions with you. The Pope is expected to issue the second "encyclical" (letter addressed to the whole world about pressing moral issues) of his papacy sometime during the week before your meeting. It will cover social justice concerns, and the Pope will likely mention it to you. (Embassy will forward a copy to the White House as soon as it is available.)
Food Security
-------------
8. (C/NF) Similarly, the Vatican is very worried about declining nutrition in the poorest countries. The Vatican has not taken a formal position on genetically modified (GM) crops -- some Church leaders oppose them because GM technology is mostly in the hands of multinational corporations, while others support their use as an element in a larger strategy to address world hunger. In his World Food Day message in October 2008, the Pope noted that the world can produce enough food to meet increasing needs, but said factors like speculation in foodstuffs, corrupt public officials, and growing investments in weapons prevented food from reaching the hungry. He called on world leaders to conclude negotiations to ensure food security, and to pursue relations "based on the reciprocal exchange of knowledge, values, rapid assistance and respect."
Environmental Issues
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--------------------
9. (C/NF) The Pope speaks frequently about the importance of caring for God's creation. Vatican City is the world's first carbon-neutral state, offsetting its emissions through use of renewable energy and a reforestation project. It has not, however, taken a position on carbon emissions trade. The Vatican is now using solar energy to power some facilities and is reducing its energy consumption overall, planning to be 20% energy self-sufficient by 2020. The Holy See is an active observer at the UN Environment Program, Food and Agriculture Organization and other international fora, and will participate in the December Copenhagen Conference also as an observer. The Pope has even joined with other religious leaders like Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to issue moral appeals to their faithful on humanity's responsibility to be good stewards of nature. The Vatican's environmental message is consistent: nature is a gift from God, so human beings have a responsibility to care for and not to abuse it.
Arms Reduction
--------------
10. (C/NF) The Vatican welcomed your call to eliminate nuclear weapons, and has long advocated arms reductions and non-proliferation. The Holy See was one of the initial signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008 - and ratified it the same day. (The Vatican of course has no such weapons itself and becomes party to such agreements to serve as a moral example.) The Pope has advocated the elimination of land mines, and the Holy See is a party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Speaking at the UN in May, the Vatican envoy reaffirmed the Vatican's support for nuclear non-proliferation and outlined five steps for nations to take to eliminate the nuclear weapons threat: adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, opening negotiations for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, ending reliance on nuclear arms as part of military policy among nuclear states, giving the International Atomic Energy Association oversight over peaceful use of nuclear energy and expanding it role to include non-proliferation, and developing a new international agreement on nuclear fuel.
Inter-faith Understanding
-------------------------
11. (C/NF) The Vatican praised your Cairo speech, especially the sections on religious freedom and diversity, the Israeli-Palestinian situation, and Iran. The Vatican itself has worked for decades on improving understanding with the Islamic world, including through a pontifical institute for the study of Arabic and Islam. It stepped up inter-faith discussions after the September 11 attacks, and then again following the negative Muslim reaction to a 2006 speech by the Pope that some argued demeaned Islam. Key dialogues are with: the "group of 138" - moderate Muslim scholars and clerics - supported by Jordan; Iranian clerics; Al-Azar University in Cairo, which co-hosted your speech; and Saudi authorities. The Vatican's primary objective for these talks is to promote religious freedom. The Holy See does not believe theological agreements with Islam are possible, but is convinced that better mutual knowledge will allay suspicions and facilitate peaceful co-existence, which they consider an even higher goal than simple "tolerance." Another Vatican goal is supporting pragmatic inter-faith cooperation on social welfare programs. The Vatican believes governments should ensure religious freedom, but not be directly involved in interreligious dialogue (which by its nature should be between religious leaders).
Middle East Peace Process
-------------------------
12. (C/NF) Peace in the "Holy Land" is one of the Vatican's top priorities, and was one of the central themes of the Pope's May visit to Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian territories. Despite criticism from some media and extremists, the trip was substantively successful. The Pope avoided any major mis-steps (always a difficult prospect for a Pontiff in visiting this area) and delivered the message that a two-state solution is the key to peace. He emphasized that the use of violence to achieve political objectives is morally unacceptable. He called for
VATICAN 00000078 004.2 OF 005
inter-faith dialogue and protection of Christian minorities. His messages largely mirror the U.S. approach to the region. This provides opportunities for further engagement with the U.S. in advancing peace initiatives there.
Iraq and Christians
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13. (C/NF) The Holy See publicly opposed U.S. intervention in Iraq. Once fighting began, however, the Vatican focus shifted to securing peace and justice, rebuilding the Iraqi economy, and protecting minority Christian communities. Holy See officials welcome your proposals for responsible withdrawal of U.S. troops, provided this does not create a security vacuum, particularly in Christian areas. The Vatican appreciates U.S. resettlement of the most vulnerable Iraqi victims of persecution -- including many Christians-- but seeks to avoid large-scale exodus of Christians from that country. (Regional bishops estimate as many as half of the region's 300-400,000 Chaldean Christians have left, and believe they will not return.) The Vatican was deeply concerned last fall that quotas set for Iraq's provincial elections system might reduce Christian representation in local governments, fueling further emigration. It took the unusual step of formally asking the USG to press the Iraqis to increase the quotas for Christians. Despite a boycott threat, Christians ultimately participated in the provincial elections. The future of the Christian communities in Iraq will remain high on the Vatican agenda before and after the U.S. military drawdown.
Africa
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14. (C/NF) The Pope travelled to Africa in March. He grabbed headlines with an interview he gave en route saying that the use of condoms contributed to the spread of AIDS. The Vatican later clarified the Pope's comments, saying that condoms are not always 100% effective and noting studies that show condom distribution increases promiscuity. Benedict XVI has called on world leaders to pay special attention to the needs of the Continent - where one in four people suffer from chronic hunger -- this year. In a letter to the German President, Pope Benedict wrote that the "support of the international community is needed...precisely because the current financial and economic crisis is particularly affecting Africa." The Pontiff has pledged the Church's continued assistance to the weakest sectors of Africa's population. (The UN estimates that Catholic charities provide 17% of health care in sub-Saharan Africa; the Church also runs schools, homes for the aged, re-integration centers for child soldiers and other programs there.) Bishops from Africa will gather in Rome in October for a month to discuss needs on the continent.
Cuba
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15. (C/NF) The Church is the only major institution in Cuba that is independent from the government. The Vatican hopes for a transition to democracy in Cuba, but is not at the forefront of that battle because it is more concerned about protecting its small space for operations in Cuba. The Vatican opposes the U.S. embargo, which it believes hurts poor Cubans disproportionately. It welcomed your decision to remove limits on family visitation and remittances. Vatican officials believe that exchanging the five Cuban spies imprisoned in the U.S. for political prisoners in Cuba is worth discussing, and have urged the U.S. to grant visas to the wives of the spies to allow them to visit.
Turkey EU Accession
-------------------
16. (C/NF) As Cardinal Ratzinger, the Pope had expressed uneasiness about the notion Turkish accession to the EU. The Holy See's position now is that as a non-EU member the Vatican has no role in promoting or vetoing Turkey's membership. The Vatican might prefer to see Turkey develop a special relationship short of membership with the EU, but Vatican Secretary of State (Prime Minister-equivalent) Bertone has stated that Turkey should become a member if it meets all the EU
VATICAN 00000078 005.2 OF 005
criteria - including full protection of human rights and religious freedoms.
Iran
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17. (C/NF) The Holy See is deeply concerned about the recent violence and ongoing human rights violations in Iran. It has been publicly silent to date on the current crisis, in part to preserve its ability to act as an intermediary if an international crisis emerges. (The Vatican helped secure the release of British sailors detained in Iranian waters in April 2007.) It is unclear how much clout the Vatican really has with Iran, however. NOYES
Thursday, 07 December 2006, 17:58
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VATICAN 000256
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/WE LARREA
EO 12958 DECL: 12/7/2016
TAGS SOCI, PHUM, TU, VT
SUBJECT: TURKEY: VATICAN BACKS INTEGRATION
REF: A. A: VATICAN 249
B. B: ANKARA 6593, ET AL.
VATICAN 00000256 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Peter Martin, Pol/Econ Chief, Vatican, State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
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Summary
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1. (C) While not officially endorsing Turkey's entry into the EU (ref a), the Holy See continues to support the dialogue and reform process connected to the issue. Top officials, including the pope, have spoken positively in public and private about European integration. Although they are critical of the religious freedom situation in Turkey, officials recognize that the EU entry process offers an opportunity to bring Turkey along on these matters. In his December 6 audience, the pope expressed emphasized his hope that Turkey would be a "bridge of friendship and of fraternal cooperation between the East and West." Post continues to engage on the issue, focusing on the opportunity presented by integration and EU entry to ameliorate the situation for Catholics and other Christians in Turkey. A high-level visit from the Department could be very helpful in highlighting the matter for the Holy See and eliciting further useful public and private comments. Please see paragraphs 5-6 for action request.
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"Positive" Process
----------------------
2. (C) Holy See Undersecretary for Relations with States (Deputy FM equivalent) Pietro Parolin told the Charge December 6 that the Holy See continues to support the "positive" process of dialogue and reform connected to Turkey's EU bid . (Recent public statements from other Holy See officials have borne a similar positive message on European integration.) The Vatican's position on Turkey's EU accession has not changed (ref a), despite inaccurate media reports following Pope Benedict's meeting with PM Erdogan . In fact, neither the pope nor the Vatican have endorsed Turkey's EU membership per se; rather, the Holy See has been consistently open to accession, emphasizing only that Turkey needs to fulfill the EU's Copenhagen criteria to take its place in Europe. If that occurs, Parolin reiterated, "we would see no obstacle" to Turkey's joining the EU -- a development which, he agreed, has the potential to promote greater rights for religious minorities in Turkey.
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Caveats
---------
3. (C) Parolin does have some concerns about the situation. One great fear is that Turkey could enter the EU without having made the necessary advances in religious freedom. He insisted that EU members - and the U.S. - continue to press the GoT on these issues. We noted that the continuing dialogue and process for EU entry provide just such a forum for this pressure, and cautioned that deadlines and ultimatums would be counterproductive -- robbing Turkey of a powerful incentive to enact needed reforms, and depriving the West of valuable leverage on the issue. Parolin took the point, but said that short of "open persecution", it couldn't get much worse for the Christian community in Turkey, where limited property rights and other factors have left Christians enjoying "freedom of belief, but hardly a full freedom of religion". Other Vatican officials expressed disappointment to us over President Sezer's veto of nine articles of the recently passed Foundations Law affecting religious minorities (ref b). Parolin noted that a list of particular problems -- outlined in a document put out by the Turkish Catholic bishops two years ago -- remains valid today as an explanation of the troubles Catholics face in Turkey.
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Pope Speaks Again
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4. (C) Parolin confirmed that the pope's trip to Turkey had been very positive for inter-religious relations. The "tense atmosphere" in Turkey preceding the visit may have eased somewhat. With regard to Erdogan's incorrect assertion that the pope had expressed his specific support for Turkey's EU membership, Parolin expressed certainty that the PM hadn't misunderstood the pontiff; but probably just wanted to get some good media coverage from the meeting. The pope expressed the "same position we have always had", though perhaps in a "nicer way". The general message from the Holy See on the issue, in any case, has been positive. At his weekly audience December 6, the pope expressed his hope for "joint Christian and Muslim action on behalf of human rights" and emphasized his hope that Turkey would be a "bridge of friendship and of fraternal cooperation between the East and West."
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Comment and Action Request
------------------------------------
5. (C) The Holy See will not officially endorse Turkey's EU entry, but positive comments from the pope and other officials in support of the dialogue and reforms that are part of integration and the entry process receive a lot of play in the European media. The pope's Regensburg speech , which made clear that he is not naove about the challenges presented by Islam, gives added heft to his favorable words on Turkey. Private comments from Vatican officials to European diplomats here also carry some weight - particularly in the traditionally Catholic countries. Our emphasis on using integration and EU entry as an opportunity to make life better for Christians in Turkey, will resonate with the Vatican, and could lead to more Holy See action, both public and private. Despite Parolin's insistence that those in favor of Turkey's EU entry must do more to push for reforms, he is on the same page with us on the overarching issue: in essence, both Turkey and Europe need to see diversity as a strength, not a threat.
6. (C) At this critical juncture we have an opportunity to catalyze a more active Holy See voice on Turkey. We hope a senior Department official such as A/S Fried or DAS Bryza can visit in the near future to highlight the matter for the Holy See and encourage them to do more to push a positive message on Turkey and integration. SANDROLINI
Monday, 02 April 2007, 11:30
S E C R E T IRAN RPO DUBAI 000018
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NEA/IR; LONDON FOR GAYLE; PARIS FOR WALLER; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD;
BAKU FOR HAUGEN
EO 12958 DECL: 4/2/2017
TAGS PGOV, ECON, MARR, IR
SUBJECT: IRAN ESCALATING TENSIONS TO DISTRACT FROM DOMESTIC WOES?
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office - Dubai, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (d)
1.(S) Summary. A long-time contact believes it is in the current Iranian government's interest to start a military skirmish with the West to allow the government to exert far greater control over civil society, distract attention from economic woes, and silence Expediency Council head Rafsanjani. He believed the government was using the stand-off with the UK over the detained British sailors for this purpose. He also claimed that the Iranian government was restricting the spectrum of political views within policymaking circles. Many sides seem increasingly nervous about the danger of an accident sparking escalation. End summary
2.(S) A long-time contactXXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that it is in the current Iranian government's interest to fuel a military confrontation with the West. A view shared by a number of IRPO interlocutors, he said that such a confrontation would allow the Iranian government to control civil society to the extent seen immediately following the 1979 revolution. A military row would also distract domestic focus away from current economic difficulties and unite the people, said the businessman. Furthermore, such a clash would silence criticism from Expediency Council head Rafsanjani.
3.(S) Along these lines, the contact saw the March 23 detention of the British sailors/marines as a deliberate attempt to push the West into greater conflict. He also believed the Iranians sought out British for this operation as a less risky stand-in for Americans, fearing a harsher reaction from the US.
4.(S) The contact also thought that breadth of viewpoints available to policymakers in Iran was constricting. For instance, he claimed that the type of political analyst who could understand the implication of an offer from Secretary Rice to sit at the negotiation table with Iranians has been sidelined in recent months. XXXXXXXXXXXX
5.(S) Comment. The idea that hardliners in Iran are seeking greater tensions to silence critics, unite the population, and divert attention away from economic and civil society concerns has been reported to IRPoffs by other contacts. While it is difficult to discern the truth of the claim, it certainly appears Iran is using its seizure of the British sailors to prove its "toughness," after facing repeated "humiliations" on the international political front. On the other hand, it is likely that Iranians thought targeting British rather than Americans would temper the reaction. In any case, many seem increasingly nervous that a blunder on any side could accidentally spark a quick military escalation.
BURNS
Wednesday, 18 April 2007, 06:05
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000023
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SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 4/18/2017
TAGS PGOV, PREL, IR
SUBJECT: REFORMIST MP ON POLITICAL STATE OF PLAY
RPO DUBAI 00000023 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office - Dubai, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (d)
1.(S) Summary: A reformist member of the Majles said the Supreme Leader favors Islamic regional interests over national interests and called the president a puppet of the leader. He claimed some radicals wanted war as an excuse to crack down on dissent and cover up their shortcomings. He acknowledged reformists' limited ability to impact policy but called the threats of impeachment a powerful tool. The long-term goal of the reformist coalition Mosharekat is to reform the constitution to eliminate or change the position of Supreme Leader to an elected, accountable position. He advised reducing what he called the negative tone of VOA's Farsi broadcasts and focus on supplying objective information to produce an informed electorate. End summary.
2.(S) On April 11, IRPOffs met with a member of the Majles XXXXXXXXXXXX. The MP shared his opinions about the state of internal politics in Iran and commented on international crises related to Iran. XXXXXXXXXXXX He claims ongoing communication with XXXXXXXXXXXX leaders, including former President Khatami.
Supreme Leader: Islamic interests over national
--------------------------------------------- --
3.(S) The MP believes that Supreme Leader Khamenei aspires to become the "emperor" of the Islamic world and is willing to sacrifice Iranian national interests for this goal. He sees President Ahmadi-Nejad as merely a puppet of the Supreme Leader, under the leader's complete control. Ahmadi-Nejad, in turn, sees more pragmatic conservatives such as Larijani and Qalibaf as his main rivals. The MP claimed the president is not worried about reformists.
4.(S) Speaking about Iran-US tensions, the MP opined that some conservatives in Iran want to go to war for the following reasons (Note: views shared by some other contacts. Endnote):
-- to crack down on reformists and further resist change; -- to appear strong and capable to the Iranian public, as defenders of the nation; -- to hide government failures.
Threats of impeachment: the reformist weapon of choice
--------------------------------------------- ---------
5.(S) The MP claimed that after the December 15 elections, hardliners attempted to take away the seat won in the Tehran Majles by-election by female reformist Soheila Jelodarzadeh. (Note: this is the first time IRPO has heard this claim. Endnote) The MP said that reformists united and threatened to impeach the interior minister, and Ms. Jelodarzadeh kept her seat.
6.(S) The MP mentioned other past efforts to impeach administration officials, including the president, noting they had failed to gather enough support. He said, however, if there is another UNSC resolution against Iran following UNSCR 1747, reform groups are determined to impeach Foreign Minister Mottaki, and ultimately President Ahmadi-Nejad. The MP indicated they were more likely to be able to gather the votes needed to impeach Mottaki than Ahmadi-Nejad, but he said they were determined to make an effort. The MP praised the passage of UNSC resolutions 1737 and 1747 as effective diplomacy and specifically praised the efforts and rhetoric of Under Secretary Burns.
7.(S) The MP said the Mosharekat reformist coalition has the eventual goal of changing the constitution to eliminate or change the position of the Supreme Leader to an elected office with accountability. He noted, however, that some reformists, such as former Majles speaker Karroubi, are opposed to amending the constitution. The MP claimed that Karroubi, former president Khatami, and even Expediency Council chair Rafsanjani cannot criticize the government as much as they might want to, because they would be marginalized.
IRGC
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8.(S) The MP said the Iranian press has reported very few details about the identities of the five Iranians detained by
RPO DUBAI 00000023 002.2 OF 002
the US in Irbil, which he saw as a strong indication the men are military, not diplomats as the Iranian government claims. Separately, he claimed that according to XXXXXXXXXXXX members of the IRGC do not necessarily support Ahmadi-Nejad. They must, however, follow the dictates of the Supreme Leader.
9.(S) The MP claimed the government is very concerned about the whereabouts of former deputy Defense Minister Ali Reza Asgari, who reportedly went missing in Turkey in February 2007. According to the MP, Asgari has the rank of IRGC commander and is a key IRGC insider with access to a great deal of sensitive information. As the government is uncertain whether he defected or was abducted, it does not know whether to attack him as a traitor and a liar or defend him as a captured hero.
The UK sailor crisis
--------------------
10.(S) Regarding the government's detention of 15 British sailors, the MP opined that the government had planned the incident as a diversion from UNSCR 1747, which was eliciting public criticism of the government's handling of the nuclear issue. Citing a widely repeated rumor that the UK has cQl and influence over the clerical government ("everybody knows the mullahs usually obey England"), the MP doubted that the sailor crisis would not have escalated beyond diplomacy, calling it simply a political stunt.
VOA broadcasts too anti-Iran?
-----------------------------
11.(S) The MP believed that the underlying theme of Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts was regime change for Iran in all but name, which he said undermines USG claims that its policy towards Iran is changed behavior, not regime change. He argued that predominantly negative coverage of Iran is counter-productive, alienating viewers. In order to educate the people and work toward the goal of democracy promotion in Iran, he recommended that the VOA report facts and objective information, with the goal of creating a better-informed Iranian public.
12.(C) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX is an outspoken XXXXXXXXXXXX . XXXXXXXXXXXX While it is doubtful he has much direct contact with members of government, his comments about the political state of play in Iran are valuable coming from inside the system. He acknowledges that the reformists in the Majles have little ability to directly effect policy changes but claims the threat of impeachment has weight. XXXXXXXXXXXX
13.(SBU) Comment continued: Although the MP did not specifically mention the recently aired VOA interview with Abdul-Malek Rigi, the leader of the violent Baluchi separatist group Jundallah with his criticisms of VOA programming, that interview in particular was widely condemned in Iran. Jundallah claimed responsibility for February terrorist attacks in Iran's southeastern Sistan-va-Baluchestan province that killed 11 and injured 31. The Foreign Ministry spokesman released a statement about the Rigi interview, saying "the aforementioned terrorist is under prosecution for drug smuggling, kidnapping, murder, and injuring some of our compatriots, so what VOA has done is in direction of double standards of the US government in fighting against terrorism." BURNS
Thursday, 29 March 2007, 06:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000112
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/29/2017
TAGS AORC, BX, EFIN, IAEA, IR, KNNP, MNUC, PARM, TRGY, UNSC
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO BRUNEI ON UNSCR 1747 AND IRAN SANCTIONS
REF: SECSTATE 37801
Classified By: Ambassador Emil Skodon, reasons 1.4(B) and (D)
1. (U) Ambassador delivered reftel points on March 29 to Datin Maimunah, Deputy Permanent Secretary for Bilateral and Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. MFAT Desk Officer for Middle East Latifah Zaini attended meeting as notetaker. Reftel talking points and text of UNSCR 1747 were left as non-papers.
2. (C) In response to demarche, Maimunah said the MFAT had already received text of UNSCR 1747 from its UN Mission and was aware of requirement for UN member states to implement its provisions. Maimunah told Ambassador that she and her MFAT colleagues had been discussing Iran's motivation for the recent seizure of British sailors, and she believed that it may have been done for domestic reasons, in order to help President Ahmadi-Nejad divert Iranian attention away from the bad news of passage of UNSCR 1747. That would indicate that Ahmadi-Nejad was starting to feel a bit of heat. Maimunah agreed with Ambassador's observation that Iranian opinion was not monolithic and there may be growing concern within Iran about the mounting costs of Ahmadi-Nejad's unwavering defiance of international opinion on the nuclear issue.
3. (C) Ambassador emphasized that Annex II of UNSCR 1747 renewed the P5-plus-one offer of a long-term agreement with Iran if it suspended its proliferation-related activities and returned to negotiations, and that this "carrot" should bolster the arguments of those within Iran who believed that the costs of noncompliance with the relevant UNSCR's was becoming unacceptable. Maimunah welcomed extension of the offer, noting it was important to show the Iranians there was a way out of the situation they had worked themselves into. Ambassador urged the Government of Brunei to point out the value of the P5-plus-one offer in its contacts with the Government of Iran and encourage its acceptance. SKODON
Wednesday, 04 April 2007, 09:22
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001157
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EO 12958 DECL: 04/01/2017
TAGS PGOV, PREL, SA, IR, SY, IZ
SUBJECT: TALABANI WELCOMES AMBASSADOR, DISCUSSES ARAB
SUMMIT, BAGHDAD SECURITY, DE-BA'ATH
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker per 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador met with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari March 31 to present his credentials. They discussed Talabani's trip to Riyadh for the Arab Summit and the side meetings he held with other Arab leaders, including a discussion on Kirkuk and the PKK with Turkish PM Erdogan. Talabani claimed that the Baghdad security initiative was going well and had successfully brought in the Sunnis. He also expressed his willingness to meet with resistance leaders. He said that the Presidency, PM, and SCIRI leader Hakim had approved the compromise draft de-Ba'athification law which he said had been forwarded to the Council of Representatives. Talabani has written a letter to Iran asking for the release of the British sailors but received no response. The President was mentally sharp and growing in strength, although by the end of the meeting he was showing signs of fatigue. END SUMMARY.
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Welcome
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2. (C) Talabani welcomed the Ambassador and expressed his conviction that he and Iraq and are real friends of the U.S. He said Iraq and the U.S. were partners in the fight for democracy and against dictatorship. He made apologies for not meeting the Ambassador the day before, blaming his staff of overprotecting him and failing to tell him of the request for a meeting. He said he is prepared to meet with the Ambassador at any time and invited him to a meal in the near future.
3. (C) The Ambassador told Talabani he was glad to be back in Iraq and praised Talabani's efforts to build a relationship with the U.S. He said he would do everything in his power to support democracy and prosperity in Iraq. He thanked Talabani for his help on a number of important issues, including de-Ba'athification and hydrocarbons. He said the U.S. is here to support Iraqi policy. The FM Zebari echoed this sentiment, saying that the Iraqi people need to understand that these are Iraqi goals.
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Arab Summit
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4. (C) Talabani said he "explained everything" in his speech to the Arab League. He spoke of the liberation of Iraq and how Coalition troops were welcomed by the Iraqi people in 2003, but lamented the passage of UN Resolution 1483. In response to King Abdullah's negative comments about the US's "illegal occupation" of Iraq, he thanked coalition forces and called for a resolution condemning terrorist activities. He told the League they cannot be divided, they must all be working for reconciliation. He said Iraq was proud to be independent and did not follow the dictates of countries to the east and north (alluding to Iran and Turkey). He claimed that the Iraqi Shia were independent from Iran and explained to the League that oil is a national asset shared by all Iraqis and difficulties in this area will be worked out.
5. (C) Talabani said in his side meeting with Amr Mousa, Secretary General of the Arab League, he criticized the
SIPDIS exclusion of crimes and terrorism taking place in Iraq in the Secretary General's report, to which Mousa responded that he
SIPDIS would add it. He said he also had private meetings with the kings of Jordan and Saudi Arabia and with Turkish PM Erdogan, whom he invited to send a delegation to Kirkuk to examine the situation and prove that Turkomen are not being treated poorly. He told Erdogan that Kirkuk is a cultural issue that cannot be decided by strong words from both sides. He expressed bemusement that Erdgoan still thought of him and KRG President Massoud Barzani as tribal chiefs. He told Erdogan that he and the KRG condemn any terrorist activity against Turkey, to which Erdogan responded positively. On the PKK issue he told Erdogan tat currently Iraq had to devote all its resources to securing Baghdad, but he said PKK activity is against the interests of the Kurdish people.
6. (C) He also spoke with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Riyadh and asked him why they had seen no results from their agreement to cooperate on security matters made when Talabani visited in January. He said Assad promised to begin cooperating.
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BSP and Sunni Participation
---------------------------
7. (C) According to Talabani, the Baghdad security initiative has been successfully implemented in a way that
BAGHDAD 00001157 002 OF 002
targets not just Sunni areas, but all parts of the city. He said even Iran was cooperating in some ways by directing the Sadrist Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia to cease targeting Sunnis. This will reduce sectarian tensions, he said. Iran had also stopped helping Thar-Allah, a Shia militia group in the south, according to Talabani.
8. (C) He said the situation was much better than a few months ago, referencing the PM's involvement of the Sunnis in the security plan. Talabani said he hoped that the Ambassador's arrival was another step forward in this regard.
9. (C) He said before his illness he had a discussion with the PM on steps to reach out to Sunni parties within the GOI. They agreed on the need for regular meetings between the Presidency and the PM, as well as regular PCNS meetings. He said the Presidency must also hold regular meetings to coordinate on the issues. He said it was vital for them to be on the same page in the fight against terrorism or at least to use the same language so that they do not send confusing messages to the press and public.
---------------------------------
Reconciliation/De-Ba'athification
---------------------------------
10. (C) Talabani said they are continuing their efforts for national reconciliation and told the Ambassador that the people are forming groups to fight terrorism and cooperating with government forces against the terrorists. He said he has been contacted by members of the national resistance movement and reported that before traveling to Riyadh he met with the UK Ambassador to Iraq and the ranking UK General in Iraq and discussed meeting with members of the resistance.
11. (C) The Ambassador thanked Talabani for his critical role in reconciliation efforts and inquired on the status of the draft de-Ba'athification law. Talabani told him that it had been sent to the Council of Representatives (CoR) for debate and approval (Note: according to Embassy contacts at the CoR they have not yet received it and it is with the Council of Ministers. End Note). Talabani said that the PM had signed the draft law for the government and he had signed in the name of the Presidency because the two Vice-Presidents were out of the country but had given him their approval. He said he announced the law at the Arab Summit where it was received with approval. He also discussed the draft law with SCIRI leader Abdelaziz al-Hakim and Hummam Hammudi, SCIRI CoR member and Foreign Relations Committee Chair, who were with him at the Summit as "houseguests" and who he claimed both approved it.
-----------------
British Detainees
-----------------
12. (C) Talabani said he wrote a letter to the president of Iran which called for the release of the British sailors. In it, he told the Iranians that the Shat al-Arab is important and the Brits were trying to prevent smuggling. He dispatched an envoy to deliver the letter but the envoy returned empty-handed - the Iranians want an apology from the United Kingdom. Talabani added that the Iranians were concerned about his health, joking that the one thing that the US and Iran have in common is concern for "the health of Talabani."
13. (C) Comment: Talabani appeared tired and seemed to have more difficulty than usual speaking English. His staff, probably concerned for his health, had refused to schedule any meetings for March 30. CROCKER
Wednesday, 11 April 2007, 05:50
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000336
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/05/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, MCAP, BA, BILAT, REGION, OFFICIALS
SUBJECT: MARINE CORPS COMMANDANT DISCUSSES IRAQ, IRAN WITH
CROWN PRINCE
Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) .
-------
Summary
-------
1. (C) Crown Prince Shaikh Salman Al Khalifa told visiting Marine Corps Commandant General Conway April 5 that the "tide needs to be turned" in Iraq, and the Iraqi security forces need to find those perpetrating the violence to stop them. He advised coalition troop level reductions in urban areas and movements to outlying areas as soon as possible, with the exception of Baghdad, to force Iraqi forces to step up and handle the security situation. He admitted violence might rise for several months but would then settle down. The CP advocated for Iraq a strong civilian government backed by the military, similar to Turkey. Regarding Iran, Shaikh Salman expressed concern about Iran's continued support for extremist groups around the world, including attempts to build networks in Bahrain, which Bahraini security works to disrupt. Commenting on the release of the 15 British sailors, the CP said that Iran had benefited disproportionately in terms of public relations over the incident. Recently back from a trip to Singapore, the CP said that officials there are concerned about the Islamic threat and youth in the community who might cause trouble. End summary.
--------------------------
Tide Needs Turning in Iraq
--------------------------
2. (C) On an April 5 visit, Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Conway met with Crown Prince Shaikh Salman Bin Hamad Al Khalifa, who said that he had been watching the situation in Iraq closely, especially the activities of Commander of the Multinational Force in Iraq General David Petraeus. He commended General Petraeus for his clear commitment to the mission in Iraq, including his "Marhaba, shabab" (Hello, youth) statement. The "tide needs to be turned," the CP said, and security forces need to find those responsible for the violence and stop them. General Conway said that there has been incremental progress, including with some Sunni tribes in Anbar province, some of whom are turning away from Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI) because of its brutal tactics and abuse of some Sunni tribal leaders.
3. (C) Regarding U.S. troop levels in Iraq, the CP advised reducing troop levels as soon as possible in urban areas, with the exception of Baghdad, and moving the troops to outlying areas. He stressed the importance of keeping the borders secure, but counseled to let Iraqis begin to sort out the security situation. Admittedly there will be a rise in violence between people who want to "settle scores," but after six months the situation will calm down. The Iraqi military needs to take over more responsibility, and it will grow to fill its role. Similarly Iraqi leaders need to increase their initiative and leadership over its people, demonstrating a sense of common purpose. When asked by General Conway whether he had expressed these ideas to U.S. Defense Secretary Gates, the CP said that he had and that Secretary Gates had listened carefully. The CP said that he
SIPDIS had experienced difficulty previously trying to convince U.S. policy-makers who still believed Iraq could be a model of democracy in the region, but Secretary Gates had not dismissed his ideas. Shaikh Salman said, "Iraq will not be a model of democracy, at least not in the next 10-15 years."
4. (C) The CP said that Iraq needs a strong federal government with 18 provinces. Splitting the country into three areas by sects is the wrong thing to do, because the country will eventually fall apart. He said Iraq needs a strong civilian government backed by the military, referring to Turkey as a model. He also said that total de-Baathification was the wrong approach, but that there needed to be efforts to root out militia members from the security forces. Shaikh Salman stated that Prime Minister Al Maliki may not be the right leader for the job in the long run, "but he is the guy for now. It was unrealistic to expect that merely a single election cycle could take Iraq from Saddam to stability." The CP offered Bahrain's support in any way it could assist.
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Concern About Iran
------------------
5. (C) Shaikh Salman expressed his concern about domestic
MANAMA 00000336 002 OF 002
problems in Iran, including the poor state of the economy, which increases desperation, and the corresponding danger, of the Iranian government. He said he was worried about a nuclear-armed Iran, as it would likely spark a nuclear arms race in the Gulf. The CP focused on Iran's consistent activity around the world spreading violence and unrest, including Iran's support of Hizbullah, Hamas, militias in Iraq, and extremists in Indonesia. Iran is also trying to build networks in Bahrain, so the Bahraini security services are working diligently to contain and disrupt their activities. Iran's policies to spread the revolution have nothing to do with being Shia, but everything to do with its Persian identity. The Iranians want to project their Persian identity across the entire Gulf. The CP noted that coverage of the release of the 15 British sailors and marines showed messages about the "Persian Gulf" prominently placed on signs in the background.
6. (C) The CP wondered aloud how the 15 British allowed themselves to be caught and why the British decided against immediate action. He surmised that they must have been too far from their support ship. General Conway added that the British seek to de-escalate tension in such incidents. The CP quipped that sometimes there is a need for quick, strong escalation (to send a message). He commented that Iran has benefited disproportionately from the incident in terms of public relations. The CP also said that he assumed the release of Jalal Sharafi, the Iranian official who had been abducted in Iraq, was connected to the release of the British sailors, mentioning that Iran has always used hostage-taking to their benefit.
--------------------
Success in Singapore
--------------------
7. (C) When asked by the Ambassador about his recent trip to Singapore, the CP said that it was a productive visit. Bahrain is in a similar position in terms of development and economic growth that Singapore was in 20 years ago. Even though Singapore is not close to the Middle East, the CP said that officials he talked with were concerned about the Islamic threat. Singaporeans live with Muslims, and officials fear the ways extremist messages affect their youth. He had been told there are approximately 2,000 hardened, completely convinced "psychopaths," who have the potential to cause serious problems in Singapore. The CP said these extremists need to be handled like a cult and stopped at their source. He said that extremist groups often cut off their recruits from their families and friends to break their support network. Consequently, officials in Singapore encourage parents and other family members to be heavily involved in their youths' lives to be more in touch with their activities and prevent their mixing with extremists.
********************************************* ******** Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/ ********************************************* ******** MONROE
Wednesday, 11 April 2007, 12:57
C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000359
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/11/2017
TAGS PREL, IR, MU
SUBJECT: BRITISH AMBASSADOR LAUDS OMANI ROLE IN IRAN'S
RELEASE OF CAPTIVE SAILORS
Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)
1. (C) During a May 11 meeting with the Ambassador, British Ambassador Noel Guckian expressed great satisfaction with Oman's efforts to facilitate the release of the 15 members of the British Royal Navy seized by Iranian forces on March 23. Guckian stated that he had been in near daily contact with Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yousef bin Alawi during the crisis, and that bin Alawi had been "very supportive." According to Guckian, bin Alawi called Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, "a number of times" to urge the immediate release of the captive sailors.
2. (C) Guckian also confirmed that he received a phone call from bin Alawi on April 4 in the early afternoon informing him that Iranian President Ahmadinejad would shortly be making a public announcement which would be "very favorable." Bin Alawi had apparently just received the news himself from Larijani. (Note: Guckian was at the Ambassador's residence for a business lunch when bin Alawi called him. End note.)
3. (C) The UK Ambassador reiterated that the Omanis had been very supportive throughout the crisis and even credited them in some part for the successful outcome. It was an occasion, he concluded, when Oman's "positive but non-substantive" relationship with Tehran actually proved useful to the Omanis and an important Omani ally. GRAPPO
Monday, 30 November 2009, 17:19
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 VATICAN 000123
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/30/2034
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KIRF, SOCI, UK, VT
SUBJECT: AMIDST CONTROVERSY, ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY MEETS POPE
REF: VATICAN 113
VATICAN 00000123 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Rafael Foley, Pol Chief. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (S) Summary: During his recent visit to Rome and meeting with the Pope --planned before the Pope urged disaffected Anglicans to convert to Catholicism-- Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams challenged the position of the Catholic Church on ordination of women and made it clear that the Vatican should have consulted with him before reaching out to the Anglican community. Although Williams' visit to Rome was cast as positive and reinforcing of ecumenical dialogue, it's clear the wounds from this controversy will affect that dialogue negatively (at least for now) and are likely to cast a pall over the Pope's planned state visit to England in 2010. End summary
Official and Public Statements Focus on Positive
--------------------------------------------- ---
2. (SBU) The Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, met with Pope Benedict XVI on November 21. The meeting was planned before the Vatican released its new apostolic constitution that facilitates the conversion of Anglicans to Catholicism. Described as "cordial" by Vatican officials in an official statement, the Holy See said "The discussions also focused on recent events affecting relations between the Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion, reiterating the shared will to continue and to consolidate the ecumenical relationship between Catholics and Anglicans." Notwithstanding this upbeat Vatican characterization of the meeting, Williams used it to draw clear lines between Anglican and Catholic core beliefs. He presented the Pope with a copy of a lecture he delivered in Rome on November 19, in which he challenged the Vatican's position on the ordination of women, the authority of the papacy, and the role and relation of local churches to a centralized governing structure.
3. (U) Speaking with Vatican Radio shortly after the meeting, Williams stressed his prior good relations with the Pope and downplayed the importance of the Vatican's new procedure for receiving Anglicans into the Catholic Church. However, he did express misgivings about how the new procedure was announced. In order to prevent negative fall-out during the Pope's planned 2010 state visit to England, Williams recommended in the interview that the Pope tread carefully while in England when discussing the late Cardinal Henry Newman (1801-1890). (Note: Newman, a convert from Anglicanism to Catholicism, may be recognized as a "blessed" model for Catholics -- beatified -- during the Pope's visit.) Williams said he had asked the Pope to speak about Newman as a great British intellectual, and not just as a convert.
~But Private Discussions Reveal a Deeper Rift
---------------------------------------------
4. (S) Archbishop Williams was the guest of honor at a dinner on Nov. 20 hosted by the British Ambassador to the Holy See, Francis Campbell, for senior Vatican officials. Campbell told the Ambassador that the tone of the conversation was respectful but at times awkward. Campbell (protect) believes the Vatican's move shifted the goal of the Catholic-Anglican ecumenical dialogue from true unity to mere cooperation. He further noted that some Vatican officials themselves believe that Williams should have been consulted --instead of simply told-- about the apostolic constitution. (Comment: Campbell was probably referring to Cardinal Kasper, who runs the Council for Christian Unity. End Comment)
5. (S) In a subsequent conversation with DCM after Williams' departure, Campbell (strictly protect) said Anglican-Vatican relations were facing their worst crisis in 150 years as a result of the Pope's decision. The Vatican decision seems to have been aimed primarily at Anglicans in the U.S. and Australia, with little thought given to how it would affect the center of Anglicanism, England, or the Archbishop of Canterbury. Benedict XVI, Campbell said, had put Williams in an impossible situation. If Williams reacted more forcefully, he would destroy decades of work on ecumenical dialogue; by not reacting
VATICAN 00000123 002.2 OF 002
more harshly, he has lost support among angry Anglicans. The crisis is also worrisome for England's small, mostly Irish-origin, Catholic minority, Campbell said. There is still latent anti-Catholicism in some parts of England and it may not take much to set it off. The outcome could be discrimination or in isolated cases, even violence, against this minority. As for the Pope's visit next year to England, Campbell said he now expected a chilly reception, especially from the Royal family - which was not a great supporter of ecumenical dialogue even before the crisis.
Comment
-------
6. (S) Williams' previously planned meeting with the Pope unquestionably came at an awkward time, but was also important that it happen in order to start healing the damage caused by the Vatican's outreach to Anglicans. The visit also gave Williams an opportunity to recover some lost stature by challenging the Catholic Church during his visit. As reported previously (reftel), the Vatican decision to go after disaffected Anglicans undercut Cardinal Kasper, and it now seems the decision may cast a pall on the Pope's visit to England next year. In the end, some may wonder whether the damage to inter-Christian relations was worth it - especially since the number of disaffected Anglicans that will convert is likely to be a trickle rather than a wave. End comment. DIAZ
Friday, 26 February 2010, 16:32
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 VATICAN 000033
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 2/26/2035
TAGS PREL, PHUM, SOCI, KIRF, VT, EI
SUBJECT: SEX ABUSE SCANDAL STRAINS IRISH-VATICAN RELATIONS, SHAKES UP
IRISH CHURCH, AND POSES CHALLENGES FOR THE HOLY SEE
VATICAN 00000033 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Julieta Valls Noyes, DCM, EXEC, State. REASON: 1.4 (b) 1. (C) Summary: The November 2009 report of cover-up by local bishops of revelations of physical and sexual abuse of children by Irish clergy appalled Catholics and others worldwide. Vatican and Irish officials' first concern was for the victims, but that reality was sometimes obscured in the events that followed which also cast a chill on Irish-Vatican relations. The Vatican believes the Irish government failed to respect and protect Vatican sovereignty during the investigations. Much of the Irish public views the Vatican protests as pettily procedural and failing to confront the real issue of horrific abuse and cover-up by Church officials. The resulting profound crisis in the Irish Church, meanwhile, required intervention by Pope Benedict, who met with Irish Church leaders in December 2009 and in February 2010 to discuss next steps. Although the Pope will address a pastoral letter on the situation to Irish Catholics in the next few weeks, both the Vatican and the local Catholic Church agree that further follow-up should be handled domestically in Ireland. The Vatican's relatively swift response to this crisis showed it learned key lessons from the U.S. sex abuse scandals in 2002 but still left some Catholics - in Ireland and beyond -- feeling disaffected. The crisis will play out for years inside Ireland, where future revelations are expected, even as new clerical sex abuse allegations are being made in Germany. End Summary.
Origin of a Scandal: Horrific and Endemic
------------------------------------------
2. (U) The Irish scandal broke in the 1990s, following a series of criminal cases and Irish government enquiries that established that hundreds of lay persons and priests had abused thousands of children in Ireland for decades. In 1999, Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern announced a program to respond to the abuse, including a compensation scheme into which the government and various religious orders made contributions. In announcing this program, Ahern was the first Irish official to apologize to the victims. He also launched a study into abuse at Irish institutions run by religious orders but overseen and funded by Ireland's Department of Education. After nine years of investigation, the Ryan Commission issued a report in May 2009 that detailed horrific abuses, including 325 alleged cases of abuse by priests, and concluded they were "endemic." With the crisis unfolding, Irish Catholics and Irish investigators turned to Rome for additional answers.
Political Reaction: Inquiries Offend Vatican and Irish Public
--------------------------------------------- ----------------
3. (SBU) After release of the Ryan report, the Irish Government ordered an investigation of the Ryan Commission's allegations against priests in the Archdiocese of Dublin, to be conducted by the independent Murphy Commission. Sidestepping diplomatic channels, the Murphy Commission sent a letter requesting further information to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF), which follows issues relating to clerical misconduct and crimes. The Commission also asked the Vatican Nuncio in Ireland to answer questions. (Judge Murphy argued that the body did not have to follow normal inter-state procedures in making its requests because the independent commission was not part of the Irish government.)
4. (S/NF) While Vatican contacts immediately expressed deep sympathy for the victims and insisted that the first priority was preventing a recurrence, they also were angered by how the situation played out politically. The Murphy Commission's requests offended many in the Vatican, the Holy See's Assessor Peter Wells (protect strictly) told DCM, because they saw them as an affront to Vatican sovereignty. Vatican officials were also angered that the Government of Ireland did not step in to direct the Murphy Commission to follow standard procedures in communications with Vatican City. Adding insult to injury, Vatican officials also believed some Irish opposition politicians were making political hay with the situation by calling publicly on the government to demand that the Vatican reply. Ultimately, Vatican Secretary of State (Prime Minister equivalent) Bertone wrote to the Irish Embassy that requests related to the investigation must come through diplomatic channels via letters rogatory.
5. (S/NF) The Irish Embassy to the Holy See offered to facilitate better communications between the Irish commission and the Holy See, but neither party took any further action. Irish Ambassador Noel Fahey (formerly ambassador to Washington) told DCM this was the most difficult crisis he had ever managed. The Irish government wanted to be seen as cooperating with the investigation because its Education Department was implicated, but did not want to insist that the Vatican answer the requests because they had come outside of regular channels. In the end, the Irish government decided not to press the Vatican to reply, according to Fahey's Deputy, Helena Keleher. Moreover, Keleher
VATICAN 00000033 002.2 OF 003
told Polchief the CDF probably did not have much to add to the inquiry. Regarding the request for the Nuncio to testify, Keleher said the GOI understood that foreign ambassadors are not required or expected to appear before national commissions. Nevertheless, Keleher thought the Nuncio in Ireland made things worse by simply ignoring the requests.
6. (C) The resentment caused by the Murphy Commission tactics - and failure of the Government of Ireland to temper them -- now has worn off a little in Rome. This is in part because the legal and diplomatic questions posed by the Commission's demands are now moot since the Murphy Commission released its report in November 2009. It substantiated many of the claims and also concluded that some bishops tried to cover up the abuses, putting the interests of the Church ahead of those of the victims.
7. (C) The Irish people's anger, however, has not worn off. The refusal of the Holy See to respond to the Murphy Commission questions caused a furor of public disbelief in Ireland when it became known. Foreign Minister Martin was forced to call in the Papal Nuncio to discuss the situation. The Irish public was not mollified. Resentment toward the Church in Rome remains very high, particularly because of the institutionalized cover-up of abuse by the Catholic Church hierarchy. In the wake of the scandal, four of the five bishops named in the Murphy Report have resigned; the fifth has refused to quit. Archbishop Martin's Christmas Eve Midnight Mass announcement of the resignation of two of the five key bishops named in the Murphy report was met be thunderous applause, which he had a hard time quieting.
Pastoral Reaction: Meetings with Clerics and Messages to Catholics
--------------------------------------------- --------------
--------
8. (C) Meanwhile, the normally cautious Vatican moved with uncharacteristic speed to address the internal Church crisis. The Pope convoked a meeting with senior Irish clerical leaders on December 11, 2009. Irish Cardinal Sean Brady and Archbishop of Dublin Diarmuid Martin came to Rome and met with the Pontiff, who was flanked by Cardinal Bertone (the Vatican Prime Minster equivalent), and four other Cardinals whose duties include oversight over some aspect of the Irish situation. At the end of the meeting, the Vatican issued a statement saying that the Pope shared the "outrage, betrayal, and shame" of Irish Catholics over the deliberations, that he was praying for the victims, and that the Church would take steps to prevent recurrences. Archbishop Martin told reporters afterwards that he expected a major shake-up of the Church in Ireland.
9. (SBU) The Vatican's next move was to call a broader, two-day meeting with Irish bishops, February 15-16, to discuss the crisis. There, the Pope urged the bishops to address the sexual abuse with resolve and courage, to prevent any recurrences, and to bring healing to the victims. Meeting participants examined and discussed a draft of the "Pastoral Letter of the Holy Father to the Catholics of Ireland" that the Pope will issue by the end of March. A later Vatican statement said the abuses in Ireland were a "heinous crime and also a grave sin."
10. (U) At a press conference on February 16, Vatican spokesman Lombardi said the meeting was aimed at dialogue and direction-setting, and was not intended to produce specific policy decisions. The statement quoted the bishops' assurances that "significant measures have now been taken to ensure the safety of children and young people." The full text is available at http://212.77.1.245/news services/bulletin/news/25154.php?index=25154& po date=16.02.2010&lang=en
Public Reaction: Vatican Response Helps, but More Needed
--------------------------------------------- -----------
11. (C/NF) Judging by media commentary, many non-Irish Catholics felt the Vatican's response to the crisis was a good start but more was needed. Irish Deputy Head of Mission Keleher told polchief on February 18 that she sympathized with victims' groups' criticism of the Vatican statement, because it was not more focused on the pain caused to the victims. Victims' associations also have complained that the Pope did not issue an apology for the abuses and that he did not order the removal of the remaining bishop accused of the cover-up. (Archbishop Martin's comments in December apparently had convinced many that the Vatican would remove the errant bishops if they did not quit.)
Comment: Some Lessons Learned, but Crisis Will Play Out for Years
--------------------------------------------- --------------------
VATICAN 00000033 003.2 OF 003
12. (C) In keeping with the Catholic practice of making local bishops ultimately responsible for the management of their dioceses, we expect that the locus of the crisis and measures to address it will remain largely with the Catholic Church in Ireland. One exception will be on decisions of whether to accept or reject resignation offers from the implicated bishops -- or the removal of the bishop who refused to offer his resignation -- which rest with the Pope. The other big exception will be the Pope's pastoral letter to Irish Catholics, in which the Vatican may address concerns and criticisms about statements and actions undertaken to date. After this, though, the Vatican will return to the background - while keeping an eye on the Irish bishops and continuing to urge them to speak with one voice. Our contacts at the Vatican and in Ireland expect the crisis in the Irish Catholic Church to be protracted over several years, as only allegations from the Dublin Archdiocese have been investigated to date. Investigations of allegations from other Archdioceses will lead, officials in both states lament, to additional painful revelations.
13. (C) In Ireland, these abuse scandals occurred at the end of a long period of increasing secularization of society - and may further reduce the influence of the Catholic Church. Indeed, the great vehemence of the Irish reaction to this crisis reflects how far the Catholic Church in Ireland has fallen. Once ensconced in the Irish Constitution, the Irish Catholic Church reached the height of its prestige and power with the 1979 visit of Pope John Paul II but it has been falling ever since. At the same time, the Murphy Report reflects Irish shame over the collaboration of Ireland's state bodies, including its schools, courts and police, in the appalling abuses and cover-up that occurred for decades.
14. (S) Vatican analysts, meanwhile, agree that the Holy See's handling of the Irish scandal shows the Vatican learned some important lessons from the U.S. sex abuse scandal of 2002. By acting quickly to express horror at allegations, to label the alleged acts both crimes and sins, and to call in the local leaders to discuss how to prevent recurrences, the Vatican limited - but certainly did not eliminate - the damage caused to the Church's standing in Ireland and worldwide. Unfortunately, given the growing abuse scandal in Germany, it may need to deploy those lessons again before long. End Comment.
15. (U) Embassy Dublin contributed to and cleared this cable. DIAZ
Friday, 20 February 2009, 16:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L VATICAN 000028
EO 12958 DECL: 2/20/2029
TAGS PREL, ECPS, PHUM, PGOV, KPAO, KIRF, VT
SUBJECT: THE HOLY SEE: A FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE
REF: VATICAN 25 AND PREVIOUS (NOTAL)
CLASSIFIED BY: Julieta Valls Noyes, CDA, EXEC, State. REASON: 1.4 (b)
1. (C) Summary: Together with other flaps, the recent global controversy over the lifted excommunication of a Holocaust denying bishop (reftel) exposed a major disconnect between Pope Benedict XVI's stated intentions and the way in which his message is received by the wider world. There are many causes for this communication gap: the challenge of governing a hierarchical yet decentralized organization, leadership weaknesses at the top, and an undervaluing of (and ignorance about) 21st century communications. These factors have led to muddled, reactive messaging that reduces the volume of the moral megaphone the Vatican uses to advance its objectives. This is especially true with audiences whose view of the Vatican is informed largely by mass media coverage. There are signs that at least some in the Vatican have learned their lessons and will work to reshape the Holy See's communications structure. Whether they'll prevail remains to be seen. End Summary.
A CENTRALIZED HIERARCHY MAKING DECENTRALIZED DECISIONS
--------------------------------------------- ---------
2. (SBU) The Vatican is highly hierarchical with the Pope ultimately responsible for all important matters. Yet it is also highly decentralized in its decision-making. This structure reflects belief in the principle of "subsidiarity": leaving decisions to those closest to, and best informed on, a particular matter. On a practical level, however, subsidiarity can limit horizontal communication by eliminating peer consultation and review. This approach also encourages a narrow focus on issues at the expense of the big picture.
3. (C) In discussing the recent crisis with CDA and PAO, Archbishop Claudio Celli, President of the Pontifical Council for Social Communications, described the Church's current communication style as being focused on the content of a decision, rather than its public impact. Monsignor Paul Tighe, his second in command, noted that this phenomenon is compounded by the fact that officials from the various Church organs see themselves as advocates for their issues, without considering their impact on the Church as a whole. The result is a process in which only a handful of experts are aware of imminent decisions -- even major decisions with broad implications -- and those who are become proponents, rather than impartial advisors to the Pope.
4. (C) A series of missteps during Benedict's Papacy have made the lack of information-sharing in the Church painfully clear. In 2006, the Pope made a speech in Regensburg that was widely decried as insulting to Muslims, though he later explained he had no such intent. In 2008, the Pope himself baptized (i.e., converted)a prominent Muslim during the 2008 Easter Vigil service at St. Peters, an event broadcast worldwide; the Cardinal who runs Inter-Faith Dialogues for the Church knew nothing about the conversion until it happened. This year, Father Federico Lombardi, head of the Vatican press office, and Cardinal Walter Kasper, President of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, which includes relations with Jews, learned only after the fact about the decision to reinstate communion with schismatic Lefebrvist bishops who included a Holocaust denier (reftel). In the midst of that scandal, meanwhile, the Pope proposed promoting to auxiliary bishop a priest who said Hurricane Katrina was "divine retribution" for licentiousness in New Orleans. The resulting outcry led the cleric to decline the offer.
A TIN EAR AT THE TOP
--------------------
5. (C) These public missteps have intensified scrutiny of the small group of decision-makers advising the Pope. Normally reserved Vatican commentators have directed withering criticism their way. XXXXXXXXXXXX, recently wrote that "curial chaos, confusion, and incompetence" had made clear "how dysfunctional the curia remains in terms of both crisis analysis and crisis management." Secretary of State Tarcisio Bertone -- who is tasked with managing the Curia and is its highest ranking official after the Pope -- has been a particular target. XXXXXXXXXXXX said Cardinal Bertone had "distinguished himself by his absence" during the Lefebrvist controversy, and that the curia had become "more disorganized than before" under his leadership. Yet XXXXXXXXXXXX may have understated the problem. At the height of the Lefebrvist scandal, Bertone referred publicly to the offending bishop by the wrong name, then denounced the media for "inventing" a problem where there was none. Other critics note Bertone's lack of diplomatic experience (he speaks only Italian, for example), and a personal style that elevates "pastoral" work -- with frequent foreign travel focusing on the spiritual needs of Catholics around the world -- over foreign policy and management.
6. (C) More broadly, critics point to a lack of generational or geographical diversity in the Pope's inner circle. Most of the top ranks of the Vatican -- all men, generally in their seventies -- do not understand modern media and new information technologies. The blackberry-using Father Lombardi remains an anomaly in a culture in which many officials do not even have official email accounts. XXXXXXXXXXXX laid even greater emphasis on the Italo-centric nature of the Pope's closest advisors. Other than Archbishop James Harvey, an American and head of the Papal household, there is no one from an Anglophone country in the Pope's inner circle. XXXXXXXXXXXX said this meant few had exposure to the American -- or, indeed, global -- rough and tumble of media communications. The Pope's Italian advisors, he said, tend towards old-fashioned, inwardly focused communications written in "coded" language that no-one outside their tight circles can decipher. (The Israeli Ambassador, for example, told CDA that he recently received a Vatican statement that was supposed to contain a positive message for Israel, but it was so veiled he missed it, even when told it was there.)
7. (C) There is also the question of who, if anyone, brings dissenting views to the Pope's attention. As noted, Cardinal Bertone is considered a "yes man," and other Cardinals don't hold much sway with the Pope -- or lack the confidence to bring him bad news. And if bad news rarely filters out, leaks never spring. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that under Pope John Paul II leaks were much more common. While damaging, these leaks did allow time for critics of pending decisions to mobilize and present opposing views to the Pope in time. Pope Benedict and Cardinal Bertone run a much tighter ship, he said, but at the expense of squashing coordination or allow dissenting voices to be heard.
NOT SPIN CITY
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8. (C) As has become evident throughout the controversies, much of the Vatican hierarchy greatly undervalues external communication. Structurally, the Pontifical Council for Social Communications and the Vatican Press Office are weak. The former applies the Church's teachings to the field of communications and is not involved in shaping the Pope's message. The latter has the writ, but not the influence.
9. (C) Father Lombardi, the spokesman, is not part of the Pope's inner circle. He has little influence over major decisions, even when he knows about them beforehand. And the poor man is terribly overworked: Lombardi is simultaneously the head of the Vatican Press Office, Vatican Radio (which broadcasts in 45 languages), and the Vatican Television Center, literally moving from one office to the other over the course of the day. It's a grueling schedule on good days, and debilitating during crises. Father Lombardi is the deliverer, rather than a shaper, of the message. In the wake of the Lefebrvist controversy, he openly said that the Vatican press office "didn't control the communication." Without a comprehensive communication strategy in which he plays a central role, he is dependent on individual Church organs and leaders seeking his advice. It's a hit or miss proposition.
10. (C) There is another cost to divorcing decision-making from public spin: the Church's message is often unclear. XXXXXXXXXXXX candidly said that the Holy See rarely considered how best to explain dogmatic, ecclesiastical, moral or other decisions to a broader public. He emphasized that the content of the message should not/not be different -- the Catholic Church would often take positions contrary to public opinion -- but the Church hierarchy needed to think more about how to present positions.
CRACKING THE REAL DA VINCI CODE?
--------------------------------
11. (C) The communication culture of the broader Catholic Church is diverse, however, with many Church-affiliated organizations now excelling at communication. One example of a Church organization that is using modern communications strategies to deliver its message, interestingly enough, is Opus Dei. (Pope John Paul II was widely perceived as being more adept at public communications than Benedict; his communications director, Joaquin Navarro Valls, famously belongs to Opus Dei.) CDA and PolOff recently met with Manuel Sanchez, Opus Dei's head of international media relations, and discussed how Opus Dei responded to the "Da Vinci Code" - a novel which pilloried the group. Sanchez said that Opus Dei realized it could respond in one of three ways: (1) ignore the controversy; (2) adopt a 'no prisoners' approach and refute every error; or (3) treat the controversy as a chance to explain Opus Dei to the world. Opus Dei chose the third option, holding regular briefings for journalists and others, and the organization's membership has actually increased as a result.
FIXING WHAT'S LOST IN TRANSLATION
---------------------------------
12. (C) There is a growing urgency within the Vatican about the need to change the current communication culture. The rare public criticisms offered by Father Lombardi and Cardinal Kasper of their colleagues' roles in the Lefebrvist scandal are an extremely strong indicator of internal disquiet. There are a number of proposals circulating to help fix the problem. XXXXXXXXXXXX have confirmed privately to the Embassy that discussions are underway about having the Pontifical Council for Social Communications assume a greater coordinating role on major decisions. Father Lombardi has privately proposed to his leadership the possibility of creating an office in the Secretariat of State to flag potentially controversial decisions and has asked for resources to prepare translations of major statements more quickly. Other Vatican insiders close to the Pope have suggested bringing more native English speakers into positions in the Pope's inner circle. And not a few voices are calling for Cardinal Bertone's removal from his current position.
COMMENT
-------
13. (C) Behind closed doors, our Vatican contacts seems to be talking about nothing but the need for better internal coordination on decisions and planned public messages. Most Church leaders recoil at the notion that they could be seen as anti-Semitic or endorsing Holocaust denials, yet are confronting the ugly reality that many people actually believe these notions because of their own poor communications culture. But if or when change will come remains an open question. The structural and cultural roots of the current situation are deep, and will not be easily uprooted as they are closely connected to Pope Benedict's governing style. Similar criticism after the disastrous Regensburg speech led to little or no change. The percolating discussions regarding the creation of a policy coordinating body within the curia - and other possible solutions -- are hopeful signs. But they are not yet guarantees that change is coming. Stay tuned. End Comment.
NOYES
Tuesday, 26 December 2006, 11:45
S E C R E T PARIS 007904
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/21/2016
TAGS PARM, FR
SUBJECT: S/CT CRUMPTON MEETS RUSSIAN COUNTERPART TO EXTEND
COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor XXXXXXXXXXXX for reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (S) Summary: In an amicable December 7 dinner meeting with Ambassador-at-Large Henry Crumpton, Russian Special Presidential Representative Anatoliy Safonov agreed to move forward with several proposals that expand U.S./Russian counter-terrorism (CT) cooperation. These include:
--Engaging the American and Russian business communities in CT efforts.
--Expanding cooperation with scientific experts to include terrorist scenario modeling.
--Continuing intelligence sharing, specifically with regard to Iran,s sponsorship of terrorism and the recent murder of Russian diplomats in Iraq.
--Continuing efforts to formulate a standardized list of criteria for designating terrorist organizations.
--Convening an experts, conference in May to discuss strategies to prevent terrorists from exploiting Islam and to explore the ideological threat of "Jihadism".
--Publicizing bilateral cooperation by staging press conferences in each other,s respective country and touring the United States together at a 2007 date to be determined. End Summary.
2. (S) In a December 7 dinner meeting with Ambassador-at-Large Henry Crumpton, Russian Special Presidential Representative Anatoliy Safonov welcomed several proposals aimed at extending bilateral counterterrorism (CT) cooperation. Safonov opened the meeting by expressing his appreciation for U.S./Russian cooperative efforts thus far. He cited the recent events in London - specifically the murder of a former Russian spy by exposure to radioactive agents - as evidence of how great the threat remained and how much more there was to do on the cooperative front. (Comment: The implication was that the FOR was not involved, although Safonov did not offer any further explanation.) Safonov noted the daunting number of countries that posed particular terrorism threats, mentioning North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, Libya, Iran, India, and Israel (sic?). He described a range of dangers, stressing the more immediate threats posed by nuclear and biological terrorism, but also acknowledging the risks of chemical terrorism. Safonov highlighted coverage of transit corridors as one of the most promising areas of U.S./Russian CT cooperation and commented that the U.S. and Russia should continue to refine this effort.
3. (S) Safonov was particularly enthusiastic about Crumpton,s proposal that their respective governments cooperatively engage the private sector in their CT efforts. Crumpton made specific reference to the Business Executives for National Security as one American group they might contact. Safonov applauded the idea,s potential for offering new CT perspectives and expressed the hope that such cooperation might enrich Russian private-sector business, which he said could learn a lot from its American counterpart. Crumpton also suggested the Russia/United States Business Council as a possible starting point for engaging the private sector. Safonov said he would meet with Ambassador Burns in Moscow to discuss next steps, and both men agreed to explore possible private sector contacts in their home countries.
4. (S) Safonov reiterated his belief that new perspectives and out-of-the-box thinking were critical to defeating terrorism and expressed his appreciation for scientific approaches, which he asserted were "broader and less conditioned by lived experience". He cited one physicist,s conception of global terrorism as analogous to biological disease, i.e., the fever that serves as a warning for larger problems. Crumpton agreed with Safonov about the importance of scientific perspectives and suggested that they expand their cooperation with Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico, specifically that they jointly direct the scientists there to undertake terrorist scenario modeling. Crumpton noted that the Sandia Laboratories already had established relationships with Russian counterparts and had worked cooperatively with them on nuclear safety and biological weapons threats, which could also be a topics for ongoing cooperation. Safonov agreed, and asked for the names of the affiliated Russian research groups. In this context, the two also touched on the importance of continued bioterrorism cooperation including bilateral consultations; Safonov seemed keen to expand all avenues of joint action.
5. (S) Also on the topic of taking advantage of academic perspectives, Ambassador Crumpton offered to "loan" XXXXXXXXXXXX to engage with Safonov,s team in Russia and to review the situation in Chechnya. Safonov seemed amenable, but the two did not discuss specifics.
6. (S) On Iraq, Crumpton stressed the paramount importance of preventing Al Qaida from establishing a safe operating haven in Iraq, which could serve as a staging area for the whole region. He also conveyed the USG,s intention to provide Russia with all available information on the terrorists responsible for the recent kidnapping and killing of Russian diplomats, noting that the CIA had already met all but one of the Russian information requests that had been made since June of 2006. On Iran, Crumpton relayed the USG,s intention to provide the Russian government with a formal intelligence report detailing the Iranian terrorist threat, including specific links to Hamas and other groups, Iran,s ongoing support of Iraqi Shia, and information on Iranian missile transfers to Hizballah.
7. (S) Crumpton asserted there was a pressing need for the G-8 to establish uniform criteria for designating terrorists and terrorist groups. Safonov agreed and noted that "We need to overcome this deadlock...Right now there are about twelve groups causing disagreement." Crumpton concurred and pressed for the name of the Russian official XXXXXXXXXXXX who was authorized to continue to negotiate on establishing uniform criteria. In the only slightly evasive exchange during the entire three-hour conversation, Safonov resisted answering outright; after repeated questioning, he provided the name of XXXXXXXXXXXX and the qualification that "there are two layers (to this issue)".
8. (S) Crumpton invited Russia to participate in a four-day experts, conference sponsored by the Marshall Center to discuss how terrorists exploit Islam and the ideological threat of "Jihadism". Safonov accepted the invitation immediately and expressed great interest in exploring how they might reverse the extremists, "hijacking" of Islam. Crumpton told Safonov that the conference -- to include NATO, Russia, and Turkey -- was planned for May in Istanbul and was tentatively divided into two days spent with subject matter experts and two days spent with policy makers.
9. (S) Safonov enthusiastically agreed to and elaborated on Crumpton,s ideas for publicly highlighting U.S./Russia CT cooperation. Safonov accepted Crumpton,s invitation to visit the United States as his guest and went on to suggest that they could publicize the visit with cross-directed press events wherein each of them would be interviewed by journalists from the other country. Crumpton pressed for a short time line, inviting Safonov to come to New York in January 2007, then going on to Los Angeles together; Safonov suggested a March-April 2007 visit timeframe. Safonov accepted responsibility for arranging the next steps.
10. (S) In the course of their exchange, Safonov made the following passing statements:
--Safonov claimed that Russian authorities in London had known about and followed individuals moving radioactive substances into the city but were told by the British that they were under control before the poisoning took place.
--On Afghanistan, Safonov said that British and Canadian soldiers were well regarded, but Dutch soldiers were causing problems by posing "constant questions about governance".
--On Lebanon, Safonov judged that the situation was probably "not yet at the bottom" and so there may not yet be enough incentive to find a solution. The key was to prevent any movement toward civil war. To that end, the Russian government planned to continue to work with Syria, which "is not the central cause of the conflict and in some ways is also a hostage of the situation". In Safonov,s eyes, the conflict had no single cause, but rather was composed of many problems and many actors, though the present crisis likely would not have arisen if former Israeli PM Sharon had been in charge. He believed Sharon would not have made the error of attacking a nation when the enemy was Hizballah.
--In Iraq, coalition forces' failure to restore order reminded Safonov of an exchange he had with a freedom fighter just after Russian forces had captured Grozny. The fighter told him, "Your real problems are only now beginning."
11. (U) This message has been cleared by Ambassador Crumpton. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm HOFMANN
Wednesday, 23 May 2007, 02:45
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001576
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/26/2026
TAGS PREL, PREF, PGOV, KS, KN
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX SHARES IDEAS ON DPRK
INTERACTION
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
SUMMARY
-------
1. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX Arranging an Eric Clapton concert in Pyongyang could also be useful, he said, given Kim Jong-il's second son's devotion to the rock legend. END SUMMARY.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
----------------------------------
2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
DOING BUSINESS IN THE DPRK
--------------------------
3. (C) For an outsider to get anything done in the DPRK, XXXXXXXXXXXX advised, it is necessary to get the DPRK's various institutions to cooperate. Each institution seems to have veto power, but none has the power to push anything forward. XXXXXXXXXXXX the only organizations that can really deliver are the military, which does not talk to anybody, or the Red Cross. XXXXXXXXXXXX
DIVIDED FAMILIES INITIATIVE
---------------------------
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX advocated in favor of USG involvement in facilitating the reunification of Korean-American families divided by the Korean War. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that currently two groups organize these visits for Korean-Americans. The first is Compatriots United, which has arranged thousands of reunions. However, the group is controlled by the DPRK's Overseas Compatriots Committee and extorts a tremendous amount of money from desperate families to arrange the visits. Families seeking to participate must pay USD 300 to apply and submit comprehensive personal and financial information. If selected, the families are forced to pay for unwanted sightseeing excursions in North Korea. Before they are finally able to see their relatives, which is always just hours before their departing flight, they are often told that the relatives had to travel to the meeting place by taxi and owed several thousand dollars in fare. As XXXXXXXXXXXX explained, these are desperate, old people who would pay anything.
After the trip, the participants typically get repeated correspondence from the North Korean government asking for money to assist the family members, who are sometimes falsely alleged to be ill.
5. (C) The other group active in family reunions is Pyongtong in Los Angeles. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the group recently arranged for 15 persons to visit family members in the DPRK. However, the DPRK canceled the arrangement after the group went to the press. Pyongyang ultimately intervened and instructed the Compatriots Committee to help facilitate the visit. Thus, Pyongtong was able to arrange a visit for six people a few weeks ago.
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that North Korea would not run such an exploitative system if the United States government were involved in the process. There is a reluctance, he said, for Korean-Americans to pursue family reunions because they do not want to divulge their personal information to the DPRK and they do not want the North Koreans to milk them for money before, during and after the reunion. The USG could at least volunteer to serve as a conduit for correspondence between these families and North Korea to prevent the DPRK from learning the home addresses and bank accounts of participants. The DPRK might be willing to accept this structure because it badly wants a relationship with Washington.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
-----------------------------
XXXXXXXXXXXX
------------------------
8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX did not see hope for inter-Korean engagement, despite the widely acclaimed railroad test. "North Koreans have no intention of dealing with (South Koreans). The South Koreans really think they can help. They don't understand that North Korea is sealed."
BOOK ERIC CLAPTON
-----------------
9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX passed on the suggestion from his North Korean interlocutors that the USG arrange for Eric Clapton to perform a concert in Pyongyang. As Kim Jong-il's second son, Kim Jong-chol, is reported to be a great fan, the performance could be an opportunity to build good will. VERSHBOW
Wednesday, 11 April 2007, 03:43
C O N F I D E N T I A L ASTANA 000919
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (M. O'MARA)
EO 12958 DECL: 04/10/2017
TAGS EINV, ENRG, KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: BAKER HUGHES SEEKS TO LIMIT FALLOUT
FROM FCPA CASE
REF: 06 ASTANA 90
Classified By: Amb. John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (U) This cable contains an action request. Please see request for guidance, para. 9.
2. (SBU) Summary: A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act case involving malfeasance by U.S. oil technology and services firm Baker Hughes in Kazakhstan will soon be settled, revealing details of bribes paid by the firm's local representatives. Baker Hughes representatives are in Astana to brief Prime Minister Masimov on the case before it becomes public, in hopes of limiting the negative impact on the firm's ability to work in Kazakhstan. In order to minimize the damage from the case to U.S. investors and the bilateral relationship, post believes it would be helpful to inform the Kazakhstani government that the U.S. government authorized Baker Hughes' representatives to brief them in advance of the settlement, and to share the text of the decision once it is issued. End summary.
3. (SBU) The Ambassador met with Alan R. Crain, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of Baker Hughes Incorporated, and Amb. Beth Jones, Executive Vice President of APCO Worldwide, on April 10 in Astana to discuss a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) case involving Baker Hughes' work in Kazakhstan. Crain and Jones informed the Ambassador that they would meet with Prime Minister Masimov later that day to brief him on the upcoming U.S. court decision in the case. They had met with Masimov on January 9 to inform him that legal proceedings were underway in the U.S., and now planned to share the details. They stated that the Department of Justice and the SEC had authorized both meetings.
4. (SBU) Crain told the Ambassador that a former employee of Baker Hughes filed a report with the SEC in August 2003 detailing alleged malfeasance in several overseas subsidiaries, including Kazakhstan.XXXXXXXXXXXX
5. (SBU) Four separate incidents were discovered during the internal investigation, the second of which is the basis of the legal proceedings currently underway in the U.S.:
-- 1998-1999: Baker Hughes retained an agent at the direction of an executive of KazTransOil and made commission payments of $1.1 million to the agent from July 1998 to April 1999.
-- 2000-2003: An agent was hired in September 2000 for an oil services contract for the Karachaganak field. The company retained the agent at the urging of Roy Fearnley, a Baker Hughes employee in Kazakhstan and a citizen of the UK. The company was awarded the Karachaganak contract in October 2000. From May 2001 to November 2003, the company made commission payments to the agent's London bank account of $4.1 million.
-- 2002: The company authorized payments for an option to lease a parcel of land. It was aware that an executive of the Kazakhstani national oil company could have an interest in the company that owned the land, and that the land was controlled by the principal of the company's agent for the Karachaganak project.
-- 2000: A $9,000 payment was made to a company where a Kazakhstani individual served as director, in exchange for his procuring import licenses. The individual may have been a government official.
6. (C) Crain and Jones stressed that the investigation to date has not shown that any of the money from the Karachaganak incident went to Kazakhstani government officials. The "money trail" ends with the agent hired in September 2000, a UK citizen who is the son of Lord Kissin. XXXXXXXXXXXX
7. (SBU) Crain expects the U.S. court to issue a settlement agreement on the FCPA case as early as next week. He expressed satisfaction with the agreement reached with the SEC and DOJ, which will require a Baker Hughes subsidiary to enter into a plea agreement on bribery charges and pay a "substantial" fine. The parent company will agree to a two-year deferred prosecution agreement. Crain commented that this was more favorable than the standard three-year agreement offered by the SEC, which he attributed to Baker Hughes' cooperation with the SEC, its thorough internal investigation, and its new, extremely strict compliance program.
8. (SBU) Jones and Crain said that their goal in briefing PM Masimov was to demonstrate the respect that Baker Hughes as an investor has for Kazakhstan and its laws, and thereby ensure that the firm will still be able to operate here and that its employees will not face harassment. They will also emphasize the fact that the investigation centered on commercial malfeasance and did not reveal the involvement of any high-ranking Kazakhstani government officials. After the Masimov meeting took place, Jones contacted the Ambassador to relay Masimov's request that the Embassy convey the court decision as soon as it is released.
9. (SBU) Request for guidance: Post requests Department's authorization to confirm to the Kazakhstani government that the SEC and DOJ authorized Baker Hughes to share the details of the upcoming court decision. Post also seeks guidance on whether it would be appropriate for the Embassy to convey the court decision to PM Masimov once it is made public. ORDWAY
Friday, 26 November 2004, 08:51
C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 003180
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN
EO 12958 DECL: 11/17/14
TAGS PBIO, PINR, UZ
SUBJECT: FIRST DAUGHTER LOLA (KARIMOVA) CUTS LOSE
CLASSIFIED BY AMB. JON R. PURNELL, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D).
1. (C) For at least the past month, the youngest of President Islom Karimov's three children, 26-year old Lola Karimova, has been frequenting restaurant/club Barkhan ("shifting sand dune") on a near nightly basis. On November 13, we once again ran into the First Daughter at this location. During this encounter, she identified one of the men in her booth to poloff as her boyfriend and confirmed the club was hers.
2. (C) Karimova typically arrives in her -- one-of-a- kind, for Tashkent -- Porsche Cayenne S Sports Utility Vehicle around ten o'clock for the traditional floorshow and stays until the wee hours dancing the night away in the raucous disco. On occasion, her older sister, Gulnora, joins her around three o'clock in the morning. Taking her prominently reserved booth amidst all the action and protected by four bodyguards, Lola Karimova drinks a fair amount of alcohol and dances freely while 28-year old Barkhan proprietor "Timur" and Ms. Karimova's thuggish-looking boyfriend also serve to keep potential dance partners at bay.
3. (C) Comment: Lola Karimova, who reportedly also owns chic Tashkent nightclub Basha, would appear to favor her new club, the Barkhan. It remains unclear whether she is the owner by appropriation/hostile takeover, or whether she reached a partnership agreement with "Timur," who is rumored to own the popular restaurant Karavan, as well. Considering the plethora of foreign contractors, diplomats, and First Family members who habitually attend the Barkhan, the securQis astonishingly light. Barkhan ownership is obviously well connected, as it's the only place in town that flaunts selling non-Uzbekistan produced hard alcohol, which is against the law.
PURNELL
Friday, 28 January 2005, 13:33
C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000284
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN AND EUR/ACE
EO 12958 DECL: 01/28/15
TAGS ECON PREL PINR UZ
SUBJECT: GULNORA INC. STRIKES AGAIN
REFS: A) 04 TASHKENT 3390 B) 04 TASHKENT 2574 and previous
CLASSIFIED BY AMB. JON R. PURNELL, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary: According to various reports from industry insiders, Gulnora Karimova, the President's daughter, is interested in taking over a new cellular company with U.S. investment, as well as Uzbektelekom, the monopoly state- owned telecommunications company. She also reportedly has agreed with local mafia boss, XXXXXXXXXXXX, to take over his share of ZeromaxXXXXXXXXXXXX. In an ironic twist, if this comes to pass, it would leave Gulnora in control of Coca-Cola - her ex-husband's former company. End summary.
2. (C) According to various reports, since first daughter Gulnora Karimova returned to Uzbekistan several months ago, she has been venturing out into new investments, mostly via several Russian companies. For example, XXXXXXXXXXXX business sources have told us that Karimova may be behind recent moves to push U.S. investment company Telecom Inc. out of the Uzbek market. Telecom Inc. invested USD 12 million in a cellular telephone company called Skytel. Skytel uses CDMA 450 frequency, which is new technology for the Uzbek market. According to the XXXXXXXXXXXX, after several months in operation, Gulnora Karimova directly approached them about taking over some portion of the company. The XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that because the company did not respond to her requests, the company's frequency has been jammed by an Uzbek Government agency, making the cellular service nearly inoperable. According to this source, Telecom Inc.'s Uzbek partner, state-owned Uzbektelekom, is either unwilling or unable to help and has chosen to not return the U.S. company's phone calls.
3. (C) It appears that Gulnora would have been able to invest in Skytel, regardless of Telecom Inc.'s response to her query. Several sources, including XXXXXXXXXXXX, claim that Gulnora is positioning herself to take over Uzbektelekom. Recent legislative changes and revisions of the company's privatization deal, lead post to believe that there is an influential local investor vying for company leadership (Ref A). According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, only an investor with a close relationship to Uzbek Government officials could convince them to make such a controversial change to legislation, basically guaranteeing colossal returns to the company's owner and imposing losses on other firms. The new legislative changes dictate that all international telecommunication networks must go through Uzbektelekom, giving them monopoly control of all services, including Internet and IP-telephony. All indications point to Gulnora as this investor.
BACK TO THE BASICS
------------------
4. (C) Aside from her interests in the telecommunications industry, Emboff also heard from XXXXXXXXXXXX that Gulnora struck a deal with local Mafia boss XXXXXXXXXXXX to take over his share of Zeromax. XXXXXXXXXXXX According to several sources, Zeromax's largest revenue stream comes from organizing and transporting crude oil from Kazakhstan for delivery to Uzbekneftegaz, something post believed Gulnora to have been involved in for several years. XXXXXXXXXXXX(Ref B)
COMMENT
-------
XXXXXXXXXXXX
PURNELL
Tuesday, 13 September 2005, 14:05
C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 002473
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CACEN, EB
EO 12958 DECL: 09/13/15
TAGS PREL ECON PGOV PINR UZ
SUBJECT: GULNORA KARIMOVA LOOKS TO IMPROVE HER IMAGE
CLASSIFIED BY AMB. JON R. PURNELL, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D).
1. (C) Summary: In the last month, several Uzbek publications have carried articles about the good works of First Daughter Gulnora Karimova. The articles focus on her selfless giving, charity work, and business acumen. One, an interview with Russian scholar Aleksi Malashenko, discusses Gulnora's chances of replacing her father as president in 2007. The discussion of the honest, hardworking Gulnora, looking out for the best interests of her country, likely irks the many business people who have been crushed by Karimova and her greed as well as the general public, who view her as something of a robber baron. This media campaign is definitely a move by Karimova to improve her image, possibly as the first step to a 2007 presidential run, but also likely as a means to silence critics within elite Uzbek circles.
PATRON OF THE ARTS, CHILDREN AND THE POOR
------------------------------------------
2. (U) On September 1, Tasvir, a widely read family magazine, published a two-page article praising Karimova's donations to schools and orphanages throughout the country. As a member of "Women's Meeting," an organization charged with the welfare of children, families and the elderly, Gulnora put on a children's production of the Lion King in schools in Samarkand, Bukhara, Jizzax, Gulistan, Fergana, and Kokand. Gulnora's personal charity fund, "Mekhr Nuri" (Lights of Love or Mercy) also works throughout the regions and has provided furniture and other school supplies to facilities in Namangan, Syrdarya, Kokand, and Bukhara. The youth-movement-run newspaper Kamolot praised Karimova for her role in giving scholarships to under-privileged students under the Forum of Culture and Art of Uzbekistan. Karimova is chair of this foundation. The first Daughter also heads the Center for Political Studies.
SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE BUSINESSWOMAN
-----------------------------------
3. (C) An August 18 article, also in Tasvir, praised Gulnora for her role in upgrading the services of the cellular telephone company Uzdunrobita. According to the article, Uzdonrobita's technology was outdated. Gulnora then "bought" the company, modernized the equipment and found the right partner, Russian MTS, to continue key developments. (Note: The price MTS paid per subscriber was significantly above the market rate. Gulnora, who acquired the company at rock bottom rates, made a considerable sum of money on the transaction. End note.) In this piece, Gulnora noted that businesses are like precious stones, they only obtain value once they are processed and improved. (Comment: This statement likely irks the multitude of business people Gulnora has usurped or put out of business through her government connections. Most of these businesses were profitable in their own right, which is what attracted the First Daughter to them in the first place. End comment.)
STANDING ON HER HIGH MORALS AND PRINCIPLES
------------------------------------------
4. (C) In an interview published on September 8, Karimova told an Uzbek paper, Darakchi that she is a highly principled person who listens to her conscience. She stressed that she can't stand treachery or lies. She sees herself as open and even-handed, and demands the same from those around her. She even went so far as to say that people treat you the way you treat them, and if you don't treat others well, you will "find yourself in a blind alley." (Comment: The many people crushed by Karimova would likely relish the chance to catch her blind in an alley. End comment.)
THE NEXT PRESIDENT?
-------------------
5. (C) On September 6, Ferghana.ru published an interview with Russian professor Aleksi Malashenko in which he discusses the potential of a Gulnora Karimova campaign for president in 2007. While, Malashenko, a member of the Moscow Carnegie Center and Professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, noted that Karimova's chances of becoming president were infinitesimally low because of the scandals surrounding her business ventures, simply mentioning the possible in a public forum raises Garimova's profile.
COMMENT: WHAT'S BEHIND THE PRESS CAMPAIGN?
-------------------------------------------
6. (C) The unusual series of articles promoting the virtue and selflessness of Gulnora Karimova is likely part of a larger strategy to clean up the First Daughter's image. Most Uzbeks see Karimova as a greedy, power hungry individual who uses her father to crush business people or anyone else who stands in her way. Even with the press campaign to improve her image, Gulnora is continuing to do business, pressuring and shutting down competitors. This charm offensive will not likely make her more popular; she remains the single most hated person in the country. (Comment: We have no polling data to support that statement, but we stand by it. End comment.) The chances of a successful 2007 presidential run for Karimova are slim to none, as neither the people, nor, more importantly, the elite, would support her. In addition, it is unlikely that many in this still very conservative culture would accept the idea of a female leader. High-level female officials are still tokens, relegated to traditional female issues. That said, the political climate is changing rapidly here, and these articles could be a trial balloon.
PURNELL
Friday, 05 May 2006, 12:59
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 000902
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN AND DRL
EO 12958 DECL: 05/05/2016
TAGS KCRM, PGOV, ECON, PREL, PINR, UZ
SUBJECT: (S) MAFIA BOSS FIXES GOU TENDERS AND JOBS
REF: TASHKENT 465
TASHKENT 00000902 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: AMB. JON R. PURNELL, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)
1. (S) Summary: XXXXXXXXXXXX
6. (S) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX's role in securing GOU tenders and jobs sheds further light on the close connections between organized crime and the GOU (reftel). Corruption is rampant in the GOU. Tenders and government positions can be fairly easily secured by paying the right amount of money to the appropriate individual, leading to a situation in which unqualified individuals have every incentive to engage in further corrupt activity to pay off the large debts they usually incur making down payments on the jobs. PURNELL
Wednesday, 27 January 2010, 13:10
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000054
SIPDIS
COMMERCE FOR D.STARKS
EEB/CBA FOR T.GILMAN
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USTR FOR C. MORROW AND P. BURKHEAD
EO 12958 DECL: 01/27/2030
TAGS ECON, EINV, EIND, ETRD, KCOR, PINR, PGOV, AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: WHO OWNS WHAT? PART 1 - THE FIRST
LADY'S FAMILY (C-RE9-02493; C-RE9-02492)
REF: 08 BAKU 93
Classified By: Charge Donald Lu, for reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (S) SUMMARY: This cable is the first in a series that will highlight the most powerful families in Azerbaijan, both in terms of economic and political power. In this opening issue, we profile the family of First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva (born Mehriban Pashayeva), and her uncle, former Azerbaijani Ambassador to the United States and current Deputy Foreign Minister Hafiz Pashayev. Mehriban Aliyeva, besides being the wife of the President, is a Member of Parliament XXXXXXXXXXXX Other members of the Pashayev family hold powerful positions in government and academia, and are associated with powerful business groups outside the energy sector. The Pashayevs are known to operate extensively in Baku's rapidly expanding construction/real estate market, and are well invested in the financial and telecommunications sectors. End Summary.
2. (C) Observers in Baku often note that today's Azerbaijan is run in a manner similar to the feudalism found in Europe during the Middle Ages: a handful of well-connected families control certain geographic areas, as well as certain sectors of the economy. By and large, this seems to be the case, with general agreement among leading families to divide the spoils and not disturb one another's areas of business or geographic control. The families also collude, using government mechanisms, to keep out foreign competitors, and entities such as the State Border Services, State Customs and tax authorities create barriers that only the best connected can clear. As a result, an economy already burgeoning with oil and gas revenues produces enormous opportunity and wealth for a small handful of players that form Azerbaijan's elite. This series of reports will describe the businesses they run, the regions they control, and the ministries they keep under their thumbs.
3. (U) Biographical note: Similar to Russian tradition, many Azeris still utilize the Slavic naming convention where the last letter(s) of a person's last name indicates gender. Example: Pashayev (male) / Pashayeva (female).
Mehriban's Heydar Aliyev Fund
-----------------------------
4. (S) First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva (born Mehriban Pashayeva) is no doubt the most famous member of this clan, playing multiple roles and holding multiple titles. Aside from being the President's wife, she is President of the Heydar Aliyev Fund, which proclaims to be a humanitarian organization constructing schools, hospitals, and youth centers, among other projects. These projects provide a constant array of goodwill photo opportunities and advertisements for the First Lady, as she cuts ribbons on new schools and cultural centers. XXXXXXXXXXXX
BAKU 00000054 002 OF 003
6. (C) Aliyeva is also a Member of Parliament and Goodwill Ambassador for UNESCO and ISESCO (the Organization of the Islamic Conference cultural organization). A recent survey of journalists accredited to Parliament declared her "the Most Active MP of 2009 in making legislative initiatives." Embassy monitors, who have attended nearly every session over the past year, have never seen her present in Parliament, an institution that in general is not known for working independently outside the realm of the Presidential Apparat. When she received Members of Congress in 2008, she appeared poorly informed about political issues and could only respond knowledgeably about issues relating to the Heydar Aliyev Fund (reftel).
Academics and Other Endeavors
-----------------------------
7. (S) Other notable Pashayevs include the First Lady's sister Nargiz Pashayeva, who heads the branch of Moscow State University located in Azerbaijan; the First Lady's father Arif Pashayev, who leads the National Aviation Academy; and the First Lady's uncle Hafiz Pashayev (brother of Arif Pashayev), who is a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Hafiz Pashayev was also Azerbaijan's first Ambassador to the United States, serving in Washington DC for over 13 years. The Deputy Foreign Minister these days spends much time focusing on his Diplomatic Academy, which is constructing an elaborate new compound (modeled after NFATC Arlington) in central Baku. As a whole, the family, which generally speaks Russian better than Azeri, is considered the single most powerful family in Azerbaijan.
8. (S) The Pashayev family's center of power is considered to be Baku, where Mehriban Aliyeva's parents were born, and the Absheron peninsula, with Aliyeva "representing" in parliament a constituency that surrounds Heydar Aliyev International Airport. Aliyeva has also arranged for the building of the Shuvelan designer shopping center in her constituency, which stands out among the crumbling houses in the area. The family is believed to exert control over the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the Ministry of Youth and Sport, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Education, simply because these ministries fall under the areas traditionally of interest for a First Lady. In that regard, the Pashayevs have been active in promoting the construction of museums and other cultural sites in Baku, and at a time were associated with an effort to open a branch of the Guggenheim museum along Baku's waterfront. Mehriban Aliyeva's collection of contemporary art also provided the foundation for Baku's new Museum of Modern Art, which opened quietly last fall. The museum was designed by Altay Sadikhzade, a local artist/designer married to Nargiz Pashayeva. No expense was spared in the construction of the museum, which highlights Soviet-era Azerbaijani artists, including Altay (whose portraits of Mehriban, Nargiz and Arif are at the center of the galleries).
A Vast Empire
-------------
9. (S) The Pashayev family controls Pasha Holding, a conglomerate that includes Pasha Bank, Pasha Insurance, Pasha Construction, and Pasha Travel. The family owns local TV station Lider TV as well as cosmetics producer "Nargiz." The family is believed to control several of the top ten banks in Azerbaijan, including Bank Standard and Kapital Bank, in addition to the newest, Pasha Bank. In November 2009, Pasha Holding opened Baku's first, and so far only, Bentley dealership.
10. (S) Nar Mobile (which is officially registered as Azerfon) is also linked to this family, and speculation is that the company is named "Nar" not only after the Azeri word for pomegranate but also after the First Lady's sister Nargiz. XXXXXXXXXXXX
11. XXXXXXXXXXXX
A First Lady, Too, in Fashion
-----------------------------
12. (S) The Pashayev women are known to be fashion-conscious and daring, far more so than the average woman in majority- Muslim Azerbaijan. First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva appears to have had substantial cosmetic surgery, presumably overseas, and wears dresses that would be considered provocative even in the Western world (reftel). On television, in photos, and in person, she appears unable to show a full range of facial expression. The First Lady and her two daughters hosted Second Lady Lynne Cheney for dinner in September 2008. Prior to the Second Lady's arrival, while the three ladies were waiting for Mrs. Cheney's car, one Secret Service agent asked "which one of those is the mother?" Emboffs and White House staff studied the three for several moments, and then Emboff said, "Well, logically the mother would probably stand in the middle."
Comment: Pashayevs Worth Talking to
-----------------------------------
13. (C) By any measure, the Pashayevs are a family to be reckoned with in Azerbaijan. First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva has traveled to the United States on multiple occasions, with her husband and separately, and been the celebrated guest at events hosted by the U.S.-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce and other organizations. Hafiz Pashayev, well known in Washington, has been an important interlocutor for the U.S. Embassy in Baku and official Americans traveling to Azerbaijan. He has not always been able to deliver outcomes that we promote -- such as on difficult issues like the jailed bloggers -- but has been wlling to hear us out and relay those messages appopriately. End Comment.
14. (C) The next report on "Who Owns What" will profile the Heydarov family. Patriarch Kemaladdin Heydarov is the Minister of Emergency Situations and the former Chairman of the State Customs Committee. A wealthy monopolist, he has been called "the most powerful man in Azerbaijan," although Post believes his family is actually second in power to that of the President and First Lady. LU
Thursday, 04 October 2007, 15:52
S E C R E T DUSHANBE 001420
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
EO 12958 DECL: 10/4/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, SNAR, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK PRESIDENT FIRES SENIOR ANTI-NARCOTICS OFFICER TO
PROTECT A RELATIVE FROM PROSECUTION
CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Hushek, Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Exec, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)
1. (S) Summary: President Rahmon has fired a senior anti-narcotics officer who pressed for prosecution of a distant relative and Major from the State Committee for National Security (i.e. the KGB) who were arrested while transporting heroin in a government vehicle. XXXXXXXXXXXX End Summary.
2. (S) Post learned from a source in the Ministry of Interior that XXXXXXXXXXXX President Rahmon personally fired XXXXXXXXXXXX. This resulted from the intercept a week ago, by XXXXXXXXXXXX police, of a State Security vehicle in southern Tajikistan carrying about 60 kilograms of heroin. The car was driven by State Security officers, one of whom was a distant relative of President Rahmon. This was the third such detection and arrest of State Security personnel moving narcotics in government vehicles in the past year. XXXXXXXXXXXX pressed for the prosecution of all of the officers involved, including the president's relative. XXXXXXXXXXXX's firing was allegedly the result of this effort. The Minister of Interior reportedly met the president XXXXXXXXXXXX and pleaded for XXXXXXXXXXXX to keep his job, to no avail.
3. (S) This is the only case we know of where the president has intervened personally to remove a high-level official to protect his relatives from drugs-related prosecution. However, this is part of a pattern of high level intervention, sometimes using the president's Anti-Corruption Commission, to protect organized crime members involved in drugs, money laundering, and protection/extortion activities within Tajikistan.
4. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX led the most effective counter narcotics organization in Tajikistan. His police division seized several times as much heroin per year as the Drug Control Agency XXXXXXXXXXXX had been in his position for the past decade, and had the reputation of a competent, relatively uncorrupt, and committed law enforcement officer. XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX
5. (S) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX stepped on two land mines: repeatedly arresting State Security officers who were working as drug couriers, and then going after a relative of the president. XXXXXXXXXXXX any committed officer who XXXXXXXXXXXX wishes to pursue drug cases to a high level or close to the president, faces the same minefield. This incident emphasizes the vulnerability of senior officials to summary removal if they displease the president or touch his family interests. This in turn illustrates the need for our engagement on narcotics to be both broad and deep, and not heavily reliant on individuals who might disappear without warning. End Comment.
HUSHEK
Monday, 14 November 2005, 06:21
S E C R E T DUSHANBE 001812
SIPDIS
STATE FOR P, EUR, SA, DRL, S/P
NSC FOR MERKEL
ALMATY PASS TO USIAD
EO 12958 DECL: 11/14/2015
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINR, PROP, ECON, EAID, KDEM, KPAO, RS, TI
SUBJECT: DESPITE RUSSIAN PRESSURE, THE UNITED STATES CAN PROMOTE ITS
POLICY GOALS IN TAJIKISTAN
REF: A. A) DUSHANBE 1805
B. B) DUSHANBE 1762 C. C) DUSHANBE 1646 D. D) DUSHANBE 1352
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy Dushanbe. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy Dushanbe. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S) SUMMARY: Although we now de-emphasize its previous Cold-War primacy in U.S. foreign policy, Russia still requires clear-eyed scrutiny for the havoc it can play with the President's democracy agenda and larger goals for transformational diplomacy in the former Soviet republics. We believe Russia is exerting consistent and strong pressure on Tajikistan to reduce the U.S. and Western role and presence. Although Tajikistan's "open-door" foreign policy seeks to balance competing foreign pressures for its own best interests, Moscow's pressure is beginning to take a toll. To promote democracy and economic and political reform in Tajikistan, we need to develop new ways to overcome negative Russian actions and influence. END SUMMARY.
WHY IS RUSSIA FOCUSING ON TAJIKISTAN?
2. (S) Russia is paying special attention to Tajikistan because of its military base and other strategic interests, including the Nurek Space Tracking Center. Moscow is determined to do everything possible to prevent a "color revolution" in Tajikistan that could threaten its perceived strategic interests. Working from the "siloviki" zero-sum-game worldview of current geo-politics, some in Moscow seem to believe that the United States wants additional and permanent U.S. military bases in Central Asia and sees Tajikistan as a prime candidate, especially after the U.S. loss of Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan.
3. (S) Despite the fact that Tajiks are war-weary and opposition-leary, and President Rahmonov is still genuinely popular, Moscow truly fears a "color revolution" in Tajikistan. Elsewhere, "color revolutions" have tended to bring Western-oriented leaders to power, although in Tajikistan no Saakashvili or Yushchenko is waiting in the wings. A "color revolution" in Tajikistan, the "siloviki" fear, would open the door for a U.S. military base, or even more devastating to Moscow, for Dushanbe to kick out the Russians and give the Russian military base to the United States. The nightmare of the "siloviki" is that the United States would then have a string of bases from Afghanistan, through Tajikistan, and into Kyrgyzstan to weaken Russia and dominate Central Asia, which Russia persists in calling its "sphere of influence."
4. (S) This may sound like easily dismissed fringe paranoia, but the "siloviki" do not play by our rules of fact-based logic. It is worth recalling that Moscow and the Russian Embassy in Dushanbe consistently put out the irrational rumor in 2004 that the United States had secretly convinced Tajikistan to demand that the Russian Border Force leave the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border which Russia had controlled back to the 19th century.
WHAT IS RUSSIA DOING?
5. (C) Because Russia is militarily weak, it uses other means to assert its authority in Tajikistan. After years of inconclusive negotiation, Russia and Tajikistan rapidly reached
agreement in 2004 (following Tbilisi's Rose Revolution) to forgive Tajikistan's bilateral debt and to establish the legal basis for the Russian military base in perpetuity.
6. (C) The symbolic culmination was President Putin's October 16, 2004, visit to Tajikistan. To set the hook in Rahmonov's jaw, Putin also announced major investments, variously described as $1.2 billion to over $3 billion, in Rahmonov's pet interests - hydropower (primarily Sangtuda-1 and secondarily Rogun) and the old Soviet aluminum tolling industry. Until then, no nation, especially in the West, took Rahmonov's pleas seriously to invest in these Soviet-era behemoths, although it is now evident that they had some economic merit, especially for South Asia.
7. (C) Since Russia made its commitment-in-principle, Iran has expressed interest in creating the financial consortium for Sangtuda-2, and China has said it will invest in the Nurek Hydroelectric Station. These potential investments, especially Russia's, could be seen as economically positive for Tajikistan and the region, or at least politically benign - except that Russia appears recently to be working to exclude Western participation in them (septel).
8. (C) Through the second half of 2004 and 2005, Russia has mounted a campaign to prevent "color revolutions" in the CIS. In overt media propaganda and in private and covert communications with governments like Tajikistan's, Moscow has asserted that U.S. democracy NGOs - specifically, National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, Freedom House, and Internews - are U.S. covert tools whose job is to prepare the local populations to overthrow "legal governments" in the CIS. More recently, the goal of Russian pressure seems to be to limit the presence of not just U.S. democracy NGOs but all Western elements present in Tajikistan.
9. (C) On the ground in Tajikistan, the Russian position seems to be hardening. The previous Russian Ambassador, Maksim Peshkov, was reasonable, amiable, and accessible. He worked the diplomatic circuit and was always available for reasonably frank, even if inconclusive, discussions with the U.S. and other Western ambassadors.
10. (C) Since the arrival in early summer of the high-level political appointee, Ambassador Ramazan Abdulatipov, the Russian Embassy has become a closed bastion. The U.S. Embassy's previous access to different sections of the Russian Embassy has nearly dried up, and Abdulatipov very seldom appears in public. He continues to accept diplomatic invitations, but almost invariably at the last minute pleads an unexpected visitor from Moscow or that he is indisposed. The rare times that he is seen in public - e.g., at important countries' national days - he ostentatiously huddles in a corner with the most senior Tajik officials present.
11. (C) At the same time, we and other Western embassies hear that Russian Embassy officers have unlimited free access at any time to Tajik Government offices, sometimes even barging in without appointments. This is especially telling because all other embassies are required to submit diplomatic notes, to which the responses are often long delayed, for appointments to conduct even the most mundane mid-level daily business.
12. (S) Most important, the Russian intelligence services thoroughly dominate Tajikistan's Ministry of Security. Ministry of Security views often take precedence in the Presidential
Apparat and key ministries like Justice that is responsible for registering foreign NGOs and Tajik media outlets and political parties.
BUT RAHMONOV IS NOT A SIMPLE PAWN
13. (C) Tajikistan describes its foreign policy as "open door," and balances its relations with the United States, Russia, China, Iran, and the European Union seeking what is best from each for its own national interests. During the last six months, President Rahmonov has repeatedly let us know he is "satisfied" with the U.S.-Tajik relationship. He is especially pleased with the security relationship - primarily U.S. funding and training to increase Tajik capabilities for border control, counter-narcotics, and counterterrorism.
14. (C) Even on the contentious issue of U.S. democracy NGOs, Rahmonov has appeared to split the baby - refusing legal registration for National Democratic Institute and Freedom House, but allowing them, nonetheless, to operate most of their programs. Another positive sign is that he has just approved for the national school curriculum a civic-education textbook that has been a long-term project of the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES). For some reason, IFES is the only U.S. democracy NGO that escaped Tajik scrutiny and operates unfettered.
INCREMENTALLY CLOSING IN ON WESTERN NGO'S AND OTHERS
15. (C) More recently, though, we detect an incremental hardening of the Tajik position. Although no new Tajik anti-NGO legislation is pending like in Kazakhstan and Russia, the Tajik Government is consistently working to gain greater control over all NGOs, not just democracy ones.
16. (C) The Tajik Government argues that during the 1992-97 Civil War and in its aftermath, Western NGOs flooded into Tajikistan without limit or supervision. Dushanbe now wants to find out who is actually in Tajikistan and what they are doing. For any country concerned about security, this is reasonable. But we also believe it is a Ministry of Security response to Russian prodding to prevent a "color revolution" and limit Western influence.
17. (C) Further, Tajikistan has recently been floating a new policy position, including during Secretary of State Rice's October visit and more recently with the European Union. The Tajik Government suggests it is time for foreign assistance delivered via NGOs to cease and be replaced by direct foreign investment in infrastructure projects (like the hydroelectric stations and roads) and business "joint ventures."
18. (C) Foreign Minister Nazarov has told us that this is, so far, a Tajik Government "desire, not a policy" (reftel B). Tajikistan argues that NGOs are both expensive, because of their high overhead to support foreign advisers, and sometimes ineffective. This, Tajikistan says, is an unacceptable waste of foreign assistance. While this argument has some merit, it suggests a worrisome trend, and will scare off the very international investors they are trying to attract.
INCREASING VISA DELAYS - MALEVOLENCE OR JUST INCOMPETENCE?
19. (C) Even more worrisome, obtaining Tajik visas is becoming more difficult - not just for U.S. NGO staff, but also for European NGO workers, foreign business people, and even staffs
of international financial institutions. Being an "inscrutable Eastern country," Tajikistan never likes to say "no." It just drags things out until reasonable but impatient people give up. There is a credible view in the Western diplomatic community that these new visa problems are a result of Russian prodding to limit Western influence in Tajikistan. It is worth noting the Ministry of Security vets all visa applications.
20. (C) However, another explanation is possible - corruption and incompetence. The previous reasonably professional chief of the Foreign Ministry's Consular Office was replaced this past summer by a Rahmonov relative (reftel D), and that's when the new problems started. It could be that he has the job to assure loyalty to a new restrictive visa policy. XXXXXXXXXXXX
BOOST THE ECONOMY TO PREVENT A "COLOR REVOLUTION"
21. (C) Russia's anti-U.S. stance in Tajikistan and Dushanbe's incremental moves against U.S. and other Western NGOs may be coincidental. However, we know Russia agitates for countries like Tajikistan to curtail, if not expel, U.S. NGOs. More indirectly, Russia does not deliver "foreign assistance" via Russian NGOs in Tajikistan. Moscow's promises of massive direct investment in hydropower and aluminum may have emboldened Rahmonov to begin to draw the line against NGO-provided Western foreign assistance.
22. (C) We know Rahmonov understands clearly that one of the key trip-wires for "color revolutions" is chronic economic stagnation. While he has been reasonably open to economic reform that would eventually create the conditions for Western economic investment, he may now be impatient with how long that process takes and that it comes with no tangible promises of investment. He may believe that to survive, he has to give Tajikistan concrete economic improvement and growth, and do it fast.
23. (C) From the West, Rahmonov receives painful and long-drawn-out economic restructuring and seemingly endless and inconclusive feasibility studies. From Russia (and Iran and perhaps China), he receives promises of large-scale investment that could potentially lift the entire economy. He has no extensive experience in the West and no deep understanding of the complexities and realities of the global economy. He wants Tajik economic growth, and he wants it now. If he has to take a little extra political baggage from Moscow, that's a price he may be willing to pay. At the same time, we do not believe that he will abandon Western-style economic restructuring and reform. He wants to hedge his bets.
WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES DO?
24. (C) PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: Our short-term focus will be to protect the interests of U.S. NGOs as deliverers of developmental assistance. A mid-level Foreign Ministry official recently told us that the Tajik Government generally does not understand what U.S. NGOs really do and simply listens to Russia on these matters (reftel A). (COMMENT: This may not be as
absurd as it seems. All written communication with any part of the government must be conducted by diplomatic note, and the Ministry of Security screens all diplomatic notes. We suspect the Ministry of Security does not pass forward diplomatic notes with which it does not agree. END COMMENT.) Embassy Dushanbe plans to arrange information roundtables to bring together senior government officials and major U.S. developmental NGOs. We will also start a public diplomacy campaign of press releases focusing each week on one U.S. NGO and its achievements for Tajikistan. Print media reach a miniscule percentage of the population; but we know that the Ministry of Security and Presidential Apparat carefully study each and every U.S. Embassy press release, and that's what counts.
25. (C) SUPPORT FOR TAJIK HYDROPOWER IN GREATER CENTRAL ASIA: In brief, the U.S. Government needs to make clear to the Government of Tajikistan, in international fora and in public, that the United States supports the development of Tajikistan's hydroelectric potential for export to Afghanistan and Pakistan to create new Central-South Asian links. See septel.
26. (C) ENGAGEMENT: We cannot and should not attempt to compete with the constant back and forth of Russian and Tajik officials between Moscow and Dushanbe - and even less should we attempt to emulate their drinking bouts. However, building on Secretary Rice's successful October 13 visit, we would
SIPDIS definitely benefit from more frequent and - this is important - longer senior U.S. visits. Rahmonov does indeed listen, but he needs to have U.S. interlocutors willing to spend more than a few hours in Tajikistan every six months or so. He especially needs interlocutors who do not focus on the relatively stable security side of the bilateral relationship but who can tackle the harder parts of the relationship, including economic development.
27. (SBU) U.S. ASSISTANCE REVIEW: We do not want to appear like iconoclasts seeking to reinvent the wheel of U.S. assistance for Tajikistan. But we do suggest for consideration two possibilities:
28. (C) (A) For democracy NGOs, we need to consider whether current partners' approaches have been overtaken by events. For example, if Internews can no longer be effective with its current programs because Tajikistan is using its licensing regulations to strangle the broadcast of non-government information (reftel C), we need to consider whether a refocus on training journalists and helping "independent" media outlets to become financially independent might be a better way to meet our media goals. Any NGO will likely find successes to justify its current programs, but we may need a review council with political-level participation to determine whether current assistance is promoting U.S. core policy goals - or if we are on self-defeating autopilot.
29. (C) (B) It may be useful to convene an off-cycle senior assistance review with both U.S. and Tajik participants who are decision makers, not just at the technical level. We need to listen as well as to preach. What does Tajikistan want? How can we make what Tajikistan wants support core U.S. policy objectives? We believe that if we make this effort, and especially if we can jointly reach consensus, there will be less pressure on U.S. development NGOs. This, in turn, will provide a wider space for the United States to promote its core policy goals and objectives.
30. (C) COMMENT: Tajikistan has brought this latest crossroads
on itself. There is the requisite political stability for Tajikistan to continue on its modest path of democratic, economic, and political reform. However, thanks to Russian pressure, Tajikistan is embarking on a potentially confrontational approach that will slow development and encourage the Tajikistan Government's worst instincts. Now is the time to encourage Tajikistan to stay on track. END COMMENT. HOAGLAND
NNNN
Tuesday, 16 February 2010, 13:41
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DUSHANBE 000173
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR S/RAP
EO 12958 DECL: 2/16/2020
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PHUM, EAID, ECON, EINV, TI
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY - TAJIKISTAN SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF SRAP
HOLBROOKE
CLASSIFIED BY: NECIA QUAST, CDA, EXEC, DOS. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: U.S. interests in Tajikistan are a stable state on Afghanistan's northern border, support for our military efforts in Afghanistan, and for Tajikistan to be a stabilizing influence and contributor to economic development in the region. Tajikistan gives unrestricted over flight rights, and quickly agreed to NDN ground transit. In the medium term, it could play a more active role in regional development, because of its huge hydropower potential, relative (to Afghanistan) stability, and religiously moderate population. But to do so Tajikistan must overcome multiple political and economic problems which stymie its own development: poverty, bad relations with Uzbekistan, intense corruption, Soviet-era economic structures and planning, an undemocratic political system, chronic food insecurity, and dependence on migrant labor in Russia.
2. (C) U.S. assistance has shown mixed results in the development sphere. Recent steps to improve the business climate have been offset by the government's campaign to force its citizens to contribute to the construction of the Roghun hydroelectric dam. The government is not willing to reform its political process. Our security cooperation shows some promise. Regardless of our efforts, there is a limit to what Tajikistan can offer: it produces very little, is poor, and its government has minimal capacity. The Tajiks have some unrealistic ideas about what we can offer them -- mainly large infrastructure projects including questionable power plants, tunnels to Pakistan, and bridges to nowhere. There is some truth to the quip that Tajikistan's real contribution to our efforts in Afghanistan is to be stable, and to allow unfettered over flight and transit to our forces - which the Tajiks have done unfailingly. We try to promote Tajik polices which will ensure continued stability. End summary.
A DIFFICULT NEIGHBORHOOD
3. (C) Some of Tajikistan's difficulties are geographic. Chronic problems with Uzbekistan, fueled by personal animosity between the presidents of each country, has stymied Tajikistan's trade, energy self-sufficiency, and economic development. Afghan instability is a malign influence: traffic in drugs undermines rule of law in Tajikistan, Tajiks fear the spread of extremist ideas from Afghanistan, and militants in Afghanistan can threaten Tajik security across the long, porous border. Russian interference looms large in the Tajik consciousness. The Russians control one major hydropower dam in Tajikistan, a source of disagreements between the two countries. The Tajiks seek alternative partners, including the United States, China, and Iran, to balance Russian influence. China is a major infrastructure donor, with over $1 billion in low-interest loans to Tajikistan to build roads and power line projects. Iran funds tunnel and hydropower projects, but displays of Persian solidarity do not mask deep suspicions between the hard-drinking, Soviet-reared, Sunni elite in Dushanbe and religiously conservative Shiites in Tehran.
4. (C) The Tajik government presses us for greater benefits in return for support on Afghanistan. The Tajiks think Uzbekistan is keeping all NDN-related business for itself; they want more traffic to transit Tajikistan, more infrastructure to support that traffic, and the United States to purchase Tajik goods for forces in Afghanistan. We currently purchase small amounts of Tajik bottled water for ISAF. They have indicated they would be happy for the U.S. establish an air base in Tajikistan. They see U.S. involvement in the region as a bulwark against Afghan instability, and as a cash cow they want a piece of.
FEAR OF INTERNAL RIVALS, MILITANTS, AND RUSSIA
5. (C) The Tajik civil war ended in 1997 with a power sharing arrangement between President Rahmon's government and the leaders of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). Since the end of
DUSHANBE 00000173 002 OF 005
the war, Rahmon gradually has reneged on this deal and forced nearly all oppositionists out of government -- some are in prison, some left the country, and others died mysteriously. In May 2009 an armed group led by a former UTO figure, Mullah Abdullo Rahimov, returned to Tajikistan from Afghanistan, reportedly with several foreign fighters. Tajik security forces neutralized this group without outside assistance. They have told us U.S. training enabled their security forces to win, and they are eager for more training.
6. (C) Russian-Tajik relations have deteriorated. Tajik officials believe the Russians supported Mullah Abdullo's group, to signal Tajikistan that they need Russian protection. The two governments could not agree on the terms of Russian involvement in the Roghun Dam, and they have other differences. In October 2009 the President downgraded the formal status of the Russian language in Tajikistan. His government broached charging Russia rent for its military bases in Tajikistan. In 2009 the Russian-controlled Sangtuda-1 hydroelectric plant cut production when the government of Tajikistan's failed to pay its bills on time.
ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES
7. (C) Tajikistan is the poorest of the former Soviet republics. It is more mountainous than Afghanistan, with earthquakes, floods, droughts, locusts and extreme weather. Parts of the country are often cut off by snow and avalanches. External links pass through obstructive Uzbekistan, unstable Afghanistan, or over the rough, remote Pamir passes to western China. Its only industrial products are aluminum and hydroelectricity. The Tajik Aluminum Company (Talco) accounts for most of Tajikistan's exports. Though it is technically state-owned, most of its revenues end up in a secretive offshore company controlled by the President, and the state budget sees little of the income. Talco consumes up to half of Tajikistan's electricity, contributing to major seasonal shortages and suffering.
8. (C) President Rahmon's response to Tajikistan's chronic energy insecurity was in late 2009 to launch a massive campaign to fund and build the Roghun Hydroelectric Plant. Roghun would be the highest dam in the world, and double Tajikistan's electricity generation capacity. The government's fundraising efforts, however, have drawn serious concern from international donors. Individuals and organizations across all walks of life have been coerced into buying shares in the project. Many people have been told they will lose their jobs unless they contribute an amount equal to many months' salary. While the government claims all share sales are voluntary, there is ample evidence that officials are forcing the population to cough up funds. Apart from the human rights question, donors are concerned that the nearly $200 million in funds raised so far will not be accounted for and spent transparently. Considering Talco's share of electricity consumption, the Roghun campaign looks like a means to ensure Talco's continued profitability.
9. (C) Tajikistan's economy suffers from the global recession through major drops in exports, imports, and remittances from a million Tajiks working in Russia. The money they sent home was equal to over 50% of GDP in 2008, and literally keeps rural communities alive. Remittances dropped 34% in 2009. The greatest obstacle to improving the economy is resistance to reform. From the President down to the policeman on the street, government is characterized by cronyism and corruption. Rahmon and his family control the country's major businesses, including the largest bank, and they play hardball to protect their business interests, no matter the cost to the economy writ large. As one foreign ambassador summed up, President Rahmon prefers to control 90% of a ten-dollar pie rather than 30% of a hundred-dollar pie.
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ELECTIONS ARE COMING, BUT DEMOCRACY ISN'T
10. (C) The government has limited opposition party operations and rejected electoral law reforms for the February 28, 2010 parliamentary elections. The Embassy does not expect the elections to be free and fair. There has been almost no coverage of opposition political parties by state media, and most of the population is unaware of the purpose of the elections. Parliamentary opposition is weak -- only 15 of the 62 members are not in the ruling party, and some of these are independent in name only. The most prominent opposition party, the Islamic Renewal Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), has two seats in the outgoing parliament. IRPT leadership has supported the government on most issues and downplays the importance of Islam in the party's platform. Parliament acts as a rubber stamp.
11. (SBU) In 2009 Parliament passed a restrictive new law on religion, curbing the activities of religious groups, Islamic or otherwise. Our advice that this could radicalize many believers has fallen on deaf ears. Last year, the government arrested dozens of individuals, accusing them of membership in the banned "Salafiya" movement, but it has no evidence that there is an organized Salafiya movement. It also arrested 92 members of the Muslim fundamentalist missionary group, Jamaati Tabligh. Most mainstream Muslim religious leaders view the Tabligh members as harmless missionaries and have called for their release.
12. (SBU) Independent media is reeling after government officials recently filed lawsuits against five newspapers for reporting on public government reports and statements in open court which were critical of judges and government ministries. The newspapers will be forced to close if the lawsuits succeed. We and European partners have protested the lawsuits.
DIFFICULT RELATIONS WITH DONORS
13. (SBU) In 2007 Tajikistan's National Bank admitted it had hidden a billion dollars in loans and guarantees to politically-connected cotton investors (of which $600 million was never repaid), violating its IMF program. The IMF demanded early repayment of some debt, an audit of the National Bank, and other reforms before renewing assistance. In May 2009 the IMF voted to lend a further $116 million to Tajikistan to help it through the next three years; the U.S. was the only IMF member to vote against this, which infuriated the Tajik government. The IMF has so far disbursed $40 million. A team from Washington was recently in Dushanbe to assess government progress, establish new benchmarks for the next tranche of funds, and assess the impact of Roghun fundraising. The team's assessment should be available soon. Donors are concerned that the campaign to finance Roghun is exacerbating severe poverty, and violates the terms of the IMF's assistance. It raises questions about the government's frequent appeals to donors for financial aid and its willingness to enact economic reforms as a condition of that aid. Donors have expressed their concerns formally to the government and await a response. Donors are pushing regional energy market integration and the construction of power lines that will allow Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to sell surplus summer electricity output to Afghanistan and Pakistan. A 220 kW line from Tajikistan to Afghanistan is under construction with Asian Development Bank financing, and will be finished in late 2010. The larger CASA-1000 power line project to link to Afghanistan and Pakistan has been delayed by financing problems.
U.S. ASSISTANCE
14. (U) U.S. assistance to Tajikistan will grow significantly to $45.3 million in FY 2010, from $27.8 million in FY 2009. The
DUSHANBE 00000173 004 OF 005
new money will go to agriculture, trade, and private sector initiatives to compensate for the loss of the much-needed food security programs. Until FY 2008 Tajikistan had a multi-year food aid program that had significant results reducing food insecurity in some of Tajikistan's most at-risk regions, followed by similar single-year programs in FY 2009 and 2010. A new Food Security Initiative is in development, but it remains unclear whether Tajikistan will receive any of those funds. New programs also will address chronic energy shortages by building a regional energy market and helping the Central Asian states address water and power issues. Tajikistan was awarded $9.9 million in FY 2008 1207 funds to address stability issues. The major threats to stability arise from the Tajikistan's poverty -- the World Bank estimates over 60% of the population lives below the poverty line -- and the government's demonstrated inability to respond to emergencies. The 1207 project works in 50 isolated communities in the Rasht and Fergana valleys, and along the Afghan frontier. Health and education deficiencies are so acute they imperil our progress in other areas. Our programs work to improve health policies, systems and services, teacher training, education finance, national curriculum, student assessment, and school governance.
SECURITY COOPERATION
15. (C) Security Cooperation remains a strong point in our relationship with Tajikistan. The Ministry of Defense volunteered last year for the first time to host CENTCOM's Exercise Regional Cooperation, including Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, which concluded August 10. CENTCOM and the Tajik Armed Forces held Consultative Staff Talks in May and established the FY 2010 Security Cooperation Plan, which reflects Tajikistan's increased interest in demining and participation in the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The U.S. Army Humanitarian Demining Research and Development Office will provide Tajikistan a mechanical demining machine for field evaluation in FY 2010 with a planned FMF purchase in FY 2011. Tajikistan reconfirmed its commitment to deploy a company-sized peacekeeping unit in 2011. Training begins this month with a National Policy White Paper Workshop that will help shape development in the Ministry of Defense and their Mobile Forces. A General Staff level workshop and actual unit training will take place next year.
16. (C) The Nizhny Pyanj Bridge and Point of Entry facilities have improved the links between Tajikistan and Afghanistan significantly. Though the bridge is not being used to its fullest capacity, traffic is much heavier than the old ferry system, and continues to grow. Counts vary between 40 and 200 containers and transport trucks per day. CENTCOM 2010funding at this facility will improve lighting, fences, and cameras, and parking areas. Tajikistan is eager to see us make greater use of our agreement on transit of non-lethal goods to Afghanistan through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), and hopes for economic benefits to Tajikistan from this agreement. So far we have low rate truck traffic from Manas through Tajikistan to Bagram. Defense Logistics Agency is arranging to buy bottled water from a Tajik producer for forces in Afghanistan. The Tajiks are looking for any way to circumvent Uzbekistan's stranglehold on their trade.
US SOF ENGAGEMENT
17. (S) The U.S. Embassy plans to continue to build the capacity and capability of select Tajikistan security forces, in support of CENTCOM Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Counter Narcotics (JIACG-CN), and U.S. government strategic themes, goals and objectives for Tajikistan. Once SOCCENT forces have done an assessment and started organizing these groups into special units, the main goal is to sustain an increase in capabilities by U.S. Special Forces Joint Combined Exercise and Training (JCET) and Counter-narcotic training (CNT) missions.
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NARCOTICS
18. (C) Tajikistan is a major transit route for Afghan heroin going to Russia and Europe. According to UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates, 40 tons of Afghan opiates enter Russia each year via Tajikistan. Less than 5% is seized before reaching Russia. Capabilities of Tajik law enforcement agencies are severely limited. Corruption is a major problem. Law enforcement agencies are reluctant to target well-connected traffickers, but are effective against low- and mid-level traffickers. The Drug Control Agency (DCA) is a ten-year-old, 400-officer agency developed through a UNODC project. Many countries are donors, but an INL-funded salary supplement program provides the primary funding. DCA's liaison officers in Taloquan in northern Afghanistan were key to seizures totaling over 100 kilos of heroin in the last four months. U.S Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents work with DCA to deepen operations.
19. (SBU) Until 2005, the Russians guarded the Tajik/Afghan border; after the Russians departed, the outposts were broken down lean-tos, unfit for human habitation. The Tajik Border Guard force is staffed largely by conscripts who are poorly trained, poorly paid, underequipped and often under-fed. INL rebuilt border posts, giving the Border Guards suitable and safe places to live, creating conditions for successful border patrol operations. Each new outpost costs about $500,000 and houses more than 100 guards. The outposts use low-maintenance energy-efficient prefab construction and alternative energy, including solar, wind and micro-hydro power. We are planning a pilot project of joint Tajik/Afghan border guard training in Khorog. If successful, it will be part of the regular training of guards assigned to the Afghan/Tajik border. We are exploring offering a popular Emergency First Responder course to a joint class of Tajik and Afghan border guards. INL has rebuilt the Tajik Border Guard academy. A U.S. Border Patrol team plans to visit to discuss and demonstrate patrolling techniques at the Academy and in the field; this might lead to an exchange of instructors.
20. (C) CENTCOM's Counter Narcotics program is making strong contributions to Tajikistan's security. This year, $16.9 million in funding, recently approved in the Supplemental Bill, will support construction of an interagency National Training Center, infrastructure at the Nizhny Pyanj Point of Entry, and communications equipment. The Training Center will be a multi-use facility for all ministries and serve as a venue for SOCCENT's bi-annual Counter Narco-Terrorism training. A recent end-use monitoring visit demonstrated the Tajiks are using previously provided communications equipment and maintaining the equipment. This year, we will begin establishing an interagency communications architecture at Nizhny Pyanj and the adjoining district. This will allow five government agencies to communicate using a compatible system. QUAST
Friday, 02 December 2005, 10:29
S E C R E T DUSHANBE 001921
SIPDIS
STATE FOR P, EUR/CACEN, EUR/RUS, SA, S/P
NSC FOR MERKEL
EO 12958 DECL: 12/2/2015
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINR, MARR, RS, TI
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT RAHMONOV: HIS VIEWS ON RUSSIA
REF: STATE 214783
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy Dushanbe. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) The Ambassador met with President Emomali Rahmonov on December 1 for two and a half hours. We report the meeting in three cables. This is two of three. The other two cover Rahmonov's views on (1) the U.S.-Tajikistan bilateral relationship and Tajik politics, and (2) Uzbekistan.
2. (S) SUMMARY: President Rahmonov judges that new Russian Ambassador Ramazan Abdulatipov is "not very diplomatic, but not a bad guy." Though Rahmonov has to work closely with Russia he made clear he keeps both eyes wide open. He alleged that he kicked the Russian Border Guards out of Tajikistan because they were plotting with former Presidential Guards Commander Gaffor Mirzoyev to overthrow him. Although some of what Rahmonov said may have been calculated for U.S. consumption, much of it has a ring of truth." END SUMMARY.
3. (S) President Rahmonov expressed gratitude for the State Department's non-paper about U.S.-Russia consultations (reftel), and said that Tajikistan will do everything possible to promote good relations in the region between Russia and the United States. He said Russia has natural historic, cultural, and security interests in the region and will always be a major force that cannot be ignored, but it is important for the international community to moderate Russia's worst instincts and help it become a positive force. It is especially important for Russia and the United states to develop common positions in the region, including in Afghanistan, to promote sustainable stability and prosperity.
RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR "NOT A BAD GUY," JUST NOT VERY DIPLOMATIC
4. (C) Rahmonov, abandoning his notes as he usually does, paused and smiled. "You know, (Russian political-appointee Ambassador) Ramazan (Abdulatipov) is not really a bad guy, even though he complains to me about you all the time. He's a politician, philosopher, and intellectual. Because he's from Dagestan, we have very interesting discussions about the history of Russia's Muslims and Persian culture. But he's just not a diplomat. He doesn't understand nuances and niceties. He's certainly no Peshkov! (NOTE: Previous Russian Ambassador Maksim Peshkov. END NOTE.) But he's open and friendly with me personally. He understands Russia creates a lot of problems here, and knows it's his job to try to solve them."
5. (S) Rahmonov added, "Actually, It's the Russian special services who cause trouble here, and I've told Ramazan it's his job to keep them under control. And it's not just here, it's coming from the Kremlin, and some of it comes from the top. We can never forget that Putin himself is a 'chekist' (career intelligence officer) at heart."
WHY RAHMONOV KICKED OUT THE RUSSIAN BORDER GUARDS
6. (S) Rahmonov said, "I want to tell you a secret why I insisted that the Russian Border Guards had to leave Tajikistan. You know they're part of the KGB. I had credible information they and (jailed General Gaffor) Mirzoyev were plotting a coup against me. That's why I pushed Mirzoyev out of the Presidential Guard, disbanded the Presidential Guard, and told Putin forcefully his Border Guards had to go. This had been building for a long time, and I had frequently discussed it with Putin, but he wouldn't do anything about it. Only after I moved
against Mirzoyev did Putin finally understand that their game was up. To make amends, he agreed that his Border Guards would leave. You know who helped me with this? (Federal Service on Control of Narcotics Chairman Victor) Cherkesov. He was here at that time studying our Drug Control Agency, and he realized that the Russian Border Guards were more involved in trafficking heroin than in stopping it. He went to Putin on my behalf."
7. (S) Having warmed to this issue, Rahmonov said, "This constant propaganda in the Russian media about how Tajikistan is failing to control its borders now that the Russians have left - you know where that comes from? From the Russian generals who want to come back here with their mafia buddies. Look what they got here - they put in two-year tours, and then went back to Moscow and bought Mercedes 600s and elite apartments. You think they did that on their salaries? Why do you think the generals lined up in Moscow all the way across Red Square and paid enormous bribes to be assigned here - just so they could do their patriotic duty?"
8. (S) "And another thing," Rahmonov continued heatedly, "why do you think I got rid of the 50 Russian generals who used to be advisers in our Ministry of Defense. They never did anything for us. They never helped us build a professional military, never gave us any military-technical assistance, because they wanted to keep us weak so their buddies could play games and make fortunes dealing drugs. I got fed up, said thanks but now it's time for you to go home. That's one reason they eventually came up with the plot to overthrow me."
9. (S) COMMENT: Rahmonov seldom misses a chance in extended conversations with the Ambassador to assert Tajikistan's independence from Russia and occasional unhappiness with their friendship-of-convenience. His revelation of why he asked the Russian Border Guards to leave Tajikistan is an amplified version of what he told us last year. Although it may be highly edited and spun for our consumption, we note a coincidence of timing. The Mirzoyev drama played out at the end of January 2004. By the end of February 2004, Russian Ambassador Peshkov confided to us that the Russian Border Guards would leave Tajikistan. END COMMENT. HOAGLAND
NNNN
Wednesday, 22 November 2006, 14:03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 002113
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
EO 12958 DECL: 11/22/2016
TAGS PREL, RS, TI
SUBJECT: WHETHER TO COOPERATE: MIXED SIGNALS FROM THE RUSSIANS IN
DUSHANBE
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Dushanbe, STATE. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: On September 21 Embassy Dushanbe, together with our Russian diplomatic and military colleagues, commemorated the 1992 evacuation of American diplomats from Dushanbe at the start of the Tajik civil war. The Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division resident in Dushanbe was instrumental in assisting the evacuation, and as usual our commemoration included a wreath-laying ceremony at the 201st headquarters. The Ambassador also hosted a dinner for ranking Russian diplomats and military commanders. The Embassy initiated these events, as we have in the past, in order to emphasize to our Russian counterparts the value of cooperation on issues of mutual concern. The morning event at the 201st was collegial and even festive, replete with heartfelt vodka toasts. The Russians used the American hosted dinner however as an opportunity to send a clear message that cooperation will not extend beyond a shared shot of vodka (or two, or a dozen). End summary.
2. (C) In October 1992, the Department ordered the evacuation of the newly established embassy in Dushanbe due to the worsening security situation caused by the civil war. The Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division - now the 201st Military Base - assisted the Embassy with the evacuation. Several years ago, the Embassy began commemorating the anniversary by thanking the Russian 201st command, laying a wreath at the 201st headquarters and hosting a dinner for senior Russian officials in country. For this year's event, we worked for nearly a month to find a date which worked for the Russian Ambassador, Defense Attache and 201st Commander. We accommodated the Russian calendars by postponing the event until November 21.
3. (C) The wreath-laying ceremony proceeded according to script. Even the weather cooperated, with the first snowfall of the season to mark the somber occasion. The wintry conditions also contributed to the Russians' already marked enthusiasm to turn the morning ceremony into an occasion for vodka drinking. Participating Embassy staff lost track of the exact count, but the many heartfelt toasts offered by both Americans and Russians were offered in a genuine spirit of cooperation.
4. (C) At the dinner later that evening, the Russians sent us a very different message. Three days prior, at President Rahmonov's inauguration, Russian Ambassador Ramazan Abdulatipov informed the Ambassador that he would not be able to attend her dinner on the 21st. He explained he had been called to Moscow for business, but his DCM would plan to attend. At the morning wreath-laying ceremony, Russian DCM Vyacheslav Svetlichny informed the Ambassador that he also had a scheduling conflict. He did not offer to send any other diplomats in his place, and no Russian civilians attended. At the dinner, Russian Defense Attache Colonel Yuri Ivanov took two calls on his mobile phone and excused himself after the first course, promising to return after 10 minutes. He did not return. Of the 201st command staff, only two of the four invited officers showed up, including 201st Commander Colonel Alexei Zavizyan. Zavizyan's behavior was mildly rude throughout the evening but deteriorated rapidly after Colonel Ivanov's departure. Zavizyan chastised the Ambassador's household staff and made a series of sexist remarks. The dinner ended abruptly after he sunk to uttering ugly racist slurs about African Americans.
5. (C) Comment: The Russians poor attendance at the dinner was no accident. We worked closely with the Russian Embassy for more than a month to pin down dates and an invitation list for their participation. It is also clear that Zavizyan's
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incredibly rude behavior was no accident, nor would we attribute it to vodka consumption. Our Russian guests made it very clear that while they will share the occasional toast with us, they do not consider us friends here in Tajikistan and will make it difficult to cooperate on issues of mutual concern. While we have faced intransigence from the Russian military and security elements here in the past, typically the Russian diplomats step in to smooth the edges. On this occasion, the Russian embassy did little to facilitate the events and absented themselves to avoid complicity with their military colleagues at the dinner. We plan to continue to take the high road, proposing areas for cooperation where it's in our mutual interest. But we won't be inviting the Russian military to dinner any time soon. JACOBSON
Tuesday, 01 August 2006, 12:12
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001464
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, EUR/CARC, PM, S/P
EO 12958 DECL: 8/1/2016
TAGS PGOV, PREL, MARR, GG, RS, TI
SUBJECT: OLD-GUARD TAJIK MINISTER OF DEFENSE OBSESSES ON NATO,
GEORGIA
DUSHANBE 00001464 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, Embassy Dushanbe, State Department. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador endured a three-hour-plus one-on-one lunch August 1 with Tajikistan's Minister of Defense Sherali Khairulloyev. Apart from the general conversation, the minister apologized for previous mil-mil relations that didn't meet expectations; harped repeatedly on NATO, Georgia, and Saakashvili; and asserted the Shanghai Cooperation Organization must become a military bloc to face down NATO. By the end of the alcohol-sodden lunch, the minister was slurring and unsteady on his feet. We suspect President Rahmonov ordered the minister to host this farewell lunch. While it was rather unusual in many respects, we believe it helped place another brick in the wall of U.S.-Tajikistan military relations. END SUMMARY
2. (C) Defense Minister Khairulloyev apologized several times for "misunderstandings and missed opportunities" in the past in U.S.-Tajik military relations. He asserted repeatedly that he expects an increasingly smooth and productive relationship. He said he has come to understand Tajikistan must have a number of equal partners, not just one [Russia], if it is to propser.
3. (C) Minister Khairulloyev returned several times to NATO and Georgia. He repeatedly asked, "Why does NATO want a country like Georgia? Even the Warsaw Pact didn't subsume losers!" He asked if NATO will improve Georgia's "hopeless" economy. He asked why the United States "indulges the adolescent" President Saakashvili. The only possibly explanation, he asserted, is to "stick your finger in Moscow's eye." He added, "When Stalin created the Georgian Socialist Republic, he threw in Abkhazia and South Ossetia because Georgians on their own were a 'fly speck.' Without Abhkazia and South Ossetia," he alleged, "Georgia has no hope of existing."
4. (C) Khairulloyev volunteered that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has to develop to become a military bloc "with one-third of the world's population" to face down NATO. The Ambassador asked why Russia and the former Soviet republics view NATO as an enemy. Khairulloyev hoisted himself up and declared, "When the Warsaw Bloc disintergrated, of course a new bloc emerged for world domination. That's the historical dialectic. It's now time to confront NATO."
COLOR
5. (C) This lunch took place in Minister Khairulloyev's private dining room off his recently renovated private office. He emphasized that he seldom receives guests in his private office and, especially, that only one other ambassador had ever dined in his private dining room - former Russian Ambassador Maksim Peshkov.
6. (C) The Ambassador lost track of the toasts after the tenth. His shot-glass held vodka. The minister's high-ball glass was kept filled with un-cut Scotch. Late into the lunch, the minister was slurring badly and was not walking a straight line. Nevertheless, as the Ambassador kept attempting a gracious retreat, the Minister insisted on showing him "secret rooms" in the ministry. Each "secret room" was merely another public conference room with a large fresh flower display and - again and again - another round of toasts set out.
COMMENT
6. (C) This bizarre event was curious, because U.S.-Tajik military relations have incrementally been improving, especially with the National Guard, but also with the Russia-centric Ministry of Defense. Khairulloyev continues to make clear he
DUSHANBE 00001464 002.2 OF 002
serves at the pleasure of President Rahmonov and may be replaced after the November presidential election. Although this drunk-fest is how many old-guard former Soviets do mutual business, it was most unusual for an American guest. It was, to a degree, a mark of respect. We would not be surprised if President Rahmonov had ordered Khairulloyev to "do something for the departing Ambassador," and we rather wonder if this may have been a sort of valedictory by an old-guard security minister who suspects his days of service are numbered. Whatever, we were pleased to have drunk Khairulloyev well under the table. END COMMENT. HOAGLAND
Wednesday, 27 July 2005, 16:10
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000936
SIPDIS
LONDON FOR POL AND LEGATT
EO 12958 DECL: 01/31/2015
TAGS PREL, EFIN, SOCI, KCRM, EI, NIPP
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON IRA MONEY-LAUNDERING INVESTIGATION
REF: A. STATE 104288
B. DUBLIN 210 C. SOFIA 1108
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Jonathan S. Benton; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (C) Summary: Irish criminal justice officials are convinced that pound sterling notes seized in Dublin and Cork in mid-February in an apparent IRA-tied money-laundering scheme was money stolen from Belfast's Northern Bank. Police are attempting to establish forensic links between the seizures and robbery in order to bring charges by late 2005, with a court case to follow a year later. Irish investigators continue to pursue a possible Bulgarian link to the money-laundering scheme, but are reluctant to provide details on exchanges with Bulgarian counterparts. The Bulgarian Ambassador in Dublin denies any Bulgarian involvement and wishes that Ireland would close off this line of inquiry publicly. Irish officials, more generally, remain concerned that IRA funds acquired through sophisticated investments are seeping into resources available for Sinn Fein's political activities in the Republic of Ireland. Post expects that Irish officials will remain reticent on details of the money-laundering investigation until charges are filed. End summary.
Linking the Bank Robbery and Money Seizures
-------------------------------------------
2. (C) The roughly STG 3 million seized in Dublin and Cork the week of February 14 (ref B) is "beyond doubt" a portion of the STG 26.5 million stolen from Belfast's Northern Bank on December 20, 2004, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX and the Department of Justice, Equality, and Law Reform (DOJ)XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX related to Emboff the GOI's belief that up to 16 individuals questioned by Garda (police) in connection with the seizures were attempting to launder the stolen proceeds on behalf of the Provisional IRA (PIRA). This belief was based on information provided by Garda intelligence assets and by "walk-ins" who, in some instances, voluntarily turned over cash that they had been asked to hide (STG 300,000 in one case). While intelligence pointed clearly to a money-laundering operation, the challenge was to build forensic ties between the money seized and the stolen Northern Bank notes in order to support a court conviction. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Garda, led by the Criminal Assets Bureau, were still attempting to establish forensic links through the tracking system used by the Northern Bank for bank note bundles in its possession at the time of December robbery.
3. (C) If such ties could be established before autumn, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), James Hamilton, would be in a position to bring money-laundering charges by late 2005 against a number of those questioned, said XXXXXXXXXXXX. (To date, no one has been charged, except a XXXXXXXXXXXX, who was charged with membership in the IRA, an illegal organization. XXXXXXXXXXXX Once charges are brought, it would likely take a year to begin the court case. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Hamilton could possibly opt for a special non-jury criminal court consisting of three judges, an option that was sometimes used for cases involving unlawful organizations like the IRA. When Emboff asked who would likely face charges, XXXXXXXXXXXX replied that, of those brought in for Garda questioning, no one had been ruled out as beyond suspicion XXXXXXXXXXXX He added that the operative legislation in the case would likely be the Proceeds of Crime Act of 1997, rather than the Criminal Justice Act of 2005, since the latter focused primarily on terrorism.
4. (C) In separate discussions with the Ambassador, DCM, and Emboffs, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that investigations into the money-laundering case could still take several months, as police used DNA and other scientific techniques to pursue a connection to the Northern Bank raid. He commented that the money-laundering operation had been poorly conducted, due most likely to the unexpected size of the bank haul. Investigators were focused primarily on Ted Cunningham and XXXXXXXXXXXX
-----------------------
XXXXXXXXXXXX
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX
-----------------------------------
7. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX
---------------------------------
8. (C) More generally, the DOJ and Garda continue to be concerned that money illegally acquired by the IRA was "seeping" into resources available for Sinn Finn's political activities in the Republic of Ireland, said the DOJXXXXXXXXXXXX. The difficulty lay in documenting the mixing of such funds. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the Standards in Public Office Commission (SIPO) was similarly concerned that political donations obtained by Sinn Fein in the United States and elsewhere overseas were being spent in the South. (Under a 2002 SIPO ruling, Sinn Fein can accept donations from non-Irish citizens in foreign countries, but only for activities outside the Republic of Ireland, i.e., in Northern Ireland.) He noted that the DOJ would be interested to see whether and how the IRA might address criminality in its expected response to Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams' call for an end to republican paramilitarism. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that the awaited IRA statement would have no bearing on the money-laundering case or other investigations into possible IRA crimes committed since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.
9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that IRA money was constantly moving, flowing from diversified sources into wide-ranging investments. While the IRA had been proficient in smuggling, robbery, and racketeering since the 1970s, the Celtic Tiger economic boom of the 1990s had prompted the IRA to diversify into more sophisticated business enterprises. IRA investments now included real estate ventures in Dublin, London, and Spanish resort areas, handled by apparently respectable businessmen. XXXXXXXXXXXX also expressed concern about the commingling of ill-gotten IRA funds with Sinn Fein's political coffers in the Republic of Ireland. The irony, XXXXXXXXXXXX explained, was that Sinn Fein was already raising substantial sums for its political activities in the South through legal avenues. He pointed out, for example, that Sinn Fein conducted at least 60 fund-raisers in the South per week for its electoral war chest.
Comment: GOI Reticence
----------------------
10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX made clear to Emboffs that the ongoing investigation into the money-laundering case constrained their ability to provide more information, as the lack of detail in their observations bears out. We expect that GOI officials will remain reticent until charges are actually filed, a step that may also be delayed by continuing investigations into the Northern Bank robbery itself. Garda and DOJ representatives are also likely to continue to be quiet in public and in discussions with us regarding funding of Sinn Fein,s activities in the Republic of Ireland. As a political force in the South, Sinn Fein has limited reach, but is seen as the most well-organized and best-funded party. Competing parties, including the governing Fianna Fail party, are anxious to ensure that Sinn Fein members/supporters abide by Irish law and are subject to public scrutiny when they do not. Both the Garda (traditionally tough on the republican movement writ large, due to its terrorist connections) and political levels of the government will be careful to avoid the public perception that any legal pursuit of Sinn Fein/IRA-tied personalities in the South is politically connected. KENNY
Wednesday, 31 May 2006, 16:37
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000623
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/31/2015
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINR, ECON, EI
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER AHERN TAKES "HARD LINE" ON DEADLINE
FOR NORTHERN EXECUTIVE
REF: DUBLIN 562
DUBLIN 00000623 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: XXXXXXXXXXXX Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (C) Summary: The Irish Government would not agree to extend the November 24 deadline for the Northern Assembly to form an Executive, due to the likely distractions of the mid-2007 Irish general elections, Prime Minister (Taoiseach) Bertie Ahern told Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss and the Ambassador on May 22. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that fleshing out details for the Northern parties on a post-November fallback plan ("Plan B") would distract their attention from the deadline. (Comment: Whether or not the Irish and British Governments stick to the November 24 deadline, Ahern,s strong remarks are a clear signal to the parties, which the GOI would like the USG to reinforce in discussions with Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).) Ahern believed that Sinn Fein would not endorse joint policing except with the formation of the Executive, though he and Reiss concurred that there had been recent republican progress in interaction with the police. Ahern also expressed disappointment with the DUP,s refusal to engage with Sinn Fein, and Reiss noted that DUP leader Ian Paisley was likely to ignore the November deadline in public defiance of the Irish and British Governments. In a separate discussion, Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern told Reiss that a single, Southern-hosted investment conference on the North would be preferable to two separate conferences (a view that Northern Secretary Peter Hain accepted in a May 24 phone call with Reiss). In another meeting, Justice Minister Micheal McDowell briefed Reiss and the Ambassador on pending Northern-related legal casesXXXXXXXXXXXX. End summary.
The November 24 Deadline and Plan B
-----------------------------------
2. (C) Under no circumstances would the Irish Government agree to extend the November 24 deadline for the Northern Ireland Assembly to form an Executive, Prime Minister (Taoiseach) Bertie Ahern told Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss and the Ambassador on May 22. Ahern explained that, if the deadline were not met, "Plan B" (indefinite suspension of the Assembly and joint UK/Irish stewardship of the Northern political process) would take effect, as the campaign for the expected May 2007 Irish general elections would preclude his continued involvement in Northern negotiations. He added that he had been clear with the British Government on this point and that any effort to establish an Executive after November 24 would fall to the parties. Ahern said he would not be surprised, however, if the parties were to press for a delay beyond the deadline, notwithstanding the long lead-up to November. (Comment: Were the Irish and British Governments to hold the line on the November 24 deadline, they would be showing atypical resolve. We suspect that the decision whether or not to extend the deadline will be taken closer to the date.)
3. (C) While Plan B would help force the parties, feet to the fire, fleshing out Plan B in more detail now would distract the parties from the November 24 deadline, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, who also attended the meeting with Ahern and Reiss. In any case, Plan B has not been drafted, noted XXXXXXXXXXXX. He expressed hope that the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) report due in early October would show enough republican progress on criminality to catalyze the negotiations, keeping the focus off Plan B. He added that the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) risked a huge tactical error in believing that a deal might be achievable after November 24, since Sinn Fein might abandon the negotiation process completely after that deadline.
The DUP's Refusal to Engage
---------------------------
4. (C) Ahern expressed disappointment with the DUP's refusal to engage with Sinn Fein, particularly "childish" tactics at the Northern Assembly Stormont Buildings like ducking out of elevators carrying Sinn Fein members. He pointed out that there had been over 30 instances of quiet contact between the DUP and Sinn Fein during the December 2004 negotiations. Since the collapse of those talks and the subsequent Northern Bank robbery and McCartney murder, engagement had ceased. Ahern cited Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams' view that the IRA's July 2005 decision to decommission weapons should have merited renewed contact with the DUP at some level, not
DUBLIN 00000623 002.2 OF 003
necessarily with DUP leader Ian Paisley. DUP resistance to engagement, he added, was leading the republican community to question Adams' overall strategy for the peace process. Ahern admitted that he did not know what would make the DUP speak with Sinn Fein, and he hoped that the Northern Assembly's proposed Restoration Committee might be a vehicle for interaction. (At roughly the same time as Special Envoy Reiss' meeting with Ahern, Paisley announced that the DUP would not take part in the Committee as a mechanism for negotiations.)
Policing and Sinn Fein
----------------------
5. (C) The Northern policing issue would not be resolved until the formation of the Executive, said Ahern. He elaborated that Sinn Fein tacticians would not want to "hand over their last card" with a commitment to joint policing before November, since the DUP would then discount that card in the negotiations. Ahern doubted that the DUP even wanted the devolution of policing at this point. He added that there was therefore little sense in making Sinn Fein endorsement for joint policing a precondition in the Northern negotiations. He added, however, that the republican community was increasingly amenable to such an endorsement.
2006: Good Progress and Next Steps
----------------------------------
6. (C) On the whole, 2006 has been a very positive year, particularly in terms of progress in the republican community, Ahern observed. He noted that there was increasing engagement on the ground between the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and republican areas of Belfast. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that the Irish and British Governments were pleasantly surprised by the public's and parties' reactions to the April 6 statement that the Assembly would reconvene. The only negative republican occurrences during the year, said Ahern, had been the April 4 murder of Denis Donaldson (the former IRA official who was out-ed as a British informant), the robbery of a liquor truck by alleged IRA members, and the discovery of a 250 lb. fertilizer bomb in Lurgan. Ahern maintained that these incidents were the work of IRA breakaway groups who were not connected with Sinn Fein leadership. He added that Sinn Fein seemed surprised and shaken by the Donaldson murder and, ironically, had supported the April 6 statement calling for reestablishment of Stormont even more strongly as a result.
7. (C) In terms of next steps, XXXXXXXXXXXX observed that Prime Ministers Ahern and Blair planned to meet with all parties on June 26. In the expectation that there would be no progress by that point, the goal of the late June consultations would be to map out the agenda for the period remaining before late November. The Governments, added XXXXXXXXXXXX, would then "bed down for the summer." He explained that the Irish Government would continue to listen carefully to the parties' rhetoric in order to gauge their seriousness about making the Good Friday Agreement work.
Reiss: No Urgency among Parties
-------------------------------
8. (C) In his discussion with the Taoiseach (and in separate meetings, per paras below), Special Envoy Reiss reported from his May 19 discussions at Stormont that he sensed no urgency among the parties, particularly the DUP, to commence work on an Executive deal. He noted that DUP was likely to ignore the November 24 deadline in public defiance of the British and Irish Governments. The DUP also appeared confident that it could achieve in the first few months after November any deal that was achievable by November 24. Reiss elaborated that DUP leaders indicated no intention of engaging Sinn Fein, partly out of fear that negotiations with Gerry Adams would see the unionist community "lose its shirt."
9. (C) Sinn Fein leaders, by contrast, were relaxed in their discussions with Reiss, with Gerry Adams focused on USG permission for fund-raising activities in the United States in the fall. Reiss believed that Adams was prepared to endorse joint policing, not only to avoid blame if the November 24 deadline passed, but also to project a positive political image for Sinn Fein in the South's 2007 general elections. Adams also suggested that a Sinn Fein Executive Council decision, rather than a full party conference, might be sufficient to endorse policing. Reiss agreed with the Taoiseach that there had been progress in the republican community, as was evident from friendly interaction with the PSNI that would have been impossible six months ago.
DUBLIN 00000623 003.2 OF 003
FM Ahern Opposes Proposals for Two Investment Conferences
--------------------------------------------- ------------
10. (C) In a separate discussion that reviewed most of the issues raised in the Taoiseach's meeting, Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern said that there was no point in having two Northern Ireland investment conferences in the fall that would be sponsored by the North and South, respectively. He remarked that whereas plans for the proposed Northern-sponsored conference lacked focus and details, the South's conference would work and would proceed regardless. Reiss agreed that a single conference would be better, and he asked for the opportunity to speak first to the British Government about this preference. (Comment: On May 24, Reiss discussed the conference proposal with Northern Secretary Peter Hain, who agreed to put off the Northern-sponsored conference until 2007.)
DOJ Update on Legal Cases
-------------------------
11. (C) Special Envoy Reiss and the Ambassador also met with Minister of Justice and Equality Michael McDowell. Irish Department of Justice (DOJ)officialsXXXXXXXXXXXX who made the following points about Northern Ireland-related legal cases:
XXXXXXXXXXXX
B) Money Launderers. Before November, the Irish Government would bring charges against several individuals connected to the police seizure of several million pound sterling in February 2005, believed to be from the 2004 Northern Bank robbery.XXXXXXXXXXXX
E) Denis Donaldson. McDowell believed that the out-ing of Denis Donaldson as an informant was a clear message from the British Government that it had another, more valuable, source of information within the republican leadership. He reiterated the Taoiseach's point, however, that Sinn Fein leaders appeared to have had no connection to Donaldson's murder. KENNY
Friday, 04 February 2005, 16:06
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000143
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/04/2015
TAGS PREL, PTER, PINR, EI, UK, NIPP
SUBJECT: PEACE PROCESS: GOI SHAKEN BY SECOND IRA STATEMENT
BUT FAVORS "INCLUSION"
Classified By: AMB JAMES C. KENNY
1. (S) SUMMARY: Amb Kenny met February 4 with XXXXXXXXXXXX. The ambassador indicated that the USG is inclined not to invite Northern Ireland political parties to the March 17 White House event. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the GOI believes engagement with Sinn Fein is better than exclusion, and asked if the USG would be willing to defer a decision in case the environment improves. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the GOI strategy regarding the peace process was to "sit tight" and let Sinn Fein find its way back in, following strong messages from the GOI and UK to Sinn Fein leaders. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX said the second IRA statement made the situation worse. He said the GOI considered the February 3 IRA statement "ominous" and was "unnerved" by it. In response to the ambassador's request for more information on the bank robbery, XXXXXXXXXXXX said the GOI information came mostly from the UK and from PSNI-Garda contacts, a point reinforced later on February 4 in a telephone conversation from XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that the GOI has a "very strong view" that Sinn Fein should not be excluded from the United States, which he wishes to discuss in person with the Ambassador at their XXXXXXXXXXXX meeting. (Note: XXXXXXXXXXXX did not specify on the phone whether he was expressing a general view on visas for Sinn Fein or a specific view on March 17 events.) Separately this week, POL/ECON chief met with political figures active in the peace process, all of whom echoed some of XXXXXXXXXXXX concerns: uncertainty over whether Sinn Fein is serious about peace, whether it can bring the IRA along or would be willing to break from the IRA, and uncertainty over whether Sinn Fein is in full control of the IRA. Interlocutors also commented on the domestic political implications of the current impasse. DCM and POL/ECON Chief also attended the meeting with XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Summary.
March 17
--------
2. (S) On XXXXXXXXXXXX, Ambassador Kenny briefed XXXXXXXXXXXXon current USG thinking about the March 17 events, emphasizing that the most important aspect of the occasion is the President's meeting with the Taoiseach (PM Ahern). He told XXXXXXXXXXXX that the USG at this point is inclined not to invite any of the Northern Ireland parties to the White House but instead to honor civic leaders. When asked for GOI views, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that it was of course a USG decision to make but it was a decision that would have ramifications in Ireland. He said that the situation is "tense" and the GOI does not want it to worsen. The GOI feels that engagement with Sinn Fein is better than exclusion. Noting that the situation is fluid, he said that the Taoiseach would prefer that no decision be made, yet, on White House participation. XXXXXXXXXXXX seemed especially concerned that no decision be announced next week, given that the week will already be highly charged because of the release of the International Independent Monitoring Commission's report on the Northern Bank robbery. The discussion then turned to Sinn Fein's visa requests for events in the U.S. around St. Patrick's Day, apart from the White House. XXXXXXXXXXXX reiterated the GOI's strong view that giving Sinn Fein visas to the U.S. helps the peace process.
IRA Statements of February 2 and 3
----------------------------------
3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the long IRA statement of February 2 had not worried the GOI because it seemed natural for the IRA to take its decommissioning offer off the table given the abeyance in the peace process. However, he said the February 3 statement had caught them by surprise. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the GOI believed the two statements were written by different drafters. The February 3 statement, he said, looked like the style of the Chief of Staff of the IRA. He called the statement "ominous" and said it had left GOI officials "unnerved and anxious." He then referred to Sinn Fein's Martin McGuinness' claim of also having no prior knowledge of the statement. He said that if McGuinness genuinely did not know in advance that the IRA would issue a second statement February 3, that could signal that Sinn Fein is genuinely breaking from the IRA. While that might indicate Sinn Fein's seriousness about pursuing peace, it would raise other issues. Was Sinn Fein losing control over the IRA? If Sinn Fein no longer can or will serve as a conduit to the IRA, who will? XXXXXXXXXXXX then noted that McGuinness did not repudiate the IRA statement, which he implied would tend to indicate no change in Sinn Fein's relationship with the IRA.
4. (C) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX uncertainty about Sinn Fein's intentions and Sinn Fein's control over the IRA were echoed in comments across the political spectrum this week, including in conversations with Senator Martin Mansergh, former government advisor on Northern Ireland; staff from the Glencree Center for reconciliation; and a Fianna Fail political advisor. That XXXXXXXXXXXX and others so long and deeply engaged in the peace process would be so uncertain of Sinn Fein's intentions is not a good omen for the peace process. It indicates the degree to which the bank robbery destroyed the government's trust in Sinn Fein. Meanwhile, uncertainty about Sinn Fein's interest in peace or control over the IRA, combined with the IRA's February 3 statement, clearly has officials worried. The government steadfastly holds onto engagement with Sinn Fein because it sees no other alternative. End Comment
Peace Process
-------------
5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the GOI's approach to the peace process was to "sit tight" and let Sinn Fein find its way back. Equally, the GOI will stay engaged with Sinn Fein, including a February 4 meeting between FM Dermott Ahern and Martin McGuinness, Sinn Fein's chief negotiator. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that until the bank robbery, there was every expectation that a comprehensive agreement would be reached. He said the two outstanding issues, decommissioning and criminality, had been considered resolvable until the bank robbery -- which he termed a "tragedy that stopped everything." Senator Martin Mansergh, who remains influential in the peace process and close to the Taoiseach, was more expansive. He said that Sinn Fein must get the message to draw a line under paramilitarism and criminality. Echoing what we have also heard from DFA, Mansergh said that since the robbery, there is no longer any willingness to accept Sinn Fein's argument that it needs time to bring the IRA along. Like other contacts, Mansergh said that ten years is long enough and this time, all around talks can only begin on the basis of the IRA winding up. Neither Mansergh nor any government official has yet defined what they would need from Sinn Fein. They say that they will not again work on a comprehensive package only to have it fall apart at the end because of the IRA yet also say they would not expect decommissioning and a cessation of criminality to be a pre-requisite to all party talks.
GOI Information on the Northern Bank Robbery
--------------------------------------------
6. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the GOI's judgment on the robbery was based almost exclusively on UK intelligence. He also said that intelligence is handled very differently in the British and Irish governments. In the Irish government, many officials, including himself, do not receive any intelligence reports. The tradition instead is to take the word of the Garda. Later on February 4, at XXXXXXXXXXXX' request, XXXXXXXXXXXX called the ambassador. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that he would be more precise with the Ambassador during their scheduled February 8 meeting, but confirmed that UK and PSNI information, combined with Ireland's long experience with the IRA, was the basis for the GOI assessment that IRA was behind the robbery. He said the GOI has no smoking gun or hard evidence but that the GOI considered it 99% certain that IRA conducted the robbery. Among several reasons, he said that no group other than IRA could have entered the neighborhood in which the bank manager lived. He described it as a "no go" area for the PSNI and splinter groups. He also said no other group would have the discipline, this many weeks after the robbery, not to try to use a bank note, or provide information on the van or any other aspect of the robbery. He said that the GOI does have "rock solid evidence" that Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness are members of the IRA military command and for that reason, the Taoiseach is certain they would have known in advance of the robbery.
Domestic Implications
---------------------
7. (C) The GOI's all-out verbal offensive against Sinn Fein has tongues wagging about domestic politics. Martin Mansergh volunteered that as much as the Taoiseach is thinking about the 2007 elections, he values the peace process more and would sacrifice political gain if he thought peace would be advanced. Mansergh told POL/ECON chief that the bank robbery has damaged Sinn Fein in the Republic. While not yet reflected in poll numbers, Mansergh and other political operatives, believe (or hope) that some Sinn Fein voters will go elsewhere now that it is clear that Sinn Fein can not become part of any government in the Republic as long as IRA activity continues. On radio, Mansergh made the point more colorfully: "The truth is that Sinn Fein, regardless of extra seats they might or mightn't win, wouldn't come within an asses' roar of power north or south of the Border until the IRA is off the pitch." 8. (C) Another idea sporadically under consideration is that Fianna Fail could start competing in elections in Northern Ireland. The argument is that Fianna Fail's best way of confronting Sinn Fein in the Republic is to become an all-island party. Some think doing so could also give nationalists in the north an alternative to Sinn Fein, given the SDLP's waning fortunes. Mansergh did not see this as a short term prospect, in part because the SDLP has not yet indicated an interest in merging with Fianna Fail. Derek Mooney, Fianna Fail's political advisor to the Defense Minister, says the opposite. He said the bank robbery is rapidly changing the prospective and it is the right time for Fianna Fail to move north. He noted that most of SDLP's former voters are not voting at all, and only a small percentage shifted to Sinn Fein. This, he said, leaves space for a nationalist party with a vision for the future, a space Mooney thinks SDLP will never re-gain because it is seen only as a peace process party. Mooney said Fianna Fail took a significant step in November 2004 when it changed its rules, allowing full membership for people not resident in the Republic. The rules also allow a person to be a member of both Fianna Fail and SDLP. Mooney provides campaign advice to SDLP. KENNY
Monday, 26 July 2004, 07:22
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 001101
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR S/P AND EUR/UBI; NSC FOR VOLKER
EO 12958 DECL: 07/07/2014
TAGS EI, PGOV, PINR, PREL, PTER, UK, EUN, NIPP
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND - IRISH PM TELLS SPECIAL ENVOY
REISS THAT IRISH AND BRITS READY FOR ONE FINAL PUSH TO CLOSE A DEAL
REF: LONDON 4943
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES KENNY PER 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (C) Summary: U.S. Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss met on June 30 in Dublin with Irish Prime Minister Ahern and Foreign Minister Brian Cowen to review Irish/British efforts to lay the ground work for another effort at restoring devolved government in NI. Ahern confirmed that he and British PM Blair are prepared to host one last round of "hot house" negotiations with Sinn Fein (SF) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in the middle of September at a remote site in Scotland on an agreement to restore devolved government in Northern Ireland (NI). If those talks fail, Ahern indicated that a "plan B" (along the lines suggested by the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP)) for standing up NI institutions with a caretaker technocratic government might be worth considering. Subsequently, however, key Irish officials told the Ambassador and DCM that the GOI does not wish to float any notions of a "plan B" in advance of September meetings. Ahern and Cowen both expressed concern that the traditional July-August summer holiday season may keep SF and DUP from adequately preparing for intensive negotiations in early September. Cowen will have staff here in August working on plans. End Summary
MEETING WITH PM AHERN: THERE ARE DANGERS WITH A PLAN B BUT SDLP PROPOSAL MAY HAVE SOME MERIT
--------------------------------------------- ---------
2. (C) Attending with PM Ahern were XXXXXXXXXXXX, and XXXXXXXXXXXX. Accompanying Special Envoy Reiss were Ambassador Kenny, S/P Green, and Emboff. Ahern said that there must be a concerted effort in September to get a SF-DUP deal; "we can't keep going the way we have been." He agreed with Reiss' observation that the key ingredients for an agreement are convincing the parties that September is a make-or-break situation, helping SF leader Gerry Adams do a deal, and getting DUP commitments on implementation (of the deal). Also, there must be a credible "plan B" in reserve. Ahern noted that SF now has the political power and position to move forward, "but I don't know if they will." Ahern said that he was impressed with the DUP, but its proposed six-month hiatus (between a deal and implementation) is a non-starter because republicans will not accept that long gap; and it brings events too close to UK elections and Blair's upcoming (1/1/05) responsibilities as G-8 Chairman and EU President.
3. (C) Reiss agreed that DUP was showing an encouraging willingness to engage, adding that the parties can always negotiate an agreement in principle and a shorter timeframe for implementation, such as three months. The key is implementation because it is unrealistic to expect SF to "pay up front" with no guarantee of a deal. Ahern said the elements of a deal are clear, but it is important to keep all of the other parties involved as well. The last elections virtually eliminated the PUP and the Women's Coalition; the Alliance Party is significantly weakened; and SDLP and the UUP could lose all their Westminster seats in the next general election (to SF and DUP).
4. (C) Ahern said SF and the DUP cannot be allowed to hold up the entire devolution process indefinitely. He noted that Blair,s October 2002 &Acts of Completion8 speech in Belfast failed spectacularly to bolster moderate unionism and the DUP continues to gain at UUP's expense. The question is how to pressure the DUP to deal? Ahern said two points were certain: SF can't be excluded from a deal, and it must be done within the parameters of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). Without it, nationalist voters will walk away, and the NI public generally will grow more skeptical of devolution. For this reason, of the plan B proposals being circulated, the SDLP,s proposal or some variation &is not a bad one.8 (Note: SDLP recently proposed that the two governments (London and Dublin) nominate 10 administrators for the 10 government departments in order to get some form of devolved government up and running. End note.)
5. (C) Reiss said the U.S. agreed there are merits to the SDLP,s proposal. Moreover, the threat of a viable plan B might be a useful inducement to get the parties to deal in September. Reiss asked what Dublin and London were doing to prepare the ground for September and offered to send Ahern some thoughts on this soon. Ahern said there were better prospects for success in September if the parties were working off one text that ring-fenced areas of agreement and bracketed the major remaining unresolved issues: fulfilling commitments under the Joint Declaration, the Finucane inquiry, On The Runs (OTRs), and release of the murderers of Garda Gerry McCabe. Reiss asked whether the Finucane case was a potential deal breaker. Ahern said it is not a republican, but a nationalist, issue. Because there is such broad-based support across the nationalist community in the North for an inquiry, SF will insist on it. Ahern added that the results of a Finucane inquiry report tomorrow would not surprise anyone and "Tony (Blair) knows what he has to do." (Comment: Presumably, that the PM will have to overrule elements of the security-legal establishments to see that some form of public inquiry is held. End comment.)
6. (C) Taioseach advisor XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that SF knows there can be no deal without decommissioning - "everyone knows what needs to be done." Ahern added that another secret decommissioning act will not work; SF must understand that without transparency it will get no credit from DUP leader Paisley. Ahern noted that a clergyman in contact with Adams XXXXXXXXXXXX might act as a witness. His participation might be seen by unionists as lending credibility. Ahern said that the way to get SF on the policing boards is a deal that devolves policing/justice relatively quickly in exchange for an end to paramilitary activity and complete decommissioning. But, he added, DUP does not yet understand this. Reiss said that he would reinforce this when he met with DUP leaders on July 28.
MEETING WITH FM COWEN: GOI READY FOR FULL COURT PRESS IN SEPTEMBER
------------------------------------
7. (C) Reiss subsequently met with Irish Foreign Minister Brian Cowen, who was accompanied by XXXXXXXXXXXX. Cowen said that, even though DUP leader Paisley wants to do a deal, the main worry going into the September talks is that the parties will delay an agreement to get a better deal: "this is why we discuss plan Bs." Cowen added that, nonetheless, the GOI is going into September "with all guns blazing." Reiss asked what will the market bear in terms of pain to the parties. That is, he suggested that the parties discuss a plan B publicly and privately to pressure both the DUP and SF. Reiss added that SF-DUP dialogue over the next two months approaching September is critical and asked whether a &stick and carrot8 approach to Sinn Fein (SF) might be adopted and result in forward motion. XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that it is difficult to find a stick that won't alienate SF and destabilize/set back the entire process. Cowen reiterated PM Ahern's endorsement that talks in September focus around a bracketed text.
8. (C) Cowen said that the key factor at present is the DUP willingness to pre-cook a deal. This should allow SF to seriously engage, get an agreement, and then proceed with sequencing. In terms of offering a carrot, XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that the DUP needs to feel &flattered.8 He noted that party members are visiting the Kennedy School of Government in Harvard during the month of July, and it may be opportune to invite them to Washington for consultations and to drive home the message that the opportunity for a deal is there. Cowen said that the DUP must understand that changes on Strand One of the GFA would need to be offset by changes to Strand Two. He added that the issue of First Minister and Deputy First Minister must be resolved sooner rather than later. On decommissioning, Cowen suggested that one way to get transparency without breaching confidentiality would be to publish retrospectively the index listing a full inventory of guns and explosives following total decommissioning.
9. (C) Reiss asked how firm was the DUP's demand for a six-month &decontamination8 period prior to SF taking seats at the Executive table. Cowen replied that 6 months is a negotiating position, and "in fairness" DUP is ready to do a "big bang" deal now. Cowen noted that the devolution of justice is a critical issue for SF, and Finucane is a potential deal breaker -- it is a &hot button topic8 that is not going to go away. KENNY
Wednesday, 01 June 2005, 08:39
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DUBLIN 000657
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/31/2015
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINS, EI, UK, NIPP
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: GOI WAITING FOR IRA RESPONSE AND
COMMITTED TO GFA
REF: LONDON 4254
Classified By: Ambassador James C. Kenny for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
SUMMARY
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1. (C) During Special Envoy Mitchell Reiss' visit to Ireland May 19-22, the Irish government emphasized that the Good Friday Agreement and the December 8 joint communique must be the basis for forward movement in the peace process. They anticipate an IRA response to Gerry Adams' call to leave the scene within 60 days; they believe the focus must be kept on the IRA but do not have a specific list of steps the IRA must take as pre-conditions to serious negotiations. They believe serious talks will begin in September, but it could take until early 2006 to put the pieces in place, especially since the DUP would require a long period to verify IRA good behavior. GOI officials uniformly expressed concern that the UK's political interest in showing progress might lead the UK to be too soft on Sinn Fein. Other issues raised include Irish unhappiness with the UK's inquiry into the Finucane murder; the importance of a non-violent marching season in Northern Ireland; and concerns about IRA criminality. Reiss briefed on his meetings in London and Belfast and informed them of the USG's decision to refuse a visa to Sinn Fein member Rita O'Hare.
2. (U) Mitchell Reiss met with the Taoiseach, PM Bertie Ahern; Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern, Justice Minister Michael McDowell; Finance Minister Brian Cowen; and, UK Ambassador Eldon. The Ambassador, DCM, POL/ECON Counselor, and S/P Special Assistant accompanied him to all meetings. Reiss and the Ambassador also had a private lunch with President and Dr. McAleese. END SUMMARY
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COMMENT
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3. (C) GOI concerns about UK "softness" represent a role reversal. Usually, it is the UK that is concerned Ireland will be too accommodating to Sinn Fein. The GOI's eventual position will depend on the Taoiseach. He is generally considered "softer" on the provisional movement than either the Foreign Affairs or Justice Ministers. However, he believes Sinn Fein leaders were aware of plans to rob the Northern Bank even as they negotiated with him last Fall. Publicly, he has been unprecedentedly critical of Sinn Fein and, until recently, greatly reduced private contacts as well. We are told that Adams prefers to deal directly with the Taoiseach and not with cabinet ministers. In deciding how to move forward, the Taoiseach is likely to look carefully at the IRA's response to Gerry Adams, given strong public feelings against IRA crime and paramilitarism. He is expected to call elections in 2007 or sooner. Having a deal in place would serve his political interests best; however, more failed attempts to reach a deal would hurt him electorally, particularly if he were seen to have been played by Sinn Fein. End Comment.
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XXXXXXXXXXXX DESCRIBES GOI EXPECTATIONS
--------------------------------------------
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX opened the meeting with an update of GOI actions. He said there had been very little GOI engagement with Sinn Fein since the talks broke down in December. He cited one meeting in January, one in March in Washington, and several private meetings between the Taoiseach and Gerry Adams. Significantly, he said the official feelings toward Sinn Fein had changed with all that has happened since December (Northern Bank robbery, money laundering, McCartney killing.) XXXXXXXXXXXX said the GOI is interested in the Good Friday Agreement and not in any "lesser models or deals." Following UK elections, the pace was picking up, he said, and he outlined a series of expected contacts with all parties. He said the GOI was pleased at PM Blair's re-election, and that Sinn Fein is aware that this is Blair's "last lap." That, he said, plays both ways. Sinn Fein knows that no successor is likely to be as engaged in the process as Blair, and that he represents their best hope of a deal. On the other hand, Sinn Fein also believes they could take advantage of Blair's interest in getting a deal before leaving office. Special Envoy Reiss, referring to his talks in London, said it is never good in a negotiation to appear more eager than the other side. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the UK had offered Sinn Fein a package following the December 8 breakdown, but withdrew it after the Northern Bank robbery. (Note: Sinn Fein has frequently expressed anger at the UK for "going back on its word." While never specifically mentioning a post-December 8 package, during the negotiations, Sinn Fein seemed confident that the UK felt Sinn Fein's decommissioning offer was worth taking up even if a comprehensive deal with the DUP was not reached.)
...KEEP THE FOCUS ON THE IRA
5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX indicated the focus must be kept on the IRA. The GOI, he said, hopes for decisive action, followed by a "proving period" and leading to talks that restore the executive. He anticipated that it might take until late fall or early in 2006 to put all the pieces together; the IRA would need to do something definitive within two months, and the DUP would likely require a six-month testing period before agreeing to sit down with Sinn Fein. XXXXXXXXXXXX said there is little appetite within the GOI or the Irish public for going "round and round again." He said GOI will not go about talks in a "headline way." The credibility of the process and the players is in question, he said, and this time, talks must work. A deal is possible, he said, but will take time. Reiss responded by saying Gerry Adams had told him to expect an IRA response in a month, before the marching season. Reiss said Adams had stated that "the IRA must be taken out of the equation." Reiss noted that public tolerance of accepting things at face value is gone. The IMC must confirm that the IRA takes any actions it promises. When the Taoiseach joined the meeting, he said that verification would have to include witnesses of decommissiong (probably clergy), in addition to the IICD, as layed out December 8.
...QUIET MARCHING SEASON NECESSARY
6. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX Reiss and the Ambassador agreed that tensions were high as marching season approaches, and it is vitally important that violence is averted. That message needs to be delivered to all parties. The Ambassador asked who is engaging with the Parades Commission; XXXXXXXXXXXX said there is a disconnect between the Parades Commission and the PSNI. All agreed that a violent marching season could set back prospects for political progress.
...DUP FLEXING ITS MUSCLES, INCLUDING REGARDING POLICING BOARD
7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX and Reiss exchanged views on the DUP, following their big win in UK elections. The Ambassador noted that DUP is looking to flex its muscles, and should not be allowed to unwind existing mechanisms, such as the Policing Board, whose mandate expires October 18. XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed and said the GOI favors renewing the policing board in its current form.
-------------------------------
TAOISEACH DISCUSSES WAY FORWARD
-------------------------------
8. (C) The Taoiseach joined the meeting, and layed out his vision of the way forward. Like XXXXXXXXXXXX he felt any deal was many months away, with talks not starting until September and a deal not likely until January. The Taoiseach then discussed what he felt was realistic to expect from the IRA. He said that no one can expect the IRA to agree to disband; rather, it could enter a new commemorative role. His own father, he said, considered himself to be an IRA man to the day he died in the 1990's. IRA members, he said, consider themselves to be soldiers and their IRA membership is the center of their lives. They could, however, convert to a commemorative organization that visits graves and plans events to mark the anniversaries of atrocities. The Taoiseach said he had explained this to DUP leader Ian Paisley. By the same token, the Taoiseach said Sinn Fein knows that they have milked the process as much as they can. He said that "Gerry understands criminality must end", even if he will not say that the IRA has been involved in crime.
9. (C) Reiss described changes in perception within the Irish-American community. Their conversations with the Taoiseach, and the IRA's words and actions following the McCartney murder were giving them a more realistic view of the IRA. The Taoiseach agreed, but noted that it is still hard for much of Irish-America to accept that the IRA was involved in the murder. Reiss then informed the Taoiseach that the US had refused Sinn Fein member Rita O'Hare's visa request.
...TAOISEACH RAISES FINUCANE
10. (C) The Taoiseach raised the Finucane case, as did every other GOI official with whom Reiss met. Reiss briefed him on his talks in London, including with the head of MI5, who committed to turning over all evidence her agency has to the inquiry, but she was adamant that the inquiry will proceed using the new legislation. Reiss noted his concern that the Finucane case will become an irritant in Irish relations with the UK and get in the way of a deal. The Taoiseach said that the entire parliament was united in opposition to the UK approach. Parliament does not believe the UK will give all evidence because, in its view, the UK did not cooperate fully with the Barron commission's investigation into the 1974 Dublin and Monaghan bombings. The Taoiseach said that the GOI wants the UK to provide evidence acknowledging its involvement in Finucane's murder and it wants to know how high in the UK government collusion went. He said if the UK were to provide the information, it would only grab the headlines for a few hours because "everyone knows the UK was involved." Other ministers made the same point and noted that the Taoiseach is particularly seized with the Finucane case and would have to personally approve any compromise to ease the dispute with the UK, such as Reiss' suggestion of putting an Irish judge in charge of the inquiry.
--------------------------------------------- ---
FM ECHOES PM ON IRA, GFA, CONCERN ABOUT FINUCANE AND MARCHING SEASON
--------------------------------------------- ---
....IRA
11. (C) FM Ahern said he liked Reiss' public comments that the IRA should respond "sooner rather than later," and he agreed with Reiss that the IRA statement must be clean, with no ambiguity, and that the three governments need to agree on what they want from the IRA. In the end, the DUP must also be on board in order for a deal to be struck. FM Ahern was adamant that the Irish government was interested in a comprehensive deal only, and was concerned that the UK might be open to Sinn Fein's desire to cut a side deal with London. He said that such talks between the UK and IRA were underway in December between the breakdown of talks and the Northern Bank robbery. Such a deal, he said, would have allowed Sinn Fein to barter decommissioning for concessions. Moreover, he said, a bilateral deal between the UK and Sinn Fein would polarize the situation in Northern Ireland.
...Sinn Fein
12. (C) FM Ahern said that Sinn Fein knows serious negotiations cannot begin unless trust is re-established. On the other hand, he said, maybe that's not what they want. (Note: FM Ahern is here referencing the theory that Sinn Fein finds engaging in the peace process in its interest because it softens the image of the party and gives them photo opportunities with prime ministers. According to this theory, the process is in Sinn Fein's interest, but Sinn Fein is not actually interested in striking a deal.) FM Ahern also touched on the balance the GOI tries to strike in talking about and to Sinn Fein. He said PSNI and others told the GOI that its tough line on Sinn Fein since December had been helpful but no longer was, and they should "lighten up." On the other hand, the GOI also is asked why it talks to Sinn Fein at all, given that the International Monitoring Commission reports that they are continuining their activities. He noted that it is difficult for the two prime ministers to say "no" when Gerry Adams asks for a meeting. He said Sinn Fein is insisting on working out details at the top level of government only. (COMMENT: This is tactically smart of Gerry Adams, especially if he, like others, sees the Taoiseach as less tough on republicans than the outspoken Justice Minister or quieter but equally firm Foreign Minister.)
...Parade Season
13. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said intelligence sources were worried that malcontents were planning to disrupt the marching season. He noted that the DUP and Orange Order were "playing games" with the Parades Commission, and repeated the view that PSNI and the Parades Commission were not connecting well. He said the GOI is particularly worried about the "walk back" -- after the parades and drinking, when marchers and hangers on walk back through republican areas. Special Envoy Reiss said that a violent marching season would play into the hands of those who believe that only the IRA can protect Catholic communities.
...Finucane
14. (C) FM Ahern raised the Finucane case, saying categorically that the UK was not complying with its 2001 Weston Park commitments. He said the GOI has lived up to its obligations and begun investigations into several cases. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the UK had pushed through its new Inquiries Act and that the Finucane family would not cooperate on that basis. ...Policing Board
15. (C) Special Envoy Reiss noted that the Policing Board was set to expire on October 18, and asked for Irish views, including on whether there were policy consequences of choosing to "continue" the board or to "reconstitute" it. FM Ahern said he had spoken to Northern Ireland Secretary of State Peter Hain about the issue. He said the GOI favors continuing the board, but the DUP wants to reconstitute it. He asserted that the DUP has no legal right to demand reconstitution on the basis of its electoral gains. FM Ahern also said he had raised IRA crime with Peter Hain, especially in the context of cross border cooperation between the Irish Criminal Assets Bureau and the Northern Ireland equivalent.
...International Fund for Ireland (IFI)
16. (C) As he has done publicly, FM Ahern talked about the importance of continuing IFI activities and the need to maintain donations from other governments. He said it is increasingly difficult to tap EU peace and reconciliation funds. FM Ahern talked about the need to reorient the board toward reconciliation and policing, and noted the board was considering a five-year strategy, ending in closure. He asked for U.S. views. The Ambassador noted that supporters of Ireland in the U.S. understand that the Ireland's economic boom means that international contributions to IFI will end at some point. One difficulty, he said, is that unionists only recently have taken part, and will insist on getting their fair share of grants. Special Envoy Reiss said that the IFI's new ideas for policing are likely to be acceptable under U.S. law.
--------------------------------------------
Justice Minister McDowell focuses on the IRA
--------------------------------------------
17. (C) Justice Minister McDowell, always the hardest hitting of the Irish cabinet, opened the meeting by saying that the Good Friday Agreement presumed the IRA would go out of business and it is still in business seven years later. He said the provisional movement (as he refers to jointly to the IRA and Sinn Fein) regards its arms cache as an embarrassment. Its semtex and kalishnakovs do not serve any useful purpose, he said, and the provisionals do not want to leave weapons in the hands of dissidents. He said the provisionals consider their arms stash a political liability that undermines their claim to be pursuing their goals through peaceful means only.
18. (C) Minister McDowell believes the provisionals want to close down the hardware side of their operation but to stay in business to fund national and international programs. He also said that the provisionals give no indication of loosening their grip on national areas in Northern Ireland where PSNI does not go. For that reason, he noted, the provisionals want to hold on to personal weapons.
19. (C) McDowell said some lessons have been learned about how to deal with the provisional movement. McDowell said that you only get concessions from the provisionals when you put your hand on their throat. When you play their propaganda game, they press for concessions. McDowell said he was "delighted" that Sinn Fein was not invited to the White House on March 17. Looking forward, he said, the GOI was not in appeasement mode, and should offer a cold shoulder to the provisionals. Sinn Fein, he said, is "asking for warm words" but governments should not offer them. He credited Sinn Fein with being "brilliant negotiators." They create eagerness and a sense of partnership, as if to say, "let's get together to sort out Sinn Fein problems." What they cannot stand, he said, is skepticism. McDowell said he has warned Peter Hain against side deals with the provisionals, especially now that there is no center ground in Northern Ireland.
----------------------------
Finance Minister Brian Cowen
----------------------------
20. (C) In pursuing a political solution for Northern Ireland, the British and Irish Governments needed to address the economic dimension to the peace process, Finance Minister Brian Cowen told Ambassador Reiss in a May 20 meeting. Cowen cautioned against an approach that focused on establishing institutions of self-government, while neglecting equally urgent economic imperatives, such as improving social services and tacking unemployment. He expressed concern that HMG might wish to disengage from these challenges after a solution was reached. While the British Exchequer had made statements on the limits of UK financial support for the peace process, Cowen believed that HMG and the GOI could jointly foster a transition in Northern Ireland toward an economic system less dominated by the public sector. This cooperation could take the form of coordinating Ireland's National Spatial Strategy with the North's development plans; there was also the possibility of harmonizing tax rates and key commodity prices to spur cross-border investment. Ambassador Reiss agreed that it was important to avoid scenarios where economic difficulties would continue to fuel social tensions even after a political resolution was in hand.
21. (U) This cable has been cleared by S/P. KENNY
Tuesday, 08 March 2005, 14:11
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000286
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/31/2015
TAGS PREL, ECON, EFIN, SOCI
SUBJECT: IRELAND: FINANCE MINISTER COWEN ON THE NORTH,
MONEY LAUNDERING, AND HIGHER EDUCATION
REF: DUBLIN 210
Classified By: Ambassador James C. Kenny; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (C) Summary. In a brief March 7 meeting with Finance Minister Brian Cowen, the Ambassador recommended U.S.-style tax incentives for university endowment contributions as a model for Ireland in addressing funding shortfalls for higher education. Cowen noted Ireland's drive on economic and academic competitiveness and said that the GOI could consider the endowment idea as part of ongoing comprehensive review of the Irish tax code. On Northern Ireland, Cowen said that a strong message from the U.S. Congress to Sinn Fein could help to advance a final resolution in the peace proces, as would Congressional hearings on criminality. Cowen also noted that Sinn Fein seems to be playing a "double game" -- taking a hard public line against criminality, but avoiding definitive action in order to retain maneuverability for final negotiations with unionists. The Minister also pointed out that the Department of Justice (DOJ) was taking the GOI lead on investigations into the apparent money-laundering scheme uncovered on February 17-18, and he offered to arrange a DOJ briefing for the Embassy on the status of the investigations. End summary.
2. (U) On March 7, the Ambassador held a brief, cordial meeting with Finance Minister Brian Cowen.XXXXXXXXXXXX also attended, along with XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX. Econoff was Embassy notetaker.
Higher Education Funding
------------------------
3. (C) The Ambassador related concerns expressed by U.S. firms and Irish universities that the quality and number of third-level graduates (roughly 16,000 in 2004) increasingly appeared insufficient to meet the needs of Ireland's hi-tech economic sectors. The Ambassador noted that this problem had repercussions for Ireland's drive on global competitiveness and was linked to limits on education funding, which derived from the Government's long-standing decision not to impose university tuition for Irish students (a theme of the Ambassador's March 3 speech at Trinity College). He cited the case of E-Bay, which had established offices in Ireland in 2004, but which was now several hundred employees behind in its hiring schedule because of qualification deficiencies among job applicants. With the reimposition of tuition fees off the table, said the Ambassador, an alternative funding mechanism for Irish higher education could be U.S.-style university endowments. Importantly, U.S. tax law encouraged individual and corporate donations to an endowment by making them tax-deductible. The Ambassador asked whether the U.S. endowment model might hold interest for the Department of Finance and also whether private contributions to university endowments were now, or could become, tax-deductible.
4. (SBU) Cowen thanked the Ambassador for his interest and cited the Government's focus on competition, both at the university level and for the Irish economy writ-large. Cowen said that, in the Government's drive to improve university education, the Department of Finance had concentrated on assisting the transition to better management structures in university administration. This effort entailed rationalizing curricula, faculty, and academic departments so as to eliminate obscure, under-attended courses with a view to making the most good for the most students. The extra motivation for the Finance Department's efforts with the universities had come primarily from an OECD report in 2004 on Irish higher education, which claimed that Ireland was risking its global economic competitiveness without more extensive education reforms. He added that whereas endowments had not previously played a major role in education funding in Ireland, this was an idea that the Government might do well to consider, especially with the unlikely reimposition of tuition fees.
5. (C) Cowen confirmed that private/corporate donations to education endowments were currently not tax-deductible, a reflection of the fact that corporate and personal tax rates were already comparatively low. He added, however, that the Finance Department was conducting a comprehensive review of breaks/incentives in the Irish tax code and that endowment contributions could be examined in that context. To introduce tax write-offs for endowment donations, it would be necessary, said Cowen, to ensure that funds otherwise destined for government coffers would not simply be switched to the endowments. Second, the tax incentives for contributions would have to be designed to discourage contributors from dictating to the universities the way that their donations could be used, e.g., only for cancer research. Cowen observed that failure on this second point could allow contributors too powerful a voice in the design of student curricula. He noted that, with the surge in the number of wealthy Irish, there could be win-win situations for the universities in terms of funding resources and for contributors in terms of their tax burden. He said the Finance Department would welcome any additional U.S. perspectives on the endowment idea that the Ambassador might wish to offer.
Northern Ireland; Money Laundering
----------------------------------
6. (C) On the Northern Ireland peace process, Cowen expected that Sinn Fein would "go off to sort itself out" following the party's annual conference on March 4-6 in Dublin. He believed that, after the May Westminster elections, Sinn Fein would attempt to convince people of its seriousness about criminality through actions designed to back up the party's recent positive rhetoric on the subject. Cowen related his impression that Gerry Adams was playing a "double game" -- taking a hard public line against criminality, but avoiding definitive action in order to retain maneuverability for final negotiations with unionists. Cowen thought the family of murder victim Robert McCartney had done a valuable public service in exposing this form of equivocation. The Minister also expressed hope that the U.S. Congress would deliver a strong message to Sinn Fein over St. Patrick's Day on the need for a final resolution in Northern Ireland, especially with the IRA cease-fire now more than ten years old. A series of Congressional hearings on Northern Ireland focusing on the criminality question would, maintained Cowen, help to bring political pressure on Sinn Fein to take the necessary steps in pursuit of a final deal.
7. (C) When the Ambassador asked for an update on the GOI money-laundering investigation into the February 17-18 police seizures of roughly euro 4 million in sterling notes (reftel), Minster Cowen replied that the Department of Justice (DOJ) was the GOI lead on the case. He said, however, that the Department of Finance was as intensely interested in GOI progress as the Embassy, and he offered to arrange a DOJ confidential briefing for the Embassy on the investigations. Cowen noted that the briefing could include a supplement from the Ireland Financial Services Regulatory Authority (IFSRA, a component of the Irish Central Bank). He added that IFSRA had not reported any problems to date in pursuing the case in the context of its relatively new regulatory powers under the "Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Act, 2003."
KENNY
Wednesday, 24 November 2004, 16:43
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUBLIN 001719
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/23/2014
TAGS OVIP, ECON, PREL, ETRD, EINV, PGOV, EU
SUBJECT: SECRETARY SNOW,S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ARCHITECTS
OF THE CELTIC TIGER ECONOMY
Classified By: Ambassador James C. Kenny for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: The November 14-15 visit of U.S. Treasury Secretary John W. Snow was an opportunity for discussion on
SIPDIS the "secrets" of Ireland,s success with policy-makers and businessmen who were the architects of Ireland,s Celtic Tiger economy. These key figures noted that while the concepts behind Ireland,s reforms had been simple, the political will to carry out the reforms had only come in the context of an economic meltdown in the mid-1980s. They said that good-faith relations with labor, investment in education, and a "dictatorial" leadership that exposed industries to the full discipline of the market had been key to success. Ireland,s skill in securing substantial EU support funds and in exploiting U.S. policy on corporate tax deferral was another important factor in Ireland,s economic turnaround. Looking ahead, the policy-makers cited both the need to ensure Ireland,s continued competitiveness as a magnet for foreign direct investment and also the role of education in shaping Ireland as an innovation-based, higher-value economy. Secretary Snow,s classroom discussion at Dublin City University (DCU) highlighted the role of higher education in promoting innovation and entrepreneurship. End summary.
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Introduction
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2. (U) The November 14-15 visit of U.S. Treasury Secretary John W. Snow was an opportunity for substantive discussion on the "secrets" of Ireland,s economic success. During a dinner hosted by the Ambassador and a lunch arranged by the Ulster Bank, Secretary Snow spoke with 16 policy-makers and businessmen (listed in para 12) who were instrumental in the emergence of the Celtic Tiger economy. A breakfast with the American Chamber of Commerce and a classroom exchange at Dublin City University (DCU) reinforced the points made by these key figures. The following are the principal insights that emerged from Secretary Snow,s visit (which are organized thematically, not in the sequential order in which they were discussed).
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In the Beginning: Political Will and Industrial Peace
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3. (C) Although the concepts behind Ireland,s reforms had been simple, the political will to carry out the reforms had only come in the context of the mid-1980s, economic meltdown, said Padraig O,hUiginn, former Secretary General in the Office of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister). O,hUiginn recalled drafting a proposal for economic recovery during that era, using ideas that were "apparent to any first-year economics graduate student" ) cut the fiscal deficit, spur competition, lower corporate taxes, etc. The ruling party at the time, Fine Gael, did not act on the proposal, but the Fianna Fail government elected in 1987 made the document the basis for the Program of National Recovery (PNR), which set forth the policies that underpinned Ireland,s economic turnaround. Fianna Fail,s "great advantage" at the time, said O,hUiginn, was Ireland,s economic crisis; with 18 percent unemployment and government debt at 130 percent of GDP, the political opposition, industry, and labor could not afford politically to impede solutions. The PNR,s linchpin was labor,s decision to accept a moderate wage increases in exchange for income tax relief, which became the basic approach to successive national wage-setting (Social Partnership) agreements. O,hUiginn recounted that the Government offered Irish pounds 700 million in tax relief in 1987 and also cut the fiscal deficit, forcing the closure of several hospitals and the retrenchment of 16,000 civil servants. He noted that the moderate wage increase incorporated in the PNR laid the foundation for Ireland,s competitiveness as an export platform and as a draw for foreign direct investment (FDI).
4. (C) The Government,s good-faith dealings with unions in negotiating Social Partnership agreements were, and remained, central to Ireland,s economic success, said Peter Cassells, former General Secretary of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. According to Cassells, a shared understanding between unions and the Government on the importance of decent wages and housing for workers was the basis of labor,s commitment to the Social Partnership approach. He added that the transparency and inclusiveness of wage-setting negotiations, in which even the most disgruntled union representatives were given voice, were also instrumental to success. The typical industrial relations model in which union chiefs and politicians hammered out back-room agreements, in the mode of Lyndon Johnson and Lane Kirkland, would not have secured labor buy-in to economic reforms, Cassells asserted. He further observed that the Social Partnership approach might not be replicable in other EU Member States, which typically were more populous than Ireland and had more diffuse union structures.
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The Key: Human Capital
----------------------
5. (C) The chief source of Ireland,s success has been its educated labor force, said EU Commissioner-designate and former Irish Finance Minister Charlie McCreevy. He noted that the introduction of free primary and secondary education in the 1960-70s initially benefited other countries as much as Ireland, due to the emigration of educated Irish workers. As a young parliamentarian, moreover, McCreevy had warned that the 1970s, baby boom was a looming disaster, on the pretext that Ireland,s small, weak economy could not accommodate a future surge in labor, even with emigration. As it turned out, this large pool of young, educated workers became Ireland,s principal resource and the main attraction for foreign multinationals to establish subsidiaries in the country. Far from a disaster, the period 1987-2003 saw the addition of 600,000 jobs to the economy and drop in the unemployment rate from 18 percent to 4 percent. This success, concluded McCreevy, was primarily attributable to Ireland,s investment in human capital.
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"Dictatorial" Leadership
------------------------
6. (C) The implementation of reforms that underpinned Ireland,s economic recovery had required "dictatorial" leadership, said McCreevy. This involved incenitivizing industries to achieve efficiencies by exposing them to the full discipline of the market, even at the risk of bankruptcies. The challenge in this approach, explained McCreevy, was to press ahead with reforms in the face of elections, which provided temptations for politicians to adopt softer, more populist economic platforms. Secretary Snow observed that whereas the gains from economic reforms in any country tended to be diffuse, the losses were often concentrated in particular sectors or geographic areas, making it easier for those affected to organize political opposition. McCreevy commented that the test of any government was how well it explained to dislocated workers that the reforms responsible for their plight were good for the country. Indecon Economic Consultants CEO Alan Gray separately pointed out that Ireland had succeeded, through education, in giving workers the skills to move across industries, to the point now where those laid off did not ask, "Do I have any hope of a job?" but rather "Which one of my new employment choices should I take?"
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EU Help
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7. (C) EU tools, primarily structural support funds, were another factor in the emergence of Ireland,s Celtic Tiger economy, explained former Prime Minister (1992-95) Albert Reynolds and Ray McSharry, former EU Commissioner and Irish Finance Minister. Reynolds said that the Irish Government did not shy from viewing such tools as entitlements, since Ireland, as an island nation, faced additional challenges trading within the European Community. He and McSharry recalled that Ireland had negotiated well to maximize the level of EU support. For example, Reynolds claimed that he had obtained over euro one billion from Brussels as a result of a discussion with Chancellor Kohl in which Reynolds agreed to support Germany,s push for rapid EU enlargement. EU Commissioner-designate McCreevy separately echoed Reynolds, points, saying that French Finance Minister Sarkozy,s proposal to reduce EU support for new Member States that applied low corporate tax rates was shortsighted. McCreevy said that any EU measures to increase growth in the new Member States would redound to the benefit of the entire EU.
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U.S. Policy on Tax Deferral
---------------------------
8. (C) The U.S. policy of tax deferral for foreign subsidiaries of American firms, combined with Ireland,s 12.5 percent corporate tax rate, underpinned the large influx of U.S. investment to Ireland during the Celtic Tiger period, observed Padraic White, former CEO of Ireland,s Industrial Development Authority (IDA). White recounted his numerous trips to the U.S. House of Representatives, Ways and Means Committee to defend tax deferral, and he argued that Senator Kerry,s plan to reverse tax deferral would have "killed Ireland," had he been elected. White believed that complaints by the U.S. public about the job outsourcing that accompanied U.S. investment flows were wrong-headed. U.S. subsidiaries in Ireland, he argued, were the principle reason that the United States had penetrated the personal computer, software, and pharmaceutical markets in Europe. He further observed that under-performing U.S. companies were typically those that had not attempted to expand overseas. Secretary Snow concurred that U.S. companies that were outsourcing overseas were those creating the most jobs in the United States. He highlighted, however, the political difficulty of explaining outsourcing to the U.S. public, recalling slogans during the recent election campaign that criticized "Benedict Arnold CEOs."
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A Propitious Lack of Monetary Policy Tools
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9. (C) An ironic feature of Ireland,s success has been the Government,s lack of monetary policy tools, remarked Cormack McCarthy, Chief Executive of the Ulster Bank. One might think that a country that had performed so well in terms of exports and investment would have relied heavily on interest rate and exchange rate levers, said McCarthy. As a euro-zone member, in fact, Ireland had ceded control of its monetary policy to the European Central Bank. The positive result, said McCarthy, were low interest rates. He believed that if Ireland had remained control of monetary policy, the Government would have been tempted to raise interest rates to slow rapid growth in the late 1990s. Instead, the low rates set by the ECB had been a boon to Ireland,s private sector and had lent a sense of stability and consistency to the Irish market for foreign investors.
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Looking Ahead: Competitiveness and Education
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10. (C) Looking ahead, the principal danger for Ireland is complacency, said Eoin O,Driscoll, Chairman of Forfas (the Government think-tank) and the Government-commissioned Enterprise Strategy Group (ESG). Echoing the ESG,s recently published findings, O,Driscoll cited the need to ensure Ireland,s continued competitiveness as a magnet for foreign direct investment (FDI), which, he said, had driven the country,s economic transformation. (U.S. and Irish businesspersons who attended the November 15 American Chamber of Commerce breakfast with Secretary Snow made similar points, noting that multinationals were increasingly attracted by low-cost manufacturing opportunities in China and India.) O,Driscoll said that, just as industry and Government had collaborated in the 1990s to make Ireland a base for leading bio-pharmaceutical and IT companies, the country needed a new shared vision to go another rung higher in the production of innovative, high-value goods and services. He note that this challenge would involve marrying innovation to better business practices, particularly in sales and marketing, and he praised the U.S. model of perfecting product designs in the market, as opposed to the European preference of the laboratory. While Secretary Snow cautioned against government attempts to pick winners in the market, he ventured that the key to economic prosperity rested with countries like the United States that fostered a culture of innovation and entrepreneurship.
11. (U) Secretary Snow,s classroom discussion with students, professors, and administrators at Dublin City University (DCU) was a venue for further discussion on the role of innovation, entrepreneurship, and academia in strengthening the Irish economy. The event took place at DCU,s "Invent Center," which serves as a business incubator for student entrepreneurs and community start-up companies. Secretary Snow highlighted the centrality of education and
SIPDIS intellectual capital to the modern, knowledge-based economy, and he explained that to embrace a market economy was to embrace ever-changing needs for new ideas and skills. He also noted the difficulties that economists had encountered in finding ways to capture creativity, "that spark," in modeling economic activity. DCU president Ferdinand von Prondzynski commented that the university had encountered a similar challenge, but espoused the belief that entrepreneurship could be taught, in the same way as poetry, painting, and other modes of creativity. Prondzynski also stressed that innovation meant little without business skills, and he cited DCU requirements for students to establish relationships Irish entrepreneurs who had both succeeded and failed in bringing new ideas to the market.
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Participants in the "Architect" Discussions with Secretary Snow
-------------------------------
12. (U) Participants in the Ambassador,s November 14 dinner for Secretary Snow were: Charlie McCreevy, EU Commissioner-designate and former Irish Finance Minister; Dermot Desmond, financier; Eoin O,Driscoll, Chairman of Forfas and the Enterprise Strategy Group; Padraig White, former CEO of the Industrial Development Authority; and Padraig O,huiginn, Former Secretary General in the Office of the Taoiseach. Attendees at the November 15 Ulster Bank lunch were: Ray McSharry, former EU Commisioner and Minister of Finance; Lochlann Quinn, co-founder of Glen Dimplex; Peter Cassells, former Secretary General of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions; Albert Reynolds, former Prime Minister (Taoiseach); Allan Gray, Chairman of Indecon Economic Consulting; Willie Walsh, CEO of Aer Lingus; Bill Harris, National Science Foundation Director; and Cormack McCarthy, David Pierce, and Michael Torpey of the Ulster Bank.
13. (U) This cable has been cleared by Treasury DAS Nancy Lee KENNY
Wednesday, 09 December 2009, 16:13
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 002742
SIPDIS
NOFORN
NSC FOR FROMAN
TREASURY FOR BRAINARD, SOBEL, BAKER, WINN
EO 12958 DECL: 12/03/2019
TAGS ECON, PGOV, UK
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER STILL FOCUSED ON TOBIN TAX,
DISAPPOINTED IN U.S. POSITION
REF: LONDON 2548
Classified By: Ambassador Louis Susman for reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (C/NF) Summary. Prime Minister Brown continues to press hard for international adoption of a Tobin Tax, despite being aware of U.S. opposition to the tax. He has raised this issue - and bonuses - on several occasions directly with the Ambassador, and said that he saw cooperation on financial services and Afghanistan as the critical elements of U.S.-UK relationship. Brown first highlighted the Tobin Tax at the November G-20 Ministerial in St. Andrews, and subsequently told Ambassador that he was disappointed that Treasury Secretary Geithner publicly refused to support the UK position. The political opposition in the UK also is questioning the lack of U.S. support. The PM is using the issue for domestic political gain but also for reasons of "social justice." The UK may feel emboldened on this issue, given French Foreign Minister Kouchner's proposal at COP-15 for an international tax on financial services for programs for poverty reduction and climate change, and would likely criticize the U.S. if there were no further international movement on this issue. End Summary.
Prime Minister Raises Tax and Bonuses with Ambassador
--------------------------------------------- --------
2. (C/NF) Prime Minister Brown continues to press hard for international adoption of some form of a Tobin Tax on financial transactions, despite being fully aware of U.S. opposition to the tax. In recent speeches to major business groups, at the Commonwealth Summit, and in press conferences, the PM has emphasized that a Tobin Tax must be among the options explored to ensure that taxpayers do not bear the cost of future bank bailouts. The Prime Minister has raised this issue several times with Ambassador Susman, most recently during the Ambassador's call to discuss the Afghanistan strategy on November 30, and in a Thanksgiving call from the PM to the Ambassador. The Prime Minister has stated that he saw coordination of our actions on Afghanistan and financial services as the cornerstones of the UK-U.S. bilateral relationship, and has expressed disappointment that on the latter, the U.S. has not been as supportive as he had hoped. We expect that the PM will become emboldened to push harder for the tax after France's Foreign Minister Kouchner, at the Copenhagen COP-15, proposed a .0005 percent tax on financial transactions to fund poverty reduction and combating climate change in developing countries.
3. (C/NF) The Prime Minister also has raised with the Ambassador the issue of bank bonuses, and has repeatedly queried what the U.S. government position would be if Goldman Sachs, among others, announced large bonuses. The issue of bonuses is coming to a head in the UK this week, with the Chancellor announcing new measures during his December 9 pre-budget report. This issue will reported septel.
Background - Brown at St. Andrews
---------------------------------
4. (C/NF) During the November 6-7 G-20 Ministerial in St. Andrews, Prime Minister Brown unexpectedly focused on the Tobin Tax - a tax on financial transactions - as one of the key measures that should be explored to ensure that financial institutions, and not taxpayers, would in the future bear the costs of risks they take. As reported in reftel, the Prime Minister, Chancellor Darling and other HMG officials had been previously informed about the U.S. opposition to such a tax. However, the PM's staff nevertheless highlighted the tax in pre-briefing the press on his speech, a strategy that backfired when the press focused on the lack of support from the U.S., other governments and the IMF. (Comment: We believed at the time that the PM's close advisor, Shriti Vadera, who no longer is officially working in government, was behind the push for the Tobin Tax. Recently, Roland Rudd, head of the think-tank Business for a New Europe and well-connected in the Labour Party, verified that Vadera was the invisible hand behind the scenes. End Comment.) Immediately after the meeting in St. Andrews, the Prime Minister called the Ambassador and expressed his disappointment that Treasury Secretary Geithner had so publicly declined to support the PM's proposal.
Continuous Campaign
-------------------
5. (SBU/NF) The Prime Minister, Chancellor Darling and
Financial Services Authority Chairman Lord Turner have, since St. Andrews, continued to draw attention to the Tobin Tax. In a November 25, Commonwealth Summit Press Briefing, the PM stated, that to make banks more accountable, "we can look at an insurance scheme; we can look at the creation of resolution funds; we can look at asking banks to hold more capital; we can look at global levy on transactions" and that he would raise these options with his Commonwealth partners. In his November 23 speech to the Confederation of British Industry, Brown also emphasized the "global levy" as an option to rebuild trust between "banks and the societies" they serve. Turner in a speech at the British Embassy in Paris on November 30 said that policy-makers "should not exclude consideration of taxes on financial transactions." He also acknowledged, however, the limitations of such a tax. It would not prevent all or even most of the "rent extraction" in the financial sector, nor would it would create the perfect amount of liquidity in the system. Darling in a BBC radio interview on November 8 admitted that it would be difficult to reach an international agreement on a global banking tax, but it was an idea that had to be considered.
Opposition Joins the Bandwagon
------------------------------
6. (C/NF) Labour Party officials are not the only ones expressing disappointment with the U.S. position on the Tobin Tax. Baroness Shirley Williams and Lord Paddy Ashcroft, two respected Liberal Democrats, recently told emboffs that they were bewildered and disappointed by U.S. opposition. Conservative Party leaders have not addressed the Tobin Tax in their position papers or remarks. Opposition leader David Cameron did state in a November 19 press conference that "the problem with the Tobin Tax is that if we applied it here and others didn't follow, we would lose lots of companies that would simply go elsewhere. It is important to remember that financial services is not just the City - there are hundreds of thousands of people employed in banks, building societies and insurance firms throughout the country."
7. (C/NF) The UK financial sector has been rather muted in its comments, preferring to remain silent unless and until the government makes an actual proposal. JP Morgan officials told us that the firm is opposed to the idea of a Tobin tax and is particularly concerned about the difficulty of implementation, which would need to be universal to avoid regulatory arbitrage. They also said there would be intense lobbying to exempt some transactions from a tax, predicting that U.S. treasuries, other government bonds and sovereign debt would be excluded from such a tax. The tax would be even more discriminatory since it would only target transactions of private firms and individuals.
8. (C/NF) Comment: The Prime Minister's position is largely being driven by domestic politics, as a way to be seen as "punishing the banks." But there is also an element of social justice and a need to fill a gaping budget deficit. The recent announcement by the French FM plays on the social justice aspect. We expect the PM will continue to press this issue, and will criticize the U.S. if it gets no further international traction.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
Susman
Friday, 28 September 2007, 15:36
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LISBON 002527
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STATE FOR XXXXXXXXXXXX
EO 12958 DECL: 09/25/2017
TAGS PGOV, PREL, OFDP, PO
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL: UK AMBASSADOR ON ENERGY SECURITY,
RUSSIA, EU-AFRICA SUMMIT, AND MCCANN CASE
Classified By: XXXXXXXXXXXX FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(D)
SUMMARY
-------
1. (C) On September 21, newly-arrived British Ambassador Alexander Wykeham Ellis informed Ambassador Hoffman that European concerns over Russia's aggressive energy policies and the need for market competition were the driving forces behind the third EU energy liberalization package. He suggested that Russia's position with its neighbors was guided by a self-proclaimed right to do "what it wants, when it wants" in its own neighborhood. Regarding Robert Mugabe's participation in the proposed EU-Africa Summit, Ellis said the UK would not discourage other member states from participating if PM Brown stayed away. He doubted, however, if the Dutch, Irish, or Swedish would attend in Brown's absence. Ellis also noted that it was the British police that developed the current evidence against Madeleine McCann's parents in the high-profile case that has captured international attention. He informed the Ambassador that former British Ambassador John Buck had accepted a private-sector position at a UK gas company and that his departure had nothing to do with bilateral issues. END SUMMARY
RUSSIA'S ENERGY GAME IS COMING TO AN END
----------------------------------------
2. (C) According to Ellis, European concerns over Russia's aggressive energy policies and the need for increased market competition were the driving forces behind the third EU energy liberalization package. He called Russia the greatest threat to European energy security and described its energy policies as a "game that's coming to an end." He argued that Gazprom's sustainability depends on the European distribution network and that Putin, who is "always trying to make a point to Europe," knew and understood this reality. Quoting a statement he had heard elsewhere, Ellis described Russia as "too strong, too weak"; suggesting that it was a bipolar society divided by feelings of strength and empowerment and internal fears of national failure.
RUSSIA, THE BIG BAD NEIGHBOR
----------------------------
3. (C) When questioned about Kosovo and Russia's relationship with its neighbors, Ellis suggested that Russia's position (on Kosovo) was driven by a self-proclaimed right to do "what it wants, when it wants" in its own neighborhood. Ellis did not believe that Russia had high regard for Serbia or any of its other neighbors, but rather it feared outside influences in the region. Reflecting on his position as Director of the EU Enlargement Team in London (2001-2003), Ellis noted that completing the 2004 EU enlargement phase had been difficult, and hypothesized that if the Russia of now were the Russia of then, the process would have been nearly impossible.
MUGABE...AND THE OTHER BAD GUYS
-------------------------------
4. (C) According to Ellis, the UK's position on Zimbabwe has not changed; if Robert Mugabe showed up, then Gordon Brown would not. However, he could not confirm if the British government would send any representatives. While he claimed that the UK had steered away from discouraging other member stated from attending, he noted the possibility that the Dutch, Irish, and Swedish leaders may follow Brown's lead. Regarding Chavez and Ahmadinejad, Ellis commented that Portugal's approach was centered on "engagement" -- even with the so-called bad guys. Ambassador Hoffman countered that "irrational people cannot be expected to behave rationally." While acknowledging that the US position was justifiable, Ellis responded that there were sensitivities at play for Portugal, especially regarding Venezuela. (Note: There are approximately a half-million Portuguese living in Venezuela. End Note)
THE MADELEINE MCCANN CASE
-------------------------
5. (C) Madeleine McCann's disappearance in the south of Portugal in May 2007 has generated international media attention with controversy surrounding the Portuguese-led police investigation and the actions of Madeleine's parents. Without delving into the details of the case, Ellis admitted that the British police had developed the current evidence against the McCann parents, and he stressed that authorities from both countries were working cooperatively. He commented that the media frenzy was to be expected and was acceptable as long as government officials keep their comments behind closed doors.
BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
-----------------------------------------
6. (SBU) Ellis, a former school teacher, joined Britain's
LISBON 00002527 002 OF 002
Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1990 and moved progressively up the chain to Ambassador. Lisbon was his first foreign tour as a diplomat, followed by postings in Brussels, Madrid and London. He has also served as Director of the EU Enlargement Team in London (2001-2003) and as adviser on energy policies and trade issues (2005-2007) under EC President Jose Barroso. XXXXXXXXXXXX Ellis informed Ambassador Hoffman that former British Ambassador John Buck had accepted a private-sector position with a British gas company and that his abrupt departure in August 2007 had nothing to do with bilateral issues.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
Thursday, 11 October 2007, 13:48
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 LISBON 002605
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS KJUS, MOPS, PO, PREL, PTER, EUN
SUBJECT: EU JHA INFORMAL MINISTERIAL
1. Summary. EU Justice and Home Affairs ministers met informally in Lisbon October 1-2. An embassy officer attended to follow discussion of such topics as the elimination of land and sea travel barriers in December, the establishment of a counternarcotics analysis and operations center, the submission of a package of counterterrorism proposals by Vice President Frattini in November, the submission of a package of border control proposals by Frattini in February, and the establishment of a missing children alert system based on the U.S. Amber Alert. End summary.
Justice and Home Affairs Informal Ministerial
---------------------------------------------
2. European Union Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Ministers held an informal ministerial in Lisbon October 1-2, chaired by Portuguese Minister of Internal Administration Rui Pereira and Minister for Justice Alberto Costa. Representatives from relevant EU institutions, Vice President of the European Commission Franco Frattini, and the Turkish Minister for Justice Mehmet Ali Sahin also participated. An embassy officer attended the proceedings to hear public statements first-hand and to engage attendees on the margins.
3. As a lead-in to the meetings, on September 30 participating member states formally signed the protocol to establish the Maritime Analysis and Operations Center - Narcotics (MAOC-N). Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom founded the center to share intelligence and coordinate counternarcotics efforts. The U.S., though not formally a member, has liaison officers assigned to the MAOC.
4. Also on the agenda but in advance of the informal ministerial meetings, the Spanish and Portuguese Interior Ministers held a bilateral meeting in which they established a task force to coordinate counterterrorism investigations and prosecutions. Pereira noted that although bilateral cooperation had long existed, the task force was established to be more proactive in regard to investigations and cooperation. During the proceedings, Portugal also signed a bilateral agreement with Malta to resettle refugees in Portugal that are currently resident in Malta.
Home Affairs - Prevention of Terrorism and Border Management
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
5. SIS/VIS: Frattini and Pereira both noted that by Christmas, all land and sea barriers in the Schengen area will be removed for nine participating Schengen states, Cyprus having requested an extension. Air travel barriers, he said, would be removed in March. Noting that the Schengen Information System (SIS) has succeeded in its testing phase, Frattini suggested that the formal decision to implement the new rules will be taken in November. Frattini also suggested that the EU must have an entry-exit register complete with biometric identifiers. This would, he opined, help manage overstays as well as be a useful data source for security services. Additionally, he noted that various databases and security systems need to be integrated and expanded to include travelers without visas. Moreover, such a European surveillance system must be accessible to local law enforcement. An aide to Frattini said that this package of proposals would be submitted to the college of Commissioners in February.
6. PNR/ETA: Frattini said he would submit a terrorism package to the Commissioners November 6 that includes a proposal to establish formally an EU-wide Passenger Name Recognition (PNR) system. He noted that the requirements demanded by U.S. negotiators convinced him that the European security services should have access to the same kind of information. Pereira and German Minister Schauble suggested that, in addition to the intelligence value, a PNR system would allow the EU to negotiate with the U.S. on an equal footing and would allow for balanced cooperation. Pereira said he would also support a PNR for intra-European flights. Schauble said further discussion on that point would be needed. Frattini and Schauble both noted that electronic travel authorizations (ETA) are useful not just for improving security, but also improving the customer service at airports. With ever increasing crowds at airports, Schauble noted that it is in a traveler's interest to participate in a voluntary ETA program.
7. Internet: Frattini will also submit a proposal to punish misuse of the internet. This will not, he stressed, be a limit on the freedom of expression. Pereira noted that the proposal would be limited to taking down sites that specifically incite terrorism or provide instruction in how
LISBON 00002605 002 OF 002
to commit terrorist acts. Indeed, added Frattini, the EU already has a regulation that prohibits transfer of illegal data on the internet, without causing concerns of limitation of freedom of speech. This proposal, he continued, would only add the specific mention of terrorism. Such an update, he opined, is a good example of why the EU needs regularly to review and update its bodies of law.
8. Conspiracy: Pereira noted that Italian Minister Amato suggested that the ministers consider developing an EU agreement to incorporate conspiracy statutes into existing law. Current legislation is directed towards formal terrorist organizations, which does not adequately address current realities. Italy, and a few other states, punish conspiracy without being part of a formal organization; Pereira and Frattini each enthusiastically supported the idea that the EU consider the question.
9. Pruhm Treaty: Slovenian Interior Minister Dragutin Mate suggested that, agreement being reached, it was incumbent on Slovenia to develop the technical handbooks for implementation.
Justice
-------
10. e-Justice Portal: Costa issued a statement that ministers agreed that the EU should have an information technology system to facilitate access to member states' judicial systems and registry systems. Member states will compile best practices on IT and regularly review performance.
11. Missing Children Alert: Frattini used the well-known case of Madeleine McCann, a missing British girl, to lay out his intention to develop an EU wide alert system for missing children. Frattini specifically and repeatedly mentioned the Amber Alert system in the U.S. as the model that the EU needed to copy. In addition, the e-Justice Portal, according to Costa, will include a list of missing children and direct users to appropriate Hague Convention resources.
12. Child Protection: Costa also noted that the ministers agreed to expand the role of the European Mediator for international child abductions and to support the strengthening and implementation of laws related to child protection. Hoffman
Thursday, 24 April 2008, 13:58
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 001160
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/24/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, KISL, PK, UK
SUBJECT: REPORTS THAT BRITAIN IS IMPORTING PAKISTANI IMAMS
ARE EXAGGERATED
REF: 07 LONDON 4471
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Summary. The British press has reported that Home Secretary Jacqui Smith announced that Britain would launch a
SIPDIS new initiative to bring "moderate Pakistani Imams" to preach in Britain. Poloff spoke April 24 with the Head of the Home Office's Prevent Unit Paul Morrison who said the initiative had been miscast and exaggerated in the press. End Summary.
2. (C) Morrison said the Home Secretary had been in discussions with Pakistani officials during her April 13-14 visit to Pakistan about what could be done to diminish the terror threat in the UK. One idea which had been floated was for Pakistani religious authorities to visit the UK as part of HMG's ongoing program to bring visiting religious scholars to the UK to promote moderate interpretations of Islam (in the Foreign Office-led speaking tour program known as "the Radical Middle Way.") Morrison said the concept had been discussed in principle but that no firm commitments had been made and no individuals had been identified. In any case, if Pakistani Imams were to come to the UK, "it would only be to visit," said Morrison.
3. (C) Morrison further clarified that it was not HMG's policy to import foreign Imams. "To the contrary," said Morrison, HMG hopes to foster local Imams "rooted in the community." To this end, HMG has supported Muslim communities' own efforts to form an association (the Mosques and Imams Advisory Body aka MINAB -- see reftel) which would lead in the development and self-regulation of Mosques in the United Kingdom. Morrison added that the Home Office looks to the Muslim communities to lead on that effort as "it is not the government's role to dictate to people how to practice their faith."
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom TUTTLE
Thursday, 25 October 2007, 16:38
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 LONDON 004045
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/17/2017
TAGS PGOV, PREL, KISL, PTER, SCUL, UK
SUBJECT: EUR SENIOR ADVISOR PANDITH AND S/P ADVISOR COHEN'S
VISIT TO THE UK, OCTOBER 9-14, 2007
REF: LONDON 4030
Classified By: DCM Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 b, d
1. (C) Summary. EUR Senior Advisor for Muslim Engagement Farah Pandith and S/P Member Jared Cohen met with a wide range of UK government leaders, community activists, think tanks, artists, and Muslim youth during their October 9-14 visit to the UK. Government officials stressed that the UK's problem with extremists is a domestic as well as a foreign policy issue, since all recent successful and thwarted terrorist attacks were perpetrated by individuals from Muslim communities in the UK. Muslim youth from deprived areas expressed less concern with UK and U.S. foreign policy than with the chance to have their voices heard in British society, while those with more education focused on disagreements with UK foreign policy and the need to use the arts to address cultural tensions and reconciliation. Bollywood actors and executives agreed to work with the USG to promote anti-extremist messages through third party actors and were excited about the idea of possibly partnering with Hollywood as well. Community activists discussed how they are working to empower their communities and help shape the debate against extremism in UK Muslim communities. One highlight of the visit was a day trip to Leicester, which Pandith said was arguably home to the most conservative Islamic population she had seen anywhere in Europe. End summary.
Radicalization Efforts
------------------------------------
2. (C) HMG is currently working on an updated strategy, yet to be blessed by ministers, to update and improve its approach to stopping terrorists and extremists, FCO Engaging the Islamic World Group Head Barry Lowen and Arab Reform Team Leader Alex Cole told Pandith and Cohen October 12. The new strategy includes the creation of the Research and Intelligence Communications Unit (RICU), which falls under the joint auspices of the FCO, the Home Office, and the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). Although still in the "embryonic stage," Lowen said, the RICU would have three primary functions: 1) tracking and coordinating research and information on extremism in the UK Muslim Community; 2) alerting HMG to important events, such as an impending Osama Bin Laden speech, and preparing a unified government response; and 3) supporting non-government tools in battling extremists (For more on the RICU and HMG's counter-radicalization structure, see ref). One project currently underway is preparation of a paper on what language works best in public outreach, Lowen said; for example, the advantage of using the word "mainstream" to define common values, as opposed to "the West," which can have negative connotations.
3. (C) Work on empowering moderate Muslim voices in the UK and overseas is divided into aid directly from HMG and facilitation of contacts between non-governmental actors, Cole said. Programs which HMG sponsors directly include: sponsoring Arabic language children's television programming in Jordan to promote peace and tolerance; assisting visiting religious leaders and journalists from UK-based Muslim communities to meet the Archbishop of Canterbury and other church leaders; and providing English language training to tutors at Al-Azhar University in Cairo through the British Council. On the non-governmental side, HMG is also currently working to facilitate linkages between third party actors, Cole said. Pandith noted these efforts mirror current USG initiatives. She and Cohen described USG efforts at "seeding" small initiatives overseas to see what works and what doesn't. Both sides agreed they would exchange ideas for promoting counter-radicalization efforts, both those directly and indirectly sponsored by governments.
4. (C) With the FCO's Policy Planning Middle East analyst Richard Shaw, Cohen described current USG thinking on the linkage between public diplomacy, counter terrorism, and counter radicalization. Shaw said the UK's overall approach is focused on how likely Muslims are to turn to violence. Unlike the U.S. September 11 attack, Shaw noted, all of the UK terrorist attacks and would-be attacks have been perpetrated by "home grown" terrorists. What is considered foreign policy for the USG is both domestic and foreign for the UK, he pointed out. Pandith, Cohen and Shaw discussed the importance of trying to work with youth through web-based technology and communications, since these are some of Al Qaida's primary tools. They also discussed the limitations of traditional outreach methods, including government-supported exchange programs, which pay off handsomely for those who participate but reach a mere handful of people, many of whom are already inclined to anti-extremist sentiment. Foreign Secretary David Miliband is focused on exactly these types of questions, Shaw said.
The Personal Journey of the UK's, First Muslim MP
--------------------------------------------- --------------
5. (C) On October 12, Pandith and Cohen met with newly-appointed Department for International Development (DFID) Minister Shahid Malik. A Labour MP since 2005, when he and fellow Labourite Saddiq Khan were the first Muslim MPs ever elected to the British Parliament, Malik is an active participant in the British Muslim dialogue. He told Pandith and Cohen his own personal story of alienation, saying that even though he grew up in the UK he was so anti-British as a young man that he rooted for the other side in any sporting match in which an England team played. At the age of 27, however, he was appointed to the Commission for Race and Equality, and began to travel around the UK and listen to the stories of other Muslims. This was a turning point in his life, he said, because he realized that many Muslims were finding ways to celebrate both their Muslim and their British heritages simultaneously. In his public appearances, Malik said, he emphasizes that anger over UK or U.S. foreign policy is not a valid reason for extremism. By the same token, he said, it is important to separate out extremists from the vast majority of law-abiding Muslims. He praised Gordon Brown's handling of the thwarted July car bombings in London, noting the Brown had referred to the perpetrators as "criminals," without mentioning their religion.
6. (C) HMG needs to organize itself better on Muslim engagement, Malik admitted, and work to empower young people and make sure their voices are heard. A lot of important work is being done on education, where the Mosques and Imams Board (MINAB) has been set up to evaluate the credentials of imams to ensure that Muslim youth are being taught by qualified teachers. Pandith suggested that the two governments work more closely together, wondering if Malik would be interested in working with other elected Muslim officials around Europe who were keen to engage youth, act as role models, and learn from each other. Malik was very keen to help make this happen; Pandith will follow up with him.
7. (C) Pandith also raised the critical need for a place in Europe where religiously curious youth could go to learn more about Islam and specificially learn about it as a Muslim in Europe. Finding a "campus" where students could go to learn about theology as well as religion, history, culture, and science was a necessary missing piece in Europe. Malik agreed and said he would follow up with further thinking about this issue.
Female Muslim Role Models
-------------------------
8. (SBU) Pandith met Lady Sheikh, wife of Conservative Peer Lord Sheikh and herself a party activist, at her offices adjacent to Westminster Abbey on October 11. Sheikh said Muslim communities are economically the most deprived in Britain, and stressed the importance of educating and encouraging British Muslims to participate in democracy. She expressed an interest in receiving American female Muslim visitors whom she could introduce to young Muslim women to serve as role models. Pandith said the USG engages in outreach of this kind and told Sheikh the Embassy would keep her request in mind when programming such exchanges.
Visit to Leicester
------------------
9. (SBU) On October 11, Pandith and Cohen traveled to Leicester, a large urban center about 70 minutes north of London with a substantial ethic minority population. Leicester's Muslim population is 11 percent, well above the overall UK percentage of three percent. The visit was organized by Parvin Ali, founder and Chief of Executive of FATIMA Women's Network, which aims to address Muslim women's issues both locally and nationally. Pandith and Cohen toured a number of Leicester's commingled but distinct ethnic neighborhoods, including Highfields (lower income, predominantly ethnic Indian Gujarati, influenced religiously by the Wahhabi sect), Medway (Bangladeshi), Evington (mainly Muslim, middle class), Stonygate (progressive Jewish neighborhood with recent influx of more affluent Muslims), and Oadby (more prosperous and outside the city center). With over 200 mosques and madrasses in Leicester, Ali noted, the city has for the first time put up Eid decorations on the streets in Muslim neighborhoods. Diwali decorations have been a tradition for some time, Ali said, and the Diwali celebrations in Leicester are said to be the largest in Europe, and possibly the largest outside of India.
10. (SBU) Leicester's progressive Muslims may be politically "quieter" because of the comparatively huge orthodox presence, Ali said. The large numbers of Gujarati immigrants who came to the UK had originally settled in East Africa, and so brought with them a unique cultural memory of immigration strategies that had worked there. These immigrants knew and recognized the importance of immediately building up community institutions, leading to the proliferation of mosques and other community institutions. In addition, Leicester's ethnic climate is unique academically - the University of Leicester attracts numerous students from outside the area, even internationally, due to its academic prestige. DeMontFord University, by contrast, can then absorb more local populations, leading to a high level of ethnic diversity there.
11. (SBU) Members of the Leicestershire Constabulary's Community Safety Bureau described to Pandith and Cohen how their main focus is neighborhood policing and anti-terrorism, including racially and religiously-related crime. These programs rely on non-police community actors, who advise, inform, and assist with police operations. The police force will inform key community members prior to a raid, so that once police action is taken, comprehensive information on the situation is made available immediately to the community, thus preventing rumors and a possible escalation of conflict. As a result, there has been a significant level of community engagement with law enforcement. Constabulary officials acknowledged that their success might be a useful information tool for others in the United States or UK. Pandith expressed interest in passing information on their work to the Department of Homeland Security.
12. (SBU) Despite the many positive programs in Leicester, the isolation of some parts of the Muslim community was striking. During a discussion with religious and community leaders at an Ahmadiyya mosque, Yaqub Khan, General Secretary of a local organization called the Pakistan Association, insisted that he had to teach young people in Urdu. When Pandith challenged him as to why he would use Urdu with children who were growing up with English as their first language, Khan insisted that there were no good books on the Koran in English. At a local book store, texts in English seemed designed to segregate Muslims from their wider community, urging women to cover themselves and remain in their homes, playing up the differences between Islam and other religions, seeking to isolate Muslims from community, and feeding hate of Jews to the young. Some Leicester Muslims seemed to have haphazardly thrown together different elements of Islam, pairing an Arabian Gulf-style hijab with a Pakistani shalwar kameez, for example. Girls as young as four years old were completely covered. Pandith commented afterward that this was the most conservative Islamic community she had seen anywhere in Europe.
Muslim Youth
------------
13. (SBU) Pandith and Cohen attended three events specifically aimed at hearing the concerns of Muslim youth in London. On October 9 they traveled to the East London neighborhood of Waltham Forest, a largely Muslim area that is plagued by urban problems including drugs, youth gangs, violence (three young people were shot close to the meeting site that same evening), and a significant radical Muslim presence. There they met with young Muslims, journalists, and community leaders, including the Mayor of Waltham Forest and two Borough Councillors, under the auspices of the Active Change Foundation (ACF), a recently-launched leadership training program targeted at Muslim youth in deprived areas of East London. The ACF had just finished recruiting its first class of young men and women to participate in the ACF's inaugural leadership training course. During the meeting, the young people present repeated several times to Pandith and Cohen that they want the skills and the opportunities to be able to represent their views to the media and to decision makers. Although the journalists kept interjecting foreign policy issues such as Iraq and Israel/Palestine, the young people stressed that while those issues might be of some concern, the real issues in their lives are jobs, education, and empowerment. After a lively exchange, the ACF students presented a grant application for Embassy consideration, and both sides pledged that the link forged that evening would be maintained.
14. (SBU) In contrast, Cohen met October 9 with a small group of more privileged Muslim youth in Kensington, a wealthy London district. This meeting was held under the auspices of Kensington Borough Councillor Mushtaq Lasharie, himself a British Muslim of Pakistani origin who is the first Muslim councillor for this predominantly non-Muslim area. The young people at this meeting, all with higher education, said they wanted to see reconciliation themes conveyed through the arts, especially music. Cohen urged them to turn their ideas into action.
15. (U) An Iftar sponsored by the Next Century Foundation and held in Pandith and Cohen's honor October 10 drew such a large number of participants that the group was split in two. Participants included representatives of the Muslim Public Affairs Committee UK (MPAC), and the Leeds and Bradford Diasporas, the UK Turkish community, and Muslim community leaders. Discussion centered on foreign policy issues including Kashmir, Israel/Palestine, Afghanistan, Armenia/Turkey, and the spread of fundamentalist Islam. The wide variety of opinions expressed provided U.S. participants with a broad cross-section of the positions of the different Muslim communities in Britain. Cohen noted a distinct difference between the focus of these young people -- all in their mid-20s with graduate degrees -- as opposed to the group of more impoverished youth in East London, where discussions focused on integration and opportunity issues inside of Britain. This group focused entirely on foreign policy, and more specifically on U.S. foreign policy. Many of them had radical views, including that "America had 9/11 coming to it."
Bollywood
---------
16. (SBU) On October 10, Pandith and Cohen met with a cross section of the South Asian community working in film to discuss the potential of working with the Indian film industry - "Bollywood" - on delivering an anti-terrorism message. Participants included Director of Arts Versa Mohsin Abbas, Channel 4 TV Head of Multicultural Programming Farouk Dhondi, Producer Director Mahmood Jamal, Locations Manager Amjad Khan, and singer/actress Humeira Akhter, who has strong links with top Bollywood actors/actresses. A lively discussion produced a number of possible ideas, including developing ways to promote existing anti-terrorist films, and to develop funds for similar productions. Once such an anti-extremist genre is established, participants believed that major Bollywood figures would be willing to speak out on the issue. Humaira Akhtar has already gotten back to Pandith on possible stars in Bollywood interested in such a project.
Community Groups
----------------
17. (U) The National Muslim Communities Development Network (MCDM) arose from a series of meetings held by various UK Muslim communities, following the July 5, 2007 bombings in London. MCDM is now an independent structure intended to bring attention to the continuing work of existing organizations focused on countering extremism. It works to help develop and broaden emerging leadership within Muslim communities, bringing communities together through positive action and raising the standard of debate on Islam in Britain today. In a meeting October 10, MCDM members including Director Nadeem Kazmi, Muslim Media Network's Munir Zamir, Waltham Forest Community Cohesion Office Munir Zamir, Citibank's Nazish Zaid, Khayall Theater's Luqman Ali, Jang's Ali Murtaza Shah, and Art Versa Mohsin Abbas, exchanged views with Pandith and Cohen about the challenge of promoting a more sophisticated and nuanced approach to the debate on Islam in British society. All parties committed to continue to explore ways to support MCDM programs, while the MCDM leaders agreed to facilitate U.S. mission efforts to reach out to the British Muslim community. These leaders agreed to stay in touch with Cohen and Pandith about their progress in creating a network of activists.
Media
-----
18. (SBU) Taking advantage of the wide range of Diaspora media available in London, Pandith spoke to a cross section of the UK-based Muslim media during her visit, including Jang Daily News, the oldest Pakistani-community newspaper in the UK with a European circulation of about 23,000 readers; Emel Magazine, a high-end weekly glossy with a print run of 20,000: the Muslim Weekly, whose website receives 34,000 hits a day; and Al Hayat, an influential Pan Arab daily with a world-wide circulation of 160,000. Pandith stressed that the USG is interested in building a dialogue with European Muslims from which both sides benefit: this gives the United States a chance to dispel myths that its policies are anti-Islam, and Muslims gain a better understanding of how U.S. foreign policy is shaped. It also empowers Muslims to discuss their own religion directly, rather than allowing the media to interpret for them through soundbites and other filters. As this dialogue has improved, so has understanding, leading to cooperative efforts to develop and support grass roots movements that combat the destructive impulses of extremists. Drawing on her own experience as a Muslim American, Pandith sought to dispel some myths about Muslims in America, noting that they are free to honor their religion as well as their ethnic and cultural backgrounds. The tension between allegiance to one's country and to one's faith is mostly absent for American Muslims, she said, because America is a country of immigrants, many of whom emigrated seeking religious freedom. She was careful to point out that the history of immigration and integration in the United States has at times been painful, but stressed that as a country the United States has benefited greatly from the experiences of the Civil Rights Movement.
19. (U) EUR Senior Advisor Pandith and S/P Member Cohen have cleared this message.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm Tuttle
Monday, 14 August 2006, 17:17
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 005958
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/14/2011
TAGS PGOV, PTER, KISL, UK
SUBJECT: (U) TENSIONS RISE BETWEEN BRITISH MUSLIMS AND HMG
IN THE WAKE OF THWARTED TERRORIST ATTACK
REF: A) LONDON 5921 B) LONDON 5884
Classified By: PolMinCouns Maura Connelly, Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Frustrated by the bruising that their community has taken after 24 UK-born Muslims were arrested in connection with the recently-thwarted air terrorist plot (reftels), prominent British Muslims sent an open letter to PM Tony Blair August 12 blaming his policy on Iraq and the Middle East for fueling extremism and putting British citizens at risk. HMG reacted angrily to the letter; in a series of meetings with Muslim community leaders August 14, government ministers planned to demand that the Muslim community itself do more to root out terrorists in its midst. At the same time, officials were scheduled to hold talks with leaders of seven UK localities where they judge unrest among Muslims may turn into street violence. Two British mosques have been set on fire since the story of the thwarted attacks broke, and UK police suspect revenge arson. Meanwhile, media sources are reporting that Blair has made contingency plans to return to the UK from holiday in Barbados if events warrant. END SUMMARY.
(U) BRITISH MUSLIMS ANGRY
2. (U) The arrest of 24 UK-born Muslims (one has since been released) in connection with the recently-thwarted air terrorist plot angered and frustrated Britain's Muslim community. Most feel they are being unjustly blamed and stereotyped. "You cannot assume that Muslims are collectively responsible for the actions of a few," Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) media spokesman Inayat Bunglawa said August 14. Many Muslims feel HMG is employing a double standard in dealing with Muslim suspects, pointing to the Bank of England's decision to release the names of 19 of the suspects when their assets were frozen at the time of their arrest. (UK officials defend this unusual practice as necessary to ensure that all assets were properly frozen.) "It is important to wait until a thorough investigation has taken place before pointing fingers and drawing conclusions. It is important to maintain the legal principles we hold dear, namely the concept of innocent until proven guilty," Federation of Students Islamic Societies (FOSIS) spokesman Wakkas Khan said August 11.
3. (U) The Muslim community's anger is also fueled by continued resentment of HMG's handling of the June raid on a home in Forest Gate in East London, when 250 officers arrested two Muslim brothers, shooting one of them in the process, only to release them without charge a few days later. Chairman of the Birmingham Central Mosque Mohammed Nassem said August 12: "With the track record of the police, one doesn't have much faith in the basis on which people are detained. And it poses the question of whether the arrests are part of a political objective, by using Muslims as a target, using the perception of terrorism to usurp all our civil liberties and get more and more control while moving towards a totalitarian state." (Note: The follow-up to the botched raid has irked some other Britons after the media reported that, since their release, the brothers and their families have been housed at a central London hotel at taxpayer expense while raid-related damage to the house is repaired, also at government expense. End Note)
4. (U) Prominent British Muslim leaders sent an open letter to PM Tony Blair August 12 stating that his policy on Iraq and the Middle East offers "ammunition to extremists" and puts British lives "at increased risk." Appearing as a full page advertisement in newspapers August 13, the letter was signed by three of the four Muslim MPs, three of the five Muslim members of the House of Lords, and 38 Muslim organizations (for full text and list of signatories see para 10). Although the letter states specifically that "attacking civilians is never justified," its signatories have used this sentence as a double-edged sword in defending the letter publicly, in effect equating civilian deaths in Lebanon with potential civilian deaths from terrorism. As MCB Secretary General Dr. Mohammed Abdul Bari told the press, "As Muslims, we condemn attacks on civilians wherever they happen. Civilians in the UK, the Middle East, and the rest of the world should all enjoy protection."
(U) HMG ANGRY
5. (U) HMG reacted sharply to the letter. A spokesman for PM Blair (currently on holiday in Barbados), noting that al-Qaida terrorist attacks began well before Iraq, said, "To imply al-Qaida is driven by an honest disagreement over foreign policy is a mistake." Home Secretary John Reid told the BBC, "I'm not going to question the motives of anyone who has signed this letter, but I think it is a dreadful
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misjudgment if we believe the foreign policy of this country should be shaped in part, or in whole, under the threat of terrorist activity if we do not have a foreign policy with which the terrorists happen to agree." Transport Secretary Douglas Alexander echoed these sentiments, saying "No government worth its salt should allow its foreign policy to be dictated to under the threat of terrorism." Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett said it would be "the gravest
SIPDIS possible error" to blame foreign policy for the threat of terrorism. "This is part of a distorted view of the world, a distorted view of life," she said. "Let's put the blame where it belongs: with people who wantonly want to take innocent lives." Other ministers called the letter "facile," "dangerous," and "foolish."
6. (U) Communities Secretary Ruth Kelly, along with ministers from her department and the Home Office, was scheduled to meet with representatives of various Muslim groups August 14. HMG has made clear that one message officials will deliver in these meetings is that Muslim leaders must do more to tackle extremism inside their community. Although the meetings also represent HMG's stepped up efforts to engage with Muslims, Labour MP Sadiq Khan said the community feels "let down" by HMG efforts to date, particularly the "Preventing Extremism Together" task forces, which the Home Office created after the 7/7 attacks. Very few of the 64 measures recommended by Muslim leaders on the task force have been implemented, Khan said, creating an "air of despondency" and leading the community to believe that the entire exercise was just a publicity stunt. For its part, HMG is keen to show that a substantial action plan is already in place. Secretary Kelly has pointed to a new Commission on Integration and Cohesion to be launched later this month.
7. (U) Meanwhile, the media has quoted aides to PM Blair as saying that No. 10 Downing Street has made contingency plans for him to return to the UK from his vacation in Barbados if events warrant it. These aides have reportedly admitted that the PM would not have left for holiday if he had known that the police were about to arrest the alleged terrorist plotters.
(U) ELEMENTS OF UNREST
8. (C) Also on August 14, law enforcement officials were scheduled to meet leaders from seven communities - Newham, Hackney, Barking, Dagenham, and Waltham Forest in London, plus Birmingham and High Wycombe - where they judged the possibility for unrest might lead to street violence. Lord Ahmed of Rotherham warned, "The police on the whole have acted professionally and satisfactorily, but they must produce some evidence soon." Meanwhile, fire fighters took almost two hours to put out a fire at the Al-Birr mosque in the town of Basingstoke in southeast England on August 13, and UK officials tell Embassy London they are seriously considering that the blaze was a revenge arson attack against Muslims. Another mosque in Blacon in northwest England was attacked August 10. Leader of white supremacist British National Party Nick Griffin, at a rally August 12, called for all Muslims between 15 and 50 to be banned from flying, and said there was "no such thing as a moderate Muslim."
9. (C) COMMENT: Since 7/7, HMG has invested considerable time and resources in engaging the British Muslim community. The current tensions demonstrate just how little progress has been made. At the same time, the Muslim community's reaction to the arrests of 24 of its own sons - a knee-jerk reaction blaming HMG - shows that its leaders too have far to go. That said, the Muslim community is not the only element in Britain blaming HMG's foreign policy for inciting radical elements; the left in particular but even the mainstream press has expressed the belief, reportedly wide-spread, that homegrown terrorism is an "inevitable" response to the UK's involvement in Iraq and reluctance to call for an "immediate ceasefire" in the Middle East. HMG's rather heated response to the letter is undoubtedly aimed at swaying broader opinion.
(U) FULL TEXT OF LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER BLAIR
10. (U) Begin text of letter:
Prime Minister, As British Muslims we urge you to do more to fight against all those who target civilians with violence, whenever and wherever that happens.
It is our view that current British government policy risks putting civilians at increased risk both in the UK and abroad.
To combat terror the government has focused extensively on
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domestic legislation. While some of this will have an impact, the government must not ignore the role of its foreign policy.
The debacle of Iraq and now the failure to do more to secure an immediate end to the attacks on civilians in the Middle East not only increases the risk to ordinary people in that region, it is also ammunition to extremists who threaten us all.
Attacking civilians is never justified. This message is a global one. We urge the Prime Minister to redouble his efforts to tackle terror and extremism and change our foreign policy to show the world that we value the lives of civilians wherever they live and whatever their religion.
Such a move would make us all safer.
(Signed) Sadiq Khan MP, Shahid Malik MP, Mohammed Sarwar MP, Lord Patel of Blackburn, Lord Ahmed of Rotherham, Baronness Uddin, Association of Muslim Schools, British Muslim Forum, Bolton Mosques Council for Community Care, Confederation of Sunni Mosques, Midlands Council of Nigerian Muslim Organizations, Council of Mosques - London and Southern Counties, Council of Mosques Tower Hamlets, Da'awtul Islam UK and Eire, Federation of Muslim Organizations (Leicestershire), Federation of Students Islamic Societies (FOSIS), Indian Muslim Federation, Islamic Forum Europe, Islam Society of Britain, Jama'at Ahle Sunnat UK, Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith UK, Jamiat-e-Ulema Britain, Lancashire Council of Mosques, Muslim Association of Britain, Muslim Council of Britain, Muslim Council of Wales, Muslim Doctors and Dentists Association, Muslim Parliament, Muslim Solidarity Committee, Muslim Students Society UK and Eire, Muslim Welfare House (London), Muslim Women Society (MWS), Muslim Women's Association, Northern Ireland Muslim Family Association (NIMFA), Sussex Muslim Society, The Council of European Jamaats, UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs, UK Islamic Mission, UK Turkish Islamic Association, World Federation of KSIMC, World Islamic Mission, Young Muslim Organization UK, Young Muslim Sisters UK, Young Muslims UK.
End text of letter.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm Tuttle
Friday, 18 April 2008, 14:03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 001113
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR S/CT - AMB.DAILEY AND EUR
EO 12958 DECL: 04/14/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, UK
SUBJECT: PROPOSALS FOR AMBASSADOR'S CT FUND
REF: STATE 20081
Classified By: Ambassador Robert H. Tuttle for reasons 1. 4 (b,d)
1. (U) Embassy London welcomes the offer made by S/CT Ambassador Dailey for S/CT to consider granting funds of up to 50,000 USD to support projects to counter violent extremist ideology. Embassy London submits the following two proposals:
2. (C) REVERSE RADICALISM: Working with Her Majesty's Government, the Embassy would contract an American academic to carry out a study of those individuals currently residing in the United Kingdom who allege they were once on the path to radicalization and terrorism but stepped back from it. These include the noteworthy number of individuals who have come forward to work on counter radicalization in the wake of the publication of "the Islamist" by Ed Hussein. Many of these individuals say they were radicalized on the streets and in the mosques of London in the 1990s and now wish to work to use that experience to encourage British youth not to become radicalized. Post believes the UK is unique in the number of its former radical Islamists and their increasingly public profile. The Embassy and HMG are aware of other, similar individuals who have begun to speak of their experience but are not yet known to the general public and may, or may not, be dedicated to using their knowledge to dissuade British youth from supporting terrorism or extremist ideology. Embassy would coordinate with appropriate HMG officials on gaining access to individuals known to HMG who would be useful participants.
The purpose of the survey would be to:
1) attempt to quantify how many of these individuals are known by the Embassy, HMG and British NGOs and think tanks now engaged in the study of radicalization;
2) create a pool of individuals that could serve as a source of information on radicalization in the UK -- its causes and what they believe will work to deflate it;
3) evaluate whether there is a common history which explains why these individuals stepped back from terrorism which is potentially applicable outside the UK context in the U.S. and elsewhere in Europe.
4) determine which of these individuals we might use to support counterterrorism efforts and how best to use them.
3. (C) The Embassy estimates costs for the Reverse Radicalism project to be 43,000 USD to cover travel costs (including airfare, lodging, M&IE, honorarium, and local transportation) and research expenses including phone calls. Funds not spent on the Reverse Radicalism project (should the Embassy and HMG not find a qualified individual to carry out the study, should the sample size prove smaller than anticipated, or should S/CT prefer not to allocate funds to the Reverse Radicalism project) would be dedicated to Embassy participation in the Ramadan Festival UK.
4. (U) RAMADAN FESTIVAL UK: Based on the highly successful Dutch model, Embassy London's contacts in the British Muslim community plan on holding a "Ramadan Festival" this year aimed at highlighting the diversity of the British mainstream. The event will help raise the standard of dialogue on extremism and promote understanding between Britain's Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Part of the festival is a series of "Ramadan Nights," focused on bringing together the British Muslim community in a positive atmosphere of learning and a global sense of community. The Festival has asked the Embassy to provide an American Muslim performance group which could appeal to both older and younger audiences.
5. The Embassy proposes to bring the "Allah Made Me Funny" comedy troupe to the UK to participate in the Festival, building on the unparalleled success we achieved with their UK program last fall. Their appeal in not restricted on an particular age group of background, and the message their performance would send, of American Muslims, proud to be both "American" and "Muslim" is a powerful message that would open British Muslim eyes to American cultural and religious diversity as well as encourage reflection on the part of British Muslim community in a positive, self-defining direction. Our expected outcome would be to reach thousand of British Muslims, including the disproportionately high youth population, with these positive messages.
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6. S/CT funds, should they be dedicated to the RAMADAN FESTIVAL UK would be allocated to cover travel costs (including airfare, lodging, M&IE, honorarium, and local transportation) for the Allah Made Me Funny group. The Embassy estimates cost for bringing the "Allah Made Me Funny" troupe to the UK to be 39,000 USD.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom LEBARON
Friday, 09 February 2007, 16:22
S E C R E T LONDON 000519
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EB/ESC/TFS BENDANA
TREASURY/OIA FOR MENDELSOHN
NSC FOR KIFAYAT
EO 12958 DECL: 02/08/2017
TAGS EFIN, ETTC, KTFN, PREL, PTER, UK
SUBJECT: TERRORISM FINANCE: REQUEST FOR POSTS ASSISTANCE IN
THE EVALUATION/ASSESSMENT OF FIRST TRANCHE OF TERRORIST FACILITATORS AND INCITERS DESIGNATIONS
REF: STATE 14467
Classified By: Economic Officer Peter Haas for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) In response to reftel, Embassy contacted officials in the international organizations and counterterrorism policy departments at the Foreign Office to request feedback on the first tranche of terrorist facilitators and inciters designations. Both officials with whom we spoke commented that, as none of the targets were UK-based, the UK government has done little to monitor the impact of the designations.
2. (S/NF) We were told, however, that the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Office are keen to draw attention to the role of facilitators and inciters and that the UK would be willing to consider a second round of designations "as long as the targets meet the 1267 criteria."
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Monday, 09 June 2008, 10:58
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 001586
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/21/2018
TAGS EFIN, KTFN, ECON, IR, UK
SUBJECT: U/S JEFFERY AND A/S O'BRIEN PRESS UK ON IRANIAN
BANKS
Classified By: Richard LeBaron, DCM, for reasons 1.4 B & D
1. (C) SUMMARY: State Under Secretary Reuben Jeffery and Treasury Assistant Secretary Patrick O'Brien met with UK banking regulators on May 15 to urge increased scrutiny and tougher actions against Iranian banks operating in London. O'Brien and State Acting Assistant Secretary Patricia McNerney also discussed U.S. and UK efforts on proliferation finance and Iran with HM Treasury and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on May 16. O'Brien noted the positive effect that coordinated international pressure was having, but urged the UK to step into a leadership role so as to serve as a model for other governments considering action. O'Brien suggested that the UK look carefully at the parent institutions of Iranian banks operating in London as UK regulators consider the application of "fit and proper" requirements on Iranian subsidiaries in the UK. British officials described their regulatory and policy efforts, noting their shared goals of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran, but pointed to legal restrictions which limit their ability to act too aggressively. They also noted their fear of losing if challenged in court. END SUMMARY
2. (U) USG officials met on May 15-16 in London to discuss the Iranian banking sector's activities in the UK. State's Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs, Reuben Jeffery, Treasury's Assistant Secretary for Terrorism Finance and Financial Crime, Patrick O'Brien, and DCM Richard LeBaron met with the Financial Services Authority's (FSA) Chief Executive Hector Sants and Director of Financial Crime and Intelligence Division Phil Robinson. Federal Reserve Board Governor Kevin Warsh also attended the FSA meeting. O'Brien, accompanied by Treasury's Colleen Eddy and Michelle Zager, also met separately with HM Treasury's (HMT) Stephen Pickford, Managing Director of Finance and International, Patrick Guthrie, Head of Asset Freezing, Pete Maydon, Deputy Asset Freezing, XXXXXXXXXXXX and the Foreign Office's (FCO) Carl Newns, XXXXXXXXXXXX and Stephen McCormick, Head of International Organizations Sanctions Team. O'Brien and McNerney, accompanied by Eddy, Zager, and State's Anthony Ruggiero, Matthew Gershwin, Jeffrey Harvey, Pam Tremont, Bart Barbessi and Mark Johnson held Proliferation Finance meetings with the Foreign Office's Paul Arkwright, Eleanor Petch and Isabella McRae, XXXXXXXXXXXX, Guthrie and XXXXXXXXXXXX, and Ministry of Defense's Catherine Simpson.
UK Financial Services Authority
-------------------------------
3. (C) U/S Jeffery and A/S O'Brien described the progress made by the international community in putting financial pressure on those individuals and entities involved in Iran's nuclear and missile programs. Jeffery noted that the U.S. and UK share the same goal of shutting down Iran's proliferation activities, and that our efforts are having a noticeable effect. O'Brien explained that Iran is using state-owned financial institutions - including Bank Sepah, Bank Melli and Bank Saderat - to facilitate its proliferation efforts and support for terrorism, and welcomed the EU's plan to designate Bank Melli. O'Brien applauded the private sector's voluntary risk-based analyses which have led them to go beyond legal requirements in avoiding doing business in Iran. These independent decisions are having a noticeable effect on Iran's ability to conduct business as usual, he said.
4. (C) On the other hand, O'Brien explained that the USG is hearing from public and private sectors around the world that governments are unwilling to get out ahead of Europe in their interpretation of UN and Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-related obligations as they consider additional domestic measures against Iranian banks. In the Persian Gulf, particularly the UAE, officials point to their proximity to Iran as a reason why they can not take a harder line on Iranian banks than the Europeans. With four Iranian banks continuing to operate in London, O'Brien said that Middle East and Asian countries are not likely to take any action on its Iranian banks unless London moves first. If the UK acted publicly, the U.S. would be willing to take that message to the Middle East and Asia to press for similar action in other jurisdictions.
5. (C) Sants assured that the FSA takes UNSCR implementation very seriously and has instituted an intense supervisory
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regime over the Iranian banks, but the FSA would need direct evidence of specific actions taken by the London-based individuals and institutions in order to take additional action against them. Sants said, however, that the FSA cannot reveal the full extent of its actions to the public.
6. (C) Robinson explained further how the burden rests upon the bank applicant to prove it is a fit and proper entity when applying for a license, but that the burden shifts to the FSA and HMT to prove otherwise once a license has been granted. The UK has taken all the evidence provided by the U.S. and applied it as far as it can legally, but does not have sufficient evidence that it can put in front of a tribunal in taking further action against Sepah. O'Brien acknowledged the independent legal status of the subsidiaries, but urged that the parent's actions should be relevant to the "fit and proper" analysis applied to a wholly-owned subsidiary. O'Brien pointed out that at the time of the UN designation of Bank Sepah, the parent and the London subsidiary shared the same CEO. O'Brien encouraged the FSA to review whether, in light of the UNSCRs, the parent banks are "fit and proper" enough to maintain subsidiaries in the UK. Robinson said the FSA has "pushed the boundaries" of what it can do in looking at the parent entities in Tehran, but must prove "intent" of the person transferring the money. All the Iranian banks are "keeping their noses clean" in the UK, explained Robinson, and the FSA can only address actions of the London-based subsidiary.
7. (C) Robinson observed that Iran had been effectively cut off from both the USD and the pound sterling, and suggested that the U.S. explore with the EU the possibility of limiting Iran's use of the euro by removing its access to the European Central Bank's settlement mechanism (known as "TARGET"). He also mentioned that it might be possible to go after Saderat based on that bank's links to Hizbollah if the UK were to designate Hizbollah as a terrorist organization. O'Brien stressed that the USG believes there is sufficient evidence of intent on the part of Sepah, evidenced by its direction to correspondents to remove its name from transactions, and noted that the subsidiary itself is designated under the UNSCRs.
Update from HM Treasury on UK Action against Iranian banks
--------------------------------------------- -------------
8. (C/NF) O'Brien also raised the symbolic importance of publicizing UK action on Iranian banks with HM Treasury given views heard from Gulf countries. O'Brien commended European diplomatic leadership in garnering international consensus on financial sanctions, and encouraged more domestic actions - especially from the UK and France. He also prodded HMG to stake out a strong political position on the level of litigation risk they are willing to tolerate, and offered USG help in brainstorming or sharing U.S. experiences. O'Brien acknowledged that Europe may be worried about China and others stepping in to fill the void left by European companies, but noted that Iran cannot meet all of its critical infrastructure needs with second-tier technology and will continue to rely on European and other sources of advanced technology in key sectors of the economy (e.g., energy). Pickford expressed concern that the UK approach to oversight of Iranian banks was being misconstrued in the Gulf, and agreed to consider ways that HM Treasury - if not the FSA - could publicize UK regulatory actions over Iranian banks in London.
9. (C/NF) O'Brien urged HMG to take the most robust possible interpretation in enforcing UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803's paragraph 10 which calls for vigilance over all Iranian banks. Pickford assured that the UK would be vigorous in its implementation of 1803, but XXXXXXXXXXXX cautioned that the UNSCR 1803 would not likely give the UK the room to remove operating licenses from Iranian banks in London. Pickford explained that the UK looked at whether it would be more advantageous if the London-based Iranian banks were branches rather than subsidiaries - as they are currently - and determined that under a branch system, it would be easier to prove the direct link between Tehran and London, but harder to prevent funds from flowing back to Tehran. For that reason they have decided to maintain the banks as subsidiaries. A branch would be easier to close up quickly, but there would be a greater risk that the money would flow back to Iran - although under the licensing regime that money should be frozen now.
10. (C/NF) On the status of Bank Sepah, O'Brien noted that over a year has elapsed since Bank Sepah was sanctioned by
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the UN, which should be sufficient time to allow for legitimate parties to extract themselves from their business relationships. He called on the UK to intensify its reviews of reserve requirements and the fit and proper nature of the banks to see if additional pressure can be put to bear on Sepah and the others. Pickford said the UK was winding down Bank Sepah and trying to prevent money from going to Iran. Guthrie explained that the UK was licensing a small number of Bank Sepah's prior commitments to be fulfilled, but that HMT denied the majority of transactions. Both HMT and FSA confirmed that Sepah has enough deposits to keep it sufficiently capitalized, but HMT is not permitting Bank Sepah to acquire new deposits. Pickford noted that the recent "hiccups" in the Bank Sepah licensing process highlighted the need for the U.S. and UK to stay engaged from the beginning of the process.
11. (S/NF) HMT's Guthrie observed that the culture at FSA has changed over the past six months. FSA previously stressed their political independence, but now seems to understand the full extent of the issue and is stepping up supervision in London. According to Guthrie, HMT is concerned about disclosure requirements, the strength and classified nature of the evidence being used, and the fit and proper status of the Iranian parent banks. FSA has reviewed the intelligence provided by the USG and has brought in Special Counsel to advise them, but are told that the Iranian parents do not exercise sufficient ownership and control over the London banks for the FSA to step in. Guthrie said the UK takes on board the criticism about being too legalistic, but needs to find a balance between protecting its legal framework while still viewing things from the big picture. HMT lawyers are reconsidering their approaches and should have an opinion on how aggressive HMT can be within a few weeks.
12. (C) On next steps, Pickford said that one approach is to push the envelope on what HMT and FSA can do to make life difficult for the banks. XXXXXXXXXXXX
U.S.-UK Proliferation Finance Dialogue
--------------------------------------
13. (S/NF) During the May 16 meeting on proliferation finance, both the U.S. and the UK presented briefings to ensure each side had the most up-to-date information on Iranian proliferation finance activities. U.S. and UK participants also agreed to work together on several next steps:
-- Continued and regularized information-sharing between intelligence, financial and diplomatic officials; -- Cooperation in FATF, including raising the profile of advisory notices so as to create a greater deterrent effect; -- Coordination with the French, Germans, Italians to try and move UNSCR 1803 implementation of measures forward; -- Expand the scope of 1803 measures and include greater participation from other nations; -- Look towards the next UNSCR utilizing evidence of financial displacement of activity; -- Increase diplomatic outreach and coordinate U.S./UK approach to Malaysia, UAE, Indonesia, Pakistan, etc. -- Hold a secure video conference before August in order to maintain the momentum on these issues.
Asset Freezing
--------------
14. (C) Maydon explained that HMT's appeal to the High Court decision on asset-freezing would be heard in mid-June. HMT is preparing a contingency plan which will include legislative solutions, but they have not yet come up with the specifics. If they lose the case, HMG will have to move quickly to maintain the current freeze, perhaps by obtaining an interim order. The government is also looking at other authorities, such as stepping up police surveillance, Control Orders, or other - undefined - measures to prevent money from leaking out.
15. (U) This cable was cleared by U/S Jeffery and A/S
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Friday, 11 September 2009, 14:51
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 002121
SIPDIS
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS ECON, EINV, EFIN, UK
SUBJECT: MEMBERS OF CONGRESS DISCUSS BONUSES, BAIL-OUTS AND
OTHER REFORM MEASURES WITH UK OFFICIALS
1. (SBU) Summary. Bonuses, regulatory structures, and EU legislation led the discussions of Senators Richard Shelby (R-Ala) and John Cornyn (R-Texas), and Representatives Paul Kanjorski (D ) PA), Scott Garrett (R ) NJ) and Luis Gutierrez (D ) Ill) during their recent meetings in London. During the September 2-7 visit, the two Congressional delegations jointly met with Members of Parliament from the Treasury Select Committee; with Lord Adair Turner and his staff from the Financial Services Authority, and with leading banking executives. A constant theme was the need for regulatory convergence and for changes to occur methodically, not hastily. End Summary. Parliament's Treasury Select Committee ) Bonuses and Brussels Top Concern 2. (SBU) MPs from both the Labour and Conservative Parties cited the "group think" of bankers and lack of oversight from boards of directors as one of the root causes of the economic crisis. John McFall, Committee Chairman and Labour MP, criticized the board of directors of Royal Bank of Scotland for not questioning RBS's purchase of ABN Ambro at the height of the market and without doing due diligence of the Bank. Michael Fallon, Conservative MP, highlighted the failure of corporate governance and ineffective self-regulation by the industry. 3. (SBU) In response to Senator Shelby's query about how we move beyond the crisis and fix the problems, McFall suggested that bank salaries and bonuses had to be a top priority. He said, however, that the Financial Services Authority's proposed guidelines on remuneration are weak, and what already is being seen, with the latest news about bonuses being paid out, is that "the punch bowl has moved to the center of the table, with a bigger ladle." He was disquieted by the "business as usual" mentality that seems to be emerging once again in the banking industry. 4. (SBU) The MPs expressed concern about actions in Brussels. Fallon said the draft EU Alternative Investment Fund Managers directive was protectionist and would erect a wall around Europe and disadvantage non-European investors. The UK should strongly oppose this directive, since it would weaken London as a global financial center. The French, he said, were taking the hardest line on the AIFM, though curiously he noted that France has no real hedge fund industry. He surmised that the French were taking such a hard line to be able to do some horse-trading later, and get UK acquiescence on issues that matter to them, like bonuses and compensation. Mark Todd, Labour MP, commented that Brussels saw the crisis as an opportunity to challenge the Anglo-Saxon model of markets. Andrew Love, Labour MP, noted that there was a great communality of interests between the UK and the U.S., and that our two governments need to work together more effectively in influencing Brussels ) a comment echoed by all the other MPs. Todd and Sally Keeble, Labour MP, noted the need to have international coordination especially when dealing with large, systemically important firms. Though, she wryly mused, that if there had been an international effort to save Lehman Brothers, the French would have gotten involved only if they received the "glory," and the Germans only if they could get jobs out the rescue plan. All MPs expressed concern that the UK's financial services interests could be undermined by actions in Brussels. 5. (SBU) Fallon also noted the international debate has centered on the questions of systemic risk and financial stability, but both terms, in his view, have not been adequately defined. Without a proper understanding of what real objectives were meant to be reached under this rubric, any regulatory structure created would be inadequate. Financial Services Authority (FSA) ) More Capital, More Accountable Boards 6. (SBU) Lord Adair Turner, Chair of the FSA, identified several causes to the crisis: too much leverage, insufficient liquidity, too low reserves, too much focus on mark-to-market accounting rules, too much risk-taking, too little oversight by boards of directors. A multi-tiered approach was needed to prevent such crises in the future, he said. Among the steps required: higher capital reserves, including, perhaps, a capital surcharge on the biggest banks ) the systemically important firms; greater oversight by boards and shareholders of pay and bonuses; greater accountability of boards; and "living wills" for systemically important firms. 7. (SBU) Specifically, he argued, banks needed a large buffer of equity capital, and that capital requirements should increase in step with the risk involved with their activity. He stated that regulators were still struggling with the concept of what was "too big to fail" ) and why financial services firms did not, or could not, fail as other major corporations did by following such procedures as declaring bankruptcy and going to court to deal with holders of credit and of debt. He supported "living wills" for failing firms, but cautioned about the practicality of such wills, since business activity was not stagnant and wills would be
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outdated the minute they were completed. Nevertheless, wills would force an examination of complex corporate structures that could enable authorities to better understand the institutions they regulate. He also thought such wills could improve corporate governance by increasing transparency. On pay, he agreed with Representative Garrett's (R-NJ) observation that the issue was turning into a "red herring." Bonuses, he said, had not been at the heart of the crisis, but the political pressure was mounting to place limits on bonuses. Regulators, he said, should not mandate levels of pay, but they could address the structure of how people were paid; whether, for example, there were immediate cash payments or payments deferred until profits/losses were cleared from the books. The issue should be the nature of incentives; employees should not be rewarded for "bad behavior." He said he supported a "claw back" provision on bonuses should activity later come to light that would be deemed as too risky. He stressed that boards of directors and shareholders need to take on greater oversight of pay. 8. (SBU) Negligent boards of directors bore much of the responsibility for the crisis, he argued, failing to provide oversight or check risky activity. As a direct result of the crisis, the FSA has ramped up its review of the composition and qualifications of directors and was interviewing, in many cases, non-executive members of boards, and turning them down if they did not have the appropriate competency levels. In its oversight of financial services, the FSA will ask boards whether they are looking at the whole range of business activity and what guidance they are providing on pay. 9. (SBU) Hedge funds also were at risk of becoming a populist issue, Turner noted. He said that hedge fund activity was not a cause of the crisis, and most funds were significantly less leveraged that many banks ) on average two to one for hedge funds versus twenty to one for investment banks. But in continental Europe, hedge fund managers were being perceived as the villains. He argued that regulators should have the absolute right to gather information about funds to review their systemic risk. And if there were concerns, regulators could impose greater capital requirements, but he did not believe that a regulation of the industry itself was necessary. 10. (SBU), Turner said institutional architectures were the least important issue. The key issue was not structure, but philosophy ) that market forces would guarantee stability. He argued that changing the overall regulatory architecture in the UK was not necessary, but increasing the competency of and funding for regulators were essential. When asked about the "Tobin tax" (tax on all trade of currency across borders), Turner said the idea has generated much comment and criticism, but said such a tax was impractical and could not be implemented. Bankers Speak Out ) "Help Us Help Ourselves" 11. (SBU) A single systemic risk regulator was needed, the bankers unanimously agreed. The banking industry can not regulate itself sufficiently to prevent any future crisis. The regulator must be able to check the industry's worst impulses, said Gary Lynch, Executive Vice President and Chief Legal Officer, Morgan Stanley, at a Embassy-hosted roundtable. 12. (SBU) In the U.S., the bankers agreed it should be the Federal Reserve Board, which already has authority for price stability and economic growth. Adding authority for financial stability would enable the Fed to monitor systemic risk. In the UK, they were mixed about whether the Bank of England should be granted greater authority, or whether the current tripartite structure ) with the BOE, Treasury and Financial Services Authority having different oversight obligations ) should remain intact. Stephen Green, Chairman HSBC, argued that under the current system in the UK, the public armor lacks "weapons." The BOE has been traditionally focused on inflation; neither the Bank nor the FSA was watching the flow of money in and out of the financial system. They were not concerned with capital reserves or liquidity. He argued that there needed to be a single regulator in the UK and that it must have a broad oversight mandate. The BOE, he said, should be able to control the flow of credit, manage capital ratios ) and have responsibility over all systemically important firms. 13. (SBU) Regarding pay and bonuses, the bankers all agreed that bonuses structures should be reviewed, and that pay and performance should be closely linked. They cautioned however about letting political pressures dictate such structures or any reform efforts. Angela Knight, President of the British Bankers' Association, argued that the industry was facing political risk; that political leaders were responding to public anger but were not addressing real issues. Some continental European leaders, she said, dislike hedge fund managers and their personal wealth, and see this crisis as an opportunity to get a grip on greed. This was part of the motivation behind a seriously flawed draft EU directive on
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hedge funds. She commented that the incoming European Commission would want to be seen as tougher on bankers than the outgoing Commission. 14. (SBU) On prospects for global economic recovery, the bankers also offered mixed views. UK exports were up and unemployment continued to rise but at a slower rate. Glenn Earle, Chief Operating Officer, Goldman Sachs, cited an increase in corporate bond issuances and a reduction in corporate debt, especially in terms of short-term debt. These were signs that the economies are healing, but the long-term prognosis was still uncertain, he said. He said that rising unemployment and savings rates would repress consumption; for how long was unclear. J. Eric Daniels, Chief Executive, Lloyds Banking Group, stated that consumer confidence was up in the UK, and noted that lower interest rates had reduced mortgage payments (by an average GBP 200 pounds per month) and raised consumers, disposable income. He also observed that inventories were being re-stocked and some delayed capital purchases were now being made. But he pessimistically noted that he did not see a real engine for growth in the UK or the U.S. It was a debt-fueled boom before, and without real gains in productivity, he said he did not expect a return to real growth anytime soon. 15. (SBU) Global imbalances ) between saving and borrowing cultures ) also still need to be addressed, argued Sir Win Bischoff, who takes over as Chairman of Lloyds Banking Group later this month. He noted that Asian growth remained dependent on the U.S. market. Green observed that Asia was rescuing global growth once again, with both China and India expected to have growth rates of eight percent or higher in the next 12 months. Agreeing with Bischoff, he said there was a real risk for Asia if the U.S. did not really start to recover until end of 2010. Growth in China was being driven by greater domestic spending on infrastructure, timetables for which were moved forward to pump money into the economy. These projects will be completed by summer 2010. The question, he asked, was what will take its place as a driver of growth? Royal Bank of Scotland ) Mistakes were Made 16. (SBU) In a separate meeting with Representatives Kanjorski, Garrett and Gutierrez, RBS Chairman Sir Philip Hampton (who was appointed by the UK government in April) acknowledged that RBS had made several enormous mistakes. Top among them was its heavy exposure in the U.S. subprime market and the bank's purchase of ABN Ambro, which occurred at the height of the market and without RBS doing proper due diligence prior to the purchase. The board of directors never questioned this purchase, which Hampton termed a failure of their fiduciary responsibilities. 17. (SBU) Hampton spoke about RBS's de-leveraging. It has set up a non-core bank with GBP 250 billion in capital to absorb its toxic and non-performing assets; it has a three-year plan to get all its toxic assets off its balance books. It will also eliminate less profitable business activity, such as marine and aviation lending ) in which RBS had been the global leader. It will retain the U.S.-based Citizens Bank, but will likely reduce the number of branches. (As an aside, Hampton noted that RBS is the number one broker/dealer of U.S. Treasuries, and that the USG should be interested in RBS's health, given the anticipated increase in sales of U.S. Treasuries.) RBS has raised GBP 50 billion in capital in the past 12 months, though two-thirds of that was from the government. He expected the government would retain its stake in RBS for several years and would only begin to reduce its holdings once the market recovery is certain. He predicted the government would sell RBS off in several tranches over the next three-to-five years. 18. (SBU) On industry-wide issues, Hampton supported some regulatory oversight of pay and bonuses but said he preferred a light touch ) otherwise, the most talented people might leave and go to non-regulated industries. He argued that there needed to be one global accounting standard; the lack of uniformity played to the advantage of those who knew how to exploit the differences. He also supported higher capital reserves requirements, even among mid-sized banks. One lesson to be learned from the crisis is that regional players can become global players, like RBS did, in a matter of years, and regulators need to anticipate this potentiality.
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SUSMAN
Wednesday, 06 May 2009, 14:57
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 001069
SIPDIS
TREASURY FOR MEYER AND WINN
EO 12958 DECL: 5/6/2014
TAGS ECON, EINV, UK
SUBJECT: RBS EXECUTIVES SAY "MEA CULPA" - AND SHARE PLANS
TO RESTORE BANK'S STANDING
Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Mark Tokola for reasons 1 .4 b and d.
1. (C) Summary. Apologizing for the bank's past excesses, senior Royal Bank of Scotland executives acknowledged that ambition drove the company to overreach and pursue investments with quick returns, which landed the bank in the deep trouble it is now. Bailed out by the UK government, which now has a 70 percent share, RBS is a pursuing a multi-year plan, with annual benchmarks, to right itself and become a profitable business again. RBS executives told visiting emboff in an April 28th meeting at the company's headquarters in Scotland that this plan would include spinning off retail and commercial activity in Asia and pursuing cost savings of GBP 2.5 billion by 2011. Regarding the overall economic climate, RBS's chief risk analyst was grim and thought the signs of recovery were delusory. He predicted that current upheavals in the financial services sector will continue, and that a return to "narrow banking" was possible. End Summary.
2. (C) RBS is acknowledging and apologizing for its mistakes, said Senior Economic Advisor, Stephen Boyle. Sir Tom McKillop, chairman, and Sir Fred Goodwin, former chief executive, have apologized to shareholders, the public, members of Parliament's Treasury Select Committee, especially for the bank's ill-timed acquisition of Dutch bank ABN Amro, Boyle stated. Proper due diligence on the purchase was not done, and the market timing could not have been worse. RBS executives had rigorously (if not blindly, Boyle added) pursued a vision of becoming one of the leading global banks, and this led to disastrous acquisitions.
3. (C) The lesson learned is that RBS must concentrate on its core businesses to recover strength and repay the British taxpayer. The bank, Boyle stated, is the process of designating core and non-core businesses, and defining a one-year, three-year and five-year strategy to reach its goals. Among the measures will be to run down or sell outright retail and commercial activity in Asia, and reduce dramatically capital intensive instruments like project finance. RBS intends to narrow the activities of its U.S.-based Citizens Financial Group, which lost $1.4 billion in the fourth quarter 2008. Several bank branches will be closed, and Citizens, like other RBS operations, will exit most activities outside its core "market footprint." In the UK, RBS will limit itself to traditional retail and commercial activities, and some insurance-related work. It will also hold on to Ulster Bank.
4. (C) Another key component in re-structuring is cost reductions, with a goal of savings of GBP 2.5 billion by 2011, said Boyle. This will be done primarily through downsizing, with an expected 9,000 job cuts just in the UK alone, and thousands elsewhere in global operations. Staff reductions will be focused on those in IT, out-sourcing and physical plant management.
5. (C) Much of the success of RBS' restructuring will depend on overall economic conditions, argued Peter Nathaniel, senior risk analyst. Selling off businesses, for example, requires suitable buyers. However, at least for next 18 months, the global economic recovery will be weak, at best, he said. While there are been a few positive indicators in the past month, no one should breathe a sigh of relief. The level of sovereign indebtedness and the cost of government borrowing will lessen chances for a quick and sustainable turnaround, he said. The UK government is in particular trouble, and will find itself at a disadvantage in terms of competing for capital, without a significant rise in interest rates - but that will also raise interest rates on its debt. He faulted HMG for being slow off the mark to address the crisis, and was particularly critical of what he said was the government's tepid response in the fall and early winter.
6. (C) Speculating about the future of banking, Nathaniel predicted that de facto, there will be a return to narrow banking practices. The number of companies with diversified financial activity will be small in number, and even those exist will have high capital reserves, either adopted voluntarily or imposed by regulators, that will reduce liquidity, As an additional effect, higher reserves will limit risk-taking and could hamstring innovation. He predicted that boutique banks specializing in limited and defined market niches will emerge in the wake of the crisis, while banks like RBS will return to traditional banking activity.
Comment:
7. (C) Meetings were held in RBS' Headquarters in Gogarburn, a 350,000 square foot building on a 78-acre site, which opened in late 2005. The building reflects the ambition of its leaders and its many vacant offices a sign of its new reality. While the executives were chagrined about some of RBS' acquisitions, they still seemed reluctant to acknowledge there might have been other missteps. Former Chief Executive Sir Fred Goodwin has been particularly criticized for his bonus of GBP 2.8 million which he received in addition to his salary of GBP 1.3 million in 2008. While RBS Chair McKillop has made a more broad-brush apology, Goodwin has only admitted that the purchase of ABN AMRO was a mistake. In the public's eye, RBS has a lot more explaining to do.
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TOKOLA
Tuesday, 03 November 2009, 15:52
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 002478
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS ECON, EFIN, ETRD, EINV, UK
SUBJECT: UK GOVERNMENT GETS TOUGH ON BANK BONUSES; DEBATES CURBS ON
"CASINO" BANKING
LONDON 00002478 001.3 OF 003
1. (SBU) Summary: The UK government is getting tough on compensation for bankers. On January 1, a code of practice for compensation requiring large firms to report in detail their company's policies will come into effect. UK-based U.S. firms joined British banks in signing this code of conduct, but some said they felt coerced to sign. Despite HMG actions to rein in bonuses, the Conservative Party has argued that more needs to be done. UK government officials also are debating whether there should be a return to "narrow banking," with Bank of England Governor Mervyn King advocating a break-up of large banks so that taxpayers do not have to bail-out banks involved in risky trading activities in the future. Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling has rejected such a proposal. End Summary.
FSA Serious on Bank Bonuses, Enforces Voluntary Code
-------------------------- -------------------------
2. (U) In August, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) published a code of practice on bank compensation requiring UK banks and building societies with capital resources exceeding GBP one billion to establish compensation policies consistent with effective risk management and long-term performance. The FSA code defines what constitutes effective pay policy. The 26 largest British banks were given a deadline of November 2 to report to the FSA the total amount and structure of bonuses they plan to give out in 2009. (Their plans will be reported septel as/if made public.) The regulator will also require banks to disclose individual compensation arrangements that fall outside the code and set out plans to bring these aspects into line before next year. The code will officially take effect from January 1, 2010.
3. (U) Building on the Financial Stability Board's recommendations to the G-20 in Pittsburgh, the UK code specifically states it is good practice for a significant proportion of any bonus - at least two-thirds - to be deferred over three years. It also says guaranteed multi-year bonuses that are not based on performance during the period under review are likely to be inconsistent with effective risk management. While the code is written as a series of recommendations, non-compliant firms could face enforcement action or be forced to hold additional capital.
4. (U) While the European Union has proposed implementation of compensation policies by the end of 2010, the FSA said it is likely the UK and possibly one or two other countries will implement a compensation code at least a year ahead of this. However, the FSA noted that practices can be modified based on what comes out of discussions in the EU and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. [Note: A target date for the implementation of an agreement in Basel has not yet been set.]
Political Parties Put Bonuses on Center Stage
----------------------- ---------------------
5. (U) Political leaders have taken tough stances on bonuses. Chancellor Darling specifically criticized bonuses at Goldman Sachs and other firms as excessive, saying no bank would be standing if it had not been for taxpayer-funded bailouts. HM Treasury considered a "windfall tax" on bank profits, though recognized this would not help banks increase capital holdings. Shadow Chancellor Osborne on October 26 called on the FSA and HM Treasury to join together to prevent retail banks and their investment banking arms from paying out significant cash bonuses. He advocated bonuses be paid only in company shares, and he said cash that would have been used to pay bonuses should be added to bank balance sheets and used to increase lending. Osborne, who previously called for handling the bonus issue internationally to avoid putting the UK at a competitive disadvantage, noted that the UK would be acting in concert with the U.S. and its recent bonus policy announcements.
Global Banks - Not Pleased
---------------------------
6. (SBU) During an October 14 meeting, Financial Services Minister Lord Myners secured commitments from eight international banks with subsidiaries in the UK (Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Nomura and UBS) to adhere to the FSA code. Newspapers reported that banks had been bullied into signing the agreement, a sentiment that was privately expressed to us as well by several U.S. bankers. Representatives of JP Morgan Chase told us while JPMC has signed on to G-20 and the UK FSA code, the details are what is important. Prior to the meeting with Lord Myners, JPMC and other firms understood from the Financial Services Authority that they were being asked to sign on to changes effective 2010. Only at the meeting with Lord Myners were they told the FSA rules would also apply to all 2009 bonuses. JPMC signed on, believing it did not have another choice. Citigroup and Goldman Sachs officials echoed
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this view. However, Citi expected U.S. regulations on pay could be more onerous than UK regulations and commented that U.S. and UK regulators would need to harmonize approaches.
7. (SBU) The British Bankers' Association (BBA) has supported the general principle of aligning compensation with risk management, but also cautioned that compensation policies must be harmonized globally so as not to disadvantage UK firms. When the FSA was consulting on the code, other firms pointed out that the cost of rewriting contracts to comply with the code, would disadvantage the UK. Firms also felt the guidelines were too prescriptive. In conversations with us, JPMC and Goldman representatives strongly defended their longstanding compensation policies and said the UK regulations would not mean big changes in how they structure compensation. Both said they have consistently used stock options, deferred bonuses, claw back provisions and other policies to tie performance to long-term growth and risk assessment.
A New Glass-Steagall? Views on Breaking Up "Casino" Banks
------------------------------- -------------------------
8. (U) Public anger over bonuses has sparked debate on how banks can be restructured to ensure taxpayer money is not spent implicitly guaranteeing risky activities. Anger has deepened since many of the most profitable banks have seen profits in their investment banking activities, while credit to household and business consumers remains weak.
9. (U) In an October 20 speech, Bank of England Governor Mervyn King called for a "serious review" of how the banking industry is structured and regulated. He said HMG and regulators will need to confront the "too important to fail" question, and he advocated separating the utility functions of banks, namely deposit taking and payment systems, from riskier ventures - dubbed "casino" banking - such as proprietary trading. He said the belief that appropriate regulation could ensure speculative activities do not result in failures is a delusion. "We all have a common interest", he argued, in ensuring continuity of service in the utility aspects of banking but taxpayers should not have to bail-out banks involved in risky trading activities.
10. (U) King's comments were in direct contradiction of HMT's positions. In response to the Governor's speech, Chancellor Darling said the problems facing the banking sector were "more complex" than King suggested and added: "I don't think a Glass-Steagall approach, which might have been right in the 1930s, is right for the 21st century." King's comments were also at odds with the FSA. In his spring report, Lord Turner, Chairman of the FSA, said he did not see a need for a strict, legal separation. He said such a separation would not be practical in today's complex global economy, nor is it clear it would radically reduce banking system risks. Rather, Turner, at the FSA's November 2 conference on financial market regulation stated that devising and enforcing appropriate risk management would be a better approach to protecting the public interest than reverting to a new form of Glass-Steagall legal separation.
11. (U) John McFall, Chairman of the House of Commons' Treasury Select Committee, has consistently argued for a re-introduction of Glass-Steagall-type legislation. While the Committee's official July report into the banking crisis did not directly call for a legal separation, it said HMG should not rule out a ban on proprietary trading in retail banks. Several British academics also have advocated "narrow banking" options. Professor John Kay, a prominent British economist, for example, has argued that it was unacceptable that HMG had to provide taxpayer funds to protect depositors in banks where problems were created by risky trading activities. He proposed a division between narrow banks focused solely on retail deposit taking and payment services and all other financial activities (which could then be deregulated). Shadow Chancellor George Osborne has described King's comments as "powerful and persuasive" but stopped short of directly endorsing legal separation.
12. (SBU) Introducing legislation to legally separate banks would be a retrograde step, according to an official at the British Bankers' Association. He told us there is no traction behind King's argument. No other country is having a serious debate about the re-introduction of Glass-Steagall-type legislation. Instead, he said, countries are focusing on creating a banking model in which risk is better addressed through capital and liquidity requirements and better planning for resolving insolvent institutions. He said this is what the FSA is currently doing. The UK needs a sensible debate around these issues, he argued, instead of looking at legislation that artificially separates banks. In a press release following Mervyn King's October 20 speech, the BBA's chief executive, Angela Knight, said the UK's current mixed banking model
LONDON 00002478 003.3 OF 003
provides choice. She said big businesses may want big banks that offer a range of products and services while individuals may want something smaller. She argued there is a "clear and unambiguous" requirement for universal banks.
13. (SBU) Conclusion: With major banks expected to announce their bonuses in the upcoming weeks, the UK government as well as the opposition parties will continue to seek ways to redress the worst abuses. The debate will spill over into the electoral campaign, as Labour and the Conservatives jockey to capitalize on public anger to promise reforms and an end to business as usual. While separating commercial from investment banking will remain attractive to some as a way to prevent recurrence of many of the worst abuses of the past decade, it is highly unlikely that the UK would go alone on this, as UK authorities are keenly focused on maintaining London's role as a leading global financial center. On bonuses, the UK will want to ensure that its approach remains consistent with that of its EU partners and the U.S.
SUSMAN
Friday, 23 May 2008, 13:58
S E C R E T LONDON 001452
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/22/2018
TAGS ECON, ETTC, KNNP, PARM, PGOV, PHUM, PREL, IR, PK, UK
SUBJECT: IRAN: FOREIGN SECRETARY SAYS UK TO LEAD FINANCIAL
PRESSURE ON TEHRAN
REF: A. LONDON 1396 B. LONDON 1352 C. STATE 54639 D. STATE 51207
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Leslie Tsou for reasons 1.4 ( b) and (d)
1. (C) Foreign Secretary Milliband is "very aware" of the centrality of financial measures, both multilateral and bilateral, to the creation of effective pressure on Tehran, and has told the FCO that HMG will be "at the forefront" of international financial efforts against Iran and will push its EU partners on Iran "as hard as possible," FCO Iran contacts told London Iran Watcher (Poloff) May 21, following HMG's recent engagement in Washington and London with senior Department of State officials. This FCO statement of the UK's newly reinvigorated posture on financial measures reflects the judgments, and action recommendations, made in ref b.
Pushing UK banks and EU Partners
--------------------------------
2. (C) UK officials, including the Financial Services Authority, will "push the legal envelope" to limit Iranian banking activity by both Iranian and UK financial institutions in London and UK diplomats in Brussels will lead the charge for very tough language in the EU Common Position on Iran, Neil Kernohan, the Sanctions Officer for the FCO's Iran Coordination Group, said. Kernohan noted the Common Position would be the first EU item of business once Iran has reacted to the P5 1 offer, and once the EU has designated Bank Melli. Reiterating the timing considerations (ref a) which led the date of the EU's expected designation of Melli to be delayed from May 19 to mid-June, Kernohan said FCO sees June 17 as the most likely date for EU designation of Bank Melli, assuming Iran has by then rejected the P5 1 incentives package.
Bank Melli in Karachi, GAERC
----------------------------
3. (S) Kernohan's comments came in the course of a call by Poloff to deliver USG points in ref d, on the need for vigilance on Bank Melli's efforts to open a branch in Pakistan, as well as pre-GAERC points contained in ref c. Kernohan noted full HMG support for the content of both USG demarches, while noting the adjusted time frame for EU action per para. 2 above. Embassy also delivered ref d to HM Treasury on May 16.
4. (C) Embassy Comment: While there is inevitably an element of "telling us what we want to hear" in Kernohan's very upbeat message, all the signals we have seen since the Secretary's May 2-3 visit are that USG engagement with HMG on Iran, especially at senior levels, has gotten Foreign Secretary Milliband's attention. This is particularly the case with respect to bilateral financial measures, where the UK has the most equities at risk, but also where it can provide the most meaningful leadership on the Iran nuclear issue to governments both in Europe and other regions.
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Thursday, 09 October 2008, 10:21
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000556
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/09/2018
TAGS EFIN, ECON, PREL, PGOV, EI
SUBJECT: THE BANK GUARANTEE: AN IRISH SOLUTION TO AN IRISH
PROBLEM
DUBLIN 00000556 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Theodore S. Pierce. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C) Summary: On September 29, the Irish government announced plans to back deposits in all Irish-domiciled banks. Foreign banks with significant Irish operations were initially left out of the scheme but some look now to be included. Irish government officials maintain that impaired assets at Irish banks are still relatively insignificant and are mostly confined to commercial property loans. They say that regulatory oversight of the financial sector will be tightened and that the drying up of credit to Irish banks forced the decision to guarantee all deposits. The crush on Irish banks could not have come at a worse time -- immediately preceding next week's presentation of what is widely expected as the most austere government budget in years. End Summary.
A Crisis Unfolds
----------------
2. (U) Following a late-night September 29 meeting with leading bankers -- Central Bank Governor John Hurley and Chief Executive of the Financial Regulator Pat Neary -- Prime Minister Brian Cowen took the decision to guarantee the deposits, loans, and obligations of the six Irish-owned Banks for two years. The next day Finance Minister Brian Lenihan and Hurley briefed their key European counterparts. During a marathon session (almost 22 hours, a record) on October 1, the Irish parliament passed legislation that would make the guarantee operational. On October 2, President Mary McAleese signed the Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Bill 2008 into law. On October 6, Lenihan faced questions about the scheme from other EU Finance Minister at an ECOFIN meeting in Brussels and the Central Bank and the Regulatory Authority met to finalize the terms of the plan. On October 8, the Irish Cabinet met to discuss the plan but delayed announcing anything until the EU gives its formal approval, which is widely expected to happen early next week.
A Perfect Storm
---------------
3. (C) Econoff and visiting EUR/WE Desk Officer met with Central Bank and Financial Services Authority officials Gordon Barham, Maria Woods, and Billy Clarke on October 6 to talk about the government's bank guarantee plan. Clarke said that the regulator had been carefully watching the banking sector as the months-long credit contraction unfolded. Explaining the seemingly sudden pressure on Irish banks last week, he said a "perfect storm" of external events related to the credit crisis had dried up the traditional sources of financing for Irish financial institutions. Barham maintained that the level of impaired assets in the system stood at between 0.5 and 0.8 percent and these are mostly confined to loans to commercial property developers. When pressed, Barham said the media had exaggerated the level of problem assets and those that existed could be managed.
4. (C) Clarke hesitated to make predictions but said that it is "likely" the regulatory system would move from one that relied heavily on bank management working within broad guidelines laid down by the regulator to a "rules-based" one. An example he gave was that the regulator may be given the authority to limit the percentage of the banks' loan books that are extended to any one sector (i.e. commercial or residential property). Barham and Clarke said that the banks would not be allowed to securitize and sell impaired assets under this scheme. Rather, the banks, the regulator, and other government agencies would have to figure out how to "unwind the problem assets without exposing the Irish taxpayer to undue risk."
5. (C) Econoff spoke with Kevin Cardiff, Second Secretary General at the Department of Finance, who has been deeply involved in putting together the guarantee package. Cardiff echoed the regulator and pointed out that auditors contracted by his Department to look at the books of at least two of the institutions under pressure came away with "a favorable impression of the loan books." While he admitted that the amount of "speculative loans, or those that are not currently productive, is not insignificant," he stressed that all involved in putting together the package were confident that the government would not be forced to bail out the banks.
6. (C) Cardiff said that credit to the Irish banks "virtually dried up" on September 29 and that the government had to step in to salvage the Irish financial sector. The genesis of this was classic "herd mentality" based mostly on rumor and innuendo about Irish banks rather than any hard facts. However, fighting the herd became impossible, he added. He added that non-Irish institutions with significant Irish
DUBLIN 00000556 002.2 OF 002
operationsXXXXXXXXXXXX would likely be included in the scheme. XXXXXXXXXXXX
7. (C) Although the move did not win any friends across Europe, Cardiff said that there is a gradual realization in Brussels that each country should be allowed to tailor its response to local conditions. He characterized the Irish government's discussion with EU officials as "positive" and indicated that the Irish solution would soon gain approval. In an aside, he pointed out that Irish Finance Minister Brian Lenihan and his British counterpart, Alistair Darling, had engaged in a very constructive exchange of views. Cardiff continued that the prevailing mood in Europe is that "large-scale failures just make things worse" and that he expected more Irish-like solutions. He warned, though, that the battle had just begun.
Comment
-------
8. (C) Against the background of a steep slump in the property market and anecdotal evidence we have picked up, it may be that government officials are being a bit optimistic in their assessment of the level of impaired assets. It begs the question: if the level of impaired assets is not a problem, why the sudden pressure on Irish banks? Perhaps the perfect storm answer is the right one. Whatever the answer, the Irish government has its work cut out for it as it works with the private sector to stop the bleeding and then rebuild the Irish financial sector. With the government maintaining that the Irish banking sector nearly collapsed during the past two weeks and the announcement of what is expected to be a very draconian 2009 government budget next week, Irish economic policymakers are facing their most significant challenge in decades. FOLEY
Monday, 17 March 2008, 18:27
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 000797
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/17/2018
TAGS ECON, EFIN, UK
SUBJECT: BANKING CRISIS NOW ONE OF SOLVENCY NOT LIQUIDITY
SAYS BANK OF ENGLAND GOVERNOR
Classified By: AMB RTUTTLE, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
Summary
-------
1. (C/NF) Since last summer, the nature of the crisis in financial markets has changed. The problem is now not liquidity in the system but rather a question of systemic solvency, Bank of England (BOE) Governor Mervyn King said at a lunch meeting with Treasury Deputy Secretary Robert Kimmitt and Ambassador Tuttle. King said there are two imperatives. First to find ways for banks to avoid the stigma of selling unwanted paper at distressed prices or going to a central bank for assistance. Second to ensure there's a coordinated effort to possibly recapitalize the global banking system. For the first imperative, King suggested developing a pooling and auction process to unblock the large volume of financial investments for which there is currently no market. For the second imperative, King suggested that the U.S., UK, Switzerland, and perhaps Japan might form a temporary new group to jointly develop an effort to bring together sources of capital to recapitalize all major banks. END SUMMARY
Systemic Insolvency Is Now The Problem
--------------------------------------
2. (C/NF) King said that liquidity is necessary but not sufficient in the current market crisis because the global banking system is undercapitalized due to being over leveraged. He said it is hard to look at the big four UK banks (Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays, HSBC, and Lloyds TSB) and not think they need more capital. A coordinated effort among central banks and finance ministers may be needed to develop a plan to recapitalize the banking system.
Unblocking Illiquid Mortgage-Backed Securities
--------------------------------------------- -
3. (C/NF) King said it is also imperative to find a way for banks to sell off unwanted illiquid securities, including mortgage backed securities, without resorting to sales at distressed valuations. He said sales at distressed values only serve to lower the floor to which banks must mark down their assets (mark to market), thereby forcing unwarranted additional write downs. He said we need to find an auction system where banks could move paper they want to sell without fear of stigma that the market views selling at a low price as a sign that a bank is in trouble. King said, however, he did not yet know how to structure such an auction and that further dialogue was needed. Kimmitt acknowledged the need to find ways to unblock these markets and said we should remain in touch bilaterally as well as in the G-7, the Financial Stability Forum, and the central banks.
A Possible Approach To Recapitalization
---------------------------------------
4. (C/NF) The G-7 is almost dysfunctional on an economic level, said King. Key economies are not included, especially those that have large and growing pools of capital. King said that a new international group was needed to address the issue. It could be a temporary group, and he suggested that perhaps the central banks and finance ministers of the U.S., the UK, and Switzerland could coordinate discussions with other countries that have large pools of capital, including sovereign wealth funds, about recycling dollars to recapitalize banks. King said Japan might not be included because it has little to offer. King noted, though that including the Japanese might force their hand in finally marking to market impaired assets. Kimmitt said that he was cautious about starting new groups in the international financial community because of the inevitable debate around whom to include.
Comment
-------
5. (C) The King proposals were not casual ideas developed in the course of luncheon conversation. It was clear that his principal objective in the meeting was to outline his outside-the-box thinking for Kimmitt. King included very few details about his proposals and was content to present broad concepts, thereby planting the seeds for future discussion. END COMMENT.
6. (U) Participants: USG: Ambassador Robert Tuttle; Deputy Secretary Kimmitt; Eric Meyer, Office Director for Europe;
SIPDIS Robert Saliterman, Spokesman, International Affairs, U.S. Treasury; Warren Chane, ECONOFF. UK: Mervyn King, Governor, Bank of England; Chris Salmon, Private Secretary.
7. (U) Deputy Secretary Kimmitt has cleared this message.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm TUTTLE
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm TUTTLE
Thursday, 08 October 2009, 10:33
S E C R E T BERN 000432
SIPDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR BEYER
EO 12958 DECL: 10/08/2019
TAGS PREL, OVIP, SZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: YOUR OCTOBER 10 VISIT TO ZURICH
Classified By: Ambassador Donald S. Beyer; reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (S) I and the rest of the Embassy Bern team are looking forward to your visit with great anticipation in what promises to be a landmark event in Armenian-Turkish relations with lasting benefits for Euro-Atlantic security. Foreign Minister Calmy-Rey is riding high on a series of foreign policy successes, from the Swiss government's agreement with DOJ in the UBS matter, to Switzerland's hosting of the October 1 P5 1 talks with Iran in Geneva, to the upcoming October 10 signing ceremony in Zurich to chart a path for normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia.
2. (S) While Calmy-Rey has reasons to celebrate, her foreign policy activism is not universally appreciated across the domestic political spectrum in Switzerland. Swiss views are colored by Switzerland's centuries-old tradition of neutrality. Issues that draw on the Swiss capacity for facilitation and mediation, such as Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, generally enjoy strong public support. On the other hand, foreign policy activism with a more partisan or "hard" security flavor, such as Calmy-Rey's vociferous support for Kosovo independence, or her recent all out -- but ultimately unsuccessful -- effort to obtain a parliamentary mandate for Swiss military participation in the EU anti-piracy operation Atalanta, do not enjoy the same broad public support. The recent arrest at the Zurich airport of film director Roman Polanski was viewed by Calmy-Rey as putting a dent in Switzerland's international image. Nevertheless, she has limited her criticism to remarking that the arrest lacked "finesse," and surely is aware that Swiss public opinion favors Polanski's extradition to the United States.
3. (S) Probably the biggest challenge on Switzerland's foreign policy front is its continuing crisis with Libya, following the July 2008 arrest of Muammar Gaddafi's son Hannibal Gaddafi in Geneva for allegedly brutally abusing his domestic staff. Swiss President Merz's ill-fated visit to Tripoli in late August, during which he publicly apologized for what by all accounts was a justified police action, thus far has failed to win the freedom of two Swiss businessmen that the Libyan government has refused to allow to leave Libya for over a year. The two Swiss citizens are being refused departure purportedly because of visa irregularities, but it is clear to all that Tripoli views them as a bargaining chip in extracting maximum concessions from the Swiss. Moreover, after living under house arrest for the past year, the two businessmen recently were taken by Libyan officials to an undisclosed location, further raising concern in Bern about their fate. Calmy-Rey has asked for USG assistance in pressing the Libyans to allow the two Swiss to return to Switzerland. I strongly believe it is in our interest to do what we can, given Switzerland's many efforts to assist U.S. citizens in Iran, including, most recently, the cases of the three hikers and the release earlier this year of Roxana Saberi.
4. (S) Finally, Calmy-Rey has been very active is urging the Swiss government to accept for resettlement in Switzerland several Guantanamo detainees who are slated for release. This idea is not at all popular with the Swiss public, but Calmy-Rey views it as a consequent gesture against the backdrop of the Swiss government's past criticisms of Guantanamo. A Swiss team visited Guantanamo in August to interview four detainees, and is looking seriously at accepting an Uzbek and two Uighurs. The Swiss government, however, is concerned that agreeing to accept Uighurs would buy too much trouble with China at a time when Switzerland is seeking to conclude a trade agreement with Beijing. Personal encouragement from you to Calmy-Rey underlining how much the USG would appreciate Switzerland accepting Uighurs would be particularly timely while you are in Zurich.
5. (U) Minimize considered. BEYER
Friday, 26 February 2010, 05:19
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000267
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP
EO 12958 DECL: 03/06/2059
TAGS PGOV, PREL, MARR, AF, KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HOLBROOKE
DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN, ZHOVTIS, OSCE SUMMIT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) Ambassador Richard Holbrooke met State Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev on February 21 to discuss Kazakhstan's support for operations in Afghanistan, including North-South polar-route overflights, the ground transit of wheeled and armored but not weaponized non-lethal military vehicles, Afghan police training, and other bilateral assistance. Holbrooke also strongly urged the government to consider a presidential pardon for imprisoned human rights activist Yevgeniy Zhovtis, discussed Kazakhstan's request for a bilateral meeting with the President in April, and said the United States was seriously considering Kazakhstan's initiative to organize a summit in 2010 during its chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), although, as Secretary Clinton had told Saudabayev recently, the President would not attend. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) Participants: United States
SRAP Ambassador Holbrooke Ambassador Hoagland SRAP Staff Gen. Field SRAP Staff Pauli SRAP Staff Bommer NSC Director for Central Asia Donnelly SCA/CEN Director Hushek Embassy Astana Acting Pol/Econ Chief Covert (notetaker) Embassy Astana Pol/Econ LES Zhantikina (interpreter)
Kazakhstan
State Secretary-Foreign Minister Saudabayev Deputy Foreign Minister Umarov Deputy Foreign Minister Yermekbayev MFA International Information Committee Chair Vassilenko Special Envoy for Afghanistan Bitimov MFA Asia and Africa Department Director Kurmanguzhin MFA America Department Director Tazhiyev MFA America Department Arystanov
3. (SBU) State Secretary-Foreign Minister Saudabayev met privately for 30 minutes with SRAP Holbrooke and then escorted him into the larger meeting. Media were present during Saudabayev's welcoming remarks, but left after five minutes.
A WARM WELCOME FOR AN OLD FRIEND
4. (SBU) Saudabayev warmly welcomed SRAP Holbrooke back to Kazakhstan, and said that Kazakhstan is grateful for the strategic vision, leadership, and advice the United States has provided to bring stability to Afghanistan. He stressed that Kazakhstan has been and will remain a "trusted and strategic partner" of the United States, and has stood by the United States ever since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
5. (C) After the press left the room, SRAP Holbrooke told Saudabayev that Kazakhstan is "the most important country in the region," expressed admiration for President Nazarbayev's achievements since independence in 1991, and asked Saudabayev to convey his personal regards to Nazarbayev, who was out of town.
A UNIQUE ROLE TO PLAY
6. (C) Holbrooke told Saudabayev that -- as Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE -- Kazakhstan has a "unique role to play this year in world affairs." He said he appreciated Kazakhstan's focus on stability in Afghanistan and told Saudabayev that the situation is "at a very critical moment." He noted that the United States was tripling the number of troops from 31,000 to 100,000 since January 2009, and hadtripled the number of civilians in Afghanistan. Holbrooke said the United States would welcome Kazakhstan becoming more involved in Afghanistan, and said that Kazakhstan could share its expertise with Afghanistan in police training and agriculture, for example.
NORTH-SOUTH POLAR-ROUTE OVERFLIGHTS
7. (C) To support operations in Afghanistan, Holbrooke reminded Saudabayev that the United States has requested Kazakhstan's agreement on North-South polar-route overflights and rail transportation of wheeled and armored but not weaponized military vehicles. Saudabayev responded that the government plans to present the U.S. Embassy its draft agreement on North-South polar-route overflights by the end of the week of February 22. He said he did not expect it would take the United States long to review and approve the agreement, since it is based on an existing agreement with Russia. Saudabayev said he expected to be able to finalize and sign the agreement in March, before President Nazarbayev departs for the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, on April 12-13. Saudabayev also said that he expects the North-South polar-route overflight agreement to "clear the way" for an agreement on the ground transportation of armored military vehicles.
8. (C) Saudabayev added that President Nazarbayev strongly supports the President's strategy in Afghanistan, particularly the increase in troop levels, and the transfer of greater responsibility and accountability to the government of Afghanistan. Saudabayev told Holbrooke that Afghanistan is the "most serious problem" facing Kazakhstan at the moment and promised, "We will stand with you to resolve the situation, because it affects the security and stability of our region."
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN
9. (C) Saudabayev said Kazakhstan welcomes the U.S. objective to make the transition from military operations to sustainable humanitarian and social development through investments in infrastructure and education. Saudabayev noted that Kazakhstan itself will provide $50 million for an education program and he introduced a Kazakh SRAP, Bitimov, whom he said has worked on Afghanistan for 30 years, "speaks the language," and understands the mentality and culture of the Afghan people. Holbrooke said he was pleased by the appointment of Special Representative Bitimov and invited him to visit Washington to discuss coordination efforts in Afghanistan.
THE ZHOVTIS CASE
10. (C) Holbrooke told Saudabayev that the imprisonment of human rights activist Yevgeniy Zhovtis is one of the pressing issues affecting Kazakhstan's bilateral relationship with the United States. He told Saudabayev that Zhovtis has become a symbol for the opposition in Kazakhstan, "a fact that he certainly understands and exploits." Holbrooke said that if Zhovtis could be released by presidential pardon, that would reduce his symbolic value, since "he is worth less to the opposition out of jail than in jail."
11. (C) On Zhovtis, Saudabayev agreed that "neither you nor we need this problem." But he said that this is an issue of principle. "We must respect the independence of our judicial system," he said. "If we make an exception to the law for Zhovtis," he claimed, "then 200 others with similar sentences will demand to be released from prison as well. They are watching to see if the government of Kazakhstan will be pressured into releasing Zhovtis." He also said that as a human rights activist, "Zhovtis never came under any political pressure" to cease his activities. Saudabayev said that Zhovtis unfortunately killed a man, was tried and sentenced by a court of law, and now must serve his four-year sentence. According to Saudabayev, "the law worked exactly the way it was designed."
12. (C) Saudabayev observed that the "unprecedented pressure" being placed on Kazakhstan as a result of the Zhovtis conviction is "not viewed positively in our society." He acknowledged that the "only legitimate way out" for Zhovtis would be via presidential pardon, but said, "that is the prerogative of our president." Attempting to draw a parallel, Saudabayev added that he admired the "persistence" of the U.S. judicial system in its persistent attempts to get film director Roman Polanski, "even though he was forgiven by the victim." Holbrooke took strong exception, noting that Polanski fled justice, escaped the law, and has been living free despite his conviction by a U.S. court.
REQUEST FOR A BILATERAL MEETING
13. (C) Holbrooke said he was hopeful that bilateral meeting between President Obama and President Nazarbayev could be arranged in April. NSC Director Donnelly confirmed that the White House is considering a possible bilateral meeting. He noted that NSC Director McFaul might visit Kazakhstan in the near future for further discussion on this issue, but that no decision has been made.
OSCE SUMMIT IN 2010
14. (C) On the subject of an OSCE Summit in 2010, Saudabayev asked Holbrooke to convey his thanks and warmest regards to the Secretary of State for their "instrumental and helpful" meeting on February 4 in Washington. He said he was grateful to have U.S. support for holding the Summit, and noted that Afghanistan would certainly be a major item on the agenda. SRAP Holbrooke told Saudabayev that, "we will make certain that the United States is represented at the appropriate level." While Holbrooke promised to advocate personally for the meetings that Kazakhstan has requested, since they would serve the interests of both countries, resolution of other issues such as North-South polar overflights, ground transportation of military vehicles, and Zhovtis, would greatly facilitate positive decisions in Washington.
15. (SBU) Ambassador Holbrooke cleared this cable. HOAGLAND
Wednesday, 01 October 2008, 10:48
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002977
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/01/2018
TAGS PGOV, KDEM, KJUS, PINR, TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES WITH FORMER PM SAMAK HIS
DOWNFALL,
REF: BANGKOK 2778 (SAMAK UNDERCUT)
BANGKOK 00002977 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b, d)
1. (C) Summary: Former Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej resigned from his position as Party Leader of the People's Power Party (PPP) September 30. He remains free on bail as he continues to appeal a years-old defamation conviction. Samak told the Ambassador September 26 that he believed Queen Sirikit, working through Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda, supported the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) protest movement. Samak viewed himself as loyal to the King, but implied that the Queen's political agenda differened from her husband's. Separately, XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed to the Ambassador October 1 that he had begun direct negotiations with the PAD and suggested that he and the current Somchai administration had 90 days to produce results.
2. (C) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX's expectation that his term in office may be short-lived tracks with a widespread view among Thais that the PPP will be fighting against the odds for its survival in upcoming party dissolution proceedings. Although XXXXXXXXXXXX provides proof that senior Thai politicians can often revive careers, we believe Samak has lost virtually all of his influence and has little prospect of staging a political comeback. PM Somchai Wongsawat appears likely to succeed Samak as PPP Party Leader. End Summary and Comment.
SAMAK QUITS PPP POST, HEADS TO DISNEY WORLD
-------------------------------------------
3. (C) On September 30, a PPP official told the media that former PM Samak Sundaravej had formally resigned from his position of PPP Party Leader. This resignation followed an Appeals Court's September 25 ruling upholding a previous conviction of Samak on defamation charges, and affirming the two-year prison sentence for Samak. In a September 26 lunch with the Ambassador, Samak explained that he expected to remain free on bail while continuing to appeal this case through other channels; he predicted his legal battle could continue for approximately two years before he might have to face incarceration. Samak planned to join unnamed associates for an extended North American vacation starting with Disney World, criss-crossing the United States and parts of Canada by car.
4. (C) Note: Once Samak lost face after PPP legislators signaled their unwillingness to support his reelection as Prime Minister (reftel), it would have been awkward for Samak to retain the position of Party Leader. PPP immediately named PM Somchai as acting party leader. Political parties typically nominate their Party Leaders for the position of Prime Minister; it would be logical to assume that Somchai will formally take the top job in PPP. Samak's resignation will not protect Samak from a five-year loss of political rights in the event that PPP is dissolved. Party dissolution by the Constitutional Court entails sanctions against the executive board that was in place at the time of the dissolution-warranting offense.
SAMAK DISCUSSES HIS DOWNFALL, CRITICIZES THE QUEEN
--------------------------------------------- -----
5. (C) Samak described to Ambassador the political pressure against him during his seven months in office. He showed disdain for Queen Sirikit, claiming that she had been responsible for the 2006 coup d'etat as well as the ongoing turmoil generated by PAD protests. He alleged the Queen operated through Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda who, along with others presenting themselves as royalists, worked with the PAD and other agitators. Citing his own regular meetings with King Bhumibol, Samak claimed he -- rather than his opponents -- was sincerely loyal to the King and enjoyed the King's support. In his discussion of the
BANGKOK 00002977 002.2 OF 002
monarchy, Samak made no mention of the Crown Prince.
6. (C) Samak, a former journalist, lamented his opponents' success in manipulating media coverage of his administration. Samak noted that jockeying for control over the media had often caused rifts within Thai Rak Thai and, subsequently, the People's Power Party.
7. (C) Samak's eyes became misty as he recalled that, when he was contemplating returning to the premiership after eviction from office by the Constitutional Court, his wife and one of his daughters had pressed him to abandon this quest. "I told them to get out," he related. "I didn't need to be betrayed by them."
Out with the Old, Out with the New?
-----------------------------------
8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX indicated to Ambassador October 1 that he expected the Somchai administration to be short-lived, though he hoped it could be extended if it proved successful in addressing the serious challenges facing the country. XXXXXXXXXXXX If Somchai's administration were to prove effective, he hoped the Constitutional Court might delay dissolution proceedings against various coalition parties to allow the government more time in office (note: the Attorney General announced later on October 1 that he had referred the first case, against Chat Thai, to the Constitution Court for review).
9. (C) On the ongoing PAD occupation of Government House, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he had twice spoken with PAD XXXXXXXXXXXX, most recently on the night of September 30. XXXXXXXXXXXX described his approach toward the PAD as similar to that which he had taken toward communist insurgents in the 1970s and 80s: he would initially stress commonalities while deemphasizing differences, which would be sorted out later. (Septel will report XXXXXXXXXXXX's views on mediating the southern insurgency.) JOHN
Thursday, 06 November 2008, 07:30
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003317
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NSC FOR WILDER AND PHU
EO 12958 DECL: 11/06/2018
TAGS PGOV, KDEM, MOPS, ASEC, TH
SUBJECT: PALACE INSIDER TELLS AMBASSADOR OF THE KING'S
OPPOSITION TO A COUP AND TO PAD PROTESTS
REF: A. BANGKOK 3289 (POLARIZATION TO PERSIST) B. BANGKOK 3280 (THAKSIN ADDRESSES UDD) C. BANGKOK 3226 (HOPES FOR MEDIATION) D. BANGKOK 3080 (QUEEN SHOWS SUPPORT)
BANGKOK 00003317 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b and d).
SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------
1. (C) King Bhumibol explicitly told Army Commander Anupong Paojinda not to launch a coup, XXXXXXXXXXXX, an advisor to Queen Sirikit, told Ambassador November 4. XXXXXXXXXXXX also claimed that the Queen had not meant to signal support for the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) anti-government agenda when she presided over funeral ceremonies on October 13. XXXXXXXXXXXX said PAD's activities had irritated the King, who reportedly wants PAD protestors to leave Government House. XXXXXXXXXXXX spoke well of Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat, saying Somchai was open to compromising with the PAD, although XXXXXXXXXXXX guessed Somchai would be forced from office by the end of the year. Separately, a politically active businessman with strong connections to the palace told us that the Queen's funeral appearance had hurt the monarchy's image, thereby serving the agenda of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. This contact also discussed a possible assassination plot against Thaksin and PAD plans for violence. Both contacts claimed the King suffered from back pain and his condition was frail.
2. (S/NF) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX's claim that the King instructed Anupong not to conduct a coup is the strongest account we have heard to date about the King's opposition to a coup and his communicating this to Anupong; it would explain why Privy Counselors Prem and Siddhi, both seen as opponents of the current government, gave recent assurances to the Ambassador that there would not be a coup. While XXXXXXXXXXXX did not specify how he heard of this exchange, the purported instruction does appear consistent with Anupong's actions, other high-level military assurances to the Ambassador, and reporting in other channels. We agree that the Queen's funeral appearance was a significant blunder, jeopardizing the public's perception of the palace's neutrality. PAD appears increasingly divided; this divide, as well as the intense and dynamic condition of Thai politics, may make it appear realistic to hope for a PAD-government compromise. Possible further violence, however, remains a concern. End Summary and Comment.
PALACE-PAD RELATIONS
--------------------
3. (C) Ambassador met privately at the Residence on November 4 with XXXXXXXXXXXX, a close advisor to Queen Sirikit who in the past has also served as a confidant of the King.XXXXXXXXXXXX remarked that he regretted the Queen's October 13 appearance at the funeral of a PAD supporter (ref D). He claimed the Queen had been emotionally affected when she learned that one victim of the October 7 violence was a young lady about to be married, and that she had told her father she was going to the protest to defend the monarchy. Initially, the Queen had wanted to send Princess Chulabhorn to the funeral. It was only at the request of Chulabhorn and Chulabhorn's companion, Chaichon Locharernkul, that the Queen decided to go herself. XXXXXXXXXXXX said there was no intention for the Queen to involve either herself or the monarchy in political matters, but, unfortunately, some members of the public could interpret the funeral appearance differently. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Queen later reached out to seriously injured police officers in an attempt to show her neutrality, but this signal went largely unnoticed.
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX remarked that King Bhumibol was highly irritated by PAD's occupation of Government House and other disruptions caused by the anti-government group, but the King was unsure how best to ensure PAD would vacate the compound. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the King had instructed two of his loyalists to convey his desire that PAD leave Government House. (One of these messengers was well-known associate of the King Disathorn
BANGKOK 00003317 002.2 OF 003
Watcharothai, who said publicly on October 29 that Thais who love the King should "go home"; see ref A.) XXXXXXXXXXXX considered XXXXXXXXXXXX to be obstinate, however, saying Sondhi had become obsessed with his own sense of mission. By contrast, XXXXXXXXXXXX thought that XXXXXXXXXXXX was reasonable and willing to compromise.
POSITIVE VIEW OF SOMCHAI
------------------------
5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed to have spoken to Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat about the current standoff. XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Ambassador that Somchai had agreed that the government could meet with the PAD and reach a compromise, but the time was not yet ripe. In his conversation with the Ambassador, XXXXXXXXXXXX spoke highly of Somchai, saying he was "very good" and had many qualities that made him suitable to be Prime Minister, including a sense of fairness and a moderate temperament. Nevertheless, XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted that Somchai could not remain long in office because he would likely be forced out by an adverse Constitutional Court ruling in the People's Power Party (PPP) dissolution case (ref A), which XXXXXXXXXXXX believed the Court might issue before the King's birthday (December 5). XXXXXXXXXXXX guessed Somchai would dissolve the parliament before being forced from office.
KING TO ANUPONG: NO COUP
------------------------
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted that the current turmoil would not result in a military coup. He said that the King, speaking with Army Commander Anupong Paojinda, had referred to the 2006 coup and made a statement to the effect that there should be no further coups.
POLITICIZATION OF THE MONARCHY
------------------------------
7. (C) We also met on November 5 with XXXXXXXXXXXX (strictly protect), the well-connected scion of a wealthy family with close palace ties. XXXXXXXXXXXX had a leading role in the XXXXXXXXXXXX; his wife, XXXXXXXXXXXX, has the royal title of "XXXXXXXXXXXX" and works closely with the Queen. XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed that the Queen's appearance at the October 13 funeral had highly negative ramifications, saying that even politically neutral Thais felt she had inappropriately brought the monarchy into politics. He also acknowledged increasing semi-public criticism of the monarchy, focused on the Queen (septel). XXXXXXXXXXXX stated with confidence that the King had sought to deter the Queen from attending the funeral by questioning the wisdom of that plan, but had stopped short of forbidding her to do so.
8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX discussed former Prime Minister Thaksin's statement in his November 1 address to supporters (ref B) that either "royal mercy or the people's power" could allow his return to Thailand. XXXXXXXXXXXX said this juxtaposition, which he viewed as highly strategic, had the predictable effect of energizing Thaksin's opponents in the royalist camp. This reaction allowed Thaksin to demonstrate publicly that many palace figures were aligned against him, thereby eroding the prestige that the palace derived from its status as an institution above politics. (Separately, after Thaksin's remarks, a member of Thaksin's legal team told us that the sentence in question was part of a "very refined product" and that she had heard this sentence "four or five times" in Thaksin's rehearsal of the speech.)
THAKSIN'S ENEMIES' PLANS FOR VIOLENCE
-------------------------------------
9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX believed PAD continued to aim for a violent clash that would spark a coup. He asserted that he had dined on October 6 with a leading PAD figure (NFI), who explained that PAD would provoke violence during its October 7 protest at the parliament. The unnamed PAD figure predicted (wrongly) that the Army would intervene against the
BANGKOK 00003317 003.2 OF 003
government by the evening of October 7. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted to us that PAD remained intent on a conflict that would generate at least two dozen deaths and make military intervention appear necessary and justified.
10. (C) We mentioned to XXXXXXXXXXXX the claim by Thaksin associate XXXXXXXXXXXX that Thaksin had been the target of an assassination plot (ref C). (Note: Subsequent to the Ambassador's meeting with XXXXXXXXXXXX, another Thaksin ally related the same claim, and said Thaksin himself had spoken of this plot. End Note.) XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested XXXXXXXXXXXX's list of conspirators -- including two prominent judges -- was not credible, but XXXXXXXXXXXX said he could confirm (presumably because of first-hand discussion with an organizing figure) that certain enemies of Thaksin (NFI) had sought to kill him. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he had been surprised to learn that the contract on Thaksin's life entailed a relatively low payment of only several hundred thousand Baht (in the range of 10,000 USD), although it also entailed resettlement abroad for the person(s) directly involved.
REMARKS ON THE KING'S HEALTH
----------------------------
11. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX (late August/early September). At that time, he said, the King's complexion appeared healthy, but overall the King appeared frail. He added that the King was upset with the Thai doctor who had organized the team that performed back surgery on the King two years ago, as the operation had not worked as well as the King had been led to expect. XXXXXXXXXXXX, in his meeting with the Ambassador, also said the King was suffering from back pain, and his activities were more limited than in recent years. JOHN
Wednesday, 20 September 2006, 12:29
C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 005811
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
TREASURY PASS TO FRB SAN FRANCISCO/TERESA CURRAN
EO 12958 DECL: 09/19/2016
TAGS PGOV, PHUM, TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: MY MEETING WITH GENERAL SONTHI
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (C) I met with General Sonthi privately directly after he addressed the diplomatic corps this afternoon. He thought the session had gone well (see septel for details; I doubt most of the Western diplomats, at least, will share his assessment).
2. (C) I began by asking Sonthi about the audience with the King last night. Who had attended? He said Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda had brought him, Supreme Commander Ruangroj and Navy Commander Sathiraphan in to meet the King. Sonthi stressed that they had been summoned to the palace; he had not sought the audience. He said the King was relaxed and happy, smiling throughout. He provided no further details.
3. (C) Turning to the US reaction, I reminded him of our conversation, August 31, when I told him any military action would result in immediate suspension of assistance programs such as IMET, FMF and numerous others. I told him he could expect us to announce such a measure shortly. He understood. I added that the restoration of such assistance could only come after a democratically elected government took office. In the meantime, I stressed that the coup group needed to make every effort to demonstrate a sincere intention to return to civilian rule as soon as possible. His announcement today that an interim constitution and civilian government would be installed within two weeks was a good example. I reiterated these points several times.
4. (C) Sonthi responded by saying the military had truly acted in order to improve Thai democracy, not destroy it. The prevailing situation had become untenable. Had Thaksin only been willing to announce publicly that he would not return as Prime Minister, this action could have been avoided. But his unwillingness to do publicly what he had repeatedly told many privately had led people to fear that his true intention was to seek a renewed mandate and return to power. Thus the military had acted. But they did not seek sustained political power and would return to barracks as soon as possible. The sooner the better, I repeated. I told him to expect fairly broad international criticism, as military coups were generally seen as a thing of the past.
5. (C) Was he going to seize Thaksin,s assets? No, he stated flatly. Would Thaksin and his family and colleagues be allowed to return to Thailand? Yes, unconditionally. What is the officially approved English rendition of the coup group,s title? &Council for Democratic Reform Under Constitutional Monarchy,8 or CDRM.
6. (C) Why had the military chosen to act at this particular point in time? Smiling slightly, he leaned forward. &Thaksin was at his weakest and we were at our strongest.8
7. (C) Comment ) Sonthi was relaxed and calm. Clearly the royal audience was the turning point last night. (Septel reports Thaksin,s defiant attitude dissolving completely when he learned of the audience.) For now at least, the CDRM appears to be taking the high road as far as how they will treat Thaksin. We have ready access to this group and will press them to implement their announced intention to return to civilian rule as soon as possible. Meanwhile, a coup is a coup is a coup and we believe a strong U.S. statement announcing the suspension of assistance and a call for an early return to civilian rule and eventually elections is entirely warranted and will submit suggested text via septel.
BOYCE BOYCE
Wednesday, 09 July 2008, 18:49
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000918
C O R R E C T E D COPY//SUBJECT LINE//////////////////////////////////
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/09/2018
TAGS PREL, PTER, MOPS, IR, PK, AF, CA
SUBJECT: COUNSELOR, CSIS DIRECTOR DISCUSS CT THREATS,
PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN
REF: A. OTTAWA 360 B. OTTAWA 808 C. OTTAWA 850 D. OTTAWA 878
OTTAWA 00000918 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons, 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) Summary. Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Director Judd discussed domestic and foreign terror threats with Counselor of the State Department Cohen in Ottawa on July 2. Judd admitted that CSIS was increasingly distracted from its mission by legal challenges that could endanger foreign intelligence-sharing with Canadian agencies. He predicted that the upcoming release of a DVD of Guantanamo detainee and Canadian citizen Omar Khadr's interrogation by Canadian officials would lead to heightened pressure on the government to press for his return to Canada, which the government would continue to resist. Judd shared Dr. Cohen's negative assessment of current political, economic, and security trends in Pakistan, and was worried about what it would mean for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Canada has begun formulating an inter-agency Pakistan strategy, and CSIS had agreed to open a channel to Iran's intelligence service which Judd has not yet "figured out." (Septel will cover Dr. Cohen's discussions regarding Pakistan and the OEF and ISAF missions in Afghanistan.) End summary.
2. (S/NF) Counselor of the Department of State Eliot Cohen and CSIS Director Jim Judd in Ottawa on July 2 discussed threats posed by violent Islamist groups in Canada, and recent developments in Pakistan and Afghanistan. (CSIS is Canada's lead agency for national security intelligence.) Director Judd ascribed an "Alice in Wonderland" worldview to Canadians and their courts, whose judges have tied CSIS "in knots," making it ever more difficult to detect and prevent terror attacks in Canada and abroad. The situation, he commented, left government security agencies on the defensive and losing public support for their effort to protect Canada and its allies.
Legal Wrangling Risks Chill Effect
----------------------------------
3. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX
4. (S/NF) Judd derided recent judgments in Canada's courts that threaten to undermine foreign government intelligence- Qthat threaten to undermine foreign government intelligence- and information-sharing with Canada. These judgments posit that Canadian authorities cannot use information that "may have been" derived from torture, and that any Canadian public official who conveys such information may be subject to criminal prosecution. This, he commented, put the government in a reverse-onus situation whereby it would have to "prove" the innocence of partner nations in the face of assumed wrongdoing.
5. (S/NF) Judd credited Prime Minister Stephen Harper's minority Conservative government for "taking it on the chin and pressing ahead" with common sense measures despite court challenges and political knocks from the opposition and interest groups. When asked to look to the future, Judd predicted that Canada would soon implement UK-like legal procedures that make intelligence available to "vetted defense lawyers who see everything the judge sees."
OTTAWA 00000918 002.2 OF 003
Terror Cases and Communities Present Mixed Pictures
--------------------------------------------- ------
6. (C/NF) Judd commented that cherry-picked sections of the court-ordered release of a DVD of Guantanamo detainee and Canadian citizen Omar Khadr (ref D) would likely show three (Canadian) adults interrogating a kid who breaks down in tears. He observed that the images would no doubt trigger "knee-jerk anti-Americanism" and "paroxysms of moral outrage, a Canadian specialty," as well as lead to a new round of heightened pressure on the government to press for Khadr's return to Canada. He predicted that PM Harper's government would nonetheless continue to resist this pressure. 7. (C) The Director mentioned other major cases that also presented CSIS with major legal headaches due to the use of intelligence products in their development: Momin Khawaja has been on trial for his role in an Al Qaeda UK bomb plot since June 23 in the first major test of Canada's 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act, and Canada's ability to protect intelligence supplied by foreign government sources (ref D); the trial of the first of the home-grown Toronto 11 (down from 18) terror plotters, which is also now underway; and, the prosecution of XXXXXXXXXXXX.
8. (C) Judd said he viewed Khawaja and his "ilk" as outliers, due in part to the fact that Canada's ethnic Pakistani community is unlike its ghettoized and poorly educated UK counterpart. It is largely made up of traders, lawyers, doctors, engineers, and others who see promise for themselves and their children in North America, he observed, so its members are unlikely to engage in domestic terror plots. He said that therefore CSIS main domestic focus is instead on fundraising and procurement, as well as the recruitment of a small number of Canadian "wannabes" of Pakistani origin for mostly overseas operations.
Pakistan and Afghanistan
------------------------
9. (C) Turning to Pakistan, Counselor Cohen briefed his recent trip to Islamabad and Peshawar, noting his alarm at the degrading economic, political, and security situation there, and its implications for Pakistan, Afghan, and regional stability. Judd responded that Dr. Cohen's sober assessment tracked with CSIS' own view of Pakistan, and that "it is hard to see a good outcome there" due to that country's political, economic, and security failures, on top of fast-rising oil and food prices. Canada does not have an explicit strategy for Pakistan, Judd said, but Privy Council Deputy Secretary David Mulroney (who leads the interagency on Afghanistan) now has the lead on developing one (septel). Dr. Cohen remarked, and Judd agreed, that it would be necessary to avoid approaching Pakistan as simply an adjunct to the ISAF and OEF missions in Afghanistan.
10. (S/NF) CSIS is far from being "high-five mode" on Q10. (S/NF) CSIS is far from being "high-five mode" on Afghanistan, Judd asserted, due in part to Karzai's weak leadership, widespread corruption, the lack of will to press ahead on counter-narcotics, limited Afghan security force capability (particularly the police) and, most recently, the Sarpoza prison break. He commented that CSIS had seen Sarpoza coming, and its link to the Quetta Shura in Pakistan, but could not get a handle on the timing.
Iranian Outreach
----------------
11. (S/NF) Judd added that he and his colleagues are "very, very worried" about Iran. CSIS recently talked to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) after that agency requested its own channel of communication to Canada, he said. The Iranians agreed to "help" on Afghan issues, including sharing information regarding potential attacks. However, "we have not figured out what they are up to," Judd confided, since it is clear that the "Iranians want ISAF to bleed...slowly."
OTTAWA 00000918 003.2 OF 003
12. (U) Dr. Cohen has cleared this message.
Visit Canada,s Economy and Environment Forum at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/can ada
WILKINS
Monday, 29 June 2009, 16:57
C O N F I D E N T I A L ACCRA 000619
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/29/2019
TAGS PGOV, SNAR, XA, XY, GH
SUBJECT: GHANA PRESIDENT LEADS FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING
Classified By: Poloff Raymond Stephens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: President John Evans Atta Mills has made private statements backed with public actions about his intention to reduce Ghana's growing role in the drugs trade. GOG agencies are following his lead and have also made a discernible effort to eliminate drugs in the country. END SUMMARY
2. (U) One highly visible step taken by the President early in his administration to show that no one is above the law when it comes to smuggling drugs was to submit voluntarily to a thorough security screening when he departed from the airport on his first overseas state visit. He made a point of submitting his luggage to a search and required his entire entourage to do the same. The airport itemizers used to detect drugs were provided by the USG.
3. (C) President Mills took a significant step toward controlling the proliferation of drugs in his country by supporting the creation of a USG funded vetted anti-narcotics unit. In the past, the police lost a large amount of drugs kept in their possession that was to be used as evidence in future trials. The USG is building a secure room at police headquarters in which to store evidence in future drugs cases.
4. (C) Within the past two weeks, Narcotics Control Board (NACOB) officials have arrested four couriers transiting Accra's international airport and seized between 1kg and 1.5kg each time. In another case involving regional law enforcement cooperation, a courier was allowed to transit Ghana successfully before being arrested in neighboring Cote d'Ivoire along with the intended recipient of the drugs. XXXXXXXXXX5. (C) The President told the Ambassador that he knows elements of his government are already compromised and that officials at the airport tipped off drug traffickers about operations there. The Interior Minister has said that there is a proposal to elevate the NACOB to a stand alone Commission that would report directly to the President. Such a move would enhance the status of the NACOB and give it more control over its budget, including better pay for staff.
6. (C) The NACOB is not the only agency working to eliminate narcotics trafficking in Ghana. The Ghana Immigration Service has been extremely cooperative in assisting DEA with the extradition of two suspected Colombian drug lords from Togo. Recently, Ghana border officials opened the border at 4:30am to allow DEA agents to move one suspect en route to board a flight to the US. In an operation involving another GOG agency, the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI) partnered with the DEA to make a controlled delivery of 4kg of cocaine that resulted in the arrest of the recipient.
7. (SBU) Last month, a container in the port of Tema marked as chewing gum raised the suspicion of Ghana Ports Authority, Customs, Excise, and Preventative Service (CEPS) because it originated in Ecuador rather than the Far East, as usual. When CEPS opened the container, they found 71.4kg of cocaine. The find led to the arrest of five people, and police are now looking at asset forfeiture of the company that imported the shipment.
8. (U) President Mills has stated that he is resolute in stopping people from using Ghana as a narcotics transit corridor and will vigorously fight for the total eradication of hard drugs in the country. So far, he has shown a good faith effort. TEITELBAUM
Tuesday, 11 August 2009, 13:32
S E C R E T HAVANA 000491
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/08/2029
TAGS SNAR, PREL, SMIG, PGOV, CU, ASEC
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT OF CUBA FRUSTRATION INCREASES OVER LACK
OF JAMAICAN COUNTERNARCOTICS COOPERATION
Classified By: COM JONATHAN FARRAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D)
1. (C) Summary: The U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) assigned to the U.S. Interests Section (USINT) in Havana, Cuba has spoken with Cuban Ministry of Interior (MININT) officials on multiple occasions, as recently as 4 August 2009, regarding their perceived lack of Government of Jamaica (GOJ) cooperation in attempting to curtail the flow of illicit narcotics to the Bahamas and the United States. Cuban MININT officials contend that narcotics smugglers from Jamaica are utilizing both Cuban airspace and waters to transport narcotics ultimately destined for the United States, but their repeated attempts to engage Jamaica on the issue have been ignored. End Summary.
2. (C) On 4 August 2009, DIS wrapped-up a two-day trip to Camaguey, Cuba where he received a briefing on the 5 July emergency landing of an aircraft, enroute from Jamaica, that dropped 13 bales of marijuana over a barren field in Cuba located southwest of Playa Santa Lucia in Camaguey Province. According to Cuban officials, the aircraft was destined for a pre-determined location over Bahamian waters where the narcotics would be dropped to two waiting go-fast vessels for eventual shipment to the United States. The crew of three discarded the contraband prematurely when they experienced engine problems.
3. (C) On 4 August, the DIS visited Joaquin de Aguero airport in Playa Santa Lucia where the smugglers' aircraft is located; DIS was provided with further insight from airport officials as to how the case played-out, and how Cuban authorities responded. According to the Cuban Anti-Drug police (DNA), all three traffickers onboard the aircraft are being detained in Cuba. XXXXXXXXXXXX
4. (C) The aforementioned case follows a 27 May 2009 case in which a joint-interdiction of a Jamaican go-fast vessel in the vicinity of Playa Guardalavaca, Cuba, that resulted in the Cuban Border Guard seizing 700 kg of Jamaican marijuana. This, after the Cuban Border Guard interdicted the vessel in its waters utilizing real-time information from OPBAT, USCG District 7, and the USCG DIS in Havana. The DIS attended a briefing on this case with Cuban officials, and boarded the subject narco-trafficking vessel.
5. (S) While the DIS is often briefed via formal means on the type of cases mentioned above, side-bar conversations during provincial trips outside of Havana with Cuban MININT officials often yield increased insight into Cuban counterdrug (CD) operations and mindset. A prevailing concern and significant frustration on the Cuban side is the reportedly complete lack of cooperation afforded them by the GOJ when it comes to CD information sharing. DIS has spoken to no fewer than 15 Cuban MININT officers whose primary missions/roles are drug interdiction or support to drug interdiction. Collectively and continually, they express frustration over the GOJ's consistent ignoring of Cuban attempts to increase the flow of drug-related information between the two island nations to increase interdictions and avoid "being surprised by drugs."
6. (C) MININT officers, specifically the MININT's international relations division and anti-drug directorate,
with whom the DIS communicates extensively, consistently allude to the lengths the GOC has gone to in order to enhance the relationship. Without fail, MININT officials allude to the fact that narco-related information (i.e. information on go-fasts and aircraft transiting to/from Jamaica in the vicinity of Cuba) passed to the GOJ is always translated to English because in the past GOJ officials stated to the GOC that they did not understand Spanish; MININT officers report that despite their efforts, GOJ officials still do not respond.
7. (S) In October 2008, DIS attended a counternarcotics meeting onboard the RFA WAVE RULER in the Port of Havana. The meeting was arranged by the UK Defense Attache to encourage greater cooperation between GOC and GOJ over CD efforts; during conversations with the Attache, the DIS learned that the impetus behind the meeting was to bring GOC and GOJ authorities together to encourage greater dialogue, and to quash growing frustration between the two. In comments to the DIS after the meeting, Cuban officials stated that the two Jamaican officers "just sat there and didn't say anything." MININT officers mention that Jamaican officials commonly agree to greater information sharing in person; however, that is the extent of their efforts.
8. (C) Currently, Cuban officials appear resigned to the idea that they will not see greater GOJ cooperation in the near future. On 3 August, the DIS asked the chief of the MININT's international relations department if he thought Cuban officials would sit down at a table with USCG, DEA, Jamaican officials, and Cuban DNA officers to discuss CD issues; he said it would be a possibility, but that the GOC does not have a suitable liaison officer at its embassy in Jamaica. DIS responded by asking if an officer or group of officers from the DNA would be able to travel to Jamaica for such talks; he once again stated that it is a possibility.
9. (C) Comment: DIS gauges that the GOC genuinely desires greater information sharing on CD issues with Jamaican authorities to serve the GOC's strategic interests. Should we decide to pursue broader counternarcotics cooperation with the GOC, MININT-DNA may be willing to attend talks with US drug authorities in concert with Jamaican authorities. At the present time, however, it appears frustration is building within the ranks of the Cuban MININT-DNA, especially as CD cases continue to bring illicit narcotics in close proximity or actually to Cuba and its littorals, posing an interdiction challenge for Cuban authorities. Through their constant reminders to the DIS and via press reports to the Cuban people, GOC officials ultimately blame the United States for this problem due to the high demand for illicit narcotics by United States consumers. End Comment. FARRAR
Friday, 21 December 2007, 13:02
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ACCRA 002590
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
LAGOS FOR SAM GAYE. ABUJA FOR MICHAEL MAKALOU. USEU FOR JIM
MCANULTY AND TOM SCARANTINO
EO 12958 DECL: 12/20/2017
TAGS SNAR, PGOV, PREL, KCRM, GH
SUBJECT: GHANA RESPONSE TO EFFORTS TO COMBAT WEST AFRICAN
DRUG TRAFFICKING
REF: A) STATE 166219 B) ACCRA 2533 (NOTAL) C) ACCRA 2244 (NOTAL) D) ACCRA 2227 (NOTAL)
ACCRA 00002590 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: CHARGE SUE K. BROWN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (U) Post provides the following information keyed to ref A request.
GOG efforts to addresses narcotics trafficking
--------------------------------------------- -
2. (C) Ghana is increasingly becoming a significant transshipment point for cocaine from South America and heroin from Southwest Asia. The majority of the narcotics flow is to Europe, although seizures have occurred on flights to the U.S. The GOG does not have a handle on the issue and lacks an overarching strategy to deal with the problem. Despite the unveiling of the Georgina Wood Report last year, the GOG has largely failed to implement its recommendations. (NOTE: The Wood Commission was convened after several narcotics scandals and its report listed numerous recommendations for the GOG to address the narcotics scourge (ref B). END NOTE.)
3. (C) The GOG does not provide the resources necessary to address the problem and, at times, does not appear to have the political will to go after the major drug barons. However the GOG has taken some steps toward educating the public about the perils of narcotics. For example, the Narcotics Control Board (NACOB), the lead agency in Ghana on counternarcotics efforts, has instituted awareness programs in schools, airports and other public places. The GOG, together with the UK, also recently launched Operation Hibiscus, which aims at deterring people from becoming drug couriers. The GOG was also helpful in the recent arrest and subsequent expulsion to the U.S. of two Afghan nationals for heroin trafficking (ref C).
Bilateral and International Donors Assistance
---------------------------------------------
4. (C) Outside of U.S. assistance, the UK has the strongest counternarcotics assistance program in Ghana. UK assistance is largely channeled through the Operation Westbridge program, which seeks to interdict narcotics transiting Kotoka International Airport. The program has been successful; however, UK contacts have pointed out that seizures in Accra drop to almost zero when the Westbridge team, who serves on short term TDYs, is back in London. In an attempt to address this problem, the UK has now structured its staffing so that at least one Westbridge official will be in Accra at all times. While the program was initially scheduled to last two years, UK contacts tell us that it will be extended at least to 2009. The UK is also assisting the GOG with a public awareness campaign aimed at deterring couriers. The French, Dutch, and Spanish embassies have law enforcement officers who monitor narcotics efforts, but they have done little to date in terms of assistance. The German Embassy sent NACOB,s operations chief to Germany for a long-term training session to be completed in early 2008.
Law Enforcement Operations
--------------------------
5. (C) The Narcotics Control Board (NACOB) is the lead agency on counternarcotics efforts. However, it has been listless over the past year as it has struggled to regain its footing after a series of scandals. NACOB's current director has no law enforcement experience but has a background in pharmaceutical regulation. He has confided that he is ready to move on after only six months on the job and seems to
ACCRA 00002590 002.2 OF 003
focus more on prevention than investigations. The Ghana Police has an organized crime unit, which among other things, addresses narcotics trafficking. Ghanaian law enforcement organizations have demonstrated their efficacy on a few occasions. If given the blessing of the GOG, they typically perform well in arresting and apprehending traffickers.
6. (C) The GOG seems to focus more on small time dealers and couriers and it does not typically carry out long term investigations that result in the arrest of major drug traffickers. For example, GOG contacts in both the police Service and the President,s office have said they know the identities of the major barons, but they have not said why they have not chosen to arrest them. A Police Service contact told us the GOG does not have the political will to go after the barons. This official and other others close to the President have also told us that they cannot trust anyone when it comes to narcotics. Corruption is endemic in Ghana and pervades all aspects of society. Although difficult to measure, corruption almost certainly impacts the law enforcement organizations charged with counternarcotics efforts. Post knows of no high level GOG officials actively involved in the narcotics trade.
Specific Law Enforcement Efforts
--------------------------------
7. (C) Some law enforcement officers are specifically dedicated to counternarcotics. NACOB is the lead agency on narcotics, however, as stated above, scandals over the past two years have severely hindered its ability to perform its charge effectively. NACOB has also been without an Operations Chief for nearly a year, although one was finally named in June and he was immediately sent to Germany for several months of training. As a result of the scandals at NACOB, the U.S. does not cooperate actively with NACOB on individual cases. However, the USG has trained NACOB officials in the past through INL funded DEA classes. NACOB is poorly resourced and, according to Ghanaian law, must rely on the Ghana Police to make arrests. For its part, the Ghana Police has an Organized Crime Unit which focuses on narcotics. The head of this unit is a close contact of the Embassy and has benefited from numerous trainings offered by the USG. This unit showed its competency during the recent arrest of two Afghans in a DEA lead operation. The Afghans were subsequently expelled from Ghana and placed in U.S. custody. They are now awaiting trial in the U.S.
Legal Framework for Counternarcotics Efforts
--------------------------------------------
8. (C) The legal framework in Ghana is satisfactory, however implementation of the laws is lacking. Most recently, Parliament passed the long awaited anti-money laundering bill, but President Kufuor has yet to sign it into law. Ghana does not have an asset forfeiture law, despite the fact that many GOG officials have pleaded for one to be passed. Ghana does have anti-corruption laws, however as with many laws, implementation is difficult and spotty. Another interesting facet of Ghanaian law is that the Ghanaian legal system does not have a plea bargain system. Small time couriers who are arrested therefore have no incentive to cooperate with law enforcement to lower their sentences.
Extent of Overall Interdiction Capacity at Ports
--------------------------------------------- ---
9. (C) Ghana largely has little control over what flows through Kotoka International Airport. The interdiction capacity the GOG has at Kotoka International Airport is
ACCRA 00002590 003.2 OF 003
largely carried out by the UK through its Operation Westbridge, which screens passengers and cargo. Westbridge officials have noted that seizures drop off in Accra and spike in London when UK officials are not present at Kotoka. These same officials complain that NACOB rotates the officers too quickly, preventing them from developing the expertise necessary to identify couriers and spot concealed narcotics. UK officials have also suggested that some NACOB officers at the airport have assisted couriers through the airport, although they are unable to prove their allegations. See ref C for a detailed description of Operation Westbridge and its operations at Kotoka International Airport.
10. (C) Despite some progress on screening passengers and cargo exiting Ghana, little to no progress has been made to screen passengers and cargo entering Ghana via air. Ghana,s long seacoast is largely unpatrolled and is easily exploited. The Ghana Navy does not have the capacity to patrol the coastline effectively and has asked for assistance in this realm. Furthermore, the GOG lacks proper evidence lockers to account for and protect evidence. In 2005 for example, cocaine went missing from NACOB,s &evidence room,8 kicking off a firestorm of controversy. BROWN
Tuesday, 10 November 2009, 09:04
C O N F I D E N T I A L ACCRA 001179
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/05/2024
TAGS PGOV, SNAR, KCOR, GH
SUBJECT: GHANAIAN CONCERN OVER DRUG SMUGGLING BY VIP
PASSENGERS
REF: ACCRA 1070
Classified By: Ambassador Donald Teitelbaum for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) .
1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 4, the head of the UK's "Operation Westbridge," the British government's anti-narcotics operation at Accra International Airport, told Poloff that President John Atta Mills wants itemizers for the Presidential suite at the airport to screen his entourage for drugs when leaving the country, and that the Narcotics Control Board's (NACOB) placement of officers in the VVIP lounge at the airport has led to a decline in the number of departing passengers using the lounge. O'Hagan also said he believes that two of the USG-funded itemizers at the airport were rendered useless by sabotage and suggested that airlines might be willing to pay for itemizer maintenance. END SUMMARY
2. (C) Poloff met November 4 with Roland O'Hagan, Project Manager for Operation Westbridge and an official with the UK Border Agency. O'Hagan said that President Mills had expressed interest in acquiring itemizers for the Presidential suite at the airport in order to screen his entourage for drugs before boarding any departing flight. According to O'Hagan, Mills wants these officials to be checked in the privacy of his suite to avoid any surprises if they are caught carrying drugs. The itemizers, similar to those provided several years ago by the U.S. Embassy through INL funding, would be sensitive, portable screening devices that can detect the drug content in minuscule drops of human sweat after recent external contact or for up to three weeks after ingestion.
3. (C) O'Hagan also said that NACOB believes that the VVIP lounge at the airport has been a source of drugs leaving the country. Passengers leaving the lounge are driven directly to the plane and are not searched before departure. NACOB placed two officers in the lounge to screen departing passengers, and the number of passengers using the VVIP lounge has decreased. (COMMENT: The Executive Secretary of NACOB previously told Poloffs that bank managers, pastors, and their wives were given official passports and access to the lounge by the Kufuor administration and questioned why these middle class travelers were awarded privileges traditionally reserved for cabinet ministers. END COMMENT)
4. (C) O'Hagan noted that among four itemizers provided to the GOG to detect drug smugglers among airline passengers, all are now non-functioning. According to O'Hagan, two itemizers that the USG gave to NACOB are still operational. O'Hagan said that the airport itemizers were kept in a dusty, un-air conditioned room that caused them to break frequently. He noted that the airport director promised in October 2008 to install an air conditioner in the store room, but that she left her job two weeks after making the promise, and an air conditioner has not been installed.
5. (C) Maintenance of the itemizers is an on-going concern. The equipment has broken frequently since it arrived, but O'Hagan said that the last two operational machines were incapacitated by sabotage. He believes the machines were sabotaged because they were in a storage room, and the filters were removed. The knowledge required to remove the filters exceeded the basic knowledge of the operators.
6. (C) O'Hagan said that he believes the airlines might be willing to pay for the itemizers to be repaired, and specifically mentioned KLM and Delta. He noted that the cost of maintenance on the itemizers is less than the cost of diverting flights on which passengers suffer drug overdoses. Within the last few months, said O'Hagan, KLM has diverted to Spain two flights from Accra to Amsterdam because passengers started vomiting drugs. In both cases, the passenger died. TEITELBAUM
Tuesday, 09 October 2007, 13:25
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ACCRA 002140
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/W AND INL
EO 12958 DECL: 10/04/2017
TAGS PGOV, SNAR, PINR, PREL, GH
SUBJECT: GOG NOT DOING ENOUGH TO COMBAT NARCOTICS
REF: REF: A) 2005 ACCRA 2517 B) ACCRA 1437
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAMELA E. BRIDGEWATER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Recent discussions with Ghanaian officials and Western diplomats paint a disappointing picture of the Ghanaian Government,s efforts to combat its increasing problem with illegal narcotics trafficking. Several GOG officials and others question whether Ghana,s leadership appreciates the magnitude of the problem and whether they have the will and/or resources to address the problem. The Narcotics Control Board (NACOB) appears to have little clear direction or initiative, and one NACOB official told us he suspects some drug &barons8 have penetrated NACOB. The British Government is considering ending its successful Operation Westbridge project at the Accra,s international airport due to dissatisfaction with GOG efforts. The apparently high level of corruption or ineptitude at the airport was demonstrated in July, when UK officials found packets of cocaine taped under passenger seats on a KLM flight before passengers boarded the plane. The situation has generated substantial frustration among officials working to combat trafficking, and as one GOG official told us, the GOG must &wake up8 soon to the narcotics trade before it is too late. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Recent conversations with the Narcotics Control Board (NACOB), Ghana Police, and diplomats have revealed little confidence in NACOB and GOG efforts to battle the flow of narcotics. Without exception, each indifidual with whom we spoke said the problem was increasing and that the GOG is largely clueless as to how to combat it. Some sources cited a lack of political will, while others said that the GOG fails to understand the magnitude of the crisis. All sources agreed that if the present trend continues, Ghana would likely see a corresponding rise in crime and drug abuse present in most transit countries.
NACOB: NOT ACTIVELY COMBATING NARCOTICS
----------------------------------------
3. (C) NACOB, according to one of its higher-ranking officials, is motionless. This official XXXXXXXXsaid that the GOG has effectively neutered NACOB since the embarrassing arrest in the U.S. of NPP MP Eric Amoateng in 2005 (ref A). All of the high-ranking officials during that time have been removed XXXXXXXX. He said the GOG was upset with NACOB since it cooperated closely with the USG on the case, which resulted in Amoateng,s guilty plea and subsequent imprisonment in the U.S. He added that no one at NACOB wants to rock the boat, including the new director, Ben Botwe, who lacks experience with narcotics enforcement.
4. (C) The current deputy at NACOB, Mark Ewuntomaah, is also a problem, according to Gary Nicholls, Second Secretary at the British Embassy, and we agree. According to Nicholls, Secretary to the President, Ambassador D.K. Osei, had
SIPDIS commented that Ewuntomaah should have stayed a retired police officer rather than being recalled to NACOB. Our experience also underlines Ewuntomaah,s apparent unresponsiveness and generally incompetence. Despite repeated promises, Ewuntomaah was unable to even organize a tour of the airport for poloff.
5. (S) While there has also been a long absence of an Operations Chief at NACOB, Post learned recently that the GOG has designated an official for this position, but he is being sent to Germany for language training to take a course on combating narcotics. He is not expected to begin work for six more months. Nicholls noted that the UK no longer shares intelligence with NACOB, but rather deals directly with the Ghana Police.
6. (C) The NACOB official expects the GOG to do little to combat narcotics until after the 2008 presidential elections. The current policy, he said, is to go after couriers, but not the &barons8 who are behind the deals. The official claimed the &barons8 are generally large supporters of the NPP and he suggested that the ruling party has no plans to pursue these individuals even though many of their identities are known. He even suggested that some of the &barons8 have penetrated NACOB by recruiting NACOB officers to keep them informed. He also said that the British, with &Operation Westbridge8 at the Accra Airport,
ACCRA 00002140 002 OF 003
are the only real forces attempting to apprehend smugglers.
7. (C) Leadership at NACOB is clearly lacking. Everyone Emboffs spoke with concerning Ben Botwe, the current head of NACOB, had little positive to say. He has spoken frequently about awareness programs, and his comments have changed little since our first meeting with him in June (ref B). In a recent conversation with poloff, he suggested he is &ready to move on.8 He has made similar comments to our British colleagues and the senior official at NACOB confirmed these sentiments. Despite his apparent desire to leave, it appears that Botwe will remain for at least another year since he was asked by the President to assume this role.
POLITICAL WILL: IS IT THERE?
----------------------------
8. (S) In a separate conversation, XXXXXXXX , questioned whether the GOG leadership has the political will and human and financial capital to combat the drug trade. He said the GOG must &wake up8 and recognize the severity of the problem. He also said he has repeatedly warned GOG officials of the ever-increasing narcotics flow but said they do not listen. The politicians, he said, do not realize the level of violence and crime that will occur should the drug trade continue to increase. He also noted that the GOG is creating a new unit to focus on the drug trade. 9. (C) Gary Nicholls echoed concerns about the lack of political will, and said the UK is considering ending its successful Operation Westbridge project at Kotoka International Airport. Nicholls said the UK is upset about Ghana,s management of the program. One problem, he said, is that NACOB has removed the UK trained NACOB officers from the airport and replaced them with untrained officers who lack basic counter-narcotics skills. More troubling, Nicholls said, is that when the Westbridge team is outside Ghana (it travels in and out from London) no seizures are made in Accra; however seizures increase markedly in London. He provided us with a spreadsheet showing seizures through the program, and pointed out that no seizures had occurred in Accra since July 25, the day the team left Accra. However, 29 seizures were made in London through September 17. Nicholls also pointed out an egregious mistake by the monitors in which NACOB officials &missed8 a two-ton shipment of cannabis, which, according to Nicholls, is nearly impossible to not see. Nicholls said UK officials have decided to put out the message via the Ghanaian media that it is dissatisfied with the program. (NOTE: One article has already appeared in the Daily Chronicle. END NOTE)
10. (C) The statistics from Operation Westbridge are quite striking. The ages of arrestees range from 16 to 55 and hail from Ghana, Nigeria, Romania, the Netherlands, the UK and New Zealand. Many carriers swallow pellets and one Ghanaian died in July when a pellet burst. Others have attempted to conceal narcotics in herbal tea, pictures, hair gel, or suitcases. Perhaps most disturbing, Westbridge officials found, before passengers boarded the plane, 1.8 kg of cocaine taped under passenger seats on a KLM flight. Seizures seem to occur daily when the Westbridge team is present. In total, since November 2006, the operation has netted 350 kg of cocaine, nearly 2,200 kg of cannabis, and 1.3 kg of heroin with a total street value of over USD 120,000.
11. (C) Many Ghanaians and nearly all Western Diplomats agree that the narcotics flow will increase without greater efforts to stem it. Several western Embassies have assigned officials to assist the GOG: the French have a full time Police Liaison, the Germans are sending one soon, and the Spanish Ambassador said his mission is also paying close attention to the matter, adding that Spain plans to open Embassies in Guinea and Guinea-Bissau to monitor narcotics and immigration.
COMMENT
-------
12. (C) The narcotics menace, if left unchecked, will definitely damage Ghana,s international credibility and its economic and political gains. We know the problem is critical when the Secretary to the President says that there is no one he can trust in law enforcement to share sensitive narcotics
ACCRA 00002140 003 OF 003
intelligence with. BRIDGEWATER
Tuesday, 05 August 2008, 16:08
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ACCRA 001005
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/W, INL FOR JOHN LYLE
EO 12958 DECL: 07/30/2028
TAGS PINR, PGOV, PREL, SNAR, GH
SUBJECT: GHANA-- UPDATE ON COUNTER-NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Sue K. Brown for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d)
1. (U) Summary: The construction of an AFRICOM funded airport interdiction facility moved a step closer on July 29 with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Charge Sue K Brown and Ghana Narcotics Board Executive Secretary Ben Botwe. Five convicted cocaine traffickers received long prison sentences. Officials from western embassies participated in a "mini-Dublin" session to discuss narcotics interdiction efforts.
MOU Signed for Airpor Facility;
--------------------------
2. (U) CDA Sue K. Brown and Ghana Narcotics Board (NACOB) Executive Secretary Benjamin Botwe July 29 signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the construction of a $75,000 airport interdiction facility. The AFRICOM funded facility, to be located at Kotoka International Airport, will provide a climate controlled space to house sensitive equipment used in drug detection. (Note: Two USG purchased itemizers, capable of detecting drug residue, are currently not functioning. The machines do not operate well in non-air conditioned spaces. End Note.) Executive Secretary Botwe used the event to lobby for an x-ray machine for airport interdiction efforts against "swallowers" who ingest pellets of cocaine. (Note: Post is working with INL and AFRICOM to obtain an x-ray machine for the airport and to support maintenance of the itemizers. End Note.)
NACOB Officials Talk Shop
----------------------------
3. (SBU) Following the signing, POLOFF, OSC Chief,IO and LES Political Specialist met with Botwe and top NACOB officials for a discussion on the state of the Narcotics Board. Botwe, who was appointed Secretary on an interim basis last year, told POLOFF that he was negotiating his return to his permanent position as Deputy Chief Executive of the Ghana Food and Drugs Board. (Note: A source at NACOB told EMBOFF that Botwe's successor has been selected and an announcement could be made soon.) Botwe lamented NACOB's position as a subordinate agency within the Ministry of Interior. He said that its status made it difficult to deal authoritatively with other Ministries and the Police Service, as NACOB needed to work within a chain of command that slowed operations and diverted resources. Botwe believes the Board needs independent status, such as an agency within the Office of the President. He added that any progress on an independent status for NACOB would need to wait until after the elections. Botwe noted that NACOB had grown significantly under his time as Executive Secretary, and its 150 member staff was projected to reach five hundred by 2010.
4.(SBU). POLOFF asked Botwe about the planned Africa Partnership Station, a US Navy maritime security program. The NACOB head said that he hoped his agency could participate in the training, nad added that participation would serve as an opportunity for the NACOB to enter into talks with the Ghana Armed Forces (and in particular the navy) on inter-agency cooperation, which is currently limited.
5.SBU) POLOFF asked Botwe about the recent seizure of a large shipment of cocaine that originated in Guinea. The shipment was stopped outside of Accra by police, but other than the three individuals in the vehicle, no arrests have been made. Botwe and his officials agreed that more patience in conducting investigations was needed in order to arrest those higher up in trafficking circles. He cited the need for better cooperation among Ghanaian law enforcement organizations.
Cocaine Traffickers Receive Long Sentences
------------------------------------------
5. (U) A Ghanaian court sentenced five traffickers each to twenty-five year prison terms. The five, involved in the MV Benjamin cocaine case, attempted in 2006 to land 2,300 kilograms of cocaine to Ghana. (Note: Some of the confiscated product later disappeared, mysteriously, from the Ghana Police Service's secured evidence storage facility. End Note). The five included three Ghanaians and two Chinese; a South Korean originally indicted was found not-guilty. The trial judge, Justice Anin Yeboah, said that the harm caused
ACCRA 00001005 002 OF 002
to the country by the rise in narcotic trafficking made it imperative for the court to issue lengthy sentences as a deterrent.
Accra Mini-Dublin Meeting Held April 24
---------------------------------------
6. (SBU) POLOFF attended the April 24 Mini-Dublin session. Representatives from the UK, French, Canada, the EU, Dutch and other western missions participate regularly in the committee. The French DCM reported that her Mission had arranged for a year's supply of drug test kits to be provided to Ghanaian authorities. The Ghanaians had allowed their inventory of kits to run out, requiring a last minute rush to obtain new kits. The UK representatives said that SOCA (Serious Organized Crime Agency) was increasing its presence in West Africa and will be posting in September or October a liaison officer in Accra. A Royal Navy vessel (HMS Endurance) will visit Ghana approximately August 20 as part of a maritime security program. The leader of the UK Project Westbridge (which conducts drug interdiction operations with NACOB at Ghana's international airport) described a training package available through the UN, currently used in Nigeria. He has held discussions with NACOB officials about using the modules in Ghana, and possibly expanding training to drug officials from other West African countries. The EU representative said that a team of narcotics experts were in West Africa. POLOFF told attendees that the DEA's plans to open an Accra office later this year were still on schedule.
7. (C) The French embassy official expressed concern over Ghanaian traffickers increasing use of Lome as a trans-shipment point for narcotics to France, via the regular Air France flights. The UK official who directs Project Westbridge described recent operations, which have included six seizures in the past month. He has observed NACOB agents at the airport (particularly Ghana Police Service officers on loan to NACOB) directing passengers away from flights receiving extra interdiction scrutiny. On one occasion, he returned unexpectedly to the airport at 4 a.m. to screen a flight. An arrested trafficker told the UK official that the trafficker had been told that Westbridge was not operating that night. A test by Westbridge officials of the cell phone SIM card of a trafficker found the phone numbers of senior NACOB officials. The UK official lamented that Ghanaian authorities return to arrested traffickers their EU identity cards, which allow entry and residence in the EU. He noted that depriving traffickers of their EU permits "hurts them worse than prison."
8. (C) Comment. The Project Westbridge team's concerns over the integrity of NACOB personnel at the airport are neither new nor surprising. Nor is the concern limited to the NACOB-- the MV Benjamin's missing cocaine from the Police Service evidence room shows that corruption is an issue throughout Ghana's counter-narcotics program. The ease of fast money in the narcotics trade is a powerful incentive for corruption. Until the authorities expand beyond interdiction, to arresting middlemen and the so-called drug barons, it is difficult to see how the drug problem will be controlled. Initiatives such as the airport facility, x-ray machine and Project Westbridge are important and should be supported, but are not sufficient alone. End Comment. BROWN
Tuesday, 16 February 2010, 16:30
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ACCRA 000139
SIPDIS
WHITE HOUSE FOR USTR LAURIE-ANN AGAMA
USDOC FOR MAC/ITA
TREASURY FOR ADAM BARCAN
DEPARTMENT FOR EEB/CBA SUE SARNIO
DEPARTMENT FOR EEB/OIA BRADLEY STILWELL
EO 12958 DECL: 02/03/2020
TAGS EPET, ECON, ELAB, EINV, ENRG, PGOV, PREL, SNAR, IV,
NI, TO, GH
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MILLS DISCUSSES OIL AND WEST AFRICAN
ISSUES
Classified By: Econ Chief Philip Cummings for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY. During a February 3 meeting with Assistant Secretary Carson, Ghanaian President Mills expressed his commitment to rule of law and transparency. He also stressed the importance of respect and openness in the way oil companies engage with Ghana, highlighting Kosmos Energy as a case where he felt that was lacking. Mills expressed his support for an observation mission to Guinea and said that ECOWAS approval was likely. Mills said he has been in contact with President Faure in Togo and President Gbagbo in Cote d'Ivoire to encourage free, fair, transparent and peaceful elections in those countries. Mills acknowledged that he was worried about the prolonged absence of Nigerian President Yar'Adua from Nigeria and expressed his hopes for a democratic transition there. He acknowledged the problem of child labor in Ghana, but highlighted the challenges of an inadequate number of schools and a cultural acceptance of children working to support their families. Mills said that Ghana is struggling with drug trafficking and increased drug use, and said he is ordering increased checks at Ghana's airports. END SUMMARY.
----------------------------
TRANSPARENCY IN OIL REVENUES
----------------------------
2. (C) Assistant Secretary Carson, accompanied by the Ambassador, Special Assistant Cook and Econoff, met with President John Atta-Mills on February 3, 2010. Carson strongly emphasized the need for leadership in ensuring that Ghana's oil resources are managed for the benefit of the country. He stressed the importance of adherence to rule of law and transparency to maintain Ghana's attractiveness for investment and its ultimate success in developing its oil resources. Mills said he is determined to ensure oil will be a blessing, but that a number of corrupt (unnamed) oil company representatives have attempted to bribe him. He said that he refused the money and was offended by their efforts.
3. (C) Mills stated without reservation that he was committed to the rule of law and transparency. He also added that Ghana would account for all oil revenues in a transparent manner. He noted that he had recently sent a Right to Information bill to Parliament that would increase transparency. He said he regarded governance of the oil sector as a serious responsibility, and stressed that oil revenues belong to the people of Ghana, not their political leaders. He said that Ghana has faced challenges, but that its leadership will do what is right.
-------------------------------
KOSMOS OFFENDED PRESIDENT MILLS
-------------------------------
4. (C) Carson stressed the importance of fair and legal processes as oil development ramps up. He cautioned that, once tarnished, the image of Ghana would be difficult to improve. Mills agreed and said that he has spent many hours discussing the importance of rule of law with his officials. He stressed that many Ghanaian officials were educated in the U.S., so they are not inclined to discriminate against American companies. That said, Mills claimed that many of the petroleum agreements negotiated under the former administration were inexplicably very different from each other, implying that some contracts were gained unfairly. He gave no details on what contracts he felt might be unfair.
5. (C) Mills emphasized the importance of respect in dealing with the GOG, claiming multiple offenses by Kosmos Energy. Mills claimed that Kosmos initially denied that they were planning to sell their asset in the Jubilee Field when they were rumored to be interested in selling. Later, when Kosmos announced their intention to sell, he said the GOG expressed
ACCRA 00000139 002 OF 004
interest in buying shares. According to President Mills, Kosmos invited a delegation to go to London to discuss a potential sale, but before the meeting the CEO of ExxonMobil informed Mills that Exxon had entered into an exclusive agreement with Kosmos to purchase the asset. Mills acknowledged the right of Exxon to enter into such an agreement, but said that he felt both Ghana and he personally had been misled and disrespected by Kosmos. Mills seemed to separate ExxonMobil from Kosmos to a degree, praising ExxonMobil's expertise in oil exploration and production. Mills raised the problem of Kosmos letting other companies view sensitive data in what he described as a violation of Ghanaian law. He said that according to Ghanaian law, GOG consent is required before such access can be granted, and that Kosmos had allowed 26 companies to view the data. Mills asserted that Kosmos has not been transparent in their dealings with the GOG, but that the GOG will adhere to transparency and rule of law in its dealings with Kosmos. He also said that he did not want to create the impression that the GOG is singling out any one company for mistreatment.
6. (C) (NOTE: Two days prior, the Minister of Energy wrote a letter to ExxonMobil CEO Tillerson, saying the GOG is unable to support an ExxonMobil acquisition of Kosmos's Ghana assets as long as the companies retain their exclusivity agreement and deny the GOG a role in the asset acquisition process. The Ambassador already raised objections to statements in the ExxonMobil letter with the Minister of Trade and Industry and the Foreign Affairs Advisor to the President. END NOTE.) Assistant Secretary Carson thanked Mills for his candor and agreed with the need for transparency and courtesy in business deals. He stressed again, however, the absolute importance of adhering to the rule of law and transparency in resolving any disagreements with Kosmos and Exxon.
------------------------------------
OBSERVATION MISSION IN GUINEA LIKELY
------------------------------------
7. (C) Assistant Secretary Carson asked if the GOG supported an observation mission of 30-40 civilians, diplomats, and military to monitor developments in Guinea. Mills agreed and expressed confidence that ECOWAS would approve the mission at its upcoming meeting in Abuja on February 15. He noted that Ghana condemned Guinea's government after the September 28 massacre, a stance Mills described as difficult. He said the military had no right to take power, and Ghana wants to see a return to normality.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
GHANA ENCOURAGING FREE ELECTIONS IN TOGO AND COTE D'IVOIRE
--------------------------------------------- -------------
8. (C) Assistant Secretary Carson brought up the importance of peaceful elections in Togo. Mills described a close relationship with Togolese President Faure Gnassingbe. Mills said he has spoken to him on multiple occassions about the need for free, fair, transparent and peaceful elections. Based on their private conversations, Mills expressed confidence that his intention to maintain peace is sincere, but he needs moral support and encouragement. Mills said that he also visited Cote d'Ivoire and urged President Gbagbo to hold free, fair, transparent and peaceful elections.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
GHANA WANTS DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION TO THE ABSENCE OF NIGERIAN PRESIDENT
--------------------------------------------- -------------
9. (C) Assistant Secretary Carson described the absence of Nigerian President Yar'Adua as a political vacuum, and stressed the need for democracy, stability, and adherence to the laws and constitution of Nigeria. Mills agreed and said he found the situation in Nigeria difficult to understand,
ACCRA 00000139 003.2 OF 004
because under Ghanaian law the Vice President always assumes the President's duties when the President is out of the country, even if only for a short time. He said that Nigeria must follow a democratic path, or it could trigger "unfortunate developments."
----------------------------------
CHALLENGES IN REDUCING CHILD LABOR
----------------------------------
10. (C) Assistant Secretary Carson praised the improvements Ghana has made with regard to combating the worst forms of child labor, but urged a continuing commitment to progress, including in the cocoa industry. Mills acknowledged that criticisms against Ghana for child labor are valid, but described major challenges. Many areas where children work do not have schools. He praised the work that USAID and MCC have done to build schools, and was hopeful that as education opportunities increase, child labor will decrease. In addition, parents often want to pass on traditional work skills to their children. He noted that some cases of child labor can be valid, such as the work he did on his family farm on weekends and vacations as a youth. Mills, however, was firm in his disapproval of any work that interferes with education. The Assistant Secretary urged President Mills to ensure that Ghana continues to focus on progress on the issue, noting that it is viewed very seriously in the U.S. and has very specific attention in Congress.
------------------------------------
COUNTER-NARCOTICS COOPERATION VALUED
------------------------------------
11. (C) Assistant Secretary Carson expressed great concern about increasing drug trafficking in West Africa, and stressed the need for sustained USG-GOG cooperation to combat it. Mills said he was grateful for U.S. cooperation and acknowledged that many problems in West Africa can be traced back to trafficking. He explained that some countries in the region do not have the capacity to enforce their CN laws, but he is personally committed to enforcement in Ghana. For example, whenever he leaves Ghana, he asks to be screened to demonstrate that all travelers, even those departing from the VIP lounge, should be screened. He was also concerned that Ghana is no longer just a transit point for drugs, but is becoming a user country, and said that drug use would lead to a bleak future for the Ghanaian people. He thanked the USG for provision of a body scanner and noted that he would like assistance in acquiring a second scanner for use in the VIP area. He also added that the GOG is working to strengthen the navy to target drug-carrying ships, but that he would discuss the matter in greater detail with the Ambassador.
12. (C) COMMENT. As usual, Ghana has shown that it will strongly and publicly oppose any unconstitutional changes of power in the region. On the issue of oil, however, we are concerned that President Mills's very real personal commitment to rule of law and transparency may not be reflected in the real life treatment of investors. President Mills's sense that Kosmos has not treated the GOG with respect and transparency is problematic, but his clear acceptance of the primacy of rule of law should ultimately counterbalance this. Perhaps significantly, Mills stopped well short of statements in recent letters from the Minister of Energy and GNPC to ExxonMobil and Kosmos saying that the GOG would not support the sale of Kosmos's asset under the firms' current agreement. He was positive in his statements about ExxonMobil. There may still be room to create positive outcomes for Kosmos and ExxonMobil in Ghana. END COMMENT.
13. (U) Assistant Secretary Carson has cleared this message.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
ACCRA 00000139 004.2 OF 004
TEITELBAUM
Thursday, 08 October 2009, 15:25
C O N F I D E N T I A L ACCRA 001070
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/08/2019
TAGS SNAR, PGOV, CVIS, XA, GH
SUBJECT: COUNTER NARCOTICS HEAD DENIES POLITICS AT BOARD
Classified By: Charge d,Affaires Julie Furuta-Toy for reasons 1.4(b) an d (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Narcotics Control Board (NACOB) Executive Secretary Yaw Akrasi Sarpong told Poloffs October 5 that while he is a staunch supporter of the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC), party politics has no place at the NACOB. Sarpong complained about the lack of effective narcotics enforcement in neighboring countries, accused XXXXXXXXXX of complicity in drug trafficking, and said that traffickers are using the airport VVIP lounge to avoid searches. While President Mills has been outspoken in his determination to combat drug trafficking, Sarpong said that the NDC government has failed so far to provide NACOB with adequate resources, and stressed that low salaries make law enforcement personnel highly vulnerable to drug traffickers. END SUMMARY
2. (SBU) On October 5, Pol Chief and Poloff met with the newly appointed Executive Secretary of NACOB Sarpong. He was appointed to the government's top anti-narcotics trafficking job in July 2009 and has moved quickly to establish his own imprimatur on the position. Sarpong stated that "I am a political man" outlining his time as former President Jerry Rawlings' youngest cabinet minister in the mid 1980s, but claimed emphatically that "there is no politics here" referring to NACOB. He claimed to track all drug dealers regardless of their political affiliation yet simultaneously made disparaging categorical remarks about drug connections in the former New Patriotic Party (NPP) government, now the opposition party (and the influence on politics of money derived from drug trafficking).
3. (C) Sarpong stated unequivocally that XXXXXXXXXX answered directly to Ghana's drug lords. He repeated the statement several times and said that he makes the accusation publicly whenever possible. However, while President Mills has struck the right rhetorical tone regarding his commitment to combating narcotics, Sarpong said that the Mills Administration has so far failed to provide adequate resources to NACOB. He underlined that the force is understaffed, underfunded, and underresourced. (COMMENT: Sarpong implied that police are open to corruption because of their personal financial situation. END COMMENT)
4. (C) The Executive Secretary noted that Ghana,s difficulty in effectively preventing the inflow of drugs across its land borders highlights the regional nature of drug trafficking in West Africa, as well as serious shortcomings in the police capabilities in Ghana,s three neighbors. Sarpong said that if his office arranged for a controlled drop in Cote d'Ivoire, the drugs would quickly wind up back in Ghana. Drugs originating in Guinea could travel through Mali and Burkina Faso and enter Ghana from the north "and no one would stop them." Sarpong also questioned how "$700,000" mansions could be built in the poor region adjacent to the main Ghana-Togo border crossing or how a single Nigerian woman could buy large parcels of beach front property and no one questions the source of her funds.
5. (C) In the context of where to install a USG funded body scanner at the airport, Sarpong outlined ways in which drugs are smuggled out of the Accra airport. In addition to the individual "mules" who ingest small quantities of drugs or conceal the drugs in luggage or body cavities, airport workers have been arrested for passing drugs to travelers after they have completed security formalities. Sarpong also said that drugs are smuggled out of the airport through the "VVIP" (Very Very Important Person) lounge. Sarpong said that in the previous administration, Ghanaians with a contact in the Foreign Ministry could obtain a pass to the lounge from the State Protocol Office that entitled the traveler to be driven from the lounge to the plane in a protocol vehicle without their person or luggage undergoing security screening. He commented that bank managers, pastors, and their wives were given service passports and access to the lounge and questioned why these middle class travelers were awarded privileges traditionally reserved for cabinet ministers.
6. (SBU) Before concluding the meeting, Sarpong asked the USG for assistance in preventing Ghanaian drug lords and their families from receiving visas to travel to the U.S. Sarpong claims that the drug barons can easily provide financial statements that help qualify them for travel visas but that once they get to the U.S. or Europe, they legitimize their money by buying property or sending their children to expensive schools. He suggested that there should be greater scrutiny of those with substantial financial resources but without a clear source of that wealth, and said law enforcement would better be able to convict traffickers if their money stays in Ghana where it can be traced.
7. (C) COMMENT: Sarpong appears determined to aggressively address Ghana,s narcotics trafficking problem, and has clearly been emboldened by President Mills, public support for this effort. His experience in intelligence and the NDC provides him the weight, and status to deal independently with the challenges facing NACOB. Nevertheless, Sarpong,s comments indicate that corruption (whether resulting from the low salaries paid to police personnel or the selling of VVIP airport privileges) remains a major obstacle to success. In addition, despite positive rhetoric it remains unclear whether the Mills Administration will devote the resources that Sarpong feels are so far lacking. END COMMENT FURUTA-TOY
Thursday, 19 February 2009, 15:45
C O N F I D E N T I A L ACCRA 000131
SIPDIS
DDEPT FOR AF/RSA-POMMERER, INL/AAE-ALTON, AND
DS/T/ATA-GONZALES
EO 12958 DECL: 02/18/2019
TAGS PGOV, SOCI, ASEC, KCRM, SNAR, GH
SUBJECT: ACCRA RESPONSE: ASSESSMENT ON THE NEED FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL TRAINING
REF: A. STATE 05448 B. STATE 09536
Classified By: DCM SKBROWN for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Ghana's law enforcement and judicial sectors have a wide range of training needs, from basic criminal investigation to intelligence and surveillance techniques. In September 2008 post hosted a State/INL interagency team which assessed to Ghana's counter-narcotics capabilities. The Mission's response concurs in significant ways with the conclusions of the assessment team (Reftel B), including the need for a vetted CN unit within Ghana's law enforcement community. The sections below provide responses to the questions asked in Reftel A.
2. (C) What are the key internal or regional challenges the host government's non-military security apparatus confronts? Ghana faces significant and growing challenges on the issue of narcotics. The country has become a transshipment point for cocaine from Latin America and heroin from South West Asia, both generally heading to Europe. Narcotics are brought into Ghana from other destinations in West Africa for shipment onward. Ghana's open business climate has made it an attractive location and cover for those involved in the narcotics trade. GOG officials have expressed concern that narcotics rings in Ghana are growing in their strength and capacity.
3. (C) Other challenges include money laundering and public sector corruption. As Ghana becomes a petroleum producing country (projected for 2011), new security issues will arise involving maritime security. Ghana's borders-including its maritime border-are porous and allow the easy transshipment of drugs or other contraband.
4. (C) Corruption remains an internal challenge to Ghana's ability to conduct counter-narcotics activities. The Ghana Police Service has experienced scandals involving the disappearance of interdicted cocaine, and there is evidence of police complicity in the trafficking process. The Narcotics Control Board (NACOB) has also experienced issues with corruption. Narcotics were an issue in the 2008 Presidential election campaign, with both major party candidates pledging to take action against trafficking. President John Atta Mills, who took office January 2009, moved quickly to appoint a new executive director of the NACOB, which may be an indication that the issue will be a priority for his administration.
5. (C) What are the host government's non-military sector's capabilities to respond to these challenges? Where ability to address these issues is lacking, please provide details: what knowledge, skills/training, equipment, relationships, policies and/or procedures are responsible for the lack of capacity?: Ghana's law enforcement capabilities are limited. All branches of Ghana's civilian law enforcement community are under resourced, lack of equipment and training and the ability to adequately compensate personnel. Training, even in relatively basic law enforcement techniques, is needed. Inter-agency cooperation is also an issue, including cooperation with the Ghana Armed Forces in areas such as narcotics interdiction, particularly along Ghana's coastline.
6. (C) Counter-narcotics efforts concentrate on interdiction, particularly at the international airport, with little or no effort directed at pursuing mid and higher level traffickers or ringleaders. Ghanaian security officials point to a specific lack of capacity in obtaining and analyzing intelligence, in surveillance techniques, and in their ability to investigate and prosecute complex cases such as financial crimes.
7. (C) Highlight specific non-military security or judicial training requirements and the intended host government recipient agency: Although specific training and equipment needs and capacities vary somewhat between law enforcement organizations, those organizations involved in CN (Narcotics Control Board, Police Service/CID, Customs and Excise Prevention Service) need assistance in developing their capacity to gather and analyze intelligence, conduct surveillance exercises, and conduct crime investigations. Ghana's Police Service and other law enforcement agencies would benefit from additional training opportunities in areas of general law enforcement. Entry level training is weak, and this condition has repercussions throughout law enforcement.
8. (C) The recently appointed director of the Narcotics Control Board has requested assistance in developing the
NACOB's ability to collect and analyze intelligence on traffickers. The Police/CID would also benefit from such training, including also in the areas of financial investigations and surveillance techniques. Ghana's law enforcement agencies and prosecutors lack the capacity to undertake most complex investigations and prosecutions.
9. (C) Training is recommended for a vetted unit capable of countering drug trafficking and money laundering operations. The specific Ghanaian law enforcement agency to host a vetted unit has yet to be determined. Training is needed in areas such as financial crime investigations, technical operations, the handling of informants and surveillance techniques, interdiction techniques and crime scene analysis. Inter-agency cooperation is also an area where further training would improve performance, including in counter-narcotics.
10. (C) Judicial and prosectorial capacity is also limited in Ghana and would be well served by additional training opportunities. INL has budgeted for a Resident Legal Advisor position to be posted with the Public Prosecutors Office. The RLA would work with Ghanaian prosecutors and judges in the area of complex prosecutions, including narcotics and money laundering. Post supports the RLA, and believes that longer term "mentoring" style training pays significant dividends.
11. (C) What is the host government's willingness to accept and be an effective partner in the implementation of USG assistance? USG and Ghanaian law enforcement officials have a cordial and professional relationship. There is a history of Ghanaian officials participating in USG sponsored training programs. Ghanaian authorities frequently request training or specific assistance from their USG interlocutors. In the past year a limited number of Ghanaian officials have told EMBOFFs that they would welcome additional opportunities for USG supported training.
12. (C) Other efforts by international partners in providing non-military security assistance and/or training to law enforcement and judicial institutions in the host country? Several development partners provide training and assistance to the GOG on law enforcement matters. The UK's Revenue and Customs Service provides training and support to the NACOB, especially in the area of airport narcotics interdiction. The UK has also opened an office of its Serious Organized Crime Agency in Ghana. France, Germany, the Netherlands, and other missions support limited training operations. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime assists with a program at the Port of Tema to scan cargo containers. While the other development partners would support additional participation by the U.S., there is a need to carefully coordinate activities. A local "mini-Dublin" group representing development partners meets periodically to coordinate programs.
13. (C) Is there any type of existing or planned non-military regional training center in your country, operated either by an international partner or host country? There are no known plans to create a regional training center per se. There has been discussion by UK officials about using Ghana as a site for training Anglophone West Africans in CN interdiction. The training would utilize a set of modules created by the UN and currently used in Nigeria. The modules focus on airport interdiction.
14. (SBU) Provide a non-military embassy point of contact for future correspondence and coordination on this issue. Embassy Accra's POC should be Jeffrey Breeden, DEA Country AttachQ, at BreedenJP@state.gov and (233) 21-741-045. TEITELBAUM
Friday, 24 July 2009, 13:13
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 001702
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/FO, AF/W, AND AF/RSA
EO 12958 DECL: 07/23/2019
TAGS PREL, EAID, MASS, PHUM, XY, NI, UK
SUBJECT: WEST AFRICA: PDAS CARTER HEARS UK CONCERNS ABOUT
DRUGS, TERRORISM, AND GOVERNANCE
REF: A. LONDON 1373 B. LONDON 1229
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Daniel McNicholas, reasons 1. 4 (b/d).
1. (C) Summary. Foreign Office West and Southern Africa DAS-equivalent Janet Douglas told PDAS Carter July 22 that relative stability in West Africa and a UK budget crunch had meant a reduced UK presence and programming in West Africa, but agreed that Briton Edwin Dyer's June murder in Mali by AQIM had been a "game changer." It re-focused UK attention on security and criminality issues in the region and prompted new efforts to coordinate policy, which Douglas strongly supports. She agreed the French proposed P-3 coordination meeting on counter-terrorism in the Sahel should be in September, given the urgency of the issue. She also agreed that CT success would come through engagement with Algeria. She acknowledged the institutionalization of drug and criminality in several West African countries, especially along the coast. The UK has concluded it needs to "up its game" with ECOWAS and that the Mano River Union, while a useful forum for desk officer and technical level, noting a more coordinated effort would be needed to push electoral reform, constitutional succession, and corruption issues with the federal government. End summary.
2. (C) AF PDAS Carter discussed the UK's overall posture in West Africa, increasing security issues in the Sahel, counter-narcotics initiatives, support to ECOWAS, and next steps with Nigeria on July 22 with Foreign Office West and Southern Africa Department Director Janet Douglas, Deputy Jennifer Townson, West Africa Team leader Paul Welsh, and Africa Research Analyst Head Clare Thomas.
The UK in West Africa: Maintaining UK Attention on the Region
--------------------------------------
3. (C) Douglas began by explaining that relative stability in West Africa and a UK budget crunch (reftel A) has meant a reduced UK presence and less UK programming in West Africa. Noting questionable trends in several West Africa countries, Douglas said her team tries to "ensure the level of consciousness on West Africa does not diminish too far" in the minds of UK ministers. She agreed the June murder of Briton Edwin Dyer in Mali by AQIM had been "a game changer," re-focusing UK attention on the security issues in the Sahel and prompting new efforts to coordinate policy on the region, particularly with the French and Spanish. She strongly endorsed greater P-3 coordination, even though the French "have not been doing a great job on promoting democracy in West Africa." Carter highlighted the need for greater focus on governance, not just democracy, and West African governments' resource distribution and service delivery to meet the needs of all their citizens. Douglas said the UK was trying to get the EU to hold a tougher line on backsliding democracies, particularly when the African Union has strong and helpful positions.
Security in the Sahel
---------------------
4. (C) Douglas agreed that counter-terrorism (CT) is the next major challenge facing the Sahel and that the West African countries lack the capacity to deal with it. Welsh acknowledged that the UK has had limited insight into the issue, in large part due to lack of presence on the ground in countries like Mauritania and Mali, though they are learning quickly and planning to open UK offices in both countries. Douglas took on board Carter's assessment that the road to CT in the Sahel, particularly in Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, is through Algiers, that Mauritania possibly faces the biggest terrorist threat in the region, and that it was imperative for EU states to stop paying ransoms for kidnapped citizens. Douglas described the EU's approach to the region as trying to extend central governments' reach on security and development issues to the whole of their countries, realizing that many problems stem from a center domination over periphery mentality of governance. Carter noted that enhancing CT capability is going to require a country-smart approach that recognizees whether it is the police, military, or security services that are best placed to deal with CT. Douglas agreed that given the urgency of the issues the French-proposed P-3 consultations in October would likely be better held in September.
Drugs, Trafficking, and Lawlessness in the Coastal States
LONDON 00001702 002 OF 002
-----------------------------------
5. (C) Douglas termed the drugs trade and other criminal activities in the West Africa as "becoming institutionalized," especially in Guinea Bissau and increasing so throughout the coastal states. She indicated that the UK has a good understanding about how the drugs arrive to West Africa, but not how they go North from there and how they are related to terrorist issues. Carter said the Northern transit routes are varied across land, air, and sea and that to date there is no information to indicate that the narcotics trade has links with terrorist activities, in particular AQIM. He did add that the Hizbollah networks in West Africa might tap into the drug trade due to its high levels of profit. Douglas agreed it was important to stymie the drug trade before it becomes more institutionalized, before it destabilizes the region further, and before terrorists begin using it as a source of revenue.
ECOWAS/Mano River Union
-----------------------
6. (C) Douglas said the UK had concluded it needs to "up its game" with ECOWAS, especially as it has recently had some useful political positions, but that it was unclear how it should be supported. Carter said that it lacked direction under Executive Secretary Chambos. He noted that ECOWAS requires a national champion. However, Nigeria, which had that role during Obasanjo's administration, has stepped back under Yar'Adua. Ghana, the next likely ECOWAS leader after Nigeria, had not picked up the ball. He said ECOWAS could best help the region by developing common strategies to deal with issues like counter narcotics. Douglas agreed that the Manor River Union did not amount to much but provided a useful forum for discussion. The secretariat did not yet merit support.
Nigeria
-------
7. (C) Strongly endorsing greater U.S.-UK dialogue on Nigeria at the desk officer and technical levels, Douglas agreed that it was important to focus on the critical areas of electoral reform, constitutional succession, and corruption issues with the federal government. Assistance should be back-loaded, as the Nigeria government has the resources to begin initiatives but lacks the political will. On the elections, Douglas agreed there is great potential for violence and that while the elections will likely be "bad," it will be important to deal with governance and democracy as a process. She agreed that working with local civil society organization in the run-up to the elections on both conflict mitigation and transparency issues would be important. She also supported working with individual states and governors, corrupt and ineffective as they may be, because they were providing an avenue of engagement and were more effective than the current, largely leaderless federal government.
8. (U) This cable was cleared by PDAS Carter.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom
LeBaron
Tuesday, 01 December 2009, 16:39
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000776
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/30/2019
TAGS ASEC, ML, PGOV, PINR, PREL, PTER
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL WARD MEET WITH MALIAN
PRESIDENT AMADOU TOUMANI TOURE
REF: A. A. BAMAKO 754 B. B. 2008 BAMAKO 217
Classified By: Ambassador Gillian Milovanovic, Embassy Bamako, for reas ons 1.4 (b) (d).
SUMMARY
1. (S) On November 27 the Ambassador and Commander of the U.S. Africa Command, General William E. ("Kip") Ward, met with Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) to discuss security in Northern Mali. ATT reiterated his commitment to take action against Al Q'Aida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, now possibly in January. General Ward encouraged the President to follow through with convening the Bamako Summit. ATT indicated he plans to travel to Algiers to meet with Algerian President Bouteflika to set the date , demonstrate his commitment and gain his support. ATT and General Ward agreed that, with or without regional cooperation, Mali has no choice but to move forward in confronting terrorist and criminal elements in the North.
THANKS FOR SUPPORT WITH HARD LANDING
2. (S) On November 27 the Ambassador and U.S. Africa Command General William E. ("Kip") Ward met with Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT). The Ambassador and General Ward were accompanied by Foreign Policy Advisor Dr. Raymond L. Brown and AFRICOM Public Affairs Director Colonel Frank Childress. ATT was accompanied by Minister of Defense Natie Pleah, Secretary General to the PresidencyDiango Cissoko, and Chief of Defense Poudiougou. General Ward thanked the President for Mali's support in the recent hard landing of a plane carrying U.S. military personnel approximately 65 miles outside of Bamako. ATT reiterated ref A comments that it was only natural Mali should help, since after all he knew the United States was coming to help Mali.
PROGRESS AND CONCERNS IN NORTHERN MALI 3. (S) ATT said that since General Ward's last visit (ref B) the Tuareg rebellion had been brought to an end. Even the head of the most recent rebellion has sent a message of peace, and ten or so of the former rebels, "since they like to fight so much" are being sent off to support the African Union Mission in Somalia (see IIR 6 958 0021 10). ATT said he had concerns about the Salafists, another term for Al Q'Aida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). While the Salafists have had difficulty getting their message across to a generally reluctant population, they have had some success in enlisting disaffected youth to their ranks. He said the Malian Army is at a turning point, with the older generation in the military giving way to a younger, less experienced one. In this regard, he thanked General Ward for the training the United States is providing to the recently created Echelons Tactiques Inter-Arme (ETIAs).
NEED FOR MORE REGIONAL COOPERATION
4. (S) ATT lamented that regional cooperation appears to be stalled. Mauritanian President Aziz is a soldier who understands the situation. He has put the recent political troubles behind him and is working well with Mali. Niger has always been a good partner. Although the country has its own Tuareg rebellion problem and is focused on a domestic political crisis, Niger continues to work well together with Mali. Military cooperation with Algeria is the problem. ATT said the Algerians think we do not do anything, and they are not totally wrong, but we need Algeria's help in terms of air support. It is not just a matter of destroying a couple of AQIM bases, we have to be able to hold the territory. The longer the situation drags on, the stronger the Salafists will get.
5. (S) ATT directly linked revenues from drug trafficking to terrorism. He said the Boeing 727 which had been set fire near Tarkint, in Northern Mali after it got stuck in the sand on or about October 30 may have been carrying drugs. Mali is cooperating with friendly countries to try to gain information about the nature of the flight and has lodged complaints about the violation of its air space with Interpol and with the UN Office of Drugs and Crime. ATT said security will be easier to achieve with three or four countries
BAMAKO 00000776 002 OF 003
working together rather than alone. If the other countries cannot agree, then of course we have to do it ourselves, he said.
UNITED STATES COMMITTED TO HELP
6. (S) General Ward thanked the President for catching him up on the situation. He said he is happy to hear of the President's continued commitment to fighting terrorism. If the government of Mali is unable to gain better control over under-governed territory, it will continue to give free reign to arms and drug traffickers and terrorists, frustrating legitimate development efforts. General Ward said that, with Ambassador Milovanovic, we are paying close attention to how we can increase the capacity of the Malian Army to eliminate the threat posed. The United States is looking to ensure a continuum of training and maintenance capacity building. Keeping trained units together and using the equipment provided in a sustainable manner will help Mali achieve its goals.
7. (S) General Ward said he shares ATT's analysis that the bad guys do not respect borders and that Mali needs regional cooperation. Having just come from Algeria, General Ward said he had made the same point to Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, as well as to the Algerian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, and to the Chief of Defense: all agreed to the need for regional cooperation. General Ward said he would be looking for signs of increased cooperation on the ground.
8. (S) The USG supports the implementation and follow-on to the meeting of Chiefs of Defense in Tamanrassett, Algeria as well as the heads of state meeting in Bamako. General Ward said he hopes the joint operations center discussed in Tamanrassett will become a reality soon, and will be able to support operations in the North of Mali. Once the operations center becomes a reality, the USG stands ready to assist with training and equipment if asked, as well as providing transparent updates on U.S. security engagement with regional partners. General Ward said he was very impressed by ATT's statement that, whether or not the neighbors get involved in a constructive manner, he would be taking responsibility for security in the North. "When that step is taken, no one will be able to say you have not done anything."
MOVING FORWARD TOGETHER
9. (S) The President said he shares General Ward's views. He noted the frank and excellent working relationship he has with Ambassador Milovanovic, noting wryly that he is sometimes embarrassed by, but always appreciates, her directness. Returning to security questions, he described his childhood memory of "the dance of death" from the village in which he grew up: If you dance too far ahead, you die; if you dance too far behind, you die; if you do not dance at all, you die. That is the way it is in the fight against the Salafists, he said. We have no choice but to move ahead together.
10. (S) Chief of Defense General Gabriel Poudiougou mentioned that the Algerian Special Forces Commander had just left Bamako November 26 after a two day visit in which he worked with his Malian counterparts to establish a transmission network and a better cooperative working arrangement on the ground. Colonel Amadou Gueye, in charge of military cooperation at the MOD, said that a mixed committee for joint military cooperation has been set up, and the fourth meeting is scheduled for December 15 in Tessalit, Mali. It is to be attended by an Algerian General. ATT said he is planning a trip to Algiers to ask Bouteflika for air support, shortly after the Tessalit meeting.
ATT THOUGHTS ON ALGERIA
11. (S) ATT then asked the Ambassador and General Ward if he could speak to them privately. In that meeting, he mentioned that he had gone to see Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi and, contrary to the view of some, he is the most interested of all in a head of state summit in Bamako. ATT said that, after Tabaski (November 28), he will be going to see President Bouteflika and sending Malian Foreign Minister
BAMAKO 00000776 003 OF 003
Moctar Ouane to the other countries to find a date for the summit.
12. (S) ATT said he believes Bouteflika and the Algerian leadership genuinely want to cooperate, although they have real doubts about Mali's resolve. His visit is intended inter alia to dispel these doubts. ATT said he thinks Algeria's intelligence services and army are holding up cooperation, and believes the Algerian army is infiltrated with Salafists. He is nevertheless pleased with the improved cooperation with Algeria, and said a lot is riding on concrete outcomes of the December 15 meeting in Tessalit. He wants the heads of state summit to take place first, and then to be prepared to start operations within a week or so. This implies that the cooperation already has to be working, in advance of the summit.
FRENCH HOSTAGE
13. (S) Regarding the French hostage kidnapped in Menaka on November 26, ATT said he had already been delivered to the Salafists. He said he thinks the Salafists knew Mali was determined to act against them and by taking a hostage, in particular a French one, on Malian soil, they were clearly moving to a new level of action. By doing so, they were trying to complicate things for the government of Mali and make it hard for them to start operations. ATT assured that Mali will act, "hostage or no hostage".
14. (S) ATT noted that the choice of hostage makes little sense. He is "broke", is married to a Tuareg woman, and is co-owner of a hotel with another Tuareg. He is fully integrated into Tuareg society. ATT speculated that it could be a criminal, personal, or business-related matter which caused him to be taken hostage in the first place, in addition to the element that the kidnapping was intended to forestall GOM action against the Salafists. The Ambassador suggested perhaps he was the only available victim at the time. ATT said Mali had a timeline to start action in January. Perhaps, he said, rather than forestalling Mali, the kidnapping will move us to take action earlier than the original timeline.
15. (S) General Ward said the United States will continue to support Mali's efforts with training and equipment. He pledged to follow up with the Algerians, telling them how important the next delegation meeting is, and conveying ATT's commitment.
16. (U) General Ward cleared this message.
MILOVANOVIC
MILOVANOVIC
Monday, 01 February 2010, 11:22
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000052
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/29/2020
TAGS PTER, KCRM, PINS, PGOV, ML
SUBJECT: KIDNAPPING AND LIBERATION OF KOUNTA LEADER
ILLUMINATES POLITICAL FISSURES IN NORTH
REF: 09BAMAKO280
Classified By: Political Counselor Peter Newman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary: In the early morning of Jan 22, Kounta traditional chief and Mayor of Anafis Baba ould Sidi Elmoctar was kidnapped from his residence in Anafis in theKidal region. POL sources concur that Telemsi Arab smugglers kidnapped the octogenarian leader as a reprisal for an ambush ould Sidi Elmoctar's son led against a joint Telemsi/Imghad drug smuggling caravan. The Kounta are one of the traditionally important tribes of northern Mali. His kidnapping had the possibility of escalating a simmering conflict over smuggling routes to open warfare between the Telemsi and Imghad communities on one side and the Kounta and Ifoghas on the other. The GOM sent a delegation to negotiate and successfully secured ould Sidi ElMoctar's release, avoiding a broader conflict for the time being. End summary.
2. (S) On Friday, Jan 22 before dawn, Telemsi Arab and Imghad Tuareg smugglers kidnapped octogenarian and diabetic Kounta traditional chief Baba ould Sidi Elmoctar from his residence. The Malian press has characterized this incident as a settling of scores between rival drug smugglers. Both POL contacts and the Malian press reported an ambush of a drug caravan in Kidal region during the week of Jan 10-16. The smugglers reportedly were Telemsi Arabs and Imghad Tuaregs. The group that ambushed the caravan was reportedly led by the son of ould Sidi Elmoctar and was comprised of Kounta Arab and Ifoghas Tuareg fighters. POL contacts have said the caravan was carrying five truck-mountable automatic weapons and cocaine. Estimates of the size of the cargo range wildly from several kilograms to several tons of cocaine.
3. (S) Northern Malian communities generally viewed the kidnapping of ould Sidi Elmoctar as disrespectful and dangerous to the relative calm experienced in northern Mali at present. One contact commented this is the first time in almost twenty years such a prominent tribal leader has been kidnapped. The last incident was in 1993, when now Malian Army Colonel Elhedji ag Gamou kidnapped Attaher ag Intallah, the overall chief of the Ifoghas Tuareg clan of Kidal. PolFSN, who is a Tuareg from Kidal, commented that the two events cannot be equated in severity because the context is totally different. Attaher ag Intallah was kidnapped during a period of open warfare in the north, while the kidnapping of ould Sidi Elmoctar was a greater affront as it occured during ostensibly a time of peace, ongoing smuggling and political conflicts notwithstanding.
4. (S) On Monday, Jan 25, the GOM sent a delegation comprised of Minister of Culture Mohamed Elmoctar, Malian Army Colonel Abderhamane ould Meydou, Tarkint Mayor Baba ould Choueck, and Malian Gendarmerie Colonel Guichma to negotiate the release of ould Sidi Elmoctar. All members are Telemsi Arabs except Guichma, who is Songhai. A former DGSE (Malian intelligence agency) director told PolCouns he believed the mission was so promptly dispatched because the risks of broader conflict were high as a result of the kidnapping. On Jan 27, the kidnappers released ould Sidi Elmoctar in Gao, after two days of successful negotiations and strong social pressure opposing the kidnapping.
5. (S) Although the consensus opinion is the kidnapping was a reprisal for an ambush and theft of contraband, POL contacts believe this event is indicative of a trend toward greater inter-tribal conflict in northern Mali, and thus, is of greater import. Two POL contacts specifically commented that northern Mali is quickly splitting into two political camps: one allied with the Telemsi Arab and Imghad Tuareg communities of Gao Region, and the other allied with the Kounta Arab and Ifoghas Tuareg communities of Kidal Region. These two camps are now formalizing their political existence as the Kounta/Ifoghas led "Reseau de Plaidoyer" and the Telemsi/Imghad "Forces du Changement."
6. (S) By way of background, the Kounta and Ifoghas have been the traditional leaders of the Tuareg and Arab communities of northern Mali for the past century and a half. The Telemsi and Imghad have been under their tutelage. Part of the current friction arises from the arrival of a form of democracy to northern Mali in recent years, with allegations arising that the Telemsi, among other groups that have
BAMAKO 00000052 002 OF 002
traditionally been smugglers/traders, are using their wealth to buy elections (particularly in the April 2009 communal elections) and are using the means of the state to usurp traditional authority in northern Mali (see reftel). If this conflict were to leave the confines of proxy battles via smuggling and elections, and enter the realm of outright warfare, it would not be the first instance: the Telemsi and Kounta communities engaged in a protracted conflict in the early-2000s. BARLERIN
Thursday, 28 June 2007, 17:41
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ACCRA 001437
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EMBASSY ROME FOR DEA RBENSON
EMBASSY BRUSSELS FOR DEA SCARANTINO
EO 12958 DECL: 06/19/2017
TAGS GH, MOPS, PGOV, PINR, PREL, SNAR
SUBJECT: GHANA'S NEW NARCOTICS DIRECTOR, GROWING
INTERNATIONAL CONCERN
REF: A. ACCRA 1275 B. ACCRA 1280
ACCRA 00001437 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: PolChief Scott Ticknor for reasons 1.4 (d) and (e).
1. (C) Summary: On June 13, Polchief and Pol FSN met with Ben Botwe, who recently took over from Major General Richardson Baiden as the Acting Executive Director of Ghana's Narcotics Control Board (NCB). Botwe is preparing a budget for urgent funding priorities and wants to build a stronger relationship with the police. He lacks security or law enforcement experience and we question whether he has the political weight or support to make an impact in his new job. The British continue to be very discouraged by the narcotics situation in Ghana. Other governments share these concerns and the Mini-Dublin group of donors plans to write to the Minister of Interior urging more effective action against narcotics trafficking. End summary.
Meeting the New Man at NCB
--------------------------
2. (SBU) Botwe, who only started two weeks ago, said he plans to create a three-year strategic plan for counternarcotics. Asked about the dimension of the narcotics concern, he said "shipments are happening," although he was not sure why they are coming to Ghana. He wants to establish SOPs for handling relations with other government agencies and to strengthen Human Resources management. He saw the need to strengthen existing programs, rebuild internal structures, and work with the media on an anti-drug campaign.
3. (SBU) In the short-term, he will prepare an "immediate needs budget" for the Minister of Interior, who he claims has assured him additional resources. NCB has just graduated 35 new recruits as core field staff but needs additional vehicles and equipment. Botwe said the GOG has approved 60 more new recruits before the end of 2007. He hopes to work with local authorities to strengthen air and sea interdiction as well as intelligence gathering. Equipping the navy to do a better job in counternarcotics is a high priority, he said.
4. (SBU) Botwe hoped to strengthen the NCB's relationship with the Ghana Police Service and opined that the recent dismissal of over 80 police officers suspected of narcotics offenses is a healthy "purging" of the police system. He thought the NCB should take the lead in narcotics intelligence gathering, monitoring, coordination and reporting, providing overall direction for counternarcotics while also helping other agencies with expertise and capacity building. The NCB should participate in operations but it has no prosecutorial or arrest authority and its agents are unarmed, he said, lamenting that in the past the NCB had taken on too many police duties. This had created tension with the police, reducing the GOG's ability to conduct sustained raids, he said.
Brief Bio
---------
5. (U) Benjamin Kwame Botwe (47) was the Chief Regulatory Officer and Deputy Chief Executive (Drugs Division) of the Food and Drugs Board from 2000-2007. Starting in 1988, he held different jobs at the Food and Drugs Board, including three years (1997-2000) as Principal Enforcement Officer. He holds a Masters in Public Administration from the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA) and a Masters of Science (Pharmaceutical Analysis) in Quality and Management.
Other Government Views of Narcotics in Ghana
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6. (C) The British remain very concerned about narcotics trends in Ghana. A British Embassy official provided PolChief with data from Operation Westbridge, a U.K.-supported program to strengthen narcotics interdiction at Accra's airport. He reported that in the seven months since the start of this Operation at the end of November, 2006 the UK had made 51 seizures of narcotics originating
ACCRA 00001437 002.2 OF 002
from Ghana, totaling 197.5 kilograms of cocaine, 713 kilograms of cannabis and 300 grams of heroin. Operation Westbridge is ongoing but will now shift from screening passengers to also screening freight. Lagos-based British Serious Organized Crime (SOCA) Officer John King recently met PolChief after several days of discussions with counternarotics contacts in Accra, including the Ministers of Interior and National Security. King told PolChief that the U.K. recently shared intelligence with the GOG on a vessel coming to Ghana from South America suspected to be carrying cocaine. King said a vessel left from Tema to provide the suspect ship with fuel and water. According to King, however, the Ghana navy failed to find it and may not have even tried (although it is not clear to us that the navy received the U.K. information). King found Minister of Interior Kan-Dapaah dismissive and irritated when King raised problems with narcotics at the airport. King concluded that the GOG was more indifferent to the narcotics issue than in 2006 and had made little progress to tackle this problem in the past year.
7. (C) These concerns were mirrored in a June 25 Mini-Dublin Group meeting, the second such narcotics cooperation meeting held in Accra, hosted by the French Embassy and attended by diplomats from the U.S., Dutch, Spanish, Italian, British, and German Embassies. The French DCM told the group that two weeks ago a French naval vessel intercepted a ship loaded with cocaine coming to Ghana from South America. Given concerns about narcotics trafficking here, a French narcotics liaison officer will be assigned to Ghana starting in September, she said. The German official noted that Lufthansa is seeing small but increasing quantities of narcotics trafficking on its flights out of Ghana. The Germans are also exploring assigning a permanent narcotics liaison officer to Accra. The Italian rep said their Dakar-based narcotics watcher is reporting a large increase of narcotics trafficking from South America through West Africa. The group agreed to send a joint letter to the Minister of Interior expressing growing concerns about Ghana's narcotics situation.
Comment
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8. (C) Botwe hopes he can apply to the NCB his experience combating counterfeit drugs at the Food and Drugs Board. His approach is bureaucratic, focused on structures, plans and institutional arrangements. He brings to the job managerial and some drug-related experience. This may be helpful in rebuilding the NCB if he has the resources and political will to back him. As recently as June 19, Minister of Interior Albert Kan-Dapaah publicly asserted that "restructuring and strengthening the NCB, particularly its human resource capacity, is one of the key issues the government has decided to implement." He reportedly told a recent Heads of Mission meeting that he was very concerned about Ghana's growing narcotics problem and its potential impact on Ghanaian politics. The additional NCB recruits and Botwe's desire to strengthen coordination with the police are positive developments.
9. (C) While these are still early days for Botwe, his nomination appears to be one more discouraging sign of the GOG's weak counternarcotics efforts, reinforcing our impressions from the Ambassador's recent meeting with President Kufuor and from PolChief's recent meeting with the Attorney General (reftels), in addition to the worries of our colleagues in the Dublin Group. Botwe lacks experience dealing with illicit narcotics and turned to his deputy, a senior police officer, on any substantive questions. He lacks the energy or independent political standing of his predecessor, who nonetheless was unable to make much impact. More worrisome, according to our Political Assistant Locally Engaged Staff, Botwe had a reputation at the Food and Drugs Board for being amenable to influence. BRIDGEWATER
Monday, 01 February 2010, 11:59
S E C R E T BAMAKO 000054
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/13/2019
TAGS KCRM, PGOV, PINS, SNAR, ML
SUBJECT: NEW INFORMATION ON CRASHED DRUG PLANE
Classified By: Political Counselor Peter Newman, Embassy Bamako, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) On January 12, [name redacted], provided PolCouns with copies of documents from the civil aviation authorities of Saudi Arabia and Guinea-Bissau he believed pertained to the Boeing 727 that crashed on take-off near the town of Tarkint in Northern Mali at the beginning of November 2009. The first document is an Aircraft Air Worthiness Certificate issued by the Saudi Arabian General Authority of Civil Aviation. The document identifies the aircraft as a Boeing B727-200 categorized as a transport aircraft with the registration mark HZ-SNE. The certificate is dated November 12, 2008 and has an expiration date of March 11, 2009.
2. (S) The second through fifth documents are letters in the name of the Civil Aviation Agency in Guinea-Bissau (AACGB). One letter is addressed to Mr. Ibrahima Gueye, identified as the Administrator of "Africa Air Assistance." A Google search Post conducted identified Africa Air Assistance as a Dakar, Senegal-based subsidiary of Malaga, Spain-based West African Aviation, an agent and distributor &for major worldwide aviation maintenance and security companies.8 The letter informs Mr. Gueye that the Boeing B727-200F under Guinea-Bissau registration J5-GCU is no longer considered airworthy, and requests information concerning the location of the identified aircraft within 24 hours. The letter is dated November 5, 2009. On the same date, AACGB sent two letters to its counterpart civil aviation authorities in Nigeria and Venezuela. AACGB stated that it had information that the aircraft J5-GCU was operating under a leasing agreement in Venezuela with Nigerian crews. The letters requested that the Nigerian and Venezuelan civil aviation authorities ground the 727 should the opportunity arise. The final letter is from AACGB to the Malian National Civil Aviation Authority (ANAC) and is dated December 1, 2009. In this letter, AACGB informs ANAC that it has learned aircraft J5-GCU was operating flights from Colombia to Mali. AACGB requests ANAC's assistance in grounding the aircraft due to the expired airworthiness certification.
3. (S) In a meeting with PolOff on November 25, the Deputy Director of ANAC, Issa Saley Maiga, stated that notwithstanding statutory jurisdiction for investigating aviation accidents, his agency was not given authority to investigate the incident until November 24, three to four weeks after the event. He said that until late November, responsibility for investigating the crash of the "drug plane" ) as it has been called in the press ) was placed solely with the DGSE. On December 17, Deputy Regional Representative of the United Nations Office Against Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Cyriaque Sobtafo explained that because the plane crash occurred in northern Mali, it was considered exclusively a matter for DGSE, and that not even the Drug Brigade of the Malian Judiciary Investigation Police was allowed to make inquiries. Sobtafo added that the Malian government had not shared any information from its investigation with UNODC.
BARLERIN
Friday, 15 August 2008, 14:08
S E C R E T FREETOWN 000406
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W (JJHUNTER)
EO 12958 DECL: 08/15/2018
TAGS SNAR, PREL, PGOV, SL, GV
SUBJECT: KOROMA REQUESTS ASSISTANCE WITH GUINEAN DRUG ARREST
REF: A. FREETOWN 336 B. FREETOWN 405
Classified By: CDA Glenn Fedzer for reasons 1.4(b/e)
1. (S/NF) Summary: President Koroma called the CDA to a meeting August 15 to request USG assistance to arrest a fugitive trafficker linked to last month's seizure of 750 kilos of cocaine (reftel A) and now believed to be in Conakry. Koroma believed he could not make the request directly to the Guinean President without Conte's inner circle tipping off the trafficker before he could be captured. President Koroma and an assistant also clarified information on the temporary detention of Conte's "wife" at the border with nearly a million dollars in gold and currency (reftel B). End Summary.
2. (S/NF) President Koroma requested August 15 that the United States Government pressure Guinea to arrest and extradite Gibrilla Kamara, a high-level trafficker associated with the cartel behind last month's shipment of 750 Kilos of cocaine seized in Lungi, Sierra Leone (reftel A). Koroma said they were tracking Kamara's movements in Conakry and wanted him arrested immediately, but were constrained in their options. Koroma considered engaging President Conte on this matter, but because Conte is old, weak, and in poor health, Koroma felt word would get out through his underlings and jeopardize the capture. He felt a second, better option was to have the U.S. Government "pressure" Conte to have Guinean police apprehend Kamara and return him to Sierra Leone.
3. (S/NF) President Koroma and his personal secretary also provided new details regarding the flight of President Conte's "wife" Zainab across the Sierra Leone-Guinea border with hundreds of thousands of dollars, Euros, as well as luxury vehicles and gold bullion. The woman was not Henriette Conte, as initially reported in reftel B, but Zainab Conte. Little seemed known about her, even to the President's advisor, other than her first name, her Sierra Leonean roots, her relationship with Conte, and a story that she was also the mistress of a former President of Sierra Leone. She was detained at the border at 9pm on August 12, and held for approximately 12 hours. Word of her detention reached a Presidential aide, and officials deliberated at length about how to proceed. They considered the issue of diplomatic immunity (Note: It is unclear whether or not Zainab has diplomatic status. End note), as well as the potential for violence at the hands of Guinean military should she not be released. The tipping-point was a call from President Conte to President Koroma, personally requesting her release.
4. (S/NF) A presidential advisor reported that, though border officials detained Zainab and a convoy of three luxury vehicles, they waved other vehicles through, not realizing one contained the long-sought after Gibrilla Kamara (aka GK). Kamara is a prime suspect in the July 13 cocaine bust, and the only "big fish" remaining outside the net of the Sierra Leone Police. Thought to be one of the drug trafficking ring's key facilitators, rumors abounded that he had fled to Guinea shortly after the bust. It now appears that Kamara remained in Sierra Leone with the currency and other valuables, with the intention of crossing the border under the protection of Zainab.
5. (S/NF) Comment: Given the Government of Sierra Leone's initial hesitation to accept high-level USG assistance on the cocaine bust, it is encouraging that the President is now actively requesting help with what could be a very delicate diplomatic, political, and security issue. While the "loot" he was accompanying is likely well-hidden, arresting Kamara could be the key to identifying and capturing other Sierra Leoneans within the highest echelon of the drug trafficking syndicate. Sadly for the President, public awareness of Kamara and Zainab's escape, especially with the loot in hand, will damage Koroma's efforts to project an anti-corruption image for himself and his party to the people of Sierra Leone. End Comment. FEDZER
Thursday, 17 January 2008, 17:31
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 000061
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TAGS AND SIGNER)
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE, S/CT, INR
DEPARTMENT FOR CA/OCS/EUR
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/EUR
EO 12958 DECL: 01/17/2018
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, KINF, KISL, PINR, NL
SUBJECT: DUTCH PREPARED TO BE PROACTIVE ON RELEASE OF
WILDERS FILM ON THE KORAN
REF: A. THE HAGUE 58
B. 11/29/07 GARRO - SMITH E-MAIL C. 07 THE HAGUE 314
THE HAGUE 00000061 001.3 OF 004
1. (C) Summary. The Dutch government and major municipalities are preparing contingency plans to respond to the anticipated release in early February of a short film expected to be critical of the Koran and of Islam made by Dutch Parliamentarian Geert Wilders. Extensive Dutch and international press reporting on the film has indicated that the film is likely to be inflammatory, and possibly include comparisons between the Koran and Mein Kampf, as well as scenes of the Koran being burned or ripped up. Wilders, whose right-wing populist Freedom Party (PVV) has an anti-immigration platform, has made statements in the past year that the Koran is a "fascist and violent" book that should be banned in the Netherlands. Officials from the MFA and Office of the National Counter Terrorism Coordinator have told Emboffs that the Dutch government is concerned about the potential for violent reaction to the film, especially in the Muslim world, and will be proactive in addressing the film, both to disassociate the government from Wilders' views and to ensure public safety at home. The city governments of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, which have large Dutch Muslim populations, are actively engaged in planning to act swiftly to prevent, and if necessary, suppress violence following the film's release. End Summary.
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APPLYING THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DANISH CARTOON CRISIS
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------------------------------------ -----------
2. (C) Andre van Wiggen, Deputy Director of the MFA's Terrorism and New Threats Department, told Emboffs January 16 that the Dutch government has been discussing strategies for responding to an event similar to the release of the Wilders film "since the Danish cartoon crisis." He said that the interagency security steering group established to ensure that the Dutch government would be adequately prepared to respond to threats to Dutch interests at home or abroad had been meeting "intensively" since the government first got word in mid-October of Wilders' intent to make a film on the Koran. Van Wiggen said that Wilders had told National Counter Terrorism Coordinator (NCTb) Tjibbe Joustra that he would not release the film before early February, and had committed to notifying NCTb 24 hours in advance of its release. Separately, a contact at NCTb confirmed to RSO that Wilders had commited to providing NCTb 24 hours notice, and an opportunity to review the tape, prior to release. Van Wiggen expressed confidence that Wilders would abide by this commitment. He requested that this information be kept very close hold within the USG. The security steering group is chaired by the Deputy National Counter Terrorism Coordinator and includes representatives from the Interior, Justice, and Foreign Ministries and the AIVD intelligence service.
3. (C) Van Wiggen stated that the government was prepared to be proactive in responding to the film and reactions to it once it was released, but did not provide specifics. He said that the planning group had an idea of the film's content, and anticipated the film would cite certain verses from the Koran and end with a "symbolic act." He did not indicate whether government officials had seen any portion of the film. He said the GONL anticipated a "stronger" reaction to the film abroad, in particular in the Muslim world, than in the Netherlands, where he said many were already displaying "Wilders fatigue," which might blunt violent reactions. He said the security group's scenarios predicted that reactions abroad could be more widespread and violent than the reactions to the Danish cartoons. He did not rule out the potential for violent protests in the Netherlands, adding that a police and public safety coordinating group had also been established to develop contingency plans for maintaining public order, especially in the four largest cities. Ensuring adequate protection for foreign missions in The Netherlands, he said, was an essential component of the group's planning process. An official in NCTb's Surveilance and Protection Department told RSO in a separate conversation that NCTb and The Hague police meet at least bi-weekly to review security measures in the city, in particular with regard to high value buildings, including the U.S. Embassy.
4. (C) Van Wiggen stressed that while the government was prepared to be proactive, they also wanted to ensure that they took "the right measures at the right time." In particular, he said, it was critical to avoid a self-fulfilling prophesy by overreacting, or appearing to predict violence, especially before the film was released. He also stated it was critical to avoid the appearance that the Dutch government would try to censor the film. He said that the Foreign Minister as well as both the Justice and Interior Ministers had met with Wilders in November to caution him about the potential negative repercussions of releasing the film, but had no intention of censoring it. He said that FM Verhagen had met in Madrid on the margins of the Alliance for Civilizations meeting with the Chair of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) to discuss the situation. The meeting was at the request of the OIC, which had contacted MFA to ask the government to take steps to suppress the film. The Foreign Minister, he said, had explained that any attempt to violate Wilders' freedom of expression was out of the question; the government could not prevent the film from being made or released. Van Wiggen added that subsequent to its release, the content of the film would be evaluated to determine if it violated any criminal statutes in the Netherlands.
5. (C) Asked whether the government had reached out to governments or religious leaders in the Muslim world or to Western allies to request information on anticipated reactions among local populations or support in constraining violence in the wake of the film's release, van Wiggen said no. This was due to Dutch government reluctance to involve other countries in what was still a domestic issue. He said that the MFA had alerted Dutch embassies abroad to the potential for violent reactions to the film, but had not sent specific instructions for approaching host governments or elevating their security posture. It was up to each embassy to ensure that its security contingency plans were adequate and up to date. Van Wiggen noted that the MFA and embassies had received a large number of information requests about the situation from other governments, to which they were trying to be responsive. He noted that the government would welcome any information the USG might gather through its channels about potential reactions abroad to the film's release.
6. (C) Van Wiggen's comments track closely with Counter Terrorism Coordinator Joustra's comments to Representative Peter Hoekstra (R-MI) during his November 29 visit to The Hague (Ref B). Joustra indicated then that the Dutch government had serious concerns about the potential for a violent reaction to the film, at home and abroad. He said the Dutch had learned from the Danish cartoon crisis, and that it would have a proactive communications strategy in place to disassociate the government from the views which he anticipated would be expressed in the film. At the same time, Joustra said, they did not want to elevate the potential negative impact of the film by overreacting. He noted that the Dutch were more exposed in many Middle Eastern capitals than the Danes, due to their high-visibility fixed investments in the region. Joustra told Hoekstra that NCTb would closely monitor developments in the run-up to the release of the film (which at that time was believed to be mid-January) to determine whether it would be appropriate to raise the national threat assessment level, which is currently set at "limited." He added that Wilders has repeatedly made inflammatory comments about Islam and the Koran in the past year, attributing the relatively mild reactions from Dutch Muslims to the fact that they are becoming accustomed to "outrageous statements" from Wilders (Ref C).
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PREPARING TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC SECURITY
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AT THE NATIONAL....
-------------------------------
7. (C) A contact from the Dutch National Police (KLPD) Counter Terrorism squad (UCTA) confirmed to Legatt Ofice January 16 the anticipated early February release date. He said it was their understanding is that the film has not yet been completed. He said that UCTA was preparing a summary of national and local law enforcement preparations for the release of the film; that summary is expected to be completed and shared with foreign police liaison officers through the KLPD's International Police Liaison Office (DINPOL) by January 18.
... AND LOCAL LEVELS
-----------------------------------
8. (SBU) A senior Amsterdam regional police official told the Consul General January 16 that the police force has plans in place to respond effectively to any incidents of violence in the wake of the film's release. He acknowledged the possibility that there could be "opportunistic" or spontaneous outbreaks of violence in the city, but stressed that the municipal government would not tolerate any violence or criminal acts. He said that the police Community Liaison Officers had been in close touch with community groups and imams, to assess possible reactions and to urge calm. He noted that imams at several mosques in the city had already begun to call in their Friday sermons for calm in response to press reports about the film's anticipated content. He assured the CG that the police would be prepared to provide adequate protection to the Consulate General should any demonstrations approach the vicinity of the consulate. Similarly, an official from The Hague regional police assured RSO that they have plans in place to respond should violent incidents take place in the vicinity of the Embassy, which is two blocks from the Parliament buildings.
9. (U) Over the January 12-13 weekend, the Amsterdam police detained eight anti-Wilders protesters associated with the International Socialists who displayed placards with a photo of Wilders above a caption stating, "Extremist - can seriously damage you and society" in a take-off of health warnings on cigarette packets. Wilders stated that the protesters' allegation that he was an extremist was "too disgusting for words," but defended their right to protest since they did not make threats against him. He said the police should have "let them get on with it." Amsterdam Mayor Job Cohen also expressed surprise, and requested an explanation of why the police had detained the protestors.
10. (SBU) The director of the Rotterdam municipal government anti radicalization program told a visiting staff delegation from the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs committee on January 10 that the city's public security department was concerned about the potential for violence in the city following release of the Wilders film. He said that the city would work closely with community liaison officers to monitor community responses and to urge calm. In a separate conversation, a policy officer for the Platform for Islamic Organizations in the Rijnmond Region (SPIOR), an umbrella organization of 60 Islamic associations in the Rotterdam area, told the staffdel that SPIOR is working closely with its membership and the city to urge calm when the film is released. She said that the potential for violent reactions could not be ruled out, adding that there was a sense among many younger Muslims in particular that Islam has been repeatedly denigrated and the Wilders film would be a "step too far." She expressed appreciation for the open communication between her group and the city government.
11. (U) According to press reports, Interior Minister Ter Horst, who overseas the national police and the domestic intelligence service, wrote to every mayor in the Netherlands in November to request that they be alert to tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims upon release of the Wilders film. The Ministry offered assistance, which several towns reportedly have accepted, in preparing contingency plans. The Minister's letter was leaked to the press on January 16.
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COMMENT
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12. (C) The Dutch at the national and local levels have been open with us in acknowledging their concerns about the prospect for violence at home and abroad in the wake of the release of Wilder's film. The government appears prepared to respond swiftly to get out a message that will stress the importance of respect for freedom of expression while disassociating the Dutch government from Wilder's views on the Koran and calling for calm among key population groups at home and abroad. Mission elements will maintain close contact with national and local public safety officials to ensure mission security posture is appropriate. Results of January 16 EAC meeting reported Ref A. Gallagher
Tuesday, 29 January 2008, 17:30
S E C R E T STATE 008993
SIPDIS
FOR COM AND RSO FROM ACTING DS ASSISTANT SECRETARY GREG STARR
EO 12958 DECL: 01/23/28
TAGS ASEC, PTER, CASC
SUBJECT: SECURITY ADVISORY - FORTHCOMING RELEASE OF GEERT
WILDERS FILM
1. (U) Classified by Acting Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security Gregory B. Starr for E.O. 12958 reasons 1.4 (c) and (d).
2. (SBU) This cable contains an action request for all posts. Please see paragraph six.
3. (S) The following is an information/action cable advising posts of the possibility of anti-Dutch demonstrations and incidents following the potential release of a short film funded by Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilders that is anticipated to be inflammatory towards Muslims. There is also the possibility that the film could generate anti-European/anti-Western protests if it is perceived as part of a worldwide campaign against Islam. There are no specific threats against U.S. interests related to this particular issue at this time, although the Dutch government has instructed its diplomatic facilities to engage host nations on this issue if deemed prudent.
4. (SBU) While Wilders has refused to discuss the content of the film, open source reporting has indicated that the film is likely to be inflammatory and may include scenes of the Koran being burned or torn. At this time, there is no release date for the film, but it is expected to be screened sometime at the end of January or beginning of February. Recent open source information indicates that Wilders has decided to postpone the release of the film for approximately two weeks. It is unknown if the film will be broadcast on television, the internet, or some other medium.
5. (SBU) Previous releases of media characterized as offensive to Islam have generated a spectrum of responses - from isolated attacks against individuals to widespread, violent protests that have targeted diplomatic facilities. The release of the Dutch film will likely serve to raise the profile of the Netherlands in particular, although reactions to the film have the potential to reverberate internationally and inflame broader anti-Western sentiment. Previous events of significance include:
-- The publication of Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammad in September 2005 stimulated two weeks of protests in at least 25 countries throughout the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Europe. It is of note that large-scale protests did not commence until February 2006, four months after the cartoons surfaced. -- In February 2006, protesters attacked and damaged Western diplomatic facilities in Beirut, Lebanon, and Damascus, Syria. Vehicles identified as Western were also stoned in other related protest activity. -- In contrast to the Danish cartoon protests, the mid-August 2007 publication of Swedish cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammad's head on the body of the dog received minimal reaction, although it did provide Islamic extremist groups with propaganda fodder. -- In November 2004, Islamic extremists murdered Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh following the release of the 12-minute documentary "Submission," which is critical of Islam.
6. (S) We are aware that posts are already operating at a heightened state of alert. However, in light of any potential violent reaction or negative security activity that this video statement may precipitate, please consider convening an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting as necessary to ensure that your security posture and transportation procedures are commensurate with your current security environment and appropriate to counter any potential backlash.
7. (U) Following the release of the Wilders film, if the need exists to issue a Warden Message or SMS Message to private American citizen communities, please use language in existing consular information program documents, specifically the Worldwide Caution. If posts also wish to alert American citizens to demonstrations in response to the film, they may use the following pre-cleared Warden Message and/or SMS Message below:
Warden Message: The U.S. (Embassy/Consulate) has learned of the release of a short film funded by Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilders that is inflammatory towards Muslims. The release of the film has sparked (use if appropriate: anti-European/anti- Western) demonstrations across (city/country/region). (Insert the specifics of known planned demonstrations as fitting)
We remind American citizens that even demonstrations intended to be peaceful can turn confrontational and possibly escalate into violence. American citizens are, therefore, urged to avoid the areas of demonstrations if possible and to exercise caution if within the vicinity of any demonstrations. American citizens should stay current with media coverage of local events and be aware of their surroundings at all times. Information regarding demonstrations in (Country) can be found on the U.S. Embassy (Post) website at (website).
Americans living or traveling in (Country) are encouraged to register with the U.S. Embassy (Consulate) through the State Department's travel registration website, https://Travelregistration.state.gov so that they can obtain updated information on travel and security within (Country). Americans without Internet access may register directly with the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate.
For the latest security information, Americans traveling abroad should regularly monitor the Department's Internet website at http://travelregistration.state.gov, where the current Worldwide Caution, (Country)-specific information, travel warnings, and other travel alerts can be found. Up-to-date information on security can also be obtained by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll free in the United States and Canada or for callers outside the United States and Canada, a regular toll line at 1-202-501-4444. These numbers are available from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern Time, Monday through Friday (except U.S. federal holidays).
SMS Message: (Embassy/Consulate) Message: Demonstrations in response to Dutch Anti-Muslim film. Violence possible. Avoid (insert location).
8. (U) If posts issue Warden Messages/SMS Messages that are outside the scope of existing public documents and the pre- cleared text above, they should be cleared prior to release through CA/OCS (available 24/7 through the Operations Center) in accordance with 7 FAM 050.
9. (SBU) Please report the results of EAC meetings convened on this subject in a front channel cable to DS, D, P, M, CA, S/CT, INR, and your respective geographic bureau. The Department will continue to ensure that you are immediately informed of any new developments or threat information associated with this controversial issue as soon as it is received.
10. (U) Minimize considered. RICE
Monday, 06 July 2009, 12:08
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000395
SIPDIS
STATE PLEASE PASS TO WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT
EO 12958 DECL: 07/06/2019
TAGS PREL, OVIP, ECON, EFIN, PINR, MOPS, NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: OVERVIEW FOR THE PRESIDENT'S JULY 14
MEETING WITH DUTCH PRIME MINISTER BALKENENDE
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael F. Gallagher for reasons 1.4 ( b) and (d).
Mr. President:
1. (C) Your July 14 meeting with Dutch Prime Minister Jan Pieter Balkenende provides an opportunity for us to urge the Dutch to continue as part of NATO in Afghanistan and to enlist PM Balkenende in solving Guantanamo issues. For his part, Balkenende will seek to continue the Dutch role in the G20 and to find a common ground to work with us on climate change and the Middle East.
2. (C) Balkenende, in office through four coalitions since 2002, is a cunning politician who does not impose his vision on coalition partners, but maneuvers effectively to achieve the intended goal. At first, he was dismissed as a lightweight "Harry Potter" look-alike, but he has consistently and skillfully delivered Cabinet support for U.S. policy objectives while balancing fragile parliamentary majorities. Balkenende,s current center-left coalition government ("Balkenende IV") is held together more by fear of early elections than any unity of vision. The financial crisis has plunged the Netherlands into a recession likely to last through 2010, and the Cabinet must continually defend its three relatively modest stimulus packages against calls to do more to spur recovery. Balkenende is also under pressure from a skeptical public to withdraw the Netherlands, 1,800 troops from Afghanistan in 2010. His main coalition partner, the Labor Party, is in decline, having fared poorly in the 2006 national election and the 2009 European Parliament election, and believes rejecting a continuing role in Afghanistan will please its base and may win back supporters.
3. (S) The Wilders Factor: Golden-pompadoured, maverick parliamentarian Geert Wilders, anti-Islam, nationalist Freedom Party remains a thorn in the coalition's side, capitalizing on the social stresses resulting from the failure to fully integrate almost a million Dutch Muslims, mostly of Moroccan or Turkish descent. In existence only since 2006, the Freedom Party, tightly controlled by Wilders, has grown to be the Netherlands second largest, and fastest growing, party. Recent polls suggest it could even replace Balkenende,s Christian Democrats as the top party in 2011 parliamentary elections. Wilders is no friend of the U.S.: he opposes Dutch military involvement in Afghanistan; he believes development assistance is money wasted; he opposes NATO missions outside "allied" territory; he is against most EU initiatives; and, most troubling, he forments fear and hatred of immigrants.
4. (C) As a result of these currents, Balkenende,s coalition finds itself in a precarious position and could fall within a year (most likely after municipal elections in March 2010). The Prime Minister is aware we want him to deliver continued Dutch boots on the ground in Afghanistan after 2010 and help with Guantanamo detainees. He knows there are high risks/expectations involved in his meeting with you, but we understand he is coming to offer as much as he thinks he can deliver at this time.
5. (S) Balkenende, a long-time champion of U.S.-Dutch relations, seeks to establish a strong relationship with you and capitalize on your popularity. The Dutch public overwhelmingly supported your election in November, and you remain hugely popular here as a beacon of change. Balkenende Qremain hugely popular here as a beacon of change. Balkenende will encourage you to view the long arc of the U.S.-Dutch relationship, not just current bumps in the road (e.g. the likely drawdown of Dutch forces in Afghanistan after 2010). He wants you to see the Netherlands as America,s friend and partner, with significant Dutch contributions to our shared foreign policy priorities: Dutch military presence in Afghanistan and support for NATO; support for U.S. intervention in Iraq; active participation in the EU, NATO, and other multilateral institutions; substantial and sustained foreign development assistance; and a long-standing commitment to promoting human rights, tolerance, and the rule of law. And, he will ask you for a seat at the G-20 table in Pittsburgh as well as for a meeting at the White House in September for the Crown Prince.
6. (C) Balkenende will use your private, one-on-one session to highlight your shared personal values and experiences. He believes social organizations are more effective in promoting change than government. His philosophy is that we must treat
THE HAGUE 00000395 002 OF 002
one another with dignity and respect as we live and work together. Your Father,s Day call for fathers to accept more responsibility in the rearing of their children resonated with him. Balkenende will also likely use the one-on-one session to pinpoint the political difficulties of the deliverables we are seeking. Rather than cover a laundry list of topics, the Dutch want the larger meeting to focus on 1) Afghanistan/Pakistan, 2) the future of the global economic system (including the role of the G20 and how to help developing countries), 3) the Middle East Peace Process/Iran, and 4) climate change. The Prime Minister is anticipating other key foreign policy issues (e.g. human rights, Russia, NATO, non-proliferation, energy security, 400th anniversary of Henry Hudson,s voyage to Manhattan - NY400) can be covered by staff or only briefly mentioned to stay focused on the major issues. Two cables will follow which will expand on these topics.
GALLAGHER
Friday, 17 February 2006, 16:14
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DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB
EO 12958 DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS PGOV, ELAB, EU, FR, PINR, SOCI, ECON
SUBJECT: SEGOLENE ROYAL DISCUSSES STRATEGY FOR 2007, TRIP
TO U.S. WITH AMBASSADOR
REF: A. (A) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 17
B. 2006 C. (B) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 10 D. (C) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 6 E. (D) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR JANUARY 20 F. (E) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR DECEMBER 19 G. 2005 H. (F) EMBASSY PARIS DAILY REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 23
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: In a February 8 meeting with Ambassador, Socialist Party (PS) presidential hopeful, current media darling and president of the Poitou-Charentes region Segolene Royal left no doubt as to her determination to win election as president of France in 2007. She matter-of-factly assessed her high poll numbers, expressing the conviction that her focus on family, school, and social services issues, along with her popularity among ordinary people, make her a potent political force. (Current polls show that Royal could make a formidable candidate in France's presidential election, now 14 months away. These polls show she is one of only two or three contenders that over half of voters now say they could be willing to vote for as president.) Conceding that "polls are not elections (ref D)" but adding that "they stop being in error about six months before the elections," Royal expressed optimism that her popularity would hold until then -- and for six months thereafter, notwithstanding the predictions of pundits to the contrary. Royal went to considerable lengths to express her openness and friendliness towards the U.S. and mentioned the possibility of visiting Washington during an upcoming trip to New York to speak at Columbia University. End summary.
A DISARMINGLY DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL HOPEFUL
-----------------------------------------
2. (C) In her discussion with Ambassador Stapleton and Embassy officers on February 8, Segolene Royal lived up to her image as an uncommonly charismatic, subtle and determined politician. She very matter-of-factly reviewed her sustained, high poll numbers (ref C) and made no bones about her intention to pursue the presidency so long as "other people think it's possible for me." Unaffectedly applying to herself the term "willful" often used about her by detractors, Royal said she was determined to stay in the presidential race until eliminated or victorious. (Comment: According to a recent biography of Royal, she wanted to test the waters by running in 2002, and rues having allowed herself to be discouraged from doing so by fellow PS heavyweights. In this biographer's account, she is determined to stay in there to the end this time around. End comment.)
"I'M THE ONE TO BEAT" FOR THE PS NOMINATION
-------------------------------------------
3. (C) Royal betrayed no qualms about her ability to shape to her benefit the process that is leading to the PS's selection of a candidate for 2007 by primary vote among party members next November. In contrast to her public remarks about securing the PS nomination, where she often quotes former president Mitterrand in saying that, in politics "you have to give time to time," Royal was much more direct with the Ambassador, shrugging off the chances of her more senior rivals in the PS by pointing out that, "I'm the one to beat." (Note: Among PS party members, who will be the only voters in next November's party primary, Royal's current popularity ratings nearly double those of her nearest rival, former prime minister Lionel Jospin. The popularity of Royal, as a potential presidential standard bearer has risen steadily among party members since last summer (ref F). Among the public at large, she also far outpaces Jospin and other PS heavyweights in current polls as the most preferred PS presidential candidate. End Note.)
4. (C) Royal said that the attraction of winning -- with her as the standard-bearer most clearly able to deliver victory -- was a powerful galvanizer of opinion among party members. She judged that her relatively junior standing as a party leader and alleged lack of qualifications need not stand in the way of her garnering enough support to win from among the party's 130,000 card-carrying members. Briefly reviewing her electoral and governmental record, she believed her experience was more than adequate to overcome any qualms party members (and thereafter, voters) might have about it. (Note and comment: Royal has been elected to the National Assembly four times; has served junior minister for the environment, junior minister for elementary education and junior minister for families, children and the handicapped. Most recently (in 2004) she won the presidency of the Poitou-Charentes region, beating the hand-picked candidate of then Prime Minister Raffarin. Royal's is a distinguished record of achievement and experience. What issue there may be over her qualifications within the PS has to be seen in light of, for example, former prime minister Laurent Fabius' experience as prime minister, president of the National Assembly, head of the PS party group in the National Assembly, minister of economy and finance and regular re-election to parliament since 1978. Since the February 8 meeting, it has become obvious that former prime minister Jospin, in many ways the party's most senior figure, is actively seeking the nomination (ref A). End Note and comment.)
GOLD-PLATED IMAGE PLUS FAMILIES-SCHOOLS-NEIGHBORHOODS
--------------------------------------------- --------
5. (C) Royal outlined a carefully crafted strategy designed to cast her as the candidate of safe change -- i.e., the candidate who answers best French voters' simultaneous eagerness for change and fear of it. Royal said that she believed "people want a new kind of political discourse." This conviction, she continued, was prompting her to skip the political talk shows and deliberately focus instead on the family, school and environmental issues that are her strength and "are what matter most to ordinary people." She argued that her focus on "soft" social services issues, coupled with her very positive public image, her sterling center-left credentials and proven effectiveness as a grass-roots politician, make her a potent political force. Royal said that the core of her candidacy is "having the courage to have confidence in the voters."
NOT A LOT OF POLICY SPECIFICITY
-------------------------------
6. (C) Royal spoke in very general, indeed, rather vague, terms about what she stands for as a presidential candidate. (Comment: Given her popularity, it is probably not in her interest to furnish policy prescriptions at this time lest she alienate potential supporters. End comment.) She described a crisis of confidence among ordinary French people who, she said, "are prey to a feeling of decline." She evoked how prospects for those in the middle class are shrinking, for their children even more so. She pointed to narrowing the quality gap between France's elite schools and its regular schools and universities as key to re-invigorating upward mobility in French society. She also criticized the Villepin government's emphasis on employment as the engine of upward mobility, lamenting the "destabilizing effects" for family life of the increased job insecurity implicit in many of the government's employment initiatives. Royal said that she would like "to lead a national project" that would succeed by renewing "hope in the people." Implicitly addressing criticism directed against the absence of a program, Royal noted that the successful record of the Jospin government didn't prevent him from losing in his bid for the presidency in 2002, concluding that "you don't win elections on your record or your program" but rather on the expectations generated by a candidacy.
OPENNESS TO THE U.S.
--------------------
7. (C) Though she did not dwell on foreign policy issues, Royal did make an effort to convey openness towards the U.S. Echoing the remarks of other political interlocutors across the board, she duly noted her opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq but went to considerable length in assuring the Ambassador that a socialist government would "never have actively campaigned against the U.S. in Africa," for example, and would have handled differences in a more understanding and less confrontational manner than President Chirac and then-FM de Villepin. Royal recalled, with evident fondness, her work organizing the 1981 Versailles Summit between Presidents Reagan and Mitterrand. This was her first experience with presidential-level diplomacy and apparently involved liaising with the U.S. Secret Service; Royal expressed her surprise, at the time, discovering the massive logistical underpinnings required by such events. Royal also made clear, through a reference to watching "Desperate Housewives," that she did not reject American popular culture. Royal did not augment her friendly sentiments toward the U.S. with any vision for U.S.-France relations. She did suggest a need "to find France's place in the world," with the GoF showing less arrogance in how it speaks to the world. The latter factor, she suggested, had played a role in the defeat of France's 2012 Olympics candidacy.
8. (U) Royal said she would be visiting the U.S. soon, probably in the context of accepting an invitation to speak at Columbia University in New York this spring. She mentioned the possibility of also visiting Washington at that time. The Ambassador said he would be pleased to work with her and her staff to design an appropriate program.
COMMENT
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9. Royal clearly believes her determination, concern for ordinary people and uncommon mix of strengths as a candidate make her a real contender, notwithstanding the predictions of pundits and her political rivals that the "Segolene phenomenon" will not last. Opponents, whether from center-right (with the exception of Interior Minister Sarkozy) or her own center-left, either insist on her "unfitness" for the job (ref D) or suggest she is a stalking horse for a "draft" of former PM Jospin. Although it is not unfair to be skeptical about Royal's staying power or even her qualifications, it is also true that much of the disparagement of her stems from envy of the popularity of a female upstart, who is also challenging the unwritten rules of the political establishment. It is also undeniable that Royal has managed to tap into the feelings of an electorate looking for change.
10. Royal appeared to be well disposed towards the U.S. That said, as is the case for many on the left of the French political spectrum, it would be a mistake to translate a high comfort level with American culture into approval for a wide range of U.S. polices, foreign and domestic. Royal has only made brief trips to the U.S. as a tourist. End comment. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton
Wednesday, 10 June 2009, 13:42
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000355
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DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USTR FOR DAVID WEINER
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS PGOV, PINR, PREL, ECON, KIPR, SW
SUBJECT: AARGH! SWEDISH PIRATES SET SAIL FOR BRUSSELS
1. Summary and Comment: Sweden's two largest political parties, the ruling Moderates and opposition Social Democrats, saw little change over their 2004 levels of support in the June 7 European Parliament (EP) election here. Instead, the Greens and the pro-EU Liberal Party were the big winners -- along with the new Pirate Party, which found support from young voters unhappy with the government's decision to shut down The Pirate Bay, a file-sharing bit torrent site that had become a target of the Motion Picture Association of America (and USTR). The anti-EU Left Party, on the other hand, suffered catastrophic losses. Overall, voter turnout was up in the month before Sweden takes over the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union, but at 43.8% still far below the regular 80% turnout for national elections. Comment: The EP election outcome has little predictive power for next year's parliamentary elections, given the self-selecting nature of those willing to go out and vote for Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Perhaps the main lesson for the larger parties relates to the need to court the youth vote in more effective ways. End Summary and Comment.
The Results
-----------
2. Sweden's EP election was a bit disappointing for the two largest parties, the Moderates (18.8% of the vote and 4 MEP seats) and the Social Democrats (24.6% and five seats). Although both parties matched the figures received in 2004, they did not manage any gains despite active campaigning. Rather, the Greens (10.9% and two seats) and the Liberal Party (13.6% and three seats) were the big winners. The Left Party suffered disastrous defeats; the party dropped to 5.6%, compared to 12.8% in 2004, and now has one seat. The Centre Party (5.5% and one seat) and the Christian Democrats (4.7% and one seat), both part of the four-party ruling coalition, performed slightly worse than in 2004, though both surpassed the 4% threshold necessary to qualify for a seat. The elections attracted more voters than in 2004, with turnout up 6.7% to 43.8%, differentiating Sweden from other Member States' downward trend.
Victory for the Pirate Party
----------------------------
3. The big winner was the Pirate Party -- which campaigned on reformation of copyright and patent law and opposition to a wiretapping law proposed by the Swedish security services. The Pirates secured a whopping 7.1% and one seat in Parliament. The party, founded in January 2006, attracted young voters angry over the guilty verdict in the Pirate Bay trial, the unpopular EU Ipred directive, and new national laws criminalizing file sharing and authorizing monitoring of emails. The party has not yet announced what EP party group it would like to belong to, and the current thinking espoused by Pirates is that the classic political right-left scale is outdated. Rather, the Pirates see themselves as an historic movement analogous to working-class and the green movements. The party is now looking to negotiate with both the liberal ALDE group and the Greens/EFA group.
4. A side effect of the Pirates' success is that it most likely reduced the chances for the far-right nationalist Sweden Democrats to gain representation in the EP. The Pirates have some of the same voter base -- young men with mistrust for politicians. Although the Sweden Democrats tripled their results to 3.3%, up from 1.1% in 2004, they remain below the threshold for representation in either the EP or Swedish Parliament. In any case, the Pirate's landslide among younger voters caught the attention of the larger parties, our contacts tell us, who are now scrambling to come up with policies to woo the youth back to the mainstream.
Personalities Rule
------------------
5. Over all, the four party governing center-right Alliance won with 42.6% of vote and nine seats over the leftist opposition with 41.1% and eight seats. For what was essentially a mid-term election in Sweden, the continued strong showing for the ruling coalition suggests to some of our contacts no loss of momentum going into next year's general elections. Others note that parties with clear and positive EU policies, like the Greens and the Liberals, did surprisingly well, while the euro-skeptics suffered. But those who could be bothered to vote in EP elections on the first sunny day in several weeks were likely a self-selecting group with pro-EU views, not necessarily representative of the wider Swedish public.
6. Results of the preference vote - where voters can mark the candidate they would prefer to be elected - came out June 10. Strong and charismatic personalities have overtaken the top candidates proposed by each of the parties. To be elected on a total number of preference votes, a candidate must have received at least 5% of the votes cast for the party. Alf Svensson, former leader of the Christian Democrats, and Anna Maria Corazza Bildt, the wife of Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, were nominated low on their respective parties' lists but will now claim seats in parliament.
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HILTON
Tuesday, 08 September 2009, 05:22
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 000569
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EO 12958 N/A
TAGS ENRG, EUN, ECON, EIND, KGHG, SENV, SW
SUBJECT: SWEDISH DEPUTY PM URGES SENIOR USG VISITS TO SWEDEN DURING
EU PRESIDENCY; WANTS TO LAUNCH U.S.-EU ALERNATIVE ENERGY PARTNERSHIP AT U.S.-EU SUMMIT
This is an Action request. Please see para 2.
1. (SBU) Summary: On September 2, Deputy Prime Minister Olofsson pressed for the strong U.S.-Sweden cooperation in alternative technology to show results. She urged a ministerial-level U.S. official come to the October 14-16 Informal meeting of EU Competitiveness Ministers to present U.S. efforts to transform the United States into an eco-efficient economy -- or another event during the Presidency. Olofsson's State Secretary Altera explained that Sweden wants to expand the U.S.-EU alternative energy partnership to the EU level, and needs to work intensely to launch this effort at the US-EU summit planned for early November. The meeting ended with a conversation of the challenge of convincing young people not to share files illegally via the internet. End Summary.
2. (U) ACTION REQUEST: The USG is currently batting 0 for 8 in responding to Swedish invitations for minister-level attendance at EU meetings. Post requests Washington's help in securing a senior USG official visit to a suitable Presidency event in Sweden during this fall. End Action request
------ -
Plea for Senior U.S. Official to Attend EU Informal Ministerial on Competitiveness
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3. (SBU) On September 1, the Ambassador paid a courtesy call on Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Enterprise and Energy Maud Olofsson, the Swedish official at the forefront of the robust U.S.-Swedish cooperation in alternative technology through the "One Big Thing" alternative energy partnership, and related programs. Olofsson explained the main theme of Sweden's EU Presidency, transformation to an eco-efficient economy, i.e. achieving economic growth while reducing green house gas emissions. (Comment: Sweden is a proven leader in this area having grown its economy 46 percent between 1992 and 2008, while reducing its green house gas emissions by 9 percent.)
4. (SBU) Sweden has held a series of EU-related meetings and Informal Ministerials to promote eco-efficiency, including a July 2009 meeting of Ministers for Energy and Environment. The Swedish government has invited White House, cabinet-level and sub-cabinet level U.S. officials to these events to present U.S. efforts to the informal gatherings of European Ministers, but so far none have been able to come. (Comment: It is unprecedented for an EU Presidency host to invite USG officials of any level to their informal ministerial meetings. During the Swedish Presidency, there have been a flood of such invitations. This may have to do with Foreign Minister Carl Bildt's personal predilection, now shared by his fellow Ministers, to shake things up and to do things differently. While USG officials may have been surprised by such invitations, we should seriously consider taking advantage of the unprecedented opportunity the Swedes have given us. End Comment)
5. (SBU) Olofsson said it is time to see results from strong U.S.-Swedish cooperation in clean technology in line with efforts toward a climate change agreement in Copenhagen and the new U.S. Administration's investment in new alternative energy technology.
6. (SBU) Olofsson noted that Sweden would have liked a senior U.S. official to attend some of the meetings at the July 2009 EU Informal Ministerial in Are of Energy and Environment Ministers in order to be part of the dialog on eco-efficiency and tell the EU Ministers what is happening in the United States.
7. (U) Olofsson said her priority is to have a Ministerial-level U.S. official attend the Informal Meeting of EU Competiveness Ministers in Umea, Sweden on October 14-16. She stressed the importance of showing European Ministers that developing a green economy is a U.S. priority.
8. (U) Note on Invitations Extended to USG officials:
The Embassy is aware of the following USG officials being invited by the Swedish EU Presidency to present to EU Informal Ministerial meetings in Sweden:
Secretary of Energy Chu Deputy Secretary of Energy Poneman Assistant to the President for Energy and Climate Change Browner Secretary of Labor Solis Secretary of Health Sebelius Secretary of Homeland Security Napolitano Secretary Clinton Deputy Secretary Lew Special Envoy Stern
STOCKHOLM 00000569 002 OF 004
Of those, the invitations Secretary Clinton, Deputy Secretary Lew and Special Envoy Stern to attend EU Development Days October 22-24 are still pending. The other invitations were declined.
In addition, Sweden has invited Assistant Secretary-level and other U.S. officials.
Assistant Secretary of Energy Zoi invited to the EU Strategic Energy Plan conference October 20-21, invitation still pending.
Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Carson represented the USG at the U.S.-EU Troika Meeting on Africa July 14
Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Phil Gordon represented the U.S. at the U.S.-EU Political Director Troika on July 3.
Department of Homeland Security Deputy Secretary Lute visited Sweden at the U.S. initiative for bilateral discussions, which was much appreciated by the GOS.
Other U.S. officials who have visited recently at the U.S. initiative for bilateral consultations with Sweden related to the Swedish EU Presidency include:
Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy Morningstar Special Advisor for the Great Lakes Region of Africa Wolpe Treasury Assistant Secretary Cohen
End Note
-----
Need to See Results From U.S. Interest in Green Technology
-----
9. (U) Olofsson said she discussed eco-efficiency with U.S. Energy Secretary Chu. She noted that there was a lot of "low hanging fruit" where the U.S. and Sweden could get results, such as cooperation in building technologies and transport systems. She said the challenge was to find proactive cooperation between U.S. and Swedish businesses on concrete projects in the U.S. and Europe. She said possible areas for business collaboration included building sustainable cities, and rebuilding in older communities, such as the sustainable development project in Stockholm's formerly run-down Hammarby district. Olofsson invited U.S. officials to call her to propose projects.
10. (U) Olofsson suggested that Sweden could perhaps arrange an eco-efficient activity in the years ahead to promote business and innovation. Altera noted that the way to do this was to ask for practical advice from businessmen on productive areas. The U.S. side noted that U.S. firms are in the forefront of many of these areas, such as energy efficiency and improved housing construction.
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Taking the U.S.-Sweden Alternative Energy Partnership to the EU Level
-------
11. (U) Olofsson noted that U.S.-Sweden cooperation included extending the U.S.-Sweden Alternative Energy Partnership to the EU level. Her State Secretary Ola Altera explained how said Sweden was ready to launch the Next Big Thing (NBT), the U.S.-EU Alternative Energy Partnership, and wanted to launch it at the U.S.-EU Summit planned for early November.
12. (U) Altera said he had consulted his State Secretary colleagues, Gustav Lind in the PM's office and MFA's Frank Belfrage, and everyone agreed that Sweden should be talking to the European Commission about NBT.
13. (SBU) Altera said the Swedish EU Presidency is positive to both U.S. energy initiatives, NBT and the U.S.-EU Energy Council, and to the broad approach behind both efforts. He said Sweden's priority is NBT, technology, research, entrepreneurship of alternative technology, and being results-oriented. He said Sweden does not want to see these efforts bogged down by geo-political discussions of the security side of the energy issue. Therefore, he said, if NBT can be part of the U.S.-Energy Council that would be good, but we should drop that link if it would bog down work on NBT.
14. (SBU) Altera also noted the value of the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), but said Sweden wants to avoid the risk of bogging down NBT if it is "run through people in Brussels."
15. (SBU) Altera said we need to work intensely to get NBT as a
STOCKHOLM 00000569 003 OF 004
result of the U.S.-EU Summit. He said it would be important for the NBT, U.S.-EU Energy Council or "whatever we call it" to meet before Christmas 2009 in order to set the course, and get the effort started.
16. (U) Altera said his Ministry was taking a pragmatic approach to launching the NBT, listening to various views. When the U.S. side suggested that NBT needed to be distilled down so it could be absorbed into the systems of other countries, Altera referred to practical meetings on the U.S.-Sweden Alternative Energy Partnership held between U.S. and Swedish business that helped shape the successful bilateral U.S.-Sweden alternative energy partnership. Olofsson said Sweden could arrange meetings to connect companies as part of the US-EU alternative energy partnership, and even co-finance projects if that is needed. Referring to her government's report on eco-efficient economies (which is at the link www.se2009.eu/polopoly_fs/1.6629 !menu/standard/file/A%20European% 20Eco%20Efficient%20Economy.pdf), Olofsson said we should pick out areas in the forefront of this effort for such cooperation.
17. (U) Finally, Altera noted that NBT does not replace the strong U.S.-Sweden bilateral cooperation on alternative energy.
18. (SBU) Comment: Following the meeting, the Embassy got additional details about Swedish plans for launching the NBT from Maria Brogren at the Energy Division of the Ministry. She noted that the European Council had ordered the Commission to give its opinion on the U.S.-proposed U.S.-EU Energy Council. She repeated that her government's first priority and preference would be to launch NBT at the U.S.-EU Summit with participation by Secretary Chu, Secretary Clinton, Minister Olofsson and Foreign Minister Bildt. She said Sweden would like to see that foursome present for the first meeting of the Energy Council. But, she said, if geopolitics bogs down the Energy Council, Sweden would want to move on the technology sub group effort of the Energy Council by launching the Next Big Thing and later folding it into the technology working group of the Energy Council. End Comment.
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Bridging the Gap on Illegal File Sharing
------
19. (SBU) The Ambassador concluded the meeting by raising intellectual property rights, since Olofsson's party (the Center Party) is the one member of the ruling coalition least supportive of U.S. efforts to improve Sweden's efforts against illegal file sharing. Olofsson said there are discussions within the government about putting more legislation in place against file sharing. While legislation is needed, and Sweden follows European level legislation, she argued that a solution should not only be left to politicians via legislation. The problem was a market failure, the lack of a product that people could easily access at a reasonable price. Many young people, she said, think that all file sharing is free. It is hard to change their perception of the rules. Olofsson said she wanted artists and creative people to be paid for their ideas, but we need to create a market solution that is easy for people to follow.
20. (SBU) The U.S. side countered that as knowledge-based economies, both the U.S. and Sweden have a lot to loose from illegal file sharing. We need to make this public debate about the artists being stolen from.
21. (SBU) Olofsson noted that Nokia and Ericsson have introduced new services to share products while paying the artists, which is good. We need to find a way to pay artists property, not just to pass legislation, she repeated.
22. (SBU) Olofsson said we need to understand how young people see the problem. We should talk about what is happening now, not just pass legislation, she stressed. She pointed to the success of Sweden's Pirate Party in the European Parliamentary elections as an example of that young people "do not trust us." She said the Pirate Party attracted voters from both the right and the left, and the Pirate Party MEP now has two advisors, one with a background in the Left Party, and one from a neo-liberal party.
------
Final Comment
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23. (SBU) The request for help in securing a senior USG official visit to Sweden during the remaining months of the Presidency was a direct plea for help. Olofsson said that she is hopeful that the USG will be able to demonstrate the importance it attaches to the bilateral links in the Alternative energy area by actually sending a senior official to a meeting where the Swedes host its European partners. End comment.
BARZUN
Thursday, 07 March 2002, 10:13
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001196
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DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE, EUR/PPD AND DRL
EO 12958 DECL: 03/05/2007
TAGS PHUM, OPRC, OPRC, OPRC, OPRC, IT, ITPHUM, ITPHUM, ITPHUM, HUMAN RIGHTS
SUBJECT: AS PREDICTED, ITALY'S HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
GENERATES FODDER FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL MILLS
REF: A. STATE 40721
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 01196 01 OF 02 082030Z B. ROME 1098 C. ROME 894 D. MYRIAD POST-DEPARTMENT E-MAILS FROM 10/01-02/02 E. ROME 348
CLASSIFIED BY: POL MINCOUNS THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: AS POST PREDICTED, THE U.S. COUNTRY REPORT FOR ITALY PROVIDED IMMEDIATE GRIST FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL MILLS. PAPERS POUNCED ON THE REPORT TO TRUMPET "HUMAN RIGHTS: U.S. 'FLUNKS' ITALY;" "POLICE ABUSES IN ITALY;" AND ESPECIALLY "MISTREATMENT OF DETAINEES" BY THE ITALIAN POLICE DURING G-8 MEETINGS LAST JULY, WITH THE ONGOING STORY THAT "THE FIFTEEN PAGES THAT THE REPORT DEVOTES TO ITALY LOOK LIKE A FULL-FLEDGED INDICTMENT OF THE BEHAVIOR OF THE GOVERNMENT DURING THE G-8 IN GENOA." ABSENT THE GUIDANCE REQUESTED FROM THE DEPARTMENT (REFS B AND C), WE HAD TO IMPROVISE IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, WHICH WAS NOTICEABLY IRRITATED BY THE REPORT. INTERIOR MINISTER SCAJOLA EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT IN A MARCH 5 MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) POLOFF DELIVERED THE ITALY HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT TO MFA NORTH AMERICA OFFICE DIRECTOR GERI SCHIAVONI AND HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE COUNSELOR ALBERTO CECCARELLI MARCH 5. (MUTUAL SCHEDULING CONFLICTS HAD PREVENTED DELIVERY THE AFTERNOON OF MARCH 4, PRIOR TO WASHINGTON PUBLICATION, BUT THE MFA WAS AWARE THAT THE REPORT WAS TO BE RELEASED AND THAT WE WERE SEEKING TO DELIVER IT IN ADVANCE OF ITS PUBLIC RELEASE.)
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ROME 01196 01 OF 02 082030Z 3. (SBU) AS WE HAD PREDICTED (REFS B, C, AND D), THE ITALIAN PRESS HAD A FIELD DAY WITH THE REPORT. SOME OF THE CHOICER HEADLINES INCLUDED: "'NO-GLOBALS' WERE MISTREATED. THE U.S. CRITICIZES ITALY" (CENTRIST CORRIERE DELLA SERA); "POLICE ABUSES IN ITALY" (LEFTIST LA REPUBBLICA); "HUMAN RIGHTS: U.S. FLUNKS ITALY" (CENTRIST LA STAMPA); "HUMAN RIGHTS: DEPARTMENT OF STATE - THE U.S. TO BERLUSCONI: 'LEGALITY IN DANGER'" (LEFTIST L'UNITA). LA REPUBBLICA CONTINUED THAT "THE FIFTEEN FULL PAGES THAT THE REPORT DEVOTES TO ITALY LOOK LIKE A FULL-FLEDGED INDICTMENT OF THE BEHAVIOR OF THE GOVERNMENT DURING THE G-8 IN GENOA. THERE ARE ALSO EMBARRASSING REFERENCES TO SILVIO BERLUSCONI, WHO IS MENTIONED REGARDING FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM."
4. (C) OUR MFA INTERLOCUTORS MADE CLEAR THEIR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE REPORT. "THE ITALY REPORT IS THAT LONG?" SCHIAVONI ASKED IN AMAZEMENT. "WHY WOULD YOU WRITE SO MUCH ON ANOTHER DEMOCRACY?" SCHIAVONI, NORMALLY AMONG OUR MOST GRACIOUS AND GOOD-NATURED OF CONTACTS, CHASTISED POLOFF AT LENGTH ABOUT THE NEED FOR POST TO ENSURE THAT WHAT WAS REPORTED ABOUT ITALY WAS CONVEYED IN THE PROPER CONTEXT AND PROVIDED WITH SUFFICIENT NUANCE. "THAT'S WHAT AN EMBASSY'S RESPONSIBILITY IS," HE INSISTED. (COMMENT: WE AGREE. END COMMENT.)
5. (C) IN THE ABSENCE OF THE GUIDANCE REPEATEDLY (REFS B AND C) REQUESTED, WE WERE FORCED TO "WING IT" IN OUR CONVERSATION AT THE MFA. (FOR BETTER OR WORSE, PRESS REPORTS WERE WRITTEN BY WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENTS. ROME-BASED MEDIA HAVE NOT CONTACTED US FOR CLARIFICATION OR COMMENT.) WE CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 ROME 01196 01 OF 02 082030Z EMPHASIZED THAT THE ITALIAN REPORT WAS WRITTEN UNDER THE SAME GUIDELINES AS THOSE FOR ALL COUNTRIES, AND URGED OUR INTERLOCUTORS TO COMPARE THE ITALIAN REPORT WITH THE ONES FOR GERMANY OR FRANCE, FOR EXAMPLE. (SCHIAVONI AND CECCARELLI WERE NOT IMPRESSED.) WE URGED THEM TO READ THE REPORT ITSELF AND NOT PRESS ARTICLES "INTERPRETING" IT. WE ESPECIALLY CLARIFIED THAT THE REPORT DRAWS NO CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE GUILT OR INNOCENCE OF THOSE CONNECTED WITH EVENTS SURROUNDING THE JULY G-8 SUMMIT, NOTES ACCURATELY THE CONTEXT OF THE EVENTS, AND EXPLAINS THAT A GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS IS ON-GOING. WE URGED THE GOI ALSO TO REFRAIN FROM DRAWING INFERENCES ON THE BASIS OF THE REPORT.
6. (C) IN A MARCH 5 MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR, INTERIOR MINISTER SCAJOLA -- WHO REMAINS UNDER FIRE FROM THE OPPOSITION FOR LAST JULY'S EVENTS LARGELY, AS WE HAVE REPORTED, BECAUSE THE CENTER-LEFT HAS SO FEW ISSUES THAT RESONATE AMONG THE ITALIAN PUBLIC -- EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE REPORT, BASED ON PRESS REPORTING. THE AMBASSADOR URGED SCAJOLA TO READ THE REPORT ITSELF, NOT MEDIA ACCOUNTS OF IT. DCM CLARIFIED THAT THE REPORT WAS WRITTEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE AND THE ITALIAN REPORT WAS SIMILAR TO THAT FOR CANADA, GERMANY, FRANCE OR ANY WESTERN COUNTRY. SCAJOLA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SECTIONS OF THE REPORT HE HAD TRANSLATED INTO ITALIAN DID NOT ENTIRELY MATCH PRESS STORIES ABOUT IT, BUT REMAINED DISAPPOINTED THAT THE REPORT HAD PROVIDED AMMUNITION TO THE OPPOSITION.
7. (C) COMMENT: POST WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 05 ROME 01196 01 OF 02 082030Z
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ7827
PAGE 01 ROME 01196 02 OF 02 082031Z ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 COR-01 NP-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00 EB-00 VC-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 LAB-01 L-00 VCE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OPIC-01 PC-01 PM-00 PRS-00 P-00 SP-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 IIP-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 PMB-00 PRM-00 DRL-02 G-00 SAS-00 /009W ------------------71B573 082032Z /38 O 071013Z MAR 02 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2621 INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE AMCONSUL MILAN AMCONSUL FLORENCE AMCONSUL NAPLES
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 001196
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED INFO ADDEES)
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE, EUR/PPD AND DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2007 TAGS: PHUM, OPRC, IT SUBJECT: AS PREDICTED, ITALY'S HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT GENERATES FODDER FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL MILLS
ESTABLISHED IN THESE MEETINGS, URGING ALL TO AVOID INFERENCES, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING EVENTS ASSOCIATED WITH CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 01196 02 OF 02 082031Z G-8 DEMONSTRATIONS OR PM BERLUSCONI'S JUDICIAL PROCESSES. IN PARTICULAR, STATEMENTS OF FACT IN THE REPORT SHOULD NOT BE READ AS JUDGMENTS OR AS A SCORECARD. WE REMAIN DISSATISFIED WITH THE ITERATIVE PROCESS OF DRAFTING THIS YEAR'S REPORT. ALTHOUGH SEVERAL OF OUR CONCERNS WERE ADDRESSED AT THE END, THE FINAL PRODUCT IS NOT AS CONSISTENT OR DEFENSIBLE AS IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN.
8. (C) COMMENT, CONTINUED: WE DO NOT WANT TO SEE AN ALREADY DELICATE SITUATION -- WHERE THE USG HAS BEEN DRAWN INTO THE CENTER-LEFT OPPOSITION'S PREVIOUSLY LARGELY UNHEARD ACCUSATIONS AGAINST A RELATIVELY POPULAR GOVERNMENT -- MADE WORSE. ABSENT ANY OTHER ATTRACTIVE ISSUE, OPPOSITION PARLIAMENTARIANS AND THEIR PRESS COUNTERPARTS WILL CONTINUE TO RESURRECT THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF THE G-8 AND BERLUSCONI'S JUDICIAL CASES. AND FROM NOW ON, THEY WILL -- RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY -- PROCLAIM USG "SUPPORT" FOR THEIR POINT OF VIEW. WE HOPE THAT OUR MFA CONTACTS, LIKE MINISTER SCAJOLA, WILL READ THE REPORT AND MOVE ON -- ALTHOUGH WE EXPECT TO HAVE AT LEAST ONE FURTHER EXCHANGE ONCE THEY HAVE HAD TIME TO READ THE REPORT CAREFULLY. UNFORTUNATELY, WE ARE NOT ABLE TO CONTROL THE TENOR OF MEDIA REPORTS, AND AS WE NOTED REF E, MEDIA WARS ARE A CONTINUATION OF POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS. ITALY'S OPPOSITION WILL CONTINUE TO HURL THE STONES THAT COME TO HAND IN THEIR EFFORTS TO UNSEAT A POPULAR PRIME MINISTER, AND WE JUST HANDED THEM SOME NEW ONES. POPE
CONFIDENTIAL
> @@@OASYS@@@
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2121
PAGE 01 ROME 01196 01 OF 02 071049Z ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00 EB-00 VC-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 LAB-01 L-00 VCE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OPIC-01 PC-01 PM-00 PRS-00 P-00 SP-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 IIP-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 PMB-00 PRM-00 DRL-02 G-00 SAS-00 /008W ------------------70C954 071049Z /38 O 071013Z MAR 02 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2620 INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001196
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE, EUR/PPD AND DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2007 TAGS: PHUM, OPRC, IT SUBJECT: AS PREDICTED, ITALY'S HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT GENERATES FODDER FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL MILLS
REF: A. STATE 40721 B. ROME 1098 C. ROME 894 D. MYRIAD POST-DEPARTMENT E-MAILS FROM 10/01-02/02 E. ROME 348
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 01196 01 OF 02 071049Z CLASSIFIED BY: POL MINCOUNS THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: AS POST PREDICTED, THE U.S. COUNTRY REPORT FOR ITALY PROVIDED IMMEDIATE GRIST FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL MILLS. PAPERS POUNCED ON THE REPORT TO TRUMPET "HUMAN RIGHTS: U.S. 'FLUNKS' ITALY;" "POLICE ABUSES IN ITALY;" AND ESPECIALLY "MISTREATMENT OF DETAINEES" BY THE ITALIAN POLICE DURING G-8 MEETINGS LAST JULY, WITH THE ONGOING STORY THAT "THE FIFTEEN PAGES THAT THE REPORT DEVOTES TO ITALY LOOK LIKE A FULL-FLEDGED INDICTMENT OF THE BEHAVIOR OF THE GOVERNMENT DURING THE G-8 IN GENOA." ABSENT THE GUIDANCE REQUESTED FROM THE DEPARTMENT (REFS B AND C), WE HAD TO IMPROVISE IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, WHICH WAS NOTICEABLY IRRITATED BY THE REPORT. INTERIOR MINISTER SCAJOLA EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT IN A MARCH 5 MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) POLOFF DELIVERED THE ITALY HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT TO MFA NORTH AMERICA OFFICE DIRECTOR GERI SCHIAVONI AND HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE COUNSELOR ALBERTO CECCARELLI MARCH 5. (MUTUAL SCHEDULING CONFLICTS HAD PREVENTED DELIVERY THE AFTERNOON OF MARCH 4, PRIOR TO WASHINGTON PUBLICATION, BUT THE MFA WAS AWARE THAT THE REPORT WAS TO BE RELEASED AND THAT WE WERE SEEKING TO DELIVER IT IN ADVANCE OF ITS PUBLIC RELEASE.)
3. (SBU) AS WE HAD PREDICTED (REFS B, C, AND D), THE ITALIAN PRESS HAD A FIELD DAY WITH THE REPORT. SOME OF THE CHOICER HEADLINES INCLUDED: "'NO-GLOBALS' WERE MISTREATED. THE U.S. CRITICIZES ITALY" (CENTRIST CORRIERE DELLA SERA); "POLICE ABUSES IN ITALY" (LEFTIST LA REPUBBLICA); "HUMAN RIGHTS: U.S. FLUNKS ITALY" (CENTRIST LA STAMPA); "HUMAN CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ROME 01196 01 OF 02 071049Z RIGHTS: DEPARTMENT OF STATE - THE U.S. TO BERLUSCONI: 'LEGALITY IN DANGER'" (LEFTIST L'UNITA). LA REPUBBLICA CONTINUED THAT "THE FIFTEEN FULL PAGES THAT THE REPORT DEVOTES TO ITALY LOOK LIKE A FULL-FLEDGED INDICTMENT OF THE BEHAVIOR OF THE GOVERNMENT DURING THE G-8 IN GENOA. THERE ARE ALSO EMBARRASSING REFERENCES TO SILVIO BERLUSCONI, WHO IS MENTIONED REGARDING FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM."
4. (C) OUR MFA INTERLOCUTORS MADE CLEAR THEIR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE REPORT. "THE ITALY REPORT IS THAT LONG?" SCHIAVONI ASKED IN AMAZEMENT. "WHY WOLD YOU WRITE SO MUCH ON ANOTHER DEMOCRACY?" SCHIVONI, NORMALLY AMONG OUR MOST GRACIOUS AND GOOD-ATURED OF CONTACTS, CHASTISED POLOFF AT LENGTH AOUT THE NEED FOR POST TO ENSURE THAT WHAT WAS REORTED ABOUT ITALY WAS CONVEYEDIN THE PROPER CONTEXT AND PROVIDED WITH SUFFICIENT NUANCE. "THAT'S WHAT AN EMBASSY'S RESPONSIBILITY IS," HE INSISTED. (COMMENT: WE AGREE. END COMMENT.)
5. (C) IN THE ABSENCE OF THE GUIDANCE REPEATEDLY (REFS B AND C) REQUESTED, WE WERE FORCED TO "WING IT" IN OUR CONVERSATION AT THE MFA. (FOR BETTER OR WORSE, PRESS REPORTS WERE WRITTEN BY WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENTS. ROME-BASED MEDIA HAVE NOT CONTACTED US FOR CLARIFICATION OR COMMENT.) WE EMPHASIZED THAT THE ITALIAN REPORT WAS WRITTEN UNDER THE SAME GUIDELINES AS THOSE FOR ALL COUNTRIES, AND URGED OUR INTERLOCUTORS TO COMPARE THE ITALIAN REPORT WITH THE ONES FOR GERMANY OR FRANCE, FOR EXAMPLE. (SCHIAVONI AND CECCARELLI WERE NOT IMPRESSED.) WE URGED THEM TO READ THE REPORT ITSELF AND NOT PRESS ARTICLES "INTERPRETING" IT. WE ESPECIALLY CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 ROME 01196 01 OF 02 071049Z CLARIFIED THAT THE REPORT DRAWS NO CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE GUILT OR INNOCENCE OF THOSE CONNECTED WITH EVENTS SURROUNDING THE JULY G-8 SUMMIT, NOTES ACCURATELY THE CONTEXT OF THE EVENTS, AND EXPLAINS THAT A GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS IS ON-GOING. WE URGED THE GOI ALSO TO REFRAIN FROM DRAWING INFERENCES ON THE BASIS OF THE REPORT.
6. (C) IN A MARCH 5 MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR, INTERIOR MINISTER SCAJOLA -- WHO REMAINS UNDER FIRE FROM THE OPPOSITION FOR LAST JULY'S EVENTS LARGELY, AS WE HAVE REPORTED, BECAUSE THE CENTER-LEFT HAS SO FEW ISSUES THAT RESONATE AMONG THE ITALIAN PUBLIC -- EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE REPORT, BASED ON PRESS REPORTING. THE AMBASSADOR URGED SCAJOLA TO READ THE REPORT ITSELF, NOT MEDIA ACCOUNTS OF IT. DCM CLARIFIED THAT THE REPORT WAS WRITTEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE AND THE ITALIAN REPORT WAS SIMILAR TO THAT FOR CANADA, GERMANY, FRANCE OR ANY WESTERN COUNTRY. SCAJOLA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SECTIONS OF THE REPORT HE HAD TRANSLATED INTO ITALIAN DID NOT ENTIRELY MATCH PRESS STORIES ABOUT IT, BUT REMAINED DISAPPOINTED THAT THE REPORT HAD PROVIDED AMMUNITION TO THE OPPOSITION.
7. (C) COMMENT: POST WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE LINE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2122
PAGE 01 ROME 01196 02 OF 02 071049Z ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00 EB-00 VC-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 LAB-01 L-00 VCE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OPIC-01 PC-01 PM-00 PRS-00 P-00 SP-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 IIP-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 PMB-00 PRM-00 DRL-02 G-00 SAS-00 /008W ------------------70C958 071050Z /38 O 071013Z MAR 02 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2621 INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 001196
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE, EUR/PPD AND DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2007 TAGS: PHUM, OPRC, IT SUBJECT: AS PREDICTED, ITALY'S HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT GENERATES FODDER FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL MILLS
ESTABLISHED IN THESE MEETINGS, URGING ALL TO AVOID INFERENCES, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING EVENTS ASSOCIATED WITH G-8 DEMONSTRATIONS OR PM BERLUSCONI'S JUDICIAL PROCESSES. IN PARTICULAR, STATEMENTS OF FACT IN THE REPORT SHOULD NOT BE READ AS JUDGMENTS OR AS A SCORECARD. WE REMAIN DISSATISFIED WITH THE ITERATIVE PROCESS OF DRAFTING THIS YEAR'S REPORT. CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ROME 01196 02 OF 02 071049Z ALTHOUGH SEVERAL OF OUR CONCERNS WERE ADDRESSED AT THE END, THE FINAL PRODUCT IS NOT AS CONSISTENT OR DEFENSIBLE AS IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN.
8. (C) COMMENT, CONTINUED: WE DO NOT WANT TO SEE AN ALREADY DELICATE SITUATION -- WHERE THE USG HAS BEEN DRAWN INTO THE CENTER-LEFT OPPOSITION'S PREVIOUSLY LARGELY UNHEARD ACCUSATIONS AGAINST A RELATIVELY POPULAR GOVERNMENT -- MADE WORSE. ABSENT ANY OTHER ATTRACTIVE ISSUE, OPPOSITION PARLIAMENTARIANS AND THEIR PRESS COUNTERPARTS WILL CONTINUE TO RESURRECT THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF THE G-8 AND BERLUSCONI'S JUDICIAL CASES. AND FROM NOW ON, THEY WILL -- RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY -- PROCLAIM USG "SUPPORT" FOR THEIR POINT OF VIEW. WE HOPE THAT OUR MFA CONTACTS, LIKE MINISTER SCAJOLA, WILL READ THE REPORT AND MOVE ON -- ALTHOUGH WE EXPECT TO HAVE AT LEAST ONE FURTHER EXCHANGE ONCE THEY HAVE HAD TIME TO READ THE REPORT CAREFULLY. UNFORTUNATELY, WE ARE NOT ABLE TO CONTROL THE TENOR OF MEDIA REPORTS, AND AS WE NOTED REF E, MEDIA WARS ARE A CONTINUATION OF POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS. ITALY'S OPPOSITION WILL CONTINUE TO HURL THE STONES THAT COME TO HAND IN THEIR EFFORTS TO UNSEAT A POPULAR PRIME MINISTER, AND WE JUST HANDED THEM SOME NEW ONES. POPE
CONFIDENTIAL
> 2002ROME01196 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Monday, 09 October 2006, 11:14
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 011316
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/09/2016
TAGS PGOV, KDEM, PHUM, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: POLITKOVSKAYA'S DEATH SENDS SHOCK WAVES THROUGH
MOSCOW; PROSECUTOR GENERAL TAKES PERSONAL CONTROL OF INVESTIGATION
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).
-------
Summary
-------
1. (C) The October 7 murder of internationally-known investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya has sent shock waves through Moscow. A public demonstration has been held, the co-owner of Novaya Gazeta, the newspaper where Politkovksaya had worked since 1999, is offering a 25 million ruble reward for information leading to the arrest of the culprit(s), the GOR Prosecutor General has taken personal charge of the investigation, and prominent media and political personalities have condemned the murder. Motives are plentiful. Politkovskaya's intrepid work in Chechnya, Beslan, and elsewhere in the North Caucasus earned her many enemies, and commentators here have been quick to point the finger at figures ranging from Chechnya's Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov to those interested in seeing President Putin remain at the helm after 2008. The Ambassador has expressed strong U.S. concerns about the case to First Deputy Foreign Minister Denisov and Presidential Human Rights Commissioner Pamfilova and will continue to press the case with the GOR. End summary. ,
----------------
OCTOBER 7 MURDER
----------------
2. (U) Moscow media report that internationally-known investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya was assassinated late-afternoon October 7 just after entering her apartment building near Belorusskiy train station in Moscow. (Politkovskaya was known for uncompromising work highlighting corruption and human rights violations in the Chechnya war, the Beslan siege, and the Moscow Nord-Ost theater siege.) The lone assassin fired four shots, and dropped the pistol before fleeing the scene. A security camera reportedly caught the blurry image of a man, his face largely concealed by a baseball cap. No one has claimed responsibility. Immediately after the killing, the area surrounding the apartment was cordoned off and key items from Politikovskaya's apartment were removed for analysis for investigators.
3. (U) Prosecutor General Yuriy Chayka has announced that he personally will take control of the investigation because of its importance. Representatives of the Prosecutor's office have removed for analysis Politikovskaya's computer and other items from her office at Novaya Gazeta, where she had worked since 1999. Embassy understands that a number of journalists XXXXXXXXXXXX have already been questioned by the PG's office. To date, no statement has been made about the progress of the investigation. Some of the news media, as of the morning of October 9, were reporting that there had been no progress in identifying the Politkovskaya's assassin. Others reported that fingerprints and other evidence had been found.
4. (SBU) Politkovskaya's assassination has prompted an outpouring of grief and rage in Moscow and elsewhere in Russia. An October 8 demonstration, originally scheduled to protest retributions against Georgians in the wake of the spy scandal in Tbilisi became as well a commemoration to Politkovskaya. (Demonstrations were held in St. Petersburg and Samara, as well.) A crowd of about one thousand attended. Although there were no speeches, prominent human rights and political figures gave interviews to the international and domestic press. XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX. described the assassination, which occurred on President Putin's 54th birthday, a "direct challenge to the President." XXXXXXXXXXXX saw the killing as a turning point, in which all must choose sides; either to cooperate with the "fascists" or fight against "such scum." There were similarly strong words from XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX. Among the signs carried by demonstrators: "Politkovskaya is our Gongadze," "The cannibalistic people in power killed Anna," "Politkovskaya - a great daughter of Russia."
5. (U) Other comments:
MOSCOW 00011316 002 OF 003
-- Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov released a statement saying he was "deeply outraged and shocked by the fact that an honest journalist, who was also a woman and a mother, had been killed";
-- XXXXXXXXXXXX: "The death of (Politikovskaya) is connected with her work in Chechnya..."
-- Chechnya's Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov said he was shocked by Politikovskaya's death, and rejected the assertion that the murder has Chechen fingerprints on it.
-- XXXXXXXXXXXX: "Politikovskaya was number one in political journalism. . .the murder of such a person is a very symbolic event for Russia..."
-- XXXXXXXXXXXX: "The fact that (the murder) occurred on the birthday of President Putin makes it a complicated political provocation. . .It is not clear if it was done by an enemy of Putin, or one of his supporters."
-- XXXXXXXXXXXX in a conversation with Embassy XXXXXXXXXXXX paid tribute to Politkovskaya, "a hero who cannot be replaced."
-- XXXXXXXXXXXX have launched their own investigation of the murder. XXXXXXXXXXXX Duma Deputy Aleksandr Lebedev has offered a 25 million ruble award for information leading to the rest of the killer;
-- XXXXXXXXXXXX: "conversations about freedom of speech are still just conversations. . .This cynical crime is an echo of the turbulent 90s";
-- XXXXXXXXXXXX: "The (murder) is a political provocation, which may be followed by the murders of other well-known people. . .";
-- XXXXXXXXXXXX: "Politkovskaya was an icon who, we believed, had reached the point where she had transcended danger. XXXXXXXXXXXX guessed that reporters working on Chechnya will be even less likely to report frankly than they have in the past;
-- XXXXXXXXXXXX reported that Moscow-based human rights organizations would be convening soon for a strategy session in the wake of Politkovskaya's murder.
6. (SBU) The mailbox in front of Politkovskaya's apartment on a busy street has been turned into an informal shrine, with flowers and a picture of the journalist. A basket of flowers hangs on the railing in the lobby where Politikovskaya was killed.
------------------
WHY POLITKOVSKAYA?
------------------
7. (C) The assassination of one of Russia's most outspoken journalists and the absence to date of any leads has generated much speculation about possible perpetrators here. Embassy contacts note that Politkovskaya's work had won her many enemies. XXXXXXXXXXXX told Embassy October 8 that the late journalist "constantly" received threats --"by telephone, letter, by e-mail, by SMS." Politkovskaya had become inured to the threats. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, "she had accepted the possibility that she could be killed at any time, and talked about it very little." The most frequent threats, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, had come from Chechnya Prime Minister "Kadyrov's people" (not necessarily with Kadyrov's knowledge) and the Russian Special Forces, whose brutalities in Chechnya had been exposed by Politkovskaya.
8. (C) There have been at least two criminal cases opened against people who have threatened Politkovskaya in the past, and she was prominent on an "enemies" list maintained by Russian nationalists. In addition, an effort was allegedly made to poison her as she flew to the North Caucasus as the Beslan tragedy was unfolding in 2004. Immediately after Politkovskaya's murder, there was a flurry of speculation that the assassination was linked to an article on the use of torture in Chechnya by troops loyal to Ramzan Kadyrov that Politkovskaya was to have turned over to Novaya Gazeta on
MOSCOW 00011316 003 OF 003
October 8. XXXXXXXXXXXX
9. (C) Among the other, highly speculative theories making the rounds here:
-- according to XXXXXXXXXXXXX (and others), the assassination is a "poisoned gift" for President Putin. It will be used by some to argue that there is a state of emergency, and that the President cannot leave when his term ends in 2008.
-- others theorize that Politkovskaya's death was tied not to Putin's birthday, but to the thirtieth birthday of Chechnya's Premier Ramzan Kadyrov. Politikovskaya's trenchant articles on the conduct of the war in Chechnya had angered Kadyrov and his confederates, the theory has it, and rumors that the pro-Moscow Chechen leadership was to be fingered in the article that was to appear this week had caused someone to intervene. A corollary speculation has it that the assassination might have been engineered by Chechnya's President Alu Alkhanov in order to implicate, and neutralize Kadyrov. A third possibility is that those in Chechnya opposed to Kadyrov's pro-Moscow regime were attempting to use Politkovskaya in order to marginalize Kadyrov.
10. (C) In the more implausible category:
-- others argue that the assassination will be used, like journalist Georgiy Gongadze's death in Ukraine, as a reference point in an effort to foment a Russian "orange" revolution. Still others suggest that her death, which follows on the heels of the assassination of Bank Deputy Chairman Andrey Kozlov, will provide a pretext for still tighter controls in an effort to restore order.
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THE U.S. CONNECTION
-------------------
11. (SBU) Politikovskaya was a U.S. citizen by birth and U.S. passport holder, although she spent most of her adult life in Russia.
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GOR REACTION
------------
12. (C) As noted above, Prosecutor General Yuriy Chayka has taken personal charge of the investigation, and it appears that the authorities are moving quickly to gather evidence. Ambassador has been told (septel) by First Deputy Foreign Minister Denisov that the GOR will issue a statement on October 9. BURNS
Monday, 22 August 2005, 17:01
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 THE HAGUE 002309
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/18/2025
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, ECON, EAID, NL, EUN, USUN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S PARTING THOUGHTS ON TAKING THE DUTCH
TO THE NEXT LEVEL
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (S) SUMMARY: With the EU divided and its direction uncertain, the Dutch serve as a vital transatlantic anchor in Europe. As one of the original six EU members, the Dutch ally with the British to counter Franco-German efforts to steer Europe off a transatlantic course. The Netherlands' solid European and international credentials create a powerful "multiplier" effect. In Iraq, Dutch forces provided the physical and political cover for Japan to deploy and the Dutch are using their NATO Training Mission commitment to push others to do more. In Afghanistan, the Dutch drove much of the Phase III planning for ISAF and deployed Dutch troops in combat operations for the first time in more than 30 years. The Dutch have led Europe in launching pilot projects to strengthen international counterterrorism cooperation, and initiated the U.S.-EU dialogue on terrorist financing which laid the groundwork for a proposed major international Terrorism Financing Conference in 2006.
2. (S) (SUMMARY CONTINUED) The Dutch are expanding their leadership beyond Europe. Dutch strategic interests in the Caribbean make them logical partners to counter Venezuelan meddling in the region. They are expanding their military involvement in Africa, in part to provide a secure environment for their robust development assistance program, and in part to add "eyes and ears" on the ground. In the Middle East, the Dutch enjoy good relations with Israel and the Palestinians and would welcome a more active role; they quickly promised funds for an expanded Multinational Observer Force (MFO) and might, under the right circumstances, commit troops. Even in areas where we disagree, such as drugs and trafficking in persons, Dutch views may be shifting. As the headquarters for major international legal institutions, the Netherlands offers a unique opportunity for advancing foreign policy goals far beyond Dutch borders.
3. (S) (SUMMARY CONTINUED) The coalition government, headed by PM Balkenende, is naturally inclined to work closely with the U.S. The balance could shift toward Brussels, however, if a center-left government comes to power in 2007 (or earlier), as predicted by most polls. The nearly one million Muslim immigrants are largely non-integrated, which is forcing the Dutch to question long-standing assumptions about Dutch "tolerance" and "identity." The murder of Theo van Gogh focused attention on Islamic extremism, and the Dutch feel they are ahead of much of Europe in addressing this growing problem. Strengthening U.S.-Dutch ties across the political spectrum is necessary to ensure that the Dutch continue to enlist others to pursue interests in line with the U.S., especially in the political-military sphere. Early and active consultations are the key to harnessing Dutch energies in enhanced pursuit of U.S. interests. END SUMMARY.
LEADERS IN EUROPE
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4. (S) Along with the British, the Dutch form a strong, reliable transatlantic anchor in Europe. As a founding member of NATO, one of the original six members of the EU, and Britain's strongest ally on continent, the Dutch are an influential voice in Europe despite having a population of just under 16 million. Prime Minister Balkenende states often that the Dutch "take their responsibilities seriously" and therefore expect to be heard. While the Dutch "no" to the EU's constitutional treaty embarrassed Balkenende, the vote revealed that the search for EU integration and consensus has its limits, capping a trend that started in the 90's with then Liberal Party leader (and later EU Commissioner) Fritz Bolkestein's proposals to redefine the scope of European integration to protect Dutch national interests.
5. (S) With the French-German engine of European integration stalled, German elections pending, and the EU unable to agree on finances, leadership opportunities for the Dutch are growing. This trend is enhanced by the gravitation of EU decision making to smaller groups, as Dutch participation can make or break internal groupings. The Dutch and Italian refusal to attend a "group of six" meeting recently proposed by Schroeder, for example, effectively squelched his initiative. The British Ambassador here recently confided that Blair sees the Dutch as essential to pursuing his European objectives and ensuring that transatlantic relations remain high on the European agenda. The leaders of the Netherlands, UK, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden already meet quietly several times a year to coordinate positions prior to EU Council and other high-level EU meetings.
6. (S) Dutch leadership within the EU does not weaken their commitment to NATO, where they are "go-to guys" for resolving potential EU-NATO conflicts. Their active, if often behind the scenes, support for NATO SYG (and former Dutch Foreign Minister) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, as well as their commitment to the NRF (and SRF, ISAF, and NTM-I), have helped push back efforts, such as Tervuren, which might otherwise create tensions between the NRF and EU battlegroups or other emerging ESDP capabilities. Foreign Minister Bot recently proposed restructuring NATO's decision-making and funding mechanisms to make them more effective. The appointment of Herman Schaper, the former deputy director general of political affairs at the Dutch MFA and a good friend of the U.S., as the new Dutch permrep to NATO should create more opportunities for productive cooperation.
POLITICAL-MILITARY COOPERATION BEYOND THE EU
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7. (S) The Dutch are increasingly aware that strategic interests outside Europe warrant their attention and leadership, especially in the political-military sphere. For example:
- Venezuela: The Dutch have strategic interests in the Caribbean (i.e., the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba) and are deeply concerned about Chavez' meddling in the region. As a Caribbean power, the Dutch have good reasons to lead an effort to balance traditional Spanish dominance on Latin American issues in the EU, but the U.S. and others will need to push them to take this role. The Dutch are active partners in regional drug enforcement efforts, and recently demonstrated their ability to deploy military forces (F-16's) on short notice. Persuading the Dutch to counter Chavez's destabilization efforts more actively would give us a reliable European partner in the region.
- Afghanistan: According to CENTCOM, the Dutch took a strong lead in organizing and soliciting forces to staff ISAF Phase III, and are now preparing to deploy up to 1,400 personnel in conjunction with British, Canadian, and possibly Australian forces. Separately, the Dutch deployment of Special Forces in a combat role represents a major shift in Dutch priorities away from peace-keeping to combat missions for the first time since the 1960's. The Dutch remain a strong supporter in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. We should encourage them both to continue to make significant contributions, and to push others to do more.
- Africa: Senior Dutch military officials say they are considering expanding their military presence in Africa to include Burundi, Rwanda, Eastern Congo, Botswana, Zambia, and Ivory Coast, adding new "eyes and ears" on the ground. The Dutch have requested embedding a cell at EUCOM (similar to that already operating in CENTCOM) to coordinate their actions with the U.S. and other allies. One objective of the Dutch military deployments is to provide a secure environment for what is already one of the most ambitious assistance programs in the world. The Dutch are the fourth largest provider of assistance to Africa world-wide. In 2005 they established a 110 million Euro Stability Fund for security sector reform in the African Great Lakes Region and Sudan (as well as Afghanistan and Iraq.) Dutch deployments in Africa have solid support in Parliament, while the focus on security as an aspect of development provides an attractive justification for potential European partners. We should not only encourage the Dutch to increase their direct involvement in Africa, but also explore whether the Dutch could act as a "clearinghouse" for other interested parties. - Iraq: The Dutch were instrumental in providing early logistic support to U.S. forces in Iraq (including permitting transshipments through Rotterdam when other ports in Europe would not.) The Dutch deployed 1,200 troops directly to the southern province of al-Muthanna for 20 months, including two controversial extensions. Although the Dutch have since withdrawn from al-Muthanna, their presence provided the political and military cover necessary for Japan to commit forces. The Dutch provided 25 trainers for the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, and have offered to provide up to 100 if other countries would make comparable contributions. We should urge the Dutch to continue to push their EU and NATO partners to do more in Iraq.
- Middle East: The Dutch enjoy a reputation for "balance" almost unique in Europe, as they are strong supporters of Israel, yet trusted by Arabs. Given Foreign Minister Bot's expressed willingness to take a more active regional role. We should look for opportunities to harness Dutch interest through participation in the Forum for the Future and other initiatives. The Dutch have already promised to make a financial contribution to an expanded Multinational Observer Force (MFO) if asked, and, under the right circumstances, might be prepared to send peace-keepers to the region as well.
8. (S) These commitments demonstrate how the Dutch "take their responsibilities seriously" in practice by committing real resources -- money, troops, hardware, and political capital -- to tackle real problems, as well as their "multiplier" effect in the political-military realm. The fact that the Dutch are providing the head (Peter Feith) and observers to the EU's new monitoring mission in Aceh is the latest example of their assuming leadership of an important international mission in a region where they feel special ties (as witnessed by FM Bot's historic decision this year to attend the commemoration of Indonesian independence, the first such visit by a senior Dutch official since Indonesian independence).
9. (S) The Dutch have one of the largest, most geographically diverse deployments of military forces in the world, with more troops deployed as a percentage of their total forces than any other ally. Defense Minister Kamp and CHOD Berlijn recently restructured the Dutch military to eliminate layers of bureaucracy, including independent service chiefs, thereby creating a leaner, more deployable force. Kamp and Berlijn believe firmly in the "use or lose" principle, and have accordingly sought increasingly challenging operations -- such as the Special Forces deployment to Afghanistan and potential operations in sub-Saharan Africa. Their desire to maximize the military's capabilities and their preference for U.S. equipment, even when alternative European suppliers exist, make the Dutch strong supporters of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. The Dutch are one of only two countries (Italy is the other) whose financial contributions merit Tier II status in JSF development. Berlijn is pushing to lock in an early commitment for 50 planes (out of a total of 85) to prevent JSF from becoming an issue in the 2007 elections. The Dutch are also seeking Tactical Tomahawks for Dutch frigates, additional lift capacity (CH-47, C-130, KDC-10), and are continuing to update their remaining hardware (AH-64D, F-16's, Patriot Missile System, etc.) all of which are focused on meeting their Prague Capability Commitment objectives as well as their ability to sustain extended expeditionary operations outside the European theater.
COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION
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10. (S) Faced with growing threats in their own country, as witnessed by the murder of Theo van Gogh in November 2004, the Dutch believe they are in the forefront of Europe with regard to counterterrorism, arguing that legislation and other steps earlier adopted by the Dutch are only now being considered in countries like the UK and Italy. Led by Justice Minister Donner and Finance Minister Zalm, the Dutch were the first in Europe to implement the Container Security Initiative (CSI), Radiological Gates, DOE's Megaports program, U.S. Customs' Green Lane Program, and, soon, Trusted Flyers. China has engaged the Dutch on next generation protocols and standards for transport security, includng RFID technology. It will be important to monitor and work with the Dutch as they work with China. The Dutch have also expressed an interest to participate in DHS's "Centers of Excellence." While the EU was arguing with us and itself over releasing personal records to airlines, the Dutch allowed U.S. immigration teams (IAP) to operate at Schipol airport. The Dutch were instrumental in pushing the EU in 2003 to designate Hamas in its entirety as a terrorist entity; an EU-wide designation of the Dutch branch of the Al-Aqsa followed. During their EU Presidency the Dutch hosted an EU-wide seminar to raise awareness of terrorist financing issues and have offered to host a major international conference on the same subject in 2006. The Dutch continue to push for EU designation of Hizballah in its entirety and to strengthen the EU's "Clearinghouse" designation process. Given their record, we should continue to look to the Dutch to launch joint pilot programs in Europe, and, more generally, to push counterterrorism issues to the top of the European agenda more generally.
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
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11. (S) The Netherlands is among the world's leading aid donors, having budgeted USD 4.2 billion (0.74 percent of GDP, with a target of raising it to 0.8 percent) in assistance in 2004. It is a top donor of unearmarked assistance to UN humanitarian programs. In 2003, the Netherlands introduced a more focused aid strategy, which phased out smaller aid programs in wealthier countries. Dutch bilateral aid is now directed to 36 partner countries, including 18 in Africa. In 2003, President Bush and Prime Minister Balkenende signed an MOU to coordinate HIV/AIDS programs in Ghana, Zambia, Rwanda and Ethiopia that emphasizes public-private partnerships. Balkenende recently expressed interest in using the Millennium Challenge Corporation as a model for promoting public-private partnerships world-wide. USAID's involvement with a Heineken AIDS treatment and education program in Rwanda has been particularly successful, and the World Bank has adopted it as a model. Dutch creativity and credibility in development makes them good potential partners for future joint initiatives with the U.S. We should also take advantage of their experience and insights to help shift global aid efforts in the direction of sustainable long-term development.
CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
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12. (S) With the International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other international legal institutions all located in The Hague, our ability to have an impact in the Netherlands on international issues ranging from Iraq to the Balkans is unique. With a historical interest in international law dating back to Grotius, the Dutch view themselves as natural defenders of international legal norms and practices. This tradition made them the perfect hosts for a conference of Iraqi judges in The Hague in 2004, and has pushed them to the forefront of international efforts to train a new generation of Iraqi jurists. While their legalistic approach can be frustrating, they are flexible. Their concerns about U.S. interpretations of the Geneva Protocols have not prevented their Special Forces from deploying in Afghanistan. The Dutch also helped sway the EU to vote against the Cuban-sponsored resolution on Guantanamo at the Human Rights Commission last year despite concerns about the treatment of detainees. But, as Foreign Minister Bot told Deputy Secretary Zoellick recently, over the long run Dutch human rights concerns must be addressed to ensure that public and parliamentary support does not erode; we and the Dutch need to work together to resolve this concern. Finally, the Dutch combination of seeking pragmatic solutions while remaining true to their legal principles could make the Dutch an important asset in resolving our differences with the EU over the ICC and article 98 agreements under the right circumstances.
ECONOMICS AND TRADE
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13. (S) Balkenende shares our interest in promoting an open international trading system and has been an ally in U.S.-EU trade disputes such as Boeing-Airbus and the Foreign Sales Corporation Tax. The Dutch share with the British a vision of a market-friendly Europe driven by free trade. They are the third largest investor in the U.S. and the fourth largest recipient of U.S. investment world-wide. Their efforts to shift the Lisbon agenda in a more cooperative direction and to promote innovation and competition are creating additional opportunities for U.S. investors in Europe. Because the Netherlands has one of the highest broadband penetrations in Europe, emerging research efforts in the areas of nanotechnology, life sciences, and other IT-related areas, and a new tax treaty, the country offers U.S. companies an important gateway into Europe. If consulted early and regularly, the Netherlands can also be an important ally in navigating the EU's regulatory environment and removing obstacles.
DRUGS AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
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14. (S) Narcotics and trafficking in persons remain areas of difficulty. Despite fundamental differences regarding "soft drugs" and legalized prostitution, the Balkenende government has worked to prevent these differences from defining our relationship. There are also signs that Dutch attitudes may be shifting. The Dutch remain a major producer of synthetic drugs. On the other hand, Dutch Health Minister Hoogevorst recently signed a precedent-setting MOU with the U.S. to share information on the health risks of new strains of marijuana with higher concentrations of THC, which may convince the Dutch to rethink their approach to "soft drugs" in general. The Dutch are addressing drug tourism -- a recent proposal to restrict the sale of marijuana to Dutch passport holders in Maastricht, for example, could cut down on cross-border smuggling and other drug-related crime. We should support such initiatives actively.
BALKENENDE SOLID INTERNATIONALLY...
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15. (S) We are fortunate to have in the Balkenende government an outward-looking partner for whom working with the U.S. and the U.K. comes naturally. Balkenende and FM Bot take pride in building bridges between the U.S. and Europe. Nowhere was this more evident than during the Dutch presidency of the EU. On two issues of great importance to the U.S. -- the China Arms Embargo and accession talks for Turkey -- the Dutch moved, with our active urging, from following an EU "consensus" set by others to redefining the issue on their, and our, terms. In both cases, Bot and Balkenende overcame initial skepticism and concluded that Dutch and U.S. interests coincided -- a pattern we have seen repeated on other less important issues. FM Bot began the EU presidency telling us that lifting the Arms Embargo was a "done deal." Later, however, he actively intervened to prevent a lift on "his" watch, saying that he did not want the blame for causing a rift between the U.S. and EU. Despite Balkenende's personal skepticism about bringing Turkey into the EU, he and Bot (a former Ambassador to Turkey) worked hard to ensure that Turkey got its date to start accession talks with the EU during the Dutch presidency, and want to see the agreement they helped negotiate successfully implemented. We will want the Dutch to continue to draw on the relationships they developed during the presidency to coax both sides to move in the right direction as October 3 approaches.
16. (S) Specific U.S. policies provoke squalls of anger and frustration here, but President Bush's visit to the Netherlands in 2005 to commemorate V-E day at the WWII Dutch American Cemetery at Margraten was met with universal acclaim and provoked remarkably little protest. Even Dutch opposed to U.S. policies warmly welcomed the visit as a reminder of enduring, shared values forged in the crucibles of World War II and the Cold War. This mission has pursued an ambitious program of outreach to future Dutch leaders to ensure that these emotions are passed to the next generation. In this effort, the President's youth roundtable in Maastricht and former Secretary of State Powell's town hall meeting with young leaders in The Hague were notable successes, which can serve as models for future efforts. Given the disproportionate influence wielded by the Dutch in international fora, we should expand our active exchange programs (including the Fulbright and International Visitor Leadership Programs) to help shape the successor generation.
...BUT FACES DOMESTIC CHALLENGES
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17. (S) Unfortunately, the outward-looking, transatlantic orientation of the Balkenende cabinet is offset domestically by strong strains of Euro-centralism and Dutch-provincialism. This division will become more pronounced as the parties prepare for local elections in March 2006, and national elections in May 2007. Current polls show that Balkenende's center-right coalition (his second government) is falling in the polls, while the main, center-left opposition Labor party (PvdA) and fringes on the right and left are gaining. Balkenende is gambling that his economic reform agenda will pay dividends in time for the 2007 elections, but that is uncertain. There is a strong chance that a center-left government dominated by the PvdA will come to power in 2007 -- or earlier if the 2006 local election results prompt national elections.
18. (S) Although U.S.-Dutch relations should remain fundamentally sound despite a shift to the center-left, a PvdA-led government would present new challenges. PvdA leader Wouter Bos has made clear his tendency to look to Brussels first in setting Dutch international priorities. He sees the Netherlands less as a transatlantic "bridge builder" than as a follower of EU consensus. As with Schroeder in Germany, Bos might also find it tempting to adopt a critical attitude toward the U.S. during elections to lock in his left flank. The PvdA is already raising allegations of U.S. abuses to challenge the rationale for Dutch deployments in Afghanistan, and does not support the JSF program. It is in our interest both to support the current government's transatlantic orientation and to engage actively with the opposition to shift them in a favorable direction.
THE ISLAMIC FACTOR
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19. (S) A new, but potentially serious factor in Dutch domestic politics is its large, poorly integrated Muslim population, currently numbering just under 1 million, or 5.8 percent of the population. USG-sponsored polls show that 83 percent of Dutch Muslims identify much more strongly with their religion than with their host country, while 51 percent have little or no faith in the Dutch government as an institution. While the problems of Dutch integration captured international headlines following the van Gogh murder, the Dutch believe they have an early start on the rest of Europe in seeking creative ways to address these concerns. Their strong interest in sharing and soliciting ideas has opened up opportunities for Embassy and USG outreach and consultations throughout Dutch society, providing insights into a growing problem throughout Europe. We expect our experiences here will provide good indications of broader European trends as well as opportunities to influence their direction.
CONCLUSIONS
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20. (S) The Netherlands is a complicated, multi-layered society. Prevailing myths about the Dutch -- e.g., they are homogenous, universally tolerant, pacifist, etc.-- do not accurately gauge differences within society or reflect Dutch potential to influence international events. While the Dutch prefer to see themselves as "balancing" between Europe and the U.S., this balance can shift due to domestic and international factors.
21. (S) The key to maximizing Dutch effectiveness is to involve them early through high-level consultations and exchanges. Dutch pragmatism and our similar world-views make the Netherlands fertile ground for initiatives others in Europe might be reluctant, at least initially, to embrace.
22. (S) As multipliers, the Dutch should be encouraged to play an increasingly prominent role on the global stage. Coaxing the Dutch into the spotlight can take effort, but pays off royally. Dutch credentials, credibility, and capabilities make them effective leaders across a wide range of geographic regions and substantive issues.
23. (S) The Dutch are actively and favorably involved in Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caribbean, Indonesia, and elsewhere. They are our best partner in developing pilot projects in the counterterrorism area, and are world leaders in development, free trade, international law and human rights. In pursuit of U.S. interests in all these areas of interest and leadership, we should build upon our successes to date to take the Dutch to the "next level." SOBEL
Monday, 21 September 2009, 07:38
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000568
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/17/2019
TAGS MARR, MOPS, NATO, PINS, PREL, NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/JSF: CONCERN ABOUT SECOND ENGINE
REF: A. THE HAGUE 271 B. THE HAGUE 264 C. THE HAGUE 543
Classified By: POLECON Counselor Andrew C. Mann for reasons 1.5(b,d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Netherlands Minister of Defense (MOD) has expressed concern over the JSF second engine (F-136) being omitted from the U.S. 2010 Defense Budget. Dutch industry has high-value contracts supporting the development of the F-136 engine. The MOD has struggled to retain the necessary support for the JSF program in what has become a politically charged battle. Cancelling the F-136 program could scuttle Dutch participation in JSF and raise doubts about American defense partnerships as we ask the Dutch to stay the course with us in Afghanistan. END SUMMARY.
Background:
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2. (U) The concept of having two competing engines for the JSF dates back to the "Great Engine War," when Congress funded the development of a second engine in 1979 for the Air Force's fighter aircraft. The Air Force and Congress cite the competition as a huge success, yielding both cost savings and a better product. This "standard" of competition drove a two engine solution (F-135 and F-136) for the JSF program. Participating countries in the JSF Program are allowed to choose the F-135, F-136, or both when they issue their procurement request per the JSF Production, Sustainment, and Follow-on Development MOU. The GONL believes based on the MOU they have an engine choice, and are currently in a study with Norway and Italy to compare both engines before a placing their orders to the JSF Program.
Dutch Industry Support on the F-136:
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3. (SBU) Two companies in the Netherlands are responsible for the co-design and production of critical components on the F-136. (Netherlands industry is not participating in the development of the F-135, but is seeking maintenance contracts with Pratt & Whitney, the manufacturer.) The F-136 contractors (General Electric/Rolls-Royce) list potential F-136 business with the Netherlands -- across the life of the program -- at over one billion dollars. Dutch labor unions and local governments are currently applying pressure to the Labor Party (PvdA), which has the pivotal vote to keep the JSF alive in the Netherlands by approving the purchase of the second test jet. The MOD is currently working with Parliament to obtain approval for the purchase the second test aircraft by December 2009. (Note: Post has ensured both the F-135 and F-136 have been equally represented during this process. End Note.)
Comment / Risk of Cancelling JSF in the Netherlands:
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4. (C) COMMENT: The JSF debate in the Netherlands remains politically charged, with the Parliament nearly scuttling Dutch participation in JSF (reftels A, B). The Dutch MOD is using the successes of the JSF in Dutch industry as an argument to keep the JSF in the Netherlands. The Dutch are aware that the U.S. defense budget has excluded the F-136 every year since 2006, but to date Congress has overturned that decision and maintained support for the F-136. However, if the second engine does not survive the budget process, significant U.S. effort will be required to keep the Dutch as a partner in the program. Opponents of the JSF, including the Labor Party (in the three-party governing coalition), would likely argue the U.S. had changed the terms of the Qwould likely argue the U.S. had changed the terms of the agreement upon which Dutch participation was based and we are unreliable. Prospects for winning continued Dutch support of the JSF are dim without continuation of the F-136 program (the two engine option). Furthermore, we are engaged in an delicate effort to keep the Dutch in Afghanistan after 2010. The Labor Party has the pivotal role on this issue as well. When we are asking the Dutch Cabinet and Parliament to make a difficult decision to stay with us as partners in Afghanistan, being perceived as an unreliable partner on JSF could prove to be a large hurdle to overcome. END COMMENT. LEVIN
Wednesday, 12 March 2008, 09:27
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 000732
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/10/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINR, EU, UK
SUBJECT: UK LIBERAL DEMOCRATS RECOVERING FROM PARLIAMENTARY
DISASTER
REF: 07 LONDON 4655
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Maura Connelly, reasons 1.4 b, d
1. (C/NF) Summary. The UK's Liberal Democrat Party limped into its spring conference in Liverpool March 7-9 following a disastrous performance in the House of Commons March 5 during the debate over a possible referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, a performance which plunged Nick Clegg into the first crisis of his three month-old leadership. Clegg managed to rally the party with a strong speech at the conference, in which he called for a shake-up of the entire British political system. He also addressed head-on the possibility of a future coalition with either the Labour or Conservative parties in the event of a hung parliament, declaring the Lib Dems would never be an "annex" to any other party, but leaving the door open for a coalition if Lib Dem concerns were taken into account. Despite the Lisbon Treaty fiasco, Clegg's position as party leader is in no jeopardy: as the third leader in two years, Lib Dems at all levels of the party tell us frankly that they have to make sure he succeeds. End summary.
A Very Bad Day: The Lib Dems and The EU Reform Treaty
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2. (SBU) March 5 marked the worst day for the Lib Dems since one infamous week in January 2006, when the party became the laughing stock of Britain after sex scandals involving two of the four candidates to succeed leader Charles Kennedy emerged one right after the other. This time around, the party imploded in the House of Commons over a Conservative Party motion to hold a nationwide referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. The Lib Dems' convoluted official position on the referendum was part of the problem. As Clegg sought to explain it to the public, the real issue for his intensely pro-Europe rank-and-file was not the Lisbon Treaty itself, but confirming UK membership in the EU once and for all. The Lib Dem official position therefore was to propose an alternate "in or out" referendum on whether the UK should remain in the EU, and abstain on the competing Conservative motion to hold a referendum on just the Treaty itself.
3. (C/NF) This position left both the pundits and the public scratching their heads: why would the UK's most pro-Europe party, whose new leader actually worked for the EU from 1994 to 1999, abstain on a vote on the Treaty? The answer, senior Lib Dems have confessed to us, is that the party leadership believes a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty would fail. Despite Labour's parliamentary majority, if there had been enough Labour defections, a Lib Dem vote for the Tory referendum could have led to its passage. In the end, the "least worst scenario," according to Shadow International Development Minister Michael Moore, was to adopt the awkward position of abstention. This unspoken subtext was derided by pundits, one of whom called it "too clever by half." Another summed up the Lib Dem position as "sinuous, supple, and so difficult to understand it's not worth getting to grips with."
Nick Clegg and His "Cojones"
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4. (SBU) In any case, Clegg failed to carry it off. As expected, the Lib Dem motion to hold a separate "in or out" referendum on UK membership in the EU failed in the Commons on February 26, but the staged Lib Dem walk-out afterwards, accompanied by jeering and good-bye waves from the rest of the House, did not come across as principled, as the party had hoped, but rather as if they were in the throes of a "hissy fit," in the words of one BBC commentator. It didn't help that, on the same day, the Guardian published a quote Clegg made prior to the 2005 election, in which he said, "The real reason, of course, why the government does not want to hold a referendum is the fear that it may lose... Nothing will do more damage to the pro-European movement than giving room to the suspicion that we have something to hide, that we do not have the 'cojones' to carry out our argument to the people."
5. (SBU) The use of the word "cojones" - not wide-spread in Britain as it is in the U.S. - came back to bite Clegg in the, er, nether regions at the March 5 session of Prime Minister's Questions. Rising to address the Commons, Clegg nervously shook a crease out of his trousers, unwittingly bringing the cojones remark back to the fore and causing the House of Commons to erupt in jeers and laughter, drowning out Clegg's question and forcing the Speaker of the House to call for order. Tory Foreign Affairs Spokesman William Hague raised the subject yet again in the debate on the Lisbon Treaty referendum later that day. "Any explanation of why
LONDON 00000732 002 OF 003
the Liberal Democrat leadership's protests in the debates have become ever more shrill," Hague said, "is that, at some point in recent months, they have become separated from their cojones. Those unfortunate objects are now to be found impaled on a distant fence." More jeers and laughter followed.
6. (C/NF) Difficult as it is to imagine, the situation got worse for Clegg after that. In the ensuing vote on the Conservative referendum motion, 13 out of the 63 Lib Dem MPs, including three members of Clegg's cabinet, broke from the official party line to vote in favor of a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, on the grounds that abstention was not in keeping with the party's 2005 election manifesto. The dissenting cabinet members - Environment Spokesman Tim Farron, Scotland and Northern Ireland Spokesman Alistair Carmichael, and Justice Spokesman David Heath - subsequently resigned their front bench positions. According to Michael Moore, the Lib Dem rebels all hold their seats by narrow margins and believe that abstention might hurt their chances of reelection. Moore took on the Scotland and Northern Ireland portfolio when Carmichael resigned, but indicated to us that the three front benchers will eventually return to their positions after a decent interval. On the idea of allowing a free vote on the referendum, as some parliament watchers had suggested, Moore said even more Lib Dems MPs would have gone against the party line if Clegg hadn't attempted to impose discipline.
7. (SBU) The press ate Clegg alive. "No Cojones Clegg" ran the headline from the Independent. "Calamity Clegg's Spectacular Blunder," ran the Daily Mail. "Since their angry 'mince-out', most MPs have decided the Lib Dems are a joke," the Guardian proclaimed. Clegg "castrated himself in full view of the House of Commons," declared columnist Matt Norton in the Independent.
Speech Rallies The Troops
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8. (SBU) Clegg went into the spring conference shaken by the events of the previous two days, but managed to deliver a strong key note speech that went some way toward repairing the damage. Speaking without notes, he called for a shake-up of the entire British political system, including a constitutional convention to examine all aspects of how Britain is governed, firing MPs who break parliamentary ethics rules, and limiting political donations. He also addressed head on the idea of a possible coalition with either the Labour or Conservative parties in the event of a hung parliament, vowing, "I will never allow the Liberal Democrats to be a mere annex to another party." His wording, however, implied that the Lib Dems would consider a coalition if their own concerns were taken into account. The BBC called the speech "an impassioned plea for change," while the Guardian said the speech demonstrates that Clegg "has the resilience to hit back."
9. (C/NF) Conference organizers told us beforehand that the Lisbon Treaty would be kept deliberately off the agenda in anticipation that the issue would blow up - as it did in the Commons. The blow-up, however, produced worry and head-scratching among the party rank-and-file at the Conference rather than attacks on Clegg. As one conference attendee put it to us, "I know something bad happened, but I'm not sure what. I don't really understand what the whole thing is about."
"We've Got To Make This One Stick"
-----------------------------------
10. (C/NF) The March 5 disaster notwithstanding, Lib Dem party members appear happy with Clegg's performance so far. Some noted to us, however, that he has spent most of his time since becoming leader in December 2007 working the political crowd in Westminster, and has not reached out to the party rank and file. All of our MP and party member contacts tell us they recognize that Clegg, who only entered Parliament in 2005, faces a steep learning curve.
11. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX says that so far Clegg has been decisive and thoughtful. In contrast, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, former leader Sir Menzies "Ming" Campbell was more like a chairman of the board, a style not in keeping with the way the unruly party actually operates. For example, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, Campbell would give directives while not understanding that the organizational structure to impose his edicts did not exist.
12. (C/NF) Shadow Housing Minister Lembit Opik has a different view of Clegg. In Opik's view, Clegg has
LONDON 00000732 003 OF 003
surrounded himself with insiders who carry out his wishes without consulting others, thus allowing Clegg to avoid direct confrontation, a trait some party members have pointed out to us as one of his failings (reftel). According to Opik, Clegg's thin skin also showed itself during the lead-up to the March 5 fiasco, when Clegg derided one of Opik's suggestions in front of the Lib Dem cabinet, then adopted it without telling Opik. When Opik confronted Clegg about it, Opik says he was immediately whisked away by a Clegg crony who begged him not to make a scene in public. Opik told us he plans to run for Lib Dem President (a leadership role, but subordinate to Clegg) at the end of the year to give the Lib Dems an alternate voice inside the party.
13. (C/NF) No matter how Clegg ultimately performs, however, XXXXXXXXXXXX told us frankly that, as the third Lib Dem leader in two years, the party has no choice but to make sure he succeeds. "We've got to make this one stick," he said. Moore and Shadow Home Affairs Spokesman Jeremy Brown affirmed to us that there are no alternative leadership candidates to Clegg.
Comment
-------
14. (C/NF) One commentator compared the Lib Dem performance on the Lisbon Treaty referendum to watching a "car crash in slow motion." One could apply that metaphor to the entire last three years, beginning in December 2005 when Charles Kennedy was forced to stand down as leader for alcoholism. There is no question that the Lib Dems were badly hurt by their handling of the Lisbon Treaty referendum, although Clegg's performance at conference appears to have undone some of the damage. And they continue to be worth watching - and not just because the horror of it makes great copy. Despite its ups and downs, the party continues to poll between 15 and 20 percent of the electorate. With Labour at about 33 percent and the Tories at about 40 percent, Nick Clegg could yet be a "kingmaker" in the event of a hung parliament at the next election.
Visit London's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm TUTTLE
Saturday, 20 February 2010, 10:53
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000108
SENSITIVE
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/18/2020
TAGS PREL, NATO, AF, NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: CABINET FALLS OVER AFGHANISTAN
ELECTIONEERING
REF: A. THE HAGUE 097 B. THE HAGUE 15 C. 09 THE HAGUE 758 D. 09 THE HAGUE 663 E. 09 THE HAGUE 271
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Edwin R. Nolan for reasons 1.4 ( b) and (d)
1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: Following a marathon 15 hour Cabinet meeting, the Dutch Cabinet fell around 02:30 a.m., February 20 due to fundamental disagreements and Labor Party (PvdA) posturing ahead of local elections. Conflicts within the governing coalition have prompted several near Cabinet crises over the past several months, as the PvdA butted heads with coalition partner Christian Democrats (CDA) over the Joint Strike Fighter, decision-making during the 2003 Iraq conflict, and now the commitment of military forces to Afghanistan after 2010. PvdA has been trying to rally its base supporters by standing firm against a Netherlands deployment in Uruzgan after 2010. With PM Balkenende submitting his resignation to the Queen, the most likely outcome is new elections and months with a caretaker government. The immediate concern for U.S. interests is the future status of Dutch forces in Uruzgan. According to FM Verhagen's staff Dutch forces will withdraw from Uruzgan in 2010, but it remains to be seen what a caretaker government could do on Afghanistan. Post will work to build support with the Dutch government on future deployment options that will meet Verhagen's stated goal of a "significant Dutch contribution to the NATO mission." END SUMMARY
2. (C) AFGHANISTAN THE LATEST IN A STRING OF IRRITANTS FOR DUTCH CABINET: Frustration among government ministers has been building for the past year (reftel A). In April, the Cabinet almost fell over a dispute over whether to purchase the Joint Strike Fighter test aircraft (reftel E). In the fall of 2009, the governing coalition parties split over a parliamentary resolution asking the Cabinet to pull troops out of Uruzgan in 2010 (reftel D). And in January coalition members bitterly disputed the results of the "Davids Committee Report" on the Dutch government's decision in 2002-2003 to give political support to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq (reftel B). Many of the disputes were prompted by public statements by members of the Cabinet characterizing internal negotiations between the parties. Resolution of the disputes required painstaking negotiations. In the JSF dispute, as well as debates over increasing the retirement age and approving the Lisbon Treaty, PvdA leader (and Deputy PM) Wouter Bos has been portrayed as backing down from his previous positions. These tensions and Bos's weak position set the stage for a showdown on Afghanistan.
3. (C) POSTURING OVER AFGHANISTAN BROUGHT DOWN GOVERNMENT: During the past several weeks, Bos, motivated by perceptions of a weak defense of PvdA positions, has repeatedly and categorically claimed he would stand firm on PvdA's pledge to end the Uruzgan mission in 2010. He has stuck with this pledge even as major newspapers editorialized against moving Dutch troops out of Uruzgan and questioned the logic of his position. In the last two days, newspaper headlines have trumpeted the Afghanistan controversy as a crisis for the government. However, the dispute was prompted more by Bos's electioneering than the virtues of the mission. For example, during an eight-hour parliamentary debate on the evening of Qduring an eight-hour parliamentary debate on the evening of February 18, opposition parties pummeled the coalition government over contradictory statements in early February by D/PM Bos (PvdA) and FM Verhagen (CDA) over whether the entire coalition had discussed and approved a request to NATO for a letter on ISAF's needs in Afghanistan. (Bos had originally denied he had been consulted.) Rather than addressing the needs of Afghanistan, the debate was a dissection of the coalition's decision-making and public statements. Firebrand parliamentarians Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders called Bos a liar. More moderate Alexander Pechtold described the proceedings as akin to watching a divorce. Pechtold's description proved apt as PM Balkenende today announced he would give Queen Beatrix his resignation, which if accepted will be followed by new elections in 1-2 months (see paragraph 5). The coalition-member PvdA insisted on the Cabinet making an immediate decision on the post-2010 Dutch deployment in Afghanistan. PM Balkenende's Christian Democrats (CDA) refused, insisting on more time to weigh options to assist NATO allies. PM Balkenende stated, "We explored today whether trust could be restored--efforts to restore trust between the parties have failed--given the challenges facing the Netherlands, what is needed is strength, not the easy way out."
4. (U) LIKELY OUTCOME: LONG PERIOD OF CARETAKER GOVERNMENT WITH LIMITED AUTHORITY: With the Cabinet's announcement, the PM will submit his resignation along with that of the PvdA Ministers to the Queen. Most likely is that the Queen accepts the resignations, and the government falls. The remaining coalition parties of CDA and CU become a minority caretaker government with limited ability to pursue action on new issues and dependent on ad hoc parliamentary majorities for each proposed law/act. Elections would take place in 1-2 months. The caretaker government continues until the next government is formed, which requires several months of negotiations after the elections. If the Queen refuses the resignations she could appoint an outsider to work with the existing coalition parties to reach an agreement on how to continue to govern through the next scheduled elections in May 2011.
5. (C/NF) IMMEDIATE CONCERN FOR U.S. INTERESTS -- DUTCH FUTURE STATUS IN URUZGAN: FM Verhagen's Chief of Staff Marcel de Vink told us earlier Friday that the Dutch government will be unable to retain troops in Uruzgan after 2010. There's "no way the Dutch forces will stay in Uruzgan . . . that door is locked". Asked about whether the Netherlands would provide force protection for the Uruzgan PRT, De Vink responded that even a minimal level of troops would be hard given the Labor Party's stubborn position. Now, a caretaker government, even without the PvdA, will find it difficult, if not impossible to do anything in Uruzgan other than follow the set policy of withdrawal in 2010.
6. (C/NF) COMMENT: With the building tensions in the Cabinet, the government's fall had become almost certain. Our efforts now turn to supporting FM Verhagen's search for a future Dutch mission in Afghanistan that will make a significant contribution to NATO requirements. END COMMENT. LEVIN
Friday, 26 September 2008, 11:35
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000919
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/25/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AJ, ENRG
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN INCOME TAKES A HIT AS NO SHORT-TERM FIX
LIKELY FOR ACG PRODUCTION PROBLEMS
REF: A. A) BAKU 897 B. B) BAKU 883
Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) SUMMARY. As Operator BP continues to look for the cause of the gas leak in its offshore ACG oil mega-field that has resulted in slashed oil production (reftels), possibilities center on either a failure in one of the wells or damage in the underlying geologic formation. A quick fix is unlikely in either scenario, meaning that at least for the short-term, GOAJ revenues from the ACG field, its major hard currency earner, will be seriously decreased. At least some ACG partners are not pleased with BP's handling of this incident, and GOAJ displeasure with BP will certainly increase if it turns out that the gas leak was due to operator error. END SUMMARY.
CHAIN OF EVENTS
2. (C) ACG Operator BP has been exceptionally circumspect in disseminating information about the ACG gas leak, both to the public and to its ACG partners. However, after talking with BP and other sources, Embassy has pieced together the following picture:
- On September 17 bubbles appeared in the waters around the Central Azeri (CA) Platform, one of the major platforms in Azerbaijan's offshore ACG oil mega-field and the platform's gas detector alarm went off, signaling the presence of abnormally high levels of gas in the water around the platform (reftel).
- Shortly thereafter, a related gas-reinjection well (B-17) for Central Azeri had a blowout, expelling water, mud and gas.
- The BP Offshore Installation Manager decided to evacuate the platform, sounding the "muster" alarm at 0900 hours, evacuating the 211 workers on the CA Platform.
- BP then shut in production at the Central Azeri field and the Eastern Azeri field. Shortly thereafter production from the Western Azeri field was also shut down for putatively unrelated reasons (problems with a generator), with an overall decrease in daily production from approximately 900,000 to 250,000 bpd (overall ACG production has subsequently increased to 300,000 bpd).
- There have been no visible signs of gas noted on the water's surface since September 19 (which does not mean gas is no longer flowing). However, the ROV has noted small holes and bubbling on the seabed floor.
POSSIBLE CAUSES
3. (C) According to Embassy interlocutors, there are three possible causes for this leak (in order of increasing severity and longer times needed to fix):
- Leak in a Gas Flowline: this was the least likely cause (and the easiest to fix), since a flowline pressure drop would have been detected. BP has subsequently ruled out flowline problems as the source.
- Well Failure: Simply put, this is operator error, most likely a bad cement job around a well, or a split casing, causing a gas leak. The fact that surface bubbling was no longer noticed shortly after well production was shut down indicates that well failure might be the cause. If this is the cause, repair could take weeks or months, and one or some wells would have to be plugged in and subsequently re-drilled.
- Formation Damage: A geologic event in the sub-seafloor around the platform, to include a sea breach of the oil/gas formation (possibly due to the operator's failure to maintain formation pressure above the 'bubble point,' which would allow the gas trapped in the oil to change from liquid to gaseous form, and thus permeate the overlying rock formation), or fracturing of faulting of the undersea formation. Shallow gas (i.e. gas under the subsea floor but above the geologic formation) and/or a mud volcano could also be causes, although according to existing data the nearest
BAKU 00000919 002 OF 003
known mud volcano is 1.5 kilometers away from the CA Platform. If formation damage is the leak's cause, the length of time needed to fix the problem, if indeed it can be fixed, will be substantial.
ACTIONS TAKEN
4. (C) BP's have pursued a multiprong strategy of data acquisition to determine the gas leak's cause, to include:
- Review of existing well data, to include the cement logs (for when the cement around the well casings was poured, to see if a faulty cement job is the cause)
-Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) surveys: BP has done and will continue to conduct underwater ROV surveys around Central Azeri.
- Reboard of CA Platform: Experts from Boots and Coots will seek to re-board the CA Platform on September 27 to, inter alia, take gas samples (biogenic gas would indicate a shallow gas source, i.e. gas from just the under subsea floor but above the formation; formation gas would indicate formation damage). Subsequent platform re-boards for investigative purposes will continue consist with safety procedures.
- Side-scan sonar, measuring up to 50 meters below the sea floor, to detect the possible presence of shallow gas.
SHALLOW SEISMIC SURVEY?
5. (C) If BP is not able to determine the cause by the above methods, it will have to conduct a shallow seismic survey, which measures up to one thousand meters below the sea floor, and the undertaking of which is, in the words of one source "a big deal." . (Comment: The geologic formation under CA is six to eleven thousand feet below the sea floor). Conducting this survey and processing the data would take at minimum until early November.
PRODUCTION ESTIMATES
6. (C) Current ACG production has plummeted from 900,000 bpd to 300,000 bpd. BP has said that the West Azeri Platform, currently shut down due to problems with its electrical generator, will be producing again on November 1, adding another 100,000 bpd to the existing 300,000 bpd. Consequently at least some ACG partners are being forced to seriously revise downwards production estimates for (at least) the remaining months of 2008, with no one currently having any clear idea as to how long this decreased production will continue.
SOCAR CONCERNS
7. (C) BP has told Embassy that it is keeping SOCAR informed as to its findings, and that SOCAR is seeking to "plug in" its own experts with those in BP working the issue. SOCAR Marketing VP Elshad Nasirov told EnergyOff on September 25 that SOCAR was concerned about delivery disruptions. There is an approximate one month lag time between arranging for the sale of oil at Ceyhan and the arrival of the vessel to pick up the oil, meaning that there are vessels steaming towards Ceyhan now to pick up oil that SOCAR (who is currently responsible for marketing 80 percent of the ACG gas) cannot deliver. SOCAR is concerned about the demurrage fines and the penalties to be charged by buyers and refineries. Nasirov said that it was his understanding that SOCAR can declare force majeure only if the cause were a natural one (such as an underwater mud volcano); if the problem resulted from ACG Operator error (such as BP erring when pouring concrete around the well), he didn't think that SOCAR would be able to declare force majeure.
LOST INCOME
8. (C) When asked to hazard a guess as to how much money the GOAJ was losing as a result of this incident, knowledgeable Embassy interlocutors have estimated approximately USD 45 million each day (600,000 barrels per day at approximately USD 100 per barrel equals 60 million, minus Capex/Opex, times 0.80 percent, since the GOAJ gets 80 percent of the profit oil).
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COMMENT:
9. (C) The ACG field is the GOAJ's main revenue-earner, and it is likely that this event is going to seriously impact its income stream in (at best) the short-term. Additionally, President Aliyev is likely to see this as the latest in a series of disappointments from BP, at a time when he is seeking to develop ACG Deep Gas and other Azerbaijan hydrocarbon assets. At least some of BP's ACG partners are similarly upset with BP's performance in this episode, as they claim BP has sought to limit information flow about this event even to its ACG partners. Although it is too early to ascertain the cause, if in fact this production shut-down was due to BP technical error, and if it continues for months (as seems possible), BP's reputation in Azerbaijan will take a serious hit. There have been no indications that the problems were caused by anything other than operator error or a geological problem. DERSE
Friday, 11 July 2008, 09:30
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000671
ANKARA OR ISTANBUL - PLS PASS TO SE GRAY
EO 12958 DECL: 07/13/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AJ, ENRG, TU
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN SCENESETTER FOR JULY 14 VISIT OF
SPECIAL ENVOY C. BOYDEN GRAY
REF: A. A) BAKU 494 B. B) ASHBABAT 817 C. C) ANKARA 1172
Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Your second visit to Baku comes on the heels of your early June participation in the Fifteenth Annual Caspian Oil and Gas Exhibition and Conference (ref A), and your subsequent early July letter to President Aliyev providing input for next steps we can take together to pursue joint USG-GOAJ energy goals of a viable gas transit regime through Turkey, enhanced GOAJ-GOTX energy cooperation, and effective EU outreach to Azerbaijan. The GOAJ is pleased with the increased USG engagement on energy. We have heard that President Aliyev was very pleased with the congratulatory letter from President Bush that you read during the opening COGS ceremony. SOCAR Vice-President Elshad Nassirov, a key energy advisor to President Aliyev with whom you will meet in the absence of SOCAR President Rovnag Abullayev, relayed Azerbaijan's enthusiasm about the "next steps" letter you sent to President Aliyev, and is working with the President to discuss it with you.
TURKEY
---------
2. (C) President Aliyev will be very interested in your just completed visit to Turkey. As you are aware, Azerbaijan's desire to conclude sales and purchase agreements for Shah Deniz Phase Two (SD2) gas with European customers has been held up for over a year by an inability to secure gas transit through Turkey. Solving transit for SD2 gas through Turkey is also linked both to selling volumes of SD2 gas to Turkey, and to renegotiations for the price of Shah Deniz Phase One gas currently being sold to Turkey. Turkey has said it seeks "all" of SD2's approximately 13 billion cubic meters annually (bcm/a) for its domestic needs, but will settle for 8 bcm/a. However, Azerbaijan wishes to sell it no more than 4 bcm/a so that 6 bcm/a of SD2 gas remains to sell to Europe, enough to sanction one pipeline project (SOCAR assumes that 3 bcm/a of SD2 will go for domestic use and/or Georgia).
3. (C) The Shah Deniz Consortium's commercial negotiations with the three pipeline projects competing for SD2 gas (TAP, Nabucco TGI) are at a standstill until transit through Turkey is solved, and the GOAJ continues a policy of seeking to persuade intermediaries such as the EU, USG and various commercial companies vying for SD2 gas to put pressure on Turkey to provide commercially viable transit. In this regard, Azerbaijan seeks to persuade Turkey that "Azerbaijan has options" for SD2 gas that don't require transit through Turkey, to include Russia, Iran, and a "Nabucco without Turkey" option that re-routes Nabucco from Georgia across the Black Sea to Bulgaria.
TURKMENISTAN
----------------------
4. (C) Although bilateral relations between the two countries have improved significantly due to Azerbaijan's diplomatic outreach to President Berdimuhamedov since the latter's accession, currently joint cooperation over offshore energy development seems dependent upon resolving the status of the offshore Serder-Kyapaz field. The GOTX seeks GOAJ acknowledgement of full Turkmen ownership of this field in exchange for the GOTX dropping its claims on the ACG field. Given such acknowledgement, the GOTX would be willing to ship S-K production through Azerbaijan. However, Azerbaijan seeks at least minority S-K ownership, while repeating its assertion that any discussion of ACG status is "off the table."
5. (C) There is ongoing cooperation between the two countries in preparation for an early September joint Energy Exhibition and Conference focusing on joint reserves to be held in Baku. This is a seminal event in growing Azerbaijan-Turkmen relations, and we will want to be as supportive as possible. In this regard, SOCAR has asked whom from the US Government should be invited to this joint exhibition and conference, asking if it would be possible for Secretary Rice to come. SOCAR has also asked for USG input as to what US-based organizations should be invited to this joint GOAJ-GOTX September conference (mentioning OPIC as one possibility).
EU
---
6. (C) SOCAR has expressed concerns about European Commission (EC)proposals it has indirectly heard about, to include EC attempts to link gas transit through Turkey with energy sector development in Turkmenistan (ref C - "Caspian Development Corporation." SD Consortium member StatoilHydro also expressed grave misgivings about such reftel plans during a July 10 meeting with Ambassador Derse-septel.) On another matter, SOCAR (along with SD Consortium member StatoilHydro) have expressed a "level of comfort" with EU verbal assurances to allow joint marketing of SD2 gas into Europe, so while they would also welcome a written guarantee, they don't deem it essential.
TRANSIT OF KAZAKH OIL
----------------------
7. (C) Much as a transparent and commercially viable gas transit regime through Turkey is essential to attract both Azerbaijan and eastern Caspian gas westwards, so too is a transparent and commercially viable oil transit arrangement through Azerbaijan essential to attract TengizChevroil (TCO) and expected Kashagan volumes. Azerbaijan needs to be reminded that North Caspian shippers seek secure, safe, predictable and transparent long-term arrangements for transit of oil through Azerbaijan before they can commit to shipping volumes westwards, and that they too have "other options."
BP-GOAJ RELATIONS
-----------------
8. (C) Finally, you should be aware of the current status of negotiations between the AIOC Consortium headed by BP (responsible for the ACG field, which provides the bulk of GOAJ income) and the GOAJ. The Consortium is seeking extension of the current Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) so that it can make the necessary investments to increase oil recovery from this mega-field. It also seeks the rights to develop "ACG Deep Gas," which is a major source of undeveloped gas lying under the area currently being developed by the AIOC Consortium. However, there has been no progress on these issues for a while, as the GOAJ is unwilling to discuss them until it resolves the following issues with AIOC:
- Zero Balance Date (ZBD): Under the current BTC PSA, after the BTC Consortium loses ownership of the pipeline in 2026, the Consortium members still reserve the rights to ship their oil at a discount through the pipeline. Additionally, SOCAR is sorely grieved by a PSA clause which decreases GOAJ ownership of the BTC pipeline after ZBD as Northern Caspian (Kazakh) crude volumes through BTC increase. SOCAR wants full ownership of BTC after ZBD, with the right to charge whatever tariffs it wishes.
- Total Transportation Costs (TTC): In the current PSA there is a link between the cost of transportation and the split of profit oil, which can swing the profit split at most five percent. TTC calculations stretched out until 2016 make a significant potential difference in revenue split, and SOCAR wants to revisit this issue. SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev has been emboldened by his success in handling of the "rate of return" dispute, which dealt with the timing of when the various shifts in splitting profit oil were to occur. XXXXXXXXXXXX
- Baku-Supsa: The Baku-Supsa pipeline, with a capacity of 100 to 150 thousand barrels a day, is currently under AIOC Consortium ownership and control, but SOCAR and the GOAJ want it for themselves so that they can set tariffs and ship volumes as they see fit. DERSE
Monday, 25 January 2010, 07:59
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000192
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON
EO 12958 DECL: 01/25/2030
TAGS PREL, PGOV, TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR ENGAGES PRIVY COUNCIL CHAIR
PREM, OTHER "ESTABLISHMENT" FIGURES ON YEAR AHEAD
REF: BANGKOK 184 (SEH DAENG)
BANGKOK 00000192 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d)
1. (S) Summary: Ambassador paid a series of New Year's-related calls on influential Thai figures, including Privy Council Chair GEN Prem, Privy Council member ACM Siddhi, and former PM Anand, to discuss the year ahead. Abhisit's performance, issues related to the royal family, and challenges posed by Thaksin/Hun Sen emerged as the primary themes. Prem offered a more positive assessment of Abhisit's performance than Siddhi, who criticized Abhisit for a lack of resolve and the absence of an effective team to carry out his policies. All three focused on the challenge posed by Thaksin to the government and, indirectly, to the monarchy; Anand attributed part of the King's poor health to Thaksin, and both Prem and Siddhi were upset about Thaksin's alliance of convenience with Cambodian leader Hun Sen. All three had quite negative comments about Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn. While asserting that the Crown Prince will become King, both Siddhi and Anand implied the country would be better off if other arrangements could be made. Siddhi expressed preference for Princess Sirindhorn; Anand suggested only the King would be in a position to change succession, and acknowledged a low likelihood of that happening.
2. (S) Comment: On the two most difficult and sensitive issues of the day in Thailand -- Thaksin and the monarchy -- the Thai elite appear as unsure about the future as any other sector of society. The stakes are significant for all sides, and resolution of the political divide and royal succession could still be far over the horizon. Elite concerns about Abhisit in office appear to reflect less on his performance than on general worries about the ultimate resolution of issues. End Summary and Comment.
Mixed Views on Abhisit's performance
------------------------------------
3. (C) Privy Councilor Chair GEN Prem shared his assessments of PM Abhisit, the Crown Prince's relationship with Thaksin, and difficulties dealing with Cambodia/Hun Sen with Ambassador over lunch January 13. Regarding Abhisit, Prem referenced widespread criticism that the PM was too young and not strong enough to be an effective leader in trying times. However, Prem felt that Abhisit had proved in 2009 that he was up to the challenge of doing what was necessary to run a fractious coalition government, no easy task. In addition, there were no other politicians available who were more principled and had more integrity than Abhisit, and Thailand needed such a leader at this point. Prem expressed hope that Thais and foreigners alike would be more patient with Abhisit, who he believed was the right man to serve as premier.
4. (C) Fellow Privy Councilor ACM Siddhi, hosting Ambassador at his home January 11, was more critical of Abhisit than Prem. Siddhi said that he had told Abhisit's father, his own long-time personal physician, that his son needed to be more decisive and "make more friends" in 2010. Abhisit spent too much time at the podium and not enough time assembling an effective team to which he could delegate action and rely on for well-thought out policy initiatives, in Siddhi's view. Abhisit also needed to get out to engage the grassroots, one of Thaksin's strengths. On Siddhi's wish list: Abhisit pushing through a permanent appointment for Acting Police Chief Pratheep; using his power over wayward coalition parties by threatening parliamentary dissolution if they did not get in line; and telling the Army to take action to dismiss renegade MGEN Khattiya, even if Defense Minister Prawit refused to sign a dismissal order.
Political Year Ahead
--------------------
5. (C) While GEN Prem expressed moderate concern about the potential for violence and political discord in early 2010, he felt the situation was no worse than six months ago. Prem asked about U.S. laws regarding demonstrations and avoiding
BANGKOK 00000192 002.2 OF 003
excessive disruptions of government functions and daily lives of citizens; Ambassador explained the U.S. system of permits for protests which allowed for free speech but not free access everywhere. Ambassador shared U.S. frustration about decisions negatively affecting economic/investment climate, such as Ma Tha Phut and the digital lottery cancellation; the uneven application of the rule of law, breaches of contract, and regulatory shifts affected the investment climate more negatively at this point than political turmoil.
6. (C) ACM Siddhi expressed more concerns than Prem about the security situation in 2010, suggesting that Army Commander Anupong's inability to control wayward red-affiliated MGEN Khattiya's M-79 attacks on yellow-shirt rallies and trips to see Thaksin overseas was not a good harbinger (note: three days later, someone attacked Anupong's office at night with an M-79, with Khattiya widely seen as the likely suspect, see reftel. End note). Siddhi said he had higher hopes for deputy Commander Prayuth, widely expected to replace Anupong in October and seen as particularly close to the Queen. Siddhi claimed Prem had sent a signal of his displeasure with Anupong by snubbing him during a group call at Prem's residence to pass birthday greetings, not stopping to talk to Anupong personally as he did with other key military commanders.
Royal Family: King, Crown Prince, Entourages
--------------------------------------------
7. (S) Regarding King Bhumibol's health, Prem indicated that the King was exercising 30 minutes a day on a stationary bicycle at Siriraj Hospital and passing a medicine ball with a physical therapist to build up strength and regain weight. Prem acknowledged that he had not seen the King since the hospitalization, but that the Queen and Princess Sirindhorn saw the King daily. When Ambassador asked about the Crown Prince's involvement, Prem repeated: the Queen and Sirindhorn visit him daily.
8. (S) Prem acknowledged Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn probably maintained some sort of relationship with fugitive former PM Thaksin, "seeing him from time to time." Prem, clearly no fan of either man, cautioned that Thaksin ran the risk of self-delusion if he thought that the Crown Prince would act as his friend/supporter in the future merely because of Thaksin's monetary support; "he does not enjoy that sort of relationship." When Ambassador asked where the Crown Prince was currently, in Thailand or Europe, Prem replied dismissively: "You know his social life, how he is." (Note: a presumed reference to Vajiralongkorn's preference to spend time based out of Munich with his main mistress, rather than in Thailand with his wife and son).
9. (S) ACM Siddhi, in a similar vein, noted that the Crown Prince frequently slipped away from Thailand, and that information about his air hostess mistresses was widely available on websites; he lamented how his former aide, now Thai Ambassador to Germany, was forced to leave Berlin for Munich often to receive Vajiralongkorn. Siddhi raised Thaksin's controversial November Times On-line interview, which Siddhi claimed cast the King in a bad light and attempted to praise the Crown Prince as broad-minded and educated abroad, hinting that Vajiralongkorn would be ready to welcome Thaksin back to Thailand once he became King.
10. (S) Ambassador mentioned to Siddhi the Crown Prince's more engaging approach in the early December King's Birthday reception with Ambassadors, shaking each envoy's hand and appearing more at ease than in the 2008 reception. Siddhi stated that succession would be a difficult transition time for Thailand. According to Palace Law, the Crown Prince would succeed his father, but added after a pause, almost hopefully: "if the Crown Prince were to die, anything could happen, and maybe Prathep (Sirindhorn) could succeed."
11. (S) Ambassador similarly raised the Crown Prince's more confident demeanor with former PM Anand in late December, seeking Anand's assessment of the dynamics in play as succession inevitably drew nearer. Anand's response was
BANGKOK 00000192 003.2 OF 003
similar to Siddhi's, but more detailed and blunt. Anand said that he had always believed that the Crown Prince would succeed his father, according to law. However, there could be complicating factors -- if Vajiralongkohn proved unable to stay out of politics, or avoid embarrassing financial transactions. After a pause, Anand added that the consensus view among many Thai was that the Crown Prince could not stop either, nor would he be able, at age 57, to rectify his behavior. After another pause, Anand added that someone really should raise the matter with the King, before adding with regret that there really was no one who could raise such a delicate topic (note: implied was the need for an alternative to Vajiralongkorn).
12. (S) ACM Siddhi expressed his personal concern about the declining image of the royal family in Thailand, noting that something as simple as excessive motorcade-related traffic jams caused by minor royals was an unnecessary but enduring irritant. Personal Private Secretary Arsa Sarasin had raised this with the King about eight years ago, according to Siddhi, and the King had agreed, authorizing Arsa to talk to royal family members and to set up new rules limiting entourages and occasions when traffic would be stopped. Nothing had changed; Siddhi noted that he had been caught up in traffic for 45 minutes the previous week returning for a meeting with the Chinese Ambassador, due to a royal motorcade. Stories that the Crown Prince now ordered second story windows closed as his motorcade passed achieved nothing but additional popular resentment, Siddhi added sorrowfully.
Thaksin and Hun Sen
-------------------
13. (C) Thaksin clearly remained on the mind of all three "establishment" figures. Former PM Anand asserted that the King's health and mood remained poor "primarily because of Thaksin" and the challenge Thaksin posed to the stability of the country. GEN Prem asked Ambassador what the U.S. would do in the situation Thailand found itself, with a neighboring country appointing as an adviser a former leader bent on bringing down the government. Ambassador replied that while former U.S. Presidents did occasionally give paid speeches overseas, they would never work for another government; he advised Prem and Thai officials to take the high road in their public comments about Cambodia, and not to be drawn into a tit for tat with Thaksin and Hun Sen. (Note: Prem seemed to be musing out loud, but he clearly was focused on what he perceived as a threat from Thaksin and Hun Sen's facilitation of Thaksin's efforts).
14. (C) ACM Siddhi said that PM Abhisit had called him on his 90th birthday recently and had indicated that now that Thailand was no longer ASEAN Chair, Abhisit would feel less constrained in responding to Hun Sen's bullying rhetoric more freely. Siddhi expressed concern that in addition to Cambodia and Brunei, clearly in Thaksin's camp due to his close personal ties with Hun Sen and the Brunei Sultan, Laos and Vietnam might back Hun Sen in the ongoing Thai-Cambodia diplomatic spat.
15. (C) ACM Siddhi attacked Thaksin as trying to use money, red-shirt protests, and Hun Sen to "destroy our country," but he predicted Thaksin would not succeed. Thaksin never had tried to negotiate, Siddhi alleged, but only issued demands; had he been willing to come back and spend a nominal time in jail for his conviction, Thaksin likely would have been quickly pardoned/released as a former PM. Now Thaksin would try to create chaos, possibly sparking the use of force. While Siddhi expected Thaksin to lose the February 26 decision on his 76 billion baht ($2.3 billion) in frozen assets, he claimed his sources indicated Thaksin still had 240 billion baht ($7.3 billion) overseas. Rather than live overseas quietly, Thaksin had decided to fight, funding websites attacking the King and Queen to stir up anti-monarchy views. JOHN
Tuesday, 05 December 2006, 15:44
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001771
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR DAS BRYZA
EO 12958 DECL: 12/04/2016
TAGS ENRG, GA, PGOV, PREL, TU, AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: PRESIDENT ALIYEV ON UPCOMING GAS
TRILATERAL
REF: BAKU 1720
Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (U) ACTION REQUEST: Please see Paragraph 10.
2. (C) SUMMARY: President Aliyev told the Ambassador on December 5 that he expected the December 8 Trilateral meeting of Energy Ministers in Tbilisi to "clarify" whether Turkey was willing to help Georgia with its winter gas problems. He said Azerbaijan would host a subsequent December 14 meeting in Baku among Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, plus BP and Statoil. Aliyev again blamed BP for linking commercial issues to the current gas problems, and reported that "nothing had changed" in Azerbaijan,s gas negotiations with Russia during Russia PM Fradkov,s visit to Baku. END SUMMARY.
3. (C) On December 5 the Ambassador met with President Aliyev and discussed both energy and press freedom issues (septel). Energyoff was notetaker.
Russian PM Fradkov Visit Readout
--------------------------------------------
4. (C) Concerning the just concluded visit to Baku of Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, Aliyev said that "nothing had changed" concerning the Gazprom offer of gas to Azerbaijan at 1.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) at USD 230 per thousand cubic meters (mcm). Aliyev said that Russia knows Azerbaijan will not buy at this price, which would be more expensive than Azerbaijan's burning mazut in its power plants. Aliyev said that he did not even seek to raise the issue with Fradkov, but that Fradkov had broached it. Aliyev said that Fradkov contended that the Gazprom offer was not "anti-Azerbaijan," and was purely a commercial decision, but Aliyev added that Gazprom's sales of gas to Ukraine at USD 130 per mcm belies this claim. Aliyev said that Russia justifies its lower gas sales price to Armenia by its being Armenia's close ally and by purchase of the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline, by which, he said, Russia seeks to control strategic future gas export routes to Europe. Russia was trying to "circle the European gas market," which also was influencing its negotiations with Belarus, but here too there has not been an agreement on sales price.
5. (C) Aliyev said that Fradkov also proposed that Russia could help Azerbaijan in transporting its gas to third countries, although Aliyev told the Ambassador his response was that he did not see how such 'help' would be possible. Fradkov told Aliyev that Russia was going to need more gas for domestic use, which would reduce volumes it could sell to Europe. Aliyev said that Russia was working with Algeria to form a gas monopoly.
Gas Trilat
------------
6. (C) The Ambassador said she knew that Aliyev had had a good discussion with DAS Bryza on energy issues in Minsk and with Georgian PM Noghaideli when he visited Baku on November 30, and that based on the latter meeting there was going to be a trilateral meeting of the Turkish, Georgian and Azerbaijani Energy Ministers in Tbilisi on December 8. Aliyev said Georgian and Azerbaijan shared a common strategic vision on energy issues, would be coordinating closely in this regard, and as such, during Noghaideli's December 4-14 visit to the United States he would be delivering an Azerbaijani message as well as a Georgian one (Comment: The Georgian Ambassador told the Ambassador on December 5 that in his US visit Georgian PM Noghaideli would ask Secretary Rice and Vice-President Cheney to "encourage" BP to help this winter). Aliyev said that he had expected the Turkish and Georgian governments to have had positive discussions prior to Noghaideli's November 30 visit to Baku but that this did not happen, and that the answer Georgia received from Turkey at that time concerning redistribution of Shah Deniz gas was negative, and contrary to the common understanding arrived at in July 2006 among the leaders of the three countries.
BAKU 00001771 002 OF 003
Aliyev said he felt that "the Turkish approach was not sincere," and as such Azerbaijan and Georgia needed to coordinate tactics and strategy. At a recent high-level meeting of his government Aliyev said he stressed his commitment to the longer-term strategic project of delivering Caspian gas to Europe and that "Azerbaijan should not sacrifice its long-term energy strategy for day-to-day needs." Azerbaijan's strategic goal, which Aliyev said was currently more important for Europe than it was for Azerbaijan, was to enter European markets. Putin is saying that Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan cannot supply gas to Europe - "if we don't do it, we lose the battle." As such, Azerbaijan has put forward the best possible solution for the short-term gas crunch: some gas for Georgia, some for Turkey, some for Azerbaijan, and some for Greece.
7. (C) The Ambassador said that the Georgians have been led to believe that the Turkish government is going to be more positive in the December 8 Tbilisi meeting, although she could not confirm this assessment (Comment: the Georgian Ambassador told the Ambassador on December 5 that Georgia's Embassy in Ankara has reported that the Turkish Foreign Ministry is saying that Turkey is now ready to discuss redistributing its 2007 Shah Deniz gas volumes) . She said that DAS Bryza has suggested that after the December 8 trilateral, it might be useful to have another trilateral meeting on December 14 in Baku with the inclusion of BP and Statoil, and she asked the President for his opinion. Aliyev said that "we don't have time to wait," noting that the winter holidays were fast approaching. He said he approved the proposed December 14 meeting -- trilateral plus BP and Statoil -- and would be willing for Baku to host it. He added that he had wanted Baku to host the December 8 meeting, but deferred to the Georgian desire to have it in Tbilisi. He said USG involvement in the December 14 meeting would be useful. He said that the December 8 Tbilisi meeting would be very important as it would 'clarify' the Turkish position, i.e. whether they were willing to help, and that the December 14 meeting would be similarly important as it would clarify whether BP was willing to help.
BP's Dangerous Game
----------------------------
8. (C) Aliyev said that BP could deliver more associated gas from the ACG field to Azerbaijan for domestic use, but that it was linking its cooperation in this regard with its desire to extend its Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) with Azerbaijan to develop ACG deep gas. Aliyev said it was inappropriate for BP to link all of its issues such as PSA extension, ACG deep gas, transportation tariff agreements and others into one bundle; it also was inappropriate for BP to link the solution of those issues to Azerbaijan's "temporary troubles." He said that BP was using "mild blackmail" and argued that BP must instead act in good faith. Aliyev said that he had instructed his officials to tell BP that if it were not "supportive" with ACG associated gas, it would not get its way with PSA extension and ACG deep gas. "If BP won't give us more ACG associated gas, I have instructed our officials to tell them no PSA extensions or ACG deep gas," Aliyev underscored. He said that he did not want this to happen, since from an economic viewpoint both the AIOC Consortium and Azerbaijan would benefit from extending the PSA and for the Consortium being the ones to develop ACG deep gas. But it was not just Azerbaijan, but also Europe and Georgia who had a stake in this issue. Aliyev concluded by saying that if Turkey agreed to redistribute its 2007 Shah Deniz gas that "would almost be the way out," but that then Azerbaijan would still need BP support in both redistributing this Shah Deniz gas and also in giving Azerbaijan more ACG associated gas.
9. (C) The President also mused that "we could cut the gas supply to Turkey" if need be. The Ambassador pointed out that this would be an extreme measure with serious repercussions. She asked Aliyev if he knew the reasons for Turkish truculence concerning gas redistribution. He said he did not, but suspected it could be monetary, i.e. buying gas at USD 120 per mcm and selling it at USD 230. He also
BAKU 00001771 003 OF 003
conjectured that Turkey could be under serious pressure from Russia.
10. ACTION REQUEST: Ambassador will meet with BP Azerbaijan President Bill Schrader December 8. Department's guidance, particularly information on the message being delivered to BP officials in Washington, is requested. DERSE
Monday, 23 March 2009, 09:27
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000791
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/20/2029
TAGS PGOV, PREL, MOPS, MARR, PTER, IZ, EPET, EFIN
SUBJECT: CDA, CG AND PM DISCUSS EVOLVING SECURITY CONCERNS,
THE BUDGET, OIL CONTRACTS; CDA DELIVERS DEMARCHE ON CAMP ASHRAF
REF: A. SECSTATE 26167 B. BAGHDAD 00442
Classified By: Charge d' Affairs Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d)
1. (S) Summary: In a meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki on March 19, Charge d' Affaires (CDA) Butenis and Commanding General MNC-I Lieutenant General (LTG) Austin discussed evolving security concerns, politics surrounding the budget, efforts to capture former Sons of Iraq (SOI) leader Adel Mashadani, and asked about the way ahead for reforms to improve management of hydrocarbons; additionally, the CDA delivered a demarche on Camp Ashraf (REF A) to which the PM acknowledged the sensitivity of the issue but emphasized the domestic Iraqi pressure as well as specific threats from Iran that he faces on the Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK) residents of Camp Ashraf. He said, however, that they would not be harmed, that he would abide by the humanitarian assurances provided to the USG, and that he would not forcibly remove anyone to Iran - even those suspected of crimes - but that they could not remain in Iraq. LTG Austin noted vast improvements in the security environment over the last year, commenting that the GOI's operation in Basra last March was a pivotal moment in Iraq's history. The PM remarked that "maintaining victory is much more difficult than achieving victory," noting that Iraqi security forces must adapt to new threats posed by smaller clandestine terrorists cells and emphasized that intelligence would be key to this end. In response to the CDA's query about payments due to General Electric for power generation contracts, the PM said that the contracts would be paid even if it had to come out of their own salaries. LTG Austin expressed his gratitude to the PM for resolving budget problems related to payment of the SOI, to which the PM responded that the COR is playing political games with the budget. With regard to hydrocarbons, the PM asked for the U.S. position on direct contracts with U.S. firms and on U.S. firms developing cross border fields on the Iran border. End Summary.
2. (S) LTG Austin informed the PM that General Odierno was in Jordan and asked about the PM's recent trip to Australia. The PM said that the trip was productive, but noted that it was very long. The position of the Australian government is a very good one, he reiterated.
----------------------------
An Evolving Security Threat
----------------------------
3. (S) LTG Austin reminded the PM that this time last year they were in Basra, adding that "so much has changed since then." Basra was a defining point in Iraq's history, he told the PM. The PM agreed, commenting that "maintaining victory is much more difficult than achieving victory." The PM said that "they (insurgents/terrorists) are still out there," but they have lost control of the cities and have become "gangs" that move from one area to the next. "We need to build our intelligence capability to track these clandestine gangs." The time of armed confrontations (battles) is over, he said. "We have to adjust our forces to counter this new threat and intelligence will play a key role in this," al-Maliki warned. He questioned whether or not existing plans or strategies, e.g., focusing on checkpoints, are still applicable. "We have to evolve our forces to compensate for the changing security environment and emerging threats," he said.
4. (S) LTG Austin said that the PM and General Odierno are of Q4. (S) LTG Austin said that the PM and General Odierno are of a like mind on this matter. He remarked that the Iraqi Police (IP) would need to assume a greater responsibility for internal security, while the Iraq Army (IA) would focus on external threats. The PM quickly responded that the IA plays a critical role in ongoing security operations and would continue to do so, particularly in light of the drawdown of U.S. forces. "There is no substitute for the IA in a security role," he said. "I don't want to risk withdrawing the IA, particularly in light of the drawdown of U.S. forces," he reiterated. Perhaps, he said, this will happen after we ensure that the insurgents and al-Qaida Iraq (AQI) will not come back.
5. (S) The PM said that "we must continue to develop the police." They need weapons and equipment and additional training in combating terrorism. There have also been some problems within the IP, noting the recent arrest of a "gang" within the passport office that was taking bribes for counterfeiting passports (photo-substitution) of suspected former Ba'ath Party members. He said that the police taking bribes is a serious problem that undermines security in Iraq.
BAGHDAD 00000791 002 OF 003
"Terrorists can use our passports to move around freely with absolute anonymity." LTG Austin responded that the IP is twice as large as the IA and that it would take some more time to develop, acknowledging that the IA is far more capable at present. PM al-Maliki responded that the IP would eventually assume responsibility for internal security, allowing the IA to focus on external threats.
--------------------------------
Politics and the Budget Process
--------------------------------
6. (S) LTG Austin thanked the PM for his help with the SOI. "I thought that there would be more problems with them getting paid, but it now seems to have been resolved," LTG Austin remarked. The PM said that the COR may have been playing political games with the budget and that he had taken money from the MOI's budget to pay the salaries of the SOI. The COR is trying to sabotage our efforts, he said. The CDA took this opportunity to ask about the GOI's plan to fund this year's payments to GE on the contract signed last year for electrical generators. The PM assured the CDA that the payments would be made, even if the money had to come from their own salaries. The PM said that "we can not sacrifice electricity (referring to the GE contract), or security, of which the SOI are an important part, even if we have to cut the budget in other areas."
---------------------------------
Former SOI Leader Adel Mashadani
---------------------------------
7. (S) Updating the PM on the status of former SOI leader Adel Mashadani (REF B), XXXXXXXXXXXX. The PM responded that he is running out of patience on this matter and that it had already taken too long. He said that Mashadani's presence is a direct challenge to the GOI. He said that "we must develop a plan that minimizes collateral damage but has some acceptable risk," comparing the situation to Basra. This is a big problem, the PM said. "I will have our special forces and intelligence units work out a strategy and present it to you, we don't want to wait too long," al-Maliki advised. LTG Austin said that they are already working with Iraqi Special Forces units in the area, noting they had recently collaborated to arrest two suspected AQI operatives in Fadhel. "We will work with your forces to develop a plan, but we want to be cautious," LTG Austin said.
8. (S) The PM was insistent that we not wait too long, fearing that Mashadani might escape or that the GOI would be perceived as being complicit in Mashadani's criminal activity, or worse, that the GOI is incapable of acting against him. The PM said that we have gone after tougher and stronger targets than him, adding that we should not fear him. LTG Austin reiterated that he only wants to minimize casualties but that he understands the PM's concerns.
9. (S) Turning to the CDA, the PM asked about the arrival of Ambassador Hill. The CDA said that Ambassador Hill will have confirmation hearings in the Senate on March 25 and that, hopefully, he would arrive in Iraq sometime in April. The Qhopefully, he would arrive in Iraq sometime in April. The PM asked the CDA if she foresaw any problems. She responded that some Senators had expressed concern with Ambassador Hill's lack of experience in the Middle East and over his negotiations with North Korea. She said that Ambassador Hill had already met with Senators McCain and Graham to address such concerns. She expressed optimism that he would be confirmed by the Senate, noting that he was one of the Department's most accomplished diplomats. The PM said that he had discussed Ambassador Hill with President Obama when they last spoke and that President Obama said that Ambassador Hill "had his complete confidence" and that he is "the right man for the job." The PM told the CDA that "we welcome him to Iraq."
-------------------------------------------
Oil Reform Proposals and Direct Contracts
-------------------------------------------
10. (S) The CDA asked the PM about the status of the reform proposals from the oil symposium hosted by Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh in early March. She said that it was a
BAGHDAD 00000791 003 OF 003
good sign that the government had formalized the symposium's conclusions into recommendations for government decision, and asked if the package would need only COM agreement or would also have to go to the COR for approval. The PM said no, he does not intend for the reform proposals to go to the COR and that he would do everything to avoid this, commenting that the COR would "take us into a political maze," which was completely unnecessary.
11. (S) Sadiq Rikabi, political advisor to the PM, asked the PM to inquire about the USG's position on direct contracts with international oil companies. The PM noted that he is in favor of direct contracts, in order to avoid the delays inherent in a bidding process. The PM said he is currently in negotiations with Chevron to develop various oil fields, to include a cross-border oil field with Iran (NFI). The PM claimed that Chevron had told him that it had already raised the issue of a cross-border development with Tehran as well. (Note: We have no independent confirmation of this; end note.) The PM asked the CDA about the political feasibility of such a deal involving a U.S. firm working both sides of a cross-border field, given current USG policies toward Iran. The CDA noted that U.S. law on sanctions would apply, but added that the Administration was reviewing its policies on Iran. PM al-Maliki said that he prefers to go with Chevron on the deal; however, he remarked that if U.S. rules prevent Chevron from doing this project, he would approach a non-American firm.
--------------------------------------
PM's Response to Demarche on the MEK
--------------------------------------
12. (S) The CDA informed the PM that she had been directed by Washington to deliver a demarche on Camp Ashraf (REF A). The CDA delivered the points in the demarche, without interruption by the PM. The PM then expressed some frustration and questioned why the GOI had to act so responsibly towards a organization determined to be a terrorist group by both Iraq and the U.S.. He noted that this created daily problems within the GOI. He asked the CDA to try to understand the very difficult situation that the GOI was in. "It is not because of Iran," he said. "We have great internal pressures to resolve this matter." The PM noted that he had been around for the last 20 years and knows very well who the MEK are and what they have done. The PM complained "they (MEK) are at the al-Rasheed hotel, meeting with COR members and conspiring against the GOI." He said that Iran had asked how the GOI could support cross border military actions by Turkey against the PKK, but not allow Iran to take similar action against the MEK at Camp Ashraf. He added that he is very concerned about a message delivered by Iran that it would attack the MEK at Camp Ashraf if no action was taken soon. Additionally, al-Maliki asked, given the drawdown of U.S. bases, whether the U.S. could help the GOI to use one of the transferred facilities - far from the Iranian border - as a new location for the MEK. LTG Austin told the PM that he will look into this possibility.
13. (S) The PM reassured the CDA that he would not take any action against the MEK. He said that he would abide by the humanitarian assurances provide by the GOI to the USG. He told the CDA that the GOI would not remove any of the Camp Ashraf residents to any country, including Iran, where they would be harmed. "We will not forcibly return any of them to Qwould be harmed. "We will not forcibly return any of them to Iran, even those suspected of crimes," al-Maliki stated. But, "they must understand that Iraq is not their home." The CDA noted that the European Union had delisted the MEK as a foreign terrorist organization and that we were working with other countries to encourage them to relocate the MEK. PM al-Maliki said that he met with ICRC President Jacob Kellenberger on March 18 who had also raised this issue with him and that they had discussed this issue at length. BUTENIS
Wednesday, 02 July 2008, 06:27
S E C R E T BAKU 000625
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/02/2018
TAGS ENRG, EPET, PTER, MARR, MASS, PBTS, IR, AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN FACES CHALLENGE OF PROTECTING CRITICAL
ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse per 1.4 (b,d)
1. (S) Summary: On June 9-13 an interagency team representing the Global Critical Energy Infrastructure Program (GCEIP) and consisting of representatives from the Department of State, Department of Energy, the Coast Guard, and EUCOM met with a number of government and private industry officials responsible for Azerbaijan's critical energy infrastructure security. The team broached the subject with the GOAJ of the USG providing technical advice on the security of such infrastructure through an agreement by which the GOAJ pays for such assistance. XXXXXXXXXXXX End summary.
DEFINING AZERBAIJAN'S CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
--------------------------------------------- -------
2. (SBU) On June 9-13 an inter-agency team consisting of representatives from the Department of State, Department of Energy, the Coast Guard, and EUCOM met with a number of government and private industry officials from organizations responsible for critical energy infrastructure security in Azerbaijan to include British Petroleum (BP), the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Ministry of National Security (MNS), the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), and the State Special Protection Service (SSPS). XXXXXXXXXXXX
5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX
ONSHORE FACILITIES
-------------------
9. (C) The primary responsibility of the SSPS is to provide security for the President and other high-ranking government officials, but approximately five years ago it was charged with ensuring the security of all onshore critical energy infrastructure. Under the mandate of its Oil and Gas Export Pipelines Security Department with its approximately 1000 employees, the SSPS guards the BTC and gas export pipelines and is responsible for the external security around the Sangachal Terminal, which it coordinates with BP.
10. (C) According to BP's Head of Regional Security in Azerbaijan, "pipeline security is in as good a shape as any pipeline in the world." XXXXXXXXXXXX
11. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX
12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX.
13. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
14. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
15. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX
OFFSHORE FACILITIES
---------------------
16. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX
17. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX
18. (S) According to BP security personnel, the problems with offshore security stem from three main issues - lack of clarity between the Coast Guard and the Navy as to respective areas of responsibility, lack of coordination between the Coast Guard and theNavy, and inadequate equipment and training in both services. Both Admiral Sultanov, who leads Azerbaijan's Navy, and the Deputy Head of the SBS Farhad Tagizade stress that there are efforts underway to improve coordination. A Maritime Security Strategy, which Admiral Sultanov claimed would more clearly delineate responsibility for energy infrastructure, is currently in development, and the two services are working together with the United States to improve their coordination efforts through tabletop exercises. XXXXXXXXXXXX Despite these efforts, Deputy Head of the SBS Tagizade admits that it will take more time for the two services to develop what he called a "mature relationship."
19. (S) BP security officials also cited equipment problems that plague the Navy and Coast Guard. According to BP's head of regional security, the off-the-shelf, commercial anti-collision radar that BP installed on the platforms and provides the Navy is the best one that the Navy currently has. BP officials also claimed that there was a general shortage of boats in both services, making it difficult for them to patrol the areas around the platforms. The boats the services do have tend to be old Soviet-era vessels, built in the 1960s and 70s.XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
DERSE
Thursday, 28 August 2008, 08:57
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000815
SIPDIS
EUR FOR MATT BRYZA; E/EEB FOR SE BOYDAN GRAY, STEVE MANN;
DOE FOR KATHY FREDRIKSEN
EO 12958 DECL: 08/27/2018
TAGS ENRG, EPET, EINT, PREL, AJ, TX, TU, GG
SUBJECT: BP BRIEFS SENATOR LUGAR ON CASPIAN ENERGY
DEVELOPMENTS
REF: A. BAKU 810 B. BAKU 787 C. BAKU 765 D. BAKU 761
Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Summary: The Russia-Georgia conflict, according to BP, may be forcing Azerbaijan to re-examine needs for regional stability and security, perhaps with leaders concluding that a large foreign presence in Azerbaijan and the region is necessary to create an environment of greater security, predictability and dependability. Azerbaijan's overland pipelines are relatively well protected; offshore assets are much more vulnerable. The GOAJ is not well coordinated internally or with regional partners to address emergencies. BP reports that, in their view, the Russians did not target the BTC or Baku-Supsa pipelines in Georgia. However, terrorists were responsible for the BTC explosion earlier this month in Turkey. Future oil and gas projects in the region depend on security of existing infrastructure, particularly BTC. Turkey must now act constructively and come to terms with Azerbaijan on Shah Deniz Phase I pricing and Shah Deniz Phase II volumes for purchase. The Nabucco project may be more realistically pursued on a piecemeal basis, with existing infrastructure patched together in Europe, fed by a "two-country inter-connector" across the Caspian Sea. In BP's analysis, there is a great deal of natural gas in the South Caspian, but "Nabucco may be ten years too early." End Summary
2. (C) BP Azerbaijan President Bill Schrader briefed Senator Richard Lugar and staff on developments in Caspian energy August 25, highlighting the current status of offshore operations and regional transport in light of the ongoing Russia-Georgia conflict and previous disruption of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. BP External Affairs Vice President Seymour Khalilov and BP Vice President for Pipelines and Terminals Rashid Javanshir were also present. Ambassador Derse accompanied Senator Lugar; DCM and Pol-Econ Chief also attended.
Georgia Crisis Changes Azerbaijan's Tune
---------------------------------
3. (C) Schrader noted that BP Managing Director Andy Inglis visited Baku from London the previous week, meeting with President Aliyev, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) and others. The purpose of that visit was supposed to be discussions on BP reinvestment in Azerbaijan's economy; instead, given the ongoing crisis in the Caucasus, regional security concerns dominated the talks. Schrader said that previously Azerbaijan's leadership had been sounding increasingly self-confident -- even arrogant, at times -- and had downplayed the need for foreign investment in the next generation of projects. With events in Georgia, and heightened Russian activity in the Caucasus, Azerbaijan "may now be changing its tune." Schrader suggested that the Russia-Georgia conflict is forcing Azerbaijan to re-examine needs for regional stability and security, with leaders apparently coming to an early conclusion that a large foreign presence in Azerbaijan and the region creates an environment of greater security, predictability and dependability.
Security Concerns Resonate
-----------------------
4. (C) Javanshir said that overland pipeline routes within Azerbaijan are reasonably well protected, with BP leading efforts to monitor. The offshore sector is more vulnerable, as it is much more difficult to protect. XXXXXXXXXXXX Azerbaijan
5. (C) Javanshir said that the BTC explosion and Georgia crisis served as a "wake-up call" for Azerbaijan, which finds itself with few transport options and mounting losses in export revenues. In the opinion of BP, the time has come for
BAKU 00000815 002 OF 003
"less gamesmanship and chess playing" and more serious cooperation among Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
------------------------------
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX
Criticism of Turkey, Acts of Terror
----------------------------
7. (C) BP was also highly critical of Turkey's BOTAS, which built the BTC on Turkish territory as a turn-key project. Construction was delayed and over-budget and BP has always suspected quality-control issues. Moreover, the Turks are responsible for pipeline security, including protection against illegal tapping and terrorism. XXXXXXXXXXXX
Turkey Must Cooperate on Shah Deniz I, II
----------------------------------------
8. (C) Javanshir said that future gas projects, like the trans-Caspian and Nabucco pipelines, "are now dependent on BTC security. If BTC cannot be protected, governments and private investors will not come forward to promote additional Southern Corridor projects." Schrader emphasized that there is "lots of gas in the South Caspian region," between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Time, however, is needed to bring this gas to markets. The Nabucco project "may be ten years too early," Schrader and Javanshir said. In the nearer term, the Turks must realize that they "cannot be greedy." Azerbaijan is willing to sell Turkey approximately 4 billion bcm of Shah Deniz Phase II gas, but a minimum 6-8 bcm, as demanded by Ankara, is not possible.
9. (C) Schrader reported that Shah Deniz Phase II's "technical path" is still on target for 2014. All depends, however, on a commercial deal with Turkey on transit and sales. SOCAR, rather than StatoilHydro, will have the lead on that front. Complicating the matter, however, is ongoing negotiations on sales price under the current (Shah Deniz Phase I) contract. BP underscored the need for Turkey to reach agreement with suppliers on pricing as soon as possible, as contractual terms expired in April. "SOCAR is now selling gas to Turkey at $130 per thousand cubic meter (tcm), while the Russians are shipping gas through Blue Stream at $450/tcm." In all likelihood, Turkey is amassing large debts to SOCAR. BP stressed that negotiations on this issue must be completed by the first quarter of 2009.
ACG Deep Gas Could Be Developed
-----------------------
10. (C) Following the visit of Andy Inglis, BP now sounds relatively optimistic about an extension of the ACG
BAKU 00000815 003 OF 003
production sharing agreement, which would allow the AIOC consortium to extend production of oil at offshore fields (and book the reserves to increase company values). BP also retains hopes of clinching a separate agreement to develop non-associated or "deep gas" at the ACG fields. Azerbaijan had been holding a firm line in negotiations on PSA extension and "deep gas," criticizing BP for Shah Deniz production delays XXXXXXXXXXXX Recent events in Georgia, however, may be causing Azerbaijan to reconsider its line, according to BP's representatives.
More on Nabucco
--------------
11. (C) Schrader noted that Nabucco, as a grand vision, is still rather hard to imagine. A single pipeline -- "a 48-inch pipe" -- running from Turkmenistan to Vienna, may never be realized. Rather, it is more constructive to look at the Nabucco project as a piecemeal project, with "capillaries" connecting existing infrastructure. This could begin in the Caspian, with a "two-country inter-connector" sufficing as a "Trans-Caspian Pipeline." Much of this work has already begun in Central Europe. BP, which has interest in investing in Turkmenistan, now worries that Ashgabat may "get scared off" from such a project because of Russia's actions in Georgia. Returning to the "10 years too early" comment, Schrader and Javanshir expressed confidence that "substantial volumes of gas" would be moving from Turkmenistan's and Azerbaijan's offshore to the West by 2030.
Comment
---------
12. (C) The crisis in Georgia, and the myriad of oil and gas transport problems that resulted from it, has caused Azerbaijan's leadership to reconsider security and energy issues. Aliyev's expressed intention to re-open discussion with BP on PSA and ACG deep gas, after a long period of inaction, is significant, and likely a result of a new appreciation for the security benefits of a significant western presence in the energy sector in the wake of regional developments. Still, we expect Azerbaijan to maintain a tough negotiating line on ACG PSA extension and access to ACG deep gas, as well as natural gas pricing, supply and transit with Turkey. Embassy agrees with BP's assessment that the future of energy projects in the region depends critically on improving the security of existing infrastructure, and on visibly heightened cooperation in this respect among Caspian/Caucasus states. DERSE
Friday, 22 August 2008, 04:03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000790
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/21/2009
TAGS ENRG, ETRD, PREL, AJ, RU, TR
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJANI PRESIDENT: I DIDN'T STAND BEHIND
SAAKASHVILI BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE MADE NO DIFFERENCE
REF: ANKARA 1474
Classified By: Charge Donald Lu, for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: On August 19, President Aliyev told visiting British Petroleum CEO Inglis that Azerbaijan is taking quiet steps to support Georgia, although Aliyev himself did not publicly support the Georgian President. For example, Azerbaijanis are repairing a critical rail bridge destroyed by the Russians. Aliyev reconfirmed his western orientation for oil and gas exports, although he acknowledged that he would sell some gas to Russia and oil to Iran. Aliyev stressed that gas sales to Russia would be limited, maybe 2 bcm, and that the purpose would be to pressure Turkey to conclude gas transit talks; oil sales to Iran are a result of current pipeline constraints. Aliyev said that during the crisis he phoned Moscow to warn them against attacking Azeri interests in Georgia, including pipelines, the ethnic Azeri community and the Azeri-owned oil terminal at Kulevi. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) On August 20, British Petroleum's Chief Executive Officer for Exploration and Production Andrew Inglis briefed the Charge on his one-hour one-on-one meeting with President Ilham Aliyev on the evening of August 19. Inglis was to meet Aliyev on August 20, but the President asked to see Inglis early before the President's meeting with visiting Turkish PM Erdogan. Inglis said that the President appeared "relaxed, convivial and warm."
PRESIDENT'S REACTION TO GEORGIA CRISIS
--------------------------------------
3. (C) The President told Inglis, "I didn't rush to stand behind Saakashvili because it would have made no difference." The President quickly added that Azerbaijan is quietly finding ways to support Georgia. He claimed that Azerbaijan is providing more aid than anyone by using its people within the country (Comment: a possible reference to ethnic Azeri Georgians) to do "real things." For example, he reported that Azerbaijanis are repairing the destroyed rail bridge link.
4. (C) Aliyev emphasized that the events of the past few days "reinforce the journey (towards a western orientation) and not the need for a U-turn." He said that he is not in favor of changing his foreign policy in response to this conflict. His foreign policy has been to develop Azerbaijan's independence from Russia using its oil and gas resources. This engagement continues.
5. (C) The President did probe Inglis about the timing of the Georgia invasion in relation to the PKK attack on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. He did not explicitly endorse the following conspiracy theory, but was interested in Inglis' reaction. Aliyev linked the following events:
-- The PKK, formerly sponsored by the KGB, attacks the BTC.
-- Three days later Russia invades Georgia.
-- In a seemingly random act, the Russians blows up a key railway bridge halting rail export of oil.
-- A stray bomb falls 10 meters from the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline.
-- Transneft reports a technical fault along the Novorossiysk Line threatening one of the last remaining oil export route.
PRESIDENT ALIYEV PHONES MOSCOW
------------------------------
6. (C) President Aliyev noted that when he learned that a stray Russian bomb struck near the Baku-Supsa line, he rang Moscow (he inferred that he called Putin but did not specify). He said that he wanted to make clear that it would be considered a "major act" if Russia took actions against Azerbaijan's interests. He specifically complained about the bombing of a military airfield in the ethnic Azeri community of Marneuli, the stray bomb near the Baku-Supsa pipeline and reports of Russian troops entering the Azeri-owned oil terminal at Kulevi. Aliyev said that in response, the troops withdrew from Kulevi and there were no further bombings in these sensitive areas.
BAKU 00000790 002 OF 003
GAS SALES TO RUSSIA A "SUBTERFUGE"
----------------------------------
7. (C) Inglis explained that limited future gas sales to Russia are for the purposes of enhancing Azerbaijan's position in the gas transit talks with Turkey. He emphasized that Aliyev told him that Azerbaijan still wants to sell Shah Deniz Phase Two gas west and not north. "It would be madness to do otherwise. The events have not changed the (political) rationale for exporting gas westward," the President added.
8. (C) Inglis believes that Aliyev is in a much stronger position with Turkey than a month ago. Inglis added that Turkey must agree to transit rights and that Aliyev is not going to negotiate from a point of weakness. Aliyev said that he would be selling some gas to Russia and that "these sales to Russia must be credible." Inglis noted that, for Russia, some is not enough. There is not enough gas to go around and Russia wants it all. There's no compromise solution. The 2 bcm to Russia is not significant. It is "subterfuge" for the price negotiations, Inglis added.
9. (C) The President also told Inglis that as a result of the pipeline closures, Azerbaijan will be forced to sell crude to Iran.
ADDITIONAL DETAILS ABOUT THE PKK ATTACK ON BTC
--------------------------------------------- -
10. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX
AZERI CHARM OFFENSIVE WITH BP
-----------------------------
13. (C) Last year, the Azerbaijani State Oil Company (SOCAR) was threatening to have BP Azerbaijan's President arrested and tried for theft of state resources. In contrast, Inglis described the mood about BP in Azerbaijan as having come full circle. Aliyev made positive comments to the press about BP and SOCAR being friends in difficult times.
14. (C) The President told Inglis that Azerbaijan still needs BP. He asked rhetorically, "If SOCAR owned BTC would it still be there?" The President said he knows that he needs to keep BP motivated and interested in Azerbaijan. There was good discussion about a Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) extension and the extraction of Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) deep gas. Inglis believed the details will still move at a certain pace, for tactical reasons, but that these issues are headed in the right direction.
15. (C) The President summoned the SOCAR President after the evening meeting with Inglis and made SOCAR available to Inglis the next day. "(SOCAR President) Rovnag (Abdullayev) was the nicest Rovnaq we've ever met." Inglis said that he
BAKU 00000790 003 OF 003
had "real conversation" with Abdullayev about the Shah Deniz Phase One gas price. Inglis advised SOCAR to settle on a price now and not wait for a conclusion of transit talks as the price of gas is rising every day.
COMMENT
-------
16. (C) Inglis believes that Aliyev is looking for a statement from the West (and particularly the U.S.) that parallels Aliyev's statement to Moscow: If you mess with the pipelines, you're messing with us. He noted that Aliyev was dismissive of high-level people turning up in Baku for a photo-op with him and lacking a substantive message.
17. (C) On the sale of Azeri gas to Russia, Inglis clearly seemed to be spinning this to try to head off expected U.S. objection to such a sale. His analysis may yet be true about this sale being used to pressure Turkey over transit talks, but it is also doubtless motivated by BP's commercial interest in developing a market and routes to justify Shah Deniz Phase Two and ACG deep gas production. Likewise, Azerbaijan oil sales to Iran could be problematic, if continued over the longer-term.
LU
Monday, 22 October 2007, 13:49
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 001268
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PASS TO A/S KAREN HARBERT, DAS ALAN
HEGBURG, OFFICE OF RUSSIA/EURASIAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR LANA
EKIMOFF
EO 12958 DECL: 09/21/2017
TAGS PGOV, PREL, ENRG, AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: SOCAR REFRAINS FROM "GOING KAZAKH" ON
BP-LED CONSORTIUM
REF: BAKU 1224
Classified By: Ambasador Anne E. Derse, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: During a October 19 steering committee meeting of the Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium (AIOC), the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), representing the Azerbaijan government, avoided declaring the Consortium in material breach of the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) as it had been threatening to do, an act which would have worsened the current dispute between the two parties over short-term issues potentially involving billions of dollars. SOCAR did give the Consortium an unrealistic ultimatum to "solve all outstanding issues within a week," but Consortium partners plan to counter-propose a working group to work on settling the issues of contention. Embassy will continue to monitor events and press for a negotiating environment in which a mutually satisfactory conclusion can be reached. END SUMMARY.
2. (C)BACKGROUND: According to BP Azerbaijan, the commercial dispute between the AIOC Consortium (formed as a result of the 1994 Azerbaijan Chirag Guneshli (ACG) Production Sharing Agreement, and consisting of BP, Chevron, Inpex, SOCAR, Statoil, ExxonMobil, TPAO, Devon, Itochu and Hess) and the Government of Azerbaijan, as represented by SOCAR, centers on three main issues, the first two of which influence the percentages of 'profit oil' going to each party:
- Calculation of the "Total Transportation Cost" (TTC) - Calculation of the "Rate of Return" (ROR) - SOCAR claim of collusion between the BTC and AIOC Consortiums so that the BTC project was deliberately slowed down in order to influence TTC by driving up transportation costs.
3. (C) Part of the dispute stems from the ACG/AIOC PSA not defining some key terms, so that, for example, while the Consortium claims that finance costs should be considered as a type of petroleum cost and hence taken into account when calculating ROR, SOCAR disagrees. BP says SOCAR's claims stem from the fact that "it doesn't like the PSA it signed 14 years ago," and that AIOC has done due diligence on its accounting practices to confirm that the Consortium's methodologies adhere to the PSA. SOCAR claims, inter alia, that the Consortium itself, by changing the methods used for calculating the ROR, is acting outside the PSA, in a "dishonest" attempt to maximize revenue.
BP: SOCAR THREATENING TO "GO KAZAKH"
------------------------------------
4. (C) On October 17, BP Azerbaijan VP-Commercial Dr. Phil Home commented that on October 2 SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev had summoned BP Azerbaijan President Bill Schrader, to inform him that SOCAR intended to claim that the AIOC Consortium was in material breach of the PSA.
5. (C) Home said that SOCAR had called for a convening of the AIOC Steering Committee on October 19, at which time SOCAR might formally claim material breach. Home said that according to the PSA, once SOCAR (on behalf of Azerbaijan) claims material breach, then the AIOC Consortium has 90 days to "respond or rectify." If after this period the dispute has not been solved, it goes to arbitration. If the arbitration process decides in favor of Azerbaijan, then the AIOC Consortium would have 90 days to rectify the material breach.
6. (C) However, Home said that SOCAR has been threatening to take action that is outside the PSA's dispute resolution mechanism, to include unilaterally shortening the amount of time the Consortium has to respond or rectify once material breach has been declared (perhaps to ten days or even shorter).
7. (C) Additionally, Home said that SOCAR has repeatedly warned the Consortium to "look at Kazakhstan," i.e. explicitly and repeatedly hinted at taking extra-legal actions if the Consortium does not give in on key issues (Comment: SOCAR VP Nasirov has made the same point, saying
BAKU 00001268 002 OF 004
that the Consortium should realize that "no international energy company has ever won a fight against the home country national oil company.")
SCHRADER TRIED FOR SMUGGLING/STEALING
-------------------------------------
8. (C) More worrisome to the Consortium and to BP, Homesaid that SOCAR President Abdullayev has threatened to unilaterally calculate the split of profit oil, declare any excess amounts being received by the Consortium as contraband, and then have BP Azerbaijan President Schrader charged with smuggling and brought before the National Parliament to be tried for "stealing ten billion dollars worth of Azerbaijani oil."
SOCAR: BP BROKE PSA
-------------------
9. (C) In an October 18 discussion with the Ambassador, SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev said that the AIOC's proposed revision of the method of calculating the Rate of Return (ROR) was "against all market rules and regulations." Although SOCAR had originally agreed to negotiate with AIOC, its "deception" in seeking to "change the PSA" caused Abdullayev to suspend talks on all future projects. Abdullayev said that the unanticipated high oil prices had caused a greedy AIOC consortium to seek to illegally change the ROR - "if oil had stayed at 30-40 dollars per barrel, the final flip in profit splitting would occur in 2012, but with the rise in price, BP claimed mistakes in its previous ROR calculation and changed the methodology, "which it had been using for a decade." XXXXXXXXXXXX
10. (C) SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev also said that the AIOC Consortium was using ACG Associated gas "as a weapon against us," trying to "blackmail" SOCAR by cutting deliveries from 3 billion cubic meters annually (bcm/a) to 1.4 bcm/a. However, the AIOC's cutting off of surplus ACG associated gas deliveries would only hurt Georgia, as it meant that Azerbaijan would no longer be able to meet all of Georgia's winter gas needs, as it intended to do had the AIOC Consortium continued to deliver 8.5 million cubic meters/day (mcm/d), vice the current daily delivery to SOCAR of 4 million mcm. Abdullayev also said that the Consortium's actions were helping Russia, who was claiming that "Azerbaijan doesn't even have enough gas to supply Georgia," which would indeed be the case if and only if the AIOC continued to "punish" Azerbaijan by withholding ACG associated gas. Although GOAJ had planned to meet all of Georgia's winter gas needs, with the AIOC's lessening of gas supplies this would no longer be possible - politically, Azerbaijan could not burn mazut that sells for an equivalent of USD 450 per thousand cubic meters to sell gas to Georgia at approximately USD 167/tcm. Abdullayev said SOCAR experts disputed AIOC claims that this gas being withheld from SOCAR was needed for re-injection, saying that re-injection of an additional 4 mcm/d into the ACG field would make "no difference" relative to the approximately 800 thousand barrels a day being extracted.
11. (C) Ambassador Derse said that while the USG cannot and does not take any position in the commercial negotiations between the AIOC Consortium and Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan has been exemplary in its devotion to the sanctity of the PSAs it has signed, all of which have the force of law in Azerbaijan. This commitment to the PSAs has resulted in rapid development of Azerbaijan's energy sector. As such, regardless of the outcome of the commercial negotiations, the U.S. hoped both sides adhere to the PSA and seek to address all concerns solely by the manners stipulated within the PSA. XXXXXXXXXXXX
BP - "ACTING W/IN THE PSA"
--------------------------
12. (C) In an October 19 talk with the Ambassador, BP Azerbaijan President Bill Schrader said that if BP were to
BAKU 00001268 003 OF 004
accede to SOCAR demands in an attempt to solve its dispute, it could be sued by any AIOC partner for acting outside the PSA.
13. (C) Schrader said that the Consortium had "19 disputed areas" about which it had asked for guidance from SOCAR, but all it got was either "silence or threats" from Abdullayev, whom he characterized as a "pit bull." Schrader was convinced that Abdullayev was "doing President Aliyev's bidding" in seeking to "box it out" with the Consortium for the approximately ten billion dollars at stake. To him, the bottom line was that SOCAR "didn't like the PSA it signed" in 1994, and was seeking to change its terms. He confirmed what Home had said earlier, i.e., that Abdullayev had threatened to arrest and try Schrader in front of Parliament for being a "criminal smuggler."
14. (C) Schrader said that BP Azerbaijan had already prepared for such an eventuality. If SOCAR went public with charges of malfeasance against BP, BP would keep a "low profile," repeating the simple message that everything it had done was consistent with the PSA. Schrader argued that the putative "change in methodology in ROR calculation" was not a change at all - before revenue started flowing the methodology being used for pro forma profit calculation runs had a flaw in it, which was corrected when the partners became aware of it and before the revenue stream started.
15. (C) Referring to the AIOC Steering Committee meeting to be held later that day, Schrader said he thought it unlikely that Abdullayev would formally claim that the AIOC Consortium was in material breach, as that would start SOCAR down a road that it didn't want to go, since the overwhelming likelihood of any arbitration would be in favor of the Consortium - "Azerbaijan doesn't want any experts involved in this matter." Schrader quoted what Chevron CEO David O'Reilly had heard from President Aliyev when they had recently met, to the effect that Azerbaijan was going to receive approximately USD 200 billion of oil revenue over the next 15 years - it was not going to embarrass itself for an extra ten billion." BP's London experts familiar with the GOAJ have similarly told BP Azerbaijan that SOCAR is unlikely to act upon is threats.
16. (C) In this regard, BP Vice-President Phil Home said that Moody's was planning to come to Azerbaijan in two weeks, and had asked to talk with him about Azerbaijan's investment climate, and he mused aloud as to what he should tell them given the Consortium's current difficulties.
17. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
18. (C) Schrader said that the AIOC partners were all in agreement as to the correct course of action. He predicted that SOCAR would "set the dogs on us," i.e., seek to make operations much more difficult for the Consortium. If this were to happen, he would keep record of every penny of additional expense incurred, send it in a monthly letter to SOCAR, and seek to cost-recover it all, in line with the PSA provisions for recovery via allocation of "cost oil."
19. (C) Speaking of the longer-term issues of PSA extension and access to ACG Deep Gas, for political reasons he thought it unlikely that President Aliyev would move on them before being re-elected as President.
SOCAR BACKS DOWN
----------------
20. (C) After the October 19 AIOC Steering Committee meeting, Schrader said that the meeting itself had turned out to be a "non-event." SOCAR head Abdullayev read prepared remarks in which he railed against BP and the Consortium, but he did not seek to claim material breech. He did tell the Consortium that they "had a week to resolve all outstanding issues," but
BAKU 00001268 004 OF 004
did not specify any adverse consequences for not doing so. Schrader said that obviously it would be impossible to meet Abdullayev's deadline, but that the AIOC partners were going to offer to form a working group to meet with SOCAR to work on these issues. He confirmed that one of SOCAR's demands was that BP yield operator status of the BTC to SOCAR, to do away with the putative "conflict of interest" due to BP being operator of both ACG and BTC. Schrader said that BP Head of Exploration and Production Andy Inglis would be coming to Azerbaijan on October 29 to meet with President Aliyev.
21. (C) SOFAZ head Shahmar Movsumov, who attended the Steering Committee meeting, afterwards told the Ambassador that Abdullayev had laid out the GOAJ's grievances in a ninety minute recitation, and that Azerbaijan was not going to "just roll over and take BP's line." However, he confirmed that Azerbaijan would work to resolve the disputes within the PSA.
22. (C) COMMENT: BP President Schrader told the Ambassador that when he got here a year ago, Azerbaijan's operating environment seemed "benign" compared to his previous assignments, to include Angola. Although BP's situation is not as "benign" as a year ago, SOCAR's decision not to escalate its dispute with the Consortium is a promising sign that a mutually satisfactory solution can be reached, thus clearing the way for PSA extension and access to ACG Deep Gas, both prerequisites for the second stage of Azerbaijani energy sector development. Embassy will continue to monitor events and press for a negotiating environment in which a mutually satisfactory conclusion can be reached. DERSE
Thursday, 15 January 2009, 11:01
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000030
SIPDIS
ANKARA PLEASE PASS TO DAS BRYZA
EO 12958 DECL: 01/13/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AJ, TU, ENRG
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN: BP DOWNBEAT ON 2009 SHAH DENIZ PHASE
TWO PROGRESS
REF: A) BAKU 1126 B) BAKU 1186 C) ANKARA 56
Classified By: CA Don Lu, Reasons 1.2 (b,d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Acording to BP Azerbaijan, inability to reach agrement between Azerbaijan and Turkey on the price of Shah Deniz Phase One gas currently being sold toTurkey and on transit of Shah Deniz Phase Two ga has delayed and will continue to delay the deveopment of the Shah Deniz Phase Two project in 2009. As such, SOCAR might be more willing to first develop ACG non-associated (aka "deep") gas, as it can be developed relatively inexpensively and in increments, with the resulting gas sold to purely regional markets, including Russia and Iran (i.e., no need to transit through Turkey). The Central Azeri Oil platform in the ACG offshore oil mega-field has resumed production as of December, and the AIOC Consortium expects production to reach pre-September 2008 levels within a few months. END SUMMARY. 2. (C) On January 13 Charge met with BP Azerbaijan President Bill Schrader and UK CDA Simon Tonge, to discuss recent energy issues. Also present were BP Azerbaijan Gas Marketing Manager Richard Ruddiman, BP Azerbaijan Government Relations VP Seymour Khalilov, and the U.S. and UK Embassy Energy Officers. SHAH DENIZ DEVELOPMENT DELAYED 3. (C) In general, BP Azerbaijan was not optimistic on timely Shah Deniz Phase Two (SD2) development. As such, according to BP Azerbaijan, the Shah Deniz (SD) Consortium will continue to slow-track SD2 development in 2009, due to disputes over Shah Deniz Phase One (SD1) price and SD2 transit with the Government of Turkey. In BP's opinion, an optimistic scenario is some type of agreement in 2009, but currently the SD Consortium has budgeted no more than a negligible, 'placeholder' amount on SD2 in 2009 due to lack of progress on SD1/SD2 in its talks with Turkey. BP Azerbaijan also noted that SOCAR will probably also be marginally less likely to spend the large amounts needed for its share of SD2 investment given its vastly decreased oil-related income and that fact that the start of payback for any such SOCAR investments is no earlier than 2015. 4. (C) As for SD1, BP senses a reluctance from SOCAR to go to arbitration with its Turkish brother, but the two sides are still orders of magnitude apart on price for SD1, with no real 'negotiating' occurring. BP senses that the SD Consortium would be willing to give GOT a price lower than the Gazprom/Iran price (as we have confirmed separately with SOCAR), but Botas's current offer is so low that "there is no real discussion going on." ACG DEEP GAS MAY MOVE FORWARD SOONER 5. (C) In a related vein, BP said it was seeing a continued increase of interest in Azeri Chirag Guneshli (ACG) non-associated (aka 'deep') gas from the GOAJ, and thinks it possible the GOAJ will seek to develop deep gas before SD2, since development can be done far more cheaply and incrementally, with the resulting gas being sold to Russia, Iran, and Georgia (i.e., no need for Turkey transit). TURKMENISTAN 6. (C) When asked about the possibility of GOTX gas being supplied to GOT, BP repeated its opinion that due to the long timelines involved with gas development, there would be no GOTX gas coming west earlier than 2020. UKRAINE-RUSSIA 7. (C) BP said that it thought that one result of the Gazprom-Ukraine gas conflict, which has affected Turkish gas supply, would be that the GOT would be even more focused on security of supply/supply diversification/getting as much gas as it can from SD2. GEORGIA 8. (C) According to BP the Georgian government is unusually quiet for this time of winter, i.e. not complaining about the lack of gas it is receiving from Azerbaijan. BP says that SOCAR is pushing as much gas to Georgia as is obligated, and that Georgia is also getting its full amount from SD1. These two sources, plus the gas it is getting as transit gas, seem to be meeting the GA demand, and BP thinks it might be the case that GA will not need any gas from Gazprom this winter. BP agreed that GA could benefit from gas storage, pointing out that many countries try to have storage equal to 20 percent of its annual need. CENTRAL AZERI GAS LEAK IDENTIFIED
BAKU 00000030 002 OF 002
8. (C) BP has restarted oil production from CA and is about to start re-injecting gas again in the Central Azeri field. It has closed off a "few suspect wells" from which they think a bad cement job caused the leaking gas (which is actually good news, since had it been a reservoir leak the damage would have been potentially non-repairable, whereas now all BP has to do is fix the cement job around a few wells, a hard and expensive job to be sure, but preferable to losing the platform). Production is now around 700,000 bpd, and with gas injection they hope to get it back up to September levels, i.e. 950,000 bpd. 9. (C) COMMENT: Since this meeting, there is indication (reftel c) that Botas has increased the price it is willing to pay for Shah Deniz Phase One gas. Additionally, SOCAR VP for Marketing Elshad Nassirov canceled a January 15 meeting scheduled with the Embassy to fly on short-notice to Turkey to meet with the Turks on SD-related issues. Embassy will be reporting on these developments septel. LU
Wednesday, 08 October 2008, 10:27
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000947
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/06/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, AJ, ENRG, TU
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN SEEKS TO DEVELOP ACG DEEP GAS, CAN
SUPPLY GEORGIA WITH WINTER GAS
REF: A. A) BAKU 919 B. B) BAKU 897 C. C) BAKU 883
Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: BP Azerbaijan President Bill Schrader told USG interlocutors that there will be "plenty of gas" for Azerbaijan to sell to Georgia this winter. This is a result of oil production problems at the offshore ACG oil mega-field, which continues to cost the GOAJ tens of millions of dollars in lost revenues, and the resulting technological prohibition on re-injecting the gas. Post-Georgia conflict, the GOAJ has shown renewed interest in the AIOC Consortium developing the second largest known gas field in Azerbaijan after Shah Deniz, referred to as ACG "Deep Gas." BP has revised upwards its production estimate for Shah Deniz Phase Two from 13 to 16 bcm/a - a development which, in conjunction with the extra one bcm/a that will be gained from debottlenecking Shah Deniz Phase One, could help alleviate differences on supply volumes between Azerbaijan and Turkey. AIOC partners have not yet been able to resolve Shah Deniz Phase I pricing discrepancies with Turkey; the case could be headed to international arbitration. BP Azerbaijan continues to maintain that Nabucco is "a good project, but ten years too early." END SUMMARY
2. (C) On September 29 BP Azerbaijan President Bill Schrader met with Ambassador Derse and UK Ambassador Browne, to brief them on ongoing production problems in ACG offshore oil mega-field. On October 1, BP President Bill Schrader met with Deputy Secretary Negroponte, DAS Bryza and Ambassador Derse at Sangachal Terminal, to brief them on BP's Azerbaijan operations. On October 2, Ambassador Derse hosted a lunch in honor of the Deputy Secretary, at which BP Azerbaijan President Schrader and other high-level BP Azerbaijan executives briefed Secretary Negroponte, DAS Bryza and Ambassador Derse on regional gas development issues.
'PLENTY OF GAS' FOR GEORGIA
3. (C) Schrader said that given BP's ongoing oil production problems at the Central Azeri platform (refs A-C), BP would not technically be able to re-inject gas into this field "well into the winter." As such the GOAJ would have "plenty of gas" to sell to Georgia this winter should it wish (NOTE: according to the AIOC PSA, all ACG gas not used for operational reasons such as re-injection is to be given free to SOCAR). BP will provide to SOCAR as much of this ACG associated gas as technically possible, since the alternative would be either to flare it or to decrease oil production even further.
SD2 = 16 BCM/A
4. (C) Schrader said that currently Shah Deniz (SD) production was doing quite well, with four wells operating and a fifth due to start in January 2009. XXXXXXXXXXXX SD2 Production would likely start in 2015.
GOAJ INTERESTED IN ACG DEEP GAS
5. (C) Schrader said that post-Georgia crisis, SOCAR has clearly seen the benefits of its association with IOCs and as such has sought to "fast-track" discussions with the AIOC Consortium over developing the non-associated gas that lies underneath the ACG oil field (NOTE: referred to as "ACG Deep Gas," this gas is not covered by the current PSA between the AIOC Consortium and the GOAJ. However, the Consortium has the right of first refusal and the right to match any offer for ACG Deep Gas development, and as a practical matter could prevent development of this field by any other IOC). This field could produce one to three bcm/a by 2013/2014, with a production plateau of six to ten bcm/a by 2015, which could continue for 30 years. SOCAR was seeking an MOU on
BAKU 00000947 002 OF 003
developing this field with the AIOC Consortium by the end of 2008. (COMMENT: Take together, this additional production projections for Shah Deniz and ACG Deep Gas could have significant positive impact in satisfying Turkey's demand and in advancing the Southern Corridor in 2015-16).
ACG AS SUBSTITUTE FOR SD2?
6. Schrader characterized Turkish intransigence on SD2 gas transit as the major barrier to expeditious SD2 development. He said that should the GOT continue to refuse to provide transit for SD2 gas on terms that Azerbaijan finds commercially viable, then the GOAJ might well decide to keep SD2 undeveloped and "let Turkey freeze for a few winters." In the interim, the GOAJ would proceed with developing ACG Deep Gas, whose product volumes would be low enough to satisfy the regional market of Russia, Georgia and Iran. (Note: in a separate conversation, Foreign Minister Mammadyarov reported to the Deputy Secretary that natural gas talks with Russa's Gazprom had "failed," because of differencesin opinion on formulas for "market pricing." End Comment)
SD1 ARBITRATION
7. (C) Schrader said that negotiations with Botas for the post-April 1, 2008 price of SD1 gas are still at a dead-end, with Botas offering a price of USD 150 per 1,000 tcm at a time when a "realistic" price for this gas would be closer to USD 350/tcm. (Gazprom's price for gas to Europe is close to USD 500/tcm.) As such, the Shah Deniz Consortium partners will in all likelihood vote on October 15 to take the matter to arbitration.
ACG OIL PRODUCTION PROBLEMS
8. (C) Schrader said that the September 17th shutdown of the Central Azeri (CA) platform, in which the "red button" was pressed after detection of a gas leak on the Central Azeri Platform that led to the evacuation of 211 platform workers off the platform, was the largest such emergency evacuation in BP's history. Given the explosive potential, BP was quite fortunate to have been able to evacuate everyone safely and to prevent any gas ignition. Gas bubbles on the water's surface were no longer observed from the air by September 19th. Due to the blowout of a gas-injection well there was "a lot of mud" on the platform, which BP would analyze to help find the cause of the blowout and gas leak. Gas samples would have to be taken to London to determine whether the gas was shallow (biogenic) or deep (foundation). Central, Eastern and Western Azeri Azeri platforms remain shut down. 9. (C) Schrader said that Western Azeri Platform was shut down due to its only functioning generator being powered by a cable from the Central Azeri Platform, and BP hoped to be able to restart this platform in November. "Black-starting" a platform (i.e. restarting a platform when all of its operations had been fully shut down) was a very difficult, time-consuming process, and would have to be taken slowly, on a step-by-step basis. BP Azerbaijan would slowly start to get its people back out on the CA Platform later this week to begin re-starting selective systems that would help ascertain the problem's source.
10. (C) It is possible that BP Azerbaijan "would never know" the cause of the gas leak, but BP is continuing to methodically investigate possible theories, Schrader said. Although the production decrease had not been a significant story heretofore, he thought it likely that more attention in the industry would be paid to it after October 2, when SOCAR nominated volumes to be sold at Ceyhan for the coming month. Schrader said although the story hadn't caught the press's attention, it had the full focus of the GOAJ, which was losing "40 to 50 million dollars" each day that the ACG production remained at 300,000 bpd vice its earlier daily production of approximately 900,000 bpd.
SD2 GAS PIPELINE OPTIONS
11. (C) BP Azerbaijan Gas Marketing Manager Richard Ruddiman said that both the TGI and TAP pipeline projects each needed approximately seven bcm/a of SD2 gas to get sanctioned. Nabucco, a 'greenfield' project with no current infrastructure and with its 30 bcm/a carrying capacity, would
BAKU 00000947 003 OF 003
need firm commitments of at least eight bcm/a and relatively firm commitments for a total of 18 bcm/a before construction could begin. Given supply constraints, both Schrader and Ruddiman said that Nabucco was "a good project, but ten years too early," and that it was unlikely that it could get sanctioned within the next ten years. They said that a more "gradual and capillary" approach to delivering Caspian gas to Europe, similar to how the US gas infrastructure was developed, was a more realistic scenario for getting Caspian gas to Europe than mega-projects such as Nabucco. Ruddiman said that there was no hard "latest date," by which these projects had to be developed; their sanctioning could continue to be postponed until/unless the main barrier of Turkish transit was solved. The key requirement for sanctioning any of these pipelines was long-term gas supply contracts that could be used to achieve construction financing.
WESTERN ROUTE
12. (C) Schrader said the Western Route oil pipeline through Georgia to the Black Sea (Baku-Supsa) was ready to resume operations and would be doing so within a week or so. (NOTE: It had restarted operations a few days before Russia's August incursions into Georgia, after which BP shut it down for operational security reasons).
TURKMEN PETROCHEMICALS
13. (C) Schrader and Ruddiman said that developing gas-intensive petrochemical industries in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan probably doesn't make sense, even given its large amounts of gas available for feedstock, as the distance to significant markets would put Turkmenistan at a competitive disadvantage. Ruddiman pointed to the example of Sumgayit in Azerbaijan as an example of a petrochemical center disadvantaged by its relative distance from key regional markets.
14. (C) COMMENT: The silver lining to ACG's ongoing oil production problems is that it seems to have solved Georgia's winter gas woes, given the massive amounts of ACG gas that will not be needed in the foreseeable future for reinjection. Less adulterated good news is that SD2 volumes will be closer to 16 bcm/a, and another one bcm/a may be available from SD1. When SD2 production was expected to be 13 bcm/a, SOCAR saw approximately three bcm/a going to Georgia and Azerbaijan and seven needed to sanction a pipeline to Europe, leaving four bcm/a for Turkey. Given SOCAR's previous offer to Turkey of surplus (i.e. above 13 bcm/a) SD2 production, these new numbers mean that SOCAR could potentially offer Turkey seven bcm/a This is an amount very close to the eight bcm/a, on which Turkey is insisting as the price of transit. Equally good news is the GOAJ's newfound desire to expedite ACG Deep Gas development, although Embassy has heard from SOCAR that this field's development also depends on the GOT allowing transit of Caspian gas to European markets. END COMMENT.
15. (U) DepSec staff, DAS Bryza, have cleared this cable. DERSE
Wednesday, 15 November 2006, 11:38
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001661
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/15/2016
TAGS AJ, PGOV, PREL, EPET, ENRG, RU
SUBJECT: BP AZERBAIJAN PRESIDENT SAYS AZERBAIJAN MOVING
SLOWLY TO ADDRESS GAS PROBLEM
REF: ANKARA 006396
Classified By: Ambassador Anne. E. Derse, Reasons 1.4 (B,D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: At a November 10 Azerbaijan International Oil Company briefing, outgoing BP Azerbaijan President David Woodward told the Ambassador that according to SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev, Turkey had not agreed to forego its contracted for 2007 Shah Deniz gas deliveries as a way of helping Azerbaijan and Georgia with their winter gas problems, although they were willing to defer delivery of some amounts if the contracted for price of USD 120 per thousand cubic meters remained the same. Woodward said that Turkey was declaring itself ready to receive Shah Deniz gas, although he himself had doubts. He said that a joint BP-SOCAR working group would start work soon to discuss ways of redressing possible GOAJ domestic gas shortages in winter 2007. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) On November 10 the Ambassador attended an Azerbaijan International Oil Company briefing headed by outgoing BP Azerbaijan President David Woodward. Other attendees were incoming BP Azerbaijan President Bill Schrader, BP Group Azerbaijan Director for Communications and External Affairs Clare Bebbington, UK Ambassador Laurie Bristow, UK EconOff, and Econoff as notetaker.
READ-OUT OF TU-GOAJ MEETING
--------------------------------------------- --
3. (C) Woodward gave a read-out of his November 2 meeting with SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev. This meeting, prompted by the visit to Azerbaijan of BP Executive Vice-President and Deputy Chief Executive of Exploration and Production Andy Inglis, occurred right after Abdullayev had returned from Turkey with Deputy Prime Minister Abid Sharifov, where they had notified Turkey of intended delays in GOAJ 2007 Shah Deniz gas deliveries. Abdullayev, fresh off the plane, provided Woodward and Inglis a read-out of his Turkey meeting with Energy Minister Gular and Botas. Rovnaq told them that Botas would not sign the document he had brought, in which Turkey was asked to agree to GOAJ providing no Shah Deniz gas in 2007 and in which the GOAJ sought to re-open Shah Deniz price negotiations. Turkey insisted on receiving its contracted for 2007 three billion cubic meters (bcm) of Shah Deniz gas at the agreed upon price of USD 120 per thousand cubic meter (tcm), but said it did not have to receive it all in 2007. It proposed that it could take half (1.5 bcm) in winter 2007, with the rest to be received in 2008 or 2009, at the contracted price of USD 120/tcm. Abdullayev told Inglis that he had gotten Turkey to agree that it would be a transit country for Shah Deniz gas (vice a buyer-seller).
4. (C) During this November 2 meeting with Abdullayev and Sharifov, Energy Minister Gular also said that Turkey was ready to receive Shah Deniz gas. In this regard, Woodward said that he thinks that Botas will ask for commissioning gas during the week of November 13-17. As to how ready Turkey actually is to receive Shah Deniz gas, Woodward said that the BP opinion is that Botas still has a lot of work to do to complete the pipeline to include work on the valve stations, and that if the work were done in accordance with international standards then the pipeline might not be ready until spring 2007. However, he added that "it was not inconceivable" that Botas could "rush finish" the job so that it would be ready to receive gas shortly, although the pipeline would not meet international standards.
ACG PROBLEM RESOLUTION
-----------------------------------------
5. (C) Woodward said that during the recent visit of BP Executive Inglis, BP had given both President Aliyev and SOCAR President Abdullayev a copy of a BP 'white paper' on the way forward for Azerbaijan in the energy sector, (a copy of which he gave to the Ambassador), with the focus on four main themes:
- ACG Maximum Development: Resolving current issues associated with ACG to maximize recovery - Short/medium/long term gas issues: Short-term - how to address this winter's gas needs; Medium/Long-term: how best
BAKU 00001661 002 OF 003
to identify and exploit GOAJ gas reserves - SOCAR: how to help make SOCAR an energy company that meets international standards - BP Social Programs: putting a 'harder edge' on them, to help build capacity in Azerbaijan
6. (C) Woodward said that there were a series of outstanding ACG-related issues the resolution of which involved billions of dollars and which the AIOC partners were trying to resolve with SOCAR in a package, vice individually. In the November 2 meeting between SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev and BP executive Inglis, Abdullayev said that he would head the SOCAR ACG steering group dealing with these problems, and that SOCAR VP Elshad Nassirov would be the SOCAR working level representative. Abdullayev also said he would head the SOCAR team on the BP-SOCAR gas working group, with Nassirov again the working-level representative. Woodward said that Abdullayev had an unrealistic expectation of how quickly these outstanding ACG issues could be resolved: whereas BP thinks that a framework within which to discuss the issues could be agreed upon by January, with actual negotiations over these issues lasting up to six months, Woodward said that Abdullayev told Inglis that the issues could be solved 'within a few days.'
7. (C) Woodward said that Abdullayev did not show much willingness to engage with BP re Azerbaijan's short-term (Winter 07) gas problems, contending that AIOC giving SOCAR more associated ACG gas could solve the problem. (Note: AIOC is scheduled to give 1.4 bcm of associated ACG gas to SOCAR in 2007; SOCAR is arguing that AIOC does not need to re-inject any ACG associated gas back into the well, and wants 3 bcm). Woodward said that all sides seemed to be waiting for the results of the President Aliyev-President Putin meeting in Moscow, although he himself doubted whether the two would reach any definitive agreement, as everyone is waiting to see the results of the various CIS bilateral Gazprom negotiations, to see if the USD 230/tcm level will hold.
BP GEORGIA GAS READOUT
----------------------------------------
8. (C) Woodward said he and his replacement Bill Schrader had just returned from Georgia, where they had met separately with the Georgian Energy Minister, Environment Minister and Prime Minister, among others. At these meetings the Georgian proposal of a November three-way gas-focused Turkish-Azerbaijani-Georgian ministerial-level meeting in Tblisi or Ankara was discussed, although nothing definite had been agreed to by all parties. In their meetings, the GOG interlocutors had referred to Turkey's Summer 2007 'agreement in principle' to supply Georgia from its own Shah Deniz gas, although Woodward said in his opinion all Turkey had agreed to at that time was a 'bring us a proposal and we'll have a look at it' type agreement. Woodward said that the GOG Energy Minister had told him that GA would not buy gas from Gazprom at USD 230/tcm, and that Turkey would supply GOG with 1.5 bcm in 2007. Woodward said the GOG PM was more realistic, saying that perhaps Georgia could get 0.8 to 1.2 bcm from Turkey in 2007. Woodward said the GOG PM seemed more relaxed about the upcoming winter gas situation than did the Energy Minister, and more concerned about Shah Deniz Stage Two-related issues, stating that, inter alia, Georgia and Azerbaijan should look at gas storage issues together, vice separately. Woodward said he got the impression that GOG was more concerned about the economics of gas purchases from Gazprom than the supply itself, and he noted that despite the intense rhetoric flowing between Russia and Georgia, the energy continues to flow.
SD PRODUCTION
------------------------
9. (C) Woodward agreed that Shah Deniz was experiencing production delays, but said that other issues would play a more determinative role in deciding where Shah Deniz gas went, such as the GOG technical capacity to uptake Shah Deniz gas at its border with Azerbaijan. He said that the Gas Pressure Reduction and Metering Station at Pump Station One in Georgia has a maximum daily design throughput of 4.0 million cubic meters, equivalent to 1.46 bcm/a at one hundred percent load (note: this compares to currently contracted
BAKU 00001661 003 OF 003
quantities which build up to around 08. bcm/a by 2011). As such, he said that part of the work of the SOCAR-BP gas working group that would be meeting imminently would be to model how much gas Georgia could uptake from Azerbaijan from a technical viewpoint. He noted that in addition to the SCP (i.e. Shah Deniz) pipeline, there was also the possibility of transferring gas from Azerbaijan to Georgia through the Azerbaijani gas system. As for Shah Deniz gas itself, Woodward said that as soon as the first two of the four wells start flowing (mid-November and late December respectively), will it be clear how quickly and how much production will be available for winter 2007.
10. (C) COMMENT: Before determining what steps to take to redress any possible winter 07 gas shortages in Azerbaijan and Georgia, Azerbaijan first needs to assess its current gas balance and possible alternative supply options. In this regard it is encouraging to hear that the joint BP-SOCAR gas working group is scheduled to meet the week of November 12. Woodward however was disparaging of the selection of SOCAR President Rovnaq Abdullayev and Deputy Prime Minister Sharifov as the GOAJ officials sent to Ankara to deal with the Turkish government (indeed, a Statoil representative told the Ambassador that Abdullayev had taken the wrong version of the Shah Deniz contract to the discussions), and despaired of any solution to the short-term regional problem occurring if management of the issue stayed at the SOCAR level. As such, he requested USG help in convincing Turkey to meet with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Now that Turkey is doing so (see reftel), Embassy will seek to ensure that the GOAJ participates at the appropriate level. END COMMENT. DERSE
Friday, 27 April 2007, 13:51
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000522
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/25/2027
TAGS ENRG, PREL, PGOV, AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN ENERGY MINISTER LIKES BP BUT WANTS MORE
LEVERAGE
REF: BAKU 463
Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) SUMMARY. In an April 18 conversation with the Ambassador, Energy and Industry Minister Natiq Aliyev said that GOAJ would continue its close cooperation with BP, and that in principle the GOAJ supported BP plans for ACG PSA extension and ACG deep gas. The GOAJ also wants BP as Shah Deniz operator to accelerate Phase Two production and to work with SOCAR to develop other fields. He said that the GOAJ cannot commit gas that "belongs to BP," and any specific public commitments or comments about future levels of Azerbaijani gas production should be made and supported by both BP and the GOAJ. The GOAJ needs some type of "lever" over BP to ensure that it lives up to its production commitments. He suspected BP was purposefully dragging its feet on Shah Deniz Phase Two development due to ambiguity about transit costs and the ultimate market for this gas. END SUMMARY
2. (C) On April 18 the Ambassador met with Energy and Industry Minister Natiq Aliyev to discuss future Azerbaijani gas production. EnergyOff was notetaker.
3. (C) The Ambassador told Aliyev that she had talked with President Aliyev recently on energy matters (reftel). She said that in her April 16 discussion with President Aliyev, he said the GOAJ "cannot commit gas that it does not own," and that GOAJ gas production o/a 2012 depends largely on BP as the Shah Deniz consortium operator. She told Energy Minister Aliyev that DAS Bryza was meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Gyurcsany on April 20 to discuss, inter alia, the Nabucco pipeline, amidst Hungarian concerns that Azerbaijan would not be able to supply sufficient gas to get it started. Prior to this meeting in Budapest, the Ambassador wanted to ensure that the USG knew and accurately reflected the message the GOAJ wanted to put out concerning its willingness and ability to supply gas for Nabucco, and President Aliyev had suggested she confer with the Energy and Industry Minister.
4. (C) Energy and Industry Minister Aliyev said that he had just met with visiting BP Production and Exploration Head Andy Inglis, whom he told that the GOAJ was ready to accelerate gas production efforts within the EU Commission framework. Aliyev said the GOAJ wanted to show its desire to participate in commercially viable gas projects, such as TGI, Nabucco, and transiting gas from Kazakhstan and/or Turkmenistan. However, for much if not most of the GOAJ's gas production, "we depend on BP." When the Ambassador pointed out that there was the possibility that the GOAJ would "lose out" on securing gas contracts with European consumers unless they could reassure them that Azerbaijan was willing and able to supply gas, the Energy Minister stressed that the GOAJ is ready and willing to coordinate and cooperate with European customers, but the GOAJ has no ability to fulfill BP's obligations. "We can't answer Europe (re availability of gas) without BP," Aliyev stressed. For this reason, the GOAJ was unwilling to publicly commit to supply "20 bcm o/a 2012" without support from BP. "It would be naive for Azerbaijan to commit 5 to 10 bcm to Nabucco without "some type of lever" over BP, Aliyev said.
5. (C) Aliyev also said that the GOAJ had no power to compel BP to produce gas on schedule, and that BP has no strong obligation to implement the GOAJ's annual production program, which was designed based on BP gas production estimates. He complained that "BP has no responsibility for fulfilling production quotas; under the PSA there is no recourse for non-performance." There had been a delay of "three to four years" with BTC, and with Shah Deniz, Azerbaijan was committed to deliver gas to Turkey in 2006, but hadn't been able to because of production delays. "We must have strong cooperation with BP," but Aliyev said he didn't know "how to ensure that BP fulfills its obligations - we can't punish them or make claims against them." BP provides gas production estimates to the GOAJ, but "these aren't obligations, and BP can change them anytime."
6. (C) Aliyev said that this year BP had projected that Shah Deniz would produce 5.6 bcm, but now they say "no more than" three bcm, "which means probably around two bcm." "If we had gotten the promised 5.6 bcm, the GOAJ could have provided gas to Georgia this last winter without any problem... and now
BAKU 00000522 002 OF 003
they are saying that there will be a second Shah Deniz well producing in May, but I don't believe them." Aliyev did grudgingly admit that offshore deep-sea gas production was "difficult," and that BP was being "careful - we can't push them too much."
7. (C) The Ambassador agreed with Aliyev that it was a difficult situation, given the GOAJ's strong desire to accelerate production and export gas to Europe. In response to the Ambassador saying that it was important for the GOAJ to state publicly its policy goal regarding Azerbaijan's willingness and ability to export this gas to Europe, Aliyev said that he thought that SOCAR and BP should make a joint declaration, "because without BP, Azerbaijan's commitment means nothing." SOCAR and BP should be working together on Shah Deniz and ACG Deep Gas, with BP making production estimates and the GOAJ approving them.
BP AND GOAJ COOPERATION
-----------------------
8. (C) Energy Minister Aliyev said that BP has large proposals for oil and gas projects in Azerbaijan. It has upgraded its estimates of oil reserves at the ACG field from an original estimate of 2.4 billion barrels to 9 billion barrels. As such, BP claims that at the end of the current PSA (2024), only 60-70 percent of the field's recoverable production could have been extracted, with two billion barrels left in the ground. Aliyev said the GOAJ agrees in principle to extending the PSA, but "now is not 1994," and the terms will change. The GOAJ will calculate to ensure that it preserves its equities.
9. (C) Minister Aliyev said that in general, the GOAJ was willing to cooperate with BP on ACG PSA extension, on ACG Deep Gas, and on accelerating production for Shah Deniz Phase Two (SD2). He also said that the GOAJ was ready to continue cooperating with BP on other SOCAR exploration blocks. (COMMENT: This statement has not been reflected by public pronouncements from SOCAR, which instead has expressed a desire to increase its control in exploring remaining offshore fields.)
BP RELUCTANT ON SD2?
--------------------
10. (C) Aliyev said that given the high price of gas if nothing else, the GOAJ should accelerate gas production as much as it could. With SD2 production beginning o/a 2012, overall Shah Deniz production would be 16 to 20 bcm. He said that he thought it unlikely that SD2 production could be accelerated earlier than 2011-2012, although to an extent this depended on capital expenditure levels. He said SD2 development is going to take a lot of capital expenditure, and he thought that BP doesn't think that there is an existing transportation option for SD2 gas. The existing system delivers only to Erzerum, and the Turkish market is very limited. Before committing to SD2 development, BP needs to see the details of transit/transport and a market for SD2 gas beyond Turkey, i.e. Greece, Italy, the Balkans. The existing Turkey-Greece pipeline capacity is only three to five bcm, which in BP's eyes is insufficient. BP doesn't see a delivery system for SD2 gas and doesn't see terms and conditions of transit. Nabucco is a project on paper only at this point, and overall there are "too many unknowns" relating to export of SD2 gas to make a commercial decision. As such, Aliyev said he thought BP is seeking to delay decisions on SD2 development until more factors, such as commercial transit fees, were known.
SD2 MARKETING
-------------
11. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question about SD2 marketing, Aliyev said that he thinks this issue would be solved between Statoil and SOCAR, because "it is not easy to be a seller, and Statoil has experience - if SOCAR wants to sell, first they have to learn how." He thought that SOCAR was currently not ready to market SD2 gas, but that "there was time" for them to learn. Aliyev went on to say that it was "too early" to worry about SD2 marketing. He mused that perhaps there could be a "rotation system" for SD2 gas sales, with the marketer changing among SD Consortium partners every two years.
BAKU 00000522 003 OF 003
12. (C) When the Ambassador tried clarifying with the Energy Minister what the USG and GOAJ can say publicly about future Azerbaijani gas exports, Aliyev said that one could say (as did the President recently) that exploration has shown that SD has 1.2 trillion cubic meters of recoverable reserves, and that Azerbaijan is committed to providing as much gas as possible as soon as possible to Europe (Baku-based energy insiders were puzzled by President Aliyev's recent statement on SD capacity, as it exceeded current SD recoverable reserve estimates). The GOAJ does not want to prematurely commit itself, but SD2 production will allow exports through Turkey. What is possible now are statements of political intent, which the GOAJ has made and is making, Aliyev said; BP should also publicly "sign on" to these expressions of intent.
13. (C) In response to the Ambassador's comment that the GOAJ needs to send a clear and strong signal to Europe that Azerbaijan's will and intention are strong, Aliyev said that Shah Deniz production combined with other GOAJ gas production, to include new discoveries, is enough to supply gas to Europe, without gas from Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan. But BP as operator must commit to this goal too. For its part, the GOAJ is willing to move forward with BP on ACG Deep Gas, on accelerating SD2 production, and on exploring other GOAJ options. But BP programs and commitments must be approved and controlled "on a high level" by BP and the GOAJ together. Aliyev said that it was in the strategic interest of the GOAJ to deliver gas to Europe, and that in this regard there had to be strong cooperation among SOCAR, BP and the GOAJ. BP Production and Exploration Head Andy Inglis would be returning to Azerbaijan in June to continue discussions with SOCAR on a range of issues, to include PSA extension, accelerated SD production, and ACG Deep Gas. The Energy Ministry was not involved with BP-SOCAR negotiations.
NEED FOR TRANSIT REGIME
----------------------
14. (C) Aliyev said that before making any decisions about gas sales, all parties involved must know the relevant information about delivery through Turkey, to include Turkish transit information, so that all involved costs are known. The Ambassador pointed out that time was a factor, as European customers had to make decisions soon for long-term gas contracts. Aliyev said that the President has not yet authorized transit talks with Turkey (COMMENT: We are following up with the GOAJ on their desired timeline for transit talks with Turkey). He asked that the USG to "push the Turks" towards beginning transit talks with Azerbaijan. As a first step, the Minister said that BP has to forward a letter to the President about terms and conditions that need to be negotiated, saying that an Intergovernmental Agreement with Turkey is needed.
15. (C) COMMENT: The Energy Minister strongly underscored the GOAJ position that Azerbaijan is ready to provide as much gas possible as soon as possible to Europe, and repeated the GOAJ talking point heard from SOCAR and President Aliyev that statements about specific volumes of future gas production must be made in conjunction with BP. Embassy will follow up with BP to ascertain concerning the status and nature of its discussions with SOCAR and the GOAJ. END COMMENT. DERSE
Monday, 09 July 2007, 12:41
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000855
SIPDIS
SIPDS
NOFORN
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, PM AND S/CT
EO 12958 DECL: 07/05/2017
TAGS ENRG, EPET, PTER MARR, MASS, PBTS, IR, AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S RITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE
VULNERABLE TO TERRRISM
BAKU 00000855 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Donald Lu per 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) Summary: Senior BP officils believe that XXXXXXXXXXXX offshore platforms are vulnerable to terrorism. As BP Azerbaijan President Bill Schrader routinely tells U.S. officials, "all it would take is one guy with a mortar or six guys in a boat" to wreak havoc in Azerbaijan's critical energy infrastructure. Although Azerbaijan has a system and plans in place to deal with security threats at its on- and offshore installations, the GOAJ's plans are hampered by a lack of resources, a lack of coordination among GOAJ agencies, and a fundamental lack of recognition of the vulnerabilities. The GOAJ is eager for U.S. views on this topic and plans to present its own assessment of critical energy infrastructure security needs at the July 9-10 bilateral security consultations. We strongly recommend that the Department explore options to help Azerbaijan better assess these vulnerabilities, in line with the NATO Riga Summit declaration on energy security. End summary.
BP'S Views on the Vulnerabilities
---------------------------------
2. (C) BP, the operator for the Azerbaijan International Operating Company and associated Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Export Pipeline, believes that XXXXXXXXXXXX Azerbaijan's off-shore platforms are vulnerable to terrorism. As BP Azerbaijan President Bill Schrader has told U.S. officials in private conversations, "all it would take is one guy with a mortar or six guys in a boat" to wreak havoc in Azerbaijan's critical energy infrastructure. TXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
8. XXXXXXXXXXXX
9. XXXXXXXXXXXX
11.XXXXXXXXXXXX----
12. XXXXXXXXXXXX
13. XXXXXXXXXXXX14. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX15. XXXXXXXXXXXX-------------------
16. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX17. XXXXXXXXXXXX18. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX
COMMENT
-------
19.XXXXXXXXXXXX LU
Tuesday, 09 October 2007, 14:14
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001227
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
VILNIUS PLEASE PASS TO MATT BRYZA
EO 12958 DECL: 10/09/2017
TAGS ENRG, PREL, PGOV, RS, TU, UP, KZ, PL, GG, LH, TX, AJ
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ALIYEV ON ENERGY ISSUES IN ADVANCE OF
THE VILNIUS ENERGY SUMMIT
REF: A. (A) BAKU 1224 B. (B) TBILISI 2498
Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse. Reason: 1.4 (B)(D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: In a one-hour one-on-one meeting with the Ambassador on October 8, President Aliyev outlined with frustration current problems on energy in advance of the Vilnius Summit. British Petroleum (BP) is "stealing our oil," he asserted sharply, seeking to put pressure on Azerbaijan to delay to 2010 the advent of an 80/20 profit split due next year under the Azeri Chirag Guneshli (ACG) Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) by threatening to cut back on gas it provides to the GOAJ from the ACG field from 3 bcm to 1.4 bcm. "Only Georgia will suffer" if BP continues down this path, he warned, noting Azerbaijan's commitment, otherwise, to help Georgia on gas this winter. He said the Georgian PM had promised him to enlist Washington's help with BP. He said BP had asked for time, until October 19, to resume talks. If a good response is not found, Azerbaijan "will make public that BP is stealing our oil," Aliyev stated. Similarly, he said, Turkey's 15 percent netback pricing scheme for gas transit is "unacceptable" as it would require Azerbaijan to disclose to Turkey sales agreements with customers in Europe and allow Turkey to sell 15 percent of Azerbaijan's gas to European markets. A transit agreement is "not so urgent for us that we will accept unjustified conditions from Turkey."
2. (C) Summary Continued: Azerbaijan has an MOU with Greece, will soon launch talks with Italy, and will not allow Turkey to "block the Azerbaijan-Europe partnership." He said Turkmenistan seems to want the trans-Caspian option to be implemented but "to hide it from Russia." Azerbaijan has shown "maximum constructiveness" -- offering its infrastructure to Turkmenistan and pledging to serve as purely a transit country -- but Azerbaijan will not initiate next steps with Turkmenistan -- "We cannot want it more than they do." Azerbaijan does support the Odessa-Brody-Plotsk oil pipeline for political reasons ("Ukraine, Poland, Georgia are friends to us.") and will present a concrete plan on next steps at a meeting in Vilnius with Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, and Georgia with the aim of making the project commercially feasible. Aliyev asked that the U.S. try to deliver the message on the unacceptability of the 15 percent netback pricing proposal to Turkey. He continues to support Nazarbayev's idea of a 3-way summit between Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan as a good signal and a way to strengthen 3-way relations, but will not initiate the meeting. End Summary.
Georgian Winter Gas
-------------------
3. (C) President Aliyev opened the discussion on energy by saying that Azerbaijan will help Georgia this winter as it has in the past. He said he confirmed this to the visiting Georgian PM during his September 27 visit to Baku. The GOAJ, however, is having some difficulties with BP, he said. Because the GOAJ halted negotiations on PSA extension and Shah Deniz development, BP is now "trying to put political pressure on us by cutting back on gas it is giving to Azerbaijan, from 3 bcm to 1.4 bcm." But "only Georgia will suffer" from this step because the Shah Deniz gas they will receive from Azerbaijan will not be enough. "If BP reduces the gas it is giving Azerbaijan, Georgia will get less." The Georgian PM, Aliyev said, had told him he is aware of this danger, and had said he would talk to Washington to "get them to help us." (See Ref. A for background on Azerbaijan-BP negotiations.)
4. (C) Aliyev continued that "these things are inter-connected. If BP is supportive and helpful, there will be no problem supplying Georgia." But the situation with BP is "unpleasant -- they are cheating us on the PSA profit split according to our calculations." The GOAJ believes that the profit split should have changed in the second quarter of this year. "They are stealing our oil -- they are unilaterally changing the formula on the ROR (rate of return) so the profit split will take place in 2010. SOCAR spoke to (BP Azerbaijan head) Bill Schrader. BP asked for time, until October 19, to come back to discussions."
BAKU 00001227 002 OF 003
(Comment: BP Azerbaijan on October 9 had no news of an impending visit by BP CEO, per Ref. B. End comment.) If there is not a good response, "we'll make public that BP is stealing our oil . . . oil that belongs to Azerbaijan, because BP wants the 80/20 profit split that should occur next year to be pushed to 2010." The Georgian situation, Aliyev repeated, "is connected to that."
Turkey Transit Agreement
------------------------
5. (C) Aliyev said that Azerbaijan rejects the Turks' 15 percent netback proposal. The Turkish formula would require Azerbaijan to disclose to the GOT its commercial agreements with Greece, Italy, and other European countries -- "anywhere our gas goes." The netback pricing proposal is "not acceptable -- it does not exist in any other transit agreement. We would lose money and Turkey could sell 15 percent of our oil to our markets. This is not fair. We'll pay an agreed transit tariff. We want to do it on the basis of best international practice. Our position with Turkey is pretty strong. If they block an agreement, they are responsible. The Minister always says Turkey will do the necessary, but then does nothing. We will not accept pressure."
6. (C) Aliyev noted that it is Turkey and European consumers who need the transit agreement. "It is not so urgent for us that we will agree to unjustified conditions with Turkey." Azerbaijan has existing and adequate markets for its gas in Georgia and Turkey, he noted. Aliyev asked that the U.S. "deliver (to Turkey) if it can, this message. Turkey wants to get everything." Turkey does not understand that Azerbaijan has signed an MOU with Greece and will soon start negotiations with Italy. "Turkey cannot block the Azerbaijan-Europe partnership." Aliyev said Finance Minister Samir Sharifov's proposal for USTDA technical assistance to review best international practice in transit agreements was a good one. Azerbaijan wants the transit agreement with Turkey to be based on best international practice, not to "invent something new." He encouraged the U.S. to consider the technical assistance.
Turkmenistan and Trans-Caspian Gas
----------------------------------
7. (C) Aliyev pointed to Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov's statement that he would "sell gas to Europe at Turkmenistan's border," adding, however, that he had failed to specify which border he was referring to -- that with Russia, Iran, or the Caspian Sea? Aliyev said it was his sense that Turkmenistan wants the trans-Caspian option to be implemented but "wants to hide it from Russia." Azerbaijan, he said, has shown "maximum constructiveness -- we offered all our infrastructure; we said we'd be a purely transit country, not do like Turkey is trying to do. But we will not be more interested than they. I will not initiate a meeting with Berdimuhamedov -- it is not right to do." Azerbaijan, he repeated, "will not initiate discussions with Turkmenistan because we do not need its gas -- we cannot be seen to want it (the trans-Caspian option) more than they do."
Odessa-Brody-Plotsk
-------------------
8. (C) Azerbaijan has finalized its energy plan, Aliyev said. Azerbaijan supported the Krakow Summit and the proposed Odessa-Brody-Plotsk oil pipeline "even though the project is seen as anti-Russian" because Ukraine, Poland and Georgia are friendly to Azerbaijan. Aliyev said that the key is for Odessa-Brody-Plotsk to be "commercially feasible." For this reason, he had asked Energy Minister Natiq Aliyev to prepare a concrete proposal for discussion in Vilnius. This will include Azerbaijan's joining as a shareholder in the Sarmitia pipeline, and the launch of a feasibility study. In addition, a joint trading company for Black Sea oil will be created. With Supsa and Novorossisk, there is a great deal of Black Sea oil available, Aliyev said. The key, he repeated, is to make the Odessa-Brody-Plotsk project commercially feasible. Azerbaijan supports it "more to show political support than any urgent need" economically.
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Three-way Summit
----------------
9. (C) Aliyev said that Lithuanian PM Adamkus had told him in Vilnius last month that Kazakhstan would not attend the Vilnius Summit. He said, again with some frustration, that the idea of a 3-way Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan summit was Nazarbayev's idea, but there has been no further progress on taking it forward to his knowledge. With the clear implication that Kazakhstan should take its idea forward, Aliyev said he still believes such a trilateral meeting "would send a good signal, strengthening our relations and could be a positive thing."
10. (C) Comment: Aliyev was clearly frustrated and uncharacteristically sharp in discussing Turkey, Turkmenistan and especially BP, and disappointed with what he sees as Kazakhstan's equivocation. He repeated throughout the conversation that Azerbaijan's interest in delivering gas to Europe is strategic, driven by Azerbaijan's desire for a deeper partnership with Europe. He also underscored, in a clear reference to Russia, that Azerbaijan "cannot be seen" to be more in the lead than others in the region on gas issues. It will be important to reassure Aliyev in Vilnius of the USG's commitment to the southern corridor and to working closely with Azerbaijan to realize it, and to encourage him to find a productive way forward, in practical terms, with Turkey, Turkmenistan and BP. Septel will provide further insights from both BP and SOCAR on both the state of GOAJ-AIOC negotiations and Azerbaijan's ability to provide gas to Georgia this winter. End comment.
DERSE
Friday, 16 March 2007, 18:28
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000258
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EO 12958 DECL: 03/16/2017
TAGS PGOV, PINR, CU
SUBJECT: CUBA: HOW BELIEVABLE IS A FIDEL CASTRO COMEBACK?
HAVANA 00000258 001.3 OF 002
Classified By: COM Michael E. Parmly; Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
1. (C) Summary: XXXXXXXXXXXX passed us a document XXXXXXXXXXXX that describes Fidel Castro's declining health, as analyzed by a XXXXXXXXXXXX doctor. The document concludes by saying that Castro has a terminal condition, and will suffer an inevitable deterioration of his faculties until he dies. But he is not about to die "immediately." This contrasts with a flurry of news and public statements by key regime figures about Castro making a comeback, including his having spoken to Hugo Chavez on the phone while the latter was in Haiti. We believe that a full comeback is unlikely, but that Fidel Castro is more of a presence behind the scenes -- and even "on stage" as a presence -- than he was a few months ago. End Summary.
2. (U) Media have reported increased activity on the part of Fidel Castro this past week: Speaking on the phone to Hugo Chavez during the Venezuelan's visit to Haiti; and receiving Colombian author and long-time sympathizer Gabriel Garcia Marquez. Both Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque (in Europe) and Parliamentary Speaker Ricardo Alarcon stated publicly that Fidel Castro was making a comeback and would return to the GOC's helm. Alarcon's statement included Castro's "winning reelection for president" in 2008. Interim dictator Raul Castro has kept a low profile during the past few weeks.
3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX passed COM and Pol-Econ Counselor a documentXXXXXXXXXXXX. The document traces Fidel Castro's critical condition from its onset last July, through the various ups and downs with his local medical staff and with the visiting Spanish doctor, Garcia Sabrido. Most of this repeats what has previously been reported, with one new development: Castro has fired hisXXXXXXXXXXXX physicianXXXXXXXXXXXX. Informal translation of this document follows in Para 4.
4. (C) Doctor's Statement:
"The illness began in the plane from Holguin to Havana (Note: after a full day of July 26, 2006 activities. End note). As this was a short flight there was no doctor aboard and they had to land urgently once they knew of his bleeding. He was diagnosed with diverticulitis of the colon.
This illness is characterized by diverticulae in the large intestine, generally. A diverticula is a protuberant sack in a segment of the intestine, not in itself necessarily dangerous. Waste gets trapped in them, for example. Nevertheless, they can cause hemorrhaging, inflammation and infection, resulting in diverticulitis. (Health Unit Comment: Simple diverticulitis, without perforation, hemorrhaging or infection, is treatable. End Comment.)
The condition requires surgery when the diverticulae are gigantic, because they are more likely to become infected and burst.
He had a perforation in the large intestine and needed to have a colostomy done; which he opposed, saying that they should splice out the infected part and reattach the intestine to his colon. XXXXXXXXXXXX was in agreement, but the rest of the team opposed. But Fidel Castro, capriciously, did not permit the colostomy.
With the passage of time, as the colon was infected, the operation collapsed and the reattached part separated. They had to operate again, but found a fistula. It wasn't known at that time what he had, but normally a fistula in the abdomen has the effect of blocking the digestion of food--resulting in the loss of 40 pounds. They began to feed him by IV serum, and they used a Korean-made device to treat the fistula, which didn't have much success. That was when they called in the Spanish doctor, the one who said that they Cuban team had done what they could, but the correct treatment should have been a colostomy.
At that point they removed Selman from the team, who is now working as a low-level doctor someplace else.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
HAVANA 00000258 002.3 OF 002
this illness is not curable, and will not, in her opinion, allow him to return to leading Cuba. He won't die immediately, but he will progressively lose his faculties and become ever more debilitated until he dies."
5. (C) This report is consistent with our reporting that Fidel Castro probably came close to death in July, 2006, and then again around October. Since then, as we have seen in video and audio broadcasts, Castro has been able to engage with Hugo Chavez and others for limited periods of conversation and other forms of carefully controlled activity. He has not appeared live on TV or in any other public context during the entire period of his critical illness, which caused him to miss the September, 2006 Non-Aligned summit and a large-scale celebration of his birthday and armed forces day in December, 2006.
6. (C) Cubans react to news about Fidel Castro with resignation and wild speculation. XXXXXXXXXXXX told usXXXXXXXXXXXX that he thought last month's taped call-in by Castro to Hugo Chavez's radio show was fake and that he would die by May. XXXXXXXXXXXX described the Castro illness as having a similar effect on the public as the Pope's 1998 visit: Greatly raised expectation for change, followed by disappointment and reversion to the totalitarian norm.
7. (C) Comment: We are missing too many variables to be able to predict accurately how many more months Fidel Castro will live. Frankly, we don't believe anyone, including Castro himself, can state that with certainty. However, while he is still alive, even in a reduced capacity, his presence has a chilling and retardant effect on Cuban society. The high expectations for change are still out there, but are mostly associated with the idea that the dictator has to die first before anything substantial will happen. PARMLY
Tuesday, 06 November 2007, 13:18
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 004881
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EO 12958 DECL: 11/05/2017
TAGS PREL, PARM, TSPL, KNNP, ETTC, ENRG, TRGY, IN
SUBJECT: PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE, GUJARAT ELECTIONS KEY TO GOI
APPROACH ON US-INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL
REF: A. NEW DELHI 4857 B. NEW DELHI 4842 C. NEW DELHI 4835 D. NEW DELHI 4823 E. NEW DELHI 4803 F. NEW DELHI 4764 G. NEW DELHI 4763 H. MUMBAI 604 I. NEW DELHI 4720 J. NEW DELHI 4638 K. NEW DELHI 4616 L. NEW DELHI 4589
Classified By: Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)
1. (C) Summary: The upcoming winter session of Parliament in mid-November and Gujarat state assembly elections in mid-December will play a key role in shaping GOI actions on the US-India civil nuclear agreement. The respective positions of the Congress Party and the Left parties are likely to be fine-tuned in a series of inter-party and intra-party meetings in the days before Parliament begins debate on the agreement on or around November 19. The debate will be unpredictable but vigorous, with a great deal of high rhetoric and low tactics by all the parties. If the UPA emerges from the debate with no clear "sense of the House" against the deal, it will look for opportunities to move forward on discussions with the IAEA. Most observers believe that the Gujarat elections in mid-December will provide the true test of UPA government's approach on the agreement. If the Congress Party puts in a good performance in this BJP stronghold, it might feel politically strong enough to challenge the Left parties by moving forward with the IAEA on the safeguards agreement at the risk of (or even the desire for) early mid-term polls. However, Mrs. Gandhi never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity to show real leadership. While remaining publicly restrained and taking care not to be seen as interfering with domestic Indian politics, the Embassy will continue to meet with all political, business and civil society parties and interest groups to urge them to support the agreement. End Summary.
Timetable Ahead of Parliamentary Debate
---------------------------------------
2. (U) With the first few days of the session devoted to housekeeping matters, Parliament is expected to take up serious business on November 19. This date is significant for Parliamentary debate on the US-India civil nuclear initiative because it follows closely four other meetings:
-- November 11-12: Meeting of Communist Party - Marxist politburo meeting;
-- November 16: Meeting of the UPA-Left coordination committee on the US-India civil nuclear agreement, unless that meeting is postponed;
-- November 16: Meeting of the Congress Working Committee, the highest decision-making body of the Congress Party; and
-- November 17: Meeting of the All India Congress Committee, the broadest and most representative body of the Congress Party.
Avoiding Monsoon Session Gridlock
---------------------------------
3. (C) The discussion and decisions taken at these meetings will feed directly into the Parliamentary debate that follows. In the monsoon session in August, boisterous disruptions by the Left parties and the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) over the nuclear initiative paralyzed Parliamentary business. The UPA government is hoping to avoid a similar scene during the winter session because the principal players appear to have recently pulled back somewhat from the confrontational approach they held in August-October.
Positive Developments: Left Parties
-----------------------------------
NEW DELHI 00004881 002 OF 003
4. (C) The US-India civil nuclear initiative still faces an uphill road (Ref G) but there have been developments in recent days that bode well for the government, if not for quick completion of the nuclear deal. The Left parties, while continuing to reiterate their firm opposition to the civil nuclear agreement, have gone out of their way to reject the notion of early parliamentary elections. "There is no threat to the UPA government," Communist Party Marxist General Secretary Prakash Karat told reporters on October 30. Some see this as a glimmer of hope that the Left may not force the collapse of the UPA government if the Prime Minister moves forward on the IAEA safeguards agreement. This is reassuring to UPA allies such as Railway Minister Lalu Prasad Yadav of the Rashtriya Janata Dal, Sharad Pawar of the Nationalist Congress Party and Karunanidhi of the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham, all of whom, deathly afraid of early elections, pressured the UPA government to slow down progress on the agreement. The Left parties have also taken pains recently to be conciliatory towards the Prime Minister and his stand on the US-India agreement after having attacked him sharply during the last two months.
Positive Developments: BJP
--------------------------
5. (C) The BJP, while it continues to speak with many conflicting voices, appears to have softened its opposition to the agreement, in part, due to the Ambassador's meetings with BJP leaders (Ref A, D, E). A party spokesman said on October 30 that the BJP will not insist, as it did during the monsoon session, that debate on the agreement be conducted under Parliamentary rules that require a vote, something the UPA government had refused to do. The BJP spokesman also noted that his party will drop its monsoon session demand for the establishment of a joint parliamentary committee to examine the agreement. Perhaps the most important BJP pronouncement on the issue was made by Leader of the Opposition L.K. Advani, who supported the call for a full Parliamentary debate but pointed out that the government is not constitutionally bound to accept the opinion of Parliament on this issue, rebuffing Karat's shrill insistence on an enhanced, more formal role for Parliament in Indian foreign policy formulation. .
Positive Developments: Congress
-------------------------------
6. (C) Since the October 12 reversal by Sonia Gandhi and the Prime Minister on the US-India agreement (Ref L), the Congress Party appears to be stiffening its back a little. The Prime Minister and the party have acknowledged a "delay in operationalizing" the agreement but have repeatedly reiterated their commitment to finalizing the deal. The Prime Minister made this observation after his October 30 meeting with German Chancellor Merkel. He assured Treasury Secretary Paulson on October 29 that the government was fully
SIPDIS committed to the agreement (Ref B) and were exploring various ways of getting it through the domestic obstacles. Speaking at a November 5 conference, he called critics of the nuclear initiative "myopic."
Unpredictable Debate
--------------------
7. (C) It is difficult to foretell how the Parliamentary debate over the agreement will turn out. The Left has been assiduously courting regional parties in recent days and several of these parties have expressed solidarity with the Left's position. Yet, the regional parties do not have strong ideological or policy positions on the agreement. What concerns them most is whether or not the deal leads to early elections. The BJP's confused stance has become even more muddled now with some leaders softening their positions but others not getting the memo. The BJP will sit down before the winter session to iron out its party line and make sure its Parliamentarians stick with it.
8. (C) Given that the Left parties are unlikely to relent from their opposition to the agreement, the best outcome for the UPA (and the deal) will be if the Left parties are isolated in the debate while the BJP expresses criticism, but remains uncommitted -- similar to the position taken by the Left in previous nuclear debates. The worst outcome would be
NEW DELHI 00004881 003 OF 003
if the Left, BJP and the regional parties corner the UPA and the "sense of the House" is clearly against the agreement. The most likely scenario is somewhere in the middle with a vigorous debate but both sides claiming victory. If this happens, the UPA government might plausibly take steps to move forward on the deal, if it can find the courage to do so.
Gujarat Elections Holds the Key
-------------------------------
9. (C) Embassy agrees with many observers who believe that if the Parliamentary debate is a draw, the Gujarat election result in December are crucial to whether Congress Party moves forward with the nuclear agreement. Gujarat is a large state, with 26 seats in Parliament. It is a prosperous state which is leading the Indian economic resurgence. It is also one of the most "saffron" states in the country. The BJP has won the last five state assembly elections. It crushed the Congress in 2002 in a lop-sided win in the aftermath of the 2002 riots. By most accounts, Narendra Modi, the poster boy of anti-Muslim Hindu nationalist ideology, has an edge to retain his Chief Minister position for a third straight time (Ref C and H). The state unit of the Congress Party is weak and poorly organized.
10. (C) If the Congress Party can put in a healthy performance to make a dent in this BJP bastion, observers believe the Congress Party will feel politically strong to risk (or even call) a mid-term national poll. In this case, the Prime Minister and the Congress Party would challenge the Left parties by moving forward with the IAEA on the safeguards agreement. It is because of the importance the Congress Party attaches to Gujarat that it is bringing in its top leaders to campaign in the state. Sonia Gandhi launched the campaign over the weekend in Anand, Gujarat. Rahul Gandhi is expected to campaign in the state. If, on the other hand, the Congress Party is trampled again in Gujarat and fails to improve on its 48 seats (out of 182 total seats in the assembly), it will feel vulnerable and will not be tempted to risk early elections. It will then require extraordinary political courage for the UPA to carry out the IAEA talks, which place its full term in office in jeopardy.
Comment: Golda Meir Would be Disgusted
--------------------------------------
11. (C) The Congress Party, led by Sonia Gandhi, has proven especially cautious and nervous in the face of recent extortionist tactics by Prakash Karat. With two huge confrontations in its future -- Parliament and Gujarat -- it will remain true to its cautious form by seeking first to gauge its levels of support before finally being forced -- if absolutely needed -- to take action. With the future of Indian foreign credibility hanging in balance, Sonia Gandhi has been unable to show principled leadership even when it might benefit her party at the polls and reveal Prakash Karat to be the extortionist he is. Mrs. Gandhi never misses and opportunity to miss an opportunity. While remaining publicly restrained and taking care not to be seen as interfering with domestic Indian politics, the Embassy will continue to meet with all political, business and civil society organizations to urge them to support the agreement. We will continue to press the UPA government on the need for early completion of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. And, we will continue our efforts to remind the BJP that the US-India civil nuclear agreement is their deal, too. WHITE
Monday, 04 June 2007, 11:37
S E C R E T NEW DELHI 002621
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SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/07/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, PBTS, MOPS, KDEM, KISL, PK, IN
SUBJECT: KASHMIRI PARAMILITARY SEEKING US VISA
Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius, Reason 1.5 (B,D)
1. (S) This is an ACTION Request for the Department. SCA please see paragraph 4.
2. (S) Summary: Kashmiri paramilitary leader and J&K State MLA Usman Abdul Majid is seeking a U.S. visa to attend functions hosted in Washington by the United States Institute of Peace starting on June 7th. Majid is a leader of the pro-GOI Ikhawan-ul-Musilmeen paramilitary group, which is made up of former Kashmiri terrorists who have surrendered to the GOI. Beginning in the early 1990s, India's security forces used Ikhwan to combat terrorism in the Srinagar Valley. Known for its brutal and corrupt practices, Ikhwan is notorious for its use of torture, extra-judicial killing, rape, and extortion of Kashmiri civilians suspected of harboring or facilitating terrorists. In the interest of remaining balanced in our approach tothe Kashmir issue following Embassy New Delhi's denial of Sayeed Ali Shah Geelani's visa request, Post recommends denying this visa application as well. End Summary.
A Dubious History
-----------------
3. (S) Kashmiri paramilitary leader and J&K state MLA Usman Abdul Majid applied for a U.S. visa on May 22nd in order to attend functions held by the United States Institute of Peace starting on June 7th in Washington, DC. Majid is a leader of the pro-GOI Ikhawan-ul-Musilmeen paramilitary group, which was formed by India's security forces to combat terrorism in the Kashmir Valley. The group is made up of terrorists who have surrendered to the Indian government and agreed to fight against their former brethren. Ikhawan has a reputation in the Valley for committing brutal human rights abuses -- including extra-judicial killings of suspected terrorists and their family members, as well as torturing, killing, raping, and extorting Kashmiri civilians suspected of harboring or facilitating terrorists. Majid won election easily in his Baramullah district of Kashmir, but this is likely only because the district has had a minute voter turnout as terrorist groups continue to enforce a boycott there of Indian-held elections. This boycott continued in Baramullah even in 2002, when turnout was much higher in other areas. Similar to many of the instances of torture and violence surrounding the Kashmir dispute, Post is unable to verify with evidence the claims against Majid.
4. (S) Action request: Post requests guidance as to how to proceed with Majid's visa application. Visas donkey will follow septel.
5. (S) Comment: Majid's reputation in the Kashmir Valley is one of the worst among those associated with the GOI. In light of our rejection of the Geelani visa, we will not be able to maintain our record of neutrality in the Kashmir dispute if we grant this visa. Nonetheless, denying his application may have some repercussions with GOI officials, especially those from India's Intelligence Bureau who have been close to his case. As with the Geelani case, this will be a very delicate matter, but in light of Ikhawan's history, Post recommends that the U.S. government deny the visa. MULFORD
Friday, 04 May 2007, 11:42
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002142
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NSC FOR ABRAMS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/04/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINR, IR, IN
SUBJECT: IRAN MANIPULATING INDIAN ELITE OPINION-MAKERS
Classified By: Charge Geoffrey Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)
1. (C) This cable contains an action request for SCA. Please see paragraph 6.
New Iranian Mischief
------
2. (C) Ambassador K.V. Rajan, former Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs and current Chairman of the Prime Minister's National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), called Charge May 4 for an urgent meeting in which he told Charge that he had been invited by the Iranian Embassy for an all expenses paid trip for "politicians, scholars and commentators." The list of invitees in a fax from the Iranian Embassy press section included notorious America-critics, such as XXXXXXXXXXXX. The visit was scheduled for April 28-May 4, and the Embassy said the guests would meet Iranian officials, scholars and would visit "one or two Iranian nuclear establishment(s)." Reports this week in the "Asian Age" and "The Hindu" indicate the group visited the Arak Heavy Water Complex and met with Minister of Energy Parviz Fatah.
3. (C) Rajan told Charge that this trip was part of an effort on the part of the Iranian government to encourage anti-American, pro-Muslim scholars and think-tankers in India to influence Prime Minister Singh's supporters to take a more pro-Iranian, anti-U.S. view, and that his presence on the delegation would have handed Iran a PR coup. In light of his suspicions, Rajan canceled at the last minute, citing a sudden family emergency. Following is the invitee list, which Rajan provided to Charge:
-- XXXXXXXXXXXX
India Seeks U.S. Help
------
4. (C) To counter this new and worrying effort to reach out to Indian opinion makers, Rajan proposed a visit to the United States starting May 14 in his NSAB capacity for five to seven days to talk to officials, think tanks, and the intelligence community to discuss ways to understand better U.S. assessments of Iran. He would expect this to feed into NSAB discussion of Iran policy options.
5. (C) Rajan's analysis of Iranian intentions to influence PM Singh's domestic constituencies is deeply worrying and spot-on, and confirms what we have been reporting. Rajan also noted stepped up Iranian funding to sympathetic Shia clerics. The United Progressive Alliance government is deeply interested in appeasing its Muslim and Left Front
NEW DELHI 00002142 002 OF 002
supporters, and is concerned about the outcome of elections in Uttar Pradesh state, where a large number of Muslim constituents reside. We see evidence that Iran has been buying off journalists, clerics and editors in Shia-populated areas of Uttar Pradesh and Kashmir, doling out large sums to stoke anti-Americanism. Now, it seems Iran is focusing squarely on influential elite audiences in Delhi, with a view to shaping the debate of India's IAEA policy and the nuclear deal.
ACTION REQUEST: HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS
------
6. (C) To counter this insidious new Iranian effort, we recommend Rajan receive meetings, if possible, with:
-- XXXXXXXXXXXX
Friday, 27 April 2007, 12:27
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002037
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EO 12958 DECL: 01/11/2012
TAGS PREL, PGOV, BG, BM, CE, IN
SUBJECT: INDIAN OFFICIAL SEES BANGLADESH AT CROSSROADS, SRI
LANKA DETERIORATING, BURMA RELATIONS BECOMING UNIDIMENSIONAL
Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary. In a meeting with PolCouns on April 26, MEA Joint Secretary Mohan Kumar:
-- said that the caretaker government in Bangladesh has reached a crossroads by allowing Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia to return, stating such a move weakens the government and will force it to reassert itself in some way; -- suggested the U.S., UK and India agree on a core message to give the Bangladeshi caretaker government, one that supports the government while it remains on a path toward credible elections but clarifies that the military needs to remain out of politics; -- provided his assessment that Chief Advisor Fakhruddin is not in control of the government, but rather the executor for a military which looms in the background; -- praised the progress which has been made between the Indian Border Security Forces and the Bangladeshi Rifles; -- asked for U.S. assistance in getting Bangladesh to open its economy; -- stated Indian influence in Burma is waning, suggesting that U.S. pressure to bring Burma before the UN Security Council was counterproductive; -- denied reports that India had provided Rangoon with T-55 tanks; -- offered to verify whether India will fulfill a request by a Burmese general to provide infantry weapons and ammunition; -- confirmed that the Indian Navy is stepping up patrols in the waters between India and Sri Lanka; and -- expressed concern over China's participation in the port project in Hambantota, Sri Lanka.
End Summary.
Bangladesh At a Crossroads
--------------------------
2. (C) PolCouns met April 26 with Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Joint Secretary (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Myanmar) Mohan Kumar to discuss India's assessment of recent events in the region. Also initially in attendance was British High Commission PolCouns Alex Hall-Hall, who had coincidentally been discussing Bangladesh with Kumar when PolCouns walked in. Kumar and Hall-Hall described their conversation, agreeing that the recent decision by the caretaker government (CTG) in Bangladesh to allow Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia to return had put that country at a crossroads. The government had gone back on its strategy to remove the two women from the political scene, they assessed, would be weakened, and the question now was whether the government will reassert itself by pushing the election schedule forward, or by digging in its heels and seeking to remain in power longer. Kumar presented a third option, that either the military or one of the women would stir up civil unrest, which could then be used as a pretext by the military to step in and take political control, although he admitted he did not believe a military coup was likely. Kumar suggested that now would be an opportune moment for the U.S., UK and India to agree on a core message to take to the caretaker government, pressing for elections and voter list reforms, providing support for the government as long as it sticks to a schedule for elections, and making clear that the military needs to remain out of politics. Hall-Hall noted that any coordination needed to remain invisible to the Bangladeshi public in order to avoid the perception of some sort of conspiracy.
3. (C) Kumar said India is concerned with the time frame for Bangladeshi elections, given -- in his analysis -- that the government has been weakened. He believed the interim government would benefit by moving up elections to the first quarter of 2008. He noted that he had been the notetaker for the April 4 meeting between Prime Minister Singh and Chief Advisor Fakhruddin, and his impression was that Fakhruddin "was not a free agent." Fakhruddin made no commitments and could not clearly explain the government's strategy, leading Kumar to believe Fakhruddin was merely the executor of the military's political control.
4. (C) Kumar stated that good progress had been made in talks between India's Border Security Forces and the Bangladesh
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Rifles. The five-day February meeting between high-level officials was "fantastic," he said, adding that guards on both sides of the border have cooperated better since the meeting. (Note: Kumar's comments echo what Bangladesh Embassy Political Minister Mashfee Binte Shams told Poloff earlier in the week, that the BSF and BDR have relieved border tensions and improved communications. End Note.)
5. (C) The U.S. and UK could help India by pressing Bangladesh to open its economy and trade, Kumar suggested. Companies such as Tata, which have made efforts to enter the Bangladeshi manufacturing market, are reporting to Kumar that the CTG is impeding its entry into Bangladesh. Kumar said he has met with representatives of the Asian Development Bank, who have been positive regarding the potential for infrastructure projects in the region, but in terms of assisting with India-Bangladesh trade have only suggested some smaller connectivity projects.
6. (C) PolCouns referred to press accounts of the recent visit to New Delhi by Burmese Quartermaster General Lt. Gen Thiha Thura Tin Aung Myint Oo, which reported that Lt. Gen Tin had come requesting infantry weapons and ammunition in return for the junta's help in flushing out insurgents based along the border. Kumar said he was unaware of any promises India made to provide such materiel, but would check on the report's veracity. He stated India is losing influence -- and gas deals -- in Burma to China, and suggested that American pressure on India to press the junta on democracy and human rights was counterproductive. The more the U.S. presses India to bring Burma before the UN Security Council, he said, the more the Burmese tell India to "go to hell." PolCouns strongly countered, pointing out the junta's horrible record on human rights and democracy dating back years, and stressed to Kumar that any assistance to the Burmese regime by India would be poorly received by Washington.
7. (C) India-Burma relations have deteriorated to being unidimensional, Kumar said, with the only cooperation being on the anti-insurgency campaign along the border. India is not getting any gas contracts from Burma ("We're getting screwed on gas" were Kumar's exact words, reflective of his candid nature), nor is it getting the transit rights it seeks which would open a bridge to East Asia. Burmese officials have told Kumar that they "hate" the Chinese and would prefer not to cooperate with China, but do so because they feel Beijing is more reliable than New Delhi. He claimed a recent report that India was planning to provide Burma with T-55 tanks was untrue.
8. (C) The situation in Sri Lanka is "bad, really bad - beyond bleak" in Kumar's judgment. Characterizing the government and the LTTE as two sets of people with scant regard for the international community, Kumar was skeptical that political progress could be achieved anytime soon. He confirmed reports that the Indian Navy has stepped up patrols in the Palk Strait, and said that India and Sri Lanka are doing coordinated patrolling to prevent the smuggling of weapons from the Tamil Nadu coast. Kumar said it would be helpful to get the American assessment of the port being built in Hambantota, which he estimated China was willing to spend $500 million to help develop. He noted that China has increased its influence with President Rajapaksa, opining that Rajapaksa had a "soft spot" for China following his visit to Beijing in March.
9. (SBU) Bio note. Kumar confirmed he has been selected to become the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Indian Embassy in Paris, likely to assume the position in August. KAESTNER
Wednesday, 04 March 2009, 13:46
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000412
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/03/2019
TAGS PTER, KJUS, PGOV, KCRM, PINR, PREL, IN
SUBJECT: INDIAN NSA SHARES DESIRE FOR COOPERATION WITH
DIRECTOR MUELLER
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i., Steven White for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (S) Summary. In a cordial March 3 meeting with FBI Director Robert Mueller, Indian National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan:
-- recognized the importance of the improved cooperation between the U.S. and India since November's terrorist attacks in Mumbai;
-- identified Lashkar-e-Taiba as the number one threat to India, while acknowledging that al Qaeda was the most dangerous threat to most other countries;
-- agreed on the need for India to integrate its intelligence and law enforcement operations as it builds preventative counter-terrorism institutions;
-- described today's extremists as differing from those of the past; they are less likely to be from the economically downtrodden, but now include professionals and affluent religious extremists;
-- suggested that Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) was the root of India's terrorism problems, adding that major reform of ISI was needed to stop Pakistan's terrorist problems; and
-- dismissed the notion of conducting a joint investigation into the Mumbai attacks with Pakistan, also noting that the existing bilateral Joint Anti-Terror Mechanism had not yielded any tangible results.
End Summary.
Counterterrorism Cooperation
----------------------------
2. (S) FBI Director Robert Mueller met with Indian National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan March 3 to discuss counter-terrorism, law enforcement and intelligence cooperation. Narayanan began the meeting on a friendly note, describing his experience in fostering Indian relations with the FBI, dating back to his days in the Intelligence Bureau when he was involved in getting the first Indian official to do an exchange with the FBI, and he even recalled a dinner both he and the Director had attended in Toronto in 2001. Narayanan emphasized that he recognized the importance of the improved counter-terrorism cooperation between the U.S. and India following the November 26 attacks in Mumbai, saying the pace of improving relations has been "frenetic" since then and adding that he hoped progress could be maintained. He stressed that what India needed was more than just good liaison work between law enforcement agencies, but broader, real-time, effective cooperation, to include work between our intelligence agencies.
LeT Threat
----------
3. (S) While acknowledging that most of the world considered al Qaeda to be the largest terrorist threat, Narayanan said that India was obsessed with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), noting that the LeT was now in over 20 countries and had a global reach. He stated that "there are signs" that another attack on India is being planned, but said the GOI did not have any information on where such an attack would take place or how it would take place. Citing the attack earlier in the day on the Sri Lankan cricket team traveling in Lahore, the National Security Advisor described the ease with which recent attacks have taken place in public, and agreed with the Director on the need for intelligence to uncover attacks in advance.
Terrorists - Changing Demographics
----------------------------------
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4. (S) Narayanan said he "entirely agreed" with the Director's assertion that as India constructs its counter-terrorism institutions, it must integrate law enforcement and intelligence functions, and Director Mueller offered U.S. assistance in helping India build its counter-terror capabilities. Narayanan described several recent cases of interrogations the GOI had conducted, including that of the lone surviving Mumbai terrorist suspect, Mohammad Kasab, which yielded both law enforcement and intelligence information. He then described a changing trend in terrorists being recruited to jihad, saying that while in the past Kashmiri terrorist recruits were vulnerable because they were economically disadvantaged, any of today's terrorists were professionals who came from well-to-do backgrounds. India, with its vast Muslim community living side-by-side with Hindus, was having difficulty identifying the sources of radicalization, he explained, adding that even Muslim leaders XXXXXXXXXXXX were confessing they were "losing control of their flock." India is also seeing the beginnings of Hindu extremist groups that use violence, he said, agreeing with the Director's point that terrorists come from more than just Muslim backgrounds.
Pakistan: The Source
---------------------
5. (S) Referring to Pakistan, Narayanan said India was "next to the epicenter of today's terrorism problem." Offering his advice to the Director for his trip to Pakistan the following day, Narayanan lamented that nearly every major attack on India had come from Pakistan, yet despite numerous promises from Pakistani officials over the years to not allow terrorism to emanate from its soil, the problem is worse than ever. He urged Director Mueller to keep the pressure on Pakistan to prosecute terrorists and dismantle their infrastructure, saying "if you want to end malaria you have to get rid of the swamp." Narayanan acknowledged progress which had been made at times in the past, particularly just prior to President Musharraf's downfall, but said India remains disappointed with the results. He specifically cited the Joint Anti-Terror Mechanism (JATM), which the two countries had established -- despite a lack of popular support for it in India -- as being unproductive, blaming the Pakistanis for not following through on information India provided. In the end, Narayanan maintained, Pakistan will need to fight terrorism for its own purposes, or it will implode. India's interest was not, as one might think, in Pakistan's demise, but rather in a stable Pakistan; "When we say we want a stable Pakistan, it's enlightened self-interest," he said. Given America's experience in dealing with 9/11, Narayanan felt the U.S. should be able to convince Pakistan that if it doesn't deal with terrorism, it won't last.
Narayanan: No Joint Investigation of Mumbai Attacks Now
--------------------------------------------- -------
6. (S) Responding to the Director's comment that Islamabad was seeking a joint investigation of the Mumbai attacks, Narayanan dismissed the idea, saying the timing is not right given the levels of suspicion India and Pakistan have for each other. He referred again to the JATM, saying it had been designed to serve as a vehicle for the sharing of information, but hadn't worked that way. Narayanan felt Pakistan could conduct its own investigation, asserting that if the government is not complicit with the terrorists, it should want to investigate and prosecute those responsible. As India gets "two to three" intercepts per day on possible terrorist activity, the National Security Advisor added that the joint investigation the Pakistanis were offering should be across the board, and not just in response to Mumbai, but India felt it couldn't share that information at this time. Rather than joint investigations, Narayanan encouraged the U.S. to continue to play the role of honest broker in the Mumbai investigation. In response to the Director's suggestion that perhaps India and Pakistan could send investigators to Washington to work together, rather than in India, Narayanan said he could consider it,
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"but at this point both sides are so suspicious of each other that to say India and Pakistan could have an honest joint investigation is difficult." Narayanan acknowledged that India's upcoming general elections -- and more specifically, the politics surrounding them -- would affect the government's ability to cooperate with Pakistan, and said it would be "unpalatable" for the government to agree to a joint investigation at this time.
7. (S) Narayanan ended the meeting by describing ISI as being the root cause of terrorism in Pakistan, and said that in order to effectively address the problem ISI would need to be seriously reformed. The United States has done a lot to pressure ISI, Narayanan opined, particularly the agency's leadership, however, the current ISI -- and its Pakistan Army leadership would not be capable of sufficient reforms by itself. He argued that lower levels of the organization, who often support terrorist attacks without their superiors' knowledge, would also need to be addressed. WHITE
Thursday, 12 February 2009, 12:48
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 000268
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/10/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, ECON, AF, PK, IN
SUBJECT: INDIA SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
HOLBROOKE
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 236 B. DELHI 195
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford. Reasons: 1.4(b, d).
1. (C) We welcome your visit to New Delhi as India begins to gear up for parliamentary elections likely to be held in April-May. While popular anger over the November Mumbai attacks has cooled slightly, Indian officials continue to demand that Pakistan respond to Delhi's demands for action against the attack organizers. On Afghanistan, the Indians have been among President Karzai's most stalwart supporters and appear opposed to a complete overhaul of international reconstruction efforts, arguing that the focus should be on beefing up security forces and police, particularly in the south and east. Indo-Pakistani relations are in the deep freeze after Mumbai, with bilateral efforts to resolve differences shelved for now. Despite clarifications made at the time your appointment was announced, you will likely face questions from the Indian foreign policy establishment and media over renewed U.S. activism on Kashmir. The successful U.S.-India nuclear deal and a post-Mumbai interest in beefing up counterterrorism cooperation underline our closer strategic partnership. These ties will likely grow regardless of which party prevails in this spring's elections.
Afghanistan: A Strategic Relationship
--------------------------------------
2. (C) India has maintained very close ties with the Karzai government since 2002 and has contributed over USD 1.2 billion in reconstruction assistance during that period, putting India among the top ranks of Afghan donors. The GOI has historically supported friendly governments in Kabul, in part to pressure Pakistan. This has continued under Karzai, who has had long-standing personal ties to India dating back to his four years of post-graduate studies in Himachal Pradesh after the 1979 Soviet invasion. Karzai has visited Delhi seven times since 2002; the last visit was in January of this year when Karzai came to express solidarity with India after the Mumbai attacks.
3. (C) GOI officials have expressed growing concern with the security situation in Afghanistan, which is affecting India's extensive reconstruction projects, and they have been increasingly critical of what they perceive as the Pakistani government's inability or unwillingness to act in the border tribal belt. India has not distanced itself from Karzai, nor questioned the international community's approach to Afghan reconstruction. The GOI feels that aspects of reconstruction could be improved, but priority should be given to strengthening the Afghan National Army and police, given the deteriorating situation in southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan. The top Afghan expert in the MEA we spoke to last week (Assistant Secretary equivalent) argued that a complete overhaul was not necessary and that the focus should be on the tribal areas. Privately, the GOI has been critical of efforts to bring Taliban elements to the negotiating table, arguing that such attempts have confused Afghan public opinion and fueled popular fears that the Taliban will return through the back door.
4. (C) India's contribution to Afghan reconstruction consists primarily of infrastructure development (including the Parliament building and a road that will connect the Afghan Ring Road to an Iranian port), trade facilities and extensive technical and English-language training. However, the scope of assistance has been quite broad and has touched almost every sector -- telcoms, banking, public administration, transport, energy, aviation and IT. During the January visit, India pledged to provide 250,000 metric tons of wheat in food aid. The U.S. is now working with India and Afghanistan to provide training in India to Afghan energy technicians. India is also a staunch advocate of the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, and it believes the USG should do more to make this a reality. We see opportunities for closer coordination on assistance. The GOI should be receptive to partnering with the U.S., but will likely want to portray any such cooperation as part of a de-hyphenated, stand-alone,
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U.S.-India partnership that is global in scope. The GOI is mindful of Pakistani sensitivities on security-related assistance in Afghanistan, but this may be under review in the post-Mumbai environment. External Affairs Minister Mukherjee demurred in response to Secretary Rice's October 4 request for unspecified Indian support for Afghan security forces, saying India had not provided security support for Afghanistan because of these concerns. Last July's bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, which the Indians suspect was linked to Pakistan's ISI, was a stark reminder of the dangers India faces in its involvement in Afghan reconstruction.
Pakistan: A Cold Peace
-----------------------
5. (C) The anger over the November Mumbai attacks may be less visible now, but India expects Pakistan to arrest and try Pakistanis involved in planning and organizing the attack and to dismantle terrorist infrastructure. The Mumbai terrorist attacks deeply angered the Indian public. This time, in addition to the reactions against Pakistan, Indians directed a new level of fury at their own political establishment, which they feel failed to protect them. The public's anger pushed the Congress Party-led government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to shelve the bilateral Composite Dialogue that was focused on resolving contentious issues, including ultimately Kashmir. While the GOI and Congress Party leaders have made muscular statements demanding the GOP investigate and prosecute those involved in the attack and asserting that no option has been foreclosed, India's strategy has been to pursue a diplomatic rather than a military solution. India has launched a worldwide diplomatic offensive to put pressure on Pakistan. India doubts the willingness of Pakistan's military leadership to take action against the Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT) and the civilian leaders' ability to do so, and assesses that Pakistan will make only token moves to rein in the LeT and its affiliates as it waits for pressure from India or the international community to dissipate.
6. (C) You are likely to hear from your Indian interlocutors that professions of good faith on the part of Pakistan's civilian leadership are insufficient because they lack sufficient control over Pakistan's many competing power centers. The Pakistani government's faltering efforts to respond to the Indian dossier on Mumbai -- plagued by cynical denial of Pakistan's involvement, contradictory press statements by Pakistani officials and missed self-imposed deadlines -- has only strengthened those views. Paradoxically, India found dealing with Musharraf much easier. Foreign Ministry officials believe that any effort to stabilize Pakistan depends on reform of Pakistan's military establishment. In the abstract, India supports a democratic Pakistan, but sees that as a longer term aspiration. The Foreign Ministry believes the military has steadily gained power at the expense of the civilian government after the Mumbai attacks. As Foreign Secretary Menon observed to the Ambassador earlier this week, "the good guys are losing."
Jammu and Kashmir Anxiety
-------------------------
7. (S) Despite clarifications made at the time your appointment was announced, there is continuing uncertainty and a degree of anxiety within the Indian foreign policy establishment over a perceived interest in U.S. activism on Kashmir. The concern of successive Indian governments over the decades has been that the U.S. would try to pressure India to make concessions that would be unacceptable in India. Our Kashmir mantra during the previous two administrations was that we support any peaceful solution agreed upon by India and Pakistan that takes into account the wishes of the Kashmiri people. On Kashmir, the two countries made considerable progress over the last four years in back channel discussions -- and National Security Advisor Narayanan told Senator Kerry that an agreement in principle was in reach in late 2006. However, President Musharraf's fall from power coupled with the Kabul and Mumbai attacks have brought a halt to progress on the issue.
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8. (C) The GOI believes that the political and security environment today in Kashmir is such that the state could be poised for a sustained period of reconciliation and prosperity. The Indians are particularly elated with the recent violence-free and high-turnout state legislative election they pulled off in Jammu and Kashmir. They believe Kashmiris have rejected the agendas of the Pakistani jihadis and Kashmiri separatists, and are now ready to turn the page away from violence and are seeking good governance and normalization. With Omar Abdullah as Chief Minister, they have in place a young, forward thinking leader who could move the state out of its two decades of political paralysis. It is not clear, however, that the GOI has the political will to make the kinds of gestures -- such as reducing the security forces footprint -- that Kashmiris need to gain some confidence in the Indian intentions.
India Heads to the Polls
------------------------
9. (C) The political season entered its final lap this month when the two main political parties held political conferences to kick off their campaigns for the upcoming parliamentary elections. The political establishment will now be single-mindedly focused on these elections until June when the new Parliament convenes and the next government is sworn in. Domestic political considerations will be paramount for the next three months. As the campaign heats up, we can expect the political attacks centered around security questions to get sharper and the rhetoric to become shriller. A relatively easy and no-political-cost punching bag for many parties is likely to be Pakistan, which will be denounced for the Mumbai attacks and accused of supporting terrorists as a state policy.
10. (C) The current Congress Party-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition government, which appeared to be in trouble only months ago, has recovered smartly. It has successfully deflected the fall-out from the Mumbai terror attacks by keeping the international pressure on Pakistan and announcing plans to strengthen its capacity to fight terrorism. While the economic slow-down remains a growing electoral concern, the government has benefited from a sharp reduction in inflation. In contrast, the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which had momentum last summer, has suffered of late. It experienced a crushing loss at the hands of the UPA in a parliamentary vote last summer on US-India civil-nuclear initiative. Its mixed performance in recent state elections has been demoralizing to its cadres. It continues to be racked by low intensity but persistent infighting that undermines its image of a well-disciplined political machine.
11. (C) It is impossible to predict now which party will emerge on top in the national elections. But it is safe to say that that neither the Congress Party nor the BJP is likely to win a majority on its own and either will have to forge a coalition with the smaller regional parties to form a government. While both the BJP and the Congress support a closer U.S.-India relationship, their ability to move forward aggressively will be constrained by the disproportionate power of smaller parties, which have narrower agendas that frequently do not extend to foreign policy issues. The worst scenario for the U.S.-India relationship would be one in which a "Third Front" forms a government that excludes both the Congress Party and the BJP. Under those circumstances, the Communist parties will likely wield great influence in a coalition. Nevertheless, the nuclear deal and a closer strategic relationship with the United States have generated an extraordinary public debate in India during the last year. We have won this debate hands down and, as a result, the U.S.-India relationship has a strong foundation on which to grow over the coming decades.
Increased Law Enforcement Cooperation
-------------------------------------
12. (C) Following Mumbai, we have offered counterterrorism assistance and encouraged the GOI to focus on improving security preparedness and prevention of terrorist attacks.
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Pakistan's terrorist infrastructure is now perceived as a permanent threat. We have already seen unprecedented law enforcement cooperation between India and the U.S., primarily with the FBI. Historically, the GOI had been a reluctant law enforcement partner. But after Mumbai, it dropped its resistance and allowed FBI teams in Mumbai to provide investigatory assistance. Significantly, the high level of cooperation has included FBI access to the sole living terrorist. The Indians have also become far more amenable to accepting our many offers of counterterrorism assistance. The Mumbai attacks have gone a long way to convincing the GOI that no country can combat terrorism alone and that countries need to cooperate with one another to address this scourge. One of our next big challenges is to spur increased defense sales and cooperation. This will depend in part on the GOI's acceptance of foundational agreements such as End Use Monitoring.
Civil Nuclear Cooperation
-------------------------
13. (SBU) The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was approved by a large bipartisan majority in the House and Senate in September, signed by Secretary Rice and External Affairs Minister Mukherjee in Washington October 10, and brought into force by an exchange of diplomatic notes on December 6. India viewed the signing of the Agreement as an historic event and an essential element in the transformation of our relationship. The Agreement no longer dominates headlines, but the goodwill it generated has contributed to improved cooperation following the Mumbai terrorist attacks.
14. (C) Implementation of the Agreement requires India to take a number of steps. India must bring its IAEA safeguards agreement into force and file a declaration of safeguarded facilities to initiate civil nuclear cooperation with the world. For the United States to fully realize the commercial benefits of cooperation, India must also follow through on its commitment to set aside nuclear reactor park sites for U.S. firms -- as it has already done for France and Russia -- and address other industry concerns, such as patent protection and adoption of domestic liability protection. Indian officials also seem to be tying U.S. company access to the conclusion of an additional bilateral arrangement regarding India,s right to reprocess U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel. Successful implementation of the Agreement will provide access to an estimated $150 billion in commercial opportunities for U.S. firms and lead to the creation of up to 30,000 American jobs over the next three decades. It will also help protect the Congressional bipartisan consensus for India and preserve the unprecedented popularity of the United States among Indians, on which our growing bilateral relationship depends.
Regional Issues
---------------
15. (C) Under Prime Minister Singh's leadership, the GOI is emerging as a responsible leader in the region, as well as in Asia at large. India encourages democracy in the region, mostly leading by example, but is worried by continuing political instability in nearly every neighboring country, and in practice seems to value stability over democracy when it comes to foreign policy. We follow closely India 's "complex relationship" -- as Indian officials have called it -- with China, the dynamics of which will significantly affect not only Asia as a power center of the 21st century, but directly impact U.S. interests from the Pacific to the Cape of Good Hope. India-China relations can most easily be described as a mutual desire to seek warmer relations through strategic dialogue, however contentious border issues and emerging economic/political power rivalry constrain broader engagement. We still diverge with India over tactics towards Iran and Burma, although we ostensibly share the same strategic goals. The encouraging news for U.S. interests is that whereas India over the previous 40-odd years had tended to quickly and suspiciously dismiss U.S. intentions in the region, our recent improvement in relations have made Delhi much more amenable to cooperating on regional issues, as evidenced by our efforts together ranging from tsunami relief
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to Nepalese democracy to anti-piracy in the Gulf and off Somalia. Trend lines suggest the opportunity for even greater cooperation is ripe.
Your Meetings
-------------
16. (U) Prime Minister Singh has not resumed a working schedule following his recent quintuple by-pass surgery. You have confirmed meetings with External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and a lunch with National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan. Foreign Secretary Menon may be your first meeting of the day. We have not been able to confirm a meeting with Home Minister P. Chidambaram, who will be busy with the parliamentary debate on the budget that will take place the day of your meetings. MULFORD
Thursday, 11 February 2010, 13:07
S E C R E T NEW DELHI 000287
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/10/2020
TAGS PREL, PTER, ECON, SENV, AF, PK, IN
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL KERRY'S VISIT TO INDIA
Classified By: A/DCM Uzra Zeya. Reasons: 1.4(B, D).
1. (S) Summary: You will find an Indian government that is more committed than ever to building a durable and wide ranging USG-GOI relationship after Prime Minister Singh's Washington visit in November. New Delhi has been broadly supportive of USG goals in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. After refusing post-Mumbai to engage broadly with Pakistan until Islamabad took action against the attack perpetrators, New Delhi has now offered unconditional talks to Islamabad. This is a calculated risk on PM Singh's part given the political fallout over last summer's India-Pakistan joint statement at Sharm al Sheikh. On Afghanistan, there are underlying concerns that U.S. policy foreshadows an early exit from Afghanistan with negative security consequences for India. India has expressed concern about the outlines of the reintegration policy promoted by the Karzai government and supported by the United States. The GOI has begun to weigh a policy response that may include increased Afghan police and military training/assistance. They will be interested in your views on India's role in Afghanistan. Our bilateral Civil-Nuclear Agreement no longer dominates the headlines, but the goodwill it generated has contributed to our improved relationship across the board and to India's gradual movement toward the nonproliferation mainstream. Several Agreement implementation measures remain unresolved. The U.S.-India defense relationship is progressing rapidly, and defense sales could reach USD 4 billion in 2011. The U.S.-India economic relationship, for decades practically nonexistent, has grown quickly and U.S. exports to India have increased five-fold from USD 3.6 billion in 2000 to USD 17.7 billion last year. On climate change, the Copenhagen conference marked a fundamental shift in India's position, and India is beginning to understand it must address the climate issue not as a poor developing nation but rather as the major economy it has become. End Summary.
Pakistan
--------
2. (S) The Indians understand our message about the importance of resuming a robust dialogue with Pakistan and the necessity of increased GOI communication to reassure Pakistani officials about India's intentions in Afghanistan. India has now offered to hold Foreign Secretary-level talks with Pakistan, but has rejected Islamabad's attempts to condition resumption of discussion on picking up the thread from the Composite Dialogue India paused after Mumbai.
3. (C) PM Singh is taking a calculated political risk in pushing forward with an offer of talks with Pakistan. While there is a general recognition that the policy of not engaging with Pakistan except on counterterrorism issues has exhausted its usefulness, that does not necessarily translate into strong or consistent support for broad talks with Pakistan among the political class, given continuing terrorist threats. There are heavyweights in the Congress, including Finance Minister Mukherjee, who were not supportive after last year's Sharm al Sheikh Joint Statement fiasco, and they will seize on any missteps to argue against a policy that reaches out to the Pakistanis. This is also likely to be the last time for some time that PM Singh will have sufficient support to reach out to re-engage on dialogue. The PM took a beating after Sharm al Sheikh and his government's post-election honeymoon came to a crashing halt. If this renewed effort falters because of lack of interest on the part of the Pakistanis, many could point to newly appointed NSA Shiv Shankar Menon as the scapegoat. Menon was lambasted for his role as Foreign Secretary at Sharm and will equally be identified with this proposal.
Afghanistan
-----------
4. (C) The reaction to the President's December 1 West Point speech announcing the way forward on Afghanistan drew guardedly positive support from most of our interlocutors. While the President's emphasis on development and agriculture assistance and a re-affirmation of USG commitment to the region drew approval, many were apprehensive about the setting of July 2011 as a beginning date for the transfer of U.S. troops out of Afghanistan. India's fears that its views and interests are not being taken into account has intensified lately: India was kept out of the Istanbul regional conference on Afghanistan (based on a Pakistani veto) and New Delhi was the odd man out at the London Conference over reintegration.
5. (U) India is proud of its own ongoing "development partnership" with post-Taliban Afghanistan that began in late 2001, and the GOI claims the sum of its performed and pledged assistance to date totals USD 1.3 billion. Civilian aid is channeled into three main areas: infrastructure development (centerpiece is a 218km road in Helmand); capacity building (scholarships and civil service training in India); and humanitarian assistance (daily food aid to 2 million Afghan school children). Virtually all GOI aid is administered through the Afghan government or NGOs.
6. (S) Indian support for Afghanistan's government is long-standing and motivated by a variety of reasons, not the least being Afghanistan's strategic value as New Delhi seeks regional influence. India, with the exception of the Taliban era, has always had strong ties to Afghanistan since Partition; conversely, Islamabad with the exception of the Taliban period, has had strained ties with Kabul. Pakistan's expectation that the government in Afghanistan will be pro-Pakistan and anti-Indian is unrealistic, particularly given Karzai's own long-standing ties to India and the goodwill that India's assistance and other elements of India's soft power have created in Afghanistan.
7. (S) While India's assistance to Afghanistan has primarily focused on reconstruction and stabilization, there has also been limited military aid. The MEA told us after the West Point speech that the GOI wishes to do more to help develop Afghan capacity, especially with regard to the police and military, but is also cognizant of USG "sensitivities" about such assistance. XXXXXXXXXXXX
Internal Politics: a Raucous Democracy
--------------------------------------
8. (SBU) We have a true partner in the current Indian government led by Prime Minister Singh, but its capabilities are not without limits. The strong performance by the Congress Party and its United Progressive Alliance (UPA) allies in India's national elections in 2009 gave the Prime Minister Singh's coalition a mandate to govern and -- freed from dependence on half-hearted allies on the Left -- to promote a closer relationship with the United States. Despite the strong endorsement by the electorate and a floundering opposition, the UPA government has gotten off the blocks somewhat slowly. The government grew less confident after its honeymoon period was cut short by the fallout over a joint statement from Singh's July 2009 Sharm-el-Sheikh meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani. The Sharm debacle rallied Singh's otherwise disjointed political opponents, while reminding the Prime Minister of his constraints despite his mandate. The tentativeness of the government was again on display during the winter session of Parliament, during which an unruly opposition united over populist causes and sidelined civil nuclear liability legislation and long-awaited financial sector liberalization. The government is again on the defensive over demands for the creation of a separate state of Telangana from Andhra Pradesh. On February 3 it bowed to political pressure and announced the formation of a five-person Committee to evaluate the issue.
Civil Nuclear Cooperation
-------------------------
9. (SBU) India viewed the signing of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement as an historic event and an essential part of transforming our relationship. India has since followed through on its nonproliferation commitments by signing its IAEA Safeguards Agreement and concluding an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. We are working with the government to implement commercial cooperation, providing U.S. firms access to an estimated USD 150 billion market and leading to the creation of thousands of high-skilled jobs, as well as providing India's growing economy with access to clean energy. The Agreement no longer dominates the headlines, but the goodwill it generated has contributed to our improved relationship across the board and to India's gradual movement toward the nonproliferation mainstream.
10. (SBU) The Indian government made substantial progress on implementing commercial cooperation ahead of PM Singh's visit to Washington, though some important hurdles remain. In recent months, India announced two favorable reactor park sites for U.S. firms in the states of Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh, and submitted its declaration of safeguarded facilities to the IAEA. We have held five rounds of reprocessing consultations pursuant to the 123 Agreement, and hope to conclude negotiations soon. The government responded to our request for Part 810 license assurances on the eve of Singh's visit, a top priority of U.S. industry, and we await clarification on two issues. The cabinet approved draft liability legislation, a top priority for U.S. firms, but Parliament was not able to pass the legislation in the just-concluded session.
The Defense Relationship
------------------------
11. (SBU) The U.S.-India defense relationship has progressed rapidly since sanctions were removed in 2000 following India's 1998 nuclear test. Today's relationship is focused on bilateral exercises, Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs), and personal exchanges at schools, conferences and seminars. Billion-dollar defense sales are a growing component and a superb opportunity to expand the relationship. Exercises are the most visible of the activities between our two militaries. In October, the Army completed its most ambitious exercise with the deployment of 17 Strykers to India for a two week exercise which included live firing of a combined mechanized task force for the first time. Simultaneously, the Air Force had five transport aircraft participating in exercise COPE INDIA held in Agra that included a Special Forces component. The Navy conducts an annual exercise, Malabar, that has been conducted both bilaterally and multilaterally. The Marines hold an annual exercise with the Indian Army, Shatrujeet, which focuses on amphibious operations. The Indians have been cooperating with the Joint POW/MIA Accountability Command for recovery of remains from downed Second World War planes in the politically sensitive state of Arunachal Pradesh. To date, we are still working on obtaining permission to repatriate all of the remains so as to properly identify and recover lost Airmen.
12. (SBU) Defense sales are growing quickly from roughly one billion USD in 2008, to over two billion so far this year. There is good potential for over four billion in sales next year, especially with the recent Ministry of Defense approval to pursue the C-17. For the first time, India can afford (politically and financially) to purchase front line U.S. equipment. They recognize the quality of U.S. systems and have been astounded by the mission capable rates quoted for U.S. aircraft compared to their older Russian inventory. They are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their analysis of costs and now use life-cycle cost instead of cost on delivery for some purchases, giving U.S. products an opportunity to beat cheaply made competitors. Most important, the July 2009 agreement on End Use Monitoring (EUM) has opened the door for FMS sales at a time when there is growing frustration with Russia - previously India's supplier of choice. The near doubling in cost and extensive delays in delivery of the ex-Russian aircraft carrier GORSHKOV, issues with transfer of technology on the T-90 tank, and universal problems with spare parts have convinced the GOI that new sources of supply are needed to balance Russia. Given an opportunity, we ask that you endorse Indian purchases of U.S. equipment as an important part of our defense relationship and support our ongoing sales efforts.
Economic Ties
-------------
13. (SBU) The U.S.-India economic relationship, for decades practically nonexistent, has grown rapidly and has significant potential to expand further. At the same time, India is an increasingly important player at the table in multilateral economic fora, from the WTO Doha Round negotiations and the G-20, World Bank and IMF to the UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen. While India was seen in the United States as a spoiler when the World Trade Organization Doha Development Agenda talks broke down in July 2008, India's new Commerce Minister showed leadership and significantly improved the tone of discussions when he hosted a Doha "Mini-ministerial" meeting in September, attended by U.S. Trade Representative Kirk.
14. (U) The United States is India's largest trading partner in goods and services and one of its largest foreign investors. Investment has surged between our countries in recent years, prompting agreement to launch negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty. U.S. exports to India has increased five-fold from USD 3.6 billion in 2000 to USD 17.7 billion last year. Two-way merchandise trade grew to a record USD 44.4 billion in 2008, a 76-percent increase from 2005. Reflecting the global economic downturn, exports to India fell 9.7 percent in January-September 2009 (to USD 8 billion), but Indian exports to the United States fell more sharply. Thus, the U.S. trade deficit with India fell 43.8 percent to just USD 3.2 billion in January-September 2009. Despite the size of its economy, India was only the United States' 18th largest trading partner in 2008. One of the major goals of the U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum is to resolve barriers to trade and investment to improve this ranking.
15. (U) India was somewhat shielded from the global economic downturn due to its conservative central bank and SEC-equivalent restricting many of the derivative innovations linked to the global financial crisis, and its relatively low reliance on exports. However, although India's "Wall Street" was less affected, its "Main Street" bore the brunt of the downturn, with slower growth, tighter access to credit, declining exports, higher unemployment, and less investment. In response, India's central bank and SEC-equivalent relaxed many of its restrictions on foreign capital inflows and investment procedures and the GOI enacted several fiscal stimulus programs, both pre- and post-election, to boost economic growth.
16. (SBU) The Indian economy continues to be one of fastest growing economies in the world, even as the global slowdown and financial crunch moderated GDP growth from nine percent in fiscal year (FY) 2007-08 to 6.7 percent in FY 2008-09, which ended March 31. Growth in the second quarter was 7.9 percent and growth in fiscal year 2009-10 is now expected to be in the seven percent range. The Commerce Ministry announced December 15 that it expects to see a return to positive export growth soon. With the expected return of higher growth rates, rising inflation, and the highest fiscal deficit (approximately 11 percent of GDP) in 20 years, the GOI has begun to reverse some the measures it enacted during the financial crisis and has announced plans to decrease subsidies and increase disinvestment. Lagging agricultural productivity and poor -- but improving -- infrastructure continue to constrain growth. Accordingly, the top Indian economic priorities remain physical and human infrastructure development and spreading economic benefits into rural India.
17. (U) The United States continues to have concerns about agricultural trade with India. The recently released Senate Finance Committee Report on Indian agricultural trade barriers -- a U.S. ITC investigation -- highlighted the essentially defensive agricultural trade policy long promoted by the Indian government. The United States is particularly interested in gaining marketing access for U.S. dairy products which are blocked due to a series of non-scientific GOI rules. Discussions are ongoing, but the effort to resolve long-standing agricultural trade issues is a Mission priority.
Climate Change/Clean Energy
---------------------------
18. (SBU) The 16th Conference of Parties (COP-16) at Copenhagen marked a fundamental shift in India's climate change position. Minister of Environment and Forests Jairam Ramesh claimed victory for India's negotiating team in a December 22 address to parliament stating India was "entirely successful" at COP-16 in that there was no dilution of either the Bali Action Plan or the Kyoto Protocol, India was not required to agree on a peak year for its emissions, and that it avoided any legally binding emission commitments, including a long-term global goal of reducing emissions 50 percent by 2050. Although India's current position is that the Kyoto Protocol and Bali Action Plan are sacrosanct and must be the basis for all future climate negotiations, both Ramesh and Prime Minister Singh have publicly supported the Copenhagen Accord pursuant to the Accord, India communicated its domestic mitigation action of reducing it's carbon intensity by 20 to 25 percent by 2020 from a 2005 baseline to the UNFCCC Secretariat on January 30. In addition, Ramesh has drawn India farther from the G77 by telling parliament India was not in the same category as other developing countries such as Bangladesh, Maldives, Grenada, or African nations, that it did not need to demand technology transfer at low or no cost, and that India should be selling green technology to the world. India's association and close coordination of its climate negotiating position with the Basic Group of nations, comprised of Brazil, South Africa, India, and China, indicates India is beginning to understand it must address the climate issue not as a poor developing nation but rather as the major economy it has become.
19. (SBU) During the November visit of the Prime Minister, Secretary Clinton and her Idian counterpart signed an MOU to Enhance Cooperation on Energy Security, Energy Efficiency, Clean Energy and Climate Change. Both countries share an interest in rapid expansion of clean and renewable energy production. India has massive investments planned in energy production, both conventional and renewable, as the government recognizes the need to continue to power India's economic growth and extend access to electricity to ever more of the significant portion of the population which still does not have it. The bilateral MOU calls for stepped up engagement beyond the existing Energy Dialogues to include a focused Clean Energy Research and Deployment Initiative to rapidly disseminate clean energy technologies, including solar, wind, hydro, as well as shale gas and cleaner coal. The USG is holding ongoing inter-agency consultations and is finalizing recommendations for the organization of these new initiatives. DOE has the lead on a Joint Clean Energy Research Center, while USAID is heading a multi-agency team to create the Clean Energy Deployment Center in coordination with State, Commerce, OPIC, EXIM, USTDA and others. Completed designs for the centers are expected by early spring. We expect that they will accelerate existing initiatives as well as launch numerous others in order to have broad impact in building the Indian clean energy market. ROEMER
Sunday, 30 November 2008, 16:01
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003025
SIPDIS
FOR PRICIPALS FROM AMBASSADOR MULFORD
EO 12958 DECL: 11/30/2018
TAGS PGOV, PTER, PHUM, PREL, PINR, KDEM, KISL, PK, IN
SUBJECT: MUMBAI TERROR ATTACKS: GOI HEADS BEGIN TO ROLL
REF: A. NEW DELHI 3024 B. NEW DELHI 3018 C. MUMBAI 550
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary: The Prime Minister began to take some initial steps to respond to the anger and fury of the Indian public at GOI failures that made the Mumbai attacks possible. Home Minister Shivraj Patil resigned on November 30. Finance Minister P.C. Chidambaram takes over from him while the Prime Minister takes over the Finance portfolio. NSA Narayanan offered his resignation but post contacts say he will remain in place. There may be some other scalping that takes place but there will likely not be a wholesale clean out. The GOI will also consider announcing some other steps in the coming days to strengthen the country's intelligence and terror fighting capacity. The Congress Party realizes it is in deep political trouble as a result of the Mumbai attacks. It is taking these steps to try to show the Indian public that it takes terrorism seriously. It may be too little too late, however, for the Congress Party to reverse its fortunes before May 2009. End Summary.
Fury at the UPA
---------------
2. (C) In the 36 hours since the terrorists in Mumbai were taken out, the firing stopped and the clean-up began, it has become increasingly clear that the Indian public is furious at the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, especially the Congress Party. The Indian public and the media point the finger squarely at the Prime Minister and Sonia Gandhi for breakdown of the intelligence apparatus and for failure to build the capacity to fight terrorism. "Enough is enough" is the prevailing sentiment. In the immediate aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, the public is beginning to look upon its government with both anger and ridicule. In this atmosphere, voters are likely to inflict a severe setback to the Congress Party in state elections which are underway now, and national elections, due before May 2009. State legislative elections results for five states are due to be announced on December 8, with polling in three of five states taking place after the Mumbai attacks began.
Political Fallout
-----------------
3. (C) The political fallout started immediately after the Mumbai attacks ended, amid signs that GOI leadership understands the gravity of the political backlash. On November 29, Sonia Gandhi called together the party top brass to take stock of the political damage when she convened an emergency meeting of the party Congress Working Committee, the party's highest decision-making body. Home Minister Shivraj Patil was subjected to heavy criticism by his colleagues at that meeting. The Prime Minister called a meeting of his defense and intelligence team on November 29 to discuss options to react to the mounting evidence that the terrorists belonged to Pakistan-based Jihadi groups. The Prime Minister also convened an all-party meeting on November 30 to discuss a united approach to strengthening the country's terror-fighting capacity. The UPA will brace for a hammering from opposition parties and its erstwhile Communist partners when parliament convenes on December 10.
Heads Begin to Roll
-------------------
4. (C) Following bitter criticism of his performance by the media, the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and his own Congress Party colleagues, Patil submitted his resignation to the Prime Minister on November 30 and it has
NEW DELHI 00003025 002 OF 003
been accepted. Finance Minister P.C. Chidamabram will move over to the Home Ministry while the Prime Minister will take over the Finance Ministry. Chidambaram has previously served as a Minister of State in the Home Ministry.
5. (C) There was media speculation on November 30 that National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan had offered to resign. Post contacts tell us, however, that Narayanan will remain in place. There is continuing and widespread media speculation as to how far the blood letting will go. Names of Home Secretary Madhukar Gupta, Intelligence Bureau Chief P.C. Haldar, Maharashtra Chief Minister Vilasrao Deshmukh and Maharashtra Home Minister R.R. Patil are often mentioned as being on the chopping block. But no action has been taken on these men as of the evening of November 30.
Other Measures
--------------
6. (C) Another action that the UPA is almost sure to take is strengthening laws to fight terrorism. The UPA had repealed the tough Prevention of Terrorism Act when it came to power on grounds that it was abused by the security agencies. There is a clamor now in the political classes to toughen the laws. The Prime Minister, in his address to the nation promised tightening of the laws to "ensure that there are no loopholes available to the terrorists. Some obsevers have called for an Indian "Patriot Act." Other steps it will likely consider are creation of a central security agency to focus combating terrorism and to streamline federal-state terror fighting coordination.
Pakistan: No Immediate Calls for Retaliation
--------------------------------------------
7. (C) While the media has reported on the Pakistan ties of the captured terrorist, there were no angry calls for swift retribution against the Pakistan. However the public feels about Pakistani involvement, it will not let the GOI off hook for its failure to prevent the Mumbai attacks if it tries to shift the attention and blame to Pakistan. The GOI appears to sense this and so far is publicly floating a non-kinetic response: suspension of the Composite Dialogue, recalling the Ambassador to Islamabad, and cancelling cricket matches, even at neutral venues.
Comment
-------
8. (C) Embassy's preliminary assessment is that the Congress Party understands that it is in deep political trouble over its handling of the Mumbai attacks and is desperately seeking to limit the damage. The firing of the Home Minister and other personnel changes in the government, if they occur, as well as announcing steps to improve the country's terror fighting capability are all intended to convey a political message to the Indian public that the UPA government takes the Mumbai attacks seriously. It may be too little too late, however, for the Congress Party to reverse its fortunes before May 2009.
9. (C) In this environment, removal of the Home Minister was inevitable. He has over the last four years proved himself to be spectacularly inept. In almost every incident of terrorist or communal violence - Bangalore, Ahemdabad, Jaipur, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Guwahati, Samjhauta Express, Orissa, Karnataka, Jammu and Kashmir - he has been asleep on the watch. Each time there have been calls for his ouster but Sonia Gandhi has protected him. The public's reaction to the Mumbai incidents has been such that even she could not save him this time.
10. (C) We believe there is a fair chance that there will be
NEW DELHI 00003025 003 OF 003
a political shakeout in the state of Maharashtra as well. There has been an active faction in the state's Congress Party that has long been plotting to oust Chief Minister Deshmukh. These calls have grown louder over the last few days. The Maharashtra Home Minister R.R. Patil became the object of scathing media ridicule when he played down the Mumbai attacks by saying on television that these sorts of incidents happen from time to time in a big city such as Mumbai.
11. (C) It is not clear how deep the scalping will run within the bureaucracy. The Prime Minister will have to balance the pressure for heads to roll with the fact that getting rid of NSA Narayanan, Home Secretary Gupta and Intelligence Bureau chief Haldar will mean he will be left with a completely new intelligence team that will take time to settle in, not an attractive prospect to govern with in the last few months of his term. The discipline and culture of Indian bureaucracy is such that if these men stay on they will continue to wield power and would not be treated as damaged goods by the rest of the government. MULFORD
Monday, 01 December 2008, 13:54
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 003031
SIPDIS
FOR PRINCIPALS FROM AMBASSADOR MULFORD
EO 12958 DECL: 12/01/2018
TAGS PGOV, PTER, PHUM, PREL, PINR, KDEM, KISL, PK, IN
SUBJECT: MUMBAI TERROR ATTACKS: POLITICAL FALLOUT CONTINUES
REF: A. NEW DELHI 3025 B. NEW DELHI 3024 C. NEW DELHI 3018 D. MUMBAI 550
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary: A day after the Home Minister was sacked, the impact of the Mumbai tragedy continued to play out domestically and in the Indo-Pakistan relationship. There is likely to be a shakeup in the Maharashtra state government today. At an all-party meeting, the Prime Minister unveiled a number of steps to strengthen the capacity of the Indian security agencies to combat terrorism. The opposition parties and allies used the meeting to bash the Congress Party over the Mumbai attacks. Most observers believe that the removal of a few political officials and announcement of new steps to combat terror will not restore the confidence of the people in the government's ability to protect them. The Indian public remains angry towards Pakistan as it increasingly appears that a Pakistani-based terrorist group was the culprit behind the attacks. There were no new GOI complaints or accusations over the Pakistani ties of the terrorists. Most observers believe that bilateral ties will suffer but that the GOI will use diplomatic pressure rather than military confrontation to respond to the Mumbai attacks. End Summary.
2. (C) The fallout of the Mumbai terror attacks continued on November 30-December 1 as the Prime Minister and the Congress Party tried to contain the political damage. The facade of all political parties coming together to present a united front to confront the tragedy lasted only a day. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), other opposition parties and the Congress Party's own allies began to aggressively pound the Congress Party for the intelligence failure that allowed the Mumbai attacks to occur.
Maharashtra Shakeup
-------------------
3. (C) Maharashtra Deputy Chief Minister and Home Minister R.R. Patil submitted his resignation after the media vilified him for his public remarks that sought to belittle the Mumbai tragedy. His party boss, Indian Agriculture Minister and head of the Nationalist Congress Party Sharad Pawar, asked Maharashtra Chief Minister Vilasrao Deshmukh to accept the resignation. Deshmukh himself is under fire and unlikely to survive. Besides being the chief executive of the state when the attacks took place, he was accused of "disaster tourism" when he visited the Taj hotel site with his actor son and a well-known filmmaker in tow. Congress Party insiders in Delhi like Verappa Moily and Abhishek Singhvi publicly criticized him for the visit. Sandeep Puri of the Congress Party told Poloff on December 1 that Deshmukh would resign that same day.
PM Unveils New Measures
-----------------------
4. (U) At a five-hour all-party meeting that lasted late into the night of November 30, the Prime Minister announced a series of steps the GOI will take to strengthen the country's capacity to combat terrorism:
-- establishing a Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) to play a leading role in fighting terrorism;
-- enacting stronger laws to allow security agencies to more effectively fight terrorism;
-- enhancing maritime and air security by strengthening the surveillance and interdiction capabilities of the navy, the
NEW DELHI 00003031 002 OF 004
coast guard, the coastal police, the air force and the civil aviation ministry;
-- increasing the size of the National Security Guard and establishing four hubs in addition the one site outside of Delhi where it is currently located.
5. (SBU) The PM came under attack from all sides at the all-party meeting. The two top BJP leaders, L.K. Advani and Rajnath Singh, skipped the meeting and sent former Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and Deputy Leader of the Opposition V.K. Malhotra instead. Jaswant Singh and Malhotra condemned the UPA's "non-serious approach" and demanded the immediate convening of Parliament. They said the GOI was too preoccupied with fighting fictitious "Hindu terror" to protect the country against real terror. The Left parties criticized the proposal to strengthen the legal framework. They also demanded that National Security Advisor and other bureaucrats responsible for internal security be fired.
"Cosmetic" and "Too Little, Too Late"
-------------------------------------
6. (SBU) The BJP also increased its pressure publicly, demanding that the government quit over its responsibility for the Mumbai tragedy. On the Home Minister's sacking, BJP's Arun Jaitely said, "It is too little, too late. The entire government should go." BJP spokesman Prakash Javedkar said :"We want the whole UPA government to go lock, stock and barrel and let the people decide what approach the country should adopt against terrorism."
7. (C) Former Ambassador V.K. Grover told Poloff that the removal of the Home Minister was overdue. "These changes will not satisfy the people. They are only cosmetic. People want real action. They have lost confidence in the government. They see it as a weak government. It will get a drubbing in the elections." XXXXXXXXXXXX said that all these steps "are cosmetic." He accused the government of not having the will to go after terrorists because of vote bank politics. XXXXXXXXXXXX defended Sonia Gandhi, saying that the resignation of the Home Minister was intended to "restore confidence among the people." XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff: "Mumbai attacks can be described as the last wake-up call for the Indian nation-state which has been soft-pedaling the issue for long."
Public Remains Angry at Pakistan
--------------------------------
8. (C) Although much of the attention of the Indian public and media has focused on their government's failings, anger toward Pakistan has grown as it increasingly appears that Pakistani-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) was the culprit behind the attacks. Pakistan XXXXXXXXXXXX shared with Poloff his dismay at what he described as the Congress Party's use of political leverage with the media to focus on and "embarrass" Pakistan. As an example he pointed out today's Times of India which described LeT as a 100 percent-owned subsidiary of the ISI's anti-India operations. In XXXXXXXXXXXX's view, this damaging rhetoric is prompted by the Congress Party and discourages cooperation between the two countries as it offends Pakistan's government.
Strikes Against Camps is as Far as They Go
------------------------------------------
9. (C) In a townhall meeting moderated by Barkha Dutt on NDTV, the audience broke into applause when one participant suggested that India strike against the training camps where
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the terrorists were trained. There have been few calls for military action beyond that. XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff that he did not advocate bombing Pakistan. He was in favor of a selective attack on a couple of training camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. In his view, this would send the right message to the perpetrators of terror.
Diplomatic Pressure Rather than Military Action
--------------------------------------------- --
10. (C) Pakistan's High Commission in Delhi was hopeful that the Composite Dialogue would survive the the current blow to Indo-Pakistan relations. Foreign Minister Qureshi's meetings in Delhi last week were very positive and Pakistan, accoring to XXXXXXXXXXXX and Pakistan made a "quantum leap in its offers to India, namely on economic cooperation." Regarding the list of tradable goods that are allowed to move through the border, Pakistan offered to move from a positive list to a negative one, which could open up trade by a substantial amount if Delhi accepts the proposal. Joint Secretary for Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran Division T.C.A. Raghavan, on 24 November - just two days before the Mumbai attacks - said to PolCouns that political parties were keen to resume the Composite Dialogue's fifth round, specifically to address the terrorism issue. Referring to the Joint Action Terrorism Mechanism and the Composite Dialogue, Raghavan commented on the lack of progress on resolving the terrorism issues between the two countries, saying that although the institutions to discuss these issues existed, "these groups are not set up only for discussion, they must provide results".
11. (C) But, in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, the Composite Dialogue is likely to suffer. XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff that although he expects bilateral tensions to increase, he does not foresee a military confrontation. He explained that due to upcoming elections, the mobilization of troops at the border is unlikely. Instead he sees India exerting strong diplomatic pressure. XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed, saying he did not expect this government to build up troops on the border or to take any other tough military measures. He anticipated diplomatic steps such as closing of trade and transit routes. He suggested the U.S. apply pressure on Pakistan to clamp down on the LeT and to bring to book criminals like Dawood.
12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX opined that the PM and Sonia Gandhi do not want to take any hasty steps against Pakistan, so there is unlikely to be any troop build up along the borders. In XXXXXXXXXXXX view, the GOI would take steps such as scrapping the cricket series (already cancelled) and closing trade routes and then "turn it over to the Americans to build up pressure on Pakistan." XXXXXXXXXXXX of the Congress Party said that the party was not in favor of any troop build up on the borders with Pakistan but would consider some stern political message to scale up the diplomatic pressure. In his view, the bus service and the train service could be suspended followed by closing of transit routes and, possibly, air routes. XXXXXXXXXXXX offered the opinion that the Confidence Building Measures that Pakistan and India had worked on within the Composite Dialogue are now in danger and the peace process will be jeopardized as a result of the attacks.
Pakistan Mission Praises GOI For Restraint
------------------------------------------
13. (C) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX , the media's portrayal of how the events will negatively affect the bilateral relationship will fizzle out over the next few months. He praised the Indian Government for acting "more responsibly and maturely" than it did after the bombing
NEW DELHI 00003031 004 OF 004
of India's embassy in Kabul, describing GOI's reaction as impulsive and politically motivated when it immediately pinned blame on Pakistan's Intelligence Agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
14. (C) Before the Mumbai attacks there existed a standing offer by Pakistan to have the two countries' intelligence chiefs cooperate, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX but this offer was retrieved after the media portrayed Prime Minister Singh's offer to the ISI Chief Ahmad Pasha to visit Delhi to cooperate on the investigation as a "summons". XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed dismay at what he described as the Congress Party's use of political leverage with the media to focus on and "embarrass" Pakistan. XXXXXXXXXXXX
Comment: No Military Confrontation Anticipated
--------------------------------------------- -
15. (C) Despite the strong diplomatic rhetoric we expect to see in the next several months, the chances of a military confrontation are being played down by most. The signposts of such a military conflict are absent: there has been no mobilization of troops at the border, ambassadors have not been recalled nor have there been requests by either side for a reduction in the number of diplomatic staff. Road, rail, and airlinks are still operative.
Comment: Not a Good Time to be the Ruling Party
--------------------------------------------- --
16. (C) There is increasing agreement between political analysts that the sacking of the Home Minister and announcement of the new measures to beef up the country's terror fighting capacity are not assuaging the public's anger at the government and its perceived callousness in protecting them. People ask why these steps were not taken four years ago when this government assumed office. Rage at the government over the Mumbai attacks has also served as a catharsis for people to vent other long simmering grievances against government - its corruption, its pompous use of symbols of authority like security guards and vehicle sirens, its indifference to providing health and education services, and its paralysis on building infrastructure. MULFORD
Monday, 22 February 2010, 08:52
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000321
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS, DRL
EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2020
TAGS PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PTER, IN, EAGR
SUBJECT: DELHI DIARY, JANUARY 30 - FEBRUARY 19, 2010
Classified By: Political Counselor Uzra Zeya for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (U) Below is a compilation of political highlights from Embassy New Delhi for January 30 - February 19, 2010, that did not feature in our other reporting.
My Name Is Rahul
----
2. (SBU) Rahul Gandhi's Mumbai visit and his skirmishing with the Maharashtra chauvinist Shiv Sena party shows he is becoming increasingly sure-footed in his political instincts. He first hurled some blunt words at the Thackerays and Shiv Sena's xenophobic agenda. These were widely and sympathetically reported around the country. He then took it a step further when the Shiv Sena issued "Keep Off Maharashtra" threats by going to the Thackeray's home ground of Mumbai, where he continued to take shots at them. He topped it off by showing the common touch when he made a last minute change in his itinerary to travel across town in a second-class train compartment. All in all, a public relations bonanza for Rahul as the press gave wide coverage to his Siv Sena bashing and his train ride. Forty Shiv Sena activists were detained by the police for Rahul's visit.
Don't Talk About My Mother
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3. (U) Not to be outdone, the Shiv Sena has been grabbing headlines in recent days with its attacks on Rahul Gandhi, Reliance Group's Mukesh Ambani and Bollywood icon, Shah Rukh Khan. The Shiv Sena has also been in a tussle with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which is the parent organization of its ally, the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP), over the rights of North Indian migrants in Mumbai. Media reports a rift between the RSS and the Shiv Sena over the Sena's verbal attacks on migrants from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Rahul Gandhi came to the defense of North Indians living and working in Mumbai during an ongoing visit to Bihar by telling press that the Sena was irrelevant and that all Indians had a right to reside freely in India. Shiv Sena supremo Bal Thackeray responded by launching an attack on Rahul Gandhi's "Italian Mummy," referring to Italian-born UPA chief Sonia Gandhi.
The Tiger Roars Again?
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4. (U) Raj Thackeray-led vitriolic splinter group, the MNS, has cut into the Shiv Sena's support base in recent years. The MNS usurped the Shiv Sena's xenophobic platform to exclude non-Maharashtrians from power and influence in Maharashtra. Finding themselves increasingly marginalized and losing support from their anti-migrant Marathi-speaking base, the Shiv Sena has gone on a publicity and campaign blitz to position itself as the undisputed champion of ethnic Marathi speakers.
The Bollywood Show Must Go On
----
5. (U) The Shiv Sena had threatened to ban screenings of Shah Rukh Khan's upcoming movie, "My Name is Khan", because Shah Rukh Khan publicly lamented the absence of Pakistani cricket players in India's professional cricket league for the coming season. Shiv Sena goons burnt posters of Khan's upcoming movie and protested in front of his home, asking Khan to "move to Pakistan." Khan himself did not bid on any Pakistani players as co-owner of one of the frachises. While some theater owners refrained from screening the film on its Friday opening due to security concerns, a show of force by the police convinced theaters to roll out a full release on Saturday. With protests and controversy generating far more international buzz than the typical Bollywood movie, Khan's new movie opened to packed audiences in Mumbai and elsewhere.
NEW DELHI 00000321 002 OF 003
New Indian Youth Congress President Appointed
----
6. (U) On February 3, the Congress Party appointed Rajiv Satav the President of its youth wing, the Indian Youth Congress (IYC). Party General Secretary Rahul Gandhi hand-picked Satav for the job, surprising political observers who had expected an election for the top IYC post per Gandhi's previous statements about making the party "more democratic." Contacts speculate that the appointment of Satav -- a native of the state of Maharashtra -- is intended to enhance the Congress Party's position in the state. A Congress Party-Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) coalition governs Maharashtra, but the coalition partners have been feuding over rising food prices. (Note: The Congress Party has repeatedly tried to shift the blame for rising prices on to NCP chief Sharad Pawar, who is also the Agriculture and Food Supplies Minister in the Congress Party's United Progressive Alliance government in Delhi. End Note.) Gandhi's IYC pick may signal that Maharashtra is the next data point along the Congress Party's trend of going it alone in some large states where it had previously been reduced to a junior partner or a non-entity.
7. (U) Rajiv Satav, 35, is the son of former Maharashtra Minister Rajnitai Satav. Satav was elected to the Maharashtra legislative assembly for the first time in 2009, following his big political break when he was nominated as the Maharashtra Youth Congress chief in 2008. Satav has accompanied Rahul Gandhi on several high profile visits, including his recent tour of Bihar and his train ride in Mumbai. As the Youth Congress chief, Satav will face the challenge of increasing youth participation in the political process, while countering the influence of the Raj Thackeray-led MNS in Maharashtra, whose aggressive and street-smart style has attracted Indian youth.
Valentine's Day Vignettes: Rainbows and Pink Hearts
----
8. (U) February 14 marked the first time some couples were able to paint the town pink in India. On July 2, the Delhi High Court overturned some provisions of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, a colonial-era law that outlawed same gender sex between two consenting adults. The GOI allowed the historic ruling to stand after deciding not to appeal it. Over six months later, Archie's, India's largest greeting card company, gave the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community another cause for celebration by selling cards targeted for the community in 500 stores across New Delhi and major Indian cities to celebrate Valentine's Day. Archie's spokesman Yohan Arya told the Times of India that the company had been considering making available several LGBT cards for some time. They decided the time was right after the July 2 high court judgment. "The court judgment ...clearly said that it's legal to be gay... so we felt this was the right time to add these cards," Arya added. (It is not yet known how well these new cards sold.) New Delhi also embraced the LGBT community by focusing on them as customers for Valentine's Day celebrations. Clubs and lounges were buzzing with theme parties and special cocktails, with some bars openly encouraging LGBT couples - the first time this has happened in New Delhi.
A Peaceful Valentine
----
9. (U) The Sri Ram Sena (SRS), a small, fringe Hindu extremist group which has in the past engaged in isolated violence against young men and women celebrating Valentine's Day, lost its momentum this year. The leader of the SRS, Pramod Muthalik, claims that he is fighting for India, the youth, and Indian culture. Valentine's Day, he alleges "is
NEW DELHI 00000321 003 OF 003
aimed at ruining (Indian) culture." This year, his message was lost, as the Sri Ram Sena joined ranks with the Shiv Sena and spent the days leading up to February 14 fighting the release of Shah Rukh Khan's latest Bollywoodblockbuster. The SRS faced additional humiliation on February 11 when an individual "attacked" Muthalik. While Muthalik was preparing to participate in a debate on Valentine's Day in an open air theater, six young men barged in, dragged him off stage, and blackened his face with ink. The shocked Muthalik fell down during the melee before he could be rescued by his supporters. The police arrested two of the perpetrators and brought three more youths in for questioning. With its leader brought down a peg, the SRS was not heard from during this year's Valentine's Day celebrations.
Update on Tibetan Refugee Flow
----
10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff on February 4 that an average of 2,500 to 3,500 refugees from Tibet typically arrive in Dharamsala each year, with most returning to Tibet after receiving an audience with the Dalai Lama. XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed that from 1980 to November 2009 87,096 refugees were processed by the Dharamsala Reception Center (RC) and that 46,620 returned to Tibet after a short pilgrimage in India. Most of those who do stay in India are children who then attend schools run by Tibetan Children's Villages. XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX both highlighted to PolOff that, following the March 2008 uprising in Tibet, the number of Tibetan refugees markedly decreased, with only about 650 refugees arriving at the RC from April 2008 to March 2009. XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated that Beijing has asked Kathmandu to step up patrols of Nepali border forces and make it more difficult for Tibetans to enter Nepal. XXXXXXXXXXXX reiterated this belief to PolOff during a XXXXXXXXXXXX meeting in Delhi, stating "the Chinese government rewards (Nepali forces)" by providing financial incentives to officers who hand over Tibetans attempting to exit China. XXXXXXXXXXXX was optimistic that flow of refugees will soon go back to normal levels because admission statistics for 2010 are surpassing those from an equivalent period in 2009. XXXXXXXXXXXX ROEMER
Monday, 03 August 2009, 14:29
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001624
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/03/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, IN
SUBJECT: REACHING OUT TO RAHUL GANDHI AND OTHER YOUNG
PARLIAMENTARIANS
REF: SECTO 0008
Classified By: AMB Timothy J. Roemer. Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary: In a candid conversation with the Ambassador during the July 20 lunch hosted by Prime Minister Singh for the Secretary, Indian Congress Party General Secretary Rahul Gandhi described his focus on upcoming state and local elections, expressed concerns regarding the challenges surrounding the UPA coalition's ability to implement its programs, and speculated about radicalization among Hindus and Muslims. Gandhi was interested in engaging with the Ambassador and could become a key interlocutor, along with other young members of Parliament, as we pursue a Strategic Dialogue with India. End Summary.
2. (C) During the Secretary's July 20 meetings in New Delhi (see reftel), Prime Minister Singh hosted a lunch in honor of the Secretary. Among the invitees was Indian Congress Party General Secretary Rahul Gandhi, as well as other prominent figures from politics, business and civil society. Gandhi, who was seated next to the Ambassador, shared his views on a range of political topics, social challenges, and electoral issues for the Congress Party in the next five years.
Rural Strategy
----
3. (C) Gandhi stressed that his focus in the upcoming months would be on state assembly elections in Maharashtra and party building efforts at the local level. He was busy trying to recruit more appealing candidates to run for Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) positions nationwide. Gandhi's focus was on finding younger party members who would not carry some of the baggage of older Congress candidates. He aimed at rebuilding party structures in small towns and rural areas to attract voters and believed the main opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was vulnerable there. He did not seem to be as focused on electoral efforts in bigger cities, such as Delhi and Mumbai.
Honeymoon is Over
----
4. (C) Noting that the Congress Party victory in this past spring's parliamentary elections had put the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government in a comfortable position, Gandhi still expressed concerns about the numerous challenges regarding the UPA's ability to implement its programs in Parliament. He said that the honeymoon period had been short and he now expected the BJP and Left Parties would be unrelenting critics of the government's program. Speaking while the budget session of Parliament was ongoing, Gandhi touched on the difficulties in keeping the UPA coalition on the right track. (Note: This conversation took place before the full scope of opposition to the July 16 Indo-Pakistani joint statement in Sharm el Sheikh had become apparent. End Note.)
Creeping Radicalization?
----
5. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's query about Lashkar-e-Taiba's activities in the region and immediate threat to India, Gandhi said there was evidence of some support for the group among certain elements in India's indigenous Muslim community. However, Gandhi warned, the bigger threat may be the growth of radicalized Hindu groups, which create religious tensions and political confrontations with the Muslim community. (Comment: Gandhi was referring to the tensions created by some of the more polarizing figures in the BJP such as Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi.) The risk of a "home-grown" extremist front, reacting to terror attacks coming from Pakistan or from Islamist groups in India, was a growing concern and one that demanded constant attention.
Comment
----
6. (C) Gandhi was forthright in describing the challenges faced by the Congress Party and the UPA government in the months ahead. Over the past four years, he was an elusive contact, but he could be interested in reaching out to the United States, given a thoughtful, politically sensitive and strategic approach on our part. We will seek other opportunities to engage with him and with other promising
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young members of the new generation of parliamentarians. Gandhi mentioned that in the recent election 60 members of the new Parliament were 45 or younger. In a system long viewed as relatively static, the influx of new faces and the rising profile of young leaders like Rahul Gandhi provides us an opening to expand the constituency in support of the strategic partnership with a long term horizon.
ROEMER
Tuesday, 02 November 2004, 08:39
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 006983
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/01/2014
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PTER, SNAR, IN, BM, CN, India-Burma
SUBJECT: INDIA ENCOURAGES DEMOCRACY IN BURMA
REF: A. 10/23 CAMP-PYATT E-MAIL
B. NEW DELHI 6881
Classified By: PolCouns Geoffrey Pyatt, Reasons 1.4 (B,D).
1. (C) Summary: India underlined its concerns about the lack of democracy in Burma during the recent visit of Rangoon's military leader Than Shwe, with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh himself delivering the message, MEA Joint Secretary (South East Asia - I) Mitra Vashishta told us on
SIPDIS November 1. The decision to encourage democracy in Rangoon reflects the GOI belief that India is best placed to help Burma reform, that Aung San Sui 's "time has come and gone," and that democracy will take root in Burma only through greater engagement and people-to-people ties. Vashishta cited the October 29-31 visit to New Delhi of UN Special Envoy for Burma Razali Ismail as evidence of India's resolve to stay engaged on democracy in Burma. The GOI would welcome US suggestions on how to best to promote democracy there, and has agreed to provide grants and limited military equipment to Rangoon in an attempt to encourage cooperation against anti-India insurgents located along the Indo-Burma border. However, there are no Indian plans to conduct joint military operations with the junta. PolCouns stressed our concerns about the safety and treatment of ASSK and the democratic opposition under Burma's new Prime Minister (ref A), and urged India to continue to press for democratic reform in Rangoon. End Summary.
Democracy
---------
2. (C) Democracy topped India's agenda for the October 24-29 visit of Burma's military leader Than Shwe, MEA Joint Secretary (South East Asia - I) Mitra Vashishta told PolCouns
SIPDIS and Poloff on November 1. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh himself raised the issue with Than Shwe "in a much more intense way than could be expressed" in the media, she said, noting that India had decided to raise the issue of democracy with Burma despite potentially negative consequences for the relationship. Vashishta reported that New Delhi had to battle for the inclusion of a joint statement paragraph emphasizing India's desire to see "a stable, peaceful, prosperous and democratic Myanmar." She commented that the Burmese delegation was "willing to do anything" to have that paragraph removed, adding that the inclusion of the paragraph was a "coup for India." The final version of the document released on October 29 "expressed support for national reconciliation and an early transition to democracy in Myanmar."
3. (C) Asked about New Delhi's plan to further encourage democracy in Burma, Vashishta responded that Rangoon considers India a democratic role model, and emphasized that the GOI has the "best credentials" to promote democracy there. She mused that democracy could only be established through grass-roots initiatives, and stressed that India would do "whatever it takes" to empower the people of Burma in this respect. Referring to the increased people-to-people ties between India and Pakistan, Vashishta said that the GOI plans to pursue a similar strategy with Burma by promoting culture and sports links between the two countries. "We are much less bothered by the situation in Burma than in Pakistan," she noted, adding that she would welcome US suggestions on how to encourage greater reform in Rangoon.
4. (C) According to Vashishta, democracy in Burma is too closely linked with the greatly respected Aung San Sui Kyi (ASSK), whose "day has come and gone." She said that Than Shwe had expressed a commitment to democracy during the visit, and speculated that he would be more apt to bring about democratic reform if he could do so without losing face. PolCouns underlined US concerns about the lack of democracy in Burma and expressed the hope that India would continue to press this issue with the junta.
Engaging Burma, Meeting India's Strategic Needs
--------------------------------------------- --
5. (C) Describing the Than Shwe trip as "entirely devoted to India's interests," Vashishta stated that New Delhi decided to proceed with the visit, even after the ouster of former-PM Khin Nyunt because the GOI did not view the replacement of Nyunt as an indication of "which way the dust would fall" on democracy. The GOI believes the coup was an "internal struggle," she said, speculating that the junta may be somewhat fragile. As evidence, Vashishta observed that Than Shwe traveled with the wives of two other powerful generals, Thura Shwe Man and Soe Win, who she mused may have been used as "hostages" to ensure tranquillity among the generals in Rangoon during Than Shwe's absence.
6. (C) Vashishta reiterated India's belief that only constructive engagement of the military regime could bring about any meaningful change, saying sanctions have only isolated Burma, and have not encouraged democratic reforms there. Burma is so isolated that members of Than Shwe's delegation wondered whether they would have to "go nuclear" to get US attention, she remarked, noting the comparison to Pakistan. She emphasized that if India also isolates Burma, no one will be able to engage Rangoon on democracy or other issues.
7. (C) Flagging that the timing of UN Special Envoy for Burma Razali Ismail's October 29-31 visit to New Delhi was not coincidental, Vashishta expressed India's desire to work with the UN on Burma. However, she argued that the organization "has lost credibility" in the eyes of developing countries and should at least make an attempt to be more "pro-Myanmar." The EU is too "obvious, shabby, shortsighted and full of contradictions" to play a meaningful role in Burma, she argued, while Thailand takes a pro-active approach to Rangoon only "because one of their ministers wants to be the next UN Secretary General."
Counter-Terrorism Agreement
---------------------------
8. (C) Billing the Memorandum of Understanding on "Non-Traditional Security Issues" as an agreement on counter terrorism "whatever they call it," Vashishta said the MOU outlines Rangoon's obligations to crack-down on anti-India militants operating out of Burmese territory. The GOI does not believe that Rangoon is fueling the insurgents to pressure New Delhi because "it is not in Burma's strategic interest," but New Delhi is growing increasingly concerned about insurgent activities in the border regions. The GOB agreed to move troops to the Indo-Burmese border "not because of their interests, but because some of India's interests are now tied up with theirs," Vashishta said, citing economic development as an example. She expressed optimism that Burma was taking India's request seriously, unlike in the past. She noted that Soe Win, Burma's new PM, had previously commanded forces along the border with India. PolCouns stressed our concerns about the safety and treatment of ASSK and the democratic opposition, given Soe Win's direct involvement in the May 30, 2003 attack on ASSK and her followers (ref A). Vashishta had different information, alleging that some of the opposition parties were hopeful about a near-term political opening.
No To Military Exercises, Yes To Grants
---------------------------------------
9. (C) Although the India-Burma joint statement on Than Shwe's visit mentions the "possibilities of expanding cooperation" in defense, Vashishta categorically stated that joint military exercises "are absolutely ruled out," saying this is "a big, firm no." She indicated the GOI could provide limited military equipment to Rangoon, "on par with what the rest of ASEAN provides," but is "very careful" when it comes to military cooperation with Burma. 10. (C) Vashishta confirmed plans to provide Burma with a USD 20 million dollar grant to be used for energy, gas, and upgrading refining facilities, and said the money would be used to entice Rangoon to reform. She explained that the junta would not receive the funds unless "they do certain things," saying that India hopes to "engage them (with the grant) and slowly lay down conditions for reform." She cast this as part of New Delhi's people-to-people strategy.
China
-----
11. (C) Expressing concern about Chinese influence in Burma, Vashishta said that the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has been "learning from the master about how to hoodwink the international community" on human rights. She said that China would like an Indian Ocean port and hopes to project its influence "everywhere India does." Vashishta argued that "what you hear about the PLA in Burma is only the tip of the iceberg," as US intelligence must know. Burmese engagement with India stems in part from Rangoon's belief that "China takes them for granted," she asserted.
Religion
--------
12. (C) Commenting on the delegation's visit to several important Buddhist shrines in India, Vashishta noted that over the last three years, Than Shwe had repeatedly requested a pilgrimage to the sites and speculated that the religious journey was a major factor behind the trip. She claimed that this pilgrimage was not just aimed a burnishing the junta's Buddhist credentials, but rather was related to Than Shwe's personal sense of mortality. But she added, the Burmese military did not think they had done anything wrong, and do not need to atone for their sins.
Comment
-------
13. (C) Led by Foreign Secretary Saran, a former Ambassador to Rangoon, the GOI has embarked on a major diplomatic initiative with Burma. India's policy toward the GOB is pragmatic, based largely on New Delhi's security interests, but also reflects the GOI's desire eventually to see a democratic Burma to its east. India has welcomed US input about how best to encourage democracy there, presenting an opportunity that we should seize upon to expand the US-India regional dialogue to include developments in Rangoon. MULFORD
Thursday, 01 May 2008, 11:39
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001194
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/01/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KNNP, EPET, KISL, ENRG, ECON, ETRD, IR, IN
SUBJECT: MENON SAYS AHMADINEJAD PLAYED TO MASSES DURING
INDIA VISIT
Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)
1. (C) Summary: Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon related to the Ambassador May 1 that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told the Prime Minister during his April 29 stop in Delhi that the world is changing in Iran's favor. When asked for specifics, Menon noted, Ahmadinejad voiced more mild opinions, and called for strengthening the governments in Afghanistan and Iraq. Regarding the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, Menon said that the Prime Minister laid down three criteria that would determine whether India signed a deal with Iran: commercial and economic viability, assured supply, and security. Menon confided that Ahmadinejad concocted the widely reported 45-day window for negotiating the pipeline when he talked to the press on his way to the airport, and Menon doubted that the countries would resolve the outstanding pipeline issues anytime soon. The Ambassador underlined that senior leaders in the U.S. Congress will likely criticize India for giving a platform to the leader of a country engaged in killing American soldiers in Iraq, developing nuclear weapons with which to blackmail other countries, and sponsoring terrorism worldwide. End Summary.
- - -
Ahmadinejad Broadly Ideological But Mild on Specifics
- - -
2. (C) Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon related to the Ambassador May 1 that he wanted to provide a briefing of the April 29 "transit stop" in Delhi by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (Note: Menon had originally requested the meeting on the evening of April 30, but rescheduled when the Prime Minister summoned Menon to his residence. End Note.) Menon outlined that, after landing at the airport at 16:30, Ahmadinejad met the Indian President for 45 minutes, followed by a meeting and dinner with the Prime Minister, in which Menon participated. During the meeting with the Prime Minister, Menon related, Ahmadinejad described a world that has improved from Iran's point of view, and would continue to shift in Iran's favor. Menon admitted that "I had not realized how ideological Ahmadinejad is." He noted that while Ahmadinejad did not attack the U.S. explicitly, he opined that the U.S. has destabilized Iraq and would withdraw soon. When asked about specifics, Menon continued, Ahmadinejad became "relatively mild." Regarding Afghanistan, Ahmadinejad noted that there was no alternative to Hamid Karzai and called for strengthening the government in Kabul, and regarding Iraq, he called for greater law and order, but considered the Maliki government good. "There was no fire and brimstone in the details," Menon observed.
- - -
India Lays Down Criteria for Pipeline
- - -
3. (C) Menon said that the discussion with the Prime Minister focused on the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline, and Ahmadinejad made clear that he aimed to produce an agreement in Delhi. However, the Prime Minister laid down that India required more detailed discussions to obtain three conditions that would allow India to sign up to the IPI: commercial and economic viability, assured supply, and security of the pipeline. Ahmadinejad gave his word that the pipeline would satisfy those conditions, and asked that Indian leaders trust him. He then agreed to more detailed discussions, but to commence within a month. "We said no to artificial deadlines," Menon stressed to the Ambassador. Ahmadinejad later told the press that the countries have 45 days to work out an agreement, but Menon maintained, "I don't know where he got that number from, but his goal in India was to say that." (Note: Menon has not corrected Ahmadinejad's statement in public. End Note.) "We made clear that our issues are more than just the price of a transaction," he underlined, averred that it would take a long time to resolve the conditions set out by the Indian government.
- - -
India Pushes Iran for Full Disclosure in IAEA
- - -
NEW DELHI 00001194 002 OF 003
4. (C) Regarding Iran's nuclear program, Menon related that Ahmadinejad reiterated his public points that Iran intended the program for peaceful use. Menon said that the Prime Minister acknowledged Iran's right to a peaceful nuclear program, but urged Ahmadinejad to assure the international community of its peaceful intentions by coming clean with the IAEA, which Iran has not done. Ahmadinejad also made clear that the uranium enrichment program would continue, Menon added. India's votes against Iran in the IAEA did not come up, he continued. Menon thanked the Ambassador for the April 27 briefing prior to Ahmadinejad's arrival, and enthusiastically remarked that he found it "very useful."
- - -
Ahmadinejad Performed in Delhi
- - -
5. (C) Menon puzzled about Ahmadinejad's "self-congratulatory, self-referential" style, which he found particularly odd during an exchange about oil prices, during which Ahmadinejad bragged that the cost of oil would remain high. Ahmadinejad also bad-mouthed other countries, including China, which he claimed had put all its money in U.S. dollars and now had nothing left. As a result, Menon judged, "we assume he speaks badly about us to other countries." Menon also noted that Ahmadinejad refrained from direct attacks on Israel, and did not bring up the Indian launch of an Israeli satellite nor the U.S.-India relationship. Overall, Menon assessed, Ahmadinejad appeared to have performed in Delhi for his domestic audience, showing Iranian voters that he can still travel and interact with other countries.
- - -
Expect Senior-Level Criticism, Ambassador Warns
- - -
6. (C) The Ambassador underlined that Americans, particularly members of Congress, will view Ahmadinejad's visit as India providing a platform for an enemy of the U.S. Members of Congress and the Administration strongly believe that Ahmadinejad is guilty of killing Americans in Iraq, developing a nuclear weapons program to blackmail the world, and sponsoring international terrorist activities, the Ambassador outlined. Moreover, the U.S. has maintained a long-term alliance with Israel, which Ahmadinejad has called for "wiping off the face of the earth," the Ambassador added. The average American will wonder why the U.S. has gone out of its way to have a nuclear cooperation initiative with India, when India is so friendly to Iran, he warned. "I cannot predict what the effect of this visit will be," he cautioned, but noted that he expected the Ahmadinejad stop to exercise those members of Congress who have gone out of their way on India's behalf.
- - -
Nothing Should Upset You, Menon Presses
- - -
7. (C) Menon responded that "there is nothing in this visit that should upset you." He emphasized that the Indian government had little choice to say yes when the Iranian government requested a stop in transit. Moreover, Menon explained, India and Iran need to talk about Afghanistan and energy issues. "We can talk with him without affecting our other relationships," Menon contended, and cited the strong India-Israel relationship that withstood India's flirtation with Iran. Menon also cautioned the U.S. against telling India what to do, especially in public. "This government has to be seen following an independent foreign policy, not responding to dictation from the U.S.," he stated. He recognized that Iran presents a global problem, and the U.S. and India differ in how to fix the situation because of geography. For instance, Menon pressed, India must work with Iran to deal with Afghanistan.
- - -
Ambassador Asks If India Is Ready for Prime Time
- - -
NEW DELHI 00001194 003 OF 003
8. (C) The Ambassador recounted that the U.S. government and Congress stood up for India by passing the Hyde Act because they believed that as a rising power, India must come into the global nonproliferation system. However, the Ambassador posited, those supporters will wonder if India is ready for prime time since it "let the enemy in and did not stand up and say, 'don't do this.'" Menon countered that such a position sounded like what the Communists have accused the U.S. of doing. The Ambassador clarified that the Communists suspect the Indian and U.S. governments of trading foreign policies in a clandestine cabal, when in this case, the Ambassador simply wished to make the Indian government aware of the possible repercussions that come from hosting the hostile Ahmadinejad.
- - -
Comment: India and Iran Relationship Needs No U.S. Interference
- - -
9. (C) By providing Ahmadinejad with a platform to berate the U.S., the Indian government has attempted to prove that it has an independent foreign policy, as the Communist critics have demanded since India's first vote against Iran in the IAEA in 2005. By kowtowing to political concerns, India has put at risk its image of an emerging, responsible major player in the world. We have warned the Indian government quietly about the implications, but sharp, public comments from the U.S. government will only push India and Iran closer together. MULFORD
Friday, 27 November 2009, 11:52
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002396
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/01/2020
TAGS PREL, PGOV, IN, PK, AF
SUBJECT: CURRENT INDIAN GOVERNMENT THINKING ON AFGHANISTAN
AND PAKISTAN
REF: STATE 118297
Classified By: A/DCM Uzra Zeya. Reason: 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) Summary: In an extended November 24 meeting, Ministry of External Affairs Joint Secretary for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran Affairs Y.K.Sinha lamented that recent media focus on the corruption and inefficiency of Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government is "undermining" international community efforts in Afghanistan. Sinha, who is the functional equivalent of an Assistant Secretary and the GOI's senior point person on Af-Pak policy, stated that the GOI avoids "micromanaging" its dealings with Karzai but stresses instead the importance of keeping Taliban elements and Islamists out of the government. Sinha said the GOI takes a dim view of Afghan reconciliation prospects, since true reconciliation can take place only among people -- unlike the Taliban -- who adhere to the Afghan constitution and are committed to democratic government. Sinha repeatedly stressed the need for greater USG-GOI coordination and cooperation in Afghanistan that goes beyond development assistance cooperation. Turning to Pakistan, Sinha called on the USG to recognize and resist Islamabad's "game" of promising cooperation in Afghanistan in return for USG pressure on India to improve ties with Pakistan, while also exaggerating India's threat to Pakistan and "trying to internationalize every bilateral issue between India and Pakistan." He stated that India has "no benchmarks" for resumption of the "paused" Composite Dialogue with Pakistan, and he delivered a bleak long-term prognosis for bilateral relations: "call me a cynic, but even if India were to lop off Kashmir and hand it on a platter to Pakistan, they would still find a reason to make trouble for us." End Summary.
Afghanistan: "Micromanagement" No, Anti-Taliban Yes
--------------------------------------------- ------
2. (C) Drawing from reftel points, A/DCM summarized USG priorities in Afghanistan and emphasized the need for the Karzai administration to make merit-based governmental appointments and take firm steps to end the perception of a culture of impunity. Sinha stated that the GOI does not discuss corruption-related issues with Karzai, since India wants to avoid "micromanaging" the Afghan government. He lamented recent media focus on corruption in Karzai's government, stating that such coverage "undermines" international community efforts in Afghanistan. Sinha paraphrased a statement he attributed to Prime Minister Singh to the effect that negative media attention focus on corruption detracts completely from good-news stories about tangible progress in education and other areas. "When you undermine Karzai," Sinha warned, "you undermine your own efforts." He said that he believes that Karzai "has gotten the message" about international community frustration with his government's corruption and inefficiency and "realizes he must do better." He said he observed the Secretary's interaction with Karzai at his inauguration in Kabul, and believes that their "excellent personal rapport" will assist international community dealings with the Afghan government.
3. (C) In GOI dealings with Karzai, Sinha said the Indians stress the importance of keeping Taliban elements out of the government. He stated that the GOI works closely with the Afghan government when identifying projects to disburse the GOI's claimed USD 1.3 billion assistance to Afghanistan. As a result of this and India's historical links to Afghanistan, India remains popular among the Afghan people (as evidence, he claimed that a recent Gallup poll found that 56 percent of Afghans favored an Indian presence in Afghanistan while 33 percent believed that Pakistan supports the Taliban). He stated that a recent delivery of 3 tons of Afghan apples to India via air freight demonstrates the scope for increased economic ties between India and Afghanistan. When asked about GOI views on Afghan reconciliation efforts, Sinha said the Indians believe that true reconciliation can only take place among people who adhere to the Afghan constitution and are committed to democratic government. He does not believe that most Taliban and Islamists adhere to the constitution or are committed to democracy in Afghanistan.
NEW DELHI 00002396 002 OF 002
4. (C) Sinha repeatedly stressed the need for greater USG-GOI coordination and cooperation in Afghanistan that goes beyond development assistance cooperation. He stated that India has ability and interest in expanding military and police training for Afghans in India. Sinha was pleased to learn of discussions about placing an Indian military liaison officer at CENTCOM headquarters. "We understand the sensitivities involved, but we can help."
Pakistan: Don't Go For The Head Fake
------------------------------------
5. (C) While Sinha's remarks about Afghanistan were largely upbeat, the tone and substance of his comments regarding Pakistan were relentlessly negative. He called on the USG to see through and resist Pakistan's "game" of promising cooperation in Afghanistan in return for "U.S. pressure on India to sort out Pakistan's problems with India." Sinha accused Pakistan of falsely claiming that India poses a grave threat on Pakistan's eastern border: "if they really believed that," he intoned, "they never would have withdrawn an entire army corps from the east and deployed it in the west." He also claimed that an essential element of Pakistani policy is to "try to internationalize every bilateral issue between us." To illustrate his point, he cited Pakistani claims that India is unjustly diverting water from Pakistan, accusations that he said were shown to be false by Pakistan's recent bumper harvest in Punjab. In fact, Sinha claimed, water cooperation is the "one area of the bilateral relationship that actually works" due to the effectiveness of the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. He confirmed that biannual meetings of the Indus Water Commission continue, with an Indian delegation expected to visit Pakistan before year-end. Sinha said Pakistan has been unable to show evidence to back its assertion that India is providing arms to anti-government fighters in Waziristan.
6. (C) Repeating the standard GOI mantra, Sinha stated that the "Composite Dialogue" with Pakistan is "paused" and will not resume until Pakistan takes "credible and verifiable" measures against terror directed at India. "We have no benchmarks" for resumption, Sinha stated, adding that improvement in bilateral ties is not dependent on a single measure such as Pakistani action against Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) supremo Hafez Saeed. Sinha stated he is "convinced that LeT is a creature of the ISI and armed by the ISI." He recounted that Indian Foreign Minister Krishna asked Pakistani FM Qureshi during an impromptu encounter at Karzai's inauguration lunch about constant delays and adjournments in the trial of alleged Mumbai attack conspirators. Qureshi replied that the Pakistani government can not interfere in Pakistan's judicial process. Sinha cited this reply as proof that Pakistan is not serious about bringing Mumbai conspirators to justice "because the Pakistanis constantly interfere in the judicial process when it suits them to do so." He delivered a bleak long-term prognosis for India-Pakistan relations. "Call me a cynic," Sinha sighed, "but even if India were to lop off Kashmir and hand it on a platter to Pakistan, they would still find a reason to make trouble for us." ROEMER
Friday, 09 January 2009, 13:06
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 000048
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/08/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, PK, IN, TSPL, KNNP, ETTC,
ENRG, TRGY
SUBJECT: MENON TOUGH ON PAKISTAN, BULLISH ON BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIP IN DISCUSSION WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 32 B. NEW DELHI 29
Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)
1. (S) SUMMARY. Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon on January 8 discussed Pakistan and the bilateral relationship in the context of the U.S. political transition with visiting Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher and Ambassador Mulford. Boucher and Menon were in full agreement on the need to ensure that Pakistan eliminate Laskhar-e-Tayiba, but disagreed on some tactics. Boucher urged Menon to "tone down" the Indian rhetoric and avoid any military movements that could be misinterpreted. Menon defended India's strategy of publicly pressuring Pakistan's security services, saying they had not yet made the strategic decision to cut ties with Lashkar-e-Tayiba, and that the civilian government was powerless to force this change. Menon agreed with Boucher that important progress was being made on preventing a future attack, with good cooperation with the U.S., but cautioned that for the moment the issue of Pakistan had become defining. Menon stressed the importance of focusing the bilateral relationship with the next U.S. administration on issues with broader popular appeal. He said India was very keen on an early visit by the next Secretary of State, and requested an early, quiet conversation to reassure India about U.S. nonproliferation policy. The Indian government planned to sign its Safeguards Agreement and to begin negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on an Additional Protocol at the end of January, but would not make a decision about designating a nuclear reactor park site for U.S. firms prior to the January 11-16 visit of the U.S.-India Business Council (USIBC) delegation. Menon said he hoped for a deal on End Use Monitoring (EUM) "as quickly as possible." END SUMMARY.
Menon Tough on Pakistan, Bullish on Bilateral Relationship
- - -
2. (C) In a meeting January 8, Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon discussed with visiting Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher and Ambassador Mulford issues including the Mumbai terrorist attack investigations, developments in Pakistan, End Use Monitoring (EUM), next steps in civil nuclear cooperation, and the bilateral relationship in the context of the U.S. political transition.
Pakistan Has Taken "No Irrevocable Steps" Post-Mumbai
- - -
3. (S/REL UK) Boucher recounted for Menon his impressions from his visit to Paksitan (ref A), that Zardari and Gailani were committed to ridding the county of terrorism and had made real strides with the terrorist groups operating in the tribal areas, but that they now understood they also had to tackle Punjabi-based groups like Lashkar-e-Tayiba, which was much more difficult. "We're not giving them any breaks: they must eliminate Lashkar-e-Tayiba," Boucher stressed, adding that it would require persistence. The U.S. hoped to encourage a continuous flow of information, but Pakistan still prefered the mechanism to be a high-level dialogue.
4. (S/REL UK) Menon replied that Pakistan was "nowhere near the threshold of proving sincerity" in its response to the Mumbai attacks and had so far taken no "irrevocable" steps toward eliminating Lashkar-e-Tayiba as a threat to India. His worry was that the problem was "more basic," that the civilian government was incaable of taking action against Lashkar and the military had not yet made the strategic shift required to do so. He recounted that Jaish-e-Mohammad was
NEW DELHI 00000048 002 OF 004
behind the assassination attempt on former Pakistani President Musharraf in 2003, but even that did not move the Pakistani Army to crack down; the group remains operational and has grown more lethal. Furthermore, compared to the Musharraf era, the Pakistan Army was "not responsible right now," according to Menon, who cited provocations such as cease-fire violations.
India Focused on Pakistani Military, Dismissive of Civilian Government
- - -
5. (S/REL UK) Boucher observed that while India had begun targeting pressure against Pakistani security services, the U.S. had decided to work through the civilian government. Boucher cautioned that recent statements claiming links between Pakistani security services and the Mumbai attacks made cooperation more difficult, as did some Indian military movements that, though limited, were enough to be noticed. Boucher said Pakistan had a democratic government committed to eliminating terrorism, and that the U.S. would hold them to it. Menon pointed out that India deliberately had not taken action that would undercut the civilian government or impact the Pakistani people, such as cutting trade, travel, or diplomatic representation. But Menon warned, "You're setting the civilians up for a fall. If you raise expectations of increased civilian power, the military will knock them down." Furthermore, an Indian embrace of the civilian government would be "the kiss of death." Menon concluded, "Honestly I do not think the civilian government can solve the problem; the military must choose to act."
6. (S/REL UK) Boucher shared that the U.S. had not reached the conclusion that Pakistan's security services were directly involved in the Mumbai attacks and asked Menon to "tone down" the public pressure. Provoking the Pakistan military made constructive cooperation less likely. Menon replied, "What we have seen so far leads us to the opposite conclusion." (Asked about evidence, Menon added that India's conclusion was "based on inference.") The political moment was such that the Pakistani Security Services could make a fundamental shift away from support to terrorist groups if they so chose, but they had not done so. "Let's not insult one another by telling a story that the Pakistan Army was not involved," said Menon. The Pakistan Army paid wages to Lashkar-e-Tayiba and sustained the organization, and until these ties were severed, India would continue to regard the Pakistani security services as complicit in the Mumbai attacks. Menon concluded, "They're either unwilling to take action, or incapable, or both; any way you look at it, they're involved."
Good Progress on Preventing Further Attacks
- - -
7. (S/REL UK) Menon agreed that important progress was being made on prevention of further terrorist attacks, with good cooperation with the U.S. He remarked that there was no popular resistance to the idea of FBI involvement in the Mumbai investigations. He agreed with Boucher that India could work with the United States to make itself safer regardless of Pakistan, but he stressed that unless the Mumbai perpetrators were brought to justice it will happen again. Menon concluded, "We have a huge confluence of interests, and as long as that exists we will work together." Boucher assured Menon that India could rely on the U.S. to keep up the pressure on Pakistan; Menon replied, "And you can count on our pressure on you to help you do it."
End Use Monitoring: India "Ready For a Deal"
NEW DELHI 00000048 003.2 OF 004
- - -
8. (C) Asked whether India was "ready for a deal" on End Use Monitoring (EUM), Menon replied emphatically, "Yes." He added that he thought a deal was close, but that it would require "sitting at a table and finding a solution that is neither yours nor ours. We can do it." He added that EUM was important to India and that he hoped for a deal "as quickly as possible."
Progress With Energy Agency, But Nervous About U.S. Nonpro Policy
- - -
9. (C) Menon shared that the government was ready to sign its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement and expected to do so "by the end of the month." Negotiations with the Agency on an Additional Protocol were likewise scheduled to begin at the end of January. Menon expected the next Parliament to take up the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). (Comment: Menon did not mention the possibility of bypassing Parliament raised by External Affairs Minister Mukherjee, reported ref B.) Menon said the government had "rescheduled" a decision about designating a nuclear reactor park site for U.S. firms and that it would not be made in time for the January 11-16 visit of the U.S.-India Business Council (USIBC) civil nuclear delegation.
10. (C) Menon confided that many people in India were "nervous" about nonproliferation policy under the new U.S. administration. He hoped for an early, quiet conversation with the new U.S. administration, saying, "The world has changed in the past eight years, and we need to be sure we share updated views." Boucher and Ambassador Mulford stressed the bipartisan support for the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement as evidence that both political parties were aware of the changed environment.
Bilateral Relationship: Seeking The Next Big Idea
- - -
11. (C) Boucher and Menon discussed a variety of bilateral issues in the context of the U.S. political transition. Menon agreed that the papers exchanged with Under Secretary Burns outlining bilateral issues ripe for progress were "very congruent, almost the same." Menon stressed the importance of focusing on issues with popular appeal. Many good things were happening on health, education, and agriculture, according to Menon, but nothing that "captures the imagination." Indians were beginning to view the relationship with the U.S. as only about political-military and nuclear issues.
12. (C) Boucher challenged Menon to think about formulating "the next big idea" to frame the bilateral relationship for the next several years. Boucher suggested that one direction might be toward popular issues, such as agriculture and energy, while another might be toward global issues, such as the environment and trade. Ambassador Mulford suggested that India might leverage its position amid the global financial crisis by elevating its stature in the international financial architecture. Menon agreed, but cautioned that for the moment the issue of Pakistan had become defining. Menon said he was very keen on an early visit by the next Secretary of State, but had not been sure who to ask.
13. (SBU) Assistant Secretary Boucher cleared this message.
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MULFORD
Friday, 04 August 2006, 13:17
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 005495
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR INR/B
EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2016
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINR, PHUM, SCUL, KWMN, PINS, IN
SUBJECT: A GARRULOUS SONIA GANDHI OPENS UP TO MARIA SHRIVER
Classified By: Charge Geoff Pyatt for reasons 1.4 (B,D)
1. (C) Summary: In a relaxed August 3 conversation with California first lady Maria Shriver, Sonia Gandhi revealed a rare glimpse of herself. Usually withdrawn and reserved in public, she spoke at great length and radiated confidence on women's' issues and some aspects of her private life. Mrs. Gandhi demonstrated a strong commitment to a progressive left-of-center agenda aimed at combating socially conservative forces bent on oppressing Indian women. However, she was also realistic, revealing an in-depth knowledge of Indian culture, especially the rural/urban divide. At times suppressing her emotions, she spoke about the compulsions of political life, her parents' objections to her marriage to Rajiv Gandhi and the sacrifices she and her family have made. Her comments and demeanor put the lie to cocktail party suggestions that she courts Manmohan Singh's job. End Summary.
Two Dynasties Meet
------------------
2. (C) Maria Shriver, California's first lady and wife of Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, met with Congress Party President Sonia Gandhi on August 3 as part of her official visit to India. Shriver is in India to discuss her various initiatives on women's' affairs and to solicit Indian involvement. She is also laying the groundwork for a proposed trade mission led by Governor Schwarzenegger around February, 2007. After her stay in Delhi, she will go to Dharamshalla to meet the Dalai Lama. In addition to the Gandhi meeting, Shriver met with the head of the National Commission for Women and toured NGO's involved in women's' affairs. Mrs. Gandhi was accompanied by former Cabinet Minister Karan Singh.
Indian Women Bear a Heavy Burden
--------------------------------
3. (C) Shriver and Gandhi engaged in an over one hour exchange that was lively and open and covered many issues, both personal and political. Shriver explained that she was concerned with women's issues, including sexual abuse and exploitation and trafficking. Mrs. Gandhi replied that the situation for women in India is more troubling and traumatic than that in the US and other developed countries, as Indian women must deal with myriad problems not found in the west, such as child labor. In addition, most Indian women live in remote villages with severe "cultural compulsions" that work against women, making it difficult for the GOI to enforce the law. She pointed out that Indian women remain largely uneducated which is a "big problem" for Indian society and makes progress difficult. This compels the GOI to rely on television and radio to reach women with messages aimed at their concerns. Mrs. Gandhi noted that while she had a deep personal interest in women's' issues, she "only rarely" gave personal interviews aimed at female audiences.
And Sonia Bears a Personal Burden
---------------------------------
4. (C) Without prompting and at her own initiative Mrs. Gandhi then spoke at length about her personal life. She revealed that after her mother in law's murder Rajiv Gandhi was under intense pressure to take up the political mantle of the Gandhi family, but both Rajiv and Sonia were intensely
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personal and had no interest in politics. According to Mrs. Gandhi, she urged her husband repeatedly to avoid politics, but he insisted. After Rajiv Gandhi became Prime Minister, Sonia was determined to avoid the limelight and "kept in the background." She clarified that she accompanied her husband to official events, but refrained from making political statements. After her husband's assassination, Mrs. Gandhi withdrew, working only on a charitable foundation established in Rajiv's memory. In a candid revelation of her personal political stance, Mrs. Gandhi stated that "the right was becoming strong in India and Congress weak," tipping her hand and "compelling" her to enter politics to protect the Gandhi family legacy. She also revealed that her children were "not keen" about the idea, but eventually told her, "whatever you decide, we will back you."
Turning Down the PM Spot
------------------------
5. (C) Mrs. Gandhi was reluctant to provide details regarding her decision to turn down the Prime Minister post after the UPA's surprise 2004 electoral victory, stating that "I am often asked about this, but tell people that I will write a book someday with the whole story." She would only say that she "felt better" that someone else became PM and "did not regret" her decision. Shriver congratulated Mrs. Gandhi for her resoluteness and described her as "courageous." Clearly embarrassed by this adulation, Mrs. Gandhi made no response. She elaborated, at Karan Singh's insistence, saying that she was under lots of pressure, as the "party workers" were "very upset." They "could not understand" why she, as party President, was not taking up the post, since they had voted for her and won a majority.
Politics and Women
------------------
6. (C) Shriver noted that she chairs a "Women's Conference" that brings 11,000 women to California to discuss relevant issues, and reinforced the point that "women can change the world." Shriver invited Mrs. Gandhi to attend next year. She pointed out that last year's keynote speaker was Sandra Day O'Connor, who spoke about balancing public and private life, and how she left the Supreme Court to look after her ailing husband and spend more time with her children. Shriver emphasized that Justice O'Connor also did not want to enter public life but was "pushed by her husband," and noted how difficult it is to be a wife and mother and play a public role. Mrs. Gandhi made no commitment to attend.
Indian Steps to Bring Justice
-----------------------------
7. (C) Mrs. Gandhi explained the steps that her UPA government had taken and planned to take to help women achieve greater social mobility and rights. She explained that the GOI had instituted a "Panchayati Raj" program under which major decisions regarding the economic development of villages are made by Panchayats (village councils). To ensure female participation, Rajiv Gandhi had "reserved" 33 percent of the positions on the Panchayats for women. Although there were "some complaints" that the women were "manipulated by their husbands," Mrs. Gandhi asserted that "research had confirmed that women will invariably take the right decisions." She noted that the UPA now wants to extend the same reservations to Parliament and the Legislative
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Assemblies. Mrs. Gandhi confirmed that currently the number of female MPs was "very small," as "some parties believe that women should not be in power."
The Indian Contradiction
------------------------
8. (C) Shriver pointed out that her trip had made her aware of the "great contradiction" between a society in which women occupied many leadership positions, including, at times, Prime Minister," but still were denied many basic rights. Mrs. Gandhi agreed with Shriver, noting that several Indian states had female Chief Ministers, and that an increasing numbers of Indian women are CEOs of major corporations, doctors, and scientists, and "we will keep fighting." She explained that the situation for women varied from state to state, and that South India was "more progressive" than the North for various historical and cultural reasons, and that, for example, the state of Kerala supplied nurses to much of the Middle East.
Possible Indian Collaboration
-----------------------------
9. (C) Praising the contribution of Indians and Indian-Americans to California, Shriver suggested that perhaps the GOI could help the state government combat its teacher and nursing shortage. She also noted that her family is very involved in the Special Olympics program and would like 500,000 participants for the Indian Special Olympics and hoped that Mrs. Gandhi would attend the events scheduled for November 6. Mrs. Shriver pointed out that those with intellectual disabilities were making great strides in the US, with many becoming self sufficient. This is necessary, she pointed out, "as we do not have the relevant institutions in the US." Mrs. Gandhi conceded that Indian government institutions for the intellectually disabled are "nothing to write home about," leaving parents and NGOs to deal with the problem, and that in rural areas, such children are "often hidden" and their disability "kept secret."
Slow Social Change
------------------
10. (C) Mrs. Gandhi was not the least defensive about the gravity of India's social problems. When asked by Shriver about adoption, she noted that adoptions remained rare in India and most Indians continued to "see nothing wrong" in that. It is a "happy change," however, that more families are taking in orphans. She readily agreed with Shriver that many Indians still considered female children as "a problem" and preferred males and, as a result, more girls are abandoned than boys. Mrs. Gandhi reiterated that "education is the key to change" as much legislation is not enforced. This makes it necessary to "convince families and make them understand" to bring about positive change.
Personal Insights Into an Active Life
-------------------------------------
11. (C) Mrs. Gandhi then provided personal insights into her life, saying that she travels constantly all over India, often to remote areas to visit the common people, as "it is only by going out and interacting with people that we are in a better position to understand their problems and determine what they want." She confided that there has been a big
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change in the Indian mindset regarding education. Earlier, parents were not very interested in ensuring their children were educated, while today, "99 percent want to send their children to school." Everywhere you go in India today, she noted, you see children in their uniforms heading for school, and this is "something that makes us happy." In addition to education, Indian parents want their children to have access to basic health care - "doctors and medicines," and some assurance that they will have a job after they complete their education. Mrs. Gandhi worried that there will be huge numbers of young Indians leaving school with no guarantee of finding a job.
Population Control Off the Screen
---------------------------------
12. (C) Mrs. Gandhi pointed out that "population control" is a political taboo in India after Indira Gandhi was voted out of office over this issue. Although she insisted allegations of forced vasectomies and other abuses were "highly exaggerated" and "politically motivated," the historical memory has forced the UPA to focus on raising awareness and providing basic health services and means that progress on reducing the birth rate will be "slow." Again, education will be the key, as demonstrated by the small family norm in urban areas.
Culture and Fighting AIDS
-------------------------
13. (C) Karan Singh pointed out that population reduction and AIDS control are linked as it requires condom distribution to combat both problems. Mrs. Gandhi pointed out that Northeast India faces a severe AIDS problem, as it is a transshipment point for narcotics with a growing drug problem. Cultural factors also inhibit AIDS control, as the government "cannot be open" with condom distribution because of "certain mindsets." This compels the GOI to find an "appropriate way" to communicate with the population. Shriver responded that the US, as a multicultural society, faces many of the same problems, as men from some cultural backgrounds "don't want anything to do" with family planning and AIDS prevention. The key, she emphasized, was "empowering women to demand action on these issues."
India and the US
----------------
14. (C) Shriver observed that there was "no anti-Americanism" in India and that Indians from diverse backgrounds, cultures and religions have successfully found ways to coexist. Mrs. Gandhi replied that Indians are "inherently tolerant" as they have co-existed for centuries. Karan Singh added that the "freedom movement of Mahatma Gandhi" also played a crucial role as it was inclusive, pluralistic and emphasized that multiplicity of Indian culture. Mrs. Gandhi jokingly pointed out that the "Indian Left is anti-American," but then agreed that its stance was aimed at "American policy" rather than the American people. Karan Singh emphasized that he and "most Indians" objected to many aspects of current American policy but held no brief against the American people. Mrs. Gandhi also pointed out that many Indian Muslims "resent certain policies of the US."
More Personal Revelations
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-------------------------
15. (C) Mrs. Gandhi revealed that her own parents objected to her marriage to Rajiv Gandhi and she "resented their position" and went ahead and married him anyway. She also noted that she felt that her gender has never been an issue in her political life and that Indira Gandhi also made the same observation. In Hinduism, "women are seen as goddesses and no puja (worship) can take place without them," while, ironically, oppression of women is common. She also revealed that common women in India's rural areas do not hold her in great awe and don't think of her as a great personality, as "their priorities are so different."
Comment: A Relaxed Gandhi Provides A Rare Personal Insight
--------------------------------------------- -------------
16. (C) Sonia Gandhi is often stiff and detached when in public. This was a more relaxed Sonia, possibly because she felt a personal rapport with Maria Shriver. In this more relaxed setting, Sonia Gandhi revealed a left of center political orientation which stresses the strong role of the government in ensuring social progress and her inherent opposition to the social conservatism of the Hindu right. At the same time, she entertained no illusions that she or the UPA will bring about rapid social change or uplift quickly India's oppressed women. Instead, she embraced an evolutionary and patient approach based on a broad knowledge of Indian culture and traditions. She was, for example, acutely aware of the vast divide between rural and urban India and the inherent difficulty of pushing entrenched villagers into the 21st century. Deeply hurt by personal tragedy, she has erected a strong and stoic persona to prevent public access to her personal space. Whenever she spoke of the deaths of her husband and mother-in-law, she struggled to keep her emotions in check. Despite her carefully erected Indian persona, her basic Italian personality is clearly evident in her mannerisms, speech and interests. She presents an intriguing enigma of a warm private personality that remains concealed and is available only to her closest confidants and family members.
17. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: (http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) PYATT
Wednesday, 06 April 2005, 13:56
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 002606
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/05/2015
TAGS PHUM, PREL, PTER, IN, PK, Human Rights
SUBJECT: ICRC FRUSTRATED WITH INDIAN GOVERNMENT
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (S) Summary: In a April 1 confidential briefing on GOI detention centers in Kashmir, ICRC XXXXXXXXXXXX described to D/Polcouns torture methods and relatively stable trend lines of prisoner abuses by Indian security forces, based on data derived from 1491 interviews with detainees during 2002-2004. The continued ill-treatment of detainees, despite longstanding ICRC-GOI dialogue, have led the ICRC to conclude that the New Delhi condones torture. The MEA/MHA recently protested ICRC presence and activities in J&K, and keeps the organization in legal limbo, but allows their operations to continue. Security forces in J&K are open to ICRC seminars in international humanitarian law (IHL). ICRC stressed that it was not asking for USG action, but may seek to mobilize support in the future, if its relations with the GOI do not improve. Separately, the media reported that COAS LTG JJ Singh put human rights issues at the center of an April 4 conference of army commanders. End Summary. ICRC XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX gave us a confidential briefing on the ICRC Kashmir program, the first such detailed and organized presentation Embassy has received in a number of years. The XXXXXXXXXXXX have limited the information they have exchanged with us to general comments on the human rights situation in Kashmir and the Northeast "in order to respect their confidentiality agreement with the GOI," with which relations have been strained. XXXXXXXXXXXX intimated that the reason he was departing from this practice was ICRC annoyance with the GOI, and his view that the USG would be an ally in ICRC attempts to regularize its status in India. The UK, Holland, and France would receive the same briefing, he stated.
Interaction
-----------
3. (S) ICRC has been active in India for 23 years, but signed its first and only MOU in 1995, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. Since the last ministerial in 1998, contacts have been at periodic Roundtables with the MEA and MHA, led on the Indian side by a Joint Secretary (A/S equivalent). The atmosphere at these meetings has usually been testy, with GOI interlocutors singling out some ICRC activities as "not part of the MOU," and occasionally claiming that data presented are "not specific enough" (even going to far as to call some of them "lies"). At recent Roundtables, ICRC has provided thick books to the GOI, which has over time raised fewer questions about the data and focused more on activities that were not carefully delineated in the MOU. Between these meetings, ICRC contact is kept to the Deputy Secretary level (the second lowest in protocol terms). Thus far, ICRC staff had not had problems with visas, he stated. (Note: The MOU was facilitated by the Embassy in the early 1990s and resulted from extensive interaction between the Mission Front Office and XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Note)
4. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, a MEA Note Verbale from January 30 stated that the GOI values its relations with the ICRC, and also its instruction in international humanitarian law (IHL) to security forces. However, he said the MEA also protested the ICRC's presence in Srinagar, asking it to "wind up" its operations, advising that its "public activities must stop" (believed to be a reference to a seminar ICRC staff held at Kashmir University on IHL in 2004), and warning against "unauthorized contacts with separatist elements" (which ICRC acknowledges have taken place, including with XXXXXXXXXXXX). (Comment: This GOI request to "wind up" operations in Srinagar seems more like a warning to keep to the letter of the MOU than a real threat to close down there. End Comment)
Detention Center Visits
-----------------------
5. (S) ICRC staff made 177 visits to detention centers in J&K and elsewhere (primarily the Northeast) between 2002-2004, meeting with 1491 detainees, 1296 of which were private interviews. XXXXXXXXXXXX considered this group a representative sample of detainees in Kashmir, but stressed that they had not been allowed access to all detainees. In 852 cases, detainees reported what ICRC refers to as "IT" (ill-treatment): 171 persons were beaten, the remaining 681 subjected to one or more of six forms of torture: electricity (498 cases), suspension from ceiling (381), "roller" (a round metal object put on the thighs of sitting person, which prison personnel then sit on, crushing muscles -- 294); stretching (legs split 180 degrees -- 181), water (various forms -- 234), or sexual (302). Numbers add up to more than 681, as many detainees were subjected to more than one form of IT. ICRC stressed that all the branches of the security forces used these forms of IT and torture.
GOI Points to Improvements
--------------------------
6. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX reported that during recent ICRC interactions with the GOI, officials have maintained that the human rights situation in Kashmir is "much better than it was in the 1990s," a view he also agreed with. Security forces no longer roused entire villages in the middle of the night and detained inhabitants indiscriminately, as they had as recently as the late 1990s. There is "more openness from medical doctors and the police," who have conceded that 95 percent of the information on particular cases is accurate. Ten years ago, there were some 300 detention centers; now there are "a lot fewer," he stated.
General Observations
--------------------
7. (S) While acknowledging these improvements, XXXXXXXXXXXXmade a number of additional observations based on ICRC experience in Kashmir that indicate persistent problems:
-- There is a regular and widespread use of IT and torture by the security forces during interrogation; -- This always takes place in the presence of officers; -- ICRC has raised these issues with the GOI for more than 10 years; -- Because practice continues, ICRC is forced to conclude that GOI condones torture; -- Dialogue on prison conditions is OK, dialogue on treatment of detainees is not; -- Security forces were rougher on detainees in the past; -- Detainees were rarely militants (they are routinely killed), but persons connected to or believed to have information about the insurgency; -- ICRC has never obtained access to the "Cargo Building," the most notorious detention center in Srinagar; and -- Current practices continue because "security forces need promotions," while for militants, "the insurgency has become a business."
Trend Lines Constant
--------------------
8. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX showed us two graphs depicting data obtained from interviews conducted during the past two years, with lines and bars tracing the various kinds of ill-treatment. All the lines were zig-zag in nature, but within bands and largely horizontal. There were no clear trend lines, up or down. The lines at the end of 2004 were in an order of magnitude roughly comparable to 2002. He did not attribute the spikes up or down to particular policies in place at particular times, but called them "ad hoc changes."
Next Steps
----------
9. (S) The ICRC official indicated that his organization would seek another Roundtable with the MEA and MHA between April and June. The ICRC New Delhi office also wants its President to visit India, to raise these and other issues in a meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. XXXXXXXXXXXX considered this "very important," although stressed that it was not agreed. After 23 years of activities in country, the ICRC also wants to regularize its status by concluding a formal agreement with the GOI like that enjoyed by UN agencies. Most importantly, ICRC seeks a "purposive, rather than restrictive" interpretation of its existing MOU and and end to IT and torture.
Bright Spot
-----------
10. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said the one bright spot in ICRC activities was with the security forces. Staff have conducted more than 300 sessions with SF on IHL in Kashmir and elsewhere, which have touched an estimated 20,000 junior grade officers in one way or another. Discussions are underway for further sessions with officers at the headquarters of the Southern Command in Pune (Maharashtra) and Northern Command in Udhampur (J&K).
COAS: Velvet Glove, Iron Fist
-----------------------------
11. (C) In a separate but related development, the media reported that COAS LTG JJ Singh made military discipline issues the centerpoint of a conference for army commanders April 5, following reports that Defense Minister Mukherjee was disturbed by continued reports of human rights violations by the security forces. Addressing the conference, Mukherkee observed that "we must realize that while dealing with insurgents, we are operating within our own territory and allegations of human rights violations will not only sully the image of the army, but also reduce our effectiveness in tackling militancy." As part of his "velvet glove, iron fist" approach, Singh has repeatedly stipulated that his officers should use "minimum force" and avoid "collateral damage" in their units in order to reverse declining standards in discipline.
Comment
-------
12. (S) The fact that ICRC reversed its practice of the last several years to provide this briefing to us reflects its frustration with the MEA and MHA, although we note that their experience with security forces in J&K is clearly better than in the past, pragmatic and bordering on the positive. The data showing stable trend lines of ill-treatment and torture in detention centers are very disturbing, because the practice continues unabated. It does not appear that the GOI is planning anything precipitous, but the ICRC is clearly upping the ante with the GOI, which it charges with "not playing ball." ICRC considers the status quo "unacceptable," and wants substantive dialogue with the GOI. Their approach to us may be a prelude to a more assertive stance vis-a-vis New Delhi, which could be helpful in goading the Home Ministry and MOD to taking firmer action, but also risks backfiring if the GOI starts to back out of a long-negotiated working relationship which has produced valuable results over the past decade. MULFORD
Tuesday, 18 April 2006, 07:08
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 12 NEW DELHI 002587
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT, DS/IP/ITA AND DS/IP/SA
EO 12958 DECL: 04/18/2015
TAGS PTER, PGOV, PINR, PREL, PINS, MASS, KJUS, KTIA, TBIO,
KCRM, TINT, EFIN, EAIR, SNAR, KISL, IN, PK, BK, NE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR APRIL 19 US-INDIA CT JOINT WORKING
GROUP
REF: A. NEW DELHI 2446 B. NEW DELHI 2361 C. NEW DELHI 2291 D. NEW DELHI 2229 E. NEW DELHI 2119 F. NEW DELHI 1632 G. NEW DELHI 1611 H. NEW DELHI 1318 I. NEW DELHI 93 J. 05 CHENNAI 2901 K. 05 NEW DELHI 9421 L. 05 NEW DELHI 9249 M. 05 NEW DELHI 8782 N. 05 NEW DELHI 8436 O. 05 NEW DELHI 7725 P. 05 NEW DELHI 6596 Q. 05 NEW DELHI 5165 R. 05 MUMBAI 1688 S. 05 NEW DELHI 3647 T. 04 NEW DELHI 878 U. 04 NEW DELHI 877 V. 04 NEW DELHI 876
Classified By: Charge Bob Blake for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary: The US-India counterterrorism dialogue reflects our shared values and encompasses the range of CT issues in South Asia. New Delhi focuses on combating jihadi terrorism launched from Pakistan, which complicates USG efforts to engage Delhi in a more vibrant intelligence dialogue without compromising relations with Islamabad. The GOI is less concerned with discussing Naxalite (Maoist agrarian peasant movement) or ethno-linguistic separatist terrorism in India's Northeast states. The GOI's focus also remains on here-and-now terrorism vice more exotic and more potentially devastating variants such as bio-terrorism and WMD-terrorism. The exception here is on cyber-terrorism/cybersecurity, where the growing financial and prestige value of India's IT sector is helping energize positive interactions. India's large Muslim population, and that community's relatively positive relations with its Hindu majority, also offer insights on how we can more effectively engage in the battle of ideas against violent extremism within a democratic, pluralistic society.
2. (C) Since the August 2004 CTJWG, the GOI has moved forward with counterterrorism legislation and policy, including on terrorist finance and hijackings, but we still have gaps in our understanding of how these new procedures will be implemented. India has a vast capacity to absorb USG counterterrorism training; although we see Indian security services replicating the training they receive, our challenge now is to rationalize the training the USG offers to ensure it meets mutually-agreed goals. There is also ample room to expand information and intelligence sharing between the USG and GOI, but much will depend on the degree to which US priorities align with Indian goals. Overcoming the lingering effects of decades of mutual mistrust is also essential. Embassy New Delhi has had some experience with working under the US-India Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) that came
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into force in October; there is room here too for improvement. Top GOI officials have publicly expressed their strong interest in India becoming a member of the Egmont Group and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). This message also includes information on other terrorism-related topics that the GOI delegation may reference, either in the formal CTJWG or in side-meetings.
3. (C) Since the last CTJWG a host of bilateral interactions, including disaster cooperation (the December 2004 tsunami and the October 2005 earthquake), foreign policy alignment (on Nepal and Afghanistan), the Defense Framework Agreement, the July 18 nuclear agreement, and the President's visit capped off by the civil nuclear deal, have brought the two countries much closer together in a variety of venues. Our CT bureaucracies and security services, however, lag behind growing bilateral movement on trade, energy and scientific cooperation, but the background atmospherics are encouraging. We now need to foster new thinking in Delhi and Washington that will advance our common CT agendas faster than before possible. End Summary.
CT Bureaucratics
----------------
4. (S) The MEA has the lead on international CT cooperation, with Additional Secretary (International Organizations) KC Singh the GOI's interlocutor (Ref K). On-the-ground CT activity at the national level is the bailiwick of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), however. In some instances, such as on the 2005 offer of an Itemizer to help secure the Srinagar-Muzzafarabad bus, we have been quietly told by our MEA interlocutors that MHA objections made certain CT cooperation impossible. (NOTE: Our inability to engage MHA on policy matters leaves us with solely the MEA's word on such occasions. End Note.) The Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) compete on CT intelligence issues; the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the FBI-equivalent, is the national-level law enforcement agency. Most CT activities, from security to investigation and prosecution, happen at the state level, however, and the various states and Union Territories exhibit varying (typically low) levels of cooperation amongst each other and with the federal government. The National Security Council Secretariat, which enjoys a wealth of subject-matter experts
SIPDIS (vice the rest of the Indian bureaucracy, which dramatically shifts portfolios every few years), is worth pursuing in areas within their scope, such as cybersecurity (see Para 20), as well as other areas they (or NSA Narayanan) seek to add to their mandate.
Threat Assessment: Priority on Jihadis
--------------------------------------
5. (C) Terrorism conducted by jihadi groups based in Pakistan -- and sometimes with the support of elements of the GOP -- is historically the most lethal and the most politically volatile strain of terrorism in India. Reflecting improved counterinsurgency policies, civilian fatalities from terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir have
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substantially decreased from 2001-2004 (approximately 20% decrease each year), according to Indian government statistics and a leading independent Indian terrorism expert. The data for the first nine months of 2005 showed a continued decline, but a spike in lethal attacks after the October 8 earthquake resulted in the 2005 levels being roughly equal to those for 2004. Since January 2005, jihadis have carried out or are believed to be responsible for lethal attacks at three popular markets on Diwali (Ref N) and Jamma Masjid (Septel), both in Delhi, as well as Ayodhya (Ref Q), Varanasi (Ref F), and Bangalore (Ref J), in addition to the litany of deadly bombings and shootings in J&K itself. These new targets in the Hindi heartland and the south reflect a new and dangerous trend that bears close watching.
6. (C) Kashmiri terrorist groups made numerous attacks on elected Indian and Kashmiri politicians, targeted civilians in public areas, and attacked security forces, killing more than 500 civilians in 2005, most of whom were Kashmiri Muslims. Attacks continued in 2006, with democracy in Kashmir a primary focus. Candidates and elected officials were attacked and murdered, and terrorists apparently prioritized deterring Kashmiris from voting. Coordinated attacks on several sites in central Srinagar on April 16 underlined terrorists' opposition to April 24 state assembly by-elections (Septel). Foreign Terrorist Organizations Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), at times operating through front names from camps in Pakistan, claimed responsibility for many of these attacks. Some of these groups maintain ties with al-Qaida, although the Indian government takes pride in claiming there is no direct al-Qaida presence in the country outside of Kashmir.
Threat Assessment: Naxals a Rising Threat
-----------------------------------------
7. (SBU) Indian terrorism analysts -- in some respects more so than the GOI -- are concerned that Naxal terrorism, which covers a broad region of Eastern, Central, and Southern India, is growing in sophistication and lethality and will be a significant long-term challenge. Unlike terrorists in Kashmir, these Naxalite groups are not dependent on support from outside India; the GOI and independent experts assess that Naxals purchase some weapons from Nepalese Maoists, but (per the GOI) "the relationship is commercial, not ideological" (Septel). The Naxals, such as those in the Communist Party of India-Maoist, also are moving toward a more unified command system than the plethora of small jihadi groups that co-exist alongside LeT and JeM. Furthermore, while jihadis are expanding their area of operations to conduct attacks, particularly in cities, Naxals are expanding the area of (rural) territory they effectively control (i.e. collect taxes, adjudicate disputes, etc.).
8. (SBU) Naxal groups often target Indian security forces vice civilians. However, in West Bengal, they have targeted members of the state ruling Communist Party of India (Marxist), who are considered an ideological competitor by the Maoist Naxalites. Overall deaths due to Naxal violence have remained relatively constant at approximately 500-600
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annually in recent years. The two primary Naxalite groups in 2004 combined to form the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist); this construct continues to hold. PM Singh on April 13 publicly called Naxalism "the single biggest internal security challenge" at a conclave of the chief ministers of the Naxal-affected states; how effective the GOI and the state governments are in stemming this threat remains to be seen.
9. (SBU) In September 2005, the Indian Home Ministry and the senior elected and bureaucratic officials from the 12 Naxal-affected states (Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal) created an Interstate Task Force to streamline regional anti-Naxal operations. The GOI is also modernizing the weapons and equipment for state police forces in Naxal-affected areas.
Threat Assessment: Northeast Terrorism Not a GOI Priority
--------------------------------------------- ------------
10. (SBU) Terrorism in India's Northeast states (Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland, Tripura, and Meghalaya) consists of many groups -- some of which maintain bases in Bangladesh, according to GOI and Indian media reports -- that are small in number compared to other terrorist organizations in India, and their reach does not extend out of the region. Civilian deaths due to terrorism in the Northeast have been declining in recent years, according to Indian government data and a leading independent Indian terrorism expert. For 2005, between 300 and 350 civilians were killed in Northeast terrorism. This variant of Indian terrorism, like Naxalism, attracts little attention from Delhi.
Why the GOI Focuses on the Jihadis
----------------------------------
11. (C) The GOI does not focus on Naxalite or Northeast terrorism with the intensity it devotes to jihadi terrorists, probably for a combination of the following reasons:
-- Attacks by Naxalites and Northeast groups remain confined to rural areas far from New Delhi.
-- The Naxals generally target security forces vice civilians.
-- The Naxals lack external support, which makes them a purely Indian problem, something the GOI cannot blame on other countries; the GOI blames Pakistan and Bangladesh as instigators/supporters of jihadi terrorism, and Bangladesh for also allowing Northeast terrorists support or, at minimum, safe haven. The GOI can and does exploit these links to attract international sympathy (and partial absolution) for its own domestic governance and border security short-comings.
-- Because Naxalites and Northeast groups are treated as domestic issues, they are largely handled by the individual
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states in which these groups operate. The GOI over the past year has tried to tie together the anti-Naxal efforts of the "Naxal-affected states," but to no discernible effect thus far, and the states lack the capacity to mount an effective response to the problem.
-- The most likely solutions to the problems posed by the Naxal and Northeast groups involve improving local/state governance and economic opportunity, a difficult and long-term solution for New Delhi and the affected states to effect.
Extraterritorial Dimensions of Terrorism in India
--------------------------------------------- ----
12. (C) Pakistan: The prominent place jihadi terrorism plays in India's threat perception is a significant irritant in Indo-Pakistan relations. Recent GOI public statements and Indian media suggest Delhi believes cross-border infiltration in March-April dropped significantly, perhaps nearly to zero in March largely due to severe snow conditions, but skeptics remain throughout the Indian bureaucracy and security services. Most of our GOI interlocutors believe Islamabad opens and closes the spigot of cross-border terrorism to influence other aspects of bilateral affairs and to keep "the Kashmir issue" on the front burner. NSA Narayanan in March told the UK High Commissioner he was less worried about LoC infiltration than he was about Pakistani intelligence support for terrorist modules elsewhere in India -- such as the cells responsible for the Delhi and Bangalore attacks (Ref G). Another growing concern is that jihadis are infiltrating into Northeast India from Nepal and Bangladesh.
13. (C) Bangladesh: The GOI for years has insisted that Northeast terrorist groups and, more recently, Pakistani jihadi groups maintain bases on Dhaka's side of the Indo-Bangladesh border, and infiltrate across the lengthy, unfenced boundary back and forth at will, owing to a combination of poor governance, conducive terrain, bribery, and/or GOB facilitation (or, at minimum, willfully ignoring Delhi's pleas) (Refs D, T-V).
14. (C) Nepal: As noted above, the GOI does not believe that domestic Naxals and Nepalese Maoists maintain any significant operational links, except for some commercial arms sales from the Nepalese to the Naxals. Nepalese Maoists, however, appear to enjoy relatively free movement within Naxal-held areas in India along the 1,700 km open border. While we frequently hear reports of Nepalese Maoist leaders (including the Number 1 and Number 2 Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai) spending long periods of time in India with leftist sympathizers, the GOI has assured us repeatedly that it gives no quarter to Nepalese Maoists, and several high-ranking Maoists are being held in Indian jails.
15. (C) The GOI also regularly tells us that Kathmandu, including the airport, has become an operations hub for Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)-supported terrorists, in large part due to its soft border with India. Our interlocutors tell us the RGON turns a blind eye to
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Delhi's complaints on this matter.
Bioterrorism not on Delhi's Radar ...
-------------------------------------
16. (C) Few Indians -- GOI, think-tanks, etc. -- are concerned about bioterrorism (Septel). They generally view it as an over-the-horizon issue, whereas RDX and AK-47s exist in the here-and-now. Some terrorism analysts, including South Asia Terrorism Portal editor Ajai Sahni, chalk this up to the "Panipat Syndrome" (NOTE: According to India's preeminent strategic thinker K Subrahmanyam, in three separate decisive battles, Indian empires declined to defend themselves against Western invaders by reinforcing strategic choke-points like the Khyber Pass. They instead waited for the advancing force to reach Panipat -- a town only 40 miles from Delhi, and over 450 miles after penetrating the Khyber -- before reacting. "Then mad panic and ineffectiveness, followed by a crushing defeat. A devastating lack of strategic sense, either in offense or defense." End Note). One terrorism scholar who has edited three Indian books on bio-terrorism told us that his books sell relatively well in the US and Western Europe, but not in India. The Home and Health Ministries are lead agencies in this field, with the Agriculture Ministry a possible player as well.
17. (C) Controls at bio-tech facilities are weak to non-existent, making India's large industrial capacity a potential source of hazardous bio-materials if not bio-weapons. That said, bio-terrorism would at most appeal to the larger jihadi terrorist groups (i.e. LeT and JeM). Naxals and Northeast separatist terrorists rely more heavily on local support, their area of operations is limited to the territory they seek to "liberate," and they lack operational reach into Delhi, all factors that suggest they would not seek to employ bio-terrorism. In a sign of latent awareness of this threat, however, the National Institute of Virology in Pune will hold a biosecurity workshop May 2-4 with the cooperation of Sandia National Labs.
... Nor is WMD Terrorism
------------------------
18. (C) Many of the same factors at play within the GOI and terrorist groups active in India regarding bio-terrorism also relate to WMD terrorism more broadly. We have seen little evidence of GOI interest or planning on the potential of WMD terrorism. In fact, outside of a few New Delhi think tanks, there appears to be no discourse on this topic whatsoever, with the exception of occasional (and, to Mission's knowledge, unfounded) speculation on whether the AQ Khan proliferation network may have supplied nuclear materials to jihadi groups or al-Qaida. Many of the nuclear non-proliferation measures that the GOI has undertaken, such as harmonization of its export controls with the NSG/MTCR and installation of CSI at the Mumbai Port, also help prevent terrorists from acquiring or shipping WMD-related items.
Cyber-Terrorism
---------------
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19. (C) Cyber-security, by contrast, is an increasing source of Indian concern and focus. India hosts a significant number of high-tech professionals, many of whom possess the skills to effect cyber-terrorism; however, reports of "cyber-terrorism" in India have heretofore related only to defacement of GOI websites. We have seen no credible information about terrorist groups attempting to execute cyber-terrorists acts, although some groups are undoubtedly interested, and jihadi groups particularly are understood to use e-mail, Internet chat services, and other digital communications platforms. That said, India's increasingly remote-controlled critical infrastructure (energy generation, transportation, water and sanitation, communications, etc.) present tempting targets for tech-savvy terrorists.
20. (C) The National Security Council Secretariat is the lead agency on cybersecurity and cyber-terrorism, and The Mission's NSCS interlocutors have been both knowledgeable about potential threats, energetic about trying to head them off, and open to bilateral assistance to protect critical systems, all pleasant surprises compared to our overall dealings with the GOI. The US-India Cybersecurity Forum, launched in 2000 as an outgrowth of our CT cooperation, now evinces frequent and robust interaction at both the policymaker and technical levels (Refs H, I, and L). The NSCS is keen to engage in new subject areas, including protection of the above listed critical infrastructure services. Given this positive interaction and the fact that the NSCS largely employs subject-matter experts vice generalists, it might be useful to pursue NSCS branching out into other areas of USG interest, such as bio- and WMD-terrorism, in the hope that we can replicate the progress we have enjoyed in cybersecurity.
Waging the "Battle of Ideas"
----------------------------
21. (C) We can learn a great deal from India's management of its large society to minimize extremist ideologies. India enjoys a democratic, multi-religious, multi-cultural, heterogeneous, multi-ethnic society where all major world religions are practiced freely. Isolated elements of religious extremism of many varieties have, however, occurred in India -- notably among Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs -- although extremists as a whole are by far outnumbered by "secular" moderates. In the Indian context, "secularism" is synonymous with tolerance for all faiths, and does not imply life devoid of religion, although religious freedom -- including atheism -- is protected and guaranteed by the Constitution and a long history of court precedent. At a time when many nations appear to be losing ground to extremist movements, India's trendlines are pointing in the right direction, bolstered by strong indigenous traditions of communal co-habitation, non-violent political protest, a free press, and a realization by politicians that religious hatred is not a vote getter among the increasingly savvy, globalized, and prosperous Indian electorate. Nevertheless, the risk always remains of isolated outbreaks of sectarian violence, especially in response to the terrorism that has
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plagued India for decades, or when provoked by regional politicians for their narrow political purposes (for example, the recently passed anti-conversion legislation in Rajasthan, see Refs A and C).
22. (C) Mission India executes robust and forward leaning programming designed to counter extremist ideologies (Ref O). We provide numerous exchange, educational, and outreach programs to counter extremism, primarily through the Front Office, PA, POL, and USAID. A special public diplomacy effort is made to engage with Indian Muslims, including young students and other young people, and to foster interfaith dialogue among India's multi-cultural and multi-religious communities. Front Office, PA, and POL officers provide critical personal and media interaction to perpetuate the USG message of moderation and tolerance. Our outreach ranges from one-on-one engagement with elites to press interviews to mass-audience interaction to overcome misperceptions and stereotypes. We also monitor and report trends in religious extremism.
Terrorist Finance and Anti-Money Laundering Legislation
--------------------------------------------- ---------
23. (SBU) India's Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), which came into effect in July 2005, allows for the freezing, confiscation and seizure of instrumentalities used in, or intended for use in, terrorist financing in limited circumstances, and provides the statutory basis for setting up India's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). However, it does not cover properties, including non-cash assets, that are intended to be used by an individual terrorist, or property of corresponding value.
24. (SBU) The PMLA also aims to combat money laundering in India and allows for confiscation and seizure of the property obtained from laundered money, but only when there is a conviction of a predicate offense. The PMLA stipulates that whoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assist, or is knowingly a party, or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime and projecting it as untainted property, shall be guilty of offenses of money-laundering. (For an in-depth assessment of the PMLA and the FIU, please see Ref B.)
25. (SBU) Top GOI officials have publicly expressed their strong interest in India becoming a member of the Egmont Group and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). India's Finance Ministry hosted a FATF delegation on April 12-13 whose purpose was to determine if India should be granted FATF observer status (Septel). The US Treasury Department's FINCEN and the FIU are considering reciprocal visits for May-July. Levels of cooperation are not where we would like them to be, although the trend lines are encouraging.
Airline/Airport Security and Anti-Hijacking Policy
--------------------------------------------- -----
26. (C) We have significant gaps in our understanding of how
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far the GOI has come in operationalizing its new anti-hijacking policy since it was unveiled in August 2005 (Ref P). Our understanding, based on Indian press articles, is that the Indian Air Force (IAF) is now allowed to counter a 9/11-like attempt to use aircraft as weapons of mass destruction by shooting them down; airport ground crews are directed (not simply "permitted") to attempt to keep a grounded, hijacked aircraft on the tarmac; and negotiators are restricted in what they can offer terrorists in a hostage situation. The opacity of the Home Ministry has been a significant obstacle in learning more; our British counterparts here report similar difficulty in getting to the ground truths here. Some of the questions that warrant probing include:
-- More specifics on how the GOI will accommodate foreign aircraft, including if a foreign plane is hijacked while in Indian airspace.
-- What additional equipment or training Indian entities will require, and if there are opportunities for USG training and American firms.
-- How first responders will prioritize between timeliness and chain-of-command in trying to make difficult decisions.
27. (SBU) The recent launch of two direct Delhi-US flights (Continental and American) and the expected announcement of several more such routes make this discussion of hijacking protocols particularly important.
ATA Training
------------
28. (SBU) Forensics is weak in India -- only two DNA labs service the entire country. Few police officers outside major cities are trained in safeguarding and exploiting electronic data, although this capacity is expanding under indigenous cybersecurity training and cooperative training with US government agencies. As a consequence, terrorism investigations and court cases tend to rely upon confessions, many of which are obtained under duress if not beatings, threats, or, in some cases, torture. These factors, along with a creaky and corrupt judiciary, contribute to cases lingering in the courts for years.
29. (SBU) India is a voracious consumer of ATA training, having digested 42 courses involving 900 Indian security officials and accepting some $10 million in equipment transfers since 1995. The sheer size of India's police, paramilitary, and other security agencies at the state and federal levels, however, guarantees that an abundance of first responders and investigators will be behind the training curve. Our goal here is to rationalize ATA training to create a more coherent syllabus that would address specific Indian security needs, in cooperation with the GOI and (ideally) with India's other CT partners to avoid duplication of efforts. RSO notes Indian security agencies are enthusiastic about receiving ATA training and graduates are being tasked with replicating courses, which they appear
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to be doing effectively (Ref E). Other encouraging news is that course graduates include officers who have since been promoted to senior ranks and a recent recipient of the President's Police Medal of Gallantry.
Information/Intelligence Sharing: Lost/Stolen Passports
--------------------------------------------- ----------
30. (SBU) The GOI has heretofore been reluctant in sharing its database of lost and stolen passports with INTERPOL, a move which would greatly increase INTERPOL's database (and therefore our own). This CTJWG, coming more than 18 months after the prior JWG, will be an ideal time to reiterate this request. This has been an important initiative of the Bureau of Consular Affairs, and an issue CA Assistant Secretary Maura Harty raised at senior levels during visits to India in 2005. The US routinely provides its lost and stolen passport data to Interpol as a means of sharing this information with other nations, and India should, too.
Information/Intelligence Sharing: Investigations
--------------------------------------------- ---
31. (SBU) While RSO's liaison with the Indian police is adequate, there is room for improvement. The Indian bureaucracy stalls many investigative requests with demands for written letters to various offices, additional approvals, and the failure to pass correspondences between Indian law enforcement agencies. The GOI requires many US Embassy sections and agencies to work directly with national-level counterparts; however, the RSOs are free from this restriction and are able to interact with both the local and national police agencies throughout India. RSO and other Embassy law enforcement elements must often pass investigative requests between Indian law enforcement agencies, acting as the middle man, although the use of personal "unofficial" contacts can sometimes expedite an investigation.
Information/Intelligence Sharing: Tactical Threat Reporting
--------------------------------------------- --------------
32. (S/NF) RSO sends the majority of threat information investigative requests to the New Delhi Police Department's Special Cell, which is the primary law enforcement entity in New Delhi tasked with the investigation of terrorist activity and major case investigations. As with all investigative efforts in India the office is only as good as its local contacts; the RSO often has greater success by discreetly contacting a local officer in the Special Cell in lieu of sending in an official request, many of which are not acted upon. RSO receives very little follow-up information from Delhi police after a terrorist attack, such as the status of the police investigations or efforts to apprehend suspects; the information RSO does receive is usually already available in the media.
33. (S/NF) RSO has found that the sharing of tactical threat information with Delhi police is woefully lacking. RSO and the Emergency Action Committee (EAC) have been pushing the
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GOI, to date unsuccessfully, to establish a liaison position that would serve as a real-time clearinghouse for threat information and coordinating responses to imminent threats. Post would appreciate if this request could be raised again during the CTWG.
34. (SBU) As noted above, much CT activity happens at the state level. India's lack of a national crime database seriously inhibits CT analysis and cooperation among the states and between states and the federal security services (CBI and IB), and allows terrorists to potentially take advantage of crossing from one jurisdiction to another to escape detection and broaden their attack patterns.
MLAT Implementation
-------------------
35. (SBU) The US-India MLAT came into effect in October 2005. In November, the USG requested GOI assistance under MLAT regarding a joint DEA-Indian Narcotics Control Board (NCB) investigation -- the DEA requested that the NCB provide documentary evidence and testimony from an NCB officer for the criminal trial in the US of a co-conspirator in a case involving Internet pharmaceuticals trade. The GOI in February 2006 provided documentary evidence that was forwarded to the US, but the request for an NCB officer to testify was not honored despite repeated high-level interventions by the Embassy, and there has been no official explanation why the officer was not sent to the US. Informal feedback received by DEA indicates the GOI is unclear on whether MLAT covers this type of request. It will be important to schedule formal implementation talks soon, either in Washington, or probably most effectively in New Delhi. DOJ's office of International Affairs will likely have the lead in this area.
Other Issues the GOI May Raise
------------------------------
36. (C) IC-814: Repeated GOI demarches last year seeking information on the December 1999 IC-814 hijackers suggest that some CT interlocutors Delhi believe the USG has additional information or access that could be useful in the trial of the hijackers, several of whom are being tried in absentia (Refs M and S). We have provided considerable information in response to GOI requests. This is an issue that largely remains dormant but flares up from time to time, and the GOI may view the CTJWG as an opportunity to renew its request.
37. (C) Dawood Ibrahim: Mumbai crime boss and Specially Designated Global Terrorist Dawood Ibrahim is wanted by Indian police for having planned and financed thirteen explosions in Mumbai in 1993 that killed almost 300 civilians; he reportedly now lives in Pakistan and the UAE, an assertion bolstered by periodic reporting in Pakistan news magazines (see below). He is also wanted for arms smuggling, counterfeiting, narcotics trafficking, murder, and other criminal matters. Dawood's daughter's July 2005 high-profile wedding reception brazenly took place at the Grand Hyatt
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Hotel in Dubai, and was the more recent rubbing of salt in this festering sore (Ref R).
38. (C) The "List of 20": The prior (Vajpayee) government had sent to Islamabad a request to extradite twenty terrorists and criminals that many in the GOI believe reside in Pakistan. The list includes the leaders of JeM, LeT and Hizbul Mujahedeen; Dawood Ibrahim and six members of his criminal organization, including several the GOI linked to the 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts or a conspiracy to kill former Home Minister LK Advani; four terrorists wanted for their roles in the IC-814 hijacking; and five Khalistani (Sikh separatist) terrorists. When in power, the BJP government used phe "List of 20" as a club with which to publicly beat Pakistan; the current UPA government has only recently revived the issue, and then in the less political context of a law enforcement bilateral. However, one of our main CT interlocutors, Ajai Sahni, told us recently that "the best thing Pakistan could do is to turn those guys over to the Indian government, but Delhi would undoubtedly make a hash of it."
Comment: Opportunity to Move Ahead
----------------------------------
39. (C) This JWG offers an opportunity much like the July 18 agreement to set ambitious goals and strive to meet them. The challenge is to build on recent successes in the broader bilateral relationship to move our counterterrorism agenda forward at a faster pace and to a deeper end. Critical to this effort is a GOI decision to boost intel exchange if we are to move beyond rhetoric in our CT relationship. Mission Station Chief will participate in the CTJWG meetings and brief Mr. Crumpton beforehand. BLAKE
Friday, 23 February 2007, 11:41
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 NEW DELHI 000909
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/07/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, PBTS, MOPS, KDEM, KISL, KTFN,
EFIN, ECON, ASEC, KCRM, PK, IN
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: INDIA COUNTER-TERRORISM JOINT WORKING
GROUP
NEW DELHI 00000909 001.2 OF 006
Classified By: DCM Geoffrey Pyatt, Reason 1.5 (B,D)
1. (S) Summary: Embassy New Delhi warmly welcomes the visit of Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism Frank Urbancic, and looks forward to adding dynamism to the India-U.S. Counter-Terrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG) and developing an atmosphere where ideas and information are easily exchanged by both sides in an atmosphere of trust. Goals for the CTJWG include better integration of efforts regarding bioterrorism, money laundering, terrorist financing, tracking terrorist movements, law enforcement, border security, and information sharing/operational cooperation. The GOI's traditional concerns over U.S. engagement with Pakistan and longstanding distrust left over from the Cold War-era between our intelligence communities have been difficult to overcome. However, the sustained increase in acts of violence by political and religious extremists in India have demanded better cooperation on counter-terrorism. In a recent meeting, your counterpart, Ministry of External Affairs Additional Secretary (International Organizations) KC Singh, mentioned favorably the idea of semi-annual meetings between GOI and S/CT, and he clearly sees the U.S. CT relationship as among India's most important. Improving our counter-terrorism cooperation is a crucial step in building the strategic relationship President Bush envisions with India, and your visit offers us an excellent chance to do so. End Summary.
Reviving a Stalled Working Group
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2. (S) Your visit comes nearly a year after the last U.S.-India CTJWG, which was held in Washington in May 2006. Although the working group was supposed to be held regularly throughout the year, it has stalled until now for two important reasons. The first was a scandal in New Delhi in summer 2006, in which our primary working-level CT interlocutor at the Indian National Security Council was arrested and charged with treason for allegedly passing information to the United States. Although there is little truth to the espionage accusations, the scandal cast a negative shadow over the CTJWG, and slowed further discussions for several months. In a recent discussion with the DCM, KC Singh raised this scandal again, noting that it was impacting his effort to build a U.S.-India dialogue on cyber terrorism. Second, Indian officials were extremely concerned about the August 2006 agreement between Pakistani officials and Waziri tribesmen in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas because of their ongoing concern about Afghanistan's stability. India's criticism of our Counter-Terror cooperation with Pakistan reached a new intensity after the Waziristan agreement, as Indian officials bitterly accused their U.S. CT counterparts of failing to take India's concerns into account in allowing the agreement to go forward. Since then we have worked to reduce these tensions, and U/S Burns' visit to New Delhi, accompanied by Virginia Palmer, in December 2006 went a long way in this regard. We have also worked across the inter-agency spectrum to share more information with India. The next step is to revive the CTJWG and work to expand our operational CT cooperation.
Bringing India on Board to Expand our Counter-Terror Cooperation
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3. (S) India's lingering zero-sum suspicion of U.S. policies towards Pakistan, its fiercely independent foreign policy stance, its traditional go-it-alone strategy toward its security, and its domestic political sensitivities over the sentiments of its large Muslim population, have all contributed to India's caution in working with us on a joint counter-terrorism strategy. While India has been very keen to receive information and technology from us to further its counter-terrorism efforts, India provides little in return, despite our belief that the country should be an equal partner in this relationship. India frequently rebuffs our offers of support for their police investigations of terrorist attacks, and our offers of training and support are often met with a stalled logistical pace. For example, our Legatt offered forensic and investigative support to India in the wake of the Samjauta Train bombings, but India refused. One of the most important tasks we will have with India at the CTJWG is to reinforce that we must make this relationship reciprocal. We must keep in mind that it will be a slow process to build the kind of trust necessary with India to achieve the relationship that we are seeking, but we must reinforce to our Indian counterparts the positive direction we seek for our partnership.
4. (S) Another consideration to keep in mind is that our perception of India's lack of cooperation on U.S. CT concerns often stems in part from India's lack of capacity to manage these issues bureaucratically. India just this month began to stand up a Counter-Terrorism Cell in the MEA's office of International Organizations. The Cell was put in place largely to manage India's new Counter-Terrorism Joint Mechanism with Pakistan, including bringing India's intelligence agencies in line with the Prime Minister's thinking on India's relations with Pakistan. This Cell will now bring five additional people on board to manage these issues, although all of the arrangements are still being handled by just two officers. Additionally, India's police and security forces are overworked and hampered by bad police practices, including the wide-spread use of torture in interrogations, rampant corruption, poor training, and a general inability to conduct solid forensic investigations. India's most elite security forces also regularly cut corners to avoid working through India's lagging justice system, which has approximately 13 judges per million people. Thus Indian police officials often do not respond to our requests for information about attacks or our offers of support because they are covering up poor practices, rather than rejecting our help outright.
5. (S) That said, using every opportunity available to signal our interest in learning from India -- which has successfully tackled "asymmetrical" insurgencies in Punjab and Kashmir -- will go a long way to reduce this distrust and may prompt Indian officials to be more receptive to our offers of support. There is much India could offer us of value to strengthen our counter-terrorism efforts. For instance, they can give us more information about the nature of the terrorist threat in India and South Asia, and help us develop new strategies for defeating terrorists derived from India's experience in Kashmir. They also may have information about Bangladeshi, Nepalese, Sri Lankan, and Pakistani terrorists that they could share.
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Relations with Pakistan
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6. (S) Your visit comes a little over a week after the horrific bombing of the Samjauta ("Friendship") Train between New Delhi, India and Lahore, Pakistan. Most of the 68 killed in the fires that destroyed two of the train's coaches were lower-middle class Pakistani mohajirs (emigrants from India) who came to India to visit relatives after years of separation. While investigations continue to find the culprits, the Indian press is hinting that Lashkar-e-Taiba or another Pakistan-based terrorist group was behind the attacks. If this is true, it would not be the first time that Pakistan-based terrorists have killed fellow Sunni Muslims on Indian soil. Police investigators tell us that all of the evidence India has found in the September 2006 attacks in a Sunni mosque in Malegon points to Lashkar-e-Taiba, which, along with the Pakistan-based terrorist groups such as Jaish-e-Muhammad, HUM, is trying to foment religious tension as a means of boosting recruitment and hindering Indo-Pak peace efforts.
7. (S) Despite bombings in Panipat, Malegon, Mumbai, Varanassi, Delhi and Kashmir in the past year, this year marks probably the closest period of friendship between India and Pakistan since their Independence from Great Britain in 1947. The two countries are working closer to resolve their dispute over Kashmir, and even amidst the tragedy of the train bombing Pakistani Foreign Minister Kasuri traveled to New Delhi on February 20th to continue the Composite Dialogue. Both sides have signaled their strong intention to continue with talks, despite the terrorists' efforts to disrupt the peace process. Nonetheless, India remains frustrated with Pakistan's seeming inaction against terrorist groups in Pakistan, who have launched multiple attacks in India's heartland. Near weekly arrests of terrorists here are a constant reminder that these groups are working to establish sleeper cells in India as relations with Pakistan continue to improve. India is also concerned about infiltration of Pakistani terrorists through Bangladesh and Nepal, as well as local terrorists' connections to Iraq, Afghanistan, and al-Qaida. India and Pakistan are holding their first Counter-Terrorism Joint Mechanism meeting on March 6th in Islamabad to build better dialogue on these issues. This Mechanism is designed to keep talks going between India and Pakistan regardless of continued terrorist attacks, and it is important that the Indian press does not confuse our Counter-Terrorism Joint Working Group with the India-Pakistan Counter-Terrorism Joint-Mechanism.
8. (S) Despite India's progress with Pakistan, Indian officials continue to advise us that our direct intervention in Indo-Pak negotiations could hamper the Prime Minister's efforts to move the process forward. Opposition BJP leaders charge frequently that India is selling out on Kashmir or soft on Pakistan at the behest of the U.S. Indian officials are extremely tight-lipped about the negotiations between the two countries, and they often bristle at any outside government's attempt to push the process forward.
Your Meeting with NSA Narayanan
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9. (S) One very important meeting we are scheduling for you for Thursday, March 1st, is with National Security Advisor MK Narayanan. As a former intelligence official, no other senior Congress Party leader has more influence over PM Singh and party chief Sonia Gandhi's decision making on national security issues than Narayanan. Narayanan is traditionally tough-talking, and will speak his mind about how he sees our CT cooperation progressing. This will be an opportunity to stress our interest in making the relationship more reciprocal, and we will provide you with a list of all of the information we have passed to the GOI in recent months with a direct comparison to what we have received in return. You should tell Narayanan that we are overcoming our concerns, and we seek similar improvement of attitudes in the Indian security agencies, whose paranoia remains undiminished.
Important Points for the CTJWG
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10. (S) South Asia terrorism issues: KC Singh is taking the lead on this session, and may use the opportunity to talk about India's concerns about Pakistan even as the Composite Dialogue moves ahead. He will likely brief you on the terrorist groups operating in Pakistan that are launching attacks in India. He will also discuss India's concern about stability in Afghanistan. This may be an opportunity to discuss our strategy in Afghanistan in response to the anticipated Taliban Spring offensive as well as preparations for the SAARC meetings in New Delhi on April 3-4. You should stress that the U.S. and India have common goals against terrorists in South Asia, that we believe groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba have become a global threat, one that we all face with India. You could also stress our efforts -- through both engagement and pressure -- to press Pakistan to crack down on all of the terrorist groups operating on its soil, as well as our continued concern about infiltration through Bangladesh and Nepal, and the progress we have seen in Islamabad's CT cooperation.
11. (S) Middle East terrorism issues: You are taking the lead on this session. India is very concerned about the security situation in Iraq, partially because of a concern that instability and sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia Muslims there will spill over into India. With Iran, India has had some recent differences over the nuclear issue. Nonetheless, India enjoys fairly good relations with most countries in the Middle East, including Israel, Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, and India may be a positive partner for the U.S. in bringing stability to the region. KC Singh was Ambassador in Tehran, and can give you superb insight on the Iranian regime.
12. (S) Bioterrorism: You will make a few remarks and then XXXXXXXXXXXX
will take over the presentation. We have a number of efforts in place to discuss bioterrorism issues and biosecurity, including a proposal from 2005 for a joint exercise in response to a bioterrism attack. Our Indian counterparts have signaled their interest to press ahead with these programs.
13. (S) WMD Terrorism: You will make a few remarks on this session, and then hand the discussions off to XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX. Our Indian counterparts are likely to remain silent during this session, although they have said they will
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listen to the presentation, and KC Singh may respond briefly. These discussions could impact the ongoing negotiations over the U.S.-India nuclear deal, and Indian officials want to avoid any discussion of safeguarding their nuclear material. They will not have the permission necessary from higher-level officials to address this issue at all in response to our briefing.
14. (S) ATA Training and Law Enforcement Cooperation: You will begin the discussion and then our RSO will continue with his briefing. We need more cooperation and, frankly, openness from the Ministry of Home Affairs in order to achieve this program's full potential.
15. (S) The delegation will participate in informal working-level break out sessions over lunch with our Indian hosts. This may be an opportunity to discuss any outstanding issues from the previous sessions with KC Singh, and raise our concerns about Indian bureaucratic inertia and paranoia.
16. (S) Terrorism Finance and Anti-Money Laundering Legislation: KC Singh will lead this session, and XXXXXXXXXXXX will provide our response. Discussion will be focused on prompting the GOI to improve their anti-money laundering regime and compliance with international standards under the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to combat incidents of terrorism financing. GOI is currently participating as a FATF observer for the first time at the ongoing FATF Plenary meeting from February 19-23. We want to use the CTJWG platform to listen to GOI's growing concerns about terrorist financing for future consideration to provide relevant technical assistance.
17. (S) Biometrics and Border Security: You will begin this session and then hand the discussions off to XXXXXXXXXXXX.
18. (S) Airline/Airport Security and Anti-Hijacking Policy: KC Singh will lead this session. He may discuss some of the various threats India has seen lately to its commercial airlines. He will likely follow up on our previous offer of assistance and anti-hijacking training, as well as India's new hijacking policy, which would affect direct flights by Delta, American, Continental, and Northwest airlines.
19. (S) Ideological Dimensions of Countering Terrorism: KC Singh will lead this session. He will likely discuss India's frustrations in dealing with Pakistan on terrorism issues. He may, however, initiate a more in-depth discussion of Prime Minister Singh's efforts on behalf of those who are disenfranchised among India's Muslim population. The purpose of this session is to initiate a discussion on local facilitators of terrorist attacks in India by the country's minority Muslim population, and to learn from India's many decades of experience in this area. 20. (S) Information Sharing and Enhancing Cooperation: This will be a closed-door discussion of our efforts to increase intelligence sharing. This may be the most crucial segment of the discussion, and ORA will take the lead in the presentation. Our RSO may also discuss our efforts to gain more information from the GOI about terrorist threats to US interests in India and sharing of information about arrests of terrorist suspects. The GOI will likely discuss a new
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point of contact the MEA is establishing in the new CT Cell to answer these questions.
21. (S) The meetings will be followed by a wrap up discussion and a GOI-hosted dinner.
Summary: A Real Opportunity
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22. (S) Summary: Overall your efforts in India will be an important step toward our goal of building a strategic partnership with India. Without a more effective CT component, and if India remains suspicious of our CT intentions, our overall relationship will not live up to its potential. As you approach the meetings, the most important element will be to break down the barriers we face to building a more productive partnership with our GOI counterparts, including at a working level. Our measure of success should be in taking steps forward, however small, toward achieving this operational goal. End Summary. MULFORD
Thursday, 08 June 2006, 12:05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 NEW DELHI 003997
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/07/2016
TAGS PTER, PREL, PGOV, TBIO, PINS, KSCA, PINR, EAIR, SENV,
KHIV, IN
SUBJECT: INDIA BEHIND ON BIOTERROR PREPARATIONS BUT TAKING
SOME STEPS
REF: A. NEW DELHI 3658 B. NEW DELHI 3636 C. NEW DELHI 3611 D. STATE 82566
Classified By: A/PolCouns Atul Keshap for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary: The GOI regards a bioterrorism attack as an event of such low probability that the potential impact does not register high on New Delhi's agenda. We have no reason to believe terrorist organizations operating in India have access to pathogens at this time; also, bioterrorism is inconsistent with the strategy of most terrorist groups active in India. Furthermore, terrorists' fear of becoming a victim of such attacks themselves reduces the likelihood of a bioterrorism attack in the near future. However, the possibility of a bioterror attack cannot be ruled out.
2. (C) Advances in the biotech sector and shifting terrorist tactics that focus on disrupting India's social cohesion and economic prosperity oblige the GOI to look at the possibility of terror groups using biological agents as weapons of mass destruction and economic and social disruption. The plethora of indigenous highly pathogenic and virulent agents naturally occurring in India and the large Indian industrial base -- combined with weak controls -- also make India as much a source of bioterrorism material as a target. In addition, India's notably weak public health and agricultural infrastructure coupled with high population density means that a deliberate release of a disease-causing agent could go undetected for quite a while before authorities become aware. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, India is particularly vulnerable to agriculture attacks. Moreover, lack of communication, coordination, and cooperation among key stakeholders from different sectors will continue to remain a major impediment to the GOI's capacity to respond to a bioterrorism attack.
3. (C) Fortunately, terrorist groups operating in India are not focused on bioterror, according to Delhi-based terrorism analysts, although XXXXXXXXXXXX told us recently that the GOI believes jihadi groups are seeking to recruit or employ biology/bio-tech PhD graduates from within India (Ref C). Recent indications of receptivity by GOI interlocutors on biodefense cooperation and steps the GOI seems to be taking to prepare for a possible bioterrorist attack (Refs B-D and Septel) may presage the writing of a new chapter in India's counterterrorism preparedness and in US-India CT cooperation. End Summary.
Just Waking Up to the Threat
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4. (C) In recent meetings with GOI representatives and Indian scientists, two themes emerged regarding the bioterror
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threat: India's public health and agriculture surveillance systems are sorely lacking, and the GOI is currently ill-equipped to prepare for or respond to a bioterrorism attack. Representatives from the Agriculture and Health Ministries, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), and law enforcement were all quick to point out the weaknesses in the various disease surveillance systems, noting there is no well-established collection of baseline epidemiological information/data (naturally occurring disease burden) which is needed for India to distinguish between a natural outbreak and a terrorist attack. Given the number of diseases endemic to India, the GOI would have a hard time differentiating between a newly emerging or re-emerging disease and a bioterrorism attack. Additionally, while individuals within various ministries are cognizant of the extent of the threat to India, there does not appear to be strong movement to shore up vulnerabilities or have key stakeholders move outside their traditional lanes. The appearance of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), H5N1 strain, within India's borders may change India's views on the need to prepare. XXXXXXXXXXXX, for example, made the extrapolation between the country's capacity to deal with a newly emerging disease and the implications for its ability to respond to bioterrorism. Most GOI interlocutors seemed unaware that executing a biological terrorist attack (i.e. obtaining and releasing pathogens) requires far less sophistication than executing a chemical or nuclear terrorist attack.
Biological Attack Potentially Devastating
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5. (C) The impact of a biological attack or the accidental release of a disease-causing agent in India could be devastating, given the high population density in Indian cities and the growing mobility of India's middle class. Most biological warfare (BW) agents do not produce symptoms for many hours or several days, so Indians exposed to a contagious BW agent could easily spread the agent to thousands before symptoms manifest. Release in an Indian city could facilitate international spread -- Delhi airport alone sees planes depart daily to numerous European, Asian, Middle Eastern and African destinations, as well as non-stop flights to Chicago and Newark.
But GOI Says India Not Ready For Bioterrorism
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6. (C) In early May meetings, GOI officials indicated to XXXXXXXXXXXX and Poloff that Delhi is neither ready for nor focusing on bioterrorism or biodefense; XXXXXXXXXXXX and Poloff were struck by the frank admissions from some interlocutors. XXXXXXXXXXXX indicated that detection and protection of "soft systems" like the logistics chains for food, milk, and water delivery are "inadequate" in the face of a determined terrorist. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated frankly that New Delhi is ill-prepared to handle a bioterrorist attack: "The government does not have the requisite experience." "The terrorists have surprise on their side, we need more preparation, and we need more scientists working with police, who typically focus more on (conventional) terrorism investigations than on protection and response," XXXXXXXXXXXX added.
7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX was unconvincing in his assertion that the GOI has biodefense well in hand. As with criminal matters, XXXXXXXXXXXX indicated that disaster management in India begins at the local government level. Districts and municipalities must then appeal to state governments to assist in situations beyond their capacity to control, and states to the federal government -- processes that could cause critical delays in a fast-moving attack or disaster situation. XXXXXXXXXXXX
At Best, A Third-Tier Priority
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8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX was candid, however, that biodefense was his third priority after chemical and nuclear/radiological incidents. He also mentioned that the NDMA was planning chemical and nuclear disaster response exercises in the coming weeks, but had no plans as yet to conduct a biological disaster response exercise, let alone one that focused on a bioterror attack. (NOTE: EmbOffs noticed that XXXXXXXXXXXX's comments frequently returned to chemical/nuclear accident response despite their questions on biological terrorism response. Furthermore, he never mentioned, and may be completely unaware, of XXXXXXXXXXXX, suggesting poor knowledge-sharing and coordination within the GOI on bioterror defense. XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Note.). XXXXXXXXXXXX turned down XXXXXXXXXXXX's reiteration of the USG proposal for support for a GOI (or joint US-India) bioterrorism exercise (see Para 24), saying India was "not yet ready"; he appeared unenthusiastic, though not immediately dismissive, of Poloff's request that the NDMA invite relevant Embassy officers to view the exercises the
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NDMA already has planned.
9. (C) Contradicting his earlier assertion, XXXXXXXXXXXX gave a frank assessment of India's ability to respond to a major biological attack or disaster. Less than two percent of the Uttar Pradesh and Bihar state budgets go for health, for example, which means that village-level health care in UP, India's most populous state with over 130 million inhabitants, is scant; nor are there sufficient veterinary facilities in these two agriculture-dependent states. He bemoaned the fact that the public health sector was slow to benefit from private sector biotechnology advances.
Opportunity: Terrorism/Natural Outbreak Overlap
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10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX both agreed that India would derive a dual benefit from improved disease surveillance and biodefense preparations that could counter either a bioterrorism attack or a natural disease outbreak. XXXXXXXXXXXX shared with us that some of his police and security colleagues had speculated that AI in India was initially introduced as a bioterrorism attack, or as a test by terrorists of their (purported) bioterrorism capabilities and a probe of Indian defenses and response. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that, rather than acquire exotic BW agents, terrorists operating in India have access to a number of naturally-occurring disease-causing agents that could be easily spread in food or water supplies, such as cholera; according to technical literature, 70% of naturally occurring multi-antibiotic resistant bacteria are found in India. Although many BW agents are sensitive to large-scale dilution in a municipal water supply, they would be well suited for use in smaller bodies of water common in India, such as a small apartment complex's water tank, urban water trucks that service middle-class communities in the summertime, or a rural well; cholera outbreaks are an annual summer event in Delhi.
Food Defense Resonates
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11. (C) Noting the GOI interest especially in food supply protection, XXXXXXXXXXXX informed XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX of the September 25-29 FBI-Joint Terrorism Task Force International Symposium on Agro-Terrorism. CBI later requested further information from the Embassy on the symposium, indicating possible CBI participation.
12. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX found a receptive audience with XXXXXXXXXXXX, who voiced concerns over vulnerabilities to agriculture and the food supply, noting not only the obvious health consequences of any outbreak or contamination, but also emphasizing the direct economic impact. XXXXXXXXXXXX mentioned that
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when the AI outbreak first occurred, the GOI was initially concerned that the public health sector would face a secondary health crisis -- malnutrition due to loss of the primary protein source. He suggested the USG consider in the food defense discussion including aquaculture, the water supply, and the use of water in food preparation and production. XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted GOI's overall weaknesses in agricultural disease surveillance and detection. Furthermore, he indicated the GOI did not have baseline data which could help determine whether an outbreak was newly emerging or a result of deliberate introduction.
Stovepiping Hinders Inter-Agency Cooperation
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13. (C) Discussions with GOI officials indicate bureaucratic inertia among the various ministries to interact with each other on these issues, which may impede the GOI's ability to prepare for, and respond to, an act of bioterrorism. One sign seemed to be the inclusion of only XXXXXXXXXXXX inXXXXXXXXXXXX meeting on bioterrorism when the USG proposals on food defense and increasing awareness and communication at the sub-federal level (reiterated to the MEA at the April 19 US-India Counterterrorism Joint Working Group meeting in Washington) clearly would necessitate broader interagency participation, especially law enforcement and agriculture. The Agriculture Ministry XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed a keen interest in learning more about the recent US-India biosafety and pathogen security workshop in Pune, yet indicated that no one in the Ministry of Agriculture was able to attend. XXXXXXXXXXXX Perhaps the formation of the NDMA will help eliminate some stovepipes as NDMA develops GOI's bioterrorism preparedness strategy. Regardless, there remains a clear need to encourage multi-sectoral GOI engagement in preparation for, or response to, a bioterrorism attack.
Access to Biomaterials "Not Very Difficult"
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14. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff the difficulty of manufacturing biological weapons is offset in India by the relative ease of procuring biological materials such as harmful bacteria, parasites, viruses or toxins that either exist naturally or are cultured in academic labs that maintain loose supervision. "It would be unlikely that a bio-agent is brought in by terrorists from outside the country if it can be easily obtained within India itself," added XXXXXXXXXXXX; "Getting into a facility to obtain
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lethal bio-agents is not very difficult here." (COMMENT: Biological agents do not require sophisticated weaponization for dispersal. Food and water supplies can be tainted or a "typhoid Mary" scenario could be employed. End Comment.)
15. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX echoed XXXXXXXXXXXX's assessment that academic facilities maintain very loose security procedures; basic entry barriers exist, but monitoring is not stringent. "The harsh reality is that you can bribe a guard with a pack of cigarettes to get inside", said Lele. "A disgruntled scientist who has been working in India in his lab for several years without a promotion is a good candidate for bribing," he added.
16. (SBU) A March 21 "Indian Express" article quoted XXXXXXXXXXXX as having requested (and obtained) police protection from angry poultry farmers whom he feared would attack the lab to retaliate for the lab's detection of the H5N1 avian influenza virus that led to the farmers having to cull their flocks. The article concluded: "Contrary to the image its name evokes, the lab has almost zero security. A couple of guards, armed only with batons, man the entrance of the laboratory."
17. (SBU) SciOff has also seen photographs taken by a senior Indian army officer, XXXXXXXXXXXX, from his tour of what he called "frontline field laboratories for diagnostics of infectious diseases." The photographs demonstrated a host of poor laboratory security and safety practices, including families sleeping in labs and disposable gloves being washed for re-use or being disposed of as non-hazardous biological waste (Ref A).
A Source of Biological Agents for External Attacks
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18. (C) Terrorists planning attacks anywhere in the world could use India's advanced biotechnology industry and large bio-medical research community as potential sources of biological agents. Given the strong web of air connections Delhi shares with the rest of the world and the vulnerabilities that might be exploited at airports, a witting or unwitting person could easily take hazardous materials into or out of the country. (NOTE: The British High Commission's air security officer noted that checked luggage is inspected well away from the airline check-in desks, and hand luggage is only inspected just before the departure gates; passengers could easily slip contraband from hand luggage into an exterior pouch in already-inspected checked luggage en route to the check-in desk, whence it is not inspected arrival at the passenger's destination. End Note.)
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Over-the-Horizon Threats an Enduring Indian Blind Spot
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19. (C) The GOI's level of preparedness to combat bioterror attacks may be attributed in part to what the dean of India's strategic establishment and former Defense Secretary K Subrahmanyan calls the "Panipat Syndrome," an Indian tradition of not anticipating strategic threats. (NOTE: According to Subrahmanyan in three separate decisive battles, Indian empires declined to defend themselves against Western invaders by reinforcing strategic choke-points like the Khyber Pass. They instead waited for the advancing force to reach Panipat -- a town only 40 miles from Delhi, and over 450 miles after penetrating the Khyber -- before reacting.
20. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX's comments provide a case in point. To place his priority list in context, the December 1984 Bhopal accident still looms large in India's psyche; although India has not suffered a nuclear disaster, the GOI has viewed from a distance the examples of Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, reminders of potential disasters that might await India's own civil nuclear program. In contrast, biological threats belong almost solely to the realm of the possible -- they come last because there has been no correspondingly dire biological attack or accident to focus Delhi's attention. The closest India came to bioterrorism was a late 2001 series of Anthrax attacks that turned out to be a hoax. When Poloff asked XXXXXXXXXXXX about the series of MEA-funded books on bioterrorism that IPCS edited and published, he remarked, "Yes, but only Europeans actually buy the books, Indians don't."
Luckily, Not On (Most) Terrorists' Radar Yet, Either
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21. (C) Bioterrorism would at most appeal to the larger jihadi terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) -- XXXXXXXXXXXXtold us recently that the GOI believes jihadi groups are seeking to recruit or employ biology/bio-tech PhD graduates with an aim to carrying out bioterrorist attacks (Ref C). Naxals and Northeast separatist terrorists rely heavily on local support, their area of operations is limited to the territory they seek to "liberate," and they lack operational reach into major cities like Delhi, Pune, Hyderabad and Bangalore -- all factors that suggest they would not seek to employ bioterrorism. "Groups like al-Qa'ida and its affiliates like LeT and JeM, who are fighting for a religious cause, are more likely to indulge in the use of BW since they are not concerned about popular support," XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested. He claimed that such groups already possess the combination of expertise and contacts to gain access to harmful bio-agents. Even if terrorist groups active in India do not yet possess in-house BW capabilities, India boasts more capable
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biological scientists -- well in the thousands -- than any other developing country. Recruitment of Indian scientists by anti-US extremists, either for ideological brotherhood or for commercial gain, could pose a significant threat. XXXXXXXXXXXX terrorism analyst XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that jihadis over the past year have shown they can adapt to using novel tactics and targeting economic and scientific institutions that fuel India's engines of growth and prosperity; under this rubric, a bioterrorism attack could wreak havoc with India's economy and cripple investor confidence.
GOI Starting to Take Action?
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22. (SBU) According to a short April 28 article on "newindpress.com," Home Secretary VK Duggal in April asked Health Secretary Prasanna Hota to assist in preparing a manual on standard operating procedures for bioterrorism attacks response. The article also stated that Health Ministry Director (General Health Services) SK Srivastava would create a technical committee to assess other countries' best practices in bioterrorism preparedness and prevention. There was no indication in the article of what timelines the Home and Health Ministries are following; none of our interlocutors mentioned this initiative to us.
Comment: Wake Up and Smell the Biohazard
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23. (C) Strategies to improve public health human and animal sectors are vital for the GOI, as are enforced regulations to safeguard biological materials. New Delhi needs to be more aggressive in laying out solid actionable plans to implement biosecurity and public health improvements.
24. (C) As a US-India CTJWG agenda item, a bioterrorism exercise is one of the most politically sensitive issues for the GOI. Many other countries are also ill-prepared to address a bioterrorism attack; however, few live in the kind of dangerous neighborhood that India does, where terrorism, lax security, petty corruption, high population density, weak public health and agricultural infrastructures, and a booming and sophisticated biotech industry coexist. New Delhi's past concern over displaying their lack of preparation on biodefense was possibly a determinant in the GOI having declined to follow-through on a joint bioterrorism exercise despite the Home Ministry having initiated the request in 2004. In contrast, their current apparent receptivity to a bioterrorism tabletop exercise (articulated by XXXXXXXXXXXX at the April 19 CTJWG in Washington), if
SIPDIS it comes to fruition, will be a significant demonstration of trust and confidence in this element of the evolving CT partnership with the USG.
25. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
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(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) MULFORD
Friday, 02 December 2005, 12:54
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 NEW DELHI 009127
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/30/2015
TAGS KISL, PGOV, KDEM, PINR, PTER, SCUL, IN
SUBJECT: INDIA'S DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMY MINIMIZE EXTREMIST
RECRUITMENT OF JUVENILES (C-CT5-00623)
REF: STATE 211901
NEW DELHI 00009127 001.2 OF 006
Classified By: POLCOUNS Geoffrey R. Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) India's over 150 million Muslim population is largely unattracted to extremism. India's growing economy, vibrant democracy, and inclusive culture, encourage Muslims to seek success and social mobility in the mainstream and reduces alienation. With Indian Muslim youth increasingly comfortable in the mainstream, the pool of potential recruits is shrinking, while Muslim families and communities provide little sanction or support to extremist appeals. This cable is in response to Reftel requesting information on methods used by extremist groups to recruit and train youths under the age of 18. Post notes that India is home to a wide variety of extremist groups, including religious extremists (Hindu, Muslim and Sikh), ethnic separatists, and extremists from the political left (Naxalites) and right (primarily Hindu fascists), all of whom recruit children. However, reftel requests information only on Islamic extremist groups such as Al-Qa'ida, Ansar al-Sunnah, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Taliban and Kashmiri militants, and we will confine our analysis to such groups.
The Muslim Minority
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2. (C) According to India's 1991 National Census, the Muslim population constitutes just under 15 percent of the country's total. It grew by 33 percent between 1981-2001, while the general population increased by 24 percent. Islam is India's largest minority religion. In many towns and cities, particularly in Northern India, one third or more of the population is Muslim. The largest concentrations of Muslims live in the states of Bihar (12 million), West Bengal (16 million), and Uttar Pradesh (24 million). The overwhelming majority (92 percent) are Sunnis, the remainder being Shias. India's Muslim population is estimated to be as large as 150 million (the second largest in the world after Indonesia), and suffers from higher rates of poverty than most other groups in India, and can be the victims of discrimination and prejudice. Despite this, the vast majority remain committed to the Indian state and seek to participate in mainstream political and economic life. Only a small number of young Muslims have concluded that mainstream politics will never address their grievances and have gravitated toward pan-Islamic and pro-Pakistan organizations, which sometimes engage in acts of violence. India's vibrant democracy, inclusive culture and growing economy have made it easier for Muslim youth to find a place in the mainstream, reduced the pool of potential recruits, and the space in which Islamic extremist organizations can operate.
A Vibrant Democracy
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3. (C) Although there are a wide variety of Islamic religious, political and social organizations, most Muslims join or support secular groups without a specific Islamic identity. The ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA), spearheaded by Congress, projects itself as the secular alternative to the opposition National Democratic Alliance (NDA), dominated by the Hindu-nationalist BJP. Muslims generally join secular parties as the best way to ensure that the BJP does not attain political power, although the BJP
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does have Muslim members as well. No exclusively Muslim organization has succeeded in mobilizing more than a small portion of the Muslim faithful. Muslim organizations that support terrorism against the Indian state and non-Muslim Indians are very small and lack influence or popular following outside of Kashmir. India's vibrant democracy has ensured that the large Muslim community has a voice in politics and recent elections have demonstrated that Muslim voters are courted actively by political parties. With a Muslim President (Abdul Kalam) occupying the highest political position in the country, Muslims have been encouraged to seek political power in electoral and parliamentary politics, all but eliminating the appeal of violent extremism.
Growing Economy
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4. (C) India's secular education system increasingly integrates Muslim students into the mainstream and has spawned a growing and prosperous Muslim middle class. Muslims, like Indians generally, rely on education and English language competence to provide access to increased job opportunities. In the past, extremist groups focused on Indian universities as potential recruiting grounds, but the economic upturn has transformed this dynamic. Most Muslims approaching graduation from University will be prepared to enter the job market and are not interested in extremism. This cuts down the time when Muslim students are vulnerable to extremist recruitment and compels extremist organizations to target younger students. Economic growth has spawned dramatic social change and Muslim extremists must find potential recruits who have not yet participated in or benefited from the economic boom, consumer capitalism and the attractions of the media. These groups are likely to reject any recruit who has already been enticed away from Islamic separatism into secular values.
And an Inclusive Culture
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5. (C) In order for Islamic extremism to be attractive to Indian Muslim youth, they would have to feel alienated from the mainstream culture. While Muslims are often victimized and discriminated against, traditional barriers to cultural integration are breaking down. Young and dynamic Muslims are popular culture heroes in sports (Sania Mirza) and Bollywood (Sharrukh Khan and many others). The message for young Muslims is that they are Indians first and Muslims second, and that they can fully participate in Indian society and culture and win the adulation and respect of other Indians, regardless of religion.
Kashmir - The Exception
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6. (C) Jammu and Kashmir, India's only Muslim majority state, is characterized by a different kind of political Islam. Kashmiri Muslims, like many of their counterparts throughout South Asia, have been historically heavily influenced by Sufi Islam, but because of their majority status and geographic isolation in a remote princely state, never saw themselves as part of the Islamic mainstream in pre-partition India. Kashmiri Muslims have worked actively to maintain a separate identity and have resisted
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integration. This has been compounded by the turbulence and terrorism that have engulfed the state since 1989. The Kashmiri sense of separateness permeates the programs and manifestos of Kashmir's Islamic groups, and Kashmiri Muslims have not embraced Indian Muslims' aspirations for national integration. Moreover, many Kashmiri Muslims have parted company with their Indian Muslim counterparts and embraced Wahhabi Islam during the insurgency. While Indian Muslims feel compelled to express support for their co-religionists in Kashmir, they tend to look upon Kashmiris with suspicion and try to keep the Kashmiri cause at arm's length.
The Extremists
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7. (C) Separatism and religious extremism have little appeal to Indian Muslims, and the overwhelming majority espouse moderate doctrines. While the conservative Sunni political organization the Jamaat Islami (JI) and the Deobandi sect espouse Islamic chauvinism, and some of their members express admiration for Osama bin Ladin, their leaders usually do not express such views in public, and there is little to indicate that they have provided anything more than rhetorical support to terrorists. Attacks by Hindu extremists on innocent Muslims and periodic bouts of bloody communal rioting, have led a small number of Muslims to cross the line from sympathizing with violence to engaging in terrorism. Some Kashmiri terrorist groups argue that only attacks outside of Kashmir will shake the Indian state and convince the GOI to withdraw. Members of these two small slivers of the Muslim community provide recruits for groups prone to acts of violence and terrorism, many of which are supported from outside India. The numbers are small, especially outside of Kashmir, but they remain capable of periodic bombings and other acts of violence.
8. (C) Indian Islamic groups that are extreme in their views and activities include
Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen Marqazi-Jamiyat-e-Ahal-e-Hadith (MJAH) Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA) Muslim Security Council of Assam (MSCA) Muslim Volunteer Force (MVF) Muslim Liberation Army (MLA) Muslim Security Force (MSF) Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS) United Muslim Liberation Front of Assam (UMLFA)
9. (C) In addition, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) are Pakistan-based groups which recruit Indian Muslims. Hizbul Mujahideen is a Kashmiri terrorist group which works closely with the Pakistan-based organizations. The MJAH is a nationwide organization for Muslims who subscribe to Wahhabi Islam. Since the overwhelming majority of Indian Sunnis belong to the more liberal Barelvi and Deobandi schools, the Wahhabi sect has relatively few adherents, and only a small segment of Indian Wahabis endorse the MJAH and its views. The group is very small and press accounts have periodically linked it to bombings, most recently in Mumbai. SIMI was originally founded to provide spiritual guidance to Muslim university students, but drifted into extremist politics and terrorism, and was subsequently banned by the GOI in 2001. Individual
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SIMI members are periodically arrested and prosecuted, but the group is largely dormant. LeT and JeM have cells in India which have committed terrorist attacks, primarily in J & K, but elsewhere as well. The GOI has stated that the LeT is the principal suspect in the recent deadly bombings in Delhi, which killed over 70 persons. Most Indians, both Muslim and non-Muslim, view members of these groups as subversive agents of a hostile power, Pakistan.
Answers to Specific Questions
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10. (C) Question A -- Recruitment
As explained above, there are two distinct threads of Islamic extremism in India, which can overlap, but are largely separate; Kashmiri groups, which are both Islamic and ethnic, and non-Kashmiri groups, which emphasize a primarily religious identity while Kashmiri groups have recruited boys under the age of 18, other extremist groups have concentrated on University students, who are often above the age of 18. Kashmir has been embroiled in terrorism for decades, exposing children to violence at an early age. Decades of conflict, a high casualty rate, and war-weariness has shrunk the pool of recruits for Kashmiri terrorist groups and they have turned to younger boys.
11. (C) Most experts believe that terrorism in Kashmiri is now largely a non-Kashmiri affair. A study by a private think tank on recruitment into Indian terrorist organizations verified that Kashmiri terrorist groups are the only Islamic groups specifically to recruit juveniles. The report claims that children have participated in terrorist attacks in Kashmir since the early 1990s, when there were documented cases of juveniles throwing grenades at security force pickets. Inspector-General of Police K. Rajendra said in October 2003 that perhaps only a handful of children have been involved in actual incidents, that in 2002 the Kashmir police knew of the recruitment of approximately 100 child recruitments, and that the number increased to approximately 500 in 2003. According to the study, the terrorist groups have evolved a specific method of juvenile recruitment. A 'scout' or 'overground worker' surveys an area and identifies boys from poor families within the target age group. On a given day, the terrorists abduct the identified targets at gun-point and take them to a hideout. The groups target schools, as exemplified in July 2003, when a LeT recruiter walked into the playground of the National High School at the small Bandipora village of Vijhar in the Baramulla district. Security forces subsequently rescued a group of six children from the LeT 'scout.' Some of the rescued children had repeatedly failed school examinations and others had dropped out to take unpaid apprenticeships in dead-end jobs. Police assert that families are coerced to 'donate' a younger son to the 'jihad' and that refusal to comply could result in the death of the entire family. Since 2003, the border has become less porous, the appeal of joining terrorist groups has diminished, and there are fewer media accounts of child abductions and rescues.
12. (C) Some prominent instances demonstrating patterns of child recruitment include:
--On 6 August 2001, security forces intercepted three terrorists forcibly taking 12 young boys at gunpoint to
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Pakistan for training and induction into their ranks. As the young boys ran towards the security forces for safety, the terrorists fired on them killing one boy and injuring another, the security forces rescued the remainder.
--In July-August 2001, security forces rescued 39 young boys in the age group of 14-18, being taken at gun point to Pakistan for training.
--In 2003, an estimated 500 teenagers were recruited into various terrorist outfits in J&K. The child recruits received rudimentary arms training, but primarily worked as cooks, cleaners, porters and guides for terrorists
13. (C) Outside of Kashmir, Islamic organizations in Indian universities have some success recruiting Muslim students, many from rural backgrounds and away from home for the first time. Those who stay with such groups can become increasingly isolated from the mainstream and are attractive recruits for Islamic extremists. Our contacts tell us, however, that most Muslim students lose interest in such groups as they become more comfortable in their new environments. The Indian media has published colorful stories implying that Madrassas are recruiting centers for Islamic terrorism and that many are funded by Pakistan's ISI. The accounts are mostly anecdotal, however, and there has been little or no hard evidence linking Indian Madrassas to terrorist recruitment. Madrassas originally started at the secondary level and were confined to boys, with most Muslim children attending public primary schools in their own villages. The Deobandi sect is establishing a series of primary schools for North Indian boys and girls. Their goal is to provide madrassa education for children from age five through university level. There is some concern that this move could isolate children from the mainstream and make them more prone to extremism or susceptible to recruitment into terrorist groups.
question B -- Characteristics of Recruits
14. (C) Muslim contacts tell us that young recruits in Kashmir are those who have been brutalized by violence, lost loved ones, or have personally experienced repression by the Indian security forces. Many are bent on revenge. As in most war-torn areas, children brutalized by their environment can begin to see violence as a normal career path and can divorce it from any ideological justification. Non-Kashmiri recruits are said to be primarily from blue collar or poor families with limited education and from a rural or urban slum background. They can find higher education to be a painful process and have trouble adjusting to a radically different environment, and can embrace radical Islam as a coping mechanism, as the Islamic groups welcome them and provide them with a warm and familiar environment. In Gujarat and Western India, particularly in Mumbai, many Muslims were traumatized by anti-Muslim rioting following the destruction of Babri Mosque in 1992, and the Godhra train violence of 2002. We speculate that their principal motivation is revenge for senseless and painful attacks inflicted on them, their families, and their communities by Hindu extremists.
question C -- Juveniles and the Advancement of Terrorist Goals
15. (C) Kashmiri groups, facing a limited manpower pool and
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heavily outnumbered by the Indian security forces, have seen a harsh attrition as their members are killed, imprisoned, or fall away. Like terrorist groups in other countries facing a similar dilemma (the LTTE in Sri Lanka for example), they have recruited younger and younger members. In addition, Kashmiri adults have largely tired of violence and extremism and are less receptive to terrorist recruitment. In such an environment, children are more pliable and less resistant. They can also provide a lifetime of service, in a conflict that seems to go on without end. Other Islamic extremist groups have a similar dilemma, in that Islamic extremism is not popular in India and most adults are not interested. This forces extremists to pitch to young and naive audiences who may be more amenable.
question D -- Rehabilitation Methods
16. (C) Since there is relatively little recruitment of juveniles into extremist groups, especially outside of Kashmir, there is no GOI program aimed specifically at rehabilitating them. We know of no instances where child terrorists have been captured. In those instances where abducted children are rescued, the security forces return them to their parents.
question E -- Reasons why Extremists May Refrain from Juvenile Recruitment
17. (C) Kashmir has had the most experience with recruitment of juveniles into extremist groups. Enthusiasm there for the separatist/terrorist cause has largely waned, and the organizations there are concerned that they could become totally isolated and liable to be crushed by the security services if their popular support dries up. Cost benefit analysis would convince most such groups that the cost of losing support from the local community is too high for the small benefit provided by youthful recruits. Outside Kashmir, Muslims are facing the same pressures for social mobility as non-Muslims. Most Indian children are under pressure to get into school, stay in school, and perform well there, in order to obtain higher education and access to well-paid jobs. Attempts by extremist groups to recruit children from Muslim homes are likely to run into a wall of opposition from parents who would see involvement in extremism as counterproductive and a threat to future success of their children. This means that extremism is most attractive to children from families that are so poor that opportunities for education and advancement are all but non-existent. As the Indian economy continues to boom, the percentage of Muslim families who feel there is no hope for their children's' future is growing smaller, as is the pool of potential recruits. MULFORD
Friday, 07 March 2008, 15:00
S E C R E T STATE 023763
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/07/2013
TAGS PARM, PREL, ETTC, MTCRE, KSCA, IN, IR
SUBJECT: FOLLOWING-UP WITH INDIA ON THE XXXXXXXXXXXX GRAPHITE
CASE (S)
REF: A. 07 STATE 141892 B. 07 STATE 158831 C. 07 NEW DELHI 5058 D. 07 NEW DELHI 5107 E. 07 STATE 167377 F. 07 NEW DELHI 5333 G. LOWE E-MAIL (JAN 02 2008)
Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (D).
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 6.
2. (S) Background: In October 2007, we shared with Indian officials information indicating that India's XXXXXXXXXXXX had offered French-origin, MTCR-controlled graphite blocks to Iran's Ward Commercial Company (Ref A). Ward had previously been involved in the procurement of items on behalf of the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG - Iran's primary liquid propellant ballistic missile developer).
3. (S) In November, we learned that XXXXXXXXXXXX was working to ship additional consignments of graphite to Ward, and that Indian officials were holding a shipment of potentially nuclear-grade graphite blocks in the Air Cargo Complex at the international airport in Mumbai (Ref B). We expressed our concerns to the GOI about the possible imminent release of this graphite for onward shipment to Iran, and also advised Indian officials that XXXXXXXXXXXX was readying follow-on shipments of graphite for Ward. In response to our concerns, Indian officials told us that they had begun an investigation of this matter, and that the shipment would not go forward until their investigation was complete (Refs C & D).
4. (S) In December, we shared with the GOI information indicating that four to five tons of graphite being readied at a XXXXXXXXXXXX warehouse for shipment to Ward had been moved from that location (Ref E). This graphite - like the shipment at the Mumbai airport - had been placed on hold by Indian authorities, preventing its onward shipment. We had no information on the date of the graphite's removal or its location, but believed that it could still be in the country, awaiting shipment to Iran from another location in India. Indian authorities advised us that they had not cleared the graphite shipment for export because its investigation was not yet complete, and that they were working to locate the missing graphite (Ref F). As of early January, the GOI informed us that none of the graphite had shipped, and that India was taking unspecified action on the case (Ref G).
5. (S) Objectives: We now want to follow-up with Indian officials on this case, and request information concerning the status or whereabouts of the graphite ) both that which was detained at the Airport as well as the graphite that was removed from XXXXXXXXXXXX's warehouse. We also want to share with Indian officials new information identifying the intended end-user of the graphite as the Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO), a cover for Iran's primary liquid- fueled ballistic missile producer, and to advise the GOI that Ward's efforts to procure this graphite for SAPICO continues.
6. (U) Action Request: Department requests Embassy New Delhi approach appropriate host government officials to deliver the talking points in Paragraph 7 and report response. Talking points may be left as a non-paper.
7. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:
(SECRET REL INDIA)
-- We would like to follow-up on a matter of potential proliferation concern we discussed with you previously.
-- In October 2007, we shared information with you indicating that the Indian company XXXXXXXXXXXX offered to provide 255 blocks of French-origin high density graphite to Iran's Ward Commercial Company.
-- We alerted you to this activity because we believed Ward Commercial Company may have been seeking this graphite on behalf of Iran's missile program.
-- Ward Commercial Company has previously worked to procure items on behalf of Iran's liquid-fueled ballistic missile developer, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), an entity designated in UN Security Council Resolution 1737.
-- On November 20, we expressed our concerns that XXXXXXXXXXXX was working to ship additional consignments of graphite to Ward, and that we were aware that Indian officials were holding a shipment of potentially nuclear-grade graphite blocks in the Mumbai Air Cargo Complex near the international terminal.
-- We also advised you that XXXXXXXXXXXX was likely readying additional graphite shipments to Iran.
-- We were pleased to hear on November 21 that your government had prevented the onward shipment to Iran of the graphite being held at the Mumbai Air Cargo Complex Terminal, and that you were investigating this matter.
-- In December 2007, we informed you that four to five tons of graphite being readied for shipment to Ward had been removed from XXXXXXXXXXXX's warehouse, and that its current location and disposition were unknown.
-- You subsequently informed us that your government had not cleared the graphite shipment for export because its investigation was not yet complete, and that you would work to locate the missile graphite.
-- In early January, India advised the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi that nothing had gone to the final destination, and that your government had taken unspecified action on the case.
-- We remain very concerned about this case, and would be interested in hearing any information you can provide regarding the status or whereabouts of the graphite ) including that which was detained at the Mumbai Airport as well as the graphite that went missing from XXXXXXXXXXXX's warehouse.
-- We would appreciate any updates you can share with us concerning actions your government has taken to prevent the shipment of this graphite to Iran.
-- We also want to share with you new information identifying the intended end-user of the graphite as the Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO), a cover name for SHIG.
-- We understand that as of late January 2008, Ward was continuing its efforts to procure this graphite from XXXXXXXXXXXX on behalf of SAPICO.
-- We hope this information is useful in your efforts to prevent this graphite from being shipped to Iran's ballistic missile program, and would appreciate any information you can provide on this matter.
End talking points/non-paper.
8. XXXXXXXXXXXX
9. (U) XXXXXXXXXXXX. RICE
NNNN
End Cable Text
Thursday, 11 February 2010, 15:57
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 000290
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/05/2016
TAGS PGOV, KDEM, PREF, PHUM, CH, IN, PINR, PREL
SUBJECT: TIBET: GROWING FRUSTRATION AFTER LATEST ROUND OF
TALKS BETWEEN BEIJING AND THE DALAI LAMA'S ENVOYS
Classified By: MIN/COUNS ZEYA for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: PolOff visited Dharamsala February 3-7 to meet a cross section of the Tibetan community upon the conclusion of the ninth round of dialogue in Beijing between the Tibetan government-in-exile, known as the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), and Chinese officials. During meetings with members of CTA's Parliament, the NGO community, journalists and activists, Poloff detected growing Tibetan frustrations over the lack of progress through the dialogue and with the Middle Way approach. Many interlocutors pointed to the widely-anticipated meeting between the Dalai Lama and President Barack Obama with excitement but also expected few, if any, tangible outcomes. They argued that the international community, particularly the United States and India, needs to engage more on the Tibetan movement to curb rising frustration after over 50 years in exile. END SUMMARY.
TIBET TALKS: POSITIVE SIGNS, OR EXERCISES IN FUTILITY?
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2. (SBU) PolOff visited Dharamsala to gauge the Tibetan community's reaction to outcomes from the ninth round of dialogue between the Dalai Lama's special emissaries and the Chinese government, held Jan 26-31 in Beijing. Interlocutors expressed mild hope mixed with intense concern for the future of the Tibetan movement. The emergence of this dialogue in 2002 was taken as a positive sign by NGOs, such as the Tibetan Women,s Association (TWA), which works with the CTA government. Most interlocutors argued that the talks, though producing no substantive change in relations between Chinese and Tibetan officials, convey to those residing in Tibet that ''something is happening.''
3. (SBU) Tibetan envoy Lodi Gyari's February 2 statement pointed out that the Chinese delegation provided a detailed briefing on results of the January 18-20 Fifth Tibet Work Forum, an internal Chinese government-run discussion of China,s Tibet policy. Gyari noted that many of the issues the Forum prioritized (such as the focus on rural livelihood development projects and China,s shift in verbiage from the ''Tibet Autonomous Region'' to the geographically-larger ''greater Tibet'') are also mentioned in the Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for All Tibetans, a document submitted by the envoys during the eighth round of the dialogue in 2008 and resubmitted during the latest round.
4. (SBU) Yet prominent members of the CTA, including Speaker of Parliament Penpa Tsering and Minister of the Department of Information and International Relations Kesang Takla, expressed frustration to PolOff with what they termed as the ''arrogant'' display by the Chinese officials who listed the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet as the sole issue on the dialogue's agenda. Tibetan envoys attempted, but were unsuccessful, in pushing substantive discussion on guidelines within Tibet that would precipitate the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet, namely a guarantee of the autonomy of the rights and welfare needs of the Tibetan people, as stated in the Memorandum. Takla argued that China's recent economic boom has negatively impacted the international community's ability to pressure the regime on its human rights record.
5. (SBU) Deputy Speaker of Parliament Gyari Dolma highlighted to PolOff four key human rights issues that CTA would like resolved in Tibet. First, Chinese accusations that the Dalai Lama is engaging in separatism must stop. Dolma contended such accusations cause Tibetans to lose confidence in the Chinese delegation, which ought to bring ''real'' issues to the talk. Second, China must allow Tibetans living in China to freely meet the Dalai Lama, so that he understands their thinking (NOTE: Dolma mentioned that CTA currently has little access to the opinions of those living in Tibet due to Chinese controls on telecommunications and the media censorship; most of their information comes from refugees. END NOTE); China should also allow a delegation from Parliament to visit Tibet with neutral observers (i.e., from the UN, US Embassy in Beijing, the media, or other impartial organizations) and guarantee the safety of those who speak with observers as
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they examine the internal situation and make recommendations for solving the Tibetan issue. Third, China should allow Amnesty International or another credible human rights organization access to the Tibetan-recognized Panchen Lama, who has been missing from the public eye since shortly after being named the Panchen Lama by the Dalai Lama in 1995. Finally, on the issue of both political prisoners and prisoners in general, China should allow greater transparency of its judicial processes (NOTE: Dolma contends that Tibetans receive no legal representation and have no clear trial dates, making it very difficult to monitor trial outcomes. She noted a recent positive change on this issue stemming from international pressure on China's ''punishment to death'' sentence, stating that now the Chinese government follows clear procedures to officially record trials in the law book, with only the High Court, upon review of the Supreme Court, holding the power to deliver a death sentence, which has reduced the number of executions imposed. END NOTE).
6. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested to PolOff that Tibetans have little hope for the dialogue as it currently exists, stating that talks are ''still at the zero point.'' He suggested two reforms to the dialogue process. First, Tibetans with Mandarin language skills should be included in the delegation along with neutral observers to record the discussion between both sides. Second, the location for talks should alternate within and outside China (NOTE: Even when discussions were held in Geneva, both sides met at the Chinese Embassy. END NOTE). Both XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that ''hope is always there'' amongst the Tibetan exile community. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that as Tibetans become more adept in using the Internet, they must use their own hopes to inspire activism over the Tibetan movement within Tibet and the international community at large.
A MILITANT SHANGRILA?
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7. (C) Although Western journalists often ask who the face of the Tibetan movement would be after the Dalai Lama passes away, Tibetans seemed remarkably unconcerned because they see a clear succession path. Speaker Tsering noted to PolOff that the democratically-elected Kalon Tripa (Prime Minister) of CTA's Parliament would serve as a figurehead for the movement while officials search for the reincarnated 15th Dalai Lama. CTA,s Charter also provides for the election of a three-person regency to be chosen by members of Parliament in the event of the Dalai Lama's death or inability to take political charge of Parliament. (Note: The Dalai Lama continues to sit in Parliament meetings, despite statements that he is a spiritual, not political, leader of the Tibetans. END NOTE). Tsering contends that, depending on the strength of the three members of the regency, this body could also serve as the voice of the Tibetan movement. The issue that interlocutors disagreed on was the future actions of Tibetans when faced with a movement no longer headed by the Dalai Lama.
8. (SBU) PolOff's discussions with most interlocutors gravitated towards mention of the March 2008 uprising in Tibet, noting, as representatives from TWA did, that it projected a united Tibetan front against Chinese rule to the world. All remarked that conditions inside Tibet have gone from bad to worse in recent years. Deputy Speaker Dolma noted that faith in the Dalai Lama's leadership had led many Tibetans to believe in the Middle Way, yet there is a growing skepticism of this approach. Dolma said that many view the Dalai Lama's and CTA,s demand for autonomy within, and not total independence from, China as too great a compromise.
9. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that protestors in both the 1997 and 2008 uprisings within Tibet were typically young, had never lived in exile, and - most importantly - had never met the Dalai Lama. (NOTE: Interestingly, according to statistics obtained from the Dharamsala Refugee Reception Center, of the 87,096 refugees that were taken in by Center from 1980 to November 2009, over half -
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46,620 people - returned to Tibet after a short pilgrimage in India and audience with the Dalai Lama. END NOTE). XXXXXXXXXXXX affirmed to PolOff that the presence of the Dalai Lama has provided the Tibetan community at large with peace while soothing unrest among the Tibetan youth. TYC is the Tibetan community-in-exile's largest NGO, comprising members whose primary aim is achieving an independent, not merely an autonomous, Tibet. ''Tibetans would rise up if the time comes,'' stated XXXXXXXXXXXX, while noting that the large assemblies of Tibetan youth, outside of audiences with the Dalai Lama, gather together when the TYC discusses independence. Minister Takla also bluntly informed PolOff that if the international community fails to adequately support the Tibetan people in their struggle against China, people residing inside Tibet could become desperate enough to desert the Tibetan movement,s historically non-violent path. Takia said that ''we in the free world would be responsible for the resulting violence'' and all would fail as human rights authorities should Tibetans become militant.
10. (C) In this context, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted approximately 6,000 Tibetans now serve, and over 30,000 Tibetans have been trained, in Establishment 22, a joint Tibetan-Nepali border force within the Indian Army that reportedly emerged in 1962 following a failed Tibetan uprising in China. Membership in Establishment 22 was compulsory for Tibetan students graduating from Tibetan Children,s Village (TCV) schools until the late 1980s, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Tibetans have never been given an opportunity to fight the Chinese, despite begging for the opportunity; they fought in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 that created Bangladesh and in Operation Meghdoot during the 1999 Indo-Pakistan fighting in Kargil.
THE AUDACITY OF HOPE
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11. (C) The widely-anticipated meeting between the Dalai Lama and President Obama in Washington was a frequent topic of conversation among Dharamsala residents. There appeared to be reasonable consensus that the Dalai Lama is not traveling to the US with a specific agenda for this meeting. Dolma noted that this will be a meeting between fellow Nobel Laureates who believe in non-violence, stating that the ''U.S. government already knows our need,'' and the Dalai Lama understands that there is no need to pressure or embarrass the President into action. Minister Takla, noting President Obama's recent stronger statements about China's trade practices, articulated that there is already international awareness about Tibet - ''everyone knows that Tibetans and the Dalai Lama want genuine autonomy for Tibetans in Tibet'' - but the question now is how do we put this desire into action and pressure China to act on the dialogue? Takla believed that failing to hold a meeting between President Obama and the Dalai Lama would ''increase China,s arrogance,'' while XXXXXXXXXXXX noted China's pressures on the United States and the Dalai Lama, stressing that the latter faced possible threats of executions of political prisoners in Tibet should the meeting proceed.
12. (SBU) Dolma and Takla both argued that other members of the international community, particularly India, must take a more proactive role on the Tibet issue. Takla stated that Tibet has historically served as a peaceful buffer zone between China and India, noting that India now has to spend large amount of money on defense and be wary of Chinese activities that may adversely affect rivers flowing downstream into India. Dolma commented that India and CTA are natural allies, noting that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has a clear understanding of the Tibetan problem, and now appreciates the Middle Way approach, versus the opinion intimated through many of the government's earlier statements to ''go back or get independence already.''
COMMENT: FRUSTRATION LIKELY TO GROW ABSENT ANY REAL PROGRESS IN DIALOGUE
-----
NEW DELHI 00000290 004 OF 004
13. (C) Growing frustration among Tibetans, displayed during the March 2008 uprising, is likely to lead to future outbursts so long as the dialogue fails to progress. The Chinese government,s international credibility on human rights will continue to decline as Tibetans gain further access to media tools to disseminate this growing frustration. Their frustration's effect on the Tibetan movement could be exacerbated by the passage of time, as the Dalai Lama's increasing age inevitably slows down his grueling travel schedule and his potential ability to continue to capture the world's attention on his people's plight. END COMMENT. ROEMER
Monday, 10 August 2009, 13:20
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001667
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/08/2019
TAGS SENV, PHUM, PREL, PGOV, PREF, KDEM, CH, IN
SUBJECT: DALAI LAMA SEEKS U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA ON
CLIMATE CHANGE IN TIBET, SAYS POLITICAL AGENDA CAN WAIT
REF: A. 08 NEW DELHI 2884 B. NEW DELHI 1487
Classified By: Ambassador Timothy J. Roemer for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)
1. (C) SUMMARY. In a August 8 introductory meeting, the Ambassador sought the Dalai Lama's views on his upcoming October visit to the U.S. and his strategy for engaging China. The Dalai Lama suggested the U.S. engage China on climate change in Tibet, recognizing that Tibetans could wait five to ten years for a political solution. The Ambassador assured the Dalai Lama that climate change was a priority for President Obama and the U.S. was prepared to work with China and India. Regarding next steps in dialogue with China, the Dalai Lama reported that he awaited a positive sign from China before attempting to reengage the PRC; in the meantime, he continued to strengthen ties with Chinese scholars and authors. The Dalai Lama supported closer U.S.-India relations and praised the Secretary's recent visit to India. He doubted the sustainability of China's authoritarian regime and warned that if China achieved its global aspirations, it would resemble the former Soviet Union. The Dalai Lama said he had no specific goals for his trip to Washington, adding that President Obama should not expect any change in the Tibetans' stance. END SUMMARY.
Focus on Climate Change
----------
2. (C) The Dalai Lama argued that the political agenda should be sidelined for five to ten years and the international community should shift its focus to climate change on the Tibetan plateau. Melting glaciers, deforestation, and increasingly polluted water from mining projects were problems that "cannot wait." The Dalai Lama criticized China's energy policy, alleging that dam construction in Kham and Amdo have displaced thousands of Tibetans and left temples and monasteries underwater. He recommended the PRC compensate Tibetans for disrupting their nomadic lifestyle with vocational training, such as weaving.
3. (C) The Dalai Lama requested the United States consider engaging China on environmental issues in Tibet and suggested increased collaboration between U.S. and Chinese scientists. The Ambassador assured the Dalai Lama that President Obama remained concerned about climate change and specifically asked him to address the issue in India and the region.
Waiting for the PRC to Reengage
----------
4. (C) The Dalai Lama reiterated that while his faith in the Chinese government had grown "thinner" after eight rounds of failed negotiations, his faith in the Chinese people had "never shaken." During the past year, the Dalai Lama met with several hundred Chinese scholars and writers to discuss Tibet. The Dalai Lama was heartened by the increased "expressions of solidarity from Chinese brothers and sisters" and reported that 682 Chinese-language articles focused on Tibet were published over the past year. The Dalai Lama conveyed he would continue to engage the Chinese people who wanted a more open society.
5. (C) The Dalai Lama provided the Ambassador with a brief account of the most recent negotiations between his envoys and the PRC, expressing disappointment that the Chinese government had rejected the Memorandum for Genuine Autonomy before his envoys reached Beijing (Ref A). When Ambassador Roemer inquired about sending envoys to Beijing again, The Dalai Lama needed some positive sign from the PRC that it was prepared for substantive dialogue because Tibetans currently felt China preferred "ruthless oppression." On the sidelines of the meeting, Representative of the Dalai Lama in India Tempa Tsering told Poloff that the clarification note for the Memorandum of Autonomy had not been completed and confirmed he would send the Embassy a copy of the note after its completion (Ref B).
PRC's Authoritarian System "Not Sustainable"
----------
6. (C) The Dalai Lama told the Ambassador that "narrow mindedness" had led China to feel threatened by Tibetans' desire to preserve their culture and language. "The past was
NEW DELHI 00001667 002 OF 002
the past," and now Tibetans and Chinese must envision a new reality based on "common sense and common interest." The European Union and United Kingdom were examples of countries uniting for these reasons, while preserving national identity. He cited these examples as high goals to aspire toward for this region's peace and prosperity. The Dalai Lama acknowledged the greatness of China and its people, but maintained that the authoritarian system was not sustainable. If China succeeded in becoming a superpower, it would resemble the former Soviet Union, securing its rule using suspicion and fear. The U.S. should consider China's values when doing business with the PRC and strive to bring China into the democratic mainstream.
October Visit
----------
7. (SBU) When the Ambassador asked about the objective of his October visit to Washington, the Dalai Lama replied that he had "no particular points at this moment," adding President Obama should not anticipate a shift from the Middle Way. He underlined that Prime Minister-in-exile Samdhong Rinpoche was the "real authority" and would set the political agenda. The Dalai Lama applauded efforts to strengthen the U.S.-India relationship, adding it was "logical and essential" for the two greatest democracies to collaborate closely. He told the Ambassador that his Indian friends praised the Secretary's visit and urged the U.S. and India to continue along this positive trajectory, "whether other countries like it or not." The Ambassador said the U.S.-India partnership is a top priority for President Obama and Secretary Clinton and we were pursuing a broad and deep strategic partnership.
8. (C) COMMENT. The Dalai Lama's message to the Ambassador may signal a broader shift in strategy to reframe the Tibet issue as an environmental concern. When Ambassador Roemer discussed the importance of climate change issues and mentioned bilateral projects between the U.S. and India, the Dalai Lama said that there were "three poles" in danger of melting: the north pole, the south pole, and the glaciers at the pole of Tibet. Tibetans have watched closely as the United States launched the new Strategic and Economic Dialogue with China, with climate change as a main focus, as well as the Secretary's emphasis on climate change during her July visit to India. In this new context, the Dalai Lama appears intent on leveraging closer U.S.-China relations to address the pressing environmental challenges and problems in Tibet. END COMMENT. ROEMER
Thursday, 10 April 2008, 11:51
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001035
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR TIBET COORDINATOR DOBRIANSKY
NSC FOR HADLEY/ABRAMS
H PASS TO SPEAKER PELOSI, REPRESENTATIVES MARKEY,
MCDERMOTT, MILLER, SENSENBRENNER, INSLEE, HOLMES-NORTON,
SOLIS, ESHOO AND HOLT
EO 12958 DECL: 04/10/2018
TAGS PREL, PHUM, IN, CH
SUBJECT: DALAI LAMA PLEADS FOR U.S. TO PERSUADE CHINESE TO
TALK
REF: NEW DELHI 906
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires George Deikun for Reasons 1.4 (b and d )
1. Action request in para. 7.
2. (C/REL UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA) Summary: Hours before his April 9 departure for the U.S., the Dalai Lama summoned PolCouns to convey a message: please use all effective means to persuade the PRC to engage in dialogue with him. He said recent events had left him increasingly concerned about the future of the Tibetan people. Reaffirming his commitment to the "Middle Way", i.e. not to seek independence as long as the Chinese government respects the distinctive character of the Tibetan people and permits them to enjoy genuine regional autonomy, the Dalai Lama stated that he sought a breakthrough with Beijing. The Dalai Lama recalled his conversation with Ambassador Mulford (reftel), where he had explained that the PRC only respects strength, and he exhorted the U.S. to take action that will "make an impact" in Beijing. At the end of the thirty-minute meeting, the Dalai Lama embraced PolCouns and made a final plea: "Tibet is a dying nation. We need America's help." End Summary.
3. (C/REL UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA) The Dalai Lama related an earlier conversation with a Chinese scholar that convinced him the "positive scenario" he outlined on March 28 -- where the PRC agrees to dialogue and permits a degree of Tibetan autonomy -- was a possibility. The Dalai Lama described this unnamed scholar as interpreting the regular use of the Dalai Lama's name by Chinese leaders and references to 'the Dalai clique' as signs they were prepared to engage with him. If PRC leaders ignored the Dalai Lama and focused instead on the Tibetan Youth Congress and Tibet-based leaders of the uprising, that would indicate the PRC planned to bypass him, according to this scholar.
4. (C/REL UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA) Immediately prior to meeting with PolCouns, the Dalai Lama met with XXXXXXXXXXXX. The Dalai Lama said XXXXXXXXXXXX had been in touch with Chinese interlocutors who convinced XXXXXXXXXXXX that a deal could be made: if the Dalai Lama supported peaceful transit of the Olympic torch through Tibet, then the PRC would simultaneously release Tibetans who had been detained since March 10. Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX. End comment.
5. (C/REL UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA) The Indian media continues to headline plans for the April 17 Olympic torch transit through New Delhi, with much speculation about which celebrities and leaders will choose to carry the torch, thereby pleasing the Chinese. India's first female director-general of police, Kiran Bedi, has declined the honor, stating that protection of the torch by China's Special Police Force guards has robbed it of its desired symbolism. Indian football captain Bhaichung Bhatia has also pulled out, expressing solidarity with Tibetan activists. China's defense attache in New Delhi informed the Indian Army's director of foreign liaison that planned Army-to-Army exercises will be cancelled if New Delhi fails to protect the torch during its 2.5-kilometer sprint through the capital.
6. (C/REL UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA) Comment: While Indian observers believe that pressure on the PRC to engage with the Dalai Lama is growing, his candid comment that "Tibet is a dying nation" indicates increasing desperation as a result of his ability to affect events in his homeland. The President's comments that dialogue provides the only way forward have resonated here, and Tibet Coordinator Dobriansky's April 24 visit to New Delhi gives the U.S. an opportunity to reinforce the President's message. The Dalai Lama, who has studied China for most of his 73 years, appears
NEW DELHI 00001035 002 OF 002
to be persuaded that a united show of strength will nudge Beijing in his direction, and that by vilifying him, China's leaders may have laid the ground work for engagement. End comment.
7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post emailed and pouched letters from the Dalai Lama to President George Bush, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and Senator Harry Reid requesting that the USG appeal to China to end the current crackdown on Tibetans immediately; release all Tibetans arrested and ensure they receive proper medical attention; and, asked for assistance in facilitating a group of international observers and media to affected areas in the TAR to ensure compliance. Post requests guidance/reply on who should assume the lead coordination in the reply to the Dalai Lama. DEIKUN
Wednesday, 26 March 2008, 12:45
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000882
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/25/2028
TAGS PREL, PREF, PHUM, CH, IN
SUBJECT: TIBET CLAMP DOWN AND PROTESTS PUT INDIA IN
DIFFICULT POSITION
REF: NEW DELHI 850
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Atul Keshap for reasons 1.4 ( b and d)
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Tibet remains a front-burner challenge in New Delhi more than 10 days after protests at the Chinese Embassy and a protest march out of Dharamsala led to the arrest of over 200 Tibetans. After another protest at the Chinese Embassy led to more arrests on March 21, the Indian press reported that Chinese Foreign Ministry warnings led the Indian government to back out of a "tentative" meeting between Vice-President Ansari and the Dalai Lama. The BJP and RSS smell blood as a result of the government's caution, while the normally meddlesome Left has kept a stony silence on China's actions in Tibet. Tibetan sources report that 70 of 140 protesters arrested in Delhi remain in detention as of March 26, despite an assurance from Foreign Secretary Menon to the Ambassador on March 19 that all those arrested before then would be released that day. The Dalai Lama's Special Envoy told Poloff that the Tibetan Government-in-Exile was satisfied with the Indian government's statements to date on the situation, and suggested that the USG positively acknowledge India's statement rather than press the GOI to be more forceful. He said that he hoped that President Bush will issue a statement "sooner rather than later," and added that the Dalai Lama had sent a personal letter to Chinese President Hu Jintao. Responding to criticism that the U.S. was applying pressure, External Affairs Minister Mukherjee said "They (the U.S.) have expressed their views. They are not putting pressure (on India)." India continues to walk the razor's edge between Beijing and Dharamsala. It cannot afford to antagonize the former, but it has a sacred obligation to the latter. END SUMMARY
----- Protesters scale perimeter wall at Chinese Embassy -----
2. (SBU) Five members of a group of Tibetan demonstrators breached the perimeter wall of the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi on the night of March 21. The report said that the five protesters were detained along with thirty-three others before any untoward incidents occurred. The Dalai Lama's Representative in New Delhi, Tempa Tsering, told Poloff on March 26 that seventy of the 140 Tibetans held in Delhi since March 14 have been released to date, noting that several of the March 21 protesters were injured. According to "The Indian Express," the Chinese Foreign Ministry summoned Ambassador Rao in Beijing to voice their concern for the safety and security of its diplomatic personnel in Delhi and handed over a list of Tibetan protests likely to take place in India prior to the Olympics, which the Chinese asked India to act upon. "The Hindustan Times" quoted the Chinese Ambassador to India Zhang Yan as saying, "I hope Indian friends see through the nature of his (the Dalai Lama's) intentions and not be misled and make correct statements based on facts and deeds, not words." Zhang added that, "He (the Dalai Lama) used non-violence to cheat the international community."
----- Indian Vice-President not to meet with Dalai Lama -----
4. (SBU) "The Indian Express" citQsources in a March 22 report as stating that Vice-President Hamid Ansari's meeting with the Dalai Lama, scheduled two months previously, was canceled after Chinese pressure precipitated the GOI to advise Ansari's office to cancel the meeting, although the news item quoted GOI sources as saying that the meeting was "only tentatively scheduled." Referring to the Dalai Lama-Ansari meeting, the "Zee News" portal quoted Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang as declaring that, "The Indian side has clarified to China on the relevant rumor, saying that there is no such plan."
----- Tibetan government-in-exile satisfied with GOI statements -----
5. (C) Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari expressed satisfaction with GOI official statements to date, noting that "They have their own understandable compulsions, and it's better than the past when no statements were issued." He expressed his belief that it would be beneficial for the USG to positively acknowledge India's March 15 statement that, "We are
NEW DELHI 00000882 002 OF 002
distressed by reports of the unsettled situation and violence in Lhasa, and by the deaths of innocent people. We would hope that all those involved will work to improve the situation and remove the causes of such trouble in Tibet, which is an autonomous region of China, through dialogue and non-violent means." Gyari speculated that positive reinforcement may motivate the GOI to issue further statements in support of the Tibetans. He revealed that a private communication from the Dalai Lama to Chinese President Hu Jintao was received by the Chinese on 20 March, and the Tibetan government-in-exile was waiting for a response. Gyari stated that he had shared the letter with Undersecretary Dobriansky, contacts at the NSC, and Indian Foreign Secretary ShivShankar Menon. He commented that he planned to meet with Indian National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan on 24 March but did not disclose the agenda for the discussion. Gyari opined that a statement from President Bush would give the Chinese reason for pause and emphasized that, if forthcoming, the statement would be "most beneficial sooner rather than later."
----- BJP blames Nehru for current Tibet morass -----
6. (SBU) Tibet has become a domestic political issue again in recent days, as posturing for the upcoming general elections continues. On March 25, India's Zee New portal reported that the Bharatiya Janata Party prime ministerial candidate L.K. Advani blamed former Congress Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru for adopting a "weak stance" on Tibet in the 1950s, stating that, "the Nehru government's failure to focus on India's diplomatic efforts, while simultaneously strengthening its military capabilities, to deftly resolve the boundary issue with China," directly contributed to the current state of affairs in Tibet. He hailed the BJP's Vajpayee administration as engineers of the current progress in India-China relations, adding that he urged Chinese President Hu during his November 2006 India visit to arrange for the Dalai Lama to visit Tibet prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Assailing the Congress Party's passive reaction to China's repression in Tibet, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) Chief K.S. Sudershan condemned the "atrocities perpetrated on the peaceful protesters" in Tibet and proclaimed that, "these demonstrations have completely betrayed the hollowness of Chinese claims that under her occupation Tibet has witnessed all-around development and that the people are happy with the regime." Broadsiding the Congress Party, Sudershan pledged the RSS's full support for the Tibetan cause and urged the world to "exert such pressure over the Government of China that it is forced to come to the negotiating table to find a peaceful solution to the Tibetan crisis." Meanwhile, the Left, ready at all times to comment negatively on anything relating to America, remains absolutely silent on the Tibet issue, preferring to stand by CPI-M leader Sitaram Yechury's hypocritical March 17 statement that the CPI-M was unable to comment as Tibet was an "internal matter" for China.
----- India keeps a finger to the wind -----
7. (C) COMMENT: The words "tightrope" and "balancing act" are constantly repeated in Delhi regarding the Indian government's handling of Tibetan protests. As Foreign Secretary Menon explained to the Ambassador, the Tibetan
SIPDIS movement has the sympathy of the Indian public, and India has been a generally supportive home to tens of thousands of Tibetans, including the Dalai Lama, for nearly 50 years. However, the tacit agreement that Tibetans are welcome in India as long as they don't cause problems is being challenged at a time when India's complex relationship with Beijing is churning with border issues, rivalry for regional influence, a growing economic interdependence, the nascent stages of joint military exercises, and numerous other priorities. While the GOI will never admit it, we expect New Delhi's Balancing Act with India's Tibetans to continue for the foreseeable future, with the caveat that a rise in violence -- either by Tibetans here or by the Chinese security forces in Tibet - could quickly tip the balance in favor of the side with greater public support. END COMMENT MULFORD
Monday, 30 June 2008, 10:26
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001795
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/30/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PREF, PHUM, SOCI, CH, IN
SUBJECT: TIBETAN YOUTH SEE POTHOLES IN THE MIDDLE PATH -
PART 1 OF A STATUS REPORT ON TIBETAN REFUGEES IN INDIA
REF: A. NEW DELHI 1483 B. NEW DELHI 3617 C. NEW DELHI 1476
NEW DELHI 00001795 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Acting PolCouns Joel Ehrendreich for Reasons 1.4 (B and D).
1. (C) Summary. A May visit to six Tibetan settlements across north and northeastern India underscores concerns that frustrated and dissatisfied Tibetan youth and concurrent Indian separatist movements could pose serious problems for the future viability of Tibetan settlements. A widening generational divide finds Tibetan leaders unable to resolve growing dissatisfaction among younger Tibetans, led by the influential Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC). Settlement leaders in West Bengal reluctantly discussed intimidation and extortion of Tibetans by Indian separatist movements, feebly dismissing the threats as "neighborly" interactions. Tibetan participation in events organized by pro-Gorkaland radicals -- whether forced or not -- could jeopardize relations between the Tibetan community and their Indian hosts. The Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) will need to address these issues or the Government of India (GOI) may address them instead. End Summary.
2. (SBU) This is the first in a three-part series assessing the Tibetan refugee situation in India. Kathmandu's Regional Refugee Coordinator, New Delhi PolOff and Kolkata POL FSN visited New Delhi, Dharamsala and remote Tibetan settlements in West Bengal, Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh. These reports distill two weeks of meetings with the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), refugee reception centers, GOI and CTA administered schools, settlement officers, monastery officials, health workers, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), and GOI liaisons with the Tibetan settlements. New Delhi PolOffs subsequently met with Delhi-based human rights activists. The first cable of this series, Part I, details increasing dissatisfaction among Tibetan youth and the potential consequences for the Tibetan community in India; Part II examines the settlements' relations with neighboring local populations and Indian separatist movements in West Bengal and the Northeast; and Part III assesses the settlements' socio-economic situation. This three-part series reflects collaboration between Embassy New Delhi, Consulate Kolkata and Embassy Kathmandu.
TYC's "Imprudent" Strategy
--------------------------
3. (SBU) With few professional opportunities and growing impatience with the Dalai Lama's "Middle Way," young Tibetans expressed frustration with their future prospects. These frustrations are articulated regularly by the TYC, which advocates complete independence from People's Republic of China (PRC). The TYC has 30,000 members in 83 chapters worldwide. The chapters vary widely in their degrees of organization and activism, with the chapters in New Delhi, Kathmandu, and some western capitals constituting a well-organized and influential force. The TYC's mission statement (posted online) declares that one of its main objectives is "to struggle for the rightful independence of Tibet even at the cost of one's life." Accordingly, while the group pledges support to the Dalai Lama, its published objectives conflict with the Dalai Lama's Middle Way, which promotes Tibetan autonomy within the PRC. The TYC has coordinated the most dramatic anti-China protests, including scaling the walls of the Chinese embassy in New Delhi four times in the past eight months (October 12,2007 and March 12, March 21, and April 21 in 2008) and mobilizing over 25,000 protesters to converge upon the capital in August 2007 (Reftels). XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized that the group's handbook instructs members "never to raise a fist" and explained that the activities are designed only to embarrass India's northern neighbor. The TYC is proud that it has succeeded in attracting Chinese ire -- revealing that China feels threatened by the TYC. XXXXXXXXXXXX also emphasized the TYC's other role -- that of a "CTA watchdog," promoting democratization, monitoring the socio-economic situation in the settlements, and directing CTA attention to vulnerable communities. With evident self-satisfaction, he noted that over the past decade, the TYC had parted ways with the CTA, comparing the relationship to a parent (CTA) who cannot come to terms with the child's (TYC) maturation.
4. (C) Older Tibetan leaders regard the TYC's activities as
NEW DELHI 00001795 002.2 OF 003
imprudent. XXXXXXXXXXXX worries that if Tibet's status is not resolved during the Dalai Lama's lifetime, the youth movement could become "more radical and dangerous" and predicted that "the debate over future strategy could fracture the Tibetan community." XXXXXXXXXXXX fears that the TYC is escalating radicalization of the Tibetan youth and that TYC leadership XXXXXXXXXXXX is purposefully antagonizing the GOI in an effort to garner international media attention. After the TYC-coordinated storming of the Chinese embassy in New Delhi, the PRC has increased pressure on the GOI to control the Tibetan refugee population. The GOI responded by restricting settlement activity in several states and increasing the rates of arrests and detentions of Tibetan activists (Reftels). (Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX End Comment.)
5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX dismissed the potential consequences of irritating the GOI, which has tolerated most demonstrations, arguing that supporters praise the TYC's measures. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the Dalai Lama's moderate strategy has failed to produce results over the past five decades. (Note: Independent of these site visits, human rights activist XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOffs that the Indian Ministry of Defense unofficially backs the TYC and is pleased with the opportunity to humiliate the Chinese government. XXXXXXXXXXXX disclosed that TYC leaders XXXXXXXXXXXX "camped out" in his NGO's office during the protests in August 2007. He also expressed concern that the TYC may push the GOI too far and advised CENTREX members to use caution. End Note.)
Few Options Open
----------------
6. (SBU) Unfortunately, life in the settlements offers relatively few options for making a living. Older Tibetans in every settlement visited consistently complained that the younger generation will move to urban areas or the west, leaving Tibetan communities populated by children and the elderly. Programs in the settlements focus principally on traditional Tibetan handicrafts, organic farming, and tailoring - options that offer relatively low wages and little possibility for a brighter future. Tibetan students complete high school in India and look towards higher education, but funding is scarce and employment prospects are grim. While Tibetans enjoy a relatively privileged refugee status, Indian law bars them from most employment opportunities and from purchasing property. Even top graduates who find a placement in the CTA only eke out a living. One young professional confided that her CTA salary is a paltry 1,400 USD per year. Several settlement officers complained that the young, educated Tibetans prefer emigrating to learning the traditional crafts, leading elders to fear that Tibetan culture may die out with this generation. (Comment: Embassy Kathmandu Refcoord spoke to the Dalai Lama's special envoy Lodi Gyari on June 16 about the frustrating lack of opportunities for youth in the settlements. He readily acknowledged that this was one of the most serious concerns facing the CTA. He said that the CTA has been actively seeking alternatives and would welcome international assistance to that end. End Comment)
7. (C) In Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, Tibetan youth take advantage of one career option - the Special Frontier Force (SFF). Seven SFF units, based in Chakrata, Uttarkhand form a special division of the Indian army composed solely of Tibetans. The GOI entrusts SFF to protect its borders, stationing Tibetans along the border with China and in Ladakh. The Tibetans can only attain the rank of junior officer and earn a meager salary compared to their Indian counterparts. Yet, most Tibetan men in northeastern India join the SFF. In Gangtok, the Welfare Officer noted that the majority of Tibetan men work for the SFF; and in Ravangla, 90% of the Tibetan families have at least one family member serving. In Miao, about 350 of the settlement's youth serve in the SFF.
8. (SBU) Tibetan leaders expressed concern over future
NEW DELHI 00001795 003.2 OF 003
options for the youth, but have yet to successfully formulate a strategy. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the CTA plans to educate and empower the youth, yet neither he (nor any other community leader) could specify any new programs to achieve this goal. Miao's settlement officer, incidentally the most dynamic leader among those interviewed, reported that the sole takeaway from a conference dedicated to the generational divide was that the CTA organize more "tea parties" to speak informally with younger Tibetans. The leaders are genuinely distressed about the younger generation and recognize that they must concentrate on alternative income strategies; however, they may need -- and have said they would welcome -- outside assistance to create more diverse opportunities beyond traditional Tibetan crafts and agriculture.
Comment - Tibetans Concerned, but No New Strategies
--------------------------------------------- ------
9. (C) Tibetan leaders in India understand the gravity of the youths' growing frustration, yet thus far they have not been able to produce a strategy to counter the youth's growing impatience politically, with Middle Way moderates, and limited economic prospects. Many Tibetans interviewed expressed concern that if there is no movement to resolve the Tibetans' long exile and if economic opportunities likewise remain stagnant, frustration could propel Tibetan youths toward more radical actions. End Comment. DAVISON
Tuesday, 30 December 2008, 14:27
S E C R E T STATE 135048
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/23/2033
TAGS PARM, ETTC, SY, IN, PREL
SUBJECT: SHIELD S04B-08: SYRIA ARRANGING TO ACQUIRE CW
EQUIPMENT FROM TWO INDIAN COMPANIES
Classified By: ISN/CB Office Director Robert Mikulak for reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d)
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 4.
2. (S//NF) BACKGROUND: The U.S. has obtained information indicating that a Syrian institution with connections to the country's chemical and biological weapons programs is attempting to acquire Australia Group-controlled glass-lined reactors, heat exchangers and pumps from the Indian firms XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX . Both firms are believed to have received visits from the Syria institution in the past 3 months and may be close to concluding their respective deals.
3. (S//NF) BACKGROUND CONT'D: We would like to alert the GOI to this information. The GOI has a general obligation as a Chemical Weapons Convention State Party to never, under any circumstances, assist anyone in the development of chemical weapons. The U.S. also has publicly stated its belief that India is a strong partner on nonproliferation issues. We therefore seek the GOI's assistance in investigating this activity and talking all steps necessary to prevent Indian entities from providing CBW equipment to Syria. We also want to remind the GOI that the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act requires us to report to Congress transfers of goods, services and technology on multilateral control lists, such as the Australia Group, to Syria. Sanctions may be imposed against individuals and entities identified in such reports.
4. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Request Post deliver the points in paragraph 6 to appropriate host government officials and report a response. The points may be left as a nonpaper.
5. (S//NF) Please begin all responses with SHIELD S04B-08 and slug for ISN.
6. (U) Begin talking points/nonpaper:
(SECRET//REL INDIA)
-- In the spirit of our cooperation in preventing proliferation we would like to raise a matter of chemical weapons (CW) proliferation concern and request the Indian government's assistance in investigating this activity.
-- We have information that the Indian company XXXXXXXXXXXX may be planning to sell glass components and related chemical processing equipment to an end-user in Syria.
-- In addition, we have information that the Indian company XXXXXXXXXXXX may be planning to sell heat exchangers, immersion heaters, pumps, and glass equipment to the same end-user in Syria.
-- Further, XXXXXXXXXXXX and probably XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed to support a visit in mid-September 2008 by representatives of a Syrian institution with connections to Syria'schemical and biological weapons programs, to finalize contracts for glass-related equipment.
-- XXXXXXXXXXXX is located in XXXXXXXXXXXX, India. -- XXXXXXXXXXXX is located in XXXXXXXXXXXX, India.
-- While they have legitimate commercial uses, glass or glass-lined chemical reactor vessels, heat exchangers and pumps can be used in the production of CW agents and therefore are controlled by the Australia Group (AG).
-- We are concerned that the equipment in question is intended for, or could be diverted to, Syria's CW program.
-- The Syrian Research Council (SSRC) is a key entity behind Syria's chemical warfare program and may be behind Syria's biological warfare program as well.
-- In light of its CW and other programs of proliferation concern, support to terrorist organizations, and efforts to destabilize other countries in the region, we believe Syria is an unreliable destination for dual-use exports, and Syrian end-user statements or other assurances are neither credible nor trustworthy.
-- In addition, the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) requires us to provide periodic reports to the U.S. Congress identifying persons (including individuals and entities) who have transferred to, or acquired from, Iran, North Korea or Syria, items that are on multilateral export control lists, such as glass or glass-lined reactor vessels, or that could make a material contribution to developing a weapon of mass destruction or missile system.
-- Under INKSNA, sanctions also may be imposed against persons identified in such reports.
-- We therefore request that the Indian government take all steps necessary to investigate this matter and prevent Syria from acquiring dual-use items, such as glass or glass-lined reactor vessels, heat exchangers, and pumps that could be used in its CW programs.
-- We look forward to the Indian government sharing with us the results of its investigation into this matter.
End talking points/nonpaper. RICE
Tuesday, 26 May 2009, 14:23
S E C R E T STATE 053356
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/26/2034
TAGS MTCRE, PARM, PREL, ETTC, KSCA, IN, IR
SUBJECT: INDIAN GRAPHITE SUPPLIER AGAIN DOING BUSINESS
WITH INTERMEDIARY FOR IRANIAN MISSILE PROGRAM (S)
REF: A. 07 STATE 141892 B. 07 NEW DELHI 4592 C. 07 STATE 158831 D. 07 NEW DELHI 5058 E. 07 NEW DELHI 5107 F. 07 STATE 167377 G. 07 NEW DELHI 5333 H. LOWE E-MAIL - JAN 2008 I. 08 STATE 23763 J. 08 NEW DELHI 760 K. 08 STATE 49730
Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASON 1.4 (B), (D).
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 5.
2. (S) Background: In October 2007, we shared with the government of India information related to the supply by the Indian firm XXXXXXXXXXXX of high-density MTCR-controlled graphite to Iran's Ward Company (Refs A & B). We later advised the GOI that the intended end-user of the graphite was the Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO), a cover company for the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), Iran's primary developer of liquid-fueled ballistic missiles (Ref I). In response to a follow-on U.S. demarche in November 2007 concerning additional consignments of graphite being readied by XXXXXXXXXXXX for shipment to Ward, Indian officials advised us that they had prevented the onward shipment of one such consignment, and that they were investigating the matter (Refs C - E). We approached New Delhi again in December 2007 with information indicating that four to five tons of graphite awaiting shipment to Ward had been removed from XXXXXXXXXXXX's warehouse (Ref F). The GOI informed us that they had not cleared the graphite shipment for export, that nothing had gone to the final destination, and that they had taken unspecified action on the case (Refs G & H). In April 2008, the Times of India (TOI) reported that in October 2007, Indian Customs in Mumbai prevented XXXXXXXXXXXX from shipping 1,150 kg of graphite to Ward, and that a second consignment of XXXXXXXXXXXX graphite bound for Dubai was subsequently stopped (Ref K). We requested additional information from India on the status of this graphite, but have not yet received an response (Ref K).
3. (S) Objectives: We want to reiterate our appreciation to Indian officials for the effective action they took in this case, and to remind them that we remain interested in any additional information they can share with us related to the final disposition of the graphite, as well as the results of their investigations or any legal proceedings that resulted from this activity.
4. (S) Objectives (continued): We also want to advise the GOI of information indicating that as of mid-April 2009, Ward and XXXXXXXXXXXX were again engaged in business- related discussions. We are concerned that this recent contact could involve additional efforts to supply graphite to Iranian entities, and want to urge Indian authorities to investigate and take all appropriate measures to prevent XXXXXXXXXXXX from acting as a supplier of sensitive materials to Iran.
5. (U) Action Request: Department requests Embassy New Delhi approach appropriate host government officials to deliver the talking points in Paragraph 6 and report response. Talking points may be left as a non-paper.
6. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:
(SECRET REL INDIA)
-- We would like to raise with you a matter of proliferation concern and request your government's assistance in investigating this activity.
-- In October 2007, we shared information with you indicating that in July 2007, the Indian company XXXXXXXXXXXX offered to provide 255 blocks of MTCR-controlled, high density graphite to Iran's Ward Commercial Company.
-- We later advised you that the intended end-user of the graphite was the Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO), a cover name for the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). SHIG is Iran's primary developer of liquid propelled ballistic missiles and is an entity designated under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737.
-- In late November 2007, we expressed our concerns that XXXXXXXXXXXX was working to ship additional consignments of graphite to Ward, and that we were aware that Indian officials were holding a shipment of potentially nuclear-grade graphite in the Mumbai Air Cargo Complex near the international terminal.
-- We were subsequently pleased to hear that your government prevented the onward shipment to Iran of the graphite being held at the Mumbai Air Cargo Complex, and that you were investigating this matter.
-- In December 2007, we informed you that four to five tons of graphite being readied for shipment to Ward had been removed from XXXXXXXXXXXX's warehouse.
-- You responded that your government had not cleared the graphite shipment for export because your investigation was not yet complete, and that the graphite had likely been moved to a location where it could be stored for a longer period of time.
-- You later advised us that nothing had gone to the final destination, and that your government had taken unspecified action on the case.
-- In April 2008, the Times of India (TOI) reported that in October 2007, Indian Customs in Mumbai prevented XXXXXXXXXXXX from shipping 1,150 kg of graphite to Ward, and that a second consignment of XXXXXXXXXXXX graphite bound for Dubai was subsequently stopped.
-- We commend Indian authorities for stopping these shipments, and remain interested in any additional information you could share with us related to the final disposition of this graphite. We also would appreciate knowing the results of your investigations or any legal proceedings that resulted from this activity.
-- In addition, we want to advise you of information indicating that as of mid-April 2009, representatives of Ward and XXXXXXXXXXXX were again engaged in business-related discussions.
-- We are concerned that this recent contact between Ward and XXXXXXXXXXXX could be related to additional efforts to supply graphite to Iranian entities of proliferation concern.
-- Given Ward's history of acting as an intermediary for Iran's ballistic missile program, we urge you to investigate this information and take whatever measures are necessary to prevent the supply Xby XXXXXXXXXXXX of sensitive materials to Iran.
-- We appreciate India's cooperation on nonproliferation issues and look forward to hearing of any actions your government takes in response to this information.
End talking points/non-paper.
7. (XXXXXXXXXXXX
8. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. CLINTON
Friday, 26 February 2010, 06:33
S E C R E T NEW DELHI 000367
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/01/2020
TAGS PREL, PTER, IN, PK
SUBJECT: FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER DISCUSSES HEADLEY CASE WITH
INDIAN HOME MINISTER CHIDAMBARAM
Classified By: Ambassador Tim Roemer. Reason: 1.4 (b,d).
1. (S) Summary: In a February 23 meeting, FBI Director Robert Mueller told Indian Home Affairs Minister P. Chidambaram that the USG would continue to cooperate with the GOI in providing information on the David Headley case and other cases involving terrorism directed at India. Chidambaram requested direct access to Headley, even if such access produces no information, as well as access to Headley's spouse, who he said was in Chicago. Chidambaram asked whether a GOI official could monitor Headley's interrogation and submit questions "in real time." Chidambaram said he had "a feeling in my bones that Headley was not acting here alone," but conceded that he had no evidence to support his supposition that Headley formed sleeper cells in India, one of which may have been involved in the February 13 Pune bombing. Mueller assented to Chidambaram's request for expedited FBI lab assistance regarding forensic cyber and voice recognition analysis. Chidambaram complained that Pakistan had "done damn near nothing" to prosecute Mumbai terror suspects, and Mueller said he would press the Pakistanis to take action during an upcoming visit to Islamabad. End Summary.
2. (S) Director Mueller opened the 20-minute meeting by expressing satisfaction over increasingly close bilateral cooperation. Characterizing the information produced by interrogations of David Headley as among the most important intelligence the USG has gleaned in the past 6 - 8 months, the Director assured Chidambaram that we would continue to pass such information in a timely manner to India. Noting that the process of Headley's proffer of evidence is nearing a critical stage, Mueller observed that Headley has expressed hatred toward India and may "clam up" if his guilty plea is tied in any way to cooperation with the GOI.
3. (S) After thanking Mueller for the "outstanding cooperation" displayed by the USG, Chidambaram stated that he understood from his discussions with Attorney General Holder that the GOI cannot use any information provided by the USG at this time in Indian prosecutions. He noted, however, that GOI investigators had developed information on their own through examination of Headley's computer and emails. Chidambaram insisted that the GOI have access to Headley: "we must be able to say we had access, even if Headley did not speak." He also requested access to Headley's spouse, Shaiza, who he said is in Chicago so GOI investigators can question her on the meaning of her alleged message to Headley that she "saw your graduation." Director Mueller said he would look into both requests. In reply to Chidambaram's observation that the "worst outcome would be a light sentence of 2 or 3 years for Headley," Mueller stated that Headley is looking at a considerably longer sentence.
4. (S) Chidambaram informed Mueller that the GOI would soon send a number of Letters Rogatory to the USG in relation to the Headley case, and Mueller responded that we would welcome such documents. Returning to the issue of access to Headley, Chidambaram asked whether GOI personnel could monitor and pass questions "in real time" to USG personnel conducting Headley's interrogation. Mueller replied that he would look into this possibility. Chidambaram again thanked the USG for providing information and assistance, but asked whether GOI requests could be handled more promptly. The Home Minister asked for increased cooperation in three areas: 1) cybser security; 2) forensic cooperation; and 3) some financial initiatives and cooperation.
5. (S) Chidambaram confided that "I have a feeling in my bones that Headley was not acting alone" in India and expressed frustration over what he characterized as Headley's false claim that he had no accomplices in India. The Home Affairs Minister conceded he had no evidence to support his working hypothesis that Headley formed sleeper cells in India, one of which may have perpetrated the February 13 Pune bombing. He noted that the GOI would not file formal charges against Headley until the trial of Mumbai defendant Mir Kasab is finished for fear that Kasab would use the Headley charges as a way to delay conclusion of his own trial. Chidambaram complained that Pakistan had "done damn near nothing" to prosecute Mumbai-related terror suspects, but added that the GOI would present a list of terror suspects to Pakistani officials when the two sides meet for talks in New Delhi on February 25. Mueller said he was traveling to Pakistan and would press the Pakistanis for increased cooperation. ROEMER
Wednesday, 24 May 2006, 10:28
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 NEW DELHI 003611
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT
TREASURY FOR DAS DANNY GRASER AND ANDY BAUKOL
FINCEN FOR HEATHER MOYE
EO 12958 DECL: 05/24/2016
TAGS PTER, EFIN, TBIO, PREL, PINS, SCUL, KCIP, ASEC, EAIR,
PBTS, PROP, KISL, KSAC, IN, PK, BG, CE
SUBJECT: EMBASSY AND MEA HOLD PRODUCTIVE, FOCUSED CTJWG
FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN DELHI
REF: A. NEW DELHI 3473 B. NEW DELHI 3057 C. 05 NEW DELHI 6596
Classified By: Charge Robert Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (U) This is an Action Request for SCA and S/CT. Please see Para 17.
2. (C) Summary: The DCM and key Embassy interlocutors on counterterrorism issues (see Paras 21-22) on May 19 reviewed with MEA Additional Secretary (International Organizations) KC Singh action items that emerged from the April 19 US-India Counterterrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG) meeting in Washington and subsequent CT-related conversations (Refs A and B). The dialogue paved the way for further discussions on bio-terrorism cooperation, operationalizing countering terrorism finance, aviation security, improving USG delivery of CT training (and a GOI offer to provide CT training to USG personnel), improving the sharing of GOI tactical terrorist threat information, and continuing the discussion on how most effectively to counter extremist ideology in mass media and on the Internet. Ambassador Singh and Joint Secretary (Cabinet Secretariat) Sharad Kumar also shared GOI concerns that India is becoming more central to al-Qai'da's agenda, and that al-Qa'ida and "al-Qa'ida franchises" share close links with the Pakistan establishment. The Indians again were receptive to the idea of a focused effort to defeat LTTE fund-raising and arms trafficking, but asked that this be couched in generic terms, rather than targeting Sri Lanka alone. End Summary.
India Now an al-Qa'ida Target
-----------------------------
3. (C) Singh opened by noting that India is becoming more prominent on al-Qai'da's radar, pointing to Ayman al-Zawahiri's April 29 video message praising "popular jihadist movements against Indians in Kashmir" and calling India "the best candidate for carrying out the Zionist-Crusader scheme to humiliate, weaken, and dismember Pakistan." He added that al-Zawahiri's recent reference to the US-India civil nuclear agreement demonstrated that Delhi's growing cooperation with Washington was drawing al-Qai'da's attention.
Alleging Direct Links Between al-Qa'ida and Islamabad
--------------------------------------------- --------
4. (S) Singh asserted that Pakistan's ISI retains connections to al-Qa'ida and has been privy to Usama bin Ladin's communications. To the DCM's question of information on operational links, Joint Secretary (Cabinet Secretariat, i.e. RAW) Sharad Kumar stated that Indian intelligence has transcripts of pre-9/11 meetings between UBL and Mullah Omar during which terrorism in J&K was discussed. He continued that UBL had been "willing to divert $20 million" from Central Asian programming to support Kashmir-oriented
NEW DELHI 00003611 002 OF 008
terrorism, and that UBL was quoted saying the Kashmiri jihadis "would not run short of funds." Kumar added that when UBL sent his bodyguard contingent to help the Taliban fight the Northern Alliance, the temporary chief of his security force was an unnamed individual who went on to join Jaish-e-Mohammad. Singh ascribed al-Qa'ida's increasing interest in India to the July 18 civil nuclear agreement. "ISI seeks to heat things up" to interfere with growing US-India convergence, he claimed.
5. (S) RAW's Kumar observed that today, "al-Qa'ida franchises," if not al-Qa'ida proper, are and have been very active in India. He defined "al-Qa'ida franchises" as groups that espouse the same extremist ideology and share some logistical and funding infrastructure even while remaining discrete organizations, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Not all these groups or their attacks are linked, he continued; each must be investigated individually to locate their intersections.
Delhi Interest in Bio-Terror Rising
-----------------------------------
6. (C) Turning to the subject of counter-bio-terrorism cooperation, Singh reported that Indian intelligence is picking up chatter indicating jihadi groups are interested in bio-terrorism, for example seeking out like-minded PhD's in biology and bio-technology. He compared the prospects for nuclear terrorism ("still in the realm of the imaginary") to bio-terrorism ("an ideal weapon for terrorism ... anthrax could pose a serious problem ...it is no longer an academic exercise for us.") and indicated conceptual support for a joint bio-terrorism exercise. Singh stated that the text of the 1997 HHS/Ministry of Health Joint Statement included provisions for modeling bio-terrorism attacks, which could be used as a mechanism to support a joint exercise. (NOTE: Embassy HHS Attache reviewed the 1997 and 2005 HHS/MoH agreements and found no such mention of modeling bio-terrorism. End Note.) He concluded that although other relevant Ministries "work at their own pace," MEA would confer with them to secure their buy-in. Embassy will pursue the matter with MEA and other GOI interlocutors with an eye to conducting a joint and multi-agency bio-terrorism tabletop exercise by late 2006.
Operationalizing Anti-Terrorism Finance
---------------------------------------
7. (C) Noting that both sides have identical interests in combating terrorist groups but no practical experience in joint operations with each other, the DCM revisited the suggestion to create a contact group of experts -- with the MEA as the hub but including the Indian Finance Ministry and the nascent Financial Intelligence Unit as well as the Embassy Economics Section -- to focus on squeezing LTTE finances (Refs A and B). The DCM and Singh agreed that to keep the operation out of the spotlight it could adopt an innocuous name such as the "Subgroup on Terror Finance."
NEW DELHI 00003611 003 OF 008
PolCouns underscored the importance of moving from exchanging data on terrorist finances to shutting down money flows, particularly in light of the LTTE's wealth (i.e. it's ability to fund both a navy and an air force) and its recent egregiously violent attacks. J/S Kumar was tasked to develop ideas about modalities of the group's operations; he observed that although a cooperative effort is the most effective way forward, "most of our people are cagey regarding cooperation and joint operations," and "do not even trust others in their own government"; however, he added, their buy-in will be required. The DCM reassured Kumar that these operations would be kept in secure channels and well away from the media. Please see Action Request in Para 17.
Aviation Security
-----------------
8. (C) Taking note of the increase in aviation links between the US and India under the Open Skies agreement, including twice-daily non-stop flights, the DCM requested an official briefing on the GOI's anti-hijacking policy (Ref C) -- specifically, a full briefing to relevant Embassy elements (RSO, ECON, POL, etc.) plus advice on how Embassy can best brief US airlines on how they are affected by the GOI policy. Singh agreed to arrange the briefing. RSO added that Continental particularly had asked the Civil Aviation Ministry for this information but was only informed of the existence of a policy (and not the elements of that policy). (NOTE: A GOI Civil Aviation representative was slated to brief the CTJWG but was unable to travel to Washington to attend the meeting. End Note.) Before turning to a broader review of CT training opportunities, RSO noted that, pending a June 1 approval deadline, a DS/ATA Airport Security Consultation is slated for June 26-30.
Making CT Training Smarter
--------------------------
9. (C) After RSO provided an update on ATA courses for India currently in the pipeline (Para 18), Singh passed to the DCM a GOI "wish-list" of ATA courses (Para 19) and a list of courses the GOI could offer to USG law enforcement/military officers (Para 20). RSO pointed out that the Airport Security Consultation could be used to bootstrap other related training, such as on travel document authentication.
10. (C) Moving forward, RSO asked for points of contact among GOI subject-matter experts to identify course objectives ahead of time, to allow USG training providers to modify courses (where possible) to meet GOI objectives. RSO noted the broad spectrum of USG elements that would benefit by having this information.
India "Can't Afford to Lag Behind" on Bio-Metrics
--------------------------------------------- ----
11. (C) Singh raised the issue of bio-metrics cooperation, in which the GOI "can't afford to lag behind," he said. The
NEW DELHI 00003611 004 OF 008
MEA's Consular/Passports/Visas Division coordinates with the Home Ministry in this area. He underlined the role of document authentication in disrupting terrorist (and other illicit) travel and the transit of weapons and other contraband shipments. Singh and the DCM agreed on the importance of harmonizing document standards. The DCM reminded Singh that one problem the USG has in repatriating Indian nationals is the difficulty in verifying their identities; the Embassy's Consular Section works with the Home Ministry but bio-metrics may offer a solution.
Streamlining Flow of Tactical Threat Information
--------------------------------------------- ---
12. (C) The DCM underlined the importance of the Embassy (through the RSO) being able promptly to inform US businesses with equities in India of "the ground truth" on terrorist threat information and terrorist attacks, including hoaxes. Stories periodically appear in the Indian press that sensationalize alleged threats against American interests. While these stories are often based on faulty information, they do serve to increase security concerns in the American corporate community in particular. The DCM explained the USG "No Double Standard" and offered that GOI sources and methods could still be protected under that policy. When Singh asked how such incidents are handled in Washington, RSO informed him the DS Protective Liaison Division keeps close contact with the diplomatic community. One DS Agent typically services several diplomatic missions -- and is able to share tactical terrorist threat information on a real-time basis. Singh concurred that such a service in India is necessary beyond what state police agencies may provide, and suggested the MEA, with inputs from the state police and Home Ministry, would be the likely information provider. The DCM then explained the function of the Embassy's EAC to evaluate imminent threat information and decide on an appropriate response, indicating how reliable real-time GOI terrorist threat information would fit into the Embassy's decision-making process. Singh agreed in principle to create a real-time response mechanism to disseminate GOI terrorist threat information, with RSO as the Embassy's POC. He saw this as important both to the diplomatic community and India's growing pool of expatriate businesses.
"No Complaints" on Intel Sharing
--------------------------------
13. (S) Singh reported that there were "no complaints" from Delhi on US-India intelligence sharing overall, and introduced J/S Kumar as a key contact for intel sharing. The DCM concurred n the positive state of intelligence cooperation. He conveyed his understanding that earlier US concerns in this area have largely been resolved.
Continuing the Ideological Discussion
-------------------------------------
14. (S) The DCM and Singh revisited the CTJWG discussion on
NEW DELHI 00003611 005 OF 008
combating extremist ideology particularly through the Internet without leaving a USG fingerprint. They agreed to schedule separate meetings to pursue this issue and explore how much can be accomplished and how best to do so.
Future Meetings Planned
-----------------------
15. (C) In addition to issue-specific Embassy-GOI meetings to be held over the summer, Singh said that he planned to meet S/CT Ambassador Crumpton in September on the fringes of the UNGA. The DCM noted that Undersecretary Nick Burns plans to visit India in late summer, which would offer an interim opportunity to review CT progress, among other issues.
Comment: Encouraging Signs Continue
-----------------------------------
16. (C) We are encouraged by the MEA's continued receptivity to engage with us more deeply than in recent history on CT issues. Barriers appear to be dissolving even regarding very sensitive issues, such as intelligence sharing and bio-terrorism preparedness. As far as the US-India CT dialogue is concerned, Ambassador Singh embodies the adage that "the right man in the right place at the right time can turn the tide." He has yet to ensure the other actionable parts of the Indian bureaucracy march in the same direction and to the same tune, but it is clear he is serious about making practical CT cooperation work and serious about working with us to do so.
Action Request for SCA and S/CT
-------------------------------
17. (C) Given the GOI's expressed interest in "doing more" on the LTTE (Refs A and B and Para 7), Embassy requests further guidance from SCA and S/CT on moving in coordination with Delhi against LTTE finances and arms flows. We expect also to be queried about what steps the USG is prepared to take against LTTE fund-raising in the US.
ATA Courses In Train for India 2006
-----------------------------------
18. (SBU) Begin list of ATA courses for India 2006:
-- ATA-5345 Executive Course on Cyber-Terrorism Duration: June 12-14 Location: Hyderabad Status: Offer accepted
-- ATA-2994 Post-Blast Investigation Duration: July 17-August 4 Location: Baton Rouge Status: Offer accepted
-- ATA-5062 India Senior Crisis Management Course Duration: August 21-26
NEW DELHI 00003611 006 OF 008
Location: Washington Status: Pending GOI approval
-- ATA-5956 Airport Security Consultation Duration: June 26-30 Location: New Delhi, Mumbai, Hyderabad, Jaipur Status: Requested by the GOI. Pending formal approval
-- ATA-5737 India VIP Protection Course Duration: August 7-25 Location: Baton Rouge Status: Pending GOI approval
GOI "Wish List" for CT Courses
---------------------------------
19. (SBU) Begin lightly edited text of GOI document "ATA Training Courses - Requirements of Indian Police:
Methodology and equipment for countering suicide bombing and fidayeen attacks.
Countermeasures against improvised explosive devices and land mines used against transport vehicles
Terrorist communications systems
Channels of terrorist financing - Modus Operandi and countermeasures
Building personal profile of terrorists/criminals: How to build the profile (including modus operandi) of terrorists and criminals associated with organized crime
Database development: -- What databases are available to investigators in the US? -- How have these databases been built/developed? -- What are the laws associated with the creation and access to these databases?
Experience Sharing: The most valuable input to agencies charged with the task of maintaining security is the experience of other such agencies. At the moment US security forces are dealing with "rural" militancy in Afghanistan and "urban" militancy in Iraq. It is not necessary to send a large number of officers from India. US officers with appropriate experience could come to India for 2-3 day sessions with Indian officers. This idea is an extension of the cooperation between the defense forces of the two countries. We would thus suggest the following:
Experience Sharing/Afghanistan: -- What were the problems faced in Afghanistan at the strategic level; at the tactical level? -- What strategies evolved to resolve the problems? -- How successful were the strategies and what were/are the problems faced in implementing the strategies? -- What were/are the equipment used in these areas by the
NEW DELHI 00003611 007 OF 008
security forces? -- In retrospect, what else could have been done?
Experience Sharing/Iraq: -- What were the problems faced in Iraq at the strategic level; at the tactical level? -- What strategies evolved to resolve the problems? -- How successful were the strategies and what were/are the problems faced in implementing the strategies? -- What were/are the equipment used in these areas by the security forces? -- In retrospect, what else could have been done?
General policing as related to terrorism: -- Forged documentation and travel documents -- Money counterfeiting -- Money laundering
Security Management: -- Airport security -- VIP protection
Intelligence gathering techniques including practical demonstration of the techniques
Illegal immigration management including border patrolling techniques
Forensics medicine: new methodology and tools available to assist investigations
Forensic science: -- DNA fingerprinting -- Other special techniques such as use of polygraph -- Use of voice prints and other biometric measures
End Text.
GOI Offer of CT Courses for USG Personnel
-----------------------------------------
20. (SBU) Begin lightly edited text of GOI document "Counterterrorism Courses for US Forces Personnel in India":
-- Money Laundering at CBI Academy, Ghaziabad
-- Counter-Insurgency and Commando Course at Border Security Forces Training Center & School, Hazaribagh.
-- Weapons & Tactics Course at Central School of Weapons and Tactics, BSF Training Center & School, Indore.
-- Bomb Disposal Course at NSG Training Center, Manesar. (NOTE: NSG is the National Security Group, whose mandate includes VIP protection and response to major acts of terrorism occurring at diplomatic and GOI facilities. End Note.)
NEW DELHI 00003611 008 OF 008
-- Young Officer-Leg. II (Integrated) Course at BSF Academy, Tekanpur
-- Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare Course at Assam Rifles Training Center & School, Dimphu (Nagaland)
-- Training at Greyhounds Regional Training Center, Hyderabad (NOTE: The Greyhounds is a GOI security force targeting India's Naxalites/Maoists. End Note.)
End Text.
--------------
21. (U) XXXXXXXXXXXX
23. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: (http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) BLAKE
Monday, 24 August 2009, 13:34
S E C R E T COLOMBO 000830
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB
EO 12958 DECL: 08/23/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PREF, PHUM, EAID, MOPS, CE
SUBJECT: DOCTORS FROM NO-FIRE ZONE RELEASED ON BAIL
REF: COLOMBO 695
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JAMES R. MOORE. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)
1. (S) Four government doctors, held by the police Criminal Investigation Division (CID) since the end of the war in May for allegedly filing false reports on civilian casualties in the No-Fire Zone during the last several months of the war, were released on bail today. XXXXXXXXXXXX
2. (S) The doctors XXXXXXXXXXXX had been pressured to give the press conference held in early July (reftel), where they recanted all the statements they had made from the No-Fire Zone. They said they were heavily coached for the press conference, given specific lines to say, and even practiced with several members of the local media beforehand. They said they XXXXXXXXXXXX had not lied when giving their original statements during the war.
3. XXXXXXXXXXXX.
4. XXXXXXXXXXXX
5. (S) Comment: The release of the four doctors is a welcome step by the GSL, but clearly they remain under investigation by the CID and now also are potentially under threat of abduction or extrajudicial killing. Post will continue to monitor the situation very closely, but for now the doctors appear to want to maintain as low a profile as possible, without undue attention brought to them either in Sri Lanka or internationally. End Comment. MOORE
Wednesday, 28 March 2007, 12:06
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 001485
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SCA FOR AMBASSADOR WILLIAM B. WOOD
EO 12958 DECL: 03/28/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, EAID, ECON, ENRG, SCUL, SOCI, AF, IN
SUBJECT: OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDIAN SOFT POWER IN AFGHANISTAN
REF: A. NEW DELHI 1327 B. NEW DELHI 729 C. HOWARD-KESHAP E-MAIL 09MAR07
NEW DELHI 00001485 001.2 OF 005
Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: As requested, this cable contains specific, concrete ideas for opportunities for India to use soft power in helping Afghanistan's reconstruction, with the broader objective of seeking ways for the U.S. to synergize its efforts with Afghanistan's "natural ally." Some of the ideas are new, many are not, but the intent is to develop a brief reference for the opportunities which are available. India has significant aid to offer, including affordable Indian professionals (versus more expensive Westerners), energy production, and training capabilities in areas such as law enforcement, election commission training, foreign service training, and administrative services, much of which can be relatively cheaply accomplished in India.
2. (C) Trilateral cooperation on infrastructure and capacity building projects among the U.S., Japan and India could also bring economies of scale and/or effective divisions of labor. Transit through Pakistan would greatly enhance India's ability to contribute to Afghan reconstruction. We would also have to overcome Pakistani objection to Indian force protection if India is to expand its role. The recommendations contained herein come with the caveat that Post has only an outsider's view of Afghanistan, and realizes that Embassy Kabul and Washington (not to mention the government of Afghanistan) are best placed to identify Afghanistan's needs. END SUMMARY.
Background: A Natural Ally, Already Giving Generously
------
3. (C) Indian experts on Afghanistan, such as XXXXXXXXXXXX believe India is well-regarded and liked in Afghanistan, and calls India a "natural ally" to the Afghan people. India and Afghanistan are considered to be close, and share good relations. There are no diplomatic issues between the two countries, nor is there any significant political or popular opposition in India to aid to Afghanistan. As Afghanistan transitions to a better future, diverse, democratic, multi-ethnic India can serve as a giant role model. India is already a major donor to Afghan reconstruction, with around $750 million pledged -- making it, we believe, the fifth largest donor country -- and is already involved in projects in a wide range of sectors, including electricity, road construction, and telecommunications, and has even in the past contributed as it could to agriculture and health. Indian aid to Afghanistan is tempered by what New Delhi perceives as Pakistani intransigence, which questions India's motives and does not allow for much cheaper overland transit of goods, personnel or equipment.
NEW DELHI 00001485 002.2 OF 005
WHAT INDIA CAN OFFER
------
Affordable Professionals
------
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX when asked to highlight India's contribution, immediately answered that the best bang for the buck comes from India's professionals, specifically engineers. India's relatively low-paid engineers are more cost-efficient employees than those from Western countries, XXXXXXXXXXXX maintains. Without having specific figures on hand, XXXXXXXXXXXX estimated that Afghanistan could hire many times the number of India engineers to live and work in the country for the same price as one European. Indian engineers are currently engaged in power construction, public works projects, telecommunications infrastructure, and road construction.
Affordable Training
------
5. (C) The GOI is already bringing Afghans to India for training in various fields much more cheaply than what most other countries can offer. From 2002-2006, more than 1300 Afghans were trained in various Indian institutions and universities, and since March 2006, India has offered short-term training courses for 500 Afghans annually. In addition, 500 Afghan students annually will be offered graduate and post-graduate education in India. XXXXXXXXXXXX believes that by bringing Afghans to India for training, Afghanistan is able to train five-to-six times as many people as would otherwise be possible. Training programs exist in law enforcement, diplomacy (at India's Foreign Service Institute), urban development, English, agriculture development, IT, civil administration parliamentary procedures and other capacity building areas. We believe India would welcome ideas for other areas that would match Afghanistan's needs. Given India's experience in running elections for a billion people, one new area to consider would be training, either in India or Afghanistan, for Afghanistan's central/local election commissions and election officials. Another new area where India would seem to match up well would be training for parliamentary procedures and support, political party organization, and local administration. If needed again, India could likely revive past training programs for Afghans in justice, journalism, civil aviation, or the small programs on marketing and enterprise development for women and in-service teacher training.
Administrative Service
------
6. (C) India is already in the process of sending some
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thirty Indian Administrative Service officers to Afghanistan (ref a). As other ministries and government offices are identified as needing outside expertise, India could be asked to increase these numbers and administrative programs could be specifically targeted to receive specialized training.
Affordable Energy
-----
7. (C) The India-led Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul power transmission line is running ahead of schedule and on budget, and should provide significant energy to Afghanistan. India is contributing to further energy production with the Salma Dam project in Herat province, and has some smaller projects ongoing, including in solar energy production. India has expertise in power generation through mountainous and difficult terrain, and could be called on for additional assistance in this area. Indian firms are also global leaders in wind power. The best incentive for full-scale Indian assistance, not to mention private sector investment, would be a political agreement which would allow power lines to transit Pakistan, connecting India all the way through to Central Asia.
People-to-People
------
8. (C) India was proud to provide food aid (in the form of high protein biscuits) during the 2002 "Back to School" campaign, as well as humanitarian assistance in earthquake relief in 2002. Should such a need arise again, India should be one of the first countries Afghanistan turns to. People-to-people exchanges are also popular in India with several NGOs promoting youth and cultural exchanges with counterparts in Pakistan and the U.S. If and when appropriate, India should be encouraged to develop exchange programs with symbolic significance, such as inviting the Afghan national women's soccer team, or kids from the Afghan Youth Sports Exchange (maximum exposure if they have anyone willing to come to play cricket). As is being done in another exchange program here, young Afghans could be invited to visit top Indian (or locally-based American?) corporations in the field of their interest to take on short internships. Numerous other possibilities exist, but one other area that seems ripe is Bollywood. We understand Bollywood movies are wildly popular in Afghanistan, so willing Indian celebrities could be asked to travel to Afghanistan to help bring attention to social issues there.
Straight Donations
------
9. (C) In addition to humanitarian and medical supplies provided in 2002, India has provided direct donations of materiel to Afghanistan, and could likely fill specific requests in the future. Our research indicates that India
NEW DELHI 00001485 004.2 OF 005
has given buses, minibuses, utility vehicles, aircraft, education kits, books, school desks, laboratory equipment, musical instruments, computers and sports supplies.
Multi-lateral Partnerships
------
10. (C) The 21st Century Leadership Alliance can provide the basis for greater cooperation between the U.S., India and Japan in promoting democracy and good governance in Afghanistan. The recent inception of the joint U.S.-Japan-India project to develop the Public Administration program at Kabul University could serve as a model for similar cooperation in other fields, such as agriculture, veterinary science, English or other foreign language development, or even faculty development. In addition to three-way collaboration, XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that, even when the U.S., India and Japan are not working together, they could coordinate better on divisions of labor which could more effectively target donor money and efforts, and take advantage of each country's area of expertise. Additionally, we could explore ways to use the U.S.-Japan Strategic Development Alliance to approach India on other coordinated trilateral projects.
IMPEDIMENTS TO INDIA'S CONTRIBUTION
------
Pakistan Withholds Transit Access
------
11. (C) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX and other Embassy contacts, transit through Pakistan is imperative for the economic integration of the region, and would be mutually beneficial for Pakistan, Afghanistan and India. However, India's perception is that Pakistan is creating obstacles that prevent such a land route from becoming a reality, and Afghan Embassy officials have indicated that they are pessimistic that the Government of Pakistan (GOP) will budge on this issue (ref b). We should use every opportunity to continue to press the GOP to allow this essential transit route. This issue will be on the agenda at the upcoming South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) meeting April 3-4, and XXXXXXXXXXXX, who told PolCouns March 12 that obtaining a transit route from Afghanistan through Pakistan to India was the "only benefit of Afghanistan's membership in SAARC," and that SAARC would be a disappointment if it didn't advance the transit issue. (COMMENT: Transit across Pakistan would also reduce India's reliance on Iran. END COMMENT.)
The Security Issue
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12. (C) Security continues to be an issue of public concern in sending Indians to work in Afghanistan. Since 2003, two Indian engineers have been abducted, and three other workers
NEW DELHI 00001485 005.2 OF 005
have been executed in Afghanistan. The Indian media says Indians who work specifically on road-building projects in Afghanistan are targeted due to Pakistani and Taliban fears that completion of a highway to Central Asia will increase India's influence in the region, thereby threatening Pakistan's interests in the region. Pakistan is also said to be opposed to India assuming a larger security role in Afghanistan. As Sudha Ramachandran said in a recent article, given Pakistan's sensitivities, India is not able to provide its own security for Indians working in Afghanistan. India will need to work out, with those suspicious of its motives, a way to protect its people on the ground, or it will not achieve its full potential in using soft power in Afghanistan.
13. (U) As an outsider looking in, Post realizes that Embassy Kabul and Washington (as well as the government of Afghanistan) are best placed to identify Afghanistan's needs. MULFORD
Thursday, 25 February 2010, 12:56
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 000355
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/17/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, PARM, KNNP, ENRG, IR, PK, IN
SUBJECT: NSA MENON DISCUSSES REGIONAL SECURITY AND TRADE
ISSUES WITH CODEL MCCASKILL
Classified By: Ambassador Tim Roemer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY. In a meeting with CODEL McCaskill February 17, National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon touched on regional security issues including Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, as well as several trade-related issues including defense acquisitions, India's Medium Multiple Role Fighter Aircraft (MMRCA) tender, export controls, civil nuclear cooperation, and genetically modified foods. Menon credited intelligence shared by the United States with helping to protect targets in the vicinity of the February 13 Pune bombing, leaving the terrorists no alternative but to go after a soft target instead. Terrorism would be "the primary issue" in the planned February 25 Foreign Secretary-level talks with Pakistan, but Menon allowed that the agenda could expand after the first round of talks depending on Pakistan's response. Menon cautioned that if the Pakistani establishment felt U.S. commitment was flagging in Afghanistan it would not do what was needed in the West. Menon was skeptical about the effect of new sanctions on the divided Iranian elite, but India would continue to implement any sanctions approved by the UN Security Council; Menon hoped they would be carefully targeted. He emphasized the importance for the U.S.-India relationship of "being seen to be sharing technology," and would encourage the Indian Embassy in Washington to explain India's proposed reforms on export controls directly to Senate staff. Menon confirmed the government would introduce civil nuclear liability legislation in the next Parliament. END SUMMARY.
Menon Touts "Full-spectrum" Relationship, Discusses Pune Bombing
- - -
2. (C) In a wide-ranging meeting with CODEL McCaskill February 17, National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon touched on several regional security and trade-related issues. Whereas the U.S.-India relationship used to be too narrow, Menon said we now had the opposite problem, a "full-spectrum" relationship touching on virtually every area of life, with correspondingly high expectations for what we can accomplish together.
3. (C) Menon welcomed the condolences offered by Senator Claire McCaskill (D-MO) for the February 13 bombing in Pune that killed 10 and injured dozens. The bombing was "a shock, yet not shocking," considering India's familiar experience as a terrorist target. Menon credited intelligence shared by the United States with helping prompt the Indian government to protect targets in the vicinity of the attack, such as the Chabad House and Osho Ashram, perhaps leaving the terrorists no alternative but to go after a soft target instead. Three groups had claimed responsibility, but the government had not come to any conclusions about the perpetrators. In India's long history of dealing with terrorism, Menon said, "Most attacks lead back to Pakistan."
"Many Pakistans"
- - -
4. (C) Menon recounted that India had entered into the Composite Dialogue with Pakistan on the basis of former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's assurance that India would not be targeted by terrorists as long as the talks continued. This dialogue process entered into a pause in 2007 at Musharraf's request when he was faced with difficult domestic challenges, which ultimately led to his ouster. Since then, India endured serial bombing attacks throughout 2008, two attacks on its embassy in Kabul (one he attributed to the Haqqani Network and the other to Lashkar-e-Tayiba), and then the November 26, 2008 attacks in Mumbai, known as
NEW DELHI 00000355 002 OF 004
"26/11." Menon lamented that Pakistan had shown itself to be "unable or unwilling to wean itself off from terror as an instrument of state policy." He alluded to evidence that serving Pakistani officials were involved in the 26/11 attacks.
5. (C) Menon shared his perspective that "We are dealing with many Pakistans, so we need to run many Pakistan policies at the same time." He stressed that even after the Mumbai attacks India did not sever trade or travel ties with Pakistan because these elements of the relationship were important to achieving an eventual peace with Pakistan. As a "true democracy," public opinion defined the limits of India's forebearance, but Menon stressed that India did not wish to play into the hands of the terrorists by shunning dialogue.
6. (C) Terrorism would be "the primary issue" in the planned February 25 Foreign Secretary-level talks, but Menon allowed that after the first talks "it will be up to the Pakistanis how they respond." A peaceful, stable Pakistan was in India's national interest, which was "why we keep trying." Menon confessed that the Indian government's expectations for talks today were lower than when India had entered into talks with Pakistan in the past because "We don't think Pakistan is capable of delivering much, but what's the alternative?" He concluded, "A peaceful, stable Pakistan is in our interest; we will work at it even if they make it hard for us."
Afghanistan: Menon a "Minority of One"
- - -
7. (C) Turning to Pakistan's role in Afghanistan, Menon cautioned that if the Pakistani establishment felt U.S. commitment was flagging in Afghanistan it would "sit it out and use the Indian threat as an excuse for not doing what was needed" in the West. Menon said he may be a "minority of one," but he thought there was more potential for success in Afghanistan than most observers in India. The British were convinced the Coalition would lose because they lost three wars there, but others had been able to tame the country. Menon trumpeted India's assistance program of small, community-based projects, saying it took Indian officials one-and-a-half years to navigate around the ministries in Kabul to get direct access to local people, but it had paid off enormously. He cited one instance in which 13,000 Afghans had applied for exams to qualify for Indian scholarships; not all of them were qualified, but it showed how strong the desire was for such opportunities. He concluded that success will require "more than just a military effort."
8. (C) McCaskill agreed we had a chance to succeed because we had adjusted our strategy. McCaskill was confident the United States would continue to sustain the 300,000 strong Afghan National Security Forces even if we began to draw down troops in 2011. Menon observed that "the wonder of the U.S. system is how quickly you learn; that cannot be said of any other country in the world."
Iran: A Choice Among "Unsatisfactory Strategies"
- - -
9. (C) Menon agreed with Senator Jeff Merkley's (D-OR) assertion that a nuclear Iran would be bad for everyone. Merkley had supported the Obama Administration's efforts to seek dialogue with Iran, but it was now clear the Islamic Republic was not open to dialogue. Menon replied that "the last thing we want is another nuclear power in our neighborhood." That was why India voted against Iran three times at the IAEA and implemented UN sanctions. Iran was
NEW DELHI 00000355 003 OF 004
"hopping mad" over India's IAEA votes and Iranian Foreign Minister Moutakki "blew up" at former National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan during his last visit to Delhi. "It goes without saying," according to Menon, that India would continue to implement any sanctions against Iran approved by the Security Council.
10. (C) India had a more complex relationship with Iran and was convinced that it could work with Iran on some issues. For instance, Menon asserted that Iran was more worried about the Taliban today than ISAF, which was not the case a year ago. The trouble was that the Iranian elite was divided, so the normal rules of Iranian politics no longer seemed to apply. Under these circumstances, Menon asked, "What effect will sanctions have?" "If you must impose sanctions, we will go along with it," according to Menon, "but we should be aware that it could end up benefiting the regime." He said any sanctions should be carefully targeted so they do not end up hurting the people rather than the elite. He concluded that the Iran situation was "very unsatisfactory from our point of view as well," and that the United States had "a choice among unsatisfactory strategies."
Trade Issues: Fighters, Export Controls, Civ Nuke, GM Foods
- - -
11. (C) Menon said he appreciated all that the India and the United States had been able to accomplish together, and said we needed to do more on defense cooperation. McCaskill remarked about the Boeing presence in St. Louis and inquired about the MMRCA fighter tender. Menon said the technical evaluations would wrap up in April and the tender would be awarded following a fair process. He added that the C-17 deal was almost done and only a few "loose ends" needed to be tied up.
12. (C) "In order to kick the relationship into a different gear," according to Menon, we needed "to be seen to be sharing technology." We both have complex legal and regulatory structures, some left over from the Cold War, "ancient stuff." It could take years to change this, but we have to try. McCaskill agreed, suggesting the possibility of using the annual Defense Authorization Legislation, which moves through Congress annually "like clockwork," to eliminate "legislative handcuffs." Menon said he would ask the Indian Embassy in Washington to be in touch with McCaskill's staff to walk them through India's proposed changes.
13. (C) Merkley praised Menon's role in helping to conclude the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and inquired about progress on implementation. Menon mentioned planned Reprocessing Consultations March 2-4 in Delhi, adding, "If we could accomplish the 123 Agreement, I don't see how this can stop us." Menon said unequivocally, "We're introducing liability legislation to the next Parliament."
14. (C) McCaskill noted that if there is one issue with regard to India that makes Americans "cranky" it is that India was stealing our manufacturing base. Pointing out that Monsanto was also located in Missouri, she conceded that genetically modified foods were controversial, but noted that the United States purchased Indian GM cotton. Menon said we were just catching "the peak of the wave" on this issue in India, noting that the papers were full of vigorous arguments on both sides. He thanked McCaskill for reminding him that in difficult economic times these issues had the potential to take on added proportion in the relationship.
15. (C) Codel McCaskill did not have the opportunity to clear this cable.
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ROEMER
Tuesday, 23 February 2010, 13:08
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000334
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/01/2020
TAGS PREL, IN, PK, AF, IR
SUBJECT: INDIAN VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN: EAGER FOR INCREASED
USG COORDINATION, WARY OF PAKISTANI SCHEMING, SKEPTICAL ON R/R
REF: NEW DELHI 225 (INDIAN ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN)
Classified By: Political Counselor Uzra Zeya for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ).
1. (C) Summary: In a February 22 meeting, YK Sinha -- India's A/S equivalent for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran -- welcomed increased GOI-USG coordination "at all levels" on our respective assistance activities in Afghanistan. He warned the USG not to be drawn into what he characterized as a Pakistani "game" of enlisting American support to "drive India out of Afghanistan" by presenting "fabricated" evidence of alleged Indian misdeeds in Afghanistan or the border areas. Sinha praised the Secretary's interventions regarding assistance to Afghan women during the January London Conference on Afghanistan, but expressed skepticism over reintegration/reconciliation efforts and claimed that Iran, Russia, and the Central Asian republics share similar doubts about the potential efficacy of such efforts. End Summary.
More Assistance Coordination
----------------------------
2. (C) Sinha told PolCouns that India welcomes increased coordination with the USG "at all levels, here and in Kabul" regarding assistance activities in Afghanistan "so that our respective interests are not undermined by Pakistan." He proposed a meeting in the near future between Foreign Secretary Rao and the Ambassador as a useful step in this direction. PolCouns affirmed our keen interest in such coordination, as Afghanistan remains a top priority issue for USG visitors to India. Sinha described Indian assistance efforts as driven largely by the Indian Embassy in Kabul (reftel): "Delhi sets the broad parameters and provides oversight, but the Embassy in Kabul implements most assistance." He identified the Indian DCM in Kabul as the GOI point person for Afghan assistance and encouraged U.S. Mission staff in Afghanistan to coordinate more closely with him.
3. (C) Sinha reminded PolCouns that he had previously broached the topic by "thinking out loud" about increased Indian training of Afghan security personnel, and claimed that U.S.-based think tanks and editorial writers were now advocating a greater security training role for India. He added that he understood this remains a sensitive topic for the USG, and stressed that India was not trying to get out in front on the issue, nor had it received such training requests from the Afghan government. PolCouns agreed that the topic is indeed a point of sensitivity for the USG, noting that in our view the overall costs of increased Indian security training outweigh the benefits. In response to PolCouns' encouraging focused Indian assistance on agriculture and education, Sinha noted India's announcement at the London Conference of 300 scholarships per year for the next 5 years for Afghans studying agriculture.
Beware of Pakistan's "Game"
---------------------------
4. (C) Sinha contended that "it is quite clear to India" that Pakistan views Afghanistan "as a zero sum game and they want India out of Afghanistan." He stated that "we will not leave Afghanistan because we have strategic interests there." Acknowledging that the USG "needs Pakistan for many things right now," Sinha counseled that the USG beware of Pakistan's "game" of enlisting American support to "drive India out of Afghanistan." He suggested that Islamabad would likely present USG officials with "fabricated" evidence of alleged Indian misbehavior in Afghanistan or the border areas, namely the FATA.
Doubts About R/R
----------------
NEW DELHI 00000334 002 OF 002
5. (C) Sinha praised the Secretary's interventions regarding assistance to Afghan women during the January London Conference on Afghanistan, characterizing her remarks as among the most significant made at the Conference and lamenting that they were overshadowed in media coverage by focus on security issues. While he conceded that some form of reconciliation is necessary for the successful resolution of any armed conflict, Sinha expressed skepticism over prospects for Afghan-led reintegration/reconciliation efforts. PolCouns outlined the distinctions between reintegration and reconciliation in the Afghan context. Sinha claimed that Iran, Russia, and the Central Asian republics share similar doubt about the potential efficacy of such efforts. Sinha closed the discussion on Afghanistan by asserting that a precipitate U.S. exit would embolden "fanatics" to feel they had defeated both the USSR and the U.S., "and the result will be very bad for the region." ROEMER
Wednesday, 24 February 2010, 13:55
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000351
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/23/2020
TAGS PREL, PTER, PARM, SENV, PK, IN
SUBJECT: SENATOR KERRY AND INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY RAO ON
INDO-PAKISTAN TALKS
Classified By: Ambassador Timothy Roemer. Reasons: 1.4(B, D).
1. (C) Summary: In a February 15 meeting with Senator Kerry, Indian Foreign Secretary Rao underlined that Indo-Pakistani talks slated for February 25 enjoy high-level support and were still on track. Rao stressed that the latest rounds of talk would not segue automatically into the formal Composite Dialogue and that a "climate of confidence" was needed to make the talks productive. In response to Senator Kerry's question, Rao emphasized the bilateral nature of the talks, while inviting U.S. encouragement and support. On Afghanistan, the Foreign Secretary cited Indian interests and criticized Pakistani attempts to exclude New Delhi from regional discussions. Rao said the GOI was "refining" its legislation on civil nuclear liability and was committed to implementing the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. End Summary.
2. (SBU) Senator Kerry (D-MA) and Ambassador Roemer met with Indian Foreign Secretary Rao on February 15 for forty-five minutes for a wide-ranging discussion of upcoming Indo-Pakistan talks, Afghanistan, implementing the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement, defense sales and climate change. The Senator's talks with Prime Minister Singh, National Security Advisor Menon and Defense Minister Antony will be reported septel. Senator Kerry was accompanied by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffers Jonah Blank and Fatema Sumar and military escort LCDR Greg Kausner. MEA Joint Secretary (Americas) Gaitri Kumar joined the Foreign Secretary.
Indo-Pakistan Talks Still On
----------
3. (C) After expressing his condolences over the February 13 terrorist bombing in Pune, Senator Kerry focused on the proposed talks between Foreign Secretary Rao and her Pakistani counterpart, now scheduled for February 25. Kerry stressed U.S. interest in and support for the talks and noted that there was a long history of distrust to overcome. He noted he would be meeting with the Pakistani leadership later on February 15 and pressed Rao for her sense of where the talks were heading.
4. (C) FS Rao underlined that support for moving ahead with the talks came from Prime Minister Singh and that he remained strongly committed to dialogue with Pakistan despite incidents such as the November 2008 Mumbai attacks. She explained that the PM had to take public opinion into account, which had worn thin after Mumbai, so there had been a pause in talks for the past 15 months. Responding to Kerry's question about what the GOP needed to do to make such talks productive, Rao said that a helpful environment could be created if Pakistan took steps to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure. She recognized there had been progress through some arrests and through the Pakistani trial of seven accused in the Mumbai attacks, although the trial would move forward slowly because of Pakistan's complicated domestic problems. At the same time, terrorist camps still remained open; infiltration over the Line of Control had seen an unseasonable increase during the winter; LeT and JuD leaders like Hafiz Saeed had threatened India with jihaad at large public rallies; and GOP rhetoric against India was on the rise. India wanted to see concrete steps to dismantle these structures.
5. (C) FS Rao was careful to note that it would take some time to move from the latest round of talks to the formal Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan that had been paused following Mumbai. Such talks "can't just be switched on" and India needed "a climate of confidence" in order to proceed to a resumption of the full dialogue. She speculated that Pakistani COAS General Kayani was likely to tell the Senator that India's military doctrine continued to pose a threat to Pakistan and observed that the Pakistani military was "hypnotically obsessed" with India's military posture
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despite constant reassurances from India about its intentions.
No U.S. Help Needed on Peace Talk Process
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6. (C) Senator Kerry asked if there were ways the United States could engage differently that would support the talks, perhaps through a regional approach that offered security guarantees with other interested states that would promote stability. Rao urged that the U.S. use it "enormous power" to encourage Pakistan to move forward in a productive way to create a positive climate for discussions. On process, Rao assured Kerry that India and Pakistan had established bilateral processes that should be used. As to Kerry's suggestion of a regional approach that also involved outside powers, Rao said her instinctive reaction was that India and Pakistan needed to engage more effectively to create a level of trust that would support bilateral talks first.
Afghanistan
----------
7. (C) Senator Kerry stressed that the U.S. was serious about its commitment to the region and that there were different possibilities for success than there had been even six months ago. He assured Rao that the July 2011 date to begin withdrawal of combat forces from Afghanistan would not end U.S. commitment in Afghanistan. The date was intended to bring leverage to bear on Afghan officials to make necessary reforms. On the Pakistani side of the border, a change was needed in the dynamics of how a fragile Pakistani civilian government and its strong military interacted with groups such as the Quetta Shura and Haqqani. Rao stressed India's commitment to its reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. She criticized Pakistani attempts to try to exclude India from regional discussions of Afghanistan and dismissed GOP criticism of India's presence in consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar, noting the consultates had originally been established in the fifties and were carrying out normal consular responsibilities.
Civil Nuclear Agreement, Clean Energy, Climate Change
----------
8. (SBU) Senator Kerry urged that the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement be fully implemented, noting that there had been questions raised in Washington about delays in moving forward. Rao assured him that the GOI recognized the necessity of coming to closure and said that nuclear liability legislation was being "further refined" and it would be ready for the next session of Parliament which opens on February 22. Kerry stressed that the U.S. and India could work together and become leaders in the field of alternative energy and Rao pointed to a bilateral MOU signed in November 2009 as supporting such cooperative efforts.
9. (SBU) Referring to the Copenhagen Summit, FS Rao said it was positive that agreement had been reached, but noted that the Accord was not a legally binding agreement. She expressed concern that pending climate change legislation in the U.S. Congress might include trade-related provisions. Senator Kerry reassured her that there was no intention to act in a unilateral or punitive fashion, but noted that an agreement among the largest emitters could not be sustained if there was no enforcement mechanism. Legislation in Congress needed to address that possibility in order to be politically sustainable.
Military Sales and Export Controls
-----------
10. (SBU) The Senator encouraged India to consider bids by Boeing and Lockheed Martin in the competition to award a contract for fighter aircraft purchases. Rao assured Kerry that India was open-minded and was using open and transparent procedures. She hailed the increase in defense cooperation
NEW DELHI 00000351 003 OF 003
as measured by increased U.S. defense sales, while noting that liberalization of export controls was a necessity if both sides wanted the relationship to grow further.
11. (U) This message has been cleared by Codel Kerry. ROEMER
Friday, 02 March 2007, 14:42
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 001051
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/01/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, EFIN, PINR, MOPS, KDEM, KISL, IN
SUBJECT: INDIANS OFFER BLEAK ASSESSMENT OF AFGHANISTAN AND
SOUTH ASIAN REGION DURING CTJWG
NEW DELHI 00001051 001.2 OF 005
Classified By: DCM Geoffrey Pyatt, Reason 1.4 (B, D)
1. (S) Summary: During the February 28, 2007 session of the U.S.-India Counter-Terrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG), the Indian delegation gave a tour d'horizon of developments in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal to help set the stage for the day's discussions (reported Septel). Indian interlocutors presented a bleak assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan. The Taliban insurgency was gaining strength, according to the Indians, while the central government in Kabul remains weak and divided. The delegation offered an open, but doubting attitude about whether Pakistan had made a permanent policy decision to uproot terrorist infrastructure on its territory. The Indians noted, however, that New Delhi remained committed to working through the Indo-Pakistani Joint Counterterrorism Mechanism, which holds its first meeting March 6. Indian officials were concerned about the first hints of Islamic extremism taking root in Sri Lanka, and were cautiously optimistic about prospects for the peace process currently unfolding in Nepal. End Summary.
Afghanistan: Internal Situation Deteriorating
--------------------------------------------- -
2. (S) At the request of Ambassador K.C. Singh, head of the Indian delegation to the CTJWG, Sharad Kumar, Joint Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, provided India's assessment of Afghanistan. Kumar noted he had a rather grim view of the near- and mid-term prospects for stability in the country. The death toll was mounting from various insurgency attacks, and both the scale and scope of these attacks were on the rise. While there had been some coalition successes in neutralizing the influence of key members of the Talib Shura, the insurgency itself was still moving further into the provinces. The Taliban had now set up seven operational councils within Afghanistan and were pursuing effective operations in each region. Even more worrisome, Kumar stated, was the fact that key Taliban leaders had recruited a large number of suicide bombers who were now ready for attacks.
3. (S) There were also signs of increasing ties between the Taliban and Al-Qa'ida elements on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, a fact which is of major significance for stability in both countries. From the debriefings of Dr. Mohammed Hanif, a key Taliban spokesman arrested on January 15, Kumar stated that "we now know that Mullah Omar is under Pakistani protection." India had also learned that the former chief of Pakistan's ISI was directly involved in assistance to the Taliban.
4. (S) Meanwhile, the central government in Kabul had been largely unable to expand its influence outside of the capital. The country, Kumar observed, was falling further into the clutches of tribalism and warlordism. President Karzai was in a "feeble" political position; there was severe bickering within his team and it was unclear that he would be able to implement much through either the tribal jirga or the Wolesi jirga. Karzai was walking a very delicate line, according to Kumar, and not advancing the cause of peace and stability that much.
5. (S) In India's view, NATO and ISAF were not on the same wavelength; their unwillingness to engage in direct combat
NEW DELHI 00001051 002.2 OF 005
was the wrong approach for the current situation in Afghanistan. Any agreement with the tribes would provide temporary relief, at best. Talks with the various leaders, moreover, were also unlikely to be successful. In addition to speaking with more moderate leaders, NATO and ISAF were speaking with the hardliners, a fact which sent the wrong message to these leaders about their status and ability to influence the situation in Afghanistan.
India Committed to Assisting the Afghan Economy, Preventing the Development of a Narco-State
------------------------------
6. (S) India had committed $750 million in assistance to Afghanistan, the goal of which was to help the country develop an economy that was no longer dependent on drug monies. Through efforts such as key road construction projects, India hoped to help "today's smugglers become tomorrow's businessmen." Indian interests -- both commercial and official -- had been targeted, even as New Delhi attempted to assist Afghanistan with its transition to a more stable economy. The road construction crews had been rocketed and bombed; there had been kidnappings and other personal attacks on Indians. Physical attacks were not the only obstacle, however. Kumar stated that India was hampered in its desire to open up natural and historic trade links with Afghanistan by the lack of overland transit through Pakistan. If India could transit humanitarian goods through Pakistan, savings could be ploughed back into Afghan development.
7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX remarked that India was specifically looking at improving controls on Indian precursor chemicals as a means to limit and degrade Afghanistan's opium/heroin production. New Delhi had met with counterparts from China, Iran, Pakistan and the UAE recently to enhance regional efforts to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals to Afghanistan. India was also sharing information directly with Pakistan, since there was ample evidence that opium and heroin were leaving Afghanistan and entering India via Pakistan. Jammu and Kashmir and the Punjab were the primary land routes.
U.S. Side Shares Concerns About Afghanistan's Future, But Less Pessimistic
-----------------------------
8. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the U.S. shared some of India's concerns, but did not share in the overall bleak assessment. The U.S. was actively engaged in programs to mitigate the risk of Afghanistan becoming a narco-state; America's own experience in dealing with countries such as Colombia had given U.S. policymakers a very clear idea of the problems for regional stability that are associated with a nation falling into this void. Deputy Chief of Mission Geoff Pyatt hailed U.S.-India counternarcotics cooperation as the "gold standard" by which the U.S. and India should seek to emulate in other areas of CT collaboration. Our ability to share sensitive evidence bilaterally, our joint capabilities to conduct surveillance and operations to wrap up narcotics rings demonstrated both nations' resolve to tackle this issue in the region.
NEW DELHI 00001051 003.2 OF 005
9. (S) Continuing with his response, XXXXXXXXXXXX added threats from corruption within Afghanistan as yet another problem to be monitored and fought. Drawing on the news that new suicide bombers had been trained and were poised to attack, the U.S. side also discussed the international dimension of this jihadist activity. Extremists could travel to Afghanistan from many regions -- North Africa, Chechnya, Central Asia -- and receive training in terrorist camps in Afghanistan. Even if/when international partners were finally able to stabilize this country, the terrorists would be able to take their skills and knowledge to a different part of the world, and to a new zone of conflict. The capabilities become part of a global terrorist knowledge base.
10. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX outlined some of the successes in the country and noted that the Karzai government had been able to increase stability and return to greater normalcy. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted India's request for land access to Afghanistan through Pakistan and said he would relay the request and register it in Washington.
India Open but Cautious about U.S. CT Cooperation with Pakistan
--------------
11. (S) In a very measured assessment of Pakistan, Ambassador Singh acknowledged U.S. reasons for pursuing CT cooperation with Pakistan, but stated that India, itself, maintained a certain skepticism about whether Islamabad had truly made a sea-change in its approach to this issue. New Delhi had seen evidence of at least tactical decisions to dismantle camps and terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan, but the Indians still receive a great deal of intelligence that shows that Islamabad may not intend to uproot this capability permanently. Pakistani authorities appear to have a desire to keep at least some assets intact in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. India's "nightmare scenario" is that this ad hoc set of actions results in a long-term trend in which terrorist groups are able to find permanent sanctuary in Afghanistan. "We do not want another century of instability," Singh stated.
12. (S) The GOI currently saw a decline in the number of infiltrations across the Line of Control (LOC), said Singh, but it was too early to tell whether this was permanent or, indeed, whether this fact mattered that much in terms of overall terrorist infiltration rates into India. Singh outlined three facts that are influencing this short-term trend.
--Both sides had stepped up policing activities on the border; --It was still winter in the border regions; one could only get a real sense as to infiltration numbers once the spring thaw arrived, and; -There is a disturbing new trend of terrorist groups using India's long, unmonitored borders with Nepal and Bangladesh to move terrorists into the Indian heartland.
Both the Bangalore and Hyderabad plots, Singh stated, were masterminded by terrorists who had come across the border with Bangladesh.
13. (S) India remained open and committed to the Counterterrorism Joint Mechanism with Pakistan. If dialogue
NEW DELHI 00001051 004.2 OF 005
is to succeed, Singh remarked, then India had to put Pakistan's willingness to engage to a legitimate test. Indian resolve will come under public scrutiny, of course, since the press is asking -- perhaps rightly -- why it has taken six months for the mechanism to hold its first full-scale meeting, and whether this lag demonstrates that Islamabad actually has no real desire to see this process succeed.
14. (S) The potential worth of the mechanism had already been proven just this month, as both sides were able to insulate the bilateral relationship from a potential downturn after the Samjhuauta train attack by agreeing immediately to discussions of this tragedy in the Joint Mechanism meeting on March 6. Nevertheless, Singh said, the Indians had received real push-back from Islamabad about establishing a regularized schedule for these talks. Singh mused that both sides had to accept the fact that extremists would probably try to disrupt any dialogue process -- periodic or permanent -- through attacks timed around the next round. That said, it would not be productive for the two sides only to meet if and when there had been some sort of attack.
15. (S) For this round, India will be presenting its evidence on the July 2006 Mumbai blasts. Singh noted it was unclear whether the Indian interagency process was prepared at this time to put evidence and information about the Panipat attack before the Pakistanis. Pakistan, he thought, would probably table concerns about alleged Indian activities in Afghanistan which Islamabad perceived as against its interests. The real issue, he said, is to get the dialogue away from the public--and political-- platforms and into a channel in which issues can be thoroughly vetted.
Sri Lanka Now More At Risk from Islamic Jihadist Activity?
----------------
16. (S) Turning to Sri Lanka, Ambassador Singh briefly recounted the historic reasons behind India's decision to adopt its current cautious position towards the conflict in that country. The peace agreement with the LTTE was more honored in the breach at this juncture; that said, New Delhi supported Colombo's current approach. Sudden or direct campaigns that resulted in massive refugee movements or displacement of the population were in nobody's interest. The most worrisome new trend in Sri Lanka was the onset of some Islamic jihadist activity. The Indians had fragmentary information at this stage. There were open questions about whether Pakistan had a role in this new development, if only at the tactical level. Irrespective of this fact, however, India still remained concerned. If Islamic extremism were to take hold in Sri Lanka, yet another port of call in the larger Indian Ocean region could become a threat to India.
Nepal: Next Few Months are Crucial to Creating Stability
-----------
17. (S) The Indian side closed its presentation with a brief overview of the peace process in Nepal. Ambassador Singh reviewed the Indian calculus that had led New Delhi to support the current peace process. It was important, he stated, for the Nepalese army to remain engaged and not to become demoralized. The UN would play a useful role in providing civilian policing and in overseeing the
NEW DELHI 00001051 005.2 OF 005
demilitarization of the Maoists. The key thing to ensure success was to shorten the transition period between the current situation and the election of the constituent assembly. With the onset shortly of the monsoon season, and the Dussehra festivities this fall, there was actually only a short window of opportunity to move the process along.
18. (S) Finding the right tools for border management was a key issue for India at this stage. Singh noted the "mushrooming" of the number of madrassas in the Terai belt and underscored India's concern that this region -- which forms an open and essentially unmonitored border with India -- become stable and peaceful. New Delhi was placing great emphasis on creating both rail and road links as a way to open up and stabilize the economy in the region. "We cannot fence the border," Singh observed, "so we need successful communities on both sides of the border as the best preventative measure" to ward off any further radicalization of the population. Singh presented this as a new Indian strategy for combating terrorism along India's borders. Softening the border actually contributes to India's ability to prevent terrorism, he explained, because a happier local population is less likely to allow terrorists the safe haven and support necessary for their activity. (Comment: Singh seemed to be implying that this was part of India's broader strategy against terrorism in other border states, including Kashmir and Bangladesh. End comment.)
19. (U) This cable was cleared by XXXXXXXXXXXX. MULFORD
Friday, 18 May 2007, 09:22
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 COLOMBO 000728
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
MCC FOR S GROFF, D TETER, D NASSIRY AND E BURKE
EO 12958 DECL: 05/18/2017
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, PHUM, MOPS, CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: GSL COMPLICITY IN PARAMILITARY
FACTIONS' HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
REF: A. COLOMBO 591 B. COLOMBO 561 C. COLOMBO 463 D. COLOMBO 460 E. 2006 COLOMBO 2056 F. 2006 COLOMBO 1896 G. 2005 COLOMBO 2157 H. 2004 COLOMBO 1219
Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b, d)
1. (S) SUMMARY: Allegations of government complicity in crimes committed by organized paramilitary groups have mounted in the last year. Paramilitaries such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)-breakaway Karuna group and Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) have helped the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) to fight the LTTE, to kidnap suspected LTTE collaborators, and to give the GSL a measure of deniability. The GSL, which denies any links to paramilitary groups, has recently touted its efforts to improve its human rights record, such as the re-publication of procedures on arrests and detentions and the appointment of a "One-Man Commission" to investigate reported disappearances (ref C). However, these efforts so far appear aimed more at improving Sri Lanka's image abroad and have yet to produce concrete improvements in the human rights situation. Outside the capital, the incidence of human rights abuses has continued, including extrajudicial killings, abductions, child trafficking, extortion, and prostitution. President Rajapaksa's government, strapped for cash, has cut direct payments to paramilitaries initiated by former President Kumaratunga and instead turns a blind eye to extortion and kidnapping for ransom by EPDP and Karuna. While many of the charges against the government have been made in public fora, a growing number of trusted Embassy contacts, often at personal risk, have described in detail the extent of the GSL's involvement with paramilitary groups. END SUMMARY.
GSL Finds Paramilitaries Useful
-------------------------------
2. (S) The GSL sees several advantages in allowing paramilitary groups to operate in the country. Paramilitary groups in the North and East help the GSL fight the LTTE and compete with the LTTE for public support and new recruits. These groups also enhance security in Colombo by kidnapping and sometimes killing those suspected of working with the LTTE. Frequent abductions by paramilitaries keep critics of the GSL fearful and quiet. Ultimately, the GSL's objective is to turn Karuna and EPDP leader Douglas Devananda into pro-GSL political leaders in the East and North, respectively. The government hopes this will ensure long term control over these areas even if some form of devolution is instituted.
3. (S) In the meantime, these paramilitary groups give the GSL a measure of deniability. XXXXXXXXXXXX
told us that some military commanders in JaffnaXXXXXXXXXXXX want to clamp down on paramilitaries but have orders from Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa to not interfere with the paramilitaries on the grounds that they are doing "work" that the military cannot do because of international scrutiny. On XXXXXXXXXXXX confided to XXXXXXXXXXXX that the Defense Ministry had instructed him not to interfere with "military intelligence" operations (ref E).
COLOMBO 00000728 002 OF 006
4. (S) The GSL has a history of funding paramilitary groups. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that under former President Kumaratunga, the GSL had begun the practice of paying paramilitaries to refrain from engaging in criminal pursuits. Several Embassy interlocutors have independently confirmed this. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the current government, cash-strapped, has ended this arrangement. Instead, he alleged, Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa has authorized EPDP and Karuna to collect the money from Tamil businessmen. This may account for the sharp rise in lawlessness, especially extortion and kidnapping, that many have documented in Vavuniya and Colombo. Even though EPDP and Karuna are each comprised nearly exclusively of ethnic Tamils, the crimes that they commit are almost always against other Tamils.
Karuna Group Becomes Pre-eminent Paramilitary
---------------------------------------------
5. (S) The Karuna faction's formal name is Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), which means "Liberation Tigers of the Tamil People" in Tamil. This name is an attempt to sap legitimacy from the LTTE by taking the "Liberation Tigers" part of their name. In less than one year since Karuna returned to Sri Lanka, the TMVP has become the most powerful paramilitary organization in the country. It began in 2004 when Karuna broke away from the LTTE, taking about 4,000 Tiger cadres with him (ref H). After the LTTE struck back, inflicting serious losses, then-President Chandrika Kumaratunga helped Karuna escape to the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, where he remained until July 2006. He remained active in managing his cadres even while living abroad. Since returning to Sri Lanka, Karuna has used strong-arm tactics to establish a powerful paramilitary group that operates under government protection (ref D).
Abductions and Killings
-----------------------
6. (S) The Karuna group is probably the most active Sri Lankan paramilitary in abductions and extrajudicial killings. XXXXXXXXXXXX confided to PolOff that even MPs fear that the GSL will use Karuna to assassinate them. XXXXXXXXXXXX echoed this anxiety to us XXXXXXXXXXXX. A number of XXXXXXXXXXXX MPs, Muslims as well as Tamils, have told us privately that they fear for their lives. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that he believed Karuna set up the assassination of Tamil MP Joseph Pararajasingham on Christmas Day 2005 (ref G) with the help of EPDP leader Devananda. XXXXXXXXXXXX was also positive that Karuna cadres were employed in the killing in Colombo of popular Tamil MP Nadarajah Raviraj on November 10, 2006 (ref F).
7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed that Karuna has extended his activities to Jaffna from his base in the East. XXXXXXXXXXXX has documented XXXXXXXXXXXX abduction cases in Jaffna XXXXXXXXXXXX, many of which he believes are the responsibility of the Karuna group. XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff that he was discouraged XXXXXXXXXXXX told us he has
COLOMBO 00000728 003 OF 006
evidence of XXXXXXXXXXXX. However, because of XXXXXXXXXXXX and limited resources, he was only able to document a sample XXXXXXXXXXXX.XXXXXXXXXXXX described one abduction in which a man suspected of having ties to the LTTE was taken and a "calling card" was left with a picture of Karuna on the front and a calendar on the back, indicating that the man's "time had run out."
Child Soldiers
--------------
8. (S) The TMVP is allowed to operate throughout the East in close proximity to SLA bases, often with clearly underage cadres guarding its camps with machine guns. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the GSL allows Karuna's cadres to recruit children forcibly from within IDP camps in the East. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the average age of Karuna recruits is 14. XXXXXXXXXXXX's allegation that Karuna recruits children from IDP camps with the tacit approval of the military was confirmed by XXXXXXXXXXXX. We have received confidential reports of the Karuna group's recruitment and use of child soldiers from a U.S.-based NGO as well.
Extortion and Prostitution Rings
--------------------------------
9. (S) Karuna does not have the international fund-raising network among the Tamil Diaspora that the LTTE has built over the past 25 years. As a result, he has resorted to a wide range of criminal activities. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that when the GSL brings in shipments of food and supplies to IDP camps from Colombo, Karuna's cadres are given the opportunity to go through the shipment first. They are allowed to take any food they need for themselves, as well as any supplies they believe they can sell, with only the left-overs making their way to the IDPs.
11. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX also explained that Karuna operates prostitution rings out of the IDP camps to "take care of" GSL soldiers, stating that the women "had no choice" but to acquiesce to Karuna cadres' demands. XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX independently described how women are forced into prostitution, or to give up their children to traffickers. The methods are similar to those in Jaffna (paras 17-18). Families sometimes try to arrange their daughters' marriages at the age of 12 or 13 in the hope that it will reduce the likelihood of their being forced into prostitution.
12. (S) Although the GSL has consistently denied supporting Karuna, XXXXXXXXXXXX allowed PolOff to listen to tapes of his interview with Gothabaya. The Defense Secretary was effusive in his praise for Karuna and the
SIPDIS benefits the GSLXXXXXXXXXXXX
COLOMBO 00000728 004 OF 006
Making Karuna Legitimate
------------------------
13. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX The TMVP does not yet have the status of a formal political party. According to Sri Lanka's Constitution, new parties cannot register when an election is "pending" in any part of the country. Elections for local councils are long overdue in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, which are now in constitutional limbo following the October 1, 2006 Supreme Court decision to de-merge the two provinces. As a result, the GSL must find an existing political party for Karuna to "join," perhaps later changing the name to TMVP, in order for Karuna to stand for elections. XXXXXXXXXXXX said thatXXXXXXXXXXXX has so far resisted GSL efforts to force a shotgun marriage with Karuna, but that he may ultimately have to yield.
EPDP: "Political Party" and Paramilitary
-----------------------------------------
14. (S) The EPDP, originally called the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), began as a rival to the LTTE. One wing of the EPRLF founded the EPDP as a formal political party when its leader, Douglas Devananda, was elected to Parliament in 1994 and aligned with the government. Devananda continues to hold the single parliamentary seat his party won in the 2004 election. As part of the ruling coalition, he serves as Minister of Social Services and Social Welfare. Although registered as a formal political party, the EPDP remains a feared paramilitary group, wielding non-official power over parts of the Jaffna peninsula and especially the offshore islands with the tacit approval of the Sri Lanka Army.
Extra-Judicial Killings with the Military's Support
--------------------------------------------- ------
15. (S) Working in concert with SLA soldiers stationed in the Jaffna peninsula, the EPDP is able to conduct extortion, abductions, extra-judicial killings and other criminal acts without fear of consequences, according to numerous sources. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us about EPDP's involvement in extra-judicial killings in Jaffna. Independently,XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed much of XXXXXXXXXXXX's account. He explained that when the EPDP intends to kill a target, they first provide notice to the military. The number of soldiers patrolling the streets of Jaffna (40,000 total on the peninsula) is such that there are literally soldiers stationed at every street corner. At an agreed time, all of the soldiers in the designated area take a five to ten minute "break" at once (although the normal practice is to take breaks in shifts). At that point, armed and masked gunmen, often riding on motorcycles, race down the street and assassinate the intended victim. Shortly after the killing, the soldiers' break over, they return to their posts to deal with the aftermath. While police investigations are common, they almost never lead to arrests. XXXXXXXXXXXX also told us of a XXXXXXXXXXXX doctor XXXXXXXXXXXX who performs forced abortions, often under the guise of a regular check-up, on Tamil women suspected of being aligned with the LTTE.
COLOMBO 00000728 005 OF 006
16. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX Child Trafficking
-----------------
17. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he believes that EPDP is operating child trafficking rings in Jaffna with a base on Delft island, which the EPDP "owns." XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that because of the large number of widows in Jaffna, men associated with the EPDP, often from neighboring villages, are used to seduce women with children, especially girls, with the promise of economic protection. After establishing a relationship, the men then take the children, sometimes by force and sometimes with the promise that they will be provided a better life. The children are sold into slavery, usually boys to work camps and girls to prostitution rings, through EPDP's networks in India and Malaysia. XXXXXXXXXXXX maintains that children are often smuggled out of the country with the help of a corrupt Customs and Immigration official at Bandaranaike International Airport in Colombo.
18. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX's story was partially verified by XXXXXXXXXXXX who stated that the EPDP works in concert with the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) to operate Tamil prostitution rings for the soldiers. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that young women were taken and forced to have sex with between five and ten soldiers a night. Sometimes they are paid approximately a dollar for each "service." The young women's parents are unable to complain to authorities for fear of retribution and because doing so would ruin the girls' reputation, making it impossible for them ever to marry. Families have begun arranging marriages for their daughters at a very young age in the hopes that the EPDP and soldiers will be less likely to take them. In addition to trafficking in children, XXXXXXXXXXXX detailed how the EPDP operates an illicit alcohol smuggling ring using child "mules."
U.S. Takes a Hard Line against Paramilitaries
---------------------------------------------
19. (S) Addressing the activities of these paramilitaries and their blatant disregard for human rights is a top priority of the Embassy. Ambassador, DCM and Pol Chief have met repeatedly with the President, the Foreign Minister, Foreign Secretary, Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa, Human Rights Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe and others to emphasize the importance of reining in these groups and ending the abductions, killings, and other human rights abuses. Visiting senior USG officials, including Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) Richard
SIPDIS Boucher and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for SCA Steven Mann have delivered tough messages on human rights to the highest levels of the GSL, noting that continued abuses could affect defense cooperation.
COLOMBO 00000728 006 OF 006
20. (S) COMMENT: While none of the evidence put forward by our contacts constitutes a smoking gun, the preponderance of these statements ) and the extent to which they independently corroborate each other ) points to a pattern of GSL complicity with paramilitary groups on multiple levels. It appears that this involvement goes beyond merely turning a blind eye to these organizations' less savory activities. At worst, these accounts suggest that top leaders of its security establishment may be providing direction to these paramilitaries. While it is perhaps understandable that the GSL wants to use every possible means in its war against LTTE terror, we must continue to stress to the Government the importance of reining in the paramilitaries and establishing internationally accepted norms for arresting, investigating, prosecuting and, if appropriate, punishing those suspected of cooperating with the LTTE. BLAKE
Tuesday, 12 June 2007, 03:23
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000830
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
XXXXXXXXXXXX
EO 12958 DECL: 06/11/2017
TAGS PTER, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: TAMIL TIGERS SIPHON OFF PART OF
INTERNATIONAL RELIEF FUNDS
Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d).
1. (S) SUMMARY: In late May PolOff met the XXXXXXXXXXXX described the LTTE's complete control of all activities that take place in Tiger-controlled territory, including forced conscription and the use of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) to extract money from INGOs. XXXXXXXXXXXX also criticized the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission's (SLMM) complacency in the face of coercive techniques the LTTE employs to maintain control of its northern stronghold. On June 8, after meetings with representatives from UNICEF, UNHCR and the World Food Program to discuss how these organizations fund projects operating in the Vanni, Emboffs confirmed that in some circumstances INGOs are required to work with TRO to accomplish their project goals. END SUMMARY.
FORCED CONSCRIPTION
-------------------
2. (C) On May 21, PolOff met XXXXXXXXXXXX private organization that provides assistance to refugees. XXXXXXXXXXXX described the LTTE's "one person per family" forced conscription program. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the Tigers require at least one person between the ages of 18 and 35 per family to fight for the LTTE, apparently believing that if the "draftees" are at least 18 years old, the international community cannot criticize the Tigers for requiring military service. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the LTTE provides written notice to draftees with orders to report to a particular military office for service. If they fail to report, they are taken forcibly, often at night.
3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the average age of LTTE "recruits" is now 17 years old. He confirmed, however, XXXXXXXXXXXX allegation of forced conscription of those 17 years old and older, stating that if a person failed to leave the Vanni before he or she turned 17, there was an extremely high likelihood of being drafted by the Tigers.
4. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX accused the SLMM of turning a blind eye to LTTE forced conscription of Tamil citizens living in the Vanni. XXXXXXXXXXXX said XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX that "all countries are entitled to institute the draft to protect their borders."
5. (C) We have received other credible reports of even more draconian conscription methods used by the Tigers. Some families are reportedly being told to provide two recruits as the LTTE prepares for war. The Tigers may threaten families living in the Vanni or elsewhere in Sri Lanka if their children do not return from jobs abroad, such as in the Persian Gulf, to take up arms.
TRO FUNDING LTTE OPERATIONS
---------------------------
COLOMBO 00000830 002 OF 003
6. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us the LTTE had ordered INGOs to provide all project funding through local NGOs, which are managed collectively by the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO). For example, XXXXXXXXXXXX receives money in its bank account from its headquarters or from international donors, then deposits the money into a separate bank account operated by a local NGO. The local NGO's director is always a member of TRO, as are many other members of the local NGO staff. The TRO representative withdraws the money from the local NGO's account, provides a cut to the LTTE, and distributes the rest to accomplish the particular project XXXXXXXXXXXX is funding with that donation. XXXXXXXXXXXX then oversees the implementation of the program, but does not control any distribution of funds after they are transferred into the local NGO's account.
7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that XXXXXXXXXXXX alleges that it does not comply with the LTTE's funding demands, but in reality, it does comply by removing its funding one additional step. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the UN provides funding to international voluntary organizations,XXXXXXXXXXXX who then comply with the LTTE's funding demands, thus providing XXXXXXXXXXXX with a measure of distance and "plausible deniability." XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that in addition to XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX of the XXXXXXXXXXXX organizations XXXXXXXXXXXX operating in the Vanni are complying with the LTTE procedures. XXXXXXXXXXXX
8. (C) One June 8, Emboffs met with XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that UNCHR did not work through TRO representatives in the Vanni, but could not say whether INGOs did so. XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed that although the UN does not work through the TRO, it does provide some funding to Is and local NGOs. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that he was aware of times when XXXXXXXXXXXX were asked to work with local program managers who are likely representatives of the LTTE, but he was unsure whether this requirement extended to funding arrangements. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the LTTE needs food supplies so badly that the WFP has successfully rebuffed LTTE attempts to levy taxes on items brought into the Vanni. He added that although the WFP does not provide financial assistance to the Tigers, he knows that several XXXXXXXXXXXX are required to provide financial resources to the LTTE through the TRO in order to accomplish their objectives in the Vanni.
9. (S) COMMENT: According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, other organizations have not complained about LTTE interference in their operations because they suffer from "a blinding case of clientitis." However, one could also argue that amounts to a simple acceptance of the realities of working in LTTE-controlled territory. XXXXXXXXXXXX anecdotal evidence of TRO serving as a conduit to channel funds to the LTTE strikes us as authentic. Although Post was unable to confirm XXXXXXXXXXXX allegations with the same level of detail that XXXXXXXXXXXX described, XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX both acknowledged that XXXXXXXXXXXX
COLOMBO 00000830 003 OF 003
have at least some involvement with the LTTE through the TRO. Our sense is that the money derived from these charities probably goes to fund the LTTE administration in the territory it occupies, rather than arms purchases. The LTTE's internal revenues are likely minuscule compared with what it raises abroad from the Tamil Diaspora. It is probably these overseas revenues that are used to purchase arms for import into the Vanni. BLAKE
Monday, 13 July 2009, 10:33
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000695
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB
EO 12958 DECL: 06/25/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PREF, PHUM, PTER, EAID, MOPS, CE
SUBJECT: DOCTORS RECANT EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF CIVILIAN
CASUALTIES
REF: A. COLOMBO 0435 B. COLOMBO 0448 C. COLOMBO 0454 D. COLOMBO 0554
COLOMBO 00000695 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JAMES R. MOORE. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The five doctors who worked inside the final conflict zone (the government-declared "no-fire zone") and who released accounts of the situation and the numbers of killed and wounded civilians there gave a press conference press conference on July 8. The doctors said they were "pressured" by the LTTE to release the casualty figures during the fighting, and that in reality the number of killed and wounded civilians was much lower. Many international observers doubt the veracity of this "confession", and casualty figures from other sources are inconsistent with the numbers given by the doctors at the press conference. Some have said the doctors were told they must make this sort of statement or be prosecuted for assisting the LTTE. It is not known if they will in fact be released soon, but it appears they have been treated relatively well while in detention. There is some concern for their safety if the doctors are in fact released. END SUMMARY. 2. (SBU) The five doctors who served in the conflict zone during the final weeks and months of the war, and who provided eyewitness accounts of the situation there during the final months of the conflict between the GSL and the LTTE publicly retracted their previous statements during a press conference arranged by the Government on July 8. The doctors announced that they were "pressured" by the LTTE to make the original statements. The five were taken into custody by the Army at the end of the conflict in May, but are now in CID (police) custody. They said they have been treated well and have been given medical attention. They noted in their statements that during the conflict they had exaggerated the number of killed and injured and also stated that there had never been a shortage of food in the zone. The doctors reported that in reality many civilians were killed trying to escape the LTTE and that the LTTE had commandeered medical supplies brought into the zone for civilians for the wounded LTTE cadres. They said LTTE officials would hand them lists of figures to cite, and then give them phone numbers of sympathetic journalists to contact with the reports. The doctors stated that the actual number of civilian deaths from January until the end of the conflict in mid-May was between 600 and 650, with 1,200 injured during that same time period.
3. (S) International media and NGOs are skeptical of the doctors' statements at the news conference. Credible local NGO sources have said the families were told the doctors may be released following such confessions and they may have had to videotape individual confessions for the president. While it is difficult to pin down solid numbers on anything that happened in the last months of the conflict, other relatively verifiable sources of information are clearly at odds with these figures. The ICRC reported on May 12 that since mid-February it had evacuated nearly 14,000 sick or wounded civilians and their relatives. Unofficial UN estimates for Tamil civilian deaths over roughly the same January to mid-May time period are more than ten times as high, between 7,000 and 8,000. Those UN estimates did not rigorously seek to exclude deaths of possible LTTE conscripts, but it is unlikely that a ten-fold increase in figures over what the doctors stated this week would be due solely to deaths of LTTE cadres mixed in with the civilian population. 4. (S) Of particular concern is what will happen to the doctors if in fact they are released soon. In a meeting with the Ambassador on May 20, the Defense Secretary indicated that it would probably not be safe to free the doctors until
COLOMBO 00000695 002.3 OF 002
after passions had cooled. More recently a senior contact in the CID was demoted because he had worked to improve the detention conditions of the doctors and apparently had expressed too strong of a desire to improve their welfare. 5. (C) COMMENT: The dead and wounded figures given by the doctors at the July 8 press conference would appear to underestimate the true number of casualties during the final months of conflict in the no-fire zone. The GSL appears to be continuing its efforts to downplay the extent of civilian suffering during the last weeks and days of the war. However, a willingness to arrange for the doctors to be released following this confession could signal an effort by the GSL to appease international criticism. If the doctors are released, it will be critical for the GSL to take meaningful action to ensure that the doctors are not then "disappeared" in order to prevent them from making any modifications to this press statement. MOORE
Friday, 22 January 2010, 09:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000050
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB
EO 12958 DECL: 01/22/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PREF, PHUM, PTER, EAID, MOPS, CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: ASSESSING PROGRESS ON KEY ISSUES
REF: A. 09 COLOMBO 1176 B. COLOMBO 32 C. COLOMBO 8
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Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)
1. (S) According to Congressional mandates and Administration policy, U.S. assistance to Sri Lanka, particularly military assistance, is tied to progress by the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) on several key issues, including treatment of IDPs, human rights, political reconciliation, and accountability for alleged crimes perpetrated by GSL troops and officials during the war with the LTTE. The GSL has progressed more or less on each of these issues since the end of the conflict. Continued or increased U.S. assistance, however, hinges on the GSL broadening and deepening this progress.
2. (S) Outlined below are these key issue areas with discussion of what progress has been made so far and what further progress we would like to see. It is important to note that we are not offering this list as a set of "benchmarks," which the GSL must meet to qualify for more robust engagement. Our experience with benchmarks in the Sri Lankan context (and elsewhere as well) is that the government often makes notable progress but in areas not anticipated, or in ways not foreseen, by our benchmarks. Thus, the following list of favored steps is not meant to be exhaustive but rather illustrative. Actual progress will have to be assessed as it happens.
3. (S) It also is important to note that the upcoming presidential election -- particularly if it were to result in an opposition victory -- could radically alter the political context of our assessment of GSL progress on key issues. Opposition candidate General Fonseka has made many significant promises in each of these issue areas, and we could expect that his new government would be interested in moving forward more quickly than the Rajapaksa government. Nevertheless, the key issue areas of concern remain the same notwithstanding the election, and we would expect any Sri Lankan government to continue to make progress. Please note that our lists of "Next Steps" are not in any order of priority or importance.
IDPs
----
4. (S) There has been a dramatic improvement in the treatment of IDPs and their living conditions over the past several months. Whether because of international pressure or electoral politics, the result is that 106,007 displaced persons remain in GSL camps, according to UNHCR, down from a high of over 280,000. Large numbers who left the camps remain in transit camps or with host families and have not yet returned to their places of origin. Although humanitarian access to camps has been inconsistent since the end of the war, most organizations reported that access was now granted upon request. Protection monitoring and confidential interviews with IDPs are still prohibited, and the ICRC revised mandate has not been finalized. ICRC headquarters is assessing whether to accept the GSL offer of a general rather than a detailed MOU. Access to returnee areas for INGOs is still limited to those engaged in de-mining and one medical organization in the Vanni, although the government and local authorities were reportedly working to extend this to other groups. INGOs in Jaffna were recently authorized to work by the Governor of the North but await confirmation from the Presidential Task Force.
5. (S) Next steps:
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-- Renew ICRC mandate. -- Provide transparent criteria and regularized processes for INGO access to the north. -- Provide transparent criteria and regularized processes for access to returnee areas for journalists. -- Continue to release or prosecute LTTE and other Tamil detainees according to a judicial process. -- Implement a national system for tracing separated family members. -- Continue GSL reintegration of returnees.
Human Rights
------------
6. (S) Numbers of disappearances have experienced a steady and significant decline across the island since the end of the war, and the Attorney General's Office, the Ministry of Human Rights and Disaster Relief, and other institutions have conducted investigations into some of the cases. For example, on December 21, Attorney General Peiris told Ambassador that there was an 11-person team working under Deputy Solicitor General De Livera to look into questions of disappearances and other potential violations under the Emergency Regulations (ref A). Peiris claimed that 100 (presumably innocent) people had been found in detention and released during the previous 45 days, and the team was continuing its investigations. He was going to Anuradhapura himself later that week to look at 33 cases and to decide whether the suspects could be released.
7. (S) Child soldiers affiliated with the TMVP have been significantly reduced over the past year, with just five reportedly remaining at the end of 2009, according to UNICEF; the government appears to be working actively to find the remaining child soldiers. On January 13, imprisoned journalist J.S. Tissainayagam was released on bail, and Post is not aware of any additional physical attacks on journalists since June, although there still have been threats.
8. (S) Next steps:
-- Disappearances continue to decline, and investigations continue to rise. The team under A.G. Peiris, in particular, should examine and process more cases. -- All remaining child soldiers accounted for and discharged/rehabilitated. -- Press freedom: threats to individual journalists must end, along with atmosphere of intimidation. -- Press freedom: progress made in investigation of the killing a year ago of Sunday Leader editor Lasantha Wickramatunga. -- Remaining ex-LTTE "new" detainees, held since the end of the war, are placed within a legal structure. All "older" LTTE and Tamil detainees, held since before the end of the war, are charged and prosecuted or released. -- Lifting the Emergency Regulations. -- Less harassment and intimidation of civil society organizations.
Political Reconciliation
------------------------
9. (S) Although progress has been slow, the presidential elections -- particularly the fact that the two main candidates are splitting the Sinhalese vote -- has moved reconciliation issues higher on the political agenda. The A-9 road has been opened for nearly all travel by Sri Lankans (NOTE: Foreigners are still not permitted to drive into the North. END NOTE.), the curfew in Jaffna has ended, and fishing restrictions in the North have been largely
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eliminated. Of the 12,000 ex-LTTE combatants held in detainment camps since the end of the war, 712 were released the week after the New Year, and the government has announced it would release an additional 1,000 shortly. General Fonseka has made reconciliation a prominent issue in his campaign, signing a ten-point program for devolving power to the North-East. In addition, in his widely distributed campaign manifesto, Fonseka has promised he would: (a) abolish the Executive Presidency; (b) reactivate the 17th Amendment to the Constitution; (c) end the culture of "white van" disappearances and extra-judicial killings; (d) eliminate the press council and establish an environment of free media; (e) return all remaining IDPs and double the resettlement allowance they receive to 100,000 rupees (about USD 880); (f) amend the Emergency Regulations; and (g) deal with all war-related detainees by either prosecuting them, releasing them, or placing them in rehabilitation programs.
10. (S) Next Steps:
-- Some sort of power-sharing or decentralization arrangement to accommodate minority rights. Should be locally developed (i.e. not necessarily the 13th Amendment) and satisfactory to minority populations in Sri Lanka. -- Lifting of High Security Zones. -- Unrestricted access permitted throughout the North for all Sri Lankans, diplomats, journalists, and NGOs. -- Remaining no-threat or low-threat ex-LTTE combatants in "new detainee" camps are released or placed into rehabilitation programs. -- Any low-risk "older" LTTE detainees convicted within the justice system are removed from prison and placed into rehabilitation programs.
Accountability
--------------
11. (S) Accountability for alleged crimes committed by GSL troops and officials during the war is the most difficult issue on our bilateral agenda, and the one we believe has the lowest prospect for forward movement. There are no examples of a sitting regime undertaking wholesale investigations of its own troops or senior officials for war crimes. In Sri Lanka this is further complicated by the fact that responsibility for many of the alleged crimes rests with the country's senior civilian and military leadership, including President Rajapaksa and his brothers and opposition candidate General Fonseka. Moreover, the fact that the LTTE leadership has been destroyed and there is virtually no one to hold accountable for LTTE war crimes makes prosecutions of GSL troops or officials that much more difficult.
12. (S) Accountability also has not been a top priority for Tamils in Sri Lanka. While Tamils have told us they would like to see some form of accountability, they have been pragmatic in what they can expect and have focused instead on securing greater rights and freedoms, resolving the IDP question, and improving economic prospects in the war-ravaged and former LTTE-occupied areas. Indeed, while they wanted to keep the issue alive for possible future action, Tamil leaders with whom we spoke in Colombo, Jaffna, and elsewhere said now was not time and that pushing hard on the issue would make them "vulnerable" (ref. B).
13. (S) Despite these considerations, there have been some tentative steps on accountability. Soon after the appearance of the State Department Report to Congress on Incidents, President Rajapaksa announced the formation of an experts' committee to examine the report and to provide him with recommendations on dealing with the allegations. At the end of the year, the president extended the deadline for the
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committee's recommendations from December 31 until April. For his part, General Fonseka has spoken publicly of the need for a new deal with the Tamils and other minorities. Privately, his campaign manager told the Ambassador that Fonseka had ordered the opposition campaign to begin work planning a "truth and reconciliation" commission (ref. C).
14. (S) Rajapaksa Next Steps:
-- Presidential experts' committee makes credible recommendations for dealing with the allegations in the State Department report. -- A commission is formed to hear complaints and resolve individual cases of war disappearances. -- GSL publicly acknowledges human cost of war and losses on both sides. -- President institutes compensation program for families of civilians killed in the war.
15. (S) Fonseka Next Steps:
-- Begins national dialogue on the war and its human costs. -- Creation of a serious and credible truth and reconciliation mechanism. -- Considers compensation program. BUTENIS
US Monday, 05 June 2006, 19:32
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HAVANA 011650
SIPDIS
STATE PASS TO NONALIGNED MOVEMENT COLLECTIVE
SIPDIS
STATE DEPT FOR WHA/CCA
EO 12958 DECL: 06/05/2016
TAGS PGOV, ECON, PREL, SOCI, CU
SUBJECT: CARTAS DE CUBA: EARLY SUMMER EDITION
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Classified By: COM Michael Parmly; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (SBU) This edition of "Cartas" features the following items:
-- Paras 2-4 Medical Malpractice -- 5-8 Baseball, Music and Racism -- 9-11 China Syndrome -- 12-19 Diplomatic Corps Reflections -- 20-22 Bracing for the NAM
-------------------
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
-------------------
2. (U) NEWS: USINT is always looking for human interest stories and other news that shatters the myth of Cuban medical prowess, which has become a key feature of the regime's foreign policy and its self-congratulatory propaganda. Two articles appeared this week in our roundup of news about Cuba that we collect and disseminate daily:
--Dateline 31 May: Jamaican Dr. Albert Lue has publicly denounced Cuban medical incompetency in handling Jamaican patients who traveled to Cuba for eye surgery. Of 60 such patients he surveyed, 3 were left permanently blind and another 14 returned to Jamaica with permanent cornea damage.
--Dateline 1 June: 14,000 Bolivian doctors are on strike to protest the 600 Cuban doctors who have been shipped into the country, with no concern as to displacement or unemployment among the Bolivian doctors, or qualifications of the Cubans.
3. (U) In a recent appearance on Miami Cable TV station 41's "A Mano Limpia" interview show, Cuban doctor and former Director of Family Medicine in the Ministry of Health, Alcides Lorenzo, slammed the Cuban medical system for being overly politicized. Lorenzo had just defected to the USA via Mexico, where he missed his connecting flight from Cancun to Havana, on the way back from an international conference in Peru. According to Lorenzo, Cuban doctors spend two-thirds of their time going to political meetings, as opposed to treating patients. Lorenzo also said that Cuban medical care was grossly understaffed and underfunded at home as a result of the "medical missions" overseas, particularly to Venezuela. Unfortunately for Lorenzo, or any other Cuban doctor who considers defecting from a "mission" overseas, his family is held hostage in Cuba and will not be permitted to leave the island.
XXXXXXXXXXXXX
---------------------------
Baseball, Music and Racism:
---------------------------
5. (C) COM and several USINT colleagues went to the Industriales-Santiago (World Series equivalent) baseball game at Latinoamericano stadium in Havana. It was a great, hard-fought game. (In the end, Industriales won, coming back from a 4-2 deficit to go ahead 8-4, and eventually finishing 10-7.) What was striking at the game, however, was not on the field but rather in the stands. First thing: The Industriales crowd was visibly "criollo," i.e, of Spanish descent, with very few black faces on their side of the field. The Santiago supporters, on the other hand, were heavily black. Their music, played in the stands, was entirely of an Afro-Cuban beat. There were also ample dashes of santero flavor among the SdC followers. What really highlighted the racial split, however, was the chants among the Industriales fans. If a Santiago pitcher was working on
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an intentional walk, the fans would yell, "Pitch, mommy, pitch!" That then evolved into "Pitch, guajira, pitch!" Then came allusions to the pitcher lacking all of his manhood, again with clear racial overtones.
6. (C) Cubans told COM that the catcalls, chants and aggressive behavior are not new. They did say that there has been a marked increase in such racially-overtoned slurs in recent years. One devoted baseball fan remarked that the regime encourages such aggressive behavior in order to take folks' minds off where the real problem lies.
7. (C) The following morning, COM and Mrs. Parmly strolled over to the Callejon de Hamel, a tourist trap in downtown Havana set up a few years ago by popular artists. All the artists there were black, and were very much into accentuating their race in their art, in their dress and hairstyles, and in their behavior. The alleyway hosted an impromptu concert of Afro-Cuban and even pure Afro rhythms, with both musicians and many black Cubans in the crowd singing along. The show was put on partly to address foreign tourists: The alleyway is listed in tourist guides, and there was a Havanatur bus right outside the street, which disgorged mainly Canadian tourists. Still, the artists and musicians were "into their own thing" for the most part. There was surprisingly little panhandling or otherwise pitching to the foreigners in the public.
8. (C) Comment: These two snapshots were a window into a part of Cuban life with a dynamic all its own. They underline the existence of at least two Cubas, and explain why so many regime supporters and sympathizers are obsessed with the notion of unity, precisely because they know how hard that unity will be to maintain when change becomes more openly energized.
---------------
China Syndrome:
---------------
9. (C) A couple of weeks ago, there was a concert at Amadeo Roldan theater that featured a Chinese conductor as guest of the National Symphony. It was part of the normal Sunday afternoon series. The Chinese Embassy made a big deal out of the Chinese guest conductor, turning out a pretty much full house of Cubans and others (presumably a large Chinese contingent), and most importantly, the visiting Chinese Vice Minister of Culture, who was in town on an official visit.
10. (C) After the concert, several officials got up to speak. Leading the Cuban cohort was Abel Prieto, Minister of Culture, who had the usual things to say about the depth and strength of Cuban-Chinese ties. All the speakers got the usual polite applause. Then the Chinese Vice Minister got up. Rather than just respond with counter-inanities, he launched into a speech on the success of the Chinese economic model, including noting the degree to which openness to the world, encouraging private initiative and letting individual creativity have free rein were key to economic progress. The audience went cold. Not a clap, not a peep when the Minister finished speaking.
11. (C) Chinese Appliances: Cubans who visit USINT tell us frequently that new, supposedly energy-saving appliances made in China are of very poor quality. The small refrigerators have earned the nickname of "underarms," because they break quickly and are seen on the streets carried under the arms of their unhappy owners to the repair facilities (which of course are understocked with spare parts). The new Chinese-made ovens have a blue plastic thermostat button which users say melts when the ovens are heated up to normal baking temperatures.
-----------------------------
Diplomatic Corps Reflections:
-----------------------------
12. (C) Spanish Ambassador Alonso (May 26) described the fight within the "nomenklatura" for the soul of the future Cuban regime. Fidel, with his railings against "Forbes" magazine and his narcissistic rollout of Ignacio Ramonet,s
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book, is "present for now," but not for the future. According to Alonso, there is a deep split within the government circles that can be summarized as Consumption vs. Investment. Alonso portrayed the split with anecdotes. Everyone knows the infrastructure is collapsing. Look at the transport network, Alonso said. Cuba got from China 12 shiny new locomotives, which were presented/rolled out with great fanfare by Fidel and others. That was several months ago. They have still not entered into service. Reason: The locomotives are designed to work at peak efficiency at speeds far in excess of what the rickety Cuban rail network will allow, unless the regime is willing to risk derailment, which it is not.
13. (C) So, Alonso continued, the regime comes back to its choice: Does it put what money it has in repairing the rail (and bus) network, or in continuing to subsidize tariffs for the average consumer? For some time, the urban transport system has needed to decide on a fare hike, but there are those within the ruling circles who say such an increase would trigger a strong negative popular response. The new Chinese Yutong buses have been put into use on inter-urban lines, accompanied by steep fare hikes. (Comment: These have already been announced in "Granma" and "Juventud Rebelde;" the papers talked of hikes of 100 to 250 percent in most inter-urban fares. End Comment.) However, it is quite another thing, Alonso noted, to raise intra-urban fares.
14. (C) The regime sounds confident in its public statements. Fidel especially sounds boisterous and bombastic. Just below him, Alonso concluded, the officials responsible for keeping the machinery running are much more uncomfortable, because they realize how narrow their margin of maneuver is. Analyzing Fidel,s reaction to Forbes, Alonso came up with two explanations: Latin America and his anti-corruption campaign. Alonso argued that Fidel,s primary target was fellow Latin leaders. Whether of left or right, most Latin political leaders are leery of Fidel, who returns the suspicion. By trying to highlight how little money he personally possesses, Fidel was telling his fellow Latin politicians to beware of forces below them. (Comment: Alonso implied, but did not state, that Fidel was threatening his fellow Latins with popular rebellion if they did not hew to the ALBA line. End Comment.)
15. (C) Corruption in Cuba is a fairly unique phenomenon, Alonso said. Fidel does not fear much the street accusing him of having stashes of cash for personal use. (Comment: Other diplomatic sources disagree, and report that the initial reaction of "the street" was precisely to ask where Castro keeps his funds. Mexican Ambassador Pina described what he heard in the following way: The average Cuban sees the Special Period having ended at least five years ago and the Venezuelan largesse having started flowing several years ago. Still, however, Cubans note no rise whatsoever in their living standards. "Where is he putting the money?" those Cubans ask. End Comment.)
16. (C) Alonso said Cuban corruption is remarkable for its universality. Corruption is needed by all to survive. Alonso said that in most Latin countries, a corruption scandal consists of a person robbing 11 million dollars. In Cuba, it is 11 million Cubans each stealing one dollar. There are exceptional cases, such as Political Bureau member Robinson, who was summarily dismissed and imprisoned recently for alleged corrupt behavior. Fidel sent an equally powerful signal in dismissing his Minister of Auditing and Control, Lina Pedraza Rodriguez. (The press reported that Pedraza would be moved to other responsibilities). However, the bulk of the corruption behavior that Fidel talks about is simply cheating on a small scale in order to get by.
17. (C) Czech Charge Vit Korselt (May 30) said he had just come back from Prague, where he had arranged for the replacement of his DCM, who was recently expelled by the regime. The new assignee will be coming from Caracas, where he handles political and press issues. Korselt explored the documents released several weeks ago by Oswaldo Paya. He said he was surprised by Paya,s emphasis on outlawing the Communist Party. At least 50 percent of Cuban society is controlled by the Party, Korselt reasoned; he wondered how
HAVANA 00011650 004.2 OF 004
the next regime would be able to function with over half the population put outside the law. (Comment: That is not what Paya proposed. Rather, Paya,s formula is to outlaw the party but not necessarily ban all former party members from public life.) Korselt said he had engaged Paya several times on the point, but had been unable to persuade the dissident of the logic of the Czech way. Korselt allowed that the Czechs had been the exception, and that all the other East European countries had followed a path proposed by Paya in Cuba; i.e., of banning Communist Parties, even if substitute parties were subsequently accepted.
18. (C) Korselt also commented on corruption in Cuba. He is convinced there are numerous multi-millionaires on the island. He has seen too many signs -- fast cars and generous meals at restaurants, for example -- to think that everyone is living on 20 dollars a month. He thought this would be an explosive factor in post-Castro Cuba.
19. (C) The UK DCM said last week that the presence of lunatic fringe MP George Galloway in Havana put the British Embassy in an embarassing situation. On the one hand, they wanted to at least go through the motions of offering assistance to an MP; on the other hand, they thought it better not to be seen or photographed next to Galloway, who had just released a statement saying that it would be just fine if somebody killed Tony Blair. Galloway made two TV apearances with Castro, in the series of "Roundtables" that aimed to discredit "Forbes" magazine's article that ranked Castro seventh on a list of the world's richest kings, queens and dictators.
--------------------
BRACING FOR THE NAM:
--------------------
20. (C) As we get closer to September, when Cuba hosts the Non-Aligned Movement Summit, we will be ever more interested in factoids that demonstrate Cuban perfidy in NAM member countries, of which recent Cuban history is replete. For example, at a recent African embassy's national day reception, P/E Officer recommended to the Angolan Charge d'Affaires that he read (Air Force Defector, General) Rafael Del Pino,s memoirs, which included a lot about Cuba,s military involvement in Angola. Del Pino,s main point was that the fighting was largely Cuban military massacring Africans, and that it was cruel and unjustified. The Angolan replied with the party line about Cuba helping defend Angola from South African aggression, that the assistance was to a sister socialist movement, etc., etc. The Charge d'Affaires, in keeping with his African socialist principles, then said he'd be spending his summer vacation at his investment home in Lisbon.
21. (C) It will be hard for us to witness the NAM first hand, but our protecting power, the Swiss Embassy, is applying to the current NAM Chairman, Malaysia, for observer status, which they enjoyed at the Kuala Lumpur Summit. A XXXXXXXXXXXX journalist has also applied for credentials to cover the NAM and was turned down. His offense: Referring to the GOC as "the regime" instead of "the government" in his last article about Cuba.
22. (C) We plan to feature more NAM-related items in our next installment; stay tuned. PARMLY
Friday, 21 December 2007, 16:46
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HAMBURG 000073
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/AGS AND DRL.
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/21/2017
TAGS PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, GM
SUBJECT: HAMBURG VS. SCIENTOLOGY
REF: BERLIN 2211
HAMBURG 00000073 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Karen Johnson, Consul General, U.S. Consulate General Hamburg, U.S. Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) CONFIDENTIAL
SIPDIS
1. (C) SUMMARY: Since the creation of the Working Group on Scientology (AGS) in 1992 within its interior ministry with its firebrand leader, Hamburg has been at sharp odds with the Church of Scientology and more recently has taken a leading role in an attempt to ban the organization. On August 7, Hamburg's Interior Minister Udo Nagel (independent) announced the proposal to ban Scientology under Germany's Law of Associations. In November, the Hamburg State Parliament mandated him with submitting the proposal to the state interior ministers at their December meeting. Leadership within the Hamburg interior ministry, including from the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (OPC), has confirmed to ConGen Hamburg that the proposal is mainly politically motivated and that they expect the issue to die down at the latest after state elections in Bavaria. This cable examines the background to the heightened debate over Scientology in Hamburg. END SUMMARY.
HAMBURG'S WORKING GROUP ON SCIENTOLOGY
2. (SBU) In 1992, the Hamburg State Parliament created the Working Group on Scientology (Arbeitsgruppe Scientology or AGS) within the Hamburg interior ministry mandated to address all "destructive groups," which endanger society, in particular young people. AGS not only focuses on Scientology's activities within Hamburg, but also other organizations such as the Church of Satan, Transcendental Meditation, and the Unification Church. According to AGS Director Ursula Caberta, AGS and the Hamburg interior ministry view Scientology as a "politically motivated destructive cult." Thus, Caberta explained, as a state institution, it is their duty to protect the public from such organizations. In her meeting with Hamburg's Pol/Econ Officer and Specialist on November 13, she stressed that she viewed her work as that of a civil servant assigned to do a particular job by the state parliament. Currently, AGS's responsibilities are three-fold: 1) to analyze what steps the state must take to protect the public from "destructive groups;" 2) to educate the public about the dangers of such organizations; and 3) to assist victims. Hamburg is the only state in Germany with a Scientology working group. Under Caberta's leadership the working group has five employees. AGS offices were filled with books on Scientology, including all of L. Ron Hubbard's works and many of his lectures.
EUROPE UNDER ATTACK?
3. (C) Caberta stated that Scientology has declared "war on Europe." She cited evidence from Hamburg's Office for the Protection of the Constitution (OPC) annual reports of how Scientology attempts to influence politicians and political institutions as well as the press. According to the Hamburg OPC's 2006 report, Scientology continues to use methods that are "against the free, democratic constitutional structure," as was established in the 1997 State Interior Ministers meeting. Caberta asserted that Scientology in Germany has received orders from the Los Angeles headquarters to "conquer" Europe. She contends that the new Berlin headquarters have been set up for this "campaign." She continually stressed that she views Scientology not as a religious organization, but as a "political extremist" one. According to Caberta, the Hamburg Scientologists as well as most of the Scientology members in Germany are only "small fish" and the organization's strategic planning is conducted in the United States. Caberta showed Pol/Econ Officer and Specialist a booklet she had received early November that appeared to be published by Hamburg's mayor. The booklet contained the mayor's photograph and signature, yet was actually a publication from Scientology's "The Way to Happiness Foundation." Caberta contended that Scientology regularly used misleading methods to fool individuals into joining and said that such booklets had been distributed to other German cities. For someone unfamiliar with Scientology publications, the booklet looked very much like information brochures from the City of Hamburg.
4. (C) In a meeting at the consulate on December 19, Hamburg OPC leadership explained that it was a political decision for the
HAMBURG 00000073 002.2 OF 003
state OPCs to observe Scientology, based upon the "totalitarian assertions" described in L. Ron Hubbard's writings. They called their observation of Scientology "special," making it clear that they did not view the organization as a threat and that it was their responsibility to only collect information and not to pass judgment on the organization. They noted that while the OPC does not view Scientology as a religious organization, this would have no bearing on their work as the OPC observes both religious and non-religious institutions.
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY'S TAKE
5. (C) In Hamburg's Pol/Econ Officer and Specialist's meetings with Hamburg Scientology figures , our contacts made it clear that the Hamburg church faces a particularly challenging situation with Caberta, who is now considered Germany's "expert" on Scientology. They also noted that Hamburg is the only German state that has a Scientology working group, although Berlin's ministry for education has a "sect-watcher" position. (Note: In a meeting on December 14, Hamburg Deputy State Minister of the Interior Christoph Ahlhaus told CG Johnson that Berlin has been trying to convince Caberta to transfer there. End Note.) Scientology press spokesman Frank Busch claimed that AGS is exempt from the German version of the Freedom of Information Act. He complained that Caberta is "above the law" and her work is not being assessed or monitored by the interior ministry. Busch questioned why this lack of scrutiny existed since Scientology found her work to be one-sided, factually incorrect, and "playing with the people's emotions." They believe that a normal citizen would have difficulty gathering objective information on Scientology in Hamburg. According to Busch, none of Hamburg's public libraries have any of L. Ron Hubbard's books. Scientology members are not allowed to distribute flyers in the city and private individuals allegedly monitor whether members overstep these boundaries. Busch also claimed that Hamburg's Chamber of Commerce still screens out Scientology members from hiring and encourages members to do so as well, even though the city of Hamburg has ceased such practices (known locally as a "sect-filter"). (Note: Documents containing the "filter" are available on-line at the Chamber of Commerce's webpage. End Note.)
NAGEL'S PROPOSAL TO BAN SCIENTOLOGY
6. (C) On August 7 at the press release of Caberta's "Black Book Scientology" Nagel announced that he would propose discussing banning Scientology at the December 7 state interior ministers meeting. In a conversation with Pol/Econ Specialist on August 13, Hamburg Interior Ministry Spokesman Marco Haase suggested that the announcement was the result of several unrelated occurrences, such as the recent publication of Caberta's book, the case of the Berlin girl and her brother seeking refuge in Hamburg (Ref.), the attention to Scientology generated during the filming of the movie "Valkyrie" in Berlin, in which Tom Cruise stars, and the summer media slump. According to Haase, Nagel believes that a ban alone is not the answer. Rather, assistance to ex-Scientologists and education on Scientology also have important roles to play. Nagel also believes that there is sufficient evidence suggesting that Scientology undertakes activities that undermine the German constitution.
7. (C) In a meeting on December 14 with Hamburg's CG and Pol/Econ Officer, Hamburg's Deputy State Minister for the Interior Christoph Ahlhaus clarified that Nagel certainly believes that Scientology should be banned, but he also realizes the political difficulties of such an endeavor. Ahlhaus explained that the Hamburg parliament charged Nagel in a unanimous decision on November 11 to propose the ban at the interior ministers meeting. He also stated that the ministry's involvement in the issue stems foremost from the criminal cases brought annually against Scientology. Ahlhaus said these numbered over 100 and had been increasing significantly. He also explained that the issue of Scientology was very popular with voters and confirmed that it had come up because of the February 24 Hamburg state elections. Ahlhaus expected that findings would be addressed at the interior ministers' spring meeting and that perhaps the issue would come up again with the Bavarian state elections next year. After that, he believed that the issue would fizzle out. Ahlhaus portrayed Hamburg as Scientology's German headquarters and noted that the
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organization is also present in Berlin, Baden-Wurttemberg, and Bavaria, where banning Scientology also has political support. He commented that Scientology is almost like a "criminal organization" with Mafia-type structures.
COMMENT
8. (C) With a strong Scientology Church and the Scientology working group both located in Hamburg, the debate on Scientology in Germany reaches a zenith in this city. Caberta has become a national figure on the organization and Ahlhaus revealed that she often speaks to the press without clearing remarks through the interior ministry. He stated that Nagel believes she is a little "crazy" and assured the CG that Nagel's office keeps a close watch on her activities. In the meantime, although Nagel is an independent, he has stakes in the upcoming elections and other local politicians are keen to show voters that they are actively addressing their concerns. It is doubtful that the Hamburg government will change their view of Scientology in the future even though officials openly and cordially discuss with ConGen representatives USG policy on religious freedom. Nevertheless, the ban proposal may move to the back burner once elections have passed, leaving Scientology Hamburg and AGS to deal with their regular concerns. END COMMENT.
9. (U) This message has been coordinated with Embassy Berlin. JOHNSON
Tuesday, 16 December 2008, 12:46
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001125
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DS, D, P, M, CA, S/CT, INR, CA/OCS
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS AMED, AMGT, ASEC, PGOV, PREL, SOCI, CASC, TBIO, ZI
SUBJECT: HARARE EAC REVIEWS TRIPWIRES AND CHOLERA OUTBREAK
REF: A. HARARE 1066 AND PREVIOUS B. HARARE 1067 C. 07 HARARE 214
1. (U) SUMMARY: Post's EAC met on December 15 to review trip wires in relation to the cholera epidemic in Zimbabwe and the collapse of medical services. The EAC agreed that the situation falls within the "Growing Potential for Drawdown" category in which Post has generally operated since March 2007. The EAC reviewed existing precautions and recommended others. Post requests funding to purchase an additional water truck and a reverse osmosis water purification unit. END SUMMARY.
2. (U) In response to a request from Crisis Management Support, and following up on Embassy Harare's December 2 EAC (Ref A), Post's EAC met on December 15 to specifically review Post's tripwires in relation to the cholera epidemic in Zimbabwe and the collapse of medical services. Management, medical and USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) staff provided context for the discussion by describing the nature of the crisis and Post's response to date (Ref B). The EAC used the meeting to review tripwires broadly in relation to the deteriorating political situation in Zimbabwe as well. RSO noted that Embassy Harare has been in the "Growing Potential for Drawdown" category since the surge in political violence in March of 2007 (Ref C). Since that time, the EAC has regularly reviewed and revised precautionary measures depending on the immediate threats facing Post personnel. These reviews have focused on political, security and logistical issues, but have not in the past tested the adequacy of Post 's medical tripwires.
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Tripwires
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3. (SBU) Post's tripwires for medical threats distinguish between the seriousness and the susceptibility to control of a medical epidemic. The three tripwires for "Growing Potential," "Authorized Departure" and "Ordered Departure" are:
--There is an outbreak of a medical epidemic that could pose a direct risk to post personnel and private American citizens. -- There is an outbreak of a medical epidemic that can be controlled but still poses a serious medical risk to post personnel and dependents and American citizens. --An outbreak of a medical epidemic that cannot be controlled and poses a serious medical risk to post personnel and dependents and American citizens occurs.
--------------
Where We Stand
--------------
4. (U) Post's medical officer and the USAID OFDA representative explained to the EAC that cholera is a preventable disease that spreads where hygiene is poor. In Zimbabwe the breakdown in public services means that untreated sewage and garbage litter the streets of high-density neighborhoods while supplies of clean water have been cut off. This creates optimal conditions for rapid spread among individuals who live in these areas and have no access to clean water, soap, or water treatment. Cholera is also a readily treatable disease, but lack of health services has resulted in an unusually high mortality rate in Zimbabwe.
5. (U) EAC members noted that Post's tripwires do not provide a clear dividing line between risk and serious risk. Medical and OFDA staff stressed that the role of hygiene in the transmission of cholera means that, as long as employees and American citizens have access to water which they can treat, the risk to Americans from cholera is easily mitigated. Consular staff reported that they view the breakdown in health infrastructure as a threat to the safety of Americans in Harare, but their concern focuses on trauma, more than on cholera. Both prevention and treatment protocols for cholera are simple and well understood by the community. EAC members agreed that the risk posed by cholera is not currently "serious" for these reasons. The EAC believed that, the risk would become serious, and would merit authorized departure, if members of the official community were not able to obtain water. Without adequate water, Post would be unable to control the spread of cholera to the Mission community.
6. (U) The EAC discussed Post's logistics tripwires and noted that, for the time being, the Embassy has been able to
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ameliorate the impact of the collapse of Zimbabwe's infrastructure. Although Post does not anticipate that the collapse will outstrip Post's ability to cope, the EAC considers this risk particularly pertinent to the sustainability of a large USG presence and has continued to seek possible measures to make Embassy coping mechanisms more robust. (Lack of water, even without a cholera epidemic, would justify authorized departure, according to existing tripwires.) The EAC also noted that, as we have been for some time, Post is in the "Growing Potential for Drawdown" category with respect to tripwires for Police and Security Forces, Political, and Media environment as well.
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Responses
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7. (U) The EAC reviewed responses to the threat already carried out, including:
--Issuance of a Travel Warning. --Distribution of information on precautions against and treatment of cholera. --Scheduling of a Town Hall meeting for Embassy community at which the option of voluntary SMA authorization will be raised. --Consultation with Harare International School. --Ordering of hand sanitizer. --Closure to the public of Post's Public Affairs Section when water is unavailable. --Revision of EAP and F-77 lists. --Request for funding for additional well drilling surveys. --Request for provision of enhanced Post medical unit facilities.
8. (U) Additional measures being initiated or endorsed by the EAC include:
--Procurement of additional satellite phones and repetition of messages advising employees that these phones may be requested for in-country travel. --Drafting evacuation travel orders for all newly-arrived employees and ensuring all have valid visas for Zambia. --Review of additional options for emergency evacuation. --Procurement of water treatment supplies for LES employees. --Request for funding to procure an additional water truck and hire an additional driver. (See Action Request para 10.) --Request for consideration of funding to procure a reverse osmosis water pumping unit. (See Action Request para 11.)
9. (U) The EAC considered but did not endorse the following measures at this time; they will be reviewed in subsequent EACs:
--In-country travel restrictions or restrictions on TDY visitors. --An additional Town Hall meeting for American citizens. --Restrictions on public functions.
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Action Requests
---------------
10. (U) Mission facilities and residences are kept supplied with water by two water trucks currently operating eight hours per day, seven days a week. Embassy employees are advised to conserve water, but there is no rationing enforced. If one of the trucks were to break down or if many more of our wells dried up, water use restrictions would have to be imposed, and authorized departure might be necessary. To reduce this risk, Post requests funds to obtain an additional water truck and hire an additional driver.
11. (U) Embassy employees rely on distilled water for drinking. Public utility and well water are used without treatment for all other purposes. If water supplies deteriorated severely in both quantity and quality, Post might need to rely on lakes or other poor quality water sources. This would likely trigger a request for ordered departure, depending on the severity of the situation. Procurement of a reverse osmosis water purification unit would enable Post to serve the needs of remaining staff.
DHANANI
Wednesday, 03 December 2008, 21:13
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001130
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/02/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KPKO, SU, AX, CG, UG
SUBJECT: ICC'S OCAMPO: BASHIR ARREST WARRANT IN JANUARY OR
FEBRUARY
Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro Wolff for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: ICC Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo on December 2 spoke with Ambassador Wolff at the UN on the situation in Sudan. Ocampo said the arrest warrant for Sudanese President Bashir would be issued in January or February. He said Arab leaders were frustrated with Bashir, and French President Sarkozy should be told it is time to move on Sudan's president. Bashir won't turn over indicted Minister Harun, according to Ocampo. He said China, as long as it keeps its oil concessions, does not care what happens to Bashir. Ocampo said arresting Lord's Resistance Army rebel leader Kony soon would encourage armed groups in both Sudan and the DRC to negotiate. END SUMMARY.
BASHIR ARREST WARRANT IN JANUARY OR FEBRUARY
2. (C) International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo and two ICC officials met with Ambassador Wolff and Poloff on December 2 at the UN. Ocampo expects the ICC to grant his request for the arrest warrant for Sudanese President Bashir "not before January and not after February" 2009. He asked for continued Security Council pressure on Bashir, saying Bashir would seize any perceived weakening of international pressure to further entrench himself.
ARABS FRUSTRATED WITH BASHIR; FRANCE NEEDS CLEAR MESSAGE
3. (C) Ocampo reported Arab League Secretary-General Amre Moussa told him all Arabs were frustrated with Bashir, but Ocampo believes Arabs could not publicly disavow Bashir. Ocampo said Libya thought Bashir was irresponsible. Ocampo also said African leaders were all "hiding behind France," hoping the French would find an exit strategy for Bashir, which, according to Ocampo, was "non-existent." Ocampo said Bashir was politically dead, but France "put him on artificial respiration," and said French President Sarkozy needed to receive a clear message that it was time to move on Bashir. (NOTE: Sarkozy reportedly met with Bashir in Doha November 29. END NOTE). Ocampo said the European Union is doing "nothing."
BASHIR WON'T GIVE UP HARUN
4. (C) When asked by Ambassador Wolff what he expected Bashir to do, Ocampo said Bashir would never turn over indicted Minister of Humanitarian Affairs Harun to the ICC. Ocampo said Bashir's next steps will depend on Security Council action.
CHINA ONLY WANTS OIL, IT DOESN'T CARE ABOUT BASHIR
5. (C) Ocampo said China, as long as it continues to have oil concessions in Sudan, does not care what happens to Bashir, and would not oppose his arrest if its revenues were not interrupted. Ocampo suggested the United States give China assurances about its oil concessions.
GETTING KONY NOW WILL "BRING THEM BEGGING" TO NEGOTIATE
6. (C) Ocampo said arresting Lord's Resistance Army leader Joseph Kony in the next month would send a strong signal to the Sudanese leaders and rebels, as well as Laurent Nkunda, leader of the DRC rebel group CNDP. Ocampo said quick action against Kony, under the legal framework of MONUC, would "bring them begging" to the table for negotiations, giving "two quick wins" -one in Sudan, one in the DRC-to the international community.
Wolff
Tuesday, 10 March 2009, 10:51
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STRASBOURG 000006
SIPDIS
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/ERA
EO 12958 DECL: 3/9/2019
TAGS PREL, COE, FR
SUBJECT: COUNCIL OF EUROPE: MORE EFFECTIVE AROUND THE EDGES THAN AT
ITS CORE
STRASBOURG 00000006 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Vincent Carver, CG, Strasbourg, State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Council of Europe (COE) likes to portray itself as a bastion of democracy, a promoter of human rights, and the last best hope for defending the rule of law in Europe - and beyond. It is an organization with an inferiority complex and, simultaneously, an overambitious agenda. In effect, it is at its best in providing technical assistance to member-states and at its worst in tackling geo-political crises. The following is a brief overview of the COE for the Department's use in preparing for COE Secretary General Terry Davis' talks in Washington March 17-20. End summary.
2. (C) The current COE Secretary General, Terry Davis (UK), leaves office this summer, after a five-year term that has been, according to many sources, devoid of vision. Davis is known as a micromanager and will not be missed by many of his staff as well as by many resident ambassadors. In addition to having an unpopular lame duck at its helm, the COE suffers from a large and entrenched secretariat that bristles at direction from member-states. It also (particularly under the current Chair - Spain) suffers from an attempt to proceed only with full consensus. Finally, the COE receives (rightfully, in our view) neither the level of funding nor the attention from member-states that other regional organizations, such as the EU and the OSCE receive. The next Secretary General will have to address these factors if the COE is to fulfill its limited - yet important - potential (septel addresses the four candidates running to replace Davis).
3. (SBU) On the eve of Secretary General Davis' meetings in Washington, we outline some of the COE's "value added" while note some of its serious shortcomings. The COE can provide valuable services, such as training EU monitors in protecting human rights in Georgia and in arranging for prisoner exchanges in the aftermath of the August war there. The COE's European Commission for Democracy Through Law (commonly known as the "Venice Commission") advises governments on national legislation on constitutional law, electoral codes, and fundamental freedoms. Its Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO - of which the U.S. is a formal member and a major financial contributor) investigates and reports on individual countries' efforts to root out systematic corruption. Various COE bodies also exchange information on money laundering and cyber crime (the U.S. is a party to the COE Convention on Cybercr8me, as well as the conventions on Transfer of Sentenced Persons and on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters).
4. (SBU) One of the COE's bodies with the widest reach is the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR serves as the court of final appeal for member-states' citizens who have exhausted all legal appeals in their own country and whose case pertains to an area covered by the European Convention on Human Rights. All member-states are required to respect and implement the ECHR's decisions. The Court currently has a backlog of almost 100,000 cases (Russia is blocking a mechanism - Protocol 14 - that has been ratified by every other COE member-state that would reduce the number of judges required to process routine cases - one critical example of how consensus can work against COE efficacy). The ECHR will block the extradition of prisoners to non-COE countries if it believes they would be subject to the death penalty or torture. It has also requested more information on pending British extradition cases to the U.S. where it believes the prisoners might be sentenced in the U.S. to life imprisonment with no possible appeal or automatic judicial review of the life sentence.
5. (C) While the COE can be effective in the various important tasks as noted above, on key geostrategic questions, it muddles through at best. The most recent - and serious - example is the COE's approach on the Georgia-Russia conflict. The Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) strongly condemned Russia's actions against Georgia and called on member-states - and other countries - not to recognize the breakaway "republics," the decision-making Council of Ministers (and their deputies - the 47 resident ambassadors in Strasbourg) did little to promote a meaningful action plan regarding Georgia. This was partially due to the chronic "consensus at any price" approach of some delegations - including those of some EU member-states - that basically provided Moscow a veto on meaningful COE action. It is also indicative of the current Council of Ministers' Chair - Spain - which takes a much more collegial approach to discussions than the previous Chair - Sweden. In any case, if the EU's 27 member-states are not unified on an issue, the COE will not be, either.
6. C) Two other illustrations of the COE's reach extending far
STRASBOURG 00000006 002.2 OF 002
beyond its influence is the omnipresent agenda item of "the situation in Cyprus." COE discussions on this issue amount to little more than an undiplomatic volley of mutual recriminations between the Cypriot and Turkish ambassadors. Still, behind the scenes, the COE is promoting limited programs such as the use of "neutral" history text books in both countries. We also note that the COE has had little success in pressuring Belarus to meet COE criteria so that it can resume its application process for full COE membership.
7. C) Finally, we turn to one issue where the COE has been both an irritant and, more recently, somewhat of a champion - Guantanamo. Dick Marty, a member of the Swiss delegation to the PACE, conducted an investigation into renditions and "secret prisons" in Europe connected to the U.S. war on terrorism. His work created a great deal of controversy and anti-U.S. sentiment in the COE. More recently, however, SecGen Davis and COE Human Rights Commissioner Hammarberg have called on COE member-states to work with the U.S. and consider accepting detainees from Guantanamo to help the U.S. shut down the detention facility there. CARVER
Thursday, 24 September 2009, 09:06
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STRASBOURG 000021
SIPDIS
DEPT ALSO FOR DRL, L, EUR/ERA AND EUR/WE
EO 12958 DECL: 9/24/2019
TAGS PREL, PHUM, COE, FR, GG, KV, RS
SUBJECT: COUNCIL OF EUROPE: OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE NEW SECGEN;
GEORGIA, RUSSIA, GUANTANAMO
REF: (A) STRASBOURG 13 (B) STRASBOURG 12
STRASBOURG 00000021 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Vincent Carver, CG, Strasbourg, State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) Department action request - please see para two.
SUMMARY
- - - - - - - -
1. (C) The Council of Europe's (COE) Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) is expected to elect the next Secretary General of the COE (REF A) September 29 or 30; a ranking Department official should consider reviewing our human rights agenda with the new SecGen soon - please see para two. The Georgians are pushing for a political confrontation with Russia at the PACE session September 28-October 2, with over 70 PACE members supporting debate over the Russian delegation's credentials. Several western European ambassadors have told us they want to prevent a plenary debate which would provoke a walkout by the Russians. Separately, a few ambassadors questioned Human Rights Commissioner Hammarberg's authority to write to all member states urging them to consider accepting detainees from Guantanamo. We do not expect this to hamper the Commissioner's continuing to support us on this issue. End summary.
EARLY CONSULTATIONS WITH NEW SECGEN WOULD BENEFIT U.S.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. (C) Mateo Sorinas, PACE Secretary General, briefed us September 21 on the September 28-October 2 PACE session. Despite lingering institutional rivalry between the PACE and member states, the PACE is expected finally to elect former Norwegian PM Jagland September 29 or 30. According to COE Chief of Protocol Benitez, Jagland would take his oath within a day of being elected and likely would assume his full-time duties in Strasbourg by mid-October. Comment: Jagland can be expected to criticize the U.S. for the death penalty; he may, however, be less enthusiastic than the previous SecGen, Terry Davis (UK), in publicly criticizing renditions, particularly if we review such issues with him soon. In this regard, we highly recommend a visit by a ranking Department official, such as the Assistant Secretary for DRL, to review our human rights agenda with the new Secretary General in the next several weeks.
COMMISSIONER CRITICIZED FOR LETTER ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. (C) Human Rights Commissioner Thomas Hammarberg, in his quarterly report to the Council of Ministers' deputies (resident ambassadors) September 23, briefly mentioned his "informal" visit a few months ago to Washington, during which he told Administration officials that the U.S. could not expect European countries to accept detainees from Guantanamo if the U.S. were not willing to accept some on U.S. soil. Hammarberg was then criticized by a few ambassadors for having written in June to all COE member states calling on them to consider accepting detainees from Guantanamo. The Maltese Ambassador (one of those criticizing Hammarberg) told us privately that Hammarberg thinks he is "God's gift to the world." The ambassador added that, if Washington wanted assistance with the detainees, it had plenty of direct channels to European countries and did not need Hammarberg to carry its messages. Comment: A few ambassadors, including the Maltese, have a history of bad relations with Hammarberg. Most member states respect and even relish Hammarberg's independence. We do not expect this recent criticism to stifle Hammarberg from raising the detainee issue with European officials.
GEORGIA: TIME TO QUESTION RUSSIA'S CREDENTIALS IN THE PACE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4. (C) The Georgian Ambassador told us September 23 that he is confident the upcoming PACE session will result in some sort of sanctions against the Russian PACE delegation. He said it is high time for the COE to penalize Russia for its non-compliance with its COE commitments, including but not limited to its actions on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Over 70 PACE members, mainly from conservative parties from central and eastern Europe, have signed a petition to debate the Russian delegation's credentials. No Georgian PACE member has signed in an effort to demonstrate that this is a "COE issue, not simply a Georgian one." The Russians have made it well known that their PACE delegation will walk out if the issue is debated in plenary (note: it will first be debated in the Monitoring Committee). While the Romanian Ambassador told us that the COE will demonstrate it means business on this issue, the Danish Ambassador told us that most member states, "taking a cue from the EU, NATO, and various European and non-European countries," want better relations with Russia and therefore seek to head off a confrontation. He also noted that the leaders of the political groups and committees in PACE do not support questioning Russia's credentials. The Russian Ambassador, speaking at the deputies' session September 23, stressed that any move to question the Russian delegation's credentials would "impose real damage to the image of the PACE and the COE. Comment: While the Georgians will view the Monitoring Committee's debate on the credentials as a victory, it likely
STRASBOURG 00000021 002.2 OF 002
will be a hollow one - we doubt that the PACE plenary will, in the face of a Russian walkout, vote to support any serious sanctions against the Russians.nor
OTHER ISSUES
- - - - - - - - - - -
5. (SBU) Hammarberg and the Serbian Ambassador had a testy exchange September 23 on Kosovo. The Serb made the usual points about its "southern province," claiming there has been no progress on IDPs and that there is a lack of freedom of movement for non-ethnic Albanians. She also criticized references to the Ahtisaari Plan and the Kosovo Constitution in Hammarberg's report. Hammarberg retorted that his report covered the Serb minority's concerns. He then underscored that he is "obliged to cover the concerns of Europeans - to help individuals - even if this might be viewed as supporting one side or another politically." He called on the Serbian Ambassador not to undermine his work "when we are trying to assist people."
6. (SBU) Several delegations and officials from the European Court of Human Rights have told us that recent rhetoric from Moscow, including from the Duma, on support for court reforms is just that - rhetoric. Few hold out any hope that Russia will ratify Protocol 14 (REF B).
7. (SBU) In a rather sad exchange at the deputies' meeting September 23, the Greek Ambassador criticized photos apparently chosen for Commissioner Hammarberg's website regarding Hammarberg's recent official visit to Turkey. The Greek (echoed by the Italian and Maltese ambassadors) contrasted the "vacation-like, very positive" images with those associated with the Commissioner's visit to Greece. Hammarberg challenged the Greek by noting that his report on Turkey had not yet been published, and therefore the photos for the website had not yet been selected. CARVER
Friday, 02 October 2009, 13:44
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STRASBOURG 000023
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/WE
EO 12958 DECL: 10/2/2019
TAGS PREL, PHUM, SENV, COE, FR, GG, NO, RS
SUBJECT: COE: NEW SECRETARY GENERAL; RUSSIA, GEORGIA, CLIMATE
CHANGE
REF: STRASBOURG 21 AND PREVIOUS
STRASBOURG 00000023 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Vincent Carver, CG, Strasbourg, State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) This is an action request; Embassy Oslo please see para three.
SUMMARY
- - - - - - -
1. (U) The Council of Europe's (COE) Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) elected September 29 Thorbjorn Jagland of Norway as the new COE Secretary General. The PACE noted that Georgia had met most and Russia had met almost none of their respective COE commitments post-August 2008. The PACE rejected, however, a resolution suspending the Russian delegation's credentials. Visiting former White House adviser Kathleen McGinty effectively provided PACE members her views regarding the U.S.' commitment to fighting climate change; several members praised U.S. engagement on the issue in the run-up to Copenhagen. Mikhail Gorbachev, speaking at a COE function October 1, sharply criticized NATO enlargement as slowing down the construction of a "Common European Home." End summary
JAGLAND ELECTED SECGEN
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. (U) The election of new COE Secretary General Thorbjorn Jagland (former Norwegian PM and FM and current President of Norway's parliament) was the highlight of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe's (PACE) September 28-October 2 session. Jagland noted after the election that "Europe is the greatest peace project ever in history," and that the Council of Europe has been "indispensable in that respect." Jagland took office October 1, telling assembled ambassadors that he would pursue reform and that he wanted the COE to focus more on its key priorities (democracy, human rights, and the rule of law).
3. (C) The Polish candidate, rather than show solidarity and grace in defeat by attending Jagland's post-election remarks to the PACE, departed Strasbourg immediately after the vote's results became known. The Polish Ambassador complained bitterly to us October 1, claiming that the "Russophile Jagland" had told the Russians during his election campaign that he had consistently opposed NATO and EU enlargement toward Russia. (Action request for Embassy Oslo: Please provide any information you may have on Jagland's views regarding NATO and EU enlargement.)
WORDS BUT NO ACTIONS AGAINST MOSCOW
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4. (C) The PACE's discussion of the consequences of the war between Russia and Georgia provided harsher and more widespread criticism of Russia than at previous sessions. The PACE noted that Georgia had met most of the PACE's demands regarding the situation while Russia had met almost none of its commitments. The PACE also reiterated its support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The PACE rejected, however, a call to suspend the Russian delegation's credentials. While the Georgian delegation and several of its Nordic supporters stressed that the COE's credibility is at stake, many PACE members argued that dialogue, rather than suspension of credentials, is the only way to find a solution between the two countries. The Danish Ambassador, no apologist for Moscow's behavior, summed up for us the COE's approach to us, "While it's difficult to work with them, it is impossible to work without them."
5. (SBU) A separate discussion on "the situation of human rights defenders and the increasing violence in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation," while less heated, also demonstrated a rift between the Russian delegation's analysis and that of most PACE members. Several speakers noted that the PACE wants to help Russia address problems, including "a pattern of impunity." All Russian speakers noted that, in addition to human rights workers, police and regional and local government officials had also been targeted by bandits and terrorists. Throughout the PACE session, several PACE members and guests, including French State Secretary for European Affairs Pierre Lellouche, also called on Russia to ratify Protocol 14 to streamline the European Court of Human Right's procedures.
U.S. SPEAKER: WORKING WITH THE WORLD ON CLIMATE CHANGE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6. (U) Former White House adviser Kathleen McGinty effectively outlined her views of the Obama Administration's commitment to fighting climate change to the PACE's Environment Committee September 29. CG underscored the need for all countries, including developing ones, to cut carbon emissions as part of any agreement coming out of the Copenhagen conference. Subsequently, PACE members welcomed the U.S.' commitment to fighting climate change, although several noted that the U.S. is the "world's largest per capita polluter." Nobel Peace Prize winner Rajendra Pachauri joined the plenary debate, nothing the need to review how climate change exacerbates the "energy
STRASBOURG 00000023 002.2 OF 002
poverty" affecting "more than two billion people" using biomass for a variety of applications. Separately, the PACE approved a resolution calling on member states to adopt an additional protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights on the "right to a healthy environment." The PACE's Legal Affairs and Human Rights Committee had opposed the resolution and one western ambassador told us the COE's Council of Ministers "will bury" the proposal.
OTHER ISSUES: OECD, UN REFORM, GORBY
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
7. (SBU) OECD Secretary General Gurria briefed members on the OECD's activities to address the financial crisis. PACE passed a largely descriptive resolution on the crisis and the OECD's actions while several members called on Gurria to provide a better idea of the "lessons learned" from the crisis. The PACE also passed a resolution on UN reform that, inter alia, called for the incorporation of a "parliamentary element in UNGA's structure" and for the non-use of veto power in the UNSC on human rights issues. Finally, former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, European Commission President Barroso, Slovene President Turk, and several other European figures addressed the COE's sixtieth anniversary celebration in Strasbourg October 1. Most praised the vision of the COE's founders and the work of the organization. Gorbachev, however, while noting many of the COE's successes, also stressed that construction of Europe's "common home" had been slowed down by NATO's expansion to the East. CARVER
Tuesday, 24 November 2009, 13:33
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HAVANA 000706
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/CCA
STATE FOR DRL CNEWLING
EO 12958 DECL: 10/23/2019
TAGS PREL, PHUM, PGOV, CU
SUBJECT: FEISTY LITTLE MISSIONS DENT CUBA'S RECORD OF
BULLYING OTHERS TO SILENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS
REF: A. HAVANA 619 (RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR) B. HAVANA 592 (GOC SIGNALS "READINESS TO MOVE FORWARD") C. VATICAN 117 ("VATICAN TWO-STEP WITH CUBA")
HAVANA 00000706 001.3 OF 003
Classified By: Poloff Joaquin F. Monserrate for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary. The Cuban Government has been able to stonewall its independent civil society from foreign visitors who have, for the large part, been all too ready to give in to Cuban bullying and give up on these encounters. A series of recent visits has shown the different approaches that foreign governments have taken to highlight, or not, Cuba's sorry human rights record. The Asutralian Foreign Minister, Switzerland's Human Rights Special Envoy and the Canadian Cabinet-level Minister of the Americas not only failed to meet with non-government Cubans, they didn't even bother to publicly call for more freedoms after visiting Cuba in November. Though also shunning NGOs, recent emissaries from the Vatican and the EU, at least called out publicly for greater rights. Some holdouts remain, refusing to bring anyone of note if the Cubans insist on conditioning access. Regardless of the approach, the result tends to be the same. There is little of substance to be gained from a "friends-at-all-costs" approach to Cuba. End Summary.
THE "BEST-FRIENDS-FOREVER" APPROACH: DO, SAY NOTHING
--------------------------------------------- -------
2. (C) Practitioners of this approach to Cuba include most countries, including all Latin Americans and Africans, Russians and Chinese, and many Europeans. The Brazilian Polcouns in Havana best summed up this style: "We don't raise (human rights) in public or private." No wonder, the U.K. number-two in Havana grumbled, that "Cuba would love nothing more than to have the same relationship with us that they have with Brazil." Most of these countries would not raise human rights even if the Government of Cuba (GOC) did not object to them doing so. This group apparently now includes the Swiss and Australians.
3. (C) The Swiss Human Rights Special Envoy Rudolf Knoblauch met with his Cuban counterparts on November 12, government-organized groups (GONGOs) and the Catholic Cardinal. He did not meet with civil society leaders nor make any public reference to Cuba's human rights record ("not the Swiss way to do things," they told us). More surprisingly, however, the Swiss admitted that Knoblauch did not raise Cuba's human rights situation in private. As part of the "Periodic Review," under their bilateral Dialogue, the Swiss and the Cubans discussed multilateral human rights issues, such as accession to international conventions and the UNCHR, but did not touch upon Cuba's political prisoners, access to prisons or the still-unscheduled visit of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture (Ref A). They invited Cuban officials to tour Swiss jails, something the Swiss said "had worked" in their relations with Vietnam.
4. (C) Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith met with Cuba's Vice President Jose Ramon Machado and Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez on November 23. According to Australian press reports, Smith said how "pleased" he was with Australia-Cuba relations and praised bilateral "friendship and cooperation," while Rodriguez thanked Australia for its support against the U.S. embargo at the United Nations, the Cuban press reported. Nothing was said in public about political or economic reforms, or human rights.
THE "KEEP-IT-PRIVATE" APPROACH: SAY NOTHING PUBLICLY
--------------------------------------------- ------
5. (C) It is hard to gauge how many countries really bring up
HAVANA 00000706 002.3 OF 003
the tough subjects when they meet in private with the Cubans, but many claim to do so. Although nothing of substance stops visitors from engaging with civil society quietly (the way, for instance, we managed to do with our U.S. visitors in September, Ref B), most countries opt to shun meetings altogether, bowing to Cuban pressure. Spain falls mostly in this group, although to their credit, Foreign Minister Moratinos spoke of the need for "gestures" after his meetings here in September. Canada laid a claim on this group after the November visit of Americas Minister Peter Kent.
6. (C) The Canadians also failed to meet with the independent civil society or make public pronouncements after the visit of Minister Kent. This was surprising, since Kent and Prime Minister Harper had been publicly critical of Cuba's human rights record, something that led the GOC to cancel Kent's visit last April. Canadian officials in Havana told us that Kent raised the issue of Cuba's political prisoners but that the GOC had immediately turned the discussion into one of definitions. (Note: The GOC claims all of its prisoners of conscience are common criminals. Its stock answer to the topic is to deny it holds political prisoners.) It's an interesting debate, our Canadian counterparts claimed, "If someone takes money from the U.S., does that make him a political prisoner?"
7. (C) In his meetings with Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez, Kent reportedly asked also about the visit of the Special Rapporteur, but again the Cubans changed the subject. "How many Rapporteur visits has Canada had?," Rodriguez was said to have shot back. Kent left town saying little, a style that "works better for the (GOC)," our northerly neighbors assured us.
THE "WE-RESPECTFULLY-DISAGREE" APPROACH: GOING PUBLIC
--------------------------------------------- --------
8. (C) The missions that air their concerns publicly are in the minority. Although the official press ignores it, the GOC frowns upon these utterances and often acts offended. Countries that go public usually also meet with civil society, but others don't. Outspoken visitors sometimes step out of their missions' carefully managed talking points, as was apparently the case, for instance, of the latest high-level visitors to Cuba from the European Union and the Holy See.
9. (C) The EU Commission in Havana sits snuggly in the "Best-Friends-Forever" camp. Their functionaries share with us their reproach of the "radical" Swedes and Czechs, with their human rights priorities, and can't wait for "moderate" Spain to take over the EU Presidency. The former Development Commissioner, Louis Michel, keenly followed that line during his visits to Cuba. Not so his successor.
10. (C) On an early November visit to Cuba, the Belgian Karel de Gucht put aside Cuban equivocations and declared that "there is a set of fundamental rights that are universal," and called on Cuba to "create the right conditions" to enact these rights. In respectful tones and emphasizing that the EU was not after "regime change," De Gucht put the GOC on notice that, if it did not begin to improve its human rights record, it could give up any hope of normalizing relations with the EU. Despite this, in a November 23 interview with CNN, de Gucht seemed to soften this line and called for normalization without demanding prior gestures from Cuba.
11. (C) The Vatican's Social Communications Council President Archbishop Claudio Cello, a grizzled veteran of China-Vatican negotiations, also mixed praise with tough love. Originally calling on the GOC to allow further radio access to Cuban churches, Celli went off script, and called on greater information and internet access for all Cubans. He even
HAVANA 00000706 003.3 OF 003
singled out Cuba's blogger community for praise, something the GOC "didn't like at all," according to Holy See diplomats in Havana (leading Celli to "clarify" his comments upon his return to Rome).
THE "TAKE-YOUR-VISIT-AND-SHOVE-IT" APPROACH: LITTLE LOST
--------------------------------------------- -----------
12. (C) Some countries refuse to let the GOC dictate to them when it comes to visitors. Although they will accommodate GOC petulancy by hosting dual national day ceremonies (and spare Cuban officials the "affront" of sharing space with Cubans it deems unworthy) and cordon off their ambassadors from civil society engagement, the holdout countries resist pressure to disengage from civil society altogether. In many cases they have chosen to keep their principals at home if the price is kowtowing to the GOC. Germany, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom may pay a price in terms of lost business and access from their principled stance. Others who stand in this camp have less to lose from sticking it to the Cubans, and include Poland and Sweden.
13. (C) In November, the Ambassador for the Order of Malta (a Catholic church NGO given diplomatic status by the GOC) took the "take-it-and-shove" it approach to new heights. After the GOC told him that he could only bring in the Belgian Ambassador (firmly in the "BFF" camp) but not the USINT Chief of Mission to a humanitarian event he was organizing at a leper hospital, he cancelled the event and left town.
14. (C) COMMENT. The Cuba overwhelming majority of the 100 foreign missions in Havana do not face a human rights dilemma in their dealings with the Cubans. These countries wouldn't raise the issue anyway. The rest, a group that includes most of Europe, Canada, Australia, Japan and the United States, claim to employ different approaches to address their human rights concerns in Cuba -- but the truth is that most of these countries do not press the issue at all in Cuba. The GOC does not like to talk about its human rights situation, and even less to be lectured publicly. It deploys considerable resources to bluff and bully many missions and their visitors into silence. For the most part the rewards for acquiescing to GOC demands are risible: pomp-full dinners and meetings and, for the most pliant, a photo-op with one of the Castro brothers. In terms of substance or economic benefits, they fare little better than those who stand up to the GOC. FARRAR
Wednesday, 10 June 2009, 18:05
C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000344
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/CCA
EO 12958 DECL: 06/09/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, CU
SUBJECT: FIDEL CASTRO IMPRESSED BY POTUS AFTER CAIRO SPEECH
Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) The Government of Cuba has offered no official reaction to President Obama's June 4 speech in Cairo. Former president Fidel Castro, however, previewed his interest in the Cairo speech in a Reflection article on June 6 that he started with "Yesterday afternoon, while I was carefully analyzing Obama's address at the Muslim university in Cairo..." (Note: Fidel's June 6 Reflection was devoted principally to linking the June 4 arrest in the United States of Kendall and Gwendolyn Meyers for espionage related charges to the June 3 OAS resolution regarding Cuba. End Note.) Fidel's subsequent Reflection on June 9 will only add to speculation from our civil society and diplomatic contacts that Fidel is obsessed with President Obama.
2. (C) Fidel's latest, lengthy (3,500 words) Reflection focused entirely on the Cairo speech, including pages worth of short excerpts from the speech itself. Fidel split the speech into two sections. Fidel mostly sympathized with POTUS - in his own way - regarding the first section, which included the fact that the U.S. is not at war with Islam, the Israel-Palestine issue, and Iran and nuclear weapons. Specifically, Fidel said, "One cannot blame the new president of the United States for the situation created in the Middle East...He takes office at an exceptionally complex time for his country and the world...It is still too early to pass judgment on his degree of commitment to the ideas he presents..." Fidel then continued his attempts to walk a thin line between a positive impression of a popular U.S. president and the idea that the evil empire will never change. For example, Fidel explained that "the current president's main difficulty lies in the fact that the principles he is advocating contradict the policy the superpower has pursued for almost seven decades..." Fidel also renewed his insistence that the United States is a racist country by adding that "Not even Obama could imagine when he was working in the black communities of Chicago that the terrible effects of a financial crisis would combine with the factors that made his election as president in a strongly racist society possible."
3. (SBU) Fidel referred to the second section of the speech on the topics of democracy, religious freedom, and women's rights as the moment when "Obama starts philosophizing and lecturing about U.S. foreign policy." Fidel targets the line in the speech "No system of government can or should be imposed by one nation on any other" and argues that it was followed by Obama immediately contradicting himself "with a declaration of faith that turns the United States into the supreme judge over democratic values and human rights." Overall, Fidel said the speech "would appear to be a public relations campaign carried out by the United States with the Muslim countries; in any case, this is better than threatening to destroy them with bombs." Fidel ends his article by calling POTUS a "very good communicator", highlighting the ecumenical breadth of the speech, and complimenting Obama on his "impressive working capacity."
4. (SBU) The U.S. Interests Section (USINT) posted a video of the speech, a link to the America.gov website covering the speech, and a Spanish translation on our homepage. USINT is distributing a Spanish copy of the speech to Cuban Muslims and other contacts in civil society and the diplomatic community. The Cairo speech was not available to Cubans through the official Cuban media, and only excerpts of Fidel's Reflections were read on the radio and television. This is not the first time Fidel's Reflection was the first official source of information regarding a significant world or domestic event. He frequently provides the only snippets of President Obama's speeches available to Cubans outside of USINT's reach. (Note: Today's Communist Party newspaper Granma notes that tonight's roundtable television program will discuss, among other things, Obama's recent trip to the Middle East. End Note.) FARRAR
Thursday, 07 January 2010, 18:48
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HAVANA 000011
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/CCA AND WHA/PD
STATE FOR OES
EO 12958 DECL: 01/06/2020
TAGS SENV, PGOV, ECON, PREL, CU
SUBJECT: CLIMATE CHANGE PROVIDES GOC WITH MUCH NEEDED
DISTRACTION
REF: A. HAVANA 168 ("CUBA WEIGHS IN ON CAPITALISTS CRISIS") B. HAVANA 763 (NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSION) C. HAVANA 736 ("HUMAN RIGHTS DAY TURNS VIOLENT")
HAVANA 00000011 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Principal Officer Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) an d (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Government of Cuba (GOC) used the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen to distract attention from problems within Cuba and ferociously vent against the United States and, in particular, President Obama. While some elements within the GOC are legitimately concerned about the environment, the harsh and well orchestrated response was pure political posturing. Like the world financial crisis before it (ref A), climate change provides a perfect platform for the GOC to join its ALBA friends to decry capitalism and blame the West for all of the world's ills. At the heart of Cuba's complaints was not the substance of the Copenhagen Accord but rather the process, in particular the fact that Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia were not involved in the negotiations. Despite the circus-like treatment that Cuba's mercurial leader afforded to climate issues, many in the GOC are actually serious about climate change. END SUMMARY.
THE MOST SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL BATTLE IN HUMAN HISTORY
--------------------------------------------- ---------
2. (SBU) Communist Party leader and former President Fidel Castro has mentioned or focused on the Copenhagen Conference and the role of the United States in nearly every one of his "Reflection" articles since September 2009. Previously, Fidel had only sporadically written on climate change, although he has been obsessed with President Obama since the 2008 elections. Fidel began to hint that the Copenhagen Summit would fail after an ALBA Summit held in Bolivia in mid-October and by early November, he was openly predicting failure. In a December 14 message to Venezuelan President Chavez following an ALBA summit held in Havana, Fidel wrote that Copenhagen represented "the most important political battle of human history." On December 17, Fidel quoted extensively from speeches by Chavez and Bolivian President Morales at the conference while criticizing a planned meeting between President Obama and twenty-plus countries scheduled for the following day.
3. (SBU) Following the conference, Fidel wrote three straight Reflections devoted to attacking President Obama's participation in Copenhagen. Fidel called President Obama's conference remarks "deceitful, demagogic and ambiguous." In a January 3 Reflection, Fidel claimed "the yanki president, Barack Obama, and a group of the richest states on the planet, resolved to dismantle the binding commitments of Kyoto." This is in sharp contrast to his mid-September Reflection that one of President Obama's two positive features was his concern for climate change (concern for health care was the other).
FOREIGN MINISTER ACTS OUT FIDEL'S REFLECTIONS
---------------------------------------------
4. (SBU) Fidel wrote on December 19, as if he were still in charge of the country, that Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez would explain in a press conference upon his return from Copenhagen "the truth" of what happened. Like a good soldier, the otherwise calm FM Rodriguez blamed President Obama in a December 21 press conference for the "failure" of the climate conference. Rodriguez said "at the summit, there was only imperial, arrogant Obama, who does not listen, who imposes his positions and even threatens developing countries." Rodriguez accused President Obama of maintaining the same position that had prevented the United States from ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. Rodriguez claimed President Obama knew he was lying when he said he was confident an agreement would be reached after the President departed but before the end of the conference. In addition to President Obama, Rodriguez also targeted UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown for allegedly trying to blackmail countries into accepting
HAVANA 00000011 002.2 OF 003
the Copenhagen Accord. This was only his fourth press conference since becoming Foreign Minister following one on the U.S. embargo in September 2009, the situation in Honduras in June, and a meeting with EU commissioner Luis Michel in March of that same year.
WHY SO ANGRY?
-------------
5. (SBU) At the heart of Cuba's complaints was not the substance of the Copenhagen Accord but rather the process, in particular the fact that Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia were not involved in the negotiations. The GOC has reported hourly details of how the events unfolded from President Obama's arrival and departure to the eventual departure of the Cuban delegation, highlighting Obama's short visit and meetings with "selected" countries. Rodriguez labeled the conference an "antidemocratic, exclusionary, arbitrary farce." The GOC detailed the efforts of presidents Chavez and Morales to defend ALBA's position and not accept any agreement that did not place all the responsibility on the developed nations, including repayment of a massive "climate debt" to developing nations.
IDEOLOGUES TRUMP SCIENTISTS
---------------------------
6. (C) A British diplomat told us that there are in fact moderates in the Cuban government that were interested in negotiating a productive agreement for the sake of the environment. Cuba's position was apparently still up in the air until the ALBA summit in Havana when hardliners in the government took over the issue. Our contact told us, "the moderates had nothing to offer; the hardliners had Chavez and his oil."
USEFUL DOMESTIC DISTRACTION
---------------------------
7. (SBU) Copenhagen also provided the international media with a distraction from the fruitless domestic meetings taking place at the same time within Cuba. In the midst of Fidel's and Bruno's outbursts, current President Raul Castro barely mentioned the conference in his December 20 speech to the National Assembly, and what he did say had a more diplomatic and reflective tone. Raul did not mention President Obama at any time in his speech. He lamented that the climate change conference ended without "tangible results", but focused on what Cuba was doing to improve its water supply, to encourage the planting of trees, to teach new generations about nature, and to plan for coastal dangers and vulnerabilities for the years 2050-2100. The rest of the National Assembly was a significant disappointment with the only sound bites coming from Raul Castro's own U.S. bashing regarding the December arrest of an Amcit and USINT efforts to monitor Human Rights Day activities (Ref B).
8. (C) Another common theme in Fidel's Reflections, Foreign Minister Rodriguez's press conference and the official press was the "brutality of the Danish police force against thousands of protesters and invitees," all stated without any sense of irony. One western diplomat commented that the events in Copenhagen provided the perfect diversion from the GOC's own repressive actions on Human Rights Day December 10 (Ref C).
CUBA'S SELF-INTEREST IN CLIMATE CHANGE
--------------------------------------
9. (C) Despite the circus-like treatment that Cuba's mercurial leader afforded to climate issues, many in the GOC are actually serious about climate change. An international journalist who follows environmental issues in Cuba told us that within the GOC there is much interest in climate change and a willingness to adapt and implement measures to combat the effects. This is partly due to Cuba's vulnerability to rising temperatures and sea levels, most notably the potential flooding of an area with great biodiversity on the
HAVANA 00000011 003.2 OF 003
southwest coast (Zapata Swamp). She said the GOC includes environmental considerations in all national development plans. The British diplomat told us that a month before the Copenhagen conference a group of British experts visited Cuba and had "serious" discussions with Cuban officials about exploring options for alternative energy. He said the Cubans are desperate for diversifying energy sources, but lack the necessary funding and technology.
10. (SBU) The UN Development Program has a $25.5 million program in Cuba for 2008-2012 focused on climate change and sustainable energy. Projects include supporting conservation and biodiversity, implementing sustainable agriculture, and promoting the safe management of the bays in Havana and Cienfuegos. The GOC also constructively participates in regional UN projects, including hosting UN Environment Program workshops and providing (EU-funded) technical assistance to other Caribbean countries like Haiti.
11. (C) Several U.S. environmental groups, like the Environmental Defense Fund, have close relationships with Cuban officials in the Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology. These NGOs provide some technical assistance, but tell us that they are not allowed to pursue their own projects but rather are limited to respond to GOC requests. In particular, any research or work related to Cuba's oil refineries and nickel plants is strictly off limits. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that the area around the nickel mines in Moa, Holguin consistently reports the sickest population in Cuba. One XXXXXXXXXXXX expert told us that oil production, refining, and electricity generation facilities in Cuba are generations behind U.S. and international environmental standards. XXXXXXXXXXXX countered in response to the GOC outbursts following Copenhagen that Cuban authorities were in no position to judge due to Cuba's disastrous treatment of its land, water, air and biodiversity. Espinosa Chepe then used official Cuban statistics to support his claim.
COMMENT
-------
12. (C) Climate change is Fidel Castro's latest pet project in which poor, socialist countries are the victims and rich, capitalist countries are entirely to blame. Climate change provides Fidel the perfect opportunity to play statesman with little risk to his brother's credibility at home. FM Rodriguez' fiery remarks during his December 21 press conference were out of character and resembled past Fidel Castro speeches. Some element of the GOC may see climate change as a legitimate concern, but the view from the top is that of a political propaganda goldmine. FARRAR
Wednesday, 23 July 2008, 13:14
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000905
SIPDIS
AF/EPS CAMILLE JACKSON
EO 12958 DECL: 07/23/2018
TAGS ECON, IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: GOI PROGRESS ON AID TO AFRICA FOR G8
PRESIDENCY
Classified By: Econ Counselor William R. Meara for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (U) Summary: The Director of Italy's Sub-Saharan African Assistance Office said assistance levels are not expected to change with the newly installed Berlusconi government. Italy will continue to focus its funding on Ethiopia and Mozambique, with an emphasis on health and education. Development officials hope assistance issues will continue to be a priority for Italy during its 2009 G-8 presidency. End Summary.
2. (U) On June 19 Econoff met with Fabrizio Nava, Director of the Office of Sub-Saharan Africa Assistance, to discuss GOI assistance to Africa. The 2008 GOI budget allocates 4.1 billion Euros for foreign assistance, or .27 percent of GDP, slightly above the percentage of GDP in 2007. The MFA disperses roughly 750 million of the 4.1 billion Euros through the foreign aid office; Africa receives around 140 to 200 million for bilateral and multilateral humanitarian assistance. The Ministry of Finance controls the remaining foreign assistance account which covers Italy's contributions to the United Nations, EU, World Bank and Italy's debt-forgiveness program. Despite the recent arrival of the center-right government and budget cuts, Nava believed African assistance levels would be maintained.
3. (U) Italy supplies aid to 36 of the countries in Africa. Of these 36, the GOI gives three countries priority: Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Eritrea. Eritrea is now, however, only given emergency aid due to EU restrictions. Nava said that the GOI recently initiated a pilot program focused on budget support to Mozambique. Should GOI deem the program a success, Nava said similar budget support will be given to other African countries starting with Cape Verde.
4. (U) According to Nava, Sudan, Egypt, and Mauritania are lower priorities, but also receive assistance from the GOI. Nava pointed to a recent memorandum of understanding pledging 12 million Euros over the next three years to Mauritania. The funds have been earmarked for poverty alleviation, the improvement of living conditions, cultural programs and training for judges. (Note: Mauritania is a personal concern of Alain Economides, Head of Minister Frattini's Private Office and former Ambassador to the region. End Note.) In Mauritania and Egypt, Nava noted that most GOI aid focuses on agricultural, medical, and educational development. Nava expects work on gender issues, an initiative started by the previous Foreign Minister, to continue to be a priority as well, although he did not provide specifics.
5. (U) Econoff brought up criticism voiced by NGOs such as Bono's "Debt AIDS Trade Africa" (D.A.T.A.) and Action Aid Italy that Italy's aid apparatus is out-of-date and overly focused on infrastructure projects. Nava explained that donating to NGOs is rather difficult due to the small number of them; there are roughly 300 "recognized" NGOs in Italy. In order to be recognized by the GOI, NGOs must go through a three-year vetting process. Nava observed that over the past two years, the Foreign Ministry has made improvements in disbursing assistance through NGOs and said he believed the trend would continue. In closing, Nava said he expected African assistance be a focus during Italy's 2009 G-8 presidency.
6. (C) Comment: With its 2009 G8 presidency looming, the GOI may decide to maintain funding levels simply to avoid an embarrassing tongue-lashing from Bono et al. End comment. SPOGLI
Tuesday, 24 March 2009, 22:17
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000306
EO 12958 DECL: 03/23/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, UNSC, PHUM, SU, XW
SUBJECT: (C) ICC'S OCAMPO ON SUDAN: GO AFTER BASHIR'S MONEY
AND CALL FOR HIS ARREST; REASSURE CHINA
Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, for reasons 1.4 b/d
1. (C) International Criminal Court Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo told Ambassadors Rice and Wolff on March 20 that Sudanese President Bashir needed to be isolated. Ocampo suggested if Bashir's stash of money were disclosed (he put the figure at possibly $9 billion), it would change Sudanese public opinion from him being a "crusader" to that of a thief. Ocampo reported Lloyd's Bank in London might be holding or knowledgeable of the whereabouts of his money. Ocampo suggested simply exposing that Bashir had illegal accounts would be enough to turn the Sudanese against him, "as with Pinochet."
2. (C) Ocampo said Bashir invents conflict to create a better negotiating position, and thought Bashir was using the expulsion of the NGOs to divert attention away from his arrest warrant. Ocampo suggested the U.S. and the international community also needed to push for Bashir's arrest to isolate him. Ocampo likened Bashir's situation to "a bleeding shark being surrounded by other sharks," with no loyalty, only greed, motivating those competing for power. By promoting the possibility of Bashir's arrest, Bashir would be further marginalized within Sudan's ruling elite, Ocampo thought.
3. (C) Ocampo suggested it would be beneficial to reassure China that its access to oil would not be jeopardized. If China believed Bashir was becoming a destabilizing influence, Ocampo said China might be more open to his removal as long as his replacement would guarantee support for China's economic interests.
Wolff
Thursday, 13 March 2008, 06:12
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000461
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/12/2018
TAGS PREL, EUN, MARR, PHUM, CD, SU, FR
SUBJECT: CHAD/SUDAN/EUFOR: FRENCH PRESIDENCY ON SARKOZY'S
VISIT TO CHAD AND POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS
REF: A. PARIS 431 (NOTAL) B. PARIS 273 (NOTAL) C. PARIS 432 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Young, 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Romain Serman, AF-advisor at the French Presidency, on March 10 reviewed Sarkozy's February 28 visit to Chad and discussed possible next steps. In Chad, Sarkozy stressed to Deby the importance of determining the fate of the missing opposition leaders and to develop a meaningful political dialogue in Chad, based on the August 13, 2007, agreement. In the short term, concerned countries should try to make it difficult politically for Sudan to allow Chadian rebels to mount a new offensive prior to the May/June beginning of the rainy season, which would allow EUFOR and UNAMID to deploy in a peaceful environment. Serman said that the Zaghawa rebels no longer seemed willing to fight Deby and might be willing to go over to his side (one of the objectives of a renewed political dialogue); only the Nouri/Gorane faction seemed willing to fight, and had been fully resupplied by Sudan. Sudan should also be placed under increased scrutiny, which would help to discourage its support for another rebel offensive. The South Africans told Sarkozy during his February 28-29 visit that they could play a role by sending a bilateral mission to Sudan to persuade Khartoum to avoid another round of fighting and could make Chad and Sudan priorities during South Africa's tenure as UNSC president in April. Other possible leverage against Sudan included a reference to potential International Criminal Court interest and increased engagement by China, which was beginning to see the threat Sudanese regional adventurism could post to China's oil interests in Sudan. Serman welcomed feedback from the U.S. and other concerned parties. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Romain Serman, one of the two working-level AF-advisors at the French Presidency, on March 10 met with acting AF-watcher and UK Embassy Paris AF-watcher Lucy Joyce to discuss President Sarkozy's February 28 visit to Chad and possible next steps on the Chad/Sudan/EUFOR cluster of issues. (Ref A reports Serman's comments on the death of the EUFOR soldier in Sudan; septel will report his comments on France's evolving military and basing posture in Africa, which Sarkozy announced in Cape Town after his visit to Chad.)
Sarkozy's Visit
---------------
3. (C) As reported Ref B, Sarkozy faced a skeptical media and NGO community prior to the February 28 trip to Chad, with criticism centered on France's support for Deby, who himself faced strong criticism on human rights and the fate of three missing opposition leaders. Serman reported that Sarkozy met with representatives of the press and NGOs to exchange views before announcing his decision to make the February 28 stop in Chad en route to South Africa. Serman said that the press and NGOs appreciated his willingness to discuss Chad with them but that there was no perceptible shift in their views. Nonetheless, it was useful for Sarkozy to speak directly to his critics, Serman said, if for no other reason to provide them with the presidency's political perspective, directly from the president. Serman reported that Sarkozy and other elements of the GOF continued to be frustrated with Amnesty International, which maintained that it possessed a document that allegedly showed that France knew about, and even approved of, the detention of the oppositionists even before they disappeared. Amnesty International refused to provide a copy of this purported document, Serman said, even when pressed to provide evidence for its assertions.
4. (C) According to Serman, Sarkozy had two priorities in Chad -- first, to insist that the fate of missing political opponents be determined and to obtain Chadian agreement that a commission of inquiry be established to address that issue. Second, Sarkozy wanted to urge Deby and Chad's political class to commit to developing a meaningful dialogue, in accordance with the framework suggested in the August 13, 2007, agreement.
5. (C) On the oppositionists, Serman asserted that French pressure yielded positive results, if only partial, citing the release of Lol Mahamat Choua, the subject of earlier French entreaties, and the eventual reappearance of Ngarlejy Yorongar in Cameroon (who subsequently received asylum in France). Serman added that the GOF, while respecting
PARIS 00000461 002 OF 003
Yornogar's status as a Deby opponent, did not put much stock in his political judgment or his position on most issues. Serman said that Chad still had to account for Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh and to establish a credible commission of inquiry to determine in a transparent manner what had happened to Deby's political opponents during, and in the wake of, the rebel offensive early in February. Serman said that the GOF had no concrete information on Saleh, although there were rumor-like indications that he was still alive. The GOC had to rename the commission of inquiry (its present title, along the lines of "Commission to Investigate Sudanese Aggression in February 2008," was unacceptable, if not ludicrous, in Serman's view) and to include a range of interested parties to supplement its pro-government members.
Political Dialogue and Next Steps
---------------------------------
6. (C) Serman stressed the importance of making progress on Sarkozy's second priority of encouraging meaningful political dialogue in Chad. Serman noted the key role the August 13, 2007, agreement could play. Acknowledging that the August 13 agreement "was not perfect," Serman said that it still could serve as a good point of departure -- "let's not throw out the baby with the bath water," he stressed. Referring to comments he had made earlier (Ref B), Serman said that the long-range goal of promoting political dialogue in Chad and, hopefully, laying the groundwork for political reconciliation, would be to deprive the rebels of a reason to continue opposing the government and to entice the rebels into working with the government instead. France's demand that the government account for its treatment of opposition leaders was another signal to the rebels that France was trying to influence the government into taking steps that would enable the rebels to stop the fighting.
7. (C) After discussing the facts of the EUFOR soldier's death (ref A), Serman said that all concerned parties should work to see that Sudan did not "escalate" tensions with Chad. Serman believed that the killing of the EUFOR soldier was a Sudanese measure to test the EU's resolve with respect to EUFOR's deployment. Serman said that the killing, so far, seemed to have no effect on the EU's willingness to deploy EUFOR and to have it carry out its mandate to protect refugees in eastern Chad and in the C.A.R.
8. (C) Serman said that steps should be taken to deter Sudanese "escalation" with respect to Chad because Bashir seemed ready to fight. However, in France's view, the Zaghawa elements of the rebel forces no longer seemed willing to renew the fighting and might be willing to go over to Deby's side. Nouri's faction (ethnically Gorane) remained committed to overthrowing Deby and had been fully resupplied by Khartoum, Serman said.
9. (C) In the immediate term, the objective was to avoid another Sudan-backed rebel offensive before the onset of the rainy season in May/June. This would allow EUFOR, as well as UNAMID, to deploy more fully. Serman suggested that the way to do this would be to make it difficult politically for Sudan to allow another offensive to take place. This could be accomplished by dispatching multilateral missions (which he did not specify in detail) to Sudan, "activating existing international fora" (which he also did not specify in detail), and to increase general diplomatic "static." He summarized by stating that Sudan had to feel that it was under intense and continuing diplomatic scrutiny, which, he believed, would discourage Sudan from pushing the rebels into launching a new offensive. This would allow EUFOR to continue its deployment in a peaceful environment and its growing presence in Chad and C.A.R., and the continued deployment of UNAMID in Darfur would serve to deter renewed fighting.
10. (C) When Sarkozy visited South Africa after the stop in Chad (ref C), the South Africans told him they could play an active and helpful role as well. The South Africans said they might send a bilateral mission to Sudan to advise against renewed fighting, and could make Chad and Sudan priorities during South Africa's presidency of the UNSC in April.
11. (C) Serman mentioned that other signals could be sent to Sudan, including subtle reminders of possible International Criminal Court interest in Sudan. Serman noted that "we know the U.S. has strong reservations about the ICC,
PARIS 00000461 003 OF 003
but we think the specter of ICC involvement could serve as an additional lever to discourage Sudan from backing a new rebel offensive. Those who do not share your reservations could send a signal to Khartoum." Serman said that the GOF believed that Sudan was extremely sensitive about the ICC and thus subject to a signal along the lines he mentioned. Serman said that the French had been talking to China, which was slowly becoming aware of its own stake in the issue, aside from the criticism it had been receiving. Serman noted the growing Chinese concern about possible North-South fissures in Sudan and the possibility that its oil interests could be threatened should there be a some sort of more permanent North-South break. The Chinese were beginning to see more clearly that Sudan's behavior towards Darfur and Chad could only increase the possibility of a North-South rupture with a possibly severe effect on China's stake in the oil sector.
12. (C) In conclusion, Serman summarized French priorities -- increased political dialogue within Chad, including resolution of the controversy over GOC treatment of opposition leaders, which could lead to reconciliation with Zaghawa rebel elements; increased engagement by the international community, including South Africa and China, to encourage Sudan from backing another rebel offensive, which would allow deployment of EUFOR and UNAMID before the beginning of the rainy season in May/June; and the use of tools such as the ICC to discourage Khartoum's regional adventurism. Serman said that the GOF would welcome dialogue with the U.S. and other international partners on how best to reduce the possibility of further Chad-Sudan conflict via their rebel proxies.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON
Thursday, 04 September 2008, 10:56
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001354
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
EO 12958 DECL: 08/12/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, KPKO, UNSC, AU-1, SU, CM
SUBJECT: CHINA COUNSELS SUDANESE ENGAGEMENT, U.S. RESTRAINT
IN ICC PROCEEDINGS AGAINST BASHIR
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: During his recent visit to Sudan, Chinese Special Envoy Zhai Jun strongly counseled the GOS to remain prudent in dealing with the threatened arrest warrant for President Bashir and to continue to engage with the international community, according to Chinese Ambassador Li. Zhai even suggested that Sudan contact the ICC itself. Li encouraged the USG to consider shared interests in Sudan,s stability and not to veto a UNSCR postponing the ICC proceedings. CDA Fernandez thanked China for its helpful message to the GOS, and reported that the USG has made no decision whatsoever regarding an Article 16 vote. He emphasized that the USG's primary concern remains tangible improvements in the situation in Darfur, the recent violence by the regime in Kalma Camp was a setback, and thus far the USG sees no reason to postpone ICC action. End Summary.
Special Envoy Zhen,s Message to Khartoum
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. (C) On September 3, Chinese Ambassador Li Cheng Wen briefed Charge Fernandez on Chinese Special Envoy and Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun,s recent visit to Sudan. Zhai, who is responsible for Africa and the Middle East, inaugurated the new Chinese consulate in Juba and discussed the possible ICC indictment of President Bashir with GOS officials in Khartoum. On the latter issue, Li stated that Zhai expressed grave concern about the negative effect an ICC indictment would have on resolving the Darfur crisis. Zhai found Bashir to be quite receptive.
3. (C) According to Li, SE Zhai praised the GOS for its calm handling of the matter thus far, and encouraged GOS officials to continue to mobilize internally and engage the international community, including the UN Security Council and especially the P-5. Zhai also made a "friendly suggestion" that the GOS consider communicating with the ICC itself, either directly or indirectly. Li expressed hope that such contact could influence and perhaps "curb the next steps" in the ICC process. He stated that the GOC views ICC indictment not only as a political, not a legal matter. As such, it is encouraging the GOS to pursue both legal and political solutions to the problem.
ICC Action Threatens Darfur Progress
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4. (C) Li stated that the GOC is extremely worried about how the ICC indictment will affect stability in Darfur, asserting that it has hardened the rebels' stance towards peace. He believes that GOS officials now understand the gravity of the situation they have created over the years, and hopes they will heed GOC advice continue to engage with the international community. "Not heating up this matter is in the interest of all parties," he said.
5. (C) CDA Fernandez thanked Li for China,s helpful and useful message to the GOS. He noted that while the United States shares GOC concerns about Sudan,s stability, its primary focus is achieving tangible improvements in the situation in Darfur, especially in regards to humanitarian access. He continued that while GOS contact with the ICC might influence P-5 members France and the UK, it does not by itself concern the United States, which is not a party to the ICC.
6. (C) Li concurred that the GOS could do more to speed up humanitarian access and take other positive actions but cautioned that "only pressuring the Sudanese government is no use." Continued antagonism serves to strengthen the suspicions of hardliners within the NCP that the West is plotting against Sudan, he said. Rather, "we need to engage with them" to help solve the Darfur crisis. Both agreed that there is some anecdotal evidence of regime infighting about what is the best strategy: cooperation or escalation.
7. (C) Li expressed puzzlement at perceived British and French support for ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo. He stated that "whoever had a role in creating this problem will bear responsibility" if Sudan descends into chaos as a result of the ICC indictment, adding that such an outcome could have been easily forecast. He declared that destabilization of Sudan is in no one,s interest, adding that "to help Sudan is to help ourselves. I hope the British and French understand this philosophy." He observed that French companies have oil interests in Sudan as well as in Chad. CDA Fernandez agreed that an ICC indictment will
KHARTOUM 00001354 002 OF 002
present great challenges to achieving peace in Darfur, but commented that the decision to indict President Bashir was may bave been made by an overzealous prosecutor and is not the result of "high politics" or a conspiracy by the West. He noted President Bashir's sweeping claims to want to change the situation in Darfur for the better, "we want to see tangible results, not words or process."
U.S. Should Not Block Delaying ICC Action
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
8. (C) CDA Fernandez' meeting with Li followed a flurry of erroneous media reports that China is expected to "veto" the issuance of an arrest warrant for President Bashir. (Note: For example, the newspaper Akher Lahza ran a story with the headline "China Does Not Rule Out Veto To Invalidate Ocampo's Allegations," which noted that "President Bashir received a verbal message from his Chinese counterpart expressing a his country's support for Sudan regarding Ocampo's allegations," but that "Peking denied reaching the stage of using a veto to invalidate the ICC prosecutor's procedures because the case is still in its primary phase." Another daily, Al-Rae'd, ran a headline "Chinese veto awaits Ocampo." End Note.) Li acknowledged that these reports suggest a fundamental misunderstanding of role of Article 16 of the ICC Statute by the Sudanese public, and that it is a P-3 veto of a deferral of the ICC proceedings that GOS must worry about. He urged the USG to think of its and Chinese "mutual interests" in Africa when making a decision. "Stability is in the interests of all parties," he said. "It's what we should work for in the New World Order."
Comment
- - - -
9. (C) Li's concern that the issuance of an arrest warrant for President Bashir could have profound destabilizing effects are well founded. Combined with the end of the rainy season and renewal of rebel activity on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border, the ICC indictment could set off a chain reaction of violence and instability. China's encouragement of GOS internal mobilization and international engagement, including with the ICC, is both useful and helpful, but its unclear whether the NCP even has the capability, let alone the willpower, to take any action towards solving the crisis if it can decide what those steps should be.
FERNANDEZ
Thursday, 11 December 2008, 05:59
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001768
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, IO/PSC
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
EO 12958 DECL: 12/07/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, ASEC, KPKO, UN, AU-1, SU
SUBJECT: JSR ADADA DISCUSSES CEASEFIRE, IMPORTANCE OF
ARABS, AND ROLE OF MINNAWI
REF: A. KHARTOUM 1737 B. KHARTOUM 1751
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: On December 7, UNAMID's Joint Special Representative Rodolphe Adada said that UNAMID continues to work on its plans for a ceasefire monitoring mechanism and asserted that UNAMID, not the UN/AU Chief Mediator, should take the lead with ceasefire plans. Adada also said that UNAMID needs to give more attention to the important role of Darfur's Arabs. Adada expressed concern about the lack of DPA implementation, saying that the GoS's failure to honor its agreements does little to persuade non-signatories to the negotiating table. He was also scathing about wildly inaccurate statements about loss of life in Darfur made by ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo. END SUMMARY.
CEASEFIRE MECHANISM
- - - - - - - - - - - -
2. (C) Adada opened the meeting saying that he had just returned from a trip to UN Headquarters in New York where he briefed Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain LeRoy, on the U.S. proposal for a Darfur Monitoring Team (DMT). Adada reported that he was surprised that Special Envoy Williamson did not raise the DMT with Le Roy in their last meeting, as Adada had prepped Le Roy on the USG proposal. Reflecting on the U.S. offer, Adada stated, "This is normally our job - but if you can help us with equipment, we would appreciate that." Once the US raises this with the UN in New York, they will respond formally.
3. (C) Adada said that UNAMID continues to draft its plan for a ceasefire mechanism. (Note: Adada did not appear to be aware that his political chief, Abdul Mohammed, had discussed UNAMID's ceasefire mechanism in depth with us on December 2 (ref. A). End Note.) He noted that most rebels are currently against the ceasefire offer, in particular SLA/Unity, which attack GoS assets to sustain their movements. "I have talked to SLA/Unity leaders like Sharif Harir and they have told me outright, 'We attack the GoS because it is like our marketplace," said Adada. Adada noted that any successful ceasefire must incorporate non-military logistical support for the rebel movements. He stated that although it was far from perfect, the generous monthly stipend allowance provided by AMIS served as almost a form of non-military logistical support for the rebels. Adada also hinted that the GoS will likely resist any form of assistance to the rebels as "the GoS wants the rebels to cause problems for everyone and make them (i.e. the rebels) look bad." He noted that while the international community may be eager for a ceasefire, they probably won't be ready to pay for the rebels not to fight.
4. (C) CDA Fernandez asked how the Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) led by Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole and UNAMID were coordinating their efforts on a ceasefire. Adada responded by saying that "Bassole can speak in general terms about the need for a ceasefire, but this is our job in UNAMID to monitor violence in Darfur." Adada then stated that UNAMID Force Commander Agwai had a meeting the morning of December 7 devoted to coordination between the JMST and UNAMID on ceasefire issues. Adada then asserted that Bassole should focus his energy on the political negotiations necessary for a ceasefire, not the details of any mechanism that will monitor the agreement. CDA urged closer coordination between UNAMID and Bassole.
NEED TO ADDRESS THE ARAB TRIBES
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5. (C) Unprompted, Adada then asked about the place of Darfur's Arabs, asking: "No one is taking care of them; what should we do about Darfur's Arabs?" Adada said that the Arab tribes are essential for the stability of Darfur, and provided an example of how Arabs, loosely integrated into GoS security forces, attacked GoS assets in the spring of 2008. He said it is important to differentiate between the Arab tribes and the janjaweed, and admitted that UNAMID has not done enough outreach to the Arab tribes. CDA Fernandez agreed with Adada and noted that it is important to encourage Darfur's Arabs to take a position independent from the GoS. He noted that the U.S. (at least the US Embassy in Khartoum) has attempted to reach out to a broad spectrum of Arab leaders (e.g. ref. B), and said that successful USAID programming in Arab areas in Darfur (such as Ad-Daien) should be expanded. Adada agreed with CDA Fernandez that the GoS has very weak control in Darfur, and that it uses the Arab tribes to rule the region.
IMPORTANCE AND COMPLEXITY OF SLM/MM'S ROLE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6. (C) Adada next turned to the role of SLM/Minnawi, saying that the GoS needs to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement in order to make a statement to the non-signatories. He joked, "The GoS better implement the agreement, otherwise every movement that signs an agreement with the government will be 'minni-mized' like Minni has been!" CDA Fernandez concurred, and then briefed Adada on the GoS's failure to make any significant progress in DPA implementation since Vice President Taha's agreement with Minnawi on September 19. Adada appeared surprised by the CDA's remarks, and said that implementing the DPA is one way to support CPA implementation, a clear priority to the U.S.
OCAMPO'S IMAGINARY NUMBERS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
7. (C) Adada poured scorn on the "wildly inaccurate" recent statements of ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo that "5,000 people were being killed each month in Darfur." He added that who would be so naive and ill-informed to believe such a thing? He noted that this would be over a hundred people a day being killed, a level of violence not seen in Darfur for several years (Note: probably not since 2005). Even the horrific Kalma camp massacre of August 25, 2008 which killed 33 innocent people was "one crime on one day, this doesn't happen very often." He mused that such patently absurd and false information put out by Ocampo doesn't make him look very credible in the eyes of those who actually know something about the reality of Darfur.
COMMENT
- - - -
8. (C) Adada appeared reluctant to discuss the ceasefire mechanism in any detail and made it clear that he would like UNAMID (and not the Chief Mediator nor the USG) to take the lead. Adada's dismissive remarks about the Chief Mediator indicate once more the existence of a strained working relationship between the latter and UNAMID. Adada appeared poorly informed about the status of SLM/MM and the lack of any real progress in DPA implementation since the September Minnawi-Taha agreement. This is particularly disappointing considering the relatively substantial resources at Adada's disposal, the fact that he needs to focus solely on Darfur, and the abundance of SLM/MM contacts in Adada's headquarters in El-Fasher and in Khartoum.
FERNANDEZ
Friday, 08 January 2010, 15:40
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000023
SIPDIS
STATE PASS S/WCI RAPP AND ANDERSON, AF/C, AND EUR/WE
EO 12958 DECL: 12/22/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, CG, BY, RW, SL, BE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RAPP DISCUSSES COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
AND THE DRC WITH BELGIAN MFA
BRUSSELS 00000023 001.2 OF 002
Classiires Richard M. Eason for' (D).
1. (C) Summar Ambassador Stephen J. Rap Belgium would continue to push for the ICC's independent Quthority to initiate trials of crimes of aggression between states. End Summary.
MFA Optimistic on Court for S)erra Leone Donation
--------------------------------------------- ----
2. (C) The AfricQ team of Director General Renier Nijskens, C/ngo Desk Officer Hugues Chantry, and Foreign MiQister Vanackere's Africa Advisor Karl D'haene met with S/WCI Ambassador Rapp, S/WCI Specia, Assistant Todd Anderson and Poloff Aaron Jensen on December 18. Representatives of the MFA Legal and Peace Building departments were also present. D'haene said he was optimistic that Belgium would make an additional EUR 150,000 contribution to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. He noted Belgium's history of supporting international justice processes and posited that Belgium's new FM Vanackere would continue that policy; the expected closure of the Special Court in 2011 after Charles Taylor's trial made a contribution more likely in his view.
Belgium Interested in DRC Judicial Reform
-----------------------------------------
3. (C) The MFA Africa team was interested in the concept of chambers of mixed composition to deal with war crimes in the DRC raised by Ambassador Rapp. They mentioned Belgium's participation in REJUSCO, the EU justice mission in Congo, and Belgian Technical Cooperation's work on REJUSCO Phase I. They were uncertain who would implement Phase II. They focused on the importance of improving the national justice system, rather than simply building up capacity in the eastern DRC. D'haene was noncommittal on Belgian support for new judicial court structures in the DRC, but said that the GOB would support UNR 1888 (Resolution on Women, Peace, and Security, which includes judicial aspects) and provide expertise to the extent that Belgium had it. He added that sending judges to the DRC would not be too difficult, but questioned whether a larger approach to judicial reform that included two court formats would work in the DRC.
Belgium and the ICC
-------------------
4. (C) Ambassador Rapp told Legal Department DG Rietjens that the U.S. was proud to regain its observer status at the ICC and said that the U.S. was currently producing a review of its ICC policy. He noted, however, that U.S. ratification of the ICC treaty was not likely. Ambassador Rapp underscored that the U.S. believed only the UNSC should be able to refer cases of crimes of aggression to the ICC and was confident that other UNSC members, including the European members of the P5, France and the UK, would agree. He said the U.S. hoped for consensus in this discussion, and he expressed understanding for Belgian, German, and Greek efforts to push for a broader ICC mandate on crimes of aggression. Rientjens acknowledged U.S. concerns on crimes of aggression, but said that Belgium would continue to push for the ICC to have an independent authority to initiate trials on crimes of
BRUSSELS 00000023 002 OF 002
aggression. Rietjens praised the U.S. return to observer status at the ICC. He said Belgium and other European nations were excited to be able to have diplomatic discussions with the U.S. about the ICC once again.
5. (U) Ambassador Rapp cleared this message.
EASON .
Wednesday, 15 April 2009, 15:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000247
DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI - WILLIAMSON/DOHERTY, L - DONOGHUE,
L/UNA - BUCHWALD, L/AN - OHAHS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/15/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KAWC
SUBJECT: SCSL'S TAYLOR TRIAL MEETS KEY MILESTONE, BUT SCSL
STILL FACES SERIOUS HURDLES
REF: A. REF: A) 2008 THE HAGUE 00021 B. B) 2008 THE HAGUE 00226
Classified By: Legal Counselor Denise G. Manning per reasons 1.5(b, d).
-- SUMMARY: SCSL MEETS A KEY MILESTONE, BUT FACES UNCERTAINTY IN TERMS OF TIMING, FINANCES, AND COMPLETION ISSUES --
1. (SBU) On February 27, 2009, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL or Court) took another step toward completing its work when the Prosecution rested its case against former Liberian President Charles Taylor -- the last SCSL case at the trial stage. The Court could potentially complete its work before the end of 2010. A number of open issues, however, may affect timing, including the start date and length of the Taylor Defense case. Timing may be particularly important given expected funding shortfalls and the possible loss of courtroom space this coming September. Additionally, the current Registrar, Herman von Hebel (Netherlands), has resigned effective June 1, and his successor will inherit a host of difficult issues and a complex transition during the final days of the Court,s operations.
--BACKGROUND: A SMALL COURT WITH SEVERAL FIRSTS --
2. (U) A Trailblazing Court. The hybrid SCSL, created in 2002 through an agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) and funded entirely by voluntary contributions, has jurisdiction over those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in Sierra Leone after November 30, 1996. Although established almost ten years after the creation of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR), the SCSL is poised to complete its work before these tribunals. The SCSL has also been the first internationalized criminal tribunal to: 1) issue an indictment for an African head of state (Liberian President Charles Taylor); 2) enter convictions for the crime of recruiting and using child soldiers; and 3) successfully prosecute forced marriage as a crime against humanity and intentional attacks on U.N. peacekeepers as a serious violation of international humanitarian law.
3. (U) Last Trial Standing. In 2003, the SCSL indicted Charles Taylor, the leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia from 1989 to 1997 and the President of Liberia from 1997 until the 2003 indictment. The indictment alleges Taylor,s deep involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict including his role in arming, training and acting in concert with the RUF and in trafficking the Sierra Leonean &blood diamonds8 that fueled and financed the fighting. The SCSL charged Taylor with eleven counts, including, inter alia, terrorizing the civilian population, unlawful killings, sexual violence, abductions and forced labor, and conscripting child soldiers.
))TIMING: TAYLOR TRIAL'S LINK TO CLOSING SCSL))
4. (SBU) Status of Trial. As the only ongoing SCSL trial, the Taylor trial is the linchpin to the SCSL completing its work. From April 6-9, 2009, the Court held the &judgment of acquittal8 hearing, with Defense arguing for acquittal on all of the charges. (Comment: In the &judgment of acquittal8 hearing, the Court considers whether Prosecution Qacquittal8 hearing, the Court considers whether Prosecution has presented any evidence that could sustain conviction on the charges, acquitting only if Prosecution has presented &no evidence8 to sustain the charge. End Comment.) In this hearing, Defense acknowledged that crimes had occurred in Sierra Leone but argued that the Prosecution had failed to 1) present evidence linking Taylor to those crimes and 2)establish that Taylor had been part of a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) because, if a JCE existed, it existed before November 30, 1996, the date at which the temporal jurisdiction of the SCSL begins. The Prosecution responded to these arguments by summarizing Taylor,s responsibility for the crimes and pointing to Taylor,s liability for JCE crimes committed after November 30, 1996, even if the planning of the JCE took place before that date. (Comment: The Court will most likely not issue its Rule 98 decision in April, especially since the Judges may recess through May. An acquittal does not seem likely. End Comment.)
5. (SBU) Next Up: Defense Case. A contact in the Registry has indicated that Defense will likely request three months to prepare for trial and four months to present its case. If the Court grants this request, the Defense case may start at the end of August. However, the same Registry source predicts that the Trial Chamber may order Defense to begin its case as early as June, working through July and August with a possible recess in September. One wild-card factor, however, is the Defense,s pending interlocutory appeal arguing that the Prosecution failed to properly plead the JCE theory of liability. The Trial Chamber may not schedule the Defense case before the appeals decision so the Defense knows which mode(s) of liability it must defend against. (Comment: Currently, the Registry,s budget milestone document projects an October 31 trial termination date, a March 2010 judgment, sentencing in April 2010, and the conclusion of appeals in October 2010. If, however, the Defense case starts in August, the timeline could be pushed back by approximately two months. End Comment.)
6. (U) Spill-Over Timing Effects. A delay in the timing for the Taylor trial may create additional challenges. First, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the location of the Taylor trial, has informed the SCSL that it will need its second courtroom as of September 2009. (The ICC scheduled its second trial to start September 24th, and will likely need the courtroom prior to September 24th for pre-trial work). Back-up options explored by the Registry include finding other space or working during gaps in the ICC schedule. Second, according to Registry sources, each additional month of trial time costs approximately one million dollars.
))THE JUDICIAL FACTOR))
7. (C) Judges Slowing Things Down? Further muddying timing predictions, Court employees have intimated that the Trial Chamber could work more expeditiously. The Taylor Chamber consists of three judges who take turns presiding: Justice Richard Lussick (Samoa), Justice Teresa Doherty (Northern Ireland) and Justice Julia Sebutinde (Uganda), along with an alternate judge, Justice El Hadji Malick Sow (Senegal). A couple of Court employees have grumbled that when the last Prosecution witness testified on January 30, 2009, the Court still had 11 outstanding motions, some over a year old. Additionally, one Chamber contact believes that the Trial Chamber could have accelerated the Court,s work by excluding extraneous material and arguments. Moreover, contacts in Prosecution and Registry speculate that Justice Sebutinde may have a timing agenda. They think she, as the only African judge, wants to hold the gavel as presiding judge when the Trial Chamber announces the Taylor judgment. Reportedly, her next stint as presiding judge begins in January.
8. (SBU) Expedited Appeals? The Appeals Chamber, with one empty seat, consists of President Renate Winter (Austria); Vice President Jon Kamanda (Sierra Leone); Justice George Gelaga King (Sierra Leone); and Justice Emmanuel Ayoola (Nigeria). President Winter reportedly has indicated that the Appeals Chamber intends to expedite any Taylor trial Qthe Appeals Chamber intends to expedite any Taylor trial appeals. Up for election in May, Winter may not, however, preside over the Appeals Chamber for any Taylor trial appeals, reportedly she will step down after the RUF appeal if she is not re-elected President.
))DEFENSE STRATEGY: WHO ME?))
9. (SBU) Drama-Bound Defense Case. A British Queen,s Counsel, Courtenay Griffiths, heads Charles Taylor,s top-notch and quick-tongued defense team, which reportedly finds itself in the midst of identifying and proofing witnesses. All signs indicate that Taylor himself will take the stand as their first witness possibly staying in the box for 6 to 8 weeks, and based on Defense,s actions to date, the Defense team will likely argue that although the crimes may have occurred, Taylor has no link to the crimes.
))AN IMMINENT BUDGET CRISIS))
10. (C) Funding Shortfall. The Registry fears that the Court will run out of money as early as next month, although an expected Canadian USD 6 million contribution would keep the Court financed until early July 2009. In a marathon campaign, Registrar Von Hebel attended 250 meetings in 15 months to drum up funds from potential donor countries, but with, according Von Hebel, little traction, due to donor fatigue, the difficult economic situation, and contributions going to other tribunals (e.g., the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) or the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia). Von Hebel wants to make another run at the Arab countries of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. He also believes that a letter from U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon asking countries to contribute might help open wallets. According to Von Hebel, when Ban sent out a similar letter in 2007, a number of countries made first-time donations. In addition, a couple of traditional donor countries have advised him they may need a similar letter in order to donate this year.
11. (U) Cost-cutting Measures: Concerned about the looming financial crisis, the Registry has undertaken cost-saving measures, reducing staffing costs by downsizing, incorporating liquidation clauses in contracts, and encouraging The Hague staff to use leave during the break between prosecution and defense cases. The Registry also plans to hand over the Freetown facilities to the GOSL in July 2010, reserving some space for its own continued use. Finally, Registry may look to consolidate the Appeals Chamber and the Taylor trial operations in The Hague, after the Appeals Chamber finalizes the RUF appeal.
12. (SBU) Help from Washington. The Registry may also seek USG,s assistance on financial issues. First, it may press the USG not to reduce its FY2009 contribution by 2 million, but to stay at last year,s level of 9 million USD. (Comment: The extra sum would not solve the Court,s immediate financial problem, since the USG generally contributes in the fall. End Comment.) Second, the Registry may ask for USG political support in the form of demarches to Arab countries, impressing upon the targeted Arab countries the critical nature of the SCSL,s financial situation.
))COMPLETION HICCUPS AND ISSUES))
13. (SBU) Registrar Musical Chairs. On April 8, 2009, the Court announced Registrar von Hebel,s resignation, effective as of June 1, 2009. Von Hebel will assume the Deputy Registrar position at the newly established Hague-based STL. (According to Embassy contacts, STL offered Von Hebel the position at the insistence of and to placate the Dutch, who believe the Dutch ICTY Registrar had been treated unfairly when the ICTY President unexpectedly declined to renew his contract). Given that the STL Registrar Robin Vincent (U.K.) recently resigned, Von Hebel may eventually step into Vincent,s shoes. Von Hebel is also tying up as many SCSL loose ends as possible, including signing a sentence-enforcement agreement with the Government of Rwanda. In terms of a successor Registrar, a Registry contact believes that the current Deputy Registrar Binta Mansaray (Sierra Leone) will surface as a strong candidate.
))COMMENT: RESIDUAL ISSUES))
14. (SBU) A Larger Role for The Hague? Although currently headquartered in Freetown, Sierra Leone, the Registry has toyed with the possibility of locating any Residual Mechanism Qtoyed with the possibility of locating any Residual Mechanism ) or parts thereof ) in The Hague. For instance, Von Hebel believes that the Court may need to move its archives out of Sierra Leone in order to properly maintain and secure them. The City of The Hague has indicated its willingness to provide archiving facilities in connection with the ICTY,s closure. Some have also suggested combining some or part of the SCSL,s residual functions with those of The Hague-based ICTY and the Arusha-based ICTR. A combined residual mechanism might prevent duplication, but it would also face significant hurdles, given SCSL,s structural differences, e.g. funding, oversight mechanism and applicable legal framework. Furthermore, GOSL desires will be key, since a joint GOSL-UN agreement created the Court.
GALLAGHER
Tuesday, 10 March 2009, 12:51
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MONROVIA 000188
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/10/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, UNSC, PHUM, KCRM, LI
SUBJECT: PRO-TAYLOR ELEMENTS STILL A FORCE TO BE RECKONED
WITH
Classified By: Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield for Reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d).
1. (C) Summary: The recent remarks by Special Court for Sierra Leone prosecutor Stephen Rapp suggesting Charles Taylor may go free because of budgetary reasons caused alarm within the GOL and has emboldened Taylor supporters. Communication inside the Taylor camp remains intact, and those in leadership roles continue to be active and unrepentant. Should Taylor be acquitted in The Hague or given a light sentence, his return to Liberia could tip the balance in a fragile peace. The international community must consider steps should Taylor not be sent to prison for a long time. We should look at the possibility of trying Taylor in the United States. End Summary.
RAPP'S COMMENTS RAISE CONCERN WITHIN THE GOL
--------------------------------------------
2. (C) Chief Prosecutor Stephen Rapp's ill considered announcement in the press February 24 that Charles Taylor may walk free because of a supposed budget shortfall for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, where Taylor is presently on trial, made headlines in the local press, and raised anxiety here about Taylor's imminent return. The GOL was alarmed enough that President Sirleaf called Ambassador on February 28 to raise her concerns. Sirleaf pointed out that Liberia's stability remains fragile, and such remarks reverberated throughout the country, as people are still traumatized by Taylor and the war.
3. (C) The press accounts out of The Hague have also emboldened the pro-Taylor factions here, including his extended family members, financiers and National Patriotic Party (NPP) loyalists, raising their hopes that Taylor might be acquitted soon. Despite their rhetoric about "moving on," they have thus far refused to appear before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to account for their activities, and those on the UN Sanctions lists continue to request delisting on the basis they have done nothing wrong rather than demonstrating what they have done to provide restitution for their activities.
GOL TREADING CAREFULLY WITH TAYLOR FACTIONS
-------------------------------------------
4. (C) The government itself is caught in the middle. There is quite little the GOL can do legally to arrest, prosecute or freeze assets of those who were close to Taylor, even if the political will were there, which remains an open question. The TRC has recommended a domestic war crimes court be set up, but under statute an Independent National Commission on Human Rights (INHCR) would implement the recommendation, and the Legislature (some of whom had close ties to Taylor) has thus far failed to establish the INCHR. The Legislature has also refused to pass any law that would allow the GOL to freeze assets of those on the UN sanctions list, and the Supreme Court has ruled that any confiscation of property can be done only after a trial.
5. (C) The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of August 2003 that ended the 14-year civil war, did not require the NPP to disband and in fact permitted the NPP to participate in the transitional government and in the 2005 elections. The NPP now holds seven seats in the Legislature (which may be one reason the legislation is being blocked). As well, none of Taylor's properties have been seized by the government and they remain in good shape and remarkably free of squatters, as no one dares to take the risk of retribution.
COMMUNICATIONS AMONG TAYLOR SUPPORTERS REMAIN STRONG
--------------------------------------------- -------
6. (C) The pro-Taylor forces still have the ability to organize themselves. An NPP rally in December 2008 gathered a sizeable crowd, and Taylor supporters in June 2008 succeeded in preventing FBI investigators from entering Taylor's residence "White Flower" to obtain evidence for the Chucky Taylor trial in Florida. The most recent example was their effort on March 7 to disrupt the International Women's Colloquium. Taylor remains popular within many rural communities, especially in Bong, Lofa and Nimba counties, and is seen as someone who was able to unite Liberia's different ethnic groups. We also suspect there is some sympathy within the Americo-Liberian population who saw him as their deliverance from their losses following the 1979 coup. While we do not suggest they would want Taylor to return, we are sure that they do no want too many rocks to be turned over.
7. (C) Although we do not have any direct evidence to support the belief that pro-Taylor factions are behind much of the
MONROVIA 00000188 002 OF 002
armed robbery on the premise that crime will keep the government weak and the country unstable, the GOL is certainly convinced of this, and has taken steps to counteract the threat. The most recent act was to put Taylor-era head of police Paul Mulbah into the LNP as an "advisor" that some accuse (and the government denies) was in order to placate the Taylor people in advance of the March 7-8 International Women's Colloquium. That the Taylor crowd can still motivate such a reaction in the government is a testament to their influence.
8. (C) Lines of communications within Taylor's faction, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) remain intact. To be sure, the disarmament of the factions following the CPA has been extremely successful, and we have thus far been unable to confirm the existence of any large weapons caches, despite the persistent rumors. But the reintegration of the ex-combatants is far from complete. Former NPFL commanders Roland Duo (the only senior Taylor supporter to have testified before the TRC), Christopher "General Mosquito" Vambo and Melvin Sogbandi (none of whom are on the sanctions lists) remain in contact with the ex-combatants, and would have the capability to organize an uprising or even criminal activity.
9. (C) Certainly, the same is true for the other factions, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). While apparently unarmed and not active in Liberia, we continue to receive reports that LURD is recruiting ex-combatants for militias in Guinea and MODEL is doing the same for Cote d'Ivoire.
THREAT OF TAYLOR'S RETURN ADVANCES THEIR CAUSE
--------------------------------------------- -
10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
11. (C) The threat of a return of Taylor strengthens their hand and for now they see no need to give in at all. However, if Taylor is put away for a long time, the government may feel a bit bolder in recovering assets and bringing Taylor backers who committed war crimes to justice.
12. (C) The international community has just a few tools to pressure the Taylor people into accepting the new reality. The UN sanctions appear to have the intended effect of keeping them somewhat marginalized and fearful of further attempts to strip them of their ill-gotten gains. However, we have regularly heard of travel outside Liberia of those on the travel ban list without prior approval.
NEXT STEPS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
------------------------------------------
13. (C) However, the best we can do for Liberia is to see to it that Taylor is put away for a long time and we cannot delay for the results of the present trial to consider next steps. All legal options should be studied to ensure that Taylor cannot return to destabilize Liberia. Building a case in the United States against Taylor for financial crimes such as wire fraud would probably be the best route. There may be other options, such as applying the new law criminalizing the use of child soldiers or terrorism statutes.
14. (C) The peace in Liberia remains fragile, and its only guarantee is the robust and adaptable UNMIL presence. The GOL does not have the ability to quell violence, monitor its borders or operate independently to fight crime. A free Taylor could tip the balance in the wrong direction. THOMAS-GREENFIELD
Friday, 16 June 2006, 06:08
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MINSK 000641
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/16/2016
TAGS PGOV, PINR, ECON, ETRD, BO
SUBJECT: BELARUS' TOP 50 OLIGARCHS
MINSK 00000641 001.3 OF 005
Classified By: AMBASSADOR GEORGE KROL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary: Econoff recently received a list purporting to show Belarus' top 50 oligarchs and their net worth. An internet search found another, slightly older list that is nearly identical to the first. Post cannot confirm the sources or exact information in these lists, but rates the information as being highly credible. These lists read as a "who's who" of the Lukashenko regime, past and present. Those listed had the opportunity to enrich themselves, and evidence indicates that many did so. End summary.
Krol
Wednesday, 22 March 2006, 15:51
C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 000311
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DECL DATE CHANGE)
EO 12958 DECL: 03/22/2016
TAGS PGOV, PHUM, PREL, BO
SUBJECT: Lukashenko Gives Victory Speech and Fiery Press
Conference
Ref: A) Minsk 297, B) 2005 Minsk
Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)
1. (SBU) Summary: On March 20, a defiant Aleksandr Lukashenko accepted his presidential "victory" at a press conference held in the cavernous Palace of the Republic and spoke to a full audience, including practically the entire Belarusian government, on live television. Lukashenko stressed Belarusians had made "a just decision" and challenged foreign nations to recognize and accept that fact. He claimed the elections were democratic and stoutly refuted international criticisms, using the moment to lambaste the U.S., West, and opposition while promoting his plans for the future. In a rare occasion, Lukashenko took questions from Western and non-state owned press correspondents on live television. The often hardball questions only aggravated more bizarre answers from a clearly disturbed Lukashenko. End Summary.
----------------------------
Lukashenko's Opening Remarks
----------------------------
Belarusians Made Their Choice, Other Countries Should Tend to Their Own Problems
--------------------------------------------- --------
2. (U) In his March 20 speech at the Palace of the Republic, President Lukashenko announced that the "revolution" that many had prepared for had failed. According to the President, Belarusians had made a wise decision. However, those [opposition leaders] who tried to go behind the backs of the people to get power "from the hands of foreign sponsors" are unable to accept this.
3. (U) Lukashenko said Belarusians respected Americans and citizens of Europe, but that did not mean Belarusians would "alter" themselves to fit Washington's, Brussels', and Warsaw's standards. Belarusians do not need to be told how to live and would not become "servants" to stronger nations. The President opined that countries of the "so-called" color revolutions should first bring order to their own people and rid themselves of poverty and crime. He called color revolutions a "virus" that infects weak countries that have turned a deaf ear to the people and allowed corruption to flourish. Belarus, however, has a strong social policy and a dynamic economy that is developing "for the people" and not for oligarchs.
Elections Were Democratic
-------------------------
4. (U) The President asserted that the March 19 presidential elections were democratic and conducted in strict accordance with Belarus' constitution. Belarusians independently made their decision and showed the world that they are the "masters" of their home. Lukashenko called the elections an indisputable victory for the people's spirit, satisfaction, and self-esteem, despite foreign and domestic interference that tried to "break" the Belarusians.
5. (U) Lukashenko stressed that foreign countries needed to respect Belarusians' decision as the will of the people and a clear indicator of democracy. According to Lukashenko, the high turnout at the polls showed that Belarusians feel a "deep and personal" responsibility for their government's fate and the welfare of their people. The President lambasted the West for its criticisms of early voting, claiming that the practice existed in "super democracies" such as the U.S. and Germany. The GOB ensured the necessary conditions for a fair democratic vote and allowed 1,200 international and 30,000 domestic observers and 1,000 journalists to monitor.
Opposition Does Not Respect Its People
--------------------------------------
6. (U) Lukashenko declared that Belarus had never seen such unprecedented pressure and anti-Belarusian behavior as the opposition had presented. The President viewed it as the opposition's high level of disrespect to its own people and failure to recognize their right to an independent election. However, the opposition's actions
Conference
with the help of foreign pressure resulted in almost all Belarusians supporting the regime in the "moment of truth."
The President's New Mission
---------------------------
7. (U) Lukashenko said the election results showed Belarusians' support for his approach to building a strong, developing country. He said his next mission was his five-year plan that would build a government for the people. The President stated that Belarus is not as rich as the people would like, but it was just a question of time and labor before Belarusians would attain or even exceed Western European standards of living.
8. (U) Belarus will continue its peaceful policies and strengthen relations with its neighbors. He noted a union with Russia is of high strategically importance to Belarus, but stressed dialogue with the U.S. and EU was also important.
-------------------------------------------
Journalists Toss Lukashenko Tough Questions
-------------------------------------------
9. (U) In a rare event, Belarusian TV provided continuous live coverage of Lukashenko's press conference with western and independent journalists, as well as with state journalists. The western and independent journalists posed many tough, if not embarrassing questions to the President. However, the audience was overwhelmingly comprised of GOB officials, state journalists, and pro-Lukashenko election monitors. All of Lukashenko's answers were greeted with broad applause.
On Demonstrators
-----------------
10. (U) Q (Liberacion): You [Lukashenko] said on March 17 that you would wring the necks of opponents who would go to the streets. What happened to them and can you give them security guarantees?
A: To wring the necks? I see your neck is all right, just as everyone else's. [Laughter from audience] So do not be concerned.
Q (RIA Novisti): If you were sure of your victory and are confident it was democratic, why was it necessary to deport foreign observers and detain representatives of the opposition?
A: I do not know who was arrested or detained. The law is the law for everyone, and if someone violated the law, then they will be prosecuted. I know that a few people were detained, but they asked for it to save their face after realizing nothing would come of their actions.
Q (BBC News): If so many people voted for you, why do you think thousands of people came to the streets to protest your victory?
A: This proves the democratic nature of our society. We have people who do not agree with the president's policyQDid you see the people who came to the square yesterday? Could you distinguish between the participants and bystanders? [The demonstrators] are 14 and 15-year-olds who were paid BYR 20,000 (USD 10) to participate. They then blamed the authorities for the weather. You can see that God was with the Belarusian people yesterday. A terrible snow blizzard was observed only on that square.
On the Elections
----------------
11. (U) Q (Associated Press): What is your reaction to opposition leaders' demands to hold a repeat election?
A: If they want to have a repeat vote, let them go and vote. There will be no reaction from my part. I only react to the results and the reaction voiced by the Central Election Commission.
Q (GOB's telegraph news Belta): It is evident the West and U.S. will not recognize the election. There are
Conference
lots of example of what happened to countries that attempted to oppose the White House. Do you think Belarus faces a threat of international isolation?
A: Judging by the words of U.S. politicians and others that you mentioned, we have lived in international isolation for a long time alreadyQI wish we could continue our development at the same pace in this isolation. If they [the U.S. and West] respect Belarusians, as they always say, they will change their policies. I am not afraid of any further isolation. I do not understand how one can isolate a country that is the heart of Europe, through which 100 million tons of goods are shipped annually. Neither the Europeans, Russians, nor the Kazakhs have ever experienced any problems hereQ.We will preserve the country like this at any cost. They will stage provocations every day and will [claim] to act in accordance with the Bible. We will show the absurdity of their policies being carried out in Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania.
Russian Support
---------------
12. (U) Journalist (state newspaper Narodnaya Gazeta): Mr. Lukashenko, the Russian authorities have supported your candidacyQ
Lukashenko: Did you hear this? Where did you get this fact? I am an official, so do not use rumors in public. Excuse me for interrupting you, but I will tell you and the West that Putin is not backing Lukashenko. An analyst says that the Belarusian economy is developing so successfully because we buy Russian oil at friendly prices and sell it to the West at international prices. I want you to know, and Euronews above all, that we buy oil from Russia at higher than world pricesQI do not need any support from Russia, though I am confident I would receive it if I asked.
Lukashenko Is An Emancipator
----------------------------
13. (U) Q (Interfax): Thanks to your election rivals, this country has learned interesting things about your private life and sons. Are you going to charge these individuals for libel? And, basically, will Milinkevich and Kozulin be sent to prison?
A: I would hate to see anyone sent to prison, but believe me, I do not send people to prison. Under the constitution, I release people, and as any other president I have the power to pardon peopleQif they are guilty, they will be sent to prison. As far as I am concerned, they will not be sent to prison for personal reasons. I will oppose this and will ask law- enforcement agencies not to touch them. Let God go with them, as it is all coming to themQI do not think the public has learned too many things about my private life. What they said is horrible...they were destroying my image with the help of spin-doctors.
Lukashenko Gets Cheeky With Ukrainian Journalist
--------------------------------------------- ---
14. (U) Journalist (Antena TV, Ukraine): Several events have happened over the last few weeks here that were viewed as scandalous. Some of our politicians were not allowed into Belarus and some of my colleagues were barred from entering this conference. My colleague was arrested when reporting live at an opposition rallyQ
Lukashenko: During a live broadcast?
Journalist: She was reporting by phone
Lukashenko: You need only this. This is good when you are detained reporting live. Your television does not need better facts.
Journalist: May I finish [the question]?
Lukashenko: As you wish. You are the master. You can finish if you want.
Journalist: Sometimes you speak about Ukraine in a slightly negative contextQ
Lukashenko: No, no, excuse me. You did not allow me to finish. I respect my opposition because they found my
Conference
Ukrainian roots. [Passage omitted: Lukashenko recalls working with Ukrainians on a collective farm and claims Belarus supports Ukrainian farmers during the harvesting campaign.] Probably, she was not arrested but detained, because it is not so easy to arrest a person. She was probably doing something wrong. So when in this country, you should abide by this country's laws.
Comment
-------
15. (C) The setting of Lukashenko's press conference showed a leader far removed from the people. He sat at a large desk, flanked by two large flags centered high on a large stage, isolated from the packed auditorium. His curt answers to Western journalists and scolding of Belarusian correspondents only helped to show the world his bizarre behavior, yet he still received healthy applause from his well-chosen audience and foreign lackeys Q including American citizen Michael Margulis, whom Lukashenko repeatedly mentioned during his remarks as representing the real American people.
16. (C) The press conference rivaled his firebrand speech at the UNGA. Lukashenko used this rare moment with Western journalists to criticize the U.S. and accuse it, along with the rest of the West, of murdering Slobodan Milosivic and unjustly removing Saddaam Hussein. At one disturbing moment, Lukashenko told a journalist she was jumping to conclusions when thinking that his third term as President would be his last. This clearly demonstrated a defiant Lukashenko intends to stay in power indefinitely and sees no reason to change his course.
KROL
Friday, 30 October 2009, 13:47
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TALLINN 000317
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/UMB JOE WANG
VILNIUS FOR MINSK MICHAEL SCANLON
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
EO 12958 DECL: 2019/10/30
TAGS PREL, PGOV, BO, EN
SUBJECT: Estonian FM Visit to Belarus; Lukashenko Goes On (and On and
On)
CLASSIFIED BY: Marc Nordberg, Political/Economic Chief; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
Classified by CDA Karen Decker for Reasons 1.4 B and D.
1. (C) Summary: Pol Chief met with MFA Desk Officer for Belarus, Moldova, and Central Asia Risto Roos on October 28 for a read-out of Foreign Minister Urmas Paet's October 20 - 21 visit to Minsk. Lukashenko, assuring Paet that Estonia was not his enemy, spent the bulk of their 90-minute meeting lashing out at Russia with claims that Minsk may be forced to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia this winter in order to get cheap gas from Russia, and that Russia had instigated the war in Georgia. Lukashenko was unrepentant on repression against civil society and has ordered his government to do nothing to please the EU before the November GAERC discusses lifting sanctions against Belarus. End summary.
2. (SBU) On October 20 - 21, FM Paet led a delegation of 30 Estonian business people (Estonia's largest ever business delegation) to Minsk. While in Belarus, Paet upgraded Estonia's Consulate to an Embassy, and separately met with Aleksandr Lukashenko, FM Sergey Martynov, and a group of Belarusan independent NGOs and opposition parties.
Lukashenko: "Estonia is Not Our Enemy," But Maybe Russia Is
--------------------------------------------- ----------------------
--------
3. (C) Civil Society: Paet's meeting with Lukashenko was scheduled to last 30 minutes, but went 90 minutes and only ended when Paet said he needed to catch his flight. Roos said Lukashenko's office told him this was only the third time that a meeting with Lukashenko had gone longer than planned (the others being Javier Solana and Benito Ferrero-Waldner). In the meeting Paet raised complaints from civil society leaders that political parties were not allowed to register or freely operate, and that security forces were increasingly using violence against demonstrators. Lukashenko replied that he and several members of the opposition had once been allies who "drank vodka and womanized together." However, these people had turned against him (Lukashenko) after he refused to give them promotions. Lukashenko told Paet that the opposition in Belarus would never unite, and only existed "to live off western grants." Furthermore, Lukashenko claimed that he could halt the flow of grant money at any time, but that he saw no reason to do so, since the parties were "harmless." Regarding civil society complaints of violence against them, Lukashenko stated the opposition should expect to get hurt when they attack the OMON (riot police). Lukashenko also claimed Belarus has no political prisoners, but that common crooks join the opposition after they are arrested in order to claim political persecution. Lukashenko added that he did not want to be president, but was only acting to help the Belarusan people. Lukashenko also repeated earlier claims that in the 2006 elections he actually received 93 percent of the vote, but reduced the final tally to 86 percent to make the vote more credible to the West.
4. (C) NATO: Lukashenko told Paet that, despite Estonia's membership in the EU and NATO, he did not consider Estonia to be an enemy. Lukashenko also said that Latvia, Lithuania and Poland were not threats to Belarus, despite being NATO members. Paet argued that NATO should not be considered as an enemy, but according to Roos, Lukashenko did not buy it.
TALLINN 00000317 002 OF 003
5. (C) EU: Lukashenko also told Paet stated that the EU's "ridiculous sanctions" had not weakened Belarus. In fact, Lukashenko told Paet he had specifically ordered his government, "to do nothing to please the EU" before the EU discusses extending sanctions at the November GAERC. Lukashenko argued that he prefers Belarus to be independent, and was particularly upset that the EU has not given him credit for any reforms or for his non-recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. He claimed that Ukraine undertook numerous reforms to "please" the EU and NATO, but that now Ukraine is no nearer membership in either organization and is in economic and political ruin. Lukashenko added that the EU, "can sleep soundly at night," because Belarus protects the EU's border from illegal immigrants. He lamented that the EU does not give Belarus any credit for this.
6. (C) Iraq, Iran and Venezuela: Lukashenko claimed to Paet that Saddam Hussein called him in early 2003, asking Lukashenko to negotiate peace with the United States. Lukashenko claimed Hussein was prepared to offer gas at half price, and had argued that Iraq had no ties to al-Qaeda nor any WMD. Lukashenko also claimed that Belarus was forced to seek friendship with Venezuela and Iran to lessen Belarus' energy dependence on Russia. Those countries help Belarus as much as they can, but Lukashenko lamented that his country is still dependent on Russia.
7. (C) Russia: Roos told us that Lukashenko maintained an anti-Russian tone throughout the meeting. Lukashenko said he hoped Finland, Sweden and Denmark refuse to give permission to build the Nordstream pipeline. Lukashenko would prefer to see Yamal II (crossing Belarus) built, arguing it would cost one-tenth the price. Lukashenko also claimed he would likely be forced to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia this winter in order to get cheaper energy from Russia. He also complained that Russian media is full of falsifications. On Georgia, Lukashenko claimed Russia had planned the war years in advance and tricked Saakashvili into acting, and told Paet Saakashvili had invited him to Georgia. Lukashenko was considering accepting this invitation, but had not yet done so since he did not want to annoy the Kremlin.
Beleaguered Civil Society
-------------------------------
8. (C) Paet met with NGO and political party representatives, who said the level of repression they face has worsened over the past six months. They reported that it has gotten even harder to get permission to demonstrate, that security services are more frequently using force to break up unsanctioned demonstrations, and that activists face violence more often after being arrested. The civil society group accused Russia of propping up Lukashenko with cheap oil and gas, and claimed Russia is trying to "Russify" Belarus as it pushes Minsk into accepting a union state.
FM Martynov Defends Status Quo
-----------------------------------------
9. (C) Paet presented the civil society complaints to FM Martynov, who argued that Belarus was reforming, but that reform takes time.
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Martynov claimed there was a debate within the GOB between a faction that is pro-reform, and others that want to halt reforms since the EU has not positively responded. Martynov reiterated Lukashenko's complaints that Belarus has not been properly thanked for refusing to recognize South Ossetia, and has not gotten any credit from the EU for decreasing its use of the death penalty. Martynov then accused the EU of double standards, since sanctions are being lifted against Uzbekistan but not against Belarus. Martynov also said that Belarus would upgrade its Consulate in Tallinn to an Embassy in six to nine months, and that the GOB wants to create an inter-governmental commission with Estonia to discuss payment of pensions, social issues, tourism, and cultural issues.
10. (C) Comment: The GOE is an active supporter of democratic reform in Belarus, even if Belarus is not one of Estonia's main foreign policy priorities (which are Afghanistan, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova). The Estonian MFA is providing 115,045 Euro in scholarships to thirteen Belarusan students removed from university for political reasons, and in 2008 gave 28,761 Euro to the European Humanities University for scholarships (EHU is a private Belarusan university currently operating in Vilnius). In recent years Estonia has granted political asylum to several young Belarusan pro-democracy activists, such as Pavel Morozow of the Third Way NGO. Estonia's Charge in Minsk told Pol Chief before his assignment that he intends to push hard for democratic transition in Minsk. Given Estonia's own transition experience, and the fact that Estonia is not an "enemy" of Belarus, the GOE's modest support and efforts could have some traction. We are actively engaged with the GOE on ways we can maximize support to Belarus' democratic opposition, and have made some useful connections (at least for us) to link up Embassies in Tallinn and Minsk with the Estonian Foreign Ministry and now, the Estonian Embassy in Minsk. We hope to be able to reinforce our national efforts to promote change in Belarus by triangulating, where we can, our assistance. DECKER
Monday, 30 April 2007, 10:58
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000409
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/30/2017
TAGS ECON, KBCT, PHUM, SY
SUBJECT: ARAB LEAGUE BOYCOTT MEETING: SPIELBERG DESIGNATED
REF: 06 DAMASCUS 05302
Classified By: CDA Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4 b/d
1. (U) Summary. The semi-annual meeting of the Arab League Boycott group was held April 23-26 in Damascus. Participation and results followed expectations and closely paralleled last November,s gathering (reftel). No companies were dropped; the one announced addition to the blacklist of entities is film director Steven Spielberg and his Righteous Persons Foundation. End Summary.
2. (C) The semi-annual meeting of the Damascus-based Arab League Boycott Office (ALBO) was held April 23-26. In attendance were diplomats and/or representatives from Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen, according to Muhammed al Ajami, head of the Syrian Regional Office for the Boycott of Israel. The Arab League main body and the Organization of Islamic Conference also had members present, he said. Malaysia, Iran, Pakistan and Indonesia showed support (via the OIC) for the boycott, and they and other countries will likely implement their own bans following the ALBO format, Ajami speculated. As with prior meetings, the most notable absences were those Arab states who have signed separate accords with Israel: Jordan, Egypt and Mauritania, Ajami said. Djibouti and Somalia did not attend, despite earlier efforts by ALBO seeking to encourage their presence, said Ajami.
3. (C) No companies were removed from the list during this most recent meeting. The one addition mentioned was film director Steven Spielberg, who was singled out for his USD one million donation to Israel last year during the summer conflict in Lebanon, according to Ajami. The committee banned all films and other products related to Spielberg or his Righteous Persons Foundation, Ajami said. Generic enforcement guidelines given to ALBO members include the banning of DVD imports and airing of Spielberg,s films. XXXXXXXXXXXX
4. (C) Comment. Ajami was much more forthcoming with EconOff than he was in a November 2006 meeting, expressing confidence that the boycott was growing stronger and asserting that Israel,s position in the region was becoming weaker. Echoing what seemed like a SARG-supplied talking point, Ajami also claimed that Syria is now being recognized as a key player in regional problems and beyond. CORBIN
Friday, 30 October 2009, 07:29
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000865
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B.WALCH
DRL FOR N. WILETT
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR J. HARMON AND L. DOBBINS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR M. GAVIN
EO 12958 DECL: 10/30/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ASEC, ZI
SUBJECT: MDC FOCUSES ON SECURITY SECTOR, GONO
REF: A. HARARE 853 B. HARARE 863 C. PRETORIA 2136
Classified By: CDA Katherine Dhanani for reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
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SUMMARY
-------
1. (S) According to Elton Mangoma, MDC-T Minister of Economic Development and member of Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai's inner circle, the MDC would like the U.S. to contribute to a "trust fund" to buy off securocrats and move them into retirement. The MDC will also try to pressure Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) Governor Gideon Gono to resignXXXXXXXXXXXX. Finally, Mangoma believes an agreement will be reached ending the MDC's disengagement from ZANU-PF, but if not, the MDC will continue pursuing its long-term strategy of preparing for elections. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) Pol/Econ chief met with Minister of Economic Development Elton Mangoma on October 29 at the Ministry. Mangoma is one of Tsvangirai's closest advisors and was one of the MDC-T negotiators of the Global Political Agreement (GPA).
3. (S) Reiterating Tsvangirai's views (Refs A and C), Mangoma said that a primary obstacle to political progress and reform was the service chiefs. Unlike many ZANU-PF insiders who had stolen and invested wisely, these individuals had not become wealthy. They feared economic pressures, as well as prosecution for their misdeeds, should political change result in their being forced from office. Therefore, they were resisting GPA progress that could ultimately result in fair elections. Mangoma asked for consideration of U.S. contribution to a "trust fund" that could be used to negotiate the service chiefs' retirement. He said he planned to approach the UK and Germany with the same request.
4. XXXXXXXXXXXX
5. (C) Although doubtful about the ability of SADC to bring about a rapprochement between ZANU-PF and the MDC, Mangoma Qabout a rapprochement between ZANU-PF and the MDC, Mangoma was hopeful that the parties themselves could ultimately reach an agreement. Most ZANU-PF officials realized that the entry of the MDC into government had brought about stability and did not want to see the MDC withdraw. If an agreement was not reached, the MDC would consider next steps with the goal of eventually having elections.
HARARE 00000865 002 OF 002
6. (C) We posited there was a general perception among diplomats and in civil society that the MDC did not have a strategic vision and had disengaged without a Plan B in the event ZANU-PF did not compromise on outstanding issues. Mangoma disagreed; the West had continuously underestimated the MDC by focusing on specific events such as ZANU-PF's repressive actions of the last week (Septel) rather than the long-term process by which the MDC had managed to enter government and begun to set itself up to win the next elections. With regard to the events of the last week, Mangoma said bumps in the road were to be expected.
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COMMENT
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7. (C) The relative power of Mugabe vis-a-vis the service chiefs is a matter of debate. While no doubt there are hardliners, including the service chiefs, close to Mugabe who are pressuring him not to further implement the GPA, we continue to believe he could make concessions should he choose to do so. The current visit of the SADC Troika may give an indication if there is any ZANU-PF flexibility. We're skeptical and expect the current impasse -- and ZANU-PF repression -- will continue in the near term. END COMMENT.
DHANANI
Wednesday, 27 September 2000, 14:59
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 005461
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH
LONDON FOR CHARLES GURNEY
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS
PASS USTR FOR ROSA WHITAKER
EO 12958 DECL: 09/21/10
TAGS PGOV, PINS, ZI, MDC, ZANU-PF
SUBJECT: ZANU-PF REPORTEDLY INTERESTED IN DEAL WITH MDC
THAT INVOLVES MUGABE'S DEPARTURE
REF: HARARE 5346 CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HARARE 05461 01 OF 02 271458Z
CLASSIFIED BY DCM EARL IRVING. REASONS: 1.5 (B) AND (D).
SUMMARY
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1. (C) ACCORDING TO A SENIOR MDC ADVISOR, THE OPPOSITION PARTY HAS RECEIVED ADDITIONAL FEELERS FROM ZANU-PF ABOUT MAKING A DEAL THAT INVOLVES PRESIDENT MUGABE'S DEPARTURE FROM OFFICE. MDC PRESIDENT MORGAN TSVANGIRAI IS REPORTEDLY WILLING TO AGREE TO A GRACEFUL EXIT FOR MUGABE BECAUSE IT IS IN ZIMBABWE'S NATIONAL INTEREST. THE MDC ADVISOR SAID KOFI ANNAN RECENTLY OFFERED MUGABE A PACKAGE TO STEP DOWN, WHICH HE DECLINED, AND THAT A SHADY ZIMBABWEAN BUSINESSMAN HAS TOLD ZANU-PF HE IS WILLING TO FINANCE A "RETIREMENT PACKAGE" FOR THE PRESIDENT. MEANWHILE, XXXXXXXXXXXX HAS BEEN ASKED BY THE MDC TO ORGANIZE A PRIVATE SECTOR INITIATIVE FOCUSED ON FORGING AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN ZANU-PF AND THE MDC ON A WAY OUT OF ZIMBABWE'S CURRENT MESS. END SUMMARY.
ZANU-PF SEES WRITING ON WALL, WANTS A DEAL
------------------------------------------
2. (C) IN A SEPTEMBER 26 CALL ON DCM AND POLOFF, XXXXXXXXXXXX SAID THE BUSINESS INTERESTS OF SENIOR ZANU-PF MEMBERS ARE BEING BADLY DAMAGED BY THE CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION. THEY BLAME PRESIDENT MUGABE AND ARE DETERMINED TO FIND A WAY TO EASE HIM OUT IN A DIGNIFIED WAY. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY REALIZE CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 HARARE 05461 01 OF 02 271458Z THAT THE MDC IS GAINING STRENGTH IN THE RURAL AREAS -- TWO RECENT RALLIES BY MDC PRESIDENT MORGAN TSVANGIRAI ATTRACTED THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE AND RAISED FUNDS FOR THE PARTY -- AND SEE THEIR LOSS OF POWER AS INEVITABLE. THEY HAVE BEGUN TO TALK SERIOUSLY TO THE MDC ABOUT MAKING A DEAL. ALTHOUGH HE IS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT IT, MDC PRESIDENT MORGAN TSVANGIRAI HAS AGREED THAT IT IS IN ZIMBABWE'S BEST
SIPDIS INTERESTS FOR THE MDC TO DO ALL IT CAN TO SECURE A GRACEFUL EXIT STRATEGY THAT PRESERVES SOMEWHAT OF A POSITIVE LEGACY FOR MUGABE. OTHERWISE, THE PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE LITTLE INCENTIVE TO GO.
ENCOURAGING MUGABE TO STEP DOWN
-------------------------------
3. (C) THE BOARD OF LEVER BROTHERS INFORMED THE MDC, XXXXXXXXXXXX REPORTED, THAT KOFI ANNAN, IN THE RECENT MEETING IN NEW YORK DURING THE MILLENIUM SUMMIT, OFFERED MUGABE A DEAL TO STEP DOWN. ALTHOUGH XXXXXXXXXXXX SAID THE MDC WAS NOT PRIVY TO THE DETAILS, HE SURMISED THAT ANNAN'S SUPPOSED DEAL PROBABLY INCLUDED PROVISION OF SAFEHAVEN AND A FINANCIAL PACKAGE FROM LIBYAN PRESIDENT QADHAFI. THE OPPOSITION PARTY HEARD THAT MUGABE TURNED DOWN THE OFFER THE FOLLOWING DAY, AFTER DISCUSSING IT WITH THE FIRST LADY. ANNAN, XXXXXXXXXXXX CONTINUED, IS NOT THE ONLY ONE TRYING TO FACILITATE MUGABE'S DEPARTURE. XXXXXXXXXXXX INFORMED XXXXXXXXXXXX THAT XXXXXXXXXXXX A SHADY WHITE ZIMBABWEAN BUSINESSMAN, HAD TOLD ZANU-PF HE WOULD PROVIDE A FINANCIAL "RETIREMENT" PACKAGE FOR MUGABE. XXXXXXXXXXXX DID NOT KNOW WHETHER XXXXXXXXXXXX HAD SUFFICIENT RESOURCES TO MAKE SUCH A PACKAGE ATTRACTIVE CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 HARARE 05461 01 OF 02 271458Z ENOUGH, BUT HE CLAIMED THAT XXXXXXXXXXXX WORKED FOR MI6 AND COULD BE A CHANNEL FOR THE BRITISH TO PROVIDE FUNDS TO SWEETEN THE DEAL. (COMMENT: THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION HERE SCOFFED AT THE VERY IDEA. END COMMENT.)
4. (C) THE MDC, ACCORDING TO XXXXXXXXXXXX, BELIEVED THAT THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED WAS FOR AN INDEPENDENT BODY -- PREFERABLY MEMBERS OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY NOT AFFILIATED WITH A PARTICULAR POLITICAL PARTY -- TO WORK WITH ZANU-PF AND THE MDC TO FORGE A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE WAY OUT OF ZIMBABWE'S CURRENT MESS. THE MDC HAS APPROACHED XXXXXXXXXXXX ABOUT LEADING SUCH AN EFFORT.
PRIVATE SECTOR AS MIDDLEMAN
---------------------------
5. (C) SHORTLY AFTER OUR DISCUSSION WITH XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX CALLED ON THE DCM AND POLOFF. XXXXXXXXXXXX NOTED THAT THE ZIMBABWEAN ECONOMY WAS HEADED FOR DISASTER, AND HE WAS EXPLORING HOW KEY MEMBERS OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR HERE COULD PREVENT A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRAINWRECK. HE INSISTED THAT HE HAD NO POLITICAL AFFILIATION, AND THEREFORE HAS A CERTAIN CREDIBILITY WITH BOTH MAJOR
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ2532
PAGE 01 HARARE 05461 02 OF 02 271459Z ACTION AF-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 DINT-00 DODE-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EUR-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 L-00 VCE-00 AC-01 NSAE-00 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 TRSE-00 USIE-00 R-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /006W ------------------8A8E22 271459Z /38 O 271459Z SEP 00 FM AMEMBASSY HARARE TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7213 INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 HARARE 005461
SIPDIS
XXXXXXXXXXXX
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/10 TAGS: PGOV, PINS, ZI SUBJECT: ZANU-PF REPORTEDLY INTERESTED IN DEAL WITH MDC THAT INVOLVES MUGABE'S DEPARTURE
POLITICAL PARTIES. THE CHALLENGE, XXXXXXXXXXXX SAID, IS CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HARARE 05461 02 OF 02 271459Z CONVINCING ZANU-PF AND THE MDC, WHO MISTRUST EACH OTHER IMMENSELY, TO SIT IN A ROOM TOGETHER AND AGREE ON A WAY FORWARD.
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX SAID HE HAS HEARD HINTS THAT PRESIDENT MUGABE IS WILLING TO STEP DOWN UNDER THE RIGHT CONDITIONS. THAT WOULD BE REMARKABLE, THE DCM POINTED OUT, AS A DECISION NOT TO STAND FOR PRESIDENT IN 2002 WOULD MAKE MUGABE A LAME DUCK AND LIKELY WOULD FURTHER UNDERMINE HIS ABILITY TO GOVERN EFFECTIVELY. THAT SCENARIO, XXXXXXXXXXXX REPLIED, ASSUMES THAT MUGABE WOULD SERVE OUT THE REMAINDER OF HIS TERM. THE PRESIDENT, HE HAS BEEN TOLD, WOULD BE WILLING TO STAND DOWN NOW IF HE IS CONVINCED THAT HIS LAND REDISTRIBUTION PLAN IS ON TRACK. AMNESTY WOULD LIKELY BE ANOTHER CONDITION, XXXXXXXXXXXX ADDED.
7. (C) THERE IS A GROWING REALIZATION IN ZANU-PF, XXXXXXXXXXXX INSISTED, THAT THE CONTINUED DETERIORATION OF THE ECONOMY WILL INEVITABLY HAND THE COUNTRY ON A SILVER PLATTER TO THE MDC. IN ORDER TO GAIN POWER, THE MDC MERELY HAS TO WAIT. ZANU-PF, THEREFORE, IS PRIMED TO MAKE A DEAL. ASKED WHAT THE CATALYST WAS FOR SUCH A DEAL, XXXXXXXXXXXX SAID ONE POSSIBILITY IS A CONFERENCE, ORGANIZED BY KEY MEMBERS OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR, IN WHICH AN INTERNATIONALLY RESPECTED FIGURE SEEN AS IMPARTIAL BY BOTH SIDES WOULD ATTEMPT TO FORGE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN ZANU-PF AND THE MDC, PRIMARILY ON LAND BUT ALSO ON OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES. SUCH A CONFERENCE WOULD ALSO ADDRESS HOW COUNTRIES SUCH AS CHILE AND ARGENTINA MADE THE TRANSITION TO MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY AND DEALT WITH THE QUESTION OF AMNESTY. ASKED HOW THE UNITED STATES COULD HELP, XXXXXXXXXXXX REPLIED THAT AN CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 HARARE 05461 02 OF 02 271459Z HONEST BROKER WAS NEEDED TO CONVINCE ZANU-PF TO PARTICIPATE AND TO UNDERWRITE THE COSTS OF WHATEVER AGREEMENT EMERGED. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, HE CLAIMED, HAS 36 MILLION POUNDS AVAILABLE FOR LAND REFORM IN ZIMBABWE, BUT THEY ARE PROBABLY TOO ANTAGONISTIC TO PLAY AN HONEST BROKER ROLE. THE AMERICANS, THOUGH, PROBABLY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.
8. (C) WOULDN'T PRESIDENT MUGABE HAVE TO BE IN THE LOOP ON SUCH AN INITIATIVE, THE DCM ASKED? ABSOLUTELY, XXXXXXXXXXXX REPLIED. THEIR EFFORT WOULD BE DESCRIBED TO THE PRESIDENT AS A NON-PARTISAN PRIVATE SECTOR INITIATIVE INTENDED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A LAND REFORM PROGRAM ACCEPTABLE TO ALL THE MAJOR STAKEHOLDERS, THEREBY RESTORING ZIMBABWE'S CREDIBILITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A CARROT FOR MUGABE TO ENDORSE OR PARTICIPATE IN SUCH AN EFFORT. ASKED WHETHER HE MEANT A FINANCIAL PAYOFF, XXXXXXXXXXXX DEMURRED, ONLY INTIMATING THAT THAT ISSUE WOULD HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED.
COMMENT
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9. (C) MANY MEMBERS OF ZANU-PF ARE INCREASINGLY CONVINCED THAT PRESIDENT MUGABE IS A SERIOUS LIABILITY. A MEMBER OF ZANU-PF'S POLITBURO RECENTLY TOLD THE INDEPENDENT "FINANCIAL GAZETTE" THAT THE PARTY HAD AGREED THAT MUGABE SHOULD NOT RUN FOR REELECTION, BUT IT HAD NOT YET SETTLED ON A CONSENSUS CANDIDATE. AS THE ECONOMY CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE, ZANU-PF OFFICIALS REALIZE THAT MUGABE'S CONTINUATION IN POWER WILL LEAD INEVITABLY TO THE ELECTION OF AN MDC PRESIDENT IN 2002. IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME. CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 HARARE 05461 02 OF 02 271459Z THEY ARE UNDERSTANDABLY SEARCHING FOR A WAY TO PROTECT THEMSELVES FROM PROSECUTION AND THEIR ECONOMIC ASSETS FROM SEIZURE OR CONTINUED DETERIORATION. WE ARE NOT SURPRISED, THEREFORE, BY THE RULING PARTY'S BACK-CHANNEL APPROACHES TO THE MDC ABOUT REACHING A DEAL, WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE PROBABLY GENUINE. THE CRITICAL QUESTION IS HOW MUGABE WILL REACT IF HE CATCHES WIND OF IT.
10. (C) WE ARE INTRIGUED BY XXXXXXXXXXXX'S EFFORT. HIS THINKING ABOUT HOW TO BROKER SOME SORT OF AGREEMENT IS CLEARLY IN THE INCIPIENT STAGES AND, TO BE SUCCESSFUL, HE MUST FIRST OVERCOME SERIOUS MISTRUST ON BOTH SIDES. ALTHOUGH THE CONFERENCE HE ENVISIONS WOULD, ON THE SURFACE, FOCUS ON REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON LAND, ITS REAL OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF MUGABE'S DEPARTURE FROM OFFICE. XXXXXXXXXXXX CLEARLY HAS MUCH GROUNDWORK TO DO. THE CLOCK IS TICKING, AS ZANU-PF MAY DISCUSS THE SUCCESSION ISSUE AT ITS EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS LATER THIS YEAR.
MCDONALD
CONFIDENTIAL
>
Wednesday, 13 May 2009, 15:37
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000497
SIPDIS
GENEVA FOR CD DEL, UNVIE FOR IAEA
EO 12958 DECL: 05/11/2019
TAGS PARM, KNNP, NPT
SUBJECT: A/S GOTTEMOELLER,S 5 AND 7 MAY BILATERAL MEETINGS
ON THE MARGINS OF THE NPT PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
Classified By: VCI - Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller. Reasons 1. 5 (b) and (d).
1. (SBU) Summary: Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Rose Gottemoeller, held several bilateral meetings May 5 and 7 on the margins of the NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) in New York. This cable reports on her meetings with: Brazil's Head of Delegation Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares, Australia's Assistant Secretary for Arms Control and Counter-proliferation John Sullivan, Canada's Ambassador Marius Grinius, Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Tibor Toth, Egypt's Ambassador Maged Abdelaziz, Philippines, Ambassador Libran Cabactulan (President-designate of the 2010 NPT Review Conference), Japan's Ambassador Tarui Sumio, Conference on Disarmament President, Algeria's Ambassador Idriss Jazairy, and the United Kingdom's Ambassador John Duncan. (SBU) Meeting with Brazil's Ambassador Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares (7 May) 2. (C) A/S Gottemoeller opened the meeting by saying that there was a good story to tell on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as the United States moved toward ratification. When the Senate first addressed the Treaty in 1999, there were two main concerns which led to the negative vote in the Senate: whether the treaty was verifiable and whether the U.S. nuclear stockpile could be maintained without testing. There have been great strides in both these areas in the last ten years, and the Administration would work closely with the Senate, and particularly with those Senators who were not members then, to ensure the facts were presented clearly. It would be hard work, but it was
achievable. 3. (C) Soares said there was reason for optimism regarding the current PrepCom The Zimbabwean was an able diplomat who had successfully managed adoption of the Durban Convention in one week. Soares noted that the debate thus far was very different from last year, saying contentious issues were not addressed, noting that the U.S. opening statement had not addressed Iran, and Iran itself had not been very aggressive. With the adoption of the RevCon agenda and procedures, the essential work had been done. Now, if the parties could agree to a short statement, that would be helpful, noting that the Chairman would soon circulate a draft document for parties to consider. 4. (C) Responding to A/S Gottemoeller,s question regarding his assessment of the state of play in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Soares said that his impression was that the CD would adopt a program of work (POW) along the lines of the Algerian Ambassador's proposal. Soares opined that he hadn't heard of any opposition, and Pakistan, in particular, had agreed to it. He wasn't sure about Iran, but felt they wouldn't oppose as it wasn't in their interest. A/S Gottemoeller noted that there was much work to be done in preparing for negotiations, but her impression was everyone could be ready to begin in January. She asked about support within the G 21, to which Soares replied that in their last meeting, none had spoken against the Algerian proposal. In an implied reference to linkages, Soares opined that it was important not to lose sight of the other issues on the CD,s agenda, and that it was indeed possible to work on more than one issue at a time. (SBU) Meeting with Australia,s Assistant Secretary for Arms Control and Counter-proliferation John Sullivan (7 May)
5. (C) A/S Sullivan began the meeting by congratulating the United States on a successful PrepCom and giving credit to the United States for the positive atmosphere. He noted that nearly all delegations seemed to be showing some "restraint" this year, and there weren,t as many personal attacks as in past PrepComs. He added that other delegations had commented to him that even Iran,s statements showed some constraint. 6. (C) A/S Sullivan asked when the P5 1 negotiations with Iran were scheduled to commence. A/S Gottemoeller said that Washington was still working out tactics and timing, but President Obama made it clear the Middle East (including Iran) was a priority for his Administration; the President,s selection of George Mitchell as the Middle East envoy showed his dedication to resolving the Iran issue quickly and diplomatically. A/S Sullivan said that the P5 should give credit to Arab League partners for "reining in" Iran, but had hopes that the United States could lead peaceful Middle East negotiations. He added that the new positive atmosphere of the NPT community could pave the way for a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) at the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon). A/S Gottemoeller asked how the Australians foresee the 2010 RevCon unfolding: would it be all Middle East, all the time, or would we focus on other issues? A/S Sullivan said that he believed the Middle East issue must be resolved first before States Party can make headway anywhere else. He noted his experience as the Ambassador to Cyprus, and explained how he saw hatred passing down from generation to generation, and he believed the Middle East was the same way. 7. (C) A/S Gottemoeller raised the issue of Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) negotiations and asked what Australia,s views were on Ambassador Jazairy's non-paper. She said she
was impressed with his ability to get consensus within the NAM so quickly, although Israel must be brought on board before any real action could take place on FMCT negotiations. A/S Sullivan agreed with A/S Gottemoeller,s comments, but said that Australia was not clear on the US plans for a way forward. He asked whether the US plan was to move forward on negotiations without consensus, or was the plan to begin negotiations only after all States agreed to commence negotiations? He said Australia was hesitant to make a decision on a way forward until they had clarification from the United States. A/S Gottemoeller requested Gary Larson, Charge d,Affaires from the US Mission to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), speak to the FMCT issue. He said that the process was progressing but the United States was giving a lot of study on the best way forward. He noted that Australia was only one Presidency away from becoming President of the CD, and that that FMCT negotiations may not begin until their Presidency, because of sensitivities with Israel. A/S Sullivan agreed and noted that his government had meetings scheduled with Israel this week and that FMCT probably would be raised. A/S Sullivan asked whether the United States believed other parties would expect quid-pro-quo verification measures, and Mr. Larson said one challenge for the nuclear weapons states and three non-states Party to the NPT would be handling expectations, including on negative security assurances (NSAs). A/S Sullivan noted that Australia did not have a strong position on NSAs one way or another. 8. (C) A/S Sullivan raised the issue of US ratification of the CTBT and asked what the US position was on process and timelines. A/S Gottemoeller reiterated President Obama,s pledge to ratify at an early date, and noted that while the
US goal was to gain the Senate,s advice and consent, we needed to do it carefully. A/S Sullivan asked how post-START negotiations would be affected by CTBT ratification. A/S Gottemoeller explained that START negotiations would commence earlier than CTBT, but that CTBT hearings would likely follow ratification of the post-START agreement. A/S Sullivan noted that he had been struck by the South Korean delegation,s remarks that US ratification of the CTBT would give the United States a greater "moral authority" and "diplomatic legitimacy" within the nonproliferation community, and hoped that the new Administration,s nonproliferation objectives would encourage or influence other countries (i.e. Iran) fulfill their own nonproliferation obligations. 9. (C) A/S Sullivan then raised the issue of the Russians and his experience with them as Chairman of the Australia Group. He noted that while the Russian mood on post-START was positive for now, the issue with NATO and Georgia could quickly sour negotiations, as it has in other fora. (SBU) Meeting with Canada,s Ambassador Marius Grinius (7 May) 10. (C) Ambassador Grinius noted his disapproval in the Russians trying to link CFE and START issues, and noted the problems with PAROS; he hoped that Russia would reconsider their plans for linking the two issues. A/S Gottemoeller asked Grinius about his take on the mood of the PrepCom. He cited a pleasant meeting he recently had with the Ambassador from Egypt, and compared it to a meeting before the PrepCom in which the Ambassador was "very aggressive." He believed most countries have much higher expectations for a positive PrepCom following the positive remarks by A/S Gottemoeller and President Obama,s statement in the opening remarks. He noted that all States, Article VI obligations have become much more important and he believes there will be renewed
effort from all States to encourage adherence to the Treaty. He also stated that he believed the United States had done a poor job highlighting their successes under Article VI and hoped that the new Administration would have a better public relations story than in the past. 11. (C) Grinius noted that during his trip to Washington last week, he met with John Wolfstahl at the National Security Council (NSC) to discuss CTBT and was encouraged by US plans to submit the Treaty to the Senate. A/S Gottemoeller discussed the recent STRATCOM conference on CTBT and stockpile reliability. She noted that the US voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing did not affect the confidence the United States has in its stockpiles and the overall consensus was that acceding to the CTBT probably would not put the reliability of the US stockpile at risk. 12. (C) Grinius fully supported US efforts to move quickly towards negotiations on FMCT and noted that it was time for the CD to "smoke out" Pakistan, Iran and Israel on their positions. He asked how the United States intended to use the US-India nuclear cooperation agreement to advance nonproliferation objectives. Adam Scheinman from the NSC said it was no longer considered the "US-India Deal" and that the United States was referring to it as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) - India Cooperation. Grinius did not think this rebranding was fair, saying that most NSG members "gave up" and "joined the bandwagon" rather than fully supporting a nuclear agreement with India. He also noted that before India could enjoy open nuclear trade, it would have to do more in the form of export controls. A/S Gottemoeller agreed, stating that Washington will be much harder on India if they don,t strengthen export controls and nonproliferation measures.
13. (C) Grinius believed the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone would be a dominant issue at the RevCon. He noted Canada,s pro-Israel policy and that his government was discussing ways to move forward on a NWFZ before the RevCon. Grinius passed a copy of the Canadian paper on institutional reform, and highlighted its recommendation for a three person team, similar to the one in the BWC, consisting of the past, present, and subsequent PrepCom Chairs supported by the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs in Geneva. He noted that having a three person team would allow further consultations in the lead up to the 2010 RevCon and such a team could share the Chairperson,s responsibilities to better facilitate a Conference. 14. (C) A/S Gottemoeller then discussed Article X and asked for Canada,s position on DPRK withdrawal. Grinius said he raised the same question during a meeting on the margins of the UN First Committee, and everyone laughed. He believes that no country wants to address the question. He believes that States Parties need to address the issue in full Plenary because the DPRK fully believes that they are no longer party to the Treaty. He suggested the United States may be in a position to call for a meeting on the DPRK and noted Canada,s support for a formal discussion. A/S Gottemoeller asked whether he believed a smaller meeting with more like-minded states would be preferable, or if it should be a large scale meeting with all delegations. He noted his support for either, although he suggested that a smaller meeting would be easier to manage. Scheinman asked whether Canada believed withdrawal and compliance issues could adequately be dealt with in the NPT process, or if it needed to be elevated to the UN Security Council. Grinius said that Canada believes it should first be handled in the NPT
channels and if no resolution is met, then it should be elevated. (SBU) Meeting with the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Tibor Toth (7 May) 15. (C) Executive Secretary Toth opened the meeting by thanking the United States for its opening statement which was very supportive of the CTBTO. He then asked about the US strategy for gaining the Senate,s advice and consent for the CTBT. A/S Gottemoeller discussed the recent STRATCOM conference on CTBT and stockpile reliability. She further stated that the Administration would ensure they had all the votes necessary before it formally requested the Senate,s advice and consent. 16. (C) Toth then discussed the upcoming conference on verification, which will be held in Vienna from 10-12 June 2009. He explained that the intent of the meeting is to have technical level discussions on verification, and he believed it would be very helpful and fruitful if the United States strongly supported the meeting and sent several technical representatives from government and national laboratories to provide presentations and serve on discussion panels. Toth then asked whether the Secretary would be willing to provide brief remarks at the Article 14 Conference in New York, after the UNGA meeting this fall. He noted that the invitation would be going out soon, and A/S Gottemoeller said she would inquire once she returned to Washington. 17. (C) A/S Gottemoeller asked how the CTBTO was preparing for alleged future DPRK nuclear tests. Toth explained that the International Monitoring System (IMS) was monitoring the area regularly. Toth stated that the IMS performed well after the 2006 DPRK test, and he was confident the IMS would
detect any future test. Toth further stated that the IMS was studying how to better prepare for the DPRK vis-a-vis Iran and other countries. He noted they were looking at additional site installations in the region and more active monitoring, but noted that the CTBTO has a small budget and could only make limited increases. Before concluding the meeting, Toth asked that the United States reconsider its $20M "red ink" policy towards the CTBTO, noting that the Organization will face extensive financial trouble in FY2010. He said there was a $15-20M deficit in the regular budget, which will substantially affect the work of the Agency. A/S Gottemoeller asked if paying the U.S. arrears would solve the CTBTO,s financial problems or was their greater need. Toth replied that even after the U.S. paid in full, the CTBTO would still have a significant shortfall. A/S Gottemoeller said she would convey his concerns to Washington. (SBU) Meeting with Egypt,s Ambassador Maged Abdelaziz (7 May) 18. (C) Abdelaziz began by praising President Obama,s recent speech in Prague and US/Russian efforts to negotiate a follow-on START agreement. He then proceeded to ask about the new Administration,s policy for the Middle East in the context of the NPT. A/S Gottemoeller said that policy still was evolving but that certain contours already should be clear: the President is serious about the Middle East peace process and has appointed a special envoy to that end; there is an evolving policy on Iran, which includes direct diplomacy; and the Administration is advocating the quick commencement of negotiations on a verifiable FMCT. All of these initiatives, she argued, contribute to the kind of atmosphere that will be required to make progress on the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Abdelaziz said he was encouraged the United
States finally was taking the issue seriously. He acknowledged that the 1995 Resolution indeed was linked to the peace process, but he said this link cannot be abused. Egypt has tried for years to foster peace in the region, and will continue to do so, but it is unwilling to wait fifty more years to see progress in implementing the 1995 Resolution. He said a new approach to Iran would be good, and that Iran cannot be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons, but the Iranian nuclear issue also should not prevent progress on implementing the Resolution. The 1995 Resolution was supposed to foster security and stability in the region, and for Cairo the issue relates directly to national security; statements from Israeli,s Prime Minister that his state possesses nuclear weapons do not contribute to security or stability. Abdelaziz said Egypt,s President soon will visit Washington, and he expected all these issues to be raised with President Obama. Egypt needs agreement on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution at the 2010 RevCon, and suggests a package approach to the issue that would include Iran, Israel, and regional security. It further emphasized the need for definite timeframes for implementation. He said if the Middle East Resolution is solved, everything else would fall into place for Egypt, including CTBT and CWC. Abdelaziz acknowledged that the contours of policy elucidated by A/S Gottemoeller address "big picture" goals for the region and the world, but said Egypt would not sacrifice its regional security for global objectives. On FMCT he emphasized the need to deal with existing stocks of fissile material. 19. (C) A/S Gottemoeller asked about Egypt,s view of the interest in nuclear energy throughout the region. Abdelaziz said it was spreading throughout the region, but states were E
concerned about perceived attempts to impose restrictions on civil nuclear technology. He said the idea of responsible vs. irresponsible states is very dangerous, and the best way to handle the growing interest in this technology was to strengthen the IAEA. He respected A/S Gottemoeller,s point that NPT Parties have both rights and responsibilities, but warned against discriminatory approaches to civil nuclear technology. 20. (C) Abdelaziz said positive momentum toward the 2010 RevCon has been established, especially with the decision to negotiate a follow-on START agreement, and the adoption of an agenda for the RevCon. He said the RevCon must produce a final document and progress must be made on the Middle East Resolution, which would help bring all non-parties into the Treaty. A/S Gottemoeller described the ways in which the US-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement had brought India further into the nonproliferation regime. Abdelaziz said if this were true, it would better his disposition toward the agreement. Finally, in an apparent attempt to portray Egypt as a responsible member of the international community, Abdelaziz claimed that Egypt had been offered nuclear scientists, materials and even weapons following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but Egypt had refused all such offers. A/S Gottemoeller asked him how he knew this to be true, to which Abdelaziz replied he was in Moscow at that time and had direct personal knowledge. (SBU) Meeting with Philippines, Ambassador Libran Cabactulan: President-designate of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (7 May) 21. (C) Cabactulan said the speeches at this year,s PrepCom have been inspiring, but it remains to be seen what the ground truths are about states, goals for the RevCon. He
said expectations were high, but cautioned memories are not short, and states will remember the disappointments of 2005. A couple concrete achievements before the RevCon could catapult the Conference to success. He said he was in a listening mode and was ready to "roll-up his sleeves and hit the road." A/S Gottemoeller discussed the expected timetables for US progress on a follow-on START agreement, the nuclear posture review, CTBT, and FMCT. She said all of these new initiatives should set a positive atmosphere for the RevCon and convince the world that the United States is serious about its NPT Article VI commitments; however, she noted it would not only be the United States that had heavy lifting to do. All NPT Parties will have to work hard to make the 2010 RevCon a success. In particular she noted the importance of dealing with the difficult problems of Iran and North Korea. 22. (C) A/S Gottemoeller asked about the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and what role regional states like the United Arab Emirates might play to help achieve progress on the Resolution in 2010. Cabactulan said it was a very difficult subject that was affected by the peace process and other regional issues, but that progress must be made on the Resolution, or the RevCon could fall apart. He said progress on an FMCT and Israel,s consideration of the CTBT would increase the chances for progress on the Resolution. He was unclear whether a simple reaffirmation of the Resolution would satisfy Egypt, but this was something he would investigate. 23. (C) Cabactulan asked several basic questions on international fuel supply initiatives, expressing confusion about the many different proposals. He also asked how to mitigate concerns that such proposals reinterpret the NPT,s
Article IV. A/S Gottemoeller and Director of Nonproliferation at the NSC Adam Scheinman explained that the diversity of proposals in fact provided greater assurance of fuel supply and that such proposals represented ways of fulfilling the NPT,s Article IV in proliferation-responsible ways. Cabactulan was interested in these responses, but thought more work would need to be done to explain to the international community the benefits of such initiatives. 24. (C) Finally, Cabactulan said his door would always be open for discussion, and suggested he could play a moderating role within the Non-Aligned Movement. (COMMENT: Cabactulan, though perhaps somewhat nave about the particular issues likely to confront him in his role as the President of the NPT Review Conference, clearly was pleased with his appointment and determined to make the RevCon a success. He appeared particularly receptive to consultations with the United States throughout the course of preparations for the RevCon. END COMMENT) (SBU) Meeting with Japan,s CD Ambassador Tarui Sumio (7 May) 25. (C) Ambassador Tarui opened the meeting by observing that everyone was saying this year,s Prepcom was much different. He said that Japan very much welcomed President Obama,s Prague speech, and that the world had high expectations. Tarui cautioned that progress could be achieved in a step-by-step manner, but the world was expecting drastic actions. Tarui worried that if something tangible couldn,t be done quickly, there would be great disappointment. He offered that if negotiations could begin on FMCT, that would constitute a great breakthrough, adding that France had expressed reservations on the Algerian POW, but told him they expected negotiations on FMCT to begin in January. Tarui highlighted FMCT, CTBT, and a follow-on to START as the three
big issues that must be dealt with first. He added that A/S Gottemoeller,s speech was welcomed even by Cuba, and thus we must take advantage of the momentum it generated as soon as possible. Tarui asked if the U.S. was prepared to accept the Algerian proposal, to which A/S Gottemoeller replied affirmatively. Tarui noted that the Pakistani Ambassador had told him very clearly that they were prepared to accept it as well. 26. (C) A/S Gottemoeller said that her list of priorities matched his and that progress on the three issues would constitute an important scene-setter for the RevCon She noted that she had met with Ambassador Jazairy and told him she was impressed with his ability to get the NAM to agree to his proposal and prepared to work with him to get FMCT negotiations started in January. On START follow-on, she noted that the negotiations had begun with a goal of having the treaty completed by December. This was a challenging goal, but she and Anatoli Antonov agreed that fifteen years of experience implementing START provided a good foundation from which to work. While optimistic of reaching the deadline, should negotiations take longer, she hoped our colleagues in the Revcon would see our efforts as evidence of our sincerity. A/S Gottemoeller added that after this treaty was completed, work would begin on a subsequent treaty aimed at further reductions based on the conclusions of the Nuclear Posture Review. ON CTBT, A/S Gottemoeller said that there was hard work ahead, but ten years experience has shown much progress on verification. There were a large number of new Senators since the last time the Treaty was considered, and the Administration would work to educate them on the issues. By the time of the Revcon, we may have begun hearings, but the important thing was to ensure we have a successful vote.
27. (C) Tarui highlighted the recent speech of the Japanese Foreign Minister, noting that they sought to use it to express support for President Obama,s speech by enunciating concrete steps that could be taken to further nuclear disarmament. The steps were divided into three tiers: 1) measures by nuclear weapons states, 2) measures by the world community, and 3) measures to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. He ended by noting that non-nuclear weapons states share a responsibility for nuclear disarmament, and that it wasn,t fair to pin everything on the nuclear weapons states, adding that this was a golden opportunity for mankind. (SBU) Meeting with Conference on Disarmament President, Algeria,s Ambassador Idriss Jazairy (5 May) 28. (C) Jazairy opened the meeting expressing appreciation for the positive indications from Washington for his efforts in the CD. He noted his work with the current CD presidents builds upon CD/1840 and that his objective was to develop a formulation in his proposal to sustain both United States and NAM support. He provided the United States with a paper further explaining his proposal and noted that during his meeting with Gary Samore in Washington earlier that week, Mr. Samore agreed that if the document was not tampered with, the United States would support it. Jazairy was concerned that if states tampered with the document, the initiative to begin FMCT negotiations would unweave. A/S Gottemoeller indicated that the United States would take counsel in Washington on the matter. Jazairy noted that France did not like the language on NSAs but told him that it would consider the US position on the matter. He also noted that Samore was aware of the challenge presented by Israel. Jazairy added he would gladly make himself available to the Israelis as part of a P-6 presentation to CD members, during which he would address
their concerns directly. A/S Gottemoeller indicated the United States would see what it could do concerning Israel,s position. Jazairy briefly summarized some of the difficulties he experienced coordinating with the Australians. 29. (C) A/S Gottemoeller queried Jazairy,s views on potential impacts of the transition to the Argentine Presidency on sustaining support for his proposal and about Chinese views. Jazairy did not believe the transition would be a problem and was unaware of any Chinese concerns. A/S Gottemoeller noted that the US was impressed with Jazairy,s achievement to consolidate NAM support for the proposal and that the window of opportunity to launch FMCT negotiations was limited. (SBU) Meeting with the United Kingdom,s Ambassador John Duncan (5 May) 30. (C) Duncan raised three issues during the bilateral: NPT, FMCT, and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). On the NPT, Duncan noted that a vision was lacking for the 2010 REVCON and that articulating such a vision would not be achievable at this meeting. He noted the Acronym Institute,s paper as a useful beginning to start thinking about the matter (Comment: the AI is a UK-based NGO). Duncan noted that difficulty with the French on the Agenda was predictable behavior and that the United States could encourage a French response. He said that the United Kingdom was ambivalent on a P-5 media statement. The Russians indicated that they had ideas but did not believe excessive time should be expended trying to issue a statement as had been done at past PrepComs. 31. (C) On FMCT, Duncan noted that delegations were not staffed to support negotiation of an FMCT and that six months of preparation would be needed to prepare for negotiations.
He noted that China is uncomfortable with the forward momentum and had been attempting to prod the Russians to press for more emphasis on PAROS in the program of work. He noted that the CD is the closest it has been to consensus in 4-5 years. A/S Gottemoeller noted that the United States realizes Israel will be key in getting a mandate and that the United States needs to engage Israel. She also concurred with the United Kingdom,s concern that tabling the Algerian Proposal before it was ready could undermine the effort. Both delegations agreed that closing the deal probably would come under the Argentine Presidency. Duncan noted the negotiations will be a long effort due to verification, though the United Kingdom believes verification is possible. He also noted that the UK has scheduled a trident test for May 18, which has already been announced in accordance with the Hague Code of Conduct, and expressed the hope that the test does not undermine CD negotiations. He also shared the implied threat of the Chinese Ambassador that if the UK did not stop publicly criticizing China for its strategic modernization, that China would make a public issue of the Trident test. 32. (SBU) On the ATT, Duncan noted that the effort was based on modern diplomacy. ATT was neither an export control nor a disarmament mechanism. He noted that there currently was no framework for international arms controls and that standards needed to trickle into legislation. He emphasized that the goal of the ATT was not to stop all military sales, but to introduce "best practices" regarding export controls. A/S Gottemoeller has cleared this cable. Rice
Tuesday, 24 July 2007, 14:06
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 001037
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
AF/E FOR B YODER AND D MALAC
MCC FOR G BREVNOV AND M KAVANAGH
EO 12958 DECL: 07/23/2012
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ECON, EAID, KMCA, PINR, TZ
SUBJECT: BIG FISH STILL RISKY CATCH IN TANZANIA
REF: A. A. DAR ES SALAAM 1009 B. B. DAR ES SALAAM 00085
Classified By: D. Purnell Delly, Deputy Chief of Mission, for reasons 1 .4(b and d).
1. (C) SUMMARY. Tanzania's Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) has never successfully prosecuted a high-level
corruption case involving either the private or public sector. On July 14, the Director General of the PCB, Edward Hoseah, assured the DCM that the PCB was now prepared to prosecute a milestone corruption case: the U.K.-Tanzanian BAE radar deal. Beyond plans to prosecute the BAE case, Hoseah painted a mixed picture regarding the Government of Tanzania's (GOT's) progress toward addressing the country's endemic corruption problem. On one hand, Hoseah highlighted recent legal reforms and the increasing willingness of both Parliament and press to level corruption charges against the government. On the other hand, he noted the unabated corruption in Zanzibar, weak capacity of his bureau, and President Kikwete's reluctance to implicate former President Benjamin Mkapa or members of Mkapa's inner circle in corruption scandals. Finally, Hoseah reiterated deep concern about his personal safety, explaining that he frequently received threatening letters. In the event of increasing threats to his life, Hoseah said he would not hesitate to seek refuge in another country. END SUMMARY.
PCB: Ready to Prosecute the BAE Radar Deal
------------------------------------------
2. (C) Edward Hoseah, Director General of the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) told the DCM that the PCB was almost finished with its investigation of the U.K.- Tanzanian BAE radar deal and that it intended to prosecute the case. "We are focused on the 31 percent commission paid to BAE. We understand that businessmen need commissions but the question is whether 31 percent is lawful or not," Hoseah said. He called the deal "dirty" and said it involved officials from the Ministry of Defence and at least one or two senior level military officers.
3. (C) Hoseah said that the two primary suspects, XXXXXXXXXXXX and Shailesh Vithlani, CEO of Merlin International, were currently out of the country but that when they returned the GOT would begin to prosecute. "I have obtained President Kikwete's support to prosecute the culprits once they return to Tanzania," he said, stressing
that prosecution of the case would mark an important milestone in the PCB's struggle. "The real signal of the GOT's political commitment will be when we take this radar case to court," Hoseah said.
4. (C) Note: Shailesh Vithlani is a British citizen who reportedly grew up in Tanzania. He heads Merlin International, a Dar es Salaam based company. Merlin International has been implicated as the agent for Britain's BAE Systems which sold a USD 40 million military radar system to the GOT in 2002. Beyond the BAE radar deal, Merlin has been linked in the media to a range of other high profile government deals including the sale of a Gulfstream presidential jet to former President Benjamin Mkapa. According to a July 13 report in This Day, a local newspaper, at the time of the BAE deal, Vithlani's local partner was Tanil Somaiya of Shivacom Tanzania Ltd.
Promising Signs on Anti-Corruption Front: Legal Reform...
--------------------------------------------- ------------
5. (C) In addition to the possible prosecution of the BAE radar case, Hoseah emphasized that there were other promising signs in Tanzania's fight against corruption. First, he noted that as of July 1 the Anti-Corruption bill had become fully operational, laying the legal groundwork to accelerate the prosecution of corruption. He said that the GOT had almost finalized its "whistle blowers" legislation and that the relationship between the PCB and the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) had improved. "I have a good working relationship with the new DPP and he appears serious about prosecuting corruption." XXXXXXXXXXXX
Stronger Parliament, Press, and Public Support
--------------------------------------------- -
6. (C) A second promising sign regarding anti-corruption efforts which Hoseah stressed was increased support within
the Parliament, press and the general public. "Parliament is now our ally. Members of Parliament are no longer just
spectators; they are starting to ask the tough questions to unveil corruption schemes," Hoseah said. He explained that the media was also making a crucial contribution, showing politicians that they could not hide: "The press has started to bring allegations against XXXXXXXXXXXX. This signals to all politicians that no one is immune." Awareness is growing among the general public too, Hoseah noted, as evidenced by the increased trust in the PCB and the decline of negative news articles about the PCB and its staff.
Initiatives Stemming from the UNCAC
-----------------------------------
7. (C) Finally, Hoseah noted Tanzania's participation in the UN Convention Against Corruption as another reason for
optimism on the anti-corruption front. As a signatory to the UNCAC, Tanzania must not only follow international standards, but will take part in several anti-corruption initiatives in the near future. For example, Tanzania will be subject to a peer review and a gap analysis on its compliance with the convention.
Troubling Signs on Anti-Corruption: Impunity at the Top....
--------------------------------------------- ----------
8. (C) Hoseah then turned to his concerns regarding Tanzania's anti-corruption struggle. He noted that President
Kikwete does not appear comfortable letting the law handle corruption cases which might implicate top level officials.
According to Hoseah, President Kikwete is hesitant to pursue cases which may implicate XXXXXXXXXXXX.
9. (C) Referring to the widespread rumors of corruption within the Bank of Tanzania (Ref B), Hoseah remarked that
XXXXXXXXXXXX In Hoseah's view, Kikwete's recent appointment of three new deputy BOT governors was XXXXXXXXXXXX. The DCM remarked that XXXXXXXXXXXX responses to allegations
XXXXXXXXXXXX were opaque and even projected a sense of impunity. "Your perception is correct," Hoseah responded, adding, "there is a sense of impunity with XXXXXXXXXXXX because he and XXXXXXXXXXXX are so closely intertwined. Kikwete would find it very difficult to fire him."
Complacency on Zanzibar...
---------------------------
10. (C) The ongoing, if not accelerating, level of corruption on Zanzibar is another cause for pessimism in Tanzania's
fight against corruption. While establishment of Tanzania's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) would indeed force changes on Zanzibar in the long term, Hoseah admitted that he did not believe Zanzibar's current leadership was committed to fighting corruption. With a "free port" and government officials routinely on the payroll of foreign investors, Zanzibar is rife with corruption, Hoseah emphasized. With the momentum of anti-corruption efforts on the Mainland, Zanzibar will have to follow suit, Hoseah said. He added, however, that "in the short term, Zanzibar's President faces the end of his term and it appears that there is actually an acceleration of corruption through acquisition of land and other assets."
Continuing Capacity Constraints...
---------------------------------------
11. (C) Hoseah raised the PCB's lack of capacity as another key challenge to Tanzania's anti-corruption campaign. He
stressed that support from the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Threshold Program has assisted the PCB immensely with training prosecutors and investigators. Still, institutional capacity at the PCB is weak and additional capacity building is needed. One area which Hoseah specified for additional training was intelligence or evidence gathering. "Cooperation among law enforcement agencies is still limited and we need to improve our intelligence capabilities," Hoseah told the DCM.
Threat of Stepping on the Wrong Toes
------------------------------------
12. (C) At the end of the meeting, Hoseah reiterated concern for his personal security (Ref A), saying he believed that his life may be in danger. He told the DCM that he had received threatening text messages and letters and was
reminded everyday that he was fighting the "rich and powerful." While Hoseah maintained that he was not scared to
do his job, he said that he could not be seen as "uncompromising." Toward the end of the meeting, he said
quietly to the DCM, "If you attend meetings of the 'inner-circle,' people want you to feel as if they have put
you there. If they see that you are uncompromising, there is a risk." Finally, he made clear that if the threat to his
life reached a certain point, he would flee the country.
Comment: PCB's List of Untouchables: Growing?
--------------------------------------------- --
13. (C) In our January 2007 meeting with Hoseah (Ref A), he said his primary goal as the newly appointed Director General of the Prevention of Corruption Bureau would be to prosecute "big fish." He told us point blank, however, that cases against the Prime Minister or President were off the table.
Now, he has revealed that XXXXXXXXXXXX may also be untouchable, many of whom have ministerial or sub-ministerial posts in Kikwete's government. Thus, while President Kikwete's talk against corruption might be tough, he is clearly treading carefully and the jury remains out on his commitment to tackling high-level corruption.
14. (C) Even if the Kikwete administration does prosecute the BAE case, it is important to note that the U.K. Serious
Fraud Office conducted the lion's share of the investigation. According to Hoseah, after the Fraud Office confronted the GOT with evidence, PCB officials were invited to spend one month in London working with the Serious Fraud Office to finalize the case. Therefore, although the GOT may ultimately point to BAE as a landmark case reflecting
commitment to combating corruption, the decision to prosecute may actually reflect the notoriety of the case in the UK, its notoriety and prominent press play here, and most importantly, the fact that a fully developed case file, brimming with detailed evidence, was presented by UK investigators to the Prevention of Corruption Bureau. In short, to the cynical eye, the GOT may have little recourse other than to prosecute. END COMMENT.
RETZER
Wednesday, 18 June 2008, 12:45
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000480
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON
EO 12958 DECL: 6/18/2018
TAGS ECON, EINV, KBCT, PGOV, UK, LY
SUBJECT: BUSINESS IS POLITICS: MARKS & SPENCER DRAMA TIED TO FATE OF
XXXXXXXXXXXX
REF: A) TRIPOLI 349, B) 07 TRIPOLI 297
TRIPOLI 00000480 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: In Libya, major business deals are both political and personal. The ongoing drama surrounding efforts by the U.K. government and investors to keep open the Marks & Spencer retail store in Tripoli, and a campaign by some GOL officials to close it, affords a prime example. Libyan officials at the highest levels have publicly attacked a major European retailer - damaging bilateral ties with the U.K. in the process - largely due to a personal grievance . the ensuing test of wills reportedly has the potential to end in violence. The U.K. Embassy, which is closely involved, has flatly told us they view the ultimate outcome of the case as an important bellwether of the investment climate in Libya and will advise potential U.K. investors accordingly. End Summary.
THE TRAVAILS OF "MARKS & SPARKS" CONTINUE
2. (C) UK retailer Marks & Spencer (M&S), affectionately referred to in the U.K. as "Marks & Sparks", opened a location in Tripoli in April that has since been a magnet for controversy (ref A). The store has been closed by Libyan authorities on at least two occasions, and there is a very good chance that it will be shut permanently in coming months. According to a local business contact with good second-hand knowledge of the situation, Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi's office has become directly involved in the matter, and has directed that the franchise either be sold to unspecified government officials, or suffer an immediate freeze on further import of stock and be closed permanently by year's end. M&S employees have received close scrutiny by Libyan security officials, who have been used as a strongarm adjunct in this political play; employees were all taken in for a second round of questioning in early June.
GOL ADOPTS REPUGNANT ANTI-SEMITIC TACTICS
3. (C) The Libyan government's public narrative has taken the form of persistent anti-Semitic rhetoric alleging that the company is a "Zionist entity" with Jewish origins that supports Israel and "the killing of Palestinians". A strongly-worded statement released to Libyan media outlets in early June by the General Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (which ostensibly represents all private businesses in Libya, both Libyan and foreign) condemned the fact that the store was still open and called for its permanent closure. XXXXXXXXXXXX
4. (C) The Chamber also voiced its disapproval of a recent stop at the M&S store by the visiting U.K. Trade Minister. According to the statement, the visit violated the Libyan people's sensibilities, as it fell "on the eve of al-Nakba" (i.e., the date of the Israeli military victory in 1948 that created the modern state of Israel). The U.K. Commercial Counselor told us that M&S had been removed in 2007 from the Arab League's list of companies to be boycotted because of Jewish ownership or Israeli equities, and that both M&S and the U.K. Embassy had done careful vetting with the GOL before the Tripoli store opened in an attempt to preclude any related complications.
HOW DID IT COME TO THIS?
5. (C) In typical fashion, while the GOL's public criticism has comprised pseudo-populist rhetoric against "the forces of Zionism", the crux of the matter is in fact about personal relations and politics.
TRIPOLI 00000480 002.2 OF 002
AND HOW DOES IT END?
6. (C) According to a well-placed embassy XXXXXXXXXXXX contact, there is a genuine threat that state security officials may visit personal harm on XXXXXXXXXXXX (and others like him) at the direction of "old guard" regime figures. XXXXXXXXXXXX They then noted darkly that if those methods proved insufficient, they would see to it that XXXXXXXXXXXX was involved in a fatal car accident.
7. (C) Comment: The ongoing drama of M&S illustrates the confluence of the personal and the political in a commercial climate in which senior regime officials have a direct stake in virtually anything worth owning or selling. XXXXXXXXXXXX motivated as far as most observers can tell solely by personal animus, has created friction with the U.K. and prompted questions by Libyan and foreign concerns about the extent to which the business and investment climate has actually improved. Some Libyan observers have expressed concern that M&S was allowed to open in the first place if the government's position was that it was a "Jewish-owned company" and therefore should not be allowed to operate in Libya. A prominent business contact told us that the travails of M&S served as a cautionary tale about the potential consequences for investors of the sheer lack of coordination and fecklessness in the GOL. The public and ham-fisted manner in which the GOL is pursuing this matter has ensured that any action taken against M&S and/or Bey will quickly become common knowledge, which may give the GOL pause before it acts too rashly against either. U.K. Emboffs have flatly told us that they view the ultimate outcome of the case as an important bellwether of the investment climate in Libya and will advise potential U.K. investors accordingly. End comment. STEVENS
Wednesday, 27 September 2006, 08:38
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 001593
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
AF/E FOR BYODER, AF/RSA FOR MBITTRICK
ALSO VCI FOR HHEINTZELMAN AND KWALKIN
EO 12958 DECL: 09/27/2016
TAGS PTER, PINR, IAEA, PGOV, CG, TZ
SUBJECT: URANIUM IN DAR COMMON KNOWLEDGE TO SHIPPING
COMPANIES, PER SWISS DIPLOMAT
REF: A. DAR ES SALAAM 01376 B. UNVIE VIENNA 00601 C. KINSHASA 01309
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires D. Purnell Delly for reasons 1.4(b),(d) and (e).
1. (C) According to a senior Swiss diplomat, the shipment of uranium through Dar es Salaam is common knowledge to two Swiss shipping companies. Hans Peter Schoni, Counsellor at the Embassy of Switzerland in Tanzania, referred to the allegations of uranium from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) passing through Zambia and Tanzania en route to Iran, but did not attribute to the shipping companies any opinion of the source or destination of the alleged uranium. Poloff pointed out that the reports were unsubstantiated, but Schoni repeated that transport of uranium is common knowledge to the two companies, though no one at either company would admit it in writing. XXXXXXXXXXXX are both based in Geneva and conduct verification and inspection work in Tanzania.
2. (C) Mission has shared this information with all relevant agencies at post which were unable to substantiate this or any other such reports of uranium shipments. Nevertheless, given the potential significance of such allegations we believe it is important to report nonetheless. DELLY
Friday, 25 July 2008, 13:44
S E C R E T LISBON 001808
SIPDIS
FOR STATE ISN/CTR, PM/ISO/PMAT (24/7), DS/IP/EUR
EO 12958 DECL: 07/24/2018
TAGS ASEC, KCRM, KNNP, MNUC, PARM, PO, PREL, PTER
SUBJECT: ALLEGATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SMUGGLING - PORTUGAL
REF: A. 07 STATE 162091 B. HAYCRAFT/PMAT E-MAIL DATED 7/24/08
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas Stephenson, Reason 1.4 (c)(d)(f)
1. (S) Post wishes to alert the Department and Washington agencies per reftel that it received a report indicating a potential incident of illicit trafficking in nuclear and/or radiological materials. The report came to post's attention via a walk-in. Information concerning this report was relayed via classified e-mail to PMAT at 2:04 PM on July 24, 2008.
2. (S) Details of the incident follow:
A) Current location of material: Material appears to be in Portugal. B) Transport status of material: Stationary C) Assessment of the likelihood that the appropriate authorities can/will secure the material: If and when it is determined the material in fact exists, the Portuguese authorities will secure the material D) If in transit, means of transportation: NA E) Intended destination of material: Unknown, depends on buyer F) Routing of material: Unknown G) Supplier and/or Origination point of material: Walk-in claims the material is in the possession of an unidentified ex-Russian General now living in Portugal. The material was allegedly stolen from Chernobyl. H) Type of material: U235 I) Date and time of incident: Reported July 24,2008, by walk-in J) Source of report: XXXXXXXXXXXX K) If an alarm, technical information: NA L) What if anything was being smuggled with the material: Unknown M) Specific place where alarm or incident occurred: The specific location of the alleged material is unknown N) Additional details: The walk-in stated he was approached two months ago by a part-time business associate named Orlando to help sell "Uranium plates" owned by an unidentified ex-Russian General living in Portugal. According to the walk-in, Orlando was working through an "old" Portuguese Judge living near Porto. As proof, the walk-in provided a color photocopy of a photograph, provided by Orlando, with what appeared to be a matte gray metallic brick placed before the front page of Portuguese newspaper Jornal de Noticias. The photocopy also contained the following handwritten notes: Sketch of a rectangle with the following dimensions: height 21 cm (left side), height 25 cm (right side), length 48 cm (top), length 51 cm (bottom). Thickness .31 cm. Total Peso (weight)=25.350kg; U2354 Kg; MTK 99.9951. (RSO NOTE: At this time, it is difficult to make an assessment of the credibility of the source. The walk-in was neatly dressed and well groomed and appeared calm, confident, and alert and responded quickly to questions, especially about his motivation (financial). His English was good. He did not hesitate in providing personal information regarding his home address (not verified) and points of contact. The walk-in was, however, unable to provide any identifiers on the ex-Russian General. The walk-in stated he is not on any medications and has not consulted any mental health specialists. The walk-in does not appear to be mentally unstable and actually appears to be believe the plates are in fact Uranium. END RSO NOTE)
3. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX
Stephenson
Wednesday, 27 June 2007, 16:23
S E C R E T BUJUMBURA 000479
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR: DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA
EO 12958 DECL: 06/27/2017
TAGS KCRM, KNNP, MNUC, PARM, PREL, PTER, ASEC, BY
SUBJECT: ALLEGED NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT IN BUJUMBURA,
BURUNDI
REF: A. 06 STATE 163201 B. 04 STATE 230588
Classified By: XXXXXXXXXXXX reason 1.4 (g,h)
1. (C/NF) Post wishes to alert the Department and Washington agencies per reftels that it has received a report indicating a potential incident of illicit trafficking in nuclear and/or radiological materials. This report came to posts attention via phone contact to the ARSO, XXXXXXXXXXXX on the morning of XXXXXXXXXXXX. informed XXXXXXXXXXXX that two Congolese men introduced to XXXXXXXXXXXX by XXXXXXXXXXXX indicated that they had found a large quantity of chemical items hidden in a stationary concrete bunker on the same property a Belgian family resided on during the Belgian colonial period 107 miles west of Bukavu, Congo. Among the items contained in the stationary bunker were Uranium, Ozone, and Red Mercury. On the afternoon ofXXXXXXXXXXXX received a call from XXXXXXXXXXXX regarding the same items. The following day, XXXXXXXXXXXX met with XXXXXXXXXXXX at the embassy. Following this interview PMAT was notified and briefed.
2. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX They control the items. The ARSO obtained copies of their identification cards.
3. (C/NF) The XXXXXXXXXXXX men indicated that there were 14 items found in the concrete bunker. All items have marking and labels indicating that they were produced in Belgium. The subjects were unable to spell the names of some of the items properly and did not know what the other items were, thus some of the spelling of the items are phonetic.
-Uranium, 30kg, powder form. The men did not know if the uranium was weapon-usable fissile material, highly enriched uranium, what the percentage of uranium-235 isotope or other isotopes were, or how its content was determined. -1 booklet describing the Uranium -Brommerck, 2,500g -Red Brommerk, 12kg -Red mercury, 6kg -Cocaine, liquid form
4. (C/NF) When asked what they intended to do with the items the subjects stated that they brought a vial of the Brommerck, to Bujumbura from the Congo. They planned on selling it to get enough money to transport the Uranium to Bujumbura upon securing a buyer. They also stated that they had not approached anyone else with this information. Their motive for approaching the American Embassy was that they did not want these items to fall into the wrong hands, specifically mentioning that they did not want Muslims to possess the items. When asked why they did not notify the Congolese authorities the subjects stated that they were afraid that the corrupt Congolese police would steal the items and sell it themselves. When asked why they approached the American Embassy in Bujumbura instead of the embassy or Consulate in the Congo they stated that the embassy in Bujumbura is much closer.
5. (C/NF) The ARSO asked the men to provide detailed photos of the items and their labels, especially the Uranium. The subjects agreed to provide photographs and additional information on all items at a later date. They indicated that they could produce a sample of the brommerck, upon request. The ARSO declined, but noticed that the subjects were pushing for a sale of the sample of brommerck,. The ARSO has the contact information of XXXXXXXXXXXX and is currently waiting to receive further photographic information from the subjects.
6. (C/NF) ARSO assessment: This case fits the profile of typical scams involving nuclear smuggling originating from the eastern DRC. ARSO considers this case to be a non-credible case of nuclear smuggling.
7. XXXXXXXXXXXX
MOLLER
Tuesday, 17 July 2007, 14:48
S E C R E T BUJUMBURA 000515
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR: DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA
EO 12958 DECL: 07/17/2017
TAGS KCRM, KNNP, MNUC, PARM, PREL, PTER, ASEC, BY
SUBJECT: ADDENDUM TO ALLEGED NUCLEAR SMUGGLING IN BURUNDI
REF: A. A. BUJUMBURA 479 B. B. 06 STATE 163201 C. C. 04 STATE 230588
Classified By: XXXXXXXXXXXX reason 1.4 (g,h)
1. (C/NF) Post wishes to alert the Department and Washington agencies per reftels that it has received additional information regarding the incident of nuclear smuggling reported in Bujumbura cable 479 dated 06/27/2007. XXXXXXXXXXXX and I have met on XXXXXXXXXXXX additional occasions since that initial meeting. XXXXXXXXXXXX During each meeting XXXXXXXXXXXX furnished additional information regarding the alleged uranium. XXXXXXXXXXXX produced a flash drive with digital images of the Brom Merck and copies of a booklet located with the cache describing the results of a laboratory analysis conducted on the uranium, a description of the uranium, a short history of uranium, and health warning pages. XXXXXXXXXXXX furnished four poor quality color photos printed on paper. XXXXXXXXXXXX he furnished the four photos provided earlier on paper, but this time in digital format plus an additional 12 digital images. Six of the photos are of the alleged uranium container in a wicker basket. Five of the photos are of the front side of the tag attached to the container. Two of the tag photos display the orange back of the tag attached to the container.
2. XXXXXXXXXXXX: #1 Booklet #2 Brom Merck #3 Unknown #4 Unknown #5 Unknown #6 Wicker basket without the uranium container #7 Uranium container and wicker basket #8 Wicker basket #9 Wicker basket #10 Uranium container and wicker basket #11 Uranium container and wicker basket #12 Back of tag #13 Back of tag #14 Front of tag #15 Front of tag #16 Front of tag #17 Front of tag #18 Front of tag
3. (C/NF) Due to the poor quality of the color photos it might be difficult for you to read the front of the tag. It is transcribed below.
A POIDS BRUIT 19 kgs E POIDS NET 03 kgs G TENNEUR 70% C N 16 012 URANIUM
4. (C/NF) If you cross reference some of the numbers with the booklet (#1) the letters CGAE running vertically from bottom to on the left side of the tag probably mean 'Commissariat General A L'Energie Atomic' from page 2 of the booklet. The same gross and net weight can be found on page 9 of the booklet. Tenneur or potency (spelled incorrectly) is listed as 98.7% on the booklet but 70% on the tag. N 16 012 is probably the 'result d'analyse number' that can also be found on page 9. The number on the tag is not the same number on the booklet. 5. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX was accompanied by XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the bunker where the alleged uranium and other materials were found was located 107 miles west of Bukavu. The materials have since been moved. One container weighing 3kg is currently located in Bukavu and another 3 kg container is located in Goma, both of which are under XXXXXXXXXXXX,s control. XXXXXXXXXXXX further stated that he knows of someone who has 3 containers who would be willing to sell them in addition to a 72 kg package of multiple containers at another location. 6. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX indicated that he has not approached anyone else or informed another country regarding the alleged uranium. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that he is not interested in monetary reward. He is only interested in keeping the materials out of the hands of the wrong people, specifically the Arabs who will 'destroy' people with it. XXXXXXXXXXXX . He has no specific knowledge regarding Uranium, Bromerck, or any other chemicals that were in the bunker. It took four months to open the bunker. In the process of opening the bunker two men were killed by a grenade booby trap. There were also land mines planted around it. 7. (C/NF) Additionally, at some time in the past the Catholic mission in Bukavu bought 12 g of red mercury from the cache. There is no indication that any other materials, specifically the Uranium, have been sold. 8. (C/NF) RSO assessment: After interviewing XXXXXXXXXXXX the C.O.S and myself feel that XXXXXXXXXXXX is quite naive of all matters concerning the uranium. The group of people he represents (as he likes to describe his relationship with them) have all the details regarding the alleged uranium. Any specific questions or requests we have are communicated to them and they communicate back via XXXXXXXXXXXX. Thus far XXXXXXXXXXXX and his accomplices have provided all the information we have asked for. Overall the entire group, including XXXXXXXXXXXX, feel that they have something of value and are anxiously waiting for some sort of indication from us that we are willing to pay for it or travel to the Congo to view the materials. At this point in time they are waiting for us take the initiative with regard to a payment or visual inspection of the materials. We have not made any offers of payment, discussed an amount, or offered assurances that we plan to observe the alleged uranium first hand. 9. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX MOLLER
Friday, 08 September 2006, 11:17
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001410
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/06/2016
TAGS ENRG, EMIN, ETRD, KGIT, PREL, PGOV, IAEA, CG
SUBJECT: SECURITY AT THE DRC'S NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER
REF: A. KINSHASA 1271 B. KINSHASA 1272 C. KINSHASA 1392
Classified By: EconOff DPopovich for reasons 1.4 b/d/e.
1. (C) Summary. Four EmbOffs and an Econ LES toured the Kinshasa Nuclear Research Center (CREN-K) July 27 to assess security and determine its needs. CREN-K houses the DRC's two nuclear reactors, neither of which functions, although staff continue to conduct nuclear-related research and teaching at the facility. External and internal security is poor, leaving the facility vulnerable to theft. The GDRC needs international assistance to secure the facility and its nuclear materials. End Summary.
Physical Layout
---------------
2. (U) July 27, Professor Fortunat Lumu Badimbayi-Matu (Lumu), the Director of CREN-K and the DRC's Atomic Energy Commission, gave four Emboffs and an Econ LES a tour of CREN-K's facility, the location of the DRC's two nuclear reactors (reftels A, B, C). CRENK-K is on approximately five acres of land on the edge of the University of Kinshasa campus, a 45 minute to one hour drive from downtown. The facility is composed of approximately five buildings. One building houses one reactor, one houses the second reactor and one acts as a small nuclear waste storage room. The remaining buildings are used as offices, research laboratories and classrooms.
Nuclear Material
----------------
3. (C) The DRC's two nuclear reactors consist of a 1959 Triga I reactor and a 1972 Triga II reactor. Neither functions. The Triga I reactor was retired in 1970, and the Triga II reactor ceased functioning in 1992 when the reactor's control center experienced an electrical problem that made it impossible to control. CREN-K also has 138 nuclear fuel rods (LEU). (Note: CREN-K originally had 140 fuel rods. Two of these, however, were stolen by unidentified thieves in 1998. Italian authorities later recovered one of these fuel rods from the Italian Mafia in Rome, who were allegedly trying to sell it to unidentified buyers in the Middle-East. The second fuel rod has never been found. End note.) 56 fuel rods are stored in the heavy water of the Triga I reactor, 74 are stored in the heavy water of the Triga II reactor. Nine others have never been used and are stored in a separate room.
4. (C) According to Lumu, the total amount of radioactive material in the Triga II reactor consists of 10.5 kilograms of non-enriched uranium (U-238) and 5.1 kilograms of enriched uranium (U-235, enriched to 20 percent). Lumu did not provide information about Triga I.
5. (C) A CREN-K technician told EconOff that the facility has approximately 23 kilograms of nuclear waste, stored in the nuclear waste storage building in four 50 gallon drums. It consists of Radium 226, neutron sources (nfi) and Cesium 137.
Security
--------
6. (C) A fence approximately six feet high surrounds some of CREN-K. The fence is constructed of cement in some places and chain-link in others. The fence is not lit at night, has no razor-wire across the top, and is not monitored by video surveillance. There is also no cleared buffer zone between it and the surrounding vegetation. There are numerous holes in the fence, and large gaps where the fence was missing altogether. University of Kinshasa students frequently walk through the fence to cut across CREN-K, and subsistence farmers grow manioc on the facility next to the nuclear waste storage building. (Note: In mid March 2006, an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) contractor detected elevated levels of radiation in this manioc plot using a Geiger counter. End note.) No fence separates the nuclear waste storage building and the University of Kinshasa's women's dormitory. The two buildings sit approximately 300 meters apart, and one can walk freely from one to the other across the manioc field.
KINSHASA 00001410 002 OF 002
7. (C) Three security officers guard CREN-K at any one time. A team of 21 security guards, which consists of nine DRC police officers and 12 private security guards, rotate shifts 24 hours a day, 365 days per year. The guards usually stand at one of two control points of entry to the facility: the main drive-in gate or the pedestrian entrance. XXXXXXXXXXXX, some are elderly, and some are occasionally caught sleeping on the job. XXXXXXXXXXXX, and both groups lack training.
8. (C) None of CREN-K's buildings have sophisticated locks, intrusion alarms, motion detectors or video surveillance systems. Once inside the facility, no one controls the entrance to the nuclear reactor, although a key is required to enter the room. The fuel rod storage room where the nine unused fuel rods are stored was not locked, and the fuel rods are not kept in a separate locked container.
9. (C) The nuclear waste storage building, which is a separate structure approximately 500 meters from the main building, is approximately 15 square meters. It was constructed of about 12 inch thick bricks, and has one iron door and several small windows near the roof. The door was locked with a standard padlock. Once through this door, there was another metal gate inside the entrance. The gate was also locked, but it was only about eight feet high, and did not reach the 16 foot high ceiling, making it possible for someone to climb over it. Beyond the metal gate is a single room approximately 32 square feet where the four 50 gallon drums containing the nuclear waste is stored against a northern wall.
CREN-K Personnel
----------------
10. (C) The DRC'S General Atomic Energy Commission (CGEA), which is under the Ministry of Science and Technology, governs CREN-K. CGEA has two divisions: technical and administrative. The technical division is responsible for running the nuclear reactor, and it is divided into four departments: Technology, Science, Biology and Nuclear Medicine. approximately 180 people work at CREN-K, about 50 of whom are scientists, 60 of whom are technicians and 70 who serve as administrative officers. According to a facility technician, their salaries range from USD 40 to 150 per month - (comment: a substantial vulnerability for the facility). Some senior officials include:
-- Professor Fortunat Lumu Badimbayi-Matu, CGEA Commissioner -- Alphune Tshisonolo Tshisho, Senior Nuclear Scientist -- Dieudonne Konbele, Chief of the Technical Department -- Leonard Makontshi Woto, Radiation Control Inspector
11. (C) While neither the Triga I or Triga II reactors function, CREN-K's nuclear scientists continue to work. They conduct agricultural research (such as irradiating and mutating corn), study nuclear medicine, produce isotopes, analyze and identify neutron material, study radiography and teach University of Kinshasa students physics and nuclear science.
12. (C) Professor Lumu, who runs the facility, told Emboffs he wants to restart the nuclear reactor. Lumu has been lobbying the international community to provide the necessary funds and technology to do this. Lumu said he plans to use the reactor to study x-ray detraction, radiology, agronomy, gamma irradiation, nuclear medicine, environmental science and radiation protection.
Comment
-------
13. (C) Because CREN-K's security is poor, it is relatively easy for someone to break into the nuclear reactor building or the nuclear waste storage building and steal rods or nuclear waste, with no greater tool than a lock cutter. It would also be feasible to pay a CREN-K employee to steal nuclear material. It is imperative that the international community find a way to help better secure the facility, even if GDRC remains unwilling to give up its fuel rods. Priority funding needs are new fencing, proper nuclear waste storage and disposal and security training. End comment. MEECE
Wednesday, 21 October 2009, 12:49
C O N F I D E N T I A L TBILISI 001919
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/19/2019
TAGS PARM, PGOV, PREL, KNNP, DOE, GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL CROSSES THE BORDER
REF: TBILISI 207
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (b) AND (d).
1. (C) Summary. On August 26, a car carrying three Armenian citizens entered Georgia from Armenia at the Sadakhlo border crossing. The car set off a gamma alarm on the radiation detection portal monitor. The driver provided a cursory explanation for the alarm, and the patrol police did not detain the group. On August 27, the same car returned to Armenia through the Sadakhlo crossing, and again set off a gamma alarm. At this point, the patrol police detained the occupants and searched the vehicle. Georgian officials determined that the car was contaminated with Cesium-137. However, because the search did not produce any radioactive material, the occupants were released and returned to Armenia. An FBI officer is currently following up with the Government of Armenia on the case. End summary.
2. (C) Comment. This incident shows the value of radiation detection portal monitors at ports of entry in Georgia, which have been installed across the country over the last several years by the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration/Second Line of Defense (SLD) program. Without the monitors, this car would have probably entered and exited Georgia with no one knowing that radioactive material may have been brought across the border. Officers with the Patrol Police, Border Police and Georgian Customs have received, and continue to receive, training from the United States on detecting and deterring radioactive and nuclear material smuggling. This includes instruction on how to operate the portal monitors. This incident also reveals that some training gaps remain within the patrol police on how to appropriately handle alarms. This vortex of knowledge likely results from the fairly recent (January 2009) assumption of responsibility of ports of entry by the patrol police (reftel). End comment.
GAMMA ALARM ON THE WAY INTO GEORGIA
3. (C) On August 26, a car carrying three Armenian citizens entered Georgia from Armenia at the Sadakhlo border crossing. As the car passed through the radiation detection portal monitors, it set off a gamma alarm. The patrol police manning the port of entry briefly detained the vehicle to try and determine the reason for the alarm. The driver of the vehicle said that he had recently had surgery, during which time a radioactive isotope was injected into his body. The patrol police accepted this explanation, requiring no documentation or proof from the driver, and allowed the vehicle and occupants to enter Georgia (Note: According to standard procedures, the driver should have had a doctor's note or some documentation confirming this. End note).
GAMMA ALARM ON THE WAY OUT OF GEORGIA
4. (C) On August 27, the same car, carrying the same three Armenian citizens, returned to the Sadakhlo border crossing to exit from Georgia. The car again set off the gamma alarm on the radiation detection portal monitor. At this point, the occupants were detained and the patrol police, using a handheld pager, determined that the car was contaminated with Qhandheld pager, determined that the car was contaminated with Cesium-137 (Cs-137). However, a search of the vehicle failed to produce any radioactive material. An official with Georgia's Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service (NRSS) was called to the site, and confirmed that there was Cs-137 contamination covering almost the entire car, even in the ventilation system. A cloth in the car produced the highest radiation reading.
5. (C) The occupants of the vehicle were questioned, and one of the detainees told the investigator that he may have been contaminated while at a radio station near his village in Armenia. Because no radioactive material was found, the occupants were released and sent back to Armenia. Using pictures of the alarms from the monitors as evidence that the alarm did go off as the car entered Georgia, thereby establishing that the material originated in Armenia vice Georgia, the FBI's Regional WMD Coordinator is currently following up with the Government of Armenia on this case. BASS
Saturday, 09 January 2010, 05:04
S E C R E T SANAA 000019
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND ISN/NESS MHUMPHREY
EO 12958 DECL: 01/08/2020
TAGS ENRG, ECON, MNUC, PARM, PREL, PGOV, IN, YM
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX SOUNDS ALARM OVER
UNPROTECTED RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
REF: A. 07 SANAA 1905 B. 07 SANAA 2029
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (S) The lone security guard standing watch at Yemen's main radioactive materials storage facility was removed from his post on December 30, 2009, according toXXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX. The only closed-circuit television security camera monitoring the facility broke six months ago and was never fixed, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX. The facility XXXXXXXXXXXX holds various radioactive materials, small amounts of which are used by local universities for agricultural research, by a Sana'a hospital, and by international oilfield services companies for well-logging equipment spread out across the country. "Very little now stands between the bad guys and Yemen's nuclear material," a worried XXXXXXXXXXXX told EconOff.
2. (S) Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi told the Ambassador on January 7 that no radioactive material was currently stored in Sana'a and that all "radioactive waste" was shipped to Syria. XXXXXXXXXXXX
3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX told EconOff that XXXXXXXXXXXX the XXXXXXXXXXXX was moved late on January 7 from the largely unsecured NAEC facility XXXXXXXXXXXX implored the U.S. to help convince the ROYG to remove all materials from the country until they can be better secured, or immediately improve security measures at the NAEC facility. XXXXXXXXXXXX
COMMENT
-------
4. (S) Post will continue to push senior ROYG officials to increase security at all National Atomic Energy Commission facilities and provide us with a detailed accounting of all radioactive materials in the country. XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX.XXXXXXXXXXXX's concern over the safety and security of Yemen's modest nuclear material inventory, however, appears genuine. XXXXXXXXXXXX. Post POC is EconOff Roland McKay, mckayrd@state.sgov.gov. SECHE
Monday, 09 May 2005, 15:53
S E C R E T ROME 001593
SIPDIS
BAGHDAD PLEASE PASS TO BG VANGJEL;
JUSTICE FOR ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION
EO 12958 DECL: 05/08/2015
TAGS PREL, MOPS, KJUS, IT, IZ, IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: IRAQ/ITALY: BERLUSCONI IN PARLIAMENT ON CALIPARI-
STRESSES GOOD RELATIONS AND COOPERATION WITH US, COMMITMENT TO IRAQ; ALSO MENTIONS WITHDRAWAL PLANS
REF: ROME 1506
Classified By: DCM Emil Skodon, reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (S) Summary and Recommendation: On May 5-6, PM Berlusconi spoke to both houses of Parliament about the joint investigation and separate reports of the March 4 shooting of Italian Intelligence officer Nicola Calipari by US forces near Baghdad. While Berlusconi defended the Italian report and took issue with some of the US report's findings (see synopsis of his remarks at para 3), he reaffirmed the points of most importance to us: the incident was unintentional; US-Italy relations and our alliance remain strong; and Italy remains committed to its involvement in Iraq. We continue to recommend letting the US report speak for us rather than prolonging public debate. While the issue appears to be losing steam here, we still must deal with the MLAT requests and the possibility of a continuing investigation by Italian prosecutors. End summary and recommendation
2. (U) On May 5, PM Berlusconi briefed the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate on the Italian and US reports that concluded the work of the joint investigation in to the March 4 shooting of Italian Intelligence officer Nicola Calipari by US forces near Baghdad. Berlusconi, in televised session, was flanked by FM Fini and other cabinet ministers. A debate followed. A synopsis of his remarks, as reported in the Chamber of Deputies transcript follows (his report to the Senate was nearly identical).
3. (U) Begin synopsis of transcript:
The impossibility of reaching shared conclusions....certainly mean that the joint investigation...was not able to bring its task to full completion. Nonetheless, it is also true that the US decision to open a joint investigation with Italy is unprecedented and came in response to a request by the Italian government. Investigations were objectively conditioned by the lack of preservation of the scene of the incident. This notwithstanding, the work of the joint investigation team was carried out in a climate of strong mutual cooperation and the Italian members of the team had full access to -- and were enabled to acquire -- all the information available.
Discrepancies between the Italian and American reports turned out to be irreducible and I will certainly not be the one to minimize the size of the disagreement. Discrepancies in the two texts touch on aspects that are far from being marginal. The US considered reliable testimony and data that do not coincide with what we collected and which we found were reliable. In particular, the declarations by the two Italian survivors are in contrast with those by the US military. Given that the impartiality and good faith of the US investigators cannot be under discussion, and I think we all agree on this, we cannot but respect their conclusions, noting that they do not coincide with ours. This is even the opinion of the Americans on our results and also, their report converges with ours on this -- it recognizes that not everything worked as it should have in preparing/locating and managing that blocking position.
Both sides, however, recognize that the incident was unintentional and both sides recognize the need to take concrete operational measures to avoid similar occurrences in the future. Still, one thing is to conclude like the Americans did, because of disciplinary measures, and another is to underscore, as we did -- and I quote -- on the basis of acquired evidence that there was a lack of intention . The absence of criminal intent -- the intention -- does not rule out the guilt/responsibility that is ascribable to negligence, imprudence or even simply inexperience. And this, you will agree, is not a small difference. The Italian report concluded that the blocking positions was irregular. It was set up with no written or specific instructions and was located where it had little visibility and could not protect the security of the military manning it nor that of drivers of vehicles approaching it. Accusations and criticism of the Government for how it managed the Calipari case and for the conclusion of the joint investigation are paradoxical. If we believe one vision of the facts is credible rather than another, it evidently cannot be friendship to make one change one's mind. This is elementary and holds true for both the US and Italy.
The friendship between Italy and the US is not under discussion. The alliance and the friendship with the United states have solid foundations, foundations that we are committed to consolidating every day against the threat of totalitarianism and terrorism. Our friendship has overcome even more difficult tests. To this day, Italy recognizes itself in the Le Monde headline after the 9/11 tragedy that read, "We are all Americans."
Our commitment to do what is possible to ascertain the truth and possible responsibilities remains unchanged. It is a commitment we intend to honor, first and foremost for the respect we owe to the memory of Nicola Calipari. The Italian judiciary can count on the firm support of the Government. I want to free the ground from any misunderstanding: there is no connection between the investigation into the circumstances of the death of Calipari and the continuation of the Italian commitment toward reconstruction in Iraq...We do not intend to establish any kind of link between the assessment of the event in which our official lost his life and Italy's role in Iraq. Italy is in Iraq in compliance with a UN Security Council Resolution.
End synopsis of transcript.
4. (U) In response to press questions after the debate, Berlusconi said:
The Center-Left opposition's attitude was "responsible," because they did not place under discussion the alliance nor the friendship with the US. The opposition continues to ask for our withdrawal from Iraq, which is in the plans, in agreement with the Iraq government and the allies. In the past, we have made announcements to this effect and we hold to this prospect. There is no reason today to say, "everybody home." It would sound irresponsible and incomprehensible. On the progressive withdrawal of troops from Iraq we already announced our position some time ago. We already discussed it with our main allies. We will continue to talk with them. A progressive reduction of our presence will certainly occur. I had even given an indication of when. Everything will be in agreement with the Iraqi government and with our allies. I even spoke about it directly and personally with Bush and Blair. Therefore, we continue in this direction. An international conference on Iraq will soon take place. Italian efforts for the reconstruction of Iraq are not isolated and even NATO and the EU are now involved.
5. (S) COMMENT: Berlusconi's remarks, while reassuring on Iraq and on US-Italy relations, also reflect a position he and his government staked out on the Calipari case from the beginning: a commitment to fix responsibility. Although this commitment was not actually included in the joint investigation's terms of reference, Berlusconi evidently felt an obligation to adhere to it. We believe this was at the heart of US-Italian disagreements over the joint investigation conclusions and set the tone of both the Italian report and Berlusconi's remarks to Parliament. In particular, the determination to avoid any criticism of Calipari's own role led the Italian government and investigators to ignore a question that seemed obvious to the US investigation: out of the 30 cars that came to the blocking position, why was this the only car fired upon that night? As in Reftel, we continue to urge Washington to discourage USG spokespeople from point-by-point refutation of the Italian report or Berlusconi's remarks. As much as possible, we should allow our report to speak for itself on our view of the incident. This will hasten the fading of the case from the political radar screen.
6. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
SEMBLER
NNNN 2005ROME01593 - Classification: SECRET
Tuesday, 03 May 2005, 15:18
S E C R E T ROME 001506
SIPDIS
BAGHDAD PLEASE PASS TO BG VANGJEL;
JUSTICE FOR ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION
EO 12958 DECL: 05/02/2015
TAGS PREL, MOPS, KJUS, IT, IZ, IRAQI FREEDOM
SUBJECT: IRAQ/ITALY: BERLUSCONI TRYING TO PUT CALIPARI
INCIDENT BEHIND US - ITALIAN REPORT FINDS NO INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
Classified By: Ambassador Mel Sembler, reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (S) Summary and Recommendation: Just prior to the May 2 release of the Italian report on the March 4 killing of intelligence officer Nicola Calipari at a U.S. checkpoint in Baghdad, Ambassador, DCM and PolMilCouns were called to PM Berlusconi's office to receive an advance copy of the report and to hear from senior GOI officials their view of the way forward. The Italians stressed that the GOI wanted to put the incident behind us, that it would not damage our strong friendship and alliance, and that it would not affect the Italian commitment in Iraq. The Italians said that while U.S. cooperation with Italy in the joint investigation had been total and thoroughly professional, Italy had to stand by the Italian reconstruction of the March 4 incident. The Italian report, they said, concluded that the shooting was not intentional and that no individual responsibility could be assigned for the shooting, thus making the magistrate's criminal investigation less likely to develop into a full criminal case.
2. (S) Recommendation (see also Para 9): While the Italian report quibbles with many findings and much of the methodology of the US AR 15-6 report on the incident, we will be best served by resisting the temptation to attack the Italian version point-by-point, and should instead continue to let our report speak for itself. While our instinct at Post is to defend the U.S. report and criticize the Italian one, we realize the consequences of doing so could be asymmetrical: while the criticism in the Italian report is unlikely to have serious negative consequences for the USG, if the GOI appears to be disloyal to its public servants - or to be rolling over to please the USG in this matter, the consequences for Berlusconi's government and Italy's commitment in Iraq could be severe. Therefore, we strongly recommend all USG spokespeople stand by the 15-6 report while refraining from detailed criticism of the Italian draft. End Summary and Recommendation.
3. (S) Ambassador, DCM and PolMilCouns were called to the PM's office late May 2 to receive an advance copy of the Italian report on the March 4 Calipari incident, based on the joint investigation carried out with the U.S., and to hear from senior GOI officials their views on the matter. Present on the Italian side were FM Fini, U/S Letta, PM Dip Advisor (NSA equivalent and Ambassador-designate to the US) Castellaneta, SISMI Chief Pollari, a few of their senior aides, and the two Italian investigators BG Campregher and MFA official Ragaglini. (Berlusconi himself was not at the meeting and, we believe, was out of Rome until the next morning.)
4. (S) The Italians made the following main points:
-- The intent of Italian Government is that this incident should have no negative effect on our excellent bilateral relations.
-- Specifically, there should be no effect on the Italian commitment in Iraq.
-- The Italian government wants to put the incident behind us and hopes this report will contribute to that end (see below for explanation as to how it will serve that purpose).
-- An unclassified version of report would be posted on a GOI web site May 2, with classified sections redacted. The full, classified report would be given only to PM Berlusconi, but the USG could have a copy on request after Berlusconi sees it.
-- Berlusconi would discuss the report in Parliament on Thursday, May 5.
-- It would be useful for President Bush to call Berlusconi Wednesday, so that he could say before Parliament the next day that he had spoken with the President about the matter.
5. (S) As to the report itself, the Italians generally described it as supporting the "tragic accident" thesis, and highlighted the following:
-- The report says it is impossible to attribute individual responsibility for the killing.
-- It also says Italian investigators found no evidence that killing was intentional.
-- This last point was designed specifically to discourage further investigation by the prosecuting magistrates, since under Italian law they apparently can investigate cases of intentional homicide against Italian citizens outside of Italy, but not cases of unintentional homicide. (NOTE: Our contacts warn that Italian magistrates are infamous for bending such laws to suit their purposes, so it remains to be seen whether the GOI tactic will work in this regard.) Also, Castellaneta told us later that the GOI was hoping the prosecutors would find that, because the killing was unintentional, there would not be grounds for a case of "excessive legitimate defense."
-- The Italian report was written with prosecuting magistrates in mind. The Italians stressed that USA 15-6 regulations permitted some things to be covered in the joint investigation but not others, while Italian magistrates had broader scope that had to be satisfied.
-- The government will block attempts by parliamentary committees to open their own investigations (there are already several calls for this from the opposition), on the grounds that this report answers questions sufficiently.
-- The report stands behind the accounts given by Sgrena, the driver, and SISMI's Baghdad Station Chief; i.e., the "Italian reconstruction" of the incident.
6. (S) The copy of 67-page Italian report that they handed to us was a draft that was still being proofread in another room (in fact, they said it was the only hard copy in existence, and they swapped out a couple pages during the meeting as typos were corrected). We have translated and e-mailed to State EUR/WE high points (see para 10) and faxed the complete text in Italian to State EUR/WE. Our quick scan indicates that there are several pages in which the Italian investigators take issue with specific facts and findings in the USA 15-6 report, generally on the grounds that the accounts of the Italian witnesses differed significantly from those of the American soldiers. There is also an extensive critique of the inadequacy of SOPs for Traffic control Points and Blocking Positions. It argues that more complete notification to US authorities would not have changed the outcome. In a subsequent meeting with the DCM, Castellaneta said the main difference in the reports was that the US report focused on communications while the Italian report focused on preparation of the soldiers and the stress under which they were operating. The final conclusions, though, are as stated by the Italians in our meeting: no individual responsibility, no deliberate intent.
7. (S) Ambassador Sembler told the Italians that the USG shared the Italian desire to put this incident behind us and not let it affect overall bilateral relations. In that regard, it was important for the Italian government not to point accusing fingers at the U.S. or complain about lack of cooperation, and we would endeavor to continue doing so ourselves . Fini said Italy could not complain about cooperation from U.S.; the Italian report clarified that the Italian investigators had full access and he would ask Berlusconi to stress that fact in parliament on May 5. Ragaglini and BG Campregher were effusive about the "total and complete" cooperation they received from the USA investigators, including access to all evidence. The one caveat was that for five days before they arrived in Baghdad BG Vangjel had been conducting interviews within the USA chain of command re communications and U.S. knowledge of the rescue operation. The Italians, however, were given copies of everything done prior to their arrival.
8. (S) The Italians were clearly not happy about the classified portions of the USA 15-6 posted on the web being "unredacted" so easily and asked the Ambassador for an explanation. They did not push the issue after he explained it was solely a technical mistake. The Italians said they had pulled from Baghdad the SISMI Station Chief whose name was revealed in the "unredacted" version of the 15-6; he will not go back.
9. (S) Embassy recommendations for immediate next steps:
-- The NSC should try to schedule a POTUS-Berlusconi call on Wednesday.
-- The USG public reaction for now should be limited to "We've just received Italian report and are studying it." (Italian press will be furiously nit-picking, and it will not serve a useful purpose for us to get into point-by-point refutation at this stage, although we might want to do backgrounders later in Baghdad, Washington, or Rome.)
-- The Department should consider a SecState-Fini call in the next few days to confirm that we share Italy's desire to put incident behind us.
10. (U) Informal Embassy Translation of Italian Report's Conclusions:
"The Italian representatives - based on the evidence they were able to obtain - did not find elements that would allege that the facts indicate deliberate murder.
It is realistic that tension felt by the soldiers and some inexperience and stress may have made them react instinctively and with little control.
The lack of formal references to clear rules that should have been observed makes it problematic to assign specific individual responsibilities.
The facts asserted by Ms. Sgrena, the car's driver and the SISMI Chief of Station in Baghdad can be considered realistic. Based on the overall analysis, their reconstruction is coherent and plausible."
End Informal Embassy Translation of Conclusions.
11. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
SEMBLER
NNNN 2005ROME01506 - Classification: SECRET
Friday, 16 November 2007, 15:46
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 001286
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/NCE - JUDY GARBER; NSC FOR STERLING
EO 12958 DECL: 11/16/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KLIG, MARR, RO
SUBJECT: POTENTIAL IMPACT IN ROMANIA OF TEO PETER "FINAL
OFFER"
Classified By: Ambassador Nicholas F. Taubman for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d ).
1. (C) Summary: The impending "final offer" by the U.S. Army Foreign Claims Service, Europe to the family of the late Romanian rock star Teofil Peter, who was killed in a 2004 car accident involving Embassy Bucharest's former Marine detcommander, seems certain to have a significant, negative effect on the U.S.-Romanian relationship. In the likely event that the family of Peter will go public with the news that the U.S. government has met their multi-million dollar settlement claim with an offer of only $80,000, Romanian leaders and opinion makers will react loudly and emotionally, calling into question some of the most important features of our bilateral partnership. President Basescu, PM Tariceanu and other prominent politicians will almost certainly rally to the family's side, even if some normally pro-American officials will still try behind the scenes to calm the anticipated public outrage. In particular, the popular outcry over what will be seen by most Romanians as an insultingly small offer to Peter's survivors will prompt renewed calls, with much more potential popular support, for the rapid withdrawal of Romanian troops from Iraq. Likewise, backing in the Romanian parliament and among members of the public for the new U.S. troop presence at joint U.S.-Romanian military facilities on the Black Sea will plummet, at least temporarily. The November 21 notification date to the Peter family's lawyers is fast approaching, and will nearly coincide with the December 4 anniversary date of Peter's death, the occasion for past anti-U.S. demonstrations in Romania. In short, we are bracing ourselves for a stormy downturn in the relationship, prompted by the continuing negative legacy of the death of this Romanian cultural icon. Some of the damage to our popular standing and to our interests in Romania may be lasting. End Summary.
2. (C) Teo Peter, one of Romania's best known and most beloved rock musicians, was killed on December 4, 2004, in a Bucharest car accident involving the taxi he was riding in and the official Embassy vehicle being driven in the early morning hours by former Bucharest Marine detachment commander Staff Sgt. Christopher Van Goethem. Van Goethem departed Romania within a few hours after the accident, under the terms of his diplomatic immunity, but many Romanians viewed his abrupt departure before local investigators had the opportunity to question him and conduct tests on his blood alcohol level as a slap in the face and an effort to shield the Marine from justice. Demonstrations were held outside the Embassy, and an effort was made to rename a nearby street after the deceased musician. Sgt. Van Goethem did subsequently face a range of charges in the U.S. military justice system. A military courts martial concluded in January 2006 that while he was guilty of making false statements and obstructing justice, he was not guilty of the more serious negligent homicide charge. The jury, somewhat unexpectedly, limited the Marine's punishment to an official letter of reprimand. This news brought, in turn, another wave of protests.
3. (C) The U.S. Army Claims Service, Europe currently plans to send legal representatives of the Peter family final offers amounting to $80,000, divided among three claimants, including Teofil Claudiu Peter, the musician's son. In briefing material recently forwarded to the Embassy, the Army's Foreign Claims Service states that the Peter family claims were adjudicated pursuant to the Foreign Claims Act, which "uses foreign law to measure damages." The accompanying press guidance then asserts: "That means the law of the country in which the claim arises are used -- in tQs case Romanian law." "The awards are consistent with Romanian court decisions measuring damages in similar cases," the guidance continues, "and reflect U.S. and Romanian principles of just compensation and respect for human life." The U.S. Army Claims Service, Europe documents go on to say that the Service contracted "a prestigious Romanian law firm to advise the Commission on the pertinent provisions of the Romanian law...(and) determined that the amount requested by the claimants greatly exceeded the economic loss substantiated by the claimants. Moreover, the Commission found no relevant precedent justifying an award of moral damages anywhere near the amount requested." Part of the award that has been approved will be centered on reimbursing
BUCHAREST 00001286 002 OF 003
the family for the funeral costs of Mr. Peter's burial.
4. (C) Teo Peter's survivors reportedly initially requested a multi-million dollar settlement. In a November 1 letter to the Ambassador from the Peter family's law firm, Arent Fox, attorney John M. Gurley suggests that the claimants are currently requesting an award of $1 million. In what is labeled "The Peter Family Claim: October 2007," Gurley cites various past precedents for awards at that level or above, including for an Australian woman's successful claim for $1 million after being hit by a Navy serviceman's golf ball, and a $1.9 million claim to survivors of a teenage Mexican goat herder, the victim ostensibly of an accident involving the U.S. military. Gurley also cites the $2 million awards presented to the survivors of the Italian cable car accident involving a U.S. warplane, a case which has been cited repeatedly in the Romanian media and by Romanian government officials. Gurley writes in his letter that he had unsuccessfully requested a transfer of the claim from the U.S. Army Claims Service, Europe in Mannheim to Fort Meade (the headquarters of the Claims Service) or Washington, D.C. Citing "the very discouraging signals" the Peter family has received to date from the Claims Service, Gurley concludes by saying he hoped the Peter claim could be settled "in a manner suitable to all parties" before the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, asserting that "it would truly be unfortunate for Romania, as well as the United States, if the NATO summit were to be marred by the U.S. government's inability to close the Teo Peter matter in a fair fashion."
5. (C) Once the award is communicated to the family's legal counsel at Arent Fox on Wednesday, November 21 (the day before Thanksgiving), we expect the family and its legal representatives to move quickly to condemn the U.S. offer publicly and to appeal to top Romanian officials and the Romanian media to put immediate pressure on U.S. representatives for a higher award. Romanian MFA officials have reported to us informally that the family has met with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister in recent weeks to express their determination to conduct a public fight should the final award offer be unacceptably low. Under these circumstances, and in light of the proximity to the anniversary of the rock musician's death, we expect the Embassy to be the focus of multiple demonstrations, including concerts and candlelight vigils. There will be a renewed effort to rename after Teo Peter the street on which the Embassy is located, and it is possible that city officials may accede to the anticipated wave of public indignation over the amount of the award offer.
6. (C) Another report we received in recent days was a suggestion that Romanian law enforcement authorities, working through EU channels, would attempt to serve a legal summons to Van Goethem, who we believe is currently a U.S. Embassy dependent at AmEmbassy Berlin.
7. (C) More seriously, we anticipate that the Peter award offer, and subsequent media attention, will embolden critics of the Romanian deployment in Iraq, along with other anti-American politicians like Chamber of Deputies President Bogdan Olteanu, to call for the immediate withdrawal of Romanian troops. Under these circumstances, they could build sufficient traction to reinvigorate the opposition to Romania's support for U.S. efforts there, and potentially force a change in policy. While President Basescu has been steadfast in his support for our continued troop presence in Iraq, he would be conscious of the fact that even before a renewed public outcry over the Peter case, only one-third of the Romanian public supports maintaining troops there. Either way, reinvigoration of the controversy over U.S. handling of the case will put our closest friends within the Romanian government, including President Basescu, into a very awkward political position. Likely enough, the Liberal Party and other political groups hoping to find a hook to boost their support in the run-up to the November 25 Euro-parliamentary elections in Romania will wrap themselves in the flag and try to capitalize on the political moment with anti-U.S. political rhetoric. More broadly, news of the Peter award offer will cut deeply into support for the new U.S. military presence at joint facilities on the Black Sea, including Kogalniceanu air base and the Babadag training grounds -- at least temporarily. While public approval of the bases has been steady, our contacts have always cautioned us that it is vulnerable to concerns over an increased terrorist threat to Romania -- and to negative stories concerning the conduct of U.S. service personnel, with the first point of reference the Teo Peter accident and the subsequent handling of the charges against Sgt. Van Goethem.
8. (C) There are other, less predictable, risk factors at play. In the wake of this week's controversy over the Ambassador's criticism of the Parliament's efforts to undermine the independence of Romanian prosecutors and their ability to investigate cases of bribery and corruption, a controversy over the Teo Peter award could enable our critics and opponents on the Romanian political scene to undermine other important initiatives which are just gathering momentum. First and foremost among them is our accelerating effort, alongside Lockheed-Martin, to persuade Romania to pursue an F-16/JSF option to replace the country's aging MiG fleet. Lockheed-Martin, in tandem with allies in the Presidency and Ministry of Defense, are seeking a "sole-source" route to the fighter plane decision, which they do not want to see tied up in the Brussels bureaucracy by the F-16/JSF's principal European competitors, Grippen and Eurofighter. This was always going to be a tricky exercise, with an expectation that supporters of a European fighter option would loudly cry foul. A firestorm over the Teo Peter case could possibly represent a tipping point away from a U.S. option, if only because of the optics.
9. (C) What little guidance we have received from the U.S. Army Claims Service, Europe suggests that all Romanian media inquiries are to be steered towards the USAREUR public affairs staff, or alternatively USMC spokespersons at Quantico. This will limit severely our ability to respond here in Romania, and to help address some of the most pernicious charges that we will face. We believe that the risk of unintended consequences in this media strategy, across geographic, language and cultural barriers, is huge. That, too, has to be factored into our overall risk assessment of the impending Claims Service actions.
10. (C) In short, our hope is that this latest policy and public affairs challenge related to the 2004 car accident will be manageable. But we are concerned that under the present circumstances, some lasting damage could be done to our core interests, including keeping Romanian troops deployed in Iraq and continuing to build on the positive momentum in our close defense and security partnership with Bucharest. This has been an especially difficult issue from the beginning, and remains the biggest single "black spot" in our recent bilateral experience. TAUBMAN
Thursday, 06 July 2006, 07:24
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000815
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS ECON, EINV, HR
SUBJECT: NJ-BASED BARR LABS IN BIDDING WAR FOR
CROATIA'S PLIVA
1. SUMMARY: NJ-BASED BARR LABS ANNOUNCED A 2.3 BILLION DOLLAR TAKEOVER BID FOR CROATIA'S PLIVA ON JUNE 28, MARKING THE LARGEST SINGLE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CROATIA AND SPARKING A BIDDING WAR WITH RIVAL SUITOR ACTAVIS PHARMACEUTICALS OF ICELAND. ALTHOUGH BOTH PLIVA'S CEO AND THE GOC HAVE PUBLICLY ENDORSED A PLIVA-BARR MERGER, ACTAVIS RAISED THE STAKES LAST WEEK, REPORTEDLY BUYING NEARLY 10 PERCENT OF PLIVA'S SHARES. BARR HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO PURCHASE SHARES, PENDING REGULATORY APPROVAL IN THE U.S., GERMANY AND CROATIA, BUT COMPANY OFFICIALS REMAIN CONFIDENT THAT THEIR OFFER WILL PREVAIL. EMBASSY HAS USED RECENT MEETINGS WITH GOC OFFICIALS AND PRESS STATEMENTS TO UNDERSCORE THE BENEFITS BOTH FOR CROATIA AND PLIVA OF BARR'S OFFER. END SUMMARY
-----------
BIDDING WAR
-----------
2. CROATIAN PHARMACEUTICAL HEAVYWEIGHT PLIVA IS THE OBJECT OF A BIDDING WAR BETWEEN NJ-BASED BARR LABS AND ACTAVIS OF ICELAND. PLIVA PUT ITSELF ON THE MARKET AND HIRED DEUTSCHEBANK AS ITS FINANCIAL ADVISOR, FOLLOWING WHAT IT CONSIDERED A HOSTILE AND LOW BID OFFER FROM ACTAVIS OF $1.6 BILLION IN THE SPRING. AT A RECEPTION HELD JUNE 28 IN ZAGREB, OFFICIALS FROM PLIVA AND BARR ANNOUNCED THAT THE TWO COMPANIES HAD REACHED AN AGREEMENT FOR BARR TO ACQUIRE PLIVA FOR $2.2 BILLION. HOWEVER, AT THE SAME TIME ACTAVIS MADE A COUNTER OFFER AND BEGAN BUYING PLIVA SHARES ON THE OPEN MARKET. BARR COUNTERED, UPPING ITS OFFER TO $2.3 BILLION. BARR SAID IT WOULD PAY PLIVA SHAREHOLDERS 743 KUNA ($131.28) PER SHARE, AS WELL AS A 12 KUNA ($2.12) DIVIDEND, FOR A TOTAL CASH CONSIDERATION OF 755 KUNA ($133.40) PER SHARE. THE CROATIAN PRESS HAS CORRECTLY CALLED BARR'S OFFER THE LARGEST U.S. INVESTMENT EVER IN CROATIA.
----------------------
Barr's Plans for Pliva
----------------------
3. BARR AND PLIVA ARE CURRENTLY ASSOCIATED THROUGH A JOINT VENTURE TO CREATE A GENERIC BIOLOGICAL VERSION OF A TREATMENT USED TO REGULATE WHITE BLOOD CELL PRODUCTION. THROUGH PLIVA, BARR WOULD GAIN ENTRY INTO RUSSIAN AND OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN MARKETS, AS WELL AS THE UK, GERMANY, SPAIN AND ITALY. A BARR- PLIVA UNION WOULD DOUBLE BARR'S ANNUAL SALES TO $2.5 BILLION AND BOOST THEIR COOPERATION IN RESEARCH AND GENERICS.
4. BARR OFFICIALS SAID THE COMPANY WILL MAINTAIN PLIVA'S HEADQUARTERS IN ZAGREB AND KEEP ITS SENIOR MANAGEMENT IN PLACE. BARR HAS ABOUT 2,000 EMPLOYEES WHILE PLIVA HAS 6,000, INCLUDING SOME IN EAST HANOVER, N.J.
---------------------
ACTAVIS STILL LURKING
---------------------
5. ACTAVIS HAS NOT GIVEN UP YET, NOTING THAT BARR STILL NEEDS A SUCCESSFUL REGULATORY REVIEW IN GERMANY, THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO CLEARANCE IN THE U.S. AND APPROVAL FROM THE CROATIAN AGENCY FOR SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES (HANFA). ACTAVIS CLAIMED IT DID NOT NEED THOSE APPROVALS, BUT PLIVA OFFICIALS HAVE SAID THAT IS NOT ENTIRELY TRUE.
6. MEANWHILE ACTAVIS HAS ALSO BEEN BUYING SHARES OF PLIVA ON THE OPEN MARKET, WHILE BARR AWAITS REGULATORY APPROVAL. AS A RESULT, ACTAVIS NOW OWNS 9.7 PERCENT OF PLIVA SHARES OUTRIGHT AND HAS OPTIONS ON A FURTHER 10.7 PERCENT. BARR CALLED ON PLIVA STOCK-HOLDERS JUNE 30 NOT TO SELL THEIR SHARES IN ORDER TO ALLOW REGULAR BIDDING. PLIVA OFFICIALS ALSO ASKED SHAREHOLDERS TO REFRAIN FROM SELLING STOCK UNTIL ISSUES REGARDING THE OFFERS ARE RESOLVED.
---------------------
CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
---------------------
7. Pliva publicly endorsed Barr and the GOC echoed this endorsement, saying it is more important to ensure the Pliva brand will continue, that production will continue in Croatia and that the company's workforce in Croatia will not be reduced, than to gain an extra 10 kuna ($1.76) per share. The GOC, which retains 17 percent of Pliva's shares, and Pliva officials feel more secure with Barr than with Activas, which reputedly has links to Russian capital. 8. Although Actavis officials also have said they plan to retain the Pliva name in Croatia and transfer some production to Croatia, analysts doubt Actavis' true intentions. They point to Actavis' activities in other countries where it operates with a significantly cheaper labor force. Actavis has apparently been on an acquisition binge in the last few years, acquiring a portfolio of companies it is yet to integrate and a large amount of debt in the process. 9. Pliva officials said U.S. anti-trust agencies need to resolve issues regarding both offers. They also note that, according to the Croatian Takeover Law, once a party directly or indirectly acquires over 25% of the voting shares of an issuer, it is obligated to immediately inform the issuer, the public and HANFA. 10. Post has used recent meetings with the GOC, including Ambassador's farewell calls, to support Barr. The GOC is eager to see this deal succeed, which would not only be a good outcome for Pliva, but would also send a signal of confidence about Croatia's investment climate. DELAWIE
Tuesday, 05 September 2006, 12:08
C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 001050
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/05/2016
TAGS ECON, EINV, PREL, HR
SUBJECT: CROATIAN PM ON DEFENSIVE OVER TAKEOVER BID FOR
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY
REF: ZAGREB 815
Classified By: Ambassador Robert A. Bradtke for reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (C) Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader called Ambassador on September 4 to express his concern over an article on the Croatian on-line news site index.hr alleging that Sanader was colluding with Chairman of Pliva Pharmaceuticals Zeljko Covic and former FM Miomir Zuzul to tip the sale of Pliva in favor of US pharmaceutical company Barr Labs. The article also included a reference to an interview the Ambassador gave in July to a leading Zagreb news magazine, in which he said that Barr's acquisition of Pliva would be a positive signal of confidence in Croatia's investment climate. It went on to suggest that Sanader believes that Pliva must go to a US company in order to maintain good bilateral relations with the United States. Sanader was clearly upset by the allegations, which he said were the opening salvo in what he predicted would be a "very dirty" opposition campaign to discredit his government over the Pliva sale. He told the Ambassador that he would rebut what he said were untrue allegations and asked if the Embassy would also respond with a press statement, given that an American company is involved and that the article mentioned the Ambassador. The Ambassador agreed to issue a statement (text at para 4) reaffirming simply that the sale of Pliva must be decided by market forces in a transparent way and in compliance with all laws and that the outcome will have no effect on U.S.-Croatian relations.
2. (C) Pliva Pharmaceuticals, one of Croatia's largest and most successful companies (in which the GOC still retains an 18 percent share), is the object of competing takeover bids by US Barr Labs and Icelandic Actavis. Barr's initial 2.3 billion dollar offer for Pliva was countered last week by a 2.5 billion dollar offer from Actavis. Barr is now expected to counter this offer in a process that may not conclude until early October. The Embassy has been in contact with Barr's representative in Zagreb, who is thus far satisfied that the process, although clearly straining Croatia's small and untested regulatory capacity, is being carried out in a transparent way and in accordance with standards that are being upheld equally for both sides.
3. (C) Comment: Although we have no indication of impropriety thus far over the sale of Pliva, a transaction of this magnitude is a first of its kind for Croatia and clearly a challenge for its regulatory mechanisms. With the share price of Pliva up nearly sixty percent since earlier in the year, it seems quite likely that the sale will provide the press with scandals both real and imagined for a long time to come, particularly with elections approaching in 2007.
4. (U) Embassy response to index.hr article: Regarding a September 3 article by Index.hr about the ongoing negotiations over acquisition of Pliva Pharmaceuticals, the Embassy has always urged that the process be open and transparent. We expect any American company to operate fully under both U.S. and Croatian law, and Barr has assured us they are doing so. In his interview with Globus on July 21, 2006, Ambassador Bradtke said, "If Barr successfully buys Pliva, that will have a very positive effect on other American companies that wish to expand to the Croatian market." The U.S. Embassy believes that purchases of companies should be based on economic criteria. Whatever Pliva shareholders finally decide regarding the future of their company, relations between the United States and Croatia will continue to be strong. BRADTKE
Wednesday, 11 October 2006, 10:46
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 001231
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/SCE
NSC FOR BRAUN
EO 12958 DECL: 10/11/2016
TAGS PREL, PGOV, HR, EUN, NATO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER - PM SANADER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
BUSH
Classified By: Ambassador Robert A. Bradtke for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
A "BALKANS" SUCCESS STORY
-------------------------
1. (C) Fifteen years after the death of Yugoslavia and eleven years after a horrible civil war, Croatia is poised to become that rarity ) a Balkans success story. With EU entry negotiations underway, tourism arrivals breaking records, and new construction on every corner, Croatia is rebranding itself as a leader in Southeastern Europe. Espresso has triumphed over Turkish coffee and new highways have brought Zagreb within ninety minutes of the warmth of the Adriatic, shrinking both the geographic and psychological distance. Prime Minister Ivo Sanader has staked his political career on continued progress and complete integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO and the European Union. Despite those few still nostalgic for some idealized version of the past (such as PM Sanader's aging political rival President Mesic, who recently attended the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in homage to Tito), most younger Croatians can't get to the future fast enough. Croatians don't all agree on what the future looks like, but all significant political parties share a commitment to democracy, free markets, and Euro-Atlantic integration. PM Sanader,s October 17 meeting with President Bush will help keep the public focus on his positive vision of the future, and will help his moderate center-right coalition when they face the electorate next year.
SANADER'S AGENDA
----------------
2. (C) Prime Minister Sanader has made the rounds of all the major European capitals, but he knows that Washington is the capital that really counts. He sees his visit to the Oval Office as both a national and a personal success: the seal of approval on Croatia's Euro-Atlantic future and proof that it has consolidated and strengthened its democratic credentials, but also an endorsement of his effort to sideline nationalists within his party and head full throttle towards integration with the West. The White House visit will burnish Sanader's own political image in advance of next year's parliamentary elections and enable him to show both domestic and foreign audiences that we consider Croatia a serious partner.
3. (C) Apart from this symbolism, Sanader will be seeking the President's support for strong NATO enlargement language at November's Riga Summit. The Croatian government's most important strategic goals are membership in NATO and the European Union; Sanader hopes to return from Washington with some public acknowledgment that his country is on the right path towards Euro-Atlantic integration. This has become even more critical after EU Commission President Barroso,s declaration of a "pause" in EU enlargement. Sanader may also seek our support for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, as Croatia seeks to play a broader role in international affairs.
ADVANCING U.S. INTERESTS
------------------------
4. (C) For the most part, Sanader has already paid up front for this meeting over the course of his nearly three years in power as head of a center-right coalition government. He has purged the extreme nationalists from his party, exorcising the ghost of the late president Franjo Tudjman. He assisted in extraditing Croatia's last major indicted war criminal Ante Gotovina to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Hague. He reached out to the ethnic Serb community, even including Serb parliamentarians in his coalition. He has pushed to normalize relations with Belgrade at considerable political risk, given that memories of the 1991-1995 war with Serbia are still painfully raw.
5. (C) In the military sphere, Sanader's government has made considerable progress on a major defense reform effort that will fully professionalize the armed services. The GOC overcame initial reluctance and now works energetically with less-developed Macedonian and Albanian militaries in the U.S.-Adriatic Charter (the "A-3") to demonstrate regional credentials. Croatia participates in twelve UN peace support operations around the world, including a leadership role in Kashmir. Most importantly, Sanader this summer delivered on a promise to triple Croatia's self-financed contribution to NATO forces in Afghanistan to 150, with plans to increase that number further next year.
ZAGREB 00001231 002 OF 002
6. (C) We can usefully push Sanader to do more to prepare Croatia for NATO accession; Sanader himself should be more active in generating public support for Alliance membership and continue required political, economic, and defense reforms. He must also step up the battle against corruption, and help put the legacies of the Balkan Wars to rest by fully implementing promised refugee return programs. In a still-unsettled region, Sanader has the credibility to play a constructive role, with our guidance, in promoting constitutional reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in speaking out for a peaceful resolution of Kosovo status issues.
CULTIVATING A FUTURE PARTNER AND ALLY IN THE REGION
--------------------------------------------- ------
7. (C) Croatia is a small country. Its contribution to regional and global security will always be modest, its engagement capacity limited, its markets minor. Nevertheless, by reaching out to a new generation of democratic political leadership and its westward leaning electorate, we serve our regional interests well. The challenge is to shape the structure of bilateral relations most productively in the coming months to pave the way for greater cooperation. In concrete terms, this means concluding agreements in such areas as civil aviation, law enforcement, and a Supplemental SOFA, promoting investments like the U.S. firm Barr's upcoming USD 2.5 billion acquisition of Pliva pharmaceuticals, promoting more people-to-people exchanges, and supporting Croatia's NATO candidacy. Sanader's visit to Washington will provide a stronger impetus to build both our bilateral and our regional partnership with Croatia. BRADTKE
Wednesday, 03 May 2006, 22:01
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRIDGETOWN 000755
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/26/2016
TAGS EINV, EAIR, EFIN, PREL, PGOV, PINR, KCRM, AC, BB, XL
SUBJECT: CRICKET BREAKFAST SERVES UP FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH
ALLEN STANFORD
REF: A. BRIDGETOWN 578
B. BRIDGETOWN 178
Classified By: Ambassador Mary E. Kramer for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Kramer met controversial Texan billionaire Allen Stanford for the first time at an April 21 "Legends of Cricket" breakfast in Barbados. Stanford bent the Ambassador's ear concerning his significant new tourism and property investments in Antigua and plans for his Caribbean Star and Caribbean Sun airlines. Also present that morning was Barbados PM Arthur, who pulled the Ambassador aside to express his view that President Bush needs to lay out an innovative, ambitious energy strategy to serve as an example to the hemisphere. The breakfast was an attempt by legendary Barbados cricketers to whip up more enthusiasm for the sport. Stanford was likely invited due to his "Cricket 2020" initiative to revive West Indies Cricket. End Summary.
2. (C) At an April 21 "Legends of Cricket" breakfast at the Barbados Hilton, Ambassador Kramer found herself seated at the head table, along with Allen Stanford, the UK High Commissioner, and Barbados Prime Minister Owen Arthur. The Barbados group "Legends of Cricket" organized the breakfast with cricket greats from the past. Stanford cancelled another cricket-related event in Antigua and flew to Barbados to participate. (Note: Allen Stanford is a controversial Texan billionaire who has made significant investments in offshore finance, aviation, and property development in Antigua and throughout the region. His companies are rumored to engage in bribery, money laundering, and political manipulation. End Note.)
---------------------------
Stanford's Expanding Empire
---------------------------
3. (C) This chance encounter was the first time the Ambassador had met Stanford. In response to the Ambassador's question about his business ventures, he discussed his plans to develop a number of homes in the US$10-20 million range and a world class golf course on a small island off the coast of Antigua. (Note: Stanford was likely referring to his Guiana Island project. End Note.) So far, he has invested about US$35 million of his own just in the design and acquisition phases. He expects to have a front-end membership fee of several million dollars and approximately US$1 million per year in dues from the residents of these high-end communities. He also plans to pay up front about $1 million (unclear which currency - US$ or EC$) in taxes to Antigua each year. He believes this development and the tax revenue it generates will make a huge difference in the local economy.
----------------------------
Caribbean Star Set to Expand
----------------------------
4. (C) Stanford's second big venture in the Caribbean is investment in new airplanes for his Caribbean Star airline. (Note: The recent Federal Aviation Administration Category One rating for the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States means Antigua-based Caribbean Star can begin flights to the U.S. See Ref A for more details. End Note). He expects to be running about 400 flights a week throughout the Caribbean, including to San Juan and Caracas, but it is unclear when this expansion will occur. A number of the planes on order are jets and the others are the familiar regional DASH-8s that currently make up most of the Caribbean Star and LIAT fleet. During his speech at the event, PM Arthur suggested that Stanford should merge his Caribbean Star airline with cash-strapped LIAT. (Comment: This scenario is highly unlikely as Stanford does not believe in partnerships. He is reportedly the sole shareholder in all his businesses, and would likely only go into business with LIAT by purchasing the government-owned airline. End Comment.)
------------------------------
PM Arthur on President Bush...
------------------------------
5. (C) Prime Minister Arthur was very cordial, seeking out the Ambassador for conversation. At the breakfast table, he expounded upon the friendship he feels he established with President Bush and how well he believes they work together for the benefit of the region. (Note: The PM was likely referring to their collaboration at the November 2005 Summit of the Americas in Buenos Aires. End Note.) Arthur also discussed how he is trying to engage other players in CARICOM to work with others--pointing to the Ambassador and UK High Commissioner--saying, "We must stop talking about bananas and
sugar and move on to talk about something we can actually accomplish together."
--------------------
...And Energy Issues
--------------------
6. (C) Another table topic was PM Arthur's belief that it is critical the United States provide leadership and make some specific statements about how it will move away from its "addiction" to oil. As the morning was coming to a close, he took the Ambassador's arm and privately delivered a message for the President. President Bush, in his opinion, must lay out a new, innovative, and ambitious energy strategy for the U.S. In Arthur's view, this is absolutely necessary for the the region, the hemisphere, and the world.
--------
Comments
--------
7. (C) Embassy officers do not reach out to Stanford because of the allegations of bribery and money laundering. The Ambassador managed to stay out of any one-on-one photos with Stanford during the breakfast. For his part, Stanford said he preferred to conduct his business without contacting the Embassy, resolving any investment disputes directly with local governments. It is whispered in the region that Stanford facilitates resolution with significant cash contributions.
8. (C) PM Arthur's desire for bold U.S. leadership on energy echoes the commitments he made to help reduce his country's fuel import bill via alternative energy during his budget speech earlier this year (Ref B). GILROY
Wednesday, 18 February 2009, 21:42
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRIDGETOWN 000114
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/CAR
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
EO 12958 DECL: 02/18/2029
TAGS PGOV, PINR, ST, CN, XL
SUBJECT: ANTIGUA: UPHEAVAL ON THE EVE OF ELECTIONS
Classified By: Classified By: Charge d,Affaires, a.i. D. Brent Hardt, f or reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
1. (C) Antiguan PM Spencer's February 17 announcement of March 12 as the date for parliamentary elections was almost immediately overshadowed by an announcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission of action being taken against U.S.-Antiguan citizen Sir Allen Stanford for "massive, on-going fraud." In the run-up to these announcements, election violence involving the fire bombing of opposition offices had escalated the election rhetoric that has polarized the local populace and led the OAS to warn both parties to rein in their followers. Local fears over Stanford indictment have led to a run on the Stanford Financial Group's subsidiary the Bank of Antigua, with depositors lining up for an hour or more to withdrawal their money. The Governor of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, seeking to stem the bank run, contacted the Embassy to seek guidance on the implications of the SEC complaint for the Bank of Antigua. In a country already burdened with headline-grabbing rising crime and a tight economy, the pre-election landscape is suddenly quite rocky and unpredictable. End summary.
---------------------------------------
PM Spencer Sets March 12 elections Date
---------------------------------------
2. (C) Prime Minister Spencer called on the Governor General to issue the writ for election for March 12 during his live televised address to the nation Tuesday evening, February 17. Spencer's address drew heavily on the run- up to the 1999 elections and the 2004 elections casting the opposition Antigua Labour Party (ALP) as corrupt and inept. Many still contend that the necessary preparations have not been made to hold the elections by the date set.
-----------------------------------
Pre-Elections Violence on the Rise
-----------------------------------
3. (C) Just prior to the PM's announcement of the election date, the district offices of two ALP candidates were set aflame early on the morning of February 16. The local constituency offices of ALP candidates Asot Michael and Gail Christian were both targeted with what appear to be "Molotov cocktails" in apparent acts of election violence and intimidation, according to Police Commissioner Tom Bennett. The police are investigating the matter, but it appears to be the ad hoc work of party supporters, not acts coordinated or perpetrated by one of the parties directly. ALP Opposition Leader Steadroy Benjamin contended that the offices of ALP candidate Christian were targeted because she is widely believed to hold a narrow lead in her race to unseat PM Spencer. He predicted there will be more violence before the election are over due to the unprecedented polarization among Antiguans. The fire bombing episodes, along with earlier small-scale crowd violence at some party rallies, has prompted the OAS, which is set to send an observer mission to Antigua, to call on the leadership of both parties to dissuade their supporters from taking violent actions. OAS Assistant SECGEN Albert Ramdin expressed hope that Antiguan elections would follow the Caribbean norm and be largely incident-free, fair, and democratic.
--------------------------------
Fallout from Stanford Indictment
--------------------------------
4. (C) No sooner did the PM's election date announcement hit the airwaves, when news of a major SEC indictment against Antigua's richest citizen, primary banker, and second largest local employer and philanthropist, Sir Allen Stanford, shock the small island -- with ripples extending throughout the Eastern Caribbean. Local Antiguan depositors at the Stanford Financial Group's subsidiary The Bank of Antigua (BOA) lined up on February 18 to withdraw their funds in what has been characterized as a bank run, following rumors and fears that U.S. authorities would seek to seize all assets related to Stanford and his companies. Commissioner Bennett confirmed that there is some concern of unrest, noting that, as of the middle of the day, there were no incidents at any of the BOA's branches. PM Spencer appealed for calm during his live national broadcast, and rebuked the ALP for trying to turn the indictment into a partisan political issue.
5. (C) Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Governor Sir Dwight Venner, meanwhile, phoned the Charge from his office in St. Kitts seeking further clarification regarding the SEC's proposed actions. He said that the ECCB was flying in money to back withdrawals at the Bank of Antigua for now, but that they could not do so for long. Prior to the SEC case, he said the bank had adequate liquidity and reasonable debt-equity ratios. He was looking for information that would allow the ECCB and the government of Antigua to reassure depositors. He has subsequently been in touch with the SEC on the matter. At some point soon, the ECCB may be required to step in and take control of the bank to protect the interests of depositors. Embassy appreciates SEC coordination on this issue.
6. (C) Steadroy Benjamin speculated that the PM called for elections immediately after the Stanford indictment due to the potential fallout should things go very badly for Stanford. Benjamin sought to link the announcement to the government's "undisclosed dealings with the Stanford group," though the current opposition was in power when Stanford first established himself in Antigua, so his ability to point fingers will be limited. Benjamin's claim was disputed by former Minister of State Aziz Hadeed, who said he was aware of the proposed election date several days prior to the announcement.
----------------------------
Meanwhile, on the Streets...
----------------------------
7. (C) These latest shockers come on the heels of another headline-grabbing spike in violent crime in Antigua. Incidents of violent crime continue to rise against locals and tourists alike. However, in an economy almost wholly dependent upon tourism, high profile attacks on foreigners are particularly damaging to the local economy. The recent murder of an Australian yacht captain made international news, driving away many of the mega yachts that regularly visit the island. The murder followed on the heels of the murder of a honeymoon couple from the UK last summer. In both cases the police were able to apprehend suspects, which are now awaiting trial, Bennett told us, but the short-term impact on a tourism-driven economy already depressed by the global recession will not be easily mitigated by the apprehension of suspects.
------------------------------------------
Cricket Test Match Placates Masses for Now
------------------------------------------
8. (C) The one bright spot for the country, Commissioner Bennett commented, has been a cricket test match between England and the West Indies team being held in Antigua this week. The high-profile event has tempered somewhat people's concerns over the elections or the Stanford indictment. The region's love of cricket means crowds are packed in the Antigua Recreation Grounds Stadium. Yet even this silver lining has a touch of grey, as in what has been termed "a national embarrassment" in regional press the match could not be held at the recently constructed 20,000 person stadium named in honor of local cricket legend Sir Vivian Richards because of poor field conditions. Most blame the poor conditions on the slapdash construction done by the Chinese government, which built the stadium as a gift to the Antiguan government, local commentator Winston Derrick said. It has also not been lost on regional commentators that one of the biggest financial backers of the West Indies cricket team, and the person who brought the more marketable 20/20 cricket format to the Caribbean, is none other than Sir Allen Stanford -- and many are beginning to wonder how his indictment might hurt a team that is just beginning to rebound from a drubbing in the 2007 cricket World Cup.
-------
Comment
-------
9. (C) The United Progressive Party (UPP), once the clear favorite to return to power, now has a real fight on its hands, which few predicted just two months ago. Rapidly falling numbers for tourism throughout the region coupled with increasing stories of murdered tourists, the indictment of the second largest employer on the island for fraud, and a failed cricket match finds Antigua in perhaps the perfect storm. Many worry that these issues could not only spell disaster for the UPP, but for the country's economy as a whole, leading to a severe economic depression and intolerable unemployment creating more violence and a cycle of less tourism, more unemployment and more crime. It is unclear if either party will try hard to use the Stanford indictment as an election issue -- Stanford amassed his fortune under an ALP government, and was knighted by a UPP government, so all hands are likely equally dirty. Of more concern for Antigua is when the run of "bad luck" will stop, and whether either party is positioned to turn things around on crime and the economy. HARDT
Tuesday, 17 February 2009, 14:14
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000069
SIPDIS
PASS TO EUR/CE TOM YEAGER
EO 12958 DECL: 02/17/2019
TAGS ENRG, PGOV, PREL, BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA'S BELENE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - BUYERS
REMORSE ON ALL SIDES EXCEPT RUSSIA'S
REF: 08 SOFIA 0815
Classified By: Amb. Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Despite its status as Bulgaria's highest priority energy project, the Belene Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is foundering. Marred by cost over-runs, financing problems, infighting between strategic partners, XXXXXXXXXXXX and serious delays, the project is looking increasingly like a lemon. The relationship between the government and the project's strategic investor, the German RWE, is one of mutual buyer's remorse. But with 700 million euros in sunk costs, in addition to priceless political capital already invested, the government is unlikely to walk away from the project. End Summary.
2. (C) When Bulgarians talk about the Belene nuclear power plant, they increasingly do so in hushed tones. Issues of delays, financing woes, non-transparent horse-trading and side deals, Russian influence, middle-man rent seeking, and the interests of well-connected politicians and energy oligarchs inevitably come up. Belene's construction offered the perfect chance for Bulgaria to decrease its independence on Russian energy sources. But the Stanishev-led government, indebted to Russia-connected energy oligarchs, let the opportunity slip away. In 2006, Bulgaria chose Russian company AtomStroyExport over a Skoda-led consortium as Belene NPP's main contractor. The tender was managed by former Minister of Economy and Energy Rumen Ovcharov, a pro-Russia energy maestro, who left office (but not political life) in June 2007 after an energy-related corruption scandal. The Belene deal lacked transparency and reeked of side deals involving the proposed South Stream gas pipeline and the long-term gas transit contract Ovcharov was negotiating with Gazprom at the same time.
-------------------------------
ONE OLD PROJECT GETS A NEW LIFE
-------------------------------
3. (C) Belene was originally started in the 1980s, but was abandoned in the early 1990s due to lack of funds. In 2005, to make up for the European Commission's decision to close Bulgaria's Kozluduy NPP reactors 1-4, the Bulgarian government approved the construction of a new 2000 MWe plant at Belene. (Note: Kozluduy units 1 and 2 were shut down due to safety concerns in 2003, while units 3 and 4 were taken off-line at the end of 2006, on the eve of Bulgaria's EU accession.) The Bulgarian National Electric Company (NEC) hired WorleyParsons as the strategic architect engineer for the financing and construction of the plant in 2005. Belene,s two units (1 and 2) will be of the Russian A-92 design (third generation) with pressurized water reactor (PWR), each producing 1000 MW electric power. The main contractor of the project, AtomStroyExport, is working with the main foreign contractor CARSIB Consortium (Areva and Siemens). In December 2008 NEC and RWE (Germany) signed a strategic investor agreement for the project with NEC controlling 51 percent and RWE with 49 percent.
4. (C) Bulgarian company participation in the Belene project is approximately 30 percent. XXXXXXXXXXXXThe French bank PNB Paribus financed the pre-construction loan of 250 million Euros. Currently, teams are preparing the site for new construction by tearing down old infrastructure from the 1980s. The plant's construction is expected to begin in late 2009 or early 2010. Construction will be in two stages. Unit 1 was originally planned to come on-line in 2014-2015 followed by Unit 2 in 2015-2016, according to the Belene NPP Managing Director, Jordan Georgiev. These time frames are now widely in doubt.
---------------
BUYER'S REMORSE
---------------
5. (C) Despite its due diligence, our contacts tell us Belene,s strategic investor, RWE, is now experiencing regret about its purchase. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, RWE
SOFIA 00000069 002 OF 002
worries about the project's lack of transparency and the need to work with AtomStroyExport. RWE wants to enforce European business practices, and is now demanding to review all Belene-related agreements. RWE is reportedly negotiating with Belgium's Electrabel to join it as a subcontractor (likely to be announced in mid-March) to help re-inforce standard European business practices. RWE's insistence on reviewing all agreements is causing Bulgaria heartburn. Delays of 3-5 years have already been announced, and Belene is not expected to come on-line until 2016-2017. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, RWE realizes that working with Russian and Bulgarian companies in the energy sector is a "poisonous combination" for European investment. Transparency is affecting financing. RWE (and Electrabel) want European banks to finance their half of the project, hoping EU restrictions and western lending standards would help with transparency. However, with the current global financial crisis, they believe finding a European bank will be difficult and may reluctantly have to turn to Russia for the money.
6. (C) The Bulgarians are also experiencing buyer's remorse. Despite Russia's offer to extend a loan of about four billion Euros for the project, rumors abound that the Russians do not have the money to finance the project and the Bulgarians have been reluctant to take the money in any event, for fear of being seen as "too close" to the Russians. For their part, the Bulgarians at Belene are chafing at RWE,s close scrutiny of all decisions and complain that this approach is needlessly slowing the project. Our contacts say that some Bulgarian officials are beginning to admit privately that in Belene, they have bought "a lemon." NEC has sunk approximately 700 million euros into the project, while the Russians are not out of pocket and could walk away losing nothing. Meanwhile, cost estimates for Belene continue to creep up, running as high as eight billion euros, double the original price.
------------------------------
BELENE VS KOZLUDUY UNITS 7 & 8
------------------------------
7. (C) The rumors of trouble at Belene have resurrected the idea of a competing project at Bulgaria's only working nuclear power plant, Kozluduy. Bulgarian Minister of Energy and Economy Petar Dimitrov has been actively and publicly courting Westinghouse to invest in a project to build two new reactors at Kozluduy -- units 7 and 8. Contacts say that the existing infrastructure, powerlines connecting Kozluduy to the national power grid, and a highly-skilled workforce close by at currently-operating Kozludy 5 and 6 give Kozluduy 7 and 8 at least a one billion euro cost edge over Belene. Westinghouse officials are cautiously interested, but only if the Belene project is abandoned and Bulgarian government financial support is put into Kozluduy. They want to avoid being used simply to create a new sense of urgency to jump-start Belene.
8. (C) Comment: There is clearly something amiss at Belene. Asked whether the project was in jeopardy, a senior WorleyParsons official privately told us that while the project was still likely to go forward, "countries walk away from deals like this all the time." With elections on the horizon and 700 million euros in sunk costs, in addition to priceless political capital already invested, the government is unlikely to abandon the project any time soon. But it may be on a very slow track.
McEldowney
Tuesday, 07 July 2009, 08:56
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000363
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
FOR SPECIAL ENVOY FOR EURASIAN ENERGY RICHARD MORNINGSTAR
FOR USEU ENERGY OFFICER RICHARD FROST
FOR EUR/CE JENNIFER HOOVER
EO 12958 DECL: 07/01/2034
TAGS ENRG, IAEA, PREL, PGOV, BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA: BELENE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT: MORE
TROUBLES
REF: A. SOFIA 0069 B. SEPTEL
Classified By: Ambassador Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) SUMMARY: Bulgaria's highest profile energy project -- the Belene Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) is dogged by cost overruns, financing woes, construction delays, and now serious safety and quality assurance concerns. Belene may end up costing Bulgaria more than money in the long run. Despite the repeated objections by project experts, END SUMMARY.
---------------------------
SAFETY AND QUALITY IGNORED
---------------------------
2. (S) Marred by many technical, political, and financial problems, the Belene NPP project continues to move forward despite strong warnings about project safety and quality by project experts. NEC, which controls 51 percent of the project along with strategic investor Germany's RWE with 49 percent, keeps pressing to start the "Site Preparation Phase" in September 2009 even before the "Demolition Phase" is completed in August 2009. (Demolition Phase includes the destruction and removal of the existing old site infrastructure.) According to project insiders,
3. (S) Pressed to meet its own self-imposed deadlines, XXXXXXXXXXXX to the "overnight creation" of temporary structures, and the lack of a Quality Assurance (QA) Program Plan for the temporary structures. (Construction of temporary structures during the "Demolition Phase" and "Site Preparation Phase" is a routine process and facilitates the storage of equipment and manufacturing of key construction components such as concrete). XXXXXXXXXXXX
4. (S) Another problem area is the lack of an overall detailed technical and quality assurance plan for BNPP. As of late June 2009, Russia's Atomstroyexport (ASE) -- Belene NPP's main foreign contractor -- has yet to provide NEC with an overall Quality Assurance (QA) Program Plan. A QA Program Plan is required before the Technical Design Approval Order (TDAO) can be issued and certainly well before the Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRA) can issue a Construction Permit for BNPP, making the targeted start dates of September 2009 and December 2010 virtually impossible.
-------------------------------
LESS THAN A GLOWING ENDORSEMENT
-------------------------------
5. (S) NEC is rushing to complete the "Demolition Phase" and start the "Site Preparation Phase" to make Belene look financially viable, attract additional international funding,
SOFIA 00000363 002 OF 002
and keep RWE as a strategic investor. Our contacts told us RWE will not provide funding until "financial closure" and it sees the "first concrete poured," which is currently estimated for December 2010. XXXXXXXXXXXX
6. (S) RWE is clearly feeling "buyer's remorse" about its participation in Belene. XXXXXXXXXXXX Belene experts said that RWE remains "in the dark" on most on-site day-to-day and technical issues. During a late May 2009 Belene project meeting, RWE asked numerous basic questions, indicating that they have not seen any of the on-site safety and environmental reports. XXXXXXXXXXXX Media reports theorize that RWE is trying to pull out of Belene. Some contacts suggest that RWE will wait until after the Bulgarian (July 5) and German (September) elections before announcing the fate of its future participation in BNPP, as GERB officials have expressed strong negative views toward the project.
7. (S) The current BSP-led government has repeatedly pushed for Belene, especially with 700 million euros in sunk costs and priceless political capital invested in the project. The Bulgarians and RWE initially wanted commercial financing for the entire project, but were unable to attract funding from Western banks -- wary of extending a large loan to an increasingly questionable project in the midst of the global financial crisis. In early June, Bulgarian Energy Holding (BEH) CEO Galina Tosheva confirmed Russian approval for a 3.8 billion EUR (5.4 billion USD) loan for Belene. The Bulgarians are still in the dark on actual details. Tosheva told us that she expects Russian PM Putin will dictate the loans terms directly to Bulgarian PM Stanishev.
8. (S) COMMENT: Vested interests -- the current BSP-led government, NEC, well-connected politicians, Bulgarian energy oligarchs, and Russian investors -- keep pushing the project. XXXXXXXXXXXX Since BNPP began, the corresponding technical documentation, the ongoing demolition, and site preparation activities have not been investigated, audited, or approved by the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA). Bisser Boev, a member of GERB's economic team, told us that as of late June, Belene also has no updated economic or technical feasibility study. We should encourage the next government to quickly begin its due-diligence on the project; stressing the importance of meeting all international safety and quality assurance standards, and bringing in the IAEA and the EU's European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) to perform an on-site inspection. END COMMENT. McEldowney
Thursday, 14 August 2008, 16:06
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000579
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH
EO 12958 DECL: 08/13/2028
TAGS PGOV, PREL, SY, LE
SUBJECT: SLEIMAN VISIT TO DAMASCUS: AGREEMENT ON
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, LOTS OF WORK AHEAD
REF: A. DAMASCUS 526 B. DAMASCUS 541
Classified By: Classified by Pol/Econ Chief Tim Pounds for 1.5 b and d.
1. (S) Summary: In a visit that went largely as scripted, Lebanese President Sleiman arrived August 13 in Damascus and issued a joint press statement with President Asad on their decision to establish full diplomatic relations "at the ambassadorial level." Though there were Syrian concerns that a bus bombing in Tripoli might have led to a postponement, the two leaders held a series of positive meetings and left their FMs with most of the follow-up work. At an August 14 mid-day press conference, FM Salloukh and FM Muallim explained that they and their ministerial counterparts would meet soon to implement this decision through a long list of bilateral committees. Beneath the calm surface, internal debate reportedly intensified among Syrian policymakers over the SARG's foreign policy course and the future of key security service officials. End Summary
----------------------------------------
Warm Atmospherics, Visit Goes as Planned
----------------------------------------
2. (SBU) Pre-visit Syrian editorials and statements waxed eloquently about the special nature of Lebanese-Syrian relations and predicted success in the opening a new chapter between the two countries. A Presidential Palace source spun the visit as a victory in preventing efforts to drive a wedge between Lebanon and Syria. Damascenes awoke to find a two-mile stretch of the Beirut-Damascus highway decorated with Syrian and Lebanese flags, placed side-by-side atop median street lights. FM Muallim told the press that Bashar had instructed all Syrian officials to make the visit "successful and fruitful," adding "it is up to both parties to decide whether they want to reopen wounds or heal them." VP Sharaa, adding his deft touch to the pre-visit build-up, said Syria was interested in good relations with Lebanon and welcomed "any Lebanese official," including PM Siniora. On the issue of prisoners ("the issue of the missing"), Sharaa called for a "solution that reassures both parties; hence, the Lebanese do not complain about having any detainees in Syrian prisons, and vice versa." The closure of this file, Sharaa added, would mark the "real entry" into new bilateral relations.
3. (C) D/FM Miqdad's Chief of Staff told us during a August 13 courtesy call with incoming and outgoing Charge that there had been concern regarding the possibility of a postponement in the wake of the early morning bus bombing in Tripoli that killed Lebanese civilians and soldiers. The SARG quickly issued a condemnation of the attack, and the joint presidential statement reiterated this sentiment. FM Muallim and Salloukh issued new condemnations in their joint press conference today.
4. (SBU) In their August 13 joint statement, Sleiman and Asad agreed on "establishing diplomatic relations between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Lebanese Republic at the ambassadorial level," in accordance with the UN Charter and international law. It added, "The foreign ministers of the two countries have been tasked, beginning this day, to take the necessary measures in accordance with legislative and legal regulations in the two countries." The text states that border issues and "missing people from both countries" were also discussed.
5. (C) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX the two Presidents discussed a wide range of issues for further action, including prisoner releases, border demarcation, and the broad array of economic, political, cultural and other agreements implemented by the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council (Ref A). Asad and Sleiman reportedly agreed in principle that Asad would visit Beirut at some date in the future. The two leaders are trying to build confidence on a basic level by exchanging embassies and ambassadors, but both sides realize the need for political consensus within each country to move forward, XXXXXXXXXXXX reported. Having only recently arrived at a Council of Ministers declaration and a vote of confidence by the Parliament, the Lebanese government needed more time to discuss how to approach the relationship. Having the foreign ministers continue discussions was the logical step, he suggested.
DAMASCUS 00000579 002 OF 002
6. (SBU) In addition to the joint Presidential statement, FM Salloukh and Muallim spoke at a joint press conference about the creation of several working committees to implement the establishment of diplomatic relations. Asked about Secretary Rice's positive characterization of the resumption of diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon, Muallim replied, "This issue was merely a result of bilateral will. If others find it positive, we welcome this." Follow up actions announced by the FMs include:
-- a commitment by both sides to reactivate joint committees on border demarcation "according to the priorities agreed by both sides." (Note: Muallim stressed, and Salloukh supported, the necessity of ending Israel's occupation of the Golan, Shebaa farms, Gajar, and Kfar Shuba.)
-- a commitment to control borders, combat smuggling, and coordinate more closely on border administration.
-- agreement to reactivate joint committees on "missing citizens" in both countries.
-- agreement to reactivate commercial relations and to create a "common market."
-- agreement to review bilateral agreements "objectively."
---------------------------------------
Report of Mounting Tensions Inside SARG
---------------------------------------
7. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, General Mohamad Sulayman's assassination remains a frequent source of controversy in internal SARG deliberations. XXXXXXXXXXXX confided that tempers flared during an August 12 Higher Policy Council meeting when high level security service officials openly questioned the government's continuation of indirect negotiations with Israel and its "generosity" with Lebanon. The spark that reportedly set off this discussion was FM Muallim's presentation on potential deliverables that would strengthen President Sleiman's hand, to include release of Lebanese prisoners. The security service chiefs claimed that Syria would make concessions and not receive any tangible gains from engaging Lebanon or talking indirectly to Israel.
8. (S) Underlying this tense exchange was frustration within the security services that the SARG was all but ignoring the assassination of Sulayman (ref B), XXXXXXXXXXXX noted. Security service officials were suggesting that "if the Israelis did it" (i.e., killed Sulayman, why was the SARG continuing the dialogue? XXXXXXXXXXXX added, "And if it was an inside job, people are wondering about their future." Bashar was thus under increasing pressure to provide assurances to his security chiefs about their positions and about the SARG's intention not to make premature concessions, such as public deliverables that would strengthen Sleiman's position within the GOL. Bashar's brother Maher was "somewhere in the middle" of this debate and was seeking to play consensus maker and would likely make efforts to satisfy security service chiefs that Sleiman visit had strengthened the regime's prestige, XXXXXXXXXXXX said.
9. (S) Comment: As expected, the Sleiman visit was long on symbolism and short on commitment to take immediate concrete actions. While this meeting marked a historic precedent, the absence of any public mention of agreed timelines suggests the exchange of ambassadors could be a prolonged process. Unless Asad and Sleiman agreed privately to expedite ministry-to-ministry talks, progress on other issues (prisoners, borders, bilateral agreements) is unlikely to move rapidly. Nonetheless, the SARG will play up Sleiman's visit to demonstrate that Syria has met a key French demand for further engagement. Internal SARG ripples from the Sulayman assassination could lead to a confrontation, but thus far the regime has contained these tensions from spilling over into the public sphere. The Palace's spin of the visit as a success in blocking efforts to drive a wedge between Lebanon and Syria suggests an attempt to satisfy hard-liners that the regime's image has been bolstered.
CORBIN
Sunday, 03 August 2008, 15:39
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000541
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/ELA
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH
EO 12958 DECL: 08/03/2028
TAGS PGOV, PTER, SY, LE, IS
SUBJECT: TOP ASAD SECURITY AIDE ASSASSINATED
Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Tim Pounds for reasons 1.4(b,d)
-------
Summary
-------
1. (S/NF) Syrian Presidential security aide Brigadier General Muhammad Sulayman was assassinated by a sniper late on the evening of August 1 in the coastal city of Tartous. Sulayman enjoyed a reputation among Embassy contacts as having special status and proximity to Bashar. Sulayman was said to have managed special projects for Asad, some of which may have been unknown to the broader Syrian military leadership. Our expectation is that the SARG will try to keep this incident under wraps as long as possible, but that will become more difficult as regional and international press run with the story. End summary.
----------------------------
Details Murky After Official News Blackout
----------------------------
2. (S/NF) On August 3, the Israeli daily Ha'aretz cited "senior sources in Damascus" in reporting Sulayman's assassination on its website, identifying Sulayman as Asad's "liaison" to Hizballah. Al Hayat and the news ticker Al Bawaba also reported the story. A reliable Embassy press contact said that he had heard of the attack yesterday, and said that the version of the story he had heard was that Sulayman's entire family had also been killed. According to the contact, Syrian security services quickly cordoned and searched the entire beach neighborhood where the shooting had occurred. Other Embassy sources would say little except that Syria-based reporters are under instructions not to report the story. As of late August 3, all Syrian-based press remains silent.
------------------------
Pointing the SARG Finger
------------------------
3. (S/NF) As in other recent assassinations in Syria, speculation about who could have done it will likely be rampant. The most obvious suspects are the Israelis. SARG security services are well aware that the coastal city of Tartous would offer easier access to Israeli operatives than would more inland locations such as Damascus. Sulayman was not a highly visible government official, and the use of a sniper suggests the assassin could visually identify Sulayman from a distance. As Tartous is also close to the northern-most part of the Syrian-Lebanese border, the SARG might blame pro-Saudi Islamist militants from Tripoli or the Nahr al-Barid camp. Some may even go so far as to suggest the (comment: unlikely) possibility that this was an inside job to prevent Sulayman from damaging the Syrian regime.
------------
Implications
------------
4. (S/NF) Although officially just a Brigadier General, Sulayman was considered President Asad's top security aide and was known to manage several special projects for Bashar -- some of which may have been unknown to the broader Syrian military leadership. Sulayman's proximity to Asad granted him special status in the eyes of more senior Syrian military officials.
DAMASCUS 00000541 002 OF 002
5. (S/NF) If the SARG were to suspect an Israeli role in the assassination, it may be reluctant to level public accusations as (1) they may not know who did it; (2) such accusations could impair or end Syria's nascent peace negotiations with Israel; and (3) publicizing the event would reveal yet another lapse in Syria's vaunted security apparatus. Syria could seek to retaliate against Israel via proxies and allies in Lebanon or elsewhere. If terrorist groups are suspected, this may prompt a domestic crackdown or counterstrikes on targets within the suspected group.
6. (S/NF) Although unlikely, elements within the SARG may suspect or allege a U.S. role. Possible responses could include staged demonstrations against U.S. interests in Syria, retaliatory diplomatic or security measures, or the threat of targeting U.S. installations via proxies. To date, Post has no indications that the SARG is seeking to blame the USG for the assassination, impose retaliatory measures, or retreat from its commitment to ensure security for our facilities and personnel. Additionally, core country team assesses that no immediate, new threats have been identified as a result of post-incident reporting.
----------------------------
Probable Short-term Reaction
----------------------------
7. (S/NF) For now, the most likely default SARG response will be to clamp down on information and say nothing while the various security services scramble to identify a culprit and avoid being blamed. However long the Syrians can hold out without saying anything, they will. SARG leaders will likely view any publicity of the assassination as a net loss for the regime.
-------
Comment
-------
8. (S/NF) As press in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region reports Sulayman's assassination, it will be increasingly difficult for the SARG to keep a lid on this high-profile attack. Coinciding with Bashar's trip to Tehran and on the heels of the latest round of indirect talks with Israel, the assassination will likely weaken advocates of the peace negotiations, including Bashar himself. CHASE
Thursday, 15 March 2007, 15:41
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000269
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NEA/ELA;TREASURY FOR LEBENSON/GLASER/SZUBIN; NSC FOR
MARCHESE
EO 12958 DECL: 03/06/2017
TAGS EFIN, ECON, ETTC, SY, SANC
SUBJECT: TREASURY TEAM'S DAMASCUS CONSULTATIONS ON
FINANCIAL SANCTIONS
REF: A. DAMASCUS 0108 B. 05 DAMASCUS 6224
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Corbin, reasons 1.4 b/d
1. (S/NF) Summary: Treasury representatives recently visited Post to discuss options for using financial sanctions to apply pressure to the Syrian regime. We discussed:
-- Treasury's requirements for finalizing the pending designations of Mohammad Sulayman and Ali Mamluk, and Treasury's information requirements for a public statement;
-- Treasury's need to maintain the legal thread between the classified designation packet and the public statement announcing the designation;
-- Post's support for designating Mohammad Nassif Kheirbek, SARG pointman for its relationship with Iran;
-- How designating regime financiers like Rami and Mohammad Mahlouf could be problematic without a new Executive Order on corruption. End Summary.
2. (S/NF) PENDING DESIGNATIONS: Post understands the designations for Mohammad Sulieman, Syrian Special Presidential Advisor for Arms Procurement and Strategic Weapons and Ali Mamluk, Chief of the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate, are pending due to a lack of unclassified material necessary for Treasury's public
SIPDIS designation statement. In post's estimate, Mohammad Sulayman is a relatively low-payoff target. His activities are not widely known, which will make it difficult to obtain unclassified information for a public statement and,
SIPDIS likewise, make it unlikely that his designation would resonate inside Syria. Ali Mamluk, on the other hand, is more well-known within Syria, especially for involvement in his objectionable activities regarding Lebanon, and his suppressing Syrian civil society and the internal opposition. Therefore, Mamluk's designation will likely have a larger impact with local and regional audiences if the public statement announcing his designation also discusses his oppression of Syrian society.
3. (S/NF) We understood from our visit with Treasury representatives that although we are limited to designating regime members under the existing Executive Orders, there is some flexibility in Treasury,s public statement announcing the designation. Post has advocated that no matter the legal basis of the designation, any public designation should focus on themes that resonate inside Syria: corruption, suppression of civil society, and denial of basic human rights (ref A). The need to maintain the "legal thread" between the designation packet and the public announcement could be challenging on cases like Mohamad Sulieman whose links to corruption are less clear. In cases like Ali Mamluk, however, the role of the organization he heads in suppressing internal dissent is publicly known in Syria and stating as much in our statement would resonate well here.
4. (S/NF) Post also supports moving forward with the designation packet on Mohammad Nasif Kheirbek, Syrian Deputy Vice-President for Security and lead Syrian liaison to Iran. Keirbek's designation could play to a SARG vulnerability, in this case, the SARG's relationship with Iran, which worries the Sunni majority. Designation of regime pillars involved with the SARG's partnership with Iran could heighten Syrian and regional concerns about the SARG's willingness to accomodate an expansionary Iranian agenda.
5. (S/NF) REGIEME FINANCIERS: We also discussed the possibility of targeting high-profile inner circle members and regime financiers like Rami Mahklouf (Asad's first cousin) and Mohammad Makhlouf (Rami's father) in the next phase of targeted financial sanctions. Based on our consultation with the Treasury representatives, it seemed apparent that without an Executive Order on corruption it would be difficult to compile enough information to designate this group under the current executive orders. The other option for pursuing this group would be to show how these individuals provided financial support to previously designated individuals such as Asif Shawkat. This course of action could prove highly problematic given the regime's proficiency at obfuscating its financial transactions (ref B).
DAMASCUS 00000269 002 OF 002
6. (S) Comment. Post thanks Treasury for its team's February 25-27 visit and welcomes any additional feedback that Washington agencies may have on our recommendations covered in ref A. Post continues to believe targeted financial sanctions are a tool appropriate for the Syrian setting but this tool requires further work to fully develop. ROEBUCK
Friday, 18 September 2009, 16:51
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000397
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/18/2019
TAGS SNAR, MOPS, NATO, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: THE 2009 AFGHANISTAN OPIUM SURVEY: UNODC COSTA
BRIEFS NATO AND PARTNER NATIONS
Classified By: A/Political Advisor A."Hoot" Baez. Reasons: 1.4 (b) AND (d).
1.(C/REL ISAF) BEGIN SUMMARY: On September 18 the Executive Director of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Antonio Maria Costa, briefed at NATO Headquarters the results of the 2009 Afghanistan Opium Survey. Opium cultivation trends reported were positive overall and showcased a major decline in opium cultivation in Afghanistan by 22 percent in 2009, the lowest in 15 years. Costa described Afghanistan as having a southern opium problem not an Afghanistan opium problem. The report found that nearly 99 percent of all opium production took place in the south. All other provinces in Afghanistan produced only 1 percent of the country's total opium in 2009. The UK and U.S. support to Helmand Governor Mangal's three-pronged "food zone" project was illustrated as a successful initiative promoting licit farming in the South. Costa said the World Food Program should buy wheat at the higher price in Afghanistan instead of Pakistan, as it would have a greater positive impact on the Afghan economy. Eradication mechanisms were reported to have minimal affects and accounted for only 3 percent to 4 percent in cutting opium cultivation. END SUMMARY
2.(C/REL ISAF) In a September 18 briefing at NATO Headquarters, UNODC's Executive Director Costa said development was the driving factor to reduce opium cultivation. When pressed by Italy, the Netherlands, and Russia on what more ISAF could do to aid Afghanistan in trying to control the drug problem, Costa responded that development was key. Costa said that ISAF counternarcotics operations did play a role and were a reinforcing trend, but not as strong as the severity of the insurgency and it coercing effects on farmers to grow illicit crops. The economic situation was reported as the most important driving factor when farmers considered if they would grow poppy.
Poverty Not the Issue
---------------------
3. (C/REL ISAF) The Netherlands asked if poverty was the driving factor for farmers to cultivate opium. Costa said that even though Afghanistan was among the most impoverished countries in the world, poverty was not the main factor. Costa said abandoning opium cultivation does not produce a humanitarian crisis. He said market forces caused a shift in opium prices and could easily influence farmers to grow licit crops if high market prices and revenue could be gained from them.
Law Enforcement and Military Strikes Having An Impact
--------------------------------------------- --------
4. (C/REL ISAF) Costa said that the most powerful motivating factors driving farmers away from opium cultivation were effective law enforcement, NATO strikes, and measures by the Afghan government to destroy crops. He said farmers acknowledged that opium was more profitable than licit crops. On the other hand, he said farmers also feared law enforcement retaliation for growing it and, thus, actually viewed it as less profitable overall. Costa said this was a
USNATO 00000397 002 OF 004
new report finding and said law enforcement retaliation was more of a driving factor not to grow opium than eradication. High cultivation trends were linked to the insurgency presence, particularly in areas with an absence of Afghan governance structures and security stability. In Costa's view, counternarcotics operations by NATO and Afghan forces alone or jointly was making an impact and causing farmers to think twice.
Opium Stocks Remain High
------------------------
5. (C/REL ISAF) Costa said that Afghanistan has 12,400 tons of opium stocks because it produces more than the world consumes. Costa believes the insurgency is withholding these stocks from the market and treating them like "savings accounts." He said the stocks pose a serious threat as it could be used to finance the insurgency. Costa encouraged intelligence organizations to keep focus on the storage and movement of Afghanistan's opium stocks.
Buy Wheat In Afghanistan, not Pakistan
--------------------------------------
6.(C/REL ISAF) Costa encouraged the World Food Program (WFP) to buy wheat in Afghanistan instead of Pakistan. He said the WFP had a policy to buy food for all humanitarian donations at the lowest price and understood that the total cost to buy wheat in Pakistan and transport it to Afghanistan was 14 percent lower than the cost of only buying wheat in Afghanistan. However, Costa said that if the WFP bought the wheat at the higher price in Afghanistan it would have a greater positive impact on the Afghan economy. He said if the WFP bought the wheat in Afghan markets, it would increase the demand for wheat in the Afghan economy, higher demand meant higher prices, and would, therefore, raise wheat's market price and revenue for Afghan farmers. Costa acknowledged that the quality of wheat in Afghanistan was low as a result of disease, high humidity, and pest contamination in low-quality storage facilities, but encouraged the World Bank to actively engage in increasing Afghanistan's wheat quality through its rural development initiatives.
Infrastructure Important; "Food Zones" Ground Breaking
--------------------------------------------- ---------
7. (C/REL ISAF) Costa said Afghanistan also needs better economic and agricultural infrastructure. In Costa's view, counternarcotics was not only about seizing opium supply and using kinetic force to protect the population from the insurgency's coercions, but also building better transport systems and storage facilities for farmers to access markets with licit crops. Costa praised the UK and U.S. financial and technical support of Helmand's "food zone" initiative, touting it as "ground breaking." Helmand province experienced a 33 percent decline in opium cultivation in 2009 according to the UNODC report. Costa said that good governance and a committed provincial governor who didn't threaten farmers to not grow poppy, but, instead, convinced them through anti-poppy awareness campaigns, wheat seed distribution, and effective law enforcement activities, with
USNATO 00000397 003 OF 004
eradication, show-cased the initiative as successful. He encouraged spreading the initiative in other provinces and said it would help other provinces remain poppy free.
Development Key, Not Eradication
--------------------------------
8.(C/REL ISAF) Costa did highlight Afghan National Security Force and International Assistance Force operations as having a destabilizing effect on the narco-insurgency link but said development was the key factor to overcome cultivation. Eradication mechanisms were reported to have minimal affects and accounted for only 3 percent to 4 percent in cutting opium cultivation.
Costa Positive On Triangle Initiative
-------------------------------------
9. (C/REL ISAF) In response to the UK's question on how the Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan's triangular initiative complimented counternarcotics efforts, Costa spoke very favorably about the initiative. He cited the triangular initiative's Counternarcotics Cell in Tehran as being composed of Afghan, Pakistani, and Iranian officials with six total locations -- three of which have been set up in the past few months. He said the Cell was heavily supported by Canada. He commented that the Cell was more symbolic than operationally effective at this point, displaying a good working relationship on intelligence sharing between the three countries historically known to be at odds.
Drug-Taliban Links
------------------
10.(C/REL ISAF) Costa responded to Sweden's question on which parts of the insurgency are gaining the most from narcotics profits by pointing to operations in southern Afghanistan. He said that there was evidence of emerging narco-cartels along Afghanistan's southern border that are linked to the Taliban. Costa said that the UNODC interviews those who have been recently released by the Taliban for an inside view into insurgency activities. He said many former Taliban detainees said that their sleeping bags were often bags of opium. Costa said the interviews yielded information that many narcotics transactions and transport activities occurred during the night. Costa said there was a grey area between those apart of the insurgency for the ideological aspects and those involved because of the financial gains of the black market narcotics industry. In the north, Costa said there was evidence within the last 12 to 18 months of new narcotics networks by the insurgency. Costa also mentioned that Afghanistan had a political drug cartel, but did not go into details.
Tajikistan Can Do More
----------------------
11. (C/REL ISAF) He also cited far too little evidence of opium seizures in Tajikistan coming from Afghanistan. Costa attributed the ineffectiveness of Tajikistan's police forces to interdict transiting opium supplies to low police
USNATO 00000397 004 OF 004
salaries, a lack of motivation, and adequate equipment.
What More Can Be Done
---------------------
12. (C/REL ISAF) When the Netherlands, Russia, and Italy asked what more ISAF could do to stem opium cultivation, Costa responded that in addition to development the regional neighbors should get more involved. Russia said the UN had the key role in counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan and encouraged NATO, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan to also work with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Costa also said that the international community had to fight drug addiction and H.I.V infection and other health related issues as a result of Afghanistan's drug trade. Costa said there should be a focus on transiting routes along the silk road and through central Asia to Russia. He also said a greater number of NATO strikes on high value targets would be helpful in the counternarcotics campaign. Costa said there were 380 UNODC observers in Afghanistan who were not intelligence personnel and it was very easy for them to identify opium markets, labs, people, and shipping routes.
13. (C/REL ISAF) Costa encouraged all nations to contribute names of all known narco-traffickers to the 1735 U.N. Security Council list. To date, Costa said there are no names on the list. Identifying the narco-traffickers would allow countries to place a ban on their travel, seize their assets, and establish pre-conditions for their extradition. All efforts would contribute to the international community's fight against drugs.
Participation
-------------
14. (C/REL ISAF) A large number of non-NATO countries were invited to the briefing, including: Afghanistan, Russia, NATO's Central Asian partners, Australia, and Sweden. DAALDER
Wednesday, 30 January 2008, 09:26
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000332
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/26/2028
TAGS PREL, PGOV, CH, FR, GM, JA, UK, BM
SUBJECT: Beijing-based G-5 Chiefs of Mission on Sino-German
Reconciliation; Recent and Upcoming High-Level Visits
BEIJING 00000332 001.2 OF 003
Classified by Ambassador Clark T. Randt, Jr. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
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1. (C) At the January 25 bi-weekly G-5 Chiefs of Mission gathering, German Ambassador Schaefer described the recent reconciliation between China and Germany, announced upcoming visits by the Vice-Chancellor and Minister of the Environment and called the recent P5-plus-1 meeting a "good show of solidarity." UK Ambassador Ehrman described the excellent personal relations between Prime Minister Brown and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and the accomplishments during Brown's recent visit to China, including the signing of several Memoranda of Understanding. Upcoming British high-level visits include the Foreign Minister in February and the Chancellor of the Exchequer in April. Japanese Ambassador Miyamoto said that Prime Minister Fukuda's December 27-30 visit was a success, the highlight being a speech given at Beijing University in which Fukuda called for greater Japanese-Sino cooperation on international relations. Fukuda also visited the birthplace of Confucius as a reminder to the Japanese public of the shared cultural heritage of Japan and China. End Summary.
Participants
------------
2. (C) German Ambassador Dr. Michael Schaefer hosted French Ambassador Herve Ladsous, Japanese Ambassador Yuji Miyamoto, UK Ambassador William Ehrman and the Ambassador January 25 for the bi-weekly G-5 gathering of Beijing-based Chiefs of Mission.
Reconciliation between Germany and China
----------------------------------------
3. (C) Germany and China, whose relations had soured in the wake of Chancellor Angela Merkel's September 23 meeting with the Dalai Lama, began to thaw when German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier met Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi at the Annapolis Conference November 26-27. At that meeting, Yang suggested an exchange of letters to clarify Germany's position on China, Taiwan and the one China policy. In its letter, Germany reaffirmed its positions that "Taiwan and Tibet are integral parts of China," that Germany does not support separatism and opposes the Taiwan referendum on UN membership. The German letter also stated that Sino-German relations are founded on "mutual respect, equality and a concern for each other's key international interests." China asked the German government to consider additions to the letter, but the Germans refused. In its letter of acknowledgement, China added a "confirmation" regarding German non-interference in China's internal affairs, which the German letter had not mentioned. Given the delicate nature of the situation, however, the German Government decided not to argue the point. At a later meeting with Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Wu Hongbo, German Ambassador Schaefer said the German Chancellor can and will meet "whomever she wants, whenever she wants." German Ambassador Schaefer noted that different countries have received different treatment following their leaders' meetings with the Dalai Lama. He said the United States escaped virtually unscathed while the Austrian Ambassador to this day remains "a pariah," unable to meet even a Director General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
German Vice-Chancellor Visit
----------------------------
4. (C) German Foreign Minister Steinmeier will come to China in his capacity as Vice-Chancellor May 17-19 to visit Chongqing as part of a series of visits with the theme "Better Cities, Better Life." The visit will feature workshops on the environment and sustainable development, cultural exchanges including rock music concerts to attract a relatively young audience and professional training. The first such visit was held in Nanjing last October. The German and French Ambassadors both noted that the Mayor and the Executive Deputy Mayor of Chongqing are impressive and independent-minded.
German Minister of the Environment Visit
----------------------------------------
5. (C) German Minister of the Environment Sigmar Gabriel will visit China January 30-February 1 beginning in Guangzhou and continuing to Beijing. Topics of the visit will include nuclear safety and electronic waste. Ambassador Schaefer noted that the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has become considerably more difficult to work with, particularly since Chen Deming moved to the Ministry of Commerce.
Germans On P5-plus-1, Iranian Banks
BEIJING 00000332 002.2 OF 003
-----------------------------------
6. (C) German Ambassador Schaefer said that from the German point of view, the P5-plus-1 (P3-plus-3) meeting in Berlin was "good," as it showed cohesion among the six parties, who demonstrated a continued willingness to negotiate if Iran stops enrichment activities. The new UNSC resolution will be a combination of UNSC resolutions 1737 and 1747 with added elements that will send a clear signal to the people of Iran in advance of upcoming elections that the Iranian government is "going in the wrong direction." Germany has implemented effective new rules for banks that deal with Iran, Schaefer said. The rules are not full sanctions, but a "name and shame practice" that requires increased supervision for banks that deal with Iran. As a result of these rules, Schaefer claimed that no German banks are willing to conduct business with Iranian banks and even Chinese and Russian banks have increased their supervision of Iranian dealings.
UK Prime Minister Brown Visit
-----------------------------
7. (C) UK Ambassador Ehrman said British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao share an interest in economic growth, health and education, which provided a basis for good personal interaction. Brown and Wen struck such a good relationship that when Brown's visit continued in Shanghai, Wen accompanied him, despite not having prior plans to do so. During the visit, both sides agreed to hold an Economic and Financial Dialogue at the Vice Premier-level and the UK invited the Chinese Sovereign Wealth Fund, the China Investment Corporation, to establish an office in London, provided the fund remains transparent and commercially-motivated. During his time in Shanghai, Brown also confirmed British participation in the Shanghai World Expo in 2010. Brown and Wen also discussed Burma. Brown urged China to press the Burmese regime to allow Aung San Suu Kyi to hold weekly meetings with her associates.
Accomplishments During the Brown Visit
--------------------------------------
8. (C) During Brown's visit, the UK signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the city of Dongtan (near Shanghai) on creating a sustainable city. Dongtan is a model environmental city with a goal of zero carbon emissions. The British MOU established, inter alia, a "virtual academy" on sustainability with a large number of British and Chinese universities. The UK signed a second MOU with the city of Wuhan, also on sustainable development. During Brown's visit, the two countries agreed to redouble joint efforts to reach the benchmarks of the UN's Millennium Development Goals. The British also established a regular exchange program to allow young Chinese politicians to visit Britain. Finally, British pharmaceutical companies agreed to establish health programs in China.
UK-China Dialogue on International Organizations
--------------------------------------------- ---
9. (C) Wen and Brown agreed that UN should increase the number of taskforces dedicated to Peacekeeping and Reconstruction. Brown shared the view that the World Bank should concentrate more on environmental protection and that the IMF should play a watchdog role and seek to increase transparency. After a pause, Wen conceded that increased stability was worth the difficulties that come with transparency.
UK-China Entrepreneurs Lunch
----------------------------
10. (C) Brown's party included 30 high-ranking business people, as well as 250-300 other representatives from British businesses, who met with Chinese counterparts. Approximately 30 Chinese and British entrepreneurs, including British billionaire Richard Branson met at a lunch devoted to "What Makes a Good Entrepreneur?" The Chinese participants criticized British entrepreneurs as being "overeducated, too conservative, lacking passion for entrepreneurship and too afraid of failure." Branson agreed that British entrepreneurs are overeducated and that schooling does not prepare one for entering the business world. The Chinese also criticized their own system as inadequate to prepare people for entrepreneurship.
High-Level Visits To and From Britain
-------------------------------------
11. (C) British Foreign Minister David Miliband will visit China for six days beginning February 26. His trip will include stops in Beijing, Chongqing, Shenzhen and Hong Kong. Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling will visit China in mid-April. In
BEIJING 00000332 003.2 OF 003
February, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan will visit Britain as a part of a cultural festival called "China Now!" He is head of the Chinese delegation to the bilateral U.K.-Sino Task Force, chaired by Alistair Darling on the U.K. side.
Fukuda's Successful Visit
-------------------------
12. (C) Japanese Ambassador Miyamoto said that Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda received a warm welcome during his visit to China December 27-30. Fukuda had defended good Sino-Japanese relations while serving as the Chief Cabinet Minister under Koizumi, and the Chinese Government had promised that his visit would be a success. Parliamentary problems kept Fukuda from arranging his visit until the last moment, but the trip nonetheless went smoothly.
Deeper Meaning to Fukuda's Beijing University Speech
--------------------------------------------- -------
13. (C) Fukuda's speech at Beijing University was the highlight of his visit, Miyamoto said. During the speech, Fukuda noted that China and Japan are both big enough to play major roles in international relations; however, cooperation between the two is necessary for each to do so. Fukuda's visit to Qufu, the birthplace of Confucius, aimed to send a signal to Japanese audiences concerning the shared cultural heritage of Japan and China. Before the visit, the Chinese had asked Fukuda to make a statement on Taiwan, but given the physical proximity of Taiwan to Japan, Fukuda had been unwilling to do so. The Japanese Embassy, among others, had been thus been surprised when during his visit Fukuda made a voluntary statement that Japan would not support a Taiwan referendum on UN membership if it led Taiwan to "take unilateral action to change the status quo."
French High-Level Visitors
--------------------------
14. (C) French Ambassador Ladsous reported that the French Government had followed up in several ways after President Sarkozy's successful November 25-27 visit. French officials had made visits concerning nuclear energy, emerging diseases and secure biological laboratories for extremely infectious diseases. France also plans a large law enforcement delegation including the Director General of Police, the Head of the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (the French Counterintelligence Unit), the Chief of the Border Police, and the Chief of the Judiciary Police. These visitors will discuss Olympic security, counternarcotics, organized crime, and police training. Currently, Chinese police undergo training in France, and the French Government is also considering sending trainers to China. In April, former French Presidents Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Jacques Chirac plan to visit, as well as Prime Minister Francois Fillon and President of the French Senate Christian Poncelet. The French will also hold their strategic dialogue later this year, with a sub-dialogue on South America. French President Nicolas Sarkozy (along with other European leaders) will also visit China in October to attend the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit.
Olympics Attendees
------------------
15. (C) Princess Anne will represent the UK at the 2008 Olympics Opening Ceremony. Prime Minister Brown will attend the Closing Ceremony, to receive the handoff for the 2012 Olympics. French President Sarkozy will attend the Opening Ceremony, Prime Minister Fillon will attend the Closing Ceremony and Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner will attend the Paralympics. Japanese Crown Prince Naruhito is considering attending the opening ceremonies.
Other Issues
------------
16. (C) Ambassador Miyamoto noted that the Japanese Government is sponsoring over 4,000 young people as part of a Japanese-Sino youth exchange. The French and German Ambassadors noted their governments had sponsored "millions" of young people in exchanges with China over the years. The French and German Ambassadors also both noted an increase in Chinese purchases of lower quality pig meat, such as offal.
Thursday, 12 February 2009, 18:25
C O N F I D E N T I A L VANCOUVER 000031
STATE FOR DS/P/MECU, DS/DSS/DO, DS/IP/WHA
STATE FOR WHA/CAN
EO 12958 DECL: 2/11/2019
TAGS CA, PGOV, KOLY, ASEC, ECON
SUBJECT: VANCOUVER 2010 OLYMPICS FEELING THE ECONOMIC PINCH IN
PREPARATIONS, SECURITY
CLASSIFIED BY: G. Kathleen Hill, Political/Economic Chief, US Consulate Vancouver, State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (U) Summary: The global economic crisis and modern demands of post 9/11 security are proving to be huge challenges for the organizers of the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver. The competition and special events venues are complete and already hosting test events, but the financial crisis surrounding the Olympic Village has consumed local politicians and media (and was probably the determining factor in the recent Vancouver Mayoral election). Finances are also looming large over the Games' security. Original estimates of C$175 million have now ballooned to a figure somewhere between C$400 million and C$1 billion. While the Province and the Government of Canada (GOC) continue to negotiate who pays what, other costs, in the form of police and military resources, are beginning to be born across the region. The impact may reach far beyond the Games, with significant reductions in policing activity and investigations nationwide. Because of the economic downturn, the Vancouver Olympics Committee (VANOC) has already announced modest changes to save money, but is still promising to stage spectacular Games - within available financial resources. End Summary.
Ready to Compete, But Not to Sleep
2. (U) Vancouver is set to host the Winter Olympics in February 2010. Optimism over the event remains strong, as evidenced by the recent phase one ticket sales for Canadians only, which sold out completely in just a few hours and left many subscribers with only a small portion of requested tickets. However the global economic crisis is creating headaches not envisioned when the city bid and won the right to host the Games. Controversies abound over the "true" costs of the Games. The Olympics were used by Vancouver and British Columbia to jump start planned but expensive infrastructure projects such as the C$600 million upgrade of the Sea-to-Sky Highway between Vancouver and Whistler and the new C$2 billion Canada Line rapid transit system. Critics like to lump these costs in with the more direct Olympics costs, emphasizing an overwhelming burden placed on the BC and Canadian taxpayer.
3. (U) Amidst the criticism, VANOC has shown remarkable financial astuteness, beginning serious revisions of the Games' operating budget in spring 2008, well before the serious specter of a global financial crisis became evident. All competition venues, one of the main areas of responsibility for VANOC, are completed or will be completed on time and within budget. VANOC recently announced a revision to the budget, increasing the final price tag on operating the Games by C$127 million to a total of C$1.76 billion. According to VANOC's Executive Vice President, David Guscott, the Organizing Committee has obtained enough corporate sponsorship and ticket and souvenir sales to bring it within sight of this budget, lacking only about C$30 million to reach its goal. But it has had to make sacrifices to keep on target, such as decreasing hiring and making changes in operational plans, including eliminating a nightly medal awards ceremony in downtown Whistler that has that community's residents feeling betrayed. Despite the financial challenges, VANOC's revenue from ticket sales and corporate sponsorship remains on target and the organization appears weQ placed to meet its obligations.
4. (U) The same cannot be said for the C$700 million-plus Olympic Village, a key element of the Games and a major responsibility of the City of Vancouver. The Village is being developed by a private corporation on prime waterfront land provided by the city. It's slated to become a mixed use residential/commercial area after the Games with high, middle and low-income housing. The developer ran into problems in September, when more than C$100 million in cost overruns threatened to stop the project. Then Mayor Sam Sullivan and the City Council held a series of closed door meetings where they developed a plan for the city to provide guarantees so a loan could be obtained to cover the increases. The secretiveness of the financial arrangements became a major factor in the December city elections, which saw Sullivan's coalition lose the mayoral seat and all but one city council position. In addition, the controversy caused the city manager, a senior deputy and the chief financial officer to lose their jobs. In December, just after the elections, the primary financial backer of the project, U.S. company Fortress Investment Group, announced it would not deliver the final C$458 million in capital to complete the project due to financial losses from the sub-prime mortgage crisis. The new mayor, Gregor Robertson, found himself in the same hot seat, dealing with the possible collapse of the project. In the end, he sought, and was granted, special provincial legislative authority for the city to seek loans to cover completion of the project. Olympic critics have had a field day with the problems, promoting stories of taxpayer losses in the billions, and a combination of substantive factors led Moody's and Standard & Poor to place the City of Vancouver on credit-watch status. Real estate analysts have been more optimistic, asserting that the city could make a considerable profit on the deal down the road and highlighting the fact that it is the last undeveloped piece of waterfront property in downtown and very desirable. The city paid only C$50 million for the land through its Property Endowment Fund, a longterm investment fund estimated to be worth almost C$3 billion. Even if the development makes only half of the originally estimated profit, the fund could cover the immediate loss without affecting the city operation's budget and, as a longterm investment, it could still be a win for the city. VANOC's Guscott was confident the city would meet its part of the deal, presenting a completed, functioning Village on time. In VANOC's view the project has been caught in an unfortunate cross between municipal elections and the downturn in the economy, with the financial problems severely overblown.
Security - But at What Price?
5. (U) Perhaps the biggest loss will be taken by the province of British Columbia and the Government of Canada (GOC) which will bear the brunt of cost overruns in the security of the games. The Integrated Security Unit (ISU) was set up to manage the Games' security. It is headed by the RCMP, with representative from all major police, intelligence and defense entities. Original estimates on Olympics security were in the C$175 million range. But now no one is willing to give a number. The provincial Finance Minister, Colin Hansen, will only say it's somewhere between C$400 million and C$1 billion. Hansen admits he was surprised at the estimates coming out of Ottawa for overall security. A special committee was established early on to determine B.C.'s and the GOC's shares of incremental costs above basic policing. The ballooning nature of the security structure and programs has left the committee bogged down in "endless line-by-line micro-analysis," according to Hansen. Consequently the Province offered up a final, comprehensive plan on who pays what which is in Ottawa for approval. Realistically, as the ISU tests and refines its plans, the costs continue to be fluid and the final numbers will not be known until after the Games are completed. BC originally estimated its overall Games' costs, including infrastructure, venues and security, at approximately C$600 million. Minister Hansen announced on February 9 that the new security numbers will force the province well over that mark. With 2009 a provincial election year in BC, the cost of Games' security is becoming a major issue for the ruling BC Liberals, who are hoping a reasonable agreement with the GOC will soften the financial blow.
6. (C) Beyond monetary costs, the Olympics are beginning to create critical resource costs. Law enforcement representatives working at the U.S. Consulate in Vancouver are reporting that more and more of their contacts are being pulled to work on Olympics security issues. A DEA agent was told by one of his RCMP counterparts that by September all regional drug agents could be working on Olympics, with no investigations ongoing until March 2010. Already the RCMP has all but stopped marijuana-related investigations. RCMP is also undergoing severe belt tightening with new, stricter enforcement of overtime rules. To highlight the Canadian constraints, an RCMP officer told us that the Italians put 30,000 Carabinieri in Turin for the 2006 Winter Games and the RCMP has less than 30,000 officers in all of Canada.
Big Business, But no Room at the Inn
7. (U) The 2010 Olympics are presenting significant financial opportunities for area residents and businesses. In addition to the massive infrastructure and construction projects, VANOC is procuring millions of dollars in services and support for the Games. And Canadians are not the only recipients of these contracts. U.S. firms have managed to win several major contracts thus far to provide everything from tents and portable toilets to tickeQprinting, dining services and flags for the games.
8. (U) One big concern for many in the tourist industry, and for those of us working the Games for the USG, is the question of accommodations. The International Olympics Committee requires a host city to provide between 20,000 and 25,000 rooms for just the Olympic "family" alone (sponsors, officials, etc). This leaves little room for the spectators who come to watch the Games and the visiting dignitaries. IOC rules give only five rooms to the National Olympic Committees (NOCs) for official delegations from participating countries. If delegations, and their support and security, are more than five people, it is incumbent on the delegation to find its own additional accommodations. Consulate General Vancouver has already secured accommodations for the agencies participating in the Olympics Coordination Office and the Joint Operations Center but would like to make an urgent plea for notification as soon as possible of the composition of the official delegations to the Opening and Closing Ceremonies of the Olympic Games. (The Paralympics are much smaller and accommodations will be more readily available.) Accommodations are scarce to non-existent now and the sooner we know the make-up of delegations, the more likely we will be able to provide suitable rooms within reasonable distance of the major venues.
9. (SBU) Comment: It should be noted that in every meeting we have with Olympics officials the first question is "Who is heading your Opening Ceremonies delegation?" Although the official invitation comes from the NOC, in this case the U.S. Olympic Committee, to the VIP, most Canadians involved are hoping that President Obama and his family will attend the Games. The President is immensely popular in Canada and given the Games' proximity to the U.S. there are high expectations that the President and his family will make an appearance.
10. (C) Proximity is also on our minds as we look at overall Olympic security. With the Olympics being held within 30 miles of the U.S. border there are already numerous areas where security is a shared responsibility, such as our pre-existing shared responsibilities over airspace through Northcom. The Canadians are doing an excellent job in developing their security strategy, but we are starting to see some small signs that they are feeling the pinch of economic and personnel shortages. They are sensitive to the issues of sovereignty and we have been reminded repeatedly that they are responsible for the overall security of the Games. Our Olympics Coordination Office and Olympics Security Coordinator are working very closely with VANOC and the ISU and closely monitoring developments with an eye toward any possible further assistance we can provide should the needs arise. End Comment.
CHICOLA
Wednesday, 20 January 2010, 01:34
UNCLAS STATE 005277
SIPDIS
MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE CHIEF OF MISSION OR
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS PREL, KPAO, KDEM, OIIP, HA
SUBJECT: Personally Engaging on Haiti
1. The tragic earthquake in Haiti and its aftermath pose enormous challenges to the people of Haiti, our nation, and the entire world community. As we seek to rescue trapped victims, assist survivors, and help Haiti begin to rebuild, the American people and our government have marshaled unprecedented resources to help, reflecting the best of our nation's values.
2. I am deeply concerned by instances of inaccurate and unfavorable international media coverage of America's role and intentions in Haiti. This misinformation threatens to undermine the international partnership needed to help the people of Haiti, and to damage our international engagement across the range of issues. It is imperative to get the narrative right over the long term. Where you see ill-informed or distorted perspectives in your host country media, I direct you as Chief of Mission to personally contact media organizations at the highest possible level - owners, publishers, or others, as appropriate - to push back and insist on informed and responsible coverage of our actions and intentions, and to underscore the U.S. partnership with the Government of Haiti, the United Nations, and the world community. It is important that you and other members of your Embassy team engage opinion-makers in setting the record straight on America's commitment to assist the Haitian people and government in recovering from this disaster.
3. I also ask you to report back to me through your Assistant Secretary, citing specific examples of irresponsible journalism in your host countries, and what action you have taken in response. This is a personal priority for me and I will be looking for your reports.
4. The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, working with your regional Public Diplomacy Offices and your Public Affairs Officers at post, will ensure you have the latest facts and talking points. The Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) has assembled a regularly updated Haiti Earthquake Assistance page to assist your efforts: https://infocentral.state.gov/haiti-earthquak e- assistance. The Under Secretary will also coordinate a regular ALDAC cable conveying the latest facts and talking points.
5. Please let Under Secretary McHale and your regional Assistant Secretary know if you need additional information or other support to carry out this important engagement effort.
6. I thank you for your personal attention to this very important matter.
7. Minimize considered. CLINTON
Wednesday, 03 June 2009, 15:09
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NASSAU 000349
NOFORN
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/CAR JROSHOLT, UK DESK ZSYED, LONDON FOR CPALMER
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS PGOV, PREL, SMIG, PHUM, ECON, ETRD, EFIN, BF, TK, UK
SUBJECT: UK DIRECT RULE COMING SOON TO TURKS AND CAICOS
1. (SBU/NF) SUMMARY: The UK is set to introduce direct rule in the British Overseas Territory of the Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI) to address evidence of official corruption and financial mismanagement as the protests of the embattled ex-Premier and his successor fall on deaf ears. Domestic opposition to the move is weak, but may increase as the government's financial woes become clear and the economy worsens. The insular nature of the small islands' population will also impact UK efforts to reform governance and accountability. END SUMMARY.
-------------------------
GOVERNOR: CONSTITUTIONAL SUSPENSION GUARANTEED
-------------------------
2. (SBU/NF) Gordon Wetherell, Britain's new governor of the tiny Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI) British Overseas Territory just to the south of The Bahamas, told Embassy Nassau Charge that he is certain that the final report from a Commission of Inquiry into gross mismanagement by ex-Premier Michael Misick - due to be made public in the next few weeks - will cause London to suspend TCI's constitution and its elected House of Assembly. Wetherell admitted that the suspension of local elected government is a harsh but necessary step toward rectifying years of financial mismanagement the by the Misick administration. In a separate conversation May 29 with Embassy London Poloff, an FCO officer who covers TCI issues observed that "the situation has not improved" in TCI since the issuance of the interim report. The FCO officer affirmed that the final report should be complete soon, that HMG would spend a few weeks "digesting" the report, and would "almost certainly" suspend the constitution and take steps to introduce direct British rule.
------------------------------------
EX-, CURRENT LEADERS PROTEST IN VAIN
------------------------------------
3. (SBU/NF) Misick launched a bitter tirade on a radio show May 5 that blasted Wetherell personally as an arrogant dictator and called for TCI independence as the only way to stop the suspension of local government and save TCI from losing its "sovereignty." Misick charged that the proposed suspension of the constitution contravened the EU Convention on Human Rights, but according to Wetherell and local press the UK has withdrawn its commitment to the section of the Convention which guaranteed the territory's right to self-determination, making the point moot. Misick is also engaged in a series of legal motions in British courts to forestall the suspension but Wetherell said he expected the motions would not delay the final report, noting the UK High Court had rejected Misick's case and he was confident that an appeal to the Court of Appeals would similarly fail.
4. (SBU/NF) Galmo Williams, who became Premier on March 25, traveled to the UK May 17 for a last ditch direct appeal to London, met with members of the House of Lords as well as FCO Under-Secretary Gillian Merron, who has responsibility for Overseas Territories. Williams presented actions already being taken by his fledgling government to address recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry's interim report, such as a Code of Conduct for government officials and beefing up laws on apportioning Crown lands. He also explored whether Britain would consider becoming financially responsible for the TCI. Failing to secure an audience with Prime Minister Gordon Brown or Opposition leader David Cameron, Williams returned with little to show for his effort.
--------------------------
PREMIER BLAMES BRITS, SAYS SUPPORT FOR UK WILL FIZZLE
--------------------------
5. (SBU/NF) Speaking with the Charge just before his trip to London, Premier Williams warned that Governor Wetherell's plan to appoint consultative bodies to act as counsels instead of the House of Assembly would be a fiasco. Wetherell separately confirmed to the Charge that he was compiling a "representative list" of TCI locals, known as Belongers, which would include "every element" of TCI society. These would include Belongers of Haitian descent, a highly sensitive issue in a territory of 30,000 of whom half are estimated to be illegal Haitian migrants (non-Belongers). Williams acknowledged that the suspension of local governance currently had strong support among some Belongers but cautioned that the 17,000 Belongers were all interrelated and resentment against UK rule would build rapidly, particularly as the cost of returning TCI to financial soundness began to bite amidst the economic pain of the global recession already affecting the islands.
6. (SBU/NF) Premier Williams passionately argued that the British bear some responsibility for TCI's mess. He pointed out that
NASSAU 00000349 002 OF 002
Governor Tauwhare, who left under a cloud last July, sat in on cabinet meetings and "signed off" on budgets, investment decisions and disposition of Crown lands. Wetherell acknowledged to the Charge that the relationship between Tauwhare and Misick was uncomfortably close, but ruefully added that the governor's role, until now, had been largely ceremonial and pro-forma.
---------------------------------------
THEY AGREE: NO KID GLOVES THIS TIME ...
---------------------------------------
7. (SBU/NF) Governor Wetherell insisted to the Charge that the UK would not repeat the mistake of being too soft on TCI, a reference to what he characterized as London's lenient approach when it was forced to intervene against former Chief Minister Norman Saunders' government after Saunders was arrested in Miami on drug charges in 1985. After serving time in the U.S., Saunders returned to a hero's welcome and is currently a sitting member of the Assembly. Wetherell noted that trial by jury would be suspended when UK rule took effect because the pool of jurors was too small for the expected criminal prosecutions against senior TCI officials. Premier Williams seemed to unintentionally support Wetherell's comments when he told the Charge that any prosecutions would inevitably hit leaders of powerful local families, which "in a short time" would alienate many Belongers.
8. (SBU/NF) Williams predicted that Wetherell would likely seek to change the deep- seated patronage system in TCI under the "guise" of good governance measures. Williams pointed out that the opposition People's Democratic Party (PDM) was already divided over the constitutional suspension, an indicator of the fragility of the UK's position. The point on the fractured nature of TCI's political leadership was reinforced by former Bahamian Foreign Minister Fred Mitchell. Mitchell, shadow foreign affairs leader for the Bahamian opposition party, recently led a delegation to TCI that wanted to explore ways to rally CARICOM against London resuming direct rule. Mitchell told the Charge that they found surprising ambivalence among TCI government officials and that the opposition PDM refused even to meet with the Bahamian delegation. Mitchell said that this explained the lack of serious Caribbean-wide efforts, at least for now, against the resumption of direct UK rule.
------------------------------
... AS FINANCIAL WOES RUN DEEP
------------------------------
9. (SBU/NF) Wetherell and a team of UK experts are preparing for the daunting task of taking direct government responsibilities for running TCI, insisting that the UK must suspend local government to give the colony "breathing space" to sort out its problems. He "hoped" the constitutional suspension would remain in effect for two years, when the next Assembly elections were scheduled to take place, a requisite amount of time needed particularly to resolve TCI's dire financial situation. Wetherell said that the final Commission report would reveal a larger fiscal hole than widely believed. Misick had overdrawn TCI official lending limits, USD 5 million, "by well over four-fold" and other debts were also in the millions. Misick himself was apparently settling in the Dominican Republic to avoid extradition, but the UK was already working to identify his bank accounts.
ZUNIGA-BROWN
Thursday, 03 September 2009, 15:18
C O N F I D E N T I A L NASSAU 000527
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/03/2019
TAGS ECON, POL, PGOV, BF
SUBJECT: BAHAMAS ASKED TO ANNEX TURKS AND CAICOS
REF: A. NASSAU 520 B. NASSAU 169 C. NASSAU 191
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Zuniga-Brown for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (U) Former Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI) Premier Michael Misick announced his belief that the people of TCI are interested in becoming an autonomous state of The Bahamas. Misick remarked that a federation would be advantageous to The Bahamas because TCI services could be provided to the southern Bahamian islands, thereby taking the strain off Nassau. Misick resigned in March in the wake of a corruption investigation of the government which resulted in the suspension of the TCI Constitution.
2. (U) GCOB Prime Minister (PM) Hubert Ingraham said he would be "happy to discuss" a federation, but only once the constitutional crisis was over. The PM reported being involved in diplomatic initiatives, including consulting with CARICOM, to work toward a quick resolution of the crisis. He said any future discussions about a federation would have to be in accordance with the wishes of the people of The Bahamas and TCI. Opposition Member of Parliament Fred Mitchell also appeared to support the idea of a federation calling the proposal "a fascinating idea worth exploring", but also conditioned his response to TCI resolving its current situation.
3. (C) Embassy sources in TCI report that there is a high level of public anxiety and uncertainty following the constitutional suspension. Government salaries are late and overall job security is a major preoccupation of the people. Massive layoffs are rumored as the U.K. government has reportedly ordered a halt to many projects that were tainted by the corruption investigation. The impact to tourism and investment is expected to be significant.
4. (C) COMMENT. The GCOB and opposition statements on federation are rhetoric designed to placate a historical neighbor during uncertain times. Mitchell was careful to note that the times in which the two countries were united, most recently from 1965 to 1973, were not "entirely happy". If the U.K. is able to quickly stabilize conditions in the country and restore government confidence, little is likely to materialize from the federation suggestion. However, if economic conditions worsen, there could be increased calls for The Bahamas to take action; calls the Bahamas is unlikely to heed. ZUNIGA-BROWN
Saturday, 23 January 2010, 06:22
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000001
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 1/23/2020
TAGS ECON, EINV, EPET, KCRM, PGOV, ASEC, IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH: FOREIGN SECURITY FIRMS ADAPT TO CHANGING CONDITIONS
REF: A. BAGHDAD 63 B. BAGHDAD 30
BASRAH 00000001 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: John Naland, PRT Team Leader, PRT Basra, US State Department. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (U) This is a Basrah PRT reporting cable.
Summary
-------
2. (SBU) Since 2003, prominent foreign security companies such as Control Risks, Aegis, and Olive Group have been a familiar and prominent presence in Basrah. Their armored convoys and heavily armed western security guards protect and escort foreign companies and foreign government clients to appointments and site visits. Many, if not all, international oil companies (IOCs) employ them. However, the composition and bottom line of many security firms are changing due to improved security, greater competition, an increasing Iraqi workforce, and the GOI and public's desire to see fewer armed westerners on their streets. While some IOCs complain of exorbitant charges for protection, security firms claim that Basrah still remains a potentially dangerous place. These firms will likely continue to increase their Iraqi workforce, recognizing locals' greater familiarity with the culture, language, and terrain, reinforced by the better reception they enjoy with the populace, police, army and GOI. End summary.
Foreign security companies in Basrah
------------------------------------
3. (SBU) Foreign security companies with their armored convoys and heavily armed western security guards have been part of the landscape of Basrah since 2003. These firms escort and assist foreign company and foreign government clients to appointments and site visits. Many, if not all, IOCs employ them as well. Firms like Control Risks, Aegis, Olive Group, and BritAm dominate the sector.
4. (SBU) Some firms also offer more comprehensive services, including business intelligence, geopolitical risk management, crisis management, and kidnap/ransom strategies. Typical services in Basrah include armed escort to oil fields, downtown Basrah, or remote construction sites. Most firms boast of employees with military or Special Forces background, and/or energy or engineering expertise. Prices for specific services are hard to gauge, dependent as they are on the number of people assisted, visit location, length of contract, and other services provided.
5. (SBU) According to our contacts, however, they do not come cheap: to escort a single executive for a four-hour, roundtrip from COB Basrah to South Oil Company costs around USD 6,000. (Note: A typical trip would include four security agents, drivers, and three or four armored vehicles. End note.) A day trip to the Port of Umm Qasr and back for two engineers could cost around USD 12,000. A recent visit by a member of the Council of Representatives from Baghdad to Basrah and back ran about USD 12,000. According to several local security representatives, however, costs for such services are beginning to fall, largely due to lessening security risks, the use of more local staff, and increased competition. (Note: The PRT has no method for verifying this assessment. End note.)
Improved security, preference for Iraqi workers forcing changes
--------------------------------------------- ------------------
6. (SBU) The composition of the workforce of many security companies is beginning to change, and will likely change more soon. There are several reasons for the shift. The first is improved security. Although no one is suggesting that security companies are no longer needed, security improvements have made it possible for maneuvers to occur with slightly less staff, vehicles, and weapons. They can also employ more local staff. All of these changes translate into lower operational and customer costs. The GOI's and the public's strong desire to see fewer foreign guards carrying guns is also a driving factor. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the GOI is anxious to "get rid of all the white faces carrying guns" in their streets. Many local security company reps openly acknowledge that a more "Iraqi face" is safer as well, as it draws less attention.
7. (C) It appears that this sentiment has increased in the wake of the Blackwater verdict in the United States (refs A, B) and recent GOI actions could point to an even more aggressive stance against these companies. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX on January 12, a China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) security team was stopped in Basrah city by the Iraqi police in a "clear attempt to disrupt and cause panic to the clients." XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the Iraqi police stopped the convoy and showed a letter from the Ministry of Interior (MOI) stating that as of January 12, personal security teams now faced a more restrictive weapons regime. The situation was eventually resolved, and the convoy
BASRAH 00000001 002.2 OF 003
was released, but XXXXXXXXXXXX said that this episode could presage a more restrictive posture towards security firms "in retaliation for the Blackwater verdict." XXXXXXXXXXXX said that on January 13, still another MOI directive had instructed that all security companies (including those working for the USG) are required to resubmit all company, employee, weapons and vehicle information to the MOI, as if they were applying for a new license. (Note: PRT is seeking more details about these allegedly new policies. End note.)
Security firms getting an Iraqi face
------------------------------------
8. (SBU) Most, if not all, of these security firms are already Iraqi-licensed companies. (Note: While legally they may be Iraqi firms, they are still managed by expats, usually British nationals. End note.) These firms were once largely staffed by expats from the U.K. or U.S. Most of them today have between 70 to 80 per cent local staff. XXXXXXXXXXX country managerXXXXXXXXXXXX said that currently most Iraqi employees are drivers or junior security guards. In the near future, he wants to see them move into full management. Many of the current expat managers and trainers would move into the background areas of training and management. The PRT also expects that new local security companies will be formed.
Some IOCs complain of high prices; exaggerated threat
--------------------------------------------- --------
9. (C) Several IOC representatives have complained of what they contend are unwarranted high prices especially given the vastly improved security situation since 2008. The security firms justify their steep charges by insisting that their own costs - purchase and import of armored cars and weapons, highly skilled professionals - necessitate the pricing. Halliburton Iraq country manager decried a "mafia" of these companies and their "outrageous" prices, and said that they also exaggerate the security threat. Apart from the high costs for routine trips, he claimed that Halliburton often receives what he says are "questionable" reports of vulnerability of employees to kidnapping and ransom. He said that he recently saw an internal memo from their security company which tasked its employees to emphasize the persistent danger faced by IOCs. PRT Econoffs have heard that Halliburton, Shell, and BP, among others, are evaluating their options regarding security firms, with an eye towards finding cheaper alternatives.
Companies claim that high risk is still present
--------------------------------------------- --
10. (C) Security firms openly acknowledge the improved security situation, but claim that Basrah remains a dangerous place. Firms often highlight recent IDFs, VBEIDs, or other attacks. (Comment: These companies also appear to be very plugged into the latest security incidents. It is unclear where they get their information. End comment.) At a recent dinner attended by representatives from France-based Total oil company and Control Risks, a starkly divergent picture of the Basrah security situation emerged. Several Total employees, veterans of the local scene and evidently well-briefed on current security issues, opined that they felt comfortable in downtown Basrah. Control Risk reps disagreed sharply citing the still-present "extremely dangerous" threats of kidnappings and armed attacks. They said it would be "years" before western businesspeople, let alone tourists, could walk the streets of Basrah with any reasonable feeling of safety.
11. (C) Reconciling these views is not easy. While security is clearly better, there is no guarantee this trend will continue. Corporate boards are often very conservative about security and often insist their employees retain security firms. Governments can be similarly risk adverse. Two expat port consultants working for the Japanese aid agency (JICA) told PRT EconOff that JICA policy mandates they travel with internationally known security firms.
With security improved, market forces at work more
--------------------------------------------- ------
12. (SBU) As security continues to improve and pressure increases for security firms to have more of an "Iraqi face," market forces could play a bigger role. IOCs, faced with tight contractual margins, are reviewing the high costs for security. Improved security could translate into a less manpower and equipment. Increased competition and more local employees could translate into lower costs and pricing. According to Olive Security and G4S, charges have decreased over the last 18 months. They note that some of the more profitable security contracts tendered by the US and UK military in the past have disappeared or will do so soon. They claim that newer contracts with IOCs are not as generous. Italy-based oil company ENI's contract with Aegis is "much less" costly than that Aegis's
BASRAH 00000001 003.2 OF 003
current contract with the US Army Corps of Engineers.
Comment
-------
13. (SBU) With improved security and absent a major upsurge in violence, security companies will likely become ever more Iraqi both in legal terms and number of workers. This shift could provide more jobs and give local security firms and employees valuable expertise. The lower cost of increasingly Iraqi security will also help the bottom lines of IOCs. For their part, security companies recognize the many advantages of hiring well-vetted local employees with greater familiarity with Iraqi culture, language, terrain, and people. The better reception they enjoy with the populace, police, army, and government may pay dividends as well. End comment.
14. (SBU) RSO Baghdad Comment: RSO believes that although security in Basrah appears to have improved, the environment should be regarded with cautious optimism and judgment reserved to observe the overall security environment after the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq. It is too early to be able to gauge whether the security environment in Iraq will allow effective employment of local nationals as members of Protective Security teams supporting private industry activities. RSO understands the value of employing local nationals to support the Protective Security effort. Presently, an effort is in place to train Iraqi Police to work with RSO Protective Security Details, and RSO's current employment of them is judicious and strictly controlled. RSO believes that building a labor pool of well-vetted local employees in Iraq's current environment is difficult. RSO efforts to vet local nationals for employment is labor intensive, often subjective and many times proves to be too difficult for many local national employees to complete successfully. Additionally, USG efforts to train local nationals in Protective Security tradecraft to ensure technical proficiency appears to be intensive in labor and time required, with mixed results. End Comment. NALAND
Monday, 13 August 2001, 11:46
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VATICAN 004258
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/WE (MENNUTI), EUR/OHI
FROM EMBASSY VATICAN/MESSAGE NO. 134/01
EO 12958 DECL: 08/10/06
TAGS PREL, PHUM, KNAR, PHUM, KNAR, VT.PREL, VT.
SUBJECT: VATICAN ARCHIVES Q "THE REAL STORY"
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 VATICA 04258 01 OF 02 131205Z REF: STATE 137397
CLASSIFIED BY A/DCM GEORGE FROWICK, REASON E.O. 12958 (B,D).
1. (C) A/DCM AND POLITICAL ASSISTANT MET WITH JESUIT FATHER PETER GUMPEL AUGUST 10 AT HIS OFFICES IN THE JESUIT CURIA TO DISCUSS THE TECHNICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN OPENING THE VATICAN ARCHIVES. (NOTE: THIS WAS A PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED MEETING, I.E. BEFORE WE RECEIVED REFTEL. WE NEVERTHELESS DELIVERED SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME SET OF POINTS, FOCUSING ON THE USG'S INTEREST IN PROMOTING A POSITIVE, PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE, AND QUICKLY, AS THE HOLOCAUST GENERATION IS PASSING. END NOTE.) GUMPEL IMMEDIATELY ADVISED THAT THE ISSUE OF ACCESS TO THE VATICAN ARCHIVES RELATED TO THE WORLD WAR II ERA WAS SIMPLY AN INTERNAL MATTER OF PROCEDURE AND NOT A POLITICAL ONE. XXXXXXXXXXXX HE ASSURED US THAT HE WAS A JUDGE FOR MATERIAL USED IN THE PROCESS TO DECLARE PIUS XII A SAINT AND NOT THE PROMOTER OF THE CAUSE FOR SAINTHOOD.
-----------------------
THE "TECHNICAL" PROCESS CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 VATICA 04258 01 OF 02 131205Z
-----------------------
2. (C) WHEN PRESSED, GUMPEL, WITH SCHOLARLY PRECISION, EXPLAINED THE TECHNICAL PROCEDURES FOR ACCESS TO THE VATICAN ARCHIVES. THE MOST RECENT MATERIAL RELEASED FOR SCHOLARLY SCRUTINY GOES BACK FIVE PONTIFICATES. MATERIAL RELATED TO THE REIGN OF BENEDICT XV (1914-1922) HAS BEEN CLASSIFIED AND CATALOGUED AND IS AVAILABLE TO RESEARCHERS. CLASSIFICATION AND CATALOGUING OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE PONTIFICATE OF PIUS XI (1922-1939) WILL BE COMPLETED IN 2009 AT THE LATEST. GUMPEL SAID HE HOPES FOR AN EARLIER COMPLETION DATE. (NOTE. THE PIUS XI DOCUMENTS WILL CONTAIN MATERIAL RELATED TO PIUS XII WHEN, AS CARDINAL EUGENIO PACELLI, HE WAS PIUS XI'S SECRETARY OF STATE Q PM EQUIVALENT - FROM 1930 UNTIL 1939.
SIPDIS END NOTE). WORK TO CLASSIFY AND CATALOGUE MATERIAL RELATED TO POPE PIUS XII (1939-1958) WOULD NORMALLY COMMENCE IN 2009. GUMPEL POINTED OUT THAT FOUR JESUITS HAD BEEN GIVEN ACCESS TO THE LITERALLY MILLIONS OF DOCUMENTS AND HAD SPENT 17 YEARS (1964-1981) SORTING OUT ALL/ALL THE DIPLOMATIC MATERIAL RELATING TO PIUS XII'S ACTIVITY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR. THESE WERE THE PAPERS PUBLISHED IN THE 12 VOLUMES TO HAVE BEEN REVIEWED BY THE COMMISSION. (COMMENT: IT IS POST'S UNDERSTANDING THAT IT CURRENTLY IS LOGISTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO OPEN UP THE VATICAN ARCHIVES RELATED TO PIUS XII'S ACTIVITIES DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR. GUMPEL SAID IT CONSISTS OF SEVERAL HUNDRED BOXES (THROUGH WHICH THE JESUITS WENT PAPER-BY-PAPER EXTRACTING ALL DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS FOR REVIEW) AND MILLIONS OF SHEETS OF PAPER. MANY OF THESE ARE PASTORAL DOCUMENTS (LETTERS TO PRIESTS, ETC) THAT HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THE HOLOCAUST, BUT WHICH COULD PROVE EMBARRASSING TO LIVING PEOPLE. IT TOOK FOUR HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 VATICA 04258 01 OF 02 131205Z MOTIVATED, INTELLIGENT, MULTILINGUAL JESUITS 17 YEARS TO SORT THROUGH AND PUBLISH THE MATERIAL. END COMMENT.) THE VATICAN INSISTS THE OTHER DOCUMENTS WILL BE OPEN TO SCRUTINY ONCE THEY HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED AND CATALOGUED AND NOT BEFORE. TWO ARCHIVISTS STAFF THE VATICAN ARCHIVE. GUMPEL ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS INADEQUATE AND THAT HE HAS REQUESTED AN INCREASE IN PERSONNEL PRECISELY TO SPEED US THE PROCESS. GUMPEL INFORMED US THAT THIS ARCHIVAL PROCEDURE HAD BEEN CLEARLY EXPLAINED TO THE SCHOLARS ON THE COMMISSION OVER THE COURSE OF MANY CONVERSATIONS.
-----------------------------------
ACRIMONY FROM THE COMMISSION'S WORK
-----------------------------------
3. (C) GUMPEL RECOUNTED AN OCTOBER 2000 MEETING HE HAD BEEN ASKED TO ATTEND WITH MEMBERS OF THE JEWISH-VATICAN COMMISSION STUDYING PIUS XII'S ROLE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. THE MEETING WAS TAPE-RECORDED WITH THE CONSENT OF ALL THOSE PRESENT. XXXXXXXXXXXX NONE OF THE COMMISSION MEMBERS HAD READ ALL THE PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS, AND MOST WERE NOT ABLE TO READ THE DOCUMENTS IN THE ORIGINAL ITALIAN AND HAD TO RELY ON TRANSLATED SUMMARIES. GUMPEL NOTED THAT FROM A SCHOLARLY PERSPECTIVE, THIS SITUATION WAS "LESS THAN IDEAL." THE COMMISSION'S REPORT, WHICH CONSISTED OF 46 COMPLEX QUESTIONS, GUMPEL HAD PREPARED TO ANSWER. HE WORKED
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 05 VATICA 04258 01 OF 02 131205Z
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0646
PAGE 01 VATICA 04258 02 OF 02 131206Z ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AMAD-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 DS-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 VCE-00 NSAE-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 DSCC-00 LBA-00 PRM-01 DRL-02 SAS-00 /003W ------------------115973 131213Z /38 R 131146Z AUG 01 FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0000 INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 VATICAN 004258
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/WE (MENNUTI), EUR/OHI
FROM EMBASSY VATICAN/MESSAGE NO. 134/01
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/06 TAGS: PREL, PHUM, KNAR, VT. SUBJECT: VATICAN ARCHIVES Q "THE REAL STORY"
UP A SERIES OF HISTORICAL DOSSIERS, INCLUDING PRIMARY DOCUMENTS. XXXXXXXXXXXX THOSE SAME VATICAN OFFICIALS, HE SAID, EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR FR. GUMPEL'S ACUTE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SITUATION AND HIS SCIENTIFIC PROFESSIONALISM. GUMPEL MADE IT CLEAR TO A/DCM THAT EVEN POPE JOHN PAUL II IS AWARE OF THE SITUATION.
-------------------------
I AM A GERMAN, NOT A NAZI
-------------------------
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX GUMPEL ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT REFERENCES IN THE MEDIA AND IN OTHER COMMENTS TO HIM AS THE "GERMAN JESUIT." GUMPEL TOLD A/DCM THAT HIS FAMILY HAD BEEN VICTIMS OF NAZI PERSECUTION AND SEVERAL HAD BEEN KILLED BY THE NAZIS. HE HIMSELF HAD TO FLEE NAZI GERMANY AS A REFUGEE, FIRST TO FRANCE AND THEN LATER TO HOLLAND. HE RECALLED THAT AT ONE POINT A REPORTER HAD PLANNED TO PRINT AN ASSERTION THAT GUMPEL WAS A NAZI HIMSELF -- SOMETHING GUMPEL SAID WAS LIBELOUS, AND WHICH HE WAS MORE THAN WILLING TO GO TO COURT TO FIGHT.
5. (C) GUMPEL SAID HE WAS NOT SURPRISED WHEN THE JEWISH- VATICAN COMMISSION DECIDED TO SUSPEND ITS WORK. XXXXXXXXXXXX HE CLOSED BY SAYING THAT THE VATICAN WANTS TO LET PASS A PERIOD OF TIME BEFORE REOPENING THIS DISCUSSION. HE SAID THAT THE VATICAN AND HE HIMSELF WERE MORE THAN WILLING TO DISCUSS ANY ANOMALIES OR QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE 12-VOLUME HISTORY ALREADY PUBLISHED. THEY JUST DIDN'T THINK THAT THE JUST-DISBANDED COMMISSION CONSISTED OF THE RIGHT MIX OF PEOPLE TO BE ABLE TO DO SO. MERANTE
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 VATICA 04258 02 OF 02 131206Z
CONFIDENTIAL
>
2001VATICA04258 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Friday, 16 October 2009, 14:39
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VATICAN 000106
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/16/2034
TAGS PREL, SCUL, VT, IS
SUBJECT: (C) VATICAN BACKS AWAY FROM DEAL WITH INTERNATIONAL
HOLOCAUST TASK FORCE
REF: A. VATICAN 25 B. VATICAN 99
VATICAN 00000106 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Julieta Valls Noyes, DCM, EXEC, State. REASON: 1.4 (b) 1. (C) Summary: On October 13, the Holy See walked back from a prior written agreement to become an observer on the International Task Force on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research (ITF). The decision may been taken by the Vatican's relatively inexperienced new deputy foreign minister, and if so, would not be the first time he has complicated Vatican foreign relations. But the Vatican may also be pulling back due to concerns about ITF pressure to declassify records from the WWII-era pontificate of Pope Pius XII. Regardless of the cause, the ITF will continue to pursue closer ties with the Holy See in the months ahead. End Summary.
High Hopes Dashed
-----------------
2. (C) Three members of the International Task Force on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research (ITF) visited Rome this week to finalize arrangements with the Holy See to become an ITF observer. However, over lunch on October 13, the team members told the Austrian Ambassador and UK and U.S. DCM's that the plan had fallen apart completely that morning due to Vatican back-pedaling. Team members -- Austrian Ambassador Ferdinand Trauttsmandorff, U.S. Professor Steve Katz of the Elie Wiesel Center at Boston University, and Dina Porat, the Israeli academic advisor to the ITF -- expressed considerable disappointment about the unexpected set-back.
3. (C) They were especially chagrined, Trauttsmandorff said, because the Vatican had first offered more than the ITF asked then rescinded its commitment. Specifically, the ITF had suggested during a February visit to Rome that the Vatican enter into a "special arrangement" with the body. The February talks and follow up discussions went very well (ref a). Subsequently, the then-Deputy Foreign Minister-equivalent at the Holy See, Monsignor Pietro Parolin, wrote to the ITF to indicate that the Vatican wanted more than a "special arrangement" and was prepared to become an ITF observer. (Note: It's unclear whether Parolin suggested permanent observer or observer country status for the Vatican. End Note)
New Vatican Team Disappoints
----------------------------
4. (C) On arrival in Rome in October, though, the ITF had to deal with a new team, as the highly-regarded Parolin had been promoted and sent as Nuncio to Venezuela. Parolin's successor, Msgr. Ettore Balestrero, saw the ITF group instead, at what the ITF team expected to be the final meeting before signing an observer agreement. Surprising the ITF, Balestrero also invited a representative from the Vatican Archives, Msgr. Chappin, and the Holy See's chief negotiator for the long-delayed Vatican-Israel Fundamental Agreement, Father David Jaeger.
5. (C) All three men, Trauttsmandorff said, evinced considerable discomfort with the idea of ITF observer status. Balestrero argued that the Vatican needed to study the implications of the status further before committing, focusing on legalistic impediments that Parolin had already dismissed. Jaeger was hostile overall to the ITF, Porat said. She fiercely criticized his inclusion, saying he had no role to play in a discussion of the ITF's relationship with the Vatican. XXXXXXXXXXXX Porat said that if Jaeger was so rigid about closer ties with the ITF while Austria held its rotating chair, no progress would be possible next year when Israel chairs the body. Trauttsmandorff was less harsh than his colleague but allowed the Jaeger's involvement in the meeting was not constructive. XXXXXXXXXXXX
Connection to the Papal Archives?
---------------------------------
6. (C) The three ITF visitors agreed that Chappin, who had previously been more open to dialogue with them, was very defensive at the October 13 meeting. He believed that the ITF would ask the Archives to release ahead of schedule the documents from the papacy of Pius XII, the World War II-era Pope. (Note: The Vatican releases the documents from each pontificate as a whole. End Note) DCM said that Father Norbert Hofmann, Secretary of the Vatican Commission for Religious Relations with Jews, had told her the preceding week that the files from the entire papacy would be ready for declassification in about five years. Katz thought this was far too rosy a
VATICAN 00000106 002.2 OF 002
scenario given that only six-eight researchers are now reviewing the documents. Although this number is up from the one-two working on them a year ago, he thought it was insufficient to catalog and review the 16 million documents from the Pius XII Papacy.
7. (C) The ITF members acknowledged their wish to gain access to the Pius XII files as soon as possible. Nevertheless, they also accepted the Vatican's arguments, shared by DCM, that ordained clergy must review them first given the possibility that the files contain confessional documents from individual Catholics. Trauttsmandorff insisted, however, that the ITF sought a relationship with the Vatican not only to get access to the Vatican Archives, but also to work jointly with Catholic Church leaders in many countries on anti-racism and remembrance education.
Now What?
---------
8. (C) Despite the disappointment, the ITF members were determined to find a way to move ahead with the Vatican. They concluded that they must now educate new Deputy Foreign Minister Balestrero about the ITF and its role, just as they had done with his predecessor, Parolin. They would also reach out to friends in the Vatican, such as Cardinal Kasper, to exert influence on their behalf. UK DCM indicated that HMG would also express support for ITF goals in discussions with Vatican officials, as did U.S. DCM. The team members left discouraged but committed to keep their eyes on the long-term goal.
Comment
-------
9. (C) Unfortunately, the ITF is only the latest group to run into problems caused by the recent change of personnel at the Vatican Foreign Ministry - others, including this embassy (ref B), have experienced similar problems on other issues. What remains to be seen is whether the ITF's problems are the results of Msgr. Balestrero's growing pains or caused by deeper Vatican uneasiness related to declassification of their Archives. The ITF team did not believe the Vatican was sending - via the decision to slow progress on the ITF observer status -- a subtle message to Israel about the need for progress in the Fundamental Agreement talks. Time will tell. DIAZ
Monday, 11 August 2008, 08:10
C O N F I D E N T I A L DHAKA 000856
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/PB, SCA/FO, DRL, S/CT AND G
EO 12958 DECL: 08/10/2018
TAGS PGOV, PHUM, PINR, MASS, PREL, BG
SUBJECT: ENGAGING BANGLADESH'S RAPID ACTION BATTALION:
VISIT BY USG INTERAGENCY ASSESSMENT TEAM
REF: STATE 61983
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
Summary =======
1. (C) The leadership of Bangladesh's Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) has pledged to provide additional information about alleged human rights violations committed by members of the force since its inception in 2004. This pledge came during two days of intensive fact-finding and discussions with members of an interagency USG team that visited Bangladesh to assess both the RAB's current operating procedures regarding human rights violations as well as possibilities for engagement. The RAB seeks a broad engagement with the USG including human rights and counterterrorism training and recognizes the need to address allegations of past abuses. While there are lingering concerns about the RAB's human rights record, there is a widespread belief within civil society that the RAB has succeeded in reducing crime and fighting terrorism, making it in many ways Bangladesh's most respected police unit. A possible stumbling block moving forward is inertia within some levels of the government bureaucracy, primarily within Bangladesh's Home Ministry, which we are trying to overcome through repeated high-level interventions with Bangladeshi government decision-makers.
RAB Pledges Full Support After Meetings with USG Team ============================================= ========
2. (C) A USG interagency team from the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice visited Dhaka July 12 - 16 to conduct an assessment of Bangladesh's Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), focusing on whether and how the USG might engage with the force. During the visit, the team met with the RAB senior leadership, visited the training academy outside of Dhaka, and visited two of the RAB's operational battalions (in Narayangang and Sirajgang). In addition to the meetings with the RAB, the team met with representatives from civil society, including journalists, human rights groups, and business leaders, in both Dhaka and the field. On their final day, the team met with officials from the Ministries of Foreign and Home Affairs. Representatives of the Embassy's inter-agency Counter Terrorism Working Group also participated in the assessment team's meetings.
3. (C) The assessment team's visit followed several months of intensive discussions between the RAB and the Embassy, as well as meetings with senior visiting officials, including DRL DAS Barks-Ruggles and S/CT Coordinator Ambassador Dailey. In these previous meetings, USG officials informed the RAB of our desire to help improve its human rights record and build its counter terrorism and law enforcement capacity but underscored the need for greater transparency and accountability. The officials explained that our ability to offer training or assistance is currently constrained by the RAB's alleged human rights violations, which have rendered the organization ineligible to receive training and assistance according to the Leahy legislation.
4. (C) The two days of meetings with the RAB, therefore, focused on gaining a better understanding of the RAB's past human rights record and the procedures in place to prevent, investigate and adjudicate abuses. The team was briefed on the RAB's efforts to incorporate human rights training into the curriculum at the training academy and at the unit level. This training, some of which is conducted by a local human rights group, is given to all new personnel transferring into the RAB. (Note: Although it shares our concerns, the British High Commission has already started a pilot round of Human Rights training with the RAB; the British will closely monitor program impact before launching a second round, which will require Ministerial approval.) According to RAB officials, allegations of abuses are handled both through internal disciplinary measures as well as through an administrative investigation by magistrates and the local court system. In response to repeated requests from the team for greater information about the magistrates' reports, the RAB's senior leadership pledged to explore
providing this information to the USG.
5. (C) The discussions with the RAB also provided the assessment team with insight into the areas in which USG assistance, at both the tactical and operational level, could be most effective. The RAB also provided additional information about its organizational structure and personnel policies, which will help us determine how individuals and units might be held accountable for past abuses.
Meetings with Civil Society Provide Nuanced View ============================================= ===
6. (C) In order to provide the assessment team with a balanced view of the RAB, we arranged meetings with members of civil society in Dhaka and during field visits. As a result, team members were able to hear from journalists, academics, human rights advocates, and business leaders, and informally through people requesting assistance from the RAB, about perceptions of the RAB's past and current conduct. There were reports of abuses and a pattern of misrepresentation by the RAB regarding so-called "encounter/crossfire killings." The Assessment Team interviewed NGOs, media personnel, and members of civil society who reported that members of the RAB, possibly on instruction from senior government officials, have unlawfully used lethal force to eliminate their targets. All we talked with agreed, however, that the RAB's human rights performance had improved during the current Caretaker Government and under the leadership of the current Director General (a career police officer and DS/ATA graduate).
7. (C) A strong message from many civil society interlocutors was that the RAB enjoys a great deal of respect and admiration from a population scarred by decreasing law and order in the last decade. Moreover, given the persistent corruption and ineffectiveness of other elements of the police, the RAB has come to be seen by many as a preferred alternative. According to some NGO sources, people in remote areas, particularly women, feel more comfortable coming forward to the RAB because they think their complaints will be dealt with in a more effective and honest manner. The team noted that the RAB and many civil society representatives seem prepared to accept that some notorious individuals will die in encounters with the RAB, and they seem to prefer that outcome as opposed to the chance of the currently ineffective and backlogged court system acquitting the guilty. What this highlights is that our desire to improve respect for human rights will require not only engagement with the RAB, but efforts to help improve other elements of the Bangladeshi judicial systems and police. Our recently approved 1210 proposal would establish a community policing program that could assist such effort.
Bureaucracy is Potential Stumbling Block =======================================
8. (C) The team's final meetings with representatives of the Foreign Ministry and Home Ministry indicated that some levels of the government bureaucracy may still be reluctant to share information about past alleged human rights abuses. In 2007, an inter-agency Embassy team met with GOB counterparts to develop a mechanism for investigating allegations of human rights violations by the security forces, including RAB. This responsibility was given to a Deputy Secretary at the Ministry of Home Affairs, but despite some positive initial meetings there has been little tangible outcome from these sessions. During the Assessment Team's meeting with the Acting Home Secretary, he displayed little enthusiasm for taking the steps needed to move ahead with an engagement program. The team underscored that it needed information from the Home Ministry regarding abuses by the RAB in order to effectively vet candidates in accordance with Leahy legislation. Fortunately, this meeting coincided with Home Secretary Abdul Karim's visit to Washington, which provided senior officials in SCA, DRL and DOD to reinforce the importance of GOB information-sharing about past abuses.
Comment =======
9. (C) Embassy Dhaka greatly appreciates the efforts of State, DoD, and Justice to send the assessment team to Bangladesh to interact with the RAB. Post looks forward to receiving the results of the assessment team's analysis of the RAB. Our multi-agency and multi-disciplinary team signaled the seriousness with which the USG views potential RAB engagement. We were clear in our meetings with the GOB that we are eager to engage, but committed to doing so in a manner consistent with Leahy legislation. We expect that the Bangladeshi Government will reciprocate by providing us with some of the additional information we need to move forward. At the same time, we may need to ensure that a few unenthusiastic bureaucrats do not foil plans for further cooperation that are strongly supported by the RAB and at least some senior government officials. Embassy Dhaka looks forward to working with the inter-agency team in Washington as we consider next steps in this process.
10. (U) The inter-agency assessment team has cleared this message. Moriarty
Monday, 31 December 2001, 08:43
C O N F I D E N T I A L VATICAN 006619
SIPDIS
EMBASSY VATICAN MESSAGE 134/01
EO 12958 DECL: 12/19/2006
TAGS KNAR, PHUM, PREL, VT
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES CATHOLIC-JEWISH HISTORICAL
COMMISSION WITH CARDINAL KKASPER
REF: 01VATICAN 4258
CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR JIM NICHOLSON, REASON E.O. 12958 1.5 (B,D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSED CATHOLIC-JEWISH DIALOGUE DURING A 12/18 COURTESY CALL ON PROPAGANDA FIDES CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 VATICA 06619 310931Z PRESIDENT CARDINAL WALTER KASPER. KASPER WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT A CATHOLIC-JEWISH COMMISSION OF LAY HISTORIANS WOULD BE RE-FORMED WITH A CLEAR MANDATE AND WOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT A SERIOUS EXAMINATION OF THE TWELVE-VOLUME WORK ON PIUS XII'S PAPACY, BUT NOT OF THE ARCHIVE ITSELF. HE SAID THE FAILURE OF THE PREVIOUS COMMISSION DID NOT MEAN CATHOLIC-JEWISH DIALOGUE HAD FAILED. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) DURING A 12/18 COURTESY CALL ON PRESIDENT OF THE PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR PROMOTION OF CHRISTIAN UNITY (PROPAGANDA FIDES) CARDINAL WALTER KASPER, CONVERSATION FOCUSED ON CATHOLIC-JEWISH DIALOGUE. (NOTE: KASPER EXPLAINED THAT PROPAGANDA FIDES, AS OPPOSED TO THE COMMISSION RESPONSIBLE FOR INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE, HAS COMPETENCY IN THIS AREA BECAUSE CHRISTIANS AND JEWS SHARE THE OLD TESTAMENT). THE AMBASSADOR RECALLED THAT THE CATHOLIC-JEWISH COMMISSION LOOKING AT THE ROLE OF PIUS XII DURING WORLD WAR II HAD DISSOLVED IN AMID SOME ACRIMONY, AND THAT THERE WAS INTEREST IN THE UNITED STATES ABOUT WHETHER IT WOULD BE RE-FORMED. KASPER REPLIED THAT THE FAILURE OF THE COMMISSION DID NOT REPRESENT THE FAILURE OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE CATHOLIC AND JEWISH FAITHS. HE LAID THE COMMISSION'S FAILURE TO PERSONALITY PROBLEMS AND TO LACK OF CLARITY ON ITS MANDATE (WHICH THE VATICAN MAINTAINS WAS ONLY TO REVIEW THE EXISTING 12-VOLUME HISTORY OF PIUS XII AND NOT TO EXPLORING THE VATICAN ARCHIVES). HE SAID THAT FATHER GUMPEL (REFTEL) WAS THE VATICAN'S BEST INFORMED LIVING EXPERT ON THE PAPACY OF PIUS XII, AND THAT THEY HAD TURNED TO HIM TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE 12 VOLUMES POSED BY THE COMMISSION. XXXXXXXXXXXX3. (C) KASPER WAS HOPEFUL THAT A DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN SOON TO BEGIN EXPLORING RE-FORMING A COMMISSION OF HIGHLY QUALIFIED ACADEMICS NOT DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH EITHER THE CATHOLIC CHURCH OR "JEWISH AGENCIES" TO EXPLORE THE TWELVE VOLUMES ON THE PAPACY OF PIUS XII. HE PREFERRED A BIGGER INTERNATIONAL GROUP THAT COULD INCLUDE ACADEMIC EXPERTS FROM DIFFERENT COUNTRIES. IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUERY, KASPER SAID A BODY CONSISTING OF EXPERTS FROM CATHOLIC AND JEWISH UNIVERSITIES COULD BE CREATED TO NOMINATE THE ACADEMIC EXPERTS THAT WOULD COMPRISE THE COMMISSION. HE WOULD LOOK FOR MOVEMENT ON THIS ISSUE SOME TIME IN 2002. AS FOR THE ARCHIVES, HE SAID THAT THE VATICAN WOULD SEEK TO SPEED UP THE CATALOGUING OF DOCUMENTS FROM PIUS XII'S PAPACY, BUT HE GAVE NO ASSURANCE THAT THEY WOULD BE ACCESSIBLE BEFORE SOME YEARS HAVE PASSED.
4. (C) KASPER AVERRED THAT THE CRITICISM OF PIUS XII AS PRO-NAZI WAS WITHOUT FOUNDATION, AND THAT THE ARCHIVES WOULD EVENTUALLY BEAR THIS OUT. THERE WAS NO SMOKING GUN. HE POINTED TO THE NEAR-UNANIMOUS PRAISE FROM JEWS (INCLUDING GOLDA MEIR) FOR THE POPE IN THE EARLY POST-WAR YEARS, AND SAID IT WAS ONLY AFTER REVISIONIST HISTORIANS BEGAN PUBLISHING IN THE 1960S THAT THE JEWISH COMMUNITY "BECAME OBSESSED" WITH WHAT PIUS XII DID OR DID NOT DO DURING THE WAR. KASPER, WHO HAD BEEN A CHILD IN NAZI GERMANY, RECALLED THAT DURING THAT TIME THE POPE, FEARING THAT OTHERS WOULD SUFFER REPERCUSSIONS FOR THINGS HE MIGHT SAY, COMMUNICATED SUBTLY BUT CLEARLY HIS OPPOSITION TO NAZISM. KASPER SAID CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 VATICA 06619 310931Z "EVERYBODY KNEW EXACTLY WHAT HE MEANT." MOREOVER, KASPER SAID, "THE CONVENTS ALL AROUND HERE (ROME) WERE FULL OF JEWS, AT GREAT RISK, EVEN THOUGH THE SS WAS IN THIS VERY BUILDING" (REFERRING TO THE APOSTOLIC PALACE.) HE SAID JEWISH ATTITUDES TOWARD PIUS XII TOOK A NEGATIVE TURN ONLY AFTER THE DEBUT OF THE PLAY "THE DEPUTY" IN THE 1960S.
5. (C) COMMENT: CLEARLY THE VATICAN REMAINS HIGHLY SENSITIVE TO CRITICISM OF PIUS XII, A POPE THEY ARE ACTIVELY SEEKING TO CANONIZE. KASPER SEEMS TO US A REALIST, AND WILL WORK IN GOOD FAITH TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES THAT AROSE OVER THE CATHOLIC-JEWISH COMMISSION. THE ARCHIVE WILL BE A HARD NUT TO CRACK. VATICAN SOURCES CONSISTENTLY TELL US THAT IT WILL REMAIN OFF-LIMITS UNTIL IT IS PROPERLY CATALOGUED. TO ARGUMENTS THAT THE USG HAS DECLASSIFIED A MILLION PAGES OF RELEVANT HOLOCAUST ERA DOCUMENTS, THEY RESPOND THAT THEY DID THAT AND MORE WHEN THE JESUITS PUBLISHED THE TWELVE VOLUME SERIES CULLED FROM THE PIUS XII ARCHIVE. TO THEM, TO ASK MORE NOW IS UNREASONABLE. NICHOLSON
CONFIDENTIAL
>
2001VATICA06619 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Wednesday, 14 January 2009, 08:15
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 000057
SIPDIS
TO S/CT'S AMBASSADOR DAILEY, SETH BAILEY AND EMILY GOLDMAN
EO 12958 DECL: 01/14/2019
TAGS PTER, PREL, KDEM, PGOV, IN, BG
SUBJECT: INDIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER EXPECTS CLOSER
COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION WITH NEW BANGLADESH GOVERNMENT
REF: A. 08 NEW DELHI 2830 B. 08 STATE 128554
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
------
SUMMARY
-------
1. (C) The Indian High Commissioner to Bangladesh told Ambassador Moriarty on 1/13 India expected improved cooperation on security and other issues with the new Awami League government. Counterterrorism cooperation would be the central issue of discussion when the Indian Minister of External Affairs visits Dhaka in early February. The High Commissioner spoke favorably of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's call for a regional task force to fight terrorism, but stressed the importance of bilateral as well as multilateral cooperation. The Embassy will soon propose to the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) a project to bring together civil society representatives and government officials from throughout South Asia to help advance regional counterterrorism cooperation.
--------------------------------------------- -----------
INDIA STRESSES THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVED CT COOPERATION
--------------------------------------------- -----------
2. (C) Indian High Commissioner Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty expressed pleasure over the December 29 Parliamentary election landslide victory by the Awami League, which traditionally had warm relations with New Delhi. He told Ambassador Moriarty that improving security cooperation would be the top Indian priority with the new Bangladeshi government. Indian Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee planned to visit Dhaka on February 8 for talks that would center primarily on counterterrorism issues. Pinak said the Minister would welcome Hasina's call for a joint task force on counterterrorism. Although India would prefer a primarily bilateral engagement, India understood that Bangladesh might insist on a regional task force to provide Hasina political cover from allegations she was too close to India. Either way, the High Commissioner stressed the importance that the task force be action-oriented and not become yet another regional talk shop. (Note: India frequently argues that international Islamic terrorists use Bangladesh as a safe haven and often cross its porous border into India for bombing and other attacks. New Delhi also says Dhaka should do more to uproot Indian domestic extremist groups, including the United Liberation Front of Assam, that use Bangladesh as a safe haven. End note.)
3. (C) Ambassador Moriarty said the U.S. Government understood the need for regional counterterrorism cooperation and was considering "Track Two" programs in which civil society would promote closer coordination among South Asian nations. Pinak said such programs were "always welcome." The High Commissioner also responded positively when the Ambassador suggested Hasina should consider appointing a counterterrorism czar whose job would be to improve coordination among the many Bangladeshi agencies with security responsibilities. Pinak also agreed when the Ambassador argued the Hasina government should not disband the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB). (Note: The RAB has emerged as the country's premier counterterrorism force but is viewed with suspicion by some Awami League leaders because it was established by the rival Bangladesh Nationalist Party. End note.) The Ambassador stressed that the USG had started human rights training for RAB. He added that the RAB was the enforcement organization best positioned to one day become a Bangladeshi version of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation.
--------------------------------------------- --
TRANSPORTATION, ENERGY AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION
--------------------------------------------- --
4. (SBU) Pinak recounted that in a meeting with Sheikh Hasina immediately after the elections she expressed a desire to invest heavily in Bangladesh's moribund railway system. This included reconnecting the Bangladeshi railroad system to Agartala, the capital of the bordering Indian state of Tripura. Pinak noted he had also met the new Water Resources Minister, Romesh Chandra Sen, on 12/13. (Note: Bangladeshi media reported the following day that the Bangladesh-India Joint Rivers Commission would likely meet soon to try and resolve simmering disputes over sharing the water of rivers that flow from India into Bangladesh. End note.) The High Commissioner also said India would offer to sell up to 250
DHAKA 00000057 002 OF 002
megawatts of power from a new 750-megawatt plant near Agartala to Bangladesh, which suffers from chronic energy shortages. He acknowledged, however, the cost of the electricity had yet to be negotiated, and Bangladesh would have to build costly infrastructure to connect the plant with its national power grid. Pinak predicted Indian companies would be interested in investing in Bangladesh under the new Awami League government. Investment from information technology firms would depend in part on their ability to train local employees and Bangladeshi government support through activities such as the creation of technology centers.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
COMMENT: BRIGHTER DAYS FOR AN OFTEN ROCKY RELATIONSHIP
--------------------------------------------- ---------
5. (C) The Awami League victory augers well for a bilateral relationship that often founders on New Delhi's charges that Bangladesh does not do enough to fight terrorists who target India. Sheikh Hasina's immediate call for a regional counterterrorism task force and India's initial positive response suggest a strong possibility of enhanced cooperation on this issue of huge importance to U.S. interests. It also creates a better environment for the USG to encourage counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia in accordance with the goals set by the Regional Security Initiative conference held in New Delhi in August 2008 (Reftel A). To build on this momentum, Embassy Dhaka will propose to S/CT the use of Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Projects funds for a program to bring together South Asian civil society representatives and government officials to encourage security cooperation (Reftel B). MORIARTY
Thursday, 16 February 2006, 20:55
C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 000407
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE PASS USTR
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/MSIEGELMAN
USDOC FOR 3134/ITA/USFCS/OIO/MKESHISHIAN/BARTHUR
EO 12958 DECL: 02/15/2016
TAGS EINV, PREL, ES
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON MCDONALD'S CONTRACTUAL DISPUTE
REF: 05 SAN SALVADOR 3544
Classified By: Amb. H. Douglas Barclay. Reason 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) Summary. On December 7, 2005, an appeals court ruled that McDonald's had illegally terminated its contract with a local franchisee on July 1, 1996, and therefore owed him $24 million in losses and damages. McDonald's is appealing the decision, but the composition of the chamber that will hear the case makes it unlikely that justice will be served. On February 10, McDonald's corporate representatives outlined for the Ambassador the company's strategy to pressure the Salvadorans to ensure a fair hearing by linking the case to CAFTA-DR implementation--an approach the Ambassador suggested would be counterproductive. They also outlined efforts to convince Salvadoran government officials of the importance that the case get a fair hearing, which the Ambassador agreed to support vigorously. End summary.
2. (C) Since 1996, Post has supported McDonald's in resolving its licensing dispute and related intellectual property rights dispute with a former franchisee, Roberto Bukele. The latest twist in this ten-year legal battle, described below in paras. 6-10, is an appeals court's ruling on December 7, 2005, that McDonald's had illegally terminated its contract with Bukele on July 1, 1996, and therefore owed him $24 million in losses and damages, a figure claimed by Bukele based on a projection of lost future earnings. On December 27, 2005, McDonald's General Counsel for Latin America and Canada Maria Leggett briefed Ambassador Barclay on the case, expressing frustration with the legal system, but indicating that her firm would go forward with an appeal to the Supreme Court's Civil Chamber--McDonald's local counsel has told us that an appeal was filed on January 4, 2006. She suggested that a fair resolution of the case was unlikely given the current composition of the Civil Chamber. Two neutral judges have recused themselves based on previous involvement in the case. Judging from her case record on the bench, the third judge, an FMLN partisan, will rule against McDonald's regardless of the merits of the case. McDonald's is seeking to have this judge removed, and three substitute judges named. McDonald's has filed a motion to have the FMLN-linked judge recused from the proceedings on the grounds that her well-documented anti-Americanism will prevent her from hearing the case impartially. Local counsel do not believe Supreme Court Chief Justice Agustin Calderon will decide on the recusal or name replacement justices until after March 12 elections.
3. (C) On February 10, McDonald's Vice President for Government Relations Dick Crawford and Maria Legett briefed the Ambassador on the company's efforts to see a fair resolution of the case. They explained that the company has engaged in a Washington-focused advocacy effort to put pressure on the Salvadorans to resolve the case according to the rule of law, suggesting that CAFTA-DR implementation should be delayed pending resolution of the case. The Ambassador, however, voiced concern that McDonald's strategy ran directly counter to U.S. interests in seeing CAFTA-DR implemented as soon as possible. Emboffs also noted that McDonald's invocation of CAFTA-DR in the lead-up to legislative elections would play into the hands of those who have resisted CAFTA-DR by alienating senior government officials who are already working to see that the case is resolved according to the rule of law and by complicating efforts to get additional CAFTA-related reforms through the Legislative Assembly. It would also unnecessarily thrust the case into the public spotlight, creating just the kind of negative publicity that McDonald's representatives have said they seek to avoid. Crawford acknowledged these concerns and agreed to tone down, but not cease, his company's efforts on this issue.
4. (C) Through local counsel, McDonald's representative also said they would continue to pursue all available legal means to see that the case is decided according to the rule of law. Emboffs suggested that this is essentially a political issue--getting a fair hearing for McDonald's means finding a way to exclude judges known to follow FMLN instructions in their rulings from the process. This is an especially delicate issue at anytime, but especially in the run-up to elections and a lame-duck legislative session that provides an excellent opportunity to push through constitutional reforms to strengthen the judicial system. McDonald's local counsel outlined a strategy it is pursuing to pressure Chief Justice Agustin Calderon to name three impartial judges to the Civil Chamber to hear the McDonald's case. In particular, they are meeting with local business associations, think tanks, and government officials to ask them to press Calderon on naming judges who will ensure the rule of law is carried out. McDonald's representatives also suggested they might participate in some of those meetings through a "road show" in El Salvador that would also include other corporate outreach activities.
5. (C) The Ambassador told Crawford and Leggett that he believes the Salvadoran Government is extremely interested in seeing the case decided fairly, and that on February 7 Foreign Minister Lainez raised the issue with the Ambassador and advised him to speak to President Saca and impress upon him the importance of the case. The Ambassador said that on February 8, he did raise the issue with Saca, emphasizing the stakes at play for a government in desperate need of foreign investment. The Ambassador emphasized that he would continue pressing this issue as appropriate to encourage resolution of McDonald's investment dispute according to the rule of law. However, he asked McDonald's representatives to consider beefing-up their presence in El Salvador to more actively work on the case to compliment his efforts here--a point that Crawford and Leggett took on board.
Background
----------
6. (SBU) In 1972, Roberto Bukele, a licensed franchisee of McDonald's, opened the first McDonald's restaurant in El Salvador. By 1992, Bukele operated three McDonald's restaurants in El Salvador, and on June 9 of that year, McDonald's Corporation agreed to extend Bukele's licenses to operate all three restaurants until December 19, 1995. On April 27, 1994, McDonald's wrote Bukele outlining the terms under which the corporation would consider renewing Bukele's licenses and extending licenses for new restaurants. Terms included remodeling of existing restaurants (to be financed by a loan from McDonald's to Bukele), use of McDonald's-approved sources for food products, establishment of a staff hiring and training plan, and corporate approval of new restaurant sites and new menu items. Although not in full compliance with the terms of the April 27 letter, in December 1995 McDonald's agreed to extend Bukele's existing licenses until June 30, 1996, and put forth specific actions Bukele must take to remain a McDonald's franchisee. Correspondence between Bukele and Bukele provided by McDonald's suggest that Bukele did not meet the terms of the April 27 letter.
7. (SBU) On July 1, 1996, McDonald's wrote Bukele informing him that his licenses had expired, while offering him one last chance to remain a franchisee by closing unauthorized restaurants, using McDonald's-approved food products, establishing a staff hiring and training program, and meeting other conditions--essentially, he was asked again to meet the terms established in the April 27 letter under which contract renewal would be considered. On July 10, 1996, McDonald's notified Bukele that his right to be a McDonald's licensee had expired and he no longer had the right to use McDonald's trademarks or proprietary information. Bukele continued to use McDonald's trademarks and proprietary information in his restaurants despite the expiration of the franchising agreement.
8. (SBU) Although there have been a number of court cases related to this dispute, the one in play now involves a suit Bukele filed against McDonald's in the Fourth Mercantile Court in March 1997 claiming damages for an alleged breach of contract. The court ruled in favor of McDonald's in 1999, and in 2000 the Second Appeals Court, at the time composed of two judges not linked to Bukele or the FMLN, affirmed the decision in response to an appeal Bukele had filed. Bukele then appealed to the Supreme Court's Civil Chamber, which at the time included two pro-FMLN judges. In 2003, the Civil Chamber remanded the case to the Second Appeals Court, requiring that the appeals court to hear additional evidence to be submitted by Bukele and annulling the 2000 verdict in favor of McDonald's. On December 6, 2005, the appeals court, which now included two judges rumored to be friendly to Bukele--either through church links or through Bukele's attorney--ruled in favor of Bukele, declaring that the April 27, 2004, letter was actually a 20-year contract renewal and that McDonald's owed Bukele $24 million in damages and losses resulting from the unlawful termination of the contract.
9. (SBU) On January 4, 2006, McDonald's appealed the decision to the Supreme Court's Civil Chamber, which now includes two neutral judges who have recused themselves based on prior involvement in the case and one FMLN judge XXXXXXXXXXXX. McDonald's has not been formally notified that the appeal has been accepted for consideration, nor has it been notified formally of the two recusals. However, the company has already filed a motion to have the FMLN-linked judge recused from the proceedings on the grounds that her well-documented anti-Americanism will prevent her from hearing the case impartially. Local counsel do not believe Supreme Court Chief Justice Agustin Calderon will forward the recusal to the entire 15-member Supreme Court for decision until after March 12 elections. Eight votes in favor of the motion would be enough to force recusal, at which point the Supreme Court en bloc would designate three judges from a pool of nine alternates to hear the case. Of the nine judges, four are linked to the FMLN. If XXXXXXXXXXXX is not recused, two will be named from this list. Either way, the reconstituted Civil Chamber would then decide on the case, with a decision ready by 2007. If McDonald's loses, they plan to appeal to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, and to the International Court of Justice if need be.
10. (SBU) There have been several other court cases related to this dispute. McDonald's sued Bukele in 1996 in the Second Mercantile Court seeking the closure of one unauthorized restaurant. The court ruled in favor of McDonald's, but Bukele appealed the case to an appeals court and then to the Supreme Court's Civil Chamber, which remanded the case back to the Second Mercantile Court. The case currently languishes in that court of first instance, but in 2000 the police and prosecutors enforced an injunction issued by the Second Mercantile Court to force the restaurant involved to discontinue using McDonald's intellectual property. McDonald's also filed suit in 1997 in the Fifth Mercantile Court to seek an injunction under an unfair competition provision in the Commercial Code to prevent Bukele from using McDonald's trademarks without authorization in all his restaurants. That court ruled in favor of McDonald's, and in 1999 the Third Court of Appeals confirmed the decision. The Supreme Court's Civil Chamber confirmed the decision of the Appeals Court in 2003, and that same year the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court denied an extraordinary appeal filed by Bukele. In July 2003, the police and prosecutor's office enforced an injunction to remove all intellectual property from Bukele's restaurants; this case is closed. Separate criminal charges filed by McDonald's in 1997 were dismissed, and that case is closed. Two other cases Bukele filed against McDonald's alleging breech of contract--one in 1996 in the First Mercantile Court and another in the third Mercantile Court--were dismissed and are closed. Barclay
Thursday, 14 May 2009, 08:08
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 000482
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR H
EO 12958 DECL: 05/13/2019
TAGS PTER, PGOV, PREL, HYMPSK, MARR, KPAO, UK, BG
SUBJECT: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON COUNTERRORISM WORKING
WITH THE UK
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
------
SUMMARY
-------
1. (C) The U.S. and the United Kingdom share common counterterrorism goals in Bangladesh and we have worked together on specific issues in the past. Embassy Dhaka and the British High Commission reviewed our efforts and agreed on several areas of cooperation at an inaugural counterterrorism quarterly meeting. Specifically, we agreed trying to arrange a visit to London and Washington for senior Bangladeshi officials to view both countries' national security systems. The missions also agreed to work closely on human rights training for the paramilitary Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) and on promoting curriculum reform at Bangladesh's unregulated madrassas. The missions identified several other areas in which coordinated action could promote badly needed security sector reform in Bangladesh.
--------------------------------------------- -
COMMON CT GOAL: PROMOTE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
--------------------------------------------- -
2. (SBU) British High Commissioner Stephen Evans and Ambassador Moriarty led an inaugural counterterrorism quarterly meeting between our two missions on May 13. Although members of the two missions have met individually to discuss counterterrorism issues and work together on specific projects, this forum provided an opoprtunity to discuss broad goals and develop strategies to work collaboratively. Several common areas of interest quickly emerged, most prominently the desire to promote security sector reform in Bangladesh. Evans said this would be the center of discussion at an inaugural Joint Working Group meeting on counterterrorism between Britain and Bangladesh, led by British Security Minister Lord West, in late June, and promised a quick read-out of the results to the Embassy.
3. (SBU) Perhaps the key element of security sector reform is building a healthier civil-military relationship. The dysfunctional relationship dates from the numerous coups in Bangladesh's early years and was recently exacerbated by the February 25-26 border guard mutiny against army officers. The Ambassador detailed Post's plans to invite senior Bangladeshi officials to participate in an Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies workshop in November to exchange views on civil-military relations and national security systems. The two missions agreed the workshop would be most effective if a Bangladeshi delegation of military, government and Parliament representatives first visited the U.S. and the United Kingdom to learn about our national security structures. The missions will seek a visit in September; Post will work with SCA to ensure the Washington leg includes visits to Capitol Hill, the Department of Defense, the State Department and the National Security Council.
4. (C) We agreed to jointly engage Bangladesh's newly formed National Committee on Militancy Resistance and Prevention, a high-level group led by Home Affairs State Minister Tanjim Ahmad Sohel Taj, who has worked closely with the Embassy on security issues. Local media has reported the committee will focus in part on anti-extremism messaging, an area in which both missions already are actively engaged and can work more cooperatively. The U.S. and United Kingdom also agreed to jointly sound out the Government of Bangladesh on its post-mutiny reorganization plans for the Bangladesh Rifles and then work together to help make it a more effective border patrol force.
-------------------------------------------
COMMON CT GOAL: PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS IN RAB
-------------------------------------------
5. (SBU) The U.S. and UK representatives reviewed our ongoing training to make the RAB a more transparent, accountable and human-rights compliant paramilitary force. The British have been training RAB for 18 months in areas such as investigative interviewing techniques and rules of engagement. They said that the training had been widely disseminated within RAB and that they were undertaking an assessment of its effectiveness. The Embassy described plans
DHAKA 00000482 002 OF 002
to imbed two U.S. marshals within RAB for three months to help set up internal affairs, use of force and rules of engagement systems. High Commissioner Evans suggested the marshals stop in London on the way to Bangladesh to meet with British police who have delivered human rights training to RAB. He said the visit would ensure maximum coordination between the U.S. and British programs; the Ambassador enthusiastically supported the proposal.
--------------------------------------------- -------
MARITIME SECURITY, POLICING, AIRPORT SAFETY AND MORE
--------------------------------------------- -------
6. (C) Evans promised to send the Embassy a "lessons learned" document from a just-concluded combined British-Bangladesh maritime security exercise in which U.S. Department of Defense personnel participated. He noted the U.K. did not expect to have any more Royal Navy ships visit Bangladesh before 2011 and asked whether the United States could take the lead in organizing a follow-up exercise. With the U.S. and Britain both ramping up programs to develop community policing, we agreed to create an informal consultative group led by the British that would include other international missions in Dhaka with policing projects. The two missions also agreed to have their two development agencies, USAID and the U.K. Department for International Development, meet to discuss strategies for supporting Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's plan to develop standardized curriculum for thousands of unregulated Islamic madrassa schools. (Note: The Embassy has submitted a 1207 proposal for a madrassa curriculum development program. End note). Finally, noting the horrendous safety gaps at Dhaka's international airport, the Ambassador and High Commissioner agreed to sound out contacts within their respective governments, the international airlines that serve Dhaka, and the Bangladeshi state airline to determine how best to improve security.
-----------------------
CONCLUSION: NOW WE KNOW
-----------------------
7. (C) The inaugural U.S.-British quarterly meeting provided each side with a much better understanding of what the other was doing to counter terrorism and extremism in Bangladesh. Not surprisingly, our counterterrorism strategies and goals are closely aligned, allowing ample room for close coordination and, in some cases, joint programs. Given that Sheikh Hasina's new government has made security a top priority, the chances of U.S.-British joint efforts bearing fruit are high indeed. MORIARTY
Tuesday, 06 March 2007, 15:13
C O N F I D E N T I A L NASSAU 000273
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/CAR RCBUDDEN
EO 12958 DECL: 02/25/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KCOR, BF
SUBJECT: CABINET MINISTER RESIGNS OVER PHOTOS WITH ANNA
NICOLE SMITH
REF: 05 NASSAU 1711
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Brent Hardt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (U) SUMMARY. Bahamian Minister of Immigration Shane Gibson resigned February 18 following publication of photographs of Gibson embracing Smith in her bed. The photos, which also appeared to show an exchange of gifts, created additional press and opposition scrutiny of potential irregularities in Smith's dealings with the Ministry of Immigration. These revelations generated pressure resulting in Gibson's resignation from Cabinet February 18. The Gibson affair is the latest of several scandals to hit the ruling Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) heading to election. The opposition Free National Movement (FNM) has used these scandals to seize the offensive in the run-up to elections. The tense pre-election climate with renewed focus on government scandal will certainly help the opposition, but whether ongoing corruption allegations can overcome a relatively strong economy, job growth and an increase in social programs under the PLP is uncertain. END SUMMARY.
Minister Gibson Resigns Over Photo Scandal
------------------------------------------
2. (U) On February 18, Minister of Immigration Shane Gibson resigned his Cabinet seat following publication of photos showing him in a bedroom embrace with celebrity Anna Nicole Smith. The photos, published by The Tribune in the intense media frenzy following Smith's February 8 death, led to public questions about Gibson's relationship with Smith and his decision to quickly grant her Bahamian residency outside of the usual lengthy process. New allegations against Gibson included claims he accepted a $25,000 watch from Smith, that Gibson's father accepted work sailing Smith's yacht, and that Gibson's mother was paid $500/week to baby-sit Smith's daughter. A police investigation under anti-bribery laws is under way. Despite the scandal, Gibson retains his parliamentary seat and may run for reelection.
Wounded PLP Strikes Back on FNM Terms
-------------------------------------
3. (U) Continuing to deny any wrongdoing, Gibson and Prime Minister Christie responded to press and opposition criticism by aggressively defending Gibson and attacking a "conspiracy" led by the FNM and the Tribune, the largest circulation daily paper that published the photos. Christie and other PLP candidates have countered by slinging mud over alleged wrongdoing during FNM rule, including a claim the FNM fast-tracked an application for an alleged pedophile. Gibson has threatened a lawsuit against the Tribune and has reportedly engaged counsel.
4. (C) According to a source in the FNM's leadership, even before the photographs of Gibson in bed with Smith, the FNM would have focused its campaign in part on transparency and corruption in the ruling party. The FNM had alleged irregular visa issuances, lack of transparency in financial accounts, and possible corruption in a government housing development. Some observers feel that the PLP's delay in calling elections was intended to diffuse concerns over these allegations, and that the renewed focus on Gibson and Smith ensured further delay before elections are called. NOTE: Under the Bahamian Constitution, Parliament must be dissolved and elections called no later than May 22, with elections held within 90 days thereafter. Traditionally, elections are not called during Lent. END NOTE.
Gibson and Press Won't Go Away
------------------------------
5. (C) COMMENT: The Gibson-Anna Nicole scandal gives the FNM just the focus it hoped for in a campaign already designed to question the PLP's integrity. Whether such a strategy can overcome a relatively strong economy, job growth and an increase in social programs under the PLP is uncertain. Regardless, it must be frustrating to the PLP that Gibson continued his relationship with Smith against party advice after the scandal first broke in the Fall. Regardless of party grumbling about Gibson, his strong constituency support -- he won his seat by a landslide in
2002 and he enjoys the patronage of political heavyweight Bishop Neil Ellis -- will ensure that Gibson stays in the PLP's plans.
6. (C) The international media circus surrounding Smith and Gibson will likely continue for some time, keeping the Bahamas in the international limelight for better or worse. On the plus side, the Bahamas has received more free advertising than they could ever have hoped to buy, and taxi operators are already cashing in by offering visits to the former Smith residence. On the negative side, many poorly informed commentators have given air time to claims that the Bahamas is awash in drugs and corruption. Items sure to attract continued international media intention include: scheduled hearings regarding ownership of Horizons, the Nassau home where Smith lived; a Bahamian coroner's inquest into the death of Smith's son; potential fights over keeping Smith's body in The Bahamas; and the ongoing police investigation into potential bribery of Gibson. The media has set up camp across the street from her former residence on Eastern Road and, on hearing days, on the courthouse steps. While easy to discount the tabloid journalism surrounding these issues, it is encouraging that the local press -- too often cautious with government and lacking strong in investigative journalists -- has been able to help hold a powerful member of the government accountable for allegedly accepting gifts and providing favoritism in the execution of his duties. END COMMENT. HARDT
Wednesday, 15 November 2006, 15:15
C O N F I D E N T I A L NASSAU 001711
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (REMOVAL OF SIPDIS CAPTION)
STATE FOR WHA/CAR RCBUDDEN, CA/OCS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/06/2016
TAGS BF, PGOV, PREL, CASC, SMIG
SUBJECT: HURRICANE ANNA NICOLE WREAKS HAVOC IN THE BAHAMAS
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission D. Brent Hardt for reasons 1.4(b ) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Several months into her Bahamian residency, American B-list celebrity and regular entertainment television fixture Anna Nicole Smith has changed the face of Bahamian politics. Not since Category 4 Hurricane Betsy made landfall in 1965 has one woman done as much damage in Nassau. Lying in disarray in her wake are Doctor's Hospital, the Coroner's Court, the Department of Immigration, local mega-lawyers Callenders and Co., formerly popular Minister of Immigration Shane Gibson, and possibly Prime Minister Christie's PLP government. At the eye of a series of scandals over her Bahamian residency application and the death of her son, Anna Nicole has inspired a revitalized Bahamian media to take aim at a system that too often rewards the privileged. Moreover, the titillating details of Anna Nicole's sordid affairs have enticed the Bahamian public to give renewed focus to government indiscretions. These shots have wounded the "people's party" PLP Government, which is responding by making changes, promising reform, and firing back in self-defense as elections approach. END SUMMARY.
Hurricane Anna Nicole Makes Nassau Landfall
-------------------------------------------
2. (SBU) On August 11, Anna Nicole Smith filed for legal residency in The Bahamas as a result of her alleged ownership of a local home, pursuant to local immigration law permitting residence for persons owning homes of $500,000 or more. In September, the application was granted and Anna Nicole allegedly provided a $10,000 check directly to Immigration Minister Gibson at a meeting at her home. According to Anna Nicole, Minister Gibson personally approved her residency permit on September 20. In response to concern over the timing of the approval -- residency approval typically takes years in the Bahamas -- Gibson and PM Christie sought to reassure the public. They said that Anna Nicole was treated as any other applicant, noting glibly that the Ministry of Immigration should not be criticized for "improved efficiencies in government for which it deserves praise."
3. (SBU) Gibson's protestations of distance with the matter were shattered by a prominent local law firm and a local gossip publication. Callenders and Co., the law firm that handled Anna's home purchase and residency application, said it delivered a $10,000 check from Anna Nicole directly to Gibson at Anna Nicole's residence, and that it communicated to Anna Nicole repeatedly on Minister Gibson's government cell phone. Additionally, it supported claims that Anna Nicole did not yet own the home that was the basis for the residency claim, an issue currently being litigated in Bahamian courts. At the same time, widely read local gossip rag "The Punch" carried a People Magazine photo of Gibson at Anna Nicole's September 28 commitment ceremony (not technically a legal wedding) to her attorney, Howard Stern -- held days after Gibson approved her residency application -- next to a photo of a Haitian sloop allegedly landing at the time of the wedding. It also republished Gibson's People Magazine quote about his strong personal relationship with Anna Nicole. Gibson reportedly visited Anna Nicole in the hospital following the birth of her child.
Minister Gibson on Life-Support
-------------------------------
4. (SBU) The resulting public furor over Gibson's favoritism has been strong. Before Anna Nicole came to Nassau, Minister of Immigration Gibson enjoyed strong public support as a result of his aggressive anti-immigrant policies. His midnight raids of Haitian communities and restriction of residency options for Haitians was widely applauded by a Bahamian public fearful of losing Bahamian opportunities to illegal immigrants. The Anna Nicole scandal has recast Gibson as puppet of the privileged rather than defender of the common people of The Bahamas.
5. (C) In response to the public outcry and mounting calls for Gibson's resignation, the Government promised a review of procedures in the Department of Immigration at the same time it fired back at Callenders and Co. for its role in the affair -- tactics that have brought criticism to others but have not helped turn the tide of public opinion. During a
November meeting with Poloff, an opposition Free National Movement Cental Committee member gleefully reported polling in Gibson's parliament district foretold a clear FNM victory in coming elections. Local newspaper and radio feedback on Gibson has been brutal. Even in the normally friendly Bahama Journal, Christie and Gibson have been roasted and a poll of the Journal's largely PLP readership showed 90% disapproval with Government handling of Anna Nicole. At the heart of Gibson's problems are the fact that Anna Nicole received residency in a matter of days, when the process normally takes many months or years. His reported direct receipt of the $10,000 check for residency represents another flagrant violation of the normal process, leading to bitter denunciations of the whole process by which residency is granted to persons for buying property here.
Anna Nicole Kills the Coroner's Court
-------------------------------------
6. (SBU) Gibson and the PLP have not been the only victims of Hurricane Anna Nicole. Following the death of her son in Nassau's Doctor's Hospital on September 10, international media descended upon Doctor's Hospital, which carefully guarded Anna Nicole's privacy in the face of heavy criticism. The quality of care at Doctor's came under fire for its treatment -- or more pointedly its complete lack of treatment -- of Anna Nicole's son while in Doctor's. For the record, Doctor's Hospital is regarded as the finest medical institution in the country and has enjoyed an excellent reputation among the expatriate community.
7. (SBU) The criticism of the hospital was nothing compared to the criticism of the Bahamas Coroner's Court. The Court, which served to review death cases and determine cause, was under heavy fire for its inability -- or unwillingness -- to provide a cause of death for Anna Nicole's son. It had yet to issue a statement when a US pathologist issued a report concluding that a toxic cocktail of drugs caused the death, leading to speculation that the government was protecting Anna Nicole from embarrassment by delaying its findings. Before the Coroner's Court concluded its inquest, the government disbanded the inefficient Court and fired the Coroner. Local legal professionals offer the move mixed reviews, agreeing that the Coroner's Court process was inefficient and needed review, but some worried that the Magistrate's Courts now handling inquest duties will be less open and even more inefficient. The Coroner's Court was originally created to speed up a process of making a legal determination for cause of death that could take years. The elimination of the court will literally affect every Bahamian citizen -- an effect caused by Anna Nicole and the bright lights of the international media.
Invigorated Media Takes on Government
-------------------------------------
8. (SBU) In Anna Nicole's wide swath of destruction, one entity has flourished -- the Bahamian media. At Post's quarterly media reception in October, a newspaper editor gushed about the increase in sales on days when Anna Nicole coverage is featured. Those days are all too common, and the type of critical investigative work that has helped the Bahamian press during Anna Nicole's Bahamian residency carried over to other hard-hitting articles targeting lack of government transparency in housing contracts and related lack of a Freedom of Information Act. The public demand for information and exposure to international press have done Bahamian reporters tremendous good as they have taken off their kid gloves to hit hard at local leaders perceived as failing the public interest.
10. (C) COMMENT: Not since Wallace Simpson dethroned a King and came to Nassau has an American femme fatale so captivated the Bahamian public and dominated local politics. Gossip in The Bahamas is an art form -- called "sip sip" -- and the Anna Nicole saga has been quite a show for connoisseurs. The sordid details of Anna Nicole's private life inspire readers to pick up a paper, and when they do they read about a Government bending the rules for personal benefit and the privileged elite. The Anna Nicole affair has severely damaged Shane Gibson's political career, tarnishing one of the PLP's brighter stars. It also killed the Coroner's Court and may lead to changes in the laws allowing foreign property
owners to obtain Bahamian residency. Whether the scandals also determine the fate of the PLP in coming elections is still to be seen, but a newly energized media holding the government accountable will almost certainly make the campaign more difficult for the incumbent party. END COMMENT. ROOD
Friday, 30 July 2004, 05:53
C O N F I D E N T I A L WELLINGTON 000647
SIPDIS
NSC FOR MGREEN
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/ANP
EO 12958 DECL: 07/30/2014
TAGS PREL, PGOV, NZ
SUBJECT: NEW ZEALAND MINISTER HOSTS MIKE MOORE'S
"FAHRENHEIT 9/11" FUNDRAISER (ALMOST)
Classified By: DCM David R. Burnett
1. (SBU) Embassy Wellington learned July 30 that GNZ Cabinet Minister for the Environment Marian Hobbs was reportedly hosting a special screening of Michael Moore's controversial movie "Fahrenheit 9/11" as a local Labour Party fundraising event. DCM contacted the Prime Minister's office to ask whether it could shed some light on the matter and was told by PM office staff that they were not aware of the issue but would look into it. DCM then contacted Minister Hobbs' office but the Minister's office declined to make her available to discuss the matter. Hobbs' staff later informed Embassy that Hobbs would not be hosting the fundraiser. However, she would be attending the event.
2. (C) COMMENT: There's a reason this particular Minister is nicknamed "Boo Boo" Hobbs. That said, it is probable that this potential fiasco may only have been averted because of our phone calls - it is apparent to us that neither the Minister nor anyone else in the Labour government seems to have thought there was anything wrong with a senior Minister hosting such an event. Ambassador will use a scheduled meeting with the Prime Minister to tell Clark of the near instantaneous press queries for USG comment in this matter and remind her that we would really rather not get dragged into internal NZ political issues, such as Ministerial fundraising events for Clark's Labour Party. Swindells
Friday, 16 July 2004, 04:20
C O N F I D E N T I A L WELLINGTON 000605
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/ANP
NSC FOR GREEN, JONES
EO 12958 DECL: 07/15/2014
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINR, NZ
SUBJECT: NEW ZEALAND IMPOSES "STRICT CONSTRAINTS" ON
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL IN WAKE OF SPY SCANDAL
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, DAVID R. BURNETT FOR REASONS 1. 5(B,D)
1. (U) In an escalating diplomatic row, two Israeli men were sentenced July 14 by the High Court of New Zealand to six months in jail on charges of trying to obtain a false New Zealand passport. The GoNZ has not pursued allegations that the men are agents of Israeli intelligence agency Mossad. While Prime Minister Helen Clark would not confirm which service employed the men, she noted "if one were to lay espionage charges, one would have to be prepared to offer the kind of evidence in court which our intelligence agencies don't like coming forward to display. We have very strong grounds for believing these are Israeli intelligence agents." Israeli citizens Uriel Zoshe Kelman and Eli Cara were sentenced to six months in jail, and ordered to each make a NZ$50,000 (US35,000) donation to the Cerebral Palsy Society. (Note: In attempting to procure a passport, they had procured the birth certificate of a cerebral palsy sufferer.) The light sentence reflected the fact that the two men were not the principal actors in the plot, which was led by Israeli Zev William Barkan, who has fled New Zealand and is still wanted. Cara and Kelman pled guilty earlier this month to three charges, including attempting to obtain a New Zealand passport and participating in an organized crime group to obtain a false passport, and faced a maximum sentence of five years. The latter charge is a relatively new provision in the New Zealand Crimes Act, designed to counter transnational crime.
Fallout - "Strict Constraints"
------------------------------
2. (SBU) Prime Minister Helen Clark suspended high-level contact with Israel and announced a range of diplomatic sanctions, including placing Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) officials under "strict constraints" in their contact with Israelis. Clark justified her actions by stating "the Israeli agents attempted to demean the integrity of the New Zealand passport system. The Israeli Government was asked for an explanation and an apology three months ago. Neither has been received." Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom responded via radio, saying "we are sorry about this matter. It will be dealt with and all will be done to restore Israel's long history of good relations with New Zealand." Clark refused to accept this informal apology. She has announced New Zealand will continue plans to require Israeli officials to apply for visas, to postpone all Israeli consultations this year, and to delay the agrement for a new Israeli Ambassador, resident in Australia. Israel's president, Moshe Katsov, was expected to visit New Zealand in August, but the GoNZ will likely refuse his request.
3. (SBU) In a separate, but possibly related incident, a Jewish cemetery in Wellington was vandalized July 15, and headstones were desecrated. Clark immediately condemned the attack.
4. (C) Comment: The GoNZ's public reaction is its strongest diplomatic retaliation in 20 years ) since French spies bombed the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland harbor in 1985. Clark's limitations on diplomatic contact go further than the GoNZ reaction in 1985, however, and it was reported that she toughened the language of her response from that put forward by MFAT. The GONZ has little to lose by such stringent action, with limited contact and trade with Israel, and possibly something to gain in the Arab world, as the GoNZ is establishing an Embassy in Egypt and actively pursuing trade with Arab states. With Israeli Government officials eager to repair the relationship, and no time limit on the GoNZ's restrictions, it is possible the issue may be resolved in six months, when the Cara and Kelman have served their time, and leave the country. Swindells
Monday, 19 July 2004, 06:17
C O N F I D E N T I A L WELLINGTON 000611
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/ANP
EO 12958 DECL: 07/18/2014
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PINR, NZ
SUBJECT: NEW ZEALAND PRAISED BY ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT
HAMAS FOR RESPONSE TO ISRAELI SPY SCANDAL
REF: A. WELLINGTON 605 B. WELLINGTON 599
Classified By: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COUNSELOR, TIMOTHY ZUNIGA-BROWN, FOR REASONS 1.5(B,D)
1. (U) According to media reports, the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas issued a press release July 17 thanking the GoNZ for Prime Minister Helen Clark's strong response to the conviction of two suspected Israeli intelligence agents (ref a). The press release urged other countries to follow the model set by New Zealand in "adopting firm measures against the Zionist entity's violations of laws on foreign lands to achieve certain targets."
2. (U) The GNZ has been quick to renounce any sympathy for Hamas. PM Clark noted that Hamas should not take comfort from the GoNZ's actions, and if Hamas agents had committed the same crimes, they would be subject to the same prosecution. Domestic media reported separately that a religious terrorism professor at Auckland University suggested that NZ's position offers New Zealand military serving in Iraq "protection."
3. (C) Comment: New Zealand continues to voice its strong support of the Roadmap, but is loathe to take actions that would identify it as a supporter of Israel and, by proxy, the United States. The GoNZ prides itself on its multi-lateral credentials (ref B) but has been increasingly trying to stand alongside "Non-Aligned" countries. Its overly strong reaction to Israel over this issue suggests the GNZ sees this flap as an opportunity to bolster its credibility with the Arab community, and by doing so, perhaps, help NZ lamb and other products gain greater access to a larger and more lucrative market. Swindells
Tuesday, 19 February 2002, 06:07
UNCLAS VATICAN 000819
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/WE (MENNUTI), EUR/PA/PD (HILTON), EUR/RHA
(BINDENAGEL), EUR/AGS, DRL
EO 12958 N/A
TAGS PREL, GM, VT
SUBJECT: VATICAN ARCHIVES - POPE ORDERS PARTIAL OPENING FOR
NAZI GERMANY AND WORLD WAR II DOCUMENTS
1. POPE JOHN PAUL II HAS ORDERED THE PARTIAL OPENING OF THE VATICAN ARCHIVES FOR MATERIAL RELATING TO THE PERIOD LEADING TO AND DURING WORLD WAR II. IN A FEBRUARY 15 STATEMENT THE VATICAN'S CHIEF ARCHIVIST SAID THAT FROM THE BEGINNING OF 2003 MATERIAL FROM PIUS XI'S PONTIFICATE HELD BY THE VATICAN FOREIGN MINISTRY PERTAINING TO BAVARIA (1922- 1939) AND GERMANY (1922-1939), AND IN THE VATICAN SECRET UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 VATICA 00819 190632Z ARCHIVE FROM THE APOSTOLIC NUNCIATURE IN MUNICH (1922-1934) AND BERLIN (1922-1930) WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO RESEARCHERS. THE COMPLETE RELEASE OF ALL DOCUMENTATION RELATING TO PIUS XI'S PONTIFICATE IS STILL SOME THREE YEARS AWAY WHEN ACCORDING TO THE VATICAN STATEMENT, MATERIAL ON VATICAN-GERMANY ISSUES DURING THE PONTIFICATE OF PIUS XII (1939-1958) WILL ALSO BE RELEASED.
2. ARCHIVAL MATERIAL RELATING TO PRISONERS DURING WORLD WAR II WILL ALSO BE AVAILABLE FROM 2003. THE VATICAN STATEMENT POINTED OUT THAT THE RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTATION WOULD "REVEAL TO HISTORIANS THE GREAT WORKS OF CHARITY AND ASSISTANCE CARRIED OUT BY PIUS XII ON BEHALF OF THE NUMEROUS PRISONERS AND OTHER WAR VICTIMS, FROM WHATEVER NATION, RELIGION AND RACE."
3. THE VATICAN STATEMENT HIGHLIGHTED THAT THIS EXTRAORDINARY DEPARTURE FROM NORMAL VATICAN ARCHIVE PROCEDURES WAS EXPRESSLY ORDERED BY POPE JOHN PAUL II, IN THE HOPE THAT THE GESTURE WOULD "CONTRIBUTE TO THE END OF UNJUST AND UNWELCOME SPECULATION."
4. COMMENT: THE DECISION TO PARTIALLY OPEN THE VATICAN ARCHIVES RELATING TO VATICAN-GERMAN RELATIONS DURING THE LEAD UP TO WORLD WAR II AND DURING THE WAR ITSELF APPEARS TO BE AN ATTEMPT BY THE POPE TO SILENCE ACCUSATIONS OF ANTI- SEMITISM LEVELED AGAINST HIS PREDECESSOR PIUS XII. IT MAY ALSO HERALD RENEWED VATICAN INTEREST IN BEATIFYING PIUS XII - FREE FROM THE PALL OF SCANDAL AND DERISION. THE DECISION BY POPE JOHN PAUL II TO DISPENSE WITH STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES IN THIS CASE COMES AFTER YEARS OF VATICAN UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 03 VATICA 00819 190632Z PROTESTATIONS THAT THIS MATERIAL COULD NOT BE RELEASED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT YET PROPERLY CATALOGUED. IN ADDITION, THE GENERAL ARGUMENT WAS FORWARDED THAT MUCH ARCHIVAL MATERIAL WAS "SENSITIVE" AND MIGHT EMBARRASS LIVING PERSONS, AND THUS SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED UNTIL AFTER A PROPER PERIOD OF TIME - CURRENTLY 70 YEARS. TODAY'S DECISION SHOWS THAT WHEN THE POPE IS CONCERNED ENOUGH ABOUT CHURCH INTERESTS, HE WILL DO AWAY WITH THE VATICAN'S STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES IN ORDER TO FURTHER THOSE INTERESTS. THE DECISION SHOWS THAT WHATEVER THE POPE WANTS, DOES IN FACT HAPPEN. END COMMENT. NICHOLSON
UNCLASSIFIED
>
2002VATICA00819 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Wednesday, 30 April 2008, 06:59
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUBLIN 000228
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/02/2018
TAGS ENRG, EPET, ECON, PREL, PGOV, KGHG, SENV, EI
SUBJECT: IRELAND GRAPPLING WITH CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY
ISSUES
REF: 07 DUBLIN 907
Classified By: DCM Robert J. Faucher. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C) Summary: The Irish government is developing policy measures to deal with environment/energy concerns, including climate change, energy security, and power generation and distribution. A lack of indigenous energy resources has focused the government on a mix of energy efficiency and renewable power sources. The Irish government has not written off traditional fossil fuels, having "fast-tracked" the approval process for an LNG regasification terminal. It remains hopeful that significant gas fields will be uncovered in the North Atlantic. While planned additional electricity generating capacity looks sufficient to meet rising demand, the government will need to significantly upgrade the transmission system. A strong sense of urgency to tackle these issues, however, is lacking. End Summary
2. (U) This cable is based on information gathered in conversations with key energy and environment contacts in Ireland, including:
-- Sara White, Deputy Secretary General, Department of Communications, Energy, and Natural Resources.
-- Padraig McManus, CEO of Electricity Supply Board (ESB).
-- David Taylor, CEO of Sustainable Energy Ireland.
-- Tom O'Mahoney, Assistant Secretary, Department of the Environment and Local Government.
-- Morgan Bazilian (AmCit), Special Advisor to the Minister on Energy and Climate Change, Department of Communications, Energy, and Natural Resources.
Climate Change and Irish Energy Policy
--------------------------------------
3. (C) While not as vocal as other Europeans, the Irish view U.S. climate change policy warily. Initially skeptical about the motivation behind the U.S.'s Major Economies Meeting (MEM) process, there is now a greater level of comfort that the U.S. does not intend this as a replacement to the Bali process but rather as a feed-in to the process, according to O'Mahony.
4. (C) Ireland's national climate change goals are ambitious. White said that Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern "fully endorses" the conclusions reached at the 2008 Spring European Council and that he is committed to reducing emissions by 30 percent in line with the recommendations laid out in the government's 2007 Energy White Paper. She admitted that the government is aiming high with its emission reduction and renewable penetration targets. However, she added, with the wind energy sources that are in the pipeline, Ireland could meet both goals.
5. (U) The White Paper sets out goals relating to energy efficiency, use of renewables in the fuel mix, and emission reductions, among other things. The government is putting in place policies so that, by 2020: Ireland will have reduced energy use by 20% in the industrial sector and by 33% in the public sector; 33% of its electrical generation will come from renewable fuel sources (primarily wind); and, carbon emissions will be 20% below 1990 levels. Currently, Ireland is about 25% above its 1990 levels -- far over Ireland's even less-ambitious Kyoto goal of 13% above 1990 emissions.
Wind and Ocean Energy -- Resources a'Plenty
-------------------------------------------
6. (C) Ireland is blessed with some of the best wind and ocean energy resources in the world, and the government is beginning to focus efforts on promoting these sources of energy. The wind sector makes up the majority of the 7500 MW of renewable generation in the approval pipeline. The main issue is connecting this capacity to the electrical grid.
7. (U) Ocean energy technology is less advanced than wind. The Irish government has put in place a package of incentives to jump-start the sector. In January 2008, Energy Minister Ryan announced a three year, Euro 26 million (USD 41 million) package that, among other things, introduces a guaranteed, subsidized tariff to make ocean energy price competitive. In addition, the Embassy is working with the Irish government to set up a workshop on July 17 and 18 in Galway to highlight Ireland's ocean energy potential.
8. (C) White believes that technological developments will drive solutions to global warming and thought that Ireland really needs to focus on a very small set of initiatives in which it can play a significant role. She saw no value in "stretching ourselves too thin" and said that the government "is taking a bit of a punt on ocean energy development." McManus agreed and said that Irish business will end up just "buying the best technology" in areas like clean coal and carbon sequestration.
Chasing Energy Security
-----------------------
9. (C) Ireland is heavily dependent on imports to meet its energy needs. Currently 90% of Ireland's energy comes from imported fossil fuels (60% oil and 30% natural gas). The EU average is 65%. Most of the gas comes from the North Sea fields and is imported through the UK, but these fields will soon be in decline. As this happens, Europe will rely more heavily on Russian gas. By promoting renewable sources of fuel, Ireland hopes to alleviate some of this import reliance, but oil and gas will still make up the bulk of the energy mix. Regarding gas supplies from Russia, White -- who is Ireland's representative on the International Energy Agency's Governing Board -- said that her personal view is that Gazprom "will act like a regular company that is interested in selling its gas" and, therefore, she doesn't worry about Russia, though she knows others do.
10. (C) Most of Ireland's indigenous gas production comes from the Kinsale field, but that, too, is reaching the end of its life. The Corrib gas field, operated by Shell, holds enough gas to supply about 60 percent of Irish gas needs. However, Shell faces local opposition to the construction of a nine kilometer stretch of pipeline that would connect the field to the national gas grid. If the pipeline is approved, the first gas is expected by the end of 2009. Julian Cetti, Shell Ireland's Head of Commercial and Business Strategy, hinted that Shell did not have a "Plan B" if they didn't get approval. He added that Corrib and the planned Shannon LNG regas plant (owned by U.S. oil firm Hess) together would be sufficient to meet Ireland's domestic gas demand for many years.
11. (C) Ireland's real hope, however, is to find more gas in the Porcupine Basin in the North Atlantic. Shell reps and Bazilian told the Embassy that 2008 could be a big year for gas exploration in Ireland. Shell's Cetti said there "could be 20 or more Corribs out there -- or very little -- depending on how the exploratory drilling progresses this year." The Irish government just announced the results of the latest round of license tendering for fields in the North Atlantic. ExxonMobil (and partners) won two of the four licenses up for grabs.
Power Generation and Distribution
---------------------------------
12. (U) The big news on this front is ESB's (the former monopoly electricity producer and transmitter) recent announcement of a Euro 22 billion (USD 35 billion) investment program to 2020. The investment will assist ESB in cutting in half its emissions in that time period and moving to zero net emissions by 2035. One-half of the funds will go towards investments in renewable energy and the other half is geared to improving its networks and facilitating the connection of wind generation.
13. (C) Bazilian told the Embassy that getting this package put together took some effort, largely because the ESB union "took some convincing." The powerful union has long complained about the planned un-bundling of the transmission network, and raised this issue during these talks. Mary Twomey, Senior Policy Analyst, Competitiveness Division at Forfas, said that, in its 2007 Energy White Paper, the government called for full ownership unbundling by the end of 2008. She worries that the recent decision by Energy Minister Ryan (Green Party) to appoint an independent commission to study the issue of unbundling is a step backward.
14. (C) Over the last several years the government has encouraged greater competition in generation and has mandated that ESB reduce its market share to no more than 40% in order to provide room for competitors. As a result, ESB plans to close three aging plants that generate about 20% of Ireland's electricity. White pointed out that current generating capacity "is not sufficient for our medium-term needs." However, new entrants into the market have not materialized as rapidly as the government had hoped, though she now sees more interest from outside players.
15. (U) Eirgrid is the transmission system operator (but ESB still owns the grid) and, with its Northern Ireland counterpart, runs the All-Island Electricity Market. This market went on-line November 1, 2007 and all reports indicate that it is functioning well. At a recent conference, Dermot Byrne, CEO of Eirgrid, said that he expects downward pressure on prices as new generation comes on-line and the All-Island market matures. He expects demand for electricity to grow about three percent per year (current peak demand is 5000MW), requiring 400 to 600 MW of new generation capacity by 2011. In the medium-term, he said that there is approximately 885 MW of conventional plant and about 7500 MW of renewable generation in the queue -- enough to meet the increased demand.
16. (C) Ireland's bottleneck is not necessarily generation capacity but rather the transmission system. Over the past two decades, Ireland has invested very little in transmission. Now, in order to support the All-Island market, Eirgrid will build a 350MW interconnector to Northern Ireland and begin work on an interconnector to Wales. Twomey agreed that the transmission grid needs expansion and, for that reason, worries that the Northern Ireland project may be "at risk or, at least, significantly delayed" by on-going protests against the construction of high voltage lines. (Note: The protestors want the cables buried underground. End note).
Comment
-------
17. (C) With the inclusion of the Green Party in government, environmental and energy issues have become an area of ferment within the Irish policymaking community. The enthusiastic engagement by Minister Ryan has produced some notable results -- the ocean energy incentives and the ESB investment program, in particular. However, other observers here echo Jim Barry's (CEO of Irish firm NTR) comment that, "the government does not have an energy/climate change policy," and that it is making decisions on an ad hoc basis rather than engaging in any strategic thinking. Part of the problem is that, as Tom O'Mahony said, the Irish populace has not, "internalized the costs of global warming," so there is no sense of urgency to move on the issue. Without public pressure to do something, there is a risk that the government will lose enthusiasm for the project and "kick the can down the road" to a future government. FAUCHER
Wednesday, 02 September 2009, 19:35
C O N F I D E N T I A L KINGSTON 000666
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/CAR (J.MACK-WILSON, W.SMITH, V.DEPIRRO)
L/LEI (C.HOLLAND, A.KLUESNER)
INR/IAA (G.BOHIGIAN)
JUSTICE FOR OIA (P.PETTY)
TREASURY FOR IA/WH (E.NEPHEW)
PASS TO CENTRAL AMERICAN CARIBBEAN BASIN COLLECTIVE
EO 12958 DECL: 09/01/2019
TAGS CJAN, CVIS, PREL, PGOV, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, SOCI, KCOR,
KCRM, JM, BR, XL
SUBJECT: JAMAICA: U.S. REQUEST TO EXTRADITE POWERFUL "DON"
PRESENTS GOVERNMENT WITH A DANGEROUS DILEMMA; KINGSTON MAYOR WARNS OF "SEVERE REPERCUSSIONS"
REF: A. STATE 85807 (181409Z AUG 09)(NOTAL) B. KINGSTON 655 (2821557Z AUG 09) C. 08 KINGSTON 972 (171906Z NOV 08)(NOTAL)
Classified By: CDA ISIAH L. PARNELL, Reasons 1.5 (B) AND (D)
Summary and Analysis
---------------------
1.(C) The U.S. request to extradite a powerful "Don" with close ties to the ruling Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) has presented Prime Minister (PM) Bruce Golding's Government with a dangerous dilemma: the requested extradition could spark violent incidents, ignite rivalries among competing gang factions, and unleash a challenge to the state and to Golding's own influence in West Kingston and beyond. The Mayor of Kingston warns of "severe repercussions" and "collateral damage." His fears are not unfounded. End Summary and Analysis.
The Mayor's perspective: severe repercussions
--------------------------------------------- -
2.(C) The Mayor of Kingston and St. Andrew, Councillor Desmond Anthony McKenzie, requested to meet with EmbOff on September 1 to discuss an "urgent" matter; the private meeting was held in his downtown office. The Mayor began by stating pointedly that the Government of Jamaica (GoJ) faced a serious crisis because of Washington's request for the extradition of Christopher Coke to stand trial on narcotics and firearms charges in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (reftels A,B). He predicted that there would be "severe repercussions" and "collateral damage" if Coke were arrested, and that this would "risk destroying everything the Government was trying to do on the economy and crime." The Mayor said that in recent years his administration had worked with Coke to reduce crime in the inner cities of Jamaica, particularly in West Kingston. If he now were extradited, this would "leave a vacuum," and matters would be much worse. McKenzie noted that in recent days several of his "contacts in the communities" had told him they "would not take this (Coke s extradition) lying down."
A "grim picture of the reality we face"
---------------------------------------
3.(C) McKenzie then asked if there were any room for further discussions with U.S. officials. EmbOff replied by reiterating that the U.S. expected Jamaica to honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty, and considered this a case of great importance; however, the Embassy would convey the Mayor's assessment and inquiry to Washington. McKenzie concluded by observing that his views were not only an assessment, but accurately portrayed the "grim picture of the reality we face."
Background: a powerful, well-connected "Don"
--------------------------------------------
4.(C) Christopher Michael "Dudus" Coke is a wealthy "Don" who wields extraordinary power in the West Kingston inner city "garrison community" of Tivoli Gardens, whose Member of Parliament (MP) is Prime Minister Bruce Golding. Coke reputedly is closely connected with leading figures within Golding's Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), including McKenzie. In the island state's tribal political culture, over the years both major parties have developed symbiotic ties of patronage and influence with the "Dons" who control the garrison communities, and whose powers have grown as Jamaica's economy has struggled. Coke's gang provides social and welfare services and turns out the JLP vote in elections, while his business interests profit from lucrative Government contracts. He is the son of the late Lester Lloyd "Jim Brown" Coke, who, together with the recently deported Vivian
Blake, for years master-minded the notorious "Shower Posse" drug gang, which wreaked havoc in Jamaica, the USA, and UK. "Jim Brown" died in prison under mysterious circumstances while awaiting extradition to the U.S. in 1992.
Analysis: a desperate Mayor, a nervous capital city
--------------------------------------------- -------
5.(C) McKenzie's fears are not unfounded: Coke's wealth, power, and influence are pervasive, and his sudden removal could spark violent incidents and/or unleash rivalries among competing gang factions in Kingston, Spanish Town, and Montego Bay. He is easily the highest profile figure whose extradition has been requested in many years, and his long-standing ties to the JLP have put McKenzie, Golding, and other leading Party figures in an extremely awkward position. (Note: The incendiary potential of rivalries among the various gangs with ties to the JLP was demonstrated during the Party's annual conference in November, 2008, when an eruption of gang-related violence at the packed national arena left one dead and several wounded, reftel C. End Note.) Rumors in circulation over recent days have ranged from a false report of Coke's arrest to speculation that he will attempt to flee to Brazil.
Media Perspective: Do the right thing
-------------------------------------
6.(SBU) Local media have focused on the difficult challenge facing the JLP Government in extraditing Coke, but no one (aside from his prospective attorney, Tom Tavares-Finson) seriously maintains his innocence. The "Observer" newspaper, generally sympathetic to the JLP, maintained in an editorial of August 30: "They say he's a 'Don,' a good man who has kept many bellies in Tivoli Gardens full over the years. That may be so, but it cannot be the basis on which to resist an extradition request. We must, as a civilized, democratic society, be prepared to stand or fall with the systems of justice to which our Government has subscribed, bellyful or no bellyful." A Sept. 1 editorial in the "Gleaner" newspaper (generally more sympathetic to the opposition People's National Party), referred to: "the dilemma faced by the Golding administration ) a concern that an attempt to extradite someone whom a community views as benefactor could unleash a challenge to the state and to the JLP's and Mr. Golding's own influence in West Kingston. And perhaps elsewhere," but concluded: "we expect the administration, unswayed by politics, to do the right thing - which Mr. Golding promised would be the hallmark of his leadership. To do otherwise, not only diminishes Mr. Golding, but will hurt Jamaica's interests, political and economic, in the international community." PARNELL
Monday, 14 December 2009, 20:19
C O N F I D E N T I A L KINGSTON 000761
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/CAR (J.MACK-WILSON, V.DEPIRRO, W.SMITH)
L/LEI (C.HOLLAND, A.KLUESNER)
INR/IAA (G.BOHIGIAN)
JUSTICE FOR OIA (P.PETTY)
TREASUTY FOR ERIN NEPHEW
INR/RES (R.WARNER)
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA
EO 12958 DECL: 2019/12/14
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ECON, EFIN, SOCI, CVIS, SNAR, PINR, ASEC, CJAN
KCOR, AID, IMF, JM, XL
SUBJECT: JAMAICA: PRIME MINISTER'S WIFE SEES "NEFARIOUS INFLUENCES"
ON SECRETARY CLINTON
REF: A. KINGSTON 753; B. KINGSTON 1050; C. KINGSON 759 D. KINGSTON 1070
CLASSIFIED BY: Isiah Parnell, CDA; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
Summary and Analysis:
------------------------------
1. (C) Lorna Golding, the wife of Prime Minister (PM) Bruce Golding, told Post's Public Affairs Officer (PAO) Patricia Attkisson that she believes Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is under the "pernicious influence" of U.S. Representative Charles Rangel regarding the contentious U.S. extradition request for Christopher "Dudus" Coke. In an often surreal and disjointed conversation, Mrs. Golding alleged that Congressman Rangel is a "sympathizer" of the opposition People's National Party (PNP) who is "manipulated" by PNP elements in the Jamaican diaspora in the U.S. and is "whispering in Secretary Clinton's ear" in order to "downgrade" the governing Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the Government of Jamaica (GOJ). Mrs. Golding also blamed this cabal for the White House's delay in naming a new ambassador and the GOJ's difficulties in finalizing a Standby Agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although it appears unlikely that Mrs. Golding was delivering a message on behalf of the PM, Mrs. Golding's rambling comments and penchant for sharing conspiracy theories with a key member of the U.S. Embassy community is consistent with a growing sense among many of indecisiveness and a lack of direction on the part of the PM and the JLP. End Summary and Analysis.
"Pernicious Influence"
----------------------------
2. (C) The invitation to the PAO to meet for afternoon tea on December 11 at the PM's residence had been unexpected; there were no other guests in attendance and no tea was actually served, although the PAO was offered some salad that Mrs. Golding said the Prime Minister had prepared the previous evening. Mrs. Golding didn't seem to be using any talking points, although the PM was aware of the PAO's presence and in fact dropped in for some small talk later in the meeting. (NOTE: This suggests that Mrs. Golding's opinions were not necessarily intended as an effort on the part of the PM's office to establish some sort of backchannel communication or to present any informal messages or official GOJ policy. End Note).
3.(C) The PAO's conversation with Mrs. Golding covered a wide array of topics, from salads and manicures to the Coke extradition request (Ref A) and Jamaica's pending negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (Ref B). Mrs. Golding expressed her belief that Secretary Clinton's failure to mention the GOJ in the Department's traditional Independence Day congratulatory message to the Jamaican people in August 2009 had been an intentional slight, instigated by the PNP through its "nefarious influence" on Secretary Clinton. Similarly, Mrs. Golding attributed the Coke extradition request to Congressman Rangel's "whispering in Secretary Clinton's ear" and the PNP's "pernicious influence" within the Jamaican diaspora, and insisted that the extradition request had been orchestrated as a means of embarrassing her husband politically.
PM Needs "Bigging Up"
------------------------------
4. (C) Despite assurances to the contrary, Mrs. Golding remained convinced, as do many Jamaicans, that the White House's delay in naming a new U.S. ambassador is because Jamaica has been "downgraded" as a result of the extradition request delay (NOTE: Mrs. Golding was apparently unaware that, earlier in the week, the Office of the Prime Minister had released a statement to the press indicating that the delay in naming an ambassador was due to the White House's "preoccupation with other matters" and was unrelated to the extradition request. Ref A. End Note) . Mrs. Golding alluded to the JLP's historical ties to the U.S.'s Republican party and the close ties between former JLP PM Edward Seaga and President Reagan, then requested that President Obama "reach out" to the Prime Minister as a means of "bigging him up" (i.e., raising his stature). Nevertheless, Mrs. Golding had nothing but praise for USAID's activities in the country and referred to the USAID Director as a "true friend" of Jamaica.
5. (C) The PAO inquired as to how new revenues would be spent if, as now appears likely (Ref C), the GOJ enters into a new IMF Standby Agreement. Mrs. Golding downplayed the likelihood of new spending on infrastructure or social welfare programs and insisted that all new revenues would be allocated toward paying down Jamaica's debt. The PM "feels strongly that the Government of Jamaica has to pay its bills," Mrs. Golding stated, a belief she says he inherited from his mother.
Conclusion and Analysis
-------------------------------
6. (C) Mrs. Golding insisted that she had invited the PAO to have tea on her own initiative and that the PM, although aware of the meeting, hadn't put her up to it. This is likely true, given that Mrs. Golding appeared completely unprepared, could not stay on message, and had no apparent talking points or agenda. If the PM had hoped to establish a backchannel for discussions with Post or to convey some informal messages to the USG regarding the Coke extradition request, the status of IMF negotiations, or some other matter of mutual concern, it would appear that the opportunity was lost. This is consistent with past practice, however, as the PM and the JLP GOJ have missed a number of opportunities in recent months to signal their willingness to make difficult decisions or to address the myriad economic and social crises the nation faces (Ref D). End Conclusion and Analysis. Parnell
Wednesday, 05 November 2008, 10:24
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001337
SIPDIS
STATE PLEASE PASS TO EEB/TPP/IPE URBAN, WALLACE,
USTR FOR YANG, GROVES, WILSON
COMMERCE FOR PAUGH
EO 12958 DECL: 11/05/2018
TAGS ECON, ETRD, IT, KIPR, PGOV
SUBJECT: BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT AND IPR -- FIRST SIGNS OF
LIFE
Classified By: DCM Elizabeth Dibble for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
First Signs of IPR Direction under Berlusconi Government
1. (C) Summary: Fabrizio Mazza, head of the Intellectual Property Office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hopes to see the GOI form an interministerial committee to deal with IPR, particularly Internet piracy, and would also like to see discussion of Internet Piracy featured in G-8 meetings during Italy's presidency. He warned, however, that Italian officials are still angry because they believe the language of the 2008 Special 301 report did not acknowledge Italian IPR efforts. Mazza admitted that IPR protections are still lacking, but added that future progress could be difficult, in that policy makers saw their efforts to bring IPR problems to the attention of the public and judiciary go unremarked. He also predicted that ACTA negotiations will not result in a text by the end of 2008. End Summary
2. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 7.
3. (U) Econoff met Oct. 23 with Fabrizio Mazza, head of the Intellectual Property Office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mazza also served in this capacity under the Prodi government.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SPECIAL 301 REPORT - NO CREDIT TO ITALY
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4. (C) Mazza said that key GOI officials are angry about the language of the 2008 301 Report. Prior to the last 301 report, he said, Italy put a great deal of effort into getting the "buy in" that will allow real change. Raising discussions of the issue to higher levels of the government was an important part of this, said Mazza. As a result of these efforts, senior government officials had begun to pressure judges to impose tougher sentences for IPR-related crimes, something that is particularly difficult politically. While Mazza claimed no one expected Italy to come off the watch list, he said GOI officials did expect recognition for their efforts. He specifically cited the fact that China was lauded more forcefully for its IPR protection efforts than Italy.
5. (C) In Mazza's view, efforts to get higher level officials engaged in IPR were working, but those same officials were taken aback by what he called "the harshness" of the 301 report's language. Mazza is eager to continue pushing for action on IPR protection but indicated that reaction to the report has made it harder to motivate other officials to continue these efforts.
- - - - - - - - - -
HOPE FOR THE FUTURE
- - - - - - - - - -
6. (C) Despite reaction to the 301 Report, Mazza says he is primed to begin a new IPR push. He wants to see the formation of an interministerial committee to deal with piracy issues. He envisions starting a dialogue with Internet Service Providers. He also envisions creation of some kind of warning or "cease and desist" system targeting unlawful downloading. He asked that the USG engage at higher levels to support the formation of such a committee. He also said he would like to see a discussion of Internet Piracy introduced into the G-8 during Italy's presidency. He noted this would need approval from PM Berlusconi, and he implied that U.S. encouragement would help.
7. (SBU) Action Request: Mazza seems to be sounding out a U.S. opinion on injecting IPR and Internet piracy issues into the G-8 process. Post seeks guidance on how to respond in discussions regarding IPR and the G-8.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EU COUNTRIES WILL ASK FOR SLOWDOWN IN ACTA NEGOTIATIONS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
8. (SBU) Mazza does not expect an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) text by the end of the year. Summer, or even fall, of 2009 is the earliest he imagined an agreed-upon text would be possible. In his view, European countries are likely to ask for a slowdown in negotiations because of opposition to the EU commission's involvement in negotiating portions of the treaty, disagreements over the confidentiality level of the negotiations, and the absence of geographical indications from the agreement.
9. (SBU) Mazza said member states are opposed to the EU Commission negotiating matters related to criminal enforcement. Mazza observed that member state competency in this area would make it more appropriate that these points be negotiated by the EU member state holding the rotating presidency. He said the United Kingdom and Scandinavian countries are particularly heated in their opposition to the Commission's involvement on these points, but that Italy is also opposed.
10. (SBU) The level of confidentiality in these ACTA negotiations has been set at a higher level than is customary for non-security agreements. According to Mazza, it is impossible for member states to conduct necessary consultations with IPR stakeholders and legislatures under this level of confidentiality. He said that before the next round of ACTA discussions, this point will have to be renegotiated.
11. (SBU) According to Mazza, ACTA is a de facto "TRIPS Plus" in the view of many European nations, yet ACTA does not address geographic indications, which is addressed in TRIPS. He said it's "only a matter of time" before a European delegation points out that this upgrade to TRIPS addresses the key American issues of piracy and counterfeiting but ignores the key European issue of geographical indications. He indicated that this omission would not be a deal breaker, but would slow negotiations.
- - - -
COMMENT
- - - -
12. (C) Though Mazza complains about the USG's supposed failure to recognize Italy's progress, a look at what he is proposing -- another committee -- demonstrates that Italy is still a long way from taking the kind of enforcement actions needed to get off the Special 301 list.
13. (C) Nevertheless, we think Mazza is trying to get the GOI to improve enforcement; we should help him. The fragmentation of IPR protection responsibility in Italy means that for any real action to take place, officials on many levels from many offices must sign onto the process. Mazza is motivated to push for IPR action, but he does not have the power to make things happen on his own. He is struggling to get the attention of his superiors, primarily the IPR Delegate. Italy's current IPR Delegate, Mauro Masi, also serves as Secretary General of the Prime Minister's Office and is well placed to push for real progress on the IPR front. We dealt with Masi on this issue under the Prodi government and he is well aware of our concerns and of the several areas where progress in IPR protection is expected. The Embassy is about to take this issue up again with Masi in an effort to kindle more policy interest in the Berlusconi government so as to secure commitments in publicly enunciated policy, popular education on the issues, enforcement, and benchmarking of progress. End Comment. SPOGLI
Tuesday, 24 November 2009, 12:31
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000736
STATE FOR JOELLEN URBAN
STATE PASS TO USTR FOR DAVID WEINER AND KIRA ALVAREZ
SIPDIS
TAGS KIPR, EINT, ETRD, ECON, PGOV, SW
SUBJECT: CONCERNS ABOUT ACTA NEGOTIATIONS AND IPR UPDATE: IPRED,
PIRATE BAY, AND VODDLER
Ref: A) STOCKHOLM 733, B) STOCKHOLM 676
1. (SBU) Summary: Swedish media and the usual blogger-circles have expressed similar concerns about the on-going ACTA (Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement) negotiations as we have seen in many other countries, mostly focusing on the secrecy and the internet chapter with its reported demands for graduated response systems. As the Swedish Justice Ministry has negotiating for the EU during the second half of this year, this has led to domestic criticism of the government. Media reporting has forced the Swedish Government to go public saying that Sweden will not agree to ACTA provisions requiring revised Swedish laws. Meanwhile, The Pirate Bay website, no longer based in Sweden, is moving towards complying with its court injunction by removing its tracker. An identical tracker shortly thereafter appeared on another site. We are now beginning to hear criticism that the IPRED (Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive) legislation makes investigating and solving crimes more difficult in Sweden as Internet Service Providers tend to destroy their records as soon as legally possible. And, some good news: There has been an overwhelming positive response to the Voddler launch. End summary.
ACTA
----
2. (SBU) Post contacted Stefan Johansson, who has represented the EU at the ACTA negotiations during the Swedish EU Presidency. He told us that the secrecy issue has been very damaging to the negotiating climate in Sweden. All political parties have vocal minorities challenging the steps the government has taken to step up its IPR enforcement. For those groups, the refusal to make ACTA documents public has been an excellent political tool around which to build speculation about the political intent behind the negotiations. If the instrument for example had been negotiated within the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) critics say, WIPO's Secretariat would have made public initial draft proposals.
3. (SBU) In Johansson's opinion, the secrecy around the negotiations has led to that the legitimacy of the whole process being questioned. This, combined with the leaked European Commission document summarizing an oral account of the U.S. internet chapter proposal, forced Justice Ministry State Secretary Magnus Graner to go public earlier this month to appease the storm of critics by assuring them that the Swedish government will not agree to any ACTA provision that would require changes to current Swedish laws.
4. (SBU) Johansson said that in his opinion, there is strong support within the negotiating group for the position that a negotiated text coming out of the ACTA discussions must be made public while there is still scope to influence the final outcome. He further told us that the European Commission is concerned that the USG has close consultation with U.S. industry, while the EU does not have the same possibility to share the content under discussion in the negotiations.
5. (SBU) EU Member states' representatives will meet around November 25-26 to further discuss the U.S. internet chapter proposal, and to coordinate its position going forward. Johansson will, of course, no longer negotiate on behalf of the EU come January 2010 - when the Presidency rotates to Spain. Nonetheless, Johansson told us he hopes the negotiations might be concluded during 2010, maybe during the second half of the year. He said that we need to get to a point soon where we start separating out linguistic differences from the principal issues that need to be negotiated. Thus far, the negotiations have not been effective at separating out the core issues.
IPRED legislation
-----------------
6. (U) Swedish Police Enforcement officials are complaining that implementation of the IPRED has made it more difficult to solve crimes. Swedish Internet Service Providers are saving user information related to IP-numbers for a shorter period of time following the IPRED legislation.
7. (U) Also, as previously reported (Ref A) the IPRED legislation might be doing little to stop the problem of illegal file-sharing as internet users now are using services which allow them to hide their IP-addresses.
IPR-issues discussed in Swedish Parliament
---------------------------------------
8. (U) U.S. Professor Lawrence Lessing lectured at the Swedish Parliament on November 18. Following the discussion he told Swedish media he hopes to shift the focus from illegal file-sharing to means of enabling "remix and creativity." Lessing maintains that it is important to both compensate right-holders, but also allow remix of certain intellectual property without compensation.
Pirate Bay tracker removed
------ ---- ------- -------
9. (U) The Pirate Bay has removed its tracker, to comply with a previous court injunction delivered in October. According to one of the founders of The Pirate Bay, the tracker is not needed for the website to function. Monique Wadsted, legal representative of the U.S. movie industry, says that the removal is not enough for The Pirate Bay to be in compliance with the USD 72,000 injunction.
10. (U) The founders of The Pirate Bay have appealed the injunction on grounds that the Stockholm District Court lacks jurisdiction because the Pirate Bay founders no longer live in Sweden. Moreover, the founders oppose the decision, arguing that they no longer have control over the website, which is located outside Sweden as well.
11. (U) Following removal of the tracker from The Pirate Bay's website, an identical tracker surfaced on a Swedish website. Monique Wadsted, representing the U.S. movie industry, on November 18 filed a claim in court, asking ISP Portlane to shut off bandwidth to the tracker which allows for file-sharers to connect with each other.
Swedes excited over Voddler launch
----------------------------------
12. (U) The new service Voddler for legally watching movies over the internet for free has attracted more than a quarter of a million Swedes since its launch two weeks ago (Ref B). In addition to signing up tens of thousands of subscribers in a matter of days, Voddler recently inked licensing deals with two major Hollywood studios, Walt Disney Company and Paramount, giving its users access to thousands of film titles.
13. (U) Founded in Stockholm in 2005, Voddler offers users legal streaming on-demand videos free of charge. When it released a beta version of its technology in July 2009, the service attracted 16,000 users on the first day. As previously reported, Voddler launched an updated version of the service in late October, inviting customers of Swedish ISP Bredbandsbolaget to sign up.
14. (U) Voddler's executive vice president Zoran Slav calls "the launch very, very successful, both in terms of how the service has been received in the press and in terms of the response from the public". He said Voddler now has 70,000 registered users, as well as a waiting-list of more than 200,000 people who have requested an invitation to join the service. "We're adding about 3,000 users a day," Slav said. Voddler is not the only company in Sweden offering legal streaming of movies over the internet, however, they are the only entertainment service provider that offers access to movies for free.
15. (U) Voddler's service is currently only available in Sweden. Voddler plans to expand service to Norway, Denmark, and Finland in 2010. According to the executive vice president, Voddler is looking to bigger markets in other parts of Europe and North America -- however, the company is taking a measured approach to its expansion plans. Voddler also recently launched a version of its service for Mac users, and Slavic said that an iPhone application is in the works.
BARZUN
Wednesday, 30 December 2009, 14:27
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003144
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/29/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, RS
SUBJECT: RULE OF LAW LIPSTICK ON A POLITICAL PIG:
KHODORKOVSKIY CASE PLODS ALONG
REF: A) MOSCOW 603 B) MOSCOW 1226
Classified By: Pol Minister Counselor Susan Elliott for reason 1.4 (d)
1. (C) Summary: The prosecution in the Khodorkovskiy/Lebedev trial has finished reading its 188 volumes of evidence, and has moved on to questioning witnesses. An observer for the International Bar Association stated his belief that the trial is being conducted fairly. Related events outside of Russia continue to affect the case. XXXXXXXXXXXX the Russian Supreme Court upheld an ECHR ruling that Lebedev's initial arrest was illegal; and an arbitration court in the Hague found Russia to be bound by the Energy Charter Treaty, leaving it open to a large judgment against it and possible seizure of GOR assets abroad by Yukos shareholders. Despite the case's wide implications, it continues to be a cause celebre only for foreigners and a minority of Russians. The case also shows the great lengths that the GOR is willing to go in order to place a "rule of law" gloss on a politically motivated trial. End Summary.
Recent developments
-------------------
2. (C) The trial of former Yukos chief Mikhail Khodorkovskiy and his associate Platon Lebedev continues in Moscow's Khaminovsky court, having moved from the reading of the prosecution's evidence -- which comprised 188 volumes and lasted throughout the summer -- to questioning of the prosecution's witnesses. Thus far the prosecution has called 31 of its 250 witnesses, meaning that the trial will probably last until 2012. XXXXXXXXXXXX, told us XXXXXXXXXXXX that he believes the trial is being conducted fairly and that Judge Danilkin has been doing everything in his power to make sure that the defense gets a fair opportunity to present arguments and challenge the prosecution's evidence.
3. (C) Among recent developments in the case, the defense has been trying to introduce the testimony of a former Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) auditor, who was deposed in California in August by Khodorkovskiy lawyers. The prosecution has objected to the introduction of the deposition into the case, complaining that they had not received sufficient notice; however, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX the Russian Embassy did not inform the head investigator in Russia until recently. The PWC deposition goes to the heart of Yukos's guilt or innocence; as Yukos's auditor, it signed off on Yukos's financial statements from 1994 to 2003, XXXXXXXXXXXX
Lebedev ruling and other "international" issues
--------------------------------------------- --
4. (SBU) The Yukos battle continues simultaneously both on domestic and the international fronts, with some concrete effects on the case's proceedings in Moscow. On December 23, the Russian Supreme Court ruled that the 2003 decision to arrest and detain Lebedev was illegal, in keeping with a 2007 ruling by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). (Note: The GOR often loses cases at the ECHR, and its common practice is to pay the compensation required by the ECHR's rulings while ignoring the substantive redress of the systemic problem involved. This decision represents a rare departure from this practice and signals a potentially encouraging trend. End Note.) The Supreme Court's ruling indicated only that the first two months of Lebedev's six years (to date) of incarceration were illegal, and thus might be considered only marginally relevant. However, the defense might use this ruling to argue that the entire conviction was tainted by the illegal detention and therefore should be thrown out. Defense lawyers told Radio Free Europe that they have not yet decided how to proceed, but called the ruling a "victory," while expressing bewilderment at the Supreme Court's two-year delay in ruling on the case.
5. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX This move follows a December 2 ruling by an international arbitration tribunal in the Hague that Russia is bound by the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), thus requiring the GOR to defend itself against claims from Yukos shareholders for an estimated 100 billion USD in damages (ref A). This sum would be the largest arbitration award ever, representing 10 percent of Russia's GDP, and although collecting the entire amount would be difficult, it could allow shareholders to seize state assets outside of Russia. The ECT ruling could affect, among others, companies such as Royal Dutch Shell and BP who were forced to renegotiate contracts on terms favorable to the GOR.
Russians apathetic, but skeptical towards GOR
---------------------------------------------
6. (SBU) Given such significant international implications to the case, and given Khodorkovskiy's former stature, one might expect a large amount of focus on the Yukos case inside Russia. However, most Russians continue to pay scant attention (ref B). According to a December poll by the Levada Center encompassing 1,600 respondents in 127 cities and villages, only a little more than one-third of Russians are following the case (a May Levada poll showed the same figure for people who were at all aware that the case existed). The same poll, however, revealed a notable divergence in public opinion from the "party line" maintained by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. In his December 3 televised question and answer session with the public, Putin defended the legitimacy of Khodorkovskiy's incarceration and accused Khodorkovskiy of also being a murderer. He also claimed that all of the earnings from the sale of Yukos were being funneled into the country's Housing and Utilities Fund. The Levada poll, however, showed that 65 percent of respondents did not believe Putin's claim about the Housing Fund, and 50 percent believed that Putin should be summoned as a witness in the case.
Khodorkovskiy starting to lose hope
-----------------------------------
7. (SBU) Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev have consistently maintained an upbeat demeanor, frequently smiling and laughing during the proceedings, and chatting buoyantly with supporters. Over the course of his imprisonment, Khodorkovskiy has written a series of philosophical articles (printed in liberal papers such as Vedomosti) that have amounted to shadow policy papers of the type that he might write if he were one of the President's advisors. He had also expressed faith that the Russian court system would exhibit sufficient fairness and rule of law, and Judge Danilkin sufficient independence, to acquit him. In recent months Khodorkovskiy has made pessimistic statements that he does not expect ever to be freed. By all accounts, in 2003 Khodorkovskiy did not believe he would actually be arrested. His thinking here seems to following a similar trajectory, from naive refusal to believe what is happening, to the gradual sinking in of the reality of his situation.
Comment
-------
8. (C) The fact that legal procedures are apparently being meticulously followed in a case whose motivation is clearly political may appear paradoxical. It shows the effort that the GOR is willing to expend in order to save face, in this case by applying a superficial rule-of-law gloss to a cynical system where political enemies are eliminated with impunity. It is not lost on either elite or mainstream Russians that the GOR has applied a double standard to the illegal activities of 1990s oligarchs; if it were otherwise, virtually every other oligarch would be on trial alongside Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev. There is a widespread understanding that Khodorkovskiy violated the tacit rules of the game: if you keep out of politics, you can line your pockets as much as you desire. Most Russians believe the Khodorkovskiy trial is politically motivated; they simply do not care that it is. Human rights activists in general have an uphill battle in overcoming public apathy and cynicism, but nowhere more so than in the Khodorkovskiy case. We will continue to monitor the case as it unfolds. Rubin
Wednesday, 18 April 2007, 07:48
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001770
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DOJ OF OPDAT/ALEXANDRE, LEHMANN AND NEWCOMBE, OCRS/OHR AND
SHASKY, OIA/BURKE AND DITTOE
STATE FOR EUR/RUS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/17/2017
TAGS ECON, KCRM, KJUS, PGOV, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: MEETING WITH XXXXXXXXXXXX
REF: A. MOSCOW 774 B. MOSCOW 697
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.5 (b, d)
1. (C) Summary: Emboffs met with XXXXXXXXXXXX. He described the new embezzlement and money laundering charges -- that Khodorkovskiy engaged in transfer pricing that harmed unwitting minority shareholders in Yukos' three production subsidiaries -- as a re-packaging of the charges in the first case. He claimed the defense has substantial evidence these shareholders were fully informed of these activities. Further, XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained that the charges are without legal or factual support and questioned the prosecution's claim that the loss to the subsidiaries was USD 30 billion, a figure he said was about equal to the value of the oil produced by the three units during the period in question. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he was surprised that a Moscow court had agreed to change the venue of the trial from Chita to Moscow. He described two cases pending before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The first case claims that Khodorkovskiy was arrested and held in pre-trial detention in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention), while the second alleges violations of Khodorkovskiy's right to a fair trial. XXXXXXXXXXXX maintained that the case against XXXXXXXXXXXX is politically motivated and being run out of the Kremlin, and does not foresee any change of status for Khodorkovskiy while the Putin Administration remains in office. End Summary.
The New Charges
---------------
2. (C) On February 16, the General Procuracy charged Khodorkovskiy and Platon Lebedev with embezzlement and money laundering (Ref B). According to the indictment, Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev acquired controlling interests in three oil companies (Samaraneftegaz, Yuganskneftegaz, and Tomskneftegaz) and then caused these companies to sell oil at below-market prices to other companies that they controlled without disclosing to other shareholders their role in these transactions. They then allegedly re-sold the oil at market prices, which were approximately 3-4 times greater than the original purchase price. The alleged victims were the other shareholders of Samaraneftegaz, Yuganskneftegaz, and Tomskneftegaz, who were entitled to the benefit of an arms-length sale at market prices, but instead received only the artificially deflated prices allegedly set by Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev (Ref B).
3. (C) As an initial matter, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the new charges are simply a re-packaging of the charges in the first case. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX in the first case, prosecutors relied on the very same transactions to charge Khodorkovskiy with tax evasion. However, he said, they were unsatisfied with Khodorkovskiy's eight-year sentence and decided to bring new charges carrying potentially heavier sentences. The money laundering charges carry a maximum sentence of 15 years and the embezzlement charges carry a maximum sentence of 10 years. He said the defense will challenge them on the grounds that they violate Russian and international norms prohibiting double jeopardy. XXXXXXXXXXXX also suggested that the new charges may have been brought to prevent Khodorkovskiy from being released on parole before upcoming Duma and Presidential elections. (Note: Russian law provides that a prisoner is eligible for early release after he has served half of his sentence. Because Khodorkovskiy was arrested in October 2003 and was sentenced to eight years, he might have been eligible for early release in October 2007. However, his prison violations, which XXXXXXXXXXXX claims were provoked by authorities, would likely have prevented his early release in any event. End Note.)
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that the new charges are without merit since this transfer pricing technique was not only legal but engaged in by "thousands of firms." He noted that the business groups and industrial firms emerging from privatization during the 1990s were generally organized to take maximum advantage of benefits the GOR provided via "internal offshore" zones. The headquarters and some operating units of a group or firm were typically located in identified havens and conducted most of the transactions, thus allowing for tax optimization. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX this structure facilitated and encouraged the widespread practice of transfer pricing, whereby one part of a company
MOSCOW 00001770 002 OF 003
purchased the output made by another part of the company at below-market prices before selling the same output at a market price.
5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX defense would present substantial documentary evidence, including records of corporate meetings, proving that the minority shareholders of Samaraneftegaz, Yuganskneftegaz, and Tomskneftegaz were fully informed of all relevant aspects of the subject transactions. XXXXXXXXXXXX also claimed that if the minority shareholders had actually been defrauded, as prosecutors claim, they would have filed civil suits, which they did not do. Finally, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the prosecution's claim of a USD 30 billion loss to the shareholders is &absurd8 because the sum would represent the total value of all the oil produced by the subject companies during the relevant time period rather than the difference between what the minority shareholders actually received and what they would have received in arms-length transactions, which, he said, would have been much a more sensible way to measure the alleged loss.
The Trial: Where and When?
--------------------------
6. (C) The Procuracy filed the new charges in Chita, where Khodorkovskiy is presently incarcerated, and sought to conduct the preliminary investigation and trial there (Ref B). Shortly after the new charges were filed, the defense filed a motion seeking a change of venue to Moscow, claiming that the majority of witnesses and evidence are located there. On March 20, the Basmanny Court in Moscow granted the defense motion. The Procuracy appealed this decision and the appeal was heard on April 16 in the Moscow City Court. This Court upheld the Basmanny Court's decision transferring the case to Moscow. XXXXXXXXXXXX Russian law provides that the preliminary investigation should be conducted in the place where the crime was allegedly committed, but may be conducted in the place where the defendant is located to ensure &completeness, objectivity and compliance with procedural norms."
7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the Procuracy chose Chita to make it difficult for the defense team to meet with their clients and prepare their defense. Specifically, he said, Chita is difficult to reach and lacks the copying machines and other office equipment the defense needs to prepare its case. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that although the Procuracy's decision was clearly wrong as a matter of law, he was surprised by the Basmanny Court's decision because the same court had consistently ruled against Khodorkovskiy in the first case. He claimed that the ruling was an indication of a general recognition that the Procuracy had "gone too far."
8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that he did not know when the trial on the new charges would take place. He said that the prosecution had sought to start the trial in June so that it would be completed before the elections, but noted that the case materials consist of 127 volumes and said that the XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the prosecutors will likely move to cut off the defense's review of the case file in May, but said that the defense would challenge such a motion. Under Russian law, the prosecution can seek to limit the time that the defense has to review the case file if there are grounds to believe that the defense is engaging in unreasonable delay. XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that a trial date could not be set until the location of the trial had been determined. Therefore, because of ongoing litigation regarding the venue of the trial and the voluminous nature of the case file, it is not clear when the case will proceed to trial.
The European Court of Human Rights
----------------------------------
9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that Khodorkovskiy has filed two complaints to the ECHR in Strasbourg alleging violations of his rights under the Convention in the first case. The ECHR in Strasbourg adjudicates claims brought under the Convention. As a result of Russia's ratification of the Convention in 1998, Russia is bound by the Convention and any ECHR decisions interpreting it. The first complaint, he said,
MOSCOW 00001770 003 OF 003
alleges that Khodorkovskiy was arrested and held in pre-trial detention in violation of the Convention. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the ECHR had agreed to hear this case on an accelerated timetable, but had not yet set a date.
10. (C) The second complaint, he said, alleges violations of Khodorkovskiy's right to a fair trial. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that before adjudicating a case, the ECHR typically sends a list of specific questions about the movant's claims to the respondent government. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX the Russian government has not yet responded to the ECHR's questions regarding the second complaint and it is therefore not clear when this case will be considered. XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that the second complaint is "more interesting" than the first because, if successful, it could result in a reversal of Khodorkovskiy's conviction. By contrast, the first claim could only result in an award of monetary damages. XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted that the French Embassy in Moscow and German Bundestag have shown interest in this case.
No Changes Expected
-------------------
11. (C) In his final remarks, XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the new charges against Khodorkovskiy are politically motivated and said that the case is being orchestrated entirely by the Kremlin. Although he stated confidently that the charges are without legal or evidentiary support, he concluded by saying that Khodorkovskiy would likely remain in prison as long as the Putin Administration is in power. BURNS
Wednesday, 27 February 2008, 13:25
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000531
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/27/2018
TAGS PHUM, PGOV, TBIO, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN PRISONS
REF: A. 07 MOSCOW 4543 B. MOSCOW 325 C. MOSCOW 378
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reason 1.4(d).
1. (C) Summary: The Russian prison system combines the country's emblematic features - vast distances, harsh climate, and an uncaring bureaucracy - and fuses them into a massive instrument of punishment. Russia imprisons a greater portion of its population than almost any other country in the world (second only to the U.S.). In contrast to other Western countries, the system is foremost focused on punishment, not rehabilitation, and while statisics are difficult to compare, produces a lower rate of recidivism. Recent prison riots, new prisoner shock tactics, and smuggled videos of prison mistreatment have highlighted the cruelties and corruption in the system. Health conditions in Russian prisons are poor and infection rates for contagious diseases are much higher than in the general population, but surprisingly the mortality rate for men in these prisons is only one-third the rate on the outside - a statistic that says much more about the dangers of alcoholism and road safety than it does about healthy living behind bars. Reports of abuses in the prison system have been answered with calls for reform, most recently in the Human Rights Ombudsman's annual report and by the President's Human Rights Council. While NGO activists XXXXXXXXXXXX praise the work of XXXXXXXXXXXX the insurmountable challenges posed by the physical and cultural nature of the prison system mean that efforts to improve conditions or to alter the character of the system from punishment to rehabilitation are likely to produce only superficial improvements. End summary.
------------------------------
Structure of the Prison System
------------------------------
2. (U) The Federal Service for the Execution of Punishments (FSIN), part of the Ministry of Justice, administers more than 700 Russian jails and prisons across the country (this cable does not address the military prison system operated by the Ministry of Defense). There are four levels of incarceration as prisoners move through the justice system: temporary police custody facilities for those held pending charges; pretrial detention facilities (SIZOs) for those charged with crimes; lower-security correctional labor colonies (ITKs); and high-security prisons for more dangerous prisoners and for those who violate the rules of ITKs. Convicted juveniles serve their sentences in "educational labor colonies" (VTKs) for juveniles, in almost all cases separate from adult prisoners.
3. (C) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX the authorities use a two-tier system of administration. The prison officials and the guards protect the perimeter of the facilities and provide the upper layer of security, but then they elevate select prisoners to act as internal enforcers among the other prisoners. These elite prisoners receive privileges and protections in return for enforcing a brutal form of order within the prisons. XXXXXXXXXXXX called this a "low-risk ghetto system" for the guards. "If one of their enforcers gets killed by another, they can just promote a new one. Maybe even the one that killed the last boss." XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that the prisoners have little choice, and cited an example XXXXXXXXXXXX.
4. (C) This system of using prisoners to enforce discipline and order was formally established by the Ministry of Justice in 2005. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX the MOJ formalized a system that had long existed. XXXXXXXXXXXX defended the system, telling us that "It was not a bad idea, but it was poorly implemented."
5. (C) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX in Moscow, the source of the problems is the Ministry of Justice and the FSIN. The low pay and low prestige of prison administrators and guards, combined with a lack of oversight and accountability, have created an abusive system rife with cruelty and corruption. Guards use violence, threats of violence, or the lack of protection to extort prisoners. Other guards take bribes for allowing relatives to smuggle in goods to prisoners. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that prison administrators knew what was occurring and probably received a cut from the guards.
-----------
The Inmates
-----------
6. (U) According to FSIN statistics, as of July, there were approximately 889,600 people in the custody of the criminal justice system, including 63,000 women and 12,100 juveniles. This rate of 630 prisoners per 100,000 citizens is second in the world only to the United States (702 per 100,000). The number of prisoners has increased in recent years. Compared to July 2005, the total number of prisoners has increased by 101,000 ( 13 percent), the number of women prisoners increased by 15,000 ( 31 percent), and the number of juvenile prisoners decreased by 2,400 (-17 percent). Not surprisingly, most prisoners are poorer and less educated that the general population; only 1.3 percent of male prisoners have university degrees, compared to 22.5 percent of the general population, and nearly 60 percent of convicts were unemployed prior to their arrests. Seventy percent are unmarried.
7. (C) During the last year, there have been scattered reports of uprisings in prisons, including a revolt and jailbreak at the youth prison in Togliatti (Samara Oblast). According to XXXXXXXXXXXX , this revolt was triggered by the transfer of a large number of 20 year-old prisoners to an adult prison. By law, he explained, convicts sentenced before they turn 18 are sent to youth prisons, where they may stay until they turn 21, at which time they are transferred to an adult prison. Other protest actions, such as hunger strikes, are still common, but XXXXXXXXXXXX described a new shock tactic whereby prisoners will en masse slice open a vein on their arms or neck in protest of mass beatings. While the poor conditions in the prisons have not further deteriorated in the past few years, the prisoners are becoming more organized. "Smuggled cell phones are enabling prisoners to communicate better and to coordinate mass action," said XXXXXXXXXXXX .
--------------------------------------------- -
Distance, Climate, and Isolation as Punishment
--------------------------------------------- -
8. (U) The prison system incorporates Russia's vast distances and harsh climate into the system of punishment. Although the law states that prisoners should not be incarcerated outside the region where they lived or were convicted unless local prisons are overcrowded, this rule is routinely disregarded, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX Many prisons are located in isolated regions with harsh climates and use buildings that are not adequately heated, cooled, or ventilated. Often, the transfer of prisoners far from their homes is due to space concerns, but it is also used as a form of punishment for troublesome prisoners. The best known example of this treatment is Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, who is imprisoned in Chita, nearly 3,000 miles from his native Moscow. His associate, Platon Lebedev is imprisoned nearly 1,200 miles from Moscow above the Arctic Circle. XXXXXXXXXXXX reported that this physical isolation leads to personal isolation, and that between 50 and 80 percent of all prisoners had not received any visitors in the prior three months. This isolation from family and friends has negative repercussions on future rehabilitation and reintegration into society.
9. (U) Due to the nature of this federal (not regional) system, juveniles and women are more likely to be located far from their homes. For example, there are only three prisons in the country for the 1,000 girl prisoners - one in Tomsk for all of Siberia and the Far East, one in Ryazan, and one in Belgorod. This great distance makes it almost impossible for families to have regular contact with their children.
10. (U) Prison guards still rely heavily on traditional forms of violence and deprivation to maintain control. Solitary confinement for long periods (sometimes longer than one year) while illegal is reportedly used, and some isolation cells are too small for the inmate to fully stretch out lying down. In what XXXXXXXXXXXX said was a typical incident, he showed us a video XXXXXXXXXXXX The video, since posted on YouTube, shows prison guards marching out prisoners in a Sverdlovsk Oblast prison past dogs. Some prisoners were then stripped to the waist, stretched out over tables, and then beaten with billy clubs by the guards. "This is routine behavior," said XXXXXXXXXXXX , "what is different is that it was recorded." REN-TV aired short segments of the video during an evening newscast. A recent news report from Kalmykiya claimed that after a new warden was appointed to a local SIZO, the Ministry of Justice's special forces visited the prison and beat up every detainee saying that it was a greeting from the new warden. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that such reports surfaced relatively rarely, and that prison administrators will continue to exploit their remote locations and be able to ward off scrutiny from the press, NGOs, or government watchdogs.
11. (U) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the recidivism rate in Russia is only 36 percent (compared to more than 50 percent in the United States or the United Kingdom). She attributed this low number to a combination of factors, including the longer average Russian prison term which keeps men in jail and a genuine fear of returning to prison. (Note: It is difficult to evenly compare the U.S. and Russian statistics since U.S. conditions vary from state to state and from the federal prisons. End note.) "We still have the problem that when these prisoners return to society, they have no system of assistance. The federal budget finances the prisons and the punishment, but they leave it up to regional and local government to finance the rehabilitation and health costs. They break them, and then we own them."
-----------------
Health Conditions
-----------------
12. (U) Conditions in pre-detention facilities (SIZOs) are generally worse than in the prisons. The prison system does not have enough SIZOs to handle the large number of the accused, and overcrowding and squalid conditions are widespread. Many SIZOs lack toilets, and inmates use buckets. In a well-documented case at the European Court of Human Rights (Mayzit v. Russia, No. 63378/00), the court found Russia in violation of the Prohibition of Inhuman or Degrading Treatment by placing Yuriy Mayzit in severely overcrowded cells with less than two square meters per person (the Russian legal minimum is four square meters/person, the European minimum is seven square meters/person). According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, similar conditions (or worse) exist throughout the system.
13. (U) Health conditions in prisons are poor. Overcrowding is common, the infection rates of resistant TB and HIV/AIDS are much higher than in the general population, and even though the TB infection rate has greatly decreased since 1999, the active TB rate among prisoner is still five times higher than in the civilian population (Ref A). According to the XXXXXXXXXXXX, there were 41,500 inmates with HIV/AIDS in 2006, approximately ten percent of the cases in the country. Prisoners with active TB are segregated from the regular prison population and are given rigorous medical treatment, but because the treatment of normal TB lasts up to 12 months and even longer for drug-resistant TB, many prisoners are released before they complete treatment and an estimated 40 percent fail to continue their treatment on the outside. A 2005 study by XXXXXXXXXXXX revealed that former prisoners carry these infections back to the general population upon their release, and they account for an estimated 20 percent of new TB cases in the civilian population.
14. (U) XXXXXXXXXXXX reported a counterintuitive statistic that even though the mortality rate from infectious diseases was greater in prisons than in the general population, the overall mortality rate for men in prison was only one-third that of the general population. XXXXXXXXXXXX attributed this to the absence of binge drinking, car accidents, and industrial accidents in prison. Long-term health for inmates, however, suffers greatly as the poor nutrition, stress, and disease manifest themselves later in life.
-----------------------
First-Hand Observations
-----------------------
15. (SBU) Embassy and Consulate employees have visited several jails and prisons across Russia and report that conditions are generally poor. In the Kholmsk pre-trial detention center on Sakhalin Island, the facilities are literally crumbling, it is dangerous to walk the hallways, and the dark living quarters lack every amenity. One American detainee was initially denied a bed, and his health deteriorated noticeably during the weeks he was held there.
16. (SBU) The facilities that consular staff see are generally better than the prevailing living conditions, according to prisoners. Consular officers generally will meet with prisoners in a waiting room, sometimes under a guard's watch, but often alone in a room. We have the greatest access to the prison in Mordovia, which is used for foreign citizens, but we cannot say that it is typical of the system. XXXXXXXXXXXX convicted of pedophilia used money and goods sent from the outside to buy the favor and protection of the prison commandant. He had no complaints about threats from other prisoners, which is not typical of Russian prisons where pedophiles are reportedly at the bottom of the prisoner caste system.
17. (SBU) At the women's prison in Mozhaisk (Moscow Oblast) the Embassy and a visiting DOJ delegation were given a tour of the prison housing facilities and clothing factory, and then treated to a bizarre fashion and talent show by the inmates. Eleven of the 43 women's prisons in the Russian Federation allow inmates to have children under age three to live on the prison grounds, and women in the other prisons who become pregnant are transferred to prisons that allow children. Only two, Mozhaisk and Mordovia, allow mothers to live and sleep in the same rooms with their young children. At age three, the children are moved to family members on the outside or to orphanages. The facilities at Mozhaisk were clean, well kept, and the factory where prisoners produced uniforms for the military, police, and other government workers appeared to be safe, well lit, and well run.
------------------------------------------
Oversight and Efforts to Reform the System
------------------------------------------
XXXXXXXXXXXX prison conditions were one of the most important issues for him, but that he had difficulty gaining unfettered access to the prisons and that prison authorities were the main obstacle he faced in addressing prisoners' human rights complaints. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the FSIN was slowly improving conditions, and that new construction fixed many of the problems of sanitation and overcrowding.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
20. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX proposes several reforms that would address problems in the system, foremost among them being the expansion of parole, which would ease the overcrowding of the system, and change the focus of the prison system from punishment to rehabilitation. He also proposes minor changes, such as moving the prison hospital system out of the Ministry of Justice and into the Ministry of Health. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Russia already had adequate legislation to address many of the abuses, such as keeping prisoners near their home region or providing them with proper medical care; the problem, however, is that the FSIN often disregards the law.
21. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the problems in the system were too great and too severe for them to handle. XXXXXXXXXXXX Putin was quoted saying "The situation (in prisons) has been changing slowly but surely, largely through consistent and systematic efforts by human rights organizations." Although XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed that human rights groups were doing most of the work to reform the system, he disagreed that the situation was improving, or that human rights organizations could do this work by themselves. " XXXXXXXXXXXX but the government runs the prisons -- neither we nor can even gain access to the 40 worst 'torture prisons.' How can he honestly expect that we could possibly change this system?"
22. (U) XXXXXXXXXXXX
-------
Comment
-------
23. (C) A system as vast and entrenched as the Russian prison system will be difficult if not impossible to reform. The nature of the system, which has not substantively varied as it has evolved from tsarist prisons to the gulag to today's system, nurtures the spread of disease, abuse, and corruption. Observers agree that the combination of distance, isolation, corruption, and general indifference to the plight of convicts combine to create a system that is brutal and will resist attempts to reveal its inner workings, or to change it. BURNS
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 002529
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/J AND OES/OA - LPHELPS
STATE PASS CEQ
USDOC FOR NOAA/NMFS - RWULFF
BRIDGETOWN FOR ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2019
TAGS: EFIS, KSCA, PREL, SENV, IWC-1, JA
SUBJECT: DCM URGES GOJ TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY IN WHALING TALKS
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 002529
Classified By: DCM James P. Zumwalt, reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (C) Following up on an October 22 letter from the Ambassador to Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) Minister Hirotaka Akamatsu, the DCM met with MAFF Vice Minister for International Affairs Shuji Yamada November 2 to convey U.S. commitment to build upon progress at recently-concluded talks in Santiago and reach an agreement in negotiations on the future of the International Whaling Commission (IWC). Yamada, along with Fisheries Agency Counselor Joji Morishita and Assistant Director of the Far Seas Fisheries Division Toshinori Uoya, readily acknowledged that progress in talks in Santiago presented an opportunity to move forward in the IWC. They urged the U.S. to show leadership in this "last chance" to ensure a positive future of the IWC, and said they looked forward to discussions on November 4 with U.S. Commissioner to the IWC Monica Medina.
2. (C) Yamada inquired about an investigation into the tax status of the U.S.-based NGO Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and repeated Japan's request for the U.S. to take action against the organization, which he said created a very dangerous situation on the seas. The DCM replied that the
U.S. places the highest priority on the safety of vessels and human life at sea, and added that if any violations of U.S. law are discovered, we will take appropriate enforcement action. Morishita went on to say it would be easier for
Japan to make progress in the IWC negotiations if the U.S. were to take action against the Sea Shepherd.
ROOS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 002588
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/J AND OES/OA - LPHELPS
STATE PASS CEQ
USDOC FOR NOAA/NMFS - RWULFF
BRIDGETOWN FOR ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2019
TAGS: EFIS, KSCA, PREL, SENV, IWC-1, JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN RECEPTIVE TO FURTHER ENGAGEMENT ON WHALING
Classified By: DCM James P. Zumwalt, reasons 1.4 b and d
1. (C/NF) Summary: U.S. representative to the International Whaling Commission (IWC) Monica Medina met with senior officials from the Fisheries Agency of Japan (FAJ) November 4 to discuss progress in negotiations under the Future of the IWC process. The FAJ Director General described the results of recent talks in Santiago as a "major step forward" and said political level consultations on whaling are necessary following the recent change in administration in Japan. He defended Japan's proposal to base future reductions in numbers on current catch quotas rather than the actual number of whales taken in past years. He added that Australia's proposal to phase out research whaling is a non-starter for Japan. He said a successful outcome in the vote on Greenland's proposal to take humpback whales and action by the U.S. and others on Japan's complaints against the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society would positively influence Japan's negotiating position in the Future of the IWC process. Ms. Medina said the USG is looking for creative solutions to the remaining issues facing the IWC and positive mention at the upcoming U.S.-Japan summit of both sides' commitment to finding a solution on whaling would be a good signal. End summary.
2. (C/NF) Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and U.S. representative to the International Whaling Commission Monica Medina met with senior Fisheries Agency of Japan officials to discuss the Future of the IWC process November 4 in Tokyo. In a morning meeting with Ms. Medina, Fisheries Agency of Japan Director General Machida said that while he expects difficult negotiations ahead, he wants the Future of the IWC process to succeed. According to Machida, political level consultations on whaling are necessary following the recent change in administration in Japan. However, he cautioned the new Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administration shares the same fundamental position on whaling as the outgoing Liberal Democratic Party, including support for the resumption of commercial whaling and continued research whaling. He added that the two sides should not rush through the negotiations, which could end up making it more difficult to reach consensus at next June's IWC annual meeting.
3. (C/NF) Ms. Medina said the USG understands there is no fundamental change in the GOJ position on whaling, but that the USG is looking for creative solutions to move the IWC forward as opposed to fundamental change. She added that the U.S. is committed to finding a solution over the next two to three months. She said she would advocate for including language on whaling in a summit statement following the meeting between the President and Prime Minister November 13. The statement would express the desire of both countries to work out remaining differences on whaling. Once negotiators have narrowed the issues, both sides could seek a political solution, she added.
4. (C/NF) Machida described the progress at the Support Group meeting in Santiago as a major step forward. However, he said there remain two major issues that need to be addressed. First, there is still no consensus on the proposals raised in Santiago even among the Support Group members, let alone the entire IWC. Second, the upper limit on catch quotas, especially a reduction in the limit for Japan's research whaling in the Southern Ocean, have yet to be negotiated. Regarding Japan's catch numbers, Machida said Australia's proposal to phase out research whaling is a non-starter for the GOJ. He added that the baseline for any reduction in Japan's research whaling should be the catch quota figures and not the actual number of whales caught.
TOKYO 00002588 002 OF 002
5. (C/NF) Ms. Medina replied that the catch quotas is the most important outstanding issue. She said the Santiago proposal calls for an overall reduction in catch numbers from all whaling nations over a ten year period, which would help in securing approval from Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. She said given the history of Japan's research whaling, and the increase in quota numbers in recent years, there is room for Japan to cut from the actual number of whales taken. A symbolic action by Japan, such as agreeing not to take fin whales this year, would be a good indicator to the rest of the IWC of Japan's commitment to reaching a solution. The USG would then work hard to make sure the EU and Australia do not block a compromise.
6. (C/NF) Machida said there are two factors outside the current Future of the IWC negotiations that influence Japan's negotiating position. First, a negative outcome in the vote at next year's IWC intersessional meeting on Greenland's proposal to catch ten humpback whales could derail the work of the Support Group. Greenland's proposal has the backing of the IWC's Scientific Committee and another rejection at the IWC plenary meeting could make the overall compromise being discussed impossible. Second, the violent protests by the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (SSCS) could limit the GOJ's flexibility in the negotiations. He said the Netherlands should have primary responsibly for taking action against the SSCS, but he appreciates the USG initiative to address the group's tax exempt status. He said action on the SSCS would be a major element for Japan in the success of the overall negotiations. Ms. Medina replied that she hopes to work out differences with the EU on Greenland's proposal on humpback whales prior to the March 2010 IWC intersessional meeting and include the issue in the overall agreement. Regarding the SSCS, she said she believes the USG can demonstrate the group does not deserve tax exempt status based on their aggressive and harmful actions.
7. (U) Ms. Medina cleared this cable subsequent to departing Tokyo. ROOS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 117709
NOFORN
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019
TAGS: EFIS, PREL, SENV, KSCA, IWC-1, JA
SUBJECT: WHALING: REQUEST FOR POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT
STATE 00117709 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DAS David A. Balton, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
Summary:
1. (C/NF) This is an action request. See paragraph 3. Post is requested to discuss with State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Tetsuro Fukuyama the potential for reaching a political agreement regarding Japan's whaling practices.
Background:
2. (C) Department of Commerce Principal Deputy Undersecretary for Oceans and Atmosphere Monica Medina traveled to Tokyo to meet with GOJ officials November 3-5. At a private meeting with State Secretary Tetsuro Fukuyama, Ms. Medina requested political commitment from the new leadership in Japan to work with the United States to transform the International Whaling Commission so that it can better accomplish its objectives to conserve whales and manage whale stocks. In particular, the Governments of Japan and the United States would work towards reaching an understanding regarding a way forward for the International Whaling Commission that would include a meaningful reduction in Japan's current whaling levels and U.S. support for international approval of sustainable small-type coastal whaling activities off the coast of Japan. In addition, the GOJ would no longer hunt fin or humpback whales in the Southern Ocean, and the United States would uphold domestic and international laws to ensure safety at sea and encourage other governments to do the same. Ms. Medina provided a draft statement outlining these objectives to Post.
Action Request:
3. (U) Post, at the highest possible level, is requested to discuss reform of the IWC with State Secretary Fukuyama and other political appointees within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries in a position to influence the GOJ's actions on this topic. Post may draw upon the following talking points during these discussions:
- The International Whaling Commission (IWC) has not functioned effectively for many years due to the polarized views of its members. Previous efforts to resolve conflicts within the organization have not succeeded.
- The conflicts have at times become an irritant in the relations among the nations concerned, including the United States and Japan. They have also undermined whale conservation and management by the IWC.
- The new administrations in Japan and the United States have a unique opportunity to chart a different course for the IWC, and resolve our long-standing disagreements through fundamental reform of the IWC. This is a small issue but it is important to the Obama Administration that it be resolved quickly.
- Most recently, a small Support Group of IWC member nations, including Japan and the United States, met in October 2009 in Santiago, Chile. The United States is pleased by the significant progress made toward a possible interim agreement that would set overall whale catches at a reduced level while longer term negotiations continue. We nevertheless recognize that work needs to be done to bridge remaining differences on a key issue.
- Although all IWC members will ultimately share responsibility for the success or failure of this process, the approach taken by Japan in the immediate future will have a major impact on the likelihood of success.
- The United States strongly urges Japan to join with other IWC members who have shown willingness to compromise in the short term in order to reach the long-term goal of a normalized IWC.
STATE 00117709 002.2 OF 002 -
We fully appreciate that, for these negotiations to be concluded successfully, all participants will need to show maximum flexibility. If agreement on some reduction in Japan's catch levels can be reached, the United States believes that an overall interim agreement would be within reach. - The United States stands ready to work with Japan and all other IWC members toward such an interim agreement. We understand that there is an important related issue regarding safety at sea of the Japanese research vessels that must also be addressed.
4. (U) The Department thanks Embassy Tokyo in advance for its cooperation on this matter. Additionally, the Department wishes to thank Embassy Tokyo for the assistance and time provided to Ms. Medina during her recent visit to Tokyo, particularly in light of the upcoming Presidential visit. The Department's point of contact on this matter is Ms. Elizabeth Phelps, reachable at 202-647-0241 or via email at phelpse@state.gov.
CLINTON
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000171
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STATE FOR EAP/J AND OES/OA - LPHELPS
STATE PASS CEQ
USDOC FOR NOAA/NMFS - RWULFF BRIDGETOWN FOR ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2020
TAGS: EFIS, KSCA, PREL, SENV, IWC-1, JA
SUBJECT: WHALING: GOJ NONCOMMITAL ON ENCOURAGING ICELAND TO LOWER QUOTA
Classified By: EMIN Marc Wall, reasons 1.4 b and d 1. (C/NF)
Summary: EMIN urged MOFA State Secretary Fukuyama and Fisheries Agency Deputy Director General Yamashita to press Iceland to lower its proposed quota for whaling in order to facilitate an overall agreement on whaling. Both Fukuyama and Yamashita said the GOJ is reluctant to take such action. Fukuyama cited a lack of desire to raise the profile of whaling to the political level, while Yamashita said Japan could not use trade measures to stop the importation of whale meat from Finland. EMIN made the case that the parties are close to an agreement and Japan should advise Iceland to come to the table with a reasonable offer. Yamashita the Sea Shepherd's harassment of the Japanese whaling fleet could limit domestic support for a compromise. End summary.
2. (SBU) EMIN met MOFA State Secretary Tetsuro Fukuyama January 25 and Fisheries Agency of Japan Deputy Director General Jun Yamashita January 26 to press the case for Japan's help in reaching out to Iceland for cooperation in the current round of negotiations in the International Whaling Commission (IWC). In his meeting with Fukuyama, EMIN thanked Fukuyama for Japan's constructive engagement in the talks and asked for Japan's help to encourage Iceland to reduce its proposed quota for whaling in the North Atlantic. Fukuyama said he understands that Iceland has taken a tough stance in the negotiations, but implied that his options are limited.
3. (C/NF) Fukuyama said the whaling issue has not been a political issue in Japan, a situation he would like to avoid. If the GOJ moves forward on the issue too quickly, he added, it will create a domestic political problem for the ruling Democratic Party of Japan. He sees the situation as a Catch 22: it may not be possible to resolve the whaling issue without taking it to a political level, but doing so could create an adverse reaction for the DPJ.
4. (SBU) EMIN replied that Iceland's proposed take of fin whales is predicated on exporting to Japan, and its catch quota is far in excess of what the Japanese market could absorb. If Japan and the U.S. work to encourage both sides in the whaling debate to take reasonable approaches there will be an opportunity for a breakthrough. Fukuyama said that while his sense is that it will be difficult for Japan to approach Iceland, he will examine Iceland's position and the market for imported whale meat.
5. (SBU) In his meeting with Fisheries Agency Deputy Director General Yamashita, EMIN again made the case for a GOJ intervention with Iceland. Yamashita argued that trade measures against Iceland are not appropriate since trade in whale meat between the two countries is not prohibited under either CITES or IWC rules. (Note: EMIN did not recommend Japan take any measures to restrict trade. End note) EMIN countered that the issue at hand is concluding an agreement. A message from Japan to Iceland that its proposed catch far exceeds what the Japanese market can absorb could bring them around. Yamashita said the U.S. and Japan need to come up with other measures beside trade to influence Iceland, but that he has no ideas at the moment. Yamashita was glad to hear of U.S. "support" for Japan's proposal to reduce its catch. EMIN said rather Japan's offer is something we can work with, and we would like to see the same out of Iceland.
6. (C/NF) Turning to harassment of the Japanese whaling fleet by the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (SSCS), Yamashita said the NGO's actions have kept the fleet from reaching its quota the last few years. Yamashita said the GOJ would come under pressure domestically if SSCS harassment
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continues to keep Japanese whalers from filling their quota after an agreement on reduced numbers is reached within the IWC. EMIN said the USG is concerned about the safety of life at sea and is looking at the activity of the SSCS.
ROOS
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 001685
SIPDIS
DEPT PASS TO PRM/PIM:SUZANNE SHELDON
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/04
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PREF, PTER, SMIG, KCRM, GR
SUBJECT: Greece: New Government Tackles Migration and Asylum Issues
REF: A) ATHENS 315; B) ATHENS 1349; C) ATHENS 1641; D) ATHENS 2038
CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Greece's new PASOK-led government has placed migration and asylum policy reform high on its agenda, announcing new measures to combat organized human smugglers, ease naturalization requirements for immigrants born in Greece, provide status to illegal economic migrants, and transfer Greece's asylum process to a new independent authority. This flurry of activity, all coming during PASOK's first two months in office, reflects the deep importance Greek officials and voters attach to immigration and its social, economic, and security implications for Greece. Prime Minister George Papandreou and his cabinet are acutely aware of the criticism leveled at Greece's asylum process and migrant detention centers by human rights organizations. The new Greek strategy involves not only domestic policy reforms but also "Europeanizing" the issue of migration enforcement: putting pressure on the EU to provide more support on border security, urging Turkey to crack down on human smuggling in the Aegean and to take back deportees, and revamping the Dublin II agreement, which saddles Greece with responsibility for all migrants entering Europe through its borders. Despite some success in placing migration on the broader EU agenda, however, the government faces daunting challenges in toughening migration enforcement and implementing a comprehensive, effective migration policy. END SUMMARY.
----------------------------------------
Migration: A Key Geopolitical and Social Challenge ----------------------------------------
2. (SBU) Greece has become the EU entry point of choice for illegal migrants and refugees, many of whom seek residence in Western Europe and seek only to transit through Greece. Since 2004, the number of illegal immigrants arrested has surged by 325 percent, from 44,987 to 146,337 in 2008--and this number is only a fraction of the true number of migrant arrivals. Greece's long coastline and the proximity of its islands to Turkey makes the country particularly attractive to maritime human smugglers, many of whom have shifted their operations away from more heavily patrolled Spanish and Italian waters. The undersized and ill-equipped Greek Coast Guard has struggled to keep up. Even if the migrants move on to other European destinations, under the Dublin II protocol, Greece is responsible for their asylum applications as the EU country of first entry--a situation neither the Greeks nor the immigrants like.
3. (C) While nearly half of all illegal migrants come from neighboring Albania, the more visible surge in immigrants from conflict zones in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa has Greeks particularly worried. Migrants participated in the violent protests in Athens between December 2008 and March 2009 (see REF A), and immigrant squatters have taken over some Athens neighborhoods and exacerbated "Greek flight" from downtown areas. Without legal status, lacking opportunities for economic and social integration, and chafing under Greek refusals to build an official mosque, Muslim illegal migrants--especially young men from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia--may be vulnerable to Islamic radicalization in the underground prayer rooms that have proliferated throughout major cities (see REF A). Until recently, Greece was an immigration sending country, and the rapid transition to receiving migrants has been jarring--many Greeks see uncontrolled waves of illegal immigration as a major economic and social destabilizer. In fact, there are key political implications as well: public dissatisfaction with the previous New Democracy government's handling of migration policy and enforcement likely contributed to its October electoral loss, and LAOS, a far-right party, has surged in recent elections on a nationalist, anti-immigration platform.
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4. (S) The large number of migrants entering Greece also poses risks. As an example, in July, Greek authorities deported Iraqi citizen Mu'ammar Latif Karim (a.k.a. Abu Sajjad), a Sh'ia insurgent commander, back to Iraq (see REF B). Other reporting indicates that multiple travel facilitators for special interest aliens continue to operate in Athens. A recent operation by DHS/ICE demonstrated that a smuggling organization run by an Iraqi national could easily smuggle special interest individuals from Greece to Central America and then into the United States.
----------------------------------------
Greece to Reform Much-Criticized Asylum Policies ----------------------------------------
5. (SBU) For the last several years, international organizations and regional and domestic NGOs have roundly criticized Greece for its treatment of refugees and its failed asylum processes. Human rights organizations ranging from Amnesty International and Doctors Without Borders (MSF) to the UN Human Rights Council and European monitoring bodies have condemned squalid detention centers, a lack of separate facilities for women and unaccompanied minors, and alleged nighttime summary deportations to Turkey without due process. UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have criticized Greece's 0.03 percent first-instance asylum approval rate, the lack of an independent appeals process, and rampant corruption and inefficiencies during application intake. Some European countries have even suspended the return of migrants and asylum seekers to Greece under the Dublin II protocol. During the last two years, Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands have intermittently halted returns to Greece, citing human rights concerns. In September 2009, UNHCR reiterated its recommendation that EU member states not return asylum seekers to Greece.
6. (SBU) Greece's new PASOK government has committed to addressing many of these concerns, and has moved quickly to revamp asylum processes and take measures that should improve the government's ability to interdict migrants. It has consolidated law enforcement agencies (the National Police, fire service, port police, and Coast Guard elements) into the new, DHS-like Ministry for Citizen's Protection. This should help the government better coordinate among security services on combating illegal migration. Fulfilling a PASOK campaign promise, Minister for Citizen's Protection Michalis Chrysochoidis formed an asylum experts' committee to propose reforms. The committee, composed of representatives from UNHCR, NGOs, academics, and officials, first met on November 26. NGO and government insiders expect new legislation to take up to six months to formulate, and are looking at stopgap measures to address pending asylum applications. NGOs have largely welcomed the government's proposals to create a new, independent asylum authority separate from the police, and have lauded promises to raise Greece's asylum approval rate to the "European average." However, they note that the situation on the ground hasn't changed at all, detention centers are still filled beyond capacity, and asylum processing by the Aliens Police has all but stopped pending new guidelines.
----------------------------------------
New Migration Policies and "Europeanizing" Enforcement ----------------------------------------
7. (C) The government's dire fiscal straits may politically
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hamstring the government's broader agenda to reshape enforcement and asylum policy, so officials have proposed additional specific migration reforms. PASOK leaders recently reaffirmed their campaign pledge to provide citizenship to children of immigrants, and Minister of Interior Giannis Ragousis told Ambassador Speckhard that the government was considering a new round of amnesties for illegal migrants. Officials admitted that it would take time to pass new legislation, but committed to allowing immigrant children born and raised in Greece to apply for full citizenship. (NOTE: Greek citizenship is difficult to obtain for individuals of non-Greek descent; citizenship criteria are not revealed to the public. END NOTE.) Over the last decade, Greece has had three rounds of amnesties, providing temporary residence permits to large tranches of illegal migrants, and Ragousis said a new amnesty might apply to up to 200,000 immigrants. To prevent an amnesty from attracting even more migrants, officials claim border enforcement would be strengthened. However, Greek law enforcement agencies, despite the recent ministerial reorganizations, remain woefully underprepared for large-scale interdiction of smugglers, and investigators and courts lack the expertise and patience to pursue the leaders of the organized criminal networks that profit most.
8. (C) Because of these domestic shortfalls in migration enforcement, the Greeks have also focused on "Europeanizing" the issue, using a three-pronged approach: putting pressure on the EU to provide more border security support, urging Turkey to crack down on maritime human smuggling and to take back deportees, and pressing for changes to the Dublin II agreement. To raise awareness on migration issues, Greece hosted the Global Forum for Migration and Development, an informal conference bringing together governments and NGOs, in November (see REF D). Over the last six months, Greek leaders have tried multiple tactics to pressure the EU: signing a four-way enforcement cooperation agreement with Malta, Cyprus, and Italy and jointly submitting an illegal migration whitepaper; bilateral meetings with EU border states focusing on enforcement and migration burden-sharing; raising migration issues at EU gatherings of foreign and interior ministers; pressing the EU to forge readmissions agreements with migration sending countries; and inviting FRONTEX, the EU border agency, to increase its presence in the Aegean (see REF C). Greek officials have tried to use the EU to pressure Turkey to live up to its 2001 bilateral protocol to readmit third-country aliens.
9. (C) The Greeks have been successful at gaining the attention of EU leaders. In July, EU Justice Commissioner Jacques Barrot noted that uncontrolled immigration risked "destabilizing Greek democracy" and called on Turkey to do more to stop migration flows. Gil Arias-Fernandez, deputy director of FRONTEX, stated during an October visit that Turkey was uncooperative in stanching illegal immigration. FRONTEX has increased the number of air patrols and maritime observers in the Aegean during the year. However, the Greeks haven't been able to change the dynamics on the ground. Western European officials have told us there is no chance that the Dublin II agreement will be revised according to Greek wishes. Papandreou has tried to foster more positive atmospherics with Turkey and has refrained from harsh criticism on migration. In November, Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan sent a letter to Papandreou with an offer to cooperate on migration; a response is expected soon.
----------------------------------------
COMMENT: Not Just a Greek Issue, but a European One ----------------------------------------
10. (C) As the migration doorway into Europe, Greece shoulders a disproportionate burden of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers. However, the broader political challenges posed by these waves of migration, especially from conflict zones in the Middle East, South
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Asia, and Africa, are applicable to all European nations. Migration is a key crosscutting political, national security, human rights, and socioeconomic phenomenon, and has already had a strong effect on politics throughout European countries this year--for example, right-wing, anti-immigration parties surged in June 2009 European Parliament elections. In our view integration programs are of crucial importance; in the aftermath of the economic crisis, immigration and labor policies are under increased scrutiny; and the EU's commitment to human rights for refugees and asylum seekers is being tested by the political reality of voters fed up with illegal migration. END COMMENT. Speckhard
UNCLAS ATHENS 000059
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, GR, SMIG, PBTS, SNAR
SUBJECT: Hellenic Police Chief on Security Service Reorganization,
Migration, C/T Cooperation
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: During a meeting on 21 January Hellenic National Police (HNP) Chief Ikonomou told the Ambassador that the reorganization of the Ministry of Citizen Protection was far from complete, but that the overall goal was to foster interagency cooperation across Greece's non-military security agencies. The HNP itself will be reorganized, beginning with the creation of a new organized crime task force modeled on the FBI. The problem of illegal immigration into Greece requires political solutions on the international level, but in the meantime Greece is sealing its exit points to prevent organized crime rings and the immigrants themselves from moving on to Western Europe. Ikonomou condemned the recent attack on a synagogue in Chania, Crete, and declared no tolerance for anti-Semitic and extreme-right violence. He said that domestic terrorism was a top priority for the police and predicted that the main terrorist groups would be dismantled in the relatively near future. He reacted positively to the Ambassador's proposal to create a local working group on counterterrorist consisting of senior HNP and EYP officials on the Greek side and FBI and other embassy officials on the U.S. side. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) On 21 January 2010 the Ambassador met for 75 minutes with the chief of the Hellenic National Police (HNP), Eleftherios Ikonomou, in the latter's office at the headquarters of the Ministry of Citizen Protection (MCP). This was the second in a series of meetings by the Ambassador to hear from senior Greek officials about the ongoing reorganization of Greece's security, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies under the umbrella of the MCP, which was formed in October 2009. (The Ambassador's meeting with the commandant of the Hellenic Coast Guard [HCG] on 20 January was reported in reftel.) Ikonomou became chief of the HNP on November 5, 2009, after the previous chief, Vasileios Tsiatouras, was unceremoniously and quite publicly fired on October 22 by the Greek Minister of Citizen Protection, Michalis Chrysochoidis. The Ambassador was accompanied by the DCM, the RAS chief, the Legatt, the ICE chief, and an LES interpreter, while Ikonomou was unaccompanied.
3. (SBU) This was the Ambassador's first meeting with Ikonomou, so he began the meeting by congratulating Ikonomou on his appointment, expressing appreciation for the importance of his position for Greek society, and wishing him good luck in his duties. The Ambassador also extended his profound thanks for the excellent work done by the HNP to safeguard his personal security and to protect the embassy's facilities and personnel. In reply, Ikonomou thanked the Ambassador for opening up a direct channel of communication. He commented on the historically close ties between Greece and the United States and praised the extensive cooperation between the two countries in the area of security. He stated that "the challenges of the times" required even closer collaboration, which he pledged to pursue.
Hellenic National Police Reorganization
-----------------------------------------
4. (SBU) Opening the substantive portion of the meeting, the Ambassador asked Ikonomou for his assessment of how the reorganization of the HNP was proceeding under the plans sketched out by Chrysochoidis. Ikonomou replied that the restructuring of the MCP was still in process, but its overarching goal was to organize Greece's security agencies in a way that fostered cooperation. He described the decision to create the MCP on the basis of the former Ministry of Public Order but to fold in a number of agencies that had belonged to other government elements, most notably the HCG in its new form but also Civil Defense. It was essential to bring all of these agencies into the same structure, so that they could share a common base that spurred interaction institutionally and personally. Personal ties were essential, Ikonomou continued, noting that the new Deputy Director General of the Greek National Intelligence Service (EYP), Fotis Papageorgiou, was a long-time police official who formerly had headed the HNP's Counterterrorism Unit. Ikonomou pointed out that he and the Director General of EYP, Konstantinos Bikas, have traveled together to Italy and France to hold discussions on bilateral cooperation. In essence, Chrysochoidis was mandating the creation within the MCP of a crisis-management system of the sort that characterized the various Greek agencies in the run-up to the Olympic Games in 2004, when all agencies worked together, many officers received training in modern security techniques, and many officers served rotations in other agencies.
5. (SBU) The Ambassador recognized the importance of close interaction between senior agency officials, but asked how much progress was being made at integrating the new constituent elements of the MCP at the working level. Ikonomou admitted that much work remained to be done in this regard. He cited the challenge of fingerprinting illegal immigrants detained at border points. In Greece only the HNP's Criminal Investigations Directorate is allowed to process and store fingerprints, but its capabilities and work practices are ill suited to the task. As a result, an initiative is underway to speed up access to this information and to employ modern technology to store and analyze data, so that an official at the border could search against the database and have immediate connectivity and results. It is also essential that these databases be linked in some way the resources and information held by other countries, including the United States, via the most modern software.
The Challenge from Illegal Migration
------------------------------------
6. (SBU) Ikonomou described the Greek government's strategy for dealing with the challenge posed by illegal immigration. Most important, the borders need to be defended as well as possible. This will require close cooperation between the MCP's elements, especially HNP and HCG, and the military, including the army and the navy. The biggest problem is along Greece's eastern border, since Turkey Is not making any meaningful effort to stop the flow of illegal immigrants across both the land and sea borders. Ikonomou said that he appreciated that Turkey has its own problems with illegal immigration, which is why this is a problem for the international community that ultimately has to take into consideration the countries of origin. He pointed out that if the Greek authorities detained a Pakistani entering Greece illegally from Turkey, the illegal immigrant needed ultimately to be returned to Pakistan and not to Turkey. Given the possibility of the radicalization of illegal immigrants and refugees indefinitely staying in Greece, the government wants the European and international communities to focus on this issue as soon as possible.
7. (SBU) In the meantime, Ikonomou continued, Greece was taking some strong short-term actions. Most notably, the authorities were sealing Greece's exits to Western Europe, especially the ports of Corinth, Patras, and Igoumenitsa, as well as the airports in Athens and Thessaloniki. In their recent trip to Italy Ikonomou and Bikas explained this approach to their Italian counterparts, so that the services of both countries could conduct joint operations, share best practices, etc. By closing the exits, Greece wants to send a strong message to the organized-crime rings, as well as the illegal immigrants themselves, that they cannot achieve their dreams of getting to Western Europe through Greece.
Organized Crime Task Force
--------------------------
8. (SBU) The Ambassador asked for an update on plans to create a new body within the HNP to deal with organized crime. Ikonomou replied that he was in full agreement with Chrysochoidis that the HNP needed a task force with jurisdiction over all Greek territory that dealt with serious crimes. The MCP is still studying what kind of task force to create, although its outline is taking shape. It will report directly to the HNP chief. It will have divisions for cyber crime, homicides, robberies, kidnappings, extortion, economic crime, and human trafficking. A decision has not been made yet about what to do with counterterrorism, whether to make it a division within this task force or to create a separate counterterrorism entity. The task force will have intelligence and analytical sections to collate, process, and study information from casework and ongoing investigations that is centralized in a single database. The software will ensure interconnectivity with other agencies, especially the HCG. It is intended to be a "small FBI," building up from an initial group of 100 newly hired specialists, for whose positions vacancy notice already have been issued.
Chania Synagogue Arson
----------------------
9. (SBU) Replying to a direct question from the Ambassador, Ikonomou condemned the arson attack of January 16 on a synagogue in Chania, Crete. He said that the HNP was taking the issue very seriously. He stressed that the police would have no tolerance for anti-Semitic or extreme-right violence in any form. The police had been caught off guard, because there had not been any previous problems in that region. The HNP has now instituted security measures around the synagogue and is investigating the incident fully. C/T
Cooperation
--------------------
10. (SBU) Asked for an update on the RPG attack against the embassy in January 2007, Ikonomou stated that combating Greek domestic terrorism was a top priority for the HNP. He said that terrorist acts were condemnable from any point of view. Domestic terrorism was problematic not only because of its past focus on diplomatic missions, but also because of its potential to destabilize Greek society. Ikonomou said that the U.S. side knows what the HNP knows about domestic terrorists, because it shares all of its information. He would not predict the timing of any arrests, but expressed optimism that the HNP was making significant progress and would be able in the relatively near future to dismantle these organizations. He stressed that it was important to act as soon as possible, because the groups on the extreme left acted as "waiting rooms" for future terrorists and because of the increasing intersection of domestic terrorist groups and organized crime. Ikonomou concluded by telling the ambassador that he should not hesitate to call him directly if he had any question or problem related to domestic terrorism.
11. (SBU) The Ambassador, reviewing briefly the history of counterterrorist training provided to the HNP, especially by FBI, DEA, and ICE, urged the HNP to forward requests for training to assist with its reorganization and to instill new skills in its changing workforce. The ambassador proposed to Ikonomou that the two sides consider forming a local working group composed of senior HNP and EYP officials on the Greek side and senior FBI and embassy security officials on the U.S. side to discuss on a monthly basis the status and requirements of collaboration against domestic and international terrorists. Ikonomou replied that he was positively disposed to the idea and promised to discuss the notion with the leadership of EYP.
Speckhard
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BERN 000141
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT, EB, EUR/AGS
FBI FOR OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
TREASURY FOR OFAC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2016
TAGS: PTER, PARM, ETTC, SZ
SUBJECT: SWISS COUNTERTERRORISM OVERVIEW - SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER
REF: A. BERN 100
B. BERN 10
C. 2005 BERN 1865
Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Eric Sandberg, Reasons 1.4 b/d
1.(C) Summary: Switzerland and Liechtenstein are considered low-threat target for terrorist attacks, but Bern acknowledges that Islamist groups could use the country as a transit point, logistics center, or haven for terrorist finances. While violent crime in both countries is relatively low, officials remain concerned about international organized criminal groups and extreme right-wing and left-wing political elements who occasionally mobilize for demonstrations surrounding major events, such as the annual World Economic Forum in Davos. Swiss officials maintain that there are few Islamic extremists in the country, but a small number of arrests in the past two years suggests there may be more under the surface. Bilateral law enforcement and intelligence cooperation is improving, but at a gradual pace; Swiss leaders insist that they can address the threat with little outside assistance. The Swiss media and individual members of Parliament have placed a greater focus on alleged USG wrongdoings in the War on Terror than on the terrorist threat itself. As for Liechtenstein, officials work very cooperatively with USG counterparts, as they seek to ameliorate their reputation as a money-laundering center. End Summary.
Anti-Terror Measures
--------------------
2.(U) Switzerland implemented UN sanctions even prior to becoming a full member in 2002. Along with UN lists, the Swiss Economic and Finance ministries have drawn up their own list of around 44 individuals and entities connected with international terrorism (Al-Qaeda) or its financing. Swiss authorities have thus far blocked about 82 accounts totaling $28 million (SFr 34 million) from individuals or companies linked to Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda under UN resolutions. The Swiss Federal Prosecutor also froze separately 41 accounts representing about $28 million (SFr 34 millions) on the ground they were related to terrorist financing. Swiss officials estimate significant overlap between the US and UN lists. Switzerland signed and ratified all of the 12 UN anti-terrorism conventions as of September 2003.
3.(U) For its part, Liechtenstein has frozen about $145 thousand in Taliban/Al-Qaeda assets under UNSC Resolution 1267. The principality has taken notable strides to combat money laundering and other illegal activity since 1999; it joined the Egmont Group in 2001, signed a mutual legal assistance treaty with the United States in 2003, and was FATF certified that same year. Liechtenstein has also ratified all of the relevant UN conventions.
Bilateral Cooperation
---------------------
4.(C) Following 9/11, the Swiss agreed to sign an operative working agreement (OWA) with the USG permitting intensified information sharing on Al-Qaeda and allowing an FBI agent to sit in the Federal Criminal Police Counterterrorism Unit. We are in the final stages of negotiating a broadened OWA to allow joint investigations on counterterrorism matters. As forthcoming as some contacts are, the Swiss law enforcement community in general remain reluctant to open up to the United States. The sentiment was expressed best by Justice Minister Blocher to the Ambassador. Blocher said that Switzerland shared America's counterterrorism goals; Switzerland will worry about Switzerland, and the U.S. can worry about the rest of the world. The least cooperative Swiss agency (with us and with other Swiss agencies) is the Federal Service for Analysis and Prevention (DAP) -- the internal intelligence service. The external service, under the Swiss Department of Defense, is more cooperative.
5.(C) In many ways, Liechtenstein officials are a model of what we wish the Swiss would become. Shocked by the international notoriety it earned in the 1990s, officials in the tiny principality decided to join FATF and cooperate with partners. The MLAT it signed with the United States in 2003 BERN 00000141 002 OF 004 was the first of its kind for Liechtenstein. They make as much use of it as do our law enforcement agencies.
Significant counterterrorism investigations
-------------------------------------------
6.(C) Swiss prosecutors have launched several investigations of suspected Al-Qaeda operatives in Switzerland. XXXXXXXXXXXX
Muslims in Switzerland ----------------------
7.(U) The Muslim population in Switzerland has grown rapidly BERN 00000141 003.2 OF 004 in the last two decades, now reaching around 310,000, or 4.3 percenQ the Swiss population. The majority of these, roughly 200,000, come from former Yugoslavia and tend to be moderate or secular in their views. Another 70,000 are of Turkish background, have long been in Switzerland, and are also moderate. Only the North African population, largely from Morocco, are seen as a possible source of Islamic extremism. There are no Islamic political parties in Switzerland; the Muslim population is divided along ethnic lines. There are only two mosque buildings in SwitzerlandQn Zurich aQeneva), but over a hundred makeshift Islamic centers operate.
8.(SBU) While Swiss authorities recognize that the Muslim population could contain extremists, they rate the threat from right-wing Neo-nazis and left-wing Swiss political extremists as being much higher. Swiss authorities believe that those Islamists present consider the country a "refuge" rather than a "place to carry out operations." A Special Report on Extremism issued late last year maintains that almost all radical groups represented in Switzerland are Sunni organizations whose primary goals are the establishment of Islamic governments in their homelands. The principal groups in this category are En Nahdha, the Tunisian Islamic Front, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), Hamas, Hizbollah and Al-Takfir wal-Hijra.
9.(C) The best known Islamists in Switzerland are the Ramadans, Tariq and Hani, of the Islamic Center in Geneva. Tariq Ramadan, formerly a professor of philosophy and grandson of Muslim Brotherhood found Hassan al-Bana, is well-known throughout Europe. He is sometimes hailed as a moderate, at other times attacked as a wolf in sheep's clothing, putting a palatable front to fundamentalist activities. Offered a teaching position at Notre Dame University in 2004, his visa was revoked by DHS, and he withdrew a subsequent application. The UK Government has included Ramadan in an advisory body to assist in their outreach efforts with its Muslim minority.
10.(U) Hani Ramadan was suspended from his duties as a public school teacher in the fall of 2002, following the publication of an article in the French newspaper "Le Monde," in which he spoke out in favor of the stoning of adulterers. He was dismissed in 2003, following an administrative investigation, but he successfully appealed the decision. However, following a second investigation, the Geneva Cantonal Government confirmed Ramadan's dismissal and removed him from the cantonal payroll in December 2004. In October 2005, the Swiss Justice Ministry denied a work permit to a Turkish Imam invited to work at the Islamic Center in Geneva, due to the Imam's extremist views.
Swiss Media Push-back on the War on Terrorism
--------------------------------------------- -
11.(C) Since the Washington Post claimed in early November 2005 that the United States was operating hidden prisons in Europe, the Swiss media has gone full bore in identifying USG sins, real and imagined. Any news on Guantanamo or Abu Ghraib is guaranteed front-page treatment, whereas Al-Qaeda attacks are relegated to the back pages. Of particular concern is the issue of overflights by alleged CIA charter planes. Italian prosecutors allege that a U.S. military jet traversed Swiss airspace on the day Milan cleric Abu Omar was kidnapped. The Swiss government has repeatedly asked the USG to explain the flight and four charter plane landings at Geneva Airport. Washington has yet to respond.
12.(C) Recently, a Swiss tabloid published a leaked Swiss intelligence report of an intercept of an Egyptian government fax. The Swiss Federal Council has condemned the leak and its subsequent publication, and the government has launched administrative and criminal investigations into the matter. The intercepted Egyptian fax claimed that the Egyptian government knew of 23 Iraqi and Afghani prisoners transferred by the USG to prisons in Romania and other Eastern European countries. Swiss officials apologized to Ambassador Willeford for the leak and for the press's overreaction to it. The Ambassador cautioned officials that Switzerland's
BERN 00000141 004 OF 004
obsession with the prisons/overflight matter -- driven in significant measure by Swiss Senator Dick Marty -- risked overwhelming Washington's perceptions of Switzerland. Marty, acting in his capacity as head of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly's Justice Commission and not in any official Swiss government capacity, greeted the information cautiously, but criticized the Swiss and other European governments for not disclosing information on the prisoner issue.
Comment -------
13.(C) Comment: Despite being somewhat shaken by attacks in London and Madrid, the Swiss internal security service continues to assess that Switzerland is relatively safe and that there is no evidence yet of any activity beyond logistical support for Islamic extremists. Swiss opinion leaders among the Parliament and media exhibit little evident concern about the terrorist threat to Switzerland, perhaps contributing to their tendency to focus their criticism on the USG reaction, rather than the initial threat itself. Embassy engagement with Swiss counterparts, reinforced by senior-level visits by USG officials, are helping to move the Swiss to be more forthcoming on information sharing and joint investigations. Absent a direct attack on Swiss interests, however, the process is liable to move very gradually. End comment. Willeford
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000057
NOFORN
SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/29
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, KTIP, SNAR, PINR, SMIG, KCOR, KCRM, KHLS, GR
SUBJECT: Citizen Protection Minister Upbeat on Reorganization, Cooperation
CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador, State, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B), (C), (D) 1. (C)
SUMMARY: During a 45-minute meeting on January 22 Greek Minister of Citizen Protection Chrysochoidis provided the ambassador with a status report of his ambitious plan to reorganize and energize all of Greece's civilian security agencies. The Hellenic Coast Guard will be renamed and reorganized by April along the model of the U.S. Coast Guard to focus on maritime border and port security. The Greek National Intelligence Service will be completely overhauled via a draft law that is being drawn up. Within the Hellenic National Police a new agency will be created and staffed with 100 new hires to work on cyber crime and organized crime. The police know the identities of most of the members of Greece's domestic terrorist groups, but lack the evidence to arrest and prosecute them. Chrysochoidis embraced the ambassador's proposal to create a local working group on counterterrorism between the embassy and the ministry and welcomed training from the U.S. side for all of the ministry's agencies as they underwent far-reaching reform. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) On January 22 Ambassador Speckhard met for 45 minutes with the Greek Minister of Citizen Protection, Michalis Chrysochoidis. This was the third in a series of meetings by the ambassador to hear from senior Greek officials about the ongoing reorganization of Greece's security, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies under the umbrella of the Ministry of Citizen Protection (MCP), which was formed after the election of the center-left Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) government in October 2009. This meeting was intended to obtain a status report on the ambitious plan that Chrysochoidis discussed with the ambassador at their previous meeting on November 12, 2009 (Ref A). The meeting was held in Chrysochoidis' office in the headquarters of the MCP. The ambassador was accompanied by the DCM, the RAS chief, Legatt, and the ICE chief, while Chrysochoidis was unaccompanied.
3. (C) Chrysochoidis began the meeting by noting that he had just returned from Toledo, Spain, where he had been with the Secretary of Homeland Security on 21 January. He said that the two main issues that he had taken away from the conference were the challenges for EU countries of internally coordinating authorities and sharing intelligence and of cooperating effectively with the United States in counterterrorist initiatives. He remarked that it was pointless for each country to amass large amounts of information and intelligence but not to share that body of data to produce results.
4. (C) The ambassador said that in the two previous days he had held meetings with the commandant of the Hellenic Coast Guard (Ref B) and the chief of the Hellenic National Police (HNP) (Ref C) and had noted their focus on creating an atmosphere of interagency cooperation. He asked Chrysochoidis for an update on how his reorganization under the MCP was proceeding and how successfully were agencies cooperating inside of the MCP. The ambassador informed Chrysochoidis that he had proposed to HNP Chief Ikonomou the creation of a local MCP-Embassy working group on counterterrorism, so that the U.S. side could best reinforce and support the Greek side's efforts.
5. (C) Regarding the Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG), Chrysochoidis said that his goal was to organize its functions around its natural missions, namely protection of Greece's maritime borders and ports. At the end of January he will propose a bill in the parliament to create a new Coast Guard, whose changed role will be reflected in its new name. Currently its name in Greek means Harbor Corps (limeniko soma), but henceforth its name in Greek really will mean Coast Guard (aktofylaki). It will be modeled very closely on the U.S. Coast Guard and oriented to fighting crime and protecting Greece's maritime borders. Chrysochoidis predicted that the new HCG would be up and running by April.
6. (C/NF) Chrysochoidis severely criticized the state of EYP, Greece's domestic security and intelligence service. He said bluntly, "EYP is nothing." It does not serve its mission of protecting Greece and in fact is dangerous to national security because of its many shortcomings, not the least of which is a unionize d labor force. As a result, Chrysochoidis declared, he intends to "collapse and rebuild it" via a draft law that is in the process of being drawn up.
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7. (C) As for the HNP, he repeated his many public comments that Greece's police force is not up to task of safeguarding society. As a result, he is restructuring it and trying to instill in it a new attitude toward its duties. Part of that drives includes creation of a new agency to fight cyber crime, organized crime, etc. Vacancy notices already have gone out for 100 new positions to be filled by economists, computer specialists, etc., who will bring new, modern skills to the HNP. These 100 new hires will be merged with other officers and located in a new building, so that a fresh modern agency can be built. Chrysochoidis announced that this plan would be rolled out by the end of February, so that it can begin work in March.
8. (SBU) Chrysochoidis said of the Firefighting Service, which now falls under the MCP, that it has enjoyed good cooperation with U.S. counterparts but that he was open to all suggestions about increasing collaboration and training.
9. (C/NF) On domestic terrorism, Chrysochoidis said that the police know the identities of almost all the members of the current terrorist-anarchist groups, but they lack the evidentiary basis for arresting and imprisoning them. He cited the recent example of a bombing on Syngrou Avenue, saying that the police know who carried it out but do not have the concrete evidence to move against them. He said that the great challenge for the police is collecting the information necessary to prosecute terrorists. He repeated earlier claims (Ref C) that there are links between some domestic terrorist groups and the Middle East, including Iran. Chrysochoidis expressed optimism that if his newly invigorated counterterrorist teams at EYP and HNP did their work well, especially their technical collection operations, they would succeed in wrapping up all of the main terrorist groups in the first half of 2010.
10. (C/NF) Chrysochoidis expressed full support for the ambassador's proposal for a local counterterrorist working group consisting of HNP, EYP, and HCG on the Greek side and FBI, DEA-ICE, and RAS on the American side. He said that he would call the embassy in the near future to get the idea started. He stated forcefully that he wanted outstanding cooperation with the United States and that the MCP did not want to have any secrets from the American side when it came to work against terrorists. He welcomed training across the MCP's agencies as each underwent fundamental reform.
11. (SBU) Chrysochoidis had just started to respond to the ambassador's question about Greek work against human trafficking, especially child labor and the sex industry, when he received a call that summoned him to the prime minister's office. As he was getting ready to leave, he did say that Greece was taking active steps to deal with the problems associated with illegal immigration, including passage of a law on citizenship that would grant legal status to many immigrants. In addition, Greek authorities were trying to end the demand for smuggling rings by closing the exit points to Europe, including the ports of Patra and Igoumenitsa. Greece also wanted to draw a line in the eastern Aegean, but needed the support of Turkey.
Speckhard
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 000007
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, DRL/IRF AND DRL/AWH
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/20
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, KIRF, HURI, PREL, VM
SUBJECT: Vietnam Religious Freedom Update - The Case Against CPC
Re-Designation
REF: A) HANOI 5; HANOI 3; 09 HANOI 1398; 09 HANOI 1202; 09 HANOI 1182 09 HANOI 1084; 09 HANOI 873; 09 HANOI 859; 09 HANOI 839; 09 HANOI 713 09 HANOI 695; 09 HANOI 694
CLASSIFIED BY: Michael Michalak, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Vietnam's poor handling of the situations at the Plum Village Community at the Bat Nha Pagoda and the Dong Chiem Catholic parish last week — particularly the excessive use of violence — is troublesome and indicative of a larger GVN crackdown on human rights in the run-up to the January 2011 Party Congress.
However, these situations are primarily "land disputes," do not meet the statutory requirement in the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act, and should not divert our attention from the significant gains in expanding religious freedoms that Vietnam has made since the lifting of CPC designation in November 2006. These gains include increased recognition and registration of scores of new religions, implementation of a new legal framework on religion, and training programs at the local and national level. Catholic and Protestant communities, including those in the North and Northwest Highlands, continue to report improvements, as do members of the Muslim, Baha'i, and Cao Dai faiths throughout Vietnam. The widespread, systematic religious persecution that existed prior to Vietnam's designation in 2004 does not exist anymore. Post therefore recommends that the Department not re designate Vietnam and instead use high-level engagement opportunities to press the GVN to continue to expand religious freedom in Vietnam. END SUMMARY.
Conditions Prior to CPC Designation
-----------------------------------
2. (C) Prior to the designation of Vietnam as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) in 2004, the Vietnamese government's repression of certain religious groups and their followers was systematic and widespread, and official interference with religious activities was the norm. The U.S. Government had a list of 45 individuals imprisoned because of their religious belief — including members of the Buddhist, Catholic, Protestant, Hoa Hao and Cao Dai faiths. Thousands of Central Highland villagers and other ethnic minorities were restricted from practicing their religion and many were forced to renounce their faith. Religious believers were often subjected to harassment and physical abuse. In 2001, the government forced the closure of nearly all unrecognized Protestant congregations and meeting points in the Central Highlands.
3. (C) The Vietnamese government, moreover, limited the intake of new seminarians and the ordination of new priests to numbers well below the necessary "replacement rate" for the Catholic Church. The government also did not support the Church's participation in humanitarian activities such as the fight against HIV/AIDS. Church requests for the creation of new dioceses, the formation of a new seminary and the appointment of new bishops also languished in the absence of formal GVN approval.
Improvements Prior to Lifting of CPC Designation
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4. (C) After Vietnam's designation as a CPC in 2004, DRL/IRF and the Embassy created a roadmap to assist Vietnam in lifting the designation. In 2004 and 2005 — just two years' time — the Vietnamese government introduced sweeping changes to its religious freedom policy by implementing a new legal framework on religion that bans forced renunciation, grants citizens the right to freedom
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of belief and religion, as well as the freedom not to follow a religion, and prohibits violations of these freedoms. The government conducted many training programs to assure uniform compliance of the new legal framework at the provincial, district, commune, and village levels. Central government officials began responding to complaints from religious leaders about their treatment at the grassroots level. Protestants across the north also reported improvement in officials' attitudes towards their religions and practice.
5. (C) In the North and Northwest Highlands, Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, and the government itself reported an increase in religious activity and observance. Nearly 1000 Southern Evangelical Church of Vietnam (SECV) "meeting points" and places of worship affiliated with other religious organizations in the Central Highlands were registered, including in Gia Lai province where registrations effectively legalized operations for 75,000 believers in the province. 76 SECV congregations were recognized in the Central Highlands and were engaged in regular religious activities. 29 Evangelical Church of Vietnam (ECVN) congregations were registered in the North and Northwest Highlands.
6. (C) The new legal framework allowed for the training of hundreds of new Protestant and Catholic clergy members, including 71 SECV pastors in the Central Highlands. 57 Catholic priests were ordained in a mass public ceremony in Hanoi. Other Catholic priests, including nine in the Dak Lak diocese, were ordained throughout the country. A new SECV Christian training center was approved and opened in Ho Chi Minh City and a new seminary was opened by the Catholic Church in 2006.
7. (C) Throughout the country, including the Central and Northwest Highlands, officially-recognized religious organizations reported that they were able to operate openly, and followers of these religions report that they were able to worship without harassment. Other non-recognized religions, such as the Baha'i faith, reported that their followers did not face harassment and that the authorities facilitated the legalization of their activities. Finally, all individuals raised by the United States as prisoners of concern for reasons connected to their faith were released as of September 2006.
Improvements since Lifting CPC Designation (November 2006)
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8. (C) While implementation of the legal framework has been uneven, the pace of progress continues to be swift. Since 2006, the GOV issued national-level recognition or registration to the following churches: Seventh Day Adventists, Grace Baptist Church, Bani Muslim Sect, Vietnam Baptist Convention (Southern Baptist), Baha'i Faith, Vietnam Mennonite Church, Assemblies of God, United World Mission Church, Pure Land Buddhist Home Practice Association, Vietnam Presbyterian Church, Vietnam Christian Fellowship, the Bani Muslim Sect, Threefold Enlightened Truth Path, the Threefold Southern Tradition, Mysterious Fragrance from Precious Mountains, and the Four Gratitudes.
9. (C) Ho Chi Minh City has registered at least 91 Protestant house churches, serving 7,225 parishioners from many different denominations established before and after 1975. These groups include Pentecostals, Jehovah's Witnesses, Baptists, Presbyterians, Methodists, LDS Church, Assemblies of God and the United Gospel Outreach Church. Additionally, all meeting points that had been closed in the Central Highlands have since been reopened, totaling over 1,700 meeting points and 150 registered congregations. The SECV has also opened scores of new churches with the assistance of Central Highlands' authorities in Gia Lai, Dak Lak, and Dak Nong provinces. The SECV has confirmed that training classes for pastors in Dak Lak and Gia Lai are ongoing and that hundreds of new pastors have been ordained and assigned to newly-registered meeting points. The SECV has reported that a previous shortage of pastors
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in the Central Highlands no longer exists.
10. (C) Additional churches were registered in the Northwest Highlands bringing the total ECVN registered congregations in the region to 168. The ECVN was allowed to build its first new church in decades in Lang Son Province in November 2008. The Church houses an ethnic minority Red Dzao congregation, but will also conduct services for a recently established and newly registered ethnic H'mong congregations. During the past few years, members of Mission Vietnam and foreign visitors, both official and religious, have witnessed religious ceremonies involving thousands of Christians, Catholics and Buddhists, as well as Vietnam's indigenous religions, such as the Cao Dai.
11. (C) Ongoing land disputes notwithstanding, the Catholic Church continues to report that its ability to gather and to worship has improved, and restrictions have eased on the assignment of clergy. During the 2007 visit of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, one Catholic priest told Commissioners that in the past, the Church had to wait for explicit approval from the GVN before moving forward with the appointment of clergy. Now, the Church submits names and the GVN has 30 days to voice its disapproval. The priest said the GVN objected in only one instance, and since the objection came after the 30 days had passed, the Church proceeded with their choice without repercussions. In 2008, the GVN approved the establishment of an additional Catholic seminary and the GVN no longer restricts the number of students entering seminary each year. In April 2008, government officials returned the La Vang church and pilgrimage center, the most important Catholic pilgrimage site in the country.
The GVN also has also relaxed its stance against Church efforts to involve itself in the fight against HIV/AIDS and other social work activities, a process we are encouraging. In December 2009, State President Nguyen Minh Triet met with Pope Benedict XVI in Vatican City for a meeting that the Vatican characterized as a "significant event in the progress of bilateral relations with Vietnam." Since 2006, the Vatican and Vietnam have exchanged a number of delegations, including a January 2007 visit by PM Nguyen Tan Dung, and created a Joint Working Group on reestablishing relations that met for the first time in February 2009.
More Needs to be Done
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12. (C) Vietnam's improving record on religious freedom has been tarred by the recent violence against Catholics in Dong Chiem and the forced eviction of nearly 400 monks and nuns affiliated with Thich Nhat Hanh's Plum Village Order from first the Bat Nha Pagoda and later the Phuoc Hue Pagoda both in Lam Dong Province. These evictions, and the violence associated with them, were preceded by months of intimidation and physical attacks. Vietnam has been slow to acknowledge the damage caused by the Lang Mai/Bat Nha dispute, with the GVN repeating the now standard line that the incidents reflected a convoluted intra- Buddhist disagreement. As religious freedom progresses in Vietnam, religious groups are increasingly demanding more from the government than the right to worship freely -- including the desire to be more involved in charitable activities and seeking resolution to longstanding property disputes. Vietnam's single- Party-dominated state still draws the line at any co-mingling of religion with politics. This explains not only Vietnam's very rough treatment of leading political dissident and BLOC 8406 cofounder Father Nguyen Van Ly, as well as the GVN's approach to the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam and the so-called "Dega Protestant Church" in the Central Highlands. Additional areas that need improvement include the slow pace of registrations of Protestant congregations in the Northwest Highlands and the lack of approval of a H'mong translation of the Bible. Isolated incidents of harassment of Christians; and while illegal, the occasional forced renunciation of faith, also continue in far-flung areas.
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13. (C) The GVN is coming under pressure, justifiably, for its ham-fisted, at times brutish, handling of the situations in Bat Nha and Dong Chiem. As we saw with the large-scale Catholic protests a year ago in Hanoi and July 2009 in Quang Binh province (reftels), there are complicated historical and land use issues at play. Until the government develops a transparent, fair process for adjudicating land claims, disputes between the government and religious organizations will continue to fester and occasionally flair up. However, such incidents are largely land issues, not religious persecution. Furthermore, they do not approach the threshold established by the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act. Moreover, despite the continuing problems mentioned above, there are no indications that the GVN is backsliding on its commitment to register and recognize religious groups, a principle condition for the lifting of CPC in 2006. The GVN appears to be implementing its legal framework on religion that it codified in March 2005. END COMMENT.
CO N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 000809
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/09/10
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ECON, ETRD, VM
SUBJECT: 2011 LEADERSHIP TRANSITION: LEADING CONTENDERS FOR GENERAL SECRETARY AND PRIME MINISTER
REF: HANOI 60 (FEW CHANGES AT THE 9TH PARTH PLENUM)
HANOI 330 (IDEOLOGY RESURGENT? THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S NEW CONCEPT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS)
HANOI 413 (IN VIETNAM, CHINA AND BAUXITE DON'T MIX)
HANOI 537 (BAUXITE CONTROVERSY SPURS LEADERSHIP DIVISIONS, VIBRANT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE)
HANOI 672 (BEHIND VIETNAM'S LATEST CRACKDOWN)
CLASSIFIED BY: Michael Michalak, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Preparations are already underway for major leadership changes in Vietnam as the Communist Party gears up for its Eleventh Party Congress in January 2011. As many as six of the Politburo's fifteen members are expected to retire, including the General Secretary, State President, and National Assembly Chair. Conventional wisdom identifies CPV Standing Secretary Truong Tan Sang and Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung as the frontrunners to replace Nong Duc Manh as General Secretary. If Dung does not become General Secretary, odds are he will remain as Prime Minister. Politburo members since 1996, Dung and Sang have amassed unparalleled influence in Vietnam's Party-state apparatus; they are arguably the two most powerful political figures in the country today. The problem is that, though rivals, Dung and Sang are also too alike for comfort -- both are Southerners, both former HCMC Party Secretaries. Vietnam's enduring regionalism argues that one, likely Sang, will be frustrated in 2011. If Dung keeps his seat as PM, the two strongest contenders for General Secretary are current National Assembly Chair Nguyen Phu Trong and -- more radically -- the Politburo's newest member, the conservative head of the CPV Ideology and Education Commission, To Huy Rua.
2. (C) COMMENT: Neither PM Dung nor Standing Secretary Sang is a champion of political reform in the manner of the late PM Vo Van Kiet. But they are known commodities: pragmatic, market-oriented, and in favor of steady, incremental advances in Vietnam's relationship with the United States. Trong has adopted a similar approach as NA Chair. Rua may be a different story altogether. His elevation to the Politburo both reflects and reinforces a hard-line trend that has been increasingly evident since the crackdown on journalists reporting on the PMU-18 corruption scandal almost exactly one year ago. What role he plays in Vietnam's leadership transition will say much about whether political liberalization -- on hold for now -- will resume after 2011 or will remain stifled. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
Preparations Underway for the 2011 Party Congress
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3. (C) Unlike the Ninth Party Plenum, which installed new members of the CPV Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee (ref. A), the Tenth Plenum, held this July, produced virtually no new personnel or policy decisions. Instead, according to contacts with access to the Central Committee, the Plenum focused mainly on preparations for the Eleventh Party Congress in 2011. Following the Plenum, the CPV announced that the once-every-five-year Congress would be held January 2011, a somewhat earlier date than usual to allow for National Assembly elections later in the year. More importantly, our contacts said that the Congress finished assignments to various subcommittees, including bodies responsible for drafting the Congress's main written product, the "Political Report." Initial drafting on some of the sections, including the portion on Vietnam's foreign relations, began several months ago, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX.
4. (C) Of the subcommittees, the one subject to most fervid speculation is the Subcommittee for Personnel Appointments. Chaired officially by General Secretary Nong Duc Manh, but under the day-to-day supervision of the Central Committee's Organizational Affairs Department Chair, Ho Duc Viet, this subcommittee is charged with preparing the list of candidates for the Eleventh Central Committee and, ultimately, the next Politburo. Viet began the formal process at a "national conference" in Hanoi, August 25-26, in which he instructed grass-roots cadres to begin organizing local and Provincial- level Party Congresses. The actual work of the Appointments Subcommittee is kept extremely
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close hold, particularly as it affects upper-level personnel, and will be subject to change until the Tenth Central Committee's final plenary session, immediately before the January 2011 Congress itself. As a sign that ideological conservatives continue to consolidate their position, the Subcommittee will take as its guidance directives put forward in the Ninth Plenum, including admonitions about the pernicious effects of Western-oriented "self-evolution" (ref. B), sources familiar with the Plenum's internal deliberations say. Additionally, the Tenth Plenum instructed Provincial Party Secretaries to compile reports explaining how changes over the past ten years had either contributed to "perfecting socialism" or "regressing into capitalism," according to the new Can Tho Party Secretary.
Retirements Will Leave Key Openings
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5. (SBU) The Personnel Subcommittee will have several important vacancies to consider. The CPV's Ninth Congress (2001) established an age limit of 60 for first-time Politburo members and 65 for those returning for a repeat term. The latter limit was increased to 67 just prior to the Tenth Congress as an exception to allow Manh, who at the time was 66, to return as General Secretary. Nearly all of our contacts predicted the present leadership would adhere to these age limits in 2011. If the limits are respected, five key Politburo members face mandatory retirement: General Secretary Manh (age 71 in 2011), State President Nguyen Minh Triet (69), National Assembly Chair Nguyen Phu Trong (67), DPM and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem (67), and DPM Truong Vinh Trong (69). In addition, a sixth member of the Politburo, CPV Inspection Commission Chair Nguyen Van Chi, will be 66 and is reported to be in extremely poor health. A minority view among our contacts held that the 67-year age exception would be extended to NA Chair Trong if he were selected as General Secretary.
Consensus Front Runners: Truong Tan Sang and Nguyen Tan Dung
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6. (C) Most observers identify PM Nguyen Tan Dung and the head of the powerful CPV Secretariat, Standing Secretary Truong Tan Sang, as the leading contenders for Secretary General in 2011. In terms of experience, authority, and potential career longevity, Dung and Sang stand head and shoulders above their counterparts on the Politburo. Both have achieved dominant positions in what many now consider almost as competing wings within the Party- state apparatus: Dung through the Office of Government, government ministries, and his control over Vietnam's largest state-owned enterprises; Sang through the Central Committee Commissions. Dung and Sang are also in the best position to provide the continuity of leadership that the Party has consistently said it needs. The two entered the Politburo in 1996, which gives them the longest tenure of any member likely to serve through 2011. At the same time, at 60, they are relatively young and would be eligible to serve two terms as General Secretary, were the 67-year age-limit exemption invoked.
7. (C) Of the two, Sang is more frequently mentioned as a replacement for GS Manh. As Standing Secretary, Sang is responsible for the day-to-day running of Party affairs and, our contacts say, has consolidated his hold over the CPV's Central Committee commissions, which retain an important role in setting broad policy goals and in personnel decisions. Though his tenure as HCMC Party Chief was somewhat tainted by the "Nam Cam" organized crime scandal, Sang is now widely acknowledged as the Party's primary power broker on a wide range of issues, including on economic matters. Meeting with a delegation of industry representatives from the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council in May, for example, Sang was able to comment authoritatively, in detail and without notes, on topics ranging from civilian nuclear cooperation to energy pricing to regulations on tenders and procurement. Sang has also intervened to stop, at least temporarily, several business
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deals that were rumored to be corrupt and that had aroused public criticism.
8. (C) Sang has in some respects already eclipsed the General Secretary, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX. Others agree that Manh has ceded authority to Sang, but offer a slightly different interpretation. XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized that Manh himself remains in overall command, but has removed himself from most policy decisions, choosing instead to focus on internal Party building. Ambassador Mitsuo Sakaba, who accompanied Manh on his April visit to Japan, told us that the General Secretary appeared disengaged in his meeting with Japanese PM Taro Aso, reading verbatim and in a monotone a 30-minute prepared statement passed to him by a staff-member; the General Secretary only really showed interest when he was taken to an agricultural site outside Tokyo. Whatever the cause of Manh's detachment, our contacts agree that Sang has already assumed many of Manh's normal responsibilities as General Secretary.
9. (C) While PM Dung has frequently been mentioned as a contender for General Secretary, a series of setbacks may have frustrated his ambitions to ascend to the top spot. Dung appears to have been stung by criticisms over his early advocacy for Chinese investment in bauxite projects in the Central Highlands (ref. C), a controversy that has been led publicly by General Vo Nguyen Giap, but which insiders say has been exploited by Sang and others as a proxy to undermine Dung (ref. D). In the most recent Plenum, the Prime Minister reportedly also came under criticism for his government's poor performance on corruption, education, and health care. Ultimately, Dung's biggest weakness is the simple fact that his power base derives from efforts to strengthen the government/ state, according to contacts such as XXXXXXXXXXXX. Dung's efforts to consolidate power within the Office of Government have alienated many in the Secretariat and the commissions of the Central Committee, the CPV's traditional centers of power, according to Eastern European diplomatic contacts with regular exposure to the upper/middle ranks of the CPV hierarchy.
10. (C) Nevertheless, most contacts suggest that Dung remains well positioned to remain Prime Minister; indeed, this may have been his goal all along. Though stung by criticism, the Prime Minister has developed an unprecedentedly tight hold over the state bureaucracy. Just as critically, Dung -- a former wartime military medic and police official -- retains strong backing within the Ministries of Public Security and Defense, support that has likely only been reinforced during the most recent crackdown on political dissent (ref E). Perhaps as an effort to showcase this, Dung has over the past months made several well-publicized visits to military commands and has addressed MPS functions. Dung also maintains extremely close contacts with MPS Minister Le Hong Anh, though Anh may not continue in his present position past 2011 (septel).
Regionalism: Why the Conventional Wisdom Might be Wrong
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11. (C) If conventional wisdom prevails, Southerners would for the first time occupy the two most important positions in Vietnam's Party-state structure, and would be in a position to keep their jobs for an additional ten years -- an untenable situation from the standpoint of the CPV's traditional power brokers in the North. Since Party strongman Le Duan's death in 1986, the General Secretary has always come from the North, the Prime Minister from the South; there has been an additional effort, less consistently applied, to have the third position in Vietnam's traditional power troika, State President, come from the Center. XXXXXXXXXXXX argue that regionalism is less and less correlated with ideological differences and of late has
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faded in importance. Additionally, XXXXXXXXXXXX and others maintain, there are important factional divisions among Southerners themselves: Sang, Dung, and State President Triet may all be former HCMC Party Chiefs, but they are not necessarily allies. There is much truth to this; however, our assessment is that having both the PM and President come from the South was an extremely hard pill for many Northerners to swallow in 2006, made palatable only because the top spot was held by a Northerner. Losing the positions of both General Secretary and Prime Minister would be too much for some to contemplate. (Comment: It is also important to keep in mind that factionalism, of which regionalism remains the most potent fault line, increasingly is no longer about ideology -- it is about power, patronage, and wealth. End comment.)
The Dark-Horse Contenders -------------------------
12. (C) Neither Sang nor Dung is likely to step aside without a struggle. If one is forced to sacrifice his ambitions, it is likely to be Sang. If Sang does not become General Secretary, a frequently mentioned alternative could be National Assembly Chair Nguyen Phu Trong, who has ably managed Vietnam's increasingly assertive national legislature and is a known commodity, having also served credibly as Hanoi Party Secretary. XXXXXXXXXXXX confided that Trong is lobbying to have the 67 limit apply not just to the position of General Secretary, but to each of the "four pillars": GS, PM, State Secretary, and NA Chair.
13. (C) A more radical choice could be the newest Politburo member, the hard-line chair of the CPV Ideology and Educational Commission (IEC) To Huy Rua. It would be unusual for a recently appointed Politburo member to ascend to the top of the CPV apparatus so soon; however, Rua has developed a formidable curriculum vitae. Rua has been a member of the Secretariat since 2006, which puts him at the heart of CPV policy making; as the long-serving IEC Chair and as a former head of the Ho Chi Minh Political Academy, he has impeccable ideological credentials; and, perhaps most importantly, as the former Party Chair for Haiphong, Rua has "executive experience" running a major provincial-level city. We have no information to corroborate an assertion by Australian academic Carlye Thayer that Rua is an ally of Sang. Rather, Rua is considered to be a protege of fellow Thanh Hoa stalwart, the hard-line former General Secretary Le Kha Phieu. Whatever the case, Rua's public profile has risen appreciably in the weeks after the most recent Plenum. On August 3, for example, Rua's views on "self-evolution" made the front-page piece in the leading CPV daily, Nhan Dan. On August 30, state media lavished extensive coverage on his visit to HCMC, where he exhorted the country's youth to follow the example of Ho Chi Minh. Rua was also shown chairing regional organizing meetings laying the groundwork for provincial Party Congresses.
14. (C) If Dung, on the other hand, is unable to retain his seat -- and Sang, in turn, ascends to the position of General Secretary -- this would likely produce a reversal of the normal regional balance, with a Northerner becoming Prime Minister. But here the field is, if anything, even narrower. For the past 20 years, Vietnam's Prime Ministers have come from the ranks of serving Deputy Prime Minister: of Vietnam's five current DPMs, only three are on the Politburo, and of them, two are scheduled to retire in 2011, leaving only Standing DPM Nguyen Sing Hung. Hung is a Northerner and an economic technocrat, and has the additional advantage of being one of PM Dung's bitterest rivals, according to several contacts. However, Hung is himself an unpopular figure. When the newly convened National Assembly met in 2007 to formally ratify the Party's selections for PM, DPMs, and government ministers -- normally a perfunctory ritual -- only 58% voted to approve DPM Hung, a shockingly low figure considering that 92% of the NA's deputies are Party members.
C O N F I D E N T I A L NASSAU 000560
SIPDIS
PASS TO WHA/CAR FOR DESK OFFICER JOSLYN MACK-WILSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2019
TAGS: BF, ECON, ETRD, EFIN
SUBJECT: CHINESE OFFER "GOLDEN OPPORTUNITIES" TO THE BAHAMAS
REF: A. NASSAU 180
B. NASSAU 041
C. NASSAU 107
D. NASSAU 493
E. E-MAIL AUGUST 20 MACE-DUBEL
F. NASSAU 526
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Zuniga-Brown for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (U) SUMMARY: The highest ranking Chinese official ever to have visited The Bahamas, Chairman Wu Bangguo, announced several lucrative financial agreements for major infrastructure and tourism projects in The Bahamas totaling USD 164.3 million dollars. These agreements include a financing framework for a planned mega-resort in New Providence, a grant for national stadium construction and a low-interest loan from the Chinese ExIm Bank for highway construction. Chinese, GCOB and hotel officials made concerted efforts to address concerns about Bahamian involvement in these projects. The Chinese also used the visit to encourage cooperation on taxation exchange and to praise the Bahamas on its &One China8 policy stance.
END SUMMARY
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Chinese Offer &Golden Opportunities8
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2. (U) Wu Bangguo, the highest ranking Chinese official ever to have visited The Bahamas, is China,s Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People,s Congress and the country,s second-highest ranking party officer. During his September 3-6 official visit to The Bahamas, Wu met with high-ranking Bahamian officials and signed major financial agreements. Throughout the visit, Chairman Wu made reference to the agreements as an example of how China and the Bahamas have turned the financial crisis into &golden opportunities for cooperation.8 Wu praised the Bahamas on multiple occasions for its adherence to the &One China8 policy, while PM Ingraham thanked Wu for support regarding Bahamas election to Permanent Observer Status in Organization of American States, and escorting Bahamian-flagged ships through pirate-infested national waterways. The two leaders discussed the possibility of inter-parliamentary exchanges and increasing Chinese tourism in the Bahamas. Chinese officials used the official visit to announce a loan of USD 58 million (at two percent interest) towards the construction of an expressway from the international airport into downtown Nassau. Both governments also signed an agreement to create &favorable conditions for investment8 for investors in both countries. Chinese officials claimed to the media over USD 1 billion in Bahamian investments in China, and pointed out that in the first half of 2009, bilateral trade exceeded 200 million dollars ) an increase of 50 percent from the same period in 2008.
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Baha Mar ) Start-Up Funds for the Super Resort
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3. (U) Baha Mar CEO Sarkis Izmirlian signed the two most significant agreements of the visit for the development of a mega resort and casino complex, akin to the Atlantis complex on Paradise Island. The 1,000 acre project will consist of a hotel, casino and commercial village along the Cable Beach area. The first agreement established a financing framework with the China ExIm Bank in which the Chinese committed USD 99 million toward development of the property and took a 2.75 equity stake. This pact does not commit, but establishes the terms for further negotiations between both parties for an additional investment of up to USD 2.7 billion in commercial loans. (See Ref A) Don Robinson, President of Baha Mar Resorts Ltd called the signings &an important milestone in our efforts to finalize the project,s financing.8 Ingraham told Chairman Wu that The Bahamas &look forward with cautious optimism to the intended investment by China Export-Import Bank in the development of the resort property on Cable Beach.8
4. (U) The second agreement between Baha Mar and the China State Construction and Engineering Corporation Limited (CSCEC) establishes the commercial terms for the firm,s involvement in the project. CSCEC spokesmen said that they expect negotiations to be finalized by the end of the year and to begin construction on the resort by the beginning of 2010 for an opening in 2013. Responding to concerns about the involvement of Bahamian contractors and construction companies, Don Robinson, president of Baha Mar resorts said that while CSCEC and Chinese workers would build &core8 project (casino and major hotels), Bahamian contractors will get the &majority8 of auxiliary development projects, such as the rerouting of West Bay Street, development of the Commercial Village and of the police station, banks and straw market ) worth an estimated USD 200 million in contracts.
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Stadium Construction: Let the Games Begin
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5. (U)The Thomas A. Robinson National Sports Stadium project is the largest construction undertaking for China in the region. The structure will take up 36,000 square meters and can seat between 15,000 and 23,000 people. Bahamian Minister of Youth, Sports and Culture Desmond Bannister expressed surprise at the speed and efficiency of the Qilu Construction Group, proclaiming that the 120 Chinese workers &are going incredibly fast.8 Nevertheless, PM Ingraham asked Wu to speed up construction timetable of the stadium in time for the Bahamas to host the Caribbean-wide Carifta Games in April 2011. In return, the Chinese requested that GCOB finish the auxiliary projects for the national stadium and to form a special group to coordinate schedule advancement. Wu also announced that China would provide a grant worth USD 7.3 million to be used for miscellaneous projects associated with the construction of the stadium. Deputy Prime Minister Brent Symonette said that although the stadium is being built by the Chinese, the majority of equipment and materials have been acquired from Bahamian firms.
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China Defends the &Developing8 Tax Haven
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6. (U) At a meeting with PM Ingraham, Wu described The Bahamas as a &developing8 nation and noted that China has advocated for an increase in representation of developing countries in international financial institutions. He also pointed to China,s opposition to the &practice of some developed countries unilaterally incorporating some developing countries into the blacklist of tax havens.8 Wu encouraged an exchange between the two governments on taxation intelligence.
7. (C)COMMENT: The Chinese appear committed to establishing a firm financial hold on projects, such as the Baha Mar, that will have a major impact on the Bahamian economy and leave the GCOB indebted to Chinese interests for years to come. Despite considerable investment in The Bahamas infrastructure and tourism sector, the Chinese stake in the Baha Mar project is substantially lower than former partner Harrah,s 43 percent equity stake and USD 343 million initial investment. The GCOB is eager for China,s participation in the project, but have taken a cautious approach toward negotiations until it is clear that the Chinese are willing to provide the USD 2.7 billion needed to build the resort. The GCOB is waiting to determine whether current Chinese behavior is a result of skepticism over market conditions or whether China is using this investment solely to establish a relationship of patronage with a U.S. trading partner less than 190 miles from the United States.
ZUNIGA-BROWN
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NASSAU 001515
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2014
TAGS: PREL, OVIP, BTIO, ECON, SCUL, CH, BF, ASEC, China
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER CHRISTIE'S CHINA TRIP, THE LATEST IN A STRING OF VISITS
REF: A. 03 NASSAU 2124 B. NASSAU 1412
Classified By: CHARGE ROBERT M. WITAJEWSKI FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
SUMMARY
1. (SBU) Bahamian Prime Minister Perry Christie will lead an official government delegation to China on August 14-21, continuing a two-year upswing in diplomatic exchanges between The Bahamas and China. In addition to numerous cultural programs, the two nations have exchanged high-level delegations to explore business opportunities and strengthen diplomatic ties. The majority of the Bahamian cabinet visits have been hosted by the Chinese government -- nominally to discuss Chinese support of The Bahamas' membership in the World Trade Organization. Despite being separated by two oceans and a continental landmass, China is one of only four countries that maintains a resident ambassador in The Bahamas. The Bahamas' largest port facility in Freeport is owned and operated by Hong Kong-based Hutchison-Whampoa. The Bahamian press gives generally positive and extensive coverage to China and interprets the growing China-Bahamas relationship as a sign of The Bahamas' increasing importance in the world and friendship with a potential superpower. END SUMMARY.
BAHAMIAN DIGNITARIES "FREQUENT FLYERS" TO CHINA...
2. (C) Prime Minister Perry Christie is scheduled to visit Beijing and Shanghai from August 14 - 21, 2004. This will be the Prime Minister's first official trip to China. Accompanying Christie will be his wife and daughter, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fred Mitchell, Minister of State for Finance James Smith, the Prime Minister's Permanent Secretary Ronald Thompson, and two reporters. An advance team consisting of Chief of Protocol Andrew McKinney and Under Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Philip Miller SIPDIS has already departed for China. The Bahamian Foreign Ministry has been unwilling to provide details about the delegation's itinerary, schedule or meetings, or the purpose of the trip.
3. (U) The Prime Minister's trip to China is the latest is a stream of high-level Bahamian visitors to China since the PLP's electoral victory in May 2002. In the past year, a number of Bahamian government officials have visited China including Cabinet-level ministers and members of parliament. On August 30, 2003, Foreign Minister Fred Mitchell and Minister of Transport and Aviation Glenys Hanna-Martin both traveled to China. They met with the Chinese Minister of Commerce to discuss World Trade Organization (WTO) issues as the Bahamas prepares for WTO membership. Ministers Mitchell and Hanna-Martin also met with China's Minister of Culture. While there, the Chinese arranged for Minister Hanna-Martin to commission a Chinese-built ship that will be registered with the Bahamas' ship registry. Just two months later in October, Minister of Trade and Industry Leslie Miller visited Beijing, again ostensibly to promote The Bahamas' accession to the WTO.
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CHINESE PRESENCE IN THE BAHAMAS
7. (C) China is one of four countries to maintain resident ambassadors in The Bahamas. Ambassador Dongcun Jiao presented his credentials to Governor General Dame Ivy Dumont on August 21, 2003. During the swearing in, Governor General Dame Ivy Dumont thanked the Ambassador for his country's assistance in the areas of education, agriculture, fisheries and the arts. Ambassador Jiao noted that the Bahamas and China have coordinated with and supported each other in international affairs. He further stated that the Chinese government is ready to make concerted efforts with the Bahamian government to build a China-Bahamas relationship of all-round cooperation in the interest of mutual development. Currently, the exceptionally large Chinese embassy in The Bahamas, given the paucity of bilateral business to conduct, consists of an Ambassador and six accredited diplomats. For its part, The Bahamas maintains a Consul General in Hong Kong but has announced that, following PRC suggestions, it will be establishing an embassy in Beijing and closing its consulate in Hong Kong.
8. (C) The largest Chinese investment in The Bahamas is the $1 billion Freeport container port owned and operated by Hong Kong-based Hutchison-Whampoa. Chinese dignitaries traveling to the Bahamas always visit Freeport and the port. Hutchison-Whampoa employs only five Chinese citizens in its Freeport facility, all in a management capacity.
9. (U) Madam Wu Yi, State Councilor to the People's Republic of China accompanied by a delegation of 30 people, including six Chinese business leaders, visited The Bahamas in January 2003. During her visit to Nassau, Madam Wu presented the Bahamian government with a grant of $250,000 for various technical, agricultural, handicraft and cooperative projects. Additionally, a delegation of Chinese government officials visited Nassau on June 19, 2004, to finalize plans for the Chinese to grant the Bahamian government $20 million for construction of a national stadium.
COMMENT
10. (C) The Bahamas' political and economic ties to China remain modest. Bilateral trade flows have increased, reaching approximately $95 million for the first eight months of 2003, and investment projects such as the Freeport port facility are always welcome. Some local commentators would like to believe that The Bahamas should attempt to use China as a counter-balance to the U.S. It is more likely, however, that Bahamian officials are merely using their moment in the Chinese spotlight to push for kinder WTO accession terms (at least as a starting point for negotiations with the other members) and to pick up whatever spare trade and investment projects a country of over one billion people can offer. For their part, the Chinese in The Bahamas may be a strategic move preparing for a post-Castro Caribbean. WITAJEWSKI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NASSAU 001635
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2013
TAGS: PREL, ECON, EINV, PINR, PGOV, CH, JA, BF, China
SUBJECT: BAHAMIAN OFFICIALS VISIT TO CHINA -- COURTESY OR CONFIDANTS?
Classified By: CHARGE ROBERT WITAJEWSKI FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).
SUMMARY 1. (C) On August 20, the Charge, and Economic Officer met with Mrs. Patricia Rogers, the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Leonard Archer, the Bahamian Ambassador to CARICOM, and Mr. Marco Rolle, Under Secretary in the International Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss the upcoming visit of Bahamian officials to China. Although the Bahamians were extremely reluctant to provide information regarding the visit to China, Dr. Rogers promised the Charge, that she would give him a briefing upon their return on September 9th. Despite deliberate attempts at ambiguity in describing the agenda for the Foreign Minister,s trip, it appears that The Bahamas will accede to a Chinese request to close their consulate in Hong Kong and open an embassy in Beijing. We urged that the GCOB also raise the issue of Chinese alien smuggling operations through The Bahamas to the United States. Rogers claimed the China visit was simply to express gratitude for Chinese technical assistance to The Bahamas. End Summary.
OFFICIAL VISIT TO CHINA BY GCOB OFFICIALS
2. (C) At a meeting with Mrs. Patricia Rogers, the Charge, inquired about the upcoming Bahamian high-level visit to China from August 22nd - September 9th. Mrs. Rogers said that Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fred Mitchell, and herself amongst others planned to travel to Beijing, Shanghai, Shenyang, plus Japan on their whirlwind tour to Asia. Bahamian Ambassador to Japan, Sir Sidney Poitier, is to accompany the Bahamian contingent on the Japanese segment of the trip since it is coinciding with his annual trip to Japan. Rogers laughingly noted that he was to be the "star attraction", and the rest of them, including the Foreign Minister, were merely along for the ride.
3. (C) Framing it as simply a "follow-up to an invitation", Mrs. Rogers attempted to minimize the significance of the official trip. But after further probing, she admitted that one of the purposes of the trip was to reassure China of The Bahamas commitment to their bilateral relationship. Rogers indicated that the Government felt that it needed to continue to solidify Chinese confidence due to "lingering distaste" left from the fact that The Bahamas maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan, including permitting a Taiwanese Embassy in Nassau, until 1999.
4. (C) Mrs. Rogers and Ambassador Leonard Archer both made a point of expressing gratitude towards the Chinese for their technical assistance in The Bahamas. When questioned further about the precise details of this assistance, the two responded by citing Chinese support for Bahamian handicraft, agriculture and their offer to assist in the remodeling/rebuilding of the National Center for Performing Arts located in Nassau, not Mrs. Rogers insisted a new convention center for The Bahamas. (A Chinese offer to build a massive convention center in the Cable Beach area of New Providence Island has been widely rumored to be on the table.) Mrs. Rogers also mentioned that Bahamian officials were to participate in a christening and launch of one of the Clipper Group ships. The company, she obliquely noted, had decided to register many of its ships on the Bahamian ship registry, and this would be a reciprocal gesture of appreciation.
"NO" AGENDA WHILE IN CHINA
5. (C) When asked by the Charge, as to what the Bahamian officials had arranged with their Chinese counterparts for the visit, Mrs. Rogers paused and said that the visit was to be very informal and denied that any agenda of discussion topics had been agreed to. Responding to the Charge,s skepticism that a major visit beginning in only two days remained so unfocused, Mrs. Rogers reluctantly admitted that it was "feasible" that some trade and cultural agreements might be signed, but insisted that the Bahamian delegation only planned to speak about general bilateral issues.
SMUGGLING CHINESE TO THE US VIA THE BAHAMAS
6. (C) The Charge, specifically questioned the Bahamian government officials about whether the issue of smuggling Chinese aliens into the United States through The Bahamas would be raised when Mrs. Rogers and Minister of Foreign Affairs Fred Mitchell visit China. Mrs. Rogers, again reluctantly, responded by saying, "it,s a tricky one, but one that will have to be brought up". The Bahamians would not provide further details.
CLOSING HONG KONG; OPENING IN BEIJING
7. (C) During the conversation, Mrs. Rogers did reveal that The Bahamas would discuss with Chinese officials the possibility of "deactivating" their consulate in Hong Kong with the intention of establishing an Embassy in Beijing. She did not indicate if Foreign Minister Mitchell and his Chinese counterpart would make an announcement to this effect while on the upcoming trip.
8. (U) Currently, the Bahamian Consulate in Hong Kong does not process visas for CARICOM members, only for Bahamian citizens. Only the embassies of Guyana and Suriname in China have that ability presently.
NEW CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO BAHAMAS
9. (C) Dr. Rogers mentioned that the new Chinese Ambassador to The Bahamas, Dongcon Jiao, will be formally presenting his credentials on August 21st. She made a point of noting that "he speaks perfect English." (Note: The former Chinese Ambassador, Changsheng Wu, had limited English skills and was always accompanied in public by an interpreter. Changsheng was, however, proficient in Spanish.) The Charge, noted that the Embassy had not been contacted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about receiving the new Chinese Ambassador for an introductory courtesy call, observing that Andrew McKinney, Chief of Protocol for the Bahamas, did consider Charges of appropriate rank. Mrs. Rogers appeared genuinely embarrassed, and expressed the intent to rectify the situation.
COMMENT
10. (C) Mrs. Rogers, and other Bahamian officials, are reluctant to discuss the details of their relationship with the Chinese. While it appears that the dynamics of the relationship are being driven by the Chinese, for their part the Bahamians have at least two reasons for acquiescing. First, there is the $1 billion investment by Hutchison Whampoa in the Freeport Container Port. Second, a Chinese presence does -even if symbolically- serve as a counterbalance to the U.S. The interest of the Chinese is more complex however, and we defer to Embassy Beijing for its analysis of Chinese strategic goals underlying its major presence in a country where apart from geography, there would seem to be few mutual cultural, tourist, economic, or political interests. WITAJEWSKI
S E C R E T DUBLIN 001739
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2014
TAGS: MOPS, PINR, PREL
SUBJECT: SHANNON: GOI UNDER PRESSURE BUT NO CHANGE IN POLICY
Classified By: DCM JONATHAN BENTON FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D
1. (S) DCM met with XXXXXXXXXXXX issues surrounding U.S. use of Shannon airport. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that while there always has been an element of Irish society that objects to the U.S. military's use of Shannon, the government feels increasingly under pressure. On a weekly basis, members of parliament question the ministers. While most of the criticism and pressure come from the opposition, the president of the Senate, from the PM's own party, also has entered the fray periodically. Parliamentarians draw on allegations from journalists, activists' web sites and tail spotters to suggest the USG has used Shannon for nefarious purposes. Particularly difficult have been questions in the last two weeks about a Gulfstream jet that allegedly has been used to transport prisoners and allegedly had its tail number changed. XXXXXXXXXXXX cited this allegation as both politically and legally difficult for the GOI. The political problem is that the government's defense of Shannon rests heavily on friendship with the U.S. and the Irish government saying it relies on the "good faith" of the USG. He said the allegations that the tail number has been changed raise suspicions and caused confusion within the GOI, along with the hope that there is a "benign" explanation about why the tail number was changed. He cautioned that if it were ever to be discovered that the U.S. was not good on its word or had transported prisoners through Shannon in the context of the war on terrorism, there would be enormous political pressure on the government. As for the legal issue, he said that were a plane to include Shannon in an itinerary that also included transporting prisoners, GOI lawyers might be forced to conclude that the GOI itself was in violation of torture conventions. His colleague cited breaking press reports of ICRC comments about Guantanamo as adding fuel to the fire.
2. (S) The DCM told XXXXXXXXXXXX that the USG would be in no position to respond to the detailed questions asked about particular planes, such as the Gulfstream jet, but stood by its commitment to abide by Irish law, consult with the Irish and avoid actions that would bring embarrassment to the Irish government. XXXXXXXXXXXX confirmed that there is no/no change pending to Irish policy allowing U.S. use of Shannon, but reiterated that some ministers feel they are going out on a limb defending U.S. use of Shannon and that the GOI is counting on the fact that the word of the USG is good and that the U.S. has not and will not transfer prisoners through Shannon or engage in any other activity that would place the government in legal or political difficulty. He said that the government consistently says the same thing and that this must not be shown later "to have holes in it." He also said it is critical that no "blue water" be found between statements that Irish and U.S. officials make. He said activists dissect statements and take any divergence as a sign that something is amiss. He said the recent assurances from the USG that prisoners had not been transferred through Shannon was helpful, as is, in general terms, the UNSCR resolution asking members to support Iraq. KENNY
S E C R E T KATHMANDU 002811
SIPDIS
SIPDIS DEPT FOR SA/INS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2015
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, PREF, PHUM, NP
SUBJECT: FM PANDEY SEEKS SPECIAL, LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S.
REF: A. KATHMANDU 2565 B. KATHMANDU 2209
C. STATE 223674 D. KATHMANDU 2568
Classified By: Amb. James F. Moriarty, Reason 1.4 (b/d)
Summary ------- 1. (C) On December 14, Foreign Minister Ramesh Nath Pandey emphasized to the Ambassador that HMGN sought a long-term special Nepal-U.S. relationship; Pandey urged the U.S. to change course and use engagement, rather than pressure, with the King. The Ambassador responded that he was authorized to tell the King that if Gyanendra took the right steps, the U.S. would be there for Nepal. However, he noted, the King's course since February 1 had brought the country to crisis. The Ambassador pressed FM Pandey to ensure the issuance of exit permits for buses to carry transiting Tibetan refugees to India; to register the Tibetan Welfare Society; and to respond favorably to our proposal to resettle Tibetan refugees long resident in Nepal. The FM was noncommittal, at times seeming to tie these issues to progress on our bilateral relationship, other times terming these "small issues" that would be easily resolved. Pandey said he planned to notify the Bhutanese FM in Dhaka on the margins of a BIMSTEC meeting that Bhutan should begin repatriation within a few months' time or Nepal would move "to internationalize the issue." End Summary.
U.S. Should Engage, Not Pressure, the King
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2. (C) Foreign Minister Pandey stressed that Nepal wanted to have a special, very close relationship with the U.S., as that was in Nepal's best interest. He asserted that the U.S. had taken the wrong line in using pressure to try to force the King to take the right steps on multi-party democracy. Instead of using tactics that "could result in Nepal becoming another Burma," the U.S. should encourage the King to move to multi-party democracy. Pandey argued that if the King knew he could depend on the U.S., "things would be completely different." The FM also noted that if Nepal did not receive arms from India or the U.S., Nepal would not be short of arms. Later that afternoon, he continued, "a plane of material from one of your best friends" would arrive in Nepal. (Note: DATT went to the airport and observed a UAE chartered cargo plane on the tarmac. We are seeking further details. End Note.)
3. (S) The Ambassador explained that there was a strong sense in Washington that the King needed to take dramatic steps quickly to solve Nepal's crisis. In response to Pandey's plea for a relationship based on trust, the Ambassador suggested that the King had shattered that trust and needed to restore it by moving in the right direction. The FM asked that the U.S. provide a roadmap of actions, which he would discuss with the King. The Ambassador reiterated ideas raised in their November 23 meeting (ref A): the King should declare a cease-fire with international monitoring and reach out to the political parties in a real way. He told Pandey that, in his upcoming audience, he would assure the King that if the monarch took the right steps, the U.S. would be there for Nepal.
4. (C) The Foreign Minister complained that the political party leaders were a major problem. Claiming to be a strong supporter of multi-party democracy, Pandey proposed that the King bypass the top Party leaders and encourage middle-tier Party leaders to take a leadership role and join the government. He also worried that the Maoists would use the Parties against the King, but then would ultimately finish off the Parties. He decried the Nepali Congress party as so weak that, if something happened to its president, GP Koirala, the Party would splinter into several factions and create a political vacuum that the Maoists would fill. His answer to these problems was that there should be "total understanding between the U.S. and the King." He offered himself as able to play a role in establishing "total strategic relations between Nepal and the U.S." He stressed that "whatever issue you ask of me, I will deliver." The Ambassador noted that Pandey's proposal would essentially involve decapitating the Parties and was unacceptable. He warned the FM that attempting to manipulate the internal workings of the political parties would not prove a successful strategy for HMGN.
No Clear Answer on Tibetan Refugee Issues
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5. (C) The Ambassador explained that, during his early December consultations in Washington, the Hill had expressed considerable concern regarding Tibetan refugee issues. The Ambassador urged Pandey to ensure that the transit of Tibetan refugees proceeded without hindrance. There were about 1,000 Tibetan refugees at the Tibetan Refugee Reception Center (TRRC); Nepal needed to make sure that the process of transiting refugees to India resumed. The Hill had expressed interest in the Tibetan refugee resettlement proposal raised in early October (ref B), to which the FM had not yet responded. The Ambassador also pushed the registration of the Tibetan Welfare Society.
6. (C) The Foreign Minister's response was ambiguous. He first reiterated that we "should leave these issues with him" and that he would address them, adding that Nepal needed to have a close relationship with the U.S. He later implied that, given the amount of support Nepal had received from the Chinese, there might not be any progress on the issues the Ambassador had raised, unless the U.S. shifted its Nepal policy. The Ambassador emphasized that Tibetan refugee issues were one of the Administration's and Congress's key concerns regarding Nepal, and if there were no progress, Nepal could put at risk other parts of the relationship, including development assistance. Pandey replied that Nepal's long-term interest was in a relationship with the U.S., not China or India.
Will Push Repatriation With Bhutanese FM
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7. (C) FM Pandey expressed frustration with the Bhutanese on the lack of progress in repatriating refugees. While stating understanding of Bhutan's concern about stability, he also worried that RGOB might expel the ethnic Nepalis still living in Bhutan. Pandey said he planned to meet with the Bhutanese FM on December 25 in Dhaka on the margins of the BIMSTEC meeting. He would inform the Bhutanese that repatriation should start within a few months' time, otherwise Nepal would "internationalize" the issue. He added that Nepal would resume issuing travel documents to the Bhutanese as part of internationalizing the issue. The Ambassador commented that as there currently was nothing guaranteeing that the RGOB would not expel ethnic Nepalis, part of the effort to internationalize the issue should be to take steps to prevent future expulsions. He noted that South Asia Assistant Secretary Rocca had written the Bhutanese FM asking for the SIPDIS terms and conditions for return, and a timeline (ref C). The Ambassador also urged the FM to consider issuing exit permits to allow the resettlement of three vulnerable minor girls (ref D), noting that their resettlement would not ease the pressure on Bhutan to repatriate the refugees from Nepal.
Comment
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8. (C) Irrespective of the plane of material that he flagged to us, the Foreign Minister's repeated pleas to re-establish a special, close relationship show that Nepal is once again seeking U.S. support. We are pushing Tibetan refugee issues hard with other parts of the government, which hopefully will combine to ensure Nepal quickly resumes issuing exit permits to the transiting Tibetan refugees. MORIARTY
Cable dated:2006-01-09T15:14:00
S E C R E T TUNIS 000055
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG - LAWRENCE AND INR PARIS FOR ZEYA
LONDON FOR TSOU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TS
SUBJECT: SUCCESSION IN TUNISIA: FINDING A SUCCESSOR OR FEET FIRST?
REF: A. 05 TUNIS 2265 B. 05 TUNIS 2148
Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM HUDSON FOR REASONS 1.5 (b) AND (d)
1. (S) SUMMARY: In a country that has had only one president for over eighteen years, suddenly and unusually, talk of the post-Ben Ali era is growing. Several senior and well-connected individuals have recently raised Ben Ali's intentions for the future with Ambassador and other embassy officials. On the heels of Ben Ali's recent illness (Ref A) and a new law providing for "former presidents" (Ref B), these discussions seem, on the surface, to be more relevant that the usual rumors. XXXXXXXXXXXX Given the constitutional framework and the political scene, a successful candidate will likely come from the RCD Politburo. None of the options suggest Tunisia will become more democratic, but the US-Tunisian bilateral relationship is likely to remain unaffected by the departure of Ben Ali. END SUMMARY.
2. (S) One of the standard jokes about President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali (usually delivered only half in jest) is that he has three goals for his presidency: to stay in power; to stay in power; and to stay in power. Ample evidence supports this view, including a 2002 constitutional amendment that he and the ruling RCD (Democratic Constitutional Rally) party pushed through which eliminated the two-term limit and effectively gave him the right to govern at least until 2014. In recent months, however, increasingly concrete speculation has been voiced by well-placed contacts (and more casual observers) that Ben Ali does not plan to run again and may even step down before his term expires in 2009.
3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX recently told the Ambassador XXXXXXXXXXXX that Ben Ali wants to avoid the "difficulties" that arose when Tunisia's first president, Habib Bourguiba, declined in 1987. At the time, Ben Ali argued that Bourguiba was medically unfit to continue as president, while denouncing Bourguiba's de facto presidency for life. One way for Ben Ali to ensure a smoother transition would be to groom a replacement and present him as the only viable candidate in 2009. XXXXXXXXXXXX later told the Ambassador that, in fact, Ben Ali does not intend to run again in the 2009 presidential elections. This scenario, while hard to imagine for many who have witnessed first hand Ben Ali's jealous control of all power in Tunisia, would allow the President to bask in the glory of being the first Arab leader to voluntarily and peacefully leave office.
4. (C) Average Tunisians spend more time commenting on Ben Ali's health and omnipotent rule than the possibility that he may step down. Ben Ali XXXXXXXXXXXX maintains an active schedule and appears healthy; but Tunisians often discuss whether he appears pale, thin or otherwise physically ill. While some people may state their hope that U.S. and European pressure could force Ben Ali to become more democratic or relinquish the presidency, they are at a loss when asked who would succeed him. Ben Ali's policy of regularly changing ministers and other senior officials has ensured that no individual has widespread support, respect, or even substantial recognition among Tunisians.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
5. (C) The significant constitutional changes approved in a May 2002 referendum that allow presidential candidates up to the age of seventy-five led many Tunisians to assume that Ben Ali intends to remain president for life. In Ben Ali's case, the changes allow him to run in 2009 and serve as president until the 2014 elections, when, at age 79, he will be legally too old to run for reelection. However, many Tunisians still cynically expect Ben Ali to change the constitution again to allow him to continue to serve as president until his ultimate demise.
6. (C) The constitutional amendments of 2002 also outlined legal procedures that address presidential illness, incapacity and death. According to the constitution, in the event of a temporary incapacity, the President can delegate some of his powers to the Prime Minister. During this interim period, the PM/acting president cannot dissolve the National Assembly, nor can he make changes to the Cabinet. (Note: During Ben Ali's four-day October illness, he did not elect to delegate any authorities. End Note.) This system replaces the previous constitutional provisions, which Ben Ali used to remove Bourguiba, in which the Prime Minister was responsible for determining the president's incapacity based on from seven doctors' certifications that the president was no longer competent to carry out the functions of his office.
7. (C) In the event the President dies in office, resigns or is unable to carry out his duties due to illness or other incapacity, the Constitutional Council would meet to determine if the vacancy of the office was "definitive." (Note: The nine-member Constitutional Council, which was created in 2001 as part of the above-mentioned constitutional revisions, is generally responsible for reviewing new laws to ensure conformity with the constitution. Four members are appointed by the President, three by the President of the Chamber of Deputies, and three are members based on their government positions: the first president of the Supreme Court, the president of the Administrative Tribunal, and the President of the National Accounting Office.) An absolute majority of the Council would be required to render the presidency vacant. The Council must then advise the presidents of the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of Counselors, of this determination, which triggers the "immediate" but temporary investiture of the president of the Chamber of Deputies as interim president. The interim president must organize elections within 60 days, and cannot dissolve the Chamber, change the constitution, change the government, nor stand for election to the Presidency.
8. (C) Thus, under the current constitutional dispensation, if Ben Ali were to be "temporarily" incapacitated due to illness, he could turn over a measure of presidential authority to Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi. Ghannouchi, an economist by training, is a respected figure in the "technocratic" mold. If Ben Ali were to die in office, resign for whatever reason, or become so ill he could no longer exercise his functions, the Constitutional Council could declare the Presidency "vacant" and interim authority would fall to Fouad Mebazaa, the current President of the National Assembly. Mebazaa is a long-time ruling RCD party stalwart (a member of the RCD Politburo, a former Minister, and a "survivor" from the Bourguiba era), whose principal task as interim President would be to organize elections and, from an RCD perspective, maintain the party's hold on power.
WHO CAN RUN - AND BE ELECTED
9. (C) In order to be eligible to run for the presidency, a candidate must be no older than 75, be a member of a party with at least one member in parliament, and obtain the signatures of 30 deputies and/or mayors. Given the personality-cult status of the opposition parties (several of which are internally fragmented and weak) and their lack of organized platforms or significant membership, it is unlikely any opposition candidate would garner enough strength to seriously challenge an RCD member. It is most likely that the next president would come from within the RCD given its history as Tunisia's founding party, its grass roots structure, and its interest in stability and continuity.
POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS
10. (S) Designating a successor may be the only means for Ben Ali to maintain his legacy as the man who brought "blessed change" to Tunisia. However, as he is an expert at shuffling his advisors and cabinet members to prevent any one individual from gaining sufficient political support to become a threat to the President's rule, it is unclear who this successor might be. Given the legal framework of the presidency, it is expected that the successor would come from the RCD Politburo -- whether handpicked by Ben Ali or following his death. Possible candidates, whose bio info is provided below, include Minister of State, Special Advisor to the President and Official Spokesman Abdelaziz Ben Dhia, Minister of Social Affairs, Solidarity and Tunisians Abroad Ali Chaouch, Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi, Minister of Defense Kamel Morjane and First Lady Leila Ben Ali. None of these individuals would likely make any significant changes in GOT domestic or foreign policies, at least initially.
Minister of State Ben Dhia: Ben Dhia is often mentioned as a possible successor, given his strong position in the palace. Since he was born in 1936, Ben Dhia's age is the prime obstacle to the likelihood he would be Ben Ali's successor, as he also would be ineligible to run in the 2014 elections. However, rumored to be equally liked by the President and First Lady, Ben Dhia could act as a placeholder while a younger family member, such as one of Ben Ali's son-in-laws, gained political power. Ben Dhia's long history of government service, including under Bourguiba, may give him widespread public support, although his relatively secretive responsibilities in the palace cause some consternation among average Tunisians. These same unknown responsibilities have also supported Ben Dhia's reputation in Tunisia as an "eminence grise" - the brilliant behind-the-scenes decision maker in the palace.
Minister of Social Affairs Chaouch: Ali Chaouch (born in 1948) has held two positions that have given him great exposure to the Tunisian public: as RCD Secretary General from 2000-04, and currently as the Minister of Social Affairs. However, he also occupied the despised position of Minister of Interior, which while it may have given him the background to run a dictatorship, earned him little popularity with the Tunisian public.
Prime Minister Ghannouchi: (8/18/1941) A career technocrat and trained economist, Ghannouchi has served as Prime Minister since 1999. Ghannouchi is rumored to have told many that he wishes to leave the GOT but has not had the opportunity. The length of his service as PM also suggests that Ben Ali does not view him as a threat and that he is unlikely to be viewed as a qualified successor. However, average Tunisians generally view him with respect and he is well-liked in comparison to other GOT and RCD officials.
First Lady Ben Ali: (10/24/1956) While there are often rumors of Leila's political ambitions, almost all observers note she does not have sufficient support among the Tunisian public. However, she cannot be ruled out as a possible successor, especially as she is widely believed to be at least partially responsible for many official appointments. If this is true, she has a wide range of political allies throughout Tunisian society that would support her -- even in the face of public disapproval.
Minister of Defense Morjane: (5/9/1945) Also affecting the credibility of succession scenarios is an oft-repeated notion that the US is favoring Morjane in the succession race. Morjane, appointed Minister of Defense in August 2005 after years of United Nations service, at one point had USG support for his candidacy to be the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and has been helpful as Minister. However, we know little about his personal politics or ambitions.
11. (S) COMMENT. Given the fact that Ben Ali has a dictatorial hold on Tunisia, it is hard to believe that he will voluntarily step down. We wonder that these discussions are not simply a ruse that will bring Tunisians - supporters and critics alike - out in force calling for another Ben Ali term. This would give Ben Ali the necessary cover that he is only responding to public demand for the continuation of his presidency, much as he did following the 2002 referendum that amended the constitution to allow him to run until 2014. However it is interpreted, the mere fact that an increasing number of Tunisians are talking about succession and the end of the Ben Ali era is remarkable. HUDSON
Cable dated:2008-11-24T14:44:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003394
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, FOR EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND WRIGHT EUR/CARC, SCA (GALLAGHER, SUMAR) DOE FOR HEGBURG, EKIMOFF
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2018
TAGS: EPET, ENRG, ECON, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: BP VP TELLS AMBASSADOR COMPANY IS IN RUSSIA FOR LONG-TERM, GETTING OUT OF CPC
REF: A. MOSCOW 3297 B. MOSCOW 2855 C. ASTANA 2144
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
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SUMMARY
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1. (C) At a November 20 meeting, BP's new Group VP for Russia and Kazakhstan, David Peattie, told the Ambassador that BP is in Russia for the long-term. The troubled partnership in TNK-BP (ref A) is only a part of their involvement and he said BP would not be surprised to see the company split up and taken over by Gazprom and Rosneft within 2 years. BP is actively pursuing options with both companies for the future. In the interval, Peattie confirmed that BP has agreed to Denis Morozov, formerly with Norilsk Nickel, as the new CEO and said he expects Morozov may prove more independent than the AAR partners will like. He predicted Russian oil production will drop by between three and five percent as companies contract capital spending in light of oil prices and credit constraints. With regard to CPC (refs B and C), Peattie said BP is holding up the expansion as a negotiating tactic but plans to exit CPC (and Kazakhstan) by selling its stake in two parts to KazMunaiGaz (KMG) and Lukoil. End summary.
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TNK-BP AND BP'S FUTURE IN RUSSIA
--------------------------------
2. (C) Peattie told the Ambassador that BP plans to be in Russia "for the next 50 years" and is thinking of the long-run in terms of its investments. He said TNK-BP is a large and important part of BP's presence but might not be the main vehicle for BP going forward. In that regard, he noted that BP had invested $8 billion in TNK-BP but had already realized $9 billion in profits. Instead, he cited BP's growing ties with Rosneft, in which it has a one percent stake, as the potential long-term foundation of BP's involvement in Russia. Peattie said to that end, BP was increasing its direct presence in Russia.
3. (C) Peattie said TNK-BP would still be important to BP in the near term and he thought that for the next 18 months or so, BP's interests would align with those of AAR, its partners in TNK-BP. "We both want to see dividends and a more efficient company," he said. He believes AAR, despite its short-term thinking, will be cooperative because the AAR partners are "desperate for cash." Peattie said BP had erred in not developing better ties with AAR and the Russian Government, and its new Russia team would make that a priority.
4. (C) Peattie confirmed that BP has agreed to the choice of Denis Morozov, the former head of Norilsk Nickel, as the new CEO of TNK-BP, saying BP was "content" with the choice. XXXXXXXXXXXX Finally, he said BP is also counting on a dozen new boards of TNK-BP subsidiaries to prevent further damage to company operations from decisions of the board of the parent company.
5. (C) Peattie said that over the medium-term, in two to three years, BP expects TNK-BP will be taken over by the Russian Government and split into separate oil and gas components that Rosneft and Gazprom will control respectively. BP expects to continue to play a role in developing the underlying assets and is in continuous negotiations with both Russian companies on long-term partnerships.
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OIL PRICES
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6. (C) Peattie said that even at today's lower oil prices, TNK-BP is "making money," though not on current exports, due
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to fluctuating export taxes. He predicted that Russian oil production would decline between 3 and 5 percent in 2009, given the disincentives for upstream production, falling prices, and the credit crunch. He said BP foresees about a year and a half of relatively weak oil prices -- in the range of $50 to $70 per barrel -- followed by a return to $90-$100 per barrel oil as the world economy strengthens and the underlying supply and demand patterns reemerge. He explained that prices are likely to stabilize at $90 because that is the marginal cost of producing Canadian "heavy oil" or oil sands, which would alleviate supply constraints.
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CPC
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7. (C) On pending expansion of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline, in which BP is a partner, Peattie said BP is withholding its approval of the most recent expansion agreement (refs B and C) as a "negotiating tactic" in its talks to sell out its share to KMG and Lukoil. He explained that BP plans to be out of CPC and the sale to KMG of the share BP inherited from Amoco is almost complete. BP is trying to sell the share it inherited from Arco to Lukoil. Once complete, according to Peattie, BP will be out of Kazakhstan altogether, and will focus on its investments in Russia and the BTC oil pipeline (from Azerbaijan to Turkey). BP is also interested in Turkmen gas, but that is a longer term prospect.
BEYRLE
Cable dated:2009-09-14T13:52:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002353
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND GREENSTEIN, S/EEE MORNINGSTAR DOE FOR HEGBURG, EKIMOFF DOC FOR JBROUGHER NSC FOR MMCFAUL, JELLISON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2019
TAGS: EPET, ENRG, ECON, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: TNK-BP COO SAYS COMPANY'S FUTURE IS BRIGHT; MODERNIZING RUSSIA'S OIL SECTOR WILL TAKE TIME
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
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Summary
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1. (SBU) Outgoing TNK-BP COO Tim Summers told the Ambassador on September 11 that his company's production would rise about 3% in 2009, that the company's finances are in good shape, and that relations with the Russian shareholders are "rational and professional." Summers noted, however, that the sector overall still operates very inefficiently and government policies hindering modernization are not likely to change anytime soon. End summary.
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TNK-BP HAS BRIGHT FUTURE
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2. (SBU) Outgoing TNK-BP COO Tim Summers and his successor, Bill Schrader (previously head of BP's Azerbaijan operations), told the Ambassador in a September 11 meeting that 2009 would be a good year for the company and that the future also looked bright. Summers said TNK-BP expects 3 percent production growth in 2009. He said the firm paid out approximately $1.5 billion in dividends in the first half of 2009, and will likely pay out another $1 billion in the second half.
3. (SBU) According to Summers, TNK-BP's financial performance has helped to smooth relations between BP and the Russian shareholders (AAR) -- "They don't want to kill the only goose in their portfolio that is laying golden eggs." He said relations between shareholders and management is "more rational and professional" than he has seen in the past, and he foresees no strategic disagreements on the horizon. Given a strong cash position and low debt, TNK-BP has raised its capital budget several times over the past year, without controversy from the board. He noted that the board was completely aligned on the attempt to take over Sibir Energy, for which TNK-BP's $2.5 billion offer fell short of Gazprom's bid of $3 billion. Summers added that he does not believe AAR partners will give up equity in the company anytime soon, as had previously been expected.
4. (SBU) Summers said he was concerned, however, that at some point BP's role in TNK-BP will be questioned by the political leadership because BP has "put in $8 billion" into the company and has "already taken out $12 billion." He explained that since BP reinvests its dividends largely in projects outside of Russia, he expects the company to receive more political scrutiny.
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OPERATIONS
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5. (SBU) Summers told us TNK-BP will spend about $7 billion in the coming years moving from exploration to production in major fields in the Yamal region. According to Summers, the company's Ruskoe field should yield "at least" 1 billion barrels of oil, even if TNK-BP exploits it very inefficiently. He said the Yamal fields should tie into Rosneft's pipeline infrastructure for its Vankor field, but that given the difficulties of negotiating these arrangements in Russia, it is entirely possible that TNK-BP would have "to waste $2 billion" building its own pipeline to move oil out. TNK-BP is also planning to invest $1.5 billion over the next five years in refining, an area in which Schrader has spent much of his career. In all, Summers said, TNK-BP is likely to invest up to $3-4 billion per year over the next ten years. Expat experts who had left the company during the dispute between the shareholders are returning, but Summers believed the company could use another 50 such employees.
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INEFFICIENCIES ABOUND
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6. (SBU) Summers was less sanguine about the oil and gas
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sector as a whole. He indicated that built-in inefficiencies and government influence hamper the rational development of the, many parts of which are facing tough times. Summers said he believes both Gazprom and Lukoil have put many employees on unpaid leave. He said Gazprom will continue to face pressure from increased and cheaper global LNG supplies -- "If you're a European buyer, the last molecule of gas you will want is from Gazprom." He noted that due to the recession, subcontractors were having difficulty maintaining quality and delivering services on time.
7. (SBU) The inefficiencies in the system "are so huge," according to Summers, that it would take a very long time to modernize the Russian oil and gas sector. For example, Summers pointed out that a well that would take 10 days to drill in Canada would take 20 days to drill in Russia. He said moving a drilling rig from one site to another, a process that might take 7 or 8 hours in Canada, takes 28 DAYS in Russia -- "multiply that by hundreds or thousands and you can start to imagine the costs to the economy."
8. (SBU) One way to get around the operational inefficiencies would be to have American oil-field service companies license and manufacture their products in Russia. According to Summers, that would make life politically easier for companies like TNK-BP and it would improve the efficiency of Russian industry. However, he lamented, Russia continues to be seen as too risky by many service companies, which have concerns about intellectual property protection of licensed products and are scared off by the negative headlines about Russia. He explained that many of these companies are not large enough to absorb the potential losses from a major investment gone bad. Furthermore, he added there were simply better opportunities for these companies elsewhere over the past few years during the oil price boom.
9. (SBU) In discussing the various difficulties facing the sector, Summers complained about the perennial problem of a lack of adequate access to Gazprom's pipelines. He said that while Gazprom plans to invest tens of billions in new production, TNK-BP and other oil companies have large amounts of gas available that they cannot sell. The gas cannot even be booked as a part of these companies' reserves until it has access to a market, he said. Summers suggested that such an inefficient situation is simply not sustainable and that common sense should ultimately prevail to force change.
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CRISIS HAS NOT SOBERED GOR
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10. (C) That transition, however, doesn't seem imminent. Responding to the Ambassador's inquiry about the GOR's posture toward foreign investment in the wake of the economic crisis, Summers said he has seen "no evidence" of a change. He said oil company Slavneft (on whose board Summers sits), had been ordered to cancel an order for foreign equipment in favor of a domestic supplier, even though the foreign equipment was clearly superior. He said that Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin (who is in charge of the energy sector) told Summers directly that he should be using Russian gas turbines instead of the preferable GE models TNK-BP was buying. Summers also expressed some concern about TNK-BP's involuntary involvement in a Russian oil company consortium in Venezuela, but deemed it would "not be terminal."
11. (SBU) Summers said he believed "the moment had passed" for reform. He explained that the financial and economic pressures favoring reform lasted for too short a period -- "it would have been better from a long-term perspective to have had several quarters of losses in row." Given economic stabilization and a rebound in oil prices, reform will now wait.
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COMMENT
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12. (SBU) Summers appears to be leaving behind a company in good shape, but in an industry that badly needs the
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modernizing influence of western companies and executives. Unfortunately, as Summers pointed out, the GOR, despite welcome words by some of its leaders, has not taken actions to attract more of this influence. End comment. Beyrle
Cable dated:2006-06-08T06:52:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 003352
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2026
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PARM, TU, IZ, IR, AJ, AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JUNE 14 VISIT OF GENERAL SCHWARTZ TO TURKEY
Classified By: Ambassador Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
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1. (C) We look forward to your visit. Turkey is a strong ally in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), facilitating the distribution of critical supplies and fuel to the coalition in Iraq and supporting the NATO Training Mission (NTM-I) there; publicly calling on Iran to comply with its IAEA commitments; and pressuring Syria and Hamas to renounce their support for terrorism. Later this year Turkey will take over command of ISAF-Central (with France and Italy) and open its first Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan. But there are challenges. Bilateral defense industry cooperation is on the decline. An enhanced Turkish security presence along the Iraqi border to combat an increase in PKK terrorist activity has raised concerns that Turkey might act unilaterally across the border into Iraq, which we have discouraged.
2. (S/NF) Turkey is a key player in a number of issues that come under your command, chiefly connected to OIF and the GWOT:
--58% of all supplies flowing into Iraq by air use the multi-directional cargo hub at Incirlik Air Base.
--25% of sustainment fuel for the coalition flows over the Turkey-Iraq border crossing at Habur Gate, as do many other key supplies for our troops downrange.
--We are now in informal discussion with the GOT to use Turkish roads and ports to retrograde excess equipment and material from Iraq. Retrograding equipment via Turkey would provide an additional LOC to CENTCOM, relieve congestion at Kuwait, and ensure a more secure route. You should urge the Turkish General Staff (TGS) to continue to work with us on this issue.
--Turkey has signaled its interest in working with us on repairing Nasosnaya Air Base in Azerbaijan; you should seek senior Turkish military confirmation and sell them on the concept.
--The Turkish military had allowed us to use Incirlik as a refueling stop for Operation FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE detainee movement operations since 2002, but revoked this permission in February of this year. We understand OSD and JCS have been discussing whether to approach Turkey to seek to reverse this decision. We recommend that you do not raise this issue with TGS pending clarification from Washington on what approach State/OSD/JCS/NSC wish to take. END SUMMARY.
Bilateral Relationship Improving
--------------------------------
3. (S) During her April 25 visit to Ankara, Secretary Rice and FM Gul announced our intention to set up a formal and regular senior-level strategic dialogue consultative mechanism. The goal was to signal progress toward restoring confidence and strengthening our ability to work together in ways helpful to our goals in the region and in Turkey itself. We are now negotiating the final touches of our "Strategic Partnership" document, which should be made public soon. We have restored bilateral dialogue through many senior level visits over the past ten months. We have shifted our dialogue on Iraq from one dominated by Turkish whining about the PKK and Kirkk to one of constructive collaboration politically and logistically in support of our efforts there.
A PARTNER IN GWOT
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ANKARA 00003352 002 OF 004
Iraq
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4. (SBU) Turkey's agreement to allow the use of its territory as a logistical hub has been a crucial asset in our Iraq operations. Two-thirds of gasoline and diesel fuel shipments (3 million gallons per day) for the Iraqi people and 25% of sustainment fuel for the coalition crosses into Iraq through the Ground Line of Communication at Habur Border Gate. Since Turkey approved the use of Incirlik Air Base as a cargo hub to support coalition operations in Iraq in May 2005, over 152 million pounds of equipment has been shipped to US troops. 58% of all equipment provided to our troops in Iraq by air pass through Incirlik. Six C-17 aircraft now deliver from Incirlik the amount of supplies it took 9-10 planes to deliver from Germany. Additionally four KC-135 tanker aircraft based there since 2003 have run 2800 refueling sorties, delivering 192 million pounds of fuel in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Turkey has four personnel assigned to NTM-I in Iraq and, under this rubric, has trained 57 Iraqi military officers in Turkey. Iraqis have pledged to send officers to at least seven additional courses this year.
Retrograde
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5. (SBU) On behalf of CENTCOM, we are informally coordinating with TGS and the MFA with respect to gaining Government of Turkey approval to use Turkish roadways and sea ports to retrograde excess equipment and material from Iraq. Retrograding equipment via Turkey provides an additional LOC to CENTCOM, relieves congestion at Kuwait, and is a more secure route. On May 26, TGS informed us that TGS and MFA are supportive of the retrograde concept. They requested that formal notification be made via diplomatic channels since the Government of Turkey is the approval authority. Additionally, they stated that our request to be exempt from customs fees, taxes and surcharges would require further discussion with Customs officials. The formal notification should occur soon. You should express your appreciation for TGS's initial support and ask for their continued support once the formal request is presented.
Afghanistan: Good New Story
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6. (SBU) Turkey has twice successfully led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, most recently from February to August 2005. Later this year, it will take over joint command of ISAF-Central in Kabul for a two-year period, and will open its first PRT in the neighboring province of Wardak. PM Erdogan visited Afghanistan in spring 2005 and subsequently increased Turkey's pledged assistance ten-fold to $100M. This will be allocated in $16M increments for five years to build schools, hospitals, medical clinics and drinking water wells throughout the country. Four hospitals have already been constructed. The GOT provides counter-narcotics training in Turkey to Afghan security forces and will initiate such training in Afghanistan this year under the auspices of the Wardak PRT. President Karzai demonstrated his gratitude for Turkey's assistance by participating in a March counter-terrorism conference at Turkey's NATO Center of Excellence for the Defense Against Terrorism.
PKK
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7. (S/NF) The PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party, which seeks to carve off the primarily Kurdish portion of eastern Turkey by force of arms) has intensified its terrorist campaign in Turkey: over 150 Turkish security forces have died so far in 2006, a dozen in the past two weeks alone. This violence has
ANKARA 00003352 003 OF 004
increased pressure on the GOT to take decisive measures to cope with the problem, including attacking PKK strongholds in northern Iraq, which the organization uses as a command, control, and logistics base to infiltrate Turkey and carry out attacks. Turkey wants the new government in Iraq to take immediate, concrete steps to limit PKK freedom of action in the country. The PKK's isolated location, the long list of priorities facing the GOI, and the attitudes of Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq make this complicated.
8. (C) Secretary Rice told GOT leaders April 25 that the U.S. will reinvigorate trilateral (U.S.-Turkey-Iraq) discussions on the issue. While recognizing that the insurgency prevents coalition troops from engaging the PKK in Iraq, the GOT remains frustrated at its inability, and U.S. unwillingness, to stop attacks by people coming from the other side of its border.
9. (S) If you are confronted with this issue, you can point to significant efforts the USG is undertaking to ameliorate the PKK threat:
--Sharing of sensitive intelligence on PKK activities within Turkey, which have led to successful Turkish COIN operations.
--MNF-I surveillance flights over PKK camps in northern Iraq, which have also had a salutary effect interms of psyops.
--An intelligence fusion cell which meets weekly in Ankara to pass information to the Turkish military on PKK activities.
--A new initiative to work with Turkey on building law enforcement cases against PKK operatives in Europe.
OTHER KEY ISSUES
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Iran
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10. (S) Secretary Rice personally informed Foreign Minister Gul May 31 of the U.S. initiative to join with the EU-3 in negotiations with Iran's representatives once Iran fully and verifiably suspends its enrichment and reprocessing activities. Deputy National Security Adviser Crouch followed up with discussions in Ankara June 4. Official and public reaction to this initiative has been uniformly positive. The GOT has publicly supported this move and called upon the Iranians to respond positively. Turkish officials have taken a tougher line on Iran since the U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA, Greg Schulte, provided in-depth briefings and consulted with Turkey in February. Gul has told visiting Congressional delegations that Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations are the single most important problem facing Europe and the Middle East, and he has emphasized the need for a united and decisive international approach. Ankara has called on Tehran to cooperate with the IAEA, adopt full transparency on its nuclear programs, and resume negotiations with the EU-3, most recently in Erdogan - Ahmadinejad encounters in Baku and Bali and during an early May visit by Iranian National Security Adviser Larijani.
An Opening on Nasosnaya?
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11. (C) As part of a continuing effort in the Caucasus, the U.S. and allies continue to promote collective assistance to Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. A recent proposal -- the upgrade of Nasosnaya Airfield located outside of Baku -- has not taken hold with our Turkish counterparts (at least not in Ankara). Over the past 2-3 years, the idea of upgrading the airfield has been briefed in several venues (the Caucasus Working Group and the South Caucasus Clearing House). Additionally, the idea of a joint venture among allies to
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perform the upgrade has been informally sent to the TGS J5 on several occasions. While the military has not responded to our entreaties in Ankara, the Turkish DATT in Baku (a one-star general) recently told us that Turkey is enthusiastic about working with us on Nasosnaya. A push at the senior levels within TGS might help break this proposal loose. Any interest you can promote during your visit would be beneficial.
Defense Industry Cooperation Declining
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12. (SBU) Defense industry cooperation, once the strongest aspect of our military-to-military relationship, is in decline. No U.S. firm has won a direct commercial sale since Boeing was awarded a contract for an Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft in 2002. In 2004, three tenders (UAVs, Main Battle Tanks, and attack helicopters) were canceled. Two U.S. firms, Boeing and Bell, were interested in a second attack helicopter tender, but declined to participate due to onerous liability and technology transfer requirements. (Several non-US firms did submit bids.) Sikorsky may choose not to participate in a tender for 54 utility helicopters for the Turkish Armed Forces and Forestry Service for the same reason, and Raytheon may bow out of contention for an aircraft trainer tender. Both in Ankara and in Washington, U.S. firms and the USG have raised the technology transfer and liability concerns with Turkey's Ministry of Defense and Defense Industry Undersecretariat (SSM). Despite both Turkish military and government insistence that it wants US competition in these tenders, SSM has resisted making the necessary changes to the tenders to ensure it. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON
Cable dated:2006-01-30T13:38:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 000331
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2016
TAGS: MARR, MASS, MOPS, PREL, PGOV, TU, IZ, AF, RU
SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR THE VISIT OF MARINE CORPS COMMANDANT GENERAL HAGEE
REF: DCD PROFILER6 JAN. 19 EMAIL TO MAJOR CRAIG MILLER
Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) SUMMARY: Your visit to Turkey comes at an important time. The tone of the relationship has been improving since PM Erdogan,s visit to Washington last June, but Iraq continues to dominate our agenda, including Turkey,s concerns regarding the PKK, the Iraqi Kurds, independence aspirations, and the fortunes of Ankara,s perceived constituents, the Iraqi Turkmen. While the Nov. 9-10 High Level Defense Group (HLDG) meetings in Ankara ) the first in two years ) helped move our defense dialogue away from "all Iraq all the time,8 the issues have not gone away. You will want to acknowledge Turkey,s contribution to the war in Iraq and the overall Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): the logistics hub at Incirlik, the Habur Gate GLOC, Turkey,s military and reconstruction contributions to Afghanistan and engendering regional cooperation in the Black Sea. It will be important to respond to complaints about US inaction against the PKK in Iraq by pointing to what we are doing to help Turkey to combat the PKK elsewhere and in other areas of the GWOT. Your visit also provides an opportunity to foster an atmosphere of increased engagement and cooperation in the near future. END SUMMARY.
2. (S) We aren't out of the woods yet, but our bilateral relationship is on the upswing from the trough that deepened in fall 2004 with MNF-I operations in Tal Afar and Fallujah, repeated Turkish truck driver abductions and killings, and factually incorrect and biased Turkish press coverage which Turkish officials failed to refute and in some cases abetted. Despite the continued unpopularity of the war in Iraq (over 95% of the population opposes the war) this no longer dominates the news. Then DCHOD GEN Basbug took the first step toward improving relations in a January 26, 2005 nationally-televised press conference, in which he underscored the importance of the bilateral relationship. Following US and Turkish media stories in February 2005 about deteriorating bilateral relations, NSC Sec Gen Alpogan, FM Gul and others scrambled to match GEN Basbug's words. In an April speech to the Istanbul War Academy, CHOD GEN Ozkok called the bilateral relationship &too broad and important to be defined by one issue.
8 With the visits of PM Erdogan, FM Gul and DCHOD Basbug to Washington in early June, the Sept. 8-9 visit of GEN Jones and then-CENTCOM Deputy Commander LTG Smith, the Sept. 24 visit to Ankara of APNSA Hadley, the December visits to Ankara of FBI Chief Mueller and CIA Director Goss, and most recently the Jan. 17 visit of EUCOM Deputy Commander GEN Wald, both sides have demonstrated our commitment to rebuild our historically strong ties through concrete actions and by improving the tone of our public statements.
PKK -- GETTING CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE -----------------------------------------
3. (S) TGS Deputy Chief GEN Kosaner did not raise the PKK with EUCOM DCDR GEN Wald on January 17 and may not with you. However, the PKK was one of the themes of TLFC Commander GEN Buyukanit's counterpart visit to the US in December, and he may raise the terrorist group's presence in Northern Iraq with you. Your response should point to what we have done and what we have offered to do to address the PKK problem more widely. During the September visit of Generals Jones and Smith, TGS rejected EUCOM's offer of aerial surveillance inside Turkey, but welcomed CENTCOM's offer to continue aerial overflights of PKK camps on the Iraqi side of border; CF now carry out flights every two weeks. Turkey accepted EUCOM's offer of Information Operations (IO) support; EUCOM staff is developing an interagency proposal that will assist TGS/MFA in developing a more effective IO program. TGS also welcomed an enhanced intelligence-sharing program on an intermittent basis tied to specific Turkish operations. Indications are the intelligence provided was beneficial to GOT. CENTCOM offered to expand the list of PKK HVI on the CENTRIX system and to facilitate TU/IZ mil-mil contacts, which may include joint border patrols. These offers remain under discussion, but will likely not bear fruit in the short term.
4. (C) The interagency initiative to partner with Turkey and the Europeans to pursue law enforcement cases against the PKK is continuing. A CIA/DIA/FBI/DOJ/Treasury team visited Ankara in December; they and the Turks identified two PKK operatives in Europe to pursue together. Your interlocutors may complain about the absence of kinetic action against the PKK, but we have a good story to tell and we should tell it.
5. (S) Despite our efforts, with PKK attacks continuing to cause casualties among Turkish military personnel, the Turkish public and the political class continue to clamor for US military action in Iraq against the PKK, or for a Turkish cross-border operation. There is widespread public belief that lack of US action against the PKK is "punishment" for Turkey's March 2003 failure to give permission for US forces to transit Turkey en route to Iraq.
SPECIAL FORCES RE-ENGAGEMENT
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6. (S) One of the casualties of the Iraq war was the relationship between our Special Forces (SF). The July 4, 2003 Suleymaniyah incident in which US forces hooded and handcuffed Turkish SF officers remains a wound in Turkey's military and national pride and with the Turkish public that will possibly take a generation to fully heal. We welcomed the Joint Staff invitation to Turkish Special Forces for a Washington Sept. 19-27 visit to begin to restore that once close relationship, and we continue to support a SOCEUR-initiated SF JCET originally scheduled for March 2006, though budgetary constraints may force a postponement. Additionally, Turkish Land Forces Commander GEN Yasar Buyukanit has just returned from the first Counterpart Visit (CPV) with the U.S. Army Chief of Staff in nine years. GEN Buyukanit was accorded full military honors and had a substantive program as well. We believe that visit will contribute greatly to restoring post-OIF army to army relations.
BEHIND THE SCENES INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ
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7. (SBU) Despite the unpopularity of the Iraq war, Turkey has provided significant logistical support to both Operation Iraqi Freedom and to OEF in Afghanistan. Turkey has approved multiple requests for the use of Incirlik Air Base, including: a tanker refueling operation which has delivered over 28 million gallons since operations began in 2003 and flown over 2,600 sorties; the transit of 8,500 US troops on rotation from Iraq from January through April 2004; and the establishment in May 2005 of a logistics hub which allows 6 US military C-17 aircraft to move the amount of cargo it took 9-10 military aircraft to move from Germany. This hub has facilitated the movement of 41,339 tons of supplies since its inception; flown 1280 C-17 sorties; received 577 wide-bodies cargo aircraft; and houses 150 TDY support personnel. Turkey also approved the use of hub flights for the emergency evacuation of US soldiers from Iraq.
8. (SBU) The Habur Gate, the only border crossing from Turkey into Iraq, provides 25% of fuel shipments to Coalition forces in Iraq and two-thirds of gasoline and diesel fuel shipments for the Iraqi people. Significant shipments of food and water for coalition forces also pass over the border.
9. (SBU) The Turkish government has also demonstrated its support through its public announcements of support for the recent elections; its plans to re-open its consulate in Mosul in early 2006; provision of training in Turkey for Iraqi diplomats, political parties, and (as part of the NATO training mission) Iraqi Security Forces; hosting a conference for Iraqi constitution drafters in July, and a meeting of Iraqi Sunni leaders with Ambassador Khalilzad in Istanbul in December.
10. (C) Turkey currently maintains approximately 1300 of its own forces in Northern Iraq in camps established prior to OEF. These forces contain elements of armor, mechanized infantry, commando, and Special Forces units commanded by the Turkish Special Forces Brigade HQ located in Silopi, Turkey. This HQ also provides Turkish LNO teams to Coalition HQs in Kirkuk, Mosul, and Tal Afar while hosting a US Liaison officer and NCO at the HQ in Silopi.
PARTNER IN GWOT
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11. (S/NF) Beyond its support for Iraq, Turkey has provided valuable assistance and cooperation to the GWOT. On Aug. 8, Turkey completed its second International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command (II and VII) in Afghanistan, which it held for six months and during which time it contributed over 1,600 troops. Turkey, France and Italy have agreed on an eight month rotating command of the ISAF Kabul Regional Command starting the second half of 2006. The GOT permits OEF detainees (Operation Fundamental Justice Flights) to transit Incirlik AB. Turkey also contributes to reconstruction and training efforts in Afghanistan. It is involved in the reconstruction of schools and is exploring counter-narcotics training programs for Afghan police and alternative livelihood options for poppy farmers. Following PM Erdogan's May 2005 visit to Afghanistan, the GOT increased its reconstruction budget for Afghanistan ten-fold, to $100 million. Turkey continues to provide significant personnel and assets for Operation Active Endeavor, KFOR, and Operation Althea.
12. (U) Together with the US, Turkey coordinates military assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, improving their abilities to protect key energy transport routes. Turkey subscribes to every security arrangement it is eligible to join, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). It will host the first PSI combined air, land and sea exercise (ANATOLIAN DEER) in May 2006 and the US is committed to participate in both the Command Post Exercise and the Live Exercise.
13. (C) Turkey continues to resist significant cooperation on Black Sea maritime security outside the context of BLACKSEAFOR and Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY (OBSH). The Turks argue that an active U.S./NATO role would be threatening to the Russians, who might respond negatively. That said, they raise no objection to our naval engagement in the region provided we abide by the Montreux Convention which imposes restrictions on Bosporus Straits passage.
14. (C) While U.S. Navy ship visits to Turkey fell drastically in 2004 and 2005, with only four port visits each year, 2006 looks more promising. CVN 71 Theodore Roosevelt and CG 56 San Jacinto are conducting a port visit in Marmaris during February with another port call proposed for DDG 51 USS Burke later in the month. The July 2005 visit of the LPD USS Nashville to the port of Aksaz included the embarkation of 30 Turkish Naval Infantry for training while continued use of Mersin port by coalition fuel tankers are essential for fuels flowing into Iraq.
IRAN AND SYRIA
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15. (S) Turkey's watchword for both Syria and Iran is "engagement." While the military and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are concerned about the dangers of the Iranian nuclear program, PM Erdogan's pro-Islam Justice and Development Party (AKP) government is not yet convinced. PM Erdogan told EU Ambassadors on January 20 that he does not believe Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons; one of his advisors had indicated the same sentiment one day prior. Part of the Turkish government's motivation is a desire not to jeopardize its nascent trade development opportunities, including energy, or its renewed intelligence exchange with Iran on the PKK. Some AKP elements even admire Iran's efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. According to TGS, Turkey and Iran began sharing intelligence this summer on the PKK, holding regular meetings at the border. As of September, Iran had turned over 40 suspected PKK members or sympathizers. Turkey touts its support for the EU-3 dialogue and multilateral efforts through the IAEA. Turkish officials stress to us the need to maintain dialogue and to identify a diplomatic solution. The tepid Turkish response to Iranian President Ahmedinejad's initial statement about wiping Israel off the map have been followed equally weak statements against the re-start of Iran's uranium enrichment program. However, recent equivocation on whether or not Turkey is planning for a visit by Ahmedinejad demonstrates that Turkey is trying to walk both sides of the line on Iran. Turkey's tack toward Syria is much the same. They and others in the government regularly urge US engagement and stress the need to deal directly with, and support Asad ) whom they see as reform minded - against the hardline Ba,athists in the regime who seek to undermine him.
DEFENSE INDUSTRY COOPERATION WEAK
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16. (SBU) Historically the strongest area of our bilateral relationship, security cooperation, is significantly declining. Under Turkey's current policy, the emphasis is on Direct Commercial Sales at the expense of Foreign Military Sales and American companies are having difficulty competing. The last significant commercial tender won by a U.S. firm was the 2002 win by Boeing for an Air Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) system. In early 2004, SSM (the Defense Industries Undersecretariat ) Turkey,s major procurement agency) cancelled three tenders (UAVs, Main Battle Tanks and attack helicopters) all of which had American companies in contention. General Atomics (UAVs) and General Defense (tanks) have both pulled out of Turkey.
17. (SBU) The revised ATAK Helicopter tender was issued in February 2005 and was the first to contain new standard (i.e., non-negotiable) terms and conditions (T&Cs). (Note: The first tender was issued in 1995 and won by Bell Textron. SSM cancelled it over technology transfer issues. End Note.) The three US firms that took the tender (Bell, Boeing, Sikorsky) found the new T&Cs so onerous that they were unable to justify participation.
18. (SBU) The GOT,s goal is to develop an indigenous defense industry that can supply a significant portion of the Turkish military,s requirements, and has outlined an aggressive timetable to do so. To meet that schedule, SSM recently began requiring companies to confirm at the time of bid submission the host government's willingness to allow transfer of the required technology. Although SSM understands the USG will not guarantee approval of technology transfer before a contract is signed, SSM has refused to revise the tender to remove that requirement. MND and SSM are requiring similar T&Cs on other tenders and American companies are frustrated. We have raised our concerns about the negative impact of the SSM program on US participation in the Turkish defense market with FM Gul, CHOD Ozkok, MND Gonul, the service chiefs and others. Across the board, the military pledged their preference for US equipment but professed an inability to influence the process.
AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT
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19. (SBU) We are currently working with the GOT on some airspace management issues in northern Iraq. Over a 60 day period this fall, the TGS noted 17 incidents where, they claim, CF aircraft flew very close to the TU-IZ border. These incidents result in alerting of TU aircraft and other intensive actions, including scrambling F16s. After discussing this issue with TGS, as a short term solution we have coordinated to have the relevant information passed from CENTAF to the Turkish Air Force. We believe the long term solution is for the TGS/TUAF to use CENTRIX to obtain the daily Air Tasking Order and determine if CF flights may approach the Turkish border. At present, the Turkish military can access CENTRIX through its LNOs located with Coalition Forces, in Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tal Afar; There is also a CENTRIX terminal at the ODC in Ankara. TGS has yet to agree to the expense (about $35,000) to have us install a CENTRIX terminal at TGS HQ, allowing them to have full access to CENTRIX right here in Ankara.
WILSON
Cable dated:2002-11-15T12:40:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 008305
S/CT FOR REAP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2012
TAGS: PTER, TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: 2002 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT
REF: STATE 201772
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM ROBERT S. DEUTSCH; REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)
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OVERVIEW
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2. (U) COMBATING TERRORISM HAS LONG BEEN A PRIORITY FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY (GOT). IN ITS EARLY AND STRONG SUPPORT OF THE COALITION IN THE GLOBAL WAR AGAINST TERROR AND ITS SUBSEQUENT TAKING-OVER OF ISAF LEADERSHIP, THE GOT HAS REAFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO FIGHTING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. DOMESTIC AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE TARGETED TURKS AND FOREIGNERS, OCCASIONALLY INCLUDING USG PERSONNEL, FOR OVER 40 YEARS. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC TERRORIST GROUPS OPERATING IN TURKEY INCLUDE MARXIST-LENINIST, RADICAL ISLAMIST, SEPARATIST, AND PRO-CHECHEN. IN RESPONSE TO THESE THREATS, GOT HAS DEVELOPED BOTH STRONG DETERMINATION AND THE CAPABILITY TO FIGHT TERRORISM. TURKEY CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE USG'S INTERNATIONAL, COORDINATED APPROACH.
3. (U) FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, TURKEY'S INTERNAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ALTERED THEIR OPERATING PROCEDURES. WITH THE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION STRONGLY AGAINST TERRORISM AND THE GLOBAL COALITION INCREASING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, THESE ORGANIZATIONS ENTERED INTO A PERIOD OF LITTLE OR NO ACTION. ACTING AS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, MANY OF THESE GROUPS HAVE REVERTED TO RECRUITMENT OF SUPPORTERS AND STRATEGY PLANNING. U.S. DESIGNATED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
4. (U) ON OCTOBER 8, 1997, THE SECRETARY OF STATE NAMED THE SEPARATIST KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK) AND THE MARXIST-LENINIST REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S PARTY/FRONT (DHKP/C, FORMERLY KNOWN AS REVOLUTIONARY LEFT, DEV-SOL), MAKING THEM SUBJECT TO THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996. ON OCTOBER 11, 2001, THE SECRETARY OF STATE RENEWED THOSE DESIGNATIONS FOR ANOTHER TWO YEARS. (THE PKK HAS SINCE CHANGED ITS NAME TO THE KURDISTAN FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY CONGRESS, KADEK.) MARXIST-LENINIST
5. (U) THE MAIN RADICAL-LEFT TERROR ORGANIZATION, DHKP/C, CONDUCTS SMALL-SCALE OPERATIONS AGAINST TURKS AND FOREIGNERS ALIKE (ARMED ATTACKS ON UNIFORMED POLICE, SUICIDE AND OTHER BOMBINGS, ASSASSINATIONS). THIS ORGANIZATION HAS NOT CONDUCTED ANY MAJOR EVENTS WITHIN TURKEY IN 2002, ALTHOUGH IT CONTINUES TO ORGANIZE ITSELF, PREDOMINANTLY WITHIN EUROPE. ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES, DHKP/C COOPERATES WITH OTHER GROUPS IN EUROPE BY PROVIDING SUPPORT, SHELTER, AND ARMS TO EACH OTHER'S ORGANIZATIONS. TURKISH AUTHORITIES SEIZED DHKP/C WEAPONS FROM A CAR AT THE KAPIKULE BORDER IN SEPTEMBER 2002. THESE WEAPONS WERE SUPPOSED TO BE USED IN OPERATIONS CAUSING DISTURBANCES PRIOR TO THE TURKISH NATIONAL ELECTIONS HELD IN NOVEMBER 2002.
6. (U) OTHER FAR-LEFT TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS STILL ACTIVE INCLUDE THE TURKISH COMMUNIST PARTY/MARXIST-LENINIST (TKP/ML), THE TURKISH WORKERS' AND PEASANTS LIBERATION ARMY (TIKKO), AND THE MARXIST-LENINIST COMMUNIST PARTY (MLKP). TKP/ML AND TIKKO PRIMARILY OPERATE IN THE AREAS OF ORDU, TOKAT, AND SAMSUN. MLKP CONDUCTS SMALL-SCALE TERRORIST OPERATIONS, USUALLY USING PIPE BOMBS, WITHIN METROPOLITAN AREAS. RADICAL ISLAMIST
7. (U) THE PRIME, RADICAL ISLAMIST TERROR GROUP OF TURKEY IS THE TURKISH HIZBULLAH. ALTHOUGH KNOWN TO FIGHT RIVALS, NAMELY THE PKK AND OTHER RIVAL ISLAMIC GROUPS, IN FAVOR OF CONFRONTATIONS WITH AUTHORITIES, TURKISH HIZBULLAH HAS NOT CARRIED OUT ANY MAJOR OPERATIONS IN 2002. IT STAGED A SPECTACULAR JANUARY 2001 AMBUSH IN DIYARBAKIR THAT TOOK THE LIFE OF DIYARBAKIR SECURITY DIRECTOR GAFFAR OKKAN AND FIVE OF HIS BODYGUARDS. TWO UNDERCOVER POLICE WERE KILLED IN ANOTHER HIZBULLAH ATTACK IN OCTOBER 2001. ACCORDING TO STATE AUTHORITIES, HIZBULLAH CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN ITS ACTIVITIES ON A THEORETICAL BASIS.
8. (U) OTHER ISLAMIC GROUPS INCLUDE THE GREAT EASTERN RAIDER'S FRONT (IBDA-C), FEDERAL ISLAMIC STATE OF ANATOLIA (KAPLANCILAR), SELAM GROUP, ISLAMIC MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION (IHO), THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS, SELEFILER, SOFULAR, AND BEYYIAT-I EL-IMAM. BOTH IBDA-C AND BEYYIAT-I EL-IMAM ARE KNOWN TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO AL QAIDA. SEPARATIST
9. (U) KADEK, FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE PKK, REPRESENTS THE LARGEST SEPARATIST ORGANIZATION GROUP IN TURKEY, THOUGH ITS CAPABILITY TO OPERATE HAS BEEN DRASTICALLY REDUCED DUE TO VIGOROUS AND ON-GOING COUNTER-INSURGENCY EFFORTS OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES, JANDARMA, TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE (TNP), AND VILLAGE GUARDS (A PARAMILITARY GUARD FORCE RECRUITED FROM LOCAL VILLAGERS). THIS EFFORT ULTIMATELY LED TO THE ARREST AND CONVICTION OF PKK LEADER ABDULLAH OCALAN IN 1999. THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) DESIGNATED THE PKK A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION IN MAY 2002.
10. (U) IN APRIL 2002 THE GROUP UNDERWENT A RE-ORGANIZATION AND NAME CHANGE. RENAMED THE KURDISTAN FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY CONGRESS (KADEK), THE ORGANIZATION HAS EXPANDED ITS OPERATIONS BY FOCUSING UPON MORE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. KADEK RETAINS THE SAME SYMBOL AND PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP OF THE PKK, THOUGH IT HAS EXPANDED THIS COUNCIL TO ELEVEN INSTEAD OF NINE MEMBERS. ACCORDING TO TURKISH GOVERNMENT EXPERTS AND NGOS, KADEK ALSO MAINTAINS APPROXIMATELY 500-ARMED MILITANTS IN TURKEY AND UP TO 5000 ARMED MILITANTS IN NORTHERN IRAQ. WHILE THE ORGANIZATION LARGELY CONTINUES TO FOLLOW THE PKK'S SELF-PROCLAIMED SEPTEMBER 1, 1999, CEASE-FIRE, IT HAS ISSUED WARNINGS VIA SUPPORTIVE NEWSPAPERS OF FUTURE ARMED ATTACKS IF CERTAIN ACTIONS ARE NOT TAKEN. SMALL CELLS AND SYMPATHIZERS REMAIN THROUGHOUT TURKEY, BUT THESE HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED TO THE POINT THAT LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, RATHER THAN THE MILITARY, OVERSEE MOST OPERATIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS. CHECHENS IN TURKEY
11. (U) IN APRIL 2002, MUSTAFA YILMAZ SEIZED THE MARMARA HOTEL IN ISTANBUL AND HELD 13 HOSTAGES FOR APPROXIMATELY TWENTY MINUTES UNTIL HE SURRENDERED WITHOUT INCIDENT. YILMAZ, WHO IS OF CHECHEN ORIGIN, IS BELIEVED TO HAVE STAGED THE RAID TO PROTEST RUSSIAN ACTIONS IN CHECHNYA. HE IS PRESENTLY IN CUSTODY AND ON TRIAL IN THE ISTANBUL BEYOGLU SECOND HEAVY CRIMINAL COURT UNDER A VARIETY OF CHARGES, ALTHOUGH NOT UNDER TURKEY'S TOUGH ANTI-TERROR LAW. THIS FOLLOWS AN APRIL 22, 2001, SEIZURE OF ISTANBUL'S SWISS HOTEL BY 13 PRO-CHECHEN TURKISH CITIZENS WHO HELD 150 HOSTAGES, INCLUDING 37 AMERICANS, FOR APPROXIMATELY 12 HOURS. LARGE NUMBERS OF TURKS, MANY WITH ROOTS IN THE CAUCASUS, ARE SYMPATHETIC TO CHECHEN AMBITIONS.
12. (U) THE CAPITALIZED TITLES BELOW CORRESPOND TO REFTEL QUESTIONS.
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GOT ACTIONS SUPPORTING THE GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST TERRORISM (A)
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13. (U) TURKISH SUPPORT FOLLOWING THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11 CEMENTED GOT'S COMMITTED POLICY ON FIGHTING TERROR. GOT ISSUED STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENTS CONDEMNING THE ATTACKS. IN THE FACE OF STRONG PUBLIC OPPOSITION, PARLIAMENT, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF PM ECEVIT, PASSED A RESOLUTION ALLOWING THE GOVERNMENT TO SEND TURKISH TROOPS ABROAD AND TO PERMIT THE STATIONING OF FOREIGN TROOPS ON TURKISH SOIL IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). TURKEY WAS ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO CONTRIBUTE FORCES TO ISAF AND ASSUMED THE LEADERSHIP ROLE IN JUNE 2002.
14. (U) THE ARREST OF THREE AL QAIDA SUSPECTS IN THE SOUTHEASTERN CITY OF VAN IN FEBRUARY 2002 AND ONE IN ISTANBUL IN AUGUST 2002 HIGHLIGHT TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE (TNP) EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM. FIRAS SULEYMAN, YUSUF SALIM HUSAYN, AND AHMAD MAHMUD WERE ARRESTED AND CHARGED WITH ENTERING TURKEY ILLEGALLY VIA IRAN IN FEBRUARY 2002. MEMBERS OF BAYT AL-IMAM, A JORDANIAN GROUP WITH CLOSE TIES TO AL QAIDA, THE THREE MEN WERE FOUND TO HAVE MET AND RECEIVED MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM USAMA BIN LADEN AND HAD BEEN PLANNING BOMBING ATTACKS ON ISRAELI AND US TARGETS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THESE MEN WERE RETURNED TO JORDAN IN SEPTEMBER 2002. AHMET ABDULLAH WAS ARRESTED IN ISTANBUL IN AUGUST 2002 AFTER AN OPERATION CONDUCTED BY THE ISTANBUL SECURITY FORCES BECAUSE OF HIS LINKS TO BAYT AL-IMAM.
15. (U) TURKEY HAS FULLY COMPLIED WITH UN SECURITY RESOLUTION 1373, RATIFYING ALL UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS ON COMBATING TERRORISM. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAVE FROZEN THE ASSETS OF THOSE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, PERSONS, AND ENTITIES FOUND ON UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS BY ISSUING A DECREE TO FREEZE ALL FUNDS AND RELATED ASSETS. THE INITIAL DECREE, NO. 2001/2483, DATED DECEMBER 22, 2001, HAS BEEN UPDATED BY NO. 2002/3873, DATED MARCH 21, 2002, AND NO. 2002/4206, DATED MAY 16, 2002.
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RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM (B)
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16. (U) STATE SECURITY COURTS (DGM) IN EIGHT PROVINCES, WITH JURISDICTION FOR ALL CRIMES THAT FALL WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE ANTI-TERROR LAW, TAKE A VIGOROUS APPROACH TOWARDS PROSECUTING TERROR-RELATED CRIMES. AVERAGE TRIAL TIMES RUN MORE THAN A YEAR, AND DEFENDANTS ARE USUALLY INCARCERATED DURING THEIR TRIALS.
17. (U) ABDULLAH OCALAN, THE LEADER OF THE PKK CONVICTED OF TREASON IN JUNE 1999 AND SENTENCED TO DEATH. FOLLOWING THE EU REFORM PACKAGE PASSED BY THE TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL PARLIAMENT IN AUGUST 2002 OUTLAWING THE DEATH PENALTY, OCALAN'S SENTENCE WAS CONVERTED TO LIFE IN PRISON.
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EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS (C/D) -----------------------------------------
18. (U) IN 2002, THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY DID NOT SEEK THE EXTRADITION OF ANY SUSPECTS FROM THE UNITED STATES ON TERROR-RELATED CHARGES, NOR DID THE UNITED STATES SEEK THE EXTRADITION OF SUCH SUSPECTS FROM TURKEY. THERE ARE NO IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS.
19. (U) IN THE PAST, TURKEY HAS FACED DIFFICULTY IN EXTRADITING TERROR-RELATED SUSPECTS FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, TURKEY HAS REQUESTED THE EXTRADITION OF 245 HIGH LEVEL ADMINISTRATORS FOR TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1991. SYMPATHY WITH KURDISH POLITICAL AND CULTURAL ASPIRATIONS IN SOME EUROPEAN STATES, ALLEGATIONS OF TORTURE BY TURKISH OFFICIALS, AND TURKEY'S LEGAL PROVISION FOR THE DEATH PENALTY HAVE ALL PROVED IMPEDIMENTS TO SUCH EXTRADITIONS. HOWEVER, IN AUGUST 2002, AS A PART OF THE EUROPEAN UNION REFORM PACKAGE, THE TURKISH PARLIAMENT PASSED A LAW BANNING THE USE OF THE DEATH PENALTY.
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RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION (E)
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20. (U) TURKS SEE THEMSELVES TO BE AMONG THE WORLD'S PRIMARY VICTIMS OF TERRORISM. THEY CITE THE 15-YEAR INSURGENCY OF THE KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK), AND THE WORLDWIDE ASSASSINATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE TURKISH DIPLOMATS AND THEIR FAMILIES BY ARMENIAN ACTIVISTS OF THE 1970S AND 1980S. THEY HAVE LONG COMPLAINED ABOUT LIBERAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES' HARBORING KURDISH (PKK), LEFTIST (DHKP-C) AND ISLAMIST (HIZBOLLAH, KAPLANISTS) "TERRORISTS." THEY FEEL OTHER NATIONS DO NOT APPRECIATE TURKEY'S SUFFERING AT THE HANDS OF THESE PARTIES. THUS, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND MEDIA WERE QUICK TO RESPOND TO THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11. AT ALL LEVELS, THERE WAS AN OUTPOURING OF SYMPATHY AND SOLIDARITY. BUT THERE WAS ALWAYS THE CONSTANT REMINDER THAT NOW OTHERS WERE BEGINNING TO EXPERIENCE WHAT TURKS HAD LIVED WITH FOR YEARS. TURKEY'S PRE-9/11 HISTORIC COOPERATION WITH THE US IN LAW ENFORCEMENT, MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS ONLY INCREASED IN THE LAST YEAR WITH PUBLIC COMMITMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM FROM THE PRESIDENT, THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE MILITARY. THERE HAS BEEN VERY VISIBLE SUPPORT FOR THE SECURITY OF AMERICANS AT OUR MISSION'S BUILDINGS BY LOCAL POLICE. AS THE STORM BROKE ON THE NOVEMBER 17 ARRESTS IN GREECE, THERE WAS INTENSE COVERAGE WITH A NEW "I TOLD YOU SO" IMPLICATION IN THE GOVERNMENT PRINT MEDIA.
21. (U) THE TURKISH STAND ON TERRORISM HAS BEEN "SOFTER" IN THE CASE OF THE CHECHENS. CHECHENS ARE, OF COURSE, MUSLIMS AND THERE ARE CULTURAL TIES BETWEEN TURKS AND CHECHENS AND LONG TIME RIVALRY WITH RUSSIA. THE ARMED, BUT NOT VIOLENT, TAKEOVERS OF A FERRYBOAT IN 1996 AND A HOTEL IN 2001 IN ISTANBUL WERE TREATED MORE LIKE PROTESTS THAN LIKE TERRORIST ATTACKS BY THE MEDIA. THAT CHANGED WITH THE OCTOBER 23, 2002 CAPTURE OF A THEATER IN MOSCOW WITH OVER ONE HUNDRED DEAD. TURKEY DID CONDEMN THE HOSTAGE-TAKING, BUT WITH THE MEDIA STILL ADDRESSING THE SUFFERING OF THE CHECHEN PEOPLE.
22. (U) TURKEY HAS A FREE PRESS. IN THE LEFTIST AND ISLAMIC FRINGE PRESS, CHECHEN REBELS, PALESTINIAN SUICIDE BOMBERS AND EVEN AL QAIDA MEMBERS CAN BE PORTRAYED AS "FREEDOM FIGHTERS." TERRORISM HAS LONG BEEN AN INTEREST OF ACADEMICS AND WRITERS IN TURKEY. IN RECENT YEARS THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL CONFERENCES ON THE TOPIC. THOSE ORGANIZED BY INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE HAVE BEEN SEEN AS TOOLS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM. PRIVATELY-FUNDED ACADEMIC PROGRAMS HAVE BECOME MORE FOCUSED ON ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM AND THE ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM.
---------------------------------------------
MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS BY THE GOT (F) ---------------------------------------------
23. (U) THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY CONTINUED ITS AGGRESSIVE COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN 2002. FOR EXAMPLE, IN A JOINT OPERATION, THE TURKISH CUSTOMS GUARD AND THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (MIT) SEIZED NINE KALASHINIKOV RIFLES AND ONE SCORPION ASSASSINATION PISTOL WITH SILENCER FROM A CAR AT THE KAPIKULE BORDER GATE IN SEPTEMBER 2002. THESE WEAPONS ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN INTENDED TO BE DELIVERED TO THE DHKP/C TO BE USED IN SUPPOSED OPERATIONS TO CREATE DISTURBANCES PRIOR TO THE TURKISH GENERAL ELECTIONS HELD IN NOVEMBER 2002.
24. (U) ADDITIONALLY, THE GOT APPREHENDED THREE SUSPECTED AL QAIDA OPERATIVES NEAR THE IRANIAN BORDER (NEAR VAN). THE GOT FOLLOWED UP BY ARRESTING DOCUMENT FORGERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE THREE, NEAR BURSA IN NORTHWESTERN TURKEY.
25. (U) THE GOT CONTINUES ITS ACTIVE SUPPRESSION OF THE PKK/KADEK, THOUGH ITS SECURITY OPERATIONS TEMPO HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED IN LINE WITH A REDUCTION IN THE CONFLICT. IT CONTINUES TO MONITOR THE ORGANIZATION'S POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN AN EFFORT TO STEM ANY POTENTIAL DISTURBANCES.
------------------------------------
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM (G) ------------------------------------
26. (U) THE GOT CONSISTENTLY AND STRONGLY OPPOSES BOTH DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. TURKEY DOES NOT VIEW ITS MAINTENANCE OF DIPLOMATIC OR ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, SUDAN, AND SYRIA AS CONSTITUTING SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.
--------------------------------------------- -
SUPPORT STATEMENTS FOR TERRORIST COUNTRIES (H) --------------------------------------------- -
27. (U) TURKEY SHARES BORDERS WITH, AND HAS BEEN AN HISTORIC TRADING PARTNER OF SYRIA, IRAN AND IRAQ. IT BALANCES A CONDEMNATION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THOSE COUNTRIES (INCLUDING PROVIDING HAVENS FOR THE PKK) WITH THE NEED TO ACCESS HISTORIC TRADE ROUTES. THUS TURKEY WILL PROVIDE BASES FOR OPERATION NORTHERN WATCH WHILE AT THE SAME TIME SENDING LARGE TRADE DELEGATIONS TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN. PUBLIC STATEMENTS AGAINST STATE-SUPPORTED TERRORISM ARE CLEAR.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS TERRORISM (I) --------------------------------------------- ---------
28. (U) SINCE THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, THE GOT HAS TAKEN AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE WORLDWIDE OPPOSITION AGAINST TERRORISM. IN MAY 2002 THE EUROPEAN UNION PLACED THE PKK AND DHKP/C ON ITS LIST OF TERRORIST GROUPS AFTER AN INTENSIVE PUSH BY THE GOT FOR THE EU TO ADOPT TOUGHER MEASURES AGAINST TURKISH TERROR GROUPS OPERATING IN EUROPE. IT CONTINUES TO PRESS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO RECOGNIZE KADEK AS THE SUCCESSOR OF THE PKK AND THUS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.
--------------------------------------------- ------------
USG COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES WITH GOT (J) --------------------------------------------- ------------
29. (U) TURKEY REMAINS A STAUNCH ALLY IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM. IN THE FACE OF STRONG PUBLIC OPPOSITION, PARLIAMENT, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF PM ECEVIT, PASSED A RESOLUTION ALLOWING THE GOVERNMENT TO SEND TURKISH TROOPS ABROAD AND TO PERMIT THE STATIONING OF FOREIGN TROOPS ON TURKISH SOIL TO SUPPORT OEF. AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THE RESOLUTION, TURKEY OFFERED A 90-MAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT FOR DUTY IN AFGHANISTAN. THE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE (TNP) CONTINUE TO PROVIDE EXCELLENT PROTECTION OF US DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY FACILITIES THROUGHOUT TURKEY.
30. (U) IN 2002, TURKEY RATIFIED THE UN CONVENTION ON SUPPRESSION OF TERRORIST FINANCING. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS CONVENTION, TURKEY ADDS TO ITS DOMESTIC ASSET FREEZE LIST ALL NAMES ADDED TO THE ASSET FREEZE LIST MAINTAINED BY THE UN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE UNDER UNSCRS 1267 AND 1373.
31. (U) TURKEY IS ALSO AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE DEPARTMENT'S ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. SINCE 1999, THE TURKS ACCEPTED ELEVEN ATA COURSES, TO INCLUDE A SENIOR LEVEL FINANCIAL UNDERPINNINGS OF TERRORISM SEMINAR AND A FOLLOW-ON FINANCIAL UNDERPINNINGS OF TERRORISM SEMINAR FOR INVESTIGATORS. (INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX)
32. (S) THE TURKISH MILITARY HAS ALSO OFFERED THE USE OF AN ADDITIONAL AIRBASE TO LIGHTEN THE LOAD ON INCIRLIK AFB AND EASED FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS TO EASE US SUPPORT OF FORCES OPERATING IN AFGHANISTAN. OTHER TURKISH ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF OEF INCLUDE: - ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO AUTHORIZE DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS ABROAD AND STATIONING OF ADDITIONAL FOREIGN TROOPS IN TURKEY IN SUPPORT OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM; - ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO OFFER SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (OFFER OF 90) - ALLOWED THE US TO USE INCIRLIK AIR BASE AS THE KEY TRANSIT POINT FOR HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE (INCLUDING LETHAL MUNITIONS) TO THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE AND US SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN; - OFFERED THE USE OF ADDITIONAL AIR BASES IN TURKEY FOR OEF-RELATED OPERATIONS; - AUTHORIZED THE US TO USE INCIRLIK AIR BASE TO TRANSIT TALIBAN AND AL-QAIDA DETAINEES FROM AFGHANISTAN TO GTMO; - STREAMLINED CUSTOM PROCEDURES AND GRANTED BLANKET OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCES FOR US OEF-RELATED AIRCRAFT (OVER 5,000 FLIGHTS TO DATE); - PROVIDES KC-135 TANKER SUPPORT AND BASING FOR THE WAR ON TERRORISM. TURKEY ALREADY HAS CONTRIBUTED CLOSE TO 80 KC-135 OEF-RELATED MISSIONS FROM TURKEY.
------------------------------------------- COOPERATION-INVESTIGATION/PROSECUTION (K/1) -------------------------------------------
(INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT'S CLASSIFIED ANNEX)
33. (C) THE MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY, WHICH ENTERED INTO FORCE IN JANUARY 1981, GOVERNS INVESTIGATIVE COOPERATION. THE GOT HAS PROCESSED REQUESTS FOR INVESTIGATIVE ACCESS TO EVIDENCE UNDER THIS TREATY. HOWEVER, IN SOME CASES THE GOT HAS LEFT REQUESTS UNANSWERED FOR OVER THREE YEARS. CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TURKISH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONTINUE IN AN EFFORT TO STREAMLINE THE PROCESS.
----------------------------
COOPERATION-PREVENTION (K/2)
----------------------------
34. (U) THE GOT COORDINATES CLOSELY WITH THE USG ON ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING INITIATIVES. IN RESPONSE TO USG REQUESTS TO FREEZE TERRORIST-RELATED FINANCIAL ASSETS, THE GOT HAS ADDED TO ITS DOMESTIC ASSET FREEZE LIST ALL NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS AND FIRMS RELATED TO UNSCRS 1267 AND 1373 (NAMES RELATED TO FINANCING OF TALIBAN AND AL-QAIDA.) THE GOT ALSO INVESTIGATES THESE NAMES AND FREEZES ASSETS FOUND IN TURKEY. TO DATE, THESE EFFORTS HAVE RESULTED IN FREEZING ABOUT USD 2 MILLION IN FINANCIAL ASSETS OWNED BY AN INDIVIDUAL ON AN USG EXECUTIVE ORDER FREEZE LIST. THE GOT IS REVIEWING THE POSSIBILITY OF AMENDING ITS LEGAL PROCESS FOR FREEZING FINANCIAL ASSETS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE QUICK REACTION TO NEW INFORMATION.
--------------------------------------------- -----
COOPERATION DURING PAST FIVE YEARS- PREVENTION (L) --------------------------------------------- -----
35. (U) OVERALL, IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, THE GOT HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE USG IN THE APPREHENSION, CONVICTION, AND PUNISHMENT OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS IN TURKEY. GOT RESPONSE IS ALWAYS IMMEDIATE AND SUBSTANTIAL WHEN ALERTED TO THREAT OR INCIDENT INVOLVING US INTERESTS. PEARSON
Cable dated:2006-02-07T22:12:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTO DOMINGO 000409
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR WHA/CAR-NICHOLS, SEARBY; INR/SAA-BEN-YEHUDA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016
TAGS: PREL, DR, HA
SUBJECT: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES HAITI
REF: SANTO DOMINGO 0171
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Kubiske. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary and comment. In a February 6 meeting requested by Charge Kubiske to underscore USG concerns about the possible return of Duvalier to Haiti, Dominican Foreign Minister Carlos Morales Troncoso said he had warned the Dominican embassy in Port-au-Prince and others to keep Duvalier out of the Dominican Republic and agreed that Duvalier,s (and Aristide,s) presence could be unhelpful. He said the Dominican Government,s highest interest was for peaceful, legitimate elections, so that the two governments -- his and the newly elected Haitian one -- could resume regular discussions on issues of mutual concern such as migration. He looked forward to working with whoever wins, and expected a Preval victory on the first round. Comment: We found Morales Troncoso current and engaged on Haiti, with plans to be immediately available to handle any developments that might arise. Morales Troncoso appeared understanding and supportive of our concern about any possible Duvalier return to Haiti. End summary and comment.
2. (C) Charge Kubiske, accompanied by poloff, met February 6 with Dominican Foreign Minister Carlos Morales Troncoso to discuss the outlook for the Haitian elections and aftermath, and, in particular, to re-alert the Dominican government to USG concerns about a possible return of Duvalier to Haiti. Morales noted several recent conversations with OAS Secretary General Insulza and UN SRSG Valdez, as well as with senior officials in the Dominican embassy in Port-au-Prince, among others.
Duvalier,s Return to Haiti "Unhelpful"
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. (C) Kubiske expressed USG concern over a return to Haiti of either Duvalier or Aristide. Both potentially were provocative and could complicate the ability of any new government to establish itself. If the election were inconclusive, a return of either one could certainly make things worse. We thought that neither should be allowed back into Haiti until a newly established, functioning democratic government could make a decision itself. Kubiske recalled President Fernandez, January 11 conversation with WHA DAS Patrick Duddy in which Fernandez himself had agreed that Duvalier,s arrival in Haiti around the time of the elections would be detrimental and that Duvalier should not be permitted to return via the Dominican Republic (reftel).
4. (C) Morales Troncoso agreed that Aristide and Duvalier supporters would get upset if their opponents returned to the scene. Anti-Duvalier Haitians might seek revenge, even after 20 years, he noted. He said he had warned the Dominican embassy in Port-au-Prince among others against Duvalier coming to or through the Dominican Republic. Reminded by Kubiske about past Dominican government tolerance of the presence of Haitian activists on Dominican soil, Morales Troncoso did not expect Duvalier to live in the Dominican Republic.
5. (C) For this week, Morales Troncoso said the most important thing is that everyone votes on February 7 and that the vote is legitimate. He added, "Anything we can do, we will do, toward this end." Kubiske suggested that the Dominican Government make clear that it doesn,t see Duvalier as helpful to Haiti. He strongly agreed: "In fact, unhelpful," he replied. Kubiske clarified that the message should be that Duvalier was "not welcome" from a Dominican perspective.
Election Day Outlook Good
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6. (C) Morales Troncoso noted his brief conversation with OAS Secretary General Insulza at the airport earlier in the day and his various conversations with the Dominican Port-au-Prince senior staff. He reported that Insulza sounded optimistic about the prospects for the Haitian elections and that his staff reported that the situation was calm as of 6:00 pm February 6. Washington is also optimistic, though we can never rule out entirely some potential problems, Kubiske noted. The foreign minister agreed, saying "You can,t rule out anything on Haiti." He confirmed that the Dominican Government had put more troops along the Dominican-Haitian border as a matter of preparing for a worst-case scenario. Morales said he had cleared his February 7 calendar of most events, in case something developed that would need his attention.
7. (C) FM Morales Troncoso thought Preval could win on the first round, though he noted that Haiti is very unpredictable. He expected low turnout for the elections; "30 percent would be great."
Working with a New Haitian Government
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
8. (C) Morales Troncoso said that the Dominican Government would be able to work with any of the candidates. Overall, the Dominican Republic wanted to be able to co-exist well with its island neighbor. As for specific candidates, Morales Troncoso was especially optimistic about Preval or Baker. With Preval, he expected that the Dominican Government could make use of the DR-Haiti bi-national commission. (Note: In the past, the two governments have been able to use the commission for migration issues, among other things.) He characterized Preval as quiet and professional. Morales Troncoso didn,t know Baker, but noted that the Dominican consul general in Port-au-Prince, Carlos Castillo, thinks highly of him. As for Manigat, Morales Troncoso thought he was a "nice guy." They had gotten to know each other after the Dominican government put him up in a hotel when Manigat was removed from the presidency in the 1980s.
9. (C) Morales Troncoso said that the Core Group on Haiti, including OAS Secretary General Insulza, had decided to postpone its meeting here from last week until March 5. The postponement would allow for organizing a more public event and discussing the post-election situation. The foreign minister also mentioned a project the Dominican government had been developing for Haitian students in the Dominican Republic. He thought the Dominican government could help Haiti with education and health. The project had been postponed while the IGOH was in power, but he hoped to resume it soon after the elections.
Comment
- - - - - - -
10. (C) We found Morales Troncoso current and engaged on Haiti, with plans to be immediately available to handle any developments that might arise. Morales Troncoso appeared understanding and supportive of our concern about any possible Duvalier return to Haiti. End comment.
Biographic Notes on Dominican-Haitian Diplomatic Dealings
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
11. (C) Kubiske asked about the new Haitian ambassador in Santo Domingo, Fritz Cineas. Cineas and his family, the foreign minister noted, were Duvalier supporters; the new ambassador, in fact, had been a young private secretary to Papa Doc Duvalier. Morales Troncoso characterized Cineas as a good man, a moderate, open and transparent. He had medical training and ample experience in diplomacy. The foreign minister didn,t know how long Cineas would keep this new job, since the outcome was likely to depend on the elections.
12. (C) As for the Dominican embassy in Port-au-Prince, Morales Troncoso noted he speaks with both Ambassador Jose Serulle RamiaXXXXXXXXXXXX and with Consul General Carlos Castillo. He acknowledged that he depends more on Castillo. Serulle, he said, is a friend of Preval,s, while Castillo is in touch with Baker.
KUBISKE
Cable dated:2005-11-16T09:53:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007777
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/7/2015
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, KDEM, TS, FR
SUBJECT: ASSAULT OF FRENCH JOURNALIST IN TUNISIA PROMPTS MEDIA OUTCRY, DOMESTIC CRITICISM OF GOF HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
REF: 03 PARIS 8954
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: The November 11 assault of a French journalist in Tunis by unknown assailants widely believed to belong to the Tunisian security services has prompted an outcry among French media, which has harshly criticized GoF complacency on Tunisia's human rights situation, with some leading dailies and opposition politicians calling for the France to boycott the World Summit for the Information Society (WSIS). The GoF response, meanwhile, has been limited to cautious MFA statements calling for the Tunisian government to shed light on the attack and respect freedom of information. MFA contacts confirmed that the controversy will not result in a GoF boycott of the WSIS, though the GoF delegation head, currently Finance Minister Breton, may be downgraded to a junior minister level, depending on the degree to which the issue continues to generate domestic controversy. MFA contacts privately expressed pessimism on prospects for improvement in Tunisia's human rights situation in the wake of the WSIS, and were similarly negative on the likelihood of France taking a tougher stance on Tunisian human rights, as long as Chirac remains president. End summary.
2. (SBU) French media continues to report widely on the attack on "Liberation" correspondent Christophe Boltanksi, who was beaten and stabbed by four unknown assailants late November 11 in Tunis, after having extensively reported on human rights abuses on the eve of the GOT-hosted WSIS. Several French newspapers, led by "Liberation," have suggested that Boltanski's attack was perpetrated by Tunisian security services, though the identities of the attackers remain unknown and there is no definitive evidence. Boltanski, who did not require hospitalization and returned to France shortly after the attack, declared in press remarks that his attackers took their time, stole his bag containing interview notes, and were not stopped by the very heavy police presence in the diplomatic quarter where the attack took place. Boltanksi dismissed the likelihood that the attack was criminally motivated, noting that foreign journalists in Tunisia are heavily monitored and that human rights activists in Tunisia have faced similar attacks from plain-clothes Tunisian security service officials. Follow-up incidents of alleged GOT harassment of Belgian and Swiss journalists and a French "TV 5" news crew in Tunis continued to attract heavy French media coverage November 16.
3. (SBU) In a November 13 statement issued some 40 hours after the Boltanski assault took place, the MFA declared, "We have made it known to the Tunisian authorities, in Paris and in Tunis, that we are counting on them to shed all light possible on the attack..." In a follow-up statement November 15, FM Douste-Blazy called on the GOT to respect freedom of information and not impede the work of journalists attending the WSIS, without protesting the Boltanski assault. "Liberation" November 14 decried the GoF's belated and mild reaction to the Boltanski attack and recurring human rights abuses in Tunisia, which it ascribed to longtime complacency by President Chirac towards the human rights situation in Tunisia, as a means of protecting French commercial and strategic interests there. "Liberation" and several other French dailies cited Chirac's widely reported comments during a December 2003 visit to Tunisia (reftel), in which he dismissed the concerns of protesting civil society activists in Tunisia and described the right to food as paramount above political liberties. "Liberation" concluded that the French president had shown himself to be closer to Moscow and Havana on human rights issues, than fellow Western democracies. A November 15 "Le Monde" editorial went further in making unfavorable comparisons between French and U.S. policy towards Tunisia, noting that the U.S. had not hesitated to call publicly for Tunisia to pursue political and human rights reforms, while France "did not have such courage." The "Le Monde" editorial concluded by calling on France to abstain from attending the WSIS, or, at minimum, to pressure Tunisia via the EU to comply with its EU association agreement obligations, which remained a "dead letter." Leaders of the opposition French Socialist party (PS) echoed the call for a WSIS boycott and called on the GoF to issue an "official protest" of the Boltanski assault.
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told usXXXXXXXXXXXX that the Boltanski attack would not affect GoF participation in the WSIS, for which Minister of Economy/Finance Thierry Breton would lead the French delegation. In a follow-up discussion XXXXXXXXXXXX was more cautious, and noted that the degree of French media attention on the attack and consequent criticism of GoF human rights policy was unprecedented. While XXXXXXXXXXXX affirmed that a GoF boycott of the WSIS was out of the question, he conceded that there was a slim possibility that the delegation head might be downgraded to the junior minister level, depending on the degree to which the issue continued to generate controversy, especially during the weekly audience by FM Douste-Blazy before the National Assembly foreign relations committee November 15. XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that the GoT had viewed the GoF decision to send Breton to the WSIS as an "insult," given that the French PM had attended the first WSIS summit and that Tunis had lobbied unsuccessfully for Chirac's attendance.
5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX remained skeptical on prospects for finding Boltanski's attackers or for any near-term improvement in Tunisia's human rights situation in the aftermath of the WSIS. While noting there was no evidence of GoT involvement in the Boltanski assault, he mused that the GoT was effective in covering up such matters. XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated that the modest gestures which Tunisia had made in the run-up to the WSIS -- allowing access to banned websites, for instance -- would evaporate as soon as the WSIS had ended, with the GoT likely to crack down on the hunger strikers as well. Pressed for details on how the GoF was articulating its human rights concerns to the GOT, XXXXXXXXXXXX offered few details. He noted that the French embassy in Tunis, for the first time, had received a representative of the eight hunger strikers November 14, though the GoF had opted not to send any emboffs to meet the hunger strikers themselves, which he said would cross a "red line" for the GoF and provoke a crisis with the GoT. Explaining the degree to which the GoF sought to accommodate the GoT on human rights concerns, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that when French FM Douste-Blazy met with representatives of the Tunisian League of Human Rights (LTDH) during a visit to Tunis last October, the French MFA received a delegation of pro-GOT LTDH members, as a quid pro quo requested by the GOT.
6. (C) Pressed to explain why the GoF could not speak more forcefully with Tunisia on human rights, given the friendship between the two countries, XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that "everyone" in the MFA wanted to see the GoF take a more activist stance on political repression in Tunisia, which was entirely without justification, as a political opening posed no risk to the stability of the GoT. On the contrary, continued suppression of basic political liberties by the GoT, out of step with Tunisia's economic success and educated population, could spell trouble for Tunisia's long-term stability and open the door to Islamist influence. XXXXXXXXXXXX concluded, though, that, despite media criticism and the preferences of working level MFA officials, GoF human rights policy on Tunisia would remain unchanged as long as Chirac remained President. In XXXXXXXXXXXX's view, the French leader's ties with Ben Ali were too long-standing for the French president to adopt a new approach.
7. (C) Comment: We view this controversy as indicative of the degree to which President Chirac's "stability first" and tradition of cultivating close relations with aging Arab world dictators is increasingly out of step with current realities and prevailing media opinion in France. While the media focus on the Boltanski attack may subside in coming days, we expect that the GoF will remain vulnerable to further domestic criticism for inaction on human rights issues in Tunisia -- as the MFA speculated, as long as Chirac remains president. End comment. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Hofmann
UNCLAS JAKARTA 000186
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR R/PPR, IIP/EAP, EAP/PD
INFO FOR PA, PA/OBS, EAP/MTS, S/P FOR JARED COHEN, IIP FOR DAN SREEBNY
NSC FOR PRADEEP RAMAMURTHY WHITE HOUSE FOR KATIE LILLIE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, KPAO, ID, XC
SUBJECT: MISSION INDONESIA FUNDING REQUEST TO AMPLIFY SOCIAL MEDIA EFFORT IN TIME FOR MARCH POTUS VISIT
REF: Jakarta 0065
1. Action/funding request in paragraph 5. 2. Summary: Mission Indonesia requests immediate additional funding to use new media and social networking tools maximize online outreach for the POTUS visit scheduled for late March, 2010. Already the leading U.S. Mission in the world on Facebook with nearly 50,000 "fans," and one of the leading Missions using Twitter, YouTube and engaging local bloggers to promote USG messages and information, we are uniquely positioned to use these tools to amplify key topics and themes to support the upcoming visit by President Obama. We request $100,000 in funding from R to boost our Facebook fan page membership to 1 million, and can accomplish this in 30 days. End Summary. Proven PD 2.0 Expertise
3. U.S. Mission Indonesia is on the forefront of Public Diplomacy 2.0. With over 50,000 fans the most of any diplomatic mission worldwide, are gaining traction using social media in Indonesia for PD. Our efforts were recently cited in an article on CNET Asia, as "a great example of social media interaction in Indonesia," prompting the author to wonder "how long will it take for other organizations and businesses to do the same?" We also have our own YouTube channel with over 300 videos, almost 1,000 followers on Twitter, and -- for the last two years -- engaged positively with thousands of country's most influential bloggers.
Indonesia's New Media Environment
4. Indonesia's internet community is emerging, but recently has become a powerful political force for reform (reftel). With roughly 10% of the population able to access the internet at least monthly, this represents over 25 million people, nearly half of whom are on Facebook. In the seventh-largest and one of the fastest-growing Facebook markets in the world, we will directly reach a young, urban population which does not rely on traditional media as information sources. In addition, Indonesians' special connection to the 44th President means that interest in the visit is incredibly high. Our Facebook post announcing the visit had interactions and comments from over 1,000 people in less than two weeks, and stories about the visit appeared in the media every day since the official announcement.
5. By actively connecting the POTUS visit to our new media efforts, we have a unique chance to build a sustainable online platform to engage Indonesians on USG issues and messages long after the visit. With enough funding to properly amplify and build on past our successes, Mission Indonesia requests $100,000 immediately in order reach a goal of 1 million Facebook fans in just 30 days -- just before POTUS visit.
Action Plan and Implementation
6. This money would be used in three areas. First, it would increase direct advertising via Facebook. Currently, Embassy Jakarta spends less than $25 per day on advertising, and nets between 300-400 new fans daily. Increasing this tenfold over 30 days, results in a gain of 100,000 to 120,000 fans. The funds would also be used to promote the visit and our fan page as the place to learn more by extensively advertising on Indonesian online portals, banner ads, YouTube, Twitter, and other promotional efforts, including embedding bloggers, contests and giveaways, and using SMS technology. With over 100 million mobile phone users in Indonesia, texting is a powerful way to include a huge audience. Partnering with a major telecom provider, we can encourage Indonesians to sign up for real-time updates via their cell phone -- a great way to reach those not yet online about the visit. Cost: $60,000.
7. Another key promotion strategy to generate interest will be offering a "golden ticket" via Facebook. We propose making a dream come true for one lucky Indonesian, by providing an opportunity to meet POTUS during his visit. If the White House approves, we could invite fans to post why they should meet President Obama, and in doing so, use our social media platform to connect fans to the visit, as well as build excitement beforehand and follow-up coverage afterwards. In addition, we could partner with a local TV station to have a "finalist" show and increase coverage. RSO would ensure any winner(s) are vetted for security issues. If the White House would not agree to this, an alternate "dream prize" might be an educational trip to the U.S. Cost: $15,000.
8. Third, in order to implement these ideas in this limited time-frame, we need short-term expert help on this promotion in the form of a qualified local digital marketing agency, who could assist the Embassy's new media team (currently one officer and three FSNs working on it part-time). Cost: $25,000.
OSIUS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000294
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/SE; OSD FOR WADE POPOVICH
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2020
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MOPS, TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: LARGEST WAVE OF MILITARY DETENTIONS TO DATE POSES QUESTIONS: WHAT NEXT IN AKP-MILITARY CLASH?
REF: A. ANKARA 150
B. ANKARA 53 AND PREVIOUS
C. ANKARA 107
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Summary: On February 22 police detained 47 retired and active-duty military officers, including 17 flag-grade officers for -- according to press reports -- their alleged involvement in coup plots dating back to 2003-2004. Although coverage of the detentions blanketed the press, neither the Turkish General Staff (TGS) nor the government appear publicly outraged (in the case of TGS) or congratulatory (the governing Justice and Development Party) by the actions. There has been no official statement from the TGS, and PM Ergodan took a back seat by stating that the police were simply acting on order from the judiciary. (His attack dog Deputy PM Arinc was more polemical.) CHOD GEN Basbug announced that he has postponed imminent travel to Egypt, and late on February 23 called an emergency meeting with his four-star generals and admirals. Prosecutors have now detained all of the force commanders from the 2003-2004 period with the exception of former CHOD Hilmi Ozkok and former Turkish Land Forces Commander Aytac Yalman. End summary.
Unprecedented Arrests...
-------------------------
2. (SBU) On February 22 nearly 50 retired and current military officers (and one NCO) were detained, likely for their alleged connections to the "Sledgehammer" (Balyoz) investigations. The homes and offices of many retired flag officers were also searched and police seized and removed documents for further inspection. Among those detained were four active duty admirals and 17 retired generals, including:
--Ergin Saygun: Former Deputy CHOD (2006-2008) and 1st Army Commander (2008-2009). Saygun is very well-known to the U.S.; he was our primary coordinator on anti-terrorism issues for many years, and had accompanied PM Erdogan during his November 2007 visit to Washington.
--Ibrahim Firtina: Former Air Force Chief from 2003-2005. Firtina was questioned in December 2009 by the Ergenekon prosecutors and has been implicated in the press for his role in the Sledgehammer Operation.
--Cetin Dogan: Former 1st Army Commander (2002-2004).
--Ozden Ornek: Former Navy Chief (2003 - 2005). Ornek's diary, which allegedly details discussions among senior military officers to start a coup between 2003-2005, is being used by prosecutors as their primary source of evidence. Ornek was also questioned by Ergenekon prosecutors in December 2009.
--Engin Alan: LtG (retired).
--Suha Tanyeli: BG (retired). Tanyeli was head of the TGS Strategic Research Center (SAREM).
3. (C) The operation itself appears to have been well coordinated, as detentions and searches took place simultaneously in Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa, Diyarbakir, Hatay, Kocaeli, and Bodrum. There have been no official pronouncements regarding the reasons for the operation, although the press widely suspects that the arrests are in connection with the 2003 Sledgehammer plan (which allegedly included a plan to overthrow the AKP government (ref B) and a separate plot known as "Operation Cage" (ref A)). Press reports state that many of the detained individuals' signatures were found on "Sledgehammer" documents. The majority of individuals, according to the press, are being interrogated in Istanbul. ...
But So What?
----------------
4. (C) Despite the press fury, reaction from TGS and the government has been minimal. TGS has yet to make a official statement. However, TGS CHOD General Ilker Basbug postponed his official travel to Egypt -- an extraordinary and
ANKARA 00000294 002 OF 003
unprecedented step -- and late on February 23 called an emergency meeting with his four-star generals and admirals. When asked about the arrests PM Erdogan, in Spain for a state visit, told reporters that the police were acting on the order of the judiciary. Although a few "usual suspects" inflammatory statements from the opposition -- such as Republican Peoples' Party (CHP) Chairman Deniz Baykal's statement that the arrests made it feel was "as if Turkey was under occupation" -- made it into the press initially, overall press reactions were overshadowed the following day by other news stories. Markets opened up this morning, and business continues as usual.
Bad for TGS? Good for AKP?
------------
5. (C) This is the largest "round-up" of military officers to date; the lack of an immediate reaction from TGS may suggest that the (current) military leadership is either fully willing to allow this investigation and the democratic process to continue unimpeded, or is waiting for AKP to hang itself on unfounded allegations. The military remains deeply unhappy about AKP's governance and is enraged at the steady campaign to erode the military's standing in Turkish society. To date, prosecutors have now detained all of the senior military commanders from the 2003-2004 period with the exception of former CHOD Hilmi Ozkok and former Land Forces Commander Aytac Yalman. And although the TGS seemed to be caught off balance and therefore was unwilling to speak up yesterday in strong opposition to these ongoing investigations, it seems unlikely that it will remain silent.
6. (C) AKP appears to have concluded that it gains politically from the arrest of military officers. Having perhaps nevertheless learned from past experiences, PM Erdogan was shielded from what could have been outraged criticism by secularists by conveniently being outside of the country. His absence also did not allow for any publicized "urgent" meeting with CHOD Basbug, as has happened in the past. Deputy PM Bulent Arinc's statements appeared designed to spin these developments as yet another example of how "times have changed" in Turkey and how the country is merely going through a "normalization" period.
7. (C) The next few days will prove interesting and possibly pivotal. The judiciary has four days to either turn the detentions into formal arrests or release the individuals. If formal charges are brought, TGS will be forced to respond. Likewise, a lack of substantive evidence will rebound on the Government, and will give credence to accusations that the long-running Ergenekon investigation has a deeper and more insidious design: to undermine AKP's secular opposition.
8. (C) Some knowledgeable embassy officers see this latest step as a more serious provocation that could trigger some type of unpredictable military reaction. We will see.
COMMENT
-------
9. (C) To repeat the facts on this whole "Ergenekon" set of events: a. There is some "fire" behind the smoke. The military obviously has plans to intervene if necessary in political affairs and can cite the 1982 constitution, endorsed by the population per referendum, which gives the military a key role in "overseeing" democratic governments' adherence to Ataturkist principles -- largely defined as by the military and its friends in the bureaucracy and judiciary. b. PM Erdogan (supported by the EU and even many anti-Erdogan Turkes who want to see the military out of politics) legitimately wants to rein in this "droit de regard" status. c. But PM Erdogan realizes that elections are coming up, and that he did relatively poorly in last year's elections (38%) but brilliantly in 2007 (47% AKP win) when he played off the military's counter-productive threats. d. Thus much of this is electoral poiltics, albeit of a
ANKARA 00000294 003 OF 003
"below the belt" contact sport variety. e. All this is exacerbated by the thuggish authoritarian behavior of the police and judiciary (reflecting prevailing tendencies in this society, including in the military). In the U.S. a prosecutor or detective would simply have visited the generals in question to post questions. "Invites" to the precinct, reading of rights, indictments, arrests, and detentions follow only after the amassing of evidence and clear indications of a case winnable in court. Not here. Anyone even suspected of "having information" is hauled before the police (armed with automatic weapons), and humiliated before the press. It's always been that way; now it's happening also to the top brass and their friends. f. Up to now, however, most of those so publicly humiliated are eventually released due to patent innocence,a lack of evidence (as in the recent "Special Forces officers planning Arinc's assassination" caper -- ref A) or because the judiciary throws the whole process out (i.e. the law making military officers subject to civilian courts -- ref C). g. But every day is a new one here, and no one can be certain where this whole choreography will fall out of whack. Then, look out.
Jeffrey
Cable dated:2010-01-21T11:33:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000081
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KNNP, IR, GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN MFA HOPE IRAN SANCTIONS TARGET LEADERS NOT MASSES
Classified By: Pol M/C George Glass for reasons 1.4 b/d
1. (C) SUMMARY. German MFA A/S equivalent for Non Proliferation and Disarmament Gottwald told House Foreign Affairs Committee Staff Director Richard Kessler that Germany was ready to support sanctions on Iran, especially ones which target the leadership and minimize impact on the general population. Germany would prefer to see action taken within the UNSC, but is concerned about Chinese commitment. Iran Task Force Director Krueger said Germany was looking at measures in sectors involving transportation (Air Iran and shipping), banking, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and Compressed Natural Gas (CNG), as well as exploring ways to target the IRGC leaders. NEA Iran/Maghreb DAS equivalent Ralph Tarraf said Germany was also exploring ways to bring Iranian Human Rights violations before the UN offices in Geneva. Tarraf also advocated taking Turkish initiatives on Iran seriously while not publicly endorsing them. Experts from XXXXXXXXXXXX advocated for a ban on weapons sales to Iran, covert sabotage of the Iranian nuclear program, and focusing efforts to find a negotiated solution more directly in the office of the Supreme Leader. End Summary.
----------------------------------------
IMPORTANCE OF UNSCR; CONCERN ABOUT CHINA ----------------------------------------
2. (C) Gottwald summarized the German position on Iran Sanctions emphasizing the importance of getting a new UNSCR passed sooner rather than later during a January 6 meeting. He noted it would be difficult, but important, to keep Russia and China on board. He said no one is enthusiastic about sanctions, but all agree that Iranian refusals to reach an agreement must carry a price. He quoted Chancellor Merkel's speech to Congress in November and said Germany had "zero tolerance" for a nuclear armed Iran and was ready to support sanctions. He expressed greater concern over the Chinese commitment to sanctions than Russian. Putting the current Iran discussion into a broader context Gottwald worried that Iran could become a spoiler in the upcoming NPT RevCon.
----------------------------------------
GOAL OF SANCTIONS: HIT LEADERS NOT PEOPLE -----------------------------------------
3. (C) When asked by Kessler what Germany would like to see in a UNSCR or EU measures on Iran, Gottwald and MFA Deputy A/S equivalent for Trade and Export Control Lingemann remained vague in their answers. Gottwald said the EU could be counted on to take its guidance from the next UNSCR on Iran and enact measures to enforce and strengthen the UNSCR. In particular he expected the EU to take action to target specific leaders with visa bans and perhaps other measures. Gottwald said Germany would like to see measures have a direct effect on Iranian leaders, and to minimize the effect on the population. Gottwald called petrol sanctions a "mixed blessing" noting that they give the government an excuse to cut subsidies which puts the burden onto the general population and money back in government budgets. Lingemann said denying access to certain exploration/extraction technology could be an effective tactic since it would more directly impact the government's pocketbook and ability to "buy friends" abroad. He stressed that we need measures that do not generate a commiseration effect from other countries. Lingemann noted that while a broad UNSCR was preferable, there were still some technological areas (such as CNG/LNG related technologies) in which U.S. and EU companies have a monopoly on the market and where Russian and Chinese companies can't compete should EU wide measures be needed. He also said that targeted measures that impact Iran's refining capabilities can be effective as they have an immediate impact on the government's income.
4. (C) Iran Task Force Director Krueger, in a separate meeting, specifically mentioned transportation (Iran Air and shipping), banking, and LNG/CNG sectors as areas on which Germany was looking to focus UNSC or EU action. He said Germany was also interested in targeting the IRGC but was still wrestling with how to best do so. He noted that the U.S. had based its justification on the IRGC's terrorist associations with Hezballah, but since Hezballah is not recognized as a terrorist organization in Europe that wouldn't work. He said his colleagues were looking at possible action against the IRGC for violations of Human Rights and thought that might be more workable in the European context, but they were open to suggestions.
BERLIN 00000081 002 OF 003
------------------------------------------
EXPLORING WHAT TO DO ON HUMAN RIGHTS FRONT ------------------------------------------
5. (C) NEA Iran/Magreb DAS equivalent Ralph Tarraf noted that Germany was looking at whether and how to bring the Iranian Human Rights violations before the UN offices in Geneva. He said it was important to make clear to the Iranian government that we are concerned about their human rights violations and that the concern is not purely a "Western" phenomena but rather a global one. He said February 15 is a key date as that is when the Iran country review process will take place in Geneva. He added that Germany is discussing listing the IRGC both under the non-proliferation regime and now also for its human rights violations. He noted that it was important to keep the two separate sanctions tracks separate and not to confuse the proliferation and human rights issues.
--------------------------------------------- ---
CAN ENGAGEMENT WORK? IS THERE A ROLE FOR TURKEY? --------------------------------------------- ---
6. (C) On the issue of whether continued engagement with the Iranian government undermines the opposition, Gottwald stressed that it is important that engagement not be construed to "favor" Ahmadinejad, but rather we should continue, as we have, on a purely "logical" basis. He said he was concerned that the current Iranian government may be incapable of coming to any conclusions, but that doesn't mean we should let up on our pressure. Tarraf said we face the "worst situation possible" with a weak regime that is not yet close to regime change. He suggested we focus on new forms of access to the regime which would allow for discrete talks to continue at a high-level. Gottwald added that he thought it was important to look for other mechanisms such as the TRR proposal which can serve as disincentives to continue down the nuclearization path.
7. (C) Tarraf said he saw increased Saudi/Iranian rivalry in the Gulf region and suggested the West avoid putting all its "eggs in one basket" behind the Saudis. He suggested looking for other allies in the region who can be constructive such as Turkey. He admitted that Turkey had abstained in the IAEA and expressed reluctance on sanctions, but these positions also afforded them greater leverage with the Iranians. He suggested we consider taking Turkish initiatives seriously without publicly endorsing them. He agreed that to date Turkish promises - on Syria/Israel and Iran- have not yielded any results, but he advocated giving Turkey a quiet nod of approval to see if they can deliver.
-------------------------------------------
ARMS BAN, SABOTAGE, FOCUS ON SUPREME LEADER -------------------------------------------
8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX argued that the only effective sanctions which could positively impact the regime's security calculations on the nuclear dossier would be a ban on sales of conventional arms. Only such a move could shift the security calculation for the regime from the longer term goal of achieving nuclear capability to the shorter term goal of maintaining a conventional capability. He warned that ineffective sanctions could be worse than no sanctions, especially if they send more money to the IRGC's pockets (through increasing necessity of procurement on the black market which is dominated by the IRGC.) In the interim XXXXXXXXXXXX recommended that a policy of covert sabotage (unexplained explosions, accidents, computer hacking etc) would be more effective than a military strike whose effects in the region could be devastating.
9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX offered some insights into the inner workings of the regime and postured that the TRR deal had failed because the Supreme Leader (SL) hadn't committed himself to the deal 100 percent. He said any deal would have to have the full blessing of the SL and said that once negotiations in the SL's office (or with his closest confidants) began, success would be guaranteed since the SL - by definition- never fails. He noted that the SL has his representatives at every level of government, but some have greater access to him than others. The three with greatest access, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, at the moment are his son Mojtaba, Ayatollah Golpaygani and Hejazi.
BERLIN 00000081 003 OF 003
10. (U) This cable has been cleared by StaffDel Kessler.
MURPHY
Cable dated:2005-03-18T11:27:00
UNCLAS GABORONE 000411
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, BC, SAN/CKGR Relocation
SUBJECT: A VISIT TO GHANZI DISTRICT: HAPPINESS IS SOMEWHERE ELSE
1. (U) Summary: Ambassador Huggins visited Botswana's western town of Ghanzi and the San/Basarwa relocation settlement of New Xade on March 10-11. Rural poverty, severe dependence on government assistance, lack of income-generating opportunities, despair among youth, and the underperformance of the parastatal Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) were identified by interlocutors as dominant issues in the district. Officials proclaimed the advantages of the relocation of the San/Basarwa out of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve into villages. NGOs emphasized the forcible aspect of the exercise and the psychological trauma and cultural disorientation it had produced. The GOB, as revealed in a subsequent meeting with the MFA PermSec, views the San as a group which, like other ethnic minorities in Botswana, should use education to move forward. End summary.
Into the Frontier Zone: Ghanzi District
---------------------------------------
2.(U) It is a truism that practically all of southern Africa is a frontier. Botswana's Ghanzi District is vintage: containing the vast Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) where the mode of hunting and gathering still provides a livelihood for remnants of various Khoi/San-speaking groups, however diminished. BaKgalagadi peoples, herders and agriculturalists, live there, as do Herero-speakers, refugees from the 1905 war of extermination in then-German Southwest Africa. Afrikaans-speaking groups, with expertise in ranching, moved in around 1900, taking advantage of Ghanzi's rangelands and its hydrogeology, where vast aquifers can be tapped at shallow depth under limestone ridges.
3. (U) Ghanzi District's major source of income is the sale of cattle to the parastatal Botswana Meat Commission, located in Lobatse, some 600 miles to the southeast. Transport has become more efficient in the past few years, with the excellently paved Trans Kalahari Highway running between Lobatse and Ghanzi, and on into Namibia. Ghanzi town has grown over the past five years, and district officials mentioned the scarcity of urban plots and available land in the immediate area of town. Ghanzi town, as district capital, has government offices, staff housing, and facilities, as well as the requisite hospital and schools. Apart from that, it functions as the service center for the outlying ranches and their population. No industry is located there.
Problems, Problems: Any Opportunities?
--------------------------------------
4. (U) Ambassador Huggins and EmbOffs met with district officials over lunch in Ghanzi on March 10. Predictably, conversation turned to a list of perceived problems. One was the low prices the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) pays for slaughtered cattle. Many considered that the time had come to end the BMC monopoly and open the trade to competition. Various officials lamented the lack of jobs for young people and stated alcohol abuse was a major problem. Ambassador Huggins noted that the Trans Kalahari Highway running up to Ghanzi should provide an economic stimulus, and urged the district planners to poise themselves to take advantage of this, but the response was low-key. The Remote Area Dwellers (RAD) program officer complained that the services provided by the GOB were not fully appreciated by "these people."
How are you going to keep them on the farm?
-------------------------------------------
5. (U) After lunch, Ambassador Huggins visited a training site just outside of town, run by the NGO XXXXXXXXXXXX, which is actively engaged in several villages bordering the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) to assist the population in making the transition from hunting and gathering easier for those in the relocation villages. They have begun communal gardens, and they have a demonstration vegetable garden at the training site that utilizes drip irrigation, installed with a grant from the Ambassador's Self-Help Fund. XXXXXXXXXXXX
6. (U) XXXXXXXXXXXX was highly critical of the GOB resettlement policy, noting that people had been dumped in villages like New Xade, without being provided with sufficient shelter, support, or even food, and decried the idea as ludicrous that the people could transform themselves into industrious villagers, craft-sellers, while seventy miles away from a main road. They emphasized the arbitrariness, the lack of consultation, and the lack of transparency in GOB decision-making when it came to the treatment of the San/Basarwa peoples in the district.
A Recipe for Discontent: Discrimination, not Dialogue
--------------------------------------------- --------
7. (U) Ambassador Huggins' XXXXXXXXXXXX meeting, with XXXXXXXXXXXX proved informative. At present, the Botswana High Court case brought in July 2004 by the First People of the Kalahari v. GOB, is in recess.XXXXXXXXXXXX considered "eviction" as a more accurate description of what took place than the GOB usage: "relocation." XXXXXXXXXXXX believed that plans for mining were the reason that the San/Basarwa groups were removed.
8. (U) XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that First People of the Kalahari accepted the support of Survival International, the London-based NGOXXXXXXXXXXXX
9. (U) The GOB had consistently declined to enter into dialogue on the question of the San/Basarwa and their right of access to the CKGR. XXXXXXXXXXXX were mystified why the relocation took place. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the GOB will point to large schools and shiny new buildings in the relocation villages as tokens of their benevolent intent, but, he asked, "Where are the Basarwa professionals that the educational system is supposed to be turning out?" Ambassador Huggins asked what alternative there would be in XXXXXXXXXXXX's view, and he mentioned that ecotourism, involving the San/Basarwa themselves, would be an option. Gradually, the San/Basarwa would then successfully be integrated into mainstream society. At present, he stated, people's rights were being violated, and they had been torn away from familiar foods, medicinal plants, environment, and religious ties with the land. The consequence was death in some cases, and enormous suffering in other cases. People mourned that they could not pass on their culture to their children.
10. (U) Ambassador Huggins asked how many persons had been removed from the CKGR, and how many had returned. In all XXXXXXXXXXXX estimated some 2,500 had been evicted; some 250 persons, mostly older San/Basarwa, were still in the CKGR, and perhaps another 250 had returned over the past two years from the relocation villages. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that San/Basarwa are systematically being discriminated against by the GOB, which moves them away from wherever there might be an income-generating opportunity.
11. (U) He cited the case of the Tsodilo Hills, renowned for its rock paintings, where San/Basarwa were moved five miles away, with the consequence that Hambukushu people now served as guides and craft sellers there. He cited the Janatarka area in Central District, where San/Basarwa were being forced to move, as well as the Trans-Frontier Park, between Botswana and Namibia, where San/Basarwa interests were sidelined. "The land use system of the San is simply not recognized by the government," he said, "and the government is unwilling to enter into any discussion on this or other matters having to do with the San/Basarwa."
Prospects for Unity: the view from the BNF
------------------------------------------
12. (SBU) In a meeting with XXXXXXXXXXXX, the major constraint to BNF gains was identified as lack of financing. XXXXXXXXXXXX was clear, and contemptuous: the way to win votes in San/Basarwa areas was through tobacco, food, and clothes. "They believe only in hand- outs," he said. When asked about prospects for 2009, and cooperation between the opposition parties, the BNF and the Botswana Congress Party (BCP), XXXXXXXXXXXX's first reaction was, "The BCP has learned its lesson; they will come to us."
13. (U) Emboffs pointed out that such a stance might not be the most diplomatic, and he agreed, saying it would be worked out at national level. XXXXXXXXXXXX gave the BDP government credit for its approach to the HIV/AIDS scourge and would not change it if the BNF came to power. They passionately disagreed, however, with the BDP silence on Zimbabwe's crisis and expressed their frustration with the national and regional paralysis on this issue. XXXXXXXXXXXX They identified the lack of jobs and recreation for young people as major problems, because the alternative, they said, was alcohol consumption and subsequent unprotected sex leading to HIV infections.
HIV/AIDS: Some Progress
------------------------
14. (U) Ambassador Huggins stopped at Tebelopele Voluntary Counseling and Testing Center, where director and counselors stated that testing had increased from an average of 60 persons per month last year to over 300 per month this year. For this, the director credited the effective rollout of ARV therapy. At dinner with Peace Corps volunteers that evening, the Ambassador expressed his appreciation for their path- breaking work in combating HIV/AIDS in the district through community organization and awareness-raising. On their part, the Peace Corps Volunteers related some success stories but also noted the often inflexible and anti-innovative nature of the Botswana bureaucratic structures with which they have to work.
Modernizing, Collaborating. . .
-------------------------------
15. (U) Early the next morning, Ambassador Huggins and EmbOffs visited the San/Basarwa resettlement village of New Xade, established in 2002, located on the edge of the CKGR, seventy miles away on a sand and gravel road away from the Trans Kalahari Highway, without telephone service. Permaculture Trust extension workers had ensured communication. We were escorted by the District Commissioner and the RAD officer. The latter pointed proudly to some livestock as we neared the village: the GOB had provided these to the Basarwa.
16. (U) The village chief, Kgosi Lobatse Beslag, greeted Emboffs. The Village Development Committee, councilors, District Commissioner and the RAD official joined our meeting held in the chief's office. The discussion took place in Setswana and was translated. A verbal list of concerns was recited: the first item mentioned was that New Xade has insufficient accommodation for civil servants. A storehouse for the vegetables grown on the Permaculture garden was required, as were recreational facilities for youth.
17. (U) Ambassador Huggins asked how people were faring after the relocation. The answer provided by the chief was that they were much better off. XXXXXXXXXXXX, who took the lead in the discussion, echoed this opinion, but he also asked for support for training and buildings. But people were much better off, in his opinion, living in New Xade.
18. (U) Despite rephrasing of the question-whether people really wanted to be in New Xade-the standard response, no doubt also influenced by the presence of the district officials, was that everything was fine. When we asked about ecotourism, we were told that a plot had been allocated for such a venture, but GOB funds had run out to translate it into reality. When we asked about plans for telephony, we were told that connectivity by telephone was in the village development plan, but much depended on the government, and it might and might not happen in 2007 and 2008. When we asked how people make a living, there was some evasion, but eventually the answers indicated that people rely on government handouts. It became clear that everything, more or less, depended on the government. When asked about craft skills and income- generation, we were told that the distance and the lack of linkages for marketing were major hurdles.
. . .and Resisting
-------------------
19. (U) Only at the end of the meeting, XXXXXXXXXXXX ventured to answer the Ambassador's question: people are not happy. While many people were resigned to the relocation by now, many also went back to the CKGR. People mourn for their way of life, and regret that their children are not with them, but at school. Another grievance was that the Game and Wildlife Department prohibits New Xade residents who want to visit their relatives on the other side of the CKGR from traveling through the reserve; they have to go around. And only some, not all, received livestock.
20. (U) Kgosi Beslag decided, at that point, that the discussion had been sufficiently extensive. When the Ambassador asked about a solution, the chief reiterated the GOB line: put San/Basarwa children in hostels for their education and their own good, and bank on the next generation. In any case, he continued, hunting and gathering was a miserable and doomed way of life. You cannot stop progress. He suggested we visit the new village clinic next.
Potemkin Village?
-----------------
21. (U) The New Xade clinic is an impressive building, dating from 2003. With a staff of 3, with a senior nurse-matron who arrived two months ago, the facility has beds, drugs, and supplies, but, at 10:00 in the morning looked eerily unused. We were told patients preferred to still go to the old clinic. Beds without linen attested to the truth of this. We next viewed two of the houses built by Permaculture Trust: one-room cinderblocks, on a plot large enough to cultivate a vegetable garden, looking comfortable. We were told who lived in one house; when we asked who lived in the adjacent one, we were told, "Oh, he has gone back to the CKGR." Our tour concluded with Ambassador Huggins greeting the assembled villagers in the central meeting place, and so we departed New Xade.
22. (SBU) The GOB is not likely to change its position on the CKGR. In a subsequent meeting between Ambassador Huggins and the GOB's Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Mr. Ernest Mpofu, the Ambassador related his impressions gained during his visit to Ghanzi District. He made the point that dialogue is the way forward, and the situation of the San/Basarwa should be reconsidered. The PermSec dismissed all such suggestions and was averse to the argument that the people are losing their culture. He viewed the plight of the San/Basarwa as no different from other ethnic minorities in the country, and he put forward again the GOB assimilationist line.XXXXXXXXXXXX. He advised the Ambassador to discuss the question with relevant GOB ministry officials and hear the "true" version of events. He stated that New Xade as a location was chosen by the San/Basarwa themselves, attracted there by the GOB's provision of water. Ambassador Huggins's suggestions that the GOB reconsider its approach to how government deals with San/Basarwa and the issue of their cultural heritage was met with thinly veiled scorn. "We were like that ourselves," said Mr. Mpofu, "when I was young; running after animals. But I sit here, talking to you, in your language, because I received an education."
Comment
-------
23. (U) This was a long-planned visit to the west of the country, with prime objective being to gain first- hand impressions of the results of the GOB's policy of San/Basarwa populations out of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve during 2002/3. While it is probably the case that two-three years on since the move, the greatest trauma is past, it is also clear that people have been dumped in economically absolutely unviable situations without forethought, and without follow-up support. The lack of imagination displayed on the part of the GOB is breathtaking. The GOB views New Xade as similar to many sites of rural poverty, deserving no special treatment. But the special tragedy of New Xade's dependent population is that it could have been avoided. HUGGINS
Cable dated:2009-04-29T11:35:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000192
NOFORN
SIPDIS
CORRECTED COPY (PARA 28 CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT WAS INADVERTENTLY LEFT OUT OF THE ORIGINAL CABLE.)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2024
TAGS: AORC, IR, IAEA, KNNP, MNUC
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: P5+1 EXPERTS MEETING USEFUL MECHANISM FOR TECHNICAL DIALOGUE
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte FOR REASONS 1.4 (c) AND (e)
-------
Summary
-------
1. (C) P5 1 experts and an EU representative met at the U.K. Mission on March 9 to discuss technical issues contained in the IAEA Director General's reports on Iran and what that report implies for Iran's progress on its nuclear program. This was the third meeting in a series of similar experts' discussions (previously held in May 2008 and June 2007). By pre-agreement, the meetings do not produce agreed/common conclusions, but there were no objections to the UK Ambassador's summary of discussions noting that Iran's current centrifuge operations at Natanz were not adequate to support Tehran's stated commercial objective, although they had improved substantially over the 2007 performance. The experts also noted it was of concern that Iran has not cooperated with the IAEA on issues related to possible military dimensions. All agreed to show continued support for the IAEA's investigation into these issues.
2. (C) France, the U.K., and the U.S. provided all the presentations on Iran's nuclear fuel cycle, weaponization-related activities, and IAEA safeguards, but Russia offered useful commentary about the status of the Bushehr power reactor. China was more engaged than in previous meetings and was heavily focused on questions regarding Iran's centrifuge performance and the possibility of further progress by Iran on that front. DDG for Safeguards Olli Heinonen participated at the end of the session and usefully answered questions about Iran's centrifuge program and Iran's refusal to allow IAEA access to the Heavy Water Research Reactor. He also reviewed the fact that select sensitive issues from the August 2007 work plan had been kicked back to the "alleged studies basket" in order to facilitate reaching that basket as the IAEA attempts to engage the Iranians on the most sensitive, military-related aspects of the investigation. Heinonen was unambiguous in dismissing Iran's "need" to have copies of the "alleged studies" documents, an issue unhelpfully raised by the German DCM. Overall, experts found the discussions useful, especially since there seemed to be no dissent on the unofficial conclusions made. No one objected to the Chair's suggestion that the group should meet again. End Summary.
--------------------------------------
The Enrichment Part of the Fuel Cycle
---------------------------------------
3. (C) The French began the discussion by highlighting Iran's indigenous sources of uranium -- from phosphate deposits (a potential future source), the Saghand uranium mine, and the Gachin uranium mine. The French noted that the ore processing facility at Ardakan, which will process the uranium from Saghand, is scheduled to start operations in March 2009, according to Iranian statements, while the current status of the ore processing facility at Gachin is unknown. They also pointed out that even if the mines at Saghand and Gachin operated at their stated capacity of approximately 70 tons per year, this amount of uranium would support only about 50 percent of the demonstrated capacity of the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan. Regarding activities at the UCF, the French explained that Iran's current uranium stockpile was dwindling, with less than 100 tons of uranium remaining, and that Iran had significantly slowed down operations at the UCF during 2008 and 2009, most likely to preserve its declining stockpile. The French noted that Iran is thought to have uranium-bearing phosphate rock deposits in the northern part of the country, with uranium content ranging from 50 to 700 parts per million, and that Iran might in the future look to exploit these deposits. Regarding potential sources for importing additional uranium, the French experts mentioned the Congo without further elaboration. Such transfers are proscribed under UNSCR 1737.
4. (C) The U.S. noted that operations at the UCF already have been impacted by the uranium shortage and that Iran can never be fully independent for its complete nuclear fuel cycle. The U.K. added that the current uranium shortage will not have a near term impact on operations at Natanz, since Iran has plenty of UF6 to keep existing centrifuges running for several years. The U.S. suggested that countries should be on the look out for Iran trying to procure uranium or large amounts of uranium-bearing phosphate rock from abroad, and also possible efforts to modify existing phosphoric acid production lines to extract the uranium.
5. (C) Turning to enrichment-related activities, the U.K. led the discussion with a detailed presentation on Iran's centrifuge progress and performance in 2008. The U.K. estimated that the IR-1 (P-1) cascades at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) performed at an average level of 0.6 separative work units (SWU) per machine-year during 2008. The U.S. indicated agreement with this value, adding that performance peaked during mid-2008 and declined somewhat since then. The U.K. developed a sliding scale of Iranian uranium enrichment, concluding that after 5 years, Iran could possess 20 tons of low enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) with 8 units of 3,000 centrifuge machines, at Iran's current pace of installation--approximately 2 cascades per month--and operation. The U.S. noted that this was about two-thirds of the amount needed for a single annual fuel reload for a Bushehr-type reactor. Russia inquired as to UK views on whether Iran has enough centrifuge parts to continue cascade installation at a rate 2 per month; the U.K. noted that it is conceivable that they do, but that it is difficult to say absent further Iranian transparency. The U.K. noted that it is possible Iran still needs to procure some associated parts. Both the U.K. and the U.S. noted that Iran had operated its centrifuges at Natanz considerably better in 2008 than in 2007, but it was implausible, as disussed at the previous experts meeting, that Tehran could reach its claimed commercial program goal with the P1-type/IR-1 centrifuges.
6. (C) Russia agreed that equipping all 8 cascade units or beyond at Natanz with P-1/IR-1 machines was a "waste" in the commercial context. Russia also replied that Iran does not need a commercial program to support the Bushehr reactor because Russia already has committed to support the lifetime operations of that reactor, including by providing fuel. The U.S. commented that although centrifuge operations in 2008 were "mediocre," Iran had now demonstrated centrifuge operations such that it had the technical ability to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) if it so chose. Consequently, even if Iran did not have a viable commercial capability, Iran is capable of producing significant amounts of low enriched uranium. The U.S. also called into question the assumption that Iran was focused on developing a commercial capability, and that it is possible Iran was intending only to demonstrate a "fait accompli" capability in the face of international pressure and to produce a stockpile of LEU.
7. (C) The U.S. asked what were the drivers--political, technical, or both--for Iran not feeding UF6 into the nine installed, but not-yet-operating, cascades in Unit A26, and when might Iran transition from the IR-1 centrifuge to one of the new generation machines. The U.K. agreed with the U.S. comment that it was possible that Iran was performing more mechanical and quality control tests, and fixing leaks and other problems before proceeding forward with operations of additional cascades, unlike in the past.
8. (C) Germany said it had a "feeling" that Iran would use the first cascade hall of 27,000 machines for the IR-1 centrifuges and fill the second cascade hall with the more advanced centrifuges. The U.K. responded that the relatively low numbers of the new generation centrifuge machines--IR-2, IR-3, and IR-4--in the pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP) at Natanz seems to indicate that the Iranians are still in the test and development stage.
9. (C) France presented a chart of Iran's production of low enriched UF6 and asked for others' assessments on how much low enriched uranium (LEU) would equate to a "significant quantity" (SQ) of HEU, if it were further enriched and converted to metal. The U.K. responded that in a simple steady-state system, 1000 kg of low enriched UF6 would equal one SQ, but Iran would need more than that for its first weapons-worth of material. France noted their estimates were roughly around 1500 kg for Iran's first weapon. There was no dissent among experts to 1500 kg as the likely threshold. France also asked if Iran could produce 20 percent enriched uranium at Natanz using its existing cascade configuration. The U.S. indicated that Iran could re-feed the 3.5 percent enriched uranium that it currently is producing to achieve roughly 20 percent enrichment, but did not know what measures Iran might have to take to ensure the higher enrichment level did not produce a safety/criticality issue in the cascade feed and withdrawal systems. The U.S. pointed out that it would be more practical to use only a portion of the existing cascades for such re-feeding, leaving the remaining cascades to continue low enriched UF6 production.
--------------------------
The Reactor Side of Things
--------------------------
10. (C) The U.K. led a short discussion on reactors and fuel fabrication, noting that this section of Iran's fuel cycle was well behind the uranium enrichment track. In a particularly helpful intervention, Russia reiterated (without prompting) the statement it had made at the previous experts meeting that Iran's fuel cycle/fuel fabrication activity currently has no connection to the Bushehr reactor, because there already is a contract for Russia to provide 10 fuel loads--which will last for a little more than 10 years--for the reactor. Replying to the U.S. question if it was possible for the fuel to be lQd into Bushehr the second quarter of this year, as indicated in the IAEA Director General's February report, Russia said that it was possible, but it was more difficult to determine when the reactor would go critical. The U.S. asked if Russia would supply Iran with the licensing so that Tehran could make its own fuel for Bushehr once the 10-load contract runs out. Russia responded that when negotiating fuel contracts with Iran, Tehran insisted on only the first 10 loads, but Russia expects to supply fuel for the lifetime of Bushehr and it would not agree to provide Iran the necessary technology/license to make its own fuel for the Bushehr reactor.
11. (C) France asked if the 10-load contract had actually been signed by the Iranians and was "in effect." Russia responded that the contract had been "agreed to," and that is what mattered. The U.S. commented that IAEA-sponsored Iranian safety and regulatory training for Bushehr was not scheduled until later this year, and posited that there might be a safety issue associated with operating Bushehr before that training takes place. Russia replied that its technicians would be in charge of all the operations at Bushehr in the near term, so it did not matter when the safety training for Iranians took place. XXXXXXXXXXXX
---------------------------------
Concerns with Lack of Progress on
Possible Military Dimensions
---------------------------------
12. (C) The U.S. started the discussion on possible military dimensions (PMD) and noted the IAEA has not been able to make any progress on this issue of serious concern since August 2008 because of lack of Iranian cooperation. The U.S. noted that the IAEA has reported at length on the extensive documentation related to Iran's effort to design a nuclear warhead and that the only response Iran has offered is that the information is "fabricated." The U.S. explained that the IAEA first began reporting on Iran's nuclear weaponization-related work in January 2006 and continued to describe in detail the nature of the work in subsequent DG reports and technical briefings.
13. (C) Recalling the U.S. Intelligence Community's assessment in the 2007 NIE that Iran halted its nuclear weapons work in 2003, France asked about information in DDG Safeguards Olli Heinonen's February 2008 technical briefing which indicated some activities had taken place in 2004. The U.S. responded that the information in Heinonen's February 2008 briefing was consistent with the 2003 weaponization halt assessment, since some activities were wrapping up in 2004. The U.S. commented that acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability requires more than just the work on a nuclear device. Instead, production of fissile material is key, and Iran has continued to develop that capability. At the end of the day, the U.S. noted, it is important for Iran to fully disclose any past weaponization-related work, implement the Additional Protocol (AP), suspend all proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, and fully cooperate with the IAEA in order to begin to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. If Iran does not do this, U.S. experts said, that would suggest Iran wishes to hide and preserve its past work, perhaps to keep a future weapons option open.
14. (C) The U.K. expressed concern that the PMD issues receive less and less attention in the DG's reports. Russia agreed, but noted its view that the IAEA has shared as much information as it has related to PMD and that there is nothing new to report. Sharing the concern that less attention seems to be paid to PMD, the U.S. recalled that the 2007 NIE assessment indicated that the 2003 weapons halt was at least partially due to the increased international scrutiny and pressure at the time. It is extremely important to continue the international pressure, in the U.S. view, so that Tehran does not feel comfortable reversing the halt.
15. (C) The DCM from the German Mission asked why copies of the alleged studies information could not be provided to Iran and remarked that some Board members saw this as a hindrance to the verification process. The U.S. suggested that it would be a good idea to get Heinonen's opinion on that issue, in particular whether the IAEA inspectors truly saw this as a hindrance to their investigation. The U.K. replied that Heinonen has made very clear to them that the IAEA is not asking for anything more to be shared with Iran, especially since Iran refuses to cooperate on what the IAEA already has shared. The French noted that Iran still has not provided an answer to the origin of the uranium hemispheres document and how it came to be in Iran. The U.S. acknowledged this, and noted that it is also important that the IAEA receive all possible assistance in resolving concerns that foreign expertise was provided to Iran regarding design of an implosion device.
------------------------
Other Outstanding Issues
------------------------
16. (C) The U.S. noted that in addition to the outstanding issues related to PMD, Iran still has not clarified the IAEA's concerns about the nature of the Lavizan facility and equipment, has not granted the IAEA access to the Gachin mine and ore processing plant, and that several issues from the August 2007 work plan that were not resolved were pushed to the "alleged studies" section of the work plan. Russia asked how the IAEA could address all these issues as long as Iran refuses to implement the AP. The U.S. replied that the UNSC has empowered the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues; therefore, the IAEA has the right to seek clarifications on these issues, but cannot do so without Iranian cooperation.
---------------------------
Safeguards and Verification
---------------------------
17. (C) France took the lead in discussing safeguards and verification of Iran's nuclear program by mentioning that the IAEA has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, implement full safeguards at Natanz, and perform 21 unannounced inspections at Natanz, but Iran continues to refuse design information verification (DIV) access to the IR-40 and design information for the reactor to be built at Darkhovin. France also noted the problems in the past that Iran created over the designation of inspectors and issuing visas. France recalled the IAEA's Legal Office opinion, provided during the March Board meeting, that Iran's refusal to implement Code 3.1 Modified and allow IAEA access to the IR-40 reactor was inconsistent with Tehran's safeguards obligations. The U.S. noted that we should inquire with Heinonen as to the point at which failure to provide DIV access was imperiling safeguards integrity.
18. (C) Describing additional concerns about the IAEA's ability to verify/investigate Iran's nuclear program, France stated that there were less than a dozen inspectors in Ops B, there continues to be a rapid turnover of IAEA officials associated with the Iranian nuclear account, and the IAEA's "Iranian" expertise is tenuous, citing the retirement of the IAEA's centrifuge expert last summer. Germany agreed that there were a lot of issues with Iran's cooperation, but the biggest problem most likely was the non-implementation of the AP, especially if there was an undeclared facility somewhere in Iran. France reiterated the importance of Code 3.1 Modified, and commented that we should focus on the issue of prompting Iranian implementation of its related obligations.
-----------------------------
U.K.'s Summary of Discussions
-----------------------------
19. (C) The U.K. Ambassador summarized the main points from the meeting, stating clearly these were not "official, agreed to positions," but just general conclusions from the Chair's perspective. (Note: China and Russia came to the meeting in the understanding that ground rules from the previous meetings would obtain, ground rules which preclude any formal agreement on shared conclusions. End note.) The main points were:
--Iran's centrifuge operations in 2008 had improved from 2007, but the centrifuge performance still was relatively poor and not at a steady state;
--the performance of Iran's centrifuge operations was not adequate to achieve Tehran's stated commercial goals;
--delays in centrifuge cascade commissioning may have more to do with centrifuge operators attempting to address performance problems than any political signal from Tehran to the international community; --there has been a complete lack of progress on PMD and the IAEA has been unable to report any developments on these issues; --the P5 1 shared the concern that the outstanding issues have not been adequately addressed by Iran, and Tehran must provide the IAEA access to individuals, documentation, and locations associated with PMD; and --the P5 1 will continue to support the IAEA on the Iranian nuclear issue. -------------------------
Session with DDG Heinonen
-------------------------
20. (C) As requested, Heinonen and IAEA weapons expert XXXXXXXXXXXX joined the meeting before it concluded. After a brief summary of the agenda, the U.K. Chair posed several questions, Heinonen responded and subsequently answered additional questions from the experts. Heinonen explained that the IAEA does not have much access to the actual centrifuges at Natanz (as they are inside casings), but said the installation of the IR-1 has been linear, although the commissioning--feeding with UF6--has not. Heinonen said the believed the installation of the additional IR-1's suggests that Iran has faith in its ability to operate those machines, but he said he would not add to the speculation as to why the Iranians have not yet fed UF6 into them. Heinonen described the low enriched UF6 reporting discrepancy at the physical inventory verification (PIV) in November 2008 as an Iranian operator calculation error. He said the IAEA is conducting a systematic internal review of the matter and also continues to work closely with Iran to assess the causes of this error and help change practices in the future so that it does not happen again.
21. (C) Regarding the question of providing copies of "alleged studies" documents to Iran, Heinonen explained in detail that the IAEA has been seeking answers from Tehran on these issues since 2005 and that Iran has been given repeated, ample access to the information, but still claims only that they are "forgeries." Noting specifically the IAEA's attempts to investigate possible military-related procurements, Heinonen described the process by which some questions in the IAEA work plan for Iran were kicked back to the final "alleged studies" basket of issues because Iran would not deal with them under other, earlier issues. He also said the work plan stated that "access," not copies or originals, to the documentation would be provided to Iran. Tehran, however, has tried to change the "rules of the game" over time and started to focus on a call to receive "originals" only in September 2008. Heinonen mentioned that he does not foresee any progress on these issues in the near term, especially without AP access and the implementation of Code 3.1 Modified.
22. (C) Responding to a question from the French about visas and the designation of inspectors for Iran, Heinonen said the IAEA currently had available the personnel it needs to work in Iran, but a problem could arise if the IAEA and Iran were to hold technical discussions requiring experts/consultants who are not designated inspectors, for example, XXXXXXXXXXXX. The U.K. asked what Iran's long-term plans were for the installation and operation of the new generation centrifuges at Natanz. Heinonen replied that he thinks Iran has realized the IR-1 is not the most dependable machine and he would be surprised if Iran installed 54,000 IR-1s in the FEP at Natanz. He speculated that maybe the fourth unit of 3,000 machines at the FEP would consist of a more advanced centrifuge.
23. (C) Germany asked if the LEU produced at Natanz was for Bushehr fuel and if Iran could enrich uranium beyond 3.5 percent. Heinonen said the safeguards agreement for Natanz allows up to 5 percent enrichment. Iran could choose to increase that level, but it would have to notify the IAEA. The U.S. asked if the safeguards approach for Natanz would change as the number of centrifuges or assay were to increase, and Heinonen responded that the camera positions would have to be rearranged and the frequency of unannounced inspections increased. In response to a query from the U.K., Heinonen specified that safeguards cameras at Natanz cover the perimeter of the cascade halls, focusing on input/output points. He also noted that, unlike such inspections under the IAEA's "Hexapartite" approach to safeguards at enrichment plants, inspectors at Natanz can go "anywhere underground" they like, i.e., there is no set course inspectors must follow during unannounced inspections. Heinonen said this combined monitoring assures that Iran cannot take machines in and out of the cascades without the IAEA knowing.
24. (C) Responding to the U.S. question about the source of the uranium dioxide (UO2) that Iran is using to produce fuel rods at the FMP, Heinonen said he thought the UO2 was being produced at the UCF, although he was not 100 percent sure. He also said that Iran has a stock of UO2 that it acquired from abroad in the early 1990s. XXXXXXXXXXXX
25. (C) The U.S. commented about the difference between a State's legal obligations under the comprehensive safeguards agreement and transparency measures, and how Syria now seems to be taking cues from Iran's behavior. Is there really a clean break between obligations and "transparency?" Heinonen said he did not think it was a clean break and that it was difficult to make the exact determination of where voluntary transparency begins. The U.K. asked if the Board could assist the IAEA Secretariat in this area, and Heinonen recalled a 1992 discussion on the strengthening of safeguards as well as States implementing the AP.
26. (C) China noted that the assessed SWU for Iran's operations of the IR-1 centrifuge in 2008 was 0.6 and asked if this low number was because of the poor design of the centrifuge. Heinonen said, "I wish I knew." The U.S. asked if Iran's DIV refusal for the IR-40 was an immediate concern and what Iran planned to do with the spent fuel from that reactor. Heinonen said he has no information on spent fuel plans for the IR-40 and that currently the main concern for DIV access is for UNSC reporting responsibilities, since Iran is at least 4-5 years away from operating the reactor. Heinonen then emphasized that safeguards concerns will grow over time and "we shouldn't tolerate this Iranian behavior too long." Germany asked about the status of the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP), which will support the IR-40 reactor, and Heinonen said the IAEA was as "equally blind" about the operational status of the HWPP, but he did not think Iran currently was producing high quality heavy water.
27. (C) Responding to Germany's question about the status of the uranium metal production line at the UCF, Heinonen explained that Iran has yet to test that process at the UCF, although all the equipment is installed. Heinonen also stated that Iran could not produce HEU metal at the UCF with the current set-up and safeguards, as different equipment would be required to make HEU metal. France asked why the uranium metal document is under seal in Iran and not in Vienna. Heinonen replied that the IAEA has asked to move the document to Vienna, but Iran has yet to turn the document over to the IAEA. The U.K. asked about Iran's time scale for converting the low enriched UF6 into UO2--for reactor fuel--at the UCF. Heinonen said that there was little work left for Iran to complete on that process, but all low enriched UF6 remains at Natanz. XXXXXXXXXXXX
28. (C) China inquired about how many centrifuge components and raw material for component manufacturing Iran currently has. Heinonen explained the IAEA's knowledge regarding Iran's component manufacturing and materials capabilities had diminished since the suspension agreement and AP were no longer in place. He said that before the IAEA lost access in 2007, Iran had enough components for approximately 10,000 IR-1 centrifuges. He remarked that during his January 2008 visit to Kalaye Electric, he discovered that Iran was actively reverse engineering components for more advance centrifuges. Also at that time Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) head Aqazadeh claimed that Iran was self-sufficient in making the high-strength aluminum alloy, maraging steel and magnets it needs for centrifuges. Heinonen commented that he did not think the maraging steel the IAEA had previously seen in Iran was appropriate for use in producing IR-2 centrifuges. He also noted that Iran would need a source of carbon fiber to build composite centrifuges and he had no idea where that carbon fiber would come from. He described maraging steel and carbon fiber as possible "bottlenecks" in the Iranian centrifuge program. Heinonen further stated that he believes that the Iranians have come to realize that the IR-1 is not the "ultimate solution" and he believes that the "IR-2 is the future". He also noted that the IR-2 and the IR-3 have approximately the same dimensions but are constructed of different materials. He stated that the IR-2 and the IR-3 appear to be subcritical machines and approximately half the height of the P-2, but the same diameter. He further believes one to be maraging steel and the other to involve carbon composite.
-------
Comment
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29. (C) The U.S. delegation believed this meeting worthwhile as a means for engaging Russian and Chinese experts on the technical facts of the Iranian nuclear program, facts that we hope will be accurately reported to more senior officials in Moscow and Beijing. Specifically, the meeting again provided a relatively depoliticized forum for experts to hear the details regarding IAEA interactions with Iran. Perhaps most valuable on this from was Heinonen's clear statement that Iran already has the option for all the "access" it needs to PMD documents and "we shouldn't tolerate this Iranian behavior too long" with regard to Tehran's continued refusal allow DIV access to the IR-40. We note that Chinese participation was more robust than in the previous two such experts meetings, and that China's questions focused heavily on better understanding the level of Iran's centrifuge prowess. Members of the U.S. delegation engaged the Chinese Mission and CAEC representatives in an extended discussion on this issue over the lunch break. These expert meetings have evolved into a relatively comfortable mechanism for discussing technical issues on Iran at the expert level, and convening them is also a useful optic for the IAEA Secretariat to witness.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Cable dated:2006-05-23T11:49:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PHNOM PENH 000983
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, INL/AAE--PETER PRAHAR AND YANTI KAPOYOS, INL/C--GREG STANTON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2016
TAGS: SNAR, PGOV, CB, TW
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA: DRUG SEIZURES AND ARRESTS UP
1. (U) SUMMARY: May 19 and 20 arrests of two Taiwanese nationals attempting to smuggle a total of nearly 7 kg of heroin to Taiwan highlight increased drug arrests and seizures in Cambodia. The quantity of heroin seized during the weekend airport busts is large by Cambodian standards--authorities seized just 11 kg of heroin in 2005. Seizures of amphetamine-type stimulants are more than double last year's levels. Police and international observers credit USG and other foreign training with providing skills, motivation, and international pressure for the increase, but say that narcotics trafficking may also be on the rise. END SUMMARY.
Heroin Seizures at Phnom Penh International Airport
--------------------------------------------- -------
2. (U) Police and customs officials seized nearly 7 kg of heroin and arrested three Taiwanese nationals in two separate incidents at Phnom Penh International Airport on May 19 and 20. These two cases represent an impressive intake for one weekend given that in 2005 Cambodian authorities seized just over 11 kg of heroin.
3. (SBU) Chen Hsin Hung, 57, was arrested on May 19 carrying 4.75 kg of heroin with a local street value of USD 95,000 to 133,000. Customs officials became suspicious when they noticed that Hung was carrying several bags of imported Taiwanese foil-wrapped candies back to Taiwan in his hand luggage. The candies turned out to be foil-wrapped packages of heroin. Hung, who was due to travel to Taiwan via Kuala Lumpur on Malaysian Airlines flight 755, had arrived in Phnom Penh the previous day. During his police interrogation, Hung said that he had been picked up at the airport and returned to the airport by a couple, whom the police identified as a Cambodian woman and a mainland Chinese or Taiwanese man. Police are attempting to locate the couple.
4. (SBU) A second Taiwanese man, who was standing near Chen Hsin Hung during the security process, appeared to be quite interested in the proceedings and upset by Hung's arrest, and had tickets for the same flight as Hung, was also arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking. Moek Dara noted that the investigation had revealed no evidence to indicate that the second individual was also involved in drug smuggling, but that it was the prosecutor's decision how to proceed in the case.
5. (SBU) On May 20, a 90-year-old Taiwanese national named Huang Sang Hou was arrested at Phnom Penh International Airport with 1.9 kg of heroin, worth USD 38,000 to USD 53,000. Hou reportedly came to Cambodia as a tourist intending to gamble. Over the course of a week, he lost the USD 4,000 he brought with him, borrowed an additional USD 2,000 from a Taiwanese national in Phnom Penh, and then lost that money as well. The Taiwanese lender then persuaded Hou to carry the heroin back to Taiwan. Airport customs officials were tipped off by the sloppy manner in which the heroin was packed on Hou's body, making him appear bloated. Hou cooperated with the police in identifying the Taiwanese lender, and Cambodian government officials have already passed his name, address, and passport information to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Hou had been planning to fly Dragon Airlines flight 207 to Hong Kong, and then to continue on to Taiwan.
Amphetamine Seizures, Prices on the Rise
----------------------------------------
6. (SBU) According to statistics from the Ministry of Interior's Anti-Drug Police and the National Authority for Combating Drugs (NACD), seizures of amphetamine-type stimulant (ATS) tablets more than doubled when comparing the first four months of 2006 with the first four months of 2005. From January to April 2006, more than 220,000 ATS tablets were seized, whereas from January to April 2005, approximately 87,000 ATS tablets were seized. The number of offenders arrested also rose from 154 from January to April 2005 to 204 during January to April 2006.
7. (U) Both Brigadier General Moek Dara, Director of the Anti-Drugs Department, and World Health Organization XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that prices for ATS tablets have risen in the past few years, with particularly dramatic increases in the past 12 months. One year ago, a single ATS tablet sold for approximately one dollar in Phnom Penh, but now costs two to three dollars. Moek Dara noted that prices rise as the ATS tablets make their way along the drug route, from fifty cents per tablet in Laos, where the
PHNOM PENH 00000983 002 OF 003
majority are produced, to USD 3 in Cambodia, and then even higher prices in two destination countries: USD 4 in Vietnam and USD 7.50 in Thailand. XXXXXXXXXXXX cited anecdotal evidence from NGOs that some ATS users are switching to injecting heroin, currently available for USD 1.50 to 2 in Phnom Penh, as a cheaper alternative to rising ATS prices.
Lower Ecstasy Seizures Likely Point to Disrupted Network --------------------------------------------- -----------
8. (U) In contrast to the dramatic rise in ATS seizures, seizures of ecstasy tablets are down sharply, from 1,900 in January to April 2005 to less than 800 in January to April 2006. Moek Dara and XXXXXXXXXXXX believe that lower levels of ecstasy seizures are a sign that supply has been disrupted following a cooperative DEA/Anti-Drug Police controlled delivery operation against the Peter Brown drug ring in 2004 and continued Anti-Drug Police action against the ring in 2005.
USG Training Provides Needed Skills, International Pressure
--------------------------------------------- --------------
9. (SBU) Moek Dara gave much of the credit for the dramatic increase in heroin and ATS seizures and drug arrests to counternarcotics training funded by the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and conducted by the DEA. Before the training sessions, which were conducted in January and April 2006, police officers along Cambodia's porous northern border were not very active and would not even conduct foot patrols in the forest, according to Moek Dara. Now, however, the officers have more skills and are more motivated to patrol actively, he said, and have seized drugs and a lot of drug production equipment as well. Customs, immigration, and police officials at the airports are also better trained and more active, and Moek Dara noted that all of the officials involved in the weekend's airport arrests had completed DEA training.
10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX gave partial credit for increased anti-drug activity to counternarcotics training by the US and other foreign donors. Some high-ranking Cambodian police and military officials are rumored to be complicit in narcotics trafficking, he noted. He speculated that the training and pressure on the Cambodian government to clamp down on drug activity has finally made an impression on higher ranking officials, and lower-level officers are "being allowed" to make more seizures. At the same time, such a dramatic increase is probably also an indication of efforts to traffic increased amounts of ATS through Cambodia, he opined.
Trainees Enthusiastic about INL/DEA Courses
-------------------------------------------
11. (U) Provincial Anti-Drug Police officers who attended the January Basic Counternarcotics course reported uniformly enthusiastic assessments to an embassy follow-up survey. Participating police captains reported an increased awareness of drug smuggling tactics, best practices in seizing and preparing evidence, and how to identify drugs using field test kits. Captain Preap Sovann of the Svay Rieng Anti-Drug Police noted that the training also promoted inter-agency and inter-province cooperation as well. All captains reported training their staffs in the key topics covered by the DEA training, and captains in Koh Kong and Pursat provinces reported conducting anti-drug outreach to primary and secondary school students as well. Trainees suggested that future courses provide written materials in Khmer as well as English, include information on money laundering, have more laboratory equipment available for in-class practice in drug identification, and include more time in simulations.
Police Officer Arrested on Drug Charges
---------------------------------------
11. (C) Nov Sophal, a municipal police officer in the southern city of Kep, was arrested on April 15 and charged with trafficking 1 kg of heroin. Moek Dara was not expansive when asked about the case, noting simply that it is not uncommon for low-ranking police and military officials to be arrested for drug trafficking. In contrast, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that drug investigations of police or military officials are very rare, and speculated that the individual involved may even have run afoul of rumored higher-level police involvement in narcotics.
12. (SBU) COMMENT: While increased smuggling activity may
PHNOM PENH 00000983 003 OF 003
account for some of the increased seizures and arrests, it is clear that the Cambodian government is turning up the heat on the country's drug smugglers. Training from the USG and other countries is playing a critical role in supporting this effort--both through the skills and enthusiasm imparted to the participants, and also through the implicit expectations of improved performance on the part of the police and other officials.
STORELLA
Cable dated:2009-01-14T23:15:00
S E C R E T STATE 003943
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2032
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, IR, CH
SUBJECT: (S) NIAG 8233: TRANSFER OF MARAGING STEEL FROM CHINA TO IRAN
Classified By: ISN ACTING A/S PATRICIA A. MCNERNEY, REASONS 1.4 (B), (C), AND (D)
SUMMARY
--------
1. (S//REL China) We have received information that XXXXXXXXXXXX associated with XXXXXXXXXXXX was making arrangements with Chinese entity XXXXXXXXXXXX to purchase maraging steel. The steel was to be partially machined in order to disguise it as mechanical parts in order to evade Chinese customs officials. Certain types of maraging steel are controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers, Group's Dual Use List, under item 2. C. 11.
2. XXXXXXXXXXXX
ACTION REQUEST
--------------
3. (S//REL China) Post is instructed to inform appropriate-level Chinese officials of this transaction, and request that they investigate the entity and individuals involved. Post should also remind the PRC that XXXXXXXXXXXX could be sanctioned under U.S. law. Post may draw from Summary, Objectives, and Talking Points/Non-Paper below, as appropriate.
OBJECTIVES
----------
4. (S//REL China) Post should pursue the following:
-- Provide information regarding the transfer and encourage Chinese officials to thoroughly investigate the transfer and the entities involved.
-- Encourage Chinese officials to share the results of their investigation with us.
-- Emphasize that the Iranian entities involved are linked to Iran's DIO, a designated entity under UNSCR 1737.
-- Note that, given Iran's continuing nuclear and missile related activities, now is not the time for business as usual with Iran.
TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER
------------------------
5. (S//REL China) Begin talking points/non-paper:
-- We would like to share with you information regarding a transfer of maraging steel from the XXXXXXXXXXXX.
-- Our information indicates that XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
-- The purchase was to consist of approximately 25 metric tons of maraging steel, which was to be machined so as to be disguised as mechanical parts in order to evade Chinese customs.
-- The pro forma invoice for this shipment includes the following details: --- Commodity: maraging steel rods, diameter: 38.1 mm, length: 450.2 mm --- Technical Standards/Specifications/Requirements: According to grade DIN. 1.270 (X3NiCoMoTi18-9-5) or AISI 18 Ni --- Packing: in seaworthy standard wooden boxes --- Price: free on Board (FOB) Chinese main port: 58.85 euro ($75.47) PER KG, Cost and Freight (CFR) XXXXXXXXXXXX: 59 euro ($75.55) per kg --- Partial shipment allowed, transshipment not allowed --- Shipment: By vessel in container
--- Payment: 50 percent by telegraphic transfer prepaid and remaining 50 percent by cash at delivery, to be paid after the cargo has been received and the quality and quantity confirmed.
--- Delivery time: within 80-140 days from the date of receipt of 50 percent prepaid payment --- Port of loading: any Chinese port
--- XXXXXXXXXXXX We believe that other deals are also being discussed between these parties, possibly involving other forms of maraging steel.
-- Certain types of maraging steel are subject to control by
the Nuclear Suppliers, Group Dual Use List, under item 2. C. 11, and by the Missile Technology Control Regime under item
6C8 of Category II.
-- Furthermore, supply to Iran,s nuclear and missile programs of certain types of maraging steel are prohibited under UNSCR 1737 as specified in the lists of UNSCR documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815. -- Although the solid maraging steel rods described previously are not explicitly controlled on these lists, the circumstances surrounding this case, i.e., deceptive practices involving a proscribed entity and prospects for further deals between the parties, suggest that the transfer of this material would be inconsistent with China's obligations under UNSCR 1737. -- Moreover, certain types of maraging steel are prohibited by UNSCR 1803 from being transferred to Iran.
-- As you are aware, we have discussed the proliferation related activities of XXXXXXXXXXXX with the Chinese Government on a number of occasions. XXXXXXXXXXXX could be sanctioned under U.S. law for these activities. -- Given the urgent nature of this nuclear-related transfer, we request that you investigate this transfer and take all necessary measures, consistent with your laws and authorities, to prevent it. -- We hope your government will provide us with the results of this investigation. END POINTS.
REPORTING REQUIREMENT
---------------------
6. (U) Post is requested to report results of its efforts within five business days of receipt of this cable.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
8. (U) Department thanks Post for its assistance. Please slug responses for EAP, ISN, NEA, and T. RICE
Cable dated:2008-08-01T19:52:00
S E C R E T STATE 083144
E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 08/01/2032
TAGS: ECON, KNNP, PARM, PTER, IR, CH, PINR
SUBJECT: EFFORTS TO HALT IRANIAN PROCUREMENT IN CHINA
Classified By: EAP Acting DAS John J. Norris for 1.4 b,d
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.
-------------------
SUMMARY/BACKGROUND
-------------------
2. (S//NF) Washington is currently initiating a more focused strategy to prevent shipments of commodities of concern to Iran. We are approaching countries and asking them to inform their relevant industries of the United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) against Iran, and encourage those industries to contact appropriate officials in their governments if they receive any inquiries of concern. We are providing information about certain Chinese companies that have provided commodities to Iranian entities involved in its nuclear program in an effort to encourage China to ensure such activities are not continued and to encourage China to adopt a similar proactive strategy of working with their companies to make them aware of potential Iranian procurement in support of its nuclear program. We would also expect that the provision of this information will lead to subsequent expert-level discussions of this issue with Chinese Government counterparts.
3. (S//NF) Iran has failed to suspend its uranium enrichment and heavy water-related activities as required by the United Nations Security Council. Iran makes frequent use of deceptive tactics in order to obtain items and technology to continue the development of its nuclear program. Furthermore, as described in IAEA Director General El Baradei,s report of 22 February 2008, Iran has admitted to evading international sanctions in order to procure sensitive nuclear-related technologies. DG El Baradei,s reports of 22 February and 26 May also describe Iran's installation and testing of two new, advanced centrifuge designs. These new centrifuges are called the IR-2 and IR-3. Based on Iranian declarations to the IAEA and on photographs taken by the Iranian Government during a visit to Natanz by Iranian President Ahmadinejad, it is probable that these new designs use rotors made from carbon fiber. The other version of Iranian centrifuge (the IR-1) consists of high strength aluminum. We are approaching countries that develop the technologies and materials that Iran,s nuclear program will require (such as carbon fiber for the IR-2 and IR-3) and requesting that these countries take proactive steps to educate and inform their companies about potential Iranian procurement efforts.
-------------------------
OBJECTIVES/ACTION REQUEST
-------------------------
4. (S//REL CHINA) We would like to reinforce China,s own efforts in thwarting Iranian attempts to procure critical materials for its nuclear program from Chinese entities. Washington requests Post deliver the non-paper in paragraph 4 to appropriate host government officials. (Note - The non-paper was originally prepared for U/S John Rood,s recent visit to China but was not delivered due to time constraints.) Post should pursue the following objectives:
-- Inform China that the U.S. is taking proactive steps domestically to thwart Iranian procurement attempts in support of its nuclear program.
-- Encourage China to take similar steps with their companies.
-- Inform China that in the spirit of our cooperation, we are sharing our assessment of them regarding previous Iranian procurement attempts in China (information in attached non-paper). This includes information about specific Chinese companies that have been approached by Iran for commodities in support of its nuclear program in the past.
-- Emphasize that the USG is very concerned that Iran will continue to approach Chinese companies to procure materials in support of its nuclear program.
-- Inform China that we hope that by sharing this information we can establish an ongoing information exchange to help ensure that both our countries are taking all necessary steps to prevent Iranian procurement attempts in support of its nuclear program.
-----------------------
BACKGROUND AND NONPAPER
-----------------------
5. BEGIN NON-PAPER S//REL CHINA:
-- Iran has failed to suspend its uranium enrichment- and heavy water-related activities as required by the United Nations Security Council. It has similarly refused to address International Atomic Energy Agency,s outstanding questions regarding its past efforts to develop a nuclear warhead, which have been described in detail in the last two IAEA reports.
-- Iran makes frequent use of deception to obtain items and technology for its nuclear program. Furthermore, as described in IAEA Director General El Baradei,s report of 22 February 2008, Iran has admitted to evading international sanctions in order to procure sensitive nuclear-related technologies.
-- DG El Baradei,s reports of 22 February and 26 May describe Iran's installation and testing of new, advanced centrifuge designs, the IR-2 and IR-3. Based on Iranian declarations to the IAEA and on photographs taken by the Iranian Government during a visit to Natanz by Iranian President Ahmadinejad, it is probable that this new design uses rotors made from carbon fiber. The other version of Iranian centrifuge (the IR-1) consists of high strength aluminum.
-- The United States is increasing its efforts to ensure that U.S.-origin goods that could provide direct or indirect support to Iran,s nuclear efforts are not exported or re-exported to Iran. These efforts include: Outreach to U.S. companies that manufacture sensitive commodities. These include producers of commodities listed in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines. We have also taken steps to designate and sanction Iranian individuals and companies associated with Iran,s nuclear program. These designations forbid U.S. companies from engaging in business with them.
-- We are currently undertaking a more focused international strategy to prevent shipments of commodities of concern before they happen. These efforts include: Approaching other countries and asking them to take similar domestic steps such as informing their companies of the United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) against Iran, and encouraging those companies to contact appropriate officials in their governments if they receive inquiries of concern. We have also shared watchlists of sensitive commodities with NSG Participating Governments (PGs) and have provided information to NSG partners on Iran procurement efforts.
-- In the spirit of our on-going nonproliferation cooperation and dialogue with China, we seek China,s partnership in this proactive strategy. We wish to work closely with you to ensure that our companies, either wittingly or unwittingly, are not aiding Iran,s nuclear program. As AFM He Yafei said in his meeting with Acting Under Secretary Rood on June 4 in Beijing, the U.S. and China must cooperate closely on Iran.
-- In particular, we want to alert you to specific commodities that Iran has been trying to procure through Chinese companies to include high-strength aluminum alloys (AA-7075) and vacuum pumps. Certain types of these commodities are controlled on the NSG dual-use annex and are included in the gas centrifuge procurement watchlist that was circulated to NSG PGs, and are covered by the Wassenaar Arrangement.
-- Additionally, based on the DG,s reports in February and May 2008, we believe that Iran may need to procure large amounts of high-strength carbon fiber to support the deployment of additional IR-2 and IR-3 centrifuges. Carbon fiber is included on the NSG,s dual-use annex and gas centrifuge watchlist circulated to NSG PGs.
-- We would like to provide you with detailed information we have compiled regarding Chinese companies that are capable of producing these or other sensitive, dual-use commodities. We hope this information will assist you in your outreach to Chinese companies on your export control regulations as they apply to Iran. We would encourage you, as we have done domestically with our own firms, to ask these companies to contact appropriate authorities should they be approached by entities that may have ties to Iran.
--Regarding aluminum 7075, we have identified Chinese companies that have conducted business with Iranian entities designated under UNSCR 1747, such as XXXXXXXXXXXX.
-- The following are companies in China that have supplied aluminum 7075 to Iranian entities of concern:
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
-- Extra vigilance on the part of our governments will help thwart Iran,s efforts to evade export control regulations and flout UNSCRs to support a nuclear program of serious concern to the international community.
-- We believe it would be beneficial if, in the spirit of our collaborative dialogue, you notify us, the NSG and the IAEA, if any of your companies receive inquiries from Iranian entities. Sharing this information will allow the international community to better track and stop Iran,s illicit procurement. -- We would like to ensure that this effort is ongoing and we propose a face-to-face meeting with the appropriate experts to further discuss this matter. -- We greatly appreciate your cooperation on this and other nonproliferation efforts and look forward to hearing the results of your work.
END NON-PAPER
------------------
REPORTING DEADLINE
------------------
6. (U) Post should report results within seven (7) business
days of receipt of this cable. Please slug replies for ISN.
Please include SIPDIS in all replies.
----------------
POINT OF CONTACT
XXXXXXXXXXXX
8. (U) Department thanks Post for its assistance.
RICE
Cable dated:2008-08-06T09:01:00
S E C R E T BEIJING 003039
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP, ISN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2033
TAGS: PARM, PREL, PTER, MNUC, ECON, KNNP, IR, CH
SUBJECT: CHINA'S RESPONSE TO EFFORTS TO HALT IRANIAN PROCUREMENT IN CHINA
REF: STATE 083144
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.
4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) PolOff delivered reftel demarche and non-paper regarding prevention of Iranian procurement in China of specific controlled commodities needed to expand uranium enrichment activities to MFA Arms Control and Disarmament Department Nuclear Division Director Zhang Shen. PolOff stressed the proactive and multilateral nature of this effort, and noted ongoing U.S. domestic efforts to prevent Iranian procurement of sensitive items.
2. (S) Zhang praised past "fruitful cooperation" between the United States and China in nonproliferation efforts, and said China will continue to "implement strongly the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions" regarding Iran. Zhang cited past efforts to educate local governments and companies about restrictions on selling sensitive commodities to Iran, but admitted that "some companies are still not aware" of these restrictions.
3. (S) When asked about possible approaches by China to the specific Chines companies cited as potential sources for Iraian procurement of high-strength aluminum alloys, vacuum pumps and carbon fiber, Zhang said he will share the information provided with other relevant ministries in order to "seek assistance" in China's "further efforts to enforce the relevant Security Council resolutions" and "educate" Chinese companies. PolOff encouraged Zhang to share any information obtained about Iranian procurement efforts in China with the United States, NSG partners and the IAEA. RANDT
Cable dated:2008-09-17T21:28:00
UNCLAS STATE 099666
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP, TRGY, PREL, PARM, IR, MNUC, AORC, IAEA, UNSC, UK, GM, FR, BE, IT, SZ
SUBJECT: CRITICAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS FOR IRAN,S NEW IR-2 CENTRIFUGE DESIGN
REF: A. STATE 021770
B. STATE 039585
C. STATE 052030
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.
2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: Washington provided all Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Participating Government (PGs) with detailed information regarding the critical commodities Iran will require to support the deployment of the next generation of gas centrifuges for its uranium enrichment program in ref C. Washington subsequently identified a list of those technologies which Iran cannot indigenously manufacture, and would need to procure from foreign suppliers. We would like to provide information about key suppliers resident in certain European PGs. The U.S. is making a similar approach to host governments in Asia, as well as key transshipment countries. The U.S. intends to approach governments with any new developments in the U.S.,s efforts to prevent Iranian procurement of critical commodities.
3. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Posts are requested to approach appropriate host government officials to deliver the nonpaper in para 4. In doing so, posts should pursue the following objectives:
-- Share information on ongoing USG efforts to prevent Iranian procurement of key gas centrifuge-related commodities and provide additional information to specific NSG PGs to make them aware of companies that are major suppliers of such items in their country.
-- Encourage host governments, if they have not already done so, to discuss and highlight to businesses and law enforcement authorities the importance of vigilance against the deceptive procurement practices of Iran particularly relating to items useful in a gas centrifuge program.
-- Urge host governments to share any relevant information from their industry outreach activities with the USG, the NSG, and the IAEA.
4. (U) Begin U.S. non-paper
FOR ALL POSTS
-- Industry outreach is critical to ensuring that Iran cannot procure items to advance its WMD programs, including its uranium enrichment activities.
-- Even though the U.S. has enacted comprehensive economic sanctions against the Iranian government, the U.S. government is undertaking various initiatives to raise awareness among U.S. industry to avoid illicit diversion of their products, and prevent the unwitting transfer of items to Iran that may contribute to Iran,s nuclear, ballistic missile, and advanced conventional weapons programs.
-- For example, the U.S. alerts U.S. companies that Iran uses deceptive tactics to make its procurement efforts for its nuclear, ballistic missile, and advanced conventional weapons programs appear to be legitimate commercial activities. Iranian entities also form front companies in other countries for the sole purpose of sending dual-use items to Iran for use in these programs. These front companies enable the regime to obtain materials that the country of origin would typically prohibit for export to Iran.
-- Therefore, we are asking U.S. companies to be extremely vigilant about their overseas customers, especially customers operating in known transshipment countries and countries with weak or nonexistent export controls.
-- The U.S. government is currently reaching out to U.S. manufacturers of critical commodities that Iran needs to procure from foreign suppliers for its new gas centrifuge design and alerting these companies to be cautious of unknown customers that may be procuring items on behalf of Iran,s illicit programs.
-- The U.S. government is also considering additional ways to alert industry and will keep your government informed of new developments in our industry outreach initiatives.
-- If you have not already done so, we encourage you to conduct outreach to your industry to raise awareness regarding the requirements of your export controls for Iran. We also request that you alert companies about Iran,s deceptive procurement practices.
-- Targeted outreach to companies known to produce these critical commodities can sensitize manufacturers and exporters to Iran,s deceptive procurement tactics and make them aware of export control regulations which ) consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1803, 1747, and 1737 - prohibit exporting sensitive commodities that could advance proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities in Iran, such as uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, heavy water production and/or reactor operation.
-- We ask that your government share any relevant information, such as inquiries your companies receive from Iranian entities, with the USG, the NSG, and the IAEA as this information could aid ongoing efforts to track Iranian procurement attempts and provide additional insight on Iranian procurement practices.
-- We are seeking ways to present information to broad groups of likely suppliers, re-exporters or transshipers on the critical commodities Iran is seeking from foreign suppliers for its nuclear and missile programs. We would like to hear your government,s suggestions on how to best accomplish this and are open to further discussions at the expert level.
-- The following companies are major producers of critical commodities that Iran needs to procure from foreign suppliers for the new gas centrifuge design.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
-- We also request that your government encourage companies to be cautious about requests to transfer these critical commodities within the EU, as Iran may seek to exploit the EU countries with weaker export control enforcement mechanisms and limited knowledge of the sensitivity of these items.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
Cable dated:2007-12-20T16:21:00
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 003586
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017
TAGS: PREL, PTER, MOPS, KPAL, IS
SUBJECT: GENERAL JAMES L. JONES' FIRST MEETINGS IN ISRAEL
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)
1. (S) Summary. Special Envoy for Middle East Security, retired General James L. Jones, met with Prime Minister Olmert, Defense Minister Barak, IDF Chief of General Staff Ashkenazi and members of the General Staff, Foreign Minister Livni, and Israel Security Agency head Diskin December 18. In all of his meetings, General Jones described his mandate as developing a security plan to address the needs that will arise from the establishment of a Palestinian state, factoring in the equities of Israel and other regional partners. He made clear that he will not be involved in monitoring the implementation of Phase One of the Roadmap, as has been reported repeatedly in the Israeli press. Barak and PM Olmert set the tone, offering full cooperation and support for Jones' work. In each meeting, the Israelis described their concerns about the security impact of a two-state solution on Israel due to Israel's small size and population, the heavy concentration of Israel's population and economic centers along the narrow coastal plain, their lack of confidence in the Palestinians' security capabilities, and the range of regional threats Israel faces. At the same time, most of them reiterated their support for an agreement with the Palestinians and progress toward a two-state solution. FM Livni emphasized that she did not look at security issues with a view to finding an excuse not to move forward. Rather, she felt it essential to look at security issues so that implementation of the two state vision could be done "the right way." General Jones indicated that this was an introductory visit and that he plans to return to discuss the issues in greater detail following the January visit of President Bush. Olmert indicated that he and Barak planned to assign a senior IDF defense expert, probably MG Ido Nechushtan, to serve as a liaison to General Jones. DAO will report in detail in their channels the strategic threats briefing provided by MG Nechushtan to General Jones. End Summary.
BARAK: CONSIDER THE REGIONAL THREATS
-------------------------------------
2. (S) General Jones' GOI meetings began with Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who was joined by IDF Chief of General Staff Gabi Ashkenazi and most of the MOD and IDF senior staff. General Jones was accompanied by the Ambassador, Army Attache, and PolCouns. After introducing the MOD and IDF senior staff and explaining their responsibilities, Barak observed that seen from a narrow focus on Israel and the Palestinians, Israel appears to be much the stronger party, but once the focus is expanded to cover the array of regional threats to Israel, Israel is the party that is threatened with extinction. The role of the IDF, he said, is to prevent that from happening. The triad of nuclear proliferation, Islamist terrorism, and rogue states poses a gathering threat. The IDF is engaged in daily clashes with Palestinian terror organizations, some of which are guided from Syria and supported by Iran. Hizballah and Syria have growing ground-to-ground missile capabilities directed against Israel, but Israel had just dealt with an even more serious threat from Syria. On Iran, Barak said Israel differs with the latest National Intelligence Estimate, but he did not elaborate.
3. (S) Turning to the negotiations with the Palestinians, Barak said there would only be minor modifications of the 1967 borders. Israel would need to retain the settlement blocs around Jerusalem and in the northern West Bank, but give up the other settlements. Since the Palestinian border would only be nine miles from the sea, Israel's security margin would require that the Palestinian state be demilitarized. Israel would retain control of the air space, as well as military access to the Jordan Valley for years to come. Gaza would have to be part of any solution, he noted, it could not be left as a separate entity for which the Palestinian government was not responsible.
4. (C) General Jones reviewed his military career, including a number of visits to Israel and interactions with the IDF. He noted that since retiring as NATO Supreme Commander and USEUCOM Commander in February, he had worked on a project involving the national security implications of energy issues for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, as well as writing a report for the Congress on the Iraqi security services. Secretary Rice had then asked him to come back part-time to develop a security plan for a Palestinian state that would take account of regional equities. He stressed that monitoring the Roadmap is not in his mandate. Barak offered the MOD's full support, noting that he would be clear about Israel's security needs.
IDF BRIEFING
------------
5. (S) IDF J-5 MG Ido Nechushtan, IDF Deputy Chief of Staff MG Dan Harel, and Israel Defense Intelligence head Amos Yadlin escorted General Jones, the Ambassador, Defense Attache, and PolCouns to the helopad on the roof of the Ministry of Defense tower in downtown Tel Aviv. Nechushtan pointed out the topographical vulnerabilities of greater Tel Aviv and Israel's coastal plain vis a vis the nearby ridges of the West Bank. At a follow-on briefing, Nechushtan stressed the security challenges posed by a Palestinian state. Unlike the Olso process, a peace agreement would not replace security, but security arrangements would ensure peace. Israel's security requirements would need to be addressed from the beginning of the process since Israel had no response time or strategic depth. Israel's coastal strip includes seventy percent of Israel's population and eighty percent of its GDP, and a Palestinian state would be immediately adjacent. In order to compensate for this increased risk, a Palestinian state would have to be completely demilitarized, with Israel in control of Palestine's air space and land borders. There would need to be special security arrangements to protect Jerusalem and Ben Gurion Airport. Israel would also retain security control of the Jordan Valley, while maintaining early warning and intelligence gathering sites on the tops of the West Bank hills. The land link between the West Bank and Gaza would have to be under Israeli control as well.
6. (S) IDI Chief Yadlin dismissed the PA's security capabilities, saying it would take a minimum of three to five years before the Palestinians could assume security responsibility for the West Bank. Terror organizations in the West Bank are highly motivated but their capabilities are limited due to the daily actions of the IDF and Shin Bet. Chief of General Staff Ashkenazi stressed that the Annapolis process must put security first. Most Israelis now believe in a two-state solution, he said, it was not even particularly controversial. The problem was security, he said, citing statistics that suicide bombers from the West Bank had killed 220 Israelis and wounded 1320 in 2002, but had not killed or wounded any Israelis in 2007 due to IDF action in 2002-03 to clean out the West Bank and build the fence. If Israel handed over security responsibility to the PA today, it would all start again. The burden must be on the PA to prove that it can take over.
7. (C) Noting the Marine Corps' counter-insurgency doctrine of not making more enemies and not harming the civilian population, General Jones asked whether the IDF's concept included economic development, reconstruction, and education and training. Nechushtan said these elements were linked to security. Tony Blair understood that and coordinated the security element for his projects. The MOD had reviewed Blair's projects and approved them. The problem here was to prepare for what will be needed once the PA is independent. Yadlin pointed out that if Qassam rockets were put in the West Bank, they could do much more damage than those fired from Gaza. MG Harel recalled that he had commanded the September 2005 evacuation of Gaza. At the time he had expected there would be peace, but instead terrorists had fired about 3,000 rockets at Israel since the withdrawal.
OLMERT: A LONG WAY TO GO ON THE GROUND ---------------------------------------
8. (C) The Ambassador and PolCouns accompanied General Jones to his meeting with Prime Minister Olmert in the PM's private office. The Prime Minister's Chief of Staff Yoram Turbowicz and Foreign Policy Adviser Shalom Tourgeman joined Olmert. General Jones reviewed his official visits and professional contacts with Israel since 1981 to Olmert's evident satisfaction. Olmert commented that he understood that Jones would not be the one to judge Roadmap performance, but rather he would be looking at security issues in light of the emergence of a Palestinian state, factoring in Jordanian and Israeli equities. Olmert called this an important mission due to the dominant influence of the U.S. It would be demanding and time consuming.
9. (C) The Prime Minister commented he was less pessimistic than most Israelis, but even so that he did not think a solution with the Palestinians was as close as Secretary Rice would like. There was still a "long way to go" on the ground, he said. During a visit to the IDF Central Command on the West Bank ten days prior, the commanders had told Olmert that cooperation with the PA security forces was improving, as was the West Bank economy and quality of life. But responsibility for counter-terrorism operations remained fully in Israeli hands, PA security forces were only performing civil law enforcement. If the IDF withdrew, Hamas would take over.
10. (S) Olmert said he was impressed by the extent of international support for the PA, as demonstrated by over USD 7 billion in pledges at the Paris donors' conference. Nonetheless, the question of how it would be transferred remained. Olmert said he had heard that the Saudi assistance would only go to projects, which he said he would be happy to see. The problem was that he did not see the PA developing the "iron fist" they would need to kick the terrorist organizations out of the West Bank. Gaza was lost to Hamas and Abbas had no plans for taking it back. The PA says the Palestinian state must include Gaza but they do not want to take responsibility for it.
11. (S) Olmert cautioned Jones that he must understand many layers of language in the Arab world. For example, in their one-on-one meetings, President Abbas always asks Olmert to take tougher actions against Hamas and its Gaza leadership. But when the IDF carries out operations in Gaza that kill terrorists, Saeb Erekat writes a letter to the UN complaining about it. Olmert said that the Palestinians say one thing to Secretary Rice and then ask him to do the opposite.
SIPDIS
12. (S) After expressing satisfaction at IDF operations in Gaza the previous day that had killed ten members of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, including the head of the PIJ military wing in Gaza, Olmert asked Jones how he expected to work with the MOD and IDF. Jones replied that he would work openly with them. This was only an introductory visit, but he would return after the President's visit and return regularly, working with a small staff. Olmert said he would ask Barak to assign a senior "defense intellectual" to liaise with Jones, most likely MG Nechushtan. Turbowicz commented that they were there to help Jones in every way. Olmert reiterated that point, saying he wanted Jones to succeed. The GOI wanted to move forward with the Palestinians, and both sides were in need of General Jones' advice.
ISA DISKIN: READY TO PROVIDE FOCUSED SECURITY BRIEFS --------------------------------------------- -------
13. (S) General Jones discussed his security mission with ISA Director Yuval Diskin, and emphasized that while he was not a stranger to Israel, he had worked principally with the IDF. Diskin described Shin Bet's mandate and activities in Israel and the territories, and the complicated reality of Israel's security environment. He underscored the problems posed by smuggling of weaponry across the Philadelphi corridor (between Egypt and Gaza) and stressed it was only part of a larger smuggling network: "Explosives come from Africa via the Sudan-Egypt-Suez-Sinai route, or via the Red Sea." Bedouin tribes provide the "Arab conductivity" between Egypt and Jordan (via Israel). People, too, are smuggled across the Sinai, from Eritrea, Somalia and Darfur (Sudan), Diskin added. He contrasted the laxity of Egyptian security control at Suez, which he said could easily be a chokepoint for GOE efforts to control smuggling, and in the Sinai with the seriousness of the Jordanians. Diskin stressed the strategic importance of Jordan, and the need for Israel to take account Jordanian interests.
14. (S) Diskin said Israel's main threat came from the West Bank, and that the security zone, especially in the northern West Bank, had been critical to Israel's success in countering that threat. Diskin underscored how Israel's "opportunity to control movement" in the West Bank contributed to Israel's security. He described how the number of Israeli victims had peaked in 2002, and had tapered off since the construction of the separation barrier and Operation Defensive Shield in 2002. Diskin reported that while 1100 Israelis had been killed since 2000, yet only ten Israeli civilians and soldiers had been killed by Palestinians in 2007 (in Israel or the territories). Israeli control of passages and the movement of persons between the West Bank and Jordan or between Israel and Gaza provides security.
15. (S) In response to Gen. Jones' question about the extent of Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, Diskin, who said he has been closely involved with Palestinian affairs since 1993, noted that even in the worst of times, Shin Bet had maintained contacts with Palestinian security services. He singled out the new Palestinian military intelligence chief in the West Bank as one of the only new faces, and one who was somewhat more serious than the others had been. (Diskin cited the Palestinian response to terrorism in 1996 as the only time when PA security forces proved to be serious and effective.) Diskin assessed that the Palestinian security establishment is "broken, not professional, reactive rather than proactive." Their establishment lacks a "circle of enforcement" (intelligence gathering, investigation, arrest and interrogation, and trial in a court of law). Instead, during the 1997-2000 period, the Palestinian Preventive Security Organization and the General Intelligence typically "completed Israeli operations in areas where they were 'sovereign.'"
16. (S) On training (of Palestinian security forces), Diskin said he preferred that there be one trainer, not several. DCM Moreno noted that all of the next 700 Palestinian trainees would be trained in Jordan. On Gaza, Diskin said the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) operatives killed on December 17-18 "were only part of the problem," Diskin did not think Israel could stand the status quo for many months, or risk importing the Gaza reality to the West Bank. A Gaza-like rocket threat in the West Bank would endanger Israeli industry and population centers. "That's why the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are not connected," Diskin concluded.
LIVNI: EAGER TO DISCUSS SECURITY WITH U.S., THEN PA --------------------------------------------- -------
17. (C) Gen. Jones recalled his familiarity with Israel and the IDF, his frequent training missions in Israel, and his encouragement of military-military contacts between NATO and Israel in the framework of the NATO Mediterranean dialogue. He discussed his mission with FM Livni, highlighting that the paper he envisioned as the outcome would apply more to future realities rather than the present situation on the ground. He stressed that he did not have Road map or referee in his job description, and asked Livni for her perspective.
18. (S) FM Livni characterized security as the most important core issue, one that has yet to be addressed: "Two states living side by side in peace in security has not been translated into an understanding." She traced the path that she had taken from ideological attachment (to the idea of Greater Israel) to the need for two states so as to end the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and to preserve Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Livni stressed the importance of Israel and the U.S. (and eventually Israel and the Palestinians) coming to such an understanding as to the meaning of living side by side with a Palestinian state in peace and security. "The word security is just too vague; it is not a real plan. We need you (Gen. Jones): your mandate and mission is crucial to the process." She said that Israel has its own ideas regarding the region, alliances, and, like Diskin, acknowledged the importance of strategic allies such as Jordan. Livni felt it critical that security issues needed to be addressed soon, as the political negotiations with the Palestinians are now getting under way. "I would like to be in a position, as Israel's negotiator, to share many of our security concerns (with the U.S.)." As negotiator, she said she would need to represent Israel's security needs in negotiations with the Palestinians and underscored her close collaboration with the Ministry of Defense.
19. (S) Livni outlined a number of the strategic challenges and questions Israel faced, and said Israel was looking for answers to "strategic questions" with a view to finding ways to implement policy. She hoped to turn first to Gen. Jones, as "it will not be easy on the bilateral (Israeli-Palestinian track) to get to understandings." -- Where does Gaza lead us? Is it a strategic threat? Is the Gaza Strip part of a Palestinian state?
-- The Philadelphi corridor is a Palestinian and Israeli security concern, and, while there are mutual interests, there will be areas of difference between the current PA and the GOI.
-- Should Israel support a seaport or airport for the Palestinians, now, or even in the future? (No, in her view).
-- Will the formation of a Palestinian state resolve some security challenges, or create new problems for Israel?
-- Would the Palestinian state be demilitarized? How would connections between a Palestinian state and other states, particularly the Jordan Valley be controlled? Would there be a passage between Gaza and the West Bank?
-- Abbas embraced the French idea of an international force in the region in his remarks in Paris. Are such forces willing to fight Hamas house-to-house? She doubted it.
-- Does it make sense for Israel to support economic projects in the West Bank when some joint ventures actually create security problems for Israel? Is there an organized plan? What does Palestinian capacity-building mean?
-- Will Palestinians chose Fatah in the future?
-- Iran poses a traditional "20th century" type of threat to Israel, but other, non-state actors, in places such as Lebanon are posing new threats.
20. (S) Livni emphasized that she did not look at security issues with a view to finding an excuse not to move forward. Rather, she felt it essential to look at security issues so that implementation of the two state vision could be done "the right way." She underscored that when it comes to security, the idea is not to bridge gaps but to clarify what needs to be done to achieve security. Gen. Jones concurred, adding that "I'm not a negotiator or a mediator." He told Livni that he would return by the end of January with a small team, and "won't be silent" in the meantime. Gen. Jones also clarified that his job description would require him to look at the "equities of the region with regard to security issues, primarily vis a vis Israel and the Palestinians, Egypt and Jordan."
21. (U) General Jones did not clear this cable.
JONES
Cable dated:2006-10-12T15:07:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 004032
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2011
TAGS: PREL, PBTS, KPAL, KWBG, MASS, PINR, EG, JO, IS
SUBJECT: USSC DAYTON RAISES RAFAH, AMA AND BADR BRIGADE WITH ISA DISKIN
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Gene A. Cretz. E.O. 12958 Reason 1.4 (B/D).
1. (C) Summary: Israel Security Agency (ISA) Director Yuval Diskin told the USSC, LTG Keith W. Dayton, that Israel's primary concern with the normalization of operations at the Rafah terminal are derived from U.S. and Palestinian failures to follow through with commitments made in the November 15, 2005 Access and Movements Agreement (AMA), and not with the procedural activities of European Union Border Assistance Mission and the Presidential Guard, whose service Diskin characterized as "very good." Diskin told the USSC that he continued to support the strengthening of President Abbas and the Presidential Guard, but noted that it was more important to strengthen Fatah as a movement than focus on bolstering Abbas' personal position. In response to the USSC's brief on the Palestinian Liberation Army's Jordan-based Badr Brigade, Diskin told the USSC that he did not have any objections to the Brigade's proposed deployment to North Gaza, but added that he didn't believe they would be able to accomplish anything on the ground unless they were incorporated into the Presidential Guard. Diskin presented an analysis of the security situation in Gaza and the West Bank and told the USSC that while clashes between Hamas and elements of Fatah had been fierce, he did not believe the Palestinians were on the verge of a civil war because neither side wanted one due to internal dynamics, and for fear of a future political fallout with the populace at the polls. Diskin provided a bleak assessment of the principal Palestinian security players: Mohammed Dahlan, Rashid Abu Shabak, Tawfic Tirawi and Abu Hisham. He concluded that none were capable of providing the necessary leadership to direct the activities of the security services in both Gaza and the West Bank. Diskin's view of Egypt's role in Gaza was that Egypt enjoyed connections with all Palestinian factions, but he felt their influence had declined in the wake of their inability to solve the Corporal Shalit crisis. He added that Egypt could be helpful by strengthening its efforts to curtail rampant smuggling between the Egyptian, Israeli, and Gazan borders. End Summary.
-------------
Rafah Passage
-------------
2. (C) U.S. Security Coordinator LTG Dayton briefed ISA Director, Yuval Diskin, October 6 on USG and EUBAM positions on the Rafah passage and the need for the normalization of operations at the Rafah crossing. Diskin told LTG Dayton that while EUBAM and the Presidential Guard "were doing a good job," Israel's main problem had to do with promises and understandings made with the U.S. side on the November 15, 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access, which were never fulfilled due to what he termed "internal bickering between the State Department and another organ of the U.S. government." The problem that Diskin spoke of had to do with the passage of certain Palestinians traveling in both directions through the crossing. Diskin went on to say that his agency possessed intelligence which showed Palestinians were utilizing the passage to ultimately travel to Iran and Lebanon in order to increase Hamas capabilities. Diskin's stated opinion is "once the base of the Agreement on Rafah is not good, it doesn't matter to me that the procedural aspects of the running of the crossing are good." Diskin told LTG Dayton that he believed it was important to keep Rafah open, but added that the original agreement was made in different circumstances with a Fatah government, not the current Hamas one: "If we want to approach this seriously, we need to start with the movements of people." Diskin stated that we should initiate meetings between the U.S., Israel, the Palestinians and EU first, and then later bring the Egyptians into the picture. -
--------------------------------------
Abbas, FATAH and the Presidential Guard
---------------------------------------
3. (C) Diskin told the USSC that he continued to support the enhancement of the power of President Abbas and the Presidential Guard. He went on to say that the long term strategic problem was the weakness of Fatah, not Hamas: "We don't need to give more power to Abbas; we need to strengthen the power of Fatah as a movement. Currently they are not motivated to do anything. The weakness of the security apparatus stems from the weakness of Fatah."
------------
Badr Brigade
------------
4. (C) LTG Dayton asked Diskin for his assessment of the Jordan-based Palestinian Badr Brigade. Diskin stated that he did not see a problem with their proposed deployment to northern Gaza, though he did not believe they would be effective. "They will likely become just another Palestinian group such as the NSF, unless they are absorbed directly into the Presidential Guard."
------------
No Civil War
------------
5. (C) LTG Dayton briefed Diskin on USSC efforts to bolster the Palestinian National Security Forces (NSF.) Diskin agreed with the utility of the move and presented an overall security assessment of the situation in Gaza and the West Bank. Diskin stated that a pattern has emerged whereby clashes between Fatah and Hamas in Gaza, where Fatah is weak, elicit strong Fatah responses in the West Bank where Fatah is militarily stronger than Hamas. "I don't believe that we are on the verge of a Palestinian civil war. Neither side, for their own reasons, want internal armed conflict. They are both against a civil war because Fitna (civil strife, chaos) will cause both sides more problems than they can handle and harms their efforts to garner positive public opinion." Diskin caveated his assessment with a warning that, should something happen to Haniyeh on the Hamas side, or Mohammed Dahlan or Rashid Abu Shabak on the Fatah side, anything could happen. He added that, "If Abbas were to do something which would cause Hamas to feel their hold on the government is in jeopardy, the situation could deteriorate and make things worse than they are today."
--------------------------------------------
Search for Palestinian Security Interlocutor
--------------------------------------------
6. (C) The balance of the conversation centered on LTG Dayton's efforts to identify an effective Palestinian security interlocutor. In response to LTG Dayton's question of who Diskin would choose to work with if he could make the choice for Palestinians, Diskin told the USSC: "There is no perfect fit to the question you have asked, a couple of people have what you need, but only partly." He said that the best that you can do would be Mohammed Dahlan and Tawfic Tirawi. He then presented estimations of the primary Palestinian security players; Rashid Abu Shabak, Tawfic Tirawi, Mohammed Dahlan and Abu Hisham. Diskin stated that Rashid Abu Shabak is weaker than he used to be, and under tremendous pressure because President Abbas had put him in an impossible situation, with an impossible mission as Director of Internal Security. Subsequently, Diskin stated "he cannot deliver and is not motivated to do so." Diskin told LTG Dayton that Tawfic Tirawi is capable of accomplishing some of the things which need to be done in the West Bank. "He is motivated, cruel and decisive, but has no standing in Gaza."
7. (C) Diskin characterized Mohammed Dahlan as a man who is smart enough, and one who understands the arena and all the players better than anyone, but his capabilities are weaker than they have ever been and he is under a lot of pressure. Dahlan "has no power base in the West Bank and continues to rely on the Preventative Security Organization (PSO) as his power base, but as you have seen, the PSO has been under tremendous pressure from Hamas in Gaza." XXXXXXXXXXXX Diskin emphasized that "We must keep the PSO alive in Gaza." Diskin then moved to Abu Hisham and told the USSC that Hisham is "pleasantly honest, he doesn't lie to us and keeps us informed, he is very accurate, but he has no power base and is not a leader. It puts us both in a bad position."
---------------------
Egyptian Role in Gaza
---------------------
8. (C) In response to LTG Dayton's question on Egypt's ability to influence matters in Gaza, Diskin replied that the Egyptians have ties across the Palestinian spectrum within Gaza, but no influence: "The most important thing they can do is stop the smuggling which takes place between their borders with both Gaza and Israel." CRETZ
46173 Cable dated:2005-11-28T10:51:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 006669
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, KWBG, IS, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: ISA CHIEF DISKIN VIEWS RAFAH AS TEST CASE
Classified By: CHARGE GENE A. CRETZ, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: During a November 18 meeting with NEA DAS Robert Danin, Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) Director Yuval Diskin said that a successfully managed passage at Rafah would encourage the opening of other passages and would benefit Qarni. Diskin expressed concern about Fatah and its leader Mahmud Abbas, whose inattention to party issues had led to infighting. He called jailed activist Marwan Barghuti the most extremist force in Fatah, but said that he could nonetheless become Fatah,s leader. Diskin offered that the best results in the upcoming Palestinian elections would be if Fatah received more than 40 percent of the vote and Hamas received less than 30. End summary.
--------------------
Rafah as a Test Case
--------------------
2. (C) During a November 18 meeting with NEA DAS Robert Danin, Israel Security Agency Director Yuval Diskin said that Israel sees risks and dangers in allowing traffic between the West Bank and Gaza. Nevertheless, if Rafah were successful, it would also benefit Qarni and other crossings into Israel. Rafah is an important test case, he said. If the Palestinians are able to manage Rafah successfully, it will influence positively the opening of other passages.
----------------
Fatah in Trouble
----------------
3. (C) Diskin expressed strong concerns about Fatah in the run-up to the Palestinian elections. He said that Mahmud Abbas has shown no interest in party business and has not set up any mechanism to run the party while he ran the Palestinian Administration. As a consequence, Fatah is disintegrating and has descended into infighting between an inactive old guard and a new guard that is ascendant but still largely excluded from the political process. Diskin predicted that the old guard would disappear after the election. He said the new guard does not trust Mahmud Abbas. Marwan Barghuti, whom he called "a real troublemaker," is an important player and very popular. Diskin believed Barghuti could become the party leader in the near future. Diskin said that Barghuti tries to appear moderate in order to make himself more attractive and to help get himself released from Israeli imprisonment, but really is one of the most extremist members of Fatah. Diskin said that keeping Barghuti in jail is the best of the available options.
---------------------
Palestinian Elections
---------------------
4. (C) Asked about his forecast of the Palestinian election scheduled for January 2006, Diskin said that the outcome would depend on the Fatah party list. He said that the likely outcome would be clearer following the upcoming primaries, even though the Central Committee and not the primary would decide who is on the list. The best results would be for Fatah to receive more than 40 percent and for Hamas to get less than 30 percent. Diskin said that recent polls indicated that with a strong party list, Fatah would receive 42 percent and Hamas 20 percent.
-----------------------------------------
No Coordination with PA on Anti-terrorism
-----------------------------------------
5. (C) Diskin indicated that terrorism is still a major problem in PA-controlled areas, and this was one reason why he had opposed disengagement. Diskin said that cooperation with his Palestinian counterparts had been "useless" and there had been no coordination on anti-terrorist activities. He said that some Palestinian leaders continue to support terrorist activities and had provided help to suicide bombers, and added that the problem was worse in Gaza than in the West Bank. Diskin said that Dahlan was no longer the strongman he once was in Gaza, and that new stars, such as Mushrawi and Hillis, were on the ascendancy. There are at least two Hamas cells in the Hebron area and one in Nablus, which Diskin called "the capital of terrorism." The Shin Bet had been able to thwart their activities. Ramallah is where the "brains of Hamas" are located, he suggested. Diskin said that without Fatah support, local commanders have no motivation to act. Thus, he argued, "We have to do the most to help Fatah."
6. (C) DAS Danin cleared this cable.
CRETZ CRETZ
Cable dated:2008-07-03T12:38:00
S E C R E T JERUSALEM 001169
SIPDIS
NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND IPA, NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/PASCUAL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2018
TAGS: KWBG, PREL, PGOV, PBTS, IS, OREP
SUBJECT: CODEL KERRY REVIEWS NEGOTIATIONS, SITUATION ON THE GROUND WITH EREKAT, FAYYAD
Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary. In separate July 1 meetings with CODEL Kerry, PA PM Salam Fayyad reviewed progress on Roadmap implementation, while PLO Negotiations Affairs Chief Saeb Erekat summarized progress on permanent status negotiations. Fayyad thanked the USG for "unprecedented" assistance and said the PA is effectively responding to local needs. Erekat said the GOI and PA are working on all issues, but the negotiations will need President Abbas and PM Olmert to "make the hard political decisions." End summary.
Settlement Expansion Threatens Confidence in Annapolis Peace Tracks
--------------------------------------
2. (C) At a July 1 meeting in Ramallah, PM Fayyad told CODEL Kerry that both sides must implement their Roadmap commitments to preserve the possibility of a two-state solution. He said the PA's top issues with the GOI are: a) settlement expansion; b) IDF incursions in the West Bank; and c) movement and access. Fayyad said there was a twelvefold increase in settlement tenders in the six months after Annapolis compared to 2007, which has undermined confidence in peace and the domestic standing of PA leaders.
PA Grateful for USG, Intl Support, But Feels Unsupported by Arab States
-------------------------------------
3. (C) Fayyad thanked the USG for "unprecedented" assistance. He said the PA is effectively responding to local needs, including in rural areas and refugee camps, and the Palestine Investment Conference helped boost confidence in the PA. However, Fayyad said the PA feels unsupported by Arab states, despite their favorable rhetoric.
Fayyad: PA Security Efforts Promising, But Barak Hasn't Delivered on Commitments
------------------------------------------
4. (C) The culture of violence in Palestinian society is waning, PM Fayyad said, and "the PA has responded to the public's need for security despite the abuse we have suffered from extremists." Fayyad said Israeli Defense Minister Barak has not delivered on positive comments in their meetings with Secretary Rice. He said there are more obstacles to movement in the West Bank than ever before, and more incursions in Nablus and Jenin than before the PA's security campaigns. He said the GOI should work with the PA on prisoner releases rather than only freeing prisoners for Hamas and Hizbullah.
Crossings Key to Restoring PA Control of Gaza
--------------------------
5. (C) PM Fayyad said he favors the Gaza ceasefire. He said "you cannot kick out Hamas by denying Palestinians basic needs, and Hamas has made a lucrative business out of tunnel smuggling. Violence and misery favor Hamas. If there is insufficient misery, Hamas will create it to exploit the situation." He argued that unless the PA regains control of Gaza's crossings, "Gaza will be gone forever."
Erekat: Abbas and Olmert Must Make the Hard Decisions
-----------------------------
6. (S) Saeb Erekat said the GOI and PA are working on all permanent status issues, noting that the two sides "are farther along than we were at Camp David or at Taba." He said the negotiators will need President Abbas and PM Olmert to "make the hard political decisions."
7. (S) Erekat said the PA is committed to finishing a permanent status framework, defining solutions to all permanent status issues, by the end of 2008. He said he is committed to meeting Israeli security requirements, but wants to do so through a mutually-agreed third-party security force rather than an Israeli military presence in the future Palestinian state.
8. (U) CODEL Kerry did not have the opportunity to clear
this message.
WALLES
Cable dated:2006-11-16T12:00:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 022025
SIPDIS
NOFORN SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2016
TAGS: CASC, ECON, KCRM, PGOV, PK, PREL, PTER
SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER SHERPAO ON HIGH PROFILE TERROR CASES, IPR AND MISSING AMCIT
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 21222 B. PESHAWAR 653 C. ISLAMABAD 21882 D. ISLAMABAD 16421
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: In a November 13 meeting, the Ambassador and Interior Minister Sherpao reviewed U.S.-Pakistani cooperation on the investigation into the 2006 Karachi Consulate bombing. Sherpao assured the Ambassador that the Government of Pakistan (GOP) is committed to defending the conviction of Omar Saeed Sheikh for the 2002 murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. The Minister re-affirmed that government plans to charge the leader of a Punjab-based militant organization under the Security of Pakistan Act, but said that the arrest would be delayed until later in November. Sherpao was receptive to the Ambassador's suggestion that his Ministry establish a dedicated intellectual property rights unit in the Federal Investigative Agency (FIA), but did not respond to the Ambassador's query regarding the whereabouts of missing AMCIT Dr. Sardar Sarki. End summary.
FBI Cooperation
---------------
2. (C) The Ambassador opened the conversation by previewing the November 17 visit of FBI Director Robert Mueller to Islamabad and reviewing the status of FBI cooperation with the GOP on several high-profile terrorism cases. Minister Sherpao indicated that arrangements would soon be made to allow Embassy LEGAT officers access to two suspects in the March 2006 Karachi Consulate bombing. Sherpao noted that the third suspect in the case -- Qari Zafar, believed to be the mastermind behind the attack -- has absconded to North Waziristan Agency. According to the Minister, police authorities came close to capturing Zafar during the recent Eid-al-Fitr holiday; investigators continue to follow his trail. The Ambassador was pleased to hear that investigators are pursuing Zafar vigorously, both to bring him to justice and for his potential value as a source of information regarding this sophisticated terror attack. Sherpao also volunteered that the Ministry should be able to arrange for LEGAT officers to have access to Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) reports before Director Mueller's arrival.
Omar Saeed Sheikh
-----------------
3. (C) The Ambassador asked about the status of the case against Omar Saeed Sheikh, who was convicted in the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl in 2002. The Ambassador stressed that the U.S. shares the GOP's determination that Sheikh not escape justice through some legal loophole and observed that there are two active indictments against Sheikh pending in U.S. courts, Sherpao assured the Ambassador that an interagency team comprising MOI, the Law Ministry and the National Police Bureau is following this case closely. XXXXXXXXXXXX. Authorities have been carefully monitoring Sheikh's activities in prison, shifting him between high-security facilities in order to prevent him from enlisting assistance or support from fellow inmates or
ISLAMABAD 00022025 002 OF 003
prison employees. Sherpao acknowledged the Ambassador's comments that the U.S. would be eager to discuss transferring Sheikh to face prosecution in American courts if it appeared that he might win his current appeal, but declined to respond directly to the offer, saying that he is confident that the Pakistani conviction would hold and that Sheikh would be executed as sentenced. (Note: According to Sherpao, the interagency team guiding the GOP's prosecution of Sheikh has also been tasked with reviewing all high-profile terror cases, traveling to each province to review files and offer guidance to local prosecutors. Sherpao said that the Chief Justice of the Pakistan Supreme Court has convened provincial Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Inspectors General and Home Secretaries to coordinate enhanced training and support for judges presiding in terror-related cases. The outreach is intended to stiffen the judges' resolve in the face of potential intimidation and to reduce procedural delays. End note.)
Hafiz Saeed
-----------
4. (C) The Ambassador also questioned Sherpao about the GOP case against Lashkar-e-Tayyba/Jammat ud-Dawa (LeT/JuD) leader Hafiz Mohammad Saeed. (Ref A) Sherpao repeated his earlier assurance that Saeed would be re-arrested, this time under the Security of Pakistan Act. Heightened domestic sensitivities following the October 31 Pak Mil air strike on a militant madrassa in Bajaur (Ref B) and the apparent retaliatory suicide attack on an Army training facility in Dirgai (Ref C) argued against proceeding against Saeed immediately, Sherpao said. He predicted that Saeed would be taken into custody again following the November 20 (?) visit of UK Prime Minister Blair to Pakistan. In the meantime, security agents are closely monitoring Saeed's activities.
Intellectual Property Rights
----------------------------
5. (C) The Ambassador commended the MOI for its cooperation with the Embassy in building local capacity to protect intellectual property rights (IPR), noting that the U.S. has developed an excellent relationship with FIA personnel enforcing IPR laws. The U.S. is willing to commit additional resources toward capacity building, but suggests that the FIA first establish a dedicated IPR unit so that newly-trained personnel are not transferred to non-IPR duties. The Minister called this a sensible suggestion and asked his staff to follow up with the Embassy.
Missing Amcit
-------------
6. (C) The Ambassador raised ongoing U.S. concern for the welfare of AMCIT Dr. Sardar Sarki, who disappeared from his home in Karachi in February 2006. (Ref C) A credible report in a respected Pakistani news magazine supports the belief of Dr. Sarki's family that he is in the custody of Pakistani security forces. The Embassy is not taking a position on possible GOP charges against Sarki, the Ambassador said, but we need to know where he is and to have consular access to him. Minister Sherpao listened to the Ambassador's remarks without comment.
ISLAMABAD 00022025 003 OF 003
CROCKER
Cable dated:2009-12-03T09:52:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 002903
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, UK, PK
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON OMAR SAEED SHEIKH CASE
REF: SECSTATE 108201
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)
1. (C) Poloff delivered reftel demarche and associated non-paper and diplomatic note on the transfer of Ahmad Omar Saeed Sheikh to the U.S. to MFA Director for Americas Sohail Khan on November 25. Per reftel instructions, she specifically requested that while the request for transfer of Sheikh was being considered, Pakistan provide written assurances that Sheikh will remain in custody throughout the appeals process. Khan responded that the case of Sheikh was a "sensitive" issue and while the case was still open, i.e. "subjudice," the government had little power to transfer Sheikh. However, Khan said that he would refer the diplomatic note and requests to the MFA's legal department for a formal response. Post will follow-up with the MFA's legal department to obtain the formal response and seek the written assurance of Sheikh's continued detention.
PATTERSON
Cable dated:2009-10-14T12:07:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 002487
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2019
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK
SUBJECT: STATUS OF DANIEL PEARL MURDER CASE AND OMAR SAEED SHEIKH
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) (d)
1. (C) On August 13, the Sindh High Court yet again continued the adjournment in the appellate case of Omar Saeed Sheikh, the convicted murderer of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl. According to Pakistani legal experts, the refusal of the Court to hear the appeal or set a date for further hearings places Sheikh's case in "sine-die adjournment" status, which means that his appeal proceedings are adjourned for an indefinite period of time. Sheikh was found guilty of murdering Pearl by a Karachi Court in 2002 and was sentenced to death. Before the indefinite adjournment, Sheikh's attorneys were attempting to appeal the verdict and sentence to the Sindh High Court. The prosecutor had filed a separate appeal with the High Court requesting tougher sentences for all individuals convicted of providing assistance to Omar Saeed Sheikh in the murder.
2. (C) In Sheikh's now dormant appeal, his lawyers had challenged the veracity of the testimony of some of the witnesses in the initial trial. As a result, the High Court ordered the lower court to re-hear witnesses' statements. In fact, most of the witnesses whose testimony is in question are not available to provide statements in future proceedings. Many have moved outside of Pakistan because they fear for their safety and security, since it is widely believed that supporters of Sheikh would threaten, harm, or kill the witnesses in order to prevent them from testifying. The unavailability of witnesses makes this aspect of the appeal almost impossible to pursue.
3. (C) In any event, neither Sheikh's attorneys nor the Pakistani government has pursued the lower court re-hearing because both sides understand this could open up a can of worms, with the lower court delving into other aspects of the case, including the sentencing. The potential downside for Sheikh is that, in this event, the lower court could order swift implementation of the death penalty. Post's understanding, from speaking with Pakistani legal experts, is that the prosecutor and Sheikh's attorneys are thus passively allowing the current verdict and sentence to stand. Additionally, our legal contacts agree that, since Sheikh has received the death sentence, the chance of any successful appeal to the Sindh High Court is minimal.
4. (C) Sheikh was transferred from a prison in Hyderabad, Sindh to a high-security prison in Karachi in August 2009. Embassy legal contacts advised that this transfer was part of regular prison procedure and not due to immediate security concerns or for pre-staging Sheikh for his release. It is Pakistani government policy to shift prisoners between prisons every two to three years for routine security and administrative reasons. Additionally, prisoners can request to be transferred to a different prison located closer to their relatives to facilitate family visitation.
5. (C) Comment: Though Sheikh's appeals still formally exists in the Sindh High Court, Pakistani legal observers agree that his case is indefinitely adjourned. In the Pakistani context, this means that all the suspects can be kept incarcerated without any foreseeable end. With Sheikh's murder conviction and death sentence, there is, in fact, no legal or political will to release him or reverse his sentence. Sheikh's prison transfer does not, in Post's opinion, indicate a move to release him. Post will follow up on this matter in political channels to ensure that Sheikh's conviction and sentence stay in force. End Comment.
PATTERSON
Cable dated:2006-02-15T15:18:00
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 000687
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2016
TAGS: ECON, KWBG, PGOV, PREL, KPAL, IS, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS, GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: MOD PRIORITIZING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROJECTS; WANTS TO CONTINUE SOME EVEN UNDER HAMAS GOVERNMENT
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) The MOD is evaluating and prioritizing all foreign assistance projects in the Palestinian territories in order to determine which should have continued support from the MOD, Brig. General (res.) Baruch Spiegel told POL and ECON counselors on February 14. Minister of Defense Mofaz had ordered Gen. Mishlev, head of COGAT, to initiate the process with Spiegel three weeks ago. Spiegel said they would place the projects into three categories ) high, medium, and low priority. Despite the uncertainty following the recent Palestinian Legislative Council elections and the Israeli Cabinet decision that the GOI will not talk to Hamas, Mofaz believes it is in Israel,s interest to maintain stability and ensure that basic humanitarian needs of the Palestinians are met.
2. (S) Spiegel said that he has been meeting with foreign donors to discuss their projects and to hear their views regarding which should be retained. The main standard the MOD is using, said Spiegel, is whether a project benefits the Palestinian people. He said that environmental projects, and those dealing with water, sewage, and electrification, for example, should continue. (Note: Spiegel told USAID director in a separate meeting on February 13 that projects that promoted private sector jobs for Palestinians are also a priority. End note.) Consideration is also being given to a project,s benefit to Israel. Spiegel pointed to projects such as the French electrification project in Jenin, road construction, and the Hebron sewage treatment plant as examples of projects that benefited the Palestinians and had a direct impact on Israel and which he would recommend for continuation. The MOD,s concerns with the continuation of certain projects are all based on legal status and security, he said.
3. (S) Spiegel said that his office will draw up a list as quickly as possible of prioritized assistance projects that should be continued and present it to MOD Mofaz to be discussed with Acting PM Olmert. Although the listing will serve only as a guideline, Spiegel believed that his recommendations and philosophy would be taken very seriously. Spiegel planned to meet with USAID and Embassy officers next week to review the projects. (Note: USAID director will meet with Gen. Mishlev on February 19 to discuss USAID-funded projects. End note.)
4. (S) Comment: If the process that Spiegel described is, in fact, used, the MOD may be planning to take a very practical and humanitarian approach to assistance to the Palestinians. Instability or a humanitarian crisis in the territories is in no one,s interest, least of all Israel,s. Clarifying GOI priorities and explaining which assistance projects are acceptable for continuation will benefit the Department during this period of uncertainty. While this practical approach by the MOD bodes well for continued assistance to the Palestinians, it does not necessarily translate into Israeli support for many USAID assistance projects. As can be seen from Spiegel,s examples, the MOD is most interested in preserving programs that also offer significant benefit for Israel, such as sewage treatment. Not all of the most effective U.S. projects can be characterized as dual use, and there is a decided lack of attention in the MOD,s calculus to programs for democracy development.
JONES
Cable dated:2005-07-15T15:24:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 004403
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2015 TAGS: PREL, KWBG, KPAL, PTER, IS, GAZA DISENGAGEMENT, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI MOD DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT AND GROWING NUMBER OF TERRORIST ATTACKS
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary: Israel suffered three attacks within the span of one hour in an effort to break the calm ("tahdiya") and derail the impending disengagement, according to Brigadier General Eitan Dangot, Military Secretary to Defense Minister Mofaz, who met with the Ambassador and Acting DATT on July 13. Hizballah fired at the IDF post at Rosh Hanikra, causing no injuries. A PIJ member drove a truck laden with gas canisters into the Shavei Shomron settlement, injuring only himself. A PIJ suicide bomber detonated an explosive charge outside a Netanya mall, killing four and wounding 91 Israelis. As a result the IDF resumed operations against PIJ in the West Bank in efforts to prevent future terror attacks on Israel, as well as to stop the increasing violence prior to the disengagement. As disengagement approaches, Dangot explained, the potential negative impact of successful attacks increases, particularly in its effect on domestic public opinion and support. Dangot provided a summary of the July 12 Security Cabinet meeting, and noted that additional meetings are scheduled to take place this month. The Prime Minister expressed his vision that the disengagement would result in the end of the military occupation of Gaza. The cabinet approved an MoD request to solicit the international community for funding for crossing facilities; and the cabinet agreed that areas evacuated within the northern West Bank would remain classified as "area C" for the near term. End summary.
-------------
PIJ CAMPAIGN?
-------------
2. (S) Dangot provided a brief summary of the July 12 attacks. Dangot stated that all three attacks took place within the span of one hour, and were likely linked. PIJ, he stated, is attempting to provoke a strong Israeli response in efforts to destroy the "tahdiya" or calm. On July 12:
-- A gunman fired several rounds at the IDF position at Rosh Hanikra. The IDF did not respond, he stated, and no one was injured in the attack. The IDF noted that Hizballah had vacated posts along the southern border with Israel prior to the attack, suggesting the link to Hizballah.
-- A Palestinian drove a small pickup truck loaded with gas canisters into the Shavei Shomron settlement. The driver had waited for someone to exit the settlement and drove through the open gate. He detonated the explosive device near the settlement's kindergarten, which was no longer in session. The Palestinian was severely burned; there were no other casualties. The IDF, Dangot stated, believes that wanted PIJ leader Louis Saadi or his deputy was involved in planning the attack.
-- A suicide bomber detonated an explosive charge near a mall in Netanya, killing four Israelis, severely wounding at least six others, and causing a total of 91 to seek medical treatment. PIJ claimed responsibility for the attack. The IDF believes that Tulkarm area PIJ commander Louay Saadi was behind the attack. Saadi, who masterminded the Stage Club attack in Tel Aviv on 25 February, is in hiding. Saadi's cell operates in the Tulkarm area, including the villages of Atil, Ilar and Saida.
3. (S) Dangot stated that PIJ-sponsored attacks are increasing. In Gaza, the IDF has tracked PIJ connected incidents for the past weeks and has noted a marked increase in mortar, Qassam rocket, explosive charge and shooting attack against Israelis. These attacks, he explained, are not the work of breakaway PIJ cells, but part of a campaign orchestrated by the PIJ headquarters in Damascus. Damascus is pushing the field to conduct attacks against Israel, said Dangot.
-----------
PA Inaction
-----------
4. (S) The IDF received a number of indications that Saadi was planning terror attacks, and passed Saadi's name to the PA several months ago. The GOI requested that PA Minister of Interior Nasir Yusif arrest him. To date, said Dangot, the PA has taken little action against the organization. In Tulkarm, eleven PIJ fugitives declined to sign a declaration ending terror attacks and refused to surrender their weapons to the PA. In response, the PA centralized them in Tulkarm and provided them shelter at night. Moreover, Dangot noted that Mahmud Abbas failed to clearly blame PIJ, during his condemnation of yesterday's terror attack.
----------------
Time Running Out
----------------
5. (S) As disengagement approaches, Dangot explained, the potential negative impact of successful attacks increases, particularly in its effect on domestic public opinion and support. Moreover, such attacks decrease Israel's maneuver space, and make risk-taking in security areas more difficult, as in the case of Bethlehem, with its close proximity to Jerusalem. Finally, the IDF does not want to begin disengagement under the back-drop of increasing violence.
6. (S) During discussions on transferring security responsibility, the IDF warned the PA that it would reenter areas transferred to PA security responsibility if the Palestinians failed to control attacks on Israelis emanating from them. As a result, the GOI decided last night to take action against the PIJ, acting where the PA does not. Early on July 13, the IDF temporarily reentered Tulkarm, and began a series of arrests. During the initial stages of the operation, PA security forces fired on, and lightly wounded, two soldiers. When returning fire, the IDF killed two PA security forces members.
------------------------
Security Cabinet Meeting
------------------------
7. (S) Dangot provided a summary of the previous day's Security Cabinet meeting, stating the group would hold two or three more meetings on disengagement issues over the next month. During the July 12 discussions, the Prime Minister explained his vision that disengagement would mean the end of the military occupation in Gaza. Once completed, there would be no symbols of military occupation, including IDF presence on the Philadelphi Strip.
8. (S) The Security Cabinet discussed potential security arrangements concerning the ports ) sea, air, and land ) but no decisions were made. It was clear, Dangot stated, that the IDF would, over time, leave the Philadelphi Strip, following assessment of the effectiveness of the Egyptian border deployment, and the effectiveness of the PA security forces in combating smuggling and cross-border attacks. Dangot stated that Egypt and Israel are still discussing the "responsibility" clause, which is holding up agreement on the deployment of border guards.
9. (S) The Security Cabinet looked also at several options concerning the Rafah crossing ) leave it as is, shift cargo operations to Nitsana, or move to Kerem Shalom. No decisions were made. Dangot stated that the GOI would look at third party supervision of customs and security arrangements, using a staged or incremental approach that would help build mutual confidence and trust.
10. (S) The Prime Minister intends to cancel the military government in Gaza, Dangott said, but needs a task force from Justice, Defense and others to explore new legal rulings on how to proceed with the Palestinians. Concerning the passage issue, the Security Cabinet agreed to an interim solution of using truck convoys between Gaza and the West Bank for door-to-door delivery of cargo in some areas. A similar system, using busses to transport people could also be adopted. Dangot added that details were not examined; a team is needed to study possible long-term solutions such as a train, sunken road, tunnel, etc.
11. (S) MoD Director-General Amos Yaron briefed the Security Cabinet on the 3-4 terminals in Gaza and some 38 crossing points for the West Bank, receiving Cabinet permission to solicit funding, estimated at some 500 million USD initially, from the international community. The cabinet also decided that the Gaza borders would be based on the 1994 map, and would include the territorial exchanges made in 1949-50.
12. (S) Concerning the West Bank, the Security Cabinet decided that there would be no change of status for the four areas containing the evacuated settlements for the time being. These areas would remain classified as "C" zones. However, the GOI would continue to coordinate issues with the PA concerning road construction or other issues. The Ambassador suggested that Israel carefully examine its position on Rafah and the Philadelphi Strip, to ensure that it had an executable exit strategy.
13. (S) Comment: Israel Defense Intelligence assesses that the Damascus PIJ headquarters is behind the Tuesday attacks, but continues to sift through information in search of a "smoking gun." Dangot was careful to explain that renewed IDF operations would continue in the West Bank, but indicated that operations in the Gaza strip would be restrained in efforts not to fuel a new spiral of violence. Nonetheless, expanded operations against PIJ risk accidental killings of bystanders, which would surely fuel a new round of violence. Note: Meeting took place before Hamas attack that killed one in Nativ Ha'asara.KURTZER
Cable dated:2009-02-23T13:07:00
S E C R E T CAIRO 000326
FOR NEA AND H
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2019
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, ECON, IR, SY, IZ, EG, IS, QA
SUBJECT: SENATOR LIEBERMAN'S FEBRUARY 17 MEETING WITH GAMAL MUBARAK
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
-------
Summary
-------
1. (C) During an hour-long meeting on February 17, Gamal Mubarak discussed with Senator Joseph Lieberman the problems with Gaza and Palestinian reconciliation, as well as the broader political split within the Arab world. Senator Lieberman sought Gamal's advice on ways for the U.S. to engage Iran; Gamal offered that the best way to defeat Iranian ambitions in the region is to make progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Unfortunately, Qatar is playing "spoiler" in order to get "a seat at the table." Gamal, a former international banker, opined that the U.S. needed to "shock" its financial system back to health, and said that Egypt -- which had so far escaped much of the pain of the global economic crisis -- was preparing to face tough economic times ahead. The Ambassador, Senator Lieberman's foreign policy adviser, and the ECPO MinCouns as note taker were also present. End summary.
----
Gaza
----
2. (C) After welcoming Senator Lieberman, Gamal began by criticizing the Israeli government's "last minute" decision not to move forward on the Gaza ceasefire without the release of Corporal Shalit. This complicates several aspects of the Israel Palestinian conflict, Gamal explained, not simply the situation in Gaza. The various Palestinian factions are due to begin reconciliation talks in Cairo "in about 10 days" and this development will make those discussions more difficult. It makes Egypt look bad, and strengthens Hamas.
--------------------------------------
Iranian Exploitation of Arab Divisions
--------------------------------------
3. (C) Another complicating factor, Gamal explained, is the current split within Arab ranks between "moderates" (Egypt and Saudi Arabia) and "radicals" (Syria and Qatar). This polarization, he opined, has "paralyzed the peace process." Iran has skillfully exploited -- using Hamas -- the lack of movement towards peace. As long as there was a viable peace process, Gamal averred, "there was no place for Iran." The best way to thwart Iranian ambitions in the region, according to Gamal, is to reinvigorate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. What is also needed, he continued, is a unified Palestinian government. "The Palestinians need elections, both presidential and parliamentary."
-------------------------------
U.S. Re-engagement with Tehran?
-------------------------------
4. (C) Senator Lieberman asked Gamal if he thought the United States should re-engage with Iran. "As long as Ahmedinejad is there, I am skeptical," Gamal responded. Senator Lieberman said he shared that skepticism, but explained that the new administration believes the U.S. should try to engage the Iranians, but no clear strategy has yet emerged in Washington; Dennis Ross has been tasked with "reviewing" the situation. The one thing that is clear, Gamal stressed, is that by removing Saddam, the U.S. opened the door for Iran to flex its muscles and spread its influence throughout the region. "Like it or not, Saddam was a stumbling block to Iranian aspirations. His fall led directly to an increase in Iranian influence on the region." Now, it is all the more important not to send a message of weakness to the Iranians, Gamal said, "neither from the U.S., nor from the moderates in the region." We cannot "concede to their policy of aggression."
5. (C) There are many in the region, Gamal explained, who believe that the U.S. was weakened by its actions in Iraq, and that Iran was strengthened. Furthermore, there is a perception that the U.S. has been hurt by the economic crisis and that it will be more inward looking for the next few years. Therefore, the Americans, it is said, will deal with problems in the region in a "less confrontational" fashion, and "may be willing to compromise. Iran is working hard to convince others that this is the case." This creates a very dangerous situation for moderate states like Egypt, Gamal stressed. Noting that there was some truth in this analysis, particularly concerning the economic straits the U.S. is in, Senator Lieberman said that the U.S. will nonetheless engage in an even more aggressive Middle East foreign policy than previously, as evidenced by President Obama's choice of
Secretary Clinton and Special Envoy Mitchell. Gamal welcomed this reassurance, noting that the GCC states in particular are "terrified" of Iran. Just the previous week, he said, an Iranian general had said publicly that Bahrain "has always been part of Iran," as well as the Tunb Islands.
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Qatar
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6. (C) Senator Lieberman then asked Gamal for his assessment of Qatari behavior. They are coordinating closely with Syria and Iran, Gamal said, "in an orchestrated attack on Egypt and other moderate Arab states." Qatar has enabled Hamas to hamper every effort we have made to cement a ceasefire in Gaza. For some reason, Qatar seems to want to play the role of spoiler, Gamal surmised. "Even regarding the March 2nd Gaza conference we are hosting, they have called for another Arab only meeting in Doha just two days before." In response to Senator Lieberman's question as to Qatari motives, Gamal responded, "They just want a place at the table, no matter what."
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Egypt's Economy
---------------
7. (C) Turning to the impact of the global financial crisis on Egypt, Gamal -- a former international banker -- said that while Egypt has so far escaped the worst effects of the crisis, "we are bound to feel the brunt of it eventually." Because Egypt's banking sector was thoroughly overhauled about five years ago, he explained, it is in much better shape than it night have been. Nonetheless, Egypt expects to see significantly lower GDP figures in 2009; "the most recent quarterly numbers are already way down." The one ray of good news, Gamal said, is that inflation also is down; "nonetheless, we know we are in for a rough ride." Egypt will be watching the United States very closely, Gamal said. Senator Lieberman asked for his advice as an experienced international financier. "Your banking system needs a shock," Gamal offered. "You need a dramatic fix. Unless you get the banking sector revived, nothing else will come around." However, Gamal continued, a piecemeal approach to the problem will not be enough; you need to inject even more money into the system than you have, and you need to get as much of the bad debt as possible out of it; "you must remove the toxic assets from the books" and restore the confidence of investors and consumers. Senator Lieberman agreed on the need for bold measures to restore confidence.
8. (U) This cable was cleared by Senator Lieberman.
SCOBEY
Cable dated:2009-03-31T14:44:00
S E C R E T CAIRO 000549
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2019
TAGS: PREL, MASS, PARM, MOPS, KPAL, IS, EG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL SCHWARTZ
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. Key Points
-- (SBU) U.S.- Egypt military relationship is strong, but should change to reflect new regional and transnational threats.
-- (SBU) More focus is needed on combating emerging threats, including border security, counter terrorism, civil defense, and peacekeeping.
-- (S/NF) Egypt continues to improve efforts to combat arms smuggling into Gaza, but a decision by Field Marshal Tantawi to delay a counter tunneling project threatens progress.
2. (S/NF) SUMMARY: General Schwartz, welcome to Egypt. Since our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program began almost 30 years ago, our strong military relationship has supported peace between Egypt and Israel and ensured critical Suez Canal and overflight access for U.S. military operations. The relationship, however, should now change to reflect new regional and transnational security threats. In FY2009, Congress removed conditions on U.S. assistance to Egypt. We and the GOE will be able to make the best case for continuing a robust FMF program by targeting funding for shared priorities like peacekeeping and border security, and must take more action on emerging regional security threats such as piracy.
3. (SBU) Summary continued. Your visit comes as Egypt continues its efforts to mediate a permanent cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, to facilitate intra-Palestinian negotiations to form a new, interim government, and to stop the smuggling of arms into Gaza. Many Egyptians see the new U.S. administration as a cause for cautious optimism in both the bilateral relationship and in U.S. engagement with the region. Special Envoy for the Middle East Senator George Mitchell has visited Egypt and the region twice and will likely return to Cairo in April. Your visit will fall on the anniversary of the April 6, 2008 nation-wide strike protesting political and economic conditions. At least one opposition group has called for another April 6 strike this year. We have requested meetings for you with Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Sami Anan and Air Marshal Reda. End summary.
-----------------------------------------
Mil-Mil Cooperation: Ready for Next Level
-----------------------------------------
4. (S/NF) President Mubarak and military leaders view our military assistance program as the cornerstone of our mil-mil relationship and consider the USD 1.3 billion in annual FMF as "untouchable compensation" for making and maintaining peace with Israel. The tangible benefits to our mil-mil relationship are clear: Egypt remains at peace with Israel, and the U.S. military enjoys priority access to the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace. We believe, however, that our relationship can accomplish much more. Over the last year, we have engaged MOD leaders on developing shared strategic objectives to address current and emerging threats, including border security, counter terrorism, civil defense, and peacekeeping. Our efforts thus far have met with limited success.
5. (S/NF) Decision-making within MOD rests almost solely with Minister of Defense Field Marshal Tantawi. In office since 1991, he consistently resists change to the level and direction of FMF funding and is therefore one of the chief impediments to transforming our security relationship. During his tenure, the tactical and operational readiness of the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) has degraded. But he retains President Mubarak's support, and so he and the top brass will most likely stay in position until Mubarak leaves the scene. COS Anan will welcome the lack of conditions on Egyptian assistance in FY 2009 funding and will seek support in convincing Congress of Egypt's strategic importance. Anan should be reassured that Egypt remains a key U.S. ally, but stress that given the current economic downturn, Egypt should do more to justify continuing value by demonstrating through action its support for our shared regional security goals
6. (S/NF) One way to demonstrate Egypt's continued strategic importance is through shifting more FMF funding to address asymmetric threats like terrorism and improving border security along its long and porous borders. We should also stress that our mil-mil relationship is much greater than the yearly flow of military assistance. Egypt could play a more active and influential role in regional security issues, including supporting and training the Iraqi military, deploying more peacekeeping troops to Sudan, joining neighbors in combating piracy, and stemming the flow of illegal migration. Another concrete display of a forward-looking security strategy would be to support CENTCOM's efforts to re-invent Bright Star. Anan may lament the loss of large-scale Bright Stars. We should stress that Bright Star continues to be an important strategic statement for the U.S. and its regional allies, and solicit his input for ways to make Bright Star more relevant.
7. (S/NF) Both Anan and Reda will express concern over releasability issues and frustration with Egypt's inability to procure restricted weapons systems. Some systems are not releasable because of Egyptian refusal to sign the necessary agreement (CISMOA) providing end-use assurances and ensuring proper protection of certain U.S. origin technology. Releasability is of special concern to the EAF as they prepare to purchase 24 F-16 aircraft that will require a costly retrofit with less-advanced weapons systems. Since 2006, the Department of State has notified Congress of six potential end-use violations by the Egyptian military. We are currently investigating two additional cases, one involving the visit of a Chinese military official to an F-16 facility on an Egyptian Air Force base. Other systems are either not releasable to any country or denied for political reasons, mainly due to concerns regarding Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME). We should stress that decisions to release advanced weapons system are made on a country-by-country basis, but signing a CISMOA and expanding cooperation on current regional threats would be welcomed steps to our dialogue on releasability.
-----------------------------------
Israel-Palestine, Counter Smuggling
-----------------------------------
8. (SBU) The election of President Obama generated much optimism in Egypt and hopes that the new administration would quickly focus on problems in the Middle East. In particular, the Egyptian leadership wants the U.S. to urgently address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Senator Mitchell has assured them that the Administration will press hard for progress. The Egyptians have traditionally served as an intermediary between us, the Israelis, and the Palestinians. Since the January 2008 Hamas breach of the Egypt-Gaza border, the Egyptian role has shifted to focus on intra-Palestinian reconciliation and the establishment of a lasting Hamas-Israel cease-fire. EGIS Chief Soliman has worked to cement a Israeli-Hamas cease-fire but believes he was badly undercut by the Israeli introduction of the release of IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit as a new pre-condition for the cease-fire. For the moment, rocket strikes from Gaza are relatively low in frequency.
9. (S/NF) Egyptian security forces continue to improve counter-smuggling efforts along the Gaza border and further afield, through increasing their security presence in northern Sinai and giving greater focus to preventing weapons from entering the Sinai. Egyptian officials claim to have identified and sealed over 100 tunnels since the beginning of the year, with new discoveries occurring daily. The Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) requested U.S. assistance to purchase 16 X-ray screening systems to monitor vehicular traffic into the Sinai for weapons and explosives, and we are currently exploring ways to provide the requested assistance. A recent decision by Tantawi to delay a FMF-funded counter smuggling project, however, threatens progress. In February, Tantawi insisted that the Army Corps of Engineers sever the satellite link necessary to calibrate seismic-acoustic sensors being installed along the Egypt-Gaza border to detect tunneling activity. He also insisted that the ACE disable GPS technology needed to accurately pinpoint tunneling activity. This decision will result in a four to five month delay to develop and implement a technical alternative. USG efforts to encourage Tantawi to reconsider, including from CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus, have been unsuccessful.
---------------
Regional Issues
---------------
10. (SBU) Egypt has shown increasing confidence that Iraq has turned the corner, although concerns remain that the Shi'a-led government is prone to Iranian influence. On Iran, Egypt is concerned by rising Iranian influence in the region, has supported UN sanctions, and is increasingly active on countering Iran, e.g. in Gaza and to some extent in Lebanon, working with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states to support Lebanese political and territorial sovereignty. Egypt has deployed peacekeeping troops to the UN Mission in Darfur, just agreed to send troops to the UN Mission in Congo and is taking a greater role within the African Union on regional security and political issues.
-------------------------------
Internal Politics and Economics
-------------------------------
11. (SBU) We continue to promote democratic reform in Egypt, including the expansion of political freedom and pluralism, and respect for human rights. Egyptian democracy and human rights efforts, however, are being stymied, and the GoE remains skeptical of our role in democracy promotion, complaining that any efforts to open up will result in empowering the Muslim Brotherhood, which currently holds 86 seats in Egypt's 454-seat parliament. Economic reform is ongoing although Egypt still suffers from widespread poverty affecting 35-40% of the population. Egyptian-U.S. trade has more than doubled in the last four years, reaching almost $9 billion in 2008. The U.S. exports to Egypt about twice as much as it imports. Egyptian banks operate very conservatively and have been spared involvement in risky financial products, but the effects of the global economic crisis on Egypt are beginning to be felt. As the global credit crunch worsens, Egypt remains vulnerable as exports, Suez Canal revenues, tourism, and remittances -- its largest sources of revenue -- are all down and likely to continue to fall.
SCOBEY
C O N F I D E N T I A L
CAIRO 000079 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, DRL/NESCA, INL AND INR/NESA NSC FOR PASCUAL AND KUTCHA-HELBLING
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2029
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM EG
SUBJECT: GOE STRUGGLING TO ADDRESS POLICE BRUTALITY REF: A. 08 CAIRO 2431 B. 08 CAIRO 2430 C. 08 CAIRO 2260 D. 08 CAIRO 783 E. 07 CAIRO 3214 F. 07 CAIRO 2845
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary and comment: Police brutality in Egypt against common criminals is routine and pervasive. Contacts describe the police using force to extract confessions from criminals as a daily event, resulting from poor training and understaffing. Brutality against Islamist detainees has reportedly decreased overall, but security forces still resort to torturing Muslim Brotherhood activists who are deemed to pose a political threat. Over the past five years, the government has stopped denying that torture exists, and since late 2007 courts have sentenced approximately 15 police officers to prison terms for torture and killings.
Independent NGOs have criticized GOE-led efforts to provide human rights training for the police as ineffective and lacking political will. The GOE has not yet made a serious effort to transform the police from an instrument of regime power into a public service institution. We want to continue a USG-funded police training program (ref F), and to look for other ways to help the GOE address police brutality. End summary and comment.
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A Pervasive Problem
------------------- ¶
2. (C) Torture and police brutality in Egypt are endemic and widespread. The police use brutal methods mostly against common criminals to extract confessions, but also against demonstrators, certain political prisoners and unfortunate bystanders. One human rights lawyer told us there is evidence of torture in Egypt dating back to the times of the Pharaohs. NGO contacts estimate there are literally hundreds of torture incidents every day in Cairo police stations alone. Egyptians are bombarded with consistent news reports of police brutality, ranging from high profile incidents such as accidental but lethal police shootings in Salamut and Aswan this past fall (refs B and C) that sparked riots, to reports of police officers shooting civilians following disputes over traffic tickets. In November 2008 alone, there were two incidents of off-duty police officers shooting and killing civilians over petty disputes. The cases against both officers are currently making their way through the judicial system.
3. (C) NGO and academic contacts from across the political spectrum report witnessing police brutality as part of their daily lives. One academic at XXXXXXXXXXXX told us XXXXXXXXXXXX the police proceeded to beat a female suspect into confessing about others involved in the theft and the whereabouts of the stolen valuables. A contact from an international NGO described witnessing police beat the doorman of an upscale Cairo apartment building into disclosing the apartment number of a suspect. Another contact at a human rights NGO told us that her friends do not report thefts from their apartments because they do not want to subject "all the doormen" in the vicinity to police beatings. She told us that the police's use of force has pervaded Egyptian culture to the extent that one popular television soap opera recently featured a police detective hero who beats up suspects to collect evidence.
4. (C) Contacts attribute police brutality to poor training, understaffing and official sanction. Human rights lawyer XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX speculated that officers routinely resort to brutality because of pressure from their superiors to solve crimes. He asserted that most officers think solving crimes justifies brutal interrogation methods, and that some policemen believe that Islamic law sanctions torture. XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that a culture of judicial impunity for police officers enables continued brutality. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, "Police officers feel they are above the law and protected by the public prosecutor." Human rights lawyer XXXXXXXXXXXX attributed police brutality against common criminals, including the use of electric shocks, to the problem of demoralized officers facing long hours and their own economic problems. He asserted that the police will even beat lawyers who enter police stations to defend their clients.
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Criminals and Islamists
-----------------------
5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that since the GOE opened a dialogue with formerly violent Islamists, such as the Islamic Group, following the 1997 Luxor terrorist attacks, torture of Islamists has decreased. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the GOE now treats Islamists better than common criminals. Some Islamist detainees are "spoiled," he asserted, with regular access to visits from friends and family, decent food and education. Before the Luxor attacks, XXXXXXXXXXXX commented, the government would torture Islamist detainees on a daily basis.
6. (C) Attorney XXXXXXXXXXXXXX commented that the GOE is more reluctant to torture Islamists, including Muslim Brotherhood (MB) members, because of their persistence in making public political statements, and their contacts with international NGOs that could embarrass the regime. XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated that the exception to this rule is when MB members mobilize people against the government in a way the regime deems threatening, such as the April 6 Facebook strike (ref D). According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the MB-affiliated blogger and "April 6 Movement" member XXXXXXXXXXXX whom police arrested XXXXXXXXXXXX (ref A) falls into this category, and the GOE is probably torturing him to scare other "April 6" members into abandoning their political activities. XXXXXXXXXXXX's assessment tracks with "April 6" member XXXXXXXXXXXX's accounts of his own torture and the alleged police sexual molestation of a female "April 6" activist this past November (ref A). Bloggers close to XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that following his arrest he was tortured severely with electric shocks and needed to be hospitalized, but that security forces stopped the torture when he began cooperating.
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GOE Awareness of the Problem
----------------------------
7. (C) Contacts agree that in the past five years, the government has stopped denying that torture exists and has taken some steps to address the problem. However, contacts believe that the Interior Ministry lacks the political will to take substantive action to change the culture of police brutality. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that following alleged standing orders from the Interior Ministry between 2000 and 2006 for the police to shoot, beat and humiliate judges in order to undermine judicial independence, the GOE made a political decision in 2007 to allow the courts to sentence police officers to short prison terms. XXXXXXXXXXXX described the 2007 Imad El-Kebir case as a turning point in influencing the government to permit the sentencing of police officers.
(Note: Per ref E, a court sentenced two police officers to three years in prison in November 2007 for assaulting and sodomizing bus driver Imad El-Kebir. The case gained notoriety after a cell phone video recording of the torture was posted on YouTube. End note.)
8. (C) An estimated 13 cases of officers accused of brutality are currently working their way through the courts, and judges have handed down moderate sentences, usually the minimum three-year prison term, against policemen over the past few months, often for heinous crimes. For example, in October 2008, a court sentenced a policeman to three years in prison for beating and drowning a fisherman. In November 2008, a court sentenced two policemen to three years in prison for hooking a man to their car and dragging him to his death. XXXXXXXXXXXXX characterized the sentences as "light," in proportion to the crimes, but commented that any prison sentences are an important development toward holding the police responsible for crimes. XXXXXXXXXXXX commented that the prison sentences demonstrate that the GOE is providing political space for judges to operate somewhat independently, in response to criticism from foreign governments and international NGOs. XXXXXXXXXXXXX described the sentences as important in drawing public attention to brutal police crimes, and strengthening the hand of advocates who call for reforming systemic problems within the police force.
-----------
GOE Efforts
-----------
9. (C) Ambassador Ahmed Haggag, who is detailed from the MFA as the coordinator for the UNDP Human Rights Capacity Building Project, described for us the organization's efforts to train the Interior and Justice Ministries and the Public Prosecutor on human rights issues through lectures and workshops. Acknowledging that torture is a "problem, but not a daily occurrence," Haggag said the UNDP trains police officers on international human rights conventions, and is trying to convince police officers to solve cases using "legal and ethical means," instead of torture. Haggag told us he "doubts there is still torture against political prisoners." Staffers from the quasi-governmental National Council for Human Rights described the council's workshops for police officers where professors give lectures on human rights law and prisoner psychology. NGO contacts have privately criticized the UNDP project as ineffective, complaining that it has banned credible human lawyers from giving lectures to the police because of their political opposition to the NDP, and instead invites MOI officials complicit in torture to give human rights presentations.
10. (C) In late December 2008, the MOI announced it had suspended 280 police officers for human rights violations and fired 1,164 lower-ranking policemen for misconduct. Our NGO contacts doubted that the disciplinary actions were human rights related, and speculated that the officers were probably involved in taking bribes and other illegal activity. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that this announcement does not amount to a serious MOI human rights policy. XXXXXXXXXXXXX expressed skepticism over whether these disciplinary actions will result in long-term positive changes XXXXXXXXXXXX
11. (C) Former senior Interior Ministry official Ihab Youssef, Director of the NGO "The Police and the People for Egypt" told us in late 2008 that his NGO did not receive many proposals from the public in response to its solicitation for ideas on developing projects to build trust between the police and citizens. Youssef said that the NGO's Facebook site, which provides a forum for the public to complain about the police, has generated more interest. In September 2008, Youssef publicly announced the formation of his NGO, which counts establishment figures such as former FM Ahmed Maher among its board members (ref C). Youssef does not receive GOE funding for the NGO, and has turned to private Egyptian businesses to raise money. XXXXXXXXXXXX
-------
Comment
-------
12. (C) The GOE has not begun serious work on trying to transform the police and security services from instruments of power that serve and protect the regime into institutions operating in the public interest, despite official slogans to the contrary. It seems that the government would have the strongest interest in preventing future accidental shootings of innocents, such as the Salamut and Aswan incidents that resulted in riots. We imagine that halting the torture of common criminals, who are usually poor and voiceless, is lower on the GOE's agenda. We want to continue USG-funded police training, and we will look for ways to help XXXXXXXXXXXX's NGO launch productive work.
SCOBEY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 000544
SIPDIS FOR NEA/ELA AND DRL/NESCA NSC FOR PASCUAL AND KUCHTA-HELBLING LONDON FOR SREEBNY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2029
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, KIRF, KWMN, SOCI, EG
SUBJECT: BLOGGERS MOVING FROM ACTIVISM TO BROADENING DISCOURSE AND SELF-EXPRESSION
REF: A. CAIRO 468 B. CAIRO 243 C. CAIRO 229 D. CAIRO 152 E. 08 CAIRO 2403 F. 08 CAIRO 1973 G. 08 CAIRO 783 H. 07 CAIRO 3214 I. 06 CAIRO 3161
Classified By: DCM Matt Tueller for reason 1.4 (d).
1. KEY POINTS — (C) Egypt's bloggers are playing an increasingly important role in broadening the scope of acceptable political and social discourse, and self-expression.
-- (C) Bloggers' discussions of sensitive issues, such as sexual harassment, sectarian tension and the military, represent a significant change from five years ago, and have influenced society and the media.
-- (C) The role of bloggers as a cohesive activist movement has largely disappeared, due to a more restrictive political climate, GOE counter-measures, and tensions among bloggers.
-- (C) However, individual bloggers have continued to work to expose problems such as police brutality and corporate malfeasance.
2. (C) Comment: The government generally allows bloggers wide latitude in posting material critical of the GOE.
Exceptions to this policy are bloggers who directly insult President Mubarak or Islam, and the government has arrested and jailed bloggers who have crossed these red-lines. The GOE has also arrested activists, such as XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX, who have used blogging to organize and support protests (refs A and C). Activists are increasingly writing blogs to advance their political aims. Contacts accurately point out that bloggers have ceased to function as a cohesive activist movement. It is noteworthy that bloggers did not play a significant role in the most recent example of mass cyber-activism — the April 6, 2008 strike orchestrated through Facebook (ref G).
-----------------------------
The Current State of Blogging
-----------------------------
3. (C) Egypt has an estimated 160,000 bloggers who write in Arabic, and sometimes in English, about a wide variety of topics, from social life to politics to literature. One can view posts ranging from videos of alleged police brutality (ref B), to comments about the GOE's foreign policy, to complaints about separate lines for men and women in government offices distributing drivers' licenses. One NGO contact estimated for us that a solid majority of bloggers are between 20 and 35 years old, and that about 30 percent of blogs focus on politics. Blogs have spread throughout the population to become vehicles for a wide range of activists, students, journalists and ordinary citizens to express their views on almost any issue they choose. As such, the blogs have significantly broadened the range of topics that Egyptians are able to discuss publicly.
-------------------------------------------
Expanding Discourse and Personal Expression -------------------------------------------
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that blogging allows Egyptian youth to air their views about social and political issues in ways that were "unimaginable five years ago." XXXXXXXXXXXX said that blog debates currently cover formerly "taboo" topics, such as Christian-Muslim tensions and the military's potential role in succession. XXXXXXXXXXXX, a blogger who now concentrates on journalism and film-making, described how bloggers began public discussions of issues, such as sexual harassment and the legal status of Bahai'is, that were previously too sensitive to discuss. XXXXXXXXXXXX attributed the media's sympathetic treatment of the Bahai'is' national identification card case in January 2008, in comparison with skeptical media coverage of the issue in 2004, to bloggers' efforts.
CAIRO 00000544 002 OF 003
5. (C) Two young upper middle-class bloggers told us that expressing themselves on their blogs is a "bright spot" for them in the current atmosphere of political, economic and social malaise. They noted that blogging provides them with an outlet, which they perceive as relatively anonymous, to disseminate criticism. One of them expressed satisfaction over being able to attack the "religious hypocrisy" and the "serious problems" in the society. A third blogger told us that she uses her blog to discuss whatever issues may be bothering her: her views on dysfunction in the Sinai, the prime minister's latest speech, or the Obama administration's Middle East diplomacy. She has written critically about issues, such as the XXXXXXXXXXXX (ref F), without any GOE attempts to silence her.
---------------------------------------
Relationship with the Independent Media
---------------------------------------
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the open atmosphere created by bloggers has positively influenced the independent media, especially satellite television, to discuss sensitive issues such as sexuality and abortion. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that while bloggers originally pushed the independent press to tackle new issues in 2006, the independent press has now overtaken the blogs in breaking important news. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that while bloggers did ground-breaking reporting on sexual assaults in 2006 before the independent press covered the issue, bloggers are now recycling news stories that the independent press breaks. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the relationship between bloggers and the independent press has come full circle, as bloggers now depend on the independent press for news.
-------------------------------
Originally an Activist Movement
-------------------------------
7. (C) While the voices of individual bloggers are currently making their mark on expanding public discourse and personal expression, bloggers originally saw themselves as a cohesive movement of political activists. XXXXXXXXXXXX, said that in 2006, bloggers with diverse orientations — secular, Islamist, and leftist -- worked together to organize events, such as a sit-in protest at the Judges' Club (ref I) and demonstrations in Tahrir Square. XXXXXXXXXXXX characterized bloggers during this period as activists who worked closely with civil society organizations to raise public awareness of issues, such as sexual assault. Because of bloggers' independent, relatively anonymous identities, XXXXXXXXXXXX continued, they were able to engage on these issues more freely than NGOs. XXXXXXXXXXXX believes that female bloggers' personal accounts of being harassed put an important personal face on the problem.
8. (C) Since 2006, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, bloggers have not been able to replicate the same kind of political activism for a number of reasons. He cited growing tensions and divisions within the blogger community, where Islamist bloggers are openly critical of secular and Christian bloggers. As part of the GOE's increasing crack-down on political reformers since 2005-6, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, State Security (SSIS) began to target bloggers. XXXXXXXXXXXX, and of pressuring western news organizations to dismiss other bloggers who challenged the GOE. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that many bloggers have abandoned their blogs due to this pressure, and are focusing instead on careers in journalism and civil society.
9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that as political activism waned after 2006, bloggers lost their context for advocacy. He concluded that there is currently no political opening for bloggers to push for significant change, and predicted that the next opportunities may be during the 2011 presidential election.
Human rights activist XXXXXXXXXXXX separately echoed XXXXXXXXXXXX' assessment, opining that there is a current "despondency" among bloggers, whom XXXXXXXXXXXX considers to be part of the broader activist community. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that in the current "political stagnation," bloggers are bereft of compelling and achievable political causes, but XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted they would play a crucial role "during the eventual succession."
----------------------------------
Bloggers as Human Rights Activists
CAIRO 00000544 003 OF 003
----------------------------------
10. (C) While XXXXXXXXXXXX minimizes bloggers' current impact as activists, veteran civil society advocates view bloggers'
contributions as significant. XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed the importance of bloggers' concern with torture and press freedom. At a public lecture XXXXXXXXXXXX human rights lawyer XXXXXXXXXXXX lauded XXXXXXXXXXXX for posting an alleged police sodomy video a few days earlier (ref B), and for breaking the El-Kebir police brutality case. In November 2007, a court sentenced two polic officers to three years in prison for assaultin and sodomizing bus driver Imad El-Kebir. The cse gained notoriety after XXXXXXXXXXXX a cell phoe video recording of the attack (ref H).
11. (C XXXXXXXXXXXX cited the "3,000 hits per day" on XXXXXXXXXXXX' blogas evidence of his influence, asserting that XXXXXXXXXXXX is more widely read than "Rose Al Youssef," th SSIS-backed daily newspaper. Separately, a human rights lawyer XXXXXXXXXXXX marveled at XXXXXXXXXXXX power to expose police brutality on his blog. Bloggers have also been active on other issues. XXXXXXXXXXXX
SCOBEY
Cable dated:2005-08-17T21:24:00]
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LIMA 003571
SIPDIS
EB FOR A/S WAYNE; WHA FOR MONSERRATE; INL FOR AGUILERA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2015
TAGS: EMIN, PGOV, SNAR, ASEC, EINV, ENRG, PE
SUBJECT: MAJAZ ANTI-MINING VIOLENCE ON ECUADOR BORDER
REF: A. LIMA 1432
B. 04 LIMA 5874
Classified By: Ambassador J. Curtis Struble. Reason: 1.4 (b,d)
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Violent protests against British firm Majaz,s exploration for copper near the Ecuador border have resulted in three deaths and several kidnappings. An unusual combination of anti-mining NGOs, the Catholic Church, leftist groups and narcotraffickers have marshaled protesters from the surrounding provincesXXXXXXXXXXXX The Mission continues its work with other Embassies and mining investors to promote conflict resolution. END SUMMARY.
2. (U) Sporadic protests began a year ago in the Minera Majaz exploration zone along the Rio Blanco, on the Ecuadorian border in northern Piura. XXXXXXXXXXXX On 7/28 protesters began road blockages and confrontations with the Peruvian National Police (PNP). The GOP sent a negotiating team to the zone to lower tensions, but Vice Minister of Mines (MEM) Romulo Mucho was injured by a protester as he left a negotiating session in Cajamarca. Despite claims that police killed many protesters, only one death (gunshot from an unknown assailant) was confirmed during demonstrations. The PNP reported also that two locals died in their home when their explosive device detonated.
3. (SBU) On 8/6 Ronderos kidnapped two Majaz employees and took them to villages where they were beaten. The two were released, but on 8/14 ronderos kidnapped ten other employees, releasing them only after the employees signed agreements not to work for Majaz. Ronderos have announced plans for more demonstrations on 8/18.
4. (C) Conversations between Mission officers, MEM VM Mucho, Majaz executives, NGO representatives and PNP officials yielded a common theme that the protesters have no negotiable complaints, but rather want to keep outsiders away. The forces overtly arrayed against Majaz are the local ronderos, mayors, several Catholic priests and some NGOs. Working behind the scene are a combination of the Peruvian Communist Party/Patria Roja, national teachers, union SUTEP and perhaps opium poppy traffickers.
5. (SBU) The Peruvian National Police have said publicly that they believe opium traffickers have also played a role in stoking the violence -- an assertion the police have amplified in private conversations with Emboffs. Police report that they have destroyed over 70,000 opium poppy plants in Northern Peru since June 2005. Company representatives have also asserted that the Majaz exploration site lies along a foot track used by couriers who convey opium latex to Ecuador.
6. (C) Comment: This area of northern Peru is in fact a priority target of our efforts to collect intelligence on poppy cultivation and opium trafficking. We are working with both the police and company representatives to further develop the information they have. So far, however, the information is general. There have been past instances when non-U.S. mining companies have claimed unconvincingly that narco-traffickers were behind opposition to their operations in an effort to enlist our assistance. End Comment.
7. (C) NGO XXXXXXXXXXXX has becomeXXXXXXXXXXXX frustrated XXXXXXXXXXXX in the Majaz community negotiations. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Majaz and MEM VM Mucho were making reasonable efforts to mediate; here, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, the ronderos refused to negotiate and simply wanted Majaz to leave. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that other mediating NGOs XXXXXXXXXXXX were experiencing the same frustration with the ronderos.
8. (U) Minera Majaz is the Peruvian subsidiary of British firm Monterrico Metals. Majaz has spent $20 million exploring for copper for over a year, building roads and providing services and employment to area residents. Exploratory drilling has finished; surveying of a planned copper concentrate pipeline (the last step for Majaz,s feasibility study) ceased during protests but resumed on 8/11. Militants still deny access to most of the pipeline route. The planned $800 million investment in a deposit of 1.3 billion metric tons (MT) of copper ore could produce 220,000 MT of copper concentrate and 500 MT of molybdenum per year.
9. (U) Embassy Lima has recently stepped up efforts to improve coordination with the embassies of Canada, Great Britain, Australia, Switzerland and South Africa as well as with major foreign mining investors with an eye to reducing anti-mining violence (Septel/Reftels).
10. (C) Comment: The anti-mining forces in action in Majaz represent a strange group of bedfellows indeed -- the Catholic church, violent radical leftists, NGOs, ronderos and perhaps narcotraffickers. These organizations are competing for a leadership role but in some cases also cooperate. The extent to which the church is tied into the ronderos and radical left is both controversial and still open to question. Unlike recent conflicts in Southern Peru (e.g., Tintaya) the protests in Majaz are not aimed at forcing a redistribution of royalties or more generous economic support from a mine. Northern Peru has a reputation for being more anti-mining than the South, where the industry is better developed and more of the local populations see benefits from the activity. The objective of protesters in Majaz is to kill the project while it is in the exploration phase -- before, presumably, a pro-mine constituency can develop in the area. STRUBLE
ID:38881 Cable dated:2005-08-19T18:20:00
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 003609
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR WHA/AND, EB/TPP BMANOGUE
COMMERCE FOR 4331/MAC/WH/MCAMERON
USTR FOR BHARMAN TAGS: N/A
TAGS: EMIN, ETRD, SNAR, PTER, ECON, EINV, PGOV, PE
TAGS:
TAGS: A) LIMA 3571, B) 04 LIMA 5874, C) LIMA 3105
1. (SBU) Summary: The U.S. and Canadian Ambassadors hosted a meeting on August 11 for representatives of international mining companies to review their operating difficulties in Peru and to coordinate efforts to improve the investment climate. Consensus among the companies is that radical forces (Communist Party-Patria Roja, drug traffickers and rural defense committees--ronderos) are increasingly active in rural communities, seeking to target mining operations throughout the country. Because of the electoral campaign, the companies do not expect the government to take a proactive role enhancing security in mining areas over the next 18 months. Ambassador Struble requested that each company develop a comprehensive list of their community projects (e.g., roads, schools, clinics, wells) to better publicize the positive impact of mining projects in Peru. End Summary.
2. (U) The U.S. and Canadian Ambassadors jointly hosted a meeting on August 11 to coordinate efforts with representatives from several international mining companies in Peru: Antamina, Newmont (Minera Yanacocha), Minera Quellaveco, Barrick, BHP Billiton (Tintaya mine). The Swiss Charge, the new Australian Consul General, and the British Embassy Trade and Investment official also participated. A representative from the South African Embassy, which forms part of this diplomatic mining group, was unable to attend. The Ambassadors sought the companies' views on initiatives each side could undertake to help improve the investment climate and security conditions in mining communities. The meeting took place shortly after the violence against British firm Majaz's exploration in Northern Peru (Ref A).
Bolder Opposition to Mining Operations
--------------------------------------
3. (SBU) Carlos Santa Cruz, Director of Minera Yanacocha (South America's largest gold mine) noted that conditions have changed since the last meeting hosted by the Canadian Ambassador (Ref B). Santa Cruz observed that NGOs have taken a backseat in the campaign against multinational mining companies since the outbreak of violence against the Anglo-Australian owned, BHP-Tintaya copper mine (Ref C), a model mining project near Cusco. He opined that radical groups, i.e., local politicians and fringe political groups such as Patria Roja, have now taken on this role. Santa Cruz believes that the objective of these groups is to create serious problems by attacking the industry and economic system. Most of the company General Managers lamented they are focused on improving security rather than enhancing production.
4. (SBU) Felipe Cantuarias, Vice President of Commercial and Corporate Affairs for Minera Antamina (copper and zinc producer), remarked that the companies are dealing with a new phenomenon: local politicians that promote violence and have ties to ronderos and coca growers. He stated that there is no solution in the short term; the GOP does not have the tools or desire to confront these radical politicians. To minimize future disruptions, Cantuarias indicated that the companies would have to take on more social responsibilities in the communities, providing jobs or visible infrastructure projects.
5. (SBU) Cantuarias contends that the recent disruptions are well-organized efforts to stop responsible mining companies from operating in Peru and Ecuador, much like the national anti-hydrocarbons movement that succeeded in Bolivia. While recent anti-mining efforts have focused on companies in the north (Quillish and Majaz), the Antamina executive noted there are indications that Dodge Phelps' Cerro Verde project (copper mine) near Arequipa in the south or the isolated Las Bambas (copper deposit near Cusco) could become future targets.
Watching the NGOs
-----------------
6. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX of Minera Quellaveco, laid much of the blame on Oxfam America and Friends of the Earth, stating the two international NGOs are fomenting anti-mining attitudes, exploiting low levels of education and weak institutions in rural areas of Peru. (Note: Oxfam America played a key role in mediating the conflict during the Tintaya crisis, Ref C. End Note.) The Ambassador stated that NGOs are entitled to express their views; nevertheless, he encouraged the companies to bring to his and the other Ambassadors' attention NGO-funded groups or individuals that advocate violence. He requested, for example, public statements, newspaper reports or radio spots that encourage violence. Armed with this information, Ambassadors would be able to confront any NGOs from their respective countries about such dangerous activities.
7. (SBU) The Canadian Ambassador recounted her recent visit to one of the country's top polling institutions and left impressed that NGOs, such as Oxfam UK, regularly consult the public opinion surveyors to obtain a feel for what issues and concerns motivate communities. She noted that the NGOs appeared to be well ahead of the companies in determining how and what messages to convey in rural mining regions.
Next Steps
----------
8. (SBU) Ambassador Struble noted that security problems in mining communities affect the interests of several countries. He recommended that the Embassies as a group (U.S., Canada, U.K., Australia, Switzerland, and South Africa) highlight the billions of dollars invested in Peru by international mining companies. The Ambassador stated that diplomats often have opportunities to remind Peruvian officials and the public of the benefits of modern mining and the higher salaries paid by mining-related jobs in Peru, but they need details. The Ambassador requested that the companies compile a list of all civic actions implemented by the international companies (roads, wells, schools, clinics) in mining communities to better publicize the benefits of mining projects throughout the country.
9. (U) The Antamina Executive recommended that the diplomats meet as a group with the Education Ministry to encourage a rotation of teachers -- often members of the radical SUTEP teachers union and Patria Roja -- in conflictive mining communities. He also suggested that the Embassies urge the Catholic Church to rotate bishops operating in these regions. The Ambassadors agreed to consider this, but needed specific examples of anti-mining teachers and priests, who engage in inappropriate activities.
10. (SBU) The executives expressed concern that none of the political party leaders had spoken against the anti-mining violence. Santa Cruz emphasized that it is crucial to stop the impunity for those who damage private property and block roads. There is a law pending approval in Congress that would give the GOP the legal framework to enhance security in mining communities. All too often, the police will arrest instigators of anti-mining violence, but the local prosecutors release them under pressure from the community. The pending law would permit the police to move a detainee to a different jurisdiction, thereby reducing the likelihood of prosecutors bowing to local demands. The Ambassadors agreed to evaluate when a meeting with the chiefs of the political parties would be most effective.
Comment: PPK Will be Instrumental
---------------------------------
11. (SBU) Pending key information from the mining companies, a core group of country representatives (U.S., Canada, U.K., Australia, Switzerland, South Africa) are ready to meet as a group with the GOP, Catholic Church and political party leaders. With the appointment of new Prime Minister Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, we have an influential government ally in a position that is willing to tackle the lawlessness issue in mining communities. His recent statements about putting the GOP's house in order, establishing control of the roadways where commerce transits, are encouraging.
STRUBLE
ID:247169 Cable dated:2010-02-04T10:15:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 000255
NOFORN
SIPDIS
PLEASE PASS TO EEB/TRA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2020
TAGS: EAIR, ECON, EU, SENV, SP, UK
SUBJECT: UK SEES FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AS KEY ISSUE IN UPCOMING U.S.-EU SECOND STAGE NEGOTIATIONS IN MADRID
REF: A. REF A: SECSTATE 9584
B. REF B: 09 LONDON 626
Classified By: Kathleen Doherty, Economic Counselor for reasons 1.4 (b)
, (d)
1. (C/NF) Summary: The British government reiterated its view that the U.S. must lift some restrictions on foreign ownership of U.S. carriers in the U.S.-EU second stage air transport negotiations. UK officials at the Department for Transport noted they agreed to the first stage negotiations with the understanding the U.S. would loosen foreign ownership restrictions in the second stage. They said domestic political pressure to renegotiate the entire agreement was mounting in both houses of the British parliament. Finally, DfT noted that Spain, which will host the next round of air transport negotiations, may be more willing to agree to second stage negotiations if the U.S. Department of Transportation grants Iberia airlines (along with British Airways, American Airlines and others) antitrust immunity. End Summary.
2. (C/NF) In a February 3 meeting at the Department for Transport (DfT) offices, EconOffs met with Francis Morgan, Head of International Aviation and Safety, and Simon Knight, Head of Aviation Negotiations. EconOffs delivered the demarche (Ref A) encouraging the UK to take a realistic and pragmatic view of the upcoming round of second stage negotiations in Madrid and indicating that the USG would not change the law limiting foreign ownership and control of U.S. airline carriers in the near future. Morgan responded with some frustration to the latter point, noting that closing second stage negotiations without a USG concession on this issue is "not possible" due to domestic political pressure in Britain. He said both houses of parliament are unsatisfied with the results of the first stage negotiations (see Ref A for background on first stage) and that a House of Commons committee suggested in December that the UK should start from scratch and renegotiate the entire agreement.
3. (C/NF) Morgan stated the UK "needs the U.S. to go as far as possible" on loosening foreign ownership restrictions. He said DfT "went out on a limb" when they pushed HMG to agree to open Heathrow Airport up to greater foreign competition in the first stage; which they did, according to Morgan, with the understanding that the U.S. would make concessions on foreign ownership in the second stage. DfT views the first stage as a fair deal for the British, Morgan noted, but the public and parliament saw Heathrow as the UK's best bargaining chip to leverage negotiations and they feel that DfT squandered it in the first stage agreement. Morgan feels that if the UK were to conclude second stage negotiations without anything to show, the domestic political pressure to pull out of the first stage agreement will increase. He urged the U.S. administration to "think hard on this" and give the UK "some recognition." Morgan said the U.S. "should be under no illusion (second stage) will be easy. We can't just close negotiations and wrap it up", but said there is room for "creativity" and that it all depended on "the proper words."
4. (C/NF) American Airlines, British Airways, Iberia airlines, Finnair and Royal Jordanian Airlines have filed a Joint Application with the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) for antitrust immunity (ATI) for airline alliance agreements, which DOT is due to rule on in the near future. While the UK claims it is not drawing a link between what happens with the ATI ruling and second stage talks, Morgan said Spain may see the two as being closely linked. (Note: Spain is hosting the next round of stage two negotiations in Madrid on February 16-17 and also holds the EU presidency until July. End Note.) Morgan also noted that British Airways could walk away from any ATI agreement which is not satisfactory, and if they did that "all bets were off".
5. (C/NF) Comment: The UK's frustration over the USG's apparent unwillingness to loosen limitations on foreign ownership of U.S. carriers was expected. Their argument that political pressures may require revisiting of first stage "concessions" is virtually the only card they can play. It is difficult to gauge whether British members of parliament (MP) - or British airlines - would realistically press for a renegotiation of the entire U.S.-EU air transport agreement should there be insufficient progress in second stage talks, as Morgan suggested. British Airways, Virgin and others are already taking advantage - to the extent the current economic climate allows - of the benefits the first stage brought them. In addition, British elections are due this spring and more than one-fifth of current MPs are expected to lose their seats. Should this be the case, many of the old guard who felt the UK gave up too much in the first stage without getting much in return, may not be around to pressure DfT. End Comment.
SUSMAN
ID:190812 Cable dated:2009-02-06T13:05:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 000333
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019
TAGS: EAIR, ECON, ETRD, SENV, EU, UK
SUBJECT: UK VIEWS ON AVIATION EMISSIONS TRADING AND OPEN SKIES STAGE II
REF: STATE 1023
Classified By: ECON COUNSELOR KATHLEEN DOHERTY FOR REASONS 1.4 b & d
1. (C/NF) Summary/Comment: The UK will present in late February a draft regulation for implementation of the EU's Aviation Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), required to be part of their domestic legislation by January 2010. HMG supports ETS and its goals, with Secretary of State Hoon saying it is an important tool for engaging the U.S. in a global approach. Hoon encouraged the U.S. to look at a regional emissions program, following the Australian model, which would be compatible with the EU's ETS. The UK is eager to engage with the new Administration on Stage II of Open Skies negotiations, and again mentioned domestic pressure to invoke the clawback passage of the agreement if momentum is not achieved this year. We explained the U.S. position on both issues, and highlighted bipartisan opposition to the unilateral ETS plan. The British are not backing down on either their ETS or Opens Skies goals. They eagerly await signals from the new team at the Departments of Transportation and State on where we will engage, and to what extent. Hoon is known as pro-American and pragmatic, but will be under pressure from domestic constituencies to not roll back on UK/EU goals in either realm. End Summary
2. (U) The following information stems from recent meetings with British Department for Transportation (DfT) officials; including Secretary of State Geoff Hoon in a meeting with Ambassador Tuttle, and Phil Dykins, Head of Bilateral Relations and Martin Capstick, Head of Aviation Environmental Division.
EU Emissions Trading Scheme
---------------------------
3. (C/NF) During a farewell call by Ambassador Tuttle, Secretary Hoon pointed out how UK support for the EU's Aviation ETS and its goals of a 20% reduction of carbon emissions by 2020 allowed him to stand up in the House of Commons and push for a third runway at Heathrow. Hoon said he understood U.S. concerns about the extra-territorial application of ETS, and sees the ETS proposal as step one in a two-step process to get the USG more actively involved in a global approach to resolving emissions issues. Hoon admitted the EU needs to look closely at both the Chicago Convention and the U.S.-EU Open Skies agreement to ensure it does not conflict with legal obligations, but that the overall goal was to get the U.S. included in either ETS or an equivalent scheme. Hoon said the EU needs to go into negotiations with the U.S. with a degree of flexibility; a goal of "let's do this together". ETS allows for regional approaches that are equivalent to ETS, Hoon explained, and pointed to Australia and New Zealand's regional models. He speculated whether the U.S./North American could adopt a similar scheme. Addressing the larger climate change issue, Hoon said that having the U.S. involved in the process would help greatly, because now China and India are hiding behind U.S. delays.
4. (C/NF) The British fully support the EU's Emissions Trading Scheme, Martin Capstick, Head of Aviation Environmental Division at the DfT, told us, but also understand some countries' concerns about sovereignty in relation to its application. Capstick said as a financial issue, ETS should be a small and diminishing concern for airlines because oil prices in the long run will force airlines to become more fuel efficient. Despite the low cost of oil now, Capstick said it was only a matter of time before prices rose again. He also explained that the ETS is relatively less expensive than auctioning emissions credits. The UK will transpose the EU directive into UK law by January 2010, and its draft regulation will come out in late February. The USG is welcome to participate in the consultation process at that point. We explained the bipartisan nature of U.S. opposition to an EU-imposed scheme, and pressed our view that emissions measures would be better done through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Capstick replied that although parties, including the UK, are working hard in ICAO's Group on International Aviation and Climate Change (GIACC), the EU and Member States believe they need to go forward with ETS unless and until a global agreement can be achieved.
5. (C/NF) We questioned how the UK could pursue both the Air Passenger Duty (APD) and ETS, noting both the imposition of hefty costs on airlines during difficult times, and their purported shared aims of addressing similar environmental concerns. Capstick told us the U.S. would be free to challenge the APD if/when the EU's ETS comes on line. He
LONDON 00000333 002 OF 002
continued that some in the UK public feel there is too much reliance on air travel, so imposition of costs through APD or ETS would force individuals to non-aviation modes of travel. Capstick acknowledged this argument works better in densely populated Europe than it would in a country with a large geographic area such as the U.S.
Open Skies Stage II
-------------------
6. (C/NF) On next steps for Open Skies Stage II negotiations, Phil Dykins, Head of Bilateral Relations at DfT, told us the UK position was fully in line with the EU's implementation schedule, and the UK was waiting for a signal from the USG that we were ready to begin the next round. DfT officials asked whether the Open Skies agreement was a priority for the Obama Administration and how it intended to push the deal in Congress. The UK officials said they would be concerned if there was no movement in the near future. Dykins invoked the specter of the British government succumbing to pressure from some of its commercial carriers to implement the clawback language if progress was not achieved. He said the external pressure on HMG would be particularly acute if British Airway's anti-trust agreement with American Airlines was not approved. We informed DfT that the new team was not yet fully in place in Washington, however, there was a commitment from USG aviation officials to tackle Stage II negotiations soon.
7. (C/NF) Secretary of State Hoon, who took over in the fall from Ruth Kelly, plans to continue his predecessor's policies of actively pursuing UK/EU goals of greater foreign ownership of U.S. airlines, cabotage, and a repeal of the Fly America Act. In his meeting with Ambassador Tuttle, Secretary Hoon displayed a keen understanding of the political dynamic the new Administration faced on Open Skies, and opined that the new Democratic-controlled congress was likely to be more protectionist than the last one.
TUTTLE
Cable dated:2007-09-19T15:24:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 001950
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
LONDON FOR TSOU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2017
TAGS: ECON, EPET, PGOV, PREL, SA SUBJECT: TOO DARN HOT: SAUDI EP BOOM REACHING LIMITS?
Classified By: Consul General John S. Kincannon for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. SUMMARY (C) With temperatures reaching 115 degrees, the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia is both literally and metaphorically "too darn hot." With vast investments being made in oil and petrochemical projects, post hears constant complaints of shortages of materials, qualified workers, and infrastructure. All of the residential compounds in the Eastern Province with adequate security have long waiting lists. Aramco's CEO in a recent meeting with the CG admitted that one of his most pressing challenges is finding qualified engineers for all of Aramco's new projects. This cable summarizes data suggesting that the enormous economic boom that the Eastern Province is witnessing may be approaching capacity limits. END SUMMARY.
--------------
HOW HOT IS IT?
--------------
2. (C) Saudi Aramco is half way through a $50 billion capital investment program that aims to expand Saudi's maximum sustainable daily oil production capacity from 9.5 mbd currently to 12.5 mbd by 2009. In May 2007, Saudi Minister of Oil and Mineral Resources Ali al-Naimi announced that Saudi Arabia would invest $75 billion to move from the world's tenth largest to third largest producer of petrochemicals by 2015. The bulk of these planned enormous capital investments and the megaprojects emerging from them are heavily concentrated in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province.
-------------------
A CONTRACTOR CRUNCH
-------------------
3. (C) Contractors-large, medium, and small-willing to take on new projects are increasingly difficult to find. Saudi Aramco recently prequalified eight bidders for a $7-$8 billion refinery project, but four of the prequalified contractors declined to bid because they were fully booked and lacked the capacity to take on the job. An American businessman representing a large American oil firm reports they received no response from contractors who were available or willing to bid on a project worth as much as $10 million in the Jubail region. An international school group was attempting to construct a new school in Dammam and issued a request for proposals from construction firms. After initially receiving interest from four contractors, three firms ultimately declined to bid on the contract and the fourth company demanded three times as much compensation as originally negotiated. The school group was ultimately forced to rescind the tender and is beginning the process again.
------------------
THE LABOR SHORTAGE
------------------
4. (C) Several post contacts have detailed the difficulties they face in finding both trained professionals and low skilled laborers to staff the many large infrastructure projects underway in the Eastern Province. As a result, wages for workers from traditional sources of labor such as India and Pakistan, as well as America and Europe, are rising. A recent study concluded the Saudi Ministry of Labor's restrictions on the recruitment of overseas labor, coupled with the burdens imposed by employment sponsorship obligations have increased the salaries of workers by as much as 35 percent for skilled engineers and 10 percent for unskilled labor. One AmCit engineer working on a large and important Aramco expansion project at Khurais commented "on my part of the project, we have maybe 5-6 engineers working because everything is stretched so thin. In the united States, we'd have 50-60 engineers working on a project this size, but we just can't find the people." Representatives from leading construction firms bemoan the increased labor shortage and consequent salary escalation saying, "you used to be able to get a decent Indian engineer for $600-$800 a month. Now if you're not offering $1,000-$1,200, they won't even talk to you." Two of the Eastern Provinces leading business groups XXXXXXXXXXXX report they find it increasingly difficult to locate qualified engineers from South Asia. The increased competition among companies to hire qualified workers has encouraged the recruitment of workers with fraudulent documentation and the payment of bribes to approve the transfer of sponsorship from one company to another. One manager of an EP firm explained to the PAO how companies seeking to hire foreign workers employed with a different company must travel to Riyadh and engage the services of a third party "facilitator." This
RIYADH 00001950 002 OF 003
facilitator then obtains the necessary paperwork from the Ministry of Labor (most likely through bribes) to approve the transfer of sponsorship for the worker from one company to another. The contact explained all his colleagues from different industries throughout the EP face similar labor shortages.
5. (C) Also significant are the effects of the SAG's Saudization quota program to require firms to hire more Saudi nationals. Many of the best and brightest Saudis entering the job market after graduating from university, seek jobs with large firms such as the oil giant, Saudi Aramco, and the national utility company, SCECO. This leaves the poorer skilled and less educated young Saudis in the labor market seeking jobs with smaller and mid-size firms. Many company bosses have bemoaned this fact to post saying the Saudis they are forced to hire (after the large firms "cherry pick" the most capable Saudis) add as much as 10% cost onto the price these companies charge their customers. Recent media accounts have detailed this phenomena at the state owned utility company, SCECO, after a technical committee submitted its findings to the King. The report detailed the poor level of productivity of SCECO's mostly Saudi work force. According to the report, 83% of the electrical company's 28,000 workers are Saudis and this had adversely affected the company's performance. Yet reports say the company is now being pressed to lay off even more skilled foreign workers to make room for a greater number of Saudis.
----------------
A HOUSING CRUNCH
----------------
6. (C) A housing crunch is limiting the ability of firms to base trained workers in the EP. Due to the conservative nature of Saudi society and the threat posed from terrorist incidents, almost all foreign workers are housed in enclosed residential compounds. These housing units resemble gated communities in many American cities and generally are guarded by special detachments from the Saudi Arabian National Guard. The residential compounds are essential for companies seeking to attract skilled workers to Saudi Arabia because they offer foreigners a welcome shelter from the often socially oppressive nature of Saudi society. In the Jubail area of the EP, all residential compounds are full with long waiting lists. Two years ago, the Intercontinental Hotel in Jubail had 25% occupancy but is now completely booked as Aramco has been forced to house expat engineers there due to a lack of other housing options. A variety of American firms in Jubail report there is simply no more space to house workers in their area, yet new projects continue to be announced on a weekly basis. Post Management and RSO Officers have confirmed the near impossibility of locating new off campus housing for new Consulate personnel in the Dhahran area. A similar issue confronts foreign firms seeking to base expatriate employees in the EP.
------------------------
A POWER CRUNCH IN SAUDI?
------------------------
7. (C) Despite its huge energy supplies, KSA may face a utility squeeze in the near future as management issues and productivity levels force the government to make new investments into energy production. A source of concern for powering this period of economic growth has been the challenges faced by SCECO. Last summer, the electricity company had to ration power in the Central and Eastern Provinces because of the limited capacities its plants could offer during this peak demand period. SCECO power production plants currently rely on diesel and crude fuel shipped by truck from Aramco's Riyadh refinery to provinces in the north and south; a process that is reported to cost as much as $80 million each year. A recent technical committee report recommended switching to natural gas as the main fuel for electrical production to boost productivity, increase efficiency and reduce environmental impact. This proposal will require a collaboration with Saudi Aramco. Aramco is consequently stepping up its gas exploration in an effort to boost its reserves by up to 40%. However, explorations by Chinese, Russian, Italian and British-Dutch drilling firms in the "Empty Quarter" of Saudi Arabia to date have not discovered any commercially viable quantities of natural gas. "Perhaps the Empty Quarter really is empty," quipped one contact recently.
8. (C) The Eastern Province already utilizes basically all natural gas available and has no real margin to absorb additional demand. Contacts in the energy sector report the electrical generation and desalinization capabilities of the
RIYADH 00001950 003 OF 003
Eastern Province have begun experiencing shortages of gas. The petrochemical building projects in the Jubail region may also force a gas crunch. Although gas supplies have been allocated for these projects through 2011, rumors circulate in the EP that there may not be sufficient supplies and that gas may need to be rationed. One American businessman representing a large Fortune 500 firm that works closely with Aramco stated the oil company is not investing in infrastructure projects to move more gas to Jubail after 2012, noting Aramco's actions speak more loudly that its words about the company's confidence in providing greater supplies beyond their 2011 commitments.
(APPROVED: KINCANNON) FRAKER
Cable dated:2008-03-16T16:43:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000524
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S AND NEA/FO WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP DOD FOR OSD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/16/28
TAGS: PARM, PREL, PGOV, MASS, MARR, PTER, IS, EG, XF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MINDEF TANTAWI'S VISIT TO THE U.S. MARCH 24-28
REF: A. CAIRO 452 B. CAIRO 488 C. CAIRO 507
CAIRO 00000524 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Francis Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 (a)(b)&(d).
1. (S) Summary: Defense Minister Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi will travel to Washington, Tampa, and Chicago March 24-28. He will meet senior officials in Washington and at USCENTCOM HQ in Tampa, and view U.S. civil defense arrangements in Chicago. Mrs. Tantawi and as many as five senior generals will accompany him. Tantawi will seek assurances that the USG will not condition or reduce military assistance to Egypt in the future. He will emphasize Egypt's continuing value to the United States as an indispensable ally in the region, and he will press to return BRIGHT STAR to a full field training exercise. The eighty-year-old veteran of five wars with Israel is committed to preventing another one ever. But he is also frozen in the Camp David paradigm and uncomfortable with our shift to the post-9/11 GWOT. Recognizing that he is reluctant to change, we nonetheless should urge Minister Tantawi towards a broader and more flexible partnership based on shared strategic objectives, including border security, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping and civil defense. End Summary.
2. (S) Border Control: Egyptian effectiveness in preventing arms smuggling into Gaza is essential to stopping Palestinian rocket fire into Israel. When the Secretary pushed hard on smuggling in October 2007, the Egyptians finally got serious and agreed to open an FMF case that will deploy counter-tunnel technology to the Rafah border. The case also includes extensive training. The initial shipment of equipment is expected in June. Training will begin this spring in the US, due to Egyptian sensitivity towards having foreigners stationed at their borders. The Egyptians are also building a concrete barrier wall on the Egyptian side to avoid a repeat of the January incursion, in which thousands of Gazans poured into Rafah.
3. (C) The Egyptians insist that they are committed to do all they can to stop smuggling into Gaza. They acknowledge the threat that Hamas poses to their own security and to the peace process. They claim to have discovered more than 200 tunnels since November 2005. Tantawi will argue that Egypt is doing everything within its power but is not the only source of weapons in Gaza. He believes that Israeli politicians are blaming Egypt for domestic political reasons and resents the impact on Egyptian military assistance. He will also urge that the USG exert influence on Israel to ease humanitarian conditions in Gaza. EGIS Chief Omar Soliman has the lead on negotiations with Hamas but Tantawi will also likely urge that Rafah be opened to ease humanitarian pressures in Gaza.
4. (S) With Tantawi we should acknowledge that the counter-tunneling technology that we will introduce this summer will contribute to interdiction efforts but does not represent a complete solution. Indeed the Army Corps of Engineers experts who designed the system have told us that the Gaza border represents a "worst case scenario" for interdiction. In a March 6 meeting with NEA A/S Welch, Tantawi hinted that the Egyptians have adopted additional measures at the border. We are still interested in a trilateral meeting with the Egyptians and Israelis (ultimately perhaps to include the PA) to share intelligence and tactics. So far the Israelis have demurred. We should broaden the discussion to maritime interdiction efforts and also addressing the weapons trail, which starts in Yemen and Sudan.
5. (S) Civil Defense: The Red Sea ferry accident in February 2006 embarrassed the Mubarak government and cost more than 1000 lives. Tantawi will bring to Washington his mandate from President Mubarak to integrate the military into crisis response management. On this he needs and will be grateful for our help -- a small but important advance against the MOD's staunch resistance to engagement with us in shifting their priorities and transforming their forces. ASD for Homeland Defense McHale has suggested including Egyptian representatives in U.S.-based civil emergency exercises
CAIRO 00000524 002.2 OF 002
planned for spring and fall 2008, and inviting GOE officials to a civil defense symposium at the Army War College this fall.
6. (S) Peacekeeping: Egypt has contributed to all UN and AU peacekeeping efforts in Africa, and is sending 1300-1400 troops for the UN/AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Egypt has also offered UNAMID two additional mechanized infantry battalions; the UN has accepted one. Despite our repeated requests, the Egyptians declined to contribute helicopters; they simply do not have the logistical and operational capability to operate in Darfur's challenging environment. We recommend that the helo request not be raised again.
7. (S) Reform: In the cabinet, where he still wields significant influence, Tantawi has opposed both economic and political reforms that he perceives as eroding central government power. He is supremely concerned with national unity, and has opposed policy initiatives he views as encouraging political or religious cleavages within Egyptian society. In a speech on March 9, Tantawi said one of the military's roles is to protect constitutional legitimacy and internal stability, signaling his willingness to use the military to control the Muslim Brotherhood in the run-up to the April 9 municipal council elections. On economic reform, Tantawi believes that Egypt's economic reform plan fosters social instability by lessening GOE controls over prices and production. Tantawi rejects any conditioning on Egyptian FMF on human rights or any other grounds. Before this year he thought that FMF was inviolable and regarded ESF as a layer of protection against possible cuts to FMF. He will argue that any conditions on military assistance are counter-productive. He will also state that the military is not behind human rights problems in Egypt and that U.S. Congressional human rights conditionally is mis-targeted.
8. (S) Washington interlocutors should be prepared to meet an aged and
change-resistant Tantawi. Charming and courtly, he is, nonetheless mired in a post-Camp David military paradigm that has served his cohort's narrow interests for the last three decades. He and Mubarak are focused on regime stability and maintaining the status quo through the end of their time. They simply do not have the energy, inclination or world view to do anything differently. Nonetheless, for the benefit of Tantawi's omnipresent aides, we should focus discussions on the future and how to operate as strategic partners as we face the challenges of that future together. RICCIARDONE
Cable dated:2008-09-23T15:17:00
S E C R E T CAIRO 002091
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA AND INR/NESA OSD FOR AGUIRRE JCS FOR YODER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2028
TAGS: PARM, PGOV, ECON, EG
SUBJECT: ACADEMICS SEE THE MILITARY IN DECLINE, BUT RETAINING STRONG INFLUENCE
REF: A. CAIRO 1851 B. CAIRO 530 C. CAIRO 524 D. 07 CAIRO 1417
Classified By: DCM Matthew Tueller for reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Recently, academics and civilian analysts painted a portrait of an Egyptian military in intellectual and social decline, whose officers have largely fallen out of society's elite ranks. They describe a disgruntled mid-level officer corps harshly critical of a defense minister they perceive as incompetent and valuing loyalty above skill in his subordinates. However, analysts perceive the military as retaining strong influence through its role in ensuring regime stability and operating a large network of commercial enterprises. Regarding succession, analysts highlight the armed forces' uneasiness with Gamal Mubarak, but largely agree that the military would support Gamal if President Mubarak resigns and installs him in the presidency, a scenario we view as unlikely. One professor opined that since 2003, the regime has tried to strengthen the economic elite close to Gamal at the expense of the military in an effort to weaken potential military opposition to Gamal's path to the presidency. Other analysts believe the regime is trying to co-opt the military through patronage into accepting Gamal and that despite tensions between the military and business, their relationship remains cooperative. End summary.
-------------------------
An Institution in Decline
-------------------------
2. (C) A series of recent conversations with academics and other civilian analysts reveals their sense that while Egypt's military is in decline, it nevertheless remains a powerful institution. (Note: These academics' expertise in Egyptian politics and willingness to comment on the sensitive issue of the military's current role makes them valuable interlocutors for us. End note.) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that the military reached its peak of influence in the late 1980's before the ouster of the recently deceased former Defense Minister Abu Ghazalah, who was dismissed because of his growing political popularity. He asserted that since 1989, the MOD's influence in Egyptian society has been gradually waning, and the privileged social position of its elite members has been in decline as society's respect for the military fades. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that military salaries have fallen far below what is available in the private sector, and that a military career is no longer an attractive option for ambitious young people who aspire to join the new business elite instead.
3. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX opined that before the 1967 war, military officers were "spoiled," and constituted a social elite. Following the military's poor performance in the 1967 war, he said, officers began a descent out of the upper ranks of society that accelerated after Abu Ghazalah's ouster in 1989. Since Abu Ghazalah, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted, the regime has not allowed any charismatic figures to reach the senior ranks. "(Defense Minister) Tantawi looks like a bureaucrat," he joked. XXXXXXXXXXXX described the mid-level officer corps as generally disgruntled, and said that one can hear mid-level officers at MOD clubs around Cairo openly expressing disdain for Tantawi. These officers refer to Tantawi as "Mubarak's poodle," he said, and complain that "this incompetent Defense Minister" who reached his position only because of unwavering loyalty to Mubarak is "running the military into the ground." He opined that a culture of blind obedience pervades the MOD where the sole criteria for promotion is loyalty, and that the MOD leadership does not hesitate to fire officers it perceives as being "too competent" and who therefore potentially pose a threat to the regime.
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX believes that the government's increasing opposition to dialogue with academia is symptomatic of its social and intellectual decline. He said that up until 6 years ago, the MOD had assigned a military representative to the Al-Ahram Center to participate in academic discussions; subsequently, the MOD jailed the representative because his views were becoming too independent, and has not sent a replacement to the center. He claimed that Tantawi has become increasingly intolerant of intellectual freedom XXXXXXXXXXXX. In his view, Tantawi has made clear that the military is "off-limits" as a subject for academic research, and that the MOD will not tolerate independent thought within its own ranks.
---------------------------------------------
... But Still Retaining Economic Clout For Now ---------------------------------------------
5. (C) Although analysts see a small number of regime and business elites exercising increasing political and economic control over the country, they acknowledge the military's strong influence in Egypt's economy. XXXXXXXXXXXX opined that the regime gives the six businessmen in the cabinet carte blanche to pursue commercial activities, but that the defense minister can put a hold on any contract for "security concerns." Contacts told us that military-owned companies, often run by retired generals, are particularly active in the water, olive oil, cement, construction, hotel and gasoline industries. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that military companies built the modern road to the Ain Souknah Red Sea resorts 90 minutes from Cairo and Cairo University's new annex. He noted the large amounts of land owned by the military in the Nile Delta and on the Red Sea coast, speculating that such property is a "fringe benefit" in exchange for the military ensuring regime stability and security. (Comment: We see the military's role in the economy as a force that generally stifles free market reform by increasing direct government involvement in the markets. End comment.)
6. (C) Most analysts agreed that the military views the GOE's privatization efforts as a threat to its economic position, and therefore generally opposes economic reforms. XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated that privatization has forced military-owned companies to improve the quality of their work, specifically in the hotel industry, to compete with private firms and attract critical foreign investment. XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted that the growing power of the economic elite at the military's expense is inevitable as economic necessity drives the government to maintain its economic reform policies in order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). He said that FDI is essential to the government's plans to maintain economic growth and political stability.
--------------------------------------------- -
Influence in the Bureaucracy and Civil Society --------------------------------------------- -
7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed to a "concerted effort" from the "top of the regime" to penetrate the civilian bureaucracy with retired senior military officers. He highlighted retired officers filling top civilian jobs, such as governors, and chief of staff positions and other senior slots at the Information, Transportation and Education ministries. Other contacts noted their anecdotal experience with military officers running civil society organizations and charities. XXXXXXXXXXXX remarked that a literacy campaign XXXXXXXXXXXX recently hired a retired military officer to run its operations. He told us that XXXXXXXXXXXX charitable society XXXXXXXXXXXX recently hired a retired general as its director, believing that the general's competence, experience with bureaucracies, and network of colleagues and contacts in the ministries would serve the charity well.
---------------------------
The Military and Succession
---------------------------
8. (C) Contacts agree that presidential son Gamal Mubarak's power base is centered in the business community, not with the military. XXXXXXXXXXXX said officers told him recently that the military does not support Gamal and if Mubarak died in office, the military would seize power rather than allow Gamal to succeed his father. However, analysts agreed that the military would allow Gamal to take power through an election if President Mubarak blessed the process and effectively gave Gamal the reigns of power. XXXXXXXXXXXX opined that after Gamal became active in the NDP in 2002, the regime empowered the reformers in the 2004 cabinet to begin privatization efforts that buttressed the wealthy businessmen close to Gamal. In his estimation, the regime's goal is to create a business-centered power base for Gamal in the NDP to compensate for his lack of military credentials. A necessary corollary to this strategy, he claimed, was for the regime to weaken the military's economic and political power so that it cannot block Gamal's path to the presidency.
9. (S) Comment: The military still remains a potent political and economic force. Its recent interventions, using the MOD's considerable resources, to produce bread to meet shortages in March and extinguish the Shoura Council fire in August (refs A and B) demonstrate that it sometimes can successfully step in where other government agencies fail. The military helps to ensure regime stability and operates a large network of businesses as it becomes a "quasi-commercial" enterprise itself. While there are economic and political tensions between the business elite and the military, the overall relationship between the two still appears to be cooperative, rather than adversarial. The military's loss of some prestige is partly due to the disappearance of an imminent, external military threat following the 1979 Camp David Accords. The regime, aware of the critical role the MOD can play in presidential succession, may well be trying to co-opt the military through patronage into accepting Gamal's path to the presidency. We agree with the analysis that senior military officers would support Gamal if Mubarak resigned and installed him in the presidency, as it is difficult to imagine opposition from these officers who depend on the president and defense minister for their jobs and material perks. In a messier succession scenario, however, it becomes more difficult to predict the military's actions. While mid-level officers do not necessarily share their superiors' fealty to the regime, the military's built-in firewalls and communication breaks make it unlikely that these officers could independently install a new leader. SCOBEY
Cable dated:2006-02-15T07:44:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000941
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2016
TAGS: PTER, PREL, KISL, EG
SUBJECT: FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER'S VISIT TO EGYPT
REF: CAIRO 493
Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) During his February 8-9 visit to Egypt FBI Director Robert Mueller held a series of cordial and productive meetings with President Mubarak, Intelligence Chief Soliman, Interior Minister Adly, and State Security Director Abdel Rahman. The strength of the bilateral security relationship, and means to expand it, was a key topic of conversation. Also discussed were the implications of the Hamas victory in the Palestinian legislative elections, the proliferation of extremist ideologies, and the nebulous nature of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptians were typically conservative in their assessments, but warmly welcomed the Director's push to further develop security ties through specific technical cooperation programs. End summary.
----------------------------
Security Ties Solid, Durable
----------------------------
2. (C) Director Mueller's early morning February 9 call on President Mubarak set the tone for all of his meetings with the GOE. Accompanied by the Ambassador, Cairo LEGAT Joe Brent, and FBI Counter Terrorism Analysis Section Chief Leonard "Chip" Yorke, the Director was warmly received by Mubarak, who affirmed that he was very supportive of the strong bilateral security relationship. EGIS Director Soliman, Interior Minister Adly, and State Security Director Abdel Rahman all echoed the view that U.S. - Egypt cooperation in the fields of counter terrorism and law enforcement were solid and to the benefit of both sides.
---------------------
Expanding Cooperation
---------------------
3. (C) The Egyptians also welcomed Director Mueller's call for expanding the scope of U.S.-Egypt security cooperation by focusing on specific areas like the sharing of biometric data on suspected terrorists/extremists. With the advent of new technologies, increasingly shadowy and diffuse terrorist movements, and porous international borders, close technical cooperation and information-sharing between allied governments was now an absolute necessity, the Director argued. The issue was discussed in particular detail in the Director's conversations with Interior Minister Adly and State Security Director Abdel Rahman. Noting that the U.S. had collected biometric data on tens of thousands of suspected terrorists and extremists around the world, including many thousands in Afghanistan and Iraq in the past three years, the Director asserted that the U.S. was prepared to share all of our data, and related hardware and technical expertise used to collect, store, and process it, with Egypt. Both Adly and Abdel Rahman indicated enthusiasm in response.
4. (C) Over lunch at State Security Headquarters, Director Abdel Rahman said that his staff enjoy strong working relations with the Cairo LEGAT office and pledged that State Security would continue to be as responsive as possible to U.S. requests for information and assistance. At the lunch, Director Mueller invited his counterpart to lead a team of senior State Security officials to visit the United States and see first hand the latest facilities and technologies the U.S. could share with allies like Egypt in the global war against terrorism and extremism. Director Mueller hoped that, in particular, the State Security Director could visit the FBI's fingerprint facility in West Virginia and the training academy in Quantico, Virginia. Abdel Rahman affirmed that he would welcome such an opportunity.
-----------------------------
Extremism and Regional Unrest
-----------------------------
5. (C) During all of the Director's meetings in Cairo, his Egyptian hosts noted the unrest in different parts of the region and the threat these problems posed for the overall security environment. Continuing violence in Iraq, political instability in the Palestinian territories, and tensions between the West and Iran were all being exploited by extremists to incite the Arab-Muslim public, President Mubarak and the other GOE officials noted. The Danish cartoon controversy was the latest manifestation of this problem, Mubarak observed, criticizing the Danish Government for what he saw as its awkward and "arrogant" handling of the matter. In his meeting with the Director, EGIS Director Soliman underlined that insufficient educational and economic opportunities were at the root of extremism in Egypt and the wider region, and asserted that Egypt had a "five year plan" to address this problem, with Mubarak's economic cabinet working intensely to shore up and modernize Egypt's economy.
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Egypt's Stabilizing Role
------------------------
6. (C) Mubarak quickly outlined for the Director Egypt's efforts (further detailed in the Director's meeting with Soliman) to promote stability in the region, citing recent efforts to cool tensions between Lebanon and Syria and offer training and technical support to Lebanon's fledgling security services, as they attempt to fill the vacuum left by Syria's withdrawal. While disdaining the government in Teheran, Mubarak counseled a measured and cautious approach toward Iran, with an emphasis on multilateral diplomatic efforts. The political crisis in the Palestinian territories, and its implications for security, was a subject of particular focus in the Director's meetings with President Mubarak and EGIS Director Soliman. Egypt has long been working to tame and moderate Palestinian extremist movements, Soliman noted, reporting that he would soon visit Damascus in an attempt to get the leadership of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to abandon its violent ways in favor of negotiation.
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Hamas Rising
------------
7. (C) Though Mubarak and Soliman, as well as Interior Minister Adly, all expressed wariness over the implications of the Hamas victory in the Palestinian legislative elections, Mubarak nonetheless advised a pragmatic approach, warning that cutting aid to the Palestinians would be counterproductive. Soliman detailed Egypt's efforts to press Hamas to adopt realistic and responsible positions, most recently during an early February visit to Cairo by a delegation of senior Hamas leaders. Unless Hamas lives up to the PA's international obligations, abandons violence, and recognizes Israel, Soliman had warned the Hamas leaders, they would not get Egypt's support. Soliman reported that Hamas leaders appeared to understand that they needed Egypt and seemed ready to fulfill the PA's international obligations and adhere to a cease-fire with Israel, but that they were still balking at recognizing Israel's right to exist. Soliman added that the issue of recognition might be finessed through Hamas' joining the PLO. Given the PLO's previous explicit recognition of Israel, Hamas' entry into the group would imply recognition and thus be a step forward, he opined. Director Mueller thanked Egypt for its consistently constructive role, in difficult circumstances, in international efforts to manage the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
------------------------------------
Muslim Brotherhood on the Home Front
------------------------------------
8. (C) Like all of the Director's Egyptian interlocutors, Mubarak slammed Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood as a "dangerous" and duplicitous movement XXXXXXXXXXXX. Mubarak underscored the historic links between the MB and Hamas, also noting the Egyptian MB's counterpart groups in Jordan, Kuwait, and farther a field. EGIS Director Soliman noted that the MB was "neither a religious organization, nor a social organization, nor a political party, but a combination of all three." The principal danger, in Soliman's view, was the group's exploitation of religion to influence and mobilize the public. Soliman asserted that the MB has spawned "11 different Islamist extremist organizations," most notably the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Gama'a Islamiya (Islamic Group). Soliman termed the MB's recent success in the parliamentary elections as "unfortunate," adding his view that although the group was technically illegal, existing Egyptian laws were insufficient to keep the MB in check. Director Mueller told the Egyptians that the Bureau was keeping an eye on the MB's fundraising and organizational efforts in the U.S. and would keep Egypt advised of relevant information the FBI developed.
9. (U) Director Mueller did not clear this message before departing Egypt. RICCIARDONE
Cable dated:2007-10-25T08:47:00
S E C R E T CAIRO 003126
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2017
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EG, IQ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR CROCKER'S VISIT TO CAIRO
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION STUART JONES. REASONS: 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (S) Welcome to Cairo.
2. (S) Cairo-Baghdad Relations: The Egyptian leadership wants assurances that the USG will not withdraw from Iraq precipitously. The Egyptians were also taken aback by Senate resolution on sectarian division, which got broad press play here. The GOE has played a constructive role in the expanded neighbors forum. Mubarak hosted the group in Sharm el Sheikh in May and Aboul Gheit will join the Istanbul meeting. The GOE dislikes and distrusts PM al Maliki, but stops short of calling for his removal, so far, even in private. Vice President Abdel Mahdi was received warmly in September and made a positive impression.
3. (S) The best thing the Baghdad can do now to improve relations with Cairo is appoint a full-time Ambassador. The GOE is still stung by the August 2005 assassination of its emissary, Ihab el-Sharif, but has made noises about appointing an Ambassador to Baghdad resident in Cairo.
4. (C) Egypt has a strong record on intelligence liaison and blocking foreign fighters en route to Iraq. This has included several arrests here. You may wish to praise Egypt's help and also ask how the Egyptians regard the problem of Syria transit. Egyptian has not experienced the huge refugee influx of Iraq's neighbors but the approximately 200,000 displaced Iraqis are a source of anxiety and concern. The Egyptians want to be involved in any refugee solution.
4. (C) DEBT: The Egyptians are not accustomed to forgiving other countries' debts and regard the Iraqis as oil-rich. MFA reportedly has the portfolio to negotiate the debt issue, but most of the debt is held by MOD, which is not engaged. The parties have discussed a compromise that the GOE would forgive official debt -- approximately $700m -- if the Iraqis paid off their private debt, owed mainly to Egyptian workers who had worked in Iraq, estimated at approximately $400m. But there is considerable dispute over the figures and the Iraqis seem no more eager than the Egyptians to close a deal. We expect this process to drag on for some time.
5. (S) IRAN: The Egyptians dismiss news reports that the GOE is moving towards normalization with Iran. Aboul Gheit met with his Iranian counterpart on the margins of UNGA. Omar Soliman takes an especially hard line on Tehran and frequently refers to the Iranians as "devils." But bilateral contacts are on the rise. Soliman will press you for an assessment of Iranian activity in Iraq and also of al Maliki's ties to Tehran. Mubarak and Soliman are furious about Bashar Al Assad's collaboration with Iran. They want the USG to improve relations with Damascus to lure Bashar back to the Arab fold. But Egyptian influence is very limited and Cairo is out of ideas.
6. (S) Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa is one of the few Arab leaders to serially visit Baghdad. (Aboul Gheit will not go). The Arab League has exchanged ambassadors with Baghdad. You may wish to enlist Moussa in efforts to increase Arab diplomatic representation in Baghdad.
7. (C) Moussa met with Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan October 18, and reportedly advised against Turkish intervention in northern Iraq, taking the view that Iraq had enough issues to deal with already. A key Arab League contact told us October 18 he was confident that the Turks will not enter northern Iraq, but noted the idea (apparently proposed by Maliki) of a joint Turkish-Iraqi force to address Turkish concerns would not be unreasonable so long as the two governments agreed to it. RICCIARDONE
Cable dated:2005-11-29T14:19:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 008938
SIPDIS
FOR THE DIRECTOR FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015
TAGS: PTER, KCRM, PREL, EG, OVIP, Visits
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER'S VISIT TO EGYPT
Classified by Ambassador Francis Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Director Mueller,
1. (C) Thank you for including Cairo in your travel to the Middle East. Your visit presents an opportunity to review and upgrade our law enforcement/intelligence cooperation with the Egyptians. The CIA already has a strong and growing relationship with the Egyptian Intelligence Service (EGIS). We would like the FBI to establish a similarly robust and productive partnership with the State Security Investigative Service. The Ministry does not yet recognize the benefit for their side of enhanced ties with the FBI. But leaders like Omar Soliman and especially President Mubarak, with whom we hope you will be able to meet, have the vision and influence to overcome these reservations. On our side, we should be ready with concrete proposals to kick start new levels of practical cooperation. Exchange of forensic and biometric data and associated upgrades of Egypt's capabilities in this field could provide a good beginning.
2. (C) The return of the specter of terrorism in Egypt in late 2004, following seven years of safety is seen here as a wake-up call to the Egyptian security forces. Interior Minister El Adly, and State Security Director Hassan, -- you will meet both -- have now seen three major terrorist incidents on their watch:
-- The bombing of three resorts in the Sinai, October 2004 -- The bombing at a major Cairo tourist market, April 2005 -- The Sharm el-Sheikh bombing, July 2005;
3. (C) El Adly may lose his job over the Sharm bombings as well as the mis-management of the current Parliamentary elections. As a result, you may find the Egyptians more receptive to a U.S. initiative to upgrade our law-enforcement cooperation.
4. (C) One specific area of cooperation that I understand is under consideration is sharing of fingerprint and other biometric data on suspected terrorists and other criminals. This could involve training and equipment upgrades for Egyptian personnel. This is a terrific initiative. In addition, you should urge State Security Director Hassan to bring a high level delegation to Washington to visit FBI HQ and the Quantico training facilities early in 2006. Once he sees what the FBI can offer and establishes some personal contact, he will be more forthcoming with intelligence cooperation on their side. I hope you will also consider offering to continue and ideally expand training opportunities for Egyptian personnel at the FBI Academy.
5. (C) Your arrival in Egypt coincides with the end of a month-long series of parliamentary elections, in which the outlawed but tolerated Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has made substantial gains. The elections have been conducted in three rounds. The final run-offs will be held on December 7. The ruling NDP will retain the super majority it needs to control the legislative agenda, but with the MB holding as much as 20 percent of the seats, atmospherics and tone of debate will probably change dramatically.
6. (C) The Egyptians have a long history of threatening us with the MB bogeyman. Your counterparts may try to suggest that the President,s insistence on greater democracy in Egypt is somehow responsible for the MB,s electoral success. You should push back that, on the contrary, the MB,s rise signals the need for greater democracy and transparency in government. The images of intimidation and fraud that have emerged from the recent elections favor the extremists both we and the Egyptian government oppose. The best way to counter narrow-minded Islamist politics is to open the system. The FBI could serve as a resource and partner ) if indeed you are willing -- in professionalizing the Egyptian security services and modernizing their investigative techniques. This would enhance the credibility of the security apparatus and remove an arrow from the Islamists, quiver.
7. (C) At the end of the day, we believe you can best pitch your visit as a serious effort to enhance our law enforcement cooperation. Both sides are absolutely committed to defeating violent extremists, and both sides can take more tangible steps toward meeting this goal.
RICCIARDONE
Cable dated:2006-01-29T11:49:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000493
SIPDIS
FOR THE DIRECTOR FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2016 TAGS: PTER, KCRM, PREL, EG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER'S VISIT TO EGYPT
REF: 05 CAIRO 8938
Classified by Ambassador Francis Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Director Mueller,
1. (C) Thank you for
rescheduling your visit to Egypt. The Egyptians will welcome you warmly, but you should be aware of some shifts in the political context and atmospherics of our relationship with Egypt since we last updated you in December (reftel). Several internal developments in the past eight weeks have put a strain on our bilateral ties, although the core of our partnership in law enforcement and mutual security affairs remains solid.
2. (S) Your visit presents an opportunity to review and upgrade our law enforcement/intelligence cooperation with the Egyptians. The CIA has a strong and growing relationship with the Egyptian Intelligence Service (EGIS). We believe your visit can help the FBI to establish a similarly robust and productive partnership with the State Security Investigative Service. Although they see the national interest in improving law enforcement cooperation, leaders like Omar Soliman, Interior Minister Adly, SSIS Director Abdel Rahman and especially President Mubarak--all of whom we expect you will meet--remain suspicious of our intent. On our side, we should be ready with concrete proposals to advance practical cooperation in law enforcement. Exchange of forensic and biometric data and associated upgrades of Egypt's capabilities in this field could provide a good beginning.
3. (C) Three developments in the past eight weeks have altered the political context. First, widespread irregularities and violence marred the parliamentary elections which concluded on December 8, drawing criticism from both domestic and international quarters, including the United States. Second, the December 24 conviction and jailing of opposition leader Ayman Nour, was an unconvincingly disguised act of political repression. Third, the December 29 operation by GOE security forces (who fall under the authority of Interior Minister Adly) to disperse a large group of Sudanese refugees squatting in a downtown park went badly awry, with 27 Sudanese dead. All three security-related incidents have undermined Mubarak's credibility as a leader of democratic reforms, and has strained our ties with Egypt. The bedrock of our strategic interests with Egypt, however, remains as important as ever.
4. (C) After a long period of quiet, the specter of terrorism returned to Egypt in late 2004. Interior Minister Adly, and State Security Director Hassan Abdel Rahman, have now seen three major terrorist incidents on their watch:
-- The bombing of three resorts in the Sinai, October 2004; -- The bombing at a major Cairo tourist market, April 2005; and -- The Sharm el-Sheikh bombing, July 2005.
5. (C) Not withstanding these terrorist attacks and the MOI's role in the election problems and Sudanese refugee deaths, Interior Minister Adly held on to his seat in the late December cabinet shuffle, and will remain a key interlocutor for us in the foreseeable future. Adly is an old-school, conservative security man, highly skeptical of any form of democratic political opening that might impact traditional MOI SoPs. But he has been very cooperative with us in most operational areas of security and law enforcement.
6. (C) We hope you will stress our interest in expanding technical cooperation, generally in your meeting with President Mubarak, and more specifically in your meetings with the Minister of Interior and the State Security Director. For example, Egypt should be a leading candidate for the FBI's initiative to upgrade sharing of fingerprint and other biometric data on suspected terrorists and other criminals. Now that Washington has identified a funding source we hope you will be able to tell the Egyptians that we are ready to move forward with this project, which would include extensive training and equipment upgrades for Egyptian personnel. In addition, we hope you will invite State Security Director Hassan Abdel Rahman to bring a high level delegation to Washington to visit FBI HQ and the Quantico training facilities early this year. We expect that once he sees what the FBI can offer and establishes some personal contact, he will be more forthcoming with intelligence cooperation on their side. Not withstanding his suspicions, he probably would welcome an offer from you to expand training opportunities for Egyptian personnel at the FBI Academy.
7. (C) Until recently, the GOE was reluctant to discuss publicly the issue of Trafficking in Persons (TIP), which as you know has taken on a high policy profile in Washington. However, on January 23, Egyptian First Lady Suzanne Mubarak delivered the keynote address at an international conference on TIP in Athens, denouncing the practice and calling for stronger international coordination to combat it. Particularly if you meet Mubarak, you may wish to compliment Egypt and Mrs. Mubarak in particular, for taking on an unaccustomed new role as an outspoken advocate against TIP and reiterate USG interest in cooperating with Egypt in this campaign.
8. (C) The November-December parliamentary elections resulted in a five-fold increase in the number of seats held by independent candidates representing the outlawed but tolerated Muslim Brotherhood. The GOE has a long history of threatening us with the MB bogeyman. Your counterparts may try to suggest that the President,s insistence on greater democracy in Egypt is somehow responsible for the MB,s electoral success,and may even try to draw a cautionary example out of Hamas' January 25 election victory. (The GOE sees Hamas, with fair reason, as spawned by the MB.) We do not accept the proposition that Egypt's only choices are a slow-to-reform authoritarian regime or an Islamist extremist one; nor do we see greater democracy in Egypt as leading necessarily to a government under the MB. The images of intimidation and fraud that have emerged from the recent elections favor the Islamist extremists whom we both oppose. The best way to counter narrow-minded Islamist politics is to open the system. If the Egyptians are willing, the FBI could serve as a resource and partner, among other U.S. agencies and programs, in professionalizing the Egyptian security services and modernizing their investigative techniques. This would enhance the credibility of the security apparatus and remove an arrow from the Islamists, quiver.
9. (C) We believe the Egyptians will welcome your visit as a serious effort to enhance our law enforcement cooperation, and another mark--only three weeks after VP Cheney's visit--of the American recognition of the value of our larger partnership across the board. RICCIARDONE
ID:237626 Cable dated:2009-12-02T13:59:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000681
SIPDIS
CIA FOR DNI BLAIR FROM AMBASSADOR ERELI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019
TAGS: OVIP, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, MARR, BA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MANAMA DIALOGUE, DECEMBER 11-13
REF: A. MANAMA 660 B. MANAMA 628 C. MANAMA 651
Classified By: CDA Christopher Henzel nor reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
XXXXXXXXXXXX
----------------
LEADERSHIP STYLE
----------------
12. (C) King Hamad is personable and engaging. He rules as something of a "corporate king," giving direction and letting his top people manage the government. He has overseen the development of strong institutions with the restoration of parliament, the formation of a legal political opposition, and a dynamic press. He is gradually shifting power from his uncle, Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, who remains the head of the government, to his son, the Crown Prince. Crown Prince Salman received his high school education at the DOD school in Bahrain and earned a BA from American University in 1985. He is very Western in his approach and is closely identified with the reformist camp within the ruling family - particularly with respect to economic and labor reforms designed to combat corruption and modernize Bahrain's economic base. King Hamad is committed to fighting corruption and prefers doing business with American firms because they are transparent. U.S. companies have won major contracts in the past two years, including: Gulf Air's purchase of 24 Boeing 787 Dreamliners, a USD 5 billion joint-venture with Occidental Petroleum to revitalize the Awali field, and well over USD 300 million in Foreign Military Sales.
-----------------
INTEL COOPERATION
-----------------
13. (S) Director of BNSA Sheikh Khalifa bin Abdallah Al Khalifa figures prominently into the King's efforts on reform and stability. Charged by the King to "Bahrainize" and professionalize BNSA, Sheikh Khalifa is determined to rid BNSA of the last vestiges of British influence and grow BNSA into a world-class intelligence and security service with global reach. Sheikh Khalifa understands well that if he is to fulfill his mandate of protecting Bahrain, he must "go deep" and develop robust intelligence liaison relationships with partners around the world. To that end, he has embarked on a program to establish and strengthen intelligence ties abroad, with a central focus on counterterrorism. Against this backdrop, Sheikh Khalifa unabashedly positions his relationship with the U.S. Intelligence Community above all others, insisting that his key lieutenants communicate openly with their U.S. liaison partners and actively seek new avenues for cooperation. In your discussions, you will find Sheikh Khalifa to be frank and likeable, and he will no doubt emphasize his sincere desire to continue strengthening the already excellent relationship he enjoys with the U.S.
HENZEL
ID:237614 Cable dated:2009-12-02T13:18:00
S E C R E T MANAMA 000680
SIPDIS
NEA FOR A/S FELTMAN FROM AMBASSADOR ERELI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019
TAGS: OVIP, PGOV, PREL, KDEM, MARR, BA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MANAMA DIALOGUE, DECEMBER 11-13
REF: A. MANAMA 660 B. MANAMA 628 C. MANAMA 651
Classified By: CDA Christopher Henzel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Jeff, you will arrive in Bahrain at a time of introspection for the Bahraini regime as this year's IISS Manama Dialogue coincides with the tenth anniversary of King Hamad's accession to the throne, on December 17, 1999. During those ten years, the political and security situation has improved considerably. Our challenge is to help the Bahrainis keep things moving in the right direction, a task made considerably easier by a forward-looking and sympathetic leadership.
---------------------------
TEN YEARS OF TRANSFORMATION
---------------------------
2. (C) Following the death of his father, Emir Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa in 1999, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa inherited a country torn by sectarian violence and accustomed to dealing with the Shia majority 5nderclass as a policing problem. He quickly embarked on a program of reform and reconciliation with Bahrain's Shia: he allowed exiles to return home, abolished the State Security Courts, and restored the parliament suspended since 1975. King Hamad understands that political stability is also tied to economic prosperity, and has undertaken far-reaching economic reforms intended to increase Bahrain's competitiveness, productivity and living standards. The result is that the Bahrain of today is a far cry from the Bahrain of the 1990s. Political parties operate freely and are preparing for a third parliamentary election cycle in 2010 (ref A). Street protests are significantly fewer and less violent. Perhaps most tellingly, the leader of the mainstream Shia Wifaq party has told us unequivocally that Wifaq will continue to engage in parliamentary politics because he believes there is more to gain in the long run by participating than by boycotting.
------------------------------------
REGIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY
------------------------------------
3. (C) A graduate of the Mons Officer Cadet School and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, King Hamad takes a leading role in directing Bahrain's security policy, and carries the title of Supreme Commander. During his three decades as Crown Prince, he personally built the Bahrain Defense Force from the ground up, relying heavily on U.S. equipment and training. King Hamad believes that the peace and prosperity of the Gulf is a result of U.S. protection and friendship. The U.S. Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain and two U.S. Patriot batteries are also stationed here. Bahrain's leaders are thus strong and outspoken proponents of a close and enduring security relationship between the United States and the region.
4. (C) Bahrain was designated a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2002, and King Hamad believes it is important that Bahrain do its part in support of regional security. In March 2008, Bahrain became the first Arab country to take command of CTF-152, one of the coalition's naval task forces in the Persian Gulf. They have also deployed as part of the CTF-151 anti-piracy mission in the Arabian Sea. On December 16, King Hamad will personally see off a company of Bahraini Special Security Forces, who will be departing to serve as part of coalition operations in Afghanistan. This activism marks Bahrain as a leader among GCC states and has encouraged others such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia to become more involved.
5. (C) King Hamad views an activist foreign policy as essential for a small state like Bahrain that wants its interests to be considered in the region. He chose the forward-leaning Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa as his foreign minister. In June, Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa penned a Washington Post op-ed in which he called on Arab leaders to engage with the Israeli people in support of the Arab Peace Initiative. Shortly thereafter, Bahraini officials traveled to Tel Aviv to bring back several Bahrainis who had been aboard a relief ship that was taken into Israeli custody when it tried to enter Gaza. Even modest steps in the direction of Israel set off criticism from local media and from members of parliament decrying "normalization." Recently, MPs in the elected (and Islamist-dominated) lower house voted to criminalize any contact with Israel or Israeli citizens (ref B) even though most recognized that the (appointed) upper house will ensure the bill never becomes law.
6. (C) Bahrain was one of the first Gulf states to reopen its embassy in Baghdad, and, while wary of the Maliki government, has reached out to Iraq politically and economically. Bahraini airlines now fly regularly to several Iraqi cities. The King has established a relationship with Sayyid Ammar Al Hakim, chairman of the Supreme Islamic Council in Iraq. During Hakim's recent visit to Bahrain (ref C), King Hamad asked for his support in channeling the energies of Bahraini Shia in a positive direction, and told Hakim that he would do what he could to get the Saudis to engage with Iraq. Bahrain maintains correct relations with Iran, but has no illusions about the threat it poses to the region. Bahrain quietly supports international pressure on Iran, and consulting with the leadership will ensure that we maintain that support.
----------------
POLITICAL VISION
----------------
7. (C) King Hamad understands that Bahrain cannot prosper if he rules by repression. Bahrain's civil society is active and is engaged with Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) programming. There is more religious freedom in Bahrain than in most neighboring countries; Sunni and Shia mosques stand alongside Christian churches and Hindu temples. The National Charter (e.g., constitution) won approval in a 2000 referendum and restored the parliament that had been suspended in 1975. Two election cycles have seen the integration of the Shia opposition into the political process. While a Shia rejectionist fringe continues to boycott the process, their influence remains limited as the mainstream Wifaq party has shown an ability to work with the government to achieve results for its constituents. Discrimination against Shia persists, however, and the government has sought to deflect criticism by engaging with Wifaq and focusing more public spending on housing and social welfare projects. So long as Wifaq remains convinced of the benefits of political participation, the long-term outlook for Bahrain's stability is good.
------------------------
COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS
------------------------
8. (S) The 2004 withdrawal of U.S. Navy dependents represented the nadir in our counterterrorism relationship. Since then, the government has enacted a tough, new CT law and has used it to obtain several convictions against Al Qaeda financiers and facilitators. Much of that success is connected to the King's installation of new, more capable leadership at both the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Bahrain National Security Agency (BNSA) in 2006 and 2008, respectively. BNSA routinely shares high-quality intel and seeks out joint operations opportunities. MOI has proven itself highly capable of maintaining internal security. The U.S. is contributing to the CT mission through the provision of a coastal radar system via Section 1206 funding that will give Bahrain (and the U.S. Navy) a 360 degree field of vision around the island.
---------------
ECONOMIC VISION
---------------
9. (C) Unlike its neighbors, Bahrain is not blessed with abundant oil and gas, and so has diversified its economy, establishing itself as the world's leading center for Islamic banking and finance. This sector generates just over one quarter of domestic GDP. Bahrain also boasts a strong regional tourism sector that accounts for a significant portion of GDP. The country produces approximately 35,000 barrels/day of oil, which is all refined locally, and 1.2 billion standard cubic feet/day of gas, which is all consumed domestically. In order to maintain economic growth, Bahrain must find additional sources of energy. The government has sought cheap gas from both Saudi Arabia and Qatar to no avail, and is currently engaged in slow-rolling talks with Iran. Contacts have asserted that discussions with Iran are aimed at getting the Saudis and Qataris off the dime.
10. (C) Bahrain has also expressed long-term interest in nuclear power, and in March, 2008 signed a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. on civilian nuclear cooperation. It has joined the IAEA and has deposited its Safeguards Agreement with that organization. The Government of Bahrain has formed an inter-ministerial committee to study the use of nuclear energy for power generation, and although the GOB recognizes that they do not have the resources to develop or operate a nuclear reactor on their own, they need the power and are interested in moving forward, ideally with an American commercial partner.
11. (U) In August 2006, the U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement entered into force -- the culmination of a multiyear effort to open and reform Bahrain's economy. (In 2009, the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal ranked Bahrain as the freest economy in the Middle East, and the 16th freest in the world). Since the FTA went into effect, total bilateral trade has increased more than 25%. Bahrain recently rolled out its "Economic Vision 2030" plan, a statement of the GOB's aspirations for Bahrain's economy, government and society. The plan establishes broad goals of economic diversification and the construction of a strong middle-class as the basis for Bahrain's future.
----------------
LEADERSHIP STYLE
----------------
12. (C) King Hamad is personable and engaging. He rules as something of a "corporate king," giving direction and letting his top people manage the government. He has overseen the development of strong institutions with the restoration of parliament, the formation of a legal political opposition, and a dynamic press. He is gradually shifting power from his uncle, Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, who remains the head of the government, to his son, the Crown Prince. Crown Prince Salman received his high school education at the DOD school in Bahrain and earned a BA from American University in 1985. He is very Western in his approach and is closely identified with the reformist camp within the ruling family - particularly with respect to economic and labor reforms designed to combat corruption and modernize Bahrain's economic base. King Hamad is committed to fighting corruption and prefers doing business with American firms because they are transparent. U.S. companies have won major contracts in the past two years, including: Gulf Air's purchase of 24 Boeing 787 Dreamliners, a USD 5 billion joint-venture with Occidental Petroleum to revitalize the Awali field, and well over USD 300 million in Foreign Military Sales.
-----------------------
HUMAN RIGHTS AND REFORM
-----------------------
13. (C) Internally, the acquittal of ten Shia men in October on charges of killing a Pakistani policeman in April 2008 has served to lower sectarian tensions. Local media reported that the presiding judge explained that the defendants' claims that they confessed under duress had influenced his verdict. Despite this, the GOB's overall record on human rights remains positive on the whole. Allegations of private and government discrimination against Shia persist, but the democratic reforms of the past ten years have radically changed the political space. The mainstream Shia opposition, Wifaq, remains committed to the political process and the parliamentary experiment has been largely successful (ref A). Shia rejectionist groups Haq and Wafa' inspire the youths who occasionally clash with police, but have not seriously threatened Wifaq's hold on the Shia street.
14. (C) Bahrain remains on the Tier Two Watchlist for human trafficking, but has enacted an anti-trafficking law and achieved one conviction. The government is also pursuing labor market reforms aimed at eliminating the sponsorship system. On August 1, it introduced labor mobility - allowing foreign workers to change jobs without obtaining prior permission from the current employer. G/TIP Ambassador CdeBaca's told GOB officials during his November 12 visit that they needed to focus on prosecution and victim identification. The Justice Minister noted during their meeting that Bahrain had prosecuted 280 trafficking-related crimes over the past year.
15. (C) Deputy Special Envoy for Middle East Peace Hale will have just met with the Foreign Minister on December 5 to brief him on recent developments. HENZEL
ID:164906 Cable dated:2008-08-05T13:58:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000528
BAGHDAD FOR AMBASSADOR ERELI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2018
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KISL, KNNP, PTER, EFIN, IR, BA
SUBJECT: BAHRAIN'S RELATIONS WITH IRAN
REF: A. 07 MANAMA 1045 B. 07 MANAMA 1070 C. 07 MANAMA 1016 D. MANAMA 22 E. MANAMA 220 F. MANAMA 430 G. MANAMA 442
Classified By: CDA Christopher Henzel for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: The Sunni ruling family of tiny, Shi'a-majority Bahrain have long recognized that they needed outsiders -- first the British, then the United States -- to protect them from predatory neighbors, Iran foremost among them. Both Shahs and Ayatollahs have asserted claims to sovereignty over Bahrain from time to time. While keeping close to their American protectors, Bahrain's rulers seek to avoid provoking Iran unnecessarily, and keep channels of communication with Iranian leaders open. End summary.
Historical Background
---------------------
2. (C) The Sunni al-Khalifa family took Bahrain in 1783 from another Arab clan that acknowledged Persian overlordship. As the British were leaving Bahrain in 1971, the last Shah of Iran asserted, then withdrew, a claim of sovereignty over the country. After the Islamic revolution in Iran, the clerical regime has from time-to-time publicly re-asserted these claims during exercises in nationalist muscle-flexing. The most recent was in 2007, when the semi-official Kayhan newspaper ran an editorial that asserted an Iranian claim to Bahrain. Bahrain -- and the USG -- loudly denounced the editorial, and the GOB eventually announced that it was satisfied with the editor's statement that he did not speak for the government.
Shi'a Bahrainis' Ties with Iran
-------------------------------
3. (SBU) Sixty to seventy percent of Bahrain's 500,000 citizens are Shi'a. (The other half-million residents are guest workers.) With the exception of a few merchant families, Shi'a Bahrainis are poorer than Sunni Bahrainis. Most Bahraini Shi'a are Arabs, but about 10-15 percent of Bahrainis are ethnically Persian, and speak Persian at home. Many of these descend from families who came here to work in the British administration or, starting in the 1930s, in the oil industry. Persian-speakers (mostly Shi'a, a few Sunni) now tend to belong to the professional classes.
4. (C) Post's very rough estimate is that 30 percent of the Shi'a here follow clerics who look to more senior clerics in Iran for guidance. The majority look to Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq, and a few to Muhammad Fadlallah and others in Lebanon. Bahrain's most popular Shi'a cleric is Sheikh Isa Qassim, who has occasionally endorsed the Iranian regime's doctrine of velayat-e faqih, and as a result is a lightning rod for loud Sunni criticism (ref F), and quieter criticism from some more orthodox Shi'a clerics. (See septel for profiles of Bahrain's leading Shi'a clerics.)
5. (C) A number of Bahrain's middle-aged clerics studied in Qom during the years when Saddam obstructed study in Iraq. Several Bahraini clerics currently teach in Qom. The pious among Bahrain's Shi'a are very happy that they again have access to study and pilgrimage in Iraq's holy cities. A delegation of Shi'a community leaders visited Najaf in July for the opening of the new airport there, and was widely feted upon their return to Bahrain. Our Shi'a contacts hail the opening of the Najaf airport as a sign of a resurgent Iraq that will regain its prominence as the center of Shi'a learning and religious authority. As a result, we expect religious ties with Qom to subside in coming years.
Bahraini Policy Toward Iran
---------------------------
6. (S) Bahrain's Sunni rulers view Iran with deep suspicion, and support USG efforts to pressure Iran to change its behavior. But the Al-Khalifas also seek to keep channels open, and make occasional gestures to placate their large, touchy neighbor. Over the past year, we have seen both sides of this Bahraini balancing act. President Ahmadinejad visited Bahrain for five hours in November, 2007, (ref A) followed by President Bush's two-day visit in January, 2008 (ref D). The GOB vetoed the plans of a prominent local Shi'a, with Iranian government funding, to build a charity hospital here, but the GOB continues protracted negotiations with Tehran over the potential purchase of Iranian natural gas (ref B). Bahrain's leaders sometimes speak to U.S. officials of their genuine worries that Iranian missiles are sighted on targets such as the NAVCENT headquarters in downtown Manama and the royal palaces. Nevertheless, the GOB is careful to keep its public positions on Iran anodyne.
7. (SBU) The vacationing Bahraini Foreign Minister sent Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Nizar Baharna to the July Non-Aligned Movement Conference in Tehran. On July 31 Iranian media reported that President Ahmadinejad had reiterated to Baharna an invitation for Bahrain's Prime Minister and King to visit Iran.
Diplomatic Presence
-------------------
8. (C) Bahrain's Ambassador in Tehran, Rashid Al-Dosari, is a former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and one of the Bahraini MFA's more experienced diplomats. However, during a recent visit to Manama, he admitted to Charge that he has poor access to Iranian officials. This may be, he said, because of the very short leash on which the GOB keeps the small Iranian Embassy in Manama.
Trade
-----
9. (U) Bahrain has a growing but limited trade relationship with Iran. Despite Iran's size and proximity, it is not one of Bahrain's top-20 trading partners. According to published Ministry of Finance figures, bilateral trade totaled only $33.7 million in 2004, grew to $99 million in 2005, and remained constant at $108 million in both 2006 and 2007 -- accounting for less than 1% of Bahrain's total trade. In contrast, bilateral trade with the U.S. reached $1.2 billion in 2007, behind only the EU and Saudi Arabia. The Bahrain-Iran trade relationship primarily consists of Bahrain exports of petroleum and mining products, and professional and financial services. Imports from Iran are minimal.
Counter-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism Finance --------------------------------------------- ------
10. (C) As a banking and financial center, the GOB has been responsive on counter-terrorism finance issues, and has affirmed its support of UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803 (ref E). In 2004, Iranian Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, together with Bahraini Ahli United Bank formed a joint venture to create Bahrain-based Future Bank BSC. Following U.S. sanctions against Banks Melli and Saderat, and in consultation with Embassy Manama and U.S. Treasury, in 2007 the Central Bank of Bahrain enjoined Future Bank from engaging in new business with Iran, effectively took control of the Board of Directors, and saw Ahli United Bank place all shares of Future Bank in a blind trust. The GOB stated that a blind trust was necessary because Ahli United was unable to divest itself of its interest in Future Bank since it was perceived by the market as "tainted" by the Iranian association (ref C). Ahli United, Bahrain's largest lender, had already suspended all new transactions with Iran by August 2007. Future Bank's deposits currently total about $275 million -- a fraction of 1% of a consolidated balance sheet for the Bahraini Banking system that exceeds $155 billion.
Alleged Iranian Subversion
--------------------------
11. (S) Bahraini government officials sometimes privately tell U.S. official visitors that some Shi'a oppositionists are backed by Iran. Each time this claim is raised, we ask the GOB to share its evidence. To date, we have seen no convincing evidence of Iranian weapons or government money here since at least the mid-1990s, when followers of Ayatollah Shirazi were rounded up and convicted of sedition. (The so-called Shirazis were subsequently pardoned and some now engage in legal politics as the very small Amal party, which has no seats in Parliament.) In post's assessment, if the GOB had convincing evidence of more recent Iranian subversion, it would quickly share it with us.
12. (C) Nevertheless, if Iran became embroiled in armed conflict, Bahrain's Shi'a would be sympathetic, and the likely street demonstrations would be an internal security concern for the GOB.
Conclusion
----------
13. (C) Bahrain will likely continue its careful engagement with Tehran, including senior visits, diplomatic representation, trade ties, and the limited presence in Bahrain of Iranian banks. At the same time it will continue to support, behind the scenes, U.S. pressure on Iran to change its behavior, and will continue to welcome a robust U.S. military presence in Bahrain and in the Gulf.HENZEL
ID:163668 Cable dated:2008-07-25T18:50:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000496
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BAGHDAD FOR GENERAL PETRAEUS AND AMBASSADOR ERELI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2028
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, IR, IZ, BA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL PETRAEUS' VISIT TO BAHRAIN
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Christopher Henzel for reasons 1. 4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) General Petraeus, Embassy Manama and the Bahraini leadership look forward to welcoming you back to Bahrain. Following on Secretary Rice's dinner in Abu Dhabi with GCC-plus 3 officials July 21, and at a time when many in the Gulf are speculating about the trajectory of the tensions over Iran's nuclear program, your visit will further reassure the Bahrainis of America's commitment to regional security. You may also wish to note Bahrain's designation of an Ambassador to Iraq, and encourage the GOB to follow through smartly.
2. (S) You will find the leadership focused first on defending against potential Iranian missile threats, but also on the return of Navy dependents, and coastal radar upgrades. Multilateral air and maritime defense initiatives remain a subject of steady follow-up with the Bahrainis since Secretary Gates' meetings with regional Chiefs of Staff in Bahrain in December 2007, and the Gulf Air Chiefs conference that General North convened in Bahrain in June, 2008.
3. (S) On the political side, the Bahraini leadership is following very closely media speculation about potential scenarios for military confrontation with Iran. Regional tensions may be adding to long-standing domestic tensions as well, contributing to the stridency of sectarian voices in Bahrain. The majority of Bahraini citizens are part of the Shi'a underclass, and their grievances, expressed both in legal political activity and in street skirmishes between youths and police, are at the center of all domestic politics here.
----------------------------------------
Missile Defense and Regional Cooperation
----------------------------------------
4. (S) Bahrain's national security strategy rests squarely on the presence here of NAVCENT/Fifth Fleet headquarters and Bahrain's close security partnership with the U.S. Unlike its Gulf neighbors, Bahrain does not enjoy the kind of oil revenues that might enable it to buy advanced weaponry on its own. U.S. foreign military financing for Bahrain this year was only $3.9 million. State, with DoD support, is pressing for an increase in the next budget.
5. (S) The top security priority for Bahrain's leadership is missile defense. King Hamad told Secretary Gates on March 26 that Bahrain has assessed the need for several complete Patriot batteries to cover the island. He said that that he hoped the U.S. would provide one, while Bahrain would buy or lease others (though in our view this would be a stretch for Bahrain's budget.) A Patriot firing unit temporarily deployed to Bahrain in May as part of the annual GCC military exercise Eagle Resolve, and most of its equipment remains here in storage. We understand OSD is examining a number of options for providing a longer-term solution, including re-deployment to the region of Patriot units currently based elsewhere, as well as the periodic deployment of SM-2 and SM-3 equipped AEGIS cruisers.
6. (S) DoD has launched a number of initiatives to develop multilateral air and maritime defense capabilities. In February, NAVCENT hosted a Maritime Infrastructure Symposium which was attended by representatives from the GCC and some NATO countries. On 22-23 June, the Commander of Air Force Central Command, LTG North, met in Bahrain with Air Chiefs from the GCC plus Jordan to develop a way ahead for shared early warning and regional, mutual air defense.
-------------------------------------
Coastal Defense and Maritime Security
-------------------------------------
7. (S) The Government of Bahrain is concerned about its vulnerability to maritime threats such as drug trafficking, terrorism and subversion. Enhancing coastal defense and maritime security is a priority second only to missile defense. The Ministry of Interior has embarked on an ambitious program to enhance the counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics capabilities of its Coast Guard Special Units. We have seen considerable commitment and improvement.
8. (S) For this reason, and in view of the low FMF levels of recent years, the Embassy strongly supports a NAVCENT-initiated Section 1206 funded proposal to upgrade Bahrain's Coastal Surveillance Radar. The proposal did not
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receive funding through the Section 1206 program this year, but will be submitted again in 2009. If approved, this proposal would significantly improve Bahrain's maritime security capability and send a strong message of support to the government at a time of steep reductions in FMF and IMET funding. Under this proposal the Bahrain Navy will receive new equipment that will augment the system already owned by the Bahrain Coast Guard. The picture will be shared with the Bahrain Coast Guard, Bahrain Military Intelligence, and the U.S. Navy. The radar picture can potentially be shared with other countries in the region.
------------------
Royal Bahrain Navy
------------------
9. (S) From 4 March through 5 June, the Commander of the Royal Bahrain Navy (RBN), Brigadier Al Mansoori, took command of Combined Task Force (CTF) 152, the coalition maritime force that patrols the central and southern Arabian Gulf. This was the first time a Gulf state commanded a coalition naval operation, and we understand Brigadier Al Mansoori's role may inspire others in the Gulf to take a turn in command of a CTF as well. The RBN would welcome an opportunity to command this task force again.
--------------------
U.S. Navy Dependents
--------------------
10. (S) The dependents of the NAVCENT personnel in Bahrain were sent home in summer 2004 in reaction to what DoD viewed as an inadequate GOB response to the discovery of a potentially violent group of Sunni extremists on the island. The Embassy's assessment differed and its dependents remained. Since then, the GOB has improved its counter-terrorism performance, and both NAVCENT and the Embassy have been advocating for the return of Navy dependents.
11. (S) The Crown Prince is a strong advocate for the people-to-people contacts fostered by having Navy families in Bahrain. He views this as important to maintaining domestic support -- especially among the Bahraini elites who have traditionally sent children to the DoD Bahrain School -- for his strategy of alignment with the U.S. The Crown Prince is, himself, a graduate of the Bahrain School; his eldest son graduated from the school in June, and another son is still attending.
12. (S) President Bush and Secretary Gates told the King during their March meetings in Washington that Navy dependents would begin returning soon. Unfortunately, this still hasn't happened. The Embassy's understanding is that DoD is currently considering authorizing a return of spouses.
-------------------
Nuclear Cooperation
-------------------
13. (C) On March 26, the U.S. and Bahrain signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Nuclear Energy Cooperation, as well as a statement of support for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Bahrain has also been invited to participate in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.
---------------
Internal Issues
---------------
14. (C) Over the past two months the King has departed from his traditional detached style and intervened personally in several controversies arising from Bahrain's Shi'a-Sunni tensions. He has publicly, both personally and through his ministers, summoned communal leaders, newspaper editors and bloggers to warn them against crossing red lines against discussion of issues like royal family disputes and criticism of judges who have sentenced Shi'a rioters to prison terms.
15. (S) Within the Sunni minority there are several pockets of extremism, which the Bahraini authorities appear to be monitoring closely. In June, police detained a Bahraini who has since been charged with being in contact with a "banned group", i.e. al Qaeda. U.S. and Bahraini security services worked together productively on this case.
----------
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Conclusion
----------
16. (S) As the smallest Gulf state, Bahrain has historically needed closer security ties with a western patron than any of its neighbors. As a result, the U.S. Navy has As a result, the U.S. Navy has had a presence here since the closing days of the second world war. As General Mansoori's command of CTF 152 demonstrates, we can use our close security ties with Bahrain to continue pushing the envelope for GCC-U.S. security cooperation.
* HENZEL
ID:150213 Cable dated:2008-04-17T13:43:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000252
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR ERELI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2018 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, OVIP, BA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE'S VISIT TO BAHRAIN
Classified By: Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli for reasons 1.4 (b ) and (d).
--------
Overview
--------
1. (S) Madame Secretary, Embassy Manama is delighted to welcome you back to Bahrain. This is just about as good a bilateral relationship as we have anywhere: Bahrain's leaders share our strategic vision for the region and they see their national interest as tied to ours.
2. (S) King Hamad and Sheikh Khalid have lofty ambitions for this ministerial. Their number-one security concern is Iran. They support our tough stand toward Tehran and hope that this GCC plus 2 gathering will galvanize regional cooperation to contain the regime there. Sheikh Khalid told us his goal for the meeting is to demonstrate that "we have an alliance that will not stand by and watch countries fall to Iran one by one." In this context, the presence of Foreign Minister Zebari should send a clear to message to other Arab states that the time has come to embrace Iraq.
3. (S) A military corollary to our regional diplomacy is Secretary Gate's efforts to promote greater multilateral
SIPDIS
security cooperation among GCC members. In this too, Bahrain is an enthusiastic supporter, and along with the UAE, wants to move forward as rapidly as possible. Internally, sectarian violence continues to simmer and political life is becoming increasingly polarized.
-------------------
Iran and the Region
-------------------
4. (S) In looking at developments in the Gulf, Lebanon, Gaza and Iraq, the Government of Bahrain sees a concerted campaign by the regime in Tehran to spread its extremist ideology throughout the region. It seeks to counter this threat through more assertive and robust regional cooperation with the United States. Bahrain's leadership pushed to host the GCC plus 2 because it believes this forum represents the best hope for accomplishing that objective.
5. (S) Our point that reintegrating Iraq into the Arab fold is critical to limiting Iranian influence has had real resonance with the Bahraini leadership, as evidenced by their decision to invite Zebari to this ministerial and to send an Ambassador to Baghdad. It has been a month since Sheikh Khalid announced that decision in Washington, and the Foreign Ministry is still vetting a shortlist of candidates. (Iraq's Ambassador to Bahrain has told us that he is exasperated by Bahrain's ambivalence toward improving relations. On the one hand, their officials publicly declare a willingness to engage and privately, the Deputy Prime Minister has encouraged him to organize more high-level visits. On the other hand, every time he tries to bring ministers to Manama, the authorities here drag their feet. He's been working for months to arrange a visit by the Minister of Tourism and to organize a meeting of the Joint Ministerial Committee, but complains that he is met with only delay and evasion.)
6. (S) Bahrain's leaders are also focusing on unilateral steps to protect themselves. They want to enhance Bahrain's missile defense capability as quickly as possible. King Hamad told Secretary Gates on March 26 that Bahrain needed three Patriot firing units; he hoped the U.S. would provide one and Bahrain would buy or lease the other two. A Patriot firing unit will temporarily deploy to Bahrain in May as part of the annual GCC military exercise, Eagle Resolve. OSD is examining options for providing a longer-term solution, including re-deployment to the region of some of the Patriot units currently based in the United States as well as the periodic deployment of SM-2 and SM-3 equipped AEGIS cruisers.
7. (S) Vulnerability to maritime threats is a second leading concern. The government has made enhancing coastal defense a high priority. The Embassy and NAVCENT have submitted a 1206 request for $20 million to upgrade Bahrain's Coastal Surveillance Radar. If approved, this proposal would significantly improve Bahrain's maritime security capability and send a strong message of support to the government at a time of steep reductions in FMF and IMET funding.
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---------------------------------
Multilateral Security Cooperation
---------------------------------
8. (S) Bahrain is a leading advocate for greater multilateral security cooperation. They eagerly welcomed Secretary Gates' initiative on regional air and maritime defenses. As a result of his meeting with Chiefs of Staff from the GCC and Jordan in Manama last December, there is now broad recognition that effective regional air and maritime defense requires multilateral cooperation. Following up, NAVCENT hosted a Maritime Infrastructure Symposium in February, which was attended by representatives from the GCC and some NATO countries. Air Force Chief of Staff General Mosley will bring together in Bahrain this June Air Chiefs from the GCC plus 2 to develop a way-ahead for shared early warning and regional air defense. On March 4, Bahrain's navy took command of Combined Task Force (CTF) 152, the coalition maritime force that patrols the central and southern Arabian Gulf. It is the first time a Gulf state has commanded a coalition military operation. It is also worth mentioning that on April 23-24, Bahrain will host a meeting of NATO's North Atlantic Council as part of the Istanbul initiative.
------------------------------
MONITORING IRANIAN MONEY FLOWS
------------------------------
9. (S) Bahrain's Central Bank carefully monitors Iranian money flows. Financial services account for almost thirty percent of Bahrain's GDP. The leadership here is well aware of the damage that illicit Iranian activity would have on Bahrain's reputation, which in banking and finance is everything. Moreover, they share our desire to prevent Iran from exploiting the international system to fund terror and weapons proliferation. They are outspoken in their calls for GCC neighbors to exercise the same degree of careful oversight.
10.XXXXXXXXXXXX
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Internal Issues
---------------
11. (C) Internally, conditions in Bahrain continue to simmer. Small but violent bands of Shi'a underclass youth, frustrated with persistent discrimination and what they perceive as too gradual a pace of reform, clash with police nearly every week. The Sunni minority, which rules the country and controls all security forces, has generally acted with restraint, but it takes only one mistake to provoke a potentially disastrous escalation.
12. (C) Many feared just such a scenario when, on the evening of April 9, a policeman was killed in the Shia village of Kazarkhan by youths who threw rocks and Molotov cocktails, igniting his vehicle. The murder of a law enforcement officer crossed a red line and concern was high that security forces would react with a massive crack-down, further inflaming sectarian tensions. In fact, it appears that all sides - Shia and Sunni, regime and opposition - looked over the precipice and decided not to take the leap. All have walked their followers back and made a conscious decision to advocate restraint and tolerance. The police have arrested 14 people believed to be connected to the attack. All major political societies, including the largest Shia party, Al-Wifaq, issued strong statements condemning the killing and supporting the security forces. Other than the arrests, there has been no security crackdown. King Hamad recognizes the danger that violence and political stalemate represent for his democratic reforms and is playing a behind-the-scenes role to encourage moderation and compromise among political leaders.
ID:168471 Cable dated:2008-09-04T14:27:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAMA 000592
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV, ELAB, KDEM, PINR, PTER, LE, IR, BA
SUBJECT: A FIELD GUIDE TO BAHRAINI POLITICAL PARTIES
REF: A. 05 MANAMA 1773 B. 06 MANAMA 49 C. 06 MANAMA 1728 D. 07 MANAMA 113 E. 07 MANAMA 190 F. 07 MANAMA 810 G. 07 MANAMA 1046 H. MANAMA 336 I. MANAMA 404 J. MANAMA 407 K. MANAMA 420 L. MANAMA 510 M. MANAMA 536
Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (SBU) Summary: This message describes the leading political groupings in Bahrain. The Wifaq party remains the most popular party among the majority Shi'a underclass and advocates non-violent political activism on behalf of the Shi'a community. Two Islamist parties dominate the Sunni side of the political scene. Secular liberals and leftists did poorly in the 2006 elections and have demonstrated little recent evidence of street appeal, but continue to maintain high media profiles. End Summary.
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Background
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2. (SBU) The 2002 constitution revived the 40-member, elected Majlis Al Nawab (Council of Representatives) after a 27 year hiatus. Although political parties remain, strictly speaking, illegal, the 2005 Political Societies Act allows for the formation of registered "political societies," which function for all intents and purposes as political parties. The law provides for GOB financial support to registered societies, but forbids the societies from accepting foreign funding. The four societies with members in the elected lower house of parliament are Wifaq (17 seats), Asala (8), Minbar Al Islami (7), and Mustaqbal (4).
---------------------------------------------
REGISTERED SOCIETIES WITH SEATS IN PARLIAMENT ---------------------------------------------
Al Wifaq National Islamic Society
---------------------------------
3. (C) Wifaq is the leading Shi'a political society. It is also the largest political party in Bahrain, both in terms of its membership and its strength at the polls. Wifaq holds a plurality in the elected lower house of parliament, but coalitions of smaller, pro-government Sunni parties usually outvote Wifaq. Most Wifaq leaders were exiled following the unrest of the 1990's, and many continued oppositionist activities from London. With the amnesty of 2001, they returned to Bahrain and founded Wifaq. After boycotting the 2002 parliamentary elections, Wifaq won 17 seats in the 2006 elections. Sheikh Ali Salman, a mid-level Shi'a cleric, officially leads the party. Sheikh Isa Qassim, Bahrain's most popular Shi'a cleric, claims to eschew politics but privately supports Wifaq (ref M) and probably exerts considerable influence over it.
4. (SBU) Wifaq's base includes most of Bahrain's poorer Shi'a; well-off Shi'a gravitate toward more secular societies or avoid politics. Wifaq continues to demand a "true" constitutional monarchy in which elected officials make policy decisions, the prime minister is accountable to the parliament, and the appointed upper house loses its legislative power.
5. (C) Wifaq works to combat perceived discrimination by the Sunni-dominated government through legislation and disciplined street demonstrations. Wifaq has used its growing parliamentary skill and strong leaders to bolster its position as the leading political force in the Shi'a community. Government officials have privately praised Wifaq for its rejection of illegal demonstrations and respect for "the rules" (ref K). Wifaq often works with other opposition societies, including Wa'ad (para 11), Al Minbar Progressive Democratic Society (paras 12 and 13), and Amal (paras 15 and 16).
6. (U) For more on Wifaq and its relationship with Haq (paras 20-22), see septel.
Al Asala Political Society
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--------------------------
7. (SBU) Asala is exclusively Sunni and is closely associated with Salafist ideology. Al Tarbiya Al Islamiya (Islamic Education Charity Society) funds the party. Asala participated in the 2006 elections and won five seats in parliament; in addition, three Sunni independents generally vote with Asala. Asala often aligns with Minbar Al Islami (para 9) to outvote Wifaq (paras 3-6). Asala's supporters are mostly from Sunni enclaves like Muharraq island.
8. (C) Asala says its goals are to increase the standard of living for Bahrainis; strengthen political, social and economic stability; and enhance financial and administrative oversight of the government and industry. Asala does not support women's empowerment. Party chair Ghanim Albuanain is First Deputy Chairman in Parliament. Albuanain strikes emboffs as rational and open-minded, though many of his followers are not. Asala usually backs the government in parliament. Most Bahrainis believe the Royal Court provides extra financial support to both Asala and Minbar (para 9) as a counter to Wifaq.
Al Minbar Al Islami (Minbar)
----------------------------
9. (SBU) Minbar is Bahrain's branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and has seven seats in parliament. It often cooperates with the Salafi political bloc Asala (paras 7 and 8), especially on issues involving religious affairs and morals. Minbar seeks a personal status law that conforms to Sharia and is acceptable to both sects. Minbar's former leader, Dr. Salah Ali Abdul Rahman, is parliament's Second Deputy Chairman. Dr. Abdullatif Al Shaikh is the current Minbar leader. Most of Minbar's leaders are related to one another, and are wealthy academics. Minbar does not allow its female members to stand for election to parliament. Minbar is pro-government, and it is widely rumored that the Royal Court and the Islamic banking sector bankroll the party. The 2006 "Bandar" report accused several prominent Minbar members of engaging in a complex bribery conspiracy to influence the outcome of parliamentary elections in favor of Sunni candidates (ref C).
Al Mustaqbal
------------
10. (SBU) Four independent members of parliament formed the Mustaqbal bloc after they were elected. The bloc bills itself as the only secular grouping in parliament, though all four members are Sunni. It votes reliably for the government and its leader, Adel Al Asoomi, is close to the Prime Minister.
--------------------------------------------- ---
REGISTERED SOCIETIES WITHOUT PARLIAMENTARY SEATS --------------------------------------------- ---
Wa'ad National Democratic Action Society
----------------------------------------
11. (SBU) Wa'ad is a socialist party formed by returning exiles in 2002. It failed to win any seats in the 2006 parliamentary elections despite support from Wifaq, and has demonstrated no recent indications that it has recovered politically. However, several of its members have good access to local and international media and are able to maintain a high media profile. Ebrahim Sharif took over the society when the former chairman, Rahman Al Nuaimi, a Sunni liberal who was exiled in 1970, fell ill in 2006. XXXXXXXXXXXX Wa'ad says it desires a peaceful rotation of power in a secular, liberal state, rather than an Islamist one. Abdulla Al Derazi resigned his seat on Wa'ad's general secretariat when he ran for Secretary General of the Bahrain Human Rights Society. Wa'ad consists primarily of middle class professionals, male and female, from both sects. Wa'ad joined the opposition boycott of the 2002 elections. The party questions the legitimacy of the 2002 constitution, and supports a new family law. Sharif led a Wa'ad delegation to Lebanon in late July 2008, where he met and publicly praised recently released Hizballah fighter Samir Al Qantar.
Al Minbar Progressive Democratic Society (APDS)
--------------------------------------------- --
12. (SBU) Established in 2001, APDS represents Bahrain's former communists. Most of its approximately 100 members
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were exiled during the late Sheikh Isa's reign. Many APDS members used their time in exile to gain experience through work with other Arab political parties. When they returned and founded APDS, the society benefited from their strong organizational skills. Dr. Hasan Madau, a Shi'a columnist for the daily Al-Ayam, chairs the society. Men and women from both sects are active APDS members. APDS had 3 seats in the 2002 parliament, but lost them to Wifaq in 2006.
13. (SBU) APDS controlled the General Federation of Trade Unions until Wifaq won control of the federation in February 2008.
Al Meethaq (National Action Charter Society)
--------------------------------------------
14. (SBU) Wealthy businessmen from well-known families of both sects founded Meethaq in 2002. Meethaq is a pro-government party formerly backed by the Royal Court that now wields little influence. Abdulrahman Jamsheer, a prominent Sunni businessman close to the Royal Court, chaired the society until Mohammed Al Buanain, from a respected Muharraq family, defeated him in the society's 2006 internal elections. After Meethaq members proved themselves inactive with little street influence, the Royal Court reportedly shifted its support to Sunni Islamists with more street appeal. In the 2006 parliamentary polls Meethaq lost its five seats to Wifaq (paras 3-6) and Minbar (para 9).
Amal Islamic Action Society (Amal)
----------------------------------
15. (SBU) Amal is the non-violent heir to the defunct Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, which launched a failed uprising in 1981 inspired by Iran's Islamic revolution. Amal members are often referred to here as "Shirazis," for their alleged ties to Ayatollah Muhammad Al-Shirazi, who died in 2001. A number of Amal's current supporters did prison time, while Mohammed Ali Al Mahfouth, Amal's founder, spent much of the nineties in Damascus calling for the overthrow of the Al Khalifas (ref M). He and his followers were pardoned in the 2001 general amnesty. Amal joined Wifaq's boycott of the 2002 parliamentary elections. Al Mahfouth founded Amal in 2002, but refused to register the society until 2005.
16. (C) Amal has no seats in parliament, and continues to lose influence in the Shi'a community to Wifaq. The Ministry of Justice and Islamic affairs recently added to Amal's troubles when it determined that Amal violated a law that bars the use of religious buildings for political purposes.
Al Watani (National Democratic Gathering Society)
--------------------------------------------- ----
17. (SBU) A few Wa'ad (para 11) members, led by Sunni Abdulla Hashim (see Adala, paras 18 and 19), split to form Watani in 2002. After Hashim failed to win a seat in the 2002 parliamentary elections, he began aligning the society with Salafis, even though Watani members hailed from both sects. This angered Watani members, who elected a new board and chairman, Fadhel Abbas, in March 2007. Hashim, an attorney, sued the party alleging that they had violated their bylaws, but lost the case. Since Abbas' election, Watani has begun to reestablish relationships with other societies, including Wa'ad.
Adala National Justice Movement
-------------------------------
18. (C) Abdulla Hashim founded Adala as an umbrella organization for extreme Sunni elements after Watani (para 17) kicked him out in 2006. Adala registered as a political society with the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs on October 22, 2007. Adala has a more nationalist identity than Asala and Minbar. The society initially focused its criticism on the U.K. and Iran, but now devotes all its energy to exposing the horrors of "U.S. imperialism." Hashim has a real talent for attracting local and international media coverage for his stunts, such as an April 26 demonstration near the U.S. Navy base here that featured the beheading a mannequin dressed to represent a U.S. Marine. Despite their media profile, however, Adala has never produced more than 80 people at one of its demonstrations. Both Hashim and deputy Muhi aldin Khan stood for parliament in Muharraq in 2006 and lost to Al Minbar Al Islami (para 9).
19. (S) Adala is Bahrain's most outspoken supporter of former Guantanamo detainees, and is usually the first to spring to the defense of Bahrainis arrested for alleged links to
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Al-Qaeda (ref G).
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UNREGISTERED SOCIETIES WITHOUT PARLIAMENTARY SEATS --------------------------------------------- -----
THE UNREGISTERED HAQ MOVEMENT
-----------------------------
20. (SBU) Hasan Mushaima, a founding, hard-line member of Wifaq, left to found Haq in November 2005. From the start, Haq has defied the requirements for registration of political societies (ref A). Haq opposes the 2002 constitution on the grounds that it rescinded liberties granted by the 1973 constitution, that the King drafted it unilaterally, and that it gave constitutional legitimacy and legislative authority to the appointed upper house of parliament. Haq accuses King Hamad of not fulfilling his promises to bring democratic reforms to Bahrain. Haq's top public goal is a new constitution for Bahrain drafted by elected delegates. Since Haq competes with Wifaq for the same Shi'a supporters, Haq gains support whenever Wifaq is perceived as unsuccessful in parliament. When Wifaq is successful, Haq loses popularity.
21. (S) Post and the public perceive Haq as inspiring many of the small gangs of Shi'a youth who throw stones and Molotov cocktails at police almost every weekend. Haq has submitted petitions to the U.N., the USG, and the GOB calling for the Prime Minister's resignation and condemning the GOB's human rights record. Abduljalil Al Singace, Haq's public affairs and media specialist, has contacts with U.S.-based and international NGOs and media outlets. GOB officials often assert that the Iranian regime controls Mushaima and other Haq supporters, however has yet to provide post with convincing evidence.
22. (U) For more on Haq and its relationship with Wifaq (paras 3-6), see septel.
ID:165861 Cable dated:2008-08-13T09:25:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000541
SIPDIS
BAGHDAD FOR AMBASSADOR ERELI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2028
TAGS: PREL, IZ, SY, LE, IR, BA
SUBJECT: GENERAL PETRAEUS' VISIT TO BAHRAIN
REF: MANAMA 510
Classified By: CDA CHRISTOPHER HENZEL FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) Summary: King Hamad said PM Maliki was &welcome8 to visit Bahrain. He accused Syria and Hizballah of helping train Bahraini extremists. He described Iranian diplomatic pressure and expressed gratitude for the continued U.S. military presence. Hussein, Bahraini Navy Deputy Commander Brig Gen Mohammed Al Sadah, and NAVCENT/Fifth Fleet commander Vice Admiral Bill Gortney.
2. (U) MNF-I Commanding General David Petraeus visited Bahrain July 29-31 for meetings with Bahraini leaders and at US NAVCENT headquarters in Manama.
King Hamad on Iraq, Syria and Iran
3. (S) Accompanied by Ambassador Ereli, Petraeus met with an upbeat King Hamad July 30 for almost ninety minutes . Petraeus congratulated Bahrain on its nomination of an Ambassador to Iraq, stressed the need for further Arab support for the Iraqi government in order to cancel out Iranian influence, and outlined the progress the GOI and Coalition forces have made against Iranian-backed militia groups and Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The King expressed hope that U.S. forces would remain in Iraq until the GOI was clearly capable of fending off Iranian-backed extremists. The King also commented on domestic politics in Bahrain (reftel.) and praised the Department of Defense Dependent School in Manama as a key element in strong U.S.-Bahraini relations over the years. The King related how his own experience at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas had been one of the most personally and professionally rewarding of his life; he praised the value of continued military education opportunities.
4. (S) General Petraeus briefed the King on the situation in Iraq, and the King characterized the transformation of Iraq as a tremendous success. The King offered to host Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in Bahrain, and named his foreign minister as action officer for a visit. (Comment: Iraq,s Ambassador in Manama told Ambassador the next day that he had heard similar things from the GOB before, but that a formal Bahraini invitation had yet to materialize. Post will follow up with FM when he returns to Bahrain on/about August 10. End comment.) The King briefed General Petraeus on recent conversations among Arab leaders about Iraq. He said King Abdullah of Jordan was supportive of more active Arab relations with the Maliki Government, while President Mubarrak and Saudi King Abdullah were reportedly more cautious.
5. (S) King Hamad related the report that Bahrainis were receiving training from Hizballah in Lebanon, but admitted he had no definitive proof. He also speculated that the Syrian government was complicit, and &must be8 helping these Bahrainis &travel without passport verification as tourists.8 (Comment: Post has heard versions of this theory from Bahraini officials in the past, but despite our requests the GOB has been unable to provide convincing evidence. End comment.)
6. (S) King Hamad said Bahrain had received a message from Iranian FM Mottaki, urging regional governments to support the efforts of Iran, Iraqi insurgents, Hamas, Hizballah, Taliban and Syria to drive American forces from the Gulf. The King commented: &With friends like these, who needs enemies?8 The King expressed his gratitude for continued U.S. military presence in the region and, particularly, in Bahrain.
Other Meetings
7. (S) In a separate meeting July 30, Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifah echoed his father,s views on the need for U.S. forces in Iraq. On Iran, the Crown Prince stressed the need for solidarity among the U.S., P-5 plus 1, and moderate Arab states. General Petraeus also paid a courtesy call on Prime Minister Khalifah bin Salman al Khalifah, and met with Bahraini journalists Mansour Al-Jamri and Reem Khalifah. On July 29, he dined at the Ambassador,s residence, joined by Deputy Prime Minister Jawad bin Salem
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Al-Arayedh, Commerce Minister Hassan Fakhro, MinState for Defence Lt Gen Dr. Mohammad Bin Abdullah Al Khalifa, Member of Parliament Jassim Hussein, Bahraini Navy Deputy Commander Brig Gen Mohammed Al Sadah, and NAVCENT/Fifth Fleet commander Vice Admiral Bill Gortney.
8. (U) General Petraeus cleared this message.
HENZEL
Cable dated:2009-12-24T08:27:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KAMPALA 001413
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/24
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, UG
SUBJECT: UGANDA: HOMOPHOBE EXTREMISTS AND HOMOSEXUAL SCAPEGOATS
REF: 09 KAMPALA 01381; 09 KAMPALA 1409; 09 KAMPALA 1396 09 KAMPALA 01024
CLASSIFIED BY: Aaron Sampson, Pol/Econ Chief, State, Pol/Econ; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) Summary: Parliamentary sponsor of the anti-homosexuality bill, David Bahati, told PolOffs on December 15 that he is open to minor changes to his legislation, expressed deep disappointment with Rick Warren and others' statements against the bill, and said Uganda will not yield to international pressure. On December 18, Bahati and Pastor Martin Ssempa dominated a one-sided "consultative meeting" on the bill organized by the Uganda Human Rights Commission with UN funding. Bahati directly challenged the White House statement against the bill, and said impending oil revenues will soon liberate Uganda from international influence. Members of the Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Committee continue to maintain that the anti-homosexuality bill is not a priority and will not come up for debate in committee until March or April 2011. However, domestic pressure on parliamentarians is growing. XXXXXXXXXXXX
-------------------------
Bahati Unrepentant
-------------------------
2. (C) PolOffs met with Bahati on December 15 to provide recent statements by Rick Warren and others against the anti-homosexuality bill. At Bahati's request, the meeting occurred at the Anglican Church of Uganda's headquarters where Bahati said he was reviewing the legislation with Anglican Church leaders. XXXXXXXXXXXX Bahati entered our meeting with a document entitled "The 10 Deadly Sins of Homosexuality", and launched into a lengthy explanation of the current bill, saying it renders existing law more specific by defining homosexuality and attaching penalties for homosexual "recruitment". He criticized international donors for short circuiting Uganda's democratic procedures when it is in their interest, said demands to withdraw the legislation outright are unacceptable, and ridiculed recent threats by Sweden to cut its assistance (ref. A). Bahati attributed international criticism to a misreading of the text and a misunderstanding of the "situation on the ground" in Uganda.
3. (U) Bahati described the bill as a "proposal", solicited recommendations for "improving" the legislation, and appeared moderately open to altering provisions regarding the death penalty and requirements to report homosexual activity to authorities within 24 hours. Bahati said he personally does not believe in the death penalty and that this language was lifted directly from Uganda's 2007 Defilement Act. He said he is talking with XXXXXXXXXXXX about the bill's impact on HIV/AIDS programs, but that he does not believe the legislation will negatively impact HIV/AIDS prevention. Although Bahati claimed the bill is intended to further protect minors from sexual predators, he seemed unaware and unconcerned that his bill's "aggravated homosexuality" provision also condemns to death "serial offenders" twice convicted of the lesser and much more vague infractions of "homosexuality" and "related offenses".
4. (C) Bahati expressed profound disappointment with Rick Warren's letter against the billXXXXXXXXXXXX and said Ugandan church leaders are in the process of drafting a response. XXXXXXXXXXXX Bahati hoped Parliament's Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Committee will take up the bill in February 2010, but said his overriding goal is to see the bill into law - and he stressed that the bill will become law - by the February 2011 elections.
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5. (C) Bahati's reasoning for introducing the bill alternated between protecting children from sexual predators, eradicating Uganda of homosexuality, and some combination of the two. He claimed to have evidence documenting the homosexual recruitment of children, particularly in same sex schools and churches, and said the bill's provisions on reporting suspected homosexuality specifically target school masters and religious leaders. When asked to elaborate on evidence of supposed homosexual recruitment, Bahati referred to a XXXXXXXXXXXX pamphlet distributed in Uganda in 2002 that mentioned same-sex attraction, vague activities of unnamed foreign NGOs, and "networking" among foreign diplomats. At the end of the meeting, Bahati noted that he is also the Chairman of the Uganda Boy Scouts and is working on another bill - the second of his short Parliamentary career - updating Uganda's 1963 Scouts Act. We did not ask if this bill will also target homosexuality.
-----------------------------------------
One-Sided Human Rights Debate
------------------------------------------
6. (C) On December 18, the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) organized - with support from the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights - what turned out to be a one-sided debate on the anti-homosexuality bill. XXXXXXXXXXXX Prior to the debate PolOff received a text message from XXXXXXXXXXXX expressing concerns for the safety of XXXXXXXXXXXX representatives scheduled to attend the event. Bahati's late arrival delayed the event for more than an hour, and the UHRC failed to seat any representative of those opposed to the legislation at the head table, despite seating Bahati and - for unexplained reasons - Uganda's most outspoken anti-gay activist Martin Ssempa. A comment by an audience member later prompted the UHRC to correct this imbalance by inviting a clearly hesitant and nervous SMUG leader, David Kato, to sit beside Ssempa on the dais. Ssempa proceeded to shake Kato's hand while striking absurd poses for the assembled press corps.
7. (C) Bahati's remarks mirrored his private statements to PolOffs. Bahati also attacked the White House statement opposing the bill, saying that he admires President Obama, that President Obama ran on a platform of change, and that Uganda's message to him is that "homosexuality is not a change but rather an evil that we must fight." At this point the room erupted in loud applause, led by Ssempa pounding his hand on the head table, and Bahati observed that oil revenues will free Uganda of foreign entanglements. At other points in Bahati's tirade against homosexuality, Ssempa registered his support by issuing audible sounds of disgust.
8. (C) Kato delivered a well-written speech defending the rights of gay and lesbians in Uganda. However, his words were nearly indecipherable due to his evident nervousness. Throughout Kato's speech, XXXXXXXXXXXX UHRCXXXXXXXXXXXX openly joked and snickered with Bahati and Ssempa XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX representatives left shortly after Kato's speech, fearing that Bahati had instructed the Inspector General of Police to arrest Kato. After a break, Ssempa showed graphic x-rated photos of what he described as gay sex, and several audience members rose to ask why authorities did not arrest Ugandan homosexuals when they had the chance. XXXXXXXXXXXX
----------------------
Buturo - He's Back
----------------------
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9. XXXXXXXXXXXX
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Parliamentary Debate in March or April
--------------------------------------------- ----
10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX reaffirmed that Bahati's bill is not a priority and that debate on the legislation will likely not begin until March or April 2011 (ref. C). Key bills on election reform, political party funding, and the International Criminal Court are already pending before XXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX said pressure to move the anti-homosexuality bill to the front of the line is "disturbing" committee members, but XXXXXXXXXXXX and take a skeptical view of anti-homosexuality legislation.
11. (C) Bahati tried to shift the bill from the Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Committee to the more favorable Presidential and Foreign Affairs Committee on December 15 but failed as there is no provision in Parliament to re-assign legislation from one committee to another. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the bill "has no place in our modern world", and XXXXXXXXXXXX
--------------------------
Opposition Concerns
--------------------------
12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff XXXXXXXXXXXX. In September, Otunnu accused state security services of running a smear campaign about his sexual orientation and HIV status to discredit a potential presidential bid (ref. D). XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated that Uganda could run a similar smear campaign against Besigye, forcing him to
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curtail presidential campaign activities.
13. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX said the opposition FDC fears Uganda will use the anti-homosexuality legislation against Besigye, and recalled government efforts to hobble Besigye's 2006 presidential campaign by arresting him on spurious charges of rape, terrorism, and treason. XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated that Uganda could disrupt Besigye's 2011 campaign with phony homosexuality allegations.
--------------------------------------------- -
Comment: Homophobic Demagogues
--------------------------------------------- -
14. (C) Recent condemnations by Warren and other U.S. based individuals have further isolated Bahati. His homophobia, however, is blinding and incurable. Bahati, Buturo, and particularly Ssempa's ability to channel popular anger over Uganda's socio-political failings into violent hatred of a previously unpopular but tolerated minority is chilling. XXXXXXXXXXXX described Ssempa as an anti-homosexuality "extremist." XXXXXXXXXXXX said he opposes the legislation not because he favors homosexuality, but because legalizing persecution of homosexuals is the first step toward state sponsored persecution of other minority groups. On December 22, XXXXXXXXXXXX asked PolOff if the U.S. could provide an expert speaker to reinforce arguments exposing the human rights ramifications of Bahati's legislation in advance of parliamentary hearings. Helping those attempting to counter Bahati, Buturo, and Ssempa to better craft their arguments - perhaps through a digital video conference or some other venue - is worth pursuing.
LANIER
ID:248885 Cable dated:2010-02-16T06:54:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KAMPALA 000073
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/16
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, KDEM, UG
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY OTERO'S MEETING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLBT ACTIVISTS
REF: 09 KAMPALA 1365; 09 KAMPALA 1024; 10 KAMPALA 47; 10 KAMPALA 45 10 KAMPALA 55; 09 KAMPALA 1276 DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 B, D
1. (C) Summary: Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs Maria Otero discussed the anti-homosexuality bill and other human rights concerns with local activists XXXXXXXXXXXX. The activists expressed appreciation for U.S. support and described their own efforts to combat the bill. Several human rights defenders but not members of the Gay Lesbian Bisexual Transgender (GLBT) community situated the anti-homosexuality bill within a broader context of growing state sponsored limitations of human rights and democratic freedoms in advance of the February 2011 presidential elections, and urged the U.S. to expand condemnation of the anti-homosexuality bill to cover other human rights concerns. End Summary
--------------------------------------------- ------
U.S. Support for GLBT Rights in Uganda
--------------------------------------------- -----
2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX human rights activists participated in a roundtable discussion with Under Secretary Otero and DRL Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel Baer XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX are outspoken opponents of anti-homosexuality bill. XXXXXXXXXXXX
3. (C) Under Secretary Otero and DAS Baer stressed the U.S. commitment to democracy and human rights, highlighted Secretary Clinton's recent Georgetown University speech, and said safeguarding human rights is a central tenet of U.S. foreign policy. DAS Baer assured participants that the U.S. is committed to defending universal principles of human rights and will continue to engage with other nations on human rights-related concerns. Under Secretary Otero noted that our engagement is intended to produce not just press headlines but real accomplishments and change, and invited participants to discuss the impact of the anti-homosexuality bill and recommendations for preventing its passage.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
Anti-Homosexuality and Anti-Human Rights
--------------------------------------------- ---------
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX placed the anti-homosexuality bill in the context of a general trend toward restricted human rights and democratic freedoms in Uganda. He said the anti-homosexuality bill is one of many regressive legislative initiatives that are not in the interests of all Ugandans and are intended to tilt the February 2011 presidential elections in the government's favor. XXXXXXXXXXXX cited draft legislation to expand the Security Ministry's monitoring of electronic communications, expanded and perhaps politically motivated enforcement of the 2002 Anti-Terrorism Act, the recently passed Land Amendment Act (ref. A), reduced press
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freedoms, and the slow pace of electoral reform as pressing human rights concerns. He encouraged the U.S. to treat these issues in the same manner as the anti-homosexuality bill, and said the anti-homosexuality issue is a government "gimmick" to divert attention away from other assaults on human rights and democratic freedoms that will ultimately undermine the integrity of the 2011 elections.
-----------------------
XXXXXXXXXXXX Views
-----------------------
5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed that threats to human rights in Uganda are growing, but said the anti-homosexuality bill is the most regressive legislation yet introduced. XXXXXXXXXXXX described the bill as a "gag" order to prevent anyone from talking about homosexuals or acknowledging that sexual minorities are entitled to rights as human beings. He referred to Ethics Minister Nsaba Buturo's proclamation that homosexuality is not a human rights issue, and wondered why the Ugandan government is so intent on targeting such a small population of individuals. XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed that homosexuality is the least of Uganda's problems, and said the bill's proponents are scapegoating homosexuals for political reasons.
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said Uganda's GLBT community has received considerable support from human rights groups and diplomatic missions, but that the draft bill is already negatively impacting homosexuals. XXXXXXXXXXXX said threats have increased, and alleged that some homosexuals have been arrested and detained by authorities and homophobic extremists eager to build legal cases in advance of the legislation's ratification. He said state-sponsored homophobia is filtering down even to low level government officials in rural areas.
7. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX said XXXXXXXXXXXX reads about the anti-homosexuality bill every day, trying to understand why MP David Bahati would introduce such a bill. XXXXXXXXXXXX said Bahati is not trying to protect the Ugandan heterosexual family or children, as he claims, but to instill fear and intimidation. XXXXXXXXXXXX said Members of Parliament who privately oppose the bill fear losing their seats if they speak out against the legislation, and therefore support the bill in public and will vote for it should it ever reach the parliamentary floor. XXXXXXXXXXXX said Bahati is blaming homosexuals for the spread HIV/AIDS, pornography, and increasing incidents of rape and defilement, and that the legislation is a diversionary ploy intended to steer attention away from real issues like corruption and the 2011 elections. XXXXXXXXXXXX (ref. B). NOTE: XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff that XXXXXXXXXXXX is not aware of any homosexuals who have been arrested by police since the bill was submitted in October (septel). END NOTE.
--------------------------------------------- -------------------
Recommendations for Engagement on Human Rights
--------------------------------------------- --------------------
8.(C) Under Secretary Otero asked how local human rights activists are working to defeat the legislation, what forms of technology they are using, and what the U.S. can do to support these initiatives. XXXXXXXXXXXX said rallying local voices against the bill is key, and that a coalition of XXXXXXXXXXXX local NGOs is using public dialogues, media outreach, and publications to discredit the rhetoric of the bill's proponents, translate the bill into layman's terms, and raise awareness of how the legislation will impact not only homosexuals but all aspects of Ugandan society. In December, the coalition published a professionally produced booklet on the bill, complete with press clips from local and international media; statements of condemnation by Secretary Clinton, Rick Warren, and others; and transcripts from the Rachel Maddow show. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted
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that even parents who wish their children were not gay do not want them to be executed, and that most Ugandans support the bill because they wrongly believe the legislation will impact only homosexuals.
9.(C) Both XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX said local XXXXXXXXXXXX activists are using cellphones, blogs, and the internet to the extent possible, but stressed concerns about government monitoring of electronic communications. XXXXXXXXXXXX said one local human rights NGO had to switch its domain name after someone hacked its email address, and XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX said they and other activists have been forced to switch telephones and restrict electronic communications to avoid harassment and eavesdropping.
10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX thanked the U.S. for standing up for the right of Ugandan homosexuals to be happy, and attributed overwhelming domestic homophobia to a general lack of civic education. He said the Ugandan leaders at the forefront of the anti-homosexuality bill are using the issue to build populist, xenophobic support. XXXXXXXXXXXX dismissed claims that homosexuality is an un-African, foreign import, noting that he witnessed homosexuality among cattle herders as a boy in rural Uganda. He warned that reporting requirements in the bill will result in increased HIV/AIDS rates and an explosion of Ugandan LGBT asylum seekers.
11. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said while international pressure may block the bill, homophobia in Uganda remains and is fanned by religious leaders. He said the bill's proponents were shocked by the level of international condemnation, and urged the U.S. to apply this kind of direct engagement to other human rights issues like electoral reforms, press freedoms, the use of torture, and illegal detention. XXXXXXXXXXXX added that several governments in East Africa have proposed laws restricting freedoms of the press, speech, assembly, and minority rights. XXXXXXXXXXXX also hailed XXXXXXXXXXXX's courage for speaking out XXXXXXXXXXXX against the bill XXXXXXXXXXXX - despite increasing threats and harassment - to defend GLBT rights. He recommended that the State Department dedicate a section of its annual human rights report to the specific acknowledgement of critical human rights defenders in each country, as this would increase the legitimacy and visibility of their work and perhaps also afford some level of protection.
--------------------------------------------- ----------------
Comment: Fighting State Sponsored Homophobia
--------------------------------------------- ----------------
12. (C) International and particularly American condemnation of the anti-homosexuality bill has forced Ugandan leaders to reconsider their initial support for Bahati's legislation. However, Ugandan officials continue to give conflicting assessments of the bill's prognosis. Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa said the bill will die a natural death in Parliament (ref. C). On February 5, Ethics Minister Buturo said an amended version of the bill - without provisions on capital punishment - will reach the parliamentary floor for a vote. President Museveni told the Ambassador the bill would be scrapped or amended (ref. D), and State Minister for International Affairs Henry Okello Oryem has said Cabinet wants to shelve the bill but also find a "win-win" solution acceptable to all sides (ref. E). Even if draft bill is shelved in the weeks ahead, rampant homophobia in Uganda won't go away. Local efforts to deconstruct Uganda's anti-homosexuality movement go well beyond public condemnation of the anti-homosexuality bill by directly challenging Uganda's pervasive homophobia. These efforts are worthy of additional and sustained support.
12. (C) In his meeting in October with Assistant Secretary Carson, even President Museveni said the anti-homosexuality bill would "divert us" (ref. F). Local human rights activists fear this is exactly the point - to divert the Ugandan populace and international donors during a contentious and competitive election
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year. As the debate over the anti-homosexuality bill extends into its sixth month, we remain cognizant of XXXXXXXXXXXX's reminder not let the anti-homosexuality bill obscure other limitations on human rights and democratic freedoms. LANIER
[ID:194957 Cable dated:2009-03-03T14:42:00]
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000198
SIPDIS
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; STATE FOR NEA/MAG; PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/2/2019
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, EIND, EINV, ETRD, EAIR, LY
SUBJECT: BLACK SHEEP MADE GOOD? SAADI AL-QADHAFI'S EXPORT FREE ZONE IN WESTERN LIBYA
REF: 08 TRIPOLI 530
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: Saadi al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, has recently turned his attention to transforming an area near the western Libyan town of Zuwara into an Export Free Trade Zone. The project would include an airport, immigration and customs operations, a high tech industrial park, banks, medical centers and educational facilities. During a rare visit by Muammar al-Qadhafi to Zuwara late last year, he promised to help bring the project to reality; work began a few days after the visit. As with most business ventures in Libya, there are considerable political dimensions to any economic enterprise. A desire to provide tangible deliverables to a leading city of the Berbers, with whom his regime has had a historically contentious relationship, may have helped prompt al-Qadhafi's support.
Saadi's status as a son of the first family may mean that his project stands a better chance of surviving as government budgets are tightened in light of flat oil prices. Although the Zuwara Free Trade Zone is an ambitious and expensive project, XXXXXXXXXXXX Regardless, the Berber-dominated town of Zuwara will benefit from the creation of new employment, both in the construction phase and later in the running of the zone.
End summary.
SAADI SETTLES IN
2. (C) Saadi al-Qadhafi, a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, has recently spent considerable time in the predominantly Berber town of Zuwara, located in western Libya near the border with Tunisia. Saadi was married off several years ago to the daughter of prominent regime figure al-Khweildi al-Hmeidi XXXXXXXXXXXX According to residents, XXXXXXXXXXXX Saadi does his own shopping and walks the streets of Zuwara's small downtown area, usually with a small security detail. A former professional footballer (he enjoyed a single season with Perugia in Italy's Serie A league, owns a significant share of al-Ahli - one of the two biggest soccer teams in Libya - and has run Libya's Football Federation) and engineer by training, Saadi's focus has drifted from soccer to the military (he was briefly an officer in a special forces unit and reportedly did well, but was bored by military life) to movies (he owns the film production company World Navigator Entertainment). He now appears to be focused on developing Zuwara into an Export Free Zone.
ZUWARA PROJECT SIZEABLE IN SCOPE
3. (SBU) The Zuwara Export Free Trade Zone project was initiated in 2006 XXXXXXXXXXXX to develop the area located between the city of Zuwara and the fishing village of Ras-Ajdar. The latter is located on the Libya-Tunisia border.
The zone is intended to encourage foreign investment and prompt industrial and commercial development and tourism that will contribute to long-term economic growth. In a press release, Saadi highlighted the project as a means by which to diversify Libya's economy, reduce dependence on oil revenues, create jobs and strengthen foreign investment. The design of the project was assigned to a number of multinational companies, which have developed a phased plan for the project. In late 2008, Emirati Emaar Properties and the Government of Libya (GOL) created a joint venture company to be the main developer of Phase 1, which included developing residential, commercial, industrial, educational, healthcare, leisure and entertainment components designed to attract foreign investment and generate employment.
4. (SBU) If implemented, the Zuwara Export Free Trade Zone would be the first of its kind in Libya. It would have unique
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features such as its own harbor and airport, and immigration and customs offices to facilitate vistors' entry into Libya, and would be a fully-functioning hub for business investors. In a nod to cultural sensitivity, there would be multi-religious worship facilities in the zone and the area would deliberately cultivate "western style" business laws with which European and American companies would be familiar. Locally-engaged Embassy staff resident in Zuwara have heard credible reports that Saadi has secured agreement to sell alcohol in the zone as part of an effort to make it attractive to potential expatriate investors and business interests. (Note: Libya is technically dry, although there is a thriving black market for alcohol and discreet drinking is tacitly accepted. A number of new hotels in Tripoli due to open soon have requested liquor licenses and believe they may get them, although there is credible reporting suggesting that Muammar al-Qadhafi personally opposes the consumption of alcohol and will not allow it so long as he remains in power. End note.)
LEADER'S VISIT SPARKS MOVEMENT ON CONSTRUCTION
5. (C) During a rare visit by Muammar al-Qadhafi to Zuwara in September 2008, he promised to help bring the project to fruition. His visit and interest in the project may have been partly prompted by a desire to provide tangible deliverables to the Berber community, with which his regime has had a historically contentious relationship. In 2007, the GOL showed some evidence of reversing its longstanding denial that any Berber communities exist in Libya and granted permission to the Amazigh (Berber) World Congress to host a large gathering in Tripoli in August 2007. Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, and the Prime Minister made high-profile visits in August and September 2007 to predominantly Berber communities and announced major infrastructure investments; however, in March 2008 the GOL hotly criticized a request for Emboffs to visit Berber leaders in Zuwara and in May 2008 Muammar al-Qadhafi denied the existence of an ethno-linguistically distinct Berber minority in a visit to Berber tribes near Jadu (reftel).
6. (C) Within a few days of his al-Qadhafi's visit to Zuwara, significant work on the free trade zone project began. On a site visit to Zwara in October 2008, Econoff noticed several old buildings being torn down along the beachfront to make way for new buildings. Roads have been re-surfaced in record time and the city's main entrance from the coastal road leading to Tripoli has been spruced up with palm trees and landscaping.
Local residents have remarked that their town, which had been a bit dusty and shabby, now looks like "an international city". A project to build another water desalination plant has just been awarded to a Turkish contractor and work has begun, which will directly contribute to the overall standard of living for Zuwara's residents. There is talk in the town of Zwara that the best building in town, previously owned by the National Livestock Company, will host the new joint venture company that will manage construction of the free zone.
7. (C) Comment: Saadi's status as a son of the first family likely means that the Zuwara Export Free Trade Zone stands a better chance of surviving as budgets are trimmed in light of flat oil prices. As reported previously, the GOL had initially pegged its 2009 national budget (now being debated at the session of the General People's Congress currently underway) to a price per barrel of USD 65; however, it recently re-calibrated the budget and significantly reduced outlays on some development projects to reflect sagging oil prices. Although the Zuwara Free Trade Zone is an ambitious and expensive project, Muammar al-Qadhafi likely views it as a relatively small price to pay if it helps occupy the notoriously ill-behaved Saadi and lend a patina of useful engagement to his otherwise less than sterling reputation. Saadi has a troubled past, including scuffles with police in Europe (especially Italy), abuse of drugs and alcohol, excessive partying, travel abroad in contravention of his father's wishes XXXXXXXXXXXX Creating the appearance of useful employment for al-Qadhafi's offspring has been an important objective for the regime. Muhammad al-Qadhafi (the oldest of al-Qadhafi's children, but by his first wife)
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dominates the telecommunciations sector, Saif al-Islam is the presumed heir-apparent and is focused on civil society and political-economic reform, Muatassim is National Security Adviser, Hannibal (another miscreant whose recent misbehavior in Geneva is the cause of the current rupture in Swiss-Libyan
relations) has maritime shipping, Khamis is commanding officer of Libya's premier military unit and Aisha runs a quasi-governmental organization and helps mediate family disputes. The mystery candidate is Saif al-Arab, who reportedly spends most of his time in Munich, where he is involved in ill-defined business pursuits and spends much of his time partying. Regardless of any desire to appease the Berber community and/or paternalistic motives behind the GOL's support for the free trade zone, the town of Zuwara and its predominantly Berber residents stand to benefit in the end from the project. End comment.
CRETZ
ID:195954 Cable dated:2009-03-09
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TRIPOLI 000208
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, INR/NESA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/4/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KCOR, ECON, MARR, MASS, PHUM, PINR, LY
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S SUCCESSION MUDDLED AS THE AL-QADHAFI CHILDREN CONDUCT INTERNECINE WARFARE
REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 564, B) 08 TRIPOLI 592, C) TRIPOLI 198, D) 08 TRIPOLI 870 , E) 08 TRIPOLI 679, F) 08 TRIPOLI 494, G) TRIPOLI 196, H) TRIPOLI 134, I) 0 8 TRIPOLI 227
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: A series of events since last summer suggest that tension between various children of Muammar al-Qadhafi has increased, XXXXXXXXXXXX. Much of the tension appears to stem from resentment of Saif al-Islam's high-profile as the public face of the regime; however, deeper tension about contradictions between Saif al-Islam's proposed political-economic reforms, XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX also play an important role. The arrest and intimidation of a number of Saif al-Islam allies since last summer, on the one hand, and moves to circumscribe Muatassim's role in military equipment procurement, on the other, suggest that the current level of discord among al-Qadhafi's children is acute. While internecine strife is nothing new for the famously fractious al-Qadhafi family, the recent escalation of tension comes during a particularly momentous period. Amid turmoil related to the 40th anniversary of the revolution, Muammar al-Qadhafi's recent election as African Union chairman, proposed political-economic reforms and persistent rumors about al-Qadhafi's health and the absence of a viable mechanism to orchestrate a succession, the sharp rivalry between the al-Qadhafi children could play an important, if not determinative role, in whether the family is able to hold on to power after the author of the revolution exits the political scene. End summary.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX the arrest of Hannibal al-Qadhafi, a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, in Geneva in mid-July (ref B subsequent) and a visit to Rome by Saadi al-Qadhafi, a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, against his father's express wishes in early August. Hannibal and Saadi both have checkered histories of unseemly behavior and public scuffles with authorities in Europe and elsewhere. Although Muammar al-Qadhafi was reportedly fed a carefully vetted version of the events attendant to Hannibal's arrest to help minimize the perception that Hannibal was to blame, the elder al-Qadhafi was reportedly vexed that Libya, for reasons of protecting the first family's pride, had to engage in a bilateral spat with Switzerland at a time when it was trying to move ahead with negotiations for a framework agreement with the European Union. XXXXXXXXXXXX
... PROMPT AN AL-QADHAFI FAMILY MEETING
4. (C) The upshot of Muatassim's solicitation of funds, Hannibal's arrest and Saadi's jaunt was an al-Qadhafi family meeting in mid-August. Al-Qadhafi reportedly decided to reduce Sanussi's role as a minder for the most troublesome children (he is still a key adviser to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi) and to
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instead assign his daughter, Aisha al-Qadhafi, the task of monitoring the activities of ne'er-do-wells Saadi, Hannibal and Saif al-Arab. (Note: The latter is the least publicly know of al-Qadhafi's children; he lives in Munich, where he pursues ill-defined business interests and spends much time partying. At the meeting, Saadi reportedly criticized his father for having ignored him, and specifically cited the fact that his (Saadi's) efforts to establish an Export Free Trade Zone near the western Libyan town of Zuwara had not enjoyed the kind of support that Muatassim's activities as National Security Adviser or Saif al-Islam's high-profile efforts under the Qadhafi Development Foundation and Libya Youth Forum. As reported ref C, Muammar al-Qadhafi subsequently made an unusual visit to Zuwara last September and significant work on the development project began within a few days of his visit. Although the Zuwara Free Trade Zone is an ambitious and expensive project, XXXXXXXXXXXX
5. XXXXXXXXXXXX have told us that Aisha played a strong role in urging a hardline Libyan position with respect to the Swiss-Libyan contretemps over Hannibal's arrest. Separately, the Swiss Ambassador told us that Aisha's less than accurate rendering to her father of the events surrounding Hannibal's arrest and treatment by Swiss authorities helped stoke Muammar al-Qadhafi's anger, limiting the extent to which Libyan and Swiss officials could maneuver to find an acceptable compromise. The Swiss have told us that in the most recent effort between the two sides to resolve the issue in Davos, Saif had approved an agreement that had the Swiss literally bending over backwards to assuage Libyan demands. After making a phone call (to either Aisha or the leader), Saif returned somewhat chastened after several minutes to rescind the aproval. The Swiss crisis, together with other points of intra-family tension, has reportedly brought Aisha, who enjoys closer relations with Hannibal than with her other brothers, together with Hannibal, Saadi and, to a lesser extent, Saif al-Arab. Muatassim reportedly agreed with the hardline approach vis a vis the Swiss and has been closer to Aisha's end of the spectrum than to that of Saif al-Islam, who urged a more moderate approach. Muhammad al-Qadhafi (the eldest son, but by al-Qadhafis' first wife) and Khamis al-Qadhafi (fifth son by al-Qadhafi's second wife and the well-respected commander of a special forces unit that effectively serves as a regime protection unit) have remained neutral. XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed frustration XXXXXXXXXXXX that Saif al-Islam had persisted in his hard-partying, womanizing ways, a source of concern in a socially conservative country like Libya.
INCREASED TENSION BETWEEN SAIF AL-ISLAM AND MUATASSIM
6. (C) Against that backdrop of tension, competition between Saif al-Islam, whom most still regard as the heir-apparent, and Muatassim, whose viability as a potential alternative successor has risen since his appointment as National Security Adviser, has increased since last fall. XXXXXXXXXXXX Saif reportedly bridled at the fact that Muatassim accompanied Muammar al-Qadhafi on the latter's visit to Moscow, Minsk and Kiev last year (ref D), and played a key role in negotiating potential weapons contracts. Muatassim (who flew back early) and his older brother Muhammad greeted Muammar al-Qadhafi at the airport upon the latter's return to Tripoli; Saif, who was in town, was pointedly absent. XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX It was further determined that Khamis al-Qadhafi would play a larger role in military procurement, since his Khamis Regiment (the 32nd Brigade) had demonstrated some success in procurement. Muatassim, whom the Serbian Ambassador described as "a bloody man" and "not terribly bright", XXXXXXXXXXXX
7. (C) Saif al-Islam's highly-publicized visit to the U.S. last November-December exacerbated tension with his siblings, particularly Muatassim, who viewed it as grandstanding. Saif al-Islam's high-profile role as the public face of the regime to the West has been a mixed blessing for him. While it has bolstered his image (he is probably the most publicly-recognized figure in Libya other than Muammar al-Qadhafi), many Libyans view him as self-aggrandizing and too eager to please foreigners at the expense of Libyans' interest. His role in the denouement of the Bulgarian nurses' case, in which he acknowledged in media interviews that the nurses had been tortured and the investigation into their alleged injection of the AIDS virus into Libyan children bungled, badly damaged his reputation. The fact that his recent visit to the U.S. came not long after his August 2008 Youth Forum address - in which he strongly criticized the existing Jamahiriya system of governance, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that most of his proposed reforms had already been achieved, and declared his intention to withdraw from political life to focus solely on civil society issues (ref E) - reportedly irritated his siblings. XXXXXXXXXXXX have suggested to us that Muatassim's desire to visit Washington this spring and his seemingly overweaning focus on having meetings with senior USG officials and signing a number of agreements are driven at least in part by a strong sense of competition with Saif al-Islam.
THE KNIVES COME OUT
8. (C) Recent events have fueled speculation that inter-sibling rivalries, and those of the more conservative regime elements they represent, have been increasing. XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX
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9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
1 XXXXXXXXXXXX
11. (C) Comment: While internecine strife is nothing new for the famously fractious al-Qadhafi family, the recent escalation of tension between Saif al-Islam and Muatassim, Aisha, Hannibal and Saadi, comes during a particularly momentous period in the Jamahiriya's history. The 40th anniversary of the revolution on September 1, 2009, together with Muammar al-Qadhafi's recent election as Chairman of the AU (ref H), proposed political-economic reforms, consideration of a constitution, and rumored elections, have contributed to a sense that Libya is in the midst of a period of particular political turbulence. XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX that a draft constitution had been finished and submitted to the General People's Committee (cabinet-equivalent) for approval, and that it could be submitted to the General People's Congress for ratification sometime this year. The UN Resident Representative recently told the Ambassador that Saif al-Islam had established a super-committee under the auspices of the Economic and Development Board to draw up plans to implement wealth distribution and privatization/government restructuring advocated by Muammar al-Qadhafi last March (ref I). XXXXXXXXXXXX Saif al-Islam's recent announcement of a regional organization that would publicly identify specific individuals who perpetrate human rights abuses and target them for sanctions has been interpreted by some local observers as a manifestation of his frustration with the slow pace of reforms
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and as a threat to conservative regime elements, many of whom personally played a part in the most serious transgressions of the late 1970's and 1980's.
12. (C) Comment (continued): Persistent rumors about Muammar al-Qadhafi's declining health have lent particular urgency to questions about succession scenarios, throwing into stark relief the fact that, absent a constitution, there is no legal mechanism by which to orchestrate such an endeavor and seemingly increasing the stakes for the sibling rivalry. XXXXXXXXXXXX As Libya lurches forward with the effort to balance badly needed economic reform with the appearance of some political re-structuring - all against the backdrop of looming succession issues - the sharp rivalry between the al-Qadhafi children could play an important, if not determinative role, in whether the al-Qadhafi family is able to hold on to power after Muammar al-Qadhafi exits (one way or another) the political scene. End comment. CRETZ
[ID:211524 Cable dated:2009-06-11T15:27:00]
S E C R E T MBABANE 000141
DEPT FOR DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA; AF/S (MJWILLS,EPELLETREU, MHARRIS); AF/RSA; LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCH
SECRET
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2019
TAGS: KDEM, PGOV, PINR, PREL, WZ, PINS, MASS, ETTC, XF
SUBJECT: SWAZILAND ARMS PURCHASE ATTEMPTED
Classified By: AMB. MAURICE PARKER FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d)
1. (S) SUMMARY: In December 2008, the GKOS sought to purchase approximately 60 million USD worth of military equipment, including helicopters, vehicles, weapons, and ammunition from a British weapons manufacturer. The British government denied the request over end-use concerns. In documents requesting permission to purchase the equipment, Swaziland's Ministry of Defense stated that the equipment was for use by the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force (USDF) on United Nations peacekeeping deployment in Africa. It is unclear whether this was the intended purpose, or whether GKOS was attempting to build up domestic capability to deal with unrest, or was possibly acting as an intermediary for a third party. END SUMMARY
2. (S) In December 2008, the GKOS sought to purchase approximately 60 million USD worth of military equipment from British weapons manufacturer Unionlet Limited (please protect). The British government denied the request over end-use concerns. A senior level contact with the British High Commission in Pretoria (please protect) recently provided Ambassador Parker with documentation on the attempted purchase.
3. (S) The purchase application, signed by XXXXXXXXXXXX, included requests for 3 Bell Model UH-1H helicopters, FN Herstal 7.6251mm Minimi light machine guns, blank and tracer ammunition, armored personnel carriers, command and control vehicles including one fitted with a 12.7x99mm M2 Browning heavy machine gun and others fitted with the FN Herstal light machine guns, military ambulances, armored repair and recovery vehicles, weapon sights, military image intensifier equipment, optical target surveillance equipment, 620 Heckler & Koch G36E assault rifles, 240 Heckler & Koch G36K assault rifles, 65 Heckler & Koch G36E rifles, 75 Heckler & Koch UMP submachine guns 9x19mm, and 35 Heckler & Koch USP semi-automatic pistols. SwazilandQs Ministry of Defense stated in the purchase documents that the equipment was for use by the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force on United Nations peacekeeping deployment in Africa.
4. (S) COMMENT: Post is disappointed that XXXXXXXXXXXX did not disclose anything about this request to Ambassador Parker or DATT Langdorf in one of several very candid and private discussions since this order was placed. If XXXXXXXXXXXX were coerced into making the order, he might have been embarrassed to discuss it, though from his experience, one would think he would assume we would find out about it and that he might have wanted to do damage control.
5. (S) The array of weapons requested would not be needed for the first phases of peacekeeping, although it is possible someone tried to convince the Swazi government they were required. The GKOS may have been attempting to build up domestic capability to deal with unrest, or was possibly acting as an intermediary for a third party such as Zimbabwe or a Middle Eastern country that had cash, diamonds or goods to trade. XXXXXXXXXXXX, traveled to Iran and later to Libya, and several GKOS Ministers made trips to Kuwait, Dubai, and other Arab nations. We also understand that an Iranian ambassador, resident in either Pretoria or Maputo, recently presented his letters of credence to King Mswati to establish formal diplomatic relations with Swaziland.
6. (S) We are not aware of subsequent purchase requests. XXXXXXXXXXXX
7. (S) Please protect information on the identity of the British weapons manufacturer. The British contact providing documentation for this purchase informed Ambassador Parker that if the information becomes public, the manufacturer could sue the British Government for violating confidentiality. END COMMENT.
PARKER
Cable dated:2008-10-27T08:20:00
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 002993
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/J, ISN/CTR, ISN/MNSA, ISN/NESS DOE FOR KBAKER, NA-20
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018
TAGS: PARM, ENRG, TRGY, NRR, MNUC, PUNE, JA
SUBJECT: MP CRITICIZES JAPANESE NUCLEAR PLANS
REF: STATE 107836
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Lower House Diet Member Taro Kono voiced his strong opposition to the nuclear industry in Japan, especially nuclear reprocessing, based on issues of cost, safety, and security during a dinner with a visiting staffdel, Energy Attache and Economic Officer October 21. Kono also criticized the Japanese bureaucracy and power companies for continuing an outdated nuclear energy strategy, suppressing development of alternative energy, and keeping information from Diet members and the public. He also expressed dissatisfaction with the current election campaign law. End Summary.
2. (C) Member of the House of Representatives Taro Kono spoke extensively on nuclear energy and nuclear fuel reprocessing during a dinner with a visiting staffdel, Energy Attache and Economic Officer October 21. Kono, a member of the Liberal Democratic Party first elected in 1996, is the son of Yohei Kono, a former President of the LDP who is currently the longest serving speaker of the House in post-war history. Taro Kono, who studied and worked in the United States and speaks excellent English, is a frequent embassy contact who has interests in agriculture, nuclear, and foreign policy issues. He is relatively young, and very outspoken, especially as a critic of the government's nuclear policy. During this meeting, he voiced his strong opposition to the nuclear industry in Japan, especially nuclear fuel reprocessing, based on issues of cost, safety, and security. Kono claimed Japanese electric companies are hiding the costs and safety problems associated with nuclear energy, while successfully selling the idea of reprocessing to the Japanese public as "recycling uranium." He asserted that Japan's reprocessing program had been conceived as part of a nuclear cycle designed to use reprocessed fuel in fast breeder reactors (FBR). However, these reactors have not been successfully deployed, and Japan's prototype FBR at Monju is still off-line after an accident in 1995.
3. (C) Kono said following the accident at the Monju FBR, rather than cancel plans to conduct reprocessing, the electric companies developed the Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel program. However, Kono criticized the MOX program as too expensive, noting it would be cheaper to just "buy a uranium mountain in Australia," or to make a deal to import uranium from other sources. Kono claimed the high costs of the reprocessing program were being passed to Japanese consumers in their power bills, and they were unaware of how much they paid for electricity relative to people in other countries. In describing the clout wielded by the electric companies, Kono claimed that a Japanese television station had planned a three part interview with him on nuclear issues, but had canceled after the first interview, because the electric companies threatened to withdraw their extensive sponsorship.
4. (C) In addition to the electric companies, Kono was also very critical of the Japanese ministries, particularly the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). He claimed the ministries were trapped in their policies, as officials inherited policies from people more senior to them, which they could then not challenge. As an example, Kono noted that Japanese radiation standards for imported foods had been set following the Chernobyl incident, and had not changed since then, despite other nations having reduced their levels of allowable radiation.
5. (C) In a similar way, he alleged, METI was committed to advocating for nuclear energy development, despite the problems he attributed to it. Kono noted that while METI claimed to support alternative energy, it in actuality provides little support. He claimed that METI in the past had orchestrated the defeat of legislation that supported alternatives energy development, and instead secured the passage of the Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) act. This act simply requires power companies to purchase a very small amount of their electricity from alternative sources. Kono also criticized the government's handling of subsidies to alternative energy projects, noting that the subsidies were of such short duration that the projects have difficulty finding investors because of the risk and uncertainty involved. As a more specific example of Japan neglecting alternative energy sources, Kono noted there was abundant wind power available in Hokkaido that went undeveloped because the electricity company claimed it did not have sufficient grid capacity. Kono noted there was in fact an unused connection between the Hokkaido grid and the Honshu grid that the companies keep in reserve for unspecified emergencies. He wanted to know why they could not just link the grids and thus gain the ability to add in more wind power.
6. (C) He also accused METI of covering up nuclear accidents, and obscuring the true costs and problems associated with the nuclear industry. He claimed MPs have a difficult time hearing the whole of the U.S. message on nuclear energy because METI picks and chooses those portions of the message that it likes. Only information in agreement with METI policies is passed through to the MPs. Elaborating on his frustrations with the ministries, Kono noted that the Diet committee staffs are made up of professional bureaucrats, and are often headed by detailees from the ministries. He said he had no authority to hire or fire committee staff, and that any inquiries he made to them quickly found their way back to the ministries.
7. (C) Kono also raised the issue of nuclear waste, commenting that Japan had no permanent high-level waste storage, and thus no solution to the problem of storage. He cited Japan's extensive seismic activity, and abundant groundwater, and questioned if there really was a safe place to store nuclear waste in the "land of volcanoes." He noted that Rokkasho was only intended as a temporary holding site for high-level waste. The Rokkasho local government, he said, had only agreed to store waste temporarily contingent on its eventual reprocessing. Kono said that in this regard, the US was better off that Japan because of the Yucca mountain facility. He was somewhat surprised to hear about opposition to that project, and the fact that Yucca had not yet begun storing waste.
8. (C) In describing how he would deal with Japan's future energy needs, Kono claimed Japan needed to devise a real energy strategy. He said while he believed Japan eventually would have to move to 100% renewable energy, in the meantime he advocated replacing energy produced by nuclear plants ready for decommissioning with an equal amount of energy from plants using liquid natural gas. To this he would add new renewable energy sources.
9. (C) Kono also made a few side remarks concerning the Japanese election process. He expressed dissatisfaction with the current election campaign law, which he called outdated. He noted, for example, that during the official campaign period he was not allowed to actively campaign on the Internet. He said he could print flyers during this time, but only a limited number, which had to be picked up by constituents at his campaign office. So, to get around these and other limitations, MPs had to campaign before the official campaign period began. Given the current uncertainty on a date for elections, he noted in a humorous manner that if the government delayed elections long enough, he and the other MPs would go broke.
SCHIEFFER
Cable dated:2008-07-17T13:23:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 001972
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018 TAGS: PREL, PARM, TSPL, KNNP, ETTC, ENRG, TRGY, IN
SUBJECT: POLITICAL BARGAINING CONTINUES PRIOR TO KEY VOTE IN PARLIAMENT
REF: KOLKATA 209
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Steven White for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)
1. (C) SUMMARY. Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon and his delegation departed for Vienna on July 17 to brief the 35 Board members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and another 19 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. In Delhi, government officials responded positively to suggestions about how to address concerns emerging from Vienna, particularly the need to begin negotiating an IAEA Additional Protocol and for the IAEA to circulate India's (INFCIRC) already-public separation plan as an official IAEA document. Political horse-trading continued in anticipation of the special session of parliament to consider the confidence vote on July 21 followed by the vote itself on July 22. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader L.K. Advani each plan to host a dinner for supporters on July 20; the parties will presumably have to chose one or the other. An estranged Congress Party MP and three Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) MPs publicly stated their intention to vote against the UPA, leaving the government still clinging to a slim majority. Small parties representing collectively about 20 votes find themselves with generous suitors; one party chief has reportedly succeeded in having the Lucknow airport renamed after his father. The unrequited Left continued its anti-government rant, but showed signs of internal strain. Lok Sabha Speaker Somnath Chatterjee refused to resign despite pressure from within the Communist party to do so and has made it clear that he was not in favor of the Left voting with the opposition BJP against the government, a position that seems to have resonance among comrades disinclined to face early elections. END SUMMARY.
GOI to Address IAEA Member Concerns, Fumbles on Scheduling - - -
2. (SBU) Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon departed for Vienna on July 17 for his briefing on July 18 to IAEA Board members and NSG members on the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. Local media had reported statements by an IAEA spokesman on July 16 that the briefing by the visiting Indian delegation had been canceled. In fact, the briefing was scaled down from all 140 IAEA members to just the 35 Board members, in addition to the 19 others that comprise the 45-member NSG that do not also sit on the IAEA Board. Menon is traveling with Department of Atomic Energy director for strategic plans Dr. R.B. Grover, Department Of Atomic Energy's (DAE) Gitish Sharma, and Chief of Staff Naveen Srivastava. They will be joined in Vienna by Geneva-based Ministry of External Affairs Counselor Venkatesh Varma, a veteran of nuclear deal negotiations.
3. (C) Pursuant to recommendations from the U.S. Mission to the IAEA, PolCouns raised two issues of concern to IAEA Board members on July 16 with Ministry of External Affairs Joint Secretary for the Americas Gaitri Kumar and Virender Paul in the National Security Adviser's office. PolCouns stressed the importance of starting negotiations on an Additional Protocol as soon as possible, relaying that such agreements usually take about a year to conclude but that IAEA Legal could have a model text ready quickly if the Indians ask to begin negotiations. PolCouns also reported, following messages from UNVIE, that some IAEA delegations did not understand the connection between the safeguards agreement (with its blank safeguarded facilities list) and the separation plan listing the civil nuclear facilities that would fall under safeguards (already a public document). PolCouns shared that the IAEA is prepared to circulate the separation plan as an official IAEA document if the Indians request it. Both Kumar and Paul promised to get on these two tasks "right away" to set things up for a productive trip to Vienna for Menon. On the Additional Protocol, the Prime Minister's Special Envoy will have to push the Department of Atomic Energy, which will have the lead. On the facilities list, an instruction could go to India's mission in Vienna fairly quickly.
UPA Maintains Precarious Lead In Vote Count - - -
NEW DELHI 00001972 002 OF 004
4. (SBU) The special session of parliament to consider the confidence vote will begin on July 21 and conclude with a vote on July 22. Minister for Parliamentary Affairs Vayalar Ravi claimed on July 15 that the government would prevail in the July 22 confidence vote with over 280 votes cast in its favor. Kuldip Bishnoi, an estranged Congress Party MP who had been suspended for floating the idea of forming his own party in December 2007, confirmed his intention to defect in the confidence vote. (This development was apparently expected by party insiders and not a leading indicator of further fragmentation within the party.) Consulate Chennai reported on July 17 that the Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) has publicly stated it will vote against the UPA. One of its three members of parliament has broken from the party, but is unlikely to support the government because the TRS has positioned the trust vote as a statehood issue, so voting for the UPA would mean voting against Telangana interests.
5. (SBU) Our best guess at this time show the government maintaining its slim majority with the anticipated vote count at about 273 in favor, 251 opposed, and 19 abstentions. A similar analysis from the British High Commission tracks closely with our numbers.
Dueling Dinners Force Parties to Declare Loyalties - - -
6. (SBU) Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader L.K. Advani each plan to host a dinner for supporters on July 20, the evening before the special parliamentary session begins on July 21. Media reported that Advani will use the dinner as a strategy session to field MPs to speak against the confidence motion. Advani will also reportedly meet the BJP's National Democratic Alliance (NDA) supporters on July 17, including Chief Ministers of the states where NDA constituents are in power. Rajasthan Chief Minister Raje reportedly plans to skip the meeting, raising the ire of the BJP leadership.
7. (SBU) Prime Minister Singh's dinner on July 20 will include the Congress Party's new allies in the Samajwadi Party as well as other recent converts and fence-sitters from smaller parties. The Telegraph quoted a senior government source who said that PM Singh was "neither crunching numbers nor seeking daily briefings on the political sensex. His bottom line is clear." It also claimed that PM Singh was upset with the BJP for allegedly recanting on an "understanding" that it would support the deal. The article concludes that if the government survives the July 22 vote, PM Singh's priority would be to implement flagship social programs to thank his party for rallying behind him.
Votes For Sale - - -
8. (SBU) Behind the scenes, the Congress Party machine is working overtime. Sonia Gandhi reportedly plans to meet Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) leader Shibu Soren and Janata Dal Secular (JD-S) leader H.D. Deve Gowda. Retaining the support of JMM's five seats and the JD-S's three seats is reportedly vital to the UPA government's strategy. In exchange for retaining the support of the three votes of the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD), the Congress Party has reportedly pledged its support to rename Lucknow's Amausi airport after Chaudhary Charan Singh, father of RLD leader Ajit Charan Singh, who may also get a cabinet seat.
9. (C) On July 16, PolCouns met with Captain Satish Sharma, a Congress Party MP in the Rajya Sabha, a former Indian Airlines Pilot, and a close associate of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi considered to be a very close family friend of Sonia Gandhi. Sharma mentioned that he, as well as others in the party, was working hard to ensure that the UPA government wins the confidence vote on July 22. He said that the Prime Minister, Sonia Gandhi, and Rahul Gandhi were committed to the nuclear initiative and had conveyed this message clearly to the party. Sharma said that PM Singh and others were trying to work on the Akali Dal (8 votes) through financier Sant Chatwal and others, but unfortunately it did not work out. He mentioned that efforts to encourage Shiv Sena (12 votes) to abstain were on-going. While different Congress operatives were working on different groups of MPs, Sharma said that Rahul Gandhi was personally working Omar
NEW DELHI 00001972 003 OF 004
Abdullah's Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (J&KNC), whose two MPs are inclined to vote in favor of the UPA. Sharma mentioned that he was also exploring the possibility of trying to get former Prime Minister Vajpayee's son-in-law Ranjan Bhattacharya to speak to BJP representatives to try to divide the BJP ranks. He mentioned that if the party wins the trust vote, they would then prefer to go for national elections in February or March 2009, which would give the UPA time to control prices and bring down inflation.
10. (S) Sharma's political aide Nachiketa Kapur mentioned to an Embassy staff member in an aside on July 16 that Ajit Singh's RLD had been paid Rupees 10 crore (about $2.5 million) for each of their four MPs to support the government. Kapur mentioned that money was not an issue at all, but the crucial thing was to ensure that those who took the money would vote for the government. Kapur showed the Embassy employee two chests containing cash and said that around Rupees 50-60 crore (about $25 million) was lying around the house for use as pay-offs.
11. (S) Another Congress Party insider told PolCouns that Minister of Commerce and Industry Kamal Nath is also helping to spread largesse. "Formerly he could only offer small planes as bribes," according to this interlocutor, now he can pay for votes with jets."
"What If"s: No Vote or a UPA Defeat - - -
12. (SBU) PM Singh appears to have opened the door to the Left to call off the vote, telling media on July 16 that the government had the numbers to prevail in the confidence vote and that it was "unfortunate" that the special session had to be foisted upon parliament and distract the government from addressing urgent issues like inflation. PM Singh publicly acknowledged trying to get the BJP to support the nuclear initiative by reaching out to former PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee, but Vajpayee reportedly deferred to opposition leader L.K. Advani to make the call.
13. (SBU) There are some signs that the GOI may decide to go ahead with the nuclear initiative even if it loses the confidence vote on July 22. Media quoted Rahul Gandhi on July 16 as saying, "I support the PM 100 percent on the nuke deal. We are going to win the trust vote, but even if the government falls, so be it." He also claimed the BJP was divided over the nuclear initiative, saying, "There are people in the BJP who support the deal and do not know why their party is opposing it." Rahul Gandhi also recalled how Left parties in the mid-1980s had stonewalled his father Rajiv Gandhi's efforts to introduce computers in government offices and vision of a computerized India. Congress Party Chief Sonia Gandhi said in Andra Pradesh on July 17 that the government "will not compromise on the nuclear deal because it is in the national interest."
Disagreements Among Comrades: Left Shows Signs of Strain - - -
14. (SBU) The Left continued its rant against the government. The Community Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) Polit Bureau groused that the Prime Minister's Office set a "dangerous precedent" by meeting industrialist Mukesh Ambani on July 14, during which Ambani reportedly offered help in securing Shiv Sena support for the UPA government. The CPI-M said the government's rejection of the use of force against Iran by Israel was "timely," but that it would only be credible if the government were to cut military ties with Israel.
15. (SBU) The Left has also begun to show signs of internal strain. CPI-M Polit Bureau member Sitaram Yechury told media on July 15 that the party erred in listing Lok Sabha Speaker Somnath Chatterjee among its members who withdrew support from the UPA government on July 8. Chatterjee said he does not want to step down as Speaker despite pressure from within the party to do so. He also wrote a letter to Prakash Karat making it clear that he was not in favor of the Left voting with the opposition BJP against the government. (Chatterjee has looked to the UPA government to help him keep his position as Speaker and appears to be rallying moderate CPI-M members disinclined to join their comrades in voting with their rival BJP against a government that they supported for
NEW DELHI 00001972 004 OF 004
several years.) Also on July 15, Samajwadi Party leader Amar Singh and two other SP leaders called for Chatterjee not to quit his post.
16. (SBU) Consulate Kolkata reported on the growing split within the CPI-M (reftel). Many CPI-M members, particularly Muslims, cannot fathom voving with the "communalist" BJP. A large group of West Bengal MPs do not want to bring down the government and are angry at Karat for his failed strategy. If the government falls, they fear the CPI-M could lose 10-15 seats in new elections based on unfavorable recent local election results. If the government survives, the Left will be embarrassed for having achieved nothing on the issues that are important to their constituents, few of whom care about the nuclear initiative. Though defection is a possibility, Communist Party discipline remains strong and members are unlikely to vote with the government.
Communists Find Muslims To Be More Anti-BJP Than Anti-American - - -
17. (SBU) A Times of India report on July 17 claimed that Muslim MPs do not view the nuclear initiative confidence vote as a communal issue, but rather one of differences in perception of national interest based on party positions. Of the 37 Muslim members of parliament, 26 are in parties that have declared their support to the government for the confidence vote, while 11 are with anti-deal parties. Mayawati's Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) has tried to turn the confidence vote into into a communal issue by reaching out to Muslim councils ("bhaichara" committees) and Islamic scholars in Uttar Pradesh and claiming that the Congress Party has compromised their interests. This strategy appears to be failing, partly because Muslims view the BJP as a more immediate threat than closer relations with the U.S. Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) MP and central committee member Hannan Mollah reportedly told media, "Let's see what strategy can be worked out to convince the Muslim electorate that we are not working in tandem with the BJP." Media reported a Forward Bloc local assembly member in West Bengal, Mehboob Mondal, saying, "It's becoming difficult to explain that we are not with the BJP. It's clear that Muslims are not happy with us and their feelings may well reflect on Lok Sabha results."
WHITE
Cable dated:2005-09-17T12:29:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 SANAA 002766
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2015 TAGS: KDEM, KMCA, KMPI, PGOV, PINR, PREL, PTER, YM, DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: WILL SALEH'S SUCCESSOR PLEASE STAND UP?
REF: A. SANAA 1910 B. SANAA 2162 C. IIR 6906 D. SANAA 2414 E. SANAA 2022 F. SANAA 1877
Classified By: Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.4 b and d .
1. (C) Summary. After 27 years in power, President Saleh's recent announcement that he would not seek another term in 2006 has provoked increased speculation about potential successors. There is widespread skepticism about Saleh's intentions not to run, especially as there are few if any viable candidates. Saleh has given little indication of how he would transfer power, begging the question as to how and when such a transition might take place. The general public's growing acceptance of democratic institutions would likely require, barring a national emergency, Saleh's successor to take office by popular vote. At the highest levels, however, true power still derives from the military and the tribes, and the next President would have to meet with their approval. In the case of Saleh's death or retirement prior to 2013, his successor would almost certainly be a military officer and likely a member of the President's Sanhan tribe. Saleh's son, Ahmed Ali, is the most obvious choice, but there are considerable doubts as to his fitness for the job. Saleh has provided Yemen with relative stability relying on his maneuvering skills and strategic alliances, but has done little to strengthen government institutions or modernize the country. As a result, any succession scenario is fraught with uncertainty. Although the Yemeni public complains freely about corruption and lack of the democratic institutions necessary to establish rule of law, Yemenis generally agree that for the time being no one but Saleh can maintain the nation's unity and stability. End summary.
----------------------------
Saleh: The Only Game in Town
----------------------------
2. (C) On July 16, President Saleh made the dramatic announcement that he would bow out of the 2006 Presidential Election. (ref A) Few observers believe he is sincere, but Saleh's declaration placed urgency on the question of who could succeed him as President. (Comment: Given the general belief that a viable successor will not appear before next year's September election, Saleh may well have made his announcement simply to drive home the point. End Comment).
3. (C) There is no clear chain of command should the President step down, die, or become incapacitated while in office. The Vice President is only a figurehead. Other prominent leaders are generally considered to be unacceptable to one or another major tribal or regional constituency within the Republic. It seems likely that Saleh would prefer his son, Ahmed Ali, succeed him, although the heir apparent does not currently command the same respect as his father and is younger than 40, the Constitutionally mandated minimum age for assuming the Presidency. When asked for names of potential successors, Yemenis are unable to come up with a single potential candidate. Despite yearnings for a genuine democratic process, most believe that the next President will come from within Saleh's inner circle of family and military allies.
4. (C) Beginning with unification in 1990, Yemen embarked on a program of limited democratic and economic reform. Nevertheless, fifteen years after unification, Saleh retains a firm grip on Yemen's executive apparatus, using the military and government finance to exert control and distribute patronage. Saleh also dominates the judiciary through his chairing of the High Judicial Council, which has sole power to appoint and remove judges. Yemen's Parliament is weak and the ruling GPC party has a wide majority of seats. Even opposition parties generally seek to influence the President rather than replace him.
----------------------
A Deal With Two Devils
----------------------
5. (S/NF) Despite his authoritarian tendencies, Saleh is unable to govern the country single-handedly due to tribal and regional fractures. He relies heavily on a "power sharing" arrangement with the country's leading tribal and military figures, Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar who heads the Hashid Tribal Confederation, and Brigadier General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, Commander of the Northeastern Military District and reputedly the most powerful military man in the land. This triumvirate was formed by written agreement in 1978, following the assassination of President al-Ghushaimi. Both Mohsen and Sheikh al-Ahmar wield great influence over Presidential decision-making, but neither challenges Saleh's presidential power directly.
6. (S/NF) Sheikh al-Ahmar is the 70 year-old Speaker of Parliament and head of Yemen's largest opposition party, Islah. As head of the Hashid Confederation, Sheikh al-Ahmar heads a veritable government within the government, and is able to broker deals between the ROYG and the tribal sheikhs within his realm. Saleh's own Sanhan tribe belongs to Hashid, making al-Ahmar the President's tribal leader. The Hashid tribes are located largely in areas of the country considered the most unstable, including Sa'ada (base of the al-Houthi rebellion), Maarib, al-Jawf, and Amran. Al-Ahmar is considered a founding father of the modern Yemeni Republic, and uses his position as Speaker of Parliament to advance his business interests and to grandstand on foreign policy. Despite his age, al-Ahmar shows no sign of retreating from public life and his sons hold positions of prominence in Parliament, business, and tribal affairs. Moderates and serious reformers within Islah blame al-Ahmar for their party's inability to affect change in Yemen, and many consider their leader more a part of the regime rather than an oppositionist.
7. (C) Ali Mohsen is between 50 and 60 years old, and is generally perceived to be the second most powerful man in Yemen. Most reports indicate Mohsen is the cousin of Saleh's two half brothers, although there is much confusion on this matter, with some claims that he is himself a half-brother to Saleh. Ali Mohsen's name is mentioned in hushed tones among most Yemenis, and he rarely appears in public. Those that know him say he is charming and gregarious. As Commander of the Northeast Region and the First Armored Division, Ali Mohsen acts as Saleh's iron fist. (Note: When Saleh took power, with the help of Ali Mohsen, he held the position of Commander of the First Armored Division. End note). The area that Ali Mohsen controls includes the governorates of Sa'ada, Hodeidah, Hajja, Amran, and Mahwit, and he is more powerful than any governor. Mohsen was instrumental in the North's victory in the 1994 civil war and in crushing the recent Sa'ada uprising. It is estimated that he controls over 50 percent of ROYG military resources and assets.
8. (S) This tripartite alliance has been the cornerstone of Saleh's 27-year rule. It depends on the President's personal relationships and history with both men. Although there have been tensions, including of late an on-again-off-again public war of words between Saleh and al-Ahmar, Saleh has remained relatively unchallenged over the course of his rule. (Note: Saleh's two predecessors were both assassinated within one year. End note). In exchange, he has given both men a wide berth to run their affairs with informal armies, courts, and economic empires. Saleh often bows to their demands on issues such as anti-corruption and gun control, and makes direct payments from the treasury to the two men's tribal and military constituencies. Despite the ad hoc nature of this arrangement, it has proved essential in maintaining control over this inherently tribal country. An acceptable successor to Saleh would be expected to deliver a similar level of stability.
--------------------------------------------- -----
Scenario 1: Electoral Defeat, A Near Impossibility --------------------------------------------- -----
9. (C) Yemen is scheduled to hold presidential elections in the fall of 2006. Assuming the President relents to his party's demands and runs as expected, it is extremely unlikely he will face a serious opposition challenger. Democracy activists from across the political spectrum yearn to see their next President elected through competitive elections, but none can point to a single viable candidate at this time. Islah, with a considerable mosque-based constituency to draw from, is the only party with the resources to mount a challenge to Saleh. It is, however, difficult to imagine as long as Sheikh al-Ahmar runs the party. (Note: in the last elections in 1999, Islah nominated Saleh rather than its own candidate. End Note).
10. (C) There have been rumblings from Islah's rank and file about fielding a candidate, most likely through the mechanism of the opposition coalition the Joint Meeting Party (JMP). Although JMP leaders continue to insist the opposition will not nominate Saleh in 2006 and intends to back its own candidate, they lack the organization, unity, or viable national figure to succeed and are unlikely to try. Recent rhetoric has focused instead on "unity and dialogue," pointing to a possible national unity party coalition that will endorse Saleh for another term. (ref B)
11. (C) There are currently three declared candidates for President: Tawfiq al-Khamri, Vice-President of the Council of Yemeni Entrepreneurs, recently announced his intention to run as the "business candidate;" Salaam al-Hakeemi who lives in exile in Cairo and was involved in a failed 1979 coup attempt; and Ahmed Noman, brother of Deputy Foreign Minister Mustafa Noman, who currently resides in London. None of these candidates represents a major political party or is considered a serious challenge to Saleh. (Note: When his brother announced his candidacy, Noman told us he received a call from Saleh who jokingly asked if the DFM would be leaving to manage the campaign. End Note).
---------------------------------
Scenario 2: A Fresh Start in 2013
---------------------------------
12. (C) Assuming Saleh wins the next election (a pretty safe assumption), his last constitutional seven-year term would expire in 2013. Considering his age and public opposition to a constitutional amendment, most Yemenis believe that they will have a new President by 2013 at the latest. Despite weak institutions and submissive political parties, democracy has permeated Yemen enough that the public will expect to choose its next President in open elections. Ahmed Ali is currently too young according to the Constitution to hold the highest office. Saleh likely plans to use the next seven years to groom his son (a la Mubarak), make him increasingly visible, and place him in positions of higher responsibility so that he will be seen as an acceptable candidate in 2013.
13. (C) Ahmed Ali is a colonel in the Yemeni military, and heads the Yemeni Special Operations Forces and the Republican Guard (both considered the most effective military units in the country). The majority of Yemenis, tribal and non-tribal alike, have a strong aversion to hereditary succession. Until the 20th Century, hereditary succession was forbidden by the Imamate. The Imam was required to be a Zaydi and a direct descendent of the Prophet, but the most qualified candidate was chosen by tribal consensus.
14. (C) These norms remain fresh for many Yemenis, and Ahmed would have to overcome the view that his accession to the presidency would be a betrayal of the republican character of the state. Election by popular vote in a viable multi-candidate election, however, would give Ahmed Ali legitimacy if Saleh can mobilize sufficient tribal and military support for his son. Faced with the absence of a viable alternative, Ahmed Ali might gain sufficient backing, but there is currently insufficient data to know if he would be able to navigate Yemen's political complexities like his father, the "Master Balancer." Reported feuding between the sons of Saleh and Sheikh al-Ahmar raise additional doubts as to whether the current power-sharing arrangement could be extended to the younger generation.
15. (C) Other potential candidates in 2013 could include one of the second generation of al-Ahmars. The most prominent of Sheikh Abdullah's ten sons are Sadiq, the eldest, who has already been anointed to succeed his father as head of Hashid, and Hamid, who as head of the al-Ahmar group runs the family's considerable business empire. Saleh's nephews, Ammar and Yahya, both hold important positions in Yemen's security establishment, but are too junior at the moment to assert themselves and play any independent political role.
------------------
Scenario 3: Coup
------------------
16. (S/NF) A military takeover could only realistically be launched by one of the five Area Commanders. Having himself come to power by coup, Saleh has been extremely careful to select Commanders whose loyalty is ensured by tribal bonds. Members of Saleh,s Sanhan tribe control all military districts and most high security posts, with the commanders enjoying blood and/or close ties to Saleh. The Commanders report directly to the President, outside the normal channels of the Ministry of Defense and without constitutional mandate. (ref C) They are the final authority in nearly every aspect of regional governance. In practice, they behave like tribal sheikhs and super-governors, parceling out new schools, water projects, and money. Despite periodic efforts to integrate military units, the Commanders recruit largely from regional tribes.
17. (C) Brigadier General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, Commander of the Northeastern region, is the most powerful of these military elites. The commander of the Eastern Area is BG Mohammed Ali Mohsen. The Eastern Area includes the governorates of Hadramawt and al-Mahra. Ali Faraj is commander for the Central Area, which includes Al-Jawf, Maarib, al-Bayda, and Shabwa, while the Southern Commander, controlling the Aden, Taiz, Lahaj, al-Dhala and Abyan, is Abd al-Aziz al-Thabet. Finally, BG Awadh bin Fareed commands the Central Area, including the capital Sanaa. With the exception of Ali Mohsen, all of these commands are subject to periodic change or shuffle.
18. (C) Considering the degree of loyalty that Saleh enjoys from his Commanders, it is unlikely they would launch a coup. Sanhan connections permeate the entire military, with 31 of the President's cousins heading army units throughout the country. In the event of Saleh's sudden demise, however, the Area Commanders would be the pool from which tribal leaders would be likely to select their next President.
-------------------------
Scenario 4: Sudden Death
-------------------------
19. (C) According to Yemen's constitution, the Vice President assumes the Presidency if the position becomes vacant and holds office for a maximum of sixty days until elections can be held. In the case of Saleh's death or incapacitation, Sheikh al-Ahmar would likely be a key player in choosing a new leader. By law, all Presidential candidates must be submitted to the Speaker of Parliament, and approved by ten percent of the legislative body. Given the short time frame, this would give al-Ahmar a pivotal role in the selection of potential candidates. The list would likely be negotiated between al-Ahmar, representing the tribes (and Parliament), and the military represented by Ali Mohsen. Citing national unity, Parliament would likely accept a consensus candidate to avoiding a messy electoral contest at a time of such potential crisis and instability.
20. (C) In such a case, the most likely candidate would be one of the Sanhani military commanders. Despite its prominence in the state, Sanhan is a relatively minor tribe in the Hashid Confederation. Nominating a leading figure from the Hashid elite, such as al-Ahmar or one of his sons, would infuriate the larger (but weaker) Bakil Confederation. It would also alarm Southerners, who already believe the state has been heavily infiltrated by tribes. Saleh's relative anonymity within tribal politics, coupled with his willingness to pay the tribes handsomely for their support, was perhaps the main reason for his early success and subsequent longevity. The tribes will look to extend this arrangement by nominating another Sanhani candidate for President.
21. (S/NF) Ali Mohsen himself would be a leading contender, as he would be able to count on the loyal support of the military and the backing of supporters in both the GPC and Islah. Ali Mohsen's questionable dealings with terrorists and extremists, however, would make his accession unwelcome to the U.S. and others in the international community. He is known to have Salafi leanings and to support a more radical Islamic political agenda than Saleh. (ref D) He has powerful Wahabi supporters in Saudi Arabia and has reportedly aided the KSA in establishing Wahabi institutions in northern Yemen. He is also believed to have been behind the formation of the Aden-Abyan Army, and is a close associate of noted arms dealer Faris Manna.
22. (S/NF) Ali Mohsen would likely face domestic as well as international opposition if he sought the Presidency. Mohsen's reputation may have been damaged in some circles by his role in the al-Houthi rebellions. Although ultimately successful in quashing the insurgency, the campaign resulted in hundreds of fatalities, months of clashes, and earned the enmity of the northern tribes and traditional Zaydis. Yemenis generally view him as cynical and self-interested. A major beneficiary of diesel smuggling in recent years, he also appears to have amassed a fortune in the smuggling of arms, food staples, and consumer products. If he holds true to form, Mohsen would likely prefer to play kingmaker, choosing another loyal military officer to hold the Presidency.
---------------------------
Scenario 5: Popular Revolt
---------------------------
23. (C) Widespread discontent with corruption in the ROYG manifested itself in direct hostility towards the President and his clan during recent nationwide riots in protest of the lifting of fuel subsidies. The ROYG has never had a firm grip on tribal regions of the country, but recent developments hint at a greater degree of instability. The fuel demonstrations spread to the tribal regions of Marib and al-Jawf, and resentment there continues to simmer over what the tribes believe is neglect by the ROYG. (ref E) This followed on the heels of two al-Houthi rebellions, which in the latter stages included attacks against ROYG officials in the capital. Contacts in other regions, including Hadramawt, Aden, and Taiz, note their own discontent with ROYG corruption and mismanagement and predict renewed resistance from Southerners.
Discontent is common among Southerners, particularly in Aden, who feel that unity did not produce hoped for economic and political benefits. Instead, they complain that carpetbaggers from the north have stolen all economic opportunities in the south, and that life was better before 1990 unification. In the event of a popular revolt that gets out of hand, a strong military leader like Ali Mohsen is likely to step in to reassert order.
24. (C) The next few years may well bring increased upheaval around the country, especially if economic conditions continue to worsen and the ROYG fails to implement serious anti-corruption measures. (ref F) The Yemeni public, however, lacks the organization, education and motivation at this point in time to topple the Saleh regime. Many Yemenis point out that the daily practice of Qat chewing by most Yemeni men is the major impediment to affecting change through peaceful means. "As long as we care more about chewing Qat than democracy," said one political activist sadly, "we cannot make a difference." Yemenis are used to complaining about the Government, but they also fear widespread instability and believe it more likely to result in regional violence and balkanization than a positive change in regime.
--------------------------
Looking for the Status Quo
--------------------------
25. (C) Comment: President Saleh has been so successful at co-opting or eliminating his competition that few viable alternatives to his leadership exist at the moment. Those figures who exert real influence, specifically Sheikh al-Ahmar and Ali Mohsen, also have powerful enemies and prefer to be kingmakers rather than kings. Saleh's success stems from his personal relationships and a complex network of deals and alliances. Regardless of the scenario, it is certain that the officers and sheikhs who comprise this patronage network would seek a successor who could maintain the status quo. This person would almost certainly be a Sanhani in the mold of Saleh, such as one of the Area Commanders or Ahmed Ali, if he is able to fill his father's shoes. The status quo, however, is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain, given a declining economy, rising frustration over official corruption, and increasing U.S. and international pressures on the regime to change the way it does business. Considering these challenges, it is no wonder that even Saleh's staunchest opponents are in no hurry to name his successor, just yet. End comment. Krajeski
Cable dated:2005-05-23T14:26:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001352
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2015
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, KMCA, KMPI, DOMESTIC POLITICS
SUBJECT: ROYG INSIDERS INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED WITH SALEH CLAN
REF: SANAA 966
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (S/NF) Ambassador met informally with XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that President Saleh is more interested in enriching his family than in making the strategic choices necessary to lead Yemen into the future. XXXXXXXXXXXX was gloomy about President Saleh's ability to understand the importance of the issues of controlling SA/LW and intelligence sharing to U.S.-ROYG cooperation, and said Saleh did not comprehend what was necessary to maintain a close relationship with the USG in the long term. End Summary.
2. (S/NF) Echoing what we are increasingly hearing from those ROYG interlocutors closest to the Embassy, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Saleh is more and more isolated, and less and less responsive to advice from those practical, progressive ROYG insiders XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX moaned that Saleh "listens to no one," and is "unrealistically and stupidly confident" that he will always make the right decisions. Saleh, he said, does not think strategically and cares only about enriching his own family, particularly: XXXXXXXXXXXX Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar Commander of Northern Army (considered the second most powerful man in Yemen); XXXXXXXXXXXX
3. (S/NF) Together with Sheikh Abdullah al Ahmar's clan (speaker of the Parliament and supreme chief the Hashid tribal confederation which includes Saleh's tribe), all of Yemen's wealth is being squandered and stolen by Saleh who is increasingly "greedy and paranoid," especially regarding American intentions, said XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX are making millions working the diesel smuggling and black market along with Ali Mohsen, using military vehicles and NSB and CSF staff to move the fuel to markets in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. XXXXXXXXXXXX
4. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX also said that his contacts in Saada, including a leading sheikh (he would not give his name), are all furious with Saleh over the amount of indiscriminate killing and destruction perpetrated by the regular army in the north during last month's suppression of the al-Houthi rebellion. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that the "Believing Youth" were by far the minority of the fighters in Saada, rather he said, most fighters came from tribes allied together against Saleh and the central government. He said Saleh is "extremely concerned" that he could lose control of the tribes in Saada and that this will spread to the al-Jawf and Ma'rib tribes.
5. (S/NF) "Everyone", according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, has had it with the corruption of Saleh and his family. As an example, XXXXXXXXXXXX cited the outrageous costs of this Sunday's May 22 celebration of the fifteenth Unity Day being held in Mukalla at a cost, claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX, of more than 300 million USD, most of which will go into the pockets of those government officials arranging the show. (Note: The price tag XXXXXXXXXXXX gave likely includes some of the massive development projects in Mukalla and elsewhere that the government is rushing to complete before May 22. End Note.)
6. (S/NF) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX is only one source, and this is not the first time he has given a pessimistic assessment of Saleh and his cronies. XXXXXXXXXXXX. But we are increasingly hearing hints and murmurs from others, including XXXXXXXXXXXX and SXXXXXXXXXXXX (who told Ambassador recently that he "wants out" of politics because the President no longer listens to his advice). Even XXXXXXXXXXXX, who, while most certainly profiting from the corrupt business dealings of XXXXXXXXXXXX and Saleh, claimed that he and a group of young GPC and Islah MP's intend to band together to force the government to control corruption and enact reforms.
7. (S/NF) Comment Continued. We have heard rumors backing up XXXXXXXXXXXX's claim of an opposition candidate in 2006. Saleh is worried about a possible political challenge next year from Islah and the new opposition coalition JMP, or even from within the GPC. We may well see another clamp-down on the press and political parties "for security reasons" that will roll back some or much of the progress made in democratic reforms and human rights just in time for this year's MCC reports. End Comment. Krajeski